diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/65008-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/65008-0.txt | 17332 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 17332 deletions
diff --git a/old/65008-0.txt b/old/65008-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 259a9fc..0000000 --- a/old/65008-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17332 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 -Volume II (of 5), by Lynn Montross - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume II (of 5) - The Inchon-Seoul Operation - -Author: Lynn Montross - Nicholas Canzona - -Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65008] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Hathi - Trust.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME II (OF 5) *** - - - - -[Illustration] - - - - - U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA - - 1950–1953 - - VOLUME II - - _The Inchon-Seoul Operation_ - - by - - LYNN MONTROSS - - and - - CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC - - - [Illustration] - - - Historical Branch, G-3 - Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, - Washington, D. C., 1955 - - - - -Foreword - - -The Inchon Landing was a major amphibious operation, planned in -record time and executed with skill and precision. Even more, it was -an exemplification of the fruits of a bold strategy executed by a -competent force. The decision to attack at Inchon involved weakening -the line against enemy strength in the Pusan Perimeter in order to -strike him in the rear. It involved the conduct of an amphibious attack -under most difficult conditions of weather and geography. - -The stakes were high and the risk was fully justified. Had it not been -for the intervention of the Chinese Communist Army, the offensive -generated by the Inchon attack would have resulted in a complete -victory for our arms in Korea. A study of the record of this operation -will disclose, with arresting clarity, the decisive power that is to -be found in highly trained amphibious forces when their strength is -applied at the critical place and time. - -[Illustration: Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr (signature)] - - LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - _General, U. S. Marine Corps_, - _Commandant of the Marine Corps_. - - - - -Preface - - -This is the second volume of a series dealing with United States Marine -Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. -Volume II presents in detail the operations of the 1st Marine Division -and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, during and -immediately following the Inchon Landing on 15 September 1950. - -In order to tell a complete story of this historic amphibious -operation, the authors have described the mobilization of the Marine -Corps reserves to form the components of the Division and Aircraft -Wing; the movement to the staging area and the hurried planning for an -amphibious landing; the withdrawal of the 1st Provisional Brigade and -Marine Air Group 33 from the embattled Pusan Perimeter to amalgamate -with the larger force for D-day at Inchon; the seizure of Seoul and its -environs, and finally the withdrawal on 7 October to prepare for the -Wonsan operation. - -Again, this is primarily a Marine Corps story. Activities of other -services are presented in sufficient detail only to set this operation -in its proper perspective. - -Grateful acknowledgment is made for the valuable information furnished -by the scores of officers and men consulted by interview or letter and -for the assistance provided by the Current History Branch of the Office -of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. - -Maps included herein were prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine -Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. - -[Illustration: T.A. Wornham (signature)] - - T. A. WORNHAM, - _Major General, U. S. Marine Corps_, - _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3_. - - - - -Contents - - - _Page_ - I The Communist Challenge 1 - - Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on - Inchon Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request - for a Marine Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness-- - Planning for the Pohang Landing - - - II The Minute Men of 1950 17 - - Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of - Marine Corps Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton-- - Embarkation of 1st Marine Division--Build-up of 7th - Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan - - - III Operation Plan CHROMITE 37 - - Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in - Tokyo--Inception of X Corps--Final Conference on - Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine Amphibious - Mission - - - IV The Planning Phase 53 - - Working Around the Clock--X Corps Scheme of Maneuver-- - Intelligence Planning for Inchon--The Landing - Force Plan--Naval Gunfire and Rockets--Plans for Air - Support - - - V Embarkation and Assault 73 - - Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo - Airfield--Shipping Assigned to Marines--Movement to - the Objective Area--Strikes and Bombardments--Marine - Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands - Secured - - - VI Hitting the Beaches 97 - - The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement-- - Seizure of Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs - under Enemy Fire--Fighting on Observatory Hill--1st - Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore - Movement--Seizure of the 0-1 Line - - - VII Securing the Beachhead 125 - - Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on - the Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack - on D-plus 1--Advance to the Force Beachhead Line-- - Displacement Ashore of Division CP - - - VIII On to Kimpo 143 - - Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7 - in Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General - MacArthur Visits the Front--The Drive to Kimpo - Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy Counterattack - at Kimpo - - - IX Marine Air Support 165 - - Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at - Kimpo--Progress of Eighth Army Offensive--Division - CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa-- - Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing - the Han - - - X Crossing the Han 187 - - Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded - in Mud--Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of - General MacArthur--Supporting Arms of Bridgehead-- - Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps - - - XI The Fight For Yongdungpo 205 - - Three Hills Taken by 1/5-Enemy Minefields Encountered-- - NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture - of Hills 80 and 85--1st Marines in Position--Assault - of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a Limb--Yongdungpo - Secured - - - XII Main Line of Resistance 233 - - Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han-- - Attack Continued by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps - Attack--Climax of the Marine Assault--The Epic of Dog - Company--River Crossing of RCT-1 - - - XIII Seoul as a Battlefield 253 - - Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25 - September--Night Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of - Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of Dog Company, - RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the - Heart of Seoul--Objective Secured - - - XIV The Drive to Uijongbu 281 - - Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at - Seoul--Crumbling of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the - Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of Inchon-Seoul - Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report - to United Nations - - - _Appendixes_ - - A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 299 - - B Build-up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf) 303 - - C Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing 305 - - D Supplies and Equipment for Inchon 311 - - E Task Organization, Joint Task Force Seven 313 - - F Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing 321 - - G Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for - the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 323 - - H Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 325 - - I Congratulatory Messages 329 - - J Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 333 - - K Comments on Close Air Support Provided By 1st Marine Aircraft - Wing 335 - - L Presidential Unit Citation 339 - - Bibliography 341 - - Index 347 - - - - -Illustrations - - -_Photographs_ - -Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 68 and 180. - - -_Maps and Sketches_ - - _Page_ - NKPA Gains, 30 June-1 August 1950 29 - - Plan for Inchon Assault 68 - - Movements to the Objective Area 82 - - Seizure of Wolmi-do 89 - - Plan for Inchon Assault 99 - - Seizure of Red Beach 109 - - Seizure of Blue Beach 119 - - Marine Attacks D + 1 137 - - NK Counterattack Ascom City, 17 September 149 - - The Drive to Kimpo 154 - - NK Counterattack Kimpo Air Field, 18 September 162 - - Advance by 1st Marines, 17 September 174 - - Capture of Sosa by 1st Marines, 18 September 179 - - General Situation, 18 September 182 - - Han River Crossing and Seizure of Hill 125 189 - - Action on 19 September 207 - - Action on 20 September 218 - - Assault on Yongdungpo 224 - - Dike Defense--Company A, 1st Marines 230 - - Approaching the Enemy MLR, 5th Marines, 21 September 237 - - Smashing the MLR, 5th Marines, 22–24 September 242 - - Seoul Assault Plan 265 - - The Battle of Seoul 266 - - Action North of Seoul, 7th Marines 269 - - Pursuit of the NKPA and Capture of Uijongbu 288 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -The Communist Challenge - -_Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on Inchon -Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request for a Marine -Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness--Planning for the Pohang Landing_ - - -No spot on earth could have seemed farther removed from war’s alarms -than Yellowstone Park on the tranquil Sunday afternoon of 25 June -1950. Yet it was here that Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., -Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), had his -first news of Communist armed aggression in Korea and the resulting -threat to world peace. - -Appointed to his new command only nine days before, he was motoring -from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico to the West Coast. From -Yellowstone Park he advised Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in -Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, of his readiness to proceed to Hawaii and -the Far East. His offer was accepted, and a Marine plane from El Toro -transported him from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. There he boarded -the first available plane to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the early -morning hours of 2 July.[1] - - [1] FMFPac _Historical Diary, 1–31 Aug 50_. - -On this date, with the Korean conflict only a week old, the armed -forces of the United States were already committed. From the outset -the United Nations had viewed the Red Korean invasion of the Republic -of Korea as a challenge issued to free nations by World Communism. The -so-called North Korean People’s Republic had been set up after World -War II as a Communist puppet state, and the army of invasion was both -trained and armed by Soviet Russia. - -More than half of the troops in the original North Korean People’s Army -(NKPA) were veterans of the victorious Chinese Communist forces in the -Chinese Civil War. Weapons and equipment, all the way from T-34 tanks -to Tokarev pistols, had been made available by the Soviet Union; and -Soviet instructors prepared the invading army for its surprise attack -of 25 June on the Republic of Korea.[2] - - [2] For a more detailed account of the organization of the - NKPA and ROK forces, see v. I of this series, _The Pusan - Perimeter_, ch. II. - -There could have been little doubt as to the outcome. Although the ROK -army included eight divisions and a regiment, estimated at some 98,000 -men in all, it could not compare with the NKPA establishment of about -equal numbers. The difference lay in the purposes for which the two -forces had been organized during the joint Soviet-American occupation -of Korea after World War II. While Red Army officers created the NKPA -as an instrument of aggression, American instructors trained the ROK -troops for frontier defense and internal security. They had neither -tanks nor combat aircraft, and their heaviest artillery consisted of a -few battalions of 105mm howitzers. It was scarcely more than a lightly -armed constabulary which crumpled at the first shock of NKPA columns -led by Soviet-made tanks and supported by Soviet-made bombing planes. -The four ROK divisions deployed along the frontier were routed, and -Seoul fell to the invaders on the third day. - -The reaction of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. On 27 June -the UN Security Council denounced the NKPA attack as a breach of world -peace and called upon member nations to aid the Republic of Korea. The -United States and 52 other nations approved this resolution, which was -opposed only by the Soviet Union and two of its satellites.[3] - - [3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_ - (Washington, 1951). - -As the NKPA tanks entered Seoul, just evacuated by American nationals, -President Truman ordered American air and sea forces in the Far East to -support the shattered ROK army. With the U. S. Seventh Fleet protecting -Formosa, Task Force 77 bombed and bombarded points on the Korean coast. -Far East Air Forces (FEAF), consisting of eight and a half combat -groups commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, -flew interdictory strikes meanwhile from bases in Japan against NKPA -supply lines. - -Within a few days the NKPA air force, consisting of about 100 Yak-type -planes, was driven from the skies except for occasional night raids. -It would appear that a mountainous peninsula of few good roads would -be a favorable area for strategic bombing, since our naval forces were -denying the sea lanes to the enemy. Yet the FEAF bombers could not -prevent the aggressors from bringing up supplies at night by means -of truck, animal, and human transport. The columns of invasion were -doubtless hampered, but they continued to roll on southward in spite of -interdictory strikes. - -General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East -(CinCFE), concluded on 29 June, during his first flying visit to the -front, “that air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that -nothing short of the intervention of U. S. ground forces could give any -assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost -ground.”[4] Unfortunately, he had only the four understrength divisions -of the Eighth U. S. Army at his disposal in the Far East. During the -two World Wars the United States had been able to raise and train -armies while allies held the line. But no such respite was forthcoming -in Korea, and the first U. S. ground forces at the front consisted of a -small task force flown from Japan--an incomplete battalion reinforced -by a battery of artillery. - - [4] Quoted from report of Chief of Staff, FECOM: LtGen Edward - M. Almond (USA). _United Nations Military Operations in - Korea, 29 June 1950–31 December 1951_ (Carlisle Barracks, - 1952), 10–11. (Hereafter, Almond, _UN Mil Ops_.) - -The date was 2 July 1950. And on this same Sunday, CinCFE sent a -request to Washington for the immediate dispatch of a Marine regimental -combat team (RCT) with appropriate air to the Far East. - - -_Authorization of Marine Brigade_ - -It is not quite a coincidence that 2 July happened also to be the date -of General Shepherd’s arrival at Pearl Harbor. Previous decisions in -Washington had made it virtually certain that General MacArthur’s -request would be granted, and CG FMFPac was on his way to the Far East -to prepare for the reception of the Marine reinforcements. - -The first step had been taken on 28 June. General Clifton B. Cates, -Commandant of the Marine Corps, conferred at the Pentagon with Admiral -Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He urged that troops -of the Fleet Marine Force be employed, and CNO promptly informed Vice -Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander of Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), -that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired -it.[5] - - [5] Gen C. B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54. - -CinCFE had hoped that an entire Marine division could be sent to the -Far East. But after being briefed by Admiral Joy as to the limitations -of Marine Corps numbers, he had to content himself with the request for -an RCT. - -Admiral Sherman acted at once. With the approval of JCS and the -President, he ordered Admiral Radford to transport the Marine units -across the Pacific. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade (Reinf.), which was activated on 7 July with three -squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 33 as its air component.[6] - - [6] For the full story of the 1st ProvMarBrig, see _The Pusan - Perimeter_, _op. cit._ - - -_First Conference on Inchon Landing_ - -While General Shepherd stopped for a few days at Pearl Harbor, the -possibility of an Inchon amphibious operation was mentioned officially -for the first time at a conference in Tokyo attended by two Marine -officers. - -On 4 July a party given by the American colony was interrupted by a -message for Brigadier General William S. Fellers, commanding general -of Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, -and Colonel Edward S. Forney, commanding Mobile Training Team Able -of that organization. As specialists in amphibious techniques, they -were summoned along with Army and Air Force officers to a meeting at -Headquarters, FECOM, presided over by General MacArthur’s chief of -staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, USA.[7] - - [7] Col Edward S. Forney _Transcript of Special Report_, n. - d., Part II. - -The Marine officers were in Japan as a result of General MacArthur’s -belief in the efficacy of amphibious tactics. Early in 1950, several -months before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, he had foreseen the -necessity of recovering lost ground by means of a ship-to-shore assault -if an enemy ever won a foothold in the Japanese Islands. His request -for amphibious instructors to train U. S. Army troops in Japan had -found the Navy and Marine Corps ready with units set up for just such a -purpose.[8] - - [8] In the autumn of 1946 a TTU team of 35 Marine officers - and 40 enlisted men had been sent to Yokosuka, Japan, at - MacArthur’s request, to train Army troops in amphibious - techniques. - -The oldest was the TTU organization of the Phib Tra Pac established -originally on 15 August 1943 to prepare Army as well as Navy and Marine -forces for amphibious operations. After making a distinguished record -in World War II, TTU created a permanent place for itself during the -following five years.[9] - - [9] Joint Landing Force Board, Project No. 13-52, Annex - Able, 28–30; see also FMFPac, _Historical Outline of the - Development of FMFPac 1941–1950_ (Preliminary), 15–16 - (hereafter, FMFPac _History_); and Maj Gen W. S. Fellers - memo to authors, 16 Feb. 55. - -A group of TTU officers and enlisted men under the command of Colonel -Forney made up Mobile Training Team Able in the spring of 1950. Sailing -from San Diego in April, these Marines were accompanied by a second -group of amphibious specialists, the ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire -Liaison Company) instruction team commanded by Lieutenant Edward B. -Williams, USN.[10] - - [10] Capt E. P. Stamford interv with HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 51. - -The ANGLICOs, composed of both Navy and Marine Corps personnel, evolved -in 1949 to assist Army units lacking the forward air control and naval -gunfire control units which are integral in Marine divisions. Growing -out of the responsibility of the Marine Corps for the development -of those phases of landing force operations pertaining to tactics, -techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces, the first company -was formed in answer to the request of Lieutenant General Mark W. -Clark, USA, for a unit capable of giving an Army division this sort of -amphibious fire support. After taking part in the MIKI exercises with -the Sixth Army in Hawaii during the autumn of 1949, this ANGLICO split -up into instruction teams assigned to various Army units.[11] - - [11] _Ibid._ The amphibious functions of the Marine Corps, as - outlined by National Security Act of 1947 and the Key - West Conference of 1948, are discussed in the following - chapter. - -Training Team Able and Lieutenant Williams’ ANGLICO team reached Japan -just in time to cooperate with a third organization of amphibious -specialists, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s Amphibious Group (PhibGru) -One of the Pacific Fleet. The three teams were given a mission of -training one regiment from each of the four Eighth Army divisions in -Japan. But the instruction program had only been launched when it was -interrupted by the Korean conflict. - -PhibGru One and the ANGLICO team were immediately assigned to new -duties in connection with the sea lift of Eighth Army troops to Korea. -They had just begun this task when orders came for Admiral Doyle and -his staff, in the USS _Mount McKinley_ at Sasebo, to proceed by air on -4 July to the conference at Tokyo.[12] There at FECOM Headquarters, -they met General Fellers, Colonel Forney, and the Army officers who had -been summoned from the Independence Day celebration of the American -colony. - - [12] ComPhibGru-1 (CTF 90), “Rpt of Ops for 25 Jun 50 to 1 - Jan 51,” in CinCPacFlt. _Interim Evaluation Report No. - 1_, v. XV, Annex Able Able. (Hereafter, PacFlt _Interim - Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able. For detailed description and - location of major reports, see the bibliography.) - -At the conference it was made plain that the concept of an Inchon -landing had originated with General MacArthur. Even at this early -date, he envisioned not only a ship-to-shore assault on some east or -west coast seaport, preferably Inchon, but also a drive inland to cut -enemy communications and envelop Seoul. The Joint Strategic Plans and -Operations Group (JSPOG) headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, -U. S. A. (FECOM G-3) was then drawing up the outline of such an -amphibious attack plan. Code-named Operation BLUEHEARTS, it called for -a landing in the Inchon area by a Marine RCT and an Army assault force -in coordination with a frontal attack from the south by the 24th and -25th Divisions. Inchon had been designated the objective area for the -amphibious assault, and the date would depend upon the availability of -troops for the combined operation.[13] - - [13] LtGen Edward M. Almond (USA, Ret.) ltr to authors, 10 - Feb 55; Col Edward S. Forney interv, 7 Dec 54. (Unless - otherwise noted, all interviews were conducted by the - authors of this work.) - -It would be an understatement to say that the naval and Marine officers -were impressed by the boldness of MacArthur’s thinking. At a time when -he could send only a battalion-size force to the aid of the shattered -ROK army, his mind had soared over obstacles and deficiencies to the -concept of an amphibious operation designed to end the war at a stroke. - -It was an idea that fired the imagination. But the amphibious -specialists of TTU and PhibGru One had been trained to view the risks -with a realistic appraisal. Their admiration was tempered by caution, -therefore, when they took into account the difficulties.[14] - - [14] Forney interv, 7 Dec 54. - -The end of World War II had found the United States at a peak of -military strength never before attained in the Nation’s history. -Then, within a year, the popular clamor for the immediate discharge -of citizen-soldiers had left the Army with scarcely enough troops for -the occupation of strategic areas in the Far East. It took vigorous -recruiting to fill the ranks in time of peace, and on 25 June 1950 the -U. S. Eighth Army in Japan included the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry -Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division. Infantry regiments -were limited to two battalions. - -In the lack of trained amphibious assault troops, a definite decision -could not be reached at the conference of 4 July. But it was proposed -by FECOM officers that Major General Hobart H. Gay’s 1st Cavalry -Division be employed as the Army assault force of the proposed Inchon -operation. PhibGru One and Training Team Able were to give the troops -all possible amphibious training, and Colonel Forney was assigned on 5 -July as the G-5 (Plans) of the division.[15] - - [15] _Ibid._ - - -_General Shepherd in Tokyo_ - -The activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July freed -General Shepherd to continue his trip to the Far East. That evening, -accompanied by his G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, he took off from the -Pearl Harbor area on the flight to Tokyo. - -Upon his arrival, CG FMFPac was acquainted by General Almond with the -deteriorating military situation. As a first step toward sending U. S. -ground forces to Korea, CinCFE had set up the GHQ Advanced Command -Group under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA. -After beginning the reorganization of the ROK forces, it was absorbed -on 3 July by Headquarters, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea. And with the -establishment next day of the Pusan Logistical Command (Brigadier -General Crump Garvin, USA), a start was made toward handling the -mountains of supplies which would be required.[16] - - [16] USMA, Dept of Mil Art and Engr, _Operations in Korea_ - (West Point, 1953). - -On 4 July the initial contact of U. S. ground forces with the enemy -took place near Osan. The little task force from Major General William -F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division could not attempt anything more -ambitious than delaying actions. But preparations were afoot to send -the rest of the division to Korea as soon as possible, to be followed -by Major General William B. Kean’s 25th Infantry Division. - -The first fire fights occurred on 5 and 6 July in the vicinity of Osan. -It was evident at once that the enemy held a great superiority in arms -and equipment. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, who had been -one of Patton’s favorite subordinates, commented after his first visit -to the Korean front that the NKPA units appeared equal to the Germans -who were his adversaries in World War II.[17] - - [17] CG FMFPac _Report of Liaison Visit to the Far East_, - 10–11 Jul 50. - -Accounts of the early actions in Korea were depressing to FECOM -officers.[18] Many plausible excuses may be found for men snatched -from occupation duties and rushed piecemeal into action against great -material odds. The nation as a whole must share the blame when willing -troops are sent to the firing line without adequate preparation, -as were the first U. S. units. Eighth Army officers had done their -best under the circumstances, but a scarcity of maneuver areas in -Japan had restricted training exercises to the battalion and company -levels. Divisions with barely 70 percent of their full complement of -troops were armed with worn World War II weapons, some of which proved -unserviceable for lack of spare parts and maintenance personnel. -Division tank units, equipped with light M-24 tanks because of poor -roads and bridges in Japan, operated at a handicap against the enemy’s -new Soviet T-34 tanks; and American 2.36-inch rocket launchers knocked -out NKPA armor only at fairly close ranges.[19] - - [18] Several of these encounters are realistically described - from first-hand interviews in a study sponsored by the - Chief of Military History, USA: Capt R. A. Gugeler, - _Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 3–19. - - [19] USMA, _op. cit._, 7–8. - -At this stage the ground forces were particularly dependent upon air -support because of shortages of artillery. But since the mission of the -Air Force in Japan had been primarily of a defensive nature, neither -the organization nor equipment was available for effective air-ground -cooperation on the tactical level. As a consequence, FEAF units had to -confine their tactical efforts largely to targets of opportunity, and -24th Infantry units had to do without such support when it was most -needed.[20] - - [20] _Ibid._ - -Altogether, the so-called “police action” in Korea proved to be one of -the toughest assignments ever given to American soldiers. - - -_Request for a Marine Division_ - -General Shepherd’s few days in Tokyo were filled with conferences, and -history was made on 10 July during the course of a conversation with -General MacArthur at FECOM Headquarters. - -The commander in chief was not optimistic about the situation at the -front. Not only had the NKPA invasion developed into a formidable -threat at the end of the first two weeks, but the possibility of Red -Chinese or Soviet armed intervention could not be dismissed. - -President Truman had named General MacArthur as supreme commander of UN -forces after the Security Council passed a resolution on 7 July calling -for a unified effort in Korea. General Walker was soon to be appointed -to the command of the Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), assuming control of -all ROK ground forces. - -The personnel situation had grown critical. After being completely -routed, the ROK troops were now in process of reorganization into five -divisions. Meanwhile, the U. S. 25th Infantry Division was being sent -to Korea as rapidly as possible; and it had been decided to withdraw -the 1st Cavalry Division from consideration as the landing force of -the proposed Inchon operation. Not only were these troops lacking in -amphibious training, but they were needed as infantry reinforcements. -Thus it was planned for the combat-loaded 1st Cavalry Division to make -a landing at the East Coast port of Pohang-dong, under the direction of -ComPhibGru One and Mobile Training Team Able, before proceeding to the -front. This would leave only the 7th Infantry Division in Japan, and it -was being stripped of troops to fill out units of the other three. - -The outweighed UN forces were still limited to delaying actions. But -General MacArthur hoped that space could be traded for time until -the arrival of stateside units enabled him to take the offensive. At -his urgent request, the 2d Infantry Division and 2d Engineer Special -Brigade had been alerted in the United States for immediate movement to -the Far East. Port dates commencing on 20 July had been assigned, and -General Wright expressed his opinion that these units might be employed -along with the recently activated 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to -initiate the first UN counterstroke.[21] - - [21] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50. - -The only hope of an early UN decision, General MacArthur told CG FMFPac -at their conference of 10 July, lay in the launching of an amphibious -assault to cut supply lines in the enemy’s rear. This situation, -he added, reminded him of the critical days of World War II in the -Pacific, when troops trained in amphibious techniques were urgently -needed to make ship-to-shore landings on Japanese-held islands. - -In a reminiscent mood, MacArthur recalled the competence shown by the -1st Marine Division while under his control during the New Britain -operation of 1943–1944. If only he had this unit in Japan, he said, he -would employ it at his first opportunity as his landing force for the -Inchon assault. - -Shepherd, who had been assistant division commander of the 1st Marine -Division during the New Britain landings, immediately suggested that -the UN supreme commander make a request that the 1st Marine Division -with appropriate Marine air be assigned to him. This possibility had -apparently been put aside by MacArthur after being limited to an RCT in -his request of 2 July. He asked eagerly if the Marine general believed -that the division could be made available for an Inchon landing as -early as 15 September. And Shepherd replied that since the unit was -under his command, he would take the responsibility for stating that it -could be sent to Korea by that date, minus the infantry regiment and -other troops of the Brigade.[22] - - [22] USMC, MarCorps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence - of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_ - (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), v. I, I-B-1. (Hereafter, MarCorps - Board _Study_.) - -Thus was history made without pomp or ceremony during the conference at -FECOM Headquarters. - -The date was 10 July, but it was already D-minus 67 for thousands of -American young men. On farms and in offices, in cities and villages -from coast to coast, these civilians had no inkling that just 67 days -later they would be fighting their way ashore in a major amphibious -operation. For they were Marine reservists, and the 1st Marine Division -could not be brought up to full strength without calling them back into -uniform. - -Shepherd realized, even while assuring MacArthur that the division -could be made combat-ready by 15 September, that the activation of -the Brigade had left the division with less than the strength of a -single RCT. Nearly as many men would be required to bring it up to -full strength as were contained at present in the entire Fleet Marine -Force.[23] But so great was his confidence in the Marine Corps Reserve -that he did not hesitate to take the responsibility. - - [23] For statistics on Reserve mobilization, see Ernest H. - Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve - in the Korean Conflict_. (HistBr, G-3 HQMC, 1952). - (Hereafter, Giusti.) - -Nor did MacArthur lose any time at making up his mind. That very day, -10 July, he sent his first request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a -Marine division. - -As the conference ended, Shepherd found the UN supreme commander -“enthusiastic” about the prospect of employing again the Marine outfit -that had been his reliance seven years before in the New Britain -operation. He planned to stabilize the front in Korea as soon as -possible, he said, as a prelude to the landing in the NKPA rear which -he believed would be decisive.[24] - - [24] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50. - - -_America’s Force-in-Readiness_ - -Long before the New Britain landing, Cates and Shepherd had learned -from first-hand experience as junior officers how decisive a -force-in-readiness can be. The lieutenant from Tennessee and the -lieutenant from Virginia took part in June 1918 with the Marines who -stopped the Germans by counterattacking at Belleau Wood. In terms of -human tonnage, two Marine regiments did not cut much of a figure in the -American Expeditionary Force. What counted was the _readiness_ of the -Marines and a few outfits of U. S. Army regulars at a time when most of -the American divisions had not yet finished training. - -More than three decades later, as CMC and CG FMFPac, both Marine -generals were firm advocates of the force-in-readiness concept as -a basic mission of the Marine Corps. It was a mission that had -evolved from practice rather than theory. During the half century -since the Spanish-American War, there had been only two years when -U. S. Marines were not on combat duty somewhere. It had long been a -tradition that the Marines, as transitory naval forces, might land on -foreign soil without the implication of hostilities usually associated -with invasion. This principle was invoked, along with a liberal -interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, by the State Department from -1906 to 1932 in the Caribbean and Central America. As a means of -supervising unstable governments in sensitive strategic areas, Marines -were sent to Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, -and China for long periods of occupation.[25] - - [25] For a detailed discussion of this subject, see US Dept - of State, Office of the Solicitor, _Right to Protect - Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces_, 3d - rev. ed. with sup. app. to 1933 (Washington, 1934). - (State Dept Pub. No. 538.) - -U. S. Marines were not only web-footed infantry during these overseas -operations; they also distinguished themselves as scouts, cannoneers, -constabulary, engineers, and horse marines. As modern warfare grew more -complex, however, the time came when the Leathernecks could no longer -sail on a few hours’ notice as a “gangplank expeditionary force” made -up of men detailed from the nearest posts and stations. No longer could -such light weapons as machine guns, mortars, and mountain howitzers -serve as the only armament necessary for seizing a beachhead. - -The Fleet Marine Force evolved in 1933, therefore, to fill the need for -a corps of highly-trained amphibious specialists capable of carrying -out a major ship-to-shore assault against modern defensive weapons. -New landing craft as well as new landing tactics and techniques were -developed during the next ten years, and the reputation of the Marine -Corps as a force-in-readiness was upheld in the amphibious operations -of World War II. - -During these three eventful decades of Marine development, General -Cates and General Shepherd had participated in all the stages while -ascending the ladder of command. Thus in the summer of 1950, they were -eminently qualified for leadership in the task of building the 1st -Marine Division up to war strength for the amphibious operation which -General MacArthur hoped to launch on 15 September. - -As a prerequisite, the sanction of Congress and authorization of the -President had to be obtained before the Marine Corps Reserve could be -mobilized. General MacArthur’s request of 10 July for a Marine division -went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred it to General Cates. -The Commandant could only reply that it would be necessary to call out -the Reserve, and no action was taken on this first request. It was -enough that a beginning had been made, and CMC put his staff to work on -the necessary studies and plans. - -General Shepherd was meanwhile winding up his visit to Tokyo by -conferring with Admirals Joy and Doyle and Generals Almond and -Stratemeyer. The Air Force general tentatively confirmed (subject to -discussion with his staff) the assignment of Itami Airfield in Japan -to Marine air units. He also informed CG FMFPac that he accepted as -valid the principle of employing Marine air in support of Marine ground -forces.[26] - - [26] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50. - -The air situation in Korea had struck General Shepherd as abounding -in paradoxes. He noted that “B-29’s are employed against tactical -targets to the dissatisfaction of all concerned--the Air Force because -of misemployment of its planes, and the ground forces because of the -results achieved. Carrier aircraft, despite the wealth of close support -targets available, were committed against deep and semi-strategic -targets. Jet fighters, with little enemy air to engage, have been -assigned to close support work despite a fuel restriction which holds -them to no more than 15 minutes in the combat zone. Only a very limited -number of aircraft adaptable to tactical support missions are available -(F-51 and B-26) and there appears to be urgent need for suitable close -support aircraft along with competent air-ground liaison units.”[27] - - [27] _Ibid._ - -These conclusions had much to do with a Marine policy, dating back -to World War II, of insisting whenever possible on Marine close air -support for Marine ground forces. Without disparaging other techniques, -Marines believed that their own fliers, trained in Marine infantry -methods, could provide the most effective tactical air for Marine -infantry. - - -_Planning for the Pohang Landing_ - -While General Shepherd was flying back to Pearl Harbor, a succession -of sleepless nights awaited the officers of PhibGru One, the ANGLICO -group, and Training Team Able. Upon the shoulders of these amphibious -specialists fell the task of drawing up the orders, planning the -loading, and mounting out the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division for -its landing of 18 July at Pohang-dong. - -It was not even certain, when the division commenced loading at -Yokohama on 14 July, that Pohang-dong could be held by the ROKs long -enough for a landing to be effected. Three reinforced NKPA divisions -were making the enemy’s main thrust down the Seoul-Taejon axis. They -were opposed only by weary 24th Infantry Division units fighting -delaying actions while falling back on Taejon and the line of the river -Kum. Along the east coast and the mountains of the central sector, -five regrouped and reorganized ROK divisions held as best they could. -Two of these units in the center were being relieved by the U. S. 25th -Infantry Division, which completed its movement to Korea on the 14th. - -As a preliminary step in the Pohang landing, a reconnaissance party of -Army, Navy, and Marine officers flew from Tokyo on 11 July into the -objective area. They returned two days later with valuable information -about the beaches, depths of water, and unloading facilities. - -“Because of the extraordinary speed with which the landing at -Pohang-dong was conceived, planned, and executed,” said the report of -ComPhibGru One, “there was no opportunity for conventional and orderly -planning.... Since all echelons of the planning force were installed -in offices at GHQ in Tokyo, it was possible to employ the quickest -and most informal ways of doing business. Telephone conversations and -oral directives were used in place of dispatches, letters, and formal -orders.”[28] - - [28] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able. - -Lack of amphibious shipping in the area made it a Herculean labor to -provide boat servicing gear, general securing gear, debarkation nets, -towing bridles, and boat and vehicle slings in less than a week. By 14 -July, however, enough shipping to move the four embarkation groups of -the division had been assembled at Yokohama--two MSTS transports, two -AKAs, six LSUs, and 16 LSTs in addition to LCVPs and LCMs. - -The transport group and screen got under way on the 15th for a -rendezvous near the objective area on D-day with the tractor group. -Naval aircraft of Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins’ carrier group of the -Seventh Fleet were on call to provide support; but at 0558 on the -18th, the armada was unopposed as it steamed into Yongil Bay. CTF 90 -signaled orders for the carrying out of Plan Baker, calling for a -landing against little or no enemy resistance. By midnight the _Mount -McKinley_, _Union_, _Oglethorpe_, and _Titania_ had been completely -unloaded, and the LSTs had accounted for 60 per cent of their cargoes. -Altogether, 10,027 troops, 2,022 vehicles, and 2,729 tons of bulk cargo -were put ashore on D-day. - -The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese -freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships -discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by -Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported -that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at -the objective.[29] - - [29] _Ibid._ - -Viewed superficially, the uncontested Pohang landing may have seemed -a tame affair to stateside newspaper readers. Nevertheless, it was -a timely demonstration of Navy and Marine Corps amphibious know-how -and Army energy, and it came at a critical moment. The important -communications center of Taejon had to be abandoned by 24th Infantry -Division units on 20 July, and it was growing apparent that the -Eighth Army would be hard-pressed to retain a foothold in Korea until -reinforcements from the States could give the United Nations a material -equality. It was a time when every platoon counted, and the fresh -regiments of General Gay’s division were rushed to the Yongdong area -two days after their landing to relieve weary and battered elements of -the 24th Infantry Division. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -The Minute Men of 1950 - -_Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of Marine Corps -Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton--Embarkation of 1st Marine -Division--Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan_ - - -On 18 July 1950, it was D-minus 59 for the Marine reservists who would -hit the beaches at Inchon. These young civilians were doubtless more -interested in major league baseball standings at the moment than in -hydrographic conditions at the Korean seaport they would assault within -two months. Yet the proposed amphibious operation moved a long step -closer to reality on the 18th when Major General Oliver P. Smith left -Washington under orders to assume command of the 1st Marine Division at -Camp Pendleton, California. - -A graduate of the University of California in 1916, General Smith had -been commissioned a Marine second lieutenant at the age of 24 in the -first World War. After serving in Guam during that conflict, he saw -duty at sea and in Haiti during the early 1920’s, followed by studies -at the Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and duty as an -instructor in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. - -In Paris, while attached administratively to the office of the U. S. -Naval Attaché, he took the full two-year course at the École Supérieure -de Guerre, and afterwards he was an instructor for three more years at -the Marine Corps Schools. He had an extensive experience of hard-fought -amphibious operations during World War II as a regimental commander in -the Talasea, New Britain, landing, as ADC of the 1st Marine Division -at Peleliu, and as deputy chief of staff of the U. S. Tenth Army on -Okinawa. Returning with the rank of brigadier, he became Commandant of -the Marine Corps Schools; and after putting up a second star, the tall, -slender, white-haired general served as Assistant Commandant at Marine -Corps Headquarters in Washington. - -At the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Major General Graves B. Erskine -had commanded the 1st Marine Division. Following his assignment to a -secret State Department mission in southeast Asia, General Smith was -named as his relief. - -The division had meanwhile been reduced to 3,386 officers and men as -compared to a strength of 7,789 on 30 June 1950. It had been stripped -of its principal operating elements to build up the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade, which numbered about 5,000 officers and men when it -sailed from San Diego to the Far East on 14 July under the command of -Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.[30] - - [30] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra. Estimate of - Brigade numbers will be found to vary according to - different stages of the build-up. - -At El Toro, the near-by Marine Corps Air Station, it was the same -story. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a total strength of 4,004 -officers and men on 30 June, provided most of the 1,548 officers and -men of Marine Aircraft Group 33, the air component of the Brigade, -commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, who was also deputy -Brigade commander.[31] - - [31] _Ibid._; see also XV: Charlie Charlie. - - -_Expansion to Full Peace Strength_ - -General Smith had known before his arrival at Pendleton that his first -task would be the building up of the 1st Marine Division to full -peace strength. As early as 12 July, a dispatch from CNO had warned -CinCPacFlt that this expansion would take place, including the elements -of the Brigade.[32] And on 15 July General Shepherd directed Brigadier -General Harry B. Liversedge, temporary CG 1st Marine Division, to -extend the work day and work week while intensifying training and -making preparations to expand.[33] - - [32] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 12 Jul 50. - - [33] CG FMFPac disp to CG 1st MarDiv, 14 July 50. - -The 15th was also the date of General MacArthur’s second request for -a war-strength Marine division with its own air for employment in -his proposed Inchon amphibious assault. General Shepherd advised CMC -that same day as to the composition of cadres to facilitate the rapid -expansion of the 1st Marine Division.[34] - - [34] CG FMFPac disp to CMC, 15 Jul 50; CG FMFPac ltr to CMC, - 16 Jul 50. - -Already it was becoming apparent that this build-up would allow little -time for training. Fortunate it was, therefore, that the Division and -the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had participated in an intensive training -program during recent months. Following are the principal exercises: - - Oct 1949 Air lift field exercise involving movement of a - reinforced battalion and air command to San Nicholas - Island, Calif. One Marine aircraft group carrier-embarked - for participation in Operation MIKI with Sixth Army in - Hawaii. - - Nov 1949 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment and - supporting aircraft. - - Dec 1949 Combined field exercise--a simulated amphibious - assault extending over a period of seven days--involving - all principal elements of the Division and Wing. - - Jan 1950 Participation by elements of Division in Operation - MICOWEX 50, stressing the use of the transport submarine - and helicopter in amphibious operations. - - Feb 1950 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment with - supporting air. - - Mar 1950 Land plane and seaplane air-lift exercise involving - seizure of San Nicholas Island by a reinforced battalion - and a Marine air command. - - May 1950 Participation by a majority of Division and Wing - elements in DEMON III, an amphibious demonstration for - students of Command and General Staff College, Fort - Leavenworth. Participation by Wing in two-week major - advanced base field exercise, with intensive training in - close support. - - Jun 1950 Continuation of training in lesser air-ground - problems, field exercises and command post exercises.[35] - - [35] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 3–5. - -Counterparts of nearly all of these exercises might have been found in -the training program for the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft -Wing on the North Carolina coast. Operation CAMID at Little Creek, Va., -was similar to DEMON III. All principal FMFLant elements participated -in Operation CROSSOVER at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in the spring -of 1950, and a Marine aircraft group was embarked aboard a carrier in -the Mediterranean. Other elements of the Wing took part in PORTREX, -an Army-Navy amphibious exercise in the Caribbean, and in SWARMER, an -Army-Air Force airborne exercise in North Carolina. Units of both the -Division and the Wing were represented in the annual Amphibious Command -Post Exercise at Lejeune; and throughout the winter and spring a -succession of smaller ground, air, and air-ground exercises emphasized -close support and amphibious landings. - -Posts and stations were meanwhile conducting annual weapons -qualification firing tests and individual training as required by USMC -General Order No. 10. This program was designed to maintain the basic -military proficiency of men not serving with the Fleet Marine Force. It -is significant, however, that a large proportion of them had reported -to such duty directly from FMF units, in accordance with the rotation -policy. - -The program for the Organized Reserve included both armory and active -duty summer training. Air and ground units of reservists were “adopted” -during their summer training by similar units of the Fleet Marine -Force, which supervised the exercises and provided instructors. By the -summer of 1950, a large proportion of the reservists had progressed -beyond basic training into advanced individual and unit training, so -that they could be classed as “nearly combat ready” at the time of the -1st Marine Division expansion.[36] - - [36] _Ibid._ - - -_Mobilization of Marine Corps Reserve_ - -Shortcomings in quantity rather than quality of Marine personnel made -expansion a problem on 19 July 1950, when General MacArthur sent his -third request to the Pentagon for a Marine division with appropriate -air. Again the Joint Chiefs referred the matter to General Cates, who -was prepared with two plans worked out in detail by his staff--Plan -ABLE, providing third rifle companies and replacements for the Brigade; -and Plan BAKER, designed to bring the 1st Marine Division up to full -war strength by calling reservists to active duty. - -These plans were based on the personnel statistics of 30 June 1950. The -grand total of 74,279 Marines on active duty at that time (97 per cent -of authorized strength) was distributed as follows: - - _Operating Forces_--engaged directly in carrying out assigned - missions and tasks 40,364 - - _Supporting Establishment_--comprising trained administrative - and supply personnel 24,552 - - _Special Assignment_--including all personnel serving with - organizations outside the regular establishment 3,871 - - _Non-Available_--made up of personnel hospitalized, confined, - or en route 5,492 - ------- - Total 74,279 - -A breakdown of the Operating Forces reveals that the Fleet Marine Force -numbered 27,703 men, the security detachments included 11,087, and -1,574 Marines were afloat. Of the 11,853 in FMFPac, 7,779 were in the -1st Marine Division, and 3,733 in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The -15,803 Marines in FMFLant included 8,973 in the 2d Marine Division and -5,297 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.[37] - - [37] Giusti, I-2. - -These figures make it evident that the 1st Marine Division could not be -brought up to war strength of about 25,000 troops without drawing upon -the 33,527 (77 per cent of authorized strength) in the ground forces -of the Organized Reserve, and the 6,341 (94 per cent of authorized -strength) in the aviation forces. The ground personnel were distributed -among these units: - -Twenty-one infantry battalions; 16 rifle companies; seven 105mm -howitzer battalions; five 155mm howitzer battalions; one 155mm gun -battalion; two 40mm gun batteries; two tank battalions; three amphibian -tractor battalions; one amphibian truck company; one signal company -(supplementary); six signal companies; one engineer battalion; 15 -women’s reserve platoons. - -Aviation units consisted of 30 Marine fighter squadrons (VMF) and 12 -Marine ground control intercept squadrons (MGCI). - -The Organized Reserve was exceeded as a reservoir of potential man -power by the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, which had a total of -90,044 men and women on 30 June 1950. This total included 2,267 -volunteer reservists on continuous active duty with the regular -establishment, about 5,000 training in some 200 volunteer training -units, and 1316 in the Fleet Reserve. - -Altogether, the strength of all Marine reserve components (less -volunteer reservists on active duty) amounted to a total of 128,959, or -nearly double the number of Marines in the regular establishment.[38] - - [38] _Ibid._, 1–5, 6. - -Behind every Marine regular, figuratively speaking, stood two -reservists who were ready to step forward and fill the gaps in the -ranks. Thus it was scarcely far-fetched when some inspired public -information officer coined the phrase “Minute Men of 1950” for these -recent civilians who made it possible for the 1st Marine Division to -hit the beaches at Inchon. - -Events moved swiftly on 19 July. Only a few hours after the receipt of -CinCFE’s third request, the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve -was authorized by President Truman with the sanction of Congress. -Headquarters Marine Corps, on the hill overlooking the Pentagon, was -ablaze with lights that summer night; and decisions were made which -enabled four important steps to be taken next day: - - (1) a warning to Reserve District directors that the Organized - Reserve would soon be ordered to active duty; - - (2) notification to commanding generals to expect some 21,000 - Organized Reservists shortly at Marine Barracks, Camp - Pendleton, and about 5,800 at Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune; - - (3) orders issued by CMC, with the approval of CNO, to - discontinue the practice of discharging reservists at their - own request; - - (4) the first reservists--22 units with a total strength of 4,830 - men--ordered to active duty with a delay of ten days.[39] - - [39] _Ibid._, II-2. - -The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not convinced that a Marine force -could be embarked to meet General MacArthur’s deadline of 10 September -without stripping FMFLant units to a dangerous extent. On the advice of -Admiral Sherman, they informed CinCFE on 20 July that a Marine division -could not be sent before November or even December. - -General Shepherd had a great deal to do with shaping the ultimate -decision. On the 20th, when CNO conferred with Admiral Radford on the -question of a Marine division, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in -his turn asked the opinion of the Marine general. General Shepherd -replied that a Marine amphibious striking force could be raised for the -proposed Inchon landing without seriously weakening the Fleet Marine -Force as a whole. This striking force, he predicted, would prove to be -“the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our -arms.”[40] - - [40] CG FMFPac memo to CinCPacFlt, 20 Jul 50. - -The Marine general’s statement was one of the main factors in causing -the Joint Chiefs to advise MacArthur on the 22d that they were -reconsidering their stand. During the next 48 hours, as dispatches sped -back and forth across the Pacific, a compromise was reached. CinCFE was -promised his Marine division in time for his target date--but it was to -be a division minus one RCT. In other words, the infantry regiment of -the Brigade would be supplemented by another RCT and supporting troops -with appropriate Marine air. But the Joint Chiefs were adamant in their -decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his -third RCT. - -These preliminaries cleared the way so that General MacArthur’s request -was finally approved by JCS on 25 July, the day when General Smith took -over command of the 1st Marine Division. The Marine Corps was directed -to build the division (less one RCT) up to full war strength, and a -date of departure of 10–15 August for the Far East was set. - -A 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within the continental -limits of the United States was authorized by CNO on that same date. -This meant that an additional 3,630 regulars would be enabled to report -for service with the 1st Marine Division. - -On the morning of the 26th a courier from Washington arrived at Camp -Pendleton with a communication for General Smith indicating that -the expanded 1st Marine Division would be composed of four types of -personnel: (1) Brigade units, to be combined with the Division upon -arrival in the Far East; (2) units of the 2d Marine Division, to be -ordered to Camp Pendleton to augment elements of the 1st; (3) regular -personnel to be called in from posts and stations; and (4) final -deficiencies to be filled by men from the Marine Corps Reserve who met -minimum combat experience requirements.[41] - - [41] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the - 1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the - Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), 3–4. (Hereafter, O. P. - Smith, _Notes_.) Among the most valuable sources of the - present book are the _Chronicle of the Operations of the - 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the - Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, O. P. Smith, - _Chronicle_), and _Notes_ prepared in typescript by the - commanding general of the division. The _Chronicle_ is - a day-by-day account of planning, command decisions, - and resulting events, while the _Notes_ are an - analytical review of the relative facts, statistics, - and directives. Combining accuracy with a keen sense of - historical values, the Marine general by his knowledge - of shorthand was able to keep a fairly complete record - in the field which he later checked with official - reports. - -Congress passed legislation on 27 July authorizing the President to -extend for one year all enlistments in the armed forces, both regular -and reserve, which were due to expire before 9 July 1951. This gave the -assurance of a stable body of troops. - -On the 31st, with the first reservists arriving at Camp Pendleton and -the first contingents leaving Camp Lejeune for the West Coast, the -Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CNO to expand the 2d Marine Division -to war strength while increasing the number of Marine tactical air -squadrons from 16 to 18.[42] Obviously, the 1st and 2d Divisions could -not be built up simultaneously without serious delays, and priority -must be given to the 1st. It was equally obvious, moreover, that this -expansion must be largely accomplished during the first week of August -if the troops were to be made ready for embarkation between the 10th -and 15th. - - [42] Giusti, II-2. - - -_The Influx at Camp Pendleton_ - -The first build-up troops to reach Camp Pendleton were three Organized -Reserve units which arrived on 31 July--the 13th Infantry Company, of -Los Angeles; the 12th Amphibian Tractor Company, of San Francisco; and -the 3d Engineer Company, of Phoenix, Arizona. This was the beginning of -an inundation which kept the camp keyed to a 24-hour day and a 7-day -week. A torrent of troops poured into the vast military reservation -by bus, train, and plane at all hours of the day and night. Confusion -seemed to reign from the tawny California hills to the blue Pacific; -and yet this seeming chaos was under the control of veteran officers -and NCOs who had mounted out before. Accommodations for the newcomers -were not de luxe, but men were being processed, assigned, fed, and -equipped as rapidly as they arrived. The tramp of feet could be heard -all night long as details of troops drew clothing and equipment or -reported for medical examinations. - -A total of 13,703 Marines reached Camp Pendleton during this busy week. -Counting the personnel already on hand, troops of four categories were -represented: - - Officers and men remaining in 1st Marine Division at Camp - Pendleton after dispatch of the Brigade 3,459 - - Officers and men reporting from posts and stations up to - 4 August 3,630 - - Officers and men reporting from the 2d Marine Division from - 3 to 6 August 7,182 - - Officers and men selected as combat-ready out of the total of - about 10,000 reservists reporting by 7 August 2,891 - ------ - Total 17,162 - -The expansion took place in two phases. First, of course, came the -bringing of the 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) up to war strength, -including augmentation personnel and supplies for the units of the -Brigade. Next, the organization of a third reinforced infantry -regiment, the 7th Marines, was directed by a letter from CMC to CG 1st -Marine Division on 4 August.[43] - - [43] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 5–6. - -Headquarters Marine Corps naturally foresaw the necessity for -replacement and rotation troops. The importance of the Reserve in this -long-range expansion program may be seen by glancing ahead at the -statistics of the next few months. Units of these recent civilians -continued to report at such a rate that by 11 September 1950 the -Organized Reserve (Ground) had in effect ceased to exist! In other -words, all acceptable personnel had already reported for active duty, -and the total of 33,528 officers and men represented a 90.02 percentage -of availability. - -The record of the Volunteer Reserve proved to be equally good after it -was ordered to active duty on 15 August 1950. During the next seven and -a half months, down to 31 March 1951, the Volunteer Reserve furnished -51,942 of the 84,821 reservists on active duty. As to the quality of -these troops, about 99 per cent of the officers and 77.5 per cent of -the enlisted were veterans of World War II.[44] - - [44] Giusti, III-2, 7. - -Many of the first reservists to report at Camp Pendleton made unusual -sacrifices. Although they had the privilege of being discharged at -their own request as late as 18 July 1950, the unexpectedness of the -Korean conflict worked hardships in some instances. Reservists with -several dependents or just establishing themselves in a business or -profession had to settle their affairs hurriedly. There was little -applause when the Minute Men of 1950 departed from home communities -which were on a basis of business and pleasure as usual. The Korean -conflict was still regarded as a “police action” which would be ended -shortly. Nobody dreamed that within its first year it would become the -fourth largest military effort of our nation’s history. - -The Marine Corps was as lenient as could reasonably be expected when it -came to granting delays and deferments. On 1 August a board of eight -officers at Marine Corps Headquarters initiated daily meetings to -consider such requests emanating from the various Reserve districts. -Two weeks later the Commandant gave Reserve District directors the -authority to grant delays for periods up to six months after judging -each case on its individual merits. But even after every concession had -been made that could be reconciled with the national interest, it was a -wrench for hundreds of reservists to make the sudden plunge from civil -into military life. - -There were instances of men seeking deferment by using political -influence or pleading physical disability. But such cases were rare -as compared to the great majority who reported promptly and declared -themselves combat-ready. - -In the selection of reservists for the division, two categories were -recognized--combat-ready and noncombat-ready. The first applied to -men whose records proved that they had been members of the Organized -Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills -or two summer camps and 32 drills. Veterans of more than 90 days’ -service in the Marine Corps also qualified. All other reservists were -classified as noncombat-ready. - -When lost or incomplete records complicated the equation, a reservist’s -own opinion could not be accepted as proof of his fitness for combat. -This ruling had to be made because so many men were found to have more -spunk than training. Officers of a reservist’s unit were questioned -before a decision was reached, and any man feeling the need of -further training could be removed without prejudice from immediate -consideration for combat. - -Standards were so strictly observed that only about half of the -reservists qualified as being combat-ready. This group broke down into -the 15 per cent accepted for the 1st Marine Division and the 35 per -cent assigned to posts and stations to relieve regulars who joined the -division. The remaining 50 per cent consisted of men placed in the -noncombat-ready or recruit class.[45] - - [45] Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York, 1952), 103–105. - -The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and -12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588 -officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10 -per cent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training. It was a -comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23 -July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro. -Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW -which had been stripped to mount out MAG-33. - -On 3 August the remaining nine GCI squadrons of the Organized Aviation -Reserve were ordered to El Toro.[46] By this time the build-up was so -well in hand that Major General Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing, conferred with General Smith about aviation shipping for -the embarkation. - - [46] Giusti, III-2. - -This veteran Marine pilot, a native of Kentucky, had been commissioned -a second lieutenant in 1917 after graduating from the U. S. Naval -Academy. Three years of service with Marine ground forces in Cuba and -the Philippines were followed by Headquarters duty at Washington and -flight training at Pensacola. Designated a naval aviator in 1929, he -held various Marine air commands before participating as colonel and -brigadier general in the Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, and Green -Island air operations of World War II. On his return, he was appointed -Assistant Commandant (Air) and Director of Aviation. - -In the autumn of 1946, after Operation CROSSROADS had given a glimpse -into the tactical future, Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith were -named as a Special Board “to orient the effort of the Marine Corps away -from the last war and toward the next.” The result was recommendations -leading to experiments with rotary wing aircraft as a means of tactical -dispersion in amphibious operations against an enemy employing atomic -weapons. Thus the Marine Corps worked out new helicopter combat -techniques which were soon to create tactical history with the Brigade -and Division in Korea.[47] - - [47] Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New York, 1954), - 51–53. - - -_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_ - -It is a curious circumstance that not until 8 August did General Smith -himself have his first information as to the Inchon landing. The -basic directive of 25 July had merely specified that the main body -of the Division would embark from San Diego, prepared for combat. -The commanding general did not learn even unofficially about the -time and the place of the proposed operation until he was told by -General Fellers. While reporting at Camp Pendleton on his return from -Japan, the TTU commander gave General Smith an informal account of -the conference which took place on 4 July at FECOM Headquarters in -Tokyo.[48] - - [48] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 18, 41. - -On the following day, 9 August, the Division issued Operation Order No. -1-50, which provided for the movement of the Division (less the Brigade -and one RCT) to the Far East to report upon arrival to CinCFE for -operational control. Embarkation was to be carried out in accordance -with Embarkation Plan No. 1-50 of 6 August. - -By this date, 17,162 Marines in Camp Pendleton were eligible for -reassignment to the 1st Marine Division. There was no time, of course, -for much training. On 2 August the Division issued Training Bulletin -No. 36–50 as a general guide providing for some rudiments of individual -and small-unit instruction. But about all that could be accomplished -was conditioning training and test firing of weapons. As a result, many -of the weapons issued directly to units were found to be defective, -having been in storage since 1945.[49] - - [49] _Ibid._, 16–17. - -The war news from Korea at this time lent an atmosphere of grim realism -to preparations at Camp Pendleton. On 2 August the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade had landed at Pusan, the day following the debarkation -of two U. S. Army units, the skeletonized 2d Infantry Division and the -5th RCT. The original destination of the Marines had been Japan, but -during the voyage the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that -on 25 July a landing in Korea was ordered by CinCFE. - -Following the capture of Taejon on 20 July, the Red Korean columns -of invasion speeded up their “end run” around the Eighth Army’s open -left flank. Driving eastward as well as southward, the enemy made such -progress during the next ten days that on 31 July the UN forces were -pushed back into a chain of defensive positions in southeast Korea. -This was the Pusan Perimeter, which must be held if the vital line of -communications from the supply port to Taegu was to be maintained. - -The Marines jumped off east of Masan on 7 August with the Army 5th -RCT and elements of the 25th Infantry Division in the first sustained -counterattack mounted by UN forces. General Craig had control of Army -as well as Marine units during the most critical period of the initial -two days, and carrier-based MAG-33 squadrons provided tactical air -support. Enemy resistance was so shattered by the 9th that the Red -Korean machine of invasion went into reverse for the first time. - -[Illustration: NKPA GAINS - -30 JUNE-1 AUGUST - -1950] - -From the 9th to the 13th, when they were relieved, parallel columns of -Army and Marine assault troops drove from Chindong-ni nearly to Chinju, -a distance of about 40 miles by the seacoast route. It was only a local -setback for the enemy, to be sure, but it had a heartening effect for -tired UN forces which had known only delaying actions so far. - -It also added to the problems of staff officers at Camp Pendleton and -Pearl Harbor, since replacements must be sent to the Brigade. With -this in mind, the Commandant had begun the organization of the 1st -Replacement Draft of approximately 800 men on the date of Brigade -activation. These troops, however, were absorbed into the 1st Marine -Division when it expanded to war strength, as was a second draft (also -designated the 1st Replacement Draft) of 3,000 men.[50] - - [50] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 8–9. - -On 3 August the 1st Marine Division was directed by FMFPac to send 10 -officers and 290 enlisted men to the Brigade by airlift. This draft was -to be ready to move from Camp Pendleton by MATS planes on 9 August, but -not until five days later did it finally proceed to San Francisco by -rail and fly to Japan. - -On the 23d another draft of 10 officers and 300 enlisted men from -Marine posts in Hawaii and Guam was sent by air to Japan, these -troops being replaced by the same number of noncombat-ready Marines -airlifted from Camp Pendleton. This process was twice repeated early -in September, when two more drafts totaling 20 officers and 590 men -flew to Japan to provide replacements and third companies for the 5th -Marines of the Brigade.[51] - - [51] _Ibid._; Col A. L. Bowser ltr to CMC, 11 Feb 55. - -Logistics offered as many problems as personnel at Camp Pendleton, -since both the Brigade and Division units had been on peace tables -of organization and equipment. The 30-day replenishment stock, held -in readiness for such an emergency, was also based on peace strength -tables. Thus it was found that the specification of “requirements” was -best determined in most instances by making out requisitions based on -the difference between T/E for peace and war. - -Narrow time limits did not permit the assembly of supplies and -equipment delivered at Camp Pendleton under the relentless pressure -of urgent deadlines. FMFLant air and ground units arriving from Camp -Lejeune brought their own organization equipment, which was staged -through the Recruit Depot at San Diego. Much of the heavy equipment -from the Barstow, California, Annex, Depot of Supplies, was delivered -dockside and loaded without further inspection. Not until arrival at -Kobe, Japan, were such items as the LVTs finally given a mechanical -checkup.[52] - - [52] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 18–22. - -Ammunition was delivered from the depots to the Naval Station, San -Diego, for loading. The following units of fire were specified by -Division Embarkation Plan 1-50: - - (1) 3 UF in hands of 1st Marines, LVT, tank, and artillery units; - 1 UF in hands of all other units; - - (2) 2 UF in hands of 1st Ordnance Bn for the 1st Marines, LVT, - tank, and artillery units; - - (3) 4 UF in the hands of the 1st Ordnance Bn for other units.[53] - - [53] 1st MarDiv _Embarkation Plan 1-50_, 6 Aug 50, Annex - Charlie. - -Even after all items of initial supply had been assembled, the problem -was by no means solved. Since the Division and Wing would be operating -under Army and Air Force control, it became necessary to establish -a long-range policy for resupply. The best answer seemed to be the -procedure adopted by the Brigade, providing that the Army and Air Force -furnish all supplies not peculiar to the Marine Corps. The latter -would be provided by Marine or Navy agencies automatically in 30-day -increments, with 120 days of resupply allotted to ground units and -90 days to air units. Thereafter, supply was to be requisitioned as -needed. And in the lack of a service command as such, the G-4 section -of FMFPac was committed to the task of preparing and submitting -resupply requisitions for items in this category.[54] - - [54] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 12. - -Five hundred civilians were employed to help with the reconditioning of -motor transport and other heavy equipment which had been “in mothballs” -at Barstow since the end of World War II. Such items had to be put -through the shops in many instances and restored to operating condition -before delivery. The enormous supply depot in the California desert -erupted with activity as trains of flatcars and long columns of motor -trucks were routed to San Diego. - -The actual loading and embarkation were conducted almost according to -schedule in spite of such handicaps as inadequate dock facilities, -the reception of supplies and equipment from a variety of sources, a -shortage of stevedores, and piecemeal assignments of shipping. Only 54 -stevedore crews were available out of the 90 requested, and commercial -ships were necessary to supplement naval shipping. Nevertheless, the -loading began on 8 August and was completed by the 22d. The following -19 ships were employed to mount out the main body of the 1st Marine -Division: - -LST 845; LSM 419; two APAs, the USS _Noble_ and USS _President -Jackson_; five APs, the USNS _General Buckner_, USNS _General -Weigel_, USS _Marine Phoenix_, USNS _General Meigs_ and USS _General -Butner_; and ten AKs, the SS _Dolly Thurman_, SS _Green Bay Victory_, -SS _Noonday_, SS _African Patriot_, SS _Twin Falls Victory_, SS -_Southwind_, SS _American Press_, SS _American Victory_, SS _Alma -Victory_, and SS _Belgian Victory_.[55] - - [55] 1st Marine Division _Special Action Report for the - Inchon-Seoul Operation_, 20 Apr 51, sec. 1. (Hereafter, - 1st MarDiv _SAR_.) - -Generals Shepherd and Cates arrived for the main embarkation on the -13th and 14th respectively, accompanied by Major General Franklin -A. Hart and Brigadier General Edwin A. Pollock. While these general -officers were being acquainted with the progress made so far, the AKA -_Titania_ blew out two boilers after being about 20 percent loaded. -Since the repairs would require about ten days, a commercial freighter -was provided as a last-minute replacement. - - -_Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment_ - -One of the purposes of General Shepherd’s visit was to discuss with -General Cates the problems of organizing and embarking the 7th -Marines (Reinf.). The activation of this unit had been directed on 10 -August 1950, when an officer of the G-1 Section, Headquarters FMFPac, -delivered orders to Camp Pendleton.[56] - - [56] FMFPac _Operation Order (Opn O) 3-50_, 11 Aug 50. - -This was the result of a change of mind on the part of the Joint -Chiefs of Staff. After reconsideration, they decided that it would be -feasible to raise a third RCT much sooner than had at first seemed -possible, though not in time for MacArthur’s assault landing. Arrival -in Japan about 20 September seemed to be the earliest date that could -be managed. - -Of the 17,162 eligible Marines at Camp Pendleton at that time, the -regulars in excess of those required to mount out between the 10th and -15th were placed in the rear echelon of the division as a cadre for the -third infantry regiment.[57] The following troops were made available -to draw upon for the formation of the 7th Marines: - - [57] See Appendix B for the build-up of the 1st Marine - Division and Appendix C for the Task Organization. - - Officers and men from 2d Marine Division 1,822 - Officers and men of 3d Bn, 6th Marines in the Mediterranean 735 - Officers and men of Marine Corps Reserve selected as - combat-ready 1,972 - Officers and men of rear echelon of Division, and from posts - and stations 1,109 - --------- - Total [58]5,638 - - [58] This account of the build-up of the 7th Marines is based - on the summary in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, - pt. V. - -Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg was designated as commanding officer on -the date of activation, 17 August 1950. The Chief of Naval Operations -directed the regiment to embark for the Far East not later than 3 -September. These components were included in the build-up: - -3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; Company D, -1st Engineer Battalion; Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion (including -two Shore Party communication teams from Signal Company, Signal -Battalion); Company D, 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Company E, 1st -Medical Battalion. - -Forming the nucleus of the regiment, the 6th Marines, at peace strength -and less two battalions, arrived from Camp Lejeune on 16 August. The -3d Battalion of this FMFLant regiment, then stationed afloat in the -Mediterranean, was ordered to proceed through the Suez Canal to become -part of the 7th Marines upon arrival in Japan. - -While the other elements were being absorbed at Camp Pendleton, a -conference attended by General Smith, Major General Alfred H. Noble, -and Colonel Litzenberg was held to discuss rear echelon personnel -and the formation of RCT-7. The following troops were found to be -available to take care of casuals and retain custody of such division -supplies and equipment as had not yet been embarked: - - MARINE CORPS NAVY - ----------------- ----------------- - _Off._ _Enl._ _Off._ _Enl._ - 224 1,029 11 35 - -Not included in these figures were 197 noneffective enlisted personnel, -a rocket battery, a motor transport company, and the organizational -rear echelon of eight officers and 28 men. It was decided that General -Noble, as FMFPac representative, would examine MOSs, to determine -how many men would be transferred to the 7th Marines or retained for -FMF units to be activated later. The need was also foreseen for rear -echelon working parties to relieve personnel of units mounting out.[59] - - [59] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 36–37. - - -_Staff Groups Flown to Japan_ - -Although the 1st Marine Division had enough problems at Camp Pendleton -to keep a full war-strength staff busy, several of the key members -were in Korea with the Brigade. The complete Division staff was never -integrated until after the landing at Inchon. On 7 August, however, a -dispatch from CinCFE requested that the “Commanding General, 1st Marine -Division, and planning group capable of developing Division embarkation -and landing plans be airlifted” to the Far East.[60] - - [60] CinCFE disp to CinCPacFlt, 7 Aug 50, info CNO, CMC, CG - 1st MarDiv, CG FMFPac, and ComNavFE. - -General Smith decided that this flight could best be made in two -echelons. The first, which took off for Japan at 1400 on 16 August -1950, included a group of 12 officers and six enlisted men selected to -initiate planning: - - _Officers_ _Enlisted_ - G-2 Col B. T. Holcomb, Jr. TSgt W. O’Grady - Ass’t G-2 Maj J. G. Babashanian Cpl J. N. Lareau - G-3 Col A. L. Bowser, Jr. Sgt G. O. Davis, Jr. - Ass’t G-3 LtCol F. R. Moore - Ass’t G-4 LtCol C. T. Hodges - Ass’t Emb Off Capt R. E. Moody PFC H. J. McAvinue - Shore Pty Off Maj J. G. Dibble - Signal Off LtCol A. Creal Cpl L Shefchik - Ass’t G-1 LtCol B. D. Godbold - Fire Sup Coord LtCol D. E. Reeve SSgt P. Richardson - Naval Gunfire Off LtCol L. S. Fraser - Air Off Capt W. F. Jacobs - -General Smith stayed at Camp Pendleton for two more days until he -was assured that the main body of the Division had sailed. Then he -accompanied the second echelon of planners which departed by air at -1410 on 18 August: - - _Officers_ _Enlisted_ - CG MajGen O. P. Smith - C/S Col G. A. Williams Cpl C. V. Irwin - Aide to CG Capt M. J. Sexton PFC W. D. Grove - G-1 Col H. S. Walseth Cpl W. P. Minette - Ass’t Signal Off Capt A. J. Gunther MSgt F. J. Stumpges - G-4 Col F. M. McAlister - Engineer Off Maj E. P. Moses, Jr. - Embark Off Maj J. M. Rouse - Amtrac Off Maj A. J. Barrett - Motor Trans Off Maj H. W. Seeley, Jr. - Ordnance Off Maj L. O. Williams[61] - - [61] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 37–38. - -The departure of the commanding general coincided with the closing of -the Division CP at Camp Pendleton. There were still several thousand -Marines of the rear echelon left under the control of General Noble in -the sprawling installation, but the brown California hills looked down -upon a scene of strange and brooding quiet as compared to the activity -of the past three weeks. - -It was D-minus 28 for the men of the 1st Marine Division. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -Operation Plan CHROMITE - - -_Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in Tokyo--Inception of X -Corps--Final Conference on Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine -Amphibious Mission_ - -The scars of war heal rapidly. From the air General Smith could see -jungle covering the battlefields of Guam. Iwo Jima looked as untouched -as if it had never been the scene of Marine casualties exceeding the -losses of the Union army at Gettysburg. Even fire-blasted Tokyo had -recovered to a surprising extent from the terrible bombings of 1945. - -Now, five years later, the United States had entered upon a new -military effort. As the Marine general landed at Haneda Airfield on the -afternoon of 22 August 1950, he was met by Admiral Doyle and driven to -the _Mount McKinley_, tied up at the dock in Tokyo harbor. And though -assigned to the cabin reserved for the landing force commander, CG 1st -MarDiv found it an ironical circumstance that he did not yet know the -prospective D-day and H-hour of the landing.[62] - - [62] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50. - -He had not long to wait for such data. The advance section of the -Marine planning group being already aboard the _Mount McKinley_, he was -quickly informed by Colonel Bowser, the G-3 of the incomplete Division -staff. D-day at Inchon had been tentatively set for 15 September, and -the landing must be made during the high tide of late afternoon. It -meant assaulting a port of 250,000 prewar population over the mud flats -and seawalls, with little opportunity to consolidate positions before -nightfall. Nor would there be time for training and rehearsals, since -the troops would reach Japan barely in time to unload and reload in -amphibious shipping before proceeding to the objective area. - -General Smith learned further that a new command structure, to be known -as X Corps, was being hastily erected by FECOM especially for the -operation. No announcement had been made of a project still classified -as Top Secret, but it was known to the planning group that General -Almond would command a corps not yet activated. The 1st Marine Division -would be under his control as the landing force. - -Admiral Doyle, an old hand at amphibious warfare, was not happy about -Inchon when he considered the naval aspects. Initiated at Guadalcanal -and Tulagi in 1942, he had taken part in some rugged ship-to-shore -assaults of World War II. Afterwards, as Commander of Amphibious -Shipping for the Pacific Fleet, he had made a career of it. And Admiral -Doyle considered Inchon a hard nut to crack. He refused to admit that -any amphibious operation was impossible as long as the United States -Navy remained afloat, but he did maintain that Inchon bristled with -risks. - -In twenty minutes that Tuesday afternoon General Smith heard enough -to convince him that the forthcoming assault would take a great deal -of doing. But there was no time for discussion. For at 1730, just two -hours after stepping from his plane, he had an appointment with the -commander in chief. - - -_Interview with General MacArthur_ - -Arriving on the minute at the Dai Ichi building, General Smith -reported to FECOM Headquarters. He was met by an aide, who escorted -him to General Almond’s office. On the way down echoing corridors, -he responded at frequent intervals to the salutes of sentries who -presented arms with fixed bayonets.[63] - - [63] This section is based upon: O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 45–51, - _Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50, and interv. 13 Jan 55. - -The offices of CinCFE and his chief of staff were connected by an -imposing conference room with paneled walls and pillars along one side. -General Smith had an opportunity to survey his surroundings at leisure -before General Almond appeared. The new X Corps commander explained -that his chief had a habit of taking a long afternoon break and would -arrive later. - -Of medium height and stocky build, Almond gave the impression at the -age of 58 of a buoyant temperament and restless energy. A native -Virginian and graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he had been -an ETO division commander in World War II. After joining MacArthur’s -staff, he became one of the most loyal officers of a group noted for -devotion to their famous chief. - -Almond greeted the reserved, white-haired Marine general cordially. He -launched at once into the topic of the Inchon operation, expressing the -utmost confidence in the ability of the UN forces to prevail. - -It was the initial contact of the two men. Mutual respect was not -lacking, but differences in temperament made it inevitable that these -generals would not always see eye to eye. History teaches that this is -by no means a deplorable situation when kept within reasonable bounds. -Character can be as decisive a factor as logistics, and some of the -greatest victories of the ages have been won by colleagues who did not -agree at times. Friction, in fact, is more likely to sharpen than to -blunt military intellects; and Smith’s precision had potentialities of -being a good counterpoise for Almond’s energy. - -While they were discussing the tactical problems, the commander in -chief returned to his office. He summoned his chief of staff for a -brief conference, then requested that Smith be presented. - -MacArthur shook hands warmly, grasping the Marine general’s elbow with -his left hand. Without the celebrated “scrambled eggs” cap, he looked -his 70 years in moments of fatigue, but the old fire and dash were -not lacking. The very simplicity of his attire--shirtsleeves and open -collar--made a dramatic contrast to the military pomp and ceremony -surrounding him in this former Japanese commercial building, one of the -few earthquake-proof and air-conditioned structures in Tokyo. - -In a cigarette-smoking age, both MacArthur and Smith preferred the -calm comfort of a pipe. The commander in chief lit up and puffed -reflectively a moment. Then he leaned back in his chair and gave his -concept of the Inchon operation. But it was more than a concept in the -usual military sense; it was a vision of a victory potent enough to end -the Korean conflict at a stroke. And it was more than confidence which -upheld him; it was a supreme and almost mystical faith that he could -not fail. - -He granted, of course, that there were difficulties and risks. -Evidently Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations, for he proceeded -to reassure the Marine general. His voice full of feeling, he expressed -his deep conviction that the war could be won in a month at Inchon, -and that the 1st Marine Division could win it. The enemy, he explained, -had committed nearly all of his troops in the Pusan Perimeter. Thus the -Marines would not be heavily opposed when they stormed ashore at Inchon -and drove inland to cut the main NKPA line of communications at Seoul. - -MacArthur said he knew that the Marines had high standards, having -commanded them in the New Britain operations of the last war. He -realized that the Marines strove for perfection, and the Inchon landing -was bound to be somewhat helter-skelter by the very nature of things. -But there was no doubt, he affirmed, that the victory soon to be gained -by the 1st Marine Division would make 15 September 1950 a glorious date -in American history. - -His voice was charged with fervor as it rose and fell eloquently. Once -General Smith made a move as if to depart, but the commander in chief -motioned him back to his chair. At last he brought the conversation to -a close by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine general’s hand, and -bidding him a cordial good-bye. - - -_Conferences in Tokyo_ - -It was sometimes an awkward situation for Navy and Marine officers in -general, and Admiral Doyle and General Smith in particular. In many -respects they appeared doubters and pessimists in contrast to FECOM -staff officers who reflected General MacArthur’s shining confidence. -But as amphibious specialists, carrying a heavy load of responsibility -for the landing, they had to give serious thought to the risks at -Inchon. - -This was brought home forcibly to the Marine general on the morning of -the 23d, when he attended a meeting conducted by Major General Clark L. -Ruffner, Chief of Staff of the future X Corps. Although the conference -proceeded according to the usual form, General Smith felt that it -departed at times from the realism which he considered an essential of -sound amphibious planning. It was announced, for instance, that after -taking Inchon, the 1st Marine Division was to cross the Han and attack -Seoul, although X Corps had neither equipment nor materiel for bridging -the sizeable river.[64] - - [64] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50. - -A review of the background disclosed that after CinCFE decided on 10 -July not to use the 1st Cavalry Division as his landing force, he -briefly considered two other Army outfits. The 2d Infantry Division, -commanded by Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, was then under orders -to embark from the West Coast. Some of the personnel had been given -amphibious training by an ANGLICO instruction team and had taken part -in Operation MIKI, but the division as a whole was much understrength. -The same difficulty led to the elimination of Major General David G. -Barr’s 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which had supplied troops to -units at the front until only a cadre remained. - -The assurance on 25 July of a war-strength Marine division took care -of the _who_ question. Next came the problems of _when_ and _where_ -an amphibious assault could be best mounted. JANIS (Joint Army and -Navy Intelligence Studies) reports indicated that the east coast of -Korea, though of lesser importance in military respects, offered such -hydrographic advantages as unusually moderate tides and a general -absence of shoals. In forbidding contrast, the shallow west coast -waters could be navigated at most points only by means of narrow -channels winding through the mud flats.[65] - - [65] JANIS No. 75, ch. IV, _Theater Study, Korean Coast and - Beaches_. - -Of all the west coast seaports, Inchon was probably the least desirable -objective when considered strictly from the viewpoint of hydrographic -conditions. From first to last, however, Inchon was Douglas MacArthur’s -choice. FECOM staff officers ventured to suggest two alternatives, -Wonsan on the east coast and Kunsan on the west coast, but the -commander in chief replied that neither was close enough to the enemy’s -main line of communications to suit his purposes. He would settle for -nothing less than Inchon. - -So much for the place. As to the time, the choice was even more -limited. The tidal range varied from an average spring tide[66] height -of 23 feet to an occasional maximum of 33 feet. Landing craft required -a tide of 25 feet to navigate the mud flats of the harbor, and the LSTs -must have 29 feet. Only during a few days in the middle of September -and October were those depths provided by spring tides of the next 12 -weeks. MacArthur rejected an October date as being too late in the -season, so that 15 September became D-day by virtue of elimination. - - [66] A spring tide is a higher than normal tide caused by the - sun and moon being in conjunction or opposition, as at - new moon and full moon. Conversely, when the moon is at - first or third quarter the tide (neap tide) is smaller - than usual. - -A late afternoon H-hour was also a choice of necessity. Islands, reefs, -and shoals restricted the approach to the outer harbor, and currents -ranging from three to six knots multiplied the chances of confusion. -This meant that daylight landings were necessary for all but small -groups. - -Much of the inner harbor was a vast swamp at low water, penetrated by a -single dredged channel 12 to 13 feet deep.[67] The duration of spring -tides above the prescribed minimum depth averaged about three hours, -and during this interval the maximum in troops and supplies must be put -ashore. Every minute counted, since initial landing forces could not be -reinforced or supplied until the next high water period. - - [67] JANIS No. 75, ch. V. - -Time and tide seemed to have combined forces to protect Inchon from -seaborne foes. As if such natural obstacles were not enough, the -target area provided others. Two islands, Wolmi-do and Sowolmi-do, -located in a commanding position between the inner and outer harbors, -were linked to each other and to Inchon by a causeway. In advance of -intelligence reports, it must be assumed that rocky, wooded Wolmi-do -would be honeycombed with hidden emplacements for enough guns to create -a serious menace for the landing craft. - -This critical terrain feature must somehow be reduced as a preliminary -to the main landing during the high tide of late afternoon. Inchon -being situated on a hilly promontory, the “beaches” were mere narrow -strips of urban waterfront, protected by seawalls too high for ramps -to be dropped at any stage of the tide. Once past these barriers, the -troops would have about two hours of daylight in which to secure an -Oriental city with a population comparable to that of Omaha. - -But the amphibious assault was only the first phase of the operation as -conceived by CinCFE. After taking Inchon the landing force had the task -of driving some 16 miles inland, without loss of momentum, to assault -Korea’s largest airfield before crossing a tidal river to assault -Korea’s largest city. - -And even this ambitious undertaking was not the whole show. For a -joint operation was to be carried out meanwhile by Eighth Army forces -thrusting northward from the Pusan Perimeter to form a junction with -the units of the Inchon-Seoul drive. This double-barreled assault, it -was believed, would shatter North Korean resistance and put an end to -the war. - - -_Inception of X Corps_ - -The time, the place, the landing force, the main objectives--these -essentials of the proposed Inchon-Seoul operation had been pretty well -settled, at least to General MacArthur’s satisfaction, by the first -week of August. But even though he had his assault troops, there was as -yet no headquarters organization. - -Admiral Sherman urged early in August that the commander in chief call -upon General Shepherd and the facilities of the FMFPac organization at -Pearl Harbor. Since there was so little time left before D-day--only a -fraction of the time usually allotted to the planning phase of a major -ship to shore assault--he felt that amphibious know-how and experience -were required. He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken to obtain -the approval of Admiral Radford, who had jurisdiction over FMFPac. - -The need for a headquarters organization was discussed on 7 August -by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of FECOM. -Brigadier General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, received a memorandum from the -other members of the staff recommending that the gap be filled in one -of two ways--either by putting into effect Admiral Sherman’s plan, or -by sponsoring the organization of a provisional corps headquarters. -General Wright favored the first course of action, as did Brigadier -General Doyle G. Hickey, FECOM deputy chief of staff. Ultimately, -however, the FECOM chief of staff decided in favor of the latter -command arrangement.[68] - - [68] OCMH, Dept of Army (Maj J. F. Schnabel), _The Korean - Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I. - - -_Final Conference on Inchon_ - -The questions of _when_ and _where_ and _who_ had been answered to some -extent. But as late as 23 August, a good many variations of opinion -existed as to _how_ the amphibious assault was to be accomplished. - -The natural obstacles of the Inchon harbor area were so disturbing -that Doyle suggested an alternative to MacArthur and Almond. Since -the purpose of the landing was to drive inland and cut the enemy’s -communications, urged ComPhibGru One, why not select a west coast -objective with fewer hydrographic difficulties? He proposed the -Posung-Myon area, about 30 miles south of Inchon on the west coast, -where better approach channels and beaches were believed to be -available in a more lightly populated locality. A landing at this -point, Doyle contended, would not be attended by the risks and -restrictions of Inchon, yet after securing a beachhead the troops would -be in position to strike inland at the enemy’s main line of rail and -highway communications in the vicinity of Osan.[69] - - [69] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50, _Notes_, 51–52. - A _myon_ is comparable to our county, being a Korean - political subdivision containing several towns or - villages. - -Smith was favorably impressed. He brought up the subject on 23 August, -when he and Barr had a meeting with Almond. The X Corps commander did -not concur, though conceding that Posung-Myon had possibilities as an -area for a subsidiary landing in connection with the Inchon assault. -Nor was Doyle able to obtain MacArthur’s consent to the alternate -objective. - -It was the Marine general’s third conference of the day. From the X -Corps meeting he had gone directly to the regular conference at GHQ, -and thence to the talk with Almond and Barr. He came away from all -three meetings with the conviction that CinCFE and his staff were -not to be swerved by his objections. It was definitely to be Inchon -on 15 September, and Smith instructed his planning group to proceed -accordingly. - -Doyle made a last attempt at 1730 that afternoon to present a -comprehensive picture of the risks and difficulties inherent at Inchon. -This final conference on the subject of a west coast landing was -attended by some of the nation’s highest ranking officers--General J. -Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief -of Naval Operations; General Shepherd, CG FMFPac; Lieutenant General -Idwal H. Edwards, U. S. Air Force; as well as other high-ranking -staff officers who had flown out from Washington. It was no secret in -Tokyo military circles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present -for the purpose of studying General MacArthur’s plans for the Inchon -landing. It was also generally known that doubts and misgivings had -been expressed at various times when the project was discussed at the -Pentagon. General Collins stated candidly at a later date that the -purpose of his Tokyo visit was “... to find out exactly what the plans -were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of -great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur. We -suggested certain alternate possibilities and places....”[70] - - [70] MacArthur Hearings, 1295, quoted by Major Schnabel in - _The Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I. - -Admirals Joy and Doyle also attended the meeting, and FECOM was -represented by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright. The conference -room on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi building proved too small -for the audience, and members of the PhibGru One team had to wait -their turn in Almond’s adjoining office. One by one, at eight-minute -intervals, Doyle’s officers took turns at being presented to MacArthur, -who listened gravely while puffing at his pipe. The following -amphibious specialists were heard: - - Cdr Edmund S. L. Marshall, USN Navigation - Lt Charles R. Barron, USN Aerology - LtCol William E. Benedict, USMC Military Aspects - LCdr Jack L. Lowentrout, USN Beach Study - LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr., USN Seabees Pontoon Causeway Plans - LCdr Clyde E. Allmon, USN Ship to Shore Plans - LCdr Arlie G. Capps, USN Gunfire Support - Cdr Theophilus H. Moore, USN Air Support[71] - - [71] The description of the conference has been derived from: - LCdr Frank A. Manson (USN) interv, 22 Apr 52; Capt - Walter Karig (USNR), _et al._, _Battle Report: The War - in Korea_ (New York, 1952), 165–168 (hereafter, Karig, - _Korea_); VAdm Arthur D. Struble ltr to authors, 25 Apr - 55. - -The officers spoke of the natural obstacles. They asserted that it -would be the peak of optimism to hope for a strategic surprise at -Inchon, for the enemy also knew that only a few days each autumn month -offered a tidal range sufficient to float the landing craft and supply -ships over the mud flats of the harbor. - -They contended that even a tactical surprise was out of the question, -since Wolmi-do must be neutralized before landings could be made on the -mainland. Otherwise, the vulnerable column of landing craft would be -exposed to a slaughter from the flanking fire of the island’s guns. - -The Navy group pointed out further that it must also be assumed that -the enemy would not neglect a good opportunity to sow both moored and -magnetic mines in the channels the shipping must take. And to cap all -the other natural and man-made risks, there was danger at the height -of the typhoon season that Nature would intervene and scatter the -amphibious armada during its approach to the objective area. - -The presentation lasted for nearly an hour and a half. At the -conclusion, Admiral Doyle summed up by giving his opinion. “The best -I can say,” he told the commander in chief, “is that Inchon is not -impossible.” - -General MacArthur heard the amphibious specialists to a finish without -his imperturbability being shaken. Even the onlookers who could not -partake of his perfect faith were impressed. There was something -magnificent about this old warrior in shirtsleeves and open collar, -calmly smoking his pipe while hearing his plan dissected. Daring and -optimism are supposed to be the exclusive prerogatives of youth, yet -this smiling septuagenarian was not only the oldest officer at the -conference, he was also the most confident and assured! After the -PhibGru One presentation ended, he took 45 minutes for his comments. -Speaking with eloquence, he declared that the natural obstacles and -practical difficulties of the proposed Inchon operation were more than -balanced in the strategic scale by the psychological advantages of a -bold stroke. About 90 percent of the NKPA forces were fighting in the -Pusan Perimeter. A combined offensive by X Corps and the Eighth Army -would have the effect of placing the enemy between the hammer and anvil. - -Referring to the Kunsan landing favored by General Collins and Admiral -Sherman, CinCFE asserted that this objective was too far south for a -fatal blow to be dealt the invaders. He cited a historical precept in -Wolfe’s victory at Quebec, made possible by audacity in overcoming -natural obstacles that the enemy regarded as insurmountable. He -recalled the amphibious victories he himself had won in the Southwest -Pacific, with the Navy and sometimes the Marine Corps sharing in -the glory. And he ended on a dramatic note with a single, prophetic -sentence spoken in a tense voice: - -“We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them!”[72] - - [72] Karig, _Korea_, 165–168. - -As the officers filed out into the noisy, teeming Tokyo street, most -of them felt certain that the last word had been said. It was still -possible, of course, for the Joint Chiefs to overrule CinCFE; and -it was not likely that all of their doubts had been laid to rest. -Nevertheless, the Navy and Marine planners proceeded on the basis that -a final decision had been reached that August afternoon. - - -_Brigade Victory in Korea_ - -Before his arrival at Tokyo, General Shepherd had paid a flying visit -to the headquarters of the Brigade in Korea immediately after the -Marines stormed and seized Obong-ni Ridge. Just as General Craig’s -men had taken part from 7 to 13 August in the first sustained UN -counterattack, so this Army and Marine effort a week later became the -first rout of a major NKPA unit. After putting up a fierce struggle -to hold their bridgehead on the east bank of the river Naktong, the -veteran troops of the NKPA 4th Division were shattered by repeated -Marine attacks. Carrier-borne Corsairs of MAG-33 had a turkey shoot at -the expense of panic stricken enemy soldiers who abandoned their arms -in a wild flight. Some of the fugitives were shot down while trying to -swim the river. - -Despite this encouraging little victory, it was still nip and tuck on -the central front of the Pusan Perimeter. With the U. S. 2d Infantry -Division and 5th RCT now in line, the Eighth Army strategy of trading -space for time had resulted in whittling down the enemy’s material -superiority. But the invaders still held the material advantage, and -there were signs that they would soon launch an all-out effort to smash -through to Pusan. - - -_The Marine Amphibious Mission_ - -General Shepherd, after being informed as to the Tokyo conferences, -accompanied General Smith on the morning of 24 August to a meeting with -Admirals Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle. It was generally agreed that -not enough weight had been given to amphibious considerations in the -final decision to attack at Inchon. Navy opinion held that one more -attempt should be made to propose another landing point with fewer -hydrographic objections. The area south of Inchon had been investigated -by Navy UDT and Marine amphibious scouts of the Reconnaissance Company, -1st Marine Division, who had sailed to the Far East with the Brigade. -As a preliminary, this group had embarked on the USS _Horace A. Bass_ -(APD-124) and gone ashore undetected to stage several raids during the -period 12–16 August on the enemy’s main line of communications along -the west coast. Three tunnels and two railway bridges were destroyed -without the loss of a man.[73] - - [73] CTF 90 _Opn O 13-50_, in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, - XV:Able, 6. - -Next the raiders successfully carried out a survey and reconnaissance -of available landing beaches during the period 22–25 August in the -Posung-Myon area. Their findings impressed General Shepherd so much -that before his departure from Tokyo he called on CinCFE to make a -last plea for reconsideration of the landing area. General MacArthur, -however, remained firm in his preference for Inchon.[74] - - [74] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 24 Aug 50. - -The meeting of the admirals and Marine generals on the 24th broke up -with a general agreement that the decision as to Inchon on 15 September -must be accepted as the basis for final planning. That same afternoon -General Smith instructed his planning group to begin work on a scheme -of maneuver. - -Modern amphibious tactics were in their infancy during World War I -when an appalling object lesson seemed to have been left by the Allied -disaster at Gallipoli in 1915–16. Brilliant in strategic conception, -this major amphibious operation might have knocked Turkey out of -the war and opened the unlocked back door of Austria and Germany. -Unfortunately, the execution fell short; and the failure was too often -charged to amphibious warfare itself rather than a wholesale violation -of its basic principles. - -In 1920 the new Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became the center -of Marine amphibious study and research. Marine units participated -in fleet problems at Panama and Culebra during the post-war years; -and in 1927 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy (forerunner of JCS) -stated in a directive that the Marine Corps had the mission of “special -preparation in the conduct of landing operations.”[75] - - [75] BrigGen Eli K. Cole, “Joint Overseas Operation,” _US - Naval Institute Proceedings_, 55, No. 11 (Nov 29):927. - -During the early 1920s the writings of a brilliant Marine officer, -Major Earl H. Ellis, had a tremendous influence on current amphibious -thought. Predicting that Japan would strike first in the Pacific and -win initial successes, he drew up a strategic plan for assaults on -Japanese-mandated islands which was approved by Major General John -A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Later known as Operation -Plan No. 712, this Top Secret document helped to shape the ORANGE -plans adopted by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy for offensive -operations against Japan if it came to war. - -After making good progress in the early 1920s, with landing exercises -being held annually, the Marine amphibious program bogged down from -1927 to 1932 because of the necessity of sending expeditionary forces -to China and Nicaragua. The turning point came in 1933, a memorable -date in the evolution of modern amphibious warfare. It was then that -Major General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine -Corps, urged that a staff be set up at Quantico to plan for the -organization of a mobile Marine striking force. This force, under the -Commandant, and fully prepared for service with the fleet, was to be -in readiness for tactical employment subject to the orders of the -Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy. General Russell further proposed that -the old name “Expeditionary Force” be discontinued and “Fleet Marine -Force” adopted as a name better expressing this mission.[76] - - [76] J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, _The U. S. Marines and - Amphibious War_ (Princeton, 1951), 21–24, 33–34. - -After the acceptance of these recommendations, the Commandant ordered -classes discontinued at the Marine Corps Schools and a concerted -effort applied to the preparation of a new amphibious manual. Both the -Army and Navy had treated some of the procedures in existing manuals, -but it remained for the Marine Corps in 1934 to put out the first -complete work of the sort. Known as the _Tentative Manual on Landing -Operations_, it became either directly or indirectly the guide for -exercises and maneuvers of the Navy and Marine Corps down to World War -II. - -Most of its suggested procedures were endorsed with revisions in the -Navy’s _Fleet Training Publication 167_, published in 1938. This work -in its turn became the model three years later for the Army’s first -basic field manual for landing operations.[77] - - [77] FMFPac, _History_, 6–9. - -Training exercises were held every year, usually at Culebra or Vieques -in the Caribbean and San Clemente Island off San Diego. At the -suggestion of the Fleet Marine Force, the Navy purchased Bloodsworth -Island in Chesapeake Bay as the first amphibious gunfire range used for -that purpose alone. - -Schools were set up to train Army and Navy as well as Marine officers -as specialists in fire control parties. Air support was closely -integrated with naval gunfire, shore artillery, and troop movements. -Technology came to the aid of tactics when the Fleet Marine Force -encouraged and supervised the designing of strange new amphibious craft -and vehicles. Concepts were actually based in several instances on -landing craft not yet developed and the confidence of the Marine Corps -in American inventiveness proved to be justified. - -Thus the Nation entered World War II with a system of offensive tactics -which opened Europe, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific to American -invasion without incurring a single major defeat. Not only was the -United States ahead of the enemy in the development of amphibious -operations but the Axis Powers never found the key to an adequate -defense. In an often quoted summary, the British military critic and -historian, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, has asserted that these -techniques were “in all probability ... the most far-reaching tactical -innovation of the war.”[78] - - [78] MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, _The Second World War_ (London, - 1948), 207. - -During the next few years the Marine Corps was twice officially given -the major responsibility for American amphibious tactics. The National -Security Act of 1947 made it the function of the Corps “to provide -fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air -components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of -advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may -be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”[79] - - [79] 61 _U. S. Stat. at L._ (1947), 495. - -At the so-called Key West Conference the following spring (March 11–14, -1948), the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff restated the -Marine Corps’ mission to include that of developing “in coordination -with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique, -and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The -Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those -landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common -interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.”[80] - - [80] OAFIE, OSD, _The United States Marine Corps_ - (Washington, 1950). (Armed Forces Talk No. 317.) - -During these post-war years, the Marine Corps was grappling with the -new amphibious problems posed by atomic weapons. It was fitting, -therefore, that the three men who formed the Special Board for this -research--Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith--should have been at the -forefront in 1950 when the Marine Corps faced its next amphibious test. -As veterans of World War II operations, they could recall the scramble -for the beaches of Bougainville, the fight for Bloody Nose on Peleliu, -the off-the-cuff landing on Oroku Peninsula in Okinawa. There had been -some tense moments in those battles, but never had Marine generals -contemplated an objective which held more potentialities for trouble -than the harbor area at Inchon. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -The Planning Phase - -_Working Around the Clock--X Corps Scheme of Maneuver--Intelligence -Planning for Inchon--The Landing Force Plan--Naval Gunfire and -Rockets--Plans for Air Support_ - - -The champion globe-trotters of the 1st Marine Division were the men of -the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Before returning to their homes from -Korea, these military tourists would have traveled entirely around the -world by various forms of land, water, and air transportation. - -The unit was originally an element of the 6th Marines, FMFLant, serving -afloat with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. On 12 August 1950 -the CP aboard the USS _Yellowstone_ at Suda Bay, Crete, received a -message from CNO ordering the battalion to the Far East. Lieutenant -Colonel Frederick R. Dowsett, deputy commander, noted that the dispatch -had bypassed such channels as CMC and the Sixth Fleet.[81] This -irregularity, he learned later, was explained by the urgency of an -order which had been framed by Admiral Sherman while General Cates was -present. It directed that the APA _Bexar_ arrive on 14 August at Suda -Bay and depart two days later with the troops. - - [81] The battalion commander, Colonel Reynolds H. Hayden, had - a deputy because of the administrative set-up within the - Sixth Fleet and did not accompany the unit to the Far - East. - -The rub was that these Marines were dispersed on various ships all over -the Mediterranean. - -Given the rush job of picking up the scattered elements of the -battalion was the USS _Leyte_, which was due to return to Norfolk for -refitting afterwards and thence to the Far East via the Panama Canal. -Not only did the carrier complete its assignment before the deadline, -but the _Bexar_ also arrived at Suda Bay on the evening of the 14th. -Both ships had hardly dropped anchor when the LCVPs and LCMs were -shuttling troops and cargo to the transport and the AKA _Montague_, -which was to accompany it to the Far East.[82] - - [82] This description is based upon: Col F. R. Dowsett - interv, 2 Nov 54. - -On the 16th the two vessels departed according to schedule by way -of Port Said and the Suez Canal. Security regulations were rigidly -enforced, with only one stop being made when the vessels anchored at -Ceylon for six hours to take on fuel. Marine officers were figuratively -as well as literally at sea, since they had no idea of the specific -mission awaiting the battalion in the Far East. Unaware of plans for -the Inchon landing, they envisioned the troops being employed as the -ship-based raiding party of some American task force. - -Meanwhile their future teammates of the 7th Marines were preparing to -embark from San Diego. Colonel Litzenberg and his officers had made -a good start at Camp Pendleton even before the activation date of 17 -August 1950. In order to build up from cadres of former 6th Marines’ -troops, this regiment received the largest proportion of combat-ready -reservists of any major unit in the 1st Marine Division--about 50 -per cent, counting the augmentation personnel to bring 3/6 up to war -strength when it would be taken into the outfit in Japan.[83] - - [83] Giusti, II-5. - -CNO had set 3 September as the date of embarkation. But Headquarters, -FMFPac, prepared the embarkation plans while the regimental staff -solved problems of organization and equipment so effectively that -the 7th Marines sailed on the 1st, thus beating the deadline by two -days.[84] - - [84] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 15. - -Orders came to El Toro on 16 August for the overseas movement of -the remaining elements of the 1st MAW. Units affected were Wing -Headquarters Squadron 1 and MAG-12, comprising Headquarters Squadron -12, Service Squadron 12, VMF-312, VMF-212, VMF(N)-542, and the rear -echelon of VMF(N)-513. - -VMF-312 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513 were loaded on the USS -_Sitkoh Bay_ with their aircraft and sailed on 24 August. Three days -later VMF-212 and VMF(N)-542 embarked on the USS _Cape Esperance_, and -the USNS _General Morton_ weighed anchor with the remaining components -on 1 September.[85] This completed the overseas movement of the 1st -MAW, since General Harris and his staff had departed from El Toro by -air for Japan the day before. - - [85] _Ibid._, XV: Charlie Charlie, 4. - - -_Working Around the Clock_ - -The first echelon of the 1st Marine Division planning group had its -preliminary briefing on 19 August, and the tractor elements of the -Attack Force were scheduled to sail for the objective area on 9 -September. This left an interval of 20 days for most of the Inchon -planning--probably the shortest period ever allotted to a major -amphibious assault. - -Less than one-fourth of the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division -staff were on the _Mount McKinley_ when planning commenced. At that -time the distribution of the staff was as follows: - - ---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------ - |With the|Aboard |En route| - |1st Prov|USS _Mount|by sea |Total - |Mar Brig|McKinley_ |to Japan| - |in Korea|in Tokyo | | - ---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------ - | | | | - Div Cdr Section | | 2 | | 2 - Asst Div Cdr Section | 2 | | | 2 - Chief of Staff Section | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 - General Staff Section: | | | | - G-1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 - G-2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 - G-3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 - G-4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 - Special Staff Section: | | | | - Adjutant | | 4 | 7 | 11 - Air & Air Observers | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 - Amph Trac | [a]1 | [a]1 | | 2 - Anti-Tank | [b]1 | | 1 | 1 - Armored Amtracs | | | [a]1 | 1 - Artillery | [a]1 | [a]1 | [a]1 | 3 - Chaplains | [b]1 | | 1 | 1 - Chem War & Radiol Def | | | 1 | 1 - Dental | [b]1 | | 1 | 1 - Embarkation | [b]1 | 2 | 1 | 3 - Engineer | | [a]1 | | - Food Director | | | 1 | 1 - Hq Comdr | [a]1 | | [a]2 | 3 - Inspector | | | 2 | 2 - Legal | [b]1 | | 1 | 1 - Liaison | 3 | | | 3 - Medical | 2 | | 1 | 3 - Mtr Trans | 1 | 1 | | 2 - Nav Gunfire | | 1 | | 1 - Ordnance | [b]1 | 1 | | 1 - Post Ex | | | [a]1 | 1 - Pub Info | [b]1 | | 1 | 1 - Prov Marshal | | | [a]1 | 1 - Shore Party | | [a]1 | | 1 - Signal | 6 | 2 | | 8 - Spec Serv | [b]1 | | 3 | 3 - Sup & Disb | [b]2 | | 9 | 9 - Tank | [b]1 | | [a]1 | 1 - +--------+----------+--------+------ - Total | 33 | 23 | 51 | 107 - ---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------ - - [a] Carried in other Brigade, Division, or Force units. - [b] Additional duty basis; not counted in total.[86] - - [86] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 54–55. - -The Marine planners aboard the _Mount McKinley_ were short on elbow -room as well as personnel, time, and equipment. Although it was an -advantage to have the planning groups of the Attack Force and Landing -Force together, the ship did not provide enough space for both without -crowding. Moreover, the already undermanned Marine contingent had to -be further reduced late in August by sending several officers to Kobe -to meet incoming units. Thus the G-2 section, to cite one example, -consisted of only two officers, one of whom was detached on this duty -for a week. - -“The issuance of and adherence to a planning schedule was utterly -impossible,” commented the 1st Marine Division report. “Only by a -virtual ‘around the clock’ working day, concurrent ... planning by -Attack Force (ComPhibGru One) and Landing Force (1st MarDiv), willing -teamwork by both, and especially the amphibious ‘know-how’ of key staff -members gained by long experience, was it possible to complete and -issue ... plans and orders for a most difficult ... landing operation. -The time-space factor denied any coordinated orientation, prohibited -even the most elementary rehearsal, made it difficult to distribute -orders, and gave subordinate units very little time for formulation and -distribution of their plans.”[87] - - [87] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, basic rpt. - -Command relationships during the embarkation and assault phases were as -follows: - - +------+ - +-----------+CinCFE+-------------+ - | +------+ | - +---+----+ +----+-----+ - +----+ComNavFe+--------+ |CG X Corps| - | +--------+ | +----------+ - | | - +------+-------+ +------+------+ - |ComPhibGru One| |CG 1st MarDiv| - +--------------+ +-------------+ - -All the top commanders were concentrated in Tokyo with the arrival -of Admiral Struble on 25 August. This facilitated the planning and -allowed important decisions to be worked out in conferences between the -principal commanders.[88] - - [88] Struble ltr, 25 Apr 55. - -Planning was based mainly on studies made by ComPhibGru One as -prospective Attack Force Commander. It was conducted entirely on a -concurrent basis by the Attack Force and Landing Force groups aboard -the _Mount McKinley_. No step was taken by either without the full -knowledge and consent of the other. - - -_X Corps Scheme of Maneuver_ - -Army planning had been initiated by the Joint Strategic Plans and -Operations Group until 16 August, when the “Special Planning Staff” -was set up at GHQ to issue directives for Operation Plan CHROMITE. -Published on 12 August as CinCFE Operation Plan No. 100-B, it was based -on these assumptions: - - (a) that the North Korean ground advance would be stopped in time to - permit the build-up of our forces in South Korea; - - (b) that our forces in South Korea would be built up to the - capability of mounting effective offensive operations against - NKPA forces opposing them; - - (c) that we retain air and naval supremacy in the area of operation; - - (d) that the NKPA ground forces would not receive major - reinforcements from the USSR or Red China; - - (e) that there would be no major change in the basic disposition of - the NKPA forces.[89] - - [89] MarCorps Board _Study_, v. II-B, 13–17. - -It was understood from the beginning that the Special Plans Staff, -headed by General Ruffner, would be the nucleus of the future X -Corps staff. In order to have the benefit of specialized amphibious -knowledge, ten Marine and two Navy officers of TTU Mobile Training Team -Able were assigned on 19 August: - - Col H. A. Forney Deputy Chief of Staff - LtCol J. Tabor Asst Coordinator, FSCC - LtCol C. E. Warren Asst G-4 - Maj J. N. McLaughlin Asst G-3 - Maj J. F. Warner Asst G-3 - Maj C. P. Weiland Air Officer, FSCC - Maj V. H. Vogel Asst G-4 - Capt H. S. Coppedge Asst G-2 - Capt T. A. Manion Asst Signal Officer, FSCC - Capt V. J. Robinson Target Info Officer - Lt L. N. Lay, USN Asst Surgeon - Lt W. A. Sheltren, USN Asst NGF Officer, FSCC[90] - - [90] MarCorps Board _Study_, v. II, app. 67. - -These officers did not begin their new assignment in time to contribute -to the preliminary X Corps over-all scheme of maneuver. The main -provisions, as communicated to General Smith at General Ruffner’s -briefing conference of 23 August, were as follows: - - (1) The 1st Marine Division, as the landing force, was to seize - the urban area of Inchon (line A-A); to capture a beachhead - (line B-B); to advance as rapidly as possible and seize Kimpo - Airfield (line C-C); to clear out the south bank of the Han - River (line D-D); to cross the river, seize Seoul and secure - the commanding ground to the north (E-E); and, finally, to - fortify and occupy this line with reduced forces until relieved - (apparently by the 3d Infantry Division, still in the United - States), whereupon the Division was to recross the Han and - seize a line (F-F) about 25 miles southeast of Seoul. - - (2) The 7th Infantry Division was to land behind the Marines - and advance on their right flank to seize the commanding ground - south of Seoul and the south bank of the river (line D-D); to - continue the advance to phase line (E-E); and to conduct a - reconnaissance in force to the south (line F-F). There, on the - line from Suwon to Kyongan-ni, the 7th Infantry Division and - 1st Marine Division would form the strategic anvil as Eighth - Army forces advanced from the Pusan Perimeter in the role of - hammer. - - (3) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was to furnish air support, - air direction, and air warning for the Corps with units - operating from Kimpo Airfield. It was also to be prepared to - operate a control center ashore on order.[91] - - [91] _Ibid._, v. I, III-B-8, and v. II, app. 16; O. P. Smith, - _Notes_, 48–49. - -The Special Plans Staff gave General Smith a study explaining the -purposes of these maneuvers. “The B-B line in this study appeared -to be a suitable beachhead line,” he commented, “and we decided to -concentrate our efforts on plans for its seizure. Subsequent operations -would be reserved for later consideration.”[92] - - [92] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 50. - - -_Intelligence Planning for Inchon_ - -Good planning, of course, depended on accurate intelligence. All -possible information about the objective area had been gathered by the -staff of PhibGru One before the arrival of the 1st Marine Division -planners. Air Force planes had taken hundreds of photographs at every -stage of the tide. Hydrographic reports and navigation charts had been -studied. Army and Navy men familiar with Inchon during the American -occupation after World War II were interrogated as well as NKPA -prisoners captured by the Eighth Army. - -Although a great deal of useful data was compiled, some disturbing -questions remained. How high were the sea walls of Inchon? Were the -mud flats suitable for landing either troops or vehicles at low tide? -Approximately how many NKPA guns were hidden on Wolmi-do?... These were -some of the intelligence gaps which must be filled before an effective -plan could be drawn up for an assault landing. - -PhibGru One made its material available to the G-2 Section of the -1st Marine Division, and the two staffs worked together on the -_Mount McKinley_ in close cooperation. Attached were the 163d -Military Intelligence Service Detachment (MISD) and the 441st Counter -Intelligence Corps (CIC) Team. Both of these units had been furnished -by FECOM and consisted of Army commissioned and enlisted personnel -as well as native Koreans serving in liaison, interpretation, and -translation capacities. - -Even when a question could not be answered conclusively, it was up -to the G-2 sections of the Attack Force and Landing Force to arrive -at a conclusion for planning purposes. For instance, it was never -satisfactorily determined from available sources--JANIS publications, -strategic engineering studies, Naval Attaché reports, and photographic -interpretation reports--whether LVTs would be able to traverse the mud -flats of the Inchon harbor area. And since there remained some doubt, -planning proceeded on the assumption that the answer was negative. -This proved to be the correct as well as the prudent decision, later -developments revealed. - -Another G-2 planning problem concerned the effect that the height -of the sea walls would have upon the landing. Photographs at hourly -stages of the tide made it appear that the masonry was too high for -the dropping of ramps at any time. As a solution, G-2 officers hit -upon a device reminiscent of the storming of castles during the Middle -Ages. Scaling ladders were recommended with the suggestion that they be -built of aluminum with hooks at one end to be attached to the masonry. -Construction was started at Kobe, but the order could be only partially -filled before D-day, and wooden ladders were built as substitutes. - -It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of estimates as -to the numbers and defensive capabilities of the enemy. Yet the G-2 -sections on the _Mount McKinley_ were up against a peculiar situation -cited in the 1st Marine Division report: - -“Our accumulated knowledge of the enemy’s military tactics, prior -to our landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, consisted almost in -its entirety of knowledge about the enemy’s offense.... With but -few exceptions, UN forces were forced to take a defensive stand and -denied the opportunity to study large scale enemy defensive tactics -from actual combat. Thus it was that our assault landing was made -with relatively little prior knowledge regarding the enemy’s probable -reaction to a large-scale offensive of this nature, particularly when -it involved the penetration into the very heart of his newly acquired -domain.”[93] - - [93] This account of G-2 planning for Inchon is based upon - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker. - -Photographic coverage showed the Inchon harbor area to be honeycombed -with gun positions and other defensive installations. On the other -hand, daily aerial observation indicated that most of them were not -occupied. - -G-2 conclusions during the planning phase often had to be based -on such conflicting evidence, even though the penalties of faulty -interpretation might be drastic. But after being viewed with due -suspicion, signs of negative enemy activity were finally accepted as -valid in estimates of light to moderate NKPA resistance. - -“Sadly lacking as was information on the objective area,” commented the -Division G-2 report, “more so was that on the enemy in the area.” Early -in September, however, the Attack Force and Landing Force concurred -in the initial X Corps estimate of 1,500 to 2,500 NKPA troops in the -immediate area, consisting largely of newly raised personnel.[94] - - [94] See Appendix I for the Order of Battle of the units - which opposed the 1st Marine Division throughout the - Inchon-Seoul operation, listing them in chronological - order as to area of employment, strength, and - effectiveness. - -Radio reports of first-hand observations in the objective area, though -coming too late for initial planning purposes, confirmed some of the -G-2 estimates. This dangerous mission was undertaken by Lieutenant -Eugene F. Clark, a naval officer on General MacArthur’s JSPOG staff. -U. S. and British Marines provided an escort on 1 September when the -British destroyer _Charity_ brought him from Sasebo to a point along -the coast where the South Korean patrol vessel PC 703 waited to land -him at Yonghung-do, an island about 15 miles southwest of Inchon.[95] - - [95] This account is based upon: Capt James B. Soper interv, - 16 Aug 54; and Karig, _Korea_, 176–191. - -Clark went ashore with a small arsenal of firearms, grenades and -ammunition, as well as 30 cases of C rations and 200 pounds of rice. -He quickly made allies of the 400 friendly Korean inhabitants of the -island and organized his own private little “army” of about 150 youths -from 14 to 18 years old. These “troops” were posted about Yonghung-do -for security, since the near-by island, Taebu-do, was occupied by 400 -NKPA soldiers within wading distance at low tide. - -The naval officer had no illusions as to what his fate might be in -the event of capture. Day and night, he kept a grenade within reach, -since he did not intend to be taken alive. When the long expected -enemy attack from Taebu-do materialized, he commandeered a “one-lung” -South Korean motor sampan and fought it out with the NKPA motor sampan -escorting boats filled with soldiers. The enemy began the strange -“naval” battle with a few badly aimed rounds from a 37mm tank gun. -Clark and his crew of three friendly Koreans finished it with a long -burst from a .50 caliber machine gun. After sinking the NKPA motor -sampan, he destroyed another boat with 18 soldiers aboard and captured -three prisoners for questioning. - -One night the intrepid lieutenant rowed a dinghy to the Inchon sea -wall. When the tide went out, he tested the mire by wading in it up -to his waist. This experience led to the sending of a radio report, -“Inchon not suitable for landing either troops or vehicles across the -mud.” - -Korean youths, posing as fishermen, brought intelligence which Clark -included in his daily radio messages. One of these spies made an effort -to count the guns on Wolmi-do and describe the locations. Others took -measurements of the Inchon sea wall and penetrated as far inland as -Seoul to report numbers and positions of NKPA troops. - -Clark declined all offers to evacuate him. As the climax of his -exploit, he managed to restore the usefulness of the lighthouse on -Palmi Island which the enemy had put out of commission. This structure, -the former entrance beacon for Inchon by way of Flying Fish channel, -served him as a refuge when he had to leave Yonghung-do hurriedly just -ahead of NKPA troops who landed in force and butchered 50 civilians of -both sexes. Clark, who received a Silver Star, stuck it out on Palmi -until midnight of 14 September, when he turned on the beacon light to -guide the amphibious task force. - - -_The Landing Force Plan_ - -The decisions behind the Landing Force Plan--1st Marine Division OpnO -2-50--obviously had to be made without benefit of Lieutenant Clark’s -reports, since the publication date was 4 September 1950.[96] It is to -the credit of these conclusions, therefore, that so few of them had to -be corrected in the light of first-hand evidence from the objective -area. - - [96] See Appendix G for a chronological list of all 1st - Marine Division operation orders during the Inchon-Seoul - operation. - -Although CG X Corps was the assigned Expeditionary Troops Commander, -planning on the Corps level was concerned almost entirely with the -exploitation phase following the seizure of the beachhead. All Landing -Force planning was done on the _Mount McKinley_ by the Division in -close coordination with PhibGru One. - -The first consideration, as viewed by the Navy planners, was that -the tides, currents, and tortuous channels of Inchon made necessary -a four-hour daylight approach to the transport area. This meant that -1130, at low tide, was the earliest hour of arrival; and not until -about 1700 would the next high tide provide enough water for an assault -landing. - -On 15 September a maximum high tide of 31 feet could be expected at -1919. Evening twilight came at 1909. It was estimated initially that -23 feet of water would take the LCVPs and LVTs over the mud flats, but -that 29 feet were necessary for the beaching of the LSTs. - -In view of these conditions, PhibGru One planners concluded that 1700 -was the best time for landing the LCVPs and LVTs, and it was decided -to beach the LSTs at about 1900. Simultaneous landings of troops on -Wolmi-do and the mainland were contemplated. - -This was the point of departure for Division planners. They maintained -that Wolmi-do was the key terrain feature, and that it should be -secured first in a separate landing. The logical course, according to -the Marines, would be to utilize the morning high tide for the seizure -of this island commanding the waterfront. The enemy would be given the -whole day in which to prepare for the attack on the mainland; but the -Landing Force could also utilize this period for cleaning up Wolmi-do -and moving in supporting artillery. - -It was typical of the harmony prevailing between the two planning -groups on the _Mount McKinley_ that PhibGru One immediately accepted -the concept of a double-barreled attack. The rub was that a night -approach would be necessary to assault Wolmi-do at 0600 on the morning -high tide, and the Navy doubted the feasibility of a movement of the -slow-moving and unmaneuverable APAs, AKAs, and LSTs through winding, -mud-lined channels in the darkness. - -At length a compromise was reached with the decision to employ DD, APD, -and LSD types primarily, which were more maneuverable in addition to -being equipped with radar navigational instruments.[97] - - [97] This summary of Landing Force planning is based upon: - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, basic rpt; MarCorps Board _Study_, - v. I, II-B, 13–16; O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 58–62; PacFlt - _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able, 6–7. - -The morning landing on Wolmi-do was to be made with a single battalion -of the 5th Marines, to be designated by the Brigade. On the mainland -the remaining two battalions would land with the evening high tide on -RED Beach, just north of the causeway connecting the island with the -city, while two battalions of the 11th Marines landed in support on -Wolmi-do. Meanwhile the 1st Marines was to hit BLUE Beach, southeast -of the urban area. And after driving rapidly inland to consolidate -their positions before nightfall, the two Marine regiments were to -make a junction in the morning and seize the beachhead while the 17th -ROK Regiment (later replaced by 1st KMC Regiment) mopped up the city -streets. - -Marine G-4 planners suggested one of the most daring of all the -calculated risks. This was the decision to use LCVPs for the RED Beach -landings because their comparative speed would clear the landing area -for the beaching of eight LSTs--all that could be crammed into the -narrow confines of this strip of urban waterfront. Each was to be -loaded with ammunition, rations, water, and fuel. Obviously these Navy -workhorses, nicknamed “large slow targets”, would be easy marks for -NKPA shore guns, but this was a chance that had to be taken if the -assault troops were to be adequately supplied. - -There was not time, of course, to unload and retract the ships during -the period of evening high tide. They must be unloaded during the night -and taken out on the morning tide. - -Since it was not considered feasible to land LSTs on BLUE Beach, that -area would not be developed beyond the needs of the immediate assault. -For this purpose, 16 preloaded LVTs were to be used as floating dumps -until the 1st Marines could link up with the other regiment. - -These were the essentials of the Landing Force plan. H-hour was -ultimately determined from a study of late photographs which brought -about a slight change in estimates. Since a tide of 25 feet (two feet -higher than the initial estimate) appeared to be necessary for the -LCVPs and LVTs to reach the sea wall, H-hour was set at 1730 instead of -1700. The completed Landing Force plan provided for these steps: - - (1) BLT-3 of RCT-5 to land on Beach GREEN at L-hour on D-day - and seize Wolmi-do. - - (2) RCT-5 (-- BLT-3) to land on Beach RED at H-hour, seize - Objective O-A, effect a juncture with RCT-1, and prepare for - further operations to the east in coordination with RCT-1 to - seize the FBHL. - - (3) RCT-1, to land on Beach BLUE, with two battalions in - assault, seize Objective O-1, and prepare for further - operations to the east in coordination with RCT-5 to seize the - FBHL. - - (4) 11th Marines (-- 3d Bn) (96th F. A. Bn, USA, attached) to - land 1st and 2d Bns on Beach GREEN at H-hour, occupy positions - on Wolmi-do and support seizure of the beachhead with priority - of fires to RCT-1. Remainder of artillery to land on call. - - (5) ROK Marines, initially in Division reserve, to land over - Beach RED on call and conduct operations to occupy the city of - Inchon in coordination with RCT-5. - - (6) 1st Tank Bn (--) (Reinf.) to be prepared to land on order - one company in LSU on Beach GREEN, remainder of battalion on - order on beaches to be designated. - - (7) 1st Engr Bn (--) to land on Beach RED or in harbor on - order, assume control of detached companies on order, and - support seizure of beachhead as directed. Priority to opening - and maintaining MSR along southern edge of the city to RCT-1 - zone of action. - - (8) 1st Shore Party Bn (--) to land on order on Beach RED or in - harbor and assume control of shore party activities on Beaches - RED and GREEN. - - (9) 1st Amph Trac Bn to transport and land elements of RCT-1 on - Beach BLUE and continue support of RCT-1 until released. - - (10) 2d Engr Spl Brig, USA (Reinf.) to furnish ships platoons - and augment Division shore party as requested. After landing - and when directed, to assume operational control of Division - shore party and responsibility for control of all port - operations. To provide logistical support of 1st MarDiv. - - -_Availability of Brigade Troops_ - -The old recipe for rabbit stew began, “First, catch your rabbit.” And -while the Landing Force plan was being formulated, General Smith had no -assurance for a few days that he could count on having the whole of his -landing force available. - -General Almond informed the Marine general on 23 August that the -release of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade for participation in -the Inchon landing would depend on the military situation. He seemed -doubtful and added that the withdrawal of the Marines would be bad for -Eighth Army morale. - -The Attack Force and Landing Force began their planning, however, -on the basis of Brigade availability. It had been the intention of -CinCFE to employ a full Marine division, but an embarkation date of 1 -September would not permit the 7th Marines to arrive in time. This left -the 1st Marines as the only RCT of the Landing Force unless the 5th -Marines and other Brigade units could be released. - -On 30 August, Smith brought up the issue again in a dispatch to X -Corps, whereupon CinCFE issued an order making the Brigade troops -available to the Division on 4 September. - -This might have settled the issue if the enemy had not launched an -all-out offensive on 1 September to smash through the Pusan Perimeter. -Although the Brigade had already sent heavy equipment to Pusan for -embarkation, the Marines were rushed up to the front on 2 September as -a mobile reserve. That same day the order for their release was revoked. - -There could be no doubt about the gravity of the military situation. -Thirteen NKPA divisions were making a final effort, and the Marines -were needed in the Naktong Bulge sector, where the Korean Reds were -attempting to cut the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. - -On the other hand, time was also running out for the Inchon planners. -Colonel Forney, the new deputy chief of staff for X Corps, informed -Smith on 2 September that Almond planned to use the 32d Infantry of the -7th Infantry Division if the 7th Marines could not arrive in time for -the Inchon landing. Recently, the cadres of this Army division had been -brought up to strength with 8,000 South Koreans. The remaining 12,000 -U. S. troops had received no adequate amphibious training, though -instructors from Training Team Able had made a start with some of the -units. - -This turn of affairs resulted in a meeting in General Almond’s office. -The Navy was represented by Admirals Joy, Struble, and Doyle; the Army -by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright; and the Marines by General -Smith. - -Wright opened the discussion by stating that Walker needed the -Brigade troops urgently as a mobile reserve to hold the line in the -current NKPA offensive. Almond conceded that the question of Brigade -availability must be decided on a basis of Eighth Army requirements and -tactical considerations. But if the 5th Marines could not be released, -he reiterated his decision to substitute the 32d Infantry for the -Inchon operation. - -Admiral Joy declared that the success of the Inchon assault depended -on the employment of Marines trained in amphibious techniques; and -he called upon Smith for his opinion. The Marine general said that -a hastily instructed unit could not be expected to take the place -of a combat-experienced regiment in the Landing Force, and that -last-minute substitutions of this sort could not be made in complicated -ship-to-shore landings without courting trouble. He added that it would -be necessary in such an event to land in column on one beach instead -of two, with the 1st Marines in advance of the 32d Infantry. These -comments had the support of Doyle, who agreed that the availability of -the 5th Marines might mean the difference between success and failure -at Inchon. - -At this point Admiral Struble commented that the issue boiled down to -the need for a mobile Eighth Army reserve. He suggested as a compromise -that a regiment of the 7th Infantry Division be embarked and moved -to Pusan as a floating reserve to be landed in an emergency as a -substitute for the 5th Marines. This solution was accepted. Almond -called up Eighth Army Headquarters immediately, and within an hour -Wright telephoned to inform Smith that the Brigade would be relieved at -midnight on 5 September.[98] - - [98] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 74–80. _Chronicle_, 31 Aug-3 Sep - 50; Forney _Special Rpt_, II, 4. - -As it turned out, the 17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division was -embarked and transferred to Pusan to substitute for the 5th Marines, -with Marine officers of Training Team Able assisting in the outloading. -After the amphibious assault, the regiment landed administratively at -Inchon to rejoin its parent unit. - - -_Naval Gunfire and Rockets_ - -At a conference on 1 September called by Admiral Struble and attended -by Admirals Richard W. Ruble, John M. Higgins, and Sir William G. -Andrewes (RN)[99] in addition to Generals Ruffner and Smith, it was -tentatively agreed that the cruisers would begin the bombardment on the -morning of D-minus 1, and the destroyers that afternoon after a napalm -air strike had been conducted against Wolmi-do on D-minus 4. - - [99] See Appendix E for Naval Task Organization giving - components, ships, and commanders of JTF-7. - -At another naval gunfire conference two days later, the napalm strike -was delayed until D-minus 3. On 8 September, when Admiral Struble held -his final meeting, PhibGru One and the 1st Marine Division agreed -on the scope and timing of naval gunfire support. It was decided, -therefore, that the bombardment would commence on D-minus 2 and be -repeated if necessary on D-minus 1.[100] - - [100] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 72–74. - -During the following week, plans were worked out in detail. The -beachhead was divided into 52 target areas, including two on Wolmi-do -and one on Sowolmi-do. In the channel to the west and southwest of -the port, imaginary lines marked off three fire support areas for the -ships, numbered in order from south to north. - -[Illustration: PLAN FOR INCHON ASSAULT] - -[Illustration: _Call to Arms----Marine reservists fall in near railway -station in Seattle for departure to Camp Pendleton (U. S. Navy -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _The Invasion Fleet----Above, Marines board troopship in -Japan for voyage to objective; and, below, Marines eating breakfast on -transport at 3:30 on the morning of D-Day (Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Sunrise at Inchon----as seen from the USS Mount -McKinley_ (_U. S. Army Photo_).] - -[Illustration: _Smiles of Victory----General MacArthur shows his -approval of the Wolmi-do Landing; behind him (left to right) are Vice -Admiral Struble, Brigadier General Wright, and Major General Almond -(U. S. Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Action on Wolmi-do----Above, Marine using flame thrower -on enemy cave; and, below, assault troops mopping up on the island -(Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _H-Hour----Above, the first wave of LCVPs heads for the -beaches at Inchon; and, below, grounded LSTs bring supplies to captured -Wolmi-do (U. S. Navy Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Hitting the Beaches----Above, Marines in landing craft -on way to BLUE Beach with scaling ladders; and, below, assault troops -using ladders to climb seawall at RED Beach (Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Ashore at Inchon----Above, an LST brings supplies to -RED Beach on heels of assault troops (Marine Corps Photo); and, below, -Marines hoisting tank over seawall, with LST 802 in background (U. S. -Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Bombardment of Inchon----Above, railway station in -flames (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, burning factory buildings (U. S. -Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Inchon Secured----Above, enemy gun emplacement (U. S. -Navy Photo); and, below, troops of 5th Marines advancing in streets of -Inchon (U. S. Army Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Advance to Force Beachhead Line----Above, assault -troops of 1st Marines move up in DUKWs; and, below, Marine tanks and -amtracs northeast of Inchon (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Upper Command Level----Above, Generals Almond (left) -and Shepherd go ashore in launch of USS_ Mount McKinley; _and, below, -General Smith and Admiral Doyle confer on the USS_ Rochester (_U. S. -Navy Photos_).] - -[Illustration: _Inchon Harbor Scenes----Above, a VMO-6 helicopter gives -a lift to a Marine officer on LCP; and, below, LST 1123 stranded at low -tide (U. S. Navy Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Interludes----Above, Hospitalman Philip A. Barome, USN, -shares his “C” rations with a Korean youngster (U. S. Navy Photo); -and, below, Private G. W. Febrey and Corporal Charles E. Burris of 1st -Marine Division, fill can at captured Yongdungpo brewery (U. S. Army -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _D-Plus 2----Above, Marine tank-infantry team searches -houses in Korean village (Marine Corps Photo); and, below, stripped -NKPA prisoners are marched past killed enemy tank (U. S. Army Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _RED Beach----LSTs unloading and Marine trucks taking -supplies to advancing troops on D-plus 2 (U. S. Army Photo)._] - -On D-day the four cruisers would stand in from 13,000 to 15,000 yards -offshore in Fire Support Area I, while the destroyers in FSAs II and -III manned stations 800 to 6,000 yards from the beach. The three LSMRs -would first support the Wolmi-do landing from close-in positions to -the north and west of the island. Later, for H-hour, one of the rocket -ships was to remain northward to soften up RED Beach, and the other two -would displace to the vicinity of BLUE Beach.[101] - - [101] This summary of naval gunfire planning is derived from: - ComPhibGru One _OpnO_ 14-50, Annex George, app. II, III. - -From L-minus 45 to L-minus 2, the cruisers and destroyers would dump -a total of 2,845 shells on Inchon and its outlying island, each ship -concentrating on specifically assigned target areas. From L-minus 15 to -L-minus 2, each of the three LSMRs would saturate Wolmi-do with 1,000 -5-inch rockets. Most of the ships were to cease fire two minutes before -the landing on GREEN Beach, when Marine planes strafed possible enemy -positions for final shock effect. Four of the destroyers would continue -to pound Inchon targets with 55 shells during the short air attack. - -Another intricate piece in the mosaic of destruction was the mission -assigned to one LSMR for the period immediately preceding and following -the landing of 3/5. The lone rocket ship would lumber parallel to -Wolmi-do’s shoreline, across the front of the advancing first wave, and -pour 40mm shells into the beach area. Clearing the route of approach -to GREEN Beach just in time for the landing craft to speed by, the -LSMR was to continue southward along the coast and direct its heavy -automatic fire at the slopes in advance of the attacking troops. - -Once Wolmi-do was secured, the full fury of the support ships would -rain down on targets in the Inchon area. From H-minus 180 to H-minus -5, the cruisers and destroyers were scheduled to blast their assigned -targets with a total of 2,875 shells. Chiming in at H-minus 25 with -2,000 rockets apiece, the LSMRs would pulverize RED and BLUE Beaches -until five minutes before the landings by the two Marine regiments. -At that time, all ships must cease fire to clear the way for strafing -Corsairs and Navy Skyraiders. - -The meticulous planning left nothing to chance, even with the -assumption that a foothold would be successfully established by -darkness. During the night of D-day, the cruisers would expend an -additional 250 shells on interdictory missions, and the destroyers -were authorized to fire a total of 300 5-inch rounds on call from the -infantry. To help thwart any possible enemy ambitions at dawn of D-plus -1, the cruisers would be prepared to unload 300 shells for interdiction -and call fires, while the destroyers stood poised with the same number -of high-explosive missiles plus 300 illuminating shells. - -Other details of the elaborate plan dealt with the coordination of -naval gunfire, air, artillery, mortars, and rockets. At certain times, -for example, Marine and Navy gunners could fire only below a maximum -trajectory of 1100 feet, so that planes, whose minimum altitude was set -at 1500 feet, could pass safely over Inchon during strikes on adjacent -areas. During those periods when close support Corsairs were scheduled -to descend on beachhead targets, all other heavy weapons would fire -completely clear of broad circles defining strike areas for the air -missions. - -More tables and instructions in the formidable appendixes of Admiral -Doyle’s operation order assigned shore fire control parties their ships -and radio frequencies, ships their battery missions and ammunition -allowances, and a host of other tasks and responsibilities. - - -_Air Support for Inchon_ - -Air support, of course, was closely related to naval gunfire planning. -After the arrival of CG 1st MAW and his staff at Tokyo on 3 September, -part of the group proceeded at once to Itami Air Force Base while -General Harris and selected staff members remained at Tokyo for -planning conferences. - -Air support planning for Inchon was based on the decision that the sky -over the objective area was to be divided between the organic air units -of JTF-7 and X Corps. - -JTF-7 counted on its fast carrier task force, TF-77, to gain air -supremacy and furnish deep support and interdiction strikes. Close -support for the landing was to be provided by the two squadrons of -TG-90.5, on board the CVEs _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_, which had -been the main air components of MAG-33 in support of the 1st Marine -Provisional Brigade. In addition, the Attack Force commander could also -call upon the aircraft of TF-77 for close support. - -Organic air support for X Corps was to be the mission of the Tactical -Air Control set up under the operational control of the corps -commander and the direct command of General Cushman. The inspiration -for this organization came from Marine officers on the staff of X -Corps. Their suggestions were accepted by General Almond, who used his -authority as FECOM chief of staff to put the idea into effect. - -MAG-33 was designated by General Harris from the Forward Echelon, 1st -MAW, to serve as TAC X Corps, with VMFs 212 and 312 in addition to -VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513. These units were not to -be assigned, however, until X Corps assumed control of operations in -the objective area, whereupon they would be based at Kimpo Airfield. -Meanwhile, they remained under the administrative control of ComNavFE -and MAG-12, with headquarters at the Itami AFB in Japan. The two -Marine carrier-based squadrons and the forward echelon of VMF(N)-513, -having come out to Korea in August as units of MAG-33, continued to be -assigned temporarily to that group for administrative purposes.[102] - - [102] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt and Annex Able: PacFlt - _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Charlie Charlie, 4–5. - -TAC X Corps was activated on 8 September, just six days before its -components landed in Japan. 1st MAW planners designated the Air Support -Section of MTACS-2, which had controlled air support for the Brigade, -to continue in that capacity for the Landing Force and later for the -entire X Corps. Arrangements were made with the Combat Cargo Command, -FEAF, to airlift aviation fuel and ammunition from Japan to Kimpo -Airfield, after its capture, until such supplies could be transported -by sea. - -Marine air units were also affected, of course, by the planning which -the 1st Marine Division air and naval gunfire representatives of the -Fire Support Coordination Center had already accomplished. Working -aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in conjunction with their opposite numbers -of PhibGru One, the FSCC group had been busy since its arrival in Japan -on 18 August. Planning was conducted with the CO 11th Marines after -the artillery regiment landed in Japan, and the resulting decisions -coordinated with air and naval gunfire plans. - -The 1st MAW completed its planning on 9 September. General Cushman was -designated Tactical Air Commander, X Corps, on that date and departed -for the objective area the next day with the air elements scheduled to -proceed by ship. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -Embarkation and Assault - -_Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield--Shipping -Assigned to Marines--Movement to the Objective Area--Strikes and -Bombardments--Marine Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands -Secured_ - - -On 30 August, ComNavFE issued his Operation Plan 108-50, assigning -to JTF-7, of which X Corps was a part, the mission of seizing by -amphibious assault a beachhead at Inchon. - -X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by -Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so -much progress that Embarkation Order 1-50 was issued on the last day of -the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO -2-50. Operations orders of JTF-7 and TF-90 were issued concurrently. - -This meant that the assault RCTs, contrary to amphibious doctrine, were -to receive rigid landing plans drawn up completely by the Division. -Lack of time caused this variation from usual procedure, but General -Smith had confidence in the ability of his troops to overcome the -handicap. “Under the circumstances,” he asserted, “adoption of such -methods was justified by the common background and training of all -elements and individuals in amphibious doctrine, procedures, tactics, -and techniques.”[103] - - [103] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie. - -The most that could be done was to summon Brigade staff officers from -Korea for a conference. Colonel Edward D. Snedeker (Chief of Staff), -Captain Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN (Brigade Surgeon), Lieutenant -Colonel Arthur A. Chidester (G-4), and Major Donald W. Sherman -(G-1) arrived on board the _Mount McKinley_ for a conference on 28 -August and the following day. The Brigade G-3, Lieutenant Colonel -Joseph L. Stewart, reported as liaison officer on the 31st. When he -returned to the front, the 5th Marines was attacking, and he discussed -landing schedules with Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray while the -regimental commander directed the action. - -“This,” remarked General Smith, “was hardly in accordance with accepted -procedure for planning amphibious operations.”[104] - - [104] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 82. See v. I of this series for a - detailed account of the Brigade in the second battle of - the Naktong and the embarkation from Pusan. - -The recommendation of Brigade staff officers that the 3d Battalion, -5th Marines, be designated for the assault on Wolmi-do was accepted -by Division planners. Colonel Snedeker also proposed that the 1st -Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment of nearly 3,000 men be substituted -for the 17th ROK Regiment, which he said was committed in the Pusan -Perimeter and might not be available. The change was approved by GHQ on -3 September, with the Eighth Army being directed to provide weapons for -the newcomers. - -This was the beginning of a relationship that would find the KMCs -serving with distinction alongside the men of the 1st Marine Division -and eventually becoming a fourth infantry regiment of the Division. -Activated in 1949 by the Republic of Korea, the unit took part in -anti-guerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. After the outbreak -of hostilities, the KMCs fought creditably in UN delaying actions in -southwest Korea. The turning point came when they were attached to the -1st Marine Division and sent to Pusan for test-firing of their new -weapons before embarking for Inchon. Immediately the Koreans commenced -to model themselves after U. S. Marines so assiduously as to win -respect for their spirit and rugged fighting qualities.[105] They were -quick to learn, despite the language handicap, and showed aptitude in -mechanical respects. - - [105] 1st MarDiv, “1st KMC Regiment and its relationship to - the 1st Marine Division,” (Type “C” Rpt) 1–2. - - -_Landing of 1st Marine Division_ - -The main body of the 1st Marine Division troops landed at Kobe from -29 August to 3 September. Marine officers sent in advance to that -seaport had found the authorities there “very cooperative” and brought -back to Tokyo a billeting plan which General Smith approved. Since -the facilities in and about Kobe were limited, two large APs were -designated as barracks ships, thus making available a Marine labor pool -at the docks. - -At best, every hour was needed for the tremendous task of transferring -cargo from merchant type shipping into assault shipping.[106] There was -cause for anxiety, therefore, when a telephone message informed the -command of the 1st Marine Division on 3 September that Typhoon JANE -had struck Kobe with winds of 74 miles per hour. First reports had it -that the _Marine Phoenix_ was on the bottom with all of the Division’s -signal gear. Several ships were said to have broken their moorings and -gone adrift; the docks were reported under 4 feet of water, and loose -cargo on the piers had been inundated by breakers. - - [106] As a time-saving measure, it was decided to combat-load - only the assault elements, allowing the other elements - to go as organization loads. This was considered - an acceptable risk in view of the enemy’s lack of - effective air and submarine forces. - -Later accounts proved to be less alarming. The _Marine Phoenix_, having -merely developed a bad list as a result of shifting cargo, was soon -righted. Nor was the other damage as serious as had at first been -supposed. But 24 hours were lost from the tight reloading schedule -while Typhoon JANE kicked up her heels, and time was one commodity that -could not be replaced. All operations at Kobe had to be speeded up to -pay for this delay. - -On 4 September the _Mount McKinley_ set sail for Kobe, arriving at 1445 -the next day to be welcomed by an Army band at the pier. The soothing -powers of music were needed by Marine officers who learned that fire -had broken out in the hold of the _Noonday_ as she belatedly approached -Kobe. This “Jonah” had taken so long to load at San Diego that she -lagged behind the others, and now large quantities of much-needed -Marine clothing were apparently ruined by water when the fire was -extinguished. Once again the Army came to the rescue with wholehearted -cooperation by taking the water-soaked boxes to a reclamation depot -where the garments were dried, repackaged and sent back to the docks in -time for loading out on the originally scheduled ships. - -Only the most basic troop training could be conducted at Kobe to -supplement the individual and amphibious instruction the men had -received on shipboard. At this time, moreover, an order from the -Secretary of the Navy made it necessary to reduce the size of the -landing force by withdrawing about 500 Marines who had not yet reached -their 18th birthday. They were transferred to the 1st Armored Amphibian -Tractor Battalion, which was to be left behind at Kobe when the -Division embarked for Inchon. - -This unit had been organized at Camp Pendleton in accordance with a -directive from the Commandant. It was found necessary, however, to -transfer most of its combat-ready men to the 1st Tank Battalion in -order to bring that outfit up to full strength. The tank battalion -was given priority because its vehicles would be used throughout -the operation while the armored amphibians might be employed only -occasionally. As a consequence, the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor -Battalion left San Diego with new personnel lacking in the skills to -make it fully combat ready. - -Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Cooper, the commanding officer, -recommended at Kobe that the unit be withheld from action until -drivers, gunners, and maintenance crews could be properly trained. -General Smith and his staff concurred, having learned that a trained -Army unit, Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, could be -made available. Orders were given for Cooper’s battalion to remain at -Kobe, therefore, with the 17-year-old Marines attached. - -Several other U. S. Army units were to take part along with the -Marines--the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2d Engineer Special -Brigade, the 73d Engineer (c) Battalion, the 73d Tank Battalion, the -50th Engineer Port Construction Company, and the 65th Ordnance and -Ammunition Company. These units comprised a total of about 2,750 troops. - -Plans called for the commanding officer of the 2d Engineer Special -Brigade to head a logistical task organization which also included -several Marine units--the 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Combat -Service Group, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The Shore Party -troops were to initiate unloading at the objective, whereupon the -over-all control would pass to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, on -order, to insure continuity of development of unloading facilities.[107] - - [107] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annexes Dog and Jig; - O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 101, 104, 107, 110–112. - -Division service units, in accordance with current directives, were to -carry the 30-day replenishment of spare parts appropriate to the unit -concerned. Although the Combat Service Group had neither spare parts -nor supplies, it was to have custody of both after the landing. Thus -the units would be freed immediately to move away from the beach in -support of the Division as it drove toward Kimpo and Seoul.[108] - - [108] See Appendix D for a list of supplies and equipment to - be embarked in assigned shipping, as prescribed by 1st - MarDiv Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 Aug 50. - -At Kobe the men of the 1st Marine Division were required to leave the -full clothing bags they had brought from San Diego and embark for -Inchon with field transport packs containing only the most essential -items. This meant that some 25,000 sea bags must be stored at the -Japanese port in such a way that future casualties and rotation drafts -could reclaim their personal effects without delay. As a reminder of -the grim task ahead, provisions must be also made to return to proper -custody the effects of deceased personnel. - - -_Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield_ - -Intelligence reports on the eve of embarkation did not depart from -earlier estimates of a maximum of 2,500 NKPA troops in the objective -area. From 400 to 500 were believed to be garrisoning Wolmi-do, 500 -defending Kimpo, and the balance stationed in and about Inchon.[109] -Despite the estimates of low to moderate enemy resistance, however, -General Smith differed with the command of X Corps when a commando-type -raid on Kimpo was proposed. - - [109] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker. - -The question came up on 8 September at a conference held at Kobe on the -_Mount McKinley_ and attended by Generals Hickey and Smith, Admiral -Doyle and Colonel Louis B. Ely, USA. Ely commanded the newly formed -X Corps Special Operations Company composed of 124 U. S. Army troops -briefly trained by TTU instructors in demolitions, individual combat -and ship-to-shore movements in rubber boats.[110] General Almond’s plan -called for this company, reinforced by Marines, to embark at Kobe on 10 -September in a British frigate and transfer to a South Korean picket -boat. Upon arrival at the objective area on D-day, the raiders were to -paddle three miles in rubber boats to the north of the Attack Force, -land under cover of darkness, and move inland for a surprise attack on -Kimpo at dawn. - - [110] Col E. H. Forney, _Special Report_, 5–7. - -General Almond felt it necessary to seize the airfield at the earliest -possible moment. Surprise, he felt, would reduce the risks. General -Smith pointed out, however, that Colonel Ely’s men would have to row -their rubber boats against a strong tide and cross a wide expanse of -mud flats on foot. His radios could only reach four miles, and his -presence in the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action would restrict the -use of naval gunfire and air support. Finally, said the Marine general, -it was not certain that the raiders could hold the airfield even if -they took it.[111] - - [111] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 92–95. - -This conference did not settle the issue. Colonel Williams, the -Division chief of staff, was requested in a telephone call followed -by a dispatch from the G-1 Section of GHQ to turn over 100 specially -qualified Marines to Ely’s company. Smith sent a dispatch requesting -reconsideration. He cited the battle casualties of the Brigade, which -had not been replaced, and the 500 under-age Marines to be left behind -at Kobe. As a final objection, many of his best qualified men had -already embarked on the LSTs. - -General Shepherd sent a dispatch supporting the 1st Marine Division -commander, and the order from GHQ was recalled.[112] - - [112] _Ibid._ Colonel Ely actually did embark with his - Special Operations Company and make the approach, but - the landing was called off because of his last-minute - decision that too great a distance had to be covered in - rubber boats. - -Another proposal by General Almond to speed up the drive inland from -the beachhead was relayed to General Smith aboard the _Mount McKinley_ -on 9 September by Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, ADC of the 7th -Infantry Division. This was a plan to land a battalion of the 32d -Infantry on GREEN Beach, Wolmi-do, with a mission of racing across -the causeway on the late afternoon of D-day and moving rapidly down -the road to seize the high ground south of Seoul, more than 20 miles -inland. The 1st Marine Division was requested to furnish five tanks in -support of the enterprise tentatively scheduled to take place while two -battalions of Marine artillery were landing on Wolmi-do and two Marine -rifle regiments were landing on the Inchon beaches. - -This idea struck Smith as being extremely optimistic. Without -going into the tactical objections, he decided that the scheme was -logistically impracticable.[113] - - [113] _Ibid._ It later developed that the 32d Infantry, first - regiment of the 7th Infantry Division ashore, did not - land until D-plus 3. - - -_Shipping Assigned to Marines_ - -The embarkation at Kobe was not completed without some confusion. -Much of the equipment was in its original containers and had never -been checked or identified. Large quantities of Class I, III, and V -supplies, distributed throughout the incoming shipping, had to be -reassembled and reassigned for the outloading. In the lack of suitable -storage areas near the piers, Classes III and V were off-loaded into -Japanese barges and held in floating storage until they could be -reloaded into assault shipping.[114] - - [114] See Appendix D. - -Inter-pier transfer of cargo was avoided whenever possible by berthing -incoming shipping so that units could load directly into assault -shipping. Unfortunately, this could not be done in some instances, -since the LST landing was outside but adjacent to the pier area. - -Facilities for the embarkation of the Brigade at Pusan were -satisfactory, with pier space for three APAs and one AKA at one -pier and an LSD at another. All of the assigned LSTs could beach -simultaneously along the sea wall. - -Only Marine amphibious experience enabled the Division to complete -its tremendous task at Kobe in spite of the time lost as a result of -Typhoon JANE. The shipping tentatively assigned by X Corps consisted -of one AGC, six APAs, eight AKAs, three LSDs, one LSM, three APDs, 12 -LSUs, and 47 LSTs. This last figure included 17 Navy-manned and 30 -SCAJAP (Japanese-manned) LSTs. The troop list of approximately 29,000 -men was broken down by the Division into the following six embarkation -groups with their assigned shipping: - - -----------------+-------------------+------------------------- - Embarkation group| Principal units | Shipping - -----------------+-------------------+------------------------- - ABLE |Divisional Troops |1 AGC - |1st CSG |2 APAs - | |5 AKAs - | |9 LSTs - | |1 LSM - | |3 LSUs (towed to - | | objective area by tugs) - | | - BAKER |1st Marine (Reinf) |1 APA - |1st Amtrac Bn |12 LSTs - | | - CHARLIE |5th Marines (Reinf)|3 APAs - |73d Tank Bn, USA |12 LSTs - | |3 APDs - | |1 LSD w/3 LSUs - | | - DOG |11th Marines |1 AKA - | |6 LSTs - | | - EASY |1st Tank Bn |2 LSDs w/3 LSUs each - | |4 LSTs (later - | | increased to 6) - | | - FOX |2d Engr Spec Brig, |1 AKA - | USA | - |96th FA Bn, USA |4 LSTs - -----------------+-------------------+------------------------- - -Four of these groups were to embark from Kobe while CHARLIE mounted -out from Pusan and FOX from Yokohama, Yokosuka, and Camp McGill in -Japan.[115] The main body of the Division’s third rifle regiment, the -7th Marines, was scheduled to land in Japan on 17 September. Colonel -Litzenberg, the commanding officer, arrived at Itami Airfield on the -6th, having flown from Camp Pendleton ahead of his troops to make -arrangements. - - [115] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annex Jig; O. P. Smith, - _Notes_, 102, 117–119. - - -_Movement to the Objective Area_ - -Command relationships during the assault and embarkation phase were as -follows: - - +---------+ - | CinCFE | - +----+----+ - | - +----+----+ - |ComNavFE | - +----+----+ - | - +----+----+ - | CJTF-7 | - +----+----+ - | - +---------+--------+ - | | - +-----+----+ +-----+-----+ - | CTF-90 | |CG X Corps | - +-----+----+ +-----+-----+ - | | - +---------+---------+--------+--------+ - | | | - +------+-------+ +-------+------+ +------+-------+ - | ComPhibGru-1 | |CG 7th Inf Div| |CG 1st Mar Div| - +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ - -The movement of JTF-7 to the objective area was planned in the most -exacting detail, owing to the dispersion of the ships to begin with, -the need for secrecy, and the limited time. Another complication -entered the picture at the last minute, when a second typhoon loomed on -the Pacific horizon with considerably more menace than its exotic name -would imply. - -Navy meteorologists had been plotting the movement of Typhoon KEZIA -since the first signs of turbulence near the Marianas Islands on 6 -September. Generating winds of 100 miles per hour three days later, -the typhoon was churning a steady course toward the East China Sea and -Tsushima Strait, where it was expected to hit on 12 or 13 September. -The timing could not have been worse as far as Admiral Doyle and -General Smith were concerned. KEZIA threatened to strike the ships -of the task force during the last stages of embarkation and the -first phase of the approach to Inchon. And any serious disruption of -the Navy’s delicate timetable would place the 15 September deadline -hopelessly beyond reach. - -With the carriers, cruisers, and destroyers scheduled to be in the -Yellow Sea, beyond the path of the storm, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious -vessels were the most imperiled elements. The Attack Force Commander -planned to move his ships to the objective area in six increments, -three of them loading in Japan, one in Pusan, and two at both places -simultaneously. Because of the last two, certain rendezvous areas -were designated so that fragments of a group could converge at sea to -form the whole. Obviously, then, the mathematics of navigation was a -dominant factor. Success hinged on coordination in terms of hours, not -weeks or days. - -Each of the six increments had its own time schedule for an independent -voyage. The route to Inchon was marked off on maps by a chain of check -points, the most significant of which bore the code names ARKANSAS, -IOWA, and CALIFORNIA. The first two, lying in the East China Sea off -the southwestern tip of Korea, formed the junction of the sea lanes -from Japan and Pusan. Consequently, there was no alternative to their -remaining fixed in the direct path of the oncoming typhoon. Point -CALIFORNIA was important in that it marked the end of the open sea -phase and the beginning of the treacherous offshore approach to Inchon -via Flying Fish and East channels.[116] - - [116] ComPhibGru-1, _OpOrder 14-50_, Annex Dog. - -[Illustration: MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA] - -The departure schedule for the Attack Force was set out in Doyle’s -Operation Order 14-50 as follows: - - ------------------------------------------------------+--------+------ - Unit | Port | Date - ------------------------------------------------------+--------+------ - Pontoon Movement Group (2 ATFs, 3 LSUs, 1 YTB, 1 YW) |Yokohama| 5 Sep - LSMR Movement Element (3 LSMRs) | do | 9 Sep - Tractor Movement Element A (LSM, 1 AMS, 1 AM, 1 ARS, 2| | - LSDs, 36 LSTs) |Kobe |10 Sep - Tractor Movement Element B (1 ARL, 1 PF, 1 PCEC, | | - 12 LSTs) | do |10 Sep - Transport Movement Group (5 APAs, 8 AKAs, 1 AP, 2 PFs)| do |12 Sep - Advance Attack Group (Wolmi-do) (1 LSD, 3 APDs) |Pusan |13 Sep - ------------------------------------------------------+--------+------ - -The chart shows the basic pattern, which would evolve only after -considerable shuffling and secondary routing. For instance, two vessels -of the cumbersome Pontoon Movement Group, carrying vital equipment -for the expansion of Inchon’s port facilities, would not leave Sasebo -until 11 September. They were to join the slow Yokohama convoy near -Point IOWA the same day. Tractor Elements A and B, the latter trailing -at a distance of six miles, would pick up the Pusan LSTs at IOWA on -13 September. The Kobe contingent of the Transport Movement Group was -to pass through Point ARKANSAS on the 14th, joining the _Cavalier_, -_Pickaway_, _Henrico_, and _Seminole_ from Pusan. - -All ship movements took place on schedule until the morning of 11 -September, when angry ocean swells off the coast of Japan marked the -approach of KEZIA. Winds at the center of the typhoon were estimated -at 125 miles per hour, but Admiral Doyle based his decisions on the -assumption that the storm would curve off to the north instead of -colliding with the invasion armada in full force. He was taking a -calculated risk, therefore, when he ordered the Transport Movement -Group at Kobe to weigh anchor on the 11th, a day ahead of schedule, and -proceed to the objective area. The LSTs, already on their way, were now -out of danger; and Doyle believed that advancing the sailing date would -enable the AKAs and APAs to escape the worst of the typhoon. - -The _Mount McKinley_, with Doyle, Smith, and their staffs aboard, -departed Kobe at 1030 on the 11th. As the ship rolled and pitched in -heavy seas, the Attack Force Commander remarked that KEZIA was one of -the worst storms he had ever encountered.[117] - - [117] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129. - -This was also the opinion of Captain Cameron Briggs, USN, then fighting -it out with KEZIA in an effort to reach Sasebo with the carrier _Boxer_ -and its 96 planes plus 14 extra aircraft taken aboard at Pearl Harbor. -It was necessary to launch these spares and land them on Okinawa before -he could finally make port on the 12th and prepare to mount out two -days later for Inchon.[118] - - [118] Karig, _Korea_, 197. - -On 12 September the _Mount McKinley_ overtook the AKAs and APAs. They -had reversed course, apparently on the assumption that they could not -get around the typhoon. If Doyle had not ordered the heaving vessels to -circle about and follow the flagship through the storm, their chances -for meeting the 15 September deadline at Inchon would have vanished -like the wind-whipped spray.[119] - - [119] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129. - -There was no joy in the troop compartments as the transports plowed -through mountains of water. But Doyle was winning his gamble that the -typhoon would slowly veer off to the north, and starting the Transport -Group a day early proved to be a sound decision. Thanks to the -admiral’s judgment and resolution, every ship weathered the storm and -approached Point ARKANSAS on schedule. - -After rounding Kyushu on 12 September, the _Mount McKinley_ docked at -Sasebo that evening to pick up General MacArthur with his party of GHQ -and X Corps officers. The proper ship for this purpose was Admiral -Struble’s flagship, the USS _Rochester_. But CinCFE preferred the -_Mount McKinley_ despite the fact that an AGC was designed for the -staffs of an Attack Force and Landing Force and had no accommodations -suited to a party including seven general officers. The ship was warped -in by two tugs and CinCFE came aboard. General Shepherd had previously -been assigned by General MacArthur to his staff for temporary duty -as amphibious adviser and personal liaison officer to the 1st Marine -Division. The Marine general was accompanied by Colonel V. H. Krulak, -G-3 of FMFPac, and his personal aide, Major J. B. Ord. - -In less than an hour the _Mount McKinley_ was back on the high seas, -straining through the darkness toward Korea.[120] - - [120] _Ibid._ - -All elements of the Attack Force completed the last leg of the voyage -without incident on 14 September. Headquarters of the 2d Battalion, 1st -Marines, rode the only cripple, an LST partially incapacitated by an -engine breakdown. Fortunately, an ocean-going tug was on hand to tow -the ailing vessel at eight knots--sufficient speed to get her to the -objective area on time. - -The Yellow Sea was quiet as the columns of ships closed on Point -CALIFORNIA and Korea’s coastline. Nothing was taken for granted, -and the approach was carefully screened to the very end by Admiral -Andrewes’ fast Blockade and Covering Force. - - -_Air and Naval Bombardments_ - -The softening up of Wolmi-do had begun on 10 September, when the Marine -fliers of TG-95.5 made napalm attacks designed to burn off the trees -screening NKPA artillery. Six planes of VMF-323 and eight planes of -VMF-214 took off from the CVEs at 0600 and scorched the eastern side of -the island. The next flight of 14 planes found it necessary to orbit -for a few minutes until the smoke cleared sufficiently for them to -continue the work of destruction. - -Lieutenant Clark’s reports had led G-2 officers to believe that enemy -defensive installations on Wolmi-do were more formidable than had -at first been supposed. As if in support of this conclusion, the -Marine fliers of the second strike were greeted with small-caliber -anti-aircraft fire both from the island and mainland. A third attack, -launched from the decks of the _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_ shortly -before noon, left the hump-backed island in flames from one shore to -another. - -After the CVEs returned to Sasebo for replenishment the next day, -the carrier-based Navy planes of TF-77 worked over both Wolmi-do and -Inchon on 12 and 13 September. It was now the turn of the destroyers, -and Admiral Higgins had planned a bold venture. Instead of risking -collision or grounding in a night approach, he decided to forego the -advantages of surprise and attack in broad daylight. And instead of -avoiding NKPA fire, he intended to goad the enemy into retaliations -which would reveal the positions of NKPA guns on Wolmi-do. - -The hazards of the operation were increased by the fact that a ROK PC -boat had discovered an NKPA craft laying mines on the morning of the -10th. This confirmed Admiral Struble’s opinion that the Inchon area -offered the enemy excellent opportunities for this form of warfare. -Not only would the muddy waters make detection difficult, but crippled -ships would block the narrow channel. - -It was not a pleasant prospect. And the outlook became darker on the -morning of 13 September when four mines were spotted in Flying Fish -Channel. The U. S. cruisers _Toledo_ and _Rochester_ and the British -cruisers _Kenya_ and _Jamaica_ had dropped off in support as the six -destroyers carried out their mission. Pausing only to detonate the -mines with 40mm rounds, the cans moved up within 800 yards of Wolmi-do -to fire down the enemy’s throat while the four cruisers poured in 6- -and 8-inch salvoes and the planes of TF-77 made bombing runs.[121] - - [121] Lynn Montross, “Fleet Marine Force Korea,” _United - States Naval Institute Proceedings_, 37, no. 9 (Aug - 53): 836–838. - -It had been long since the Navy issued the historic order “Prepare to -repel boarders!” But Admiral Higgins did not overlook the possibility -of NKPA infantry swarming out over the mud flats to attack a disabled -and grounded destroyer. And though he did not issue pikes and -cutlasses, the crews of the _Gurke_, _Henderson_, _Swanson_, _Collett_, -_De Haven_, and _Mansfield_ were armed with grenades and Tommy guns for -action at close quarters. - -The enemy endured half an hour of punishment before obliging Higgins -by opening up with the shore guns of Wolmi-do. The _Gurke_ and _De -Haven_ took hits, and five NKPA shells found the _Collett_. The total -damage was insignificant, however, and the casualties amounted to one -man killed and eight wounded. These results cost the enemy dearly when -the cruisers and destroyers silenced the NKPA guns shortly after they -revealed their positions. - -On the return trip the destroyers found eight more mines and exploded -them. This proved to be all, for the enemy had neglected an opportunity -to make the waters around Inchon dangerous for the attack force. The -next morning, when the destroyers paid another visit to Wolmi-do, the -shore guns appeared to have been effectually silenced. The DDs fired -more than 1,700 5-inch shells and drew only a few scattered shots -in reply. Meanwhile, the Marine planes of VMFs-214 and -323, having -returned from Sasebo, cooperated by spotting for the cruisers and -launching napalm strikes before and after the bombardment. - -On the evening of 14 September, after five days of continual pounding, -Wolmi-do was a blasted piece of real estate as the Marines of 3/5 -prepared to hit GREEN Beach in the morning. - - -_Marine Landings on GREEN Beach_ - -The pre-dawn stillness of the Yellow Sea was shattered as the Corsairs -of VMFs-214 and -323 flashed up from the decks of the _Sicily_ and -_Badoeng Strait_. To the west the planes of Task Force 77 were -assembling in attack formations above the _Valley Forge_, _Philippine -Sea_, and _Boxer_. Squadron after squadron droned eastward through the -blackness, and the first aircraft began orbiting over the objective -area at 0454.[122] - - [122] ComAirSupGrp and ComCarDiv 15 _Report of Operations - 6–21 Sep 50_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item: Baker, 4. - -Two hours earlier, Advance Attack Group 90.1, under Captain Norman W. -Sears, USN, had glided into the entrance of Flying Fish channel. Led by -the _Mansfield_, the column of 19 ships snaked through the treacherous -passage while captains and navigators sweated over radar scopes. -Lieutenant Clark’s handiwork provided a welcome relief midway along -the route, when the glimmering beacon on Palmi-do guided the vessels -past one of the more dangerous points in the channel. Minutes after -air cover began to form over Inchon, the ships eased into the narrows -west of Wolmi-do and sought assigned battle stations. Training their -big guns on the port city were the cruisers _Toledo_, _Rochester_, -_Kenya_, and _Jamaica_, comprising one of the three Fire Support Units -under Admiral Higgins. Other support vessels scattered throughout the -waters of the objective area were the destroyers _Collet_, _Gurke_, -_Henderson_, _Mansfield_, _De Haven_, _Swenson_, and _Southerland_; -and this array of fire power was further supplemented by the three -bristling rocket ships, LSMR’s 401, 403, and 404.[123] - - [123] 1st MarDiv _OpOrder_ 2-50; Karig, _Korea_, 213. - -The control ship, _Mount McKinley_, its flag bridge crowded with -star-studded commanders, steamed into the narrows just before dawn. -No sooner had the gray shoreline become outlined in the morning haze -than the 6- and 8-inch guns of the cruisers belched sheets of orange -flame in the direction of Inchon; and at 0545, the initial explosions -rocked the city and reverberated throughout the channel. There was -a deafening crescendo as the destroyers hammered Wolmi-do with their -5-inch guns. Radio Hill, its seaward side already burnt and blackened -from previous bombardments, was almost hidden by smoke when Marine -planes streaked down at 0600 to smother the island with tons of rockets -and bombs.[124] - - [124] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. I; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, - 15–20 Sep 50_; O. P. Smith, _Notes_. - -Captain Sears, reporting to the _Mount McKinley_, confirmed L-hour at -0630. To this end, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s landing force -was boated by 0600, and the LCVPs and LSUs rendezvoused while Marine -air continued to soften up the target.[125] - - [125] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_. - -Air attacks ceased at 0615, but Wolmi-do enjoyed only a momentary -respite before the most unnerving blow of all. In strange contrast to -the sleek men-o’-war and nimble aircraft, three squat LSMRs closed on -the island from the north, a few hundred yards offshore. Phalanxes -of rockets arose from the decks of the clumsy ships, arched steeply, -and crashed down. One of the rocket ships, taking a southerly course, -passed GREEN Beach and dumped salvo after salvo along the slopes and -crest of Radio Hill. - -When the LSMR cleared North Point of Wolmi-do, seven LCVPs darted -across the line of departure and sped shoreward with 3/5’s first -wave.[126] Rockets and 40mm shells were still ripping the southern -half of the island when one platoon of Company G and three platoons of -Company H stormed GREEN Beach at 0633. Two minutes later, the second -wave of landing craft ground to a halt on the sand, bringing the -remainder of both assault companies. - - [126] The following narrative is derived from 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annexes Queen Queen and Oboe Oboe; 1st MAW - _SAR_; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_; Taplett - interv, 25 Aug 54; Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 27 Jul - 54; Capt J. D. Counselman memo to authors, 10 Mar 55; - and MSgt E. L. Knox memo to authors, 10 Jan 55. - -The Marines were confronted by a scene of devastation almost devoid -of enemy resistance. Only a few scattered shots greeted the assault -force as it punched inland. The failure of UDT men to clear away all -of the wrecked small craft cluttering the beach had left 3/5 a landing -strip less than fifty yards wide. Consequently, each wave had to -contract like an accordion, and there was considerable crowding during -the first crucial minutes of the landing. But even at this stage, the -potent Marine air arm offered a final measure of protection to the -infantrymen splashing ashore. Pilots swung their F4Us fifty yards ahead -of the assault troops and hosed the routes of advance with machine-gun -bullets. - -[Illustration: SEIZURE OF WOLMI-DO - -3RD BN, 5TH MARINES - -15 SEPT 1950] - -After a brief pause for reorganization at the beach, First Lieutenant -Robert D. Bohn’s Company G wheeled to the right and drove up the -northern slopes of Radio Hill, Objective 1-A. Only half-hearted -resistance was met along the way, most of the scattered and numb North -Koreans preferring to surrender rather than face the inevitable. At -0655, Sergeant Alvin E. Smith, guide of the 3d Platoon, secured the -American flag to a shell-torn tree on the crest. - -At this point General MacArthur rose from the swivel chair in which -he had been viewing the operation on the flag bridge of the _Mount -McKinley_. “That’s it,” he said. “Let’s get a cup of coffee.” - -Meanwhile, the Wolmi-do assault continued as Captain Patrick E. -Wildman, after detaching a small force from Company H to clear -rubble-strewn North Point, attacked across Wolmi-do toward the Inchon -causeway with the rest of his unit. How Company’s mission was to seize -Objective 2-B, which included the eastern nose of Radio Hill and the -shoreline industrial area facing Inchon. - -At 0646, the three LSUs comprising the third wave squeezed into the -narrow beach and disgorged the armored detachment of Company A, 1st -Tank Battalion, under Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet. Ten tanks -were landed in all--six M-26s, one flame-thrower, two dozers, and one -retriever. The big vehicles crunched inland a short distance to await -calls from the infantry. - -Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered his free boat to the beach at 0650. -Fifteen minutes later, he radioed the _Mount McKinley_ and _Fort -Marion_ that his assault companies were advancing on schedule. - -It was ironic that 3/5’s reserve company should encounter the angriest -hornets’ nest on Wolmi-do. Landing in the fourth wave at 0659, Captain -Robert A. McMullen’s Company I moved through North Point in trace of -the How Company detachment which supposedly had cleared the area. -Suddenly a flurry of hand grenades clattered on the rubble, and the -surprised Marines scattered for cover. Regaining their composure after -the explosions, the infantrymen determined the source of trouble to be -a by-passed string of enemy emplacements dug into a low cliff at the -shoreline facing Inchon. There appeared to be about a platoon of North -Koreans, who would rise from their holes intermittently, fling grenades -inland, then disappear from sight. - -Item Company’s interpreter crawled toward the cliff during a lull, -bellowing to the Reds that their predicament was hopeless and -exhorting them to surrender. When the Communists responded to this -advice by throwing more grenades, McMullen signalled Sweet’s tanks -into action. The M-26s and Marine riflemen took covering positions, -while the dozer tank, directed by McMullen himself, rumbled into the -troublesome pocket and systematically sealed the die-hard Reds in their -holes. - -Another bit of drama unfolded before the reserve troops when they -closed on the causeway terminus in the wake of How Company’s advance. -From one of many caves drifted noises indicating the presence of -several occupants, hitherto unnoticed. While riflemen covered the -entrance, a Marine tank drove forward and fired two rounds into the -interior. - -Muffled explosions shook the area, and billows of black smoke streaked -with flame rolled out of the cave. Wide-eyed, as though watching ghosts -emerge, the Marines of Company I saw thirty enemy soldiers stagger out -of the blazing recess and throw up their hands. - -Less than an hour after landing, 3/5 controlled half of Wolmi-do. -Company H, having cleared the causeway terminus, was pivoting southward -to clean out the ruins of the industrial area. Engineers, close on the -heels of the infantry, advanced 25 yards out on the pavement leading -to Inchon and laid an antitank mine field. George Company had advanced -about 400 yards and was clearing the northern crest of Radio Hill. -Action up to this point is best summed up in Taplett’s message to the -_Mount McKinley_ at 0745: - -“Captured 45 prisoners. Meeting light resistance.” - -Nor did the situation change as Company G occupied the dominating peak -of Radio Hill, some 105 meters high. The enemy lacked the will to -fight, despite the fact that he had sufficient weapons and a formidable -defensive complex from which to fire them. Frightened, dejected Red -soldiers continued to surrender singly or in small groups, and Taplett -exulted over the amazingly light casualties sustained by his battalion. - -Since Company H found the going slow in the shambles of the industrial -area, the battalion commander ordered Lieutenant Bohn to seize the -whole of Radio Hill. Accordingly, George Company troops rushed across -the ridgeline to the eastern spur. This done, Bohn dispatched a force -to clear the western reaches of the high ground. By 0800, Radio Hill -became the property of the 1st Marine Division, and with the prize went -control of the island and Inchon Harbor. - -When the news of 3/5’s success blared from the loudspeaker on the -flag bridge of the _Mount McKinley_, the commander in chief, wearing -his famous leather jacket and braided campaign cap, withdrew to his -cabin and penned a spirited message to Vice Admiral Struble aboard the -_Rochester_: - - “The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this - morning. - - MACARTHUR” - - -Consolidation of Wolmi-do required the reduction of an enemy outpost on -Sowolmi-do, the small lighthouse station connected to the southwestern -tip of the island by a causeway 750 yards long and 12 yards wide. An -islet of about 500 square yards, Sowolmi-do was topped by a low hill -with the navigational beacon on the summit. Before bothering with this -tiny, isolated target, Taplett put his larger house in order. - -By previous plan, the three rifle companies of 3/5 took up defensive -positions generally facing Inchon. Item Company occupied North Point, -Wildman’s unit the slopes above the industrial area, and Company G the -crest of Radio Hill. While the battalion dug in, mopping-up operations -throughout the island continued to net more prisoners and reveal -the extent of North Korean fortifications. Radio Hill was ringed by -mutually supporting trenches and emplacements, all of which had brought -only a negligible return on the Reds’ investment in time and labor. -Parked on the western nose of the ridge were two intact 76mm antitank -guns that could have wrought havoc on landing waves approaching GREEN -Beach. Fortunately, these weapons had been exposed to the 40mm fire of -the LSMR covering the beach assault, and their crews had lacked the -stomach to man them. - -More antitank guns were scattered around the terminus of the causeway -leading to Inchon, leaving some question as to whether they had been -rushed to the defense of the island or were marked for displacement to -the city. - -North Point, once a luxurious resort, was honeycombed with caves used -both for storage and for bomb shelters. The swimming pool, one of the -few structures still recognizable after the bombardment, was converted -by the Marines into a prisoner-of-war stockade. - -More than 300 cast-iron antipersonnel mines were found attached to the -barbed wire entanglement stretched along the west coast at the base -of Radio Hill. The explosives were removed and disarmed by Technical -Sergeant Edwin L. Knox and his detachment from Company A, 1st Engineer -Battalion. Though the North Koreans had been helpful in placing these -mines in so obvious a location, they had, oddly enough, failed to -employ similar obstacles on the beaches, roads, and paths around the -island. - -Prior to the midmorning advance on Sowolmi-do, total casualties for -the 3d Battalion were 14 wounded--an incredibly small price for a -critical terrain feature commanding the approaches to Korea’s major -west coast port. Evacuation plans so carefully laid out by the 1st -Medical Battalion worked smoothly. In the early phase of the operation, -LCVPs returning from GREEN Beach delivered Marine casualties to the -_Fort Marion_, whose normal medical complement had been augmented -by a special surgical team. Men with particularly bad wounds were -transferred to the _Mount McKinley_ after being administered first aid. -As the battle developed, navy medical corpsmen of 3/5 established a -collecting point on a small pier which could be reached by ambulance -boats even during low water. - -Shortly before 1000, Taplett ordered Company G to seize Sowolmi-do. -Bohn in turn assigned the mission to one infantry squad reinforced -with machine guns and a section of tanks, all under the control of -Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman, leader of George Company’s 3d -Platoon. Although the islet was by no means an objective of formidable -proportions, the attackers eyed their route of approach over the long -strip with misgivings. Their skepticism was not unfounded, for they -neared the entrance to the causeway only to be stopped cold by heavy -rifle and machine-gun fire from the other end. A platoon of North -Koreans, almost literally at the end of a rope, preferred to fight it -out. - -Taplett ordered the tank-infantry team to hold up while he radioed a -mission to Marine air. A few minutes later, Corsairs of VMF-214 nosed -down and scorched the objective with napalm. - -Sweet’s tanks, preceded by an engineer mine-clearance team and followed -by the column of infantrymen, rumbled onto the rock bed tracing the -seaward edge of the causeway. As the task force filed across the -exposed route, 81mm shells from 3/5’s mortar platoon rattled overhead -and tore into the Communist emplacements. Enemy fire was reduced to a -light patter, and the observers on Radio Hill breathed a sigh of relief -when the attackers gained the far end of the causeway at 1048. - -Covered by tank fire, the Marine infantry quickly fanned out and closed -with the defenders. There was a sharp outburst of small-arms racket, -interspersed with the clatter of machine guns; then a few scattered -volleys and the main fight was over at 1115. Mopping up with grenades -and a flame thrower continued for almost another hour, owing to the -number of caves and the determination of a few Red soldiers. - -Nineteen North Koreans surrendered and 17 were killed, including some -hapless warriors who tried to swim to the mainland. Despite the size -of the islet, eight Reds succeeded in hiding out from the attackers; -and General Craig, after landing on Wolmi-do with the ADC group in the -evening, observed the fugitives escape to the mainland.[127] - - [127] LtGen E. A. Craig memo to authors, 12 Jan 55. - - -_The Two Harbor Islands Secured_ - -Three Marines were wounded on Sowolmi-do, bringing 3/5’s total -casualties for the day to 17 WIA. In return, Taplett’s battalion could -count 136 prisoners and 108 enemy dead. Since interrogation of captives -established the original number of Red defenders at 400, it could be -concluded that some 150 more Communist fatalities lay entombed in -sealed emplacements and caves throughout the island. - -The Wolmi-do garrison was part of a 2,000-man force committed to the -defense of Inchon by NKPA headquarters in Seoul. Represented were -elements of the 226th Marine Regiment, to which two companies of the -2d Battalion, 918th Coast Artillery Regiment were attached with their -Soviet-manufactured 76mm guns. The spiritless resistance encountered -by 3/5 was the natural reaction of green troops to the awesome power -of modern combined arms; for the North Korean marines and their -artillerymen were largely recent conscripts with sketchy training and -no experience. It remained to be seen how the other 1,600 Red troops -would respond to the later assaults on RED and BLUE Beaches. - -Mopping-up operations on the island were completed by noon, and with -the support ships standing silent in the narrows, an oppressive quiet -settled on the objective area. Gradually the phenomenal tide rolled -back from its morning high of more than 30 feet. By 1300 the waters -had receded, leaving 3/5 perched on an island in a sea of mud. For the -next several hours Taplett and his men were on their own, speculating -whether an enemy force might suddenly rush out of Inchon’s dead streets -in an attempt to cross the mud flats, or whether a Red tank column -would abruptly streak from the city and make for the causeway. - -Nothing happened. The air of unreality caused by the stillness of the -Oriental seaport weighed down on the nerves of the entire attack force. -As the afternoon wore on, the Marines detected movement here and there, -but the distant figures were identified as civilians more often than -not. Captain McMullen, studying the RED Beach area from his OP on North -Point, reported possible enemy “field pieces” on Cemetery Hill. What he -actually sighted were the tubes of the mortar company of the 226th NK -Marine Regiment, as will be shown later. - -At Taplett’s OP on Radio Hill, the Shore Fire Control Party Officer, -Second Lieutenant Joseph R. Wayerski, searched Inchon intently through -his binoculars. On one occasion he called down naval gunfire on -small groups of people stirring in the inner tidal basin area to his -right front, but when further observation revealed the figures to be -civilians raiding a pile of rice, the Marine officer promptly cancelled -the mission. Wayerski’s lone tactical target of importance was a -section of trench on Observatory Hill in which he once spotted about 20 -enemy soldiers on the move. He smothered the earthworks with 30 5-inch -shells from the _Mansfield_, and what North Koreans remained chose -other avenues from that point on. - -Taplett and others of his headquarters picked out enemy gun -emplacements right at the waterfront near the Inchon dry dock. After -the report went out to the _Mount McKinley_, red pencils throughout the -task force circled the locale on maps for special attention during the -pre-H-Hour bombardment. - -Thus, the 3d Battalion enjoyed an almost uneventful interlude during -its isolation. An occasional mortar round or long-range machine gun -burst was the feeble reminder that Inchon still remained in enemy hands. - -While the infantry lolled in relative ease and safety, service and -support elements, attached to 3/5 for the landing, set the stage at -GREEN Beach for the logistical follow-up so vital to amphibious -operations. First Lieutenant Melvin K. Green’s team from Shore Party -Group A, having unloaded its LSUs in record time, established dumps -for ammunition, rations, and other field necessities. Personnel of -the Ordnance Battalion, Combat Service Group, and Service Battalion -engaged in backbreaking toil to alleviate the headaches of a harried -beachmaster. Signalmen scurried about, setting up their equipment and -creating the familiar maze of wire. The reconnaissance detachment of -the 11th Marines probed around the island’s desolation in search of -battery positions for the howitzers scheduled to roll ashore on the -evening tide. - -The narrow strip of sand on North Point would have appeared crowded -and hopelessly confused to the inexperienced eye, but old hands knew -that order would gradually emerge, as if by magic, from the “early rush -hour”--that necessary evil inherent in all assault landings. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -Hitting the Beaches - -_The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement--Seizure of -Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs under Enemy Fire--Fighting on -Observatory Hill--1st Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore -Movement--Seizure of the O-1 Line_ - - -The concept of the amphibious envelopment of the North Korean Peoples -Army, together with the actual assault on Inchon by United States -Marines, constituted heresy to that school of wishful thinkers which -sprang to life as World War II faded in the first brilliant flashes of -the Atomic Age. Widely accepted and noisily proclaimed was the belief, -perhaps sincere, perhaps convenient, that the nuclear and aeronautical -sciences had relegated armies, navies, and man himself to insignificant -positions in the waging of war. The massing of ships and field forces, -it was argued, was a thing of the past; for the next war, if humanity -dared risk another, would be decided in weeks or even days with the -power unleashed by electronic and mechanical devices--many of which in -1950 were still in rudimentary stages on drawing boards. - -This was the controversial “push-button” theory of war which left -the peace-loving nations of the world unprepared in 1950 for violent -aggression by the tough little peasant army of North Korea, supported -by some 100 tanks and a few hundred artillery pieces. And to the -premature acceptance of this theory by a large section of the American -public may be attributed many of the major shortcomings of the Inchon -assault, as it unfolded in the evening of 15 September. That the -operation succeeded despite these shortcomings and the myriad natural -handicaps amounts almost to a tactical miracle. - -In the words of General Smith, “... half of the problem was in getting -to Inchon at all.”[128] The tremendous obstacles overcome in solving -that “half of the problem” have already been treated at length; and it -remains now, in the short space of a chapter, to show how the other -half became history. - - [128] LtGen O. P. Smith memo to authors, 28 Feb 55. - - -_The Assault Plan_ - -Aboard the _Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ in the Inchon narrows on 15 -September were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines, yanked out -of the Pusan Perimeter ten days earlier. Having had no time for a -rehearsal and only a few days for planning on the basis of admittedly -sketchy intelligence, these two units would scale the sea wall of -RED Beach and plunge into the dense waterfront area of the sprawling -seaport. - -The mission of the 5th Marines (less 3/5 on Wolmi-do) was to seize -the O-A Line, a 3,000-yard arc encompassing Cemetery Hill on the left -(north), Observatory Hill in the center, and thence extending the -last 1,000 yards through a maze of buildings and streets to terminate -at the inner tidal basin. Each battalion would land in a column of -companies, Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1st, on the left, -seizing Cemetery Hill and the northern half of Observatory Hill; -while Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d secured the remainder -of the latter, the hill of the British Consulate, and the inner tidal -basin.[129] - - [129] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -Landing nearly three miles southeast of the 5th Marines, the 1st -Regiment would seize BLUE Beach, a north-south strip fronting a -suburban industrial area. BLUE Beach One, on the left, was 500 yards -wide, flanked on the north by the rock revetment of a salt evaporator -that jutted into the water at a sharp angle to the shoreline. A wide -drainage ditch, about which little was known besides the fact that it -existed, formed the south boundary. Just inland a dirt road--the sole -exit from the beach--skirted the north end of a steep knoll that ran -the whole width of the landing site. There being no revetment at the -waterline, Marine planners hoped that amphibian tractors could crawl -ashore with the assault troops.[130] - - [130] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter. - -[Illustration: PLAN FOR INCHON ASSAULT] - -BLUE Beach Two, connected to One by the drainage ditch, also extended -500 yards. Like RED Beach it was fronted by a rock sea wall. On the -right half, the wall retained one side of a narrow ramp that jutted -southward like a long index finger. Behind the ramp lay a cove, its -shoreline at a right angle to the sea wall. During the assault, Marines -would scale the waterfront of BLUE Two from LVTs, while the cove around -the corner on the right, unofficially dubbed “BLUE Beach Three,” was -investigated as a possible supplementary landing site.[131] - - [131] _Ibid._; and Col T. L. Ridge ltr to authors, 11 May 55. - -Preceded by a wave of LVT(A)s of Company A (Reinf), 56th Amphibian -Tractor Battalion, USA, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, would -land abreast on BLUE One and Two respectively. With two companies -initially in the assault, each of the infantry battalions was to drive -forward and secure its portion of the O-1 Line. This four-mile arc bent -inland as far as 3,000 yards to include four main objectives, assigned -as follows: - - 2d Battalion (BLUE One) - - ABLE A critical road junction about 1,000 yards northeast of - the beach. - - DOG Hill 117, 3,000 yards northeast of the beach, commanding - Inchon’s back door and the highway leading to Seoul, - 22 miles away. - - 3d Battalion (BLUE Two) - - CHARLIE The seaward tip of Hill 233, a long east-west ridge - beginning 1,500 yards southeast of the beach and blocking - off the stubby Munhang Peninsula, which projected - southward. - - BAKER A small cape, topped by Hill 94, to the right of Objective - Charlie and flanking BLUE Beach.[132] - - [132] 1st MarDiv _OpnO 2-50_; and 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex - Peter Peter. - -While a question may arise as to the choice of landing the 5th -Marines in the very heart of Inchon, it must be remembered that -immediate seizure of the port facilities was vital to the success -of the operation. Hitting the beaches at only two-thirds infantry -strength, the 1st Marine Division could not swell to the overwhelming -proportions of an invasion force. A modern harbor for rapid build-up -and exploitation by X Corps figured inherently in MacArthur’s strategy. - -If RED Beach thus constituted the critical objective, then the -selection of BLUE Beach for a supporting landing followed in logical -sequence. Once on the O-1 Line, the 1st Marines would flank the single -overland approach to the peninsular seaport, thereby presenting the -NKPA garrison with the grim alternatives of early flight, capitulation, -or strangulation. Without this leverage on Inchon’s flank and rear, the -5th Regiment could easily be swallowed up by two square miles of dense -urban area. - -Four assault battalions would have two hours of daylight in which to -bridge the gap between planning and reality. From overhead and behind -they could expect a preponderance of heavy fire support, but ahead lay -enemy and hydrographic situations still clouded by question marks. - - -_Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement_ - -As the early afternoon of 15 September wore on, the continued silence -of Inchon beckoned temptingly to Lieutenant Colonel Taplett on -Wolmi-do. Having studied the city over a prolonged period without -detecting any significant evidence of Communist defensive capability, -he radioed Division headquarters for permission to move a strong -tank-infantry force across the causeway. The battalion commander -believed that 3/5 could launch either an effective reconnaissance in -force or an actual assault on RED Beach. Although his estimate of the -enemy potential was shortly borne out, the degree of risk in Taplett’s -bold plan drew a firm “negative” from the _Mount McKinley_.[133] - - [133] Taplett interv, 25 Aug 54. - -Busy with last-minute details aboard the command ship, General Smith -at noon had radioed General Craig instructions to land on Wolmi-do on -the evening tide and set up an advance echelon of the division command -post with the ADC group. Smith did not desire to land the remainder -of his headquarters until D-plus 1, when there would be more room for -dispersion within the expanding beachhead.[134] - - [134] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 152. - -The Landing Force Commander could look down from the flag bridge at -1400 and note the first signs of activity on the water. A few special -landing craft were beating the forthcoming traffic rush as they sped -toward the various ships to which they were assigned as command boats. - -At the same time, the central control vessel, _Diachenko_ (APD 123), -edged forward to its key station 3,000 yards southwest of the BLUE -Beach line of departure. Lieutenant Commander Allmon checked the set -and drift of the current and radioed his observations to Admiral Doyle. -Estimated at three and a half knots, the run of current was heavier -than expected. After receiving the Senior Control Officer’s report, the -Attack Force Commander confirmed 1730 as H-Hour.[135] - - [135] _Ibid._; ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_; and LCdr R. W. - Berry ltr to authors, 17 Mar 55. - -The confirmation went out to the entire Joint Task Force at 1430, and -Admiral Higgins’ fire support ships immediately commenced the final -bombardment of Inchon. His four cruisers and six destroyers poured -shells into the seaport for the next three hours, smashing every -landmark of tactical importance and starting fires that blazed across -the whole waterfront. - -Under the calculating eyes of tactical air observers and coordinators -in F4Us droning high above the objective area, VMFs-323 and -214 -and three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders alternately blasted Inchon, -integrating their strikes with naval gunfire from H-minus 180 minutes -onward. Simultaneously, Fast Carrier Task Force 77 kept another 12 -planes in the air continuously for deep support missions designed to -freeze all enemy activity within a radius of 25 miles. - -As if enough obstacles did not confront the landing force already, rain -squalls began drifting past Inchon during the bombardment. Gradually -the storm clouds merged with the thick smoke boiling up from the city, -and heavy overcasts settled over large areas, particularly in the -vicinity of BLUE Beach.[136] - - [136] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -Assault troops of the 5th Marines scrambled down cargo nets on the -_Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ to fill landing craft splashing into the water -from booms and davits. Nearly 200 LCVPs and 70 LCMs soon were joined -by 12 LSUs and 18 LVT(A)s, 164 LVTs, and 85 DUKWs disgorged from the -yawning wells of the LSTs, wherein the Marines of the 1st Regiment had -made ready for battle.[137] - - [137] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item; I. - -Guided by Lieutenant Commander Ralph H. Schneeloch, USNR, the _Horace -A. Bass_, RED Beach control vessel, slowly steamed toward the line of -departure, a long file of assault craft trailing behind like a brood -of ducklings. Lieutenant Theodore B. Clark, USN, ordered the _Wantuck_ -to the head of the boat lane to BLUE Beach, and _PCEC 896_, under -Lieutenant Reuben W. Berry, USN, took station off Wolmi-do to regulate -the waves scheduled for the administrative landing on GREEN Beach.[138] - - [138] _Ibid._, VII; Cdr C. E. Allmon, USN, ltr to authors, 9 - Mar 55; LCdr T. B. Clark, USN, ltr to authors, 11 Mar - 55; and LCdr R. H. Schneeloch, USN, ltr to authors, 20 - Mar 55. - -At 1645, the 18 Army LVT(A)s comprising the first wave of the 1st -Marines crossed the line of departure and headed for BLUE Beach. -Crawling at four knots, the armored vehicles had three quarters of an -hour to cover the 5,500 yards to the target. The LCVPs, capable of -twice the speed of the amphibian tractors, left the inner transport -area near the _Diachenko’s_ station for the five-mile trip northward to -the RED and GREEN boat lanes.[139] - - [139] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item:VI. - -The roar of the fire support ships increased in volume during the -approach of the landing craft until, at 1705 (H-minus 25), Admiral -Higgins signaled the LSMRs into action. At once the cruisers and -destroyers fell silent. Again missiles soared from the squat rocket -ships in high arcs that sent them plunging into the RED and BLUE -landing areas. Upwards of 6,000 rockets detonated in the seaport during -the next twenty minutes, further numbing the defenders but at the same -time increasing the density and volume of the overcast.[140] - - [140] _Ibid._, Annex George: II; and Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar - 55. - - -_Seizure of Cemetery Hill_ - -The critical moment of every amphibious assault was now at hand--the -moment when intelligence and planning would be put to the test of -actuality. On the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_ high-ranking Army, -Navy, and Marine Corps officers gathered again about General MacArthur, -seated in a swivel chair. They listened for the second time that day as -the loud speaker gave a blow-by-blow account of developments reported -by aerial observers. - -Everything that air attacks and naval gunfire could do to soften up -the target had been done, yet no one could be sure just what sort of -opposition the troops would encounter on RED and BLUE Beaches. It might -be as fainthearted as that brushed aside by 3/5 on Wolmi-do; or it -might be that another Tarawa awaited on those cramped strips of urban -waterfront lying between the mud flats of the harbor and the dark, -crooked streets of the Asiatic town and environs. The enemy had been -given ample time in which to prepare for a defense of the mainland. - -Even the possibility of undetected mines or surprise NKPA air attacks -at the last minute had not been overlooked. Although the Attack Force -continued to exercise control from the TADC on the _Mount McKinley_ -of all aircraft operating in its assigned area, an alternate control -agency had been installed on the USS _George Clymer_, utilizing an -emergency hookup and a control unit attached to TAC, X Corps. All -nets were manned and communications set up to permit a rapid shift of -control to General Cushman in case of disaster.[141] - - [141] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt; and LtGen (Ret) T. J. Cushman - interv, 26 Jul 54. - -With H-hour only minutes away, the sky above the objective was murky -and the wind whipped rain as well as stinging spray into the faces -of the Marines in the assault waves. Only the Marine and Navy flyers -upstairs could see the panorama of the waterborne attack--the cruisers -and destroyers standing silent in the background, LSMR rocket flashes -stabbing the false twilight ashore, the landing craft trailing pale -wakes behind them like the tails of comets. The pilots observed the -LCVPs to the left of Wolmi-do fan out at the line of departure and -touch the sea wall of RED Beach minutes later. To the right of the -little island, however, they saw the leading waves of the 1st Marines -disappear in a blanket of gloom. For while the smoke and moisture-laden -air had obscured parts of the 5th Marines’ zone of action ashore, it -had completely blotted out BLUE Beach and half the length of the 1st -Regiment’s boat lanes. Because of this development and other factors -which posed special problems for the 1st Marines, the narrative will -treat each landing separately, beginning with that of the 5th Regiment -on the left. - -Eight LCVPs had crossed the line of departure at H-minus 8 and sped -toward RED Beach with the first wave of the 5th Marines. Starting from -the left, boats numbered one through four carried parts of two assault -platoons of Company A, 1st Battalion, whose mission was to seize -Cemetery Hill and anchor the regimental left. In boats five through -eight were troops of Company E, 2d Battalion, whose task included -clearing the right flank of the beach and taking the hill of the -British Consulate.[142] - - [142] The RED Beach narrative, unless otherwise noted, is - derived from: 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; - LtCol M. R. Olson interv, 29 Dec 54; LtCol H. S. Roise - interv, 21 Dec 54; Maj J. R. Stevens interv, 1 Aug - 54; Capt E. A. Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55; Capt G. C. - McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and 1stLt F. W. Muetzel - interv, 6 Jan 54. - -From Wolmi-do 3/5’s machine guns, mortars, and supporting M-26s cut -loose with a hail of bullets and high explosive to cover the landing. -Technical Sergeant Knox lead an engineer team forward to clear the -causeway, in order that the detachment of Able Company Tanks could -advance to the mainland after the initial assault waves hit the beach. - -As the landing craft passed the midway point of the 2,200-yard boat -lane, the heaving LSMRs ceased firing, so that Lieutenant Colonel -Walter E. Lischeid and Major Arnold A. Lund could lead in VMFs-214 and --323 for final strikes on both RED and BLUE Beaches. Navy Skyraiders -joined in at the request of Captain John R. Stevens, commander of -Company A; and the FAC of 1/5, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, -controlled their strafing passes as the first wave came within 30 yards -of the sea wall.[143] - - [143] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Baker; and 1stLt (Ret) F. W. - Muetzel ltr to CMC, 11 Apr 54. - -Although the tide was racing in fast, the wall still projected about -four feet above the ramps of the landing craft. The Marines readied -their scaling ladders. On the right the boats of Company E touched the -revetment at 1731. Up went the ladders as the assault troops hurled -grenades over the wall. Following the explosions, the Marines from the -four boats scrambled to the top of the barrier one by one. The ladders -slipped and swayed as the LCVPs bobbed next to the wall. But they -served their purpose, and in short order every man of Second Lieutenant -Edwin A. Deptula’s 1st Platoon was on the beach. - -There were no casualties from the few stray bullets cracking through -the air. Filtering through smoke and wreckage, the platoon moved inland -to cover the landing of the second and third waves, carrying the -remainder of Easy Company. - -On the north of RED Beach, three of the four LCVPs with the leading -elements of Company A bumped the sea wall at 1733. Boat number one, -carrying Technical Sergeant Orval F. McMullen and half of his 1st -Platoon, was delayed offshore by an engine failure. The remainder of -the 1st, under the platoon guide, Sergeant Charles D. Allen, scaled -the wall from boat number two in the face of heavy fire from the north -flank and from submachine guns in a bunker directly ahead. Several -Marines were cut down immediately, the others being unable to advance -more than a few yards inland. - -Boat number three, with Second Lieutenant Francis W. Muetzel and a -squad of his 2d Platoon, touched a breach in the sea wall under the -muzzle of an enemy machine gun protruding from a pillbox. The weapon -did not fire as the Marines scrambled through the gap and onto the -beach. A second squad and a 3.5-inch rocket section joined from boat -number four. Gunfire crackled far off on the left, barely audible amid -the road of fighter planes strafing fifty yards ahead. Muetzel and his -men jumped into a long trench which paralleled the sea wall a few feet -away. It was empty. Two Marines threw grenades into the silent pillbox, -and the six bloody North Koreans who emerged in the wake of the hollow -explosions were left under guard of a Marine rifleman. - -Just beyond the beach loomed Cemetery Hill, its seaward side an almost -vertical bluff. To avoid getting trapped if the enemy opened up from -the high ground, Muetzel attacked toward his objective, the Asahi -Brewery, without waiting for the remainder of his men in the tardy -second wave. The skirmish line raced across the narrow beach, ignoring -padlocked buildings and flaming wreckage. Passing to the south of -Cemetery Hill, the 2d Platoon entered the built-up area of the city and -marched unopposed up a street to the brewery. - -On the left of Company A’s zone, the beached half of the 1st Platoon -made no progress against the flanking fire and the Communist bunker -to the front. The 3d Platoon, under First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez, -landed in the second wave, and McMullen finally got ashore with the -other half of the 1st. Both units crowded into the restricted foothold -and casualties mounted rapidly. Enemy guns had felled Lopez as he -climbed ashore and moved against the bunker with a grenade. Unable to -throw the armed missile because of his wound, the young officer was -killed when he smothered the explosion with his body to protect his -men. Two Marines attacked the emplacement with flame throwers. They -were shot down and their valuable assault weapons put out of action. - -The situation on the left was at its worst when Captain Stevens landed -in Muetzel’s zone at H-plus 5. Learning of Lopez’ death and unable to -contact McMullen, he ordered his executive officer, First Lieutenant -Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., to “take over on the left and get them organized -and moving.”[144] Time was of the essence, since Cemetery Hill, -objective of the 1st Platoon, yet remained in enemy hands. Succeeding -waves would be landing hundreds of Marines in the shadow of the cliff -within the next half hour. Stevens also radioed Muetzel, whose small -force had just reached the brewery without suffering a casualty, and -ordered the 2d Platoon back to the beach to help out. - - [144] Capt F. F. Eubanks, Jr., ltr to CMC, 2 Jun 55. - -Muetzel immediately formed his unit in column and struck out on the -return trip to the waterfront. Nearing Cemetery Hill again, he noted -that the southern slope of the vital objective was an excellent -route of approach to the top. In planning Company A’s part of the -operation, Stevens had once told him that the 2d Platoon could expect -to help seize the high ground if the job proved too rough for the 1st -alone.[145] With a creditable display of judgment and initiative, -Muetzel launched an assault on the key to RED Beach. - - [145] Maj J. R. Stevens ltr to authors, 29 Mar 55. - -The Marines moved rapidly up the incline, flushing out about a -dozen Red soldiers who surrendered meekly. Gaining the summit, -they drove forward and saw the entire crest suddenly come alive -with infantry-crewmen of the 226th NKPA Regiment’s mortar company. -Spiritless and dazed from the pounding by air and naval gunfire, the -North Koreans to a man threw down their weapons, filed quietly from -trenches and bunkers, and marched to the base of the hill where a -small detachment kept them under guard. Hardly a shot had been fired -by the 2d Platoon, still without a single casualty, and the capture of -Cemetery Hill had required about ten minutes. - -During the attack on the high ground, Eubanks had taken the situation -in hand on the left of the beach. He first bested the bunker’s -occupants in a grenade duel, then ordered the emplacement fired by a -flame thrower. Just as Muetzel prepared to dispatch assistance from the -top of Cemetery Hill, the 1st and 3d Platoons broke out of the pocket, -drove inland to the edge of the city, and made physical contact with -the 2d. - -At 1755, Stevens fired an amber star cluster signifying that Cemetery -Hill was secured for the 5th Marines. The half-hour fight in the north -corner of RED Beach had cost Company A eight killed and 28 wounded. - - -_RED Beach Secured_ - -After landing in 2/5’s first wave, the 1st Platoon of Company E -pushed inland 100 yards to the railroad tracks against no resistance -whatsoever. Captain Samuel Jaskilka was ashore with the rest of the -Company by H-plus 10, and reorganization took place quickly near the -Nippon Flour Company buildings, just south of the beach. Deptula’s -platoon then moved unopposed down the railroad tracks and seized the -British Consulate, Regimental Objective C, at 1845. Simultaneously, -another platoon cleared the built-up area across the tracks on the -lower slopes of Observatory Hill. These rapid accomplishments secured -the 5th Marines’ right flank, giving an added measure of protection to -22 more waves of landing craft and LSTs scheduled for RED Beach. - -Still in enemy hands, however, was Observatory Hill, reaching well over -200 feet above the center of the regimental zone to buttress the arc of -the O-A Line. Company C of the 1st Battalion, landing in the fourth and -fifth waves shortly before 1800, was to take Objective A, northern half -of the critical terrain feature. To Dog Company of 2/5 was charged the -southern half, designated Objective B. - -That the attack did not go off as planned stemmed from a series of -mishaps which began as far out as the line of departure. Despite -the fact that Lieutenant Commander Schneeloch was using standard -control procedures from the _Bass_, including radio contact with the -beach, there was a mixing of waves starting with number four.[146] -This development reflected the lack of a rehearsal in the hurried -preparations for the operation, and the end result was that parts of -Companies C and D, both in the second assault echelon, landed over -the wrong beaches.[147] After landing, Charlie Company had the added -disadvantage of being without its company commander for a crucial 12 -minutes. Captain Poul F. Pedersen was delayed when the fifth-wave -commander, who shared his boat, decided to tow a stalled LCVP left -behind by the preceding formation.[148] When he finally reached his -company, the job of reorganization was much more difficult than it -would have been had he arrived at the beach on schedule. With troops -pouring over the sea wall from succeeding waves, what had begun as -intermingling at the point of overlap in the center of the landing area -had grown to temporary congestion and confusion. - - [146] Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55. - - [147] Col G. R. Newton ltr to CMC, 8 Apr 55. - - [148] Capt P. F. Pedersen memo to CMC, 1 May 55. - -[Illustration: SEIZURE OF RED BEACH - -5TH MARINES] - - -_LSTs Under Enemy Fire_ - -Out in the channel, the first of eight LSTs[149] heralded the climax of -the ship-to-shore movement at 1830 by crossing the line of departure -and heading for the sea wall. Prior to the approach, ships’ officers -had spotted the close fighting on the north flank of RED Beach as -they peered through binoculars from their respective bridges. Later, -noting the growing knot of Marines in the center of the waterfront -area, they concluded that the assault troops could not advance inland. -This impression was strengthened by an abrupt procession of gun -flashes on Observatory Hill where, owing to the delay in the attack by -Companies C and D, a handful of enemy soldiers had recovered from shock -sufficiently to set up machine guns. A few North Korean mortar crews in -the city also came to life and manned their weapons. - - [149] Under the over all command of LCdr James C. Wilson, - who flew his broad pennant in LST 859, the eight ships - were: 859 (Lt L. Tinsley); 883 (Lt C. M. Miller); - 914 (Lt R. L. Holzhaus); 973 (Lt R. I. Trapp); 898 - (Lt R. M. Beckley); 975 (Lt A. W. Harer); 857 (Lt D. - Weidemeyer); and 799 (Lt T. E. Houston). - -LST 859, leading the pack, came under mortar and machine-gun fire as it -waddled toward its berth about 1835. Gun crews on the ship reacted by -opening up with 40mm and 20mm cannon, spraying Cemetery and Observatory -Hills and the right flank of the beach. Next in the column of ships, -LSTs 975 and 857 likewise commenced firing after taking hits from -mortars and machine guns. Enemy automatic weapons touched off a fire -near ammunition trucks on LST 914, trailing fourth, but sailors and -Marines quickly brought the blaze under control. Guns on the latter -ship remained silent as a result of dispatch orders received by the -captain after leaving the line of departure.[150] - - [150] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtGen (Ret) E. A. - Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; LCdr R. I. Trapp, USN, ltr - to CMC, 18 Mar 55; and Lt (Ret) R. L. Holzhaus, USN, - ltr to CMC, 14 Mar 55. - -Lieutenant Muetzel and his platoon were chased by LST fire from the -crest of Cemetery Hill to the slope facing Inchon--where they came -under fire from a Red machine gun in a building on Observatory Hill. -Fortunately, a 40mm shell from one of the LSTs crashed into the -building and obliterated the enemy position. There were no casualties -in Muetzel’s outfit, but Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2d Battalion did -not fare as luckily from the misdirected shooting by the American -ships. Weapons and H&S Companies of 2/5 had landed about 1830 and were -just proceeding inland when LST fire seared their ranks, killing one -Marine and wounding 23 others. “If it hadn’t been for the thick walls -of the Nippon Flour Company,” remarked Roise later, “the casualties -might have been worse.”[151] - - [151] LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 23 Mar 55. - -All eight of the supply vessels were intact in their berths by 1900. -Guns fell silent as soon as the LSTs touched the sea wall and contact -was established with the infantry. - -On the beach, meanwhile, Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness had -reorganized his 2d Platoon of Company C and, on his own initiative, -attacked Observatory Hill. Second Lieutenant Max A. Merritt’s 60mm -mortar section followed closely behind, but the rest of the company -remained fragmented in the landing area. Sparked by Technical Sergeant -Max Stein, who was wounded while personally accounting for a North -Korean machine gun, the provisional force advanced rapidly in the -gathering darkness and at 1845 seized the saddle between Objectives A -and B on Observatory Hill. This was just about the time when the LSTs -stopped firing.[152] - - [152] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj F. I. - Fenton, Jr., ltr to authors, 21 Mar 55. - -Since their single flare misfired and they were not able to raise -Lieutenant Pedersen by radio, Magness and Merritt were unable to inform -the beach of their success. In the meantime, Company B, 1/5’s reserve, -had landed in the 2d Battalion zone, the waves having swerved to -that area to avoid small-arms fire peppering their assigned approach -on the left. Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr., led the unit through a -mixed group on the waterfront to an assembly area near the base of -Cemetery Hill. When he discussed the beach situation by radio with the -battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Newton ordered him to take over -Charlie Company’s mission and assault the northern half of Observatory -Hill.[153] - - [153] _Ibid._; Newton ltr, 8 Apr 55; and Capt B. L. Magness - ltr to CMC, 29 Mar 55. - - -_Fighting on Observatory Hill_ - -Darkness had fallen when Company B drove up the slopes of Objective A -in a two-pronged attack. Six Marines were wounded in brief skirmishes -with North Korean die-hards along the way. Gaining the summit at 2000, -Fenton deployed three platoons on line, making contact with the -Magness-Merritt force dug in on the saddle to the right. With Objective -A seized and Able Company deployed on top and to the flanks of Cemetery -Hill, Newton radioed the 5th Marines at 2240 that 1/5’s segment of the -O-A Line was secured.[154] - - [154] _Ibid._ - -In the right of the 5th Marines’ zone, the 2d Battalion had also been -making gains, despite the handicaps of mixed boat waves, LST fire, poor -visibility, and, finally, enemy action.[155] It will be recalled that -Company E suffered no casualties in landing and clearing the waterfront -as far south as Objective C, the British Consulate. Next to hit the -beach was First Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Company D, part of which went -ashore in 1/5’s zone. Assembling later near the base of Observatory -Hill, the unit prepared to carry out its mission of seizing Objective -B, the southern half of the big ridge. - - [155] The following narrative is derived from: 1st Mar Div - _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; - Roise ltr, 23 Mar 55; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and - Magness ltr, 29 Mar 55. - -Although 2d Battalion overlays show that Easy Company bore no -responsibility for the crest of Observatory Hill, Smith’s men somehow -got the impression that part of Jaskilka’s force was already on the -summit. Its tactics based on this misunderstanding, Company D formed -a simple route column, with Second Lieutenant Ray Heck’s 1st Platoon -leading the way, and marched up a street to the top of the hill. The -vanguard troops cleared the first peak in the company zone without -opposition and continued along the road to the second, expecting to -meet men of Company E. They were greeted, however, by machine-gun fire -from an enemy squad entrenched to the right of the street. - -The Marines tumbled into positions on the left. Grenades and small-arms -fire flew back and forth across the road during a brisk exchange that -lasted about 15 minutes. One of Heck’s men was killed and three others -wounded. The company corpsmen was hit but refused evacuation until -he had first administered to the other casualties and seen them off -to safety. Company D’s executive officer, First Lieutenant Michael -J. Dunbar, went forward with Lieutenant Colonel Roise, the battalion -commander, and was wounded by a ricochet. - -The enemy troops were driven off just as darkness closed in, leaving -the Marines to grope for night defensive positions on unfamiliar -ground. Eventually Lieutenant Smith formed a line with all three -rifle platoons deployed on the forward slopes of Objective B. Out of -battalion reserve came Second Lieutenant Harry J. Nolan’s platoon of -Company F to bridge the gap between Company D and the Magness-Merritt -positions in 1/5’s zone on the left. - -With Cemetery and Observatory Hills secured, the only portion of -the O-A Line not yet under control was the extreme right, anchored -on the inner tidal basin. Since the night was pitch black, Roise -felt apprehensive about sending troops any farther into the city. -In answer to a query, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, whose regimental -headquarters had landed at 1830 and set up near the terminus of the -Wolmi-do causeway, emphasized to Roise that where the O-A Line could -not actually be defended from a suitable tactical standpoint, it must -at least be outposted. The battalion commander forthwith dispatched a -two-squad patrol from Fox Company to the tidal basin, and the small -force returned from the 1,000-yard prowl into the city at 2300, having -seen no sign of the enemy. Roise reacted by committing Company F, less -its platoon on Observatory Hill, to a defensive perimeter on the right -flank. Shortly after midnight, Captain Uel D. Peters deployed the -company next to the tidal basin as ordered; and the 5th Marines’ O-A -Line, though not manned in entirety, came as close to tactical reality -as the tangled black depths of the seaport would allow. - - -_1st Marines on BLUE Beach_ - -As mentioned earlier, the overcast resulting from rain squalls and -smoke had completely blotted out BLUE Beach by H-hour, 1730. This fact -in itself would have sufficed to upset a precise landing procedure; -but at this point in the narrative, it is timely to review some of the -other problems which had beset the 1st Marines since the inception of -the plan for the Inchon assault.[156] - - [156] The preliminary to the landing account is derived from: - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Col R. W. Rickert - memo to authors, 15 Apr 55; ltr, 11 May 55; Col A. - Sutter and Maj G. S. Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Col - A. Sutter memo to authors, 5 May 55; and Maj E. H. - Simmons ltr to CMC, 28 Mar 55. - -In the short space of weeks, the regiment had been brought up to war -strength by the rapid convergence on Camp Pendleton of Marines--in -units or as individuals, both regular and reserve--from all over the -United States; it had embarked at San Diego and crossed the Pacific; -and it had reloaded and embarked from Japan for a combat operation -designed to quench a major conflagration. There had been time for only -the sketchiest training above the company level. The new 1st Marines -had never operated tactically as a regiment, nor had it ever been -concentrated in one place as an organizational entity up until the time -it hit BLUE Beach. - -During the planning phase in Kobe, battalions had to combat-load their -LSTs according to an X factor, while awaiting the prescribed tactical -plans that would be handed down from higher echelon at the last -minute. Intelligence on the enemy and beach conditions was practically -non-existent; and the speculative studies and inadequate photos -available could be kept only a few hours before being passed on to the -next unit in line. - -Whenever Marines are given a difficult assignment, the United States -Navy invariably draws its own full measure of handicaps. A typical -example of the problems confronting naval planners was this case, cited -by Major Edwin H. Simmons, of 3/1: - - “I was aboard LST 802, which was carrying H&S Company and - elements of Weapons Company. The ship had just been recovered - from the island trade. Her captain had been flown out to - Sasebo from the States, given a pick-up crew and two weeks to - condition the ship and crew for an amphibious landing. Despite - his best efforts, the 802 had three major breakdowns and had to - drop out of convoy several times. At one point it appeared as - though the battalion command group would have to be taken off - the 802 if they were to get to Inchon in time.” - -In connection with BLUE Beach itself, officers of the 1st Marines had -only a vague impression of offshore conditions and the accessibility -of the landing site. As already noted, the current in the channel was -underestimated, and so little was known about the consistency of the -mud flats that each landing craft contained planking for emergency use -by the assault troops. - -The sole exit from BLUE One was the dirt road already mentioned. On -aerial photos the drainage ditch separating BLUE One and Two appeared -to be some kind of a road over which tractors could crawl ashore. No -one was certain, and “BLUE Beach Three,” the cove on the right, was -ruled out as a possible landing area early in the planning. At the last -minute, however, recent aerial photos and studies led to the conclusion -that both the inlet and the ramp at the southern tip of BLUE Two might -be good approaches after all. Acting on this information while en route -to the target area, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commanding -officer of 3/1, decided to explore personally the right flank with -his executive officer at the outset of the assault. If the ramp, BLUE -Three, or both were accessible to LVTs, Ridge would divert later -assault echelons on a “follow me” basis. - -Thus vital questions were to remain unanswered until the officers -and men of the 1st Marines got their first look at BLUE Beach. It -was keenly disappointing, therefore, when they stared from the line -of departure on the afternoon of 15 September and saw, instead of -the distant shoreline, a murky wall rolling seaward from the blazing -waterfront. - -As noted previously, the line of departure was 5,500 yards--3.2 -miles--from the beach, a distance requiring 45-minute trips for the -slow-moving LVT waves. The ship-to-shore movement got off to a bad -start owing to the current, which scattered some of the landing -formations during the rendezvous phase. Other obstacles entered the -picture in rapid succession, one of them best described by Lieutenant -Clark, BLUE Beach Control Officer: - - “At about H-50, while press boats and the initial waves of - LVT(A) and LVT were milling around the BLUE Beach control - vessel [_Wantuck_], mortar fire was received in the immediate - vicinity. This created some confusion until a destroyer spun - around on her anchor and silenced the battery. This was the - beginning of the end of the well-planned ship-to-shore movement - for BLUE Beach.”[157] - - [157] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55. - -Other shortcomings that took on special significance because of the -overcast were the lack of compasses and radios in the amphibian -tractors and the inexperience of many of the crews. The first wave, -consisting of the Army LVT(A)s, was escorted shoreward from the line of -departure by Navy guide boats, manned by UDT crews who possessed both -the compasses and seamanship necessary to pierce the smoke screen and -find the distant beach on time.[158] Wave number two, only a minute -behind and close enough to benefit by the expert guidance, did not fare -too badly. The ragged formation of number three, however, indicated -mounting difficulties at the line of departure. From a study of -numerous accounts, the experience of Major Simmons appears to have been -typical: - - [158] Unless otherwise cited, the remainder of this section - is derived from: ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI; - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_ and - _OpPlan 1-50_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and - Capt B. F. Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - - “Wave 5 cleared the 802 about 1630. We had been told that - a wave guide would pick us up and lead us to the line of - departure.... Time was passing and we were feeling desperate - when we came alongside what was apparently the central control - vessel. I asked the bridge for instructions. A naval officer - with a bull horn pointed out the direction of BLUE Two, but - nothing could be seen in that direction except mustard-colored - haze and black smoke. We were on our way, and our path crossed - that of another wave. I asked if they were headed for BLUE Two. - Their wave commander answered, ‘Hell no, we’re the 2d Battalion - headed for BLUE One.’ We then veered off to the right. I broke - out my map, but the LVT driver had no compass.... With no - confidence in its accuracy within a steel hull, I got out my - lensatic compass and made a best guess as to the azimuth of our - approach line.”[159] - - [159] Simmons ltr, 28 Mar 55. - -The nine LVT(A)s leading off for Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter’s 2d -Battalion thrashed through the gloom and crawled ashore on BLUE One at -1730, on schedule. Meeting no opposition at the beach, they rumbled -northward to the road skirting the knoll in order to penetrate the -interior. The exit was blocked by an earth slide resulting from the -naval bombardment of the high ground, and the column of amphibious -vehicles ground to a halt. - -At H-plus 1, most of the eleven LVTs of the second wave crunched ashore -with elements of two assault companies. The remainder, with troops of -Fox Company embarked, had grounded in mud about 300 yards offshore. -The Marines had to wade to the beach, and they lost several pieces -of communications gear in potholes en route. Company D, on the left, -was to have remained aboard the tractors for the drive inland, while -the troops of Company F debarked at the beach, cleared the knoll, and -continued overland on foot. The latter scheme of maneuver unfolded as -planned, and the Marines encountered no resistance when they swept to -the top of the high ground. Dog Company, meanwhile, had also dismounted -because of the blocked road. - -The third wave groped ashore through the smoke at H-plus 4, bringing -the remainder of both assault companies and raising the total strength -on BLUE One to 30 tractors and over 600 men. Noting that the beach was -getting crowded, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter ordered his free tractor -to pull alongside the revetment of the evaporator on the left. When -his battalion headquarters had debarked on the wall, he turned his -attention seaward that he might signal the succeeding three waves, -carrying the rest of 2/1, to do likewise. He looked and waited in vain, -however, for the LVT formations did not materialize out of the offshore -haze. - -Meanwhile, Companies D and F reorganized quickly to continue the -attack. Looking inland from the knoll, officers and NCOs could catch -glimpses of the unfamiliar terrain only between billows of smoke. -Several landmarks loomed ahead that were not marked on the inaccurate -tactical maps. Many others that had been recorded were ablaze, and the -numerous fires would make direct compass marches difficult. Moreover, -since the enemy situation inland was open to conjecture, dispersed -tactical formations would add to the problem of controlling the Marine -advance. - -Despite these disadvantages, Sutter pressed the attack. Easy Company -in battalion reserve, together with part of Weapons and H&S, had not -landed, nor had all of the vital signal equipment for supporting arms. -But further waiting and delay was out of the question, since only about -an hour of daylight remained. - -Company D struck out for Regimental Objective ABLE, the junction on -the left flank 1,000 yards away, and Company F drove northeast in the -direction of Objective DOG, Hill 117. It was almost dark when the last -of the 600 troops plunged forward into the unknown, leaving LVT crews -behind to open the road with picks and shovels. - - -_Ending the Ship-to-Shore Movement_ - -The nine LVT(A)s comprising 3/1’s first wave had closed on the sea wall -of BLUE Beach Two shortly after H-hour.[160] Nosing their vehicles -toward the drainage ditch on the left, the drivers apparently eyed -the muck and conformation of the restricted passageway with some -skepticism, for they backed off and exchanged fire with scattered enemy -soldiers shooting from just beyond the waterfront. - - [160] Unless otherwise cited, this section is derived from: - ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI; 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annexes Peter Peter and Tare Tare; LtCol R. R. - Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; LtCol J. D. Trompeter interv, - 31 Jan 55; Maj D. W. Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; Maj - W. L. Bates interv with MarCorps HistDiv, 27 Aug 51; - Capt J. G. Costigan interv, 17 Nov 54; Capts R. W. - Crowley and N. L. Adams II interv, 9 Feb 55. - -Wave number two passed through the Army tractors and bumped the sea -wall ten minutes late with the leading elements of Companies G and I, -the former on the left. Since the landing echelons had intermingled -in the cloudy boat lane, some LVTs of the third wave arrived with -those of the second. This accounted for Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s -tractor reaching the beach one increment ahead of schedule. The -battalion commander and his executive officer, Major Reginald R. Myers, -immediately swung their separate vehicles around to the right flank, -Ridge heading toward the ramp while the other officer continued around -the corner in the direction of BLUE Three. - -On the left of BLUE Two, meanwhile, the amphibians carrying Captain -George C. Westover’s Company G formed a column and crawled into the -drainage ditch.[161] Troops of First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher’s Item -Company simultaneously scrambled up their aluminum ladders and deployed -just beyond the sea wall in the face of moderate small arms fire. -As had been anticipated, some of the metal scaling devices bent and -buckled under the strain, delaying troop debarkation from the landing -craft crowding the revetment. Assault elements of Captain Lester G. -Harmon’s Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, reached the beach and -anchored cargo nets over the wall to speed up the landing.[162] - - [161] Maj G. C. Westover memo to CMC, 21 Apr 55. - - [162] Rickert memo, 15 Apr 55. “Study of aerial photos of - BLUE Beach prior to departing Kobe, Japan, convinced - CO, 1st Marines, that aluminum scaling ladders might - not suffice for the sea wall. Consequently, the assault - companies were provided with debarkation nets, 3´ - steel picket pins, and sledges with which to anchor - the nets on the reverse slope of the sea wall. The - nets proved very valuable, not only with regard to - getting personnel ashore but particularly in landing - crew-served weapons, ammo, and equipment.” - -The lead tractor in George Company’s column bellied down in the mud of -the drainage ditch, blocking five other LVTs behind. Westover ordered -his troops to dismount and move forward along a road near the beach. -After a brief period of reorganization, Company G fanned out for -the drive inland, its mission being to block a lowland corridor and -secondary access road leading to BLUE Beach out of the east.[163] - - [163] Westover memo, 21 Apr 55. - -Just about the time Westover’s LVTs bogged down in the ditch on the -left, the tractors transporting Ridge and Myers crawled ashore over -the ramp and BLUE Beach Three respectively, setting a precept for the -mounting number of landing craft lying off BLUE Two. A heavy volume of -traffic was thus diverted to the cove, and the appreciable gain in time -far outweighed the intermingling which developed by landing troops at a -right angle to those scaling the sea wall. - -[Illustration: SEIZURE OF BLUE BEACH - -1ST MARINES] - -In recalling the situation ashore as of 1800 (H-plus30), Colonel Lewis -B. Puller, the regimental commander, later observed: - - “I personally landed on BLUE Beach with the 3d wave. My reason - for doing so was, exactly, that there was a strong possibility - of confusion and disorganization under the circumstances: - namely, the unavoidable necessity of landing the regiment - without a rehearsal, without even a CPX.... The reorganization - of the assault battalions was accomplished with remarkable - speed and effectiveness. I recall being, at the time, extremely - gratified that my prior concern in this connection was not - warranted.”[164] - - [164] MajGen L. B. Puller ltr to authors, 11 May 55. - -Despite the initial delays at the ditch and sea wall, Companies G and I -cleared the beach rapidly. Of the few casualties taken during the first -30 minutes ashore, most were caused by an enemy machine gun in a tower -about 500 yards inland. LVT fire silenced the weapon, and the Marine -infantry plunged forward through a labyrinth of blazing buildings -and smoke-filled streets. On the left, George Company groped almost -straight ahead toward the lowland corridor as Item veered sharply -southward to attack Objective CHARLIE, the seaward tip of Hill 233. - -While the assault units fought inland, the gathering darkness created -one more formidable handicap for the last wave serials leaving the -line of departure far out in the channel. The four Navy guide boats, -mentioned earlier as having escorted the first wave, were exactly 28 -short of the number prescribed by amphibious doctrine for a landing -of the Inchon assault’s magnitude.[165] For this reason the guide -boats took station on either side of the boat lanes after the initial -run, since it was manifestly impossible for them to help out in any -other way. The limited visibility, however, just about negated their -worth as stationary markers, owing to the fact that some landing craft -formations were losing their direction even before they entered the -boat lanes. - - [165] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare, 4. - -In describing the situation as it developed at the line of departure -Lieutenant Clark later commented: - - “The BLUE Beach Control Officer was unable to contact LVT - wave commanders or wave guide officers by radio at any time - during the initial assault. The control officer was aware that - waves or groups of LVTs and boats were landing at the wrong - places but was helpless to prevent it without communications. - As a last resort, Casualty and Salvage landing craft were - dispatched to assist the initial wave guides (members of UDT - 1) in rounding up vehicles and leading or directing them to - BLUE Beach.”[166] - - [166] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55. - -Since current and smoke fought relentlessly against tractors seaward of -the line of departure, not all of the vehicles could find the control -ship. If they did, it was next to impossible to come in close enough to -get instructions shouted from the bridge. Thus many wave commanders, -amtrac officers, and infantry leaders gave orders to head shoreward -on their own initiative. They went in with waves and fragments of -waves, displaying the kind of leadership that made the operation an -overwhelming success in spite of the obstacles. This was the case with -the three waves of 2/1 that failed to arrive at BLUE One. They found -their way ashore, some of the LVTs landing on BLUE Two, others diverted -to BLUE Three; but the important thing was that they got there.[167] - - [167] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to CMC, 12 Apr 55. - -The most serious error of the day, again offset by initiative and -decision, involved Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins’ 1st Battalion, -landing in regimental reserve.[168] About H-hour, Puller radioed -Hawkins and ordered him to cross the line of departure with LCVP waves -21 through 25, carrying the whole of 1/1. Had the approach to the beach -gone smoothly, the battalion would have begun landing at approximately -H-plus 45 (1815). - - [168] The following account of 1/1 is derived from: Rickert - memo, 15 Apr 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr, 8 Mar 55; Bates - interv, 27 Aug. 51; Bridges interv, 18 Oct. 54, and - memo to CMC, 31 Mar 55; Maj R. H. Barrow memo to CMC, - 25 Apr 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 23 Apr 55. - -Because of conditions in the channel and boat lanes, as already -described, a searchlight on the control ship now beamed the supposed -course to the beach. Actually, the whole area had become so clouded -that the light was mistakenly pointed toward the outer tidal basin, -some 45 degrees off course to the northeast. - -Moving in the designated direction, the first two of the reserve waves -reached the sea wall of the basin; and the Marines, believing they were -at the revetment of BLUE Two, began debarking. Hawkins, following in -the third wave (wave number 23), caught the error as his boat passed -within sight of two outlying islands between the basin and the salt -evaporator jutting out from the left of BLUE One. About the same time, -Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of the 1st -Marines, noticed some of the errant landing craft from his free boat -between the line of departure and BLUE One. He intercepted a group of -the LCVPs and reoriented them. - -In the meantime, Hawkins cruised the length of the basin wall and -shouted instructions to the troops of the first two waves. Most of -Company B had already debarked and a few of the empty boats had left -for the channel. Able Company, having just begun to land, promptly -reembarked in its LCVPs. In short order, the battalion reformed at sea -and headed toward BLUE Two. Owing to the lack of boats, one platoon of -Baker Company remained on the tidal basin all night. Hiking to rejoin -the company on the mainland next morning, this platoon rounded up an -impressive bag of prisoners. - -Upon reaching BLUE Two in darkness, Hawkins found Company C, which -had avoided the detour owing to the sixth sense of a boat coxswain, -organizing and setting up local security. The battalion commander led -most of 1/1 forward to a night assembly area along the railroad tracks, -half a mile inland. Major David W. Bridges, battalion S-3, was left -behind to organize late-comers as they arrived from the tidal basin. - - -_Seizure of the O-1 Line_ - -The tactical situation ashore had meanwhile begun to crystallize -for the 1st Marines. In the 2d Battalion zone, Dog Company occupied -Objective A, the road intersection, at 2000. Two hours later, Fox -Company reported that it occupied enough of Objective D, Hill 117, so -that it could cover the Inchon-Seoul highway with fire. - -The attack from the beach had cost Sutter’s unit one KIA and 19 WIA as -compared to enemy losses of 15 prisoners and an estimated 50 dead. - -On the right of the regimental zone, Ridge’s 3d Battalion was also -making good progress against light resistance. Item Company reported at -1900 that it was on Objective C, the western nose of Hill 233. Half an -hour later, George company began deploying in blocking positions across -the corridor and road at the center of the O-1 Line. This movement was -completed about 2030.[169] - - [169] Ridge ltr, 11 May 55. - -The 1st Platoon of How Company passed seaward of Item at 2030 and -pressed a night attack against a company of North Koreans on Objective -B, the small cape topped by Hill 94. After a token resistance, the -Reds abandoned their well-prepared entrenchments, leaving 30 dead and -wounded to be counted by the Marines. - -How Company (less 1st and 2d Platoons) covered the low ground between -George and Item, finally occupying a blocking position about 400 yards -behind the O-1 Line. - -With the seizure of Hill 94, the critical portions of the O-1 Line -were secured. There was, however, a good deal of activity within the -perimeter for several more hours. Major Bridges of 1/1 collected about -100 late-comers at BLUE Three and led them forward in search of the -battalion assembly area. Composed of men from H&S, Able and Baker -Companies, the little force not only missed its destination but made -one of the deepest penetrations of the day, finally halting on a hill -to the left of George Company’s front lines. - -Shortly after Bridges set up a defensive position for the night, his -position was invaded by an Easy Company contingent in search of the -2d Battalion. Reoriented to some degree, the visitors reached Dog -Company’s intersection much later. The 2d Battalion CP had meanwhile -intercepted a group from Major Whitman S. Bartley’s Weapons Company at -the trail junction selected in the darkness for the initial battalion -CP. At one or the other of these points, the misdirected portions of -Sutter’s battalion were directed to their parent units. All personnel -were present or accounted for before dawn.[170] - - [170] Sutter memo, May 55. - -Two other troop movements completed the tactical mosaic of the 1st -Marines. The 2d Platoon of How Company was to pass through Item’s lines -on Objective C at 2330 and outpost the summit of Hill 233, some 2,000 -yards farther along the ridge and beyond the regimental front. After -setting out on schedule, the small unit covered about half of its -rugged journey upon reaching Hill 180, an intermediate height. With -most of the night gone and his troops wearied by the climb, the platoon -leader radioed for permission to halt and his request was granted. - -Another venture into the unknown was made by an even smaller unit. -Second Lieutenant Bruce F. Cunliffe’s 60mm section of Fox Company had -somehow mingled with 3d Battalion troops during the drive inland. When -he led his men through the darkness in search of 2/1, the section -ranged forward of friendly lines and into unexplored territory near -Hill 117. - -The surprise was mutual when these Marines stumbled into a small NKPA -patrol. But a brief fire fight in the darkness was enough for the Red -soldiers, who took to their heels and left three dead. Cunliffe’s -force, which had no casualties, spent the rest of the night in -uneventful isolation. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Securing the Beachhead - -_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on the -Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack on D-plus 1--Advance -to the Force Beachhead Line--Displacement Ashore of Division CP_ - - -Of all the calculated risks taken at Inchon, perhaps the most daring -was the decision to ground eight LSTs abreast on RED Beach immediately -after the assault troops landed. The Navy workhorses were vulnerable -enough at best, and on this narrow strip of waterfront they were lined -up so close to one another that shots fired by a blindfolded enemy -could scarcely have missed. - -Not all the NKPA shells and bullets did miss, for that matter. But -fortune as usual blessed the bold, and such enemy rounds as found their -targets did not touch off tons of napalm, gasoline, and ammunition. - -Only with reluctance had the planners accepted the risk of landing -thin-skinned supply vessels before the immediate battle area was -secured. But Inchon was not a typical amphibious operation. The -tremendous tidal range created an unprecedented situation; and if vital -supplies were not landed on the evening high tide, the assault troops -must pass a precarious first night without adequate quantities of -ammunition, water, and gasoline. - -Dusk had fallen, with visibility further reduced by smoke and rain -squalls, when the vessels wallowed into RED Beach. The reconnaissance -element of Shore Party Group Able had gone ahead with the assault -troops to erect landing guides during the last moments of daylight. -While the men were working under fire, one of the beach markers was -riddled by enemy machine guns as it was being erected. - -The H&S Company of Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe’s 1st Shore Party -Battalion came in with the first of the LSTs, and other elements of -Groups Able and Baker followed in short order. Each of the eight -vessels brought a cargo consisting of 50 tons of ammunition, 30 tons -of rations, 15 tons of water, and five tons of fuel. These special -loads were in addition to the normal cargo of engineer and shore party -equipment and combat vehicles. Every LST was limited to 500 short -tons, however, in order to insure that it could be beached without -trouble.[171] - - [171] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Dog. - -The last of the LCMs had not yet unloaded and retracted on RED Beach -when the first of the LSTs appeared slightly ahead of schedule. Naval -officers managed to hold the LSTs back until the beach had cleared, and -the eight vessels made a successful landing in spite of treacherous -currents combined with low visibility. Two of them grounded momentarily -on the mud flats but butted their way through to the beach. And though -the sea wall temporarily prevented several vessels from lowering bow -ramps effectively, the LSTs at each end of the line were able to -discharge cargo over their ramps.[172] - - [172] LCdr R. Schneelock, Jr., USN, memo to authors, 20 Apr - 55. - -Bulldozers were first on the beach. They moved along the sea wall under -enemy fire, pushing down sections of masonry which interfered with -unloading operations. - -LST 973 had no more than grated ashore when a Red Korean mortar shell -exploded among the drums of motor fuel. Gasoline flooded the main -deck and leaked down to the crew quarters through holes made by shell -fragments. Orders were given to cut off electric motors and enforce -all possible precautions, and the vessel miraculously escaped a -conflagration even though it took further hits from enemy machine-gun -fire.[173] - - [173] Karig, _Korea_, 236–241. - -LST 857 ran into a ROK PC boat while heading in toward the beach, -but no harm was done to either vessel. Hits from NKPA mortar and -machine-gun fire punctured eight drums of gasoline without any of them -bursting into flame. This was one of the LSTs which fired back at -enemy gun flashes. During the exchange a sailor was killed and another -knocked unconscious when an enemy projectile damaged one of the LST’s -gun mounts. - -LST 859, which had a sailor wounded by enemy mortar fragments, hit -RED Beach with all guns blazing away. When the vessel beached, it was -immediately boarded by Marines who helped themselves to ammunition -while shouting to sailors in the well deck to stop firing. The same -message was slammed home more authoritatively when First Lieutenant -William J. Peter, Jr., appeared on deck, as directed by Lieutenant -Colonel Newton, and demanded that the LST’s guns cease at once.[174] - - [174] MSgt B. W. Gifford interv, 17 Nov 54; Col G. R. Newton - memo to authors, 16 Apr 55; LCdr D. Weidemeyer memo to - authors, 12 Apr 55. - -This put an end to the bombardment of shore positions. “No LSTs fired -after my ship beached,” commented Lieutenant Trumond E. Houston, USN, -commander of LST 799 at the extreme left of the line. “Earlier LSTs -beaching had opened fire on targets unknown to me, but my command had -received very firm orders not to open fire due to the danger of firing -into our own forces.”[175] - - [175] LCdr T. E. Houston ltr to authors, 8 Mar 55. - -As dusk shaded into darkness, the Marines on and around Cemetery Hill -extended their lines into the city. Even at the climax of the military -drama there was an unexpected note of comedy--assault troops were to -discover shortly that among the ammunition brought by the LSTs, some -useless .22 caliber cartridges testified to the haste of departure from -Camp Pendleton.[176] There was enough M-1 ammunition, however, so that -the enemy had no cause to complain of being neglected by the Marines. - - [176] SSgt H. M. Grenell interv, 15 Nov 54. - - -_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches_ - -It was absolutely essential that the LSTs unload in time to retract -on the morning high tide and allow other cargo vessels to take their -places. This meant an all-night job for the 1st Shore Party Battalion, -which was to initiate unloading on both beaches for the organization -composed also of the 1st Combat Service Group, the 7th Motor Transport -Battalion, and the U. S. Army 2d Engineer Special Brigade, with the -latter in control. - -The vehicles came off the LSTs first--about 450 of them, all told--and -darkness had fallen when the unloading of cargo got into full swing. -Congestion on the 650-foot strip of beach did not permit normal -location and employment of dumps. It was catch-as-catch-can for the -shore party troops and engineers, with the cargo being off-loaded -and stockpiled wherever space could be found. Later, as the tactical -situation improved, designated dumps were established. - -The men went about their work under the floodlights, heedless of -scattered enemy small-arms fire which continued throughout the -night. At a glance the unloading presented a scene of noisy chaos, -yet everything was so well under control by midnight that the -accomplishment of the mission within prescribed time limits was assured. - -In the morning the eight LSTs were retracted according to schedule as -a like number approached the beach to discharge cargo. Two of them -grounded in the mud flats too far out for unloading, but the supply -problem was already so well solved that this setback was not serious. - -On BLUE Beach it was not the intention to develop the area beyond the -needs of the initial assault, so that a comparatively small shore party -element was required. Only such equipment as could be carried by hand -was taken ashore in the LCVPs and LVTs. - -The reconnaissance element of Shore Party Group B (--) had landed -with the assault troops, followed by the rest of the group at 1930. -Provisions for the use of pre-loaded LVTs having been made in the -assault phase supply plan, the shore party troops set out flanking -lights to mark the entire BLUE area as a single beach. This was in -preparation for the arrival of the 24 LVTs bringing pre-loaded supplies -to sustain the attack in the morning. Ten of these vehicles were so -delayed by adverse currents that a receding tide left them high and -dry. Officers of the 1st Marines decided that the supplies were not -critical enough to warrant unloading by hand over the mud flats, and -the job was postponed until the LVTs could be floated in on the morning -high tide. While they were discharging on BLUE-3, the LCVPs came in -with other gear which was unloaded and stored in the regimental dump. - -Prison stockades were set up on both beaches the first night. The LSTs -continued to unload most of the Division supplies on RED Beach in -spite of treacherous currents, the tidal range and the mistakes made -by Japanese crews. BLUE Beach was closed on D-plus 1, having served -its purpose, and the shore party personnel transferred to GREEN Beach, -where facilities for unloading LSTs had been improved. Supplies landed -there could be trucked across the causeway, and on D-plus 2 the shore -party troops on RED Beach were also relieved and sent to Wolmi-do. - -The 2d Engineer Special Brigade retained control of all logistical -operations in the Inchon port area on 17 September as vessels began -to discharge at Pier No. 2, designated as YELLOW Beach. There were -assurances by this time that the engineers would soon have the tidal -basin partially operative, thus adding materially to the capacity of -the harbor.[177] - - [177] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike; Costigan interv, - 17 Nov 54; K. W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea” in - _Marine Corps Gazette_, 37, no. 1:48–55 (Jan 53). - -The 1st Combat Service Group remained in control of consolidated dumps. -This organization was the storage agency for all X Corps supplies with -the exception of ammunition and engineering materials, both of which -were handled by Army personnel. Owing to the shortage of trucks, the -7th Motor Transport Battalion was held in the port area under control -of the engineer brigade. - -The lack of enough motor trucks for port operations was alleviated -by the restoration of rail transportation much sooner than had been -expected. Although the planners did not count on this factor before -D-plus 30, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade rounded up Korean crews and -speeded up the tremendous task of putting the Inchon-Seoul line back -in working order. As early as D-plus 1 a switch engine and six cars -were operating in the Inchon yards. Three days later the first train, -carrying 1,200 Marines, was dispatched over the 5-mile run from Inchon -to Ascom City. As the ground forces advanced, the engineers followed -close behind the front with rail transportation which handled a total -of 350,000 rations, 315,000 gallons of fuel, 1,260 tons of ammunition, -and 10,000 troops before the Division was relieved. - - -_Surgical Teams on the Beaches_ - -Casualties of the Landing Force on D-day amounted to 20 KIA, 1 DOW, -1 MIA, and 174 WIA in addition to 14 of non-battle classification. -Medical officers regarded the operation as a landmark because of the -four Navy surgical teams, each composed of three doctors and ten -corpsmen, which went in behind the assault troops on the LSTs. Similar -teams had been employed in the later operations of World War II, -but Inchon had the distinction of being the first amphibious assault -in which carefully planned medical techniques were integrated with -military operations. - -The surgical teams had been drilled and rehearsed in Japan for their -tasks. Patients requiring immediate surgery on the night of D-day -were evacuated to LST(H) 898, where an improvised operating room had -been installed. During the assault phase, 42 military and 32 civilian -casualties were treated instead of the 300 which had been expected. -Such an unqualified success was achieved that the teams were recalled -to Japan afterwards to act as instructors. Within a year the numbers of -Navy surgical teams had grown to a total of 22 on standby duty in the -Far East.[178] - - [178] Capt E. R. Hering, (MC) USN, memo to authors, 4 Apr 55; - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How; Lynn Montross, “They - Make Men Whole Again,” in _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, - no. 12:42–49 (Dec 52). - -Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, had served in the Pusan Perimeter -as the Brigade Surgeon. From a study of maps and intelligence reports, -he tentatively selected a site for the Division hospital on the eastern -outskirts of Inchon. - -The 1st Medical Battalion, commanded by Commander Howard B. Johnson, -(MC) USN, consisted of an H&S Company and five letter companies. -Able and Baker were hospital companies, while Charlie, Dog, and Easy -functioned as collecting and clearing companies. The last was organized -for attachment to the 7th Marines when that regiment landed at Inchon. - -Medical planning necessarily had to be hurried. In view of the unusual -landing conditions at Inchon, it was decided to revert the clearing -platoons, normally attached to infantry regiments, to Division control -when they reached the transport area. - -Three casualty teams, each consisting of a medical officer and -six hospital corpsmen--one team from Able Company, and two from -Baker--landed from separate LSTs on D-day with a mission of caring for -initial casualties. Supporting collection sections of Charlie and Dog -Companies landed with the assault troops of the two rifle regiments. - -The reconnaissance group and the two hospital companies arrived on -D-plus 1, followed by the H&S Company with equipment for the hospital -set up in a schoolhouse. It was opened at 1500 on D-plus 2, with 47 -casualties being received the first day. - -These were the forerunners of a total of 5,516 patients to be treated -by the 1st Medical Battalion for all causes during the entire -Inchon-Seoul operation. Most of them were WIA cases, but such ailments -as acute appendicitis, hernia, piles, and sprains are also recorded. - -Of the 2,484 surgical patients, only nine died after reaching the first -aid station, and among them were six deaths following major surgery. -The proportion of patients surviving after evacuation, therefore, -reached the figure of 99.43 per cent. This meant that the chances were -about 199 to 1 that a wounded Marine would live. - - -_Artillery and Tank Operations_ - -The planners, anticipating the need of artillery support for the -assault on the mainland, had hoped that DUKWs could land two battalions -of Colonel James H. Brower’s 11th Marines on GREEN Beach for this -mission. There was some reason to believe that these vehicles could -cross the mud flats at low tide, thus enabling the 105s to get in -position on Wolmi-do and registered before the Inchon landing. In the -end, however, it was decided that this plan was not feasible, and the -1st and 2d Battalions of the artillery regiment landed on the evening -tide while the rifle regiments were hitting the beaches at Inchon. -A delay of an hour and a half occurred as a result of the confused -maneuvering of ships in the inner harbor. It was not until 2150, -therefore, that the 1st and 2d Battalions were prepared to deliver -massed fires in support of the 5th and 1st Marines respectively.[179] -Fortunately, the lack of this support at H-hour had not been a grave -handicap in view of the light resistance encountered on the beaches. - - [179] The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, was attached to RCT-7 - and had not yet landed at Inchon. - -Low visibility and lack of targets limited the fires to a few rounds -the first night. Next day the artillery landing was completed when -4/11 went ashore on RED Beach, followed on D-plus 2 by the 96th Field -Artillery Battalion, USA. Plans for the drive inland called for 1/11 -and 2/11 to fire in direct support of RCT-5 and RCT-1 respectively. -Support was to be provided by 4/11 for RCT-5 and by the Army battalion -for RCT-1.[180] - - [180] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar. - -The problems of tank support for the Inchon operation had given the -planners many a headache. BLUE Beach was dismissed from consideration -because of the mud flats, and the possibilities at RED Beach were not -encouraging. GREEN Beach offered the best prospects for landing tanks, -though it was recognized that they would be stranded if the enemy -destroyed the causeway connecting Wolmi-do with the mainland. - -The consequences of the hasty embarkation from Camp Pendleton had borne -down heavily upon the 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant -Colonel Harry T. Milne. Crews trained with the M-4A3 (Sherman) and -105mm howitzer were suddenly equipped with the M-26 (Pershing) and its -90mm gun. With the exception of Company A, which saw action with the -Brigade, few of the men had had any experience either at driving or -firing the new tanks. The flame tank platoon of Headquarters Company -had received some training at Barstow, but most of the personnel of -Baker, Charlie, and Dog Companies were limited to shipboard instruction. - -The men of the Company A platoon which landed on GREEN Beach in support -of 3/5 were veterans of several fights with NKPA tanks and infantry in -the Pusan Perimeter. In the evening of D-day they supported the landing -on RED Beach and moved across the causeway to the mainland at dusk. -There they joined the other two platoons of Able Company and the flame -tank platoon, which landed with the LSTs in support of the 5th Marines. - -At 1700 on D-day a reconnaissance team went ashore on Wolmi-do to -prepare for the landing of B Company, which took place late the -following afternoon. YELLOW Beach, in the inner harbor, was operative -for the landing of Company C on 18 September, and Company D was to -arrive later with the 7th Marines.[181] - - [181] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. - - -_The Attack on D-plus 1_ - -The night of 15–16 September passed quietly for both of the infantry -regiments. At 2000 on D-day the 3d Battalion crossed over the causeway -from Wolmi-do to rejoin RCT-5. The most dramatic action on either -regimental front was an episode in the Cemetery Hill area. Two Marines -mistakenly wandered out in front of the high ground and were cut down -by enemy fire from a cave at the base of the hill, just below the lines -of Company A, 5th Marines. Repeated attempts to reach the fallen men -were thwarted by submachine gun fire from the recess, until a ROK -interpreter, threatening the use of tanks, persuaded the occupants to -surrender. As a squad of North Koreans filed out in submission, troops -from Able Company rushed forward to get their two comrades. One of the -Marines was already dead; the other lay mortally wounded.[182] - - [182] Muetzel interv, 6 Jan 55. - -In the middle of the night, the 1st and 5th Marines received General -Smith’s OpnO 3-50, directing them to attack after dawn. Murray’s -regiment, by previous plan, would march through the southern part of -Inchon, leaving the heart of the seaport to be cleared by the KMC. -About three miles inland, the 5th Marines would reach the O-2 Line -coming abreast of Puller’s front of the night before. (Thus, the O-1 -and O-2 Lines were one and the same in the 1st Marines zone). Tied in -along the Inchon-Seoul Highway at Hill 117, the two regiments would -drive eastward to the O-3 Line, approximately five miles inland. This -last arc was the goal specified in Smith’s attack order.[183] - - [183] 1st MarDiv _OpOrders 2-50_ and _3-50_; O. P. Smith - _Notes_, 346. - -Murray’s tactical plan was dictated by the simple necessity of getting -out of Inchon as quickly as possible. The 5th Marines would therefore -attack in a column of battalions, with Roise’s 2d in the lead, -followed by the 1st and 3d in that order. Two hills, located north of -the highway on the outskirts of the city, were designated Regimental -Objectives D and E. In taking this high ground, 2/5 would automatically -control the 5th Marines’ segment of the O-2 Line and seal off the -Inchon Peninsula in conjunction with the 1st Marines. This would leave -a secure pocket for the great ship-to-shore build-up commencing on the -morning tide. - -Following a brief orientation at dawn, Captain Jaskilka led Company E -forward from the British Consulate. Unopposed, the column passed the -inner tidal basin, where Fox Company fell in behind. In the meantime, -Company D left its positions atop Observatory Hill and brought up the -rear of the battalion formation. Inchon’s streets were strangely quiet -during 2/5’s advance. Frightened civilians peeped from windows and -alleyways, but the enemy was nowhere to be found. The sprawling seaport -seemed dead. - -Inconsistencies of the Oriental enemy were exposed in a striking -contrast of scenes at 0700. Nearing the edge of the city, Easy Company -was preparing to veer off the road and attack Objective D. The troops -were encountering no resistance whatsoever, and it was obvious that the -North Koreans had abandoned Inchon in haste during the night. Only five -miles away, however, six T-34 tanks were rumbling along the highway in -broad daylight, headed toward the seaport without infantry escort. - -An eight-plane strike of VMF-214 intercepted the enemy armor at the -village of Kansong-ni. As the Corsairs swept down on the first pass, -one of the tanks was enveloped in flaming napalm. Another was disabled -when a rocket hit blew off its tracks. A third was left seemingly -helpless on the road, squatting in a pool of motor fuel which poured -out of its wounds.[184] - - [184] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4. - -Marines of 2/1 watched the show with enthusiasm from the top of Hill -117, less than two miles away. The joy of victory went flat, however, -when one of the planes failed to pull out of its dive. Captain William -F. Simpson, the pilot, was killed as the F4U crashed beside the -highway.[185] - - [185] _Ibid._; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - -A second flight of VMF-214 descended on Kansong-ni with a vengeance. -Rocket fire destroyed one T-34, and a direct bomb hit knocked another -off the road. It will be shown shortly that these two tanks must have -been the same pair that were severely damaged by napalm and rockets -during the first strike. When panicky NKPA crewmen fled to nearby -thatched huts for concealment, the dwellings were promptly razed by -napalm. Marine pilots, assuming incorrectly that all six tanks lay dead -beneath the pall of smoke and flame, turned their attention to other -targets in the area. They bombed an enemy jeep and weapons carrier -standing in the open, then strafed two other motor vehicles which had -been cleverly camouflaged.[186] - - [186] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4. - -It would soon become more apparent why Red leaders in Seoul had -sacrificed precious armor in a clearly hopeless thrust against the -swelling beachhead. Communications were destroyed, so that NKPA defense -forces fought or fled as isolated units. Adequate reserves were not -at hand initially, with the result that stop-gap detachments were fed -piecemeal into battle, only to be flattened by the Marine steamroller. -In short, the North Koreans lost control. And when they attempted to -regain it, time had run out. - -While Marine air hammered the enemy’s armored column, the 2d Battalion, -5th Marines, deployed outside Inchon. Having made sight contact with -Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s troops on Hill 117 at 0730, Captain -Jaskilka led Easy Company off the road and toward Objective D the left. -Fox Company continued along the pavement several hundred more yards, -then also veered northward in the direction of Objective E. Neither -company met opposition, and both were atop their respective hills at -0930.[187] - - [187] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen. - -Meanwhile, Company D had advanced eastward on the highway with a -platoon of Able Company tanks. There was the occasional whine of a -sniper’s bullet overhead as the column moved rapidly to its junction -with the 1st Marines. At 0900, while Easy and Fox Companies were -climbing their objectives, Dog made contact with 2/1 at Hill 117.[188] - - [188] _Ibid._ - -It was its opposite of the 1st Marines that Dog Company of 2/5 met at -Hill 117. Fox Company of 2/1 had been clearing the eastern reaches -of the big ridge since 0615, and Easy was to spend all morning and -afternoon securing high ground and a village about a mile off on the -right flank. When the attack along the highway resumed shortly after -0900, Company D of the 5th Marines and a platoon of A/Tanks took the -lead. Fox and Dog Companies of 2/1 followed in trace and on the right -as the formation advanced rapidly against nothing heavier than sniper -fire. By 1100, elements of both battalions were deployed at Sogam-ni, -just a few hundred yards short of smoking Kansong-ni. Since the former -hamlet bordered the O-3 Line, the Marines held up to await further -orders.[189] - - [189] _Ibid._; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; - LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; and Capt J. L. - Carter ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55. - -To the south of the highway, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, -reorganized in the center of Puller’s zone and moved forward as -regimental reserve. Simultaneously, the 3d Battalion began its sweep of -the Munhang Peninsula, Companies G and I attacking generally southward -from Hill 233. Since the broad front was studded with high ground and -villages, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge relied on LVT transport whenever -possible to regain momentum lost to hill-climbing and searching. -Resistance on the peninsula proved negligible, although once again the -capture of prisoners and materiel revealed enemy potential unused. -Among the weapons abandoned by the North Koreans were quantities of -rifles and machine guns, a battery of Russian-made 120mm mortars, and -four coastal guns, the latter pointing menacingly toward the ships of -the Attack Force anchored in the channel.[190] - - [190] 3/1 _SAR_; Crowley-Adams interv, 9 Feb 55; Col T. L. - Ridge ltr to CMC, 12 May 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to - CMC, 27 Apr 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 15 - Apr 55. - -Although 1/1 and 3/1 did not reach their portion of the objective until -later in the day, Division Headquarters realized by midmorning that -enemy resistance as far out as the O-3 Line could be discounted. Now -that the tremendous obstacles of the actual landing had been overcome, -the tactical advantage of the moment swung from the Red commander at -Seoul to General Smith. Owing to the conformation of the Inchon and -Munhang Peninsulas, which were linked together inland like Siamese -twins, the O-3 Line formed a front three miles long with both flanks -bounded by water. A glance at the map will show the beachhead thus -set off as an ideal foothold. To North Koreans thinking in terms of -counterattack, the vacuum rapidly being filled by the Landing Force was -a defensible bottleneck. To the Marines, on the other hand, it was the -gateway to freedom of maneuver for an overland offensive. - - -_Advance to the Force Beachhead Line_ - -Opening the gate was the subject of General Smith’s OpnO 4-50, issued -by dispatch at 1045, D-plus 1. He directed Puller and Murray to -continue the attack from the O-3 Line, seized the Force Beachhead -Line (FBHL), and thereby conclude the assault phase of the amphibious -operation. The order also marked off a new Tactical Bomb Line,[191] -behind which Marine Air was forbidden to strike without ground -coordination. - - [191] The first bomb line corresponded to the FBHL, and Corps - Phase Line AA was the equivalent of the O-2 Line. - -Roughly the shape of a right angle, the FBHL corresponded to X Corps -Phase Line BB. Like the O-3 arc, it was anchored on the sea at both -ends. The east-west leg of the angle, five miles long, lay above and -almost parallel to the Inchon-Seoul Highway. The north-south leg, about -seven miles inland, added a third projection, the Namdong Peninsula, -to the beachhead. Encompassing the built-up centers of Ascom City and -Mahang-ri on the main road, the apex of the FBHL pointed northeast -toward Kimpo Airfield like an arrowhead. - -[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS - -D-PLUS 1] - -The Inchon-Seoul Highway remained the boundary between the 1st and -5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s order went out to the latter -before noon, directing a two-pronged assault. The 2d Battalion would -jump off from the O-3 Line and trace the course of the highway, -clearing the hills and villages on the left. Simultaneously, the 3d -was to swing sharply northward from behind 2/5 and attack high ground -overlooking the east-west leg of the FBHL. The 1st Battalion would -remain in regimental reserve.[192] - - [192] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -There were a number of reasons why Colonel Puller’s scheme of maneuver -was more complex. Not only was the 1st Marines’ front much wider and -the terrain more difficult, but the rapid advance had left troops units -scattered throughout a zone of action some 15 square miles in area. -There was considerable shuffling to be done before the regiment could -deploy along the highway for the drive to the east. - -The 2d Battalion would continue along the MSR, clearing the high ground -on the right and coordinating with 2/5 on the left. To the south, the -1st Battalion would move up on the right of the 2d as quickly as the -rugged terrain allowed. The 3d, after clearing the Munhang Peninsula, -was to pass into regimental reserve subsequent to being relieved on the -right flank by the Reconnaissance Company. Swinging around a sharp cove -of salt pans and mud flats, the latter unit would patrol the Namdong -Peninsula to secure the Division right.[193] - - [193] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; Ridge - ltr, 12 May 55; and Hawkins ltr, 27 Apr 55. - -At 1335, the 5th Marines attacked against minor resistance on the north -of the highway. Moving into Kansong-ni, the vanguard of 2/5 and its -tank escort approached a sharp bend where the road veered northward for -about a mile to avoid two large hills. Around the curve were the enemy -tanks believed to have been knocked out by VMF-214 earlier in the day. - -A section of Marine armor turned left off the pavement just short of -the bend. The two M-26s crawled to the top of a knoll from which they -could cover the infantry, as the latter advanced around the corner. -Looking down from their vantage point, the tank crews saw three intact -T-34s parked in column on the highway, about 300 yards beyond the turn. -Hatches on the Communist vehicles were buttoned, with the 85mm guns -leveled at the road bend.[194] - - [194] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2dLt J. Sleger, Jr., - to Dr A. D. Coox, ORO, Dept of Army, n. d. (Sleger rpt). - -The M-26s opened up immediately. Twenty rounds of 90mm armor-piercing -(AP) ammunition crashed into the enemy armor. There was no return fire, -probably because the Red crews had not time to elevate and traverse -their manually-operated guns. In the space of a few minutes, each of -the T-34s exploded and burst into flame. The crews did not escape.[195] - - [195] _Ibid._ - -The Marine attack rolled past the blazing hulks. Nearby were two other -wrecked T-34s, obviously the victims of the air attack. If the pilots -of VMF-214 had attacked a total of six enemy tanks, one of the vehicles -must have escaped before the ground troops reached the scene.[196] - - [196] _Ibid._; CG 1st MarDiv disp to CTF 90, 16 Sep 50. - -Tracing the north-south stretch of highway that led to Ascom City, Dog -Company of RCT-5 marched a thousand yards beyond the bend and ascended -a high hill on the west side of the road. Company F swung out to the -left, crossed the railroad tracks running parallel to the highway, and -seized the high ground adjacent to that held by Company D. Both assault -units encountered only sniping, but it was early evening before the two -hills and surrounding low ground had been searched thoroughly.[197] - - [197] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtCol H. S. Roise - interv, 24 Nov 54. - -Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered 2/5 to dig in for the night. He -was about 3,000 yards short of the highway’s intersection with the -FBHL, but his battalion held the commanding ground. Companies D and -F defended the approach to Ascom City, which sprawled out on the low -ground just forward of their positions. Company E, in reserve, set up a -perimeter in the battalion rear.[198] - - [198] Roise interv, 24 Nov 54. - -Lieutenant Sweet’s five M-26s, which had supported the day-long -advance from RED Beach, were relieved at dusk by the 1st Platoon of -Able Company tanks. In addition to their score of three T-34s, Sweet’s -veterans of the Pusan Perimeter had captured an impressive tally of -enemy materiel: three NKPA trucks, two 76mm AT guns, two 122mm mortars, -and a pair of Russian-manufactured jeeps.[199] - - [199] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. - -During 2/5’s attack along the MSR, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was -occupied with the hills overlooking that portion of the FBHL to the -northwest. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had launched his drive at 1330 -with Companies G and I in the assault and H in reserve. On the left, -George Company seized its high-ground objective at 1440, while Item -took an extra hour to clear adjacent Hill 137. There were no Marine -casualties during a rapid advance that netted 12 enemy prisoners.[200] - - [200] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -Patrols from 3/5 ranged westward to the sea, and eastward to the edge -of Ascom City, where Item Company troops discovered an enemy ammunition -dump and vehicle park. Location of these undefended prizes was promptly -reported to the 5th Marines CP.[201] - - [201] _Ibid._ - -South of the Inchon-Seoul Highway, the 1st Marines attacked from the -O-3 Line at 1600. Sutter’s 2d Battalion drove forward on the right -of the MSR and passed below Kansong-ni without incident. Continuing -a thousand yards farther, Company D scaled the rugged slopes of Hill -186, cleared the summit, and dug in. Fox Company climbed the same high -ground shortly afterwards and went into position on the left of Dog and -overlooking the highway. Thus 2/1’s front for the night was across the -road and slightly to the rear of the high ground positions occupied by -Company D of 2/5. Easy Company returned from its independent mission -on the right flank and set up a reserve position in the vicinity of -Kansong-ni, just rearward of Sutter’s CP at the base of Hill 186.[202] - - [202] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Sutter-Codispoti - interv, 25 Jan 55; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr - 55. - -The enemy attitude in the 2d Battalion’s zone gradually had developed -from occasional sniping early in the day to a pattern of definite light -resistance as the Marines surged over Hill 186. Though most of the -North Koreans fled after firing a few rounds, their token efforts cost -the battalion four killed and 10 wounded. These figures are noteworthy -in view of the fact that total losses for the whole Division on D-plus -1 were four KIA and 21 WIA.[203] - - [203] _Ibid._ - -Sutter’s troops exacted a comparatively stiff price from the Reds in -return, for it was estimated that 120 of the enemy were killed or -wounded. Moreover, the Marines captured more than 30 prisoners, 70 -rifles, 10 machine guns, and an ordnance dump loaded with small-arms -ammunition.[204] - - [204] 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr 55. - -Elsewhere on the 1st Marines front there was considerably more hiking -than combat. The 3d Battalion completed its sweep of the Munhang -Peninsula about 1600 and assembled at the southern tip of the O-3 Line -to await relief by the Reconnaissance Company.[205] In the course of -rounding up NKPA prisoners and abandoned weapons, 3/1 had encountered -a group of Korean villagers, headed by their schoolmaster, who called -themselves the Young People’s Anti-Communist Resistance League. They -had armed themselves with Russian rifles and light machine guns left -behind by enemy troops fleeing inland.[206] - - [205] 3/1 _SAR_, 6; Ridge ltr, 12 May 55; Simmons ltr 15 Apr - 55. - - [206] _Ibid._; Maj G. C. Westover ltr to authors, 1 Apr 55; - and Capt J. R. Fisher ltr to authors, 18 Apr 55. - -In the center of Puller’s zone, the 1st Battalion had moved rapidly to -fill the gap between the 2d and 3d. Attacking into the vacuum left by -the retreating enemy, Hawkins’ unit drove two mountainous miles beyond -the O-3 Line, finally stopping for the night on high ground about -2,500 yards south of 2/1’s positions on Hill 186. The break in the -regimental front was protected when 3/1 shifted northward and formed a -reserve perimeter to the rear of the lines, after being relieved on the -right at 1700 by Captain Kenneth J. Houghton’s Reconnaissance Company. -Assuming responsibility for the Division’s southern flank, the Recon -troops set up a night defense at the base of the Namdong Peninsula with -their front linked to that of 1/1 on the left.[207] - - [207] Recon Co, HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov - 50; and Ridge ltr, 12 May 55. - - -_Displacement Ashore of Division CP_ - -The establishment of a Division CP on shore was delayed by the -necessity of utilizing every minute of the limited periods of high tide -for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. General Smith -decided on D-day that it would not be advisable to displace his CP -ashore until General Craig and the ADC group (former headquarters of -1st ProvMarBrig) were able to set up adequate communications. With this -object in mind, the ADC group landed on the evening high tide of D-day -to locate an advance echelon on Wolmi-do. - -Not much could be done that evening. And in the morning Craig informed -CG 1st MarDiv that the island was too crowded. He reported that he -and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had discovered a likely spot on the -southeast outskirts of Inchon and recommended that the CP be moved -without delay.[208] General Smith approved and the move started at once. - - [208] BGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 5 Apr 55. - -Meanwhile, a good deal of military housekeeping had been accomplished -in the Inchon port area. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge’s 1st -Engineer Battalion was given the task of making a survey of beach exit -roads with a view to opening up an MSR between RED and BLUE Beaches. - -After elements of Company A hit GREEN Beach, the remaining troops of -the battalion had landed on the two beaches and assisted shore party -units at unloading water, ammunition, and rations. This work was so -well along by the morning of D-plus 1 that the engineers opened up the -MSR between the two beaches and assigned personnel for improvement -and maintenance. A Water point was established at the north end of -RED Beach with 31 distillation units, and 125,000 gallons were issued -during the next six days.[209] - - [209] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan. - -The new Division CP on the outskirts of Inchon was ready by the -afternoon of D-plus 1, and General Smith said goodbye to General -MacArthur on the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_. The commander in chief -wished him well and enjoined him to take Kimpo Airfield at the first -opportunity.[210] - - [210] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 188–189. - -The Marine general landed at YELLOW Beach at 1730. Upon arrival at the -CP, he sent a dispatch to Admiral Doyle, informing him that he was -assuming responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore at 1800 on -16 September. Thus ended the amphibious assault phase, almost exactly -24 hours after the first wave of Marines set foot on RED Beach. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -On to Kimpo - -_Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7 in -Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General MacArthur Visits the -Front--The Drive to Kimpo Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy -Counterattack at Kimpo_ - - -On Sunday morning, D-plus 2, General Smith was directed as Landing -Force Commander to re-establish civil government in Inchon. Although -parts of the Korean seaport had been burned or battered into rubble, -thousands of refugees were returning to the ruins of their homes after -having fled during the bombardments. The KMC Regiment, operating -under the control of RCT-5, had been given the task of screening the -remaining inhabitants for their loyalty. No fault could have been found -with the thoroughness of these Korean allies who were perhaps inclined -to be too zealous when they suspected subversion. - -General Smith concluded that the best procedure was to find loyal -Korean officials and uphold their authority. He consulted Rear Admiral -Sohn Won Yil, the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, and learned that the -former mayor of Inchon had fled during the original NKPA invasion and -never returned. Admiral Sohn vouched for the loyalty of one of the -political prisoners, Pyo Yang Moon, who had been the losing candidate -for the mayoralty in the last election. The Marine general decided to -install him as Inchon’s chief executive and issued a proclamation to -that effect in Korean as well as English. - -Induction ceremonies were held on the morning of 18 September on the -portico of the city hall, a once imposing edifice which bore the scars -of war. About 700 prominent citizens attended as the Marine interpreter -led in singing the Korean national anthem. After the proclamation had -been read in both languages, General Smith made a few remarks and -the new mayor responded. A ROK Marine guard of honor officiated, and -Admiral Sohn brought the occasion to a close with a brief address. - -Steps were taken immediately to bury the civilian dead, to care for -the orphans, to distribute food and clothing to the distressed, and to -establish a civilian hospital and police force.[211] - - [211] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 197–199. - - -_Operations on Other Korean Fronts_ - -Dispatches received from the Pusan Perimeter revealed that the Eighth -Army had jumped off according to schedule on the 16th in its joint -offensive. Although gains were negligible the first day, this effort -was pinning down NKPA troops who might otherwise have reinforced the -defenders of Kimpo and Seoul. - -Several other operations had been mounted on both coasts as diversions -to keep the enemy guessing as to where the lightning would strike. -Kunsan, it may be recalled, had been briefly considered by X Corps -planners as an alternate amphibious objective. Early in September this -west coast seaport was selected as the chief target of feints during -the preparations for the Inchon landing. General Stratemeyer’s Fifth -Air Force bombers initiated strikes on rail and highway communications -within a 30-mile radius. That same day a hit-and-run amphibious raid on -Kunsan was planned at Admiral Joy’s headquarters in Tokyo. As a result, -Colonel Ely sailed with his company on the British frigate _Whitesand -Bay_ and raided the Kunsan waterfront on the night of 12 September. -Three casualties were incurred from enemy machine-gun fire. - -The Seventh Fleet added to the deception by singling out Kunsan -for carrier air strikes and naval gunfire bombardments to give the -impression of softening up an objective for amphibious assault. -Chinnampo, the seaport of Pyongyang, also appeared to be threatened -when it was bombarded by a British task force. - -On the east coast the USS _Missouri_, just arrived from the United -States, poured 16-inch shells into Samchok on 14 September while a -Navy helicopter did the spotting. The cruiser _Helena_ and three U. S. -destroyers added their metal to the bombardment.[212] - - [212] Material for this section has been derived from Karig, - _Korea_, 112, 243–255. - -D-day at Inchon was the date of a landing of ROK guerrillas behind the -NKPA lines at Changsa-dong, a coastal town about midway between Yongdok -and Pohang-dong. After the ROK merchant marine LST struck submerged -rocks and grounded, it was used as an improvised fortress by the -guerrillas, who retreated from the NKPA forces when their ammunition -ran short. The only two Americans, an Army lieutenant and sergeant, -radioed for help; and the cruiser _Helena_ provided naval gunfire for -the Navy relief expedition which took off the survivors. - -How much these diversions on both Korean coasts may have contributed -to a surprise at Inchon is a moot question. It might even be argued -that the enemy was not surprised, since an intercepted NKPA radio -message warned Pyongyang on 13 September that United Nations vessels -were approaching Inchon and planes bombing Wolmi-do. The senders -deduced that an amphibious landing was forthcoming and assured NKPA -Headquarters that defensive units were being stationed where they would -repulse the UN forces.[213] - - [213] Quoted in Karig, _Korea_, 202. - -This would make it appear doubtful that a surprise had been achieved. -But it is the opinion of Admiral Struble that “the actual results in -the Inchon-Seoul area clearly indicate surprise.... While the message -was apparently sent, and was a good report, there is no evidence that -the enemy headquarters accepted the report. It is possible that a later -report that the enemy bombarding ships were retreating from Inchon may -have confused the issue. In any event, only a short time was available -to take advantage of strong defensive positions and certainly not -enough time to mine the harbor.”[214] - - [214] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 18 May 55. - -An excellent analysis of the outcome is to be found in Admiral Doyle’s -official report. After paying tribute to the pre-D-day bombardments by -the cruisers and destroyers, plus the air strikes by planes of TF-77 -and TG-90.5, he concluded that “the assault itself was successful only -through the perfect teamwork that existed between the participating -Naval and Marine elements. The successful accomplishment of the -assault on Inchon demanded that an incredible number of individual and -coordinated tasks be performed precisely as planned. Only the United -States Marines, through their many years of specialized training in -amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, had the requisite -know-how to formulate the plans within the limited time available -and execute those plans flawlessly without additional training or -rehearsal.”[215] - - [215] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Annex Able Able, 8. - - -_Landing of RCT-7 in Japan_ - -Dispatches were received on D-plus 2 at the new Division CP to the -effect that the 7th Marines was preparing to embark that day from Kobe -and land at Inchon on 21 September. - -The 3d Battalion of this regiment, it may be recalled, had originally -been a unit of the 6th Marines on FMFLant duty with the Sixth Fleet -in the Mediterranean. Upon being ordered to the Far East, the unit -sailed from Crete to Japan by way of the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. -Lieutenant Colonel Dowsett, the battalion commander, did not know -throughout the voyage what specific mission awaited his men. - -They later met at Kobe their new regimental commander, Colonel -Litzenberg, who had flown to Japan ahead of the other two battalions -sailing from San Diego. He informed Dowsett that his battalion was -now a part of the 7th Marines and named him executive officer of the -regiment. Major Maurice E. Roach succeeded to the command of the newly -designated 3/7. - -A formidable task awaited the 7th Marines in Japan. The officers of the -staff, not having served with the Division before, were unfamiliar with -references and terms in directives dealing with the Inchon landing. -Problems of integrating the regiment into the operations of the -division were solved only by intensive application. - -A reshuffling of the regiment had to be accomplished meanwhile before -embarking for Inchon. The purpose was to spread the hundreds of -reservists throughout the three battalions instead of having them -concentrated in several companies.[216] - - [216] Dowsett interv, 2 Nov 54. - -It took some remarkable adjustments to get the regiment ready for -embarkation from Kobe only 17 days after sailing from San Diego. But -it meant that the 7th Marines would get into the fight at least a week -sooner than Division planners had anticipated. - - -_Destruction of NKPA Tank Column._ - -The amphibious assault phase was left behind on D-plus 2 when the 1st -and 5th Marines jumped off from the western outskirts of Ascom City to -initiate their drive inland. With the exploitation phase coming next, -command relationships would be as follows: - - +-------------+ - | CinCFE | - +------+------+ - | - +------+------+ - | CG X Corps | - +------+------+ - | - +------+------+ - |CG 1st MarDiv| - +------+------+ - | - +---------+---------+ - | | - +------+------+ +------+------+ - |CG 1st MarDiv| |CG 7th InfDiv| - +-------------+ +-------------+ - -The night of 16–17 September had been quiet all along the Division -front. It was so quiet, in fact, that the troops of 2/5 paid no -particular heed to a truck which drove through their lines on the -Inchon-Seoul Highway about midnight. Not until the vehicle penetrated a -few hundred yards into Marine territory was it stopped by curious tank -crews of Able/Tanks’ 1st Platoon, whose M-26s were deployed across the -road in deep anti-mechanized defense. The startled occupants of the -stray truck turned out to be an NKPA officer and four enlisted men, but -they were no more surprised than the Marines who stepped out of the -darkness and took them prisoner.[217] - - [217] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Capt J. E. - Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55. - -Apparently, neither the tank crews nor anybody else in the area -attached any special importance to the strange truck incident. In a few -hours, however, an epic of smoke, flame, and twisted steel would attest -to the significance of this scrap of evidence. The fact of the matter -was that the Red leaders in Seoul did not know the exact location of -the 1st Marine Division. - -It will be recalled that Dog Company of 2/5 occupied a hill on the west -side of the highway as the attack on D-plus 1 ground to a halt. About -200 yards beyond the company front was a large knoll that nosed into -the center of Ascom City. Observing that the highway turned sharply to -the east and passed through a cut at the base of the knoll, Lieutenant -H. J. Smith decided to outpost the natural roadblock in strength. At -dusk, therefore, he dispatched the 2d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant -Lee R. Howard, to man the advance position along with machine-gun and -rocket-launcher attachments.[218] - - [218] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv, - 7 Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55. - -As the first rays of dawn creased the sky on 17 September, Howard and -his troops were entrenched in a compact perimeter atop the knoll. -Several hundred yards to the rear, the 1st Platoon of A/Tanks was -augmented in its blocking position by 3.5-inch rocket launchers of 2/5 -and the 75mm recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines. Just across the road -from this formidable array were more 75s and 3.5s of the 1st Marines, -emplaced with Fox Company of 2/1 on Hill 186.[219] - - [219] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe, Peter Peter, and - Queen Queen; and 2/1 _SAR_, 5. - -Records of the 5th Marines describe this bristling gauntlet as “... a -temporary defensive position in depth....” It was more like a giant -torpedo. - -Sometime before daybreak, a North Korean column formed on the -Inchon-Seoul Highway a few miles east of Ascom City.[220] In the van -were six sleek T-34s of the 42d NKPA Mechanized Regiment. Perched -atop the tanks and strung out for about a hundred yards were 200 -Red infantrymen, comprising a mixed representation of the 18th NKPA -Division in Seoul. The enemy force was on its way to block the advance -of the 1st Marine Division along the highway. - - [220] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is - taken from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Baker, Oboe Oboe, - Peter Peter, Queen Queen; 2/1 _SAR_; Harrell interv, 4 - Jan 55; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; and McNaughton interv, - 7 Jan 55; and Statement of Capt W. D. Pomeroy enclosed - in Maj G. M. English ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55. - -It was obvious that the Communist soldiers had little or no knowledge -of the situation ahead. For as they neared Ascom City at the crack -of dawn, some were still sitting comfortably on the tanks and eating -breakfast. Others laughed and jabbered as they trailed along the road. - -Lieutenant Howard saw them approaching his Dog Company outpost on the -knoll. He reported to Smith, who passed the word to Roise at 2/5’s CP, -first one tank, then three, and finally six. Roise took the information -with the proverbial grain of salt, supposing it to be a delusion of -youth and inexperience. Just as quickly as that impression formed in -his mind, it was shattered by the first reverberations of the battle. - -[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK - -ASCOM CITY-17 SEPT] - -The attitude of the enemy soldiers as they neared his outpost convinced -Howard that they were unaware of the proximity of Marine lines. He let -the head of the column slip by on the road below, therefore, until the -tanks began to round the bend leading to Dog Company’s MLR. Then the -platoon leader shouted the order, and his men opened up with machine -guns, rifles, and BARs.[221] - - [221] _Ibid._ - -The Red infantry went down under the hail of lead like wheat under the -sickle. Soldiers on the tanks were knocked to the road, where many were -ground under as the big vehicles lurched and roared crazily in reaction -to the surprise. - -Corporal Okey J. Douglas moved part way down the knoll and closed on -the lead T-34 with his 2.36-inch rocket launcher. A few well-placed -rounds, fired calmly at a range of 75 yards, killed the armored vehicle -on the spot. Continuing the single-handed assault, Douglas damaged tank -number 2 just as the main Marine position exploded into action. - -Under attack by the outpost, the cripple and the four unharmed T-34s -had continued around the road bend, some of them spilling off the curve -in an attempt to deploy in the adjacent rice paddy. All five were taken -under fire by First Lieutenant William D. Pomeroy’s M-26s, about 600 -yards away. Within five minutes, the Marine 90mm guns threw 45 rounds -of AP at the enemy armor. - -Recoilless rifles of Second Lieutenant Charles M. Jones’ platoon (5th -Marines AT Co) added their hot metal at a range of 500 yards, and the -75s with the 1st Marines across the road also erupted. Simultaneously, -Second Lieutenant James E. Harrell ordered the 3.5-inch rocket -launchers of 2/5’s assault platoon into action. - -The T-34’s didn’t have a chance. All of them exploded under the heavy -fusilade; and when the smoke cleared, they were heaps of burning -wreckage. Scattered around the dead tanks and along the road were the -bodies of 200 Red infantrymen. So rapid and complete was the enemy’s -destruction that only one Marine casualty--slightly wounded--resulted -from the fight. - -It was only natural that conflicting claims would arise among the -participants in the short, violent clash. To Pomeroy’s tank crews, it -appeared that the M-26s accounted for the five T-34s with little or -no assistance from infantry arms. This was a reasonable conclusion on -their part, owing to the limited visibility from the buttoned vehicles -and the fact that their 90mm guns unquestionably wrought the greatest -destruction on the NKPA machines. Since so many weapons were firing -simultaneously from various other positions, however, and since the -T-34s were wrecked so completely, kills and partial kills were also -claimed by the recoilless rifles of both regiments. Moreover, the -3.5-inch rocket gunners of 2/5 and 2/1 believed that some of their -rounds found the mark in the midst of the furor. It is known, for -instance, that Private First Class Walter C. Monegan, Jr., rocket -man in the assault squad of Fox Company, 1st Marines, closed on the -enemy vehicles after they had rounded the bend and fired his weapon at -point-blank ranges. - - -_General MacArthur Visits the Front_ - -The acrid odor of high explosives still lingered in the fresh morning -air as a column of jeeps came slowly around the bend from the rear. -General MacArthur was making his first visit to the front. With him and -Admiral Struble were Generals Almond, Shepherd, Smith, Ruffner, Hodes, -Wright, and a group of X Corps staff officers. Several jeeps filled -with newspaper correspondents and photographers followed close behind -the military cortege.[222] - - [222] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Sep 50. - -Grimy Marines of RCT-5, their eyes dazzled by the glitter of starry -insignia, gazed in wonder at this sudden revelation of the pomp and -circumstance of war. The generals and admirals in their turn were -equally impressed by the destruction these Marines had wrought--the -warm corpses beside the road, the blazing heaps of twisted metal that -had been T-34 tanks only a few minutes before. - -The Marine driver parked the leading jeep on a culvert and General -MacArthur leaped down to survey the spectacle. Instantly he was -surrounded by cameramen snapping pictures which would soon appear on -stateside front pages. All America was rejoicing at the turning tide in -Korea after the humiliating weeks of delaying operations. - -Early that morning CinCFE had been met by General Smith at YELLOW Beach -and welcomed to the 1st Marine Division CP, a Quonset hut with a dirt -floor. There the commander in chief was briefed by the Division G-2 and -G-3 on the military situation. - -The second stop was at the 1st Marines CP. CinCFE informed Colonel -Puller and Admiral Sohn that he was awarding each of them a Silver -Star. Reaching into the pocket of his leather jacket, he discovered -that he had no medals with him. - -“Make a note of that,” he enjoined an aide as the correspondents busily -scribbled on their pads. - -Next, the route of the procession led to the zone of RCT-5 and the -scene of the Marine tank ambush. It was not exactly a happy occasion -for General Smith, who felt a heavy responsibility for the lives and -welfare of the 1st Marine Division’s distinguished guests. Not only was -the commander in chief indifferent to danger, but the Marine general -had similar cause to worry about others making the tour of inspection. -For instance, there was Frank Lowe, a 66-year-old retired National -Guard major general visiting Korea as President Truman’s personal -observer. Astonishingly hardy for his age, this admirer of the Marines -took personal risks which gave concern to Smith. Another source of -anxiety was the attractive correspondent of a New York newspaper, -Marguerite Higgins, who had hit RED Beach on the heels of the Landing -Force. - -Both she and Lowe were on hand when the column of jeeps stopped to -survey the results of the tank ambush. Smith scanned the landscape with -apprehension, devoutly hoping that some hidden foeman would not choose -this moment to obliterate several visiting generals with a well-aimed -mortar round. It was with relief that he departed with MacArthur for -a visit to the CP of the 5th Marines. And it was just as well that he -did not learn until later what happened shortly after his departure. -First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s platoon, hearing a suspicious -noise, had flushed seven armed NKPA soldiers out of a culvert--the -culvert on which General MacArthur’s jeep had been parked! A few rifle -shots persuaded them to surrender as the only survivors of the enemy -expedition.[223] - - [223] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55. - -The caravan of distinguished visitors proceeded meanwhile to the CP of -the 5th Marines, raising a cloud of dust that could be seen for miles. -Lieutenant Colonel Murray and General Craig were next to be awarded -Silver Stars by General MacArthur. His tour of inspection ended with a -look at the Marine stockade in Inchon, where 671 NKPA prisoners were -held, and a survey of the defenses of Wolmi-do. - -When the Marine general returned to his CP, he found Major General -James M. Gavin, USA, waiting to make a detailed study of Marine close -air support and the weapons employed. The day ended with Ruffner -and Hodes conferring with Smith on plans for the employment of the -32d Infantry, due to land the next day as the first unit of the 7th -Infantry Division to go ashore. Plans were made for the Army unit to -assume responsibility at 1200 on 19 September for the zone of action on -RCT-1’s right flank.[224] - - [224] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 29; O. P. Smith, - _Chronicle_, 18 Sep 50. - - -_The Drive to Kimpo Airfield_ - -On the evening of D-plus 1, General Smith had issued OpnO 5-50, -directing the 1st and 5th Marines to attack toward Corps Phase Line CC -the next morning.[225] The actual jump-off on 17 September was delayed -about an hour by the intrusion of the ill-fated Red tank column. - - [225] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie, 7. - -Both in scope and in shape, Phase Line CC was an enlargement of the -FBHL. Beginning on the coast above Inchon and running parallel to the -Inchon-Seoul Highway, the line extended inland about eight miles to -bend around Kimpo Airfield. It then ran southward, intersecting the -highway two miles east of Sosa and finally terminating at an inlet not -far from the Namdong Peninsula. - -The 5th Marines’ tactical plan was of necessity an ambitious one, since -approximately two-thirds of the Division’s projected 19-mile frontage -lay in Murray’s zone. On the left, an attached KMC battalion would -attack northward to the phase line, taking high ground Objectives -One, Two, and Three en route. Roise’s 2d Battalion was to advance -in the center on a northeasterly course, which included Objectives -ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE, the latter being Kimpo itself. Newton’s 1st -Battalion would follow the 2d initially, then take over the regimental -right and seize Objectives EASY and FOX, two sprawling hills just -beyond the phase line.[226] - - [226] _Ibid._, Annex Queen Queen. - -The 3d KMC Battalion passed through 2/5’s lines at 0700 for the purpose -of clearing the western outskirts of Ascom City before driving toward -its numbered objectives to the north. That the initial mission was -accomplished only with considerable difficulty and assistance will be -shown later. Afterwards the Korean Marines made rapid progress, as they -advanced over flatlands almost devoid of enemy resistance. - -[Illustration: THE DRIVE TO KIMPO - -5TH MARINES - -17 SEPTEMBER] - -Lieutenant Colonel Roise launched 2/5’s attack at 0900. Company E led -the long route column eastward on the Inchon-Seoul Highway through the -carnage left by the defeat of the Red tank thrust. Having marched about -a mile, the vanguard of the battalion turned left on a secondary road -that traced the eastern edge of Ascom City.[227] - - [227] _Ibid._ The word “Ascom” was formed from “Army Service - Command.” - -This expansive urban area would prove to be a thorn in the side of the -5th Marines for the next 24 hours. Originally a large Korean village -called Taejong-ni, Ascom City became the site of a huge service command -of the United States Army during the occupation of South Korea after -World War II. The few acres of small buildings and thatched huts had -grown into almost two square miles of residential, industrial, and -storage area. Caves, large warehouses, hundreds of other buildings, -and a complex network of streets made it an ideal hiding place for -fragments of a broken enemy, as the Marines were shortly to learn. - -Marching northward through the outskirts, Easy Company of 2/5 was -repeatedly held up by small pockets of resistance among the dwellings -on both sides of the road. Captain Jaskilka’s veteran infantry reduced -the enemy positions methodically, but the whole morning was used up in -the process. Simultaneously with the main advance, the 2d Platoon of -Fox Company marched through the heart of Ascom City and screened 2/5’s -left flank. Second Lieutenant Tilton A. Anderson, the platoon leader, -reported everything quiet in his zone, although his men did not have -time to check all of the side streets and blocks of buildings.[228] - - [228] _Ibid._; Capt T. A. Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54. - -Having cleared the eastern fringe of the city by noon, Roise looked in -vain for the branch road shown on his map as leading to Objective Able -and Baker, some four miles distant. The chart was inaccurate, and only -a time-consuming reconnaissance could locate the correct route. It was -already 1400 by the time Company E led off on the hike. - -While 2/5 was having its troubles in the eastern outskirts, Lieutenant -Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion stepped in to help the Korean Marines on -the other side of Ascom City. In regimental reserve, 3/5 was scheduled -to occupy a series of assembly areas throughout the day, moving forward -by bounds behind the assault elements. The morning displacement, into -the western edge of Ascom City, took place before the KMC attack had -cleared the suburb as planned. Using his initiative, Taplett committed -his battalion against moderate resistance that was holding up the South -Koreans.[229] - - [229] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj R. A. - McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54. - -Company G went into action and knocked out a Communist machine-gun -emplacement in the city. Next, a George Company patrol attacked a -strong enemy force deployed among the buildings. The North Koreans fled -after a hot fight, leaving behind 18 dead at a cost of three wounded to -the Marines. Item and How Companies also spread out through the maze of -streets, and there were several more skirmishes before the “assembly -area” was secured. The Korean Marines then passed through and attacked -to the north, as mentioned earlier.[230] - - [230] _Ibid._ - -The 1st Platoon of A/Tanks, having silenced other enemy positions in -the city, made contact with 3/5 at 1500. Leaving the built-up area, -Lieutenant Pomeroy led his M-26s in search of 2/5, in order to support -that unit’s drive on Kimpo. His armor was escorted by Lieutenant -Anderson’s rifle platoon, which had just completed its independent -mission in Ascom City without incident. Finding a road to the -northeast proved as much of a headache to Pomeroy as it had to Roise, -particularly since his big vehicles could not use the same route over -which 2/5’s infantry column had advanced an hour earlier.[231] - - [231] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv, - 20 Aug 54. - -Extending his quest northward, the tank platoon leader found a road -that not only paralleled the infantry’s path but also led to within a -few hundred yards of Kimpo, now about five miles distant. The M-26s -proceeded approximately a mile on the new route and were stopped by a -damaged bridge. First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards rounded up a party -of Korean natives to help his 2d Platoon of A/Engineers repair the -span. During the layover, Pomeroy’s force was beefed up by another -platoon of M-26s, brought forward by Captain Gearl M. English, the -company commander, and by a long column of rolling stock from 2/5’s -headquarters.[232] - - [232] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Queen Queen. - -Meanwhile, the leading elements of Roise’s infantry reached the foot -of Objectives Able and Baker, two large hills about 4,000 yards due -south of Kimpo. There being no evidence of the enemy in the area, -the battalion commander did not waste time by committing whole rifle -companies to the high ground. At 1600, Lieutenant Deptula’s 1st -Platoon of Easy Company ascended Objective Baker, while the rest of -the battalion waited on the road below. The hill was laced with vacant -entrenchments, and once on the summit, Deptula further observed that -objective Able was unoccupied. Moreover, he reported by radio that -it appeared to be clear sailing over the low ground leading to the -airfield.[233] - - [233] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula - interv, 18 Jan 55. - -Acting on this information, Roise promptly launched his attack on -Kimpo, one of the major tactical objectives of the Inchon-Seoul -operation. A left face by the roadbound column put the troops of 2/5 on -line for the assault. Easy and Dog Companies, the latter on the left, -advanced rapidly against only desultory sniper fire. - -Captain English’s tanks arrived propitiously, entering far out to the -left front of the attacking infantry. At a point 1,000 yards south of -the airfield, the M-26s came under moderate small-arms fire. Lieutenant -Anderson’s rifle platoon dismounted and engaged the small force of -North Koreans, knocking out one automatic weapon with grenades. The -Marine armor put down the remaining resistance with seven rounds -of 90mm High Explosive (HE) followed by a thorough hosing with bow -machine-gun fire.[234] - - [234] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv, - 20 Aug 54. - -Just as this action subsided, Company D of 2/5 swept through the area, -picked up a platoon of tanks, and continued toward the airfield. The -other platoon of armor swung to the right to support Easy Company’s -attack. By 1800, the Marines were on the southern tip of Kimpo’s main -runway. Aside from sporadic long range fire from the east, there was no -opposition worthy of note.[235] - - [235] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 - Dec 54; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55. - - -_Action at 5th Marines CP_ - -Over a mile long and three-quarters of a mile wide, Korea’s principal -airdrome was no mean target to secure. Scattered around the field were -more than half a dozen villages, and the runways themselves were lined -by scores of plane revetments and emplacements. It was already dusk -when Roise ordered his two assault companies to take the objective -“with all speed,” but by nightfall the infantry and tanks had cleared -only the southern portion of the runway.[236] - - [236] Maj S. Jaskilka memo to authors, 13 May 55; Roise - interv, 21 Dec 54. In the gathering darkness, Roise - underestimated the size of the airfield and thought - he controlled more than actually was the case. Thus - he reported the objective “secured” at 2020, as 2/5 - commenced digging in for the night. - -Rather than stretch a single defensive line to the point of diminishing -returns, the battalion commander deployed his three rifle companies in -separate perimeters, each one a tightly knit strong point. Easy Company -dug in on the east of the main runway and Dog on the west. Company F -deployed to the south of the airfield, paying particular attention -to the main road and a pair of intersections that tied in secondary -routes. In a central perimeter was 2/5’s CP, and Able Company Tanks -took up positions in Company D’s area. Just before dark, Lieutenant -Deptula’s platoon had raced northward to outpost the village of -Soryu-li, several hundred yards beyond Company E’s lines.[237] - - [237] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula - interv, 18 Jan 55. - -While 2/5 was investing the southern reaches of Kimpo, Lieutenant -Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, pressed the attack on the -regimental right. Encountering no resistance, Company A occupied the -southern portion of Objective Easy at 1900. Company B ascended the -northern half of the high ground without incident later in the evening. -With Charlie Company on another hill to the west, 1/5 settled down for -the night some 1,500 yards southeast of the 2d Battalion’s lines. Two -miles to the rear, 3/5 deployed in regimental reserve around a critical -road junction midway between Kimpo and Ascom City.[238] - - [238] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -During the afternoon of 17 September, as the assault elements of the -5th Marines rolled forward over a relatively quiet front, regimental -headquarters suddenly found itself in the center of an angry hornets’ -nest. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP had just displaced to the north of -the railroad station in Ascom City, when Commissioned Warrant Officer -Bill E. Parrish walked across the tracks to reconnoiter a site for his -ordnance dump. Gaining the summit of a small knoll, the officer and his -NCO assistants were met by a heavy fusilade from the orchard and rice -paddy beyond. Parrish was killed instantly and two of his men seriously -wounded.[239] - - [239] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54. - -Cries of help brought First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st -Platoon of A/Engineers, which had just arrived at Murray’s CP. In -a brief clash around the orchard, the engineers killed ten enemy -die-hards. South Korean police swept through the adjoining rice paddy -and came up with seven prisoners. - -About the same time, Major James D. Jordan’s party arrived in the area -to select a position for Battery A of 1/11. Again small-arms fire -crackled. Two of Jordan’s NCOs, Technical Sergeants Kenneth C. Boston -and Donald Comiskey, plowed through the hail of lead and killed four -more North Koreans.[240] - - [240] Maj J. D. Jordan interv, 27 Sep 54. - -North of the railroad, still another Marine was killed and one more -wounded not far from Murray’s headquarters. For obvious reasons a tight -perimeter of engineers and H&S Company troops was drawn around the CP -during the night. Nevertheless, a Red officer stumbled through the -line in the darkness and seriously wounded Second Lieutenant Lawrence -Hetrick of A/Engineers. - -At dawn on 18 September the regimental commander and his staff were -awakened by the chatter of an enemy submachine gun a few yards from the -CP. Holed up in a grain field with one Communist rifleman, the officer -who had shot Hetrick fought fanatically against a whole platoon of -engineers. Another Marine was wounded before the suicidal stand was -crushed by grenades and rifle fire. - -There were no regrets when Murray’s headquarters took leave of Ascom -City and displaced to Kimpo. - - -_Enemy Counterattack at Kimpo_ - -The air at Kimpo was charged with tension during the night of 17–18 -September. Troops of 2/5, manning perimeters which had been laid out on -unfamiliar ground during darkness, had every reason to believe that the -North Koreans would not give up the airfield without a fight. - -But there were troubles enough in the North Korean camp, where -confusion and panic seemed to be the order of the day. Intelligence -on the enemy garrison in the Kimpo area presents a scrambled picture -so characteristic of the Communist organization throughout the -Inchon-Seoul operation.[241] It appears that elements of the NKPA 1st -Air Force Division were charged with the operation of the airfield. -Under the command of 40-year-old Chinese-trained Brigadier General Wan -Yong, the division was comprised of the following units or, more often -than not, mere fragments thereof: - - [241] The intelligence summary is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annexes Baker and Queen Queen. - - Division Headquarters - 1st Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt - 3d Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt - 3d Plat, Gunners Co - 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt - 2d Bn, 1st Regt - Finance Co, 3d Technical Bn - Supply Co - -The Kimpo force was augmented by a motley mixture of poorly trained -troops from the 226th and 107th NKPA Regiments and the separate 877th -Air Force Unit. In the face of the Marine advance, Colonel Han Choi -Han, commander of the 107th had fled across the Han River, leaving the -remnants of his regiment to an obvious fate. Major Kung Chan So, leader -of the 877th AF Unit, was killed in action on 17 September. Of the 400 -men originally assigned to this organization, only five remained in -combat by 18 September. - -Crowded into undesirable terrain between the airfield and the Han -River, the Red troops were demoralized and bewildered by the rapid -advance of the 5th Marines. Only the fanaticism of a few officers and -NCOs prevented the complete collapse that would have resulted from the -lack of tangible assistance from the North Korean leaders in Seoul. And -it was no boost to sagging morale that white clothing had been issued -by the Supply Company, so that the Red soldiers could quickly change to -the traditional Korean garb when defeat was imminent, and dissolve in -the local populace. - -In the counterattack against the airfield, which was designed to uproot -a full-strength Marine battalion backed by tanks and other heavy -fire support, the celebrated night tactics of the Communists fizzled -completely. With only a few hundred men at most, the rest having -slipped away to safer parts, the North Koreans further reduced their -strength by trying to develop three widely separated attacks. That they -launched these assaults with only rifles and submachine guns serves to -make the story more incredible. - -The first move was in company strength against Lieutenant Deptula’s -isolated platoon outpost in Soryu-li, far to the north of Easy Company -lines.[242] Deployed on both sides of a road junction in the village, -the Marines heard the enemy column approaching about 0300. Deptula held -fire until the Red vanguard marched into the center of his position. -Sergeant Richard L. Martson then jumped to his feet, bellowed “United -States Marines!” and opened up with his carbine on full automatic. A -sheet of rifle and BAR fire poured into the column from the roadsides, -and a dozen North Koreans went down in a heap. The remainder fled. - - [242] The account of the Kimpo counterattacks is taken from: - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Deptula interv, 18 - Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55. - -The Communist commander rallied his soldiers for three more thrusts -against the Marine platoon. In between the attacks, his gravel-voiced -exhortations ground the air. The will to fight was lacking, however, -and each time, the attackers barely brushed the Marine position before -darting back into the night. - -A T-34 tank was finally brought up to buttress another North Korean -assault. Without AT weapons to stop the armored vehicle rumbling -down the road toward his platoon, Deptula retracted southward in the -direction of 2/5’s main positions. The outpost had suffered only one -KIA and one WIA in blunting the four attacks. It was not pursued during -the withdrawal. - -Deptula’s platoon gained Company E’s lines at 0500, just before the -perimeter received enemy small-arms fire from the west. Captain -Jaskilka, supposing it to be coming inadvertently from Dog Company, -forbade his men to reply. He stood up and yelled, “Hey! Cease fire, you -guys, this is Easy Company!” Fortunately, the enemy’s aim must have -been disturbed by the spectacle of a Marine officer giving orders, for -Jaskilka escaped without a scratch after discovering his mistake. This -enemy force proved to number about two squads, and just at that moment -the main NKPA force hit from the east. Easy Company was thus engaged -on two fronts, with Jones’ recoilless gun platoon taking on the attack -from the west while the 2d Platoon bore the brunt of the assault from -the east.[243] - - [243] Jaskilka memo, 13 May 55. - -The 2d Battalion’s southernmost position, manned by Company F, had -been active throughout the night. Lieutenant Harrell’s assault platoon -together with Richards’ engineer outfit was entrenched around an -overpass within the southeastern arc of the company perimeter. In -the first hours of 18 September, a North Korean lieutenant and his -five-man demolition team tried to reach the bridge in an apparent -attempt to destroy it. Sergeant Ray D. Kearl opposed the intruders -single-handedly, killing the Red officer and three of his men, and -driving the remaining pair back into the night. Before daybreak, -another enemy patrol approached on the road and was annihilated. - -[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK - -KIMPO AIRFIELD--18 SEPTEMBER] - -It proved that these and other scattered incidents were the prelude -to the third and final attack against the airfield, which was -launched from the south at dawn. This last maneuver by the Reds, -however, was checked even before it began, for the 1st Battalion, -5th Marines, spotted the attackers moving across its front toward -Kimpo. Baker Company took the North Koreans under fire immediately, -and the battalion commander called down heavy mortar and artillery -concentrations. - -Most of the Communist column was disorganized and dispersed before -it could reach 2/5’s southern defenses. The lone platoon that did -connect with Company F’s perimeter engaged the Marines at the overpass. -Harrell’s troops and the engineers poured small-arms fire and white -phosphorus rockets into the attackers. Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kikta, -defying enemy bullets as he moved among his men shouting encouragement, -fell mortally wounded. Sergeant David R. DeArmond, normally a bulldozer -operator for A/Engineers, was killed behind his machine gun. - -After the short, bitter clash, the surviving North Koreans retreated -through the rice paddies and hills leading to the Han River. Companies -E and F, supported by A/Tanks, fanned out from their perimeters and -mopped up. In 1/5’s zone, Lieutenant Colonel Newton committed Charlie -Company against the withdrawing enemy and inflicted more casualties. - -Kimpo and the surrounding villages were secured by 1000, 18 September. -Half an hour later, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered Company D, -supported by tanks, recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns, to -seize Regimental Objective Dog--Hill 131, which dominated the banks of -the Han River north of the airfield. Advancing under cover of naval -gunfire, the Marines occupied the high ground unopposed at 1145.[244] - - [244] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -In the 24 hours since leaving Ascom City, the 2d Battalion, 5th -Marines, had suffered four KIA and 19 WIA in driving over nine miles of -hills and rice paddies.[245] The rapid advance cost the North Koreans -100 dead in 2/5’s zone, ten prisoners, and one of the finest airdromes -in the Far East. - - [245] _Ibid._ - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -Marine Air Support - -_Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at Kimpo--Progress of -Eighth Army Offensive--Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of -RCT-1 to Sosa--Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing the -Han_ - - -At 1000 on the morning of 18 September an HO3S-1 helicopter became -the first American aircraft to land on Kimpo Airfield since June. -Mopping up operations had scarcely been completed, following the -enemy counterattack, when Captain Victor A. Armstrong of VMO-6 made -a vertical approach with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak as -passengers. They were greeted by General Craig, the ADC, who had just -arrived in a jeep. - -The field was in surprisingly good shape, considering the fighting it -had seen within the last few hours. As evidence that the enemy had -been surprised, one Russian-built fighter of the Yak III type and two -Stormovik type aircraft were found “relatively undamaged” and turned -over to Air Force Intelligence.[246] Several other Yaks and Stormoviks -had been destroyed by the enemy. - - [246] 1st MAW, Annex Able. - -On the return trip, Armstrong was requested by his passengers to fly -them across the Han for a preview of the outskirts of Seoul. Except -for scattered small-arms fire, the helicopter was allowed to proceed -without being molested by the enemy. There were few signs of extensive -NKPA preparations to be seen at this time.[247] - - [247] Maj V. A. Armstrong interv, 16 Mar 55. - - -_Helicopters and OYs in Support_ - -VMO-6, the composite observation squadron commanded by Major Vincent J. -Gottschalk, had already made a name for itself in the Pusan Perimeter -actions. Consisting of eight HO3S-1 helicopters and an equal number of -OY planes, this former Brigade unit came under the operational control -of the 1st Marine Division and the administrative and logistical -control of MAG-33. During the Inchon assault, VMO-6 was based on SCAJAP -LST QO79 in the harbor except for an Oy attached to each of the two -CVEs. - -The first of a long sequence of helicopter rescue missions during the -Inchon-Seoul operation took place on D-plus 1 when First Lieutenant -Max N. Nebergall picked up a Navy pilot who had ditched in Inchon -harbor. Flights carried out by other aircraft were reported as three -reconnaissance, two artillery spot, three beach reconnaissance, and one -utility.[248] - - [248] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe. - -VMO-6 displaced ashore the next day to an airstrip improvised near -the Division CP by the Marine engineers. This was the beginning of -liaison, utility, reconnaissance, evacuation, and rescue flights on a -dawn-to-dark basis. - -Division air and naval gunfire representatives of the Fire Support -Coordination Center followed VMO-6 ashore on the 16th. During the -planning phase they had worked with their opposite numbers of PhibGru -One and with the 11th Marines after the Division landed at Kobe. -Although some of the officers and men embarked for Inchon in the _Mount -McKinley_, the materiel and 90 percent of the personnel arrived in the -_President Jackson_. At 1400 on D-plus 2 the FSCC became operational -after all elements and their equipment reported to the Division CP. -Responsibility for the coordination of supporting arms ashore was -assumed at 0630 on 16 September for air, at 1500 on the 17th for -artillery, and at 1800 on the 18th for naval gunfire.[249] - - [249] _Ibid._, Annexes Baker Baker, Charlie Charlie, and Dog - Dog. - -The rapid advance of Marine ground forces during the first three days -meant that Major Robert L. Schreier’s 1st Signal Battalion had a job -on its hands. The main body reached the objective area on board the -_President Jackson_, and the first units ashore were the battalion and -regimental ANGLICO teams, most of which had embarked in LSTs. When -the ADC group displaced from Wolmi-do to Inchon, radio facilities were -maintained without a hitch. - -Radio and message center facilities met all requirements during -the night of 16–17 September. Teletype (through radio carrier) was -initiated between the Division CP and Corps, afloat on the _Mount -McKinley_. And by the morning of D-plus 2, such progress had been made -that wire communication was established not only with both advancing -infantry regiments but also with most of the battalions.[250] - - [250] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex George George. - -Enemy resistance was so ineffectual from 16 to 18 September that -the Marine infantry regiments were able to advance without much -flank protection. The three battalions of the 11th Marines did more -displacing than firing in their efforts to keep pace, and men and -vehicles of the Signal Battalion were kept busy at laying wire. - -Security was provided for the left, or northern, Division flank by -the attack of the KMC Regiment (less the 2d Battalion, left behind -for police duties in Inchon) under the control of the 5th Marines. -Attached to the regiment for possible use in calling down naval gunfire -were two Shore Fire Control Parties. Objectives on Corps Phase Line CC -were reached without much difficulty after the initial KMC setbacks -described in the previous chapter.[251] - - [251] _Ibid._, basic rpt, and Annex Queen Queen. - - -_Marine Air Units at Kimpo_ - -There had been little or no urgent need for close air support until 18 -September, when RCT-1 met stubborn opposition in the Sosa area. Thus -the capture of Kimpo in comparatively good condition was a timely boon, -since it meant that land-based Marine tactical air support could be -initiated as soon as Captain George W. King’s Able Company Engineers -made the field operative with temporary repairs. - -This was the conclusion of Generals Harris and Cushman, commanding the -1st MAW and TAC X Corps, when they visited Kimpo by helicopter on the -afternoon of the 18th. They advised CG X Corps accordingly, and that -evening he ordered the deployment of MAG-33 to the captured airfield -with its headquarters and service squadrons. - -The tactical squadrons figured in an administrative switch that has -sometimes puzzled chroniclers of Marine air operations. By order of -General Harris, the following reassignments were directed to take -effect on 21 September 1950: - -From MAG-33 to MAG-12--VMF-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513; - -From MAG-12 to MAG-33--VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542.[252] - - [252] CG 1st MAW speedltr, 20 Sep 50. - -Both MGCIS-1 and MTACS-2 were already ashore at Inchon under the -operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Aircraft and flight -echelons of the tactical squadrons were to be flown to Kimpo on the -19th from Itazuke and Itami airfields in Japan, with the remaining -elements following by surface shipping. Thus MAG-33 would consist of -these units: - - ------------+--------+--------+---------- - Organization|Officers|Enlisted| Total - ------------+--------+--------+---------- - HqSq-33 | 74 | 177 | 251 - SMS-33 | 29 | 538 | 567 - VMF-212 | 32 | 154 | 186 - VMF-312 | 53 | 221 | 274 - VMF(N)-542 | 54 | 291 | 345 - MTACS-2 | 34 | 190 | 224 - MGCIS-1 | 19 | 185 | 204 - +--------+--------+---------- - Total | 295 | 1,756 |[253]2,051 - ------------+--------+--------+---------- - - [253] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item. - -VMFs-214 and 323 would continue to operate from the carriers _Sicily_ -and _Badoeng Strait_, with the night-fighters, VMF(N)-513 being based -as usual at Itazuke AFB in Japan. The only difference was that a -scratch of the pen had transferred these units from MAG-33 to MAG-12. -It was their responsibility to support the advancing ground forces -during the critical period while the other three tactical squadrons -were making the move from Japan to Kimpo. - -Control of tactical air support had passed from the TADC on the _Mount -McKinley_ to the Air Support Section of MTACS-2 on D-plus 2, after the -Landing Force Commander signified his readiness to assume it. Calls for -close air support were increasing as the enemy recovered from the first -shock of invasion. On the 18th and 19th, the three fighter squadrons of -MAG-12 flew a total of nearly 50 close support sorties controlled by -the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. Napalm, 20mm ammunition, rockets, -and 500-pound bombs were used to blast NKPA troop concentrations in the -zone of the 1st Marines.[254] - - [254] MarCorps Board _Study_, IV-B, 16, 17; 1st MAW _SAR_, - basic rpt, and Annex Jig. - -Logistical as well as tactical and administrative problems had to -be solved. During the planning phase, it may be recalled, Colonel -Kenneth H. Weir (C/S TAC X corps) had learned that X corps would not -have enough trucks to support air operations at Kimpo by transporting -aviation gasoline and aircraft munitions from Inchon. As a solution, -arrangements were made to accept the offer of FEAF Combat Cargo Command -to provide logistical support; and these totals in tonnage were flown -in from Japan during the first week: - - ------+----+-----+------- - Date |Ammo|Avgas| Oil - ------+----+-----+------- - 18 Sep| 16| 8| 0 - 19 Sep| 73| 28| 5 - 20 Sep| 151| 86| 0 - 21 Sep| 219| 88| 11 - 22 Sep| 268| 153| 5 - 23 Sep| 139| 80| 0 - 24 Sep| 118| 81|[255]16 - ------+----+-----+------- - - [255] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt. - -This proved to be the largest total for a single week during the -Inchon-Seoul operation. In addition, about 1,025 tons of POL and 425 -tons of ammunition were trucked from Inchon to Kimpo during the entire -period, and the forward echelon of VMR-152 flew in spare parts and -items of urgently needed equipment. - -Headquarters of the 1st MAW remained at Itami AFB in Japan, though -General Harris made frequent trips to Kimpo. The chief task of the -Wing during the Kimpo air operations was furnishing administrative and -logistical support to TAC X Corps and MAG-33. - -TAC X Corps set up its headquarters at Kimpo Airfield on 19 September, -followed by MTACS-2, MGCIS-1, and VMO-6. The first fighter squadron of -MAG-33 to arrive at the new base was VMF(N)-542. Lieutenant Colonel Max -J. Volcansek, Jr., the commanding officer, and five pilots landed their -F7F-3Ns at 1830 on the 19th after a flight from Itami AFB. This was the -baptism of fire for a majority of the squadron’s pilots. Numbering -54 officers and 274 enlisted men when it left El Toro, VMF(N)-542 had -only 20 trained night fighter pilots. The remainder were volunteer -reservists qualified by “a good experience level and a desire to become -night fighters.”[256] - - [256] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-542 rpt. - -The squadron claimed the distinction of flying the first Marine combat -mission from Kimpo at 0735 on the 20th when four of the F7F-3N aircraft -destroyed two enemy locomotives after expending some 3,000 rounds -of 20mm ammunition. The Corsairs of Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. -Wyczawski’s VMF-212 and two aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank -Cole’s VMF-312 also landed at Kimpo on the 19th and got into action the -following day. Conditions were primitive at the outset. In the lack -of refueling facilities, the first strikes had to be flown on fuel -remaining in the aircraft, and bombs were loaded by hand.[257] - - [257] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item VMF-212 rpt. - -It had been an achievement to have two tactical squadrons of MAG-33 in -action less than 48 hours after the reconnaissance landing by Generals -Harris and Cushman. This accomplishment owed a great deal to the care -shown by the 5th Marines to keep damage at a minimum. Lieutenant -General George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, expressed his appreciation of -this factor in a letter to General Smith: - -“I want to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration and -gratification for the manner in which elements of your Division -recently captured Kimpo Airfield and so secured it as to make it -available for use by Far East Air Forces and Marine Corps aircraft in -the shortest possible time.”[258] - - [258] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 212–213. - - -_Progress of Eighth Army Offensive_ - -General MacArthur had intended the Eighth Army to be the hammer and X -Corps the anvil of a great joint operation. During the first few days, -however, it sometimes appeared as if these roles were reversed. On 18 -September, after a penetration of 16 miles on the X Corps front, the -attacking forces in the Pusan Perimeter had just begun to inch ahead -against desperate NKPA resistance. In some sectors, indeed, the enemy -not only put up a stubborn defense but counterattacked vigorously. (See -map in end papers.) - -The Eighth Army now consisted of the U. S. I Corps (IX Corps did not -become operational until 23 September) and the ROK I and II Corps. -General Walker’s command was already on the way to becoming the most -cosmopolitan army in which Americans have ever served. Contingents of -British ground forces had reached the front; and before the end of the -year, 40 countries of the United Nations would have offered assistance, -either military or economic, to the fight against Communism. - -Most of this aid had not yet materialized on 16 September, but the -Eighth Army had overcome its disadvantage in numbers of trained -troops, thanks to NKPA losses, when it jumped off all along the line -in southeast Korea. In the north the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th -Infantry Division, ROK 1st Division, and British 27th Brigade launched -a determined attack along the Taegu-Waegwon axis to win a bridgehead -across the Naktong. It was nip-and-tuck for the first three days, and -not until the 19th did the UN forces fight their way across the river -against the last-ditch opposition of the 1st, 3d, 10th, and 13th NKPA -Divisions.[259] - - [259] Almond, _UN Mil Ops_, 13. - -Still farther north, the enemy relinquished little ground until the -18th. On that date the ROK 3d Division recaptured the east coast port -of Pohang-dong, which the invaders had taken in their drive during the -first week of September. - -In the south, the U. S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions and attached ROK -units were held up for three days by the NKPA 6th and 7th Divisions. -The deadlock lasted until 19 September, when the enemy fell back in the -Masan area along the southern coast.[260] - - [260] _Ibid._ - -Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513, operating out of its Itazuke -base, played a conspicuous role in the first days of Walker’s -offensive. Although specialists in night-fighting, the Marine pilots -flew 15 daylight close support missions for Army units from 17 to 19 -September. Enemy troops, tanks, vehicles, and artillery were scored -during every strike, as the planes ranged the entire extent of the -Pusan Perimeter.[261] - - [261] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-513 rpt. - - -_Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-ri_ - -So much progress had been made by this date on the X Corps front that -General Smith displaced the 1st Marine Division CP from the eastern -outskirts of Inchon to Oeoso-ri, about a mile and a half southeast of -Kimpo Airfield. This forward location was selected by General Craig -with a view to preliminary Division planning for the crossing of the -Han, which would entail a reshuffling of units. - -Oeoso-ri having been an American housing area during the post-World War -II occupation, duplex houses and Quonset huts were available. General -Smith arrived by helicopter on the afternoon of the 19th, and the -new CP opened at 1645. During the next few days the area was treated -to intermittent artillery fire, apparently from a single well-hidden -gun somewhere in the Seoul area. It was an embarrassment to Marine -artillery officers, who were never able to locate the offending weapon, -but no great harm was done. - -By this time General Smith could look forward to the arrival of more -units at the front. On D-day the strength of X Corps on paper had been -69,450 ground force troops. In addition to the 1st Marine Division and -7th Infantry Division, there were such major units as the 93d and 96th -Field Artillery Battalions, the 73d Tank Battalion, 56th Amphibian Tank -and Tractor Battalion, the 2d Engineer Combat Group. In GHQ UNC Reserve -were the 3d Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne RCT.[262] - - [262] GHQ UNC _OpnO No. 1_, 30 Aug 50. - -The 3d Division had not sailed for the Far East in time to take part -in the Inchon-Seoul operation. The 187th Airborne RCT, due to land at -Inchon on 23 September, had been the answer to General MacArthur’s -requests in July for paratroops to land behind the enemy’s lines -in conjunction with the amphibious assault planned as Operation -BLUEHEARTS. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against flying -an airborne RCT to Japan at the time, the 11th Airborne Division was -later directed to organize and train such a unit for service in the -Far East. On account of the large proportion of new troops filling out -a skeleton unit, General Collins stipulated that the 187th was not -to be committed for an airdrop before 29 September. It was decided, -therefore, that the RCT would be given an initial mission of protecting -the left flank of the 1st Marine Division. - - -_Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa_ - -Preliminary planning for the crossing of the river Han began as soon -as the Division staff settled down in the new CP. The reshuffling of -various units had to wait, however, until both Marine regiments took -their assigned objectives of 18 and 19 September. Throughout the 17th, -while Murray’s regiment drove northeastward toward Kimpo, the 1st -Marines had continued the attack from Ascom City along the Inchon-Seoul -Highway. As mentioned previously, Monegan’s rocket launcher and the -75mm recoilless rifles, emplaced in 2/1’s positions on Hill 186, helped -smash the North Korean tank-infantry column at dawn. It appeared that -a second enemy force was supposed to have closed on Marine lines by -taking a parallel course through the hills south of the highway. The -Red infantry, in about company strength, was spotted moving along the -high ground toward Company D’s front on Hill 186. Fox Company dispersed -the column with mortar fire and then notified Dog to be on the -alert.[263] - - [263] 2/1 _SAR_, 5; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - -Though the North Koreans were stopped cold, they did not flee with the -usual rapidity. Their base of operations seemed to be Hill 208, a land -mass that began near Mahang-ri on the highway and spread southward -across most of the 2d Battalion front. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s -attack plan committed Easy Company on the left of the road, Fox on -the right, and Dog in the high ground to the south. No sooner had the -companies jumped off than they became involved in scattered, stubborn -fighting with Red soldiers on and around Hill 208.[264] - - [264] _Ibid._ - -Howitzers of the 11th Marines raked the high ground ahead of the -attackers, and Sutter’s troops measured off slow but steady progress. -In the low ground bordering the highway, enemy troops had taken -cover in the fields on both sides of a road block about 500 yards -from Mahang-ri. Second Lieutenant Robert C. Hanlon’s 2d Platoon -of Easy Company was pinned down by fire from three sides. Second -Lieutenants Johnny L. Carter and George E. McAlee started forward -with reinforcements, but McAlee was wounded by several bullets. After -summoning a corpsman, Carter got through to Hanlon, and they called -for 3.5-inch rockets and 75mm recoilless fire on huts sheltering enemy -soldiers. The two officers then led an advance which took the platoon -to a small hill on the right of the road block, where the other two -platoons moved up abreast. About 20 NKPA troops were estimated to have -been killed.[265] - - [265] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to authors, 9 May 55. - -[Illustration: ADVANCE BY 1st MARINES--17 SEP] - -At noon, Companies F and D had secured Hill 208 overlooking the FBHL, -but it remained for E to break into Mahang-ri on the highway. By this -time 3/1 had entered the fight with an armored column. Company G, led -by First Lieutenant Robert L. Gover’s 1st Platoon of Baker Company -Tanks, punched down the road in an attempt to pierce the screen of -Red resistance with the rest of 3/1 in column close behind. The M-26 -crews spotted an 85mm gun protruding from a thatched hut and destroyed -the camouflaged T-34 before it could fire a shot. An infantry platoon -riding the Marine tanks was forced to dismount at Mahang-ri and deploy, -while the armor fired from the road at numerous targets of opportunity. -The village was finally secured shortly before 1600, and small bands -of enemy were seen darting eastward to take up new positions along the -highway.[266] - - [266] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 - _SAR_; and Capt B. J. Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54. Col - T. L. Ridge, memo to authors, 13 May 55. - -The advance to Mahang-ri and the FBHL had carried the 1st Marines 3,000 -yards from its starting point at Ascom City. As the attack continued -late in the afternoon, the next objective was Corps Phase Line CC, -whose boundaries were defined in the previous chapter. Midway between -Mahang-ri and the phase line was the town of Sosa, and it was from this -locale that North Korean soldiers were pouring westward to delay the -Marine advance on the highway. - -Since the 5th Marines had veered to the northeast to attack Kimpo, -its boundary with the 1st had moved well to the left of the highway. -Henceforth, Puller’s regiment would have to go it alone on the main -road. This was the case as the 2d and 3d Battalions butted against -enemy delaying forces between Ascom City and Mahang-ri, and the -isolation became more pronounced as they attacked toward Sosa late on -the 17th. - -Sutter’s unit advanced on the left of the highway with Companies E -and F in assault. George Company of 3/1, transported in LVTs and -followed by the rest of the battalion, moved along the road behind the -2d Platoon, Baker Company Tanks. There is a defile halfway between -Mahang-ri and Sosa, and at this spot the North Koreans chose to make a -determined stand. Second Lieutenant Bryan J. Cummings nosed his lead -M-26 into the pass, while infantry moved to the shoulders on either -side against light opposition. Suddenly the troops and lone tank were -hit from the front by a heavy volume of small-arms, antitank, and -mortar fire.[267] - - [267] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54. - -The Marine infantry was thrown back by the intensity of the outburst, -the most severe they had yet encountered. As luck would have it, the -engine of Cummings’ tank went dead at this inopportune moment, and the -big vehicle stalled. Remembering that infantry had been riding on top -of his M-26, the platoon leader opened the hatch to make a quick check. -He yanked a lone rifleman inside and buttoned up just as Red soldiers -scrambled down the embankment. - -Fumes from the 90mm gun choked the Marines in the vehicle as they -listened to the clamor of North Koreans on the hull. The infantryman -who had been pulled to safety by Cummings suddenly went berserk and -had to be knocked out. Then the officer was forced to choose between -two evils: either his crew must succumb to the acrid fumes or take its -chances on opening the pistol port for ventilation. He opened the port. -A grenade bounced inside, and the ear-shattering explosion within the -steel enclosure wounded Cummings, the rifleman, and one of the tank -gunners. At this moment the semi-conscious Marines resigned themselves -to the worst.[268] - - [268] Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54. - -Help was on the way, however, and it was timed to the split second. -Just as the grenade exploded, Sergeant Marion C. Altaire’s M-26 moved -to the mouth of the defile and “scratched the back” of the beleaguered -vehicle with bow machine-gun fire. Riddled Red soldiers were swept from -the top of Cummings’ tank and piled up alongside. Within a few minutes, -a VMF-214 flight appeared over the pass, and the planes peeled off to -bomb, rocket, and strafe the high ground.[269] - - [269] _Ibid._; and 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 5. - -As the tide of battle swept past, Cummings and his men opened the -hatch, coughing and choking, and drank in long breaths of fresh air. -It took them a moment to realize that they were back again in the land -of the living after one of the closest calls that Marines have ever -experienced. - -Company G of 3/1 fought back on the right of the MSR and gained the -high ground above the pass. Simultaneously, Staff Sergeant Arthur J. -MacDonald led the second section of Cummings’ tank platoon into the -defile, and the M-26s laid down heavy 90mm and machine-gun fire on the -crescent of North Korean emplacements ahead. A total of six enemy AT -guns was destroyed, but not before the weapons had knocked a track off -Cummings’ vehicle and damaged two others to a lesser extent.[270] - - [270] _Ibid._; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - -The 2d Battalion drove to the top of the high ground on the left of the -road, and the Marines enjoyed a small-scale “turkey shoot” as the North -Koreans pulled out and pelted toward Sosa. While the assault units -consolidated their holdings, the remainder of the 2d and 3d Battalions -moved into the area around the defile and dug in for the night. - -The 1st Marines’ attack along the highway had netted 4,800 yards. -Despite repeated clashes in the course of the day, 2/1 lost only one -killed and 28 wounded, and Company G of the 3d Battalion suffered six -WIA. Enemy losses included 250 killed and wounded, 70 prisoners, one -T-34 tank, several AT guns, and large quantities of small arms and -ammunition.[271] - - [271] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; and 3/1 - _SAR_. In its account of NKPA losses for 17 September, - 2/1 lists four other enemy tanks destroyed. These - vehicles were among the six knocked out jointly by the - 1st and 5th Marines and Able Company Tanks at the dawn - ambuscade near Ascom City. 1st MarDiv G-2 reports of - 14 NKPA tanks destroyed this date cannot be supported - by the records of subordinate units. In addition to - the six T-34s destroyed in the morning and the single - vehicle knocked out by our tanks near Mahang-ri, one - other kill was recorded by Marine air. - -Action on the Division’s southern flank involved little more than hill -climbing and foot races for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and the -Division Reconnaissance Company. After jumping off in the morning of -D-plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ infantry fanned out through a -maze of twisting valleys and ridges. The battalion encountered only -light resistance, which invariably evaporated under pressure, and -by dark the assault elements had gained 4,000 yards. Hawkins then -deployed his troops for night defense on the high ground south of 3/1’s -positions overlooking the highway defile.[272] - - [272] McGee-Carlon interv, 9 Feb 55. - -On the right of the 1st Battalion, Captain Houghton’s Reconnaissance -Company reached the tip of the Namdong Peninsula. The Recon troops -spent two days, the 17th and 18th, patrolling this spacious tactical -vacuum. A number of dispirited prisoners were collected and caches of -arms and munitions uncovered. One of the more significant discoveries -was a small arsenal in which Russian-type wooden box mines were being -manufactured and stored in quantity. First encountered by Able Company -engineers in the Pusan Perimeter, these crude but effective explosives -would become serious obstacles to the Marine advance in the days -ahead.[273] - - [273] HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov 50; and - Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. See also this series, I:225. - -The night of 17–18 September passed quietly for the 1st Marines. During -the hours of darkness, Ridge requested intermittent naval gunfire to -interdict Sosa and Hill 123, where he believed enemy defenses to be -located. Jump-off fires were also planned for the morning in addition -to air strikes. Captain P. W. Brock’s HMS _Kenya_ poured in more than -300 6-inch rounds with good results. “Our Royal Navy ally not only -supported the battalion to the maximum of its naval gunfire desires,” -said Ridge, “but volunteered to render more than was requested.”[274] - - [274] Ridge memo, 13 May 55. - -Shortly after first light on D-plus 3, the 2d Battalion attacked along -the highway with Easy Company on the left of the road and Dog on the -right. Premature air bursts from an artillery preparation resulted in -two KIA and three WIA among the troops of Company E.[275] - - [275] 2/1 _SAR_, 6; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; Carter ltr, 9 - May 55. - -Ridge’s 3d Battalion boarded a column of LVTs, DUKWs, and jeeps, then -rumbled down the highway through 2/1’s assault companies. In striking -contrast to the previous day’s advance, there was a conspicuous absence -of NKPA infantry along the way. The Marines brushed aside light -opposition, including an antitank roadblock at Sosa’s outskirts, and -captured the town at noon. Covered by Baker Company Tanks, 2/1 moved -into defensive positions on the right side of the railroad about a mile -beyond the built-up area, and the 3d Battalion deployed on Hill 123 -just across the tracks.[276] - - [276] _Ibid._; and 3/1 _SAR_, 7. - -On the Division’s right, 1/1 gained another 4,000 yards in the course -of 18 September. In its third consecutive day of attack, the battalion -had yet to encounter anything more formidable than steep hills and -vapid enemy bands. Hawkins built his night defenses along a mountainous -two-mile front south of 2/1’s position overlooking the highway. - -[Illustration: CAPTURE OF SOSA - -1st MARINES--18 SEP] - - -_Reports of Enemy Build-up_ - -There was little activity in the 5th Marines’ zone of action during -the 1st Regiment’s drive on Sosa. After helping 2/5 smash the dawn -counterattack at Kimpo, Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked Objective -Fox under cover of an artillery preparation. Lieutenant Pedersen’s unit -seized the high ground against light opposition at 0930, while the -remainder of 1/5 remained entrenched at Objective Easy, captured the -previous day.[277] - - [277] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -Murray’s CP displaced to Kimpo at 1245 on the 18th, and the regiment -spent the rest of the day patrolling from its positions which ringed -the airfield. On the 5th Marines’ left, the 3d Battalion of the KMC was -joined by 1/KMC in searching out the base of the Kumpo Peninsula. A -new security force was added to the Division sector when the 17th ROK -Regiment landed at Inchon and fanned out to comb the troublesome area -between Ascom City and the sea.[278] - - [278] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _Chief of Staff_ (C/S) - _Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50. - -The General Situation Map gives the disposition of friendly and -suspected enemy elements as of late afternoon on 18 September. This -date is particularly important in that the Marine division, regimental, -and battalion headquarters were swamped by a torrent of intelligence -which indicated for the first time the future patterns of organized -NKPA resistance. - -Beginning on the left of the broad arc of the 1st Marine Division’s -front, repeated reports told of enemy concentrations north and south of -the Han River in the area of the Kumpo Peninsula.[279] Upwards of 1,000 -troops were sighted by natives and air observers, and it was believed -that the North Koreans were organizing for an attempt against Kimpo. -A strike by four Navy Skyraiders caught part of the Red force exposed -on both banks of the Han northeast of the airfield. After killing an -estimated 50 of the enemy and dispersing the remainder, the Navy pilots -reported the area “still active.” - - [279] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is - derived from: 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50; - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and 1st Marines - _PIR No. 3_. - -[Illustration: _Hail to the Chief--General Smith welcomes General -MacArthur ashore, on D-plus 2, for his first trip of inspection (U. S. -Army Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Drive to Kimpo----Above, Marines pass burning enemy -tank with bodies of NKPA soldiers on top; and, below, enemy transport -knocked out by Marine planes (Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Advance to Yongdungpo----Above, an enemy ammunition -dump goes up in smoke (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, RCT-1 Marines -march prisoners back through a rice paddy (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Kimpo Airfield Secured----Above, correspondents examine -captured Yak fighter (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, First Lieutenant -J. V. Hanes of VMF-214 shows Lieutenant Colonel Walter Lischeid the -flak scars on his Corsair (U. S. Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Aircraft----Above, Corsair fighter-bombers on -Kimpo Airfield; and, below, the F7F Tigercat used as a night fighter -and intruder._] - -[Illustration: _Crossing the Han----Above, Marine amtracs take Marines -and KMCs across river, with Hill 125 on far shore; and, below, troops -of 32d Infantry, USA, cross in Marine amtracs (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Approach to Seoul----Above, the rugged terrain -northwest of Seoul as seen by Marine from ridge on south bank of Han; -and, below, Marine fire team fighting in this terrain (U. S. Navy -Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Regimental Commanders----Above, Lieutenant Colonel -Raymond L. Murray, commanding officer of RCT-5, in his CP; and, below, -General Smith being greeted by Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanding -officer of RCT-7 (Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Command Conferences----Above (left to right) Colonel -Lewis B. Puller, commanding officer of RCT-1, General MacArthur -and General Smith; and, below (left to right), Colonel Charles E. -Beauchamp, commanding officer of 32d Infantry, General Barr, General -Almond and General Craig (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Battle Casualties----Above, Navy Hospitalmen R. E. -Rosegoom and Frank J. Yasso give first aid to wounded NKPA prisoner; -and, below, Marines carry wounded comrade back from firing line (U. S. -Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Northwest of Seoul----Above, the KMCs move up in -amtracs; and, below, Korean refugees return to ruined homes on -outskirts of Seoul (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _The Fight for Seoul----Above, Marine tank and infantry -close in on northwest approaches; and, below, Marines pass refugees in -battered streets (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Return of Refugees----Displaced residents of Seoul come -back to find railway station (above) and Hotel Banta (below) scarred by -artillery fire (U. S. Army Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Ceremonies----Above, former Marine cemetery at Inchon -is dedicated as United Nations Cemetery; and, below, President Syngman -Rhee and General MacArthur at liberation ceremony in Seoul (U. S. Army -Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Artillery----Two views of 105mm howitzers of -11th Marines in Korea (Marine Corps Photos)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Air Commanders--Above, Major General Field -Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, holding a captured -Russian burp gun; and, below, facing camera from left to right, General -Harris and Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, commanding TAC X -Corps._] - -Marine Air in turn warned of a build-up of Communist troops and -equipment in the vicinity of Haengju and Hill 125, directly across -the Han from 2/5’s position north of Kimpo. East of the airfield, the -enemy was withdrawing from the 5th Marines’ zone toward Yongdungpo, -using the Hill 118 area as an intermediate rallying point. Moreover, -interrogation of two NKPA officers captured near Kimpo disclosed that a -Communist regiment was already committed to the defense of Yongdungpo. -Since this large industrial suburb of Seoul rambled across the 1st -Marines’ path to the Han, Colonel Puller knew well in advance that -trouble lay ahead of his regiment. - -Further evidence that storm clouds were gathering over the highway came -from a number of sources in Sosa. Informants were almost unanimous -in their predictions that the approaches to Yongdungpo would be sown -liberally with land mines. - -VMF-214, which provided effective close air support for the 1st -Marines’ attack through Sosa, reported destroying huge enemy stockpiles -hidden in and around buildings on the sand spit between Yongdungpo and -Seoul. The squadron also sighted six enemy tanks far beyond Marine -lines and killed two of them with direct napalm hits. Its sister unit, -VMF-323, likewise scoured the Division front and radioed similar -findings to Tactical Air Control. - -Other reports from scattered sources placed approximately 3,000 North -Koreans in Seoul--with more on the way. Air spotters noted heavy -traffic south from the 38th Parallel and north from the Suwon area. -Tanks, troops, and vehicles from the latter not only were heading -for the capital but also were veering off toward Yongdungpo and the -Division right flank. - -Thus, the Marines faced the possibility of major interference from: -(1) the Kumpo Peninsula; (2) the Haengju locale on the north bank -of the Han; (3) the area around Hill 118 between Kimpo Airfield and -Yongdungpo; (4) Yongdungpo itself; (5) Seoul; and (6) the direction -of the Division’s right (southeastern) flank. Strangely enough for an -enemy who was at his best with the artful dodge, only the two flank -threats failed to measure up to expectations. - -The North Koreans gave a preview of the changing picture on the -afternoon of 18 September when, at 1415, the first shells of a -sustained mortar barrage crashed into 3/1’s positions on Hill 123. -During the next hour, 120mm eruptions traced accurate paths back and -forth along the ridge, and 30 Marines were cut down by the whirring -fragments. Moving through the explosions with near-miraculous immunity, -the 3d Battalion’s senior medical officer, Lieutenant Robert J. -Fleischaker, (MC) USN, remained fully exposed to the barrage while -administering to the wounded. “He never thought of his own safety -when men needed his services,” commented Lieutenant Colonel Ridge.[280] - - [280] Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; Ridge memo, 13 May 55. - -[Illustration: GENERAL SITUATION - -18 SEPTEMBER] - -South of the highway, enemy gunners ranged in on 2/1’s lines at 1800, -adding 14 more Marines to the casualty rolls. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter -and his S-3, Captain Gildo S. Codispoti, narrowly escaped injury when -two mortar rounds hit the battalion CP. The explosions wounded Captain -Albert L. Williams, commander of Company E, and Warrant Officer Bartley -D. Kent, the battalion supply officer.[281] - - [281] Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - - -_Orders for Crossing the Han_ - -Late in the afternoon of the 18th, both Corps and Division issued -orders within a period of two hours for crossing the Han. In OpnO 6-50, -the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division directed RCT-5 to -seize crossing sites along the south bank the next day and be prepared -to cross on order while RCT-1 continued its attack along the highway -toward Yongdungpo. - -Much more territory was taken in by X Corps Operational Instructions -No. 1, which ordered the 1st Marine Division to reconnoiter the river -on the 19th and cross the next day. Then, after enveloping enemy -positions on the north bank in the vicinity of Seoul, the Marines were -to seize and secure both the city and the high ground to the north. - -Since the Corps did not concern itself much with ways and means, -General Smith asked for a conference at 0930 the next morning with -General Almond. He informed the X Corps commander that he and his staff -had already given considerable thought to the question of a crossing -site. A preliminary Marine study had disclosed that three abandoned -ferry crossings met military requirements: one downstream from Kimpo -Airfield; one at Yongdungpo in the zone of the 1st Marines; and one -opposite Kimpo near the village of Haengju. The first was too far from -Seoul, and the second too near; but the Haengju site seemed to satisfy -all conditions, subject to General Craig’s verification by helicopter -reconnaissance.[282] - - [282] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 218–219. - -Next to be discussed was the problem of bridging material. The X Corps -engineer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny, reported that -Corps had no material other than that brought by the 1st Engineer -Battalion of the Marines. Fortunately, that unit’s commanding officer, -Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, was prepared to meet the emergency. -Although he did not have enough floating bridge material to span such a -wide stream, he reported to General Smith that he could have one 50-ton -raft in operation to support the assault of troops crossing in LVTs, -and another shortly afterwards. These rafts would take the tanks and -vehicles across, and Partridge added that later his engineers might be -able to put together an actual bridge by combining floating and Bailey -components.[283] - - [283] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54. - -The two Marine regiments had been in effect the infantry of X Corps -up to this time. But Almond promised the Marine general that the -32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division would be moved up on the -right flank of RCT-1. This Army unit, it may be recalled, had made an -administrative landing at Inchon on the 18th and gone into an assembly -area under 1st Marine Division control. The other two regiments of the -7th Division were the 31st Infantry, due to arrive on the 20th, and the -17th Infantry, still attached to the Eighth Army. - -The X Corps commander lost no time at ordering the 32d to move up on -the right, after reverting to the control of the 7th Division, to -relieve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. This was the first of a series -of maneuvers carried out on the 19th in preparation for the river -crossing. On the left, the 2d Battalion of the KMCs advanced against -negligible opposition to occupy the high ground south of the Han and -provide flank protection for the crossing. - -A more intricate maneuver was carried out when 1st Battalion of -the 5th Marines was relieved west of Yongdungpo by its opposite of -RCT-1, which had sideslipped to the left after the 32d Infantry moved -up in protection of the regiment’s right flank. This shift was not -accomplished without some fighting, the account of which belongs in a -forthcoming chapter dealing with the battle for Yongdungpo. - -Another preliminary step was taken on the 19th when the 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion was relieved of its mission of supporting the 1st -Marines. All LVTs were withdrawn as the unit displaced by motor march -to the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield, a distance of about 18 miles.[284] - - [284] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare. - -The 1st Shore Party Battalion was also concerned in planning for the -river crossing. On the 19th this unit reverted to Division control and -displaced to the vicinity of Oeoso-ri. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance -detail reported to the CP of the 5th Marines with a mission of -selecting DUKW, LVT, and ferry sites. The shore party battalion was -also to have the responsibility of establishing evacuation stations and -supply dumps on both banks after the crossing while exerting LVT and -DUKW traffic control.[285] - - [285] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike. - -Except for the 1st Battalion, the 5th Marines had no trouble on the -19th while advancing to its assigned positions on the south bank of -the Han. All objectives were occupied against little or no opposition, -placing the regiment in position for the crossing. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -Crossing the Han - -_Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud--Daylight -Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of General MacArthur--Supporting -Arms of Bridgehead--Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_ - - -The CP of the 5th Marines had a holiday atmosphere during the afternoon -of 19 September. An already large group of newspaper and magazine -correspondents had been reinforced by new arrivals flown in from Tokyo -to report the crossing of the Han. The gathering might have been -mistaken for a journalistic convention, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray -and his regimental planners could scarcely make themselves heard. -Finally it became necessary to request the gentlemen of the press to -leave, so that the battalion and company commanders could be summoned -for briefing and orders. - -The CP was located in a basement room of the Kimpo Airfield -administration building. Coleman lanterns lighted the scene as Murray -gave a brief talk to his officers, seated about him on boxes and -bedrolls. There had been little time for planning, said the regimental -commander, but he was confident of success. General Craig, who made a -helicopter reconnaissance of the river and roads leading to Seoul, had -recommended the old ferry crossing to Haengju. The river was about 400 -yards wide at this site, which was about a mile from the Kaesong-Seoul -railroad and main highway to Seoul. Hill 125, as the principal terrain -feature, was an isolated knob rising nearly 500 feet and located on the -right of the landing point. To the left was the village of Haengju, -bordered by dikes and rice paddies. - -Regimental planning, said Murray, had been conducted in compliance -with 1st MarDiv OpnO 7-50, issued at 1430 that afternoon. The 5th -Marines was directed to cross the Han in the vicinity of Haengju seize -Hill 125 and advance southeast along the railroad to the high ground -dominating the Seoul highway. The units attached for the operation -were the 2d Battalion, KMC Regiment, the Division Reconnaissance -Company, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion, and Company A of the 56th -Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA. In addition, the 11th Marines had -been directed to give priority in artillery fires to the 5th Marines, -while the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion and 1st -Amphibian Tractor Battalion were in direct support. - - -_Swimming Team Leads the Way_ - -Major William C. Esterline, the S-2 of the 5th Marines admitted that -intelligence as to conditions on the north bank left much to be -desired. He mentioned the reports of an enemy build-up on the other -side of the river, and he added that a POW had told of enemy mining -activities along the road to Haengju. But in spite of these warning -notes, his listeners got the impression that 5th Marines’ planning was -based on assumptions of light resistance. - -Major Charles H. Brush, Jr., the S-3, announced the hastily formulated -regimental plan. Houghton’s Recon Company was to lead the advance -by sending a swimming team across shortly after nightfall. If the -swimmers found the other bank clear of the enemy, they were to signal -for the rest of the men to follow in LVTs. Recon Company then had the -mission of seizing a bridgehead consisting roughly of the triangle -formed by Hills 95, 125, and 51. After securing these objectives, about -1,500 yards apart, Recon was to defend until Taplett’s 3d Battalion -crossed at 0400, with Bohn’s and McMullen’s companies in assault and -Wildman’s in reserve. While they passed through Recon and attacked -toward Seoul, Roise’s 2d Battalion would follow in column two hours -later, with Newton’s 1st Battalion remaining in reserve and crossing -on order as the KMC battalion protected the regiment’s left flank. -Tanks and vehicles would be ferried across on 50-ton floating bridge -sections.[286] - - [286] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen, 19 Sep 50; Capt - R. B. Crossman ltr to authors, 23 Nov 54. - -No alternate plan was provided. After the briefing ended at 1700, -Houghton and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr., executive -officer of RCT-5, climbed a hill on the south bank and inspected the -old ferry crossing and the opposite shore. They saw no enemy activity. -Houghton was so optimistic that he asked permission to swim across at -dusk but Murray denied the request.[287] - - [287] Maj K. J. Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. - -[Illustration: HAN RIVER CROSSING & SEIZURE OF HILL 125 - -5th MARINES--20 SEP] - -The swimming team consisted of Houghton, Second Lieutenant Dana -M. Cashion, and ten enlisted men, accompanied by two Navy reserve -officers, Lieutenant Horace Underwood and Ensign John Seigle. The first -went along as interpreter, and the other as public information officer -with a tape recorder. General Lowe had asked permission to cross in the -LVTs; and when the Division commander refused, the 66-year old observer -showed a card signed by President Truman, requesting that he be allowed -to go anywhere. Even this passport did not swerve General Smith, who -decided that Lowe must wait to accompany the reserve battalion.[288] - - [288] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 227. - -It was a dark and moonless night when the swimmers trudged through the -muddy grain fields to the river bank, carrying two small rubber boats -in which to tow the arms and equipment. After checking the current -and making allowances for drift, they stripped to their skivvies and -slipped into the tepid water shortly after 2000. Only two or three -sets of rubber fins were available, but speed was not expected of -men using a slow breast stroke to avoid making noise or ripples. -These precautions became all the more necessary after a Marine shell -or aerial bomb set fire to a native house on the far bank and the -flames cast a lurid glow over the water. Apparently the swimmers had -not been observed when they scrambled ashore, dripping, about 2040. -They encountered two Koreans at the water’s edge and overpowered them -without much difficulty. Lieutenant Underwood questioned the captives -in their native tongue and reported that they were escaping from -Seoul.[289] - - [289] 1stLt E. L. DeFazio ltr to authors, 11 Dec 54. - -Houghton ordered Lieutenant Cashion and four enlisted men out on patrol -duty with a mission of reconnoitering Hill 125 and the Haengju area. -The Recon commander remained at the beach, where Gunnery Sergeant -Ernest L. DeFazio and the other members of the swimming team guarded -the prisoners and prowled the immediate area without encountering -enemy. There were so few signs of NKPA activity that Houghton decided -even before the return of Cashion’s patrol to give the signal for the -rest of the company to cross. And it was when the LVTs revved up on -the south bank, shattering the night’s stillness, that hell broke -loose.[290] - - [290] _Ibid._; Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. - - -_Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud_ - -The men in the amtracs had the problem of advancing five miles by road -from Kimpo to an embarkation site they had never seen, crossing a -river in the darkness, and seizing three objectives on a basis of map -reconnaissance. First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman, executive officer -of Recon Company, had received oral orders without an overlay or an -opportunity to take notes during the briefing at the Fifth Marines CP. -His first message by SCR-300 from Houghton came about 2000, warning -that the swimming team was taking to the water. This was the signal -for the amtracs to start their road trip. They were on the way when -Houghton prematurely radioed the familiar words: - -“The Marines have landed and the situation is well in hand.”[291] - - [291] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54. - -An hour later the Recon commander came in again with a message that -no enemy had been encountered. He directed his executive officer to -cross in LVTs with the three platoons of Recon Company and the attached -platoon of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, which had a mission of -mining road blocks after the objectives were secured. - -Crossman acknowledged this message but replied that he could not reach -the river bank for nearly an hour. He had assigned the three objectives -to his platoon commanders, directing that they take their orders from -Houghton upon reaching the other bank. SCR-300 communications were -frequently blurred, however, or blasted off the air altogether by -the more powerful radios of the tractors. Thus the possibilities for -confusion were multiplied as the nine amtracs proceeded in column -to the embarkation point, clanking and revving up thunderously in -preparation for the crossing.[292] - - [292] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54. - -The din was deafening enough to arouse even an enemy who had not shown -much fight so far in the zone of RCT-5. Hill 125 suddenly came to life -as NKPA bullets whipped the water and mortar shells exploded among -the LVTs or along the beach occupied by Houghton’s swimmers. Although -Cashion’s patrol reported no enemy encountered on Hill 125, his men -came under fire from that quarter on their return to the beach. One -of them, Private First Class Alphonse O. Ledet, Jr., was reported as -missing in action, and it was assumed that Communists bullets had cut -him down.[293] - - [293] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54. - -The embarkation area was so cramped that Crossman had found it -necessary to send the LVTs across the river in column, with First -Lieutenant Francis R. Kraince’s 1st Platoon in the lead, followed by -Second Lieutenant Philip D. Shutler’s 2d Platoon and the 3d commanded -by Second Lieutenant Charles Puckett. Kraince was to seize Hill 125 -while Shutler attacked Hill 51 and Puckett went up against Hill 95. - -The three platoons were accompanied by a 4.2-inch mortar forward -observer team, two 105mm FO teams from the 11th Marines, and a squad -of engineers. Communications on the SCR-300 net were so badly jammed, -however, that Houghton and Crossman were figuratively as well as -literally in the dark on opposite sides of the river. Crossman’s final -messages from Kraince and Shutler reported that four of their amtracs -had drifted from the course and grounded in the mud. He ordered both -officers to extricate themselves while Puckett, who had not yet left -the south bank, covered them with fire. Just then DeFazio radioed that -Houghton and his team were planning to swim to the LVTs. This was the -last word from the north bank received by Crossman, who lost all radio -contact afterwards with anyone except the 5th Marines.[294] - - [294] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54. - -At the height of the pandemonium on the north bank, the two Korean -prisoners attempted to escape. Both were killed by Marines of the -swimming team.[295] - - [295] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54. - -Houghton’s first thought had been to swim out and guide the LVTs to -the north bank. But the enemy had shown such unexpected resistance as -to justify the withdrawal of the swimming team. The rubber boats and -excess equipment were hidden along the shore and some of the weapons -thrown in the river to prevent capture.[296] Then the swimmers -started their return trip through water churned by mortar shells, -chiefly Marine 4.2-inch bursts falling short. One of these projectiles -exploded so near to Houghton as to knock him out momentarily, and -he was assisted to a grounded LVT by Corporal James Morgan. The -Recon commander suffered a sprained back and double vision from the -concussion, and two men of the team were slightly wounded. DeFazio led -the remaining swimmers to the south bank. - - [296] Ensign Seigle found it hard to part with his tape - recorder containing an account of the venture. He hid - it near the water, but the record had been erased by - subsequent sounds when he retrieved it the next day. - -There he learned that all the amtracs had returned except the four -reported grounded. Most of the Recon troops on these stranded vehicles -had chosen to swim or wade back to the south bank. These stragglers -were collected on the northern tip of Hill 131 by Captain John F. Paul -and Corporal James P. Harney of the amtracs and shuttled to Kimpo as -fast as they returned.[297] - - [297] 1stLt J. P. Harney interv, 17 Nov 54. - -DeFazio took care of his casualties, then set out with eight men in -search of Houghton. It was low tide by this time, but wading through -the mud proved to be more tiring than swimming. After finding Houghton -in a dazed condition on one of the grounded LVTs, the sergeant agreed -with Kraince and Shutler that the approach of dawn made it necessary -to abandon the two amtracs which were still stuck. They returned -on the two that the officers had succeeded in extricating. Thus at -daybreak the swimming expedition ended in the CP of the 5th Marines, -with DeFazio reporting to Murray and Brush after seeing his commanding -officer on the way to a field hospital.[298] - - [298] DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54. - -The crews and troops on the LVTs retained a confused impression of the -night’s events. Master Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, who crossed with the -engineers in the second amtrac, could not understand why the column -withdrew. The vehicles were dispersed in every direction after some -became stuck, and it was on his LVT that Captain Houghton received -first aid.[299] - - [299] MSgt E. L. Knox, ltr to authors, 13 May 55. - -It was not officially established who gave the order for the return -of the LVTs when they neared the north bank, if indeed such an order -was ever given. But all participants agreed that it was for the best. -Events had proved that too much dependence was placed in assumptions -of little or no resistance, despite G-2 warnings of an enemy build-up -in the Haengju area. And even if Recon Company had landed, the task of -taking three hills in a night attack without previous reconnaissance -would probably have been too much for a unit of 126 men against an -enemy estimated by Houghton at a battalion. - - -_Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5_ - -At dawn on the 20th the command and staff of the 5th Marines rebounded -from this preliminary reverse with vigor and firmness. General Craig, -the ADC, summed up the viewpoint of Murray and his officers when he -commented: - -“The eyes of the world were upon us. It would have looked bad for the -Marines, of all people, to reach a river and not be able to cross.”[300] - - [300] LtGen (Ret) E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Aug 54. - -It was decided at 0430 that the 3d Battalion would make a daylight -assault crossing just two hours later. The revised plan called for LVTs -to cross at the Haengju site in waves of two to six vehicles. Troop -units would be organized into boat teams, and the plan provided for a -15-minute artillery preparation by the 1st and 4th Battalions of the -11th Marines.[301] - - [301] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 27, 28. - -Many of the Marine shells fell short, so that little benefit was -derived from the barrage by the assault troops. On the other hand, -enemy fire from Hill 125 was only too well placed. About 200 hits were -taken by the first wave of amtracs from 14.5mm antitank projectiles and -small caliber high explosive shells as well as machine-gun bullets. The -armor plate prevented any infantry losses, and only four casualties -were suffered by the crews. - -Battalion objectives, according to the revised plan, were designated -ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE--Hills 125, 51, and 95. Captain McMullen’s -Item Company landed at 0650 in the first wave, followed by How -and George. While discharging troops, the LVTs were exposed to -more machine-gun and antitank fire, resulting in several infantry -casualties.[302] - - [302] This section is based upon: McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54; - Maj J. N. Irick interv, 16 Nov 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, - Annexes Peter Peter and Queen Queen. - -Item Company, it may be recalled, consisted of newcomers who had -arrived at Pusan to make up third infantry companies just before the -Brigade embarked for Inchon. Barring a few World War II men, these -troops had known no combat experience before they hit GREEN Beach at -Wolmi-do. They acquitted themselves like veterans in the Han crossing, -however, as platoon leaders organized them under fire after they piled -out of the amtracs. - -The only covering fires at first were provided by the 50-caliber -machine guns of First Lieutenant Stanley H. Carpenter’s platoon of -amtracs, which had taken the first wave across. Then four Corsairs of -VMF-214 struck the enemy on Hill 125 while Captain Joseph N. Irick of -the amtracs led four of his vehicles eastward to a position where they -could direct 50 caliber fire on the NKPA positions. - -Item Company’s plan of attack called for a two-pronged assault on Hill -125 (Objective ABLE) from the northwest by First Lieutenant William F. -Sparks’ 3d Platoon on the right, attacking up the main spur paralleling -the river, while First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson’s 2d Platoon -attacked on the left after riding a few hundred yards inland on LVTs. -Second Lieutenant Roy E. Krieger’s 1st Platoon was to remain on call in -reserve. - -Item Company had it hot and heavy from the beginning. The two -assault platoons overcame such difficulties as bogged-down amtracs, -intermingled units, and bullet-swept open areas before getting in -position to return the Communist fire. The first phase ended on a -plateau about halfway up the hill when enemy machine guns cut down most -of the mortar section before the Marines could gain a foothold. - -At this point it became necessary for the 3d Platoon to fall back and -redeploy. Contact had been lost momentarily with Peterson’s men; but -after he appeared on the left, McMullen called up his reserve unit -to pass through the 3d Platoon. Sparks having been wounded, First -Lieutenant Wallace Williamson took command of his men, now reinforced -by an engineer squad and troops from company headquarters. The revamped -3d Platoon was sent out to envelop the enemy left while Krieger hit the -center and Peterson worked his way around the NKPA right. - -This time the plateau was carried in a single rush. But casualties -had reduced the company to the point where another reorganization -was necessary before attacking the military crest. Although Captain -McMullen had been wounded, he remained in action to lead the final -assault. - -The 1st and 3d Platoons were clawing their way upward when Peterson -radioed from the left that he could see enemy soldiers in flight from -the peak to the low ground north of the hill mass. One of the VMF-214 -Corsairs also reported Communists streaming down the eastern slopes -with Marine planes in hot pursuit. Thanks to their efforts, not many -Korean Reds were left on the crest when the panting Marines arrived -to finish the job. More lucrative targets were presented by the foes -racing down the eastern slopes. Marine rifles and BARs cut down many of -these fugitives when they attempted to change into civilian clothes to -avoid capture. - -It was estimated that the enemy had 200 killed on Objective ABLE. The -other two battalion objectives offered little or no resistance to -troops who rode in column from the beaches on LVTs--How Company to -seize Hill 95, and George Company attacking Hill 51. Thus at a total -cost of 43 casualties--most of them in Item Company--the 3d Battalion -had secured its three objectives by 0940. - -Among the other results of the successful assault crossing was the -salvaging of the two grounded LVTs, both of which had been in the -enemy’s field of fire. The equipment left on the north bank by the -swimming team was also recovered, and PFC Ledet showed up unharmed. -After being assigned to an observation post, he had inadvertently been -left behind as missing in action when the Reds opened fire. But he kept -his head throughout his lonely night’s vigil and was able to give a -good report of enemy numbers and activities. - -At 1000 on the 20th the first wave of amtracs crossed the river -with troops of 2/5. This battalion had orders to remain in the LVTs -while passing through 3/5 and continuing the attack. The scheme of -maneuver called for a sharp turn to the right at Hill 51, and the next -objectives, DOG and EASY, consisted of the high ground on either side -of the Kaesong-Seoul Railroad about three miles east of Haengju. - -Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA, was to follow -with the 2d Battalion of the KMC regiment in DUKWs. These troops had a -mission of providing security for the rear of the 5th Marines. - -The 1st Battalion of that regiment was alerted to be ready to cross the -Han at 1330 and move into an assembly area near Hill 95, prepared to -continue the attack toward Seoul. - -Once the plan has been told, it would be repetitive to describe a -performance which put it into effect without incident. At 1400 the -regimental CP displaced across the river to the vicinity of Sojong, -about two miles northeast of the Haengju crossing site. Fifteen minutes -later the 2d Battalion reported that it had secured Objectives Dog and -EASY. Troops of that unit had ridden the LVTs as far as Sojong, where -they encountered a swamp and a bridge too small for anything larger -than a jeep. The infantry proceeded on foot while a few LVTs and a -platoon of tanks crossed over a railroad bridge. About 30 prisoners, -believed to be the remnants of enemy forces on Hill 125, were taken -on Objective EASY. They were hiding in a cave and surrendered after a -couple of warning rounds fired by a platoon of the Army amtrac troops -supporting the battalion. Company D dug in on Objective EASY and -Company E on Objective DOG while Company F covered the gap between.[303] - - [303] Roise memo to authors, 13 May 55. - -The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area a mile north of Hill 95. -And after 1/5 moved a company to Hill 125 to secure the landing area -for the night, the 1st Marine Division had a firm bridgehead on the -north bank of the Han. - - -_Departure of General MacArthur_ - -General Shepherd and Admiral Struble witnessed the crossing from a -vantage point on the south bank, where they had a good view of the -fight for Hill 125.[304] Both accompanied General MacArthur that -afternoon, when he made a final tour of the front before his departure -for Tokyo. - - [304] Col V. H. Krulak interv, 27 Jun 55. - -The caravan of jeep-borne officers and reporters stopped first at the -crossing area, then proceeded to the zone of the 1st Marines, where the -battle for Yongdungpo was going on full blast. General MacArthur got -out of his jeep and continued on foot along rice paddies where Marines -were still flushing out snipers. This meant a period of anxiety for -General Smith which lasted until the responsibility for the safety of -the commander-in-chief passed to General Barr in the zone of the 7th -Infantry Division. - -On the afternoon of the 21st the Marine general saw MacArthur off at -Kimpo on his plane for Tokyo. Never had the old warrior worn his famous -“scrambled egg” cap with more verve. Barely a week had gone by since -the Marines scrambled ashore on RED and BLUE Beaches, yet most of the -major objectives had already been taken--Inchon, Kimpo, Yongdungpo, -the north bank of the Han, and the approaches to Seoul. In the Pusan -Perimeter meanwhile, the Eighth Army had been hitting the enemy hard in -its joint offensive. - -This was the score on D-plus 7. But perhaps the famous septuagenarian -recalled with pardonable complacency that as late as D-minus 7, the -Joint Chiefs of Staff had reiterated doubts of the Inchon landing which -they had expressed on several previous occasions. MacArthur was warned -that if the operation failed, the entire United Nations cause in Korea -might be plunged into serious difficulties. The commander in chief -replied with superb assurance, “I and all of my commanders and staff -officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the -success of the enveloping operation.”[305] - - [305] CinCFE radio to JCS, 8 Sep 50, quoted in OCMH - (Schnabel), _Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I. - -Such confidence could not be withstood. But it was not until 8 -September 1950 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally acquiesced in an -operation they had never entirely approved--an operation scheduled to -take place in just one week. - -It may be that Douglas MacArthur was recalling this exchange of views -as he stood in the sunlight of Kimpo Airfield, his eyes flashing and -his chin outthrust. There is no tonic like victory, and he looked 20 -years younger than his actual years as he decorated General Smith with -a Silver Star just before the plane took off. - -“To the gallant commander of a gallant division!” said the commander in -chief by way of citation. - - -_Supporting Arms of Bridgehead_ - -Even success did not alter the conviction of Navy and Marine amphibious -specialists that risks had been assumed in the Inchon landing which -might have resulted in disaster. It was taking no credit away from -General MacArthur for his unshakeable faith in victory to conclude -that fortune had smiled in some instances when a frown would have been -costly. - -The teamwork of Marine supporting arms was never shown to better effect -than in the establishment of a bridgehead over the Han. Lieutenant -Colonel Partridge’s engineers, of course, were on the job from the -beginning. It was up to them to get the tanks across the river as -soon as possible, in case the infantry needed the support of armor. -Approaches and ferry landings had to be constructed for this purpose; -and just six hours after the initial infantry crossing, the engineers -had their first six-float M4A2 raft in operation. It had taken them -four hours to build.[306] - - [306] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan; Partridge interv, 23 - Nov 54. - -The 2d Platoon of Able Company, 1st Tank Battalion, crossed the river -at 1410 on 20 September and moved up in support of 3/5. The 1st Platoon -followed at 1600 and the 3d Platoon late that afternoon, after the -engineers completed a second raft. - -When the KMCs attempted to cross in DUKWs, the clumsy vehicles bogged -down several yards from the river on the south bank. Partridge -suggested to the KMC commander that his troops build a makeshift -corduroy approach off the main route which Marine engineers were -constructing to the embarkation point. The Korean officer agreed with -Partridge that this was a sensible solution and soon had his men -gathering logs. - -Neither of them dreamed that they had stirred up an international -incident which called for a decision on the division level. American -policy makers had felt it necessary to lean backwards to avoid giving -Communist propagandists any excuse to charge us with recruiting Koreans -for “slave labor.” It was an extremely sensitive subject, and Partridge -was astonished at the repercussions. At last General Craig visited -the ferry site and ruled that it was a closed incident after finding -all explanations satisfactory. It was further decided--for mechanical -rather than political reasons--to take the KMCs across in amtracs -rather than waste any more time on DUKWs.[307] - - [307] Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54. - -On the night of the 20th, Partridge and Colonel McAlister, the Division -G-4, interviewed a captured NKPA engineer major at Kimpo Airfield. -The prisoner informed them that the bombed highway bridge between -Yongdungpo and Seoul had been damaged beyond repair with the means at -hand. This agreed with the conclusions of the Marine officers on the -basis of aerial observation. Prospects for a span over the Han seemed -dim as Partridge was leaving McAlister’s quarters. That very evening, -however, Lieutenant Colonel Rowny, chief of the X Corps engineers, -telephoned to announce that materials for a floating bridge unit had -been accumulated by the Army in Japan and would be flown to Korea -shortly. Up to this time, with rafts the only solution, the Marine -engineers had supplied all the materials. But Rowny announced that -Corps would assume the responsibility after the arrival of enough -materials for a floating bridge unit.[308] - - [308] _Ibid._ - -Military operations could not wait a week or ten days for the new span, -and the Marine ferry plus amtracs and DUKWs[309] had to nourish the -assault on Seoul. With this end in view, the 1st Shore Party Battalion -reverted to Division control on the 19th and displaced from Inchon to -Oeoso-ri. By nightfall the entire battalion was bivouacked in this area. - - [309] MajGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 29 Apr 55. - -On the 20th, after establishing a forward CP at Kimpo Airfield, the -shore party troops of Baker Company moved up to the Han in support of -the 5th Marines, followed by two teams from Able Company. Evacuation -stations and supply dumps were set up on both banks. Other shore party -missions were maintaining LVT and DUKW traffic control, providing -guides for the amtracs, posting security at the crossing sites on both -banks, and effecting unit distribution of supplies upon request by the -DUKWs and LVTs. - -Control of the ferry site, known as BAKER Ferry, became the -responsibility of Baker Company of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. Teams -1 and 2 were employed on the south bank, and Team 3 plus headquarters -troops on the other shore. Traffic control was of the utmost -importance, since ferry operation had to be limited to periods of low -tide, and during idle intervals a long line of vehicles accumulated. -Most of them were trucks containing cargo to be reloaded in LVTs and -taken across the river. The shore party men had the duty of keeping the -traffic flowing as smoothly as possible, both on land and water, and -special regulations were enforced to prevent the LVTs from colliding -with the ferries. With the establishment of a third ferry, the problem -of supplying the troops across the river was pretty well solved.[310] - - [310] 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike. - - -_Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_ - -A military ceremony was held on 21 September when the commanding -general of X Corps established his CP in Inchon and assumed command at -1700 of all forces ashore. It was stated in some reports that command -had been transferred from the commander of JTF-7 to the commander of X -Corps. But officers familiar with amphibious doctrine pointed out that -at no time prior to landing did CG X Corps relinquish command; and only -through him did the commander of JTF-7 exercise command.[311] - - [311] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 32. - -The date was also significant for the 1st Marine Division in that its -third rifle regiment, the 7th Marines, landed at Inchon with Major -Francis F. Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines attached. Before -the ships reached the inner harbor, Colonel Litzenberg went ashore and -reported at the Division CP. Informing General Smith that troop units -in the convoy had been vertically loaded for maximum flexibility, he -asked what troops the Division commander desired to have unloaded first. - -“An infantry battalion,” said General Smith. - -“And what next?” - -“Another infantry battalion,” said the commanding general. - -Colonel Litzenberg began unloading at once, and by 2200 his CP had -opened at Wonjong-ni, two miles south of Kimpo Airfield, while H&S -Company and the 3d Battalion (Major Maurice E. Roach) occupied near-by -assembly areas. The 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Thornton M. -Hinkle) had reached an assembly area at Hill 131, a mile north of -Kimpo, by 0100 on 22 September with a mission of providing security for -the airfield and a river crossing site. The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant -Colonel Raymond G. Davis) was given the duty of unloading the ships of -the convoy.[312] - - [312] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg memo to authors, 11 May 55. - -It appeared for a few hours on 21 September that the enemy might be -planning to retake Kimpo Airfield. At 0730 a report came to the 3d -Battalion, KMC Regiment, warning of an attempted NKPA crossing of the -Han in the area about seven miles northwest of the field. Air strikes -were called immediately with the result of dispersing the enemy. At -1310, however, an estimated two NKPA battalions were reported in front -of KMC positions by the air liaison officer attached to the battalion. -All units in the Kimpo area were alerted to the possibility of attack. -The CO of the 1st Shore Party Battalion was designated as coordinator -of defensive forces consisting of his unit, and elements of the 1st -Engineer Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion, and 1st -Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Army troops of the 56th Amphibian Tractor -Battalion were also ordered to Kimpo. - -With an NKPA attack threatening, some concern was felt about an enemy -Yak type aircraft--fueled, armed, and ready for flight--which had -been discovered in a revetment on the edge of the airfield by First -Lieutenant Edward E. Collins of the Ordnance Battalion and later of -the 5th Marines. The plane was hastily disarmed and painted with U. S. -markings, so that it could be flown to Japan in case the enemy overran -Kimpo.[313] - - [313] Capt E. E. Collins ltr to authors, 6 May 55. - -Although the NKPA threat did not materialize, there could be no -doubt of an enemy build-up within striking distance. And it was on -this sensitive left flank that the support of naval gunfire was most -effective. - -As early as 19 September the 1st and 5th Marines had advanced beyond -the range of the light cruisers and destroyers. The battleship -_Missouri_ was made available the next day, but targets in Seoul -proved to be too distant for her maximum range, and no further efforts -were made to call upon the battleship’s 16-inch rifles. In the Kimpo -area, however, naval gunfire was at its best, and a total of 535 -8-inch shells were fired from 21 to 24 September by the _Toledo_ and -_Rochester_. These fires were requested by Lieutenant Wayerski in -support of patrol actions by the 3d KMC Battalion. One of the KMC -attacks wiped out a company-size pocket of Red Korean resistance in the -vicinity of Chongdong--about three miles northwest of the airfield on -the south bank of the Han--with a loss to the enemy of 40 counted dead -and some 150 prisoners.[314] - - [314] Capt J. R. Wayerski, interv, of 28 Sep 54. - -After the Han crossing, the 1st Marine Division found itself in -the position of advancing astride an unbridged tidal river with -the northern flank wide open. Generals Smith and Craig depended on -VMO-6 helicopters for their visits to the 5th Marines front. Those -rotary-winged aircraft were in increasing demand for evacuating serious -casualties; and the commanding general directed that such missions be -given priority over command and liaison flights. This meant that Smith -and Craig were occasionally “bumped.” In such instances they crossed -the river by LVT or waited until their helicopter could return. - -At the time of the Han crossing, the general plan of the 1st Marine -Division had been for RCT-5 to clear the north bank and open up -crossing sites for RCT-1 in the Yongdungpo area. That regiment would -then cross to seize South Mountain, just north of the crossing site, -thus forming an enclave in Seoul proper. Further objectives were to be -seized by RCT-1 to the north and east while the KMC Regiment passed -through RCT-5 to attack the center of the city. Here a political -motive entered the picture, since it was desired to have Koreans take -a prominent part in the liberation of the former ROK capital. To the -north, on the left flank of the Division, it was planned for RCT-7 to -seize objectives to protect the flank and cut off the escape of the -enemy. Meanwhile, RCT-5 would revert to Division reserve as soon as the -tactical situation made it possible. - -So much for the plan. Before it could be put into execution, stiffening -NKPA resistance made it necessary to consider revisions.[315] Not only -was the hilly terrain northwest of Seoul well suited to defensive -operations, but it had been a training area as far back as the Japanese -overlordship, with fields of fire accurately charted. Moreover, it -had become evident by the 21st that the enemy was about to exchange -a strategy of delaying operations for one of defending to the last -ditch. The 1st Marines had already experienced the new NKPA spirit -at Yongdungpo, and on the 21st the 5th Marines contented itself with -limited advances for the purpose of seizing high ground from which to -launch the assault on Seoul. - - [315] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 253–255. - -The attack on the 21st was launched astride the railroad by the 3d -Battalion to the north and the 1st Battalion between the railroad and -the river. After passing through the 2d Battalion, Taplett’s men seized -three hills and by dusk were digging in on Hill 216, about six miles -east of Hill 125 and the ferry landing site. - -The 1st Battalion had meanwhile advanced to Hill 96, about 3,000 -yards southeast of yesterday’s Objective DOG, now occupied by the -2d Battalion in reserve. Further gains of some 2,500 yards to the -southeast took the battalion to Hill 68, between the railroad and -river, which was seized and held for the night. - -Enemy resistance ranged from light to moderate in both battalion zones. -Between them, the 1st Battalion of the KMCs moved up to Hill 104, just -north of the railroad and south of Sachon Creek.[316] - - [316] 1st MarDiv, _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; O. P. Smith, - _Notes_, 255–256. - -This was the situation across the river at nightfall on the 21st. The -5th Marines was in position to grapple with the enemy for possession of -Seoul. Hill 104, in the center of the 5th Marines front, was only 5,000 -yards west of the Government Palace in the northwest section of the -city. Less than three miles, yet officers and men alike realized that -they would have to fight for every inch of the way. If anyone had any -doubts, he had only to watch the flashes of gunfire stabbing the night -sky to the southeast, and he had only to listen to the unremitting roar -of gunfire. For at Yongdungpo the 1st Marines had been slugging it out -with the enemy for the last three days in a battle for the rambling -industrial suburb. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -The Fight for Yongdungpo - -_Three Hills Taken by 1/5--Enemy Minefields Encountered--NKPA -Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture of Hills 80 and 85--1st -Marines in Position--Assault of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a -Limb--Yongdungpo Secured_ - -“If Yongdungpo is lost, Seoul also will fall.” This was the warning -note sounded during the conferences of the Red Korean military leaders -in Seoul. So important did they consider the industrial suburb that a -regiment of the 18th NKPA Division was assigned to the defense of the -built-up area on the south bank of the Han.[317] - - [317] 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_. - -Slogans of this sort were a favorite form of Communist inspirational -literature, and they may have served to buck up the defenders. From the -tactical standpoint, however, the quoted catch phrase was illogical. -Yongdungpo was untenable. Squatting on the low ground at the confluence -of the Kalchon and Han Rivers, the town was an isolated landmark of -only symbolic significance. It was separated from Seoul by two miles -of sand and water, and the only connecting links, the old railroad and -highway bridges, had long since been destroyed. Thus, what had once -been a vital communications hub south of the Han was now a veritable -dead end. - -While the Reds in Seoul were able to ferry troops and materiel -across the exposed river and sand spit by night, they could not hope -by this primitive method to meet the logistical requirements of a -regimental garrison confronted by a modern juggernaut of combined -arms. Nevertheless, the North Koreans chose to make a fight of it, and -in addition to the hundreds of troops in Yongdungpo, they sent over -considerable artillery and armor that could have been put to better use -in the defensible terrain around Seoul. - - -_Three Hills Taken by 1/5_ - -Hill 118 was the principal terrain feature between Kimpo Airfield and -Yongdungpo, the dominating peak being about three miles from the former -and two from the latter. Giant spurs from the main ridge extended -northward toward the Han and eastward to the bed of the Kalchon, beyond -which lay Yongdungpo. At the end of one easterly projection were the -twin caps, Hills 80 and 85. Paralleling the Han River, a modern highway -led from Kimpo, passed north of Hill 118, skirted 80 and 85, then -bridged the Kalchon to enter Yongdungpo from the northwest. - -It will be recalled that the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied high -ground generally east of Kimpo Airfield at the close of 18 September. -During the night, Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered the unit to seize -Hills 80 and 85 the next day. To gain these gates to Yongdungpo, it -would be necessary to take Hill 118; and the battalion commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Newton, formulated his plan accordingly.[318] -Company B would leave its positions on old Objective EASY at dawn and -envelop Hill 118 from the south. Company C would attack frontally -from Objective FOX, assist the enveloping force by taking one of -118’s spurs, then continue eastward to seize 80 and 85. Company A was -to remain behind an Objective EASY for the purpose of guarding the -approaches to the airfield. - - [318] Unless otherwise noted, the story of 1/5’s fight is - derived from 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -At dawn of 19 September, Company C atop Objective FOX was greeted -by a hail of mortar and small-arms fire. Under this shield part of -a 500-man enemy force attacked the Marine position from the east, -while the remainder attempted to move along the Yongdungpo-Kimpo -Highway, obviously bent on reaching the airfield. Other large NKPA -concentrations were spotted at the base of Hill 118. - -Charlie Company’s organic weapons roared into action along with the -battalion 81s. While the Marine fire cut swaths through the exposed -enemy ranks, Baker Company lunged forward to envelop Hill 118 according -to plan. Air and artillery paved the way so effectively that Captain -Fenton’s unit gained the commanding peak about 1100 without suffering a -casualty. This left the North Korean attackers, who had been contained -by Charlie Company, trapped between Objective Fox and Hill 118. After -losses of 300 dead and 100 prisoners, the Red Force broke into a few -small bands that fled across the highway to the fields and villages -bordering the Han. Company C’s casualties in stopping the attack -and moving forward to its spur on Hill 118 were two killed and six -wounded.[319] - - [319] _Ibid._; and Capt. P. F. Pedersen memo to authors, 30 - May 55. - -[Illustration: ACTION ON 19 SEPTEMBER - -SHOWING ATTACKS BY 1/5, 2/1, & 3/1] - -As the two assault companies reorganized on the newly won ridge, Fenton -spotted a large number of Red troops on Hill 80, now about 1,000 yards -away. He directed an air strike from his advance position, and the -Corsairs not only cut down many of the North Koreans but completely -routed the survivors. While the planes worked over the enemy positions -on the high ground, the Marines of Company B observed a growing throng -of NKPA soldiers in the vicinity of the Kalchon Bridge leading to -Yongdungpo. Some of the Reds were milling around, but others were -filing across the undamaged span and disappearing into a knot of -warehouses and huts at the far end. Fenton radioed for artillery fire -just as Communist machine guns and an AT weapon opened up on Baker -Company from positions across the bridge. Four times firing for effect -with “battery four rounds,” the Marine howitzers sent a total of 96 -shells crashing into the enemy positions within the space of a few -minutes. The explosions neutralized the bridge area, but the span -itself was badly damaged in the process.[320] - - [320] Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., memo to authors, 1 Jun 55. - -First Lieutenant Pedersen led Company C along the highway toward Hills -80 and 85 at 1430. Owing to the press of time, the area between the -road and the Han River was not cleared, with the result that small -bands of enemy were left free to roam the fields and make their -presence felt later. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Harold L. -Dawe, Jr., peeled off the column and attacked Hill 80 shortly after -1500. Following at an interval of 500 yards, Second Lieutenant Robert -H. Corbet’s 1st Platoon continued along the pavement toward Hill 85. A -platoon of A/Tanks supported the two-pronged assault along with Charlie -Company’s mortars and machine guns, and by 1650 the two heights were -secured. In the wake of the air strike called down by Fenton, the -attacking infantry had encountered practically no opposition. - -Yongdungpo, bristling with Communist armament, rumbled its challenge -from the low ground 500 yards east of Hill 85. Taken under heavy fire -by artillery, mortars, and small arms, Company C was forced to dig in -on the reverse slopes of its high ground, there to await the expected -counterattack after nightfall. - - -_Enemy Minefields Encountered_ - -As noted previously, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, spent -the night of 18–19 September astride the Inchon-Seoul Highway a mile -east of Sosa. The 1st Battalion, deployed over a broad front in the -hills south of the road, was to be relieved in the morning by the -32d Infantry, so that Colonel Puller could shift his regiment to the -left. Since the relief did not take place as early as expected, Puller -ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to attack at 1030, leaving 1/1 in -position to await replacement by the Army unit.[321] - - [321] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -On the left of the highway, 3/1 jumped off from Hill 123 with Companies -H and I in the assault. The battalion’s mission was to clear a rambling -ridge complex that extended more than three miles before stopping short -of Hill 118. Assigned as a final objective was the terminal height, -Lookout Hill, facing western Yongdungpo across the wide bottomland of -the Kalchon.[322] - - [322] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_. - -Considering the formidable cross-compartment approach, the assault -companies led by the battalion S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, made -good progress against enemy resistance described as “light but -stubborn.” At a cost of two killed and 15 wounded, the Marines combed -the vertical wilderness and seized Lookout Hill late in the evening. -The attack was almost too successful, for the battalion was now out on -a limb. The closest friendly forces were on Hill 118, several hundred -yards to the north, and along the Inchon-Seoul Highway, about a mile to -the south, as will be shown.[323] - - [323] _Ibid._; and Myers interv, 1 Feb 55. - -The 2d Battalion could boast comparable success along the highway in -the course of 19 September, but gains were made under far different -circumstances. Spearheaded by Charlie Company Tanks commanded by -Captain Richard M. Taylor, the battalion had advanced only 500 -yards in the morning when the lead M-26 was enveloped in a violent -explosion. With one track and two road wheels destroyed, the steel -monster settled into the crater left by the detonation of a wooden box -mine.[324] - - [324] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. - -Simultaneously, the infantrymen of Company F came under heavy -small-arms fire from Hill 72 to the right front. In an attempt to sight -in on the enemy positions, other tanks tried to bypass the mine field -in the highway, only to discover that explosives were concealed in both -road shoulders as well. Howitzers of the 11th Marines registered on -Hill 72, and during the ensuing bombardment a VMF-214 flight appeared -overhead to lend further assistance.[325] - - [325] 2/1 _SAR_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig; Easy; and Cunliffe - interv, 24 Aug 54. - -Despite his generous use of supporting arms, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter -was forced to commit all three rifle companies to the fight. Tank -gunners tried to detonate mines embedded in the road with machine-gun -fire, but without success.[326] It remained for First Lieutenant -George A. Babe’s 2d Platoon, Charlie Company Engineers, to remove the -obstacles under fire. Darting forward on the bullet-swept highway, the -engineers placed “snowball” charges of C-3 on the wooden boxes, then -took cover while the mines exploded.[327] - - [326] Owing to the crude design, the top of the wooden box - mine must protrude above the road for best effect. - Although the Communists sometimes concealed the - projections with debris, Marines usually had no - difficulty in spotting them. - - [327] Capt G. A. Babe--1stLt P. Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54. - -After 2/1 had driven the enemy from the area with the assistance -of Marine air and artillery, the job of clearing the 250-yard mine -field proceeded under less hair-raising conditions. To get the armor -back into the fight as soon as possible, Babe ignored the explosives -embedded in the highway shoulders. Word was passed back to this effect, -but several jeeps and trucks were lost later when drivers failed to -heed the warning.[328] - - [328] _Ibid._; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -While the tanks remained on the sideline, Companies D and F punched -about a mile down the highway against continuing resistance, which -gradually solidified at Hill 146. Like 72, this ridge was on the right -side of the road, in the 32d Infantry’s zone of action. Since the Army -unit had yet to enter the picture, the Marine flank was becoming more -and more exposed with each forward bound by 2/1.[329] - - [329] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55. - -Sutter had no choice but to commit troops beyond his zone. Not only -were the Reds entrenched on Hill 146 with machine guns and field -pieces, but they had blocked the highway with trees and other -encumbrances. Thus, while Fox Company seized a knoll on the left, Dog -Company invaded Army territory and battled its way to the top of Hill -146’s western spur. VMF-214 plastered the peak itself, and the 11th -Marines shelled enemy positions across the whole battalion front.[330] - - [330] _Ibid._; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - -It was 1300 when the mine field to the rear was finally cleared, -enabling Charlie Company Tanks to move forward in an attempt to -overtake Sutter’s infantry. Within sight of the fighting around Hill -146, the armor ground to a halt before the roadblock of trees, rice -bags, and other debris.[331] A dozer tank rumbled ahead, smashed -through the first obstruction, then went up in a cloud of smoke. Under -the litter on the road lay a second mine field, 75 yards long.[332] - - [331] Rice bags filled with dirt commonly were used by the - NKPA for barriers in place of sandbags. - - [332] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. - -Again the tank men watched from behind as engineers cleared the highway -and 2/1 drove forward out of sight. By 1730, the Marine infantry had -completely smashed the main enemy concentration on the highway. When -the surviving Reds fled, they exhibited the same determination that had -characterized their stand throughout the day. Weapons and equipment -were strewn along the road, and the Marines captured a truck loaded -with mines as further evidence of the hasty retreat.[333] - - [333] _Ibid._; and 2/1 _SAR_. - -Sutter ordered 2/1 to hold up at 1900 and dig in astride the highway. -The 4,800-yard advance had cost the Marine unit four killed and 18 -wounded, against 350 casualties and five prisoners for the North -Koreans. Since all written and personal accounts agree that 19 -September amounted to almost one continuous fire fight for the 2d -Battalion, the amazing contrast in friendly-enemy loss figures must be -attributed to the sound employment of Marine supporting arms.[334] - - [334] 2/1 _SAR_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and - Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. - -As mentioned earlier, 2/1’s positions for the night were a mile -southeast of the 3d Battalion on Lookout Hill. Company E entrenched -on high ground to the left of the highway--4,000 yards from -Yongdungpo--while D and F manned a long, low hill on the right. Because -the latter height ran parallel to the road, the line formed by Dog and -Fox was at a right angle to that held by Easy. Sutter’s choice of this -L-shaped defense would shortly prove to be an extremely wise one. - - -_NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September_ - -The right flank of the 1st Marines was bare. Not until 1200, 19 -September, did the 32d Infantry begin relieving 1/1 in its old -positions southeast of Sosa. Liaison between the Marine and Army units -at this time was weak. Apparently many of the Marines were unaware that -General Barr’s OpnO No. 2,[335] for the 7th Infantry Division did not -call for a jump-off by the 32d until 0630 on the 20th. At that time -the Army regiment would attack a series of objectives which included -Hill 146 and other high ground above the road.[336] Thus, the schedules -north and south of the highway were running one day apart, and it would -take the enemy himself to straighten the line when he slammed the gates -of Yongdungpo. - - [335] Issued at 2000, 19 September. - - [336] 7th InfDiv (USA) _Opn Rpt_, in Inclusions to 7th InfDiv - War Diary for Sep 50. - -Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, entrucked below Sosa for its -circuitous journey from the right flank of the regiment to the left, -where it was to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on Hills 118, -80, and 85. The 11-mile trip via Sosa and Wonjong-ni was uneventful, -except that the troops had to dismount at the latter village and -proceed on foot over the primitive road. With the first increment to -arrive at Wonjong-ni, Captain Robert H. Barrow, commanding Company A -of 1/1, set a rugged pace to get his troops on top of Hill 118 before -dark. Relieving Company B of 1/5, he expected Charlie Company to pass -through and replace its opposite of the 5th Marines on Hills 80 and 85. - -It was dusk, and Companies B and C were still on the move when Hawkins -of 1/1 met Newton of 1/5. They briefly discussed the lay of the -land, the latter’s tactical disposition, and the requirement that -1/5 assemble at Kimpo within a matter of hours to prepare for the -river-crossing next day. Time, space, and terrain factors were too -great, Hawkins concluded, for his battalion to assume all positions -then occupied by the other. To facilitate the rest of the relief, which -now would take place in darkness, he ordered Charlie Company to occupy -Hill 118 with Able and directed Baker to dig in on a southern extension -of the big ridge.[337] - - [337] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Maj R. H. Barrow - interv, 17 Aug 54; and LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, 21 - May 55. - -Having relieved Fenton on Hill 118 before nightfall, Barrow enjoyed -the opportunity to reconnoiter 1/5’s area and to realize the tactical -significance of Hills 80 and 85. When it became apparent that -Company C would not arrive before dark, he radioed the battalion S-3 -for permission to move his company to the twin peaks immediately, -explaining that Charlie Company of 1/5 could remain in position no -later than 2100. Since Hawkins had already decided against taking over -too much unfamiliar ground after daylight, Major Bridges turned down -the request. Thus, at 2100, with no relief in sight, the 5th Marines’ -unit withdrew from the two heights as ordered. Company C of 1/1 -reached Hill 118 at 2200 and went into position with Barrow’s outfit -for the night. Unknown to the enemy, Hills 80 and 85 had become a -no-man’s-land.[338] - - [338] _Ibid._; and Fenton ltr, 1 Jun 55. - -While the battalions of the 1st Marines settled down for the night in -a three-mile arc facing western Yongdungpo, the North Korean commander -within the town organized part of his garrison for two separate thrusts -against the closing vise. In one case he would win by default; in the -other he would see more of his limited resources go down the drain. - -Just before dawn of 20 September, the Marines on Hill 118 were alerted -by a furious clatter of small arms and automatic weapons far out to the -east. Daylight disclosed that the enemy was “assaulting” Hills 80 and -85. When the North Koreans finally discovered that their objectives -were unoccupied, they abruptly ceased firing, surged over both crests, -and entrenched in about company strength. An attempt was made to extend -the counterattack to Hill 118, but Companies A and C, backed by a -flight of VMF-323, threw the Reds back with ease.[339] - - [339] _Ibid._; and Bates interv, 27 Aug 51. - -During the early morning blackness which found the enemy filling the -vacuum on Hills 80 and 85, a stronger North Korean force--estimated at -a battalion--marched out of Yongdungpo toward 2/1’s positions astride -the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[340] In the van of the Red column were five -T-34 tanks preceded, oddly enough, by a truck loaded with ammunition. -Other vehicles, laden with less sensitive supplies, were safely -interspersed among the infantry in the long file. - - [340] The account of this counterattack is taken from: - 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_; - Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Cunliffe interv, 24 - Aug 54; and CMH Citation for PFC W. C. Monegan, Jr. - -It will be remembered that Companies D and F, the latter in the -fore, occupied high ground positions parallel to and south of the -highway. Farther back, Easy Company’s line tied in at a right angle -and extended to the north of the road. The troops of Fox Company, -tense with anticipation in their advance deployment, heard the first -distant sounds of clanking armor and racing engines sometime before -0400. The noise grew steadily louder until, at 0430, the shadows of -the ammunition truck and T-34s passed beneath the Marine defenses and -continued along the road toward Easy Company’s lines. At the latter, -Private Oliver O’Neil, Jr., rose from behind his machine gun and -shouted a challenge to the truck, which by this time was well out in -front of the enemy tanks. O’Neil was cut down by automatic fire in -answer, and pandemonium broke out on the highway. - -Obviously the North Koreans had stumbled into it again, just as they -had done at Ascom City. Two T-34s stopped short of Easy Company’s front -and opened up wildly. Companies D and F in turn exploded with machine -guns, small arms, grenades, and mortars against the flank of the enemy -column, while E fought to deny further passage along the road. Under -the hail of fire from above, the Red soldiers milled about in panic and -were slaughtered. Some flung themselves into roadside ditches, where -the crowding only increased the odds of destruction. Others sought -escape by scrambling up the slopes--into the very muzzles of Dog and -Fox Company weapons. - -The T-34s began to lurch back and forth like trapped animals. Owing -either to mines laid by Marine engineers or a grenade thrown from -above, the ammunition truck exploded in a brilliant spectacle of -pyrotechnics. In the midst of the furor, Private First Class Monegan -moved across the hillside from Company F’s front with his rocket -launcher. Observing his progress against the backdrop of flames from -the truck, his comrades either held or shifted their fire to protect -him. - -Monegan closed on the lead tank and wrecked it with one 3.5-inch -projectile. Approaching the second T-34 under intense fire, he paused -and took aim with imperturbability. Again his rocket connected with a -roar, and the black hulk on the road turned into a blazing furnace. -Silhouetted against the hillside, the Marine leveled his weapon at a -third armored vehicle just as it was pivoting around to retreat. But at -this moment an enemy machine gun found the mark, and Monegan--killer of -tanks--fell dead. - -Although the North Korean attack was thus smashed at the outset, -fighting along the highway continued until daylight. In addition to the -two T-34s destroyed, another was captured intact with its crew. The -11th Marines closed the “back door” of the highway with a curtain of -high explosive, thereby sealing the fate of the Red battalion. - -Dawn of 20 September revealed a scene of utter ruin across the Marine -front. The highway was littered with burnt NKPA trucks, tanks, and -equipment. Heaped on the road, in ditches, and along hillsides were 300 -enemy dead.[341] - - [341] Marine losses were surprisingly small, although the - exact number cannot be determined. In the whole course - of 20 September, 2/1 sustained four KIA and 32 WIA, but - these figures included losses during the Marine advance - after the NKPA counterattack. - - -_Recapture of Hills 80 and 85_ - -For the most part, fighting around Yongdungpo on 20 September was a -contest of the giants. Supporting arms of both sides exchanged heavy -blows, and the 1st Marines reported with business-like frankness that -it was “... leveling the southern part of Yongdungpo, which is infested -with enemy.” North Korean mortars, tanks, and field pieces pumped -hundreds of rounds out of positions in the center of town and the -eastern outskirts. Marine planes and howitzers replied by smothering -Red concentrations and emplacements with literally thousands of -missiles of all types. - -The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, commanded by Major William McReynolds, -fired 28 concentrations in the course of the day; and Lieutenant -Colonel Merritt Adelman’s 2d Battalion expended 1,656 rounds in 21 -missions. It was the precision firing of these two units which had -supported 2/1 so effectively during the pre-dawn counterattack.[342] - - [342] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar. - -Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, FMF, moved to advance -positions in the morning to increase the pressure on the Yongdungpo -garrison. Land counterpart of the LSMRs which rocked the Inchon -waterfront on D-day, this unit had seen little action to date, owing -to the lack of M48 fuses for its missiles. Banking on substitute -detonating devices (M51 for 105mm and 155mm Howitzer shells), First -Lieutenant Eugene A. Bushe ordered his gunners to fire a test salvo -of 24 rockets. No visible effect being noticeable from his OP, the -battery commander then called for a full ripple of 144--enough high -explosive to flatten a good portion of the town. Again the big missiles -plowed into the target area with a dull thud, and Bushe withdrew his -battery to the rear. The M48 fuses did not arrive until 28 September, -with the result that the potent Marine rocket artillery was sidelined -until the closing days of the operation.[343] - - [343] _Ibid._; and Capt D. A. Rapp interv, 18 Nov 54, with - comments by Capt E. A. Bushe. - -Colonel Puller’s tactics during the bombardment on 20 September were -designed to align the 1st Marines for the actual assault of Yongdungpo, -planned for the next day. It was necessary to occupy in strength all -the final approaches to the town, so that the full weight of the -regiment could be brought to bear against the defending garrison. From -left to right, therefore, the schedule of operations on the 20th was as -follows: (1) 1st Battalion to seize Hills 80 and 85; (2) 3d Battalion -to remain in position on Lookout Hill; and (3) 2d Battalion to advance -to the first of two highway bridges which spanned branches of the -Kalchon just outside of Yongdungpo. - -These limited attacks would also provide time for the 32d Infantry -to catch up on the right. The day’s mission for the Army unit was -to attack over a six-mile front and secure, among other objectives, -towering Tongdok Mountain south of the MSR and two miles from -Yongdungpo.[344] - - [344] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and 7th InfDiv - _OpnO 2_. - -Shortly after first light, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins reached the -crest of Hill 118 and established his OP. He was in time to see Able -and Charlie Companies repulse disconnected Red elements moving on the -Marine lines from Hills 80 and 85. While the battalion commander issued -his order for the attack, Major William L. Bates, Jr., commander of -1/1’s Weapons Company, set up his “supporting arms center” to cover the -impending assault.[345] - - [345] Though not provided for in Fleet Marine Force T/O, the - “supporting arms center,” a provisional facility for - coordination modeled after the regimental SAC, was a - favorite with many battalion commanders in the field. - -Hawkins gave Company C the mission of taking Hills 80 and 85.[346] -Deciding on a southerly approach, the company commander Captain Robert -P. Wray ordered his 2d Platoon to lead off by clearing a village -sprawled across the route to the lower peak. Second Lieutenant John N. -Guild moved out at the head of the skirmishers and led them over 500 -yards of intervening low ground. Nearing a knoll which topped the clump -of thatched huts, the platoon came under heavy small-arms fire and was -stalled. - - [346] The following narrative is taken from: Bates interv, 27 - Aug 51; Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and Captains F. B. - Carlon and J. M. McGee interv, 9 Feb 55; Hawkins ltr 21 - May 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 30 May 55. - -Wray immediately committed the rest of his company in a two-pronged -attack which wrapped around the flanks of Guild’s line and smashed -through the North Korean resistance. After a hot fire fight, the -surviving Reds fled to Hill 80, and Company C occupied the village and -knoll by early afternoon. The executive officer, First Lieutenant James -M. McGee, led a six-man patrol eastward to clean out a small nest of -holdouts, while Wray reorganized the company for the assault on the -twin caps. - -Charlie Company’s tactics in advancing on the enemy’s southern flank -were ideal from the standpoint of Weapons and Able Companies, which -supported the attack from Hill 118. The two units could actually -witness the progress of the assault troops across the 1st Battalion’s -front, so that mortars and machine guns at the base of fire had only to -shift gradually leftward to support the Marine advance. - -Late in the afternoon, Wray launched a double envelopment of Hill 80. -Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey led his 3d Platoon around to the -right, and Second Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st swung through the -low ground on the left. A few huts concealing snipers were demolished -by 3.5-inch rockets, but otherwise the Marines met little resistance as -they moved over the crest of the objective early in the evening. With -the first signs of darkness already in the sky, Wray lost no time in -preparing for his third double envelopment of the day. - -The remnants of the North Korean company were entrenched on the -crest and forward slopes (facing the Marine attack) of Hill 85, -obviously intent on making a determined stand. Anticipating Charlie -Company’s tactics, the Red leader had bent back both flanks to -prevent encroachments on the sides or rear. Thus, though both Marine -assault platoons swung out to stab at the enemy flanks, the Communist -disposition actually relegated each maneuver to a separate frontal -attack. - -Craven’s platoon and Charlie Company machine guns, under First -Lieutenant Francis B. Carlon, covered the attackers from a base of fire -on the northern slopes of Hill 80. Moving aggressively through a hail -of bullets, the 2d Platoon on the left crossed the low ground and -drove up the western incline of the objective. Almost to the top, Guild -was grievously wounded by a machine-gun burst. - -[Illustration: ACTION ON 20 SEP - -SHOWING DAWN NKPA COUNTERATTACK AGAINST 2/1, & 1st MARINES’ ATTACKS -DURING DAY] - -On the right, Lieutenant Commiskey paved the way in the face of -heavy resistance. Nearing the crest of Hill 85, the officer abruptly -bounded ahead of his platoon and went over the top. He jumped into a -machine-gun emplacement and was dispatching the last of five occupants -when his lead skirmishers caught up with him. He ran forward again to -clean out another North Korean position in a single-handed attack. By -this time, the Reds on the eastern side of the hill had had enough. -Those who still had hides to save pelted down the northern slopes in -the direction of the mouth of the Kalchon River, where the stream was -spanned by the now damaged bridge. - -Guild’s platoon, inspired by its leader who remained in action despite -a mortal wound, gained the summit shortly after Commiskey’s unit. -Captain Wray, following closely behind, later described his meeting -with Guild on the slope as follows: - -“He stayed on his feet and turned toward where I was climbing 20 yards -behind him. He dropped at my feet and made every effort to remain -conscious long enough to tell me how his squads were attacking and -pleading with me to keep them attacking. I called for a corpsman; he -tried to refuse, saying that he had a wounded man who needed one more -than he did.” - -Lieutenant Guild died shortly afterwards. - - -_1st Marines in Position_ - -During the morning phase of Charlie Company’s attack, Hawkins and -the others on Hill 118 were racked by frustration of a type seldom -experienced by Marines in the history of the Corps. It will be recalled -that the ground between the Kimpo-Yongdungpo Highway and the Han River -was not cleared in the course of 1/5’s attack on Hills 80 and 85 on -19 September. Since the 5th Marines’ unit had withdrawn to cross the -Han at Haengju, and since Charlie Company of 1/1 had chosen a southern -route in recapturing the twin heights, enemy bands in hiding along the -river bank were unmolested. The potential danger in the area was not -realized, however, until too late. - -From Kimpo came a “weasel” of the 1st Signal Battalion, the crew calmly -stringing wire into the 1st Marines’ zone as the vehicle rattled along -the highway. Just short of the Kalchon bridge, the little tractor -struck a mine and was ambushed by a party of North Koreans. The -power-packed Marine infantry on Hill 118, less than a thousand yards -away, watched helplessly as the communications men were either killed -or captured. No sooner had the Reds disappeared into the brush with two -prisoners than a Marine truck, belonging to A/Engineers, cruised down -the highway with four unsuspecting passengers. Captain Barrow ordered -his troops to fire over the vehicle, hoping that the driver would hear -the bullets in the air and turn back. But the truck continued on into -the ambuscade, where it was stopped by an enemy fusilade.[347] - - [347] Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and SSgt C. O. Edwards - interv, 12 May 54. - -The engineers piled out and plunged into a rice paddy in an attempt -to escape. Three of them made it. The fourth, Private First Class -Clayton O. Edwards, was tracked down and captured. Although the Marine -was out of ammunition and already wounded, one heroic warrior of the -NKPA stepped forward and bayoneted him in the shoulder after he had -surrendered. Edwards later escaped from a POW train fleeing before the -UN drive into North Korea. - -Not long after these incidents, Captain Richard F. Bland led Baker -Company of 1/1 through the area and secured Hill 55 and the nearby -villages on the bank of the Han. The North Koreans pulled out and -crossed the Kalchon to join the Yongdungpo garrison. - -With fighting going on to the right and left, 3/1 sat quietly on -Lookout Hill during 20 September without suffering a casualty. An -occasional break in the orange and black pall over Yongdungpo allowed -the Marines a glimpse of the wrecked railroad and highway spans which -once had bridged the Han to Seoul. - -The ROK capital was still a long way off for the 1st Marines; and the -2d Battalion, now on the regimental right and in its sixth straight -day of the assault, was more concerned with the immediate foreground. -After smashing the Red attack in the morning of the 20th, Sutter’s unit -jumped off at 0645 against scattered resistance along the Inchon-Seoul -Highway. The assault elements reached the bridge spanning the western -branch of the Kalchon at 1230, and the battalion commander immediately -ordered engineers to inspect the long concrete structure. It was -reported to be in good enough condition to support M-26 tanks for the -attack on Yongdungpo the next day.[348] - - [348] 2/1 _SAR_. - -While the battalion dug in on the west side of the stream, the Marines -eyed the 2,000-yard stretch of highway leading ahead to a second span, -bridging the Kalchon’s eastern branch at the very edge of the blazing -town. A high ridge on the right of the road--technically in the 32d -Infantry’s zone of action--was a beehive of North Korean activity. -Anticipating the effect of this commanding position on his attack the -following day, Sutter contacted Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Mount, -USA, commanding the 2d Battalion of the 32d, for permission to shell -the height. The Army officer approved the request at 1300, but more -than _seven hours_ elapsed before the necessary clearance filtered -through 7th Division, X Corps, and 1st Marine Division to reach the -11th Marines. When the howitzers finally opened up, darkness prevented -effective observed fire from being delivered on the enemy strong -point.[349] - - [349] _Ibid._; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55. - -Out of sight and earshot of 2/1 during 20 September, Colonel Charles -E. Beauchamp’s 32d Regiment, in its first day of actual combat, paid -with seven killed and 36 wounded in taking Tongdok Mountain and part -of “Copper Mine Hill.” Using the Inchon-Anyang road as an MSR, the -Army unit lost three tanks in a field of over 150 wooden box mines. -Beauchamp himself narrowly escaped death or serious injury when his -jeep struck one of the explosives, killing the driver and wounding a -radio operator. By nightfall, the 32d was deployed far out on the right -of the Marines on the Inchon-Seoul Highway; and the 31st Infantry, -having landed at Inchon earlier in the day, went into position even -farther southward.[350] - - [350] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50. - - -_Assault of Yongdungpo_ - -There was no infantry action during the night of 20–21 September. -Both sides were steeling themselves for the ordeal each knew would -commence at dawn. The Red commander in Yongdungpo threw up formidable -earthworks to block the approach over the Kalchon from Hills 80 and 85 -in the northwest; and he concentrated a strong force between the two -tributaries in the southwest. That edge of town facing due west, though -most defensible, he left unguarded, with the result that a single -Marine rifle company would hasten his demise. - -Marine artillery thundered all night long, and the glare from flaming -Yongdungpo rolled back the darkness in an ever broadening arc. Shortly -after dawn, the Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, threaded across -the wreckage of the Kalchon bridge under cover of machine-gun, mortar, -and tank fire from Hill 85. Reaching the eastern bank, the attackers -swept over a knoll overlooking the Han on the left, which the North -Koreans had left undefended. The assault inched forward toward the -town, first through sporadic small arms resistance, then into a deadly -cross-fire from several automatic weapons.[351] - - [351] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and Bates interv, - 27 Aug 51. - -Baker Company was now confronted by two dikes which the Reds had -converted into a main line of resistance. One of the barriers -paralleled the Han River north of Yongdungpo; the other ran the entire -length of the western edge of town. Where they met to form a point -facing the Kalchon bridge and the Marine advance, a reinforced company -of North Koreans was deployed across each levee in strong, mutually -supporting positions. - -Captain Bland chose wisely in directing his attack against the northern -dike alone. By this decision he not only kept his left flank and rear -protected by the Han, but also maintained local superiority in numbers -over the Reds immediately confronting him. Grinding slowly forward with -heavy casualties, Company B rolled up the length of enemy entrenchments -on the levee and pushed eastward 2,000 yards by afternoon. The Marines -then formed a line with their backs to the Han and shot it out with the -Communists on the second dike at a range of 500 yards. At this point -the attack stalled, and the fight settled down to one of attrition. -Casualties on both sides mounted rapidly under the ceaseless exchange -of machine-gun, mortar, and tank fire.[352] - - [352] _Ibid._ - -Part of Bland’s difficulty owed to the random deployment of all -opposing forces at this time, as indicated on the charts of the 11th -Marines. Noting that Company B’s positions were along the Han north -of Yongdungpo, the artillerymen expressed reluctance to fire on the -enemy-held dike to the “rear” in answer to Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ -repeated requests from his OP on Hill 85. It was a matter of the -howitzers pointing generally north toward Seoul, while Bland’s outfit, -at the moment, was trying to head south. The misunderstanding was -finally cleared up late in the afternoon, and Marine air joined the -artillery in pounding the southern barrier. The Reds held stubbornly -under the battering, and at darkness Hawkins sent Charlie and Weapons -Companies across the bridge to form a perimeter with Baker for the -night.[353] - - [353] _Ibid._ - -The narrative will now switch to the action in the 2d Battalion zone, -leaving the separate attack of Company A to be taken up in detail later. - -Sutter’s unit jumped off at 0630 on the 21st with Companies D and -E in the assault. The infantry crossed the first bridge without -incident, then fanned out to move on the second. It was no surprise -when the North Koreans on the intermediate ridge to the right of the -highway suddenly threw heavy fire across the Marine front, but it was -disconcerting to Sutter that his calls for artillery fire met with the -same delay as on the previous day. He therefore shelled the high ground -with attached 4.2-inch mortars on his own initiative, before ordering -Companies E and F to attack the enemy bastion.[354] - - [354] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55. - -Meanwhile, Captain Welby Cronk led Company D forward on the left of the -highway against a strongly defended dike fronting the Kalchon’s western -branch. Progress was slow and casualties severe, but the Marines closed -to within 100 yards of the barrier by noon. There they dug in and -slugged it out, while the 2d and 3d Platoons of Charlie Company tanks -alternated in ripping the Communist trenches with 90mm, delayed-action -shells. - -Heavy fighting continued on the right side of the road until evening. -Companies E and F fought part way up the slopes of the ridge and -suffered heavily during the close exchange with the Reds on the crest. -Since the enemy was still in control of most of the high ground at -dusk, Sutter ordered the assault units to withdraw into 2/1’s zone and -dig in with Dog Company. VMF-214 covered the hot disengagement--one of -the most difficult of all tactics--under a masterful job of forward -air controlling by First Lieutenant Norman Vining, Sutter’s FAC. After -bombing and rocketing from 75 to 100 yards beyond the Marine front, -the Corsairs closed to within 30 yards for strafing runs to shield the -retracting line of infantry.[355] - - [355] _Ibid._; and E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air - Over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 6 - (Jun 52). - -[Illustration: ASSAULT OF YONGDUNG-PO - -1st MARINES----21 SEP] - -The seventh straight day in the assault had cost the 2d Battalion 11 -killed and 74 wounded, bringing its total casualties since D-Day to -28 KIA and 226 WIA. Partially because of these crippling statistics, -Colonel Puller, at 1530 on the 21st, had committed 3/1 to the relief -of the battle-weary outfit. The reserve battalion swung northeast from -Lookout Hill to flank the enemy dike positions facing Company D from -the eastern tributary. Crossing the Kalchon against light resistance, -the attackers ran into trouble at the fortified levees fronting -southwestern Yongdongpo. - -After heavy machine guns of 3/1 bested a battery of Communist automatic -weapons, Companies G and I, the latter on the right, attacked astride -the stream branch. Progress was slow, but at a cost of 11 killed and 18 -wounded, the Marines rolled up the heavily defended dike and reached -the bridge entering the city. Darkness fell with the 3d Battalion -entrenching to the north of the 2d, both units along the left side of -the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[356] - - [356] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; LtCol T. L. Ridge ltr to CMC, 20 - May 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 19 May 55. - -To the south of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry met with considerable -success during its attack over a mountainous nine-mile front. The 1st -Battalion on the right mopped up Copper Mine Hill, then seized the high -ground around Anyang against “light sniper fire.” In the left of the -Army zone and adjacent to the Marines, 2/32 took its objective south -of Yongdungpo against light-to-moderate resistance. Thus, at a cost -of two KIA, 28 WIA, and one MIA, the regiment succeeded in cutting -the railroad and highway leading from Suwon to Seoul via Anyang and -Yongdungpo. Difficulties in Marine-Army liaison and coordination -throughout 21 September stemmed from the fact that neither realized -the size of the gap between them. The map will show that the 32d’s -route of advance was planned to miss Yongdungpo by two miles, not even -coming close to the NKPA strong point which gave the 2d Battalion, 1st -Marines, so much trouble.[357] - - [357] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50. - - -_Able Company on a Limb_ - -With the coming of night on 21 September, there was grave apprehension -in the 1st Marines over the fate of one rifle company. In the course -of the day, the Reds had staved off major penetrations by two Marine -battalions in the southwest and the better part of another in the -northwest. Incredibly enough, one Marine unit of some 200 men had swept -through the space in between and cleared the very heart of Yongdungpo; -so that when darkness fell, the isolated force was anchored in the rear -of the enemy, a good mile and a half beyond the closest friendly units. - -Company A of the 1st Battalion had jumped off from below Hill 80 on -the morning of the 21st, after Baker Company was slowed by the dike -positions east of the Kalchon bridge. In committing the unit to an -attack through a mile of open rice paddies, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins -was gambling with high stakes for surprise.[358] - - [358] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bates interv, 27 Aug 51; - Maj R. H. Barrow intervs, 8 Oct 51 and 17 Aug 54; and - Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54. - -Captain Barrow employed the classic approach-march formation. Forward -on the left was Second Lieutenant John J. Swords’ 3d Platoon; on the -right front was the 2d, under Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones. -To the left rear was First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s 1st -Platoon, with the dual mission of company reserve and flank guard. In -the right rear were the 60mm mortars, a section of heavy machine guns -of Weapons Company, and the assault squad. Light machine gun sections -were attached to each rifle platoon, so that they could be employed to -the front or flanks on a moment’s notice. Barrow’s six-foot, four-inch -frame loomed between the two assault platoons. - -To say that these Marines were tense and expectant as they plodded -across the broad, flat expanse would be an understatement. Far off -on the left and right, small arms crackled continuously at the -bridge entrances to Yongdungpo. Marine planes were swooping down in -the distance, the hollow eruptions of their ordnance adding to the -incessant rumbling of artillery and mortars. - -Almost hidden from view by the high grain stalks, Company A swept -through the rice paddies against no opposition whatever. Its advance -was rapid until the 3d Platoon was slowed by muck which marked the -beginning of the Kalchon’s bed. Heads craned eagerly to the front and -flanks as progress dropped to a snail’s pace for several minutes. - -The crucial moment seemed certainly at hand when the assault line -stepped forward from the concealment of the rice and waded into the -stream, completely exposed to the wide bank and parallel dike beyond. -Still, not an enemy shot was fired. Dripping mud and water, the -green-clad figures in the van surged ashore and over the dike. The rest -of the men followed, unbelieving, close behind. - -Retaining the same tactical formation, ready to engage in any or all -directions, Company A marched into Yongdungpo. The first buildings were -100 yards ahead of the levee. Barrow channeled his advance astride the -main east-west street. Although buildings and dwellings were many, the -layout was not dense; and the Marines were able to keep their ranks -open and enjoy good all-around observation. - -The place seemed empty and dead. By noon Able Company was several -hundred yards within the town, its careful search of buildings and -side streets having failed to uncover a flicker of enemy resistance. -Barrow could tell from the din far out on either flank that he was well -ahead (eastward) of Baker Company and the 2d Battalion. He radioed for -instructions, and Hawkins told him to keep going. - -Halfway through town, Barrow noted on his map that the Inchon-Seoul -Highway was now converging on his right, so that it would meet the -company’s attack route just east of Yongdungpo. Because of the furious -clatter along the stretch of highway out of sight on the southwest -(2/1’s fight), he ordered the reserve platoon to shift from the left -side to the right. No sooner had McClelland completed the move than his -men spotted an enemy column advancing down the highway in the direction -of 2/1’s front. The Reds were chanting a spirited military air when the -3d Platoon opened up and cut the formation to ribbons. - -Simultaneously, the two lead platoons began firing on individuals and -small groups in the streets of eastern Yongdungpo. Astonished at the -sight of a large Marine force in the very heart of their bastion, most -of the North Koreans took to their heels. But there were other Reds “in -the rear with the gear” who obviously did not recognize the attackers. -After glancing curiously from distant streets, they went calmly about -their business. - -Swords’ 3d Platoon barreled through town on the left of the street and -broke into the open. A dike topped by a road lay across the Marine -front, and the platoon leader led his men into a hasty defense on -top. From this position they could cover the vast sand spit with its -airfield and approaches to Seoul. Looking north, they observed a large -body of enemy soldiers withdrawing from Baker Company’s zone onto the -spit. Light machine guns took the North Koreans under fire immediately, -and the section of heavies sent forward by Barrow joined in shortly -afterwards. Caught by surprise in the open, the Red outfit suffered -heavy casualties before the survivors could fan out and disappear. - -The rest of Company A moved up on the right of the 3d Platoon, -occupying more of the dike and the junction with the Inchon-Seoul -Highway. It was at this point that Company A--if it could hold the -ground--had an opportunity to deal the Yongdungpo garrison a mortal -blow. For the road junction turned out to be the enemy’s supply center. - -Across the intersection lay what appeared at first glance to be a huge -coal pile. Actually it was a camouflaged mountain of ammunition. During -a fire fight with a small group of North Koreans taking cover behind -the explosives, one Marine set off the dump with a grenade. The whole -countryside shook with the detonation, and the great cloud of smoke -that shot into the air marked Able Company’s isolated position for the -rest of the 1st Marines on the outskirts of town. - -While part of the unit dug in on the dike, the remainder inspected and -cleared the area around the intersection. A five-story building on the -near corner was jammed with captured U. S. Army medical supplies, field -equipment, ammunition, and enemy ordnance. The Marines could not use -the heavy caliber ammo but they did help themselves to blood plasma for -their wounded. - -Throughout the afternoon, the Reds made repeated attempts to regain -the vital area by throwing small assault parties against Able Company -from the south. Each attack was smashed, and darkness found the Marines -firmly entrenched on the dike, hoping only that their limited supply -of ammunition would last throughout the night. A weak SCR-300 battery -prevented further communications with the battalion CP. - - -_Yongdungpo Secured_ - -If the Marine Corps Schools ever enlarges its varied curriculum to -include “The Defense of a Dike,” Captain Barrow’s tactical disposition -on the night of 21–22 September 1950 can be taken as a unique -precedent. Able Company’s commander chose to defend a 100-yard stretch -of the levee just north of the intersection. Here the macadam road ran -about 25 feet above ground level, and the incline on either side sloped -gently. The Marines staggered their foxholes alongside, some high on -the slope, others low. Machine guns and BARs were emplaced along the -shoulders at the top, so that automatic fire could be directed in -volume in any direction. Since all of their ammunition had been fired -during the afternoon counterattacks, the 60mm mortar crews laid aside -their tubes and went into the line as infantry.[359] - - [359] _Ibid._ - -Company A’s perimeter for the night thus had the shape of a long -sausage, with the 3d Platoon in an arc at the northern end, the 1st -defending the west side, and the 2d in position on the east. From their -foxholes on the top and sides of the levee, the Marines commanded the -sand spit, the road on the dike, Yongdungpo’s eastern exits, and the -vital intersection with the Inchon-Seoul Highway. - -Fortunately, they had dug their holes deep. At dusk came the telltale -rattling, revving, and clanking from the direction of 2/1’s front; and -five unescorted T-34s loomed on the Inchon-Seoul Highway, headed toward -the intersection. They turned left just short of the crossroads and -proceeded in column along a street that paralleled Company A’s dike. - -The Marines on the levee crouched low in their holes. Cruising -majestically like a file of battleships, the tank column cut loose with -a hail of machine-gun fire and salvoes of 85mm shells at a range of 30 -yards. Able Company’s rocket gunners, whose total experience with the -3.5-inch launcher was limited to the firing of a few practice rounds, -popped up from their holes and let fly. One of the tanks exploded in a -convulsion of flame and smoke, its turret twisted askew as though some -giant hand had torn the steel cap from the body. - -The other four tanks continued to the end of the perimeter, then -reversed course past the Marine line a second time, pumping a steady -stream of steel into the western slope of the dike. Reaching their -starting point at the Inchon-Seoul Highway, they turned back and made -another round trip, with Marine rocket fire damaging two more vehicles -and sending them limping off the field. The remaining pair, upon -completing the second circuit, again reversed course and made a final -pass--the fifth--on the Marine lines. Clearing the perimeter, they -rumbled into town and disappeared. - -[Illustration: DIKE DEFENSE--COMPANY A, 1st MARINES - -YONGDUNG-PO--NIGHT OF 21–22 SEP] - -Fantastic as it may seem, Company A sustained a single casualty, a -concussion case, during the half hour of sustained heavy caliber -pounding at pistol ranges. Tremendous muzzle velocity had embedded -the 85mm, armor-piercing shells deep in the slope of the dike in the -split second before each explosion; and Marine foxholes proved to be -sufficient protection against the raking machine-gun fire. - -Between 1900 and 2100 it was relatively quiet. McClelland’s platoon, -facing town, killed a few Reds attempting to remove stores from the -five-story building. Then the long expected report reached Barrow by -sound-power telephone: Swords’ platoon, manning the northern arc of the -perimeter, could hear a large enemy force approaching its front. - -The counterattack hit shortly after 2100. Transmitting a running -account of the sharp fire fight by phone, Swords assured his company -commander that he was “having no trouble.” After 15 minutes of failure, -the Reds withdrew for a breather. They struck in the same place half an -hour later and were thrown back again, despite any inspiration derived -from a display of multi-colored flares and wild cries of “banzai.” - -By midnight, the 3d Platoon had withstood five such onslaughts, each -appearing to be in about company strength. Before the last attack, a -captive Red officer escaped from Company A’s POW “compound” east of -the dike and ran northward into the blackness, shouting repeatedly, -according to Barrow’s ROK interpreter, “Don’t attack any more! They’re -too strong for you!” - -Apparently his advice was heeded, much to the relief of the Marines, -whose ammunition supply was becoming dangerously low. At midnight, -following the enemy’s fifth unsuccessful attempt against Swords’ -position, the fight for Yongdungpo came to an end for the 1st Marines. -There was scattered firing throughout the night, but the North Koreans, -denied access to their vital supplies, quickly withered on the vine. - -At dawn, Company A counted 275 dead and 50 automatic weapons around its -perimeter, principally in front of the 3d Platoon. The four T-34 tanks -which had withdrawn into town were found abandoned. - -The 1st and 3d Battalions attacked at 0800 against negligible -resistance and converged on the isolated unit, making the historic -linkup in short order. The enemy was gone, except for the hundreds -of dead that littered the borders of the city. He had left behind -practically all of his heavy armament, equipment, and supplies. - -Continuing the advance on the 22d, the 1st Marines surged eastward -beyond Yongdungpo, then spent the remainder of the day reorganizing and -patrolling. On the 23d, the regiment moved almost unopposed to the bank -of the Han, 3/1 seizing Hill 108 which dominated the battered bridges. -Late that night Puller received orders to effect the river-crossing -early next morning. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -Main Line of Resistance - -_Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han--Attack Continued -by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps Attack--Climax of the Marine -Assault--The Epic of Dog Company--River Crossing of RCT-1_ - - -During the night of 21–22 September an NKPA shell crashed through the -roof of the native house serving as CP of the 5th Marines northwest -of Seoul. The explosion wounded Lieutenant Colonel Hays so severely -that the regimental executive officer required immediate evacuation. -Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who escaped with a slight cut, directed that -the CP be moved to a cave on the reverse slope of a hill. - -Thus did the enemy serve notice that henceforward the battle for the -northwest approaches to Seoul would be furiously contested. Yongdungpo -had been taken by the 1st Marines only after a grim, three-day struggle -in which the Korean Reds made their first real stand as distinguished -from delaying operations. And now it was the turn of the 5th Marines to -meet opposition such as that regiment had not encountered since D-day. - -Two new NKPA units had much to do with the sudden stiffening of -resistance. One was the 78th Independent Regiment, commanded by Colonel -Pak Han Lin. This unit, numbering about 2,000 recruits in July, was -organized into three battalions of infantry supported by medical, -motorcycle, weapons, reconnaissance, mortar and 76mm gun companies, and -an engineer platoon. - -Another recent arrival which won the respect of the Marines for rugged -fighting qualities was the 25th Brigade of 4,000 to 5,000 troops. -Commanded by Major General Wol Ki Chan, who had reportedly studied in -Russia in 1947, the unit was made up of four heavy weapons battalions -and an infantry battalion in addition to engineer, 120mm mortar, heavy -artillery, and brigade artillery battalions.[360] - - [360] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker, and Queen Queen:Baker, - app. I. - -It was literally a fight to the death for these two NKPA outfits, which -were all but wiped out of existence by the Marines of RCT-5 during the -battle for Seoul. But while they lasted, the 78th Regiment and 25th -Brigade put up a determined and at times desperate resistance in hill -country well adapted to defense. - - -_Three Hills Designated 105_ - -The grapple for the northwest approaches to Seoul began in deadly -earnest at 0700 on the morning of 22 September. From north to south, -the three assault battalions of the reinforced 5th Marines were the -3d on the left, the 1st KMC in the center, and the 1st on the right. -They were jumping off from the high ground about three miles southeast -of Haengju along a line bounded by Hill 216 on the north, 104 in the -center, and 68 on the south. - -Misunderstandings in regard to routes and unit boundaries were made -inevitable by maps disagreeing as to place names and heights of ridges. -Added to the confusion was the fact that each battalion zone had a Hill -105 as one of its final objectives. (Staff officers played safe by -designating them 105-N, 105-C, and 105-S to indicate north, central and -south.) - -Ahead of the Marines lay a hill complex which constituted a great -natural bastion of interlocking heights and fields of fire. Spurs and -defiles leading from one ridge to another enabled NKPA troops to move -up in concealment and launch counterattacks in the most unexpected -quarters. - -Casualties of the next three days were the heaviest for a comparable -period that RCT-5 had suffered in Korea. Added to previous totals, it -meant that 17 of the original 18 platoon leaders were killed or wounded -in a 50-day period, and five of the six company commanders who landed -with the Brigade.[361] - - [361] Geer, _The New Breed_, 163. - -Grim as the outlook was, the Marines of the 2d Battalion enjoyed a -sideshow on the eve of battle when Sergeant James I. Higgins and a -companion made a prize of an enemy locomotive. Knowing nothing about -operating it, they found a simple but effective solution by firing up -and opening throttles or depressing levers until the gauges were at the -halfway mark. This policy of moderation led to success. The locomotive -took off with ponderous docility, and Higgins managed to bring it to -a safe stop near the regimental CP. His exploit was not applauded, -however, by supply officers taking alarm from the dense clouds pouring -out of the smokestack. They did not relish the idea of providing enemy -artillery with a target marker, visible for miles, in an area full of -exposed Marine ammunition. As a result of their anxiety, Higgins was -promptly invited to keep rolling until he reached the rear.[362] - - [362] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54. - -The 2d Battalion remained in reserve while the 1st KMC Battalion jumped -off in the center from Hill 104. Heavy resistance was met immediately. -In fact, NKPA detachments infiltrated all the way to Hill 104 itself, -though it had been secured by 3/5 the previous afternoon. They poured -small-arms fire into KMCs already taking a pounding from mortar and -artillery fire, and the battalion was held up until the high ground to -the front could be cleared by artillery and air strikes.[363] - - [363] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -On the left, 3/5 also ran into trouble after deceptively easy progress -at first. At 0700 all three companies jumped off from Hill 216, secured -by Item Company the day before. The new objective, as directed by 5th -Marines’ Operations Order 24–50, was Hill 296. - -This height was reported by How Company as taken at 0945. It was not -realized at the time that Hill 296 was actually the bastion of the Red -Korean defense complex northwest of Seoul if its three southern spurs -were considered. Attached to the main land mass like the roots of an -ulcerated molar were Hills 56, 88, and 105-N, with 105-C, 72, and 105-S -describing an arc to the southward. Nearly all of these positions would -have to be reduced before the road could be opened to Seoul. - -Only long-range small-arms fire from Hill 338 was encountered by How -Company at the outset, but enemy pressure steadily increased from the -southern spurs of 296. An NKPA counterattack in estimated company -strength was repulsed with heavy enemy losses, including some 40 -prisoners, by Marine riflemen supported by tanks. Communist pressure -was soon renewed, however, with How Company receiving heavy small-arms, -automatic, AT, and mortar fire. - -Patrols from the other two companies, ranging to the northeast of Hill -216 in the early afternoon, met determined opposition. A reinforced -rifle platoon of Item Company encountered an NKPA force, in estimated -company strength, defending the village of Nokpon-ni. During the -ensuing fight the Marines lost two men killed and 11 wounded. Action -was broken off at dusk, when the 3d Battalion received oral orders to -defend against an enemy infiltrating from the south, southeast, and -northeast in attempts to regain lost ground. - -The fight for Hill 296 had only begun.[364] - - [364] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter. - -South of the railroad, 1/5 had about 2,000 yards to cover to its -objective, Hill 105-S. The battalion plan of maneuver called for Baker -Company to deliver fire support while Able passed through Charlie and -advanced to the base of the hill. Meanwhile, Charlie was to envelop -the objective from the right. When the three Able platoons moved into -position, they were pinned down by enemy automatic fire from the -forward slope of 105-S. First Lieutenant Joseph A. Schimmenti of 3/A -and his men had a grim reminder of American reverses earlier in the -war when they found a 50-caliber machine gun and ammunition of U. S. -manufacture which the enemy had abandoned.[365] - - [365] Capt J. A. Schimmenti interv, 4 Jan 55. - -Schimmenti was severely wounded and First Lieutenant Nathaniel F. Mann, -Jr., killed before Able Company won a foothold on the lower slopes of -105-S. It took until 1500 for Charlie Company, supported by a machine -gun section, to complete its wide swing and close in on the right of -the enemy’s positions. Baker Company passed through Able meanwhile and -attacked the forward slopes. At 1720, after an intense mortar, air, -and artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion needed only 15 minutes in -which to secure the objective. The three companies had taken losses of -12 killed and 31 wounded during the day.[366] - - [366] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan. - -Close air support was provided for RCT-5 by the MAG-33 squadrons which -had begun tactical operations at Kimpo on the 20th. Although they were -still in process of moving to the airfield from Japanese bases, VMF-212 -and VMF(N)-542 flew strikes in support of all three assault battalions. -Of the two carrier-based squadrons, VMF-323 almost doubled its usual -number of daily missions on 22 September.[367] - - [367] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig: Appendix Fox; Annex Item: - Roger, Sugar. - -[Illustration: APPROACHING THE ENEMY MLR - -5th MARINES--21 SEP] - -Just before nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed 1/5 to pull -back to Hill 68 with one company while holding Hill 105-S with the -other two. This shift was made necessary by the fact that the KMCs had -been compelled to withdraw to Hill 104, their starting point. As a -consequence, the center of the line was more than 1,000 yards in the -rear of the battalions on the right and left. The company on Hill 68 -was to provide covering fires in the morning, therefore, when the KMC -battalion would renew its attack in an effort to regain lost ground. - - -_RCT-7 North of the Han_ - -On D-plus 8 the 1st Marine Division had its third rifle regiment in -line for the first time. OpnO 9-50, issued at 1200 on 23 September, -directed the 7th Marines (less 2d Battalion) to cross the Han into a -zone of action in the rear of the 5th Marines. - -In response to verbal instructions and a fragmentary warning order the -day before, the regimental headquarters and 3d Battalion crossed late -on the morning of the 23d. Colonel Litzenberg set up his CP on the -north bank at 1710, and his men had their first contact with the enemy -the following morning. A 3d Battalion patrol ranging to the north of -the battalion zone of action encountered an estimated 200 NKPA troops, -and Marine air and artillery supported a successful attack.[368] - - [368] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Roger Roger. - -Division orders called for the relief of 2/7 on the 24th in the area -northwest of Kimpo by the 2d Battalion of the 187th Airborne RCT, USA. -The Marine unit was directed to cross the Han that afternoon, followed -by the 1st Battalion, which had completed unloading at Inchon. - -It had been decided by the Division command and staff to give the 7th -Marines time for shaking down instead of committing the newcomers -immediately to the attack on Seoul. The regiment was assigned a series -of five objectives along a ridgeline extending from the ferry crossing -at Haengju on a gentle arc to a point north of the city. Protecting -the north flank and rear of the 5th Marines was a primary mission, and -Colonel Litzenberg was also directed to prevent the escape of the enemy -to the northward.[369] - - [369] O. P. _Smith, Notes_, 251–252. - - -_Attack Continued by RCT-5_ - -On the morning of the 23d the 1st KMC Battalion was directed to attack -from Hill 104 at 0700 to straighten out the line. The 1st and 3d -Battalions of the 5th Marines were to remain in position and assist the -advance by fire. - -Heavy and immediate resistance was encountered from NKPA troops dug -in on Hill 56. Although the KMCs made a valiant effort, they were -soon stopped cold. Only slight gains resulted at an excessive cost in -casualties from artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.[370] - - [370] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -Lieutenant Colonel Roise moved his CP forward at 1300 to the western -base of Hill 104. While his 2d Battalion assembled under cover of that -height, he conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Murray after receiving -orders to pass through the KMCs and continue the attack on Hill 56. -Both officers realized the advantages of swinging around to hit the -enemy from the left after approaching along the low ground. But it was -already midafternoon and this movement could not be completed before -darkness. The only alternative was a line-buck in the center if Hill -56 was to be taken that day. And since the line had to be stabilized -and the KMCs pulled back in reserve to give the regimental defense some -depth, Murray and Roise agreed that the situation called for a frontal -assault without delay.[371] - - [371] LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 9 Nov 54. - -At this stage the Marine officers did not realize that Hill 56 was -part of the enemy’s main line of resistance. It seemed logical to them -that he would make his final stand on the next ridgeline, crowned with -Hills 105-C and 105-N. As for the repulses suffered by the KMCs, it was -a logical assumption that their inexperience had been a contributing -factor. In view of these circumstances, a brief artillery preparation -and the support of a platoon of tanks seemed sufficient when Companies -D and F attacked and E contributed fires from the eastern slopes of -Hill 104.[372] - - [372] _Ibid._ - -Captain Peters’ Fox Company was to lead off on the right, south of the -railroad, and seize the portion of the objective below the railroad -tunnel. From this high ground, his men could then support First -Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Dog Company, moving forward under cover of a -sunken road, to assault Hill 56 north of the tunnel. About 1,000 yards -of rice paddies had to be crossed at the outset, and the expected -support of the tanks in this low ground failed to materialize. The -leading M-26 bogged down in a wide ditch which prevented the advance of -the other four. One of them remained in the paddies to give supporting -fires while three took a new route along the railroad tracks. Fox -Company received increasingly heavy casualties meanwhile on the way -across the low ground. - -Peters ordered Second Lieutenant S. E. Sansing’s mortar section -forward, but the officer reported afterwards that his radio did not -pick up the message. This left the three assault platoons without 60mm -support as they climbed the lower slopes of Hill 56 and became heavily -engaged with NKPA troops just below the railway tunnel.[373] - - [373] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54. - -Apparently the Reds so overrated the weight of Company F’s assault that -they lost the topographical peak of Hill 56 by default. Whether their -timely withdrawal from Dog Company’s initial objective was meant to -be permanent is not known, for they might have been caught flatfooted -while shifting troops against Fox. Nevertheless, Company D emerged from -the sunken road in a column of platoons and moved onto the high ground -in its zone against negligible opposition. - -Lieutenant Heck’s 1st Platoon, according to plan, then pivoted leftward -to spearhead the attack on the final objective, Smith’s Ridge--named -by the men after their company commander. Halfway into the connecting -saddle, the Marines were caught in the open by a heavy burst of fire -from a large knoll on the southern tip of the wooded ridge. Heck fell -mortally wounded, and his senior NCO, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson, -went down with a shattered leg. In the space of a few minutes, more -than half of the exposed platoon became casualties.[374] - - [374] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv, - 7 Jan 55. - -Startled by the intensity of enemy reaction from this unexpected -quarter, Smith personally retrieved the battered 1st Platoon, while -the 2d and 3d were clearing the northeastern slopes of Hill 56. Then, -owing to the lateness of the hour, he deployed Company D defensively on -that high ground for the night. There was no contact with Fox Company -or any other friendly unit. This fact, coupled with the evidence of -strong enemy positions on Smith’s Ridge, led the company commander to -reconsider carefully his plans for the postponed attack.[375] - - [375] _Ibid._ - -Fox Company had meanwhile been heavily engaged along the eastern -slopes of Hill 56 in the vicinity of the railway tunnel. Peters -ordered Lieutenant Anderson to lead his 2d Platoon against the strong -NKPA positions just beyond the tunnel. Only 27 men were left to fight -it out at close quarters with an entrenched enemy estimated by the -platoon leader at company strength. The Communist force was wiped out -in exchanges of small-arms fire and grenades at murderous ranges, but -the effort took a frightful toll of the 1st Platoon in KIA and WIA -casualties. Only seven able-bodied men were left when Peters ordered a -withdrawal to the company position south of the tunnel.[376] - - [376] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54. - -All of Anderson’s wounded and most of his dead were brought back, and -he combined his remnants with the survivors of Lieutenant Nolan’s 2d -Platoon. A gap of about 50 yards separated their position from First -Lieutenant Albert F. Belbusti’s isolated 3d Platoon as Fox Company dug -in for the night.[377] - - [377] _Ibid._ - -No fault could be found with the over-all plan of attack, providing as -it did for each assault company to seize ground from which it could -support the advance of the other. But as darkness approached, it became -evident that the 2d Battalion had bargained for more North Korean real -estate than it could handle. The two isolated companies had no choice -but to cling desperately to their scorched holdings while organizing to -meet an expected NKPA counterattack. - -Although the other two battalions of the 5th Marines had defensive -missions on 23 September, enemy threats and encroachments kept them -occupied. On Hill 296, in the zone of 3/5, Weapons Company took a -good deal of satisfaction in firing a captured NKPA howitzer to break -up hostile troop concentrations in the vicinity of Nokpon-ni. How -Company remained in contact with the enemy all day, supported by -50-caliber and 90mm fires from Marine tanks.[378] - - [378] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter. - -[Illustration: SMASHING THE MLR - -5th MARINES--22–24 SEP] - -It was in the How Company zone that Taplett’s men first made the -acquaintance of “Fireproof Phil.” This was the name applied to a -gigantic NKPA officer, towering head and shoulders over his troops, who -exposed himself with contempt for Marine bullets. Not only his burly -build but his light complexion gave some of the Marines the conviction -that he was Russian. At any rate, Fireproof Phil was both fearless and -lucky. Machine gun bullets and mortar rounds seemed to bounce off his -frame. Finally, the tanks paid the honor of making him the special -target of 90mm ammunition, and still Fireproof Phil always had the -benefit of a minor miracle at the last moment.[379] - - [379] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 19 Apr 55. - -Combat leadership by enemy officers and NCOs was outstanding in the -operations north of Seoul. On Hill 105-S the 1st Battalion came under -pressure all day on 23 September. Movement was impossible for the -men of Baker and Charlie Companies, and supplies of water, food, and -ammunition had to wait for darkness. Enemy smoke pots created a haze -restricting air activities, but it did not prevent a timely strike -flown by Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid and five planes of VMF-214 to -break up a threatened enemy counterattack on Hill 105-S. This was one -of six close support missions completed on the 23d by that squadron in -the zone of RCT-5.[380] - - [380] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan; 1st MAW _SAR_, - Annex Jig:Easy. - -Why the enemy did not launch a counterattack that night against the -hard-hit assault companies of the 2d Battalion is one of the mysteries -of the war. But the weary Marines on the slope of Hill 56 attributed -their respite to effective and unremitting artillery support. All -night long the howitzers of the 11th Marines lit up the night sky like -heat lightning in the rear and crashed like thunder in front as they -scourged the NKPA positions. - - -_Modified Plan of Corps Attack_ - -Up to this time the Corps plan of attack had called for the 1st -Marines to clear the south bank of the Han and cross in the vicinity -of Yongdungpo to join the 5th Marines in an assault on Seoul from the -west and southwest. In view of the location of the boundary between the -1st Marines and the 7th Infantry Division, this meant that the Army -troops would not participate in the attack on the city. - -General Almond had already made it plain in conversations with General -Smith that it was highly desirable to take Seoul by 25 September as GHQ -wished to announce the liberation just three months to the day after -the NKPA invasion. - -The subject came up again during a conference at Corps Headquarters -on 23 September. Almond proposed that Smith send RCT-1 around to -attack Seoul from the southeast while RCT-5 continued its assault from -the northwest. This plan struck the Corps commander as promising to -maneuver the enemy out of the city sooner than the attack as formerly -conceived. - -Smith replied that the NKPA forces defending Seoul had proved to be -much stronger than had been expected. He said he was convinced that -the enemy would put up a fight from street to street regardless of any -flanking maneuvers. The Marine general added that the fierce opposition -met by RCT-5 had demonstrated that the western approaches to Seoul were -too much for one regiment to handle, and he urged that no change be -made in the original plan of crossing RCT-1 northwest of Yongdungpo to -aid the attack. This plan, Smith asserted, would offer the advantage -of keeping the 1st Marine Division together; for when the 1st and 5th -Marines had penetrated well into the city, the 7th Marines could be -brought around from the northwest to deliver the _coup de grace_.[381] - - [381] This section has been derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, - sec. 1; O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 252–253, 262–265, and - _Chronicle_, 23–24 Sep 50. - -Differences between commanders are not remarkable, and it is noteworthy -that Corps and Division usually managed in the Inchon-Seoul operation -to reach an acceptable solution. Such was the case when General Almond -reconsidered on the 23d and agreed to allow the 1st Marines to cross -northwest of Yongdungpo, as originally planned, and take part in a -two-regiment attack on Seoul from the west and southwest. In place of -the 1st Marines, the 32d Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division was to -cross the Han and enter Seoul from the southeast. Amphibian tractors -for the operation would be furnished by the 1st Marine Division. - -Revised 1st Marine Division plans called for RCT-1 to take position -on the right flank of RCT-5 after the crossing, then pivot to the -northeast and continue the attack through the heart of the city. RCT-7 -(less one battalion in Division reserve) would have the mission of -advancing across the northern approaches to protect the left flank and -prevent the enemy from escaping while RCT-5 sliced through the western -edge of the built-up area. Thus the burden of capturing Seoul fell -chiefly upon Colonel Puller’s regiment. - - -_Climax of the Marine Assault_ - -As the eastern sky turned gray on the Saturday morning of 24 September, -the men on the firing line northwest of Seoul knew that the time had -come. They knew with the instinct of battle-wise troops that supporting -arms had done all they could. Now it was up to the infantry to come to -grips with the enemy. Supporting arms could only sue for victory and it -was up to the infantry to collect. - -The two companies of 2/5 were still clinging by their eyelashes to -the scarred slopes of Hill 56. All three of the Company F platoon -leaders, Nolan, Anderson, and Belbusti were carrying on in spite of -wounds. Corporal Welden D. Harris, who had killed three Red Koreans in -hand-to-hand combat the day before, refused to be evacuated after a -second wound.[382] - - [382] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54. - -The survivors of Captain Peters’ outfit could not say too much in -praise of the support given continuously throughout the night by -Captain Arnold C. Hofstetter’s Baker Battery of the 11th Marines. There -were indications that several incipient NKPA counterattacks had been -broken up during the night by the bombardment. - -In the Dog Company zone the night had been relatively uneventful except -for sniping, though the enemy could be heard digging new positions and -bringing up ammunition. - -The regimental scheme of maneuver, as outlined in OpnO 26-50, called -for the 2d Battalion to continue the attack, with Hill 105-N as a final -objective. This meant going up against practically the entire Hill 296 -defense system, since Smith’s Ridge and all of Hill 88 also remained -to be seized. An estimated 2,500 enemy troops, well supported by -automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery were defending every foot of -defensible ground in front of the two thinned companies of 2/5. - -It was intended that 3/5 should assist by attacking down the principal -eastern spur of 296 to outflank the enemy and contribute supporting -fires. Taplett’s men were to be relieved in gradual stages on Hills -216 and 296 by elements of the 1st Battalion. As a preliminary, Newton -was to send out a patrol to secure a portion of the river bank on the -right flank of Hill 105-S in preparation for the crossing of the Han -by the 1st Marines that morning. The reserve company of 1/5 would then -commence the relief of the 3d Battalion while the 1st Battalion of -the KMC Regiment remained in an assembly area in the rear of the 5th -Marines and elements of the 7th Marines protected the left flank. Units -of 1/5 were to continue to defend 105-S--seized and held at a total -cost of 27 KIA and 72 WIA--until the crossing of the 1st Marines and -the relief of 3/5 had been completed.[383] - - [383] 1st MarDiv OpnO 10-50, 24 Sep 50. - -Two small enemy counterattacks were repulsed without much trouble by -elements of 3/5 on Hill 296 before dawn. Company H remained in contact -with the enemy on the eastern slopes until 1550, when Company G moved -around the right flank and a coordinated attack was launched against -moderate NKPA artillery, mortar, and AT fires. Relief of Item Company -and other 3/5 troops remaining on Hill 216 was completed by the 1st -Battalion at 2000. Casualties of the 3d Battalion for the day were five -killed and 33 wounded.[384] - - [384] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter. - -The movements of these two battalions were subsidiary to the main -attack launched by 2/5 on 24 September. H-hour at 0630 was preceded -by a 20-minute artillery preparation and an air strike by VMF-323 -planes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise planned to bring up Easy Company from -reserve on Hill 104 and push it forward between Dog and Fox while those -companies completed the seizure of Hill 56 and cleared the heavily -wooded spur to the north known as Smith’s Ridge, linking up with the -main land mass of Hill 296. Easy Company would then take the lead in a -battalion attack aimed at Hills 88 and 105-N as the final objectives. - -Fox Company jumped off on the eastern slope of Hill 56. Nolan having -been evacuated, Anderson led what was left of the 2d and 3d Platoons--a -total of some 20 riflemen. Belbusti commanded about the same number in -the combined assault on the heavily defended finger of high ground -east of the tunnel. Counting machine gunners, mortarmen, and troops -bringing up ammunition, Fox Company had been reduced to fewer than 90 -effectives, including wounded men refusing evacuation. - -Corsairs of VMF-323 swooped down to drop 500-pound bombs less than -a hundred yards in front of the attackers. Thanks to such close air -support, Fox Company soon seized high ground which enabled the men to -gain fire superiority.[385] At this point they took cover to make use -of their advantage in an exchange of small-arms and automatic fire. - - [385] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex - Queen Queen:Oboe. - -Dog Company, with two platoons still almost at full strength, had at -least a dozen walking wounded who elected to keep on fighting. Ground -mist and smoke from burning huts made for low visibility when the men -jumped off in a column of platoons. The enemy opened up from Smith’s -Ridge as the Marines came within close range, pinning them down for two -hours by concentrated and accurate artillery, mortar, AT, and automatic -fire. One of the Marine tanks moving up the road in support was -disabled by a mine and another became inoperative after a direct hit by -an NKPA mortar shell on the motor hatch.[386] - - [386] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex - Queen Queen. - - -_The Epic of Dog Company_ - -The large knob across the sunken road from Hill 56 remained to be -taken before Dog Company completed its mission by advancing northward -to clear the enemy from the wooded spine of Smith’s Ridge. After -the attack stalled with heavy casualties Lieutenant H. J. Smith -ordered every available man into line, including personnel of company -headquarters. Two Marine machine guns were kept in action at a cost -of repeated casualties as First Lieutenant Karle Seydel made five -consecutive trips under fire to bring up ammunition. - -At some points the opposing forces were within long grenade-throwing -distance. In these exchanges the Marines had a pronounced advantage -because of stronger arms and the control developed by baseball. - -Both sides attempted without success to break the deadlock by sending -out detachments for flanking movements. Sergeant Robert Smith of -McNaughton’s platoon led a squad in a wide end sweep to the north, only -to meet such fierce NKPA opposition that Smith and eight of his men -were killed, including a corpsman. Only three wounded Marines ever got -back.[387] - - [387] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55. - -At 1000 the company commander sent the first of three messages to -inform the battalion CP of his situation and request reinforcements. -Roise could only reply that Easy Company, his reserve unit, was -irrevocably committed to the attack on the final objectives. During -the course of the battle the battalion commander himself was wounded -by a mortar fragment but returned to the CP after having his arm -dressed.[388] - - [388] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe. - -When Second Lieutenant George Grimes’ 60mm mortar section ran out of -ammunition, the survivors fought as riflemen. Two platoon leaders, -McNaughton and Lieutenant Howard, were wounded but continued in action. - -About 1030, as the smoke and mist cleared, the howitzers of the 11th -Marines and the 81mm mortars of 2/5 poured it into the enemy positions -along the wooded ridge. The men on the firing line had another welcome -assist when four Corsairs of VMF-323 roared in to make passes with -bombs, rockets, and napalm. - -Lieutenant Smith had 44 effectives left as he alerted his men for the -assault. McNaughton, Seydel, Grimes, and First Lieutenant Karl Wirth -were the other officers still on their feet. Platoons, sections, and -squads had ceased to exist as units when the 44 men of Dog Company -moved out of their foxholes and swarmed over the high ground that had -held them up for more than two hours. - -First impressions under more normal circumstances would have been -shocking, for the position held more enemy dead and dying than the -Marines had ever seen before in Korea. The entire area was honeycombed -with foxholes, trenches, and bunkers, which had become the graves of -Red Koreans cut down by Marine air and artillery. There they had died -at their posts, crowded together so closely that every shell, bomb, or -rocket had caused frightful carnage. The dead outnumbered the living, -in fact, for the men of Dog Company met unexpectedly weak resistance -from the few NKPA effectives who trusted to their weapons instead of -their feet.[389] - - [389] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55. - -Lieutenant Smith paused to regroup in a skirmish line for the final -attack to clear the remainder of the ridge. Again the Marines seemed -to prevail by sheer moral ascendancy as the assault went forward by -leaps and bounds. But the victory was bought at the cost of the company -commander’s life, for Smith was killed at the head of his men. - -Only five additional casualties were taken in this phase, but Marines -dropped from exhaustion until McNaughton, as acting commander, had just -26 able-bodied men left at the finish. They were greeted by the strange -spectacle of three enemy officers exhorting about 150 Red Koreans to -retreat. No second invitation was needed, and the Marines had a “turkey -shoot” at the expense of foemen scurrying down the eastern and northern -slopes in the direction of Seoul.[390] - - [390] _Ibid._ - -Seydel was the only officer left unwounded when Dog Company notified -the Battalion CP at 1300 that objectives had been secured. Fox Company -reported about two hours later that it also had seized all assigned -ground and was digging in after a mopping-up period.[391] - - [391] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe. - -Casualties had not been heavy on the east side of the ridge as compared -to the day before. The Company F attack consisted of two prolonged fire -fights in which the Marines seized better positions and made good use -of their advantage. After reaching the objective, they took cover and -proceeded systematically to cut the enemy down to size with the support -of VMF-214 planes. Captain Peters then sent both platoons forward to -eliminate an NKPA force firing on them from a distance. Anderson’s men -passed through a small built-up area and took cover behind a stone wall -on the enemy’s flank. Opening fire on Communists about 300 yards away -in an open field, they made short work of the opposition.[392] - - [392] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54. - -Second Lieutenant Wiley J. Grigsby, the machine gun platoon leader, -was killed in the day’s final Fox Company attack. Anderson’s composite -platoon had three men killed and three wounded. Among the casualties -was Corporal Harris, who received a mortal wound after twice refusing -evacuation. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.[393] - - [393] _Ibid._ - -The attack of Easy Company on Hill 105-N was delayed until after the -other two companies took their objectives. At 1500, after moving up -from battalion reserve, Jaskilka’s men ran into heavy enemy mortar -and automatic fire soon after passing Hill 56. Two tanks of the 1st -Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion were knocked out, one by an AT -mine and the other by a direct hit of a mortar shell. The remaining -three tanks could not have continued in action except for the efforts -of Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPherson of Company A, 1st Engineer -Battalion, who went ahead and cleared a path through the enemy mine -field. By some miracle he survived the hail of NKPA fire unhurt, and -the tanks went on to destroy two enemy AT guns and several machine gun -emplacements. - -The main enemy stronghold appeared to be Hill 72, a conical height -located between Hills 105-N and 105-C and enfilading both of them. Not -enough daylight remained on 24 September to mount an assault on this -position, and the effort was put off until the following morning.[394] - - [394] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe; Deptula - interv, 18 Jan 55. - -Marine air had a busy day. Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid’s VMF-214, -repeating the pattern of the day before, launched strikes of five -aircraft every two hours in support of 2/5 attacks northwest of -Seoul--a total of six missions. Not only was the city a flak-trap, but -Marine pilots were flying Corsairs from which the armor around the -air-cooler system had been removed by order of BuAer as a peacetime -economy measure and never restored. As a consequence, NKPA small-arms -fire was likely to hit the oil lines and send a machine down in -flames.[395] - - [395] Cushman interv, 26 Jul 54. - -A 1st MAW record for combat sorties flown in a day by a single squadron -was set on the 24th by VMF-212 with 12 flights and 46 sorties. Close -support missions were about equally represented along with search and -attack.[396] - - [396] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Roger. - -Nightfall of this eventful day found 2/5 in possession of ground -containing the most enemy dead in a small area ever seen in the -Inchon-Seoul operation. Lieutenant Colonel Roise estimated that 1,500 -NKPA bodies were left on Hill 56 and Smith’s Ridge, and the command of -the 1st Marine Division put the figure at 1,750 enemy killed in the -Hill 296 defenses.[397] - - [397] Roise interv, 9 Nov 54; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286. - -Survivors of Dog Company agreed that in spite of such frightful losses, -the Red Koreans had enough able-bodied men left at the finish to make -mincemeat of the 26 attackers who took Smith’s Ridge. But this Marine -effort seemed to break the heart of enemy resistance in the Hill 296 -defense complex, thus giving fresh proof of Napoleon’s famous dictum, -“The moral is to the material in war as three to one.” - - -_River Crossing of RCT-1_ - -The battle for Seoul entered its final stage on the 24th with the -river crossing of the 1st Marines. At first light a site about 2,000 -yards southwest of Hill 105-S was cleared by Charlie Company of the -1st Engineer Battalion. Extensive mine-clearing operations at the -crossing site area caused delays, and it was 0800 when reconnaissance -and assault elements of 2/1 embarked in the LVTs of Company A, 1st -Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Sutter’s troops completed their crossing -at 0945 against scattered and ineffectual fire, and made contact -that afternoon on the north bank with elements of Company C, 5th -Marines.[398] - - [398] 2/1 _SAR_; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 268. - -For lack of a ferry, the 1st Marines had no tank support at the -crossing site. Plans had been made to send Baker Company, 1st Tank -Battalion, around by the Haengju ferry to join the infantry north of -the river. As it worked out, however, the armor was delayed by a fight -on the north bank which will be discussed in the next chapter. - -Hill 79, about 4,000 yards from the crossing site, had been assigned -to the 1st Marines by Division OpnO 10-50 as an objective. The 2d -Battalion began a rapid advance toward this point after moving into -position on the north bank abreast of the 5th Marines on a 1,500-yard -front. - -The 1st Battalion and Regimental Headquarters were next to cross. -Puller ordered Hawkins and his men to drive eastward along the river -and pass through the 2d Battalion. Since that unit was rapidly -advancing at the time, one of the 1/1 staff officers looked dubious. - -“You’ll just have to advance a little faster,” explained the veteran -regimental commander.[399] - - [399] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54. - -This proved to be a practical even if not exactly a school solution. -On the march the 1st Battalion had the same experience as the 2d when -small-arms and automatic fire came from Hill 105-S, supposedly secured -by 1/5. Again the enemy was demonstrating his ability to hide out -behind the Marine lines and make the most of his nuisance value. The -2d Battalion had two men killed and nine wounded by harassing fires, -and the 1st suffered four casualties while passing through at 1300 to -continue the attack. - -Effective Marine artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the -advance. After drawing out of range of Hill 105-S, Hawkins and his men -encountered long-range small-arms fire, and roads into the city were -mined. Hill 79 was located in the southwest section of Seoul itself, -commanding a good view of the railroad marshaling yards and industrial -area. After seizing the objective at 1500, the men celebrated by -raising an American flag, thus precipitating a friendly race with the -5th Marines in exuberant ceremonies of this sort. - -At 1515 the 3d Battalion was relieved by the Division of its mission of -defending Hill 108, south of the wrecked Han bridges, and reverted to -regimental control for a river crossing completed at 2000. On the north -bank Ridge’s outfit was thought to have pulled the last fangs of enemy -resistance on Hill 105-S after his men in their turn came under fire -from hidden opponents. Since this height dominated the new regimental -CP, Company I was given the mission of outposting the height. A small -but lively fire fight took place at dusk, and the Marines bagged ten -prisoners at a cost of one man killed and two wounded.[400] - - [400] 3/1 _SAR_. - -The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area near the crossing site for -the night. Hawkins set up a perimeter defense on the objective, and the -2d Battalion occupied positions about 2,000 yards in the rear. A few -probing attacks were received from enemy patrols on Hill 79, but Marine -artillery and 4.2-inch mortars made short work of these attempts. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -Seoul as a Battlefield - -_Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25 September--Night -Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of -Dog Company, RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the Heart of -Seoul--Objective Secured_ - - -On the morning of 25 September 1950, with RCT-1 across the river, the -1st Marine Division was in a position for the first time since D-day to -launch an attack of all three regiments abreast. - -This was but one of the portents indicating that the days of the North -Korean People’s Army were numbered. Exactly three months had passed -since the invasion of the Republic of Korea, and now the forces of the -Communist puppet state were reeling under blows from two directions. -While X Corps pounded inland to seize the NKPA main communications hub, -the Eighth Army had smashed through the Pusan Perimeter and was driving -northward to place the enemy between two fires. - -The big break in South Korea came on 23 September. Up to that time, -the NKPA 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions had put up a stubborn -resistance on the northern front of the Pusan Perimeter against six ROK -divisions. Then the enemy crumpled and the ROKs began an advance (see -map in end papers) that would take them 70 miles during the ensuing -week.[401] - - [401] Almond, _UN MilOps_, 13. - -It was much the same story along the Kumchon-Taejon axis of the central -front. There the U. S. I Corps, comprising the U. S. 24th Infantry -and 1st Cavalry Divisions, the 1st ROK Division, and the British 27th -Brigade, drove a deep salient into the line of the 1st, 3d, 13th, -10th, and 2d NKPA Divisions. UN gains of 35 miles were made from the -22d to the 25th. - -In the south the U. S. 2d and 25th Divisions had hurled the NKPA 6th, -4th, 9th, and 7th Divisions back from the vicinity of Masan to the -Chinju area. This gain of about 15 miles from 21 to 23 September was -only a prelude as the two U. S. divisions pressed their advantage -against a retreating enemy.[402] - - [402] _Ibid._ - -The ultimate purpose of the joint Eighth Army and X Corps offensive -must already have been made alarmingly apparent to NKPA generals. Not -only was the Eighth Army salient along the Kumchon-Taejon axis being -extended northwest, but a X Corps regiment was driving southeast toward -a junction. This was the 31st Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division, -which had been given the mission of following in the trace of the 32d, -then wheeling southward toward the Suwon area to meet the elements of -the 1st Cavalry Division spearheading the Eighth Army advance. Thus was -the drawstring being rapidly pulled on the remnants of the invading -NKPA army, soon to have its main routes of escape cut off by UN forces. - - -_Two More River Crossings_ - -After nearly a week of commanding a division in combat on both sides -of an unbridged tidal river, Generals Smith and Craig now had a -consolidated front north of the Han, with RCT-1 on the right, RCT-5 in -the center, and RCT-7 on the left. The 11th Marines was in position -on the south bank. The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions lined up northwest -of Yongdungpo, while the 2d Battalion and the U. S. Army 96th Field -Artillery emplaced to the east of that shattered suburb.[403] - - [403] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37. - -Two more river crossings took place on 25 September. First, the 32d -Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division moved to the north bank in -accordance with the revised Corps plan. The Marine 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion (less Company B) and the Army’s Company A, 56th -Amphibian Tractor Battalion had to make a 25-mile round trip that night -to bring the troops to an embarkation point about 5,000 yards east -of the railroad bridge at Yongdungpo. Scattered enemy small-arms and -artillery fire was received during the crossing, resulting in a few -casualties among crews and soldiers. The LVTs took the troops about 200 -yards inland, where they advanced on foot to their objectives on South -Mountain without encountering any opposition other than long-range -harassing fires.[404] - - [404] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37; Irick interv, 16 Nov - 54. - -Later that same day the 17th ROK Regiment, under the control of the 7th -Infantry Division, crossed in the LVTs. It was hoped by United Nations -leaders that this unit, known as the Seoul Regiment, could take part in -the liberation of the ROK capital. Apparently the second river crossing -of the day alarmed the enemy, for it drew mortar and artillery fire in -greater volume and accuracy than had been encountered before. - -The support given to the two crossings by the 1st Amphibian Tractor -Battalion was commended by General Barr in a letter to General Smith. -“Despite long hours, loss of sleep, maintenance difficulties, and -exposure to fire,” said the commanding general of the 7th Infantry -Division, “the personnel of your battalion performed so magnificently -that I have nothing but praise to offer. If at any time in the future -elements of this Division are called upon to cross a river, it is my -sincere wish that they may be supported by the 1st Amphibian Tractor -Battalion.”[405] - - [405] MajGen D. G. Barr (USA) ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 5 - Oct 50. - -From South Mountain the troops of the 32d Infantry looked down upon the -city. They could not enter as yet because of the danger of interfering -with the fires of the 1st and 5th Marines. But the 32d and the ROK unit -were assigned a zone of action by Corps for an advance on the right of -the Marines when the time came for a concerted effort. - - -_Division Attack of 25 September_ - -At 0700 on the 25th the 1st Marine Division launched the final phase of -its attack on Seoul. The following objectives were assigned by Division -OpnO 11-50: - -RCT-1, with the 2d KMC Battalion attached, was to seize the part of -Seoul within its zone of action and Objective ABLE, consisting of the -high ground beyond the northeastern outskirts and about six miles from -the jump-off positions. The zone of action, ranging from a mile to -a mile and a half wide, carried the attack through the heart of the -city, with South Mountain on the right and Ducksoo Palace on the left. -Mopping-up operations were assigned to the KMCs, who would revert to -their own regimental control afterwards. - -RCT-5, with the Division Reconnaissance Company and 1st KMC Battalion -attached, was to seize that part of Seoul within its zone of action -and Objective BAKER, comprising the high ground overlooking the -Seoul-Uijongbu road six miles from the line of departure. About a mile -and a half wide, this zone included the northwest section of the city -and the Government Palace, though the regiment would be operating in -open country after an advance of about two miles. The KMCs were to be -used for mopping up after RCT-5. - -RCT-7 had the mission of protecting the left flank of the Division and -seizing Objective CHARLIE--the high ground astride the Seoul-Kaesong -road about six miles northwest of the center of Seoul in the vicinity -of Chonsong-ni. - -The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 2d Battalions) was designated the -division reserve. It was to be prepared to resume control of detached -battalions and occupy Seoul. - -The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, with Special Operations Company -attached, was to continue under operational control of the 1st Marine -Division and protect the Corps left flank west and south of the river -Han.[406] - - [406] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 133–135. - -Following the artillery and air preparation, 3/5 and 2/5 jumped off -abreast from left to right in an attack on the remaining defenses of -the Hill 296 complex. Roise’s objective was Hill 105-N. He was to -be supported by fires from Taplett’s men, attacking down the slopes -of Hill 296 in an advance that would eventually pinch out the 2d -Battalion, which would go into reserve. The 1st Battalion had completed -its relief of 3d Battalion elements on Hills 216 and 296, thus placing -it in position to move up on the left of the 3d.[407] - - [407] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -During the air strikes, VMF-214 had its second pilot fatality in two -days when Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid was shot down in flames over the -western edge of the city. His death brought to light a curious train -of circumstances. It was recalled that the squadron had lost its first -pilot on D-plus 2 when enemy fire killed Captain Simpson in plane No. -17. Two days later, while inspecting the new No. 17 on the flight deck -of the _Sicily_, Technical Sergeant George C. Underwood received a -mortal wound from an accidental discharge of the guns. Major Robert -Floeck was flying this Corsair when he met his death on 23 September, -but the machine was saved. And it was in plane No. 17 that the squadron -commander crashed on the 25th. This was enough for Captain John H. -Thach of the _Sicily_, and he issued an order banning the number -forever on the carrier.[408] - - [408] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig:Easy; Karig, _Korea_, 259. - -Within two hours of Lischeid’s death, two other squadron commanders -were shot down, Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski of VMF-212 and Lieutenant -Colonel Volcansek of VMF(N)-542. Both escaped with moderate injuries, -but in the space of a few minutes Volcansek had pressed his luck within -a hair’s breadth of the point of no return. Wounded, his plane badly -damaged by enemy fire from Seoul, the squadron commander stubbornly led -his flight in two more passes on Red positions. Approaching Kimpo, he -was forced to keep the battered F7F-3N at almost 200 knots--twice the -landing speed--to prevent its stalling. - -There was no alternative but to bail out. When he jettisoned the -canopy, his altimeter needle wavered around the 1,000-foot mark. -Slipstreams from the twin engines pinned him to the cockpit as the -plane continued losing altitude. In desperation he kicked violently at -the stick with both feet. The aircraft lurched downward and Volcansek -was thrown clear, the big tail of the machine missing him by inches -as both plummeted earthward. A few seconds after the officer’s chute -opened and broke the fall, his feet touched earth a few miles northwest -of Kimpo. Within 45 minutes he was aboard a helicopter rattling back to -the airfield.[409] - - [409] _Ibid._, Annex Item:Sugar; Col M. I. Volcansek, Jr. - interv, 15 Mar 55. - -It was the last day for the Sicily and VMF-214 in the Inchon-Seoul -operation. That evening the CVE left the area for maintenance work, and -the _Badoeng Strait_ took over with VMF-323. - -Easy Company led the attack of 2/5 on the 25th, with Dog on the left -and Fox in reserve. The advance was supported by a platoon of tanks as -well as fires from 3/5 on Hill 296. An effective artillery preparation -aided the advance, but Captain Jaskilka’s men were enfiladed by enemy -mortar and automatic fire from Hill 72. Lieutenant Deptula’s platoon -led the assault and seized this position by 1335 after suffering -heavily along the way. Lieutenant Seydel commanded the remnants of -Dog Company which jumped off from Smith’s Ridge and took Hill 88 at -1320.[410] - - [410] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe. - -While Fox Company moved up to occupy Hill 72, an airstrike was called -on Hill 105-N at 1310, and the artillery bombardment began 15 minutes -later in preparation for the final assault by Easy Company. Second -Lieutenants James W. Epley and Samuel L. Eddy, Jr., led the advance -with their platoons, and Hill 105-N was reported as secured at 1545. - -The 2d Battalion, with the exception of Deptula’s platoon had met -moderate opposition as compared with the last two days. It was in the -zone of the 3d that the enemy put up his most stubborn resistance on -25 September. George and How Companies, the latter on the exposed -left flank, led the attack on the remaining NKPA positions along the -two southeastern spurs of Hill 296. Initial progress was slow, the -attackers being harassed by long range fires from Hill 338 on the -left and 105-N on the right. Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed the -battalion to hold up until the situation around 105-N clarified. -Resuming the attack against mounting resistance on the left, at 1435, -the two companies reached their objectives two hours later and made -contact with 2/5 on the right.[411] - - [411] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter. - -Since 105-N capped the terminus of the lower of 3/5’s two spurs, the -whole length of the 1,000-yard projection was tagged with that number. -This fact accounts for both Roise and Taplett reporting that they -were in possession of the height. Actually, 2/5 was on 105-N, and -George Company of 3/5 held an unnumbered peak to the north on the same -ridge.[412] - - [412] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and LtCol H. S. - Roise interv, 11 May 55. - -Company H, in moving down the huge spur on the open left flank, had -taken heavy casualties before reaching its objective, an intermediate -peak. Just as Item Company was passing through to continue the attack -at about 1700, the Marines were hit hard by a force of 200 Reds, who -advanced under cover of accurate supporting fire. The close-in fire -fight raged until after nightfall, and both depleted companies were -hard-pressed to hold their own. Weakened by the loss of 100 dead, the -enemy finally withdrew, thereby allowing Item Company to take over the -front line while How reverted to battalion reserve.[413] - - [413] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Taplett interv, 11 - May 55; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 25 Aug 54. - -Thus, the 3d Battalion was now in position to pinch out the 2d on the -morrow and to trace Item Company’s spur into the very heart of Seoul. -In preparation for the assault of Hill 338, Newton’s 1st Battalion had -shifted to the regimental left, where, with the Division Recon Company -and the 1st KMC Battalion, it blocked the precipitous approaches to 216 -and 296. - -In the zone of the 7th Marines, the 2d Battalion had jumped off at 0630 -and occupied Objective CHARLIE at 1215 without meeting resistance. -Patrols of the 1st Battalion devoted the day to reconnoitering the -area between RCT-7 and RCT-5, maintaining contact with both. The 3d -Battalion was employed defensively along roads and trails in an arc -around the ferry crossing site at Haengju.[414] - - [414] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286–287. - - -_Tank Victory on Hill 105-S_ - -In preparation for the attack of the 1st Marines, the 3d Battalion -moved forward before daybreak in a column of companies. Passing -eastward through the 2d Battalion, Ridge’s men began a sharp wheel to -the north. The 1st Battalion, on Hill 79, withdrew slightly, pivoting -on its left flank in order to reorient its direction of attack and tie -in with the 3d Battalion on the left. - -Thus did RCT-1 carry out the Corps plan of maneuver on the morning of -the 25th by making a 90-degree change of direction, after advancing -eastward to Hill 79, and driving straight northward toward the heart -of Seoul. It was necessary to jump off without tank support, however, -since the assigned armor had been delayed by a fight on the way. - -The 2d and 3d Platoons of Captain Bruce F. Williams’ Baker Company, 1st -Tank Battalion, had crossed the river at the Haengju ferry on the 24th. -Reports of enemy mines along the railroad leading into Seoul caused -Lieutenant Babe’s 2d Platoon of Company C Engineers to be attached to -the tanks. And since the column was to pass through the zone of the 2d -Battalion, 5th Marines, a depleted infantry platoon of Company F was -attached under the command of Staff Sergeant Arthur Farrington. - -Owing to the shift of 1/5, a gap existed at this time between the zones -of the 1st and 5th Marines; and the little task force entered this area -with the infantry at the point and the engineers sandwiched between the -tanks--a total of some 50 men supporting the armor. About half of the -gap between the regiments had been safely traversed when the head of -the column received a few scattered shots from the slope of Hill 105-S. - -After being supposedly secured by 1/5, with a final mopping up by 3/1, -this troublesome position now erupted into enemy small-arms fire that -could only have come from at least a company-size pocket of resistance. -Lieutenant Babe was severely wounded before he could carry out his plan -of sending Farrington’s platoon around to envelop the left flank of the -NKPA troops entrenched on the slope. After Technical Sergeant Pasquale -Paolino took command of the engineers, his men and the infantry platoon -were so badly outnumbered that Captain Williams considered pulling them -inside the tanks and withdrawing. Then it occurred to him to send a -flame-thrower tank, escorted by Staff Sergeant Altaire’s M-26, around -the enemy’s left flank by way of a primitive trail leading southward -from the railway tracks.[415] - - [415] The description of this fight is based upon the - following sources: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; - Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54; and Babe-Paolino interv, 15 - Nov 54. - -This maneuver had a spectacular success. The flame tank moved into -a position enabling it to sear the length of the NKPA trenches with -bursts of napalm. When the terrified Red Koreans fled down the slope, -they became targets for the machine guns of Lieutenant Cummings’ -platoon of tanks. - -Sergeants Paolino and Farrington had meanwhile been organizing an -infantry and engineer base of small-arms fire from men taking cover -along the railroad embankment and the lower slopes of the hill. The -engineer NCO noticed that enemy grenades were being lobbed from three -thatched huts below the NKPA trenches on the left flank. Closer -inspection revealed the mouth of a cave, concealed by the third house -and extending back into Hill 105-S. - -Paolino, after getting Williams’ permission to direct tank fire, banged -on the hull of Cummings’ M-26 and indicated the huts and mouth of the -cave as targets. A few 90mm rounds destroyed the huts; but before -Cummings could fire into the cave, eight or ten NKPA soldiers came out -with upraised hands. When they were allowed to surrender unharmed, the -example had an amazing effect as a seemingly endless file of enemy -troops poured out of the cave. Altogether, 131 prisoners were taken, in -addition to an estimated 150 killed, on a hill first reported secured -two days before. Apparently the undiscovered cave had provided a refuge -for nearly 300 Red Koreans. - -Among the captives, as the Marines discovered later were two women in -uniform who had evidently been armed. Because of the NKPA reputation -for treachery, it was considered necessary to search them; but they -were treated with respect and provided with garments more appropriate -to their sex. In spite of the consideration shown them, the incident -resulted in sensational articles in stateside publications after the -women reached the rear and claimed mistreatment on the grounds that -they were nurses. - -Two wounded engineers and an infantry casualty were the price of the -Marine success after a surprise encounter had been turned to the -disadvantage of the enemy. Since the NKPA prisoners were more than -double the numbers of the engineers and infantry, they were placed -between two M-26s when the column resumed the march. - -It was 1200 when Cummings reported to Colonel Puller at the -intersection of the railroad and a boulevard with street car tracks -leading into the heart of the city. The tanks took the lead, joining -3/1 in its fighting advance up both sides of the north-south boulevard. -Enemy mines knocked out two of the M-26s, one of them being Cummings’ -tank, but both were retrieved in spite of heavy NKPA fire. - -Successive road blocks consisting of earth-filled rice bags were -stubbornly defended by enemy infantry supported by NKPA automatic, -AT, and mortar fire from the roof tops. The Marines pressed forward -methodically and by evening the 3d Battalion had penetrated about 2,000 -yards into the city to occupy positions astride the streetcar line -and on the western slopes of Hill 97. The 1st Battalion, on the high -ground to the right, had advanced about 2,000 yards when both assault -units tied in for the night with defensive positions on Hill 82. The 2d -Battalion, as regimental reserve, deployed in the rear of the 1st to -protect the right flank and rear.[416] - - [416] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; O. P. Smith, - _Notes_, 284–285. - - -_Night Attack Ordered by Corps_ - -The battle for Seoul took a sudden and unexpected new turn at 2009 on -the night of 25 September 1950 when the following X Corps flash (plain) -message was received at the CP of the 1st Marine Division: - -“Info addressee (X Corps TacAir Commander) reports enemy fleeing city -of Seoul on road north of Uijongbu.... He [TacAir] is conducting -heavy air attack and will continue same. You will push attack now to -the limit of your objectives in order to insure maximum destruction of -enemy forces. Signed Almond.”[417] - - [417] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 288–289. - -The Division G-3 immediately called the Corps G-3 for corroboration. -Colonel Bowser questioned the ability of night air observation to -determine whether the movement out of the city consisted of urban -refugees or enemy troops. He was informed, however, that the intention -of Corps was for the attack to begin at once. - -General Smith then called the X Corps chief of staff for confirmation, -pointing out the inadvisability of attacking at night in an unfamiliar -Oriental city of the size and complexity of Seoul, particularly as -there was no indication of the enemy fleeing from the Division front. -But General Ruffner replied that General Almond himself had dictated -the message and it was to be executed without delay.[418] - - [418] _Ibid._ - -General Smith gave the attack order to the commanding officers of the -1st and 5th Marines, directing them to coordinate their efforts and -confine them to avenues of advance which could be identified at night. -His order was receipted by the 1st Marines at 2205 and the 5th Marines -at 2215 just a few hours after the NKPA counterattack hit the 3d -Battalion of Murray’s regiment. - -While the two rifle regiments made preparations to jump off, the order -was relayed to the 7th and 11th Marines. Colonel Puller coordinated -hastily with the 5th Marines and supporting arms for an attack -scheduled to begin at 0145 on 26 September, following a 15-minute -artillery preparation.[419] - - [419] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen; - MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 38–39. - -At 0138, deciding that the preparation was inadequate, he notified the -assault battalions to “stand fast, preparatory fires to be repeated.” A -new jump-off time of 0200 was set, but at 0153 a dramatic interruption -came in the form of a flash message from the 3d Battalion of the 1st -Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge reported that a heavy enemy attack, -supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, was moving down the main -avenue leading from the center of the city to the southwest in the zone -of the 1st Marines.[420] - - [420] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -It was the enemy’s misfortune that 3/1 had sent out a patrol of eight -Marines and three natives under Corporal Charles E. Collins to make -contact with a similar patrol from the 5th Marines. But at 0130 the -clamor of a fire fight about 400 yards in front of 3/1 was followed -by the return of members of the patrol who gave the alarm. Corporal -Collins was still missing when Major Simmons heard the sound of tracked -vehicles and was warned that two enemy tanks were approaching the -George Company roadblock defended by heavy machine guns, 3.5-inch -rocket launchers and 75mm recoilless guns.[421] - - [421] 3/1 _SAR_. - -These weapons accounted for the destruction of one enemy tank and the -hasty retreat of the other. The Division attack scheduled for 0200 was -indefinitely postponed, of course, until 3/1, astride the principal -avenue of approach, could deal with a large-scale enemy counterattack -launched by an estimated battalion of infantry and about 12 tanks -supported by self-propelled guns and mortars. A terrific concentration -of Marine artillery was called down upon an NKPA effort that reached -its peak about 0230. High-angle Marine howitzer and 81mm mortar fire -almost literally blasted the attacking column out of existence, and -enemy infantry action was negligible afterwards.[422] - - [422] _Ibid._ - -At 0315 the artillery liaison officer informed Puller that the three -battalions of the 11th Marines must cease barrage fire at the penalty -of burning out the tubes of their howitzers. During the comparative -lull the T-34s continued to attack at intervals until daybreak, and -the last two tanks were killed at 0630.[423] About that time Corporal -Collins returned safely after having been given up as dead. Exposed -to friendly as well as enemy fire all night, he had made his way back -through enemy-held areas in a disguise of Korean civilian garments. - - [423] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -POW interrogation and examination of the ground revealed that seven -enemy tanks and two self-propelled guns were destroyed or disabled -by Marine mines, rockets, mortars, or artillery. An estimated 475 to -500 infantry of the NKPA 25th Brigade had been killed and many more -wounded, and the Marines took 83 prisoners at a relatively light cost -in casualties.[424] - - [424] _Ibid._ - -At 0500, as 3/1’s fight in the city was tapering off, another Red -force of battalion strength hit the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, on -South Mountain. A section of the Army unit’s front was overrun, but -a counterattack restored the line by 0700. Finally driven from the -ridge, the North Koreans left behind 394 dead and 174 prisoners, -according to the regimental report.[425] - - [425] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50. - - -_Entrapment of Dog Company, RCT-7_ - -On the morning of 26 September it may have occurred to some of the -Marines that yesterday’s announcement by X Corps of the capture of -Seoul was a bit premature. The lines of the Division remained where -they were the night before, with only the difference that hundreds of -enemy dead gave testimony of a busy night. - -Division OpnO 12-50, issued at 1230 on the 26th, directed a -continuation of the attack on Seoul, the principal change from the last -order being the commitment of the 7th Marines. This regiment, augmented -by the Division Recon Company and 5th KMC battalion, was given the -mission of pinching out the 5th Marines about 1200 yards beyond the -Government Palace and attacking abreast of the 1st Marines toward -the northeast. In the 7th’s zone of advance north of the city lay -Objectives DOG (northern half of Hill 338), EASY (Hill 342), FOX (Hill -133), GEORGE (Hill 343), and BAKER (Hill 171)--as rugged an order of -terrain as any outfit could be served. Puller’s regiment, with the 2d -KMC Battalion attached, would drive northward from Hills 97 and 82 in -lower Seoul, clear the center of the city, then wheel to the right to -take Objective ABLE, Hill 133 in the northeastern outskirts. - -The 5th Marines, with the 1st KMC Battalion attached, was to support -Litzenberg’s attack until being pinched out, whereupon it had orders to -assemble in Division reserve and relieve elements of the 7th Marines. -The KMC Regiment was still under orders to resume control of its -detached battalions for the occupation of Seoul. The 3d Battalion, -however, was detached from the 1st Marine Division and ordered to -report to the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, for operational control -in Kumpo Peninsula operations. Responsibility for the security of Kimpo -Airfield now rested upon X Corps.[426] - - [426] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 294–295. - -Thus, the Marine front prior to the assault formed a semicircle -extending from the Kaesong Highway in the northwest to Hill 82 in the -south, and the concave side faced Seoul like a giant scythe poised to -mow down the last remnants of NKPA resistance. - -[Illustration: SEOUL ASSAULT PLAN - -26 SEP 50 - -SHOWING DIVISION & REGTL BOUNDARIES] - - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF SEOUL - -SHOWING ATTACKS BY 5th MARINES, 1st MARINES, & 32d INF] - -Colonel Litzenberg dispatched Dog Company of the 7th Marines southwest -along the Kaesong Highway at 0630 on 26 September. The mission of the -unit was to approach Seoul and make contact with the 5th Marines on the -right. In the van of the column was the company machine gun officer, -First Lieutenant William F. Goggin. For a while it seemed as though -this untried unit was reaping the laurels earned by its battle-weary -relatives of the 1st and 5th Marines, since hundreds of Koreans lined -the highway to welcome the “victors” with resounding cheers.[427] - - [427] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; and Maj J. D. Hammond interv, - 17 Aug 54. - -Progress was marked off rapidly in the absence of enemy resistance. The -Marines passed through Hoengjeoe-ri, and by 0900 the great slopes of -Hill 296 loomed up on the right and those of 338 on the left. Tracing -the road through the narrow valley between, the company approached the -Sodaemun Prison at the northwest corner of Seoul. Suddenly the column -came under machine-gun fire from a high tower about 400 yards down the -road. The initial burst caused several casualties, including Lieutenant -Goggin, and the Marines quickly deployed on both sides of the road. -Several more enemy machine-guns and rifles opened up from hillside -positions only a hundred yards away. Since the throngs of well-wishers -along the highway had prevented the use of flank guards, Company D was -caught flatfooted in the low ground by the hail of lead. - -After a few minutes, other Red weapons began firing from the lower -slopes of Hills 296 and 338, directly to the flanks, and encirclement -seemed imminent. Dog Company’s commander, Captain Richard R. Breen, -reacted by ordering the 2d Platoon to attack the high ground around -the prison. Simultaneously, First Lieutenant Paul P. Sartwell set up -two 60mm mortars on the road and silenced one of the North Korean -emplacements. Directing his crews from an exposed position, the young -officer was wounded three times before finally being put out of action. - -First Lieutenant Edward H. Seeburger closed on the prison with his 2d -Platoon, while First Lieutenant Paul V. Mullaney’s 1st ascended the -slopes of Hill 338 on the left. The 3d, under First Lieutenant James -D. Hammond, Jr., remained in position along the road. When the assault -platoons were stopped on the high ground by stiffening resistance, -Company D settled down in an elongated perimeter for a battle of -survival. There was no artillery support, but Marine air assisted by -pounding the crescent of Red positions. - -The S-3 of the 7th Marines, Major Raymond V. Fridrich, radioed Captain -Breen and asked about the situation. Though now wounded himself, Breen -stated that he could hold his ground. A small tank-infantry column was -dispatched from regiment to reach the beleaguered force with ammunition -and supplies. By this time, however, the Reds had set up in the rear of -Dog Company, and the relief force was turned back. - -Faced with the bleak fact that it was now surrounded, Company D -withdrew 1000 yards to a defensible road cut between Hills 296 and -338. The Marines completed the move with their wounded and dead at -1600. After being resupplied by air drop in their tight perimeter, they -prepared grimly for an all-night stand. - -Elsewhere in the 7th Marines’ zone, 26 September would be remembered -as much for exhausting marches and climbs as for enemy contacts. -In the morning the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Davis, -had taken over flank responsibility far to the northeast along the -Kaesong highway, thereby relieving the 2d (less Company D) and 3d for -the advance on Seoul. The 2d Battalion then moved out in trace of -Dog Company, but according to plan veered leftward into the hills at -Hoengjeoe-ri, one mile short of the ambuscade. While 2/7 reconnoitered -the high ground above the village, Major Roach’s 3d Battalion completed -an eight-and-a-half-mile forced march to gain an assembly area in -preparation for the assault of northern Hill 338. - -At 1400 Fox and Easy Companies of 2/7 attacked eastward from the height -above Hoengjeoe-ri to seize Hill 343. After an advance of 1000 yards, -they were stopped cold by heavy fire from the direction of Hill 338 to -the south. Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle ordered 2/7 to dig in short of the -objective, since any further progress would only make his right more -vulnerable to the enemy guns on the flank. - -Captain Thomas E. Cooney led Company G of 3/7 through Hoengjeoe-ri -about 1700, circled the northern half of Hill 338, then launched a -two-platoon assault on the crest. His Marines gained the north summit -against no opposition, but Company H, led by Captain Nicholas L. -Shields, was taken under fire in a draw to the right and held up on the -slopes for the night.[428] - - [428] _Ibid._; and Capt H. H. Harris--Capt R. R. Van Cleve - interv, 10 Aug 54. - -[Illustration: ACTION NORTH OF SEOUL - -7th MARINES] - - -_Last Fight on Hill 296_ - -While the 7th Marines were fighting uphill on 26 September, the 3d -Battalion, 5th Marines, punched downward in a bitter contest to clear -the last NKPA resistance from the Hill 296 complex. The attack was -launched early in the morning after preparatory fires by artillery and -81mm mortars. Item Company on the left was to sweep the remainder of -the giant spur which descended into the very heart of Seoul. George, -upon jumping off from the ridge above Hill 105-N, would clear the low -ground on Item’s right. - -Dissatisfied with the accuracy of the preparatory barrages, and -underestimating the enemy’s strength and determination, Captain -McMullen called off supporting arms and based the success of his -two-platoon assault on organic company weapons alone. No sooner had the -Marines lunged downhill than great gaps were torn in the skirmish line -by fire from swarms of North Koreans on the lower slopes. Both assault -platoon leaders were wounded before an intermediate knoll was taken, -and McMullen was forced to commit his reserve to bolster the hard-hit -3d Platoon on the right. - -Continuing the attack under the personal leadership of its commander, -the entire company waded into a maze of entrenchments manned by 200 -enemy soldiers. In the close-in fighting that followed, the Reds were -driven from their emplacements to seek cover farther down the spur. The -depleted ranks of Item Company ground to a halt. - -There followed a brief calm--abruptly shattered when the North Koreans -rallied and counterattacked uphill against the company center. A wild -melee enveloped the ridgeline, and the tactical situation gradually -became a blur. Just as it seemed the Marines’ hold on the lower spur -would be pried loose, Lieutenant Williamson plowed into the tumult at -the head of a small supply party. Ammunition distributed in the heat of -the fighting tipped the scales in favor of the Marines, but not before -McMullen was carried from the field as a result of his seventh battle -wound in two wars. - -The heavy fighting finally eased toward the close of the day. Although -the last organized defenses of the enemy were smashed, Company I was -too badly battered to seize the tip of the spur before nightfall. -Abreast on the right, First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize led Company -G into defensive positions after a day of inching forward against -stubborn opposition in the low ground.[429] - - [429] As is frequently the case after heavy fighting, 3/5’s - _SAR_ contains inaccuracies in its account covering - 24–27 September, leaving the reader with the impression - that the entire spur leading into the city was secured - on the 26th. In retracing the progress of the attack - during interviews with the authors, both Lieutenant - Colonel Taplett and Captain (now Major) McMullen agree - that the foregoing account is correct. - -Other units of the 5th Marines experienced little action during 3/5’s -day-long engagement. While the 2d Battalion mopped up in its zone south -of the 3d, the 1st KMC Battalion moved into position between the latter -and the Reconnaissance Company, now manning the topographical peak -of Hill 296 in the northwest. To the rear of 3/5, the 1st Battalion -enjoyed a quiet interlude in regimental reserve. - - -_1st Marines in the Heart of Seoul_ - -Early in the morning of 26 September, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, -moved out of reserve to pass through the 3d on the streetcar line -and continue the attack northward into the center of Seoul. On the -right of Puller’s zone, 1/1 prepared to descend Hill 82 and clear the -main railroad station and adjoining slopes of South Mountain, where -increasing enemy activity had been noted below the positions of the 32d -Infantry.[430] - - [430] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_; - Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cummings - interv, 12 Oct. 54. - -Sutter’s unit completed the passage of lines at 0900 and attacked along -the boulevard with Fox and Easy Companies in the assault. Leading the -advance up the street were the tanks of Baker Company, Cummings’ M-26 -in the van. The young officer’s machine had proceeded only a few yards -when it struck an American M6 mine, overlooked by Marine engineers -while they were removing their hasty field of the previous night. Not -only did the explosion wreck the tank, but it also caused several -casualties among the infantry on either side. - -The attack edged forward in the second day of the “Battle of the -Barricades.” Every 200–300 yards, fanatical Red detachments manned -rice-bag barriers about eight feet high and five feet thick, -stretching the whole width of the street. It fell to the M-26s to -smash the emplacements and silence the NKPA antitank guns behind each -one. Marine tank action in turn hinged on mine clearance by supporting -engineers, who looked to flanking infantry for covering fire. Thus was -a system of three-party teamwork developed and perfected during the -roar of battle. - -Aiding the Communists behind the barricades were other North Koreans -who fired their rifles and submachine guns from roof tops, windows, -and side streets. The Marine infantry, therefore, had to defend in -every direction as it attacked to the front. Intense heat from burning -buildings along the street added to the handicaps, and the constant -discovery of South Korean civilians, including women and children, -huddled in the rubble further strained the taut nerves of men who -looked for trouble from every quarter. - -It was a dirty, frustrating fight every yard of the way, perhaps -best described by Puller himself, who reported that “progress was -agonizingly slow.” A principal deterrent to speed was the fact that all -supporting tanks simultaneously expended their ammunition and fuel, -so that all had to return to the rear for replenishment at the same -time. During their absences from the fight, the infantry understandably -chose to await their return rather than pay heavily in casualties by -assaulting barricades with small arms alone. - -At one point in the street battle, an enemy soldier darted from behind -a building and charged a flame tank advancing behind two lead M-26s. -Ignoring the Marine infantrymen, who gaped in disbelief, the North -Korean hurled a huge satchel charge over the engine compartment of the -armored vehicle, then escaped unharmed as the explosion rocked the -area. The flame tank was wrecked, but the crew escaped serious injury -with the assistance of supporting infantry. Apparently a suicide squad -of NKPA demolitions men had been assigned the mission of destroying -Marine armor in this fashion, for several other Red soldiers tried -single-handed assaults shortly afterwards. The riflemen of 2/1 were -alert for the later attempts, however, and the enemy fanatics were cut -down before inflicting further damage. - -The crucial period in the 2d Battalion’s day-long fire fight came as -Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company approached a street junction -below Hill 97. It had been planned that this unit would advance through -the intersection and continue along the streetcar line, while Company -E, moving behind in column, veered off on the right branch. Enemy -resistance against Fox’s advance proved so fierce that Captain Norman -R. Stanford by-passed the fork and threw Easy Company’s weight in -support of the other unit. The North Korean strong point crumbled under -the two-company onslaught, but not before Stanford and several others -were added to the casualty rolls.[431] - - [431] Capt N. R. Stanford, “Road Junction,” _Marine Corps - Gazette_, 35 no. 9 (Sep 51): 16–21. - -By dark, 2/1 had measured off a hard-won gain of 1200 yards. Lieutenant -Colonel Sutter ordered the battalion into defensive positions astride -the boulevard a scant 100 yards from the tip of the ridge spur which -was costing Item Company, 5th Marines, so dearly. - -In the right half of Puller’s zone on 26 September, the 1st Battalion -stamped out a hornets’ nest around the main railroad station, nestled -at the foot of South Mountain.[432] Charlie Company had led off the -early morning attack in the wake of a preparation by air, artillery, -and mortars. After descending Hill 82 in a column of platoons, the -company formed on line along a stream paralleling the rail yard. Then, -at a signal from Captain Wray, the platoons crossed over, wheeled to -the north, and advanced up the tracks by leaps and bounds. - - [432] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; - and Capt F. B. Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55. - -Though the over-all intensity of enemy resistance in this quarter -could be termed only moderate, the random deployment of the Reds -among buildings and train cars made the going slow and costly for the -Marines. After clearing out the yard, the attackers converged on the -station house itself and drove the last North Koreans from the building -during a sharp exchange. The interior of the bullet-pocked structure -produced only a handful of enemy dead, but in one corner were heaped -the bodies of several South Korean women and children. It was obvious -that the latter had been gunned by Communist executioners, since their -sheltered location within the building was ample protection against the -small arms of the advancing Marines. - -By darkness, Company C was in undisputed control of the railroad -terminal, a patrol led by Lieutenant Carlon having mopped up the fringe -area. To the right, Company A had secured the park promontory on the -northwestern tip of South Mountain in conjunction with Baker Company’s -drive which included the nose jutting out below. - -East of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry’s zone was the scene of -considerable activity throughout 26 September. After the 2d Battalion -repulsed the enemy’s pre-dawn counterattack, the 3d jumped off at 0800 -from positions a mile and a half east of South Mountain. Its objective, -Hill 106, lay more than 3000 yards away, just south of the highway -leading eastward out of Seoul. Approaching the base of the ridge, -Company L surprised and destroyed a strong NKPA position, while Company -I swept up the objective itself against light opposition. - -Reaching the summit, the company commander called an air strike on an -enemy column marching out of Seoul on the highway. As the planes broke -up the Red formation, Company L, reinforced with tanks and additional -infantry, drove down the road to mop up and block the escape route.[433] - - [433] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50. - -In the day-long attack, 3/32 and its supporting armament accounted for -500 enemy dead, five tanks, 45 vehicles, three artillery pieces, and -two ammunition dumps, according to regimental reports. The remainder of -the 32d, now augmented by the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, in addition -to the 17th ROK, saw spots of heavy fighting during the mop-up and -consolidation on and around South Mountain. Casualties for the 32d, as -reported on 26 September, were six KIA, 92 WIA, and three MIA. Most of -those reported the following day--32 KIA, 33 WIA, and nine MIA--could -also be traced to action on the 26th.[434] - - [434] _Ibid._ - -Thus the Army regiment, having been impressively blooded in its eight -days of action, could lay claim to clearing both South Mountain and -that 15 per cent of Seoul’s built-up area east of the great height.[435] - - [435] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 42. - -In the course of the day, the 1st Marines had made patrol contact with -the 5th Marines in the left rear and with Army elements atop South -Mountain on the right flank. Prospects for the morrow appeared much -brighter at Division and Corps levels, where there must have existed -some apprehension over the complicated maneuvering which had denied the -attackers a solid front until they were in the heart of the sprawling -capital. - - -_Objective Secured_ - -The twenty-seventh of September dawned as the day of reckoning. -Applicable to the tactical situation in Seoul was the old law of -physics, that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. -With X Corps troops pouring into the city and environs to share them -with the Communist garrison, it was axiomatical that one side or the -other would shortly have to go. - -Oddly enough, despite the electrified atmosphere, the night of 26–27 -September had passed quietly, even for Dog Company, 7th Marines, -isolated in the road cut between Hills 296 and 338.[436] At dawn a -tank-infantry team supported by engineers of Company D, 1st Engineer -Battalion, advanced down the Kaesong Highway against negligible -resistance and escorted the beleaguered rifle company back to the 7th -Marines CP at Hoengjeoe-ri. - - [436] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv - _SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; - Harris--Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54; and Maj W. R. - Earney, _Notes on Operations of 3d Bn, 7th Mar, in - South Korea_ (Earney Notes), MS. - -While the anticlimatical “rescue” was taking place, the 3d Battalion -jumped off in the attack, supported by fire from the 2d on the left, to -clear the northern reaches of Hill 338. How Company pressed forward up -the draw on George’s right but was stalled by heavy fire which suddenly -erupted on the slopes above. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant -Paul E. Denny, broke through in its zone, only to be recalled by -Shields when the rest of the company failed to regain the lost -momentum. Captain Richard H. Sengewald’s Item Company, en route to take -positions on the left of George, paused to assist Shields’ outfit for -a short time. After further attempts by Company H to gain the summit -were unsuccessful, Sengewald led his unit to the north and attacked the -right flank of the NKPA elements scattered indiscriminately over the -remote humps of Hill 338. The situation on the northern half of the -towering objective did not change appreciably in the course of the day. - -Colonel Litzenberg developed further pressure against the enemy’s right -by ordering 2/7 to continue the attack against Hill 343 in midmorning. -On the right of the battalion zone, Captain Walter D. Phillips, Jr., -led Company E forward in the face of stubborn enemy resistance from the -crest. Owing to steady North Korean fire and the rugged terrain, gains -were measured off by the yard, both for Phillips’ unit and for Captain -Elmer J. Zorn’s Fox Company on the left. By nightfall, nevertheless, -the Marines had mastered the situation to the extent that Company E sat -firmly entrenched atop Hill 343--2500 yards from its starting point. - -More force was applied to Litzenberg’s flanking lever north of Seoul -when Company G was withdrawn from its ridgeline on Hill 338 and ordered -to attack eastward to seize Hill 342, which loomed above the capital -building in the northern tip of Seoul. Circling through the low ground -north of Hill 338, the company passed safely through an extensive -minefield that had been conveniently marked off by friendly South -Koreans. As the Marines approached the base of their objective and -came under heavy sniper fire, Captain Cooney ordered the 1st Platoon, -under Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Mooney, to set up a base of fire on -intermediate high ground in order to support an assault by the 2d and -3d. - -The plan backfired, for the 1st Platoon became engaged in a hot fire -fight as it moved toward the designated position. The two assault units -fared no better when, without the expected covering fire, they were hit -by a hail of lead on the lower slopes of Hill 342. Several officers -and NCOs were killed or wounded within a matter of minutes, and the -scattered fighting that continued until nightfall brought about no -significant change in the local situation. - -Thus, the day ended on Litzenberg’s “Seoul Front” with the 7th Marines -in control of Hill 343 but sharing parts of 338 and 342 with the -NKPA. The story would not be complete, however, without a brief visit -to the regiment’s “Haengju Front,” several miles to the west, which -had crackled with activity during the early afternoon. About 1200, a -company of North Koreans emerged from the northern hills and attacked -toward the old ferry crossing at Hill 125. On the way the Reds had -the misfortune to stumble into Captain David W. Banks’ Able Company -of 1/7, manning a blocking position at Ryokoku. (See map of Han -River crossing). To avoid the danger of infiltration in the bustling -bridgehead, Lieutenant Colonel Davis promptly committed Company C, -under Captain Richard F. Delamar, III. - -Despite their disadvantages in numbers and fire power, the dogged -Reds extended the fight sufficiently to involve even a platoon of -Captain Myron E. Wilcox’s Baker Company. After a prolonged clatter, the -engagement ended almost as abruptly as it had begun; and the immediate -result was that all Communist troops above the ferry site withdrew to -Kaesong. - -The 7th Marines claimed 375 enemy killed and 34 taken prisoner in the -fighting which ranged its vast front from 23 to 27 September. The -spoils of war included the strangely unbalanced assortment of four -machine guns, six rifles and 600 bayonets. - -While the 2d and 3d Battalions of Litzenberg’s regiment struggled among -the massive ridges north of Seoul on the 27th, the 1st and 5th Marines -struck at the vital nerve center of the ROK capital. The regimental -attacks through the center of the city began as separate thrusts in the -morning, but as the day wore on they took on aspects of a coordinated -foot race. It could even be said, finally, that the battle became a -flag-raising contest between the two Marine units, as the last NKPA -resistance died in heaps of rubble and torn rice bags. - -At 0645, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, jumped off to clear the tip -of Hill 296’s troublesome eastern spur. For the first time in longer -than they cared to remember, the infantrymen were greeted not by a -sheet of small-arms and machine-gun fire, but by occasional, erratic -pops from the rifles of dispirited snipers. Groping through the smoke -and haze boiling up from the shattered city, Companies G and I swept -the high ground by 0730 and--at long last--slowly filtered through the -first streets of western Seoul. In short order they were encountering -the expected barricades and minefields. There was a hint of stiffening -opposition, but it quickly dissolved as the riflemen, backed by -supporting tanks and engineers, ground forward relentlessly.[437] - - [437] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -By 0930, George Company made contact with the 1st Marines on the -right.[438] Less than an hour later, after wheeling northward 3/5 -controlled Middle School and adjacent high ground--the springboard -for the assault on the capital building 1000 yards away. At 1200, -Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered Companies G and I to continue the -attack, guiding on the two Red flags which whipped the wind defiantly -on both sides of the great dome ahead. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion -moved up behind and prepared to advance on the left of the 3d. Its -mission in the final assault was to seize the craggy peak of Hill 338, -which reared upward on the left of the capital building like a grim -fortress.[439] - - [438] Contact on 26 September was between rearward elements - of the 1st and 5th Marines, not between assault units. - - [439] _Ibid._ - -On the right of the 5th Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines -had smashed through another series of rice-bag barriers on the -boulevard and at 1057, the United States colors unfurled above the -French Consulate. A furious fight exploded around the city’s main -intersection, where the principal streetcar lines crossed to form an X -not far from Middle School. Company D, spearheading 2/1’s drive, waded -into the fray with determination. Lieutenant Cummings, who by this time -appeared to have a remarkable affinity for heavy trouble, again lost -his tank to enemy mines, but not before he had knocked out two Russian -76mm self-propelled guns emplaced in the middle of the intersection. -Staff Sergeant MacDonald’s M-26 obliterated an NKPA truck with two -90mm rounds when the vehicle tried to escape with a howitzer and its -crew.[440] - - [440] 2/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54. - -The afternoon of 27 September was a time of climax as the 1st Marine -Division front surged forward of Middle School and the central -intersection. Though beaten and faltering, the North Koreans still -managed to fight stubbornly here and there; but their over-all -deployment no longer bore any semblance of tactical integrity. - -By early afternoon the Reds facing the 5th Marines broke and fled. -Troops of 3/5 poured into the government compound, their final -objective, and secured it at 1508. The North Korean flags were struck, -and in their place rose the United States colors. Somewhat awed by -the historic import of their accomplishment, young Marine riflemen -wonderingly probed the spacious halls and chambers of the huge building -that shortly would be reoccupied by the government of the Korean -Republic.[441] - - [441] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -On the left of the 3d Battalion, Company A of 1/5 had launched its -attack on Hill 338 at 1300 in the wake of devastating preparations by -air, artillery, and mortars. Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell -led off with the 1st Platoon, which seized an intermediate piece of -high ground against moderate resistance. The 2d Platoon, under Second -Lieutenant Edward E. Collins, then drove forward on the left of the -ancient wall leading to the crest of the objective; but the attack was -stopped by heavy mortar and small-arms fire. Marine air thundered down -to rake the target with machine guns and rockets. The ground troops -followed up with heavy concentrations of 60mm and 81mm mortars. Moving -closely behind the supporting fire, the 1st Platoon overran a knob -situated below the dominating peak. The 2d Platoon then resumed its -advance on the left of the wall, and the 3d, under Technical Sergeant -George W. Bolkow, took the lead on the right. It was the latter unit -that smashed through the last resistance and secured the cliffs at the -summit of Hill 338 at 1850.[442] - - [442] _Ibid._ - -While the 5th Marines completed its final mission in Seoul, 2/1 on -the right continued along the streetcar line which curved below the -government buildings to run eastward to the far edge of the city. Since -the 7th Marines had been slowed in the hills north of the capital, the -expected tie-in on the left flank did not occur, and Puller’s troops -had to go it alone through the dense maze of streets in eastern Seoul. -At 1530 infantrymen of 2/1 raised the American flag over the Russian -Consulate, just to the right of the curve in the boulevard. Seven -minutes later the flag also waved above the United States Consulate, -about 350 yards farther off on the flank.[443] - - [443] 2/1 _SAR_. - -To the right of 2/1, the 1st Battalion was making good progress after -a slow start against stiff opposition. Charlie Company had been -held up at the outset in the neighborhood of the railroad station, -but supporting tanks, including flame throwers, had paved the way -by blasting and burning a formidable nest of NKPA automatic weapons -and AT guns. One armored vehicle was disabled by a mine and another -by antitank fire before the Marines finally broke through. As the -battalion pivoted eastward in accordance with the general plan, both -Charlie Company and Able on the right hammered through the usual -barricades and suicide detachments.[444] - - [444] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55. - -The 32d Infantry and elements of the 17th enjoyed a relatively quiet -day on and around South Mountain, for these units had only to hold firm -in their positions until the 1st Marines could complete its wheeling -movement and come abreast, facing east.[445] - - [445] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50. - -Shortly before 1630, 2/1 was pounding eastward through a stretch of the -streetcar line south of the government compound. Fire poured into the -ranks of Dog Company from three sides, and Marines sweltered in the -heat of burning buildings that offered dubious protection. Corsairs -screamed down to plaster enemy positions only a block ahead of the -foremost infantry. Immediately after each pass by the gull-winged -planes, Second Lieutenant Carl B. Thompson, Jr., led his 1st Platoon in -the assault with covering fire provided by supporting tanks.[446] - - [446] 2/1 _SAR_; and Capt T. Culpepper interv, 9 Feb 55. - -There was a final surge up the street by the green-clad riflemen and -BAR-men, and then it was all over. At 1630 enemy resistance across -the 1st Regiment’s front abruptly collapsed, with the result that the -Battle of Seoul came to an end. Snipers and bypassed pockets remained -to be mopped up by the Marines, KMC units, and South Korean Police; but -the NKPA had clearly quit the fight and abandoned the city. The 1st -and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines marched rapidly through desultory -sniper fire to the eastern part of town, where they dug in for the -night.[447] - - [447] _Ibid._; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, - 1 Mar 55. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -The Drive to Uijongbu - -_Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at Seoul--Crumbling -of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of -Inchon-Seoul Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report -to United Nations_ - - -As rapidly as the advance of the troops permitted, preparations were -made for the restoration of civil government to Seoul. A group of -former city officials had arrived by plane from Pusan; and on 26 -September, Mayor Lee opened a temporary office in Yongdungpo. The -police chief, construction engineer, and the health and welfare -officials also resumed their old duties. - -Collecting points were set up for handling the civilian wounded. The -following statistics, comprising the patients treated for all causes by -the 1st Medical Battalion of the 1st Marine Division, show that Korean -civilians were second in numbers only to the Marines themselves: - - U. S. Marine 2,811 - Korean civilian 1,908 - U. S. Army 358 - KMC and ROK 322 - U. S. Navy 78 - POW [448]39 - - [448] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How. - -The problem of food for a city with a pre-war population of a million -and a half was met during the advance when stores of rice and other -supplies were turned over to Seoul officials by the Marines. Medical -supplies found in the city were redistributed for use in Seoul and -Inchon hospitals as well as the hospital established at Yongdungpo by -Captain Hering, the Division Surgeon, expressly for the treatment of -civilian wounded. - -A shipment of some 50 tons of rice through X Corps, plus large amounts -located in Seoul by the Marines, enabled the officials to take over -without critical food shortages. On the 28th, Mayor Lee moved into -the city hall at Seoul and acted immediately to re-establish police -authority, clear destroyed areas and provide for the restoration of -such public utilities as water and electricity.[449] These prompt -measures did much to ease the hardships of thousands of returning -refugees. - - [449] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 312–313. - - -_Operations of 28 September_ - -The 5th Marines passed an uneventful day on 28 September, having taken -its assigned objectives and been pinched out by the 1st Marines on the -right and the 7th Marines on the left, as planned. An assembly area was -established in the vicinity of the Women’s University, and though the -regiment sent out patrols, no enemy were encountered.[450] - - [450] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen. - -The 7th Marines put in a busy day at seizing objectives which consisted -of the high ground north of Seoul on both sides of the main highway -from the capital to Uijongbu. Opposition was light to moderate, with -the stiffest resistance occurring in areas which indicated that the -enemy intended to put up a fight to protect his escape route to -Uijongbu. Seventy-five tons of American-made dynamite and explosives, -captured by the 7th Marines, were believed to have been originally -supplied to the ROK forces before the war and abandoned during the -NKPA invasion.[451] Total advances for the day ranged from 1,500 yards -in the zone of the 3d Battalion to 2,600 yards in the zone of the 2d -Battalion. - - [451] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger. - -When the 1st Marines jumped off at 0645 on the 28th, the 1st and 2d -Battalions were in assault. The 3d Battalion remained in an assembly -area in the rear and continued mopping up along with the 2d KMC -Battalion. Although organized resistance in the city had been broken, -the 1st Battalion met stubborn resistance from enemy groups and -encountered many mines. The 2d Battalion, on the left, made headway -against light opposition. - -These attacks cleared the remainder of Seoul and took the assault -battalions to Hill 133 (Objective ABLE) commanding the city on the -northeast.[452] - - [452] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter. - -General Smith visited the CPs of all three regiments on the 28th by -helicopter. He found Colonel Puller at the Ducksoo Palace, near the -intersection of the streetcar lines. Colonel Litzenberg’s CP was -located a short distance to the west, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray had -established his headquarters in the Women’s University on the northwest -outskirts of the city. - -Later that day Generals Smith and Craig displaced the Division CP from -Oeoso-ri to a barracks area in Seoul, southwest of South Mountain. The -two Marine generals took over a former infirmary, but they decided that -the mortuary slab was too depressing and had that fixture removed.[453] - - [453] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 308, 338–339. - - -_Liberation Ceremonies at Seoul_ - -Planning for impressive liberation ceremonies at Seoul had begun while -the street fighting was at its height. The 1st Marine Division was -requested by Corps to furnish two honor guards and a band. Musical -instruments having been left behind in Japan, air shipment was -prescribed.[454] - - [454] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 27 Sep 50, _Notes_, 313–315. - -General MacArthur had hoped to hold the liberation ceremony at Seoul -on 25 September, just three months to the day after the launching -of the NKPA invasion. The enemy, however, was not cooperative with -respect to this date; and even on the morning of the 29th, three NKPA -counterattacks were repulsed on the outskirts of the city. As it -proved, General MacArthur vetoed plans for a ceremony with band music. -“I will personally conduct the proceedings without being introduced,” -said his message to X Corps, and he specified that there be no honor -guard.[455] - - [455] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50. - -Two pre-dawn counterattacks on the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were -not auspicious beginnings for the day of the liberation exercises. -The first occurred at 0445 on 29 September, when the OP, located on a -spur projecting forward of the MLR and defended by a rifle platoon, -was infiltrated by an estimated 70 to 100 NKPA troops. A second enemy -attack hit the left flank of the battalion shortly afterwards. Both -attempts were repulsed with total losses of 48 to the Communists, and -the Marines had casualties of 4 KIA and 28 WIA, most of them resulting -from hand grenades.[456] - - [456] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. - -Another assault, launched by the enemy at 0600 in the zone of action of -the 7th Marines, was repulsed without trouble. Most of the fighting on -29 September was done by this regiment, which pushed forward to gain -all the rest of its objectives before nightfall. - -At dawn, in preparation for the liberation ceremony, Marine guards -were unobtrusively stationed along the route of approach from the new -floating bridge to the Government Palace. This duty fell chiefly on -3/1, with elements of the 5th Marines being responsible for security in -the western part of the city. - -General MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee drove directly to the -Palace after separate arrivals at Kimpo Airfield. The guests included -Korean dignitaries and United Nations officials in addition to -high-ranking representatives of military organizations. - -The commander in chief opened the ceremony with a moving five-minute -address ending with the Lord’s Prayer. The rumble of artillery could be -heard at times, and some of the guests glanced up apprehensively at the -shattered skylight overhead. - -“Occasional falls of glass from the dome and drifting smoke and ashes -were part of the scene,” commented a Marine officer. “Unheeded noise -of rifle shots punctuated the talks. Grim Marines from Puller’s -regiment surrounded the seated audience.... The youth of the guards -was offset by the tall, gray-haired figures of Generals Smith and Barr -at the front of the audience. They were patently the men who had borne -precisely and capably the load of decision.”[457] - - [457] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54. - -With the 1st Marine Division still responsible for security, it was -a relief to General Smith when the distinguished visitors departed -unharmed. Not all the mines had been removed from the streets as -yet, and it was suspected that snipers might still be lurking in the -ruins.[458] - - [458] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 29 Sep 50. - - -_Crumbling of NKPA Resistance_ - -Although more hard fighting lay ahead in the Inchon-Seoul operation, X -Corps alerted its major units on 29 September to the possibility of a -new amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. This was one of the -earliest announcements of the planning which led to the Wonsan landing -and the advance to the Chosin Reservoir, but the history of those -events belongs in the next volume of this series. - -The new operation was suggested by the rapid disintegration of the -main body of the NKPA invasion forces. In a single day, 26 September, -elements of the 1st Cavalry Division had advanced more than 100 miles; -and a total of about 23,600 prisoners were taken by the Eighth Army -before the end of the month. Enemy resistance was still encountered, -to be sure, and sometimes it was of a desperate nature as Red Korean -troops fought to escape encirclement. But all hope and heart had gone -out of the Communist cause. One Eighth Army column sliced across the -peninsula to Kunsan while other spearheads drove northward and ROK -units pushed up the east coast nearly to Samchok. NKPA opposition was -crumbling everywhere as demoralized invasion troops threw away their -weapons and changed to civilian clothes in the hope of making their way -to North Korea through the ever tightening Eighth Army cordon.[459] - - [459] U. S. MilAcad, _Operations in Korea_, 18–19. - -The X Corps troops in the Seoul area had enough on their hands to -finish the old operation before starting a new one. 1st Marine Division -OpnO 13-50, issued at 2000 on 29 September, provided for the securing -of the captured city by these means: - - (1) a continuation of the attack to the east; - - (2) the conduct of reconnaissances in force to the north and - northwest; - - (3) the relief of elements of the 7th Infantry Division north of - the river Han; - - (4) the seizure of prescribed blocking positions.[460] - - [460] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 318. - -The Division plan of maneuver called for the three Marine rifle -regiments to take blocking positions forming a rough semi-circle -defending Seoul from three sides--the 5th Marines to the northwest, -the 7th Marines to the north, and the 1st Marines to the northeast. -Responsibility for the area north of the Han river and west of the -Pukhan River had passed to the 1st Marine Division, and at 1500 on 30 -September the following missions were assigned by OpnO 14-50: - - RCT-1--To protect the right flank of the Division and be - prepared to assemble in Division reserve by battalions for a - motor lift. Blocking positions, as assigned by OpnO 13-50, - consisted of high ground from two to five miles northeast of - Seoul. - - RCT-5--To continue reconnaissance in force with minimum of - a reinforced battalion to Suyuhyon and establish a blocking - position; to protect the left flank of the Division; and to - be prepared to provide a reinforced rifle company for Task - Force Kumpo, on order. These attachments to be made: 1st - Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion, - USA; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; Company A, 1st Engineer - Battalion; and a company from the 1st Motor Transport Battalion. - - RCT-7--To advance rapidly and seize blocking positions in - the vicinity of Uijongbu. These attachments to be made: 3d - Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion, - USA; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; and one company of the KMC - Regiment. - - The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions and one - company of the 5th Battalion, with a detachment of ANGLICO - attached) was meanwhile to advance to the east and seize - blocking positions at the junction of the Han and Pukhan rivers - where the road leading northeast from Seoul reaches that point. - The 1st KMC Battalion had been attached to the 7th Infantry - Division, and the 3d Battalion was operating on the Kumpo - Peninsula. - - Task Force Kumpo, when activated on Division order, was to - consist of the 3d KMC Battalion and Battery C, 50th AAA - Battalion, USA, plus a 5th Marines rifle company and a tank - detachment, if required. As it proved, however, X Corps held - responsibility for the defense of this area until 2 October, - when the 187th Airborne RCT was relieved by Task Force - Kumpo.[461] - - [461] _Ibid._, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo” - are used in reports to designate the same area--the - peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first - name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the - second from the principal town of the peninsula. - -Two more small fire fights awaited the 5th Marines in carrying out -the missions assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. At 1030 on 1 October, -while patrolling the extensive area of regimental responsibility, a -detachment of 2/5 made contact with an NKPA force estimated at 150 to -200 men. Air strikes and mortar fire soon took the fight out of the -enemy, who left 30 dead behind. - -At 0600 on 1 October the 3d Battalion, reinforced with a battery of -artillery and a platoon of tanks and engineers, moved out toward -Suyuhyon. Charlie Company of 1/5 followed in trace to protect the -battalion rear and provide security for returning motor transport. - -Two road blocks were cleared before the battalion tied in for the night -on high ground just short of the objective. Then, at 0230 the next -morning, the enemy struck in estimated company strength. The attempt -was repulsed by machine-gun fire, and 67 Red Korean bodies were found -at daybreak in the attack area. At 0700 the column resumed the march to -Suyuhyon, which was occupied without further incident.[462] - - [462] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen: basic rpt and - Peter. - -The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions -assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. In fact, the regiment had only a few -minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul. - -Colonel Litzenberg’s men were now making the main effort of the 1st -Marine Division. Preparations for the drive to Uijongbu began with -every indication that the enemy was bent upon flight. A patrol from the -3d Battalion found 30 Korean bodies beside a wall, including several -women and a child, whose hands had been bound behind them before -they were shot. The victims, according to a POW, were members of the -families of ROK soldiers.[463] - - [463] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger. - -Positions had been consolidated by the late afternoon of 30 September -in readiness for the jump-off in the morning. The 7th Marines might -well have been called Task Force Litzenberg at this stage for it was -reinforced by Major Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, Captain -Lester T. Chase’s Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion, Captain Byron -C. Turner’s Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Captain Kim’s -Company C of the 5th KMC Battalion. - -The drive to the new objective began at 0630 on 1 October in a column -of battalions. Air reconnaissance had made it appear likely that any -NKPA resistance would probably take advantage of a tactical bottleneck, -about halfway to Uijongbu, where steep and rocky ridges overlooked a -narrow defile through which the road passed. Colonel Litzenberg and his -staff decided to maneuver by sending the 1st Battalion to make a broad -feint to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile with tank -support while the 2d Battalion followed in reserve. - -Lieutenant Colonel Davis secured his preliminary objectives, then -swiftly spread out on both sides of the defile for his feint. -Unfortunately, Major Roach was delayed by an enemy mine field, which -brought the 3d Battalion and the tanks to a halt while the engineers -cleared the way. Davis’ simulated attack had meanwhile disclosed that -the enemy was entrenched in depth along the high ground on each side of -the defile. Both Marine battalions took heavy NKPA artillery and mortar -fire before halting for the night.[464] - - [464] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes - Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex - Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv, - 22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T. - Bey interv, 17 Nov 54. - -[Illustration: PURSUIT OF THE NKPA & CAPTURE OF UIJONGBU - -28 SEP--3 OCT 1950] - -At least the day’s attacks had unmasked the enemy’s positions and -exposed them to savage attacks by the Corsairs of VMF-312. RCT-7 -continued the attack at 0630 on the 2d, with Roach on the left of the -road and Davis on the right. About halfway through the defile the 3d -Battalion was pinned down by a concentration of NKPA artillery, mortar, -and small-arms fire. Again the tanks were held up while the engineers -cleared away mines, working in a hail of bullets. The tanks of the -1st Platoon repaid the favor by closing in on two huts sheltering -NKPA troops and killing an estimated 35. Here an attached dozer tank, -without blade, had a freakish accident when two men in the turret were -wounded by enemy fire down a 105mm gun tube while the breech was open. - -The 1st Battalion managed to cross the stream east of the defile and -seize the high ground just beyond. But the day ended with gains of only -300 yards in the defile. - -Roach’s men returned to the attack in the morning, supported by the -tanks of the 2d Platoon. Again VMF-312 flew one close air support -sortie after another. Major Charles E. McLean was hit by enemy AA fire -but crash-landed his plane in friendly territory. First Lieutenant -Robert O. Crocker was killed in action shortly after being brought down -by NKPA small-arms fire. - -VMF-312 fliers intercepted an enemy convoy and First Lieutenant -Franklin Stratton reported the destruction of seven out of eight -trucks. The tanks also gave the infantry helpful support, firing 167 -90mm rounds during the day and an estimated 20,000 machine gun rounds -at enemy troops along the ridge. - -While 1/7 cleared the high ground on the east side of the road and 3/7 -on the west side, Colonel Litzenberg directed Major Webb D. Sawyer[465] -to pass between them with 2/7 and drive directly along the highway. -Progress was satisfactory from the start. When Sawyer’s men began to -overrun abandoned NKPA artillery pieces and supply dumps, they pounded -ahead with the realization that enemy resistance was broken. - - [465] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander, - had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September. - -At five that afternoon the 2d Battalion entered the ruins of Uijongbu, -evacuated by the enemy. The last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul -operation had ended in a smashing victory for the Division’s youngest -regiment. - -Identifications showed that the Marines had been opposed by three -battalions of the 31st Regiment of the 31st NKPA Division. Elements of -the 17th and Seoul Divisions and of an artillery battalion were also -encountered. These troops had been supported by 13 tanks, of which -four were killed by Marine air attacks and two captured in a damaged -condition by 2/7 after the others escaped. - -The three-mile advance of RCT-7 on 3 October had resulted in the -cutting of lateral communications to the east and west of Uijongbu and -the securing of an important blocking position on the X Corps final -phase line. Losses of 13 killed and 111 wounded were suffered by the -regiment in the three-day fight. - - -_Last Days of Inchon-Seoul Operation_ - -The climax of the battle was witnessed by General Cates, who visited -the front on 3 October, accompanied by Major Generals Edwin A. Pollock -and Clayton C. Jerome. After being briefed at the Division CP by the -G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, the Commandant inspected the positions of RCT-1 -and RCT-5 by helicopter before taking a jeep tour along the road to -Uijongbu to watch Colonel Litzenberg’s men slug their way forward into -the battered town.[466] - - [466] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 2–3 Oct 50. - -That evening the fighting virtually came to an end, for the 1st Marine -Division had a total of only seven casualties during the last four days -of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The rifle regiments had only to maintain -their blocking positions while patrolling to front and flank. - -Operations on the Kumpo Peninsula, which had been sputtering -intermittently ever since the occupation of the airfield, also drew -to a close.[467] Responsibility for the area having passed from Corps -back to Division on 2 October, elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were -relieved by Task Force Kumpo, consisting of the 3d KMC Battalion, a -detachment from the 1st Signal Battalion, and Battery C of the 50th AAA -Battalion, USA. - - [467] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54. - -Naval gunfire had found its greatest mission of the exploitation phase -in support of the widely assorted units which protected the left flank -of X Corps at various times. The 187th, being short on artillery, had -relied on the naval gunfire and spot teams commanded by Lieutenant -(jg) Leo D. McMillan, USN, and First Lieutenant J. E. Dolan, of the -2d Battalion, 7th Marines. These officers and their men remained with -Task Force Kumpo after it relieved the 187th, but patrols reported no -enemy contacts after 2 October. The chief activity on the peninsula -was listening to the baseball games of the World Series, which came in -clearly over the radios of the naval gunfire teams.[468] - - [468] _Ibid._ - -As directed on 5 October by OpnO 15-50, the last to be issued by the -Division in the Inchon-Seoul Operation, the major Marine units were -scheduled to close into staging areas in Inchon as follows: - - 5th Marines 1800 on 5 October; - 11th Marines 1700 on 6 October; - 1st Marines Prior to darkness, 6 October; - 7th Marines Midafternoon, 7 October; - KMC Regiment Prior to darkness, 7 October. - -An impressive ceremony was held on the 6th, when the cemetery -established by the Marines on the outskirts of Inchon was taken over -by the United Nations. After an invocation by Chaplain R. M. Schwyhart -of the 1st Marine Division, General Almond made a few remarks and -laid a wreath on the grave of an unknown soldier. Then General Smith, -General Barr, and Colonel Lee performed the same ceremony over Marine, -Army, and ROK graves. Volleys were fired, taps were sounded, and the -dedication ended with the national anthems of the United States and -Korea.[469] - - [469] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 342; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex - George, 7. - -There could be no doubt, as the Marines prepared to mount out for a -new amphibious operation, that the NKPA invaders had been knocked out -of the war by the combined X Corps and Eighth Army offensives. The Red -Korean retreat had become a rout, and Marine staff officers considered -it doubtful whether the enemy could hold the east coast port of Wonsan -long enough to defend it against the proposed new Marine assault -landing.[470] - - [470] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the - Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal - route. - -It was apparent, in fact, that only the active intervention of Red -China or the Soviet Union could save the North Korean People’s Republic -from imminent collapse. At this time, however, it did not seem likely -that any such attempt would be made. - -And so it was that one of the most remarkable amphibious operations -in Marine Corps annals came uneventfully to an end on 7 October 1950. -Early in the morning the Division CP displaced from Seoul to a housing -area just north of Ascom City. At 0935, in accordance with X Corps OpnO -5, General Smith reported to Admiral Doyle, ComPhibGru One, for duty -as commander of the landing force for the proposed Wonsan assault. -And at 1200 the Inchon-Seoul operation passed into history when the -last troops of the 7th Marines were relieved in the Uijongbu area by -elements of the Eighth Army. - - -_Summaries and Conclusions_ - -At this stage the men of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing were still too close to the operation to see it clearly -in detail. If there was any one overwhelming impression they all had in -common, it was a sense of the speed with which events had raced toward -a climax. - -This was by no means an illusion. Hundreds of Marine reservists had -watched baseball games or enjoyed picnics with their families on the -Fourth of July, never dreaming that shortly after Labor Day they would -be scrambling out of landing boats to assault a flaming Asiatic seaport -on the other side of the earth! - -Speed was an essential if the assault landing were to be completed -on the prescribed D-day. But there was no place for the proverbial -haste that leads to waste. It had to be the speed of precision--an -acceleration of men and events made possible by the amphibious know-how -of a Navy-Marine Corps team that had worked together throughout the -Pacific operations of World War II. - -Sometimes this acceleration was so unobtrusive as to pass almost -unnoticed. Shipping does not grow on trees, particularly the enormous -amounts of shipping required for a major amphibious operation. Yet the -U. S. Navy made it appear a simple and routine matter to assemble from -all the seven seas an invasion fleet made up of craft ranging from -cruisers to rowboats. - -The Marines, as the Landing Force, worked hand-in-hand with the Attack -Force commanded by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who had no superior -in the world of 1950 as an amphibious specialist. From preliminary -planning to final execution, Doyle and his staff officers of PhibGru -One supplied a precision which had much to do with the success of an -operation holding so many potentialities of disaster. - -Looking back, some of the Marine participants could hardly recall a -full night’s sleep from 25 July 1950, the date of the order directing -that the 1st Marine Division be brought up to full war strength, until -7 October 1950, when the operation came to a victorious end. From the -mobilization at Camp Pendleton to the street fighting in Seoul, it was -often necessary to utilize the hours of darkness ordinarily devoted to -rest. At Kobe, for instance, there were so few copies of the plans for -the Inchon landing that they were circulated on a 24-hour schedule for -study by Marine officers who took turns. - -The acceleration of the 1st Marine Division in 64 days from a peacetime -basis to the capture of Seoul has been summarized as follows: - - (a) Expansion from a reduced peace strength (less the 1st - Provisional Marine Brigade) to a reinforced war strength, less - one RCT, was completed in a period of approximately 15 days. - - (b) Administrative sea lift and movement of over 15,000 - personnel, organic equipment, and partial resupply from San - Diego to the Far East Command commenced in less than three - weeks after expansion was ordered. - - (c) Debarkation and unloading from administrative shipping, - and reembarkation and reloading at Kobe, Japan for the assault - landing at Inchon were done in a period averaging about seven - days per unit, two days of which were lost due to a heavy - typhoon in the Kobe area. - - (d) Completed planning and the issuance of the complete - operation order for the amphibious landing at Inchon were - accomplished 17 days after the receipt of the initial directive. - - (e) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disengaged from - active combat with the enemy on the South Korean front at - midnight on 5 September, moved to Pusan, and outloaded in - combat shipping in less than 7 days. - - (f) A successful assault landing was executed at Inchon, - Korea, on 15 September under some of the most adverse landing - conditions in the history of amphibious operations. - - (g) The Force Beachhead Line approximately six miles from - landing beaches was seized within 24 hours after the main - landing on Beaches RED and BLUE. - - (h) Kimpo Airfield, a primary objective of the operation in the - 1st Marine Division’s zone of action, was captured 50 hours and - 35 minutes after H-Hour, D-Day. - - (i) The first assault crossing of the Han River (400 yards wide - at the crossing site) was executed by RCT-5, employing LVTs, - DUKWs, and pontoon ferries, less than five days after landing - at Inchon. - - (j) The remainder of the Division crossed the Han River without - bridging, and after intense fighting completed the seizure of - Seoul 12 days after landing at Inchon. - - (k) The effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team and close - air support doctrine were reaffirmed with outstanding success. - - (l) The ability of Marine units to participate in extended land - operations, provided additional transportation requirements are - met during the emergency, was demonstrated in the Inchon-Seoul - operation.[471] - - [471] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 365–366. - -In any such summary, it is understood that credit for the -accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division was shared by the 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing. Two more days of fighting remained for the -squadrons at Kimpo after the relief of the ground forces, since -Marine air operations cover the period from 7 September to 9 October -1950. Altogether, 2,774 combat sorties were flown by the five Marine -squadrons during this 33-day period, most of them in close support of -infantry units. Following are the totals: - - --------------+--------+---------- - Squadron | Days in| Combat - | Action| Sorties - --------------+--------+---------- - VMF-214 | 16 | 484 - VMF-323 | 22 | 784 - VMF-212 | 19 | 607 - VMF-312 | 10 | 288 - VMF(N)-542 | 19 | 573 - | +---------- - Total | |[472]2,774 - --------------+--------+---------- - - [472] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been - derived form: 1st MAW _SAR_, Annexes Able, Item, Jim, - Queen, Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, - “Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, - 36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27. - - Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38 - flown by two aircraft of VMF-312, which began operating - from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron - arrived. - -“No enemy air operations of any significance were encountered,” stated -the TAC X Corps report. “Some enemy antiaircraft fire from light to -moderate was encountered. Most of this AA fire was of small caliber.” - -Eleven Marine planes (not counting VMO-6 aircraft) were shot down by -NKPA ground forces. Six pilots and a crewman were killed in action and -two pilots wounded. - -As an example of the types of missions, the 326 combat sorties flown -by VMF-322 fell into these categories: close air support, 163; -reconnaissance, 99; rescue cover, 18; deep support, 17; helicopter -escort, 8; photo escort, 6; combat air patrol, 6; tactical air control, -4; leaflet, 2; R4D escort, 2; message drop, 2. In addition, the -squadron was credited with 151 noncombat sorties. - -There could be no question that Marine close air support had won -the esteem of Army infantry units. Generals Harris and Cushman were -the recipients of many spontaneous comments of appreciation from -individuals as well as formal endorsements. (See Appendix L for the -record.) - -On the other hand, the Marines had cause to be grateful for the deep -support and interdiction strikes provided by the Naval fast carrier -planes of JTF-7 in combination with the Fifth Air Force, which was -committed primarily to the support of the Eighth Army in South Korea. -During the first two weeks of September, JTF-7 had responsibility -for the gradual isolation of the Inchon target area by means of air -operations conducted as far as 150 miles north of the objective and 100 -miles to the south. - -The air defense of our forces at sea and in the Inchon area, and the -air interdiction operations of the first five or six days of the -landing--these were carried out largely by Naval air effort under -Commander JTF-7. Mutual assistance between JTF-7 and the Fifth Air -Force was provided for, with coordination being achieved by the -delineation of areas for each.[473] - - [473] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55. - -VMO-6, under the control of the 1st Marine Division and administration -control of MAG-33, completed a total of 643 helicopter and OY flights -in 515 hours. Of the 139 seriously wounded men evacuated by helicopter -from the firing line, a large proportion owed their lives to the -speed and ease with which they were transported to the hospital. The -helicopters also were credited with twelve rescue missions of friendly -pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.[474] - - [474] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex William William. - -In the long run, of course, it took the coordinated efforts of ground, -air, and sea forces to win the final victory in one of the most unusual -and difficult amphibious operations of all time. And though this book -is limited to an account of Marine activities primarily, the Marines -who took part would be first to acknowledge how much the final victory -owed to the efforts of other ground forces--the U. S. Army units, the -KMC Regiment, and the ROK contingents. - -Many of these units, like the Marines, had been handicapped by a hasty -build-up which allowed little or no time for special training and -rehearsals. No greater feat of organization was recorded in 1950 than -the creation of a new 7th Infantry Division from the bare bones of the -old in only a few weeks. The Marines saw more of the 32d Infantry than -General Barr’s other units, for it was this regiment which protected -the right flank during critical periods of the advance on Seoul while -elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were responsible for the security of -the left flank. - -The Army artillery units, amphibian tractor troops, and AAA companies -also deserve their full share of credit for the victory. And though -the Marines were not often in contact with the ROKs, they realized -how much these allies had contributed, often under the most adverse -circumstances. - -Naturally, the Marines felt a special interest in the KMC Regiment, -which they had trained and equipped. The KMCs repaid this feeling by -the valor with which they fought in every phase of the operation from -the mopping up of Inchon to the battle for Seoul. - -The Inchon landing and its exploitation have been made the subject of a -study by officers of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, who summed -up the over-all effects as follows: - - (a) The amphibious envelopment at Inchon produced a decisive - threat to the North Korean forces which led directly to the - rapid disintegration of their front on the Pusan Perimeter. The - 1st Marine Division was the landing force in this amphibious - envelopment. - - (b) It completed the dislocation of the enemy’s entire - logistical system by the capture of Seoul, which, together with - the combat action of other UN forces, shattered the enemy in - all of South Korea, causing the complete rout of the North - Korean forces. The 1st Marine Division played a principal role - in the capture of Seoul. - - (c) The successful completion of the campaign made available to - UN forces the port facilities of Inchon and the extensive Seoul - communications complex for carrying offensive action into North - Korea. - - (d) By the direct action of the 1st Marine Division, the - enemy’s potential was reduced by the capture of 4,692 POWs, by - inflicting 13,666 casualties on the enemy, by destroying 44 - tanks, and by destroying or capturing much other material.[475] - - [475] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 45–46. Here again it - may be noted that later reports, not available when - this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims - were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two - others unaccounted for in records. The actual total, - therefore, is 38. - -In view of such far-reaching results, total casualties for the 1st -Marine Division of 366 KIA, 49 DOW, 6 MIA, and 2,029 WIA cannot be -considered excessive for an operation fraught with so many calculated -risks. No man’s life was given in vain, for the Communist challenge -to the free nations was met in Korea and the aggressors beaten so -decisively that the world would soon have had peace except for the -intervention of Red China. - - -_MacArthur’s Report to United Nations_ - -Again it is worthy of emphasis that the victory was not won by any -one nation or any one branch of the military service. As far as this -country is concerned, the Inchon-Seoul operation was conducted jointly -by the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. General -Douglas MacArthur was spokesman for all of them late in September 1950, -in these extracts from the Sixth Report of the Commander in Chief, -United Nations Command, to the Security Council of the United Nations: - - “Events of the past two weeks have been decisive. The strategic - concepts designed to win the war are rapidly proving their - soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea, - and air forces. - - “The seizure of the heart of the enemy’s distributing system - in the Seoul area has completely dislocated his logistical - supply to his forces in South Korea and has quickly resulted in - their disintegration. Caught between our northern and southern - forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of - our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy is thoroughly - shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our - combined combat activities. - - “The prompt junction of our two forces is dramatically symbolic - of this collapse. - - “The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the - enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor - beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel and - an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success - demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious - warfare, clockwork coordination, and cooperation between the - units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy - about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been. - The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with - the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and - guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had - this development been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy - would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have - been more costly to United Nations forces.” - -At no time, not even when the United Nations forces were fighting with -their backs to the wall at Pusan, did the commander in chief ever have -any doubts as to the outcome. It was fitting, therefore, that he should -have summed up the results of the combined Eighth Army and X Corps -offensives in this conclusion written after the securing of Seoul: - - “A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely - changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the - North Korean army has been broken and their scattered forces - are being liquidated or driven north with material losses in - equipment and men captured.” - - - - -APPENDIX A - -Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations - - - AAA(AW)Bn--Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (USA). - AD--Destroyer Tender. - AE--Ammunition Ship. - AerialDelPlat--Aerial Delivery Platoon. - AF--Air Force; Store Ship. - AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship. - AH--Hospital Ship. - AK--Cargo Ship. - AKA--Assault Cargo Ship. - AKL--Cargo Ship--Light. - AKS--Stores Issue Ship. - AM--Minesweeper. - AmphTracBn--Amphibious Tractor Battalion. - AmphTrkBn--Amphibious Truck Battalion. - AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper. - ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. - AO--Oiler. - AOG--Gasoline Tanker. - AP--Transport. - APA--Assault Transport. - APD--High Speed Transport. - ARG--Repair Ship--Internal Combustion Engines. - ARH--Repair Ship--Heavy Hull Damage. - ARL--Repair Ship--Landing Craft. - ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion. - ARS--Salvage Vessel. - AT--Antitank. - ATF--Ocean Tug--Fleet. - AV--Seaplane Tender. - AVP--Seaplane Tender, Small. - Bchmstr Unit--Beachmaster Unit. - BLT--Battalion Landing Team. - Bn--Battalion. - CA--Heavy Cruiser. - CG--Commanding General. - CICDet--Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment (USA). - CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. - CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. - CL--Light Cruiser. - CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps. - CNO--Chief of Naval Operations. - CO--Commanding Officer. - Co--Company. - ComAirSupGrp--Commander Air Support Group. - ComCarDiv--Commander Carrier Division. - ComNavFE--Commander Navy Far East. - ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One. - CP--Command Post. - C/S--Chief of Staff. - CSG--Combat Service Group. - CTF--Commander Task Force. - CV--Aircraft Carrier. - CVE--Aircraft Carrier--Escort. - CVL--Aircraft Carrier--Light. - DD--Destroyer. - DDE--Escort Destroyer. - DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer. - DOW--Died of wounds. - DUKW--Amphibious Truck. - Emb Off--Embarkation Officer. - EngrBn--Engineer Battalion. - EngrPortConstCo--Engineer Port Construction Company (USA). - EngrSpecBrig--Engineer Special Brigade (USA). - ETO--European Theater of Operations. - EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea. - FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA). - FAC--Forward Air Controller. - FBHL--Force Beachhead Line. - FEAF--Far East Air Force. - FECOM--Far East Command. - F4U--Vought “Corsair” Fighter. - FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac-Pacific; Lant-Atlantic). - FO--Forward Observer. - FSA--Fire Support Area. - FSCC--Fire Support Coordination Center. - F7F-3--Grumman “Tigercat” Night Fighter. - Fum & Bath Plat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon. - GCI--Ground Control Intercept. - GHQ--General Headquarters. - H & S Co--Headquarters and Service Company. - HO3S-1--Sikorsky Helicopter. - HqBn--Headquarters Battalion. - HqCo--Headquarters Company. - HqSq--Headquarters Squadron. - InfDiv--infantry Division (USA). - interv--Interview. - JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. - JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. - JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group. - JTF--Joint Task Force. - KIA--Killed in Action. - KMC--Korean Marine Corps. - LCM--Landing Craft, Mechanized. - LCVP--Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel. - LSD--Landing Ship, Dock. - LSM--Landing Ship, Medium. - LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket. - LST--Landing Ship, Tank. - LSU--Landing Ship, Utility. - LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked. - LVT(A)--Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored). - MAG--Marine Air Group. - MAW--Marine Air Wing. - MedBn--Medical Battalion. - MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron. - MIA--Missing in action. - MOS--Military Occupational Specialty. - MPCo--Military Police Company. - MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. - MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion. - NCO--Noncommissioned Officer. - NGF--Naval Gunfire. - NK--North Korea(n). - NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. - OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA). - Off--Officer. - OP--Observation Post. - OpnO--Operation Order. - OrdAmmCo--Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA). - OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion. - OY--Consolidated-Vultee light observation plane. - PC--Submarine Chaser. - PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel. - PF--Frigate. - PhibGru--Amphibious Group. - PhibTraPac--Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet. - PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report. - Plat--Platoon. - POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants. - POW--Prisoner of War. - RAF--Royal Air Force. - RcnCo--Reconnaissance Company. - RCT--Regimental Combat Team. - RktBn--Rocket Battalion. - ROK--Republic of Korea. - SAC--Supporting Arms Center. - SAR--Special Action Report. - SCAJAP--Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan. - ServBn--Service Battalion. - SigBn--Signal Battalion. - SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company (USA). - SPBn--Shore Party Battalion. - SpOpnsCo--Special Operations Company (USA). - TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator. - TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps. - TacAir--Tactical Air. - TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. - T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS. - T/E--Table of Equipment. - TF--Task Force. - TG--Task Group. - T/O--Table of Organization. - UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team. - UF--Unit of fire. - UN--United Nations. - UNC--United Nations Command. - USA--United States Army. - USAF--United States Air Force. - USMC--United States Marine Corps. - USN--United States Navy. - VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron). - VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron). - VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron). - VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron). - WIA--Wounded in action. - WP--White phosphorous. - YMS--Motor Minesweeper. - YTB--Harbor Tug, Big. - YW--District Barge, Water (self-propelled). - - - - -APPENDIX B - -Build-Up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf) - - -(Figures include Marine Corps and Navy, both officer and enlisted) - - ------------------------------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- - Authorized by CMC ltr conf. |1st Prov | Main | 7th RCT | Total in - Ser. 03C20550 of 25 Jul 54 | Marine | body | (sailed | Inchon- - and CMC ltr conf. Ser. | Brigade | (sailed | from | Seoul - 03A21250 of 4 Aug 50 |(sailed | San Diego|Mediterranean| area on - ---------------------+--------+San Diego| 10–22 Aug| 16 Aug 50 |23 Sep 50 - | |14 Jul 50| 50 | and San | [477] - Units |Strength| arrived | arrived | Diego | - | | Pusan, | Kobe | 28 Aug- | - | | Korea | Japan | 2 Sep 50 | - | |2 Aug 50)|28 Aug to | arrived | - | | |10 Sep 50)| Inchon on | - | | | | 21 Sep 50) | - | | | | [476] | - ---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- - DIVISION | 22,343 | 4,770 | 12,195 | 5,336 | 20,218 - +--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- - Hq Bn | 923 | 259 | 725 | | 860 - Hq Co | (656)| (182)| | | - Mp Co | (140)| (38)| | | - RcnCo | (127)| (39)| | | - 1st Serv Bn | 827 | 173 | 656 | | 785 - 1st Sig Bn | 960 | 249 | 591 | 116 | 661 - 1st MT Bn | 783 | 118 | 582 | 89 | 761 - 1st Ord Bn | 558 | 124 | 438 | | 518 - 1st Med Bn | 636 | 99 | 432 | 107 | 667 - 1st Tank Bn | 907 | 181 | 677 | 132 | 921 - 1st SP Bn | 755 | 188 | 357 | 196 | 836 - 1st Engr Bn | 1,180 | 218 | 815 | 163 | 969 - 11th Marines | 3,108 | 518 | 1,845 | 697 | 3,009 - 1st Marines | 3,902 | | 3,942 | | 3,393 - 5th Marines | 3,902 | 2,643 |[478]1,135| | 3,170 - 7th Marines | 3,902 | | | 3,836 | 3,666 - +========+=========+==========+=============+========== - FMF TROOPS | 3,969 | 554 | 3,167 | | 2,973 - +--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- - 1st Armd Amph Bn | 526 | | 490 | | - 1st Amph Trac Bn | 944 | 256 | 720 | | [479]842 - 1st Amph Trk Co | 245 | 77 | 166 | | 236 - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ | 90 | | 89 | | 77 - Rkt Bn | | | | | - Carrier Plat FMF | 94 | | 84 | | 86 - 1st Comb Serv Grp | 1,434 | 109 | 1,120 | | 1,167 - 7th MT Bn | 431 | | 418 | | 410 - 1st Air Delivery Plat| 63 | | 62 | | 63 - 1st Fum & Bath Plat | 30 | | 18 | | 30 - VMO 6 | 112 | 112 | | | 62 - +========+=========+==========+=============+========== - Total reinforced | 26,312 | 5,324 | 15,362 | 5,336 | 23,191 - division | | | | | - ---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- - - [476] Activated 17 Aug 50. The 3d Bn 6th Marines, in the - Mediterranean, was assigned to the 7th Marines and, - upon arrival in Kobe, Japan, on 3 Sept 50, was - redesignated the 3d Bn 7th Marines. Augmentation - personnel for this Battalion arrived in Kobe, Japan, - on 14 Sept 50 on the USS _Thomas Jefferson_. The - regimental commander and his staff arrived by air at - Kobe on 6 Sept 50. - - [477] Based on Division Personnel Periodic Report No. 1 - covering the period 15–23 Sept 50. The following losses - and gains during the period are reflected in this - report: - - _Net - _Losses_ _Gains_ Loss_ - - KIA 118 Replacements 28 - WIA 845 Returned to duty 160 - MIA 14 ----- ----- - Non-battle Cas 286 188 1,075 - ----- - 1,263 - - - [478] Augmentation personnel for the 5th Marines (Reinf) - already in Korea. The CO, 1st Marines was charged with - the assembly and organization of the augmentation units - for the 5th Marines (Reinf). Augmentation personnel - were organized into three reinforced rifle companies. - (The battalions of the 5th Marines in Korea contained - only two rifle companies each.) The reinforced - rifle companies were embarked together on one ship. - Augmentation personnel for units of the Brigade, other - than the 5th Marines, were attached to the reinforced - rifle companies. - - [479] The 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was left - in Kobe. In addition, at Kobe, were the Division - Administrative Center and some 500 17-year olds, who, - by order of SecNav, were removed from the troop list - just before sailing for Inchon. As of 15 Sept 50 there - were the following personnel of the 1st Marine Division - (Reinf) at Kobe: - - Key: _O_: Officers - _E_: Enlisted - - _Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_ - -------------- -------- ---------- - _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ - 59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282 - - - - -APPENDIX C - -Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing - - -In order to present a concise picture of the Task Organization of -the 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, for the period of 1 August-7 -October 1950, task organizations are presented for the following five -conditions: - - (1) Completion of mobilization of the Division (less 1st - Provisional Marine Brigade and RCT-7) at Camp Pendleton, - Oceanside, California, 12 August. - - (2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA, 15 September. - - (3) RCT-7 task organization on arrival INCHON, KOREA, 21 - September. - - (4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during - the period 15 September-7 October. - - (5) Completion of INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation on 7 October. - -The detailed Task Organizations are as follows: - - (1) Completion of Mobilization on WAR “K” series T/O, 12 August. - - _1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less Brig Det LtCol M. T. STARR - 1st SigBn, less Brig Det, 2 SP - Comm Sects & Det Anglico - Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER - 1st ServBn, less Brig Det LtCol C. L. BANKS - 1st OrdBn, less Brig Det Maj L. O. WILLIAMS - 1st MT Bn, less Cos A and D; 1st - Amph Trk Co, FMF, less 1 Plat LtCol O. L. BEALL - 1st Med Bn, less Cos A and E Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN - 1st EngrBn, less Cos A and D LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE - 1st SP Bn, less Cos A and C LtCol H. P. CROWE - 1st Tk Bn, less Cos A and D; - Tk Plat AT Co, 1st Mar - Tk Plat AT Co, 5th Mar LtCol H. T. MILNE - 1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less Cos - A and D LtCol E. F. WANN - 1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF, less - 1st Plat Co A and Cos C and D LtCol F. H. COOPER - - 1st CSG, SC, FMF, less BrigDet; - 1st Fum & Bath Plat, SC, FMF - 1st Aerial Del Plat, SC, FMF Col J. S. COOK - 7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA - 1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co; Cos - C, F, and I, Reinf, 5th Mar Col L. B. PULLER - 11th Mar, less 1st and 3rd Bns; - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER - - (2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA (1st Prov Mar - Brig disbanded 13 September, units and detachments reverted - control parent organizations of division). Task Organization - from Annex “A”, 1st Mar Div Op Order 2-50 as derived from X - Corps Op Order No. 1. - - _1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, Reinf, 1stMarDiv, less dets - 163rd Mil Int Service Det - 441st CIC Det - 1st Sig Bn, Reinf, less dets; - Det, 205th Sig Rep Co USA - Carrier Plat, FMF - Det, 4th Sig Bn, USA - 1st Serv Bn, less Dets - 1st MT Bn - 1st Ord Bn, less dets - Det, MTACS-2 - - _Blt-3, RCT-5_ LtCol R. D. TAPLETT - - 3dBn, 5th Mar - Det, ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn - Det, Co A, 1st Tk Bn - Recon Det, 11th Mar - Team 1, SP Gp A - 1stPlat, Co A, 1st SP Bn - SP Comm Sqd, 1st Sig Bn - Amm Sqd, 1st Ord Bn - Det, Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn - Det, 1st CSG, (SP Aug) - Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN - - _RCT-5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 5th Mar, less 3dBn & Tk Plat, AT Co - Co A, 1st Engr Bn - Co C, 1st Med Bn - Det Anglico, 1st Sig Bn - ROK Marine Bn - SP GP A, less Team 1; - Co, A, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat - Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn - Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG - Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG - Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG - Det, CS Plat, CSG - Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG - SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn - Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug) - Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN - 1st Traffic Plat, MP Co - Police Sqd, MP Co - FO & Ln Sec, 1st Bn, 11th Mar - Co A, 1st Tk Bn, less det - Det, Sig Co, 1st Sig Bn - - _RCT-1_ Col L. B. PULLER - - 1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co - Co A, Reinf, 56th Amph Trac Bn, USA - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF - Co C, Reinf, 1st Engr Bn, less det; - Water Sup Sec - Co D, 1st Med Bn, less det - Det ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn - SP Gp B, less Team 3; - Co B, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat & - Equip Sec - Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn - Amm Plat, less 1 Sqd, 1st Ord Bn - Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn - Fuel Sec, 1st Ser Bn - SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn - - - Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN - Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug) - 2d Traffic Plat, MP Co - Police Sqd, MP Co - FO & Ln Secs, 2d Bn, 11th Mar - - _11th Mar, less 3d Bn, reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER - - 96th FA Bn, USA - Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn - 1st Amph Trk Co, FMF - - _1st Tk Bn, less dets, reinf_ LtCol H. T. MILNE - - Tk Plat, AT Co, 1st Mar - Tk Plat, AT Co, 5th Mar - - _1st Engr Bn, less dets_ LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE - - _1st SP Bn, less dets_ LtCol H. P. CROWE - - H&S Co, 1st SP Bn, less dets - SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn - Team 3, SP Gp B - 3d Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn - Equip Sec, Co B, 1st SP Bn - SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn - Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG - Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG - Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG - Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG - Det, GS Plat, CSG - Det, Depot Plat, CSG - - _Rcn Co, 1st MAR Div_ Capt K. J. HOUGHTON - - _1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN - - _VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK - - _ROK Marine Regt_ (-) Col SHIN, KMC - - _2d Engr Spec Brig reinf_ Col J. TWITTY, USA - - 1st CSG, SC, FMF, less dets - 1st Fum & Bath Plat - 1st Aerial Del Plat - Naval Beach Gp 1, less dets - 7th MT Bn, SC, FMF - 73d Engr (C) Bn, USA - 50th Engr Port Const Co, USA - 65th Ord Amm Co, USA - -(3) RCT-7 Task Organization on landing at INCHON, KOREA, 21 September. -Attachments reverted to parent control on arrival assembly areas. - - _RCT-7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 7th Mar - 3d Bn, 11th Mar - Co D, 1st MT Bn - Co D, 1st Tk Bn - Co D, 1st Engr Bn - Co E, 1st Med Bn - Co C, 1st SP Bn - Det, 1st Sig Bn (ANGLICO - & 2 SP Comm Sec) - -(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during the -period 15 September-7 October. - - 18 Sept--32nd RCT USA attached 1st Mar Div - - 19 Sep--SpOpnsCo USA attchd 1st Mar Div - 32nd RCT detached 1st MarDiv reverted to 7th Inf Div - - 23 Sep--17th ROK Regt attchd 1st Mar Div - 17th ROK Regt detached 1st Mar Div - - 24 Sep--3d Bn, 187th Airborne RCT USA Attchd 1st Mar Div - 3d Bn, KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div attached 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT - 1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less 3 Cos, detached 1st Mar Div attchd 7th - Inf Div - Co A, 1st Amph Tk and Trac Bn, USA, detached 1st Mar Div attchd - 7th Inf Div - - 25 Sept--3d Bn, 187th AB RCT detached 1st Mar Div, attchd X Corps - 3d Bn, KMC Regt det 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT attchd 1st MarDiv - 161st KMC Bn (redesignated 5th KMC Bn) attchd 1st Mar Div - Sp Opns Co, USA detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT - - 26 Sep--3d Bn KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 187th AB RCT - (TF ABLE) - - 29 Sep--1st Amph Trac Bn, less 3d Cos, detached 7th Inf Div attchd 1st - Mar Div 96th FA Bn, USA detached 1st Mar Div - - 30 Sep--50th AAA(AW)Bn attached 1st Mar Div - - 3 Oct--50th AAA(AW)Bn detached 1st Mar Div - -(5) Completion of INCHON-SEOUL operation, 7 October, and prior to -mounting out at INCHON. - - _1st Marine Division Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, 1st MarDiv - 163d MISD - 441st CIC - Civ Asst Team LtCol M. T. STARR - - 1st Sig Bn - Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER - - 1st Serv Bn LtCol C. L. BANKS - - 1st Ord Bn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS - - 1st MT Bn - 1st Amph Trk Co, FMF LtCol O. L. BEALL - - 1st Tk Bn LtCol H. T. MILNE - - 1st Med Bn Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN - - 1st SP Bn LtCol H. P. CROWE - - 1st Engr Bn LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE - - 1st Mar Col L. B. PULLER - - 5th Mar LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 7th Mar Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 11th Mar - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER - - 1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF - less Co D LtCol E. F. WANN - - 1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF - less Cos C & D LtCol F. H. COOPER - - 7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA - - 1st CSG, SC, FMF less dets; - 1st Fum & Bath Plat - 1st Aerial Del Plat Col J. S. COOK - - - - -APPENDIX D - -Supplies and Equipment for Inchon - - -1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 August 1950 provided -that the following supplies and equipment would be embarked in assigned -shipping: - - a. Class I - - (1) Rations: 30 days as follows: - - For attached Army units and 5th Marines (Reinf) - Individual Assault Type C 5 days - (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - Operational Type B 25 days - (Unit Loaded) (25 days) - PX Accessories Pack 30 days - (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - (Unit Loaded) (10 days) - (Convoy Loaded) (15 days) - - For 1st Marine Division (Reinf) (Less Army elements - and 5th Marines (Reinf)) 5 days - Operational Type B - (Convoy Loaded) - Food Packet, Individual Assault 1A1 2 days - (In hands of individuals) (1 day) - Individual Combat, Type C 10 days - (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - (Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - PX Accessories Pack 30 days - (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - (Unit Loaded) (10 days) - (Convoy Loaded) (15 days) - Small Detachment 5 in 1 Type 5 days - (Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) - Individual Combat Type C - (Convoy Loaded-Corps Reserve) 150,000 Rations - (In hands of 1st Serv Bn) - - (2) Water - - (a) All water containers filled, not less than 5 gallons per - man combat loaded; 5 gallons per man to be unit loaded. - - (b) Assault Elements: 2 filled canteens per individual. - - (c) Others: 1 filled canteen. - - b. Class II - - (1) Essential Class II items as determined by unit commanders. - Vehicles to be loaded on priority basis within available space. - - (2) Initial (less chemical warfare) in hands of units. - - (3) Chemical warfare in hands of 1st Serv Bn. - - (4) 30 day replenishment in hands of appropriate service units. - - (5) All distillation units to have high priority for unloading. - - (6) No special services gear to be lifted in assault shipping. - - (7) Tentage: not to exceed 10% of T/E allowance. - - (8) Other Class II in accordance AdOrder 2-50. - - c. Class III - - (1) Vehicle tanks ¼ full. Jeeps-1 filled expeditionary can - (5 gal); all other vehicles: 2 filled cans (5 gal each). - - (2) Replenishment 30 days - Assault units: - (Combat Unit Load) (15 days) - (Unit Load) (15 days) - Other Units: - (Combat Unit Load) ( 5 days) - (Unit Load) (25 days) - - d. Class IV - - (1) In accordance with AdOrder 2-50. - - e. Class V--5 units of fire - - (1) Assault Units - (Combat Unit Load) ( 2 U/F) - (Unit Load) ( 3 U/F) - (2) Other than Assault Units - (Combat Unit Load) ( 1 U/F) - (Unit Load) ( 4 U/F) - (3) Flame thrower fuel 15 U/F - (Combat Unit Load) ( 5 U/F) - (Unit Load) (10 U/F) - - - - -APPENDIX E - -Task Organization Joint Task Force Seven - - - JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN VAdm Arthur D. Struble - - Task Force 90--Attack Force RAdm James H. Doyle - 92.1 Landing Force MajGen Oliver P. Smith - 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) - - 92.11 Regimental Combat Team 1 Col Lewis B. Puller - 92.11.1 Battalion Landing - Team 1, 1st Marines LtCol Jack Hawkins - 92.11.2 Battalion Landing - Team 2, 1st Marines LtCol Alan Sutter - 92.11.3 Battalion Landing - Team 3, 1st Marines LtCol Thomas L. Ridge - - 92.12 Regimental Combat Team 5 LtCol Raymond L. Murray - 92.12.1 Battalion Landing - Team 1, 5th Marines LtCol George R. Newton - 92.12.2 Battalion Landing - Team 2, 5th Marines LtCol Harold R. Roise - - 90.00 Flagship Element - _Mount McKinley_ AGC Capt Carter A. Printup - _Eldorado_ (RAdm Lyman K. - Thackrey embarked) AGC Capt Joseph B. Stefanac - 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element - Tactical Air Squadron 1 Cdr Theophilus H. Moore - 90.02 Naval Beach Group Element Capt Watson T. Singer - 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit - 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr Martin C. Sibitzky - 90.02.3 Boat Unit 1 LCdr Herman E. Hock - 90.02.4 Amphibious - Construction - Battalion LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr. - 90.02.5 Underwater - Demolition - Team Unit LCdr David F. Welch - - 90.03 Control Element LCdr Clyde Allmon - _Diachenko_ APD LCdr James R. Wilson - 90.03.1 Control Unit Red LCdr Ralph H. Schneeloch, Jr. - _Horace A. Bass_ APD LCdr Alan Ray - 90.03.2 Control Unit Green Lt Reuben W. Berry - PCEC 896 PCEC Lt Reuben W. Berry - 90.03.3 Control Unit Blue Lt Theodore B. Clark - _Wantuck_ APD LCdr John B. Thro - - 90.04 Administrative Element Capt Virginius R. Roane - 90.04.1 Service Unit - _Consolation_ AH Capt Charles M. Ryan - 12 LSU (plus additional - LSUs on arrival) 12-20 LSU - 90.04.2 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette - _Lipan_ LCdr Howard K. Smith - _Cree_ Lt George E. Poore - _Arikara_ 3 ATF LCdr Kenneth A. Mundy - _Conserver_ ARS Lt James L. Thompson - _Askari_ ARL LCdr Robert J. Siegelman - YTB 406 YTB - _Gunston Hall_ Cdr Charles W. Musgrave - _Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr. - _Comstock_ 3 LSD Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette - 90.1 Advance Attack Group Capt Norman W. Sears - 92.12.3 Advance Landing - Force Unit - Battalion Landing Team 3 LtCol Robert D. Taplett - 5th Marines - 90.11 Transport Element Capt Norman W. Sears - _Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr. - 3 LSU embarked - 90.11.1 Transport Unit Cdr Selden C. Small - _Horace A. Bess_ LCdr Alan Ray - _Diachenko_ LCdr James R. Wilson - _Wantuck_ LCdr John B. Thro - 90.2 Transport Group Capt Virginius R. Roane - _George Clymer_ Capt Raymond S. Lamb - _Cavalier_ Capt Daniel J. Sweeney - _Pickaway_ Capt Samuel H. Crittenden, Jr. - _Henrico_ Capt John E. Fradd - _Noble_ 5 APA Capt Michael F. D. Flaherty - _Union_ Capt Gerald D. Zurmuchlen - _Alshain_ Capt Robert N. S. Clark - _Achernar_ Capt Crutchfield Adair - _Oglethorpe_ Capt Paul F. Heerbrandt - _Seminole_ Capt Henry Farrow - _Thuban_ Cdr Erle V. Dennett - _Whiteside_ Capt Eugene L. Lugibihl - _Washburn_ 8 AKA Capt James A. Prichard - _President Jackson_ AP Capt Charles A. Ferriter - _Gunston Hall_[A] Cdr Charles W. Musgrave - _Comstock_[A] Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette - - 90.3 Tractor Group Capt Robert C. Peden - LST 611 Lt Delmar E. Blevins - LST 715 Lt Willie J. Gros - LST 742 Lt Robert B. Leonnig - LST 802 Lt Vladimir Fedorowicz - LST 845 Lt John F. Butler - LST 1048 Lt Rayburn M. Quinn - LST 1123 Lt Charles L. Wall - LST 1134 Lt William B. Faris - LST 1138 Lt Mike Stapleton - LST 857 Lt Dick Weidemeyer - LST 859 Lt Leland Tinsley - LST 898 Lt Robert M. Beckley - LST 914 Lt Ralph L. Holzhaus - LST 973 Lt Robert I. Trapp - LST 799 Lt Trumond E. Houston - LST 883 Lt Charles M. Miller - LST 975 17 LST Lt Arnold W. Harer - SCAJAP LSTs 30 LST - LSM 419 LSM Lt John R. Bradley - - 90.4 Transport Division 14 Capt Samuel G. Kelly - (7th RCT U. S. Marines and MAG - 33 embarked; did not arrive - Inchon until 21 Sept.) - _Bayfield_ Capt William E. Ferrall - _Okanogan_ Capt Timothy F. Donohue - _Bexar_ Capt Clarence E. Coffin, Jr. - _Thomas Jefferson_ 4 APA Capt Tyrrell D. Jacobs - _Algol_ Capt John A. Edwards - _Winston_ Capt Jack Maginnis - _Montague_ 3 AKA Capt Henry P. Wright, Jr. - _Catamount_ Cdr Kenneth Loveland - _Colonial_ 2 LSD Cdr Thomas J. Greene - - 90.5 Air Support Group RAdm Richard W. Ruble - 90.51 CVE Element RAdm Richard W. Ruble - Badoeng Strait Capt Arnold W. McKechnie - Sicily 2 CVE Capt John S. Thach - 90.52 CVE Screen Cdr Byron L. Gurnette - _Hanson_ DDR Cdr Cecil R. Welte - _Taussig_ Cdr William C. Meyer - _George K. MacKenzie_ Cdr William R. Laird, Jr. - _Ernest G. Small_ 3 DD Cdr Franklin C. Snow - - 90.6 Gunfire Support Group RAdm John M. Higgins - - 90.61 Cruiser Element RAdm John M. Higgins - 90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 1 RAdm John M. Higgins - _Toledo_ Capt Richard F. Stout - _Rochester_ Capt Edward L. Woodyard - _HMS Kenya_ Capt P. W. Brock, RN - _HMS Jamaica_ Capt J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O., - O.B.E., RN - - 90.62 Destroyer Element Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr. - 90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 2 Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr. - _Mansfield_ Cdr Edwin H. Headland - _De Haven_ Cdr Oscar B. Lungren - _Lyman K. Swenson_ 3 DD Cdr Robert A. Schelling - - 90.63 Fire Support Unit 3 Cdr Robert H. Close - _Collett_ Cdr Robert H. Close - _Gurke_ Cdr Frederick M. Radel - _Henderson_ Cdr William S. Stewart - - 90.63 LSMR Element Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr. - 90.6.4 Fire Support Unit 4 Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr. - LSMR 401 LCdr Melvin E. Bustard, Jr. - LSMR 403 Lt Frank G. Schettino - LSMR 404 3 LSMR Lt George M. Wrocklage - - 90.7 Screening and Protective Group Capt Richard T. Spofford - _Rowan_ DD Cdr Alan R. Josephson - _Southerland_ DDR Cdr Homer E. Conrad - _Bayonne_ LCdr Harry A. Clark - _Newport_ LCdr Percy A. Lilly, Jr. - _Evansville_ LCdr Elliot V. Converse, Jr. - _HMS Mounts Bay_ Capt J. H. Unwin, D. S. C., RN - _HMS Whitesand Bay_ LCdr J. V. Brothers, RN - _HMNZS Tutira_ LCdr P. J. H. Hoare, RNZN - _HMNZS Pukaki_ 7 PF LCdr L. E. Herrick, D. S. C., RNZN - _RFS La Grandiere_ 8 PF Cdr Urbain E. Cabanie - _Pledge_ AM Lt Richard Young - _Partridge_ Lt(jg) Robert C. Fuller, Jr. - _Mockingbird_ Lt(jg) Stanley P. Gary - _Kite_ Lt(jg) Nicholas Grkovic - _Osprey_ Lt(jg) Philip Levin - _Redhead_ Lt(jg) T. R. Howard - _Chatterer_ 6 AMS Lt(jg) James P. McMahon - - 90.8 Second Echelon Movement Group Capt Louis D. Sharp, Jr. - 92.2 7th Infantry Division - (Reinforced) - _General G. M. Randall_ Capt Alexander C. Thorington - _General J. C. Breckinridge_ Capt Fremont B. Eggers - _General H. W. Butner_ 3 AP Capt Dale E. Collins - _Fred C. Ainsworth_ - _General Leroy Eltinge_ - _Aiken Victory_ - _Private Sadao S. Munemoi_ 4 T-AP - _SS African Rainbow_ - _SS African Pilot_ - _SS Robin Kirk_ - _SS Helen Lykes_ - _SS Meredith Victory_ - _SS Empire Marshall_ - _SS Mormacport_ - _SS Lawrence Victory_ - _SS Southwind_ - _SS Beaver Victory_ - _SS Robin Goodfellow_ - _SS California Bear_ - - 90.9 Third Echelon Movement Group Capt Albert E. Jarrell - X Corps troops - _General William A. Mann_ AP Capt Charles H. Walker - _General William Weigel_ - _Marine Phoenix_ 2 T-AP - _SS Robin Trent_ - _SS Dolly Turman_ - _SS Charles Lykes_ - _SS Twin Falls Victory_ - _SS American Veteran_ - _SS American Attorney_ - _SS Empire Wallace_ - _SS Green Bay Victory_ - _SS P. & T. Navigator_ - _SS Luxembourg Victory_ - _SS Belgium Victory_ - _SS Bessemer Victory_ - _SS Cotton State_ - - 91 Blockade and Covering Force RAdm Sir William G. Andrewes, - K. B. E., C. B., D. S. O., RN - _HMS Triumph_ CVL Capt A. D. Torlesse, D. S. O., RN - _HMS Ceylon_ CL Capt C. F. J. L. Davies, D. S. C., RN - _HMS Cockade_ LtCdr H. J. Lee, D. S. C., RN - _HMS Charity_ LtCdr P. R. G. Worth, D. S. C., RN - _HMCS Cayuga_ Capt Jeffry V. Brock, D. S. C., RCN - _HMCS Sioux_ Cdr P. D. Taylor, RCN - _HMCS Athabaskan_ Cdr R. T. Welland, D. S. C., RCN - _HMAS Bataan_ Cdr W. B. M. Marks, RAN - _HMAS Warramunga_ Cdr O. H. Becher, D. S. C., RAN - _HNethMS Evertsen_ 8 DD LtCdr D. J. Van Doorninck - - ROK NAVAL FORCES Cdr Michael J. Luosey, USN - - _Paik Doo San_ (PC 701) Cdr Chai Yong Nam, ROKN - _Kum Kang San_ (PC 702) Cdr Lee Hi Jong, ROKN - _Chi Ri San_ (PC 704) 4 PC LCdr Hyun Sibak, ROKN - YMS 302 - YMS 303 - YMS 306 - YMS 307 - YMS 501 - YMS 502 - YMS 503 - YMS 510 - YMS 512 - YMS 515 - YMS 518 11 YMS - - TASK FORCE 77--FAST CARRIER GROUP RAdm Edward C. Ewen (in - _Philippine Sea_) - - Carrier Division 1 RAdm Edward C. Ewen - _Philippine Sea_ CV Capt Willard K. Goodney - Carrier Division 3 RAdm John M. Hoskins - _Valley Forge_ CV Capt Lester K. Rice - Carrier Division 5 - _Boxer_ CV Capt Cameron Briggs - 77.1 Support Group Capt Harry H. Henderson - _Worcester_ Capt Harry H. Henderson - 77.2 Screen Group Capt Charles W. Parker - DesDiv 31 Capt Charles W. Parker - _Shelton_ Cdr Charles B. Jackson, Jr. - _James E. Kyes_ Cdr Fran M. Christiansen - _Eversole_ 3 DD Cdr Charles E. Phillips - _Higbee_ DDR Cdr Elmer Moore - DesDiv 111 Capt Jeane R. Clark - _Wiltsie_ Cdr Carrol W. Brigham - _Theodore E. Chandler_ Cdr William J. Collum, Jr. - _Hamner_ 3 DD Cdr Jack J. Hughes - _Chevalier_ DDR Cdr Blake B. Booth - DesDiv 112 Capt Bernard F. Roeder - _Ozbourn_ Cdr Charles O. Akers - _Mc Kean_ Cdr Harry L. Reiter, Jr. - _Hollister_ 3 DD Cdr Hugh W. Howard - _Frank Knox_ DDR Cdr Sam J. Caldwell, Jr. - CortRon 1 - _Fletcher_ Cdr W. M. Lowry - _Radford_ 2 DDE Cdr Elvin C. Ogle - - TASK FORCE 79--COMMANDER - SERVICE SQUADRON 3 Capt Bernard L. Austin - - 79.1 Mobile Logistic Service Group Capt John G. McClaughry - _Cacapon_ (Initially) Capt John G. McClaughry - _Passumpsic_ (Initially) 2 AO Capt Frank I. Winant, Jr. - _Mount Katmai_ AE Capt Albert S. Carter - _Graffias_ AF Capt William W. Fitts - 79.2 Objective Area Logistic Group Capt Philip H. Ross - _Navasota_ (Initially) AO Capt Robert O. Strange - _Virgo_ AKA Capt Philip H. Ross - _Grainger_ AK Cdr Horace C. Laird, Jr. - _Hewell_ Lt Stanley Jaworski - _Ryer_ Lt Gurley P. Chatelain - _Estero_ 3 AKL Lt Tom Watson - 79.3 Logistic Support Group Capt Bernard L. Austin - _Piedmont_ Capt James R. Topper - _Dixie_ 2 AD Capt Jose M. Cabanillas - _Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG Cdr Lester C. Conwell - _Jason_ ARH Capt William B. Epps - _Cimarron_ AO Capt Stanley G. Nichols - _Warrick_ Capt George Fritschmann - _Uvalde_ 2 AKA Capt Louis F. Teuscher - _Nemasket_ AOG Lt Harry F. Dixon - _Karin_ AF LCdr Berley L. Maddox - 79.4 Salvage and Maintenance Group - _Mataco_ ATF Lt Frank P. Wilson - _Bolster_ ARS Lt Billis L. Whitworth - - TASK FORCE 99--PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE - FORCE RAdm George R. Henderson - - _Curtiss_ AV Capt Anson C. Perkins - _Gardiners Bay_ AVP Capt Frank G. Raysbrook - _Salisbury Sound_ AV Capt Francis R. Jones - 99.1 Search and Reconnaissance Group Capt Joseph M. Carson - 99.11 Patrol Squadron 6 Cdr Arthur F. Farwell, Jr. - 99.12 88th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Helme - 99.13 209th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Le Cheminant - 99.2 Patrol and Escort Group Capt Joseph M. Carson - 99.21 Patrol Squadron 42 Cdr Gordon F. Smale - 99.22 Patrol Squadron 47 Cdr Joe H. Arnold - - [A] 3 LSU embarked - - - - -APPENDIX F - -Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing - - -Below, as nearly as can be determined, is the troop list of the 1st -Marine Division (Reinf) for the Inchon Landing. The list is correct as -to units included, but it has been difficult to reconcile the totals -given for units. - - _Unit_ _Actual - Strength_ - Headquarters Bn 916 - 1st Serv Bn 873 - 1st Sig Bn [480]652 - 1st MT Bn 686 - 1st Med Bn 566 - 1st Am Trk Co 244 - 1st Ord Bn 533 - 1st Shore Party Bn [481]648 - 1st Engr Bn 1,038 - 1st Tank Bn [482]811 - 11th Marines [483]2,360 - 1st Marines 3,850 - 5th Marines 3,611 - 7th Marines 0 - 1st Am Trac Bn 868 - 1st CSG [484]1,291 - 7th MT Bn 430 - Det MTACS-2 55 - VMO-6 62 - ------- - Total Marine Corps and Navy 19,494 - ------- - Korean MC Regt 2,786 - ------- - Co A, 56th Am Trac Bn, USA 151 - Hq Det, USA 38 - Sig Det, USA 37 - 96th FA Bn, USA 388 - 2d Engr Spec Brig, USA 952 - 73d Engr (c) Bn, USA 724 - 50th Engr Port Const Co., USA 214 - 65th Ord Amm Co., USA 256 - ------ - Total U. S. Army 2,760 - ------ - Grand Total 25,040 - - [480] Includes Carrier Platoon, FMF. - - [481] Includes Detachments of Naval Beach Group 1. - - [482] Includes Anti-Tank Platoons of the Antitank Companies - of the 1st and 5th Marines. - - [483] Includes Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Bn, FMF. - - [484] Includes 1st Fumigation and Bath Plat., FMF; 1st Aerial - Delivery Plat., FMF; and Naval Beach Group 1 (less - dets. with the 1st Shore Party Bn). - - -_Distribution of Units of the Division Not Participating in the Inchon -Landing_ - -The following units of the Division, distributed as indicated, did not -participate in the Inchon Landing: - - Key: _O_: Officers - _E_: Enlisted - _Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_ - -------------- -------- ---------- - _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ - - RCT-7, en route to the Far East. 233 4,905 21 224 254 5,129 - - Administrative Center Pusan, - Korea 9 172 1 9 173 - - Division Administrative Center, - 1st Armd Amph TracBn, - 17-year-olds and casuals - at Kobe, Japan 59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282 - ------------------------------------ - Total 301 6,345 24 239 325 6,584 - - - - -APPENDIX G - -Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for the -Inchon-Seoul Campaign - - - 1-50 9 Aug 50 Movement of the Division to the Far East - - 2-50 4 Sep 50 Inchon Landing - - 3-50 15 Sep 50 (2328) Seizure of Objective O-3 short of the FBHL - - 4-50 16 Sep 50 (1045) Seizure of FBHL - - 5-50 16 Sep 50 (1600) Capture of Kimpo Airfield. Prepare to seize - Corps Phase Line C-C - - 6-50 18 Sep 50 (1814) Seizure and preparation of crossing of Han - River by 5th Marines. 1st Marines to - continue attack relieved on the right - (south) flank by the 32nd Infantry now - attached to 1st MarDiv - - 7-50 19 Sep 50 (1430) Crossing of the Han River by the 5th Marines - and uncovering crossing sites by 1st - Marines - - 8-50 20 Sep 50 Continuation of attack by 5th Marines toward - Seoul to uncover the northern approaches - of the main Seoul bridge sites. - Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to - seize the southern and western approaches - and the Seoul bridge sites, prepared to - cross the Han River in that vicinity - - 9-50 23 Sep 50 (1200) Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to - seize high ground south of the road and - rail bridges leading to Seoul prepared to - cross the Han River. Continuation of attack - by 5th Marines to uncover the bridge - sites. Crossing of the Han River at - Haengju by the 7th Marines to seize - objectives covering the north flank of the - Division - - 10-50 23 Sep 50 (2200) Crossing of the Han River by the 1st Marines. - Continuation of the attack by the - 5th Marines. 7th Marines to continue or - Mission assigned by 1st MarDiv OpnO - 9-50 - - 11-50 24 Sep 50 (2400) Continuation of the attack with all three - regiments to capture Seoul and the high - ground north thereof - - 12-50 26 Sep 50 (1230) Continuation of the attack to capture Seoul. - Boundary between 5th and 7th Marines - changed to pinch out 5th Marines beyond - the Government Palace. The 7th Marines - to make an enveloping attack from the - northwest - - 13-50 29 Sep 50 (2000) Continuation of the attack to the east to - secure Seoul and conduct a reconnaissance - in force to the northwest prepared to - relieve elements of the 7th Infantry - Division north of the Han River. Seizure of - prescribed Corps blocking positions - - 14-50 30 Sep 50 (1500) Continuation of the attack and prescription - of blocking positions to be occupied by the - Division - - 15-50 5 Oct 50 Movement of the Division to staging area - in the vicinity of Inchon in anticipation of - the move in assault shipping to Wonsan - - - - -APPENDIX H - -Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign - - -The enemy’s method of operation, except for a brief determined stand -near and in Seoul, consisted of moderate to strong delaying actions. -The first reaction following the initial disorganization at Inchon -was an attempt to contain our advance until such time as sufficient -reinforcements could arrive to warrant initiating a counteroffensive. -In view of the scarcity of reinforcements and our own rapid advances, -this never materialized. - -The Order of Battle of the units which opposed the advance of the -Division from the time of the landing at Inchon until the capture of -Uijongbu, north of Seoul, is given below: - - --------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------ - Unit | POWs | Area of |Strength| Remarks - |captured| employment | | - --------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------ - 226th Marine | 183 |Inchon | 2,000 |In the Inchon area - Regt | | | | prior to the landing. - | | | | Newly conscripted - | | | | and poorly trained. - | | | | - 918th (Coast) | 2(?) | do | 200 |In the Inchon area prior - Art Regt | | | | to the landing. 8 76mm - (Elements). | | | | guns. Wiped out or - | | | | scattered by naval and - | | | | air bombardment. - | | | | - Air Force | 91 |Kimpo | [485] |When out troops - Division | | Airfield | | approached the - | | | | airfield area part - | | | | of the personnel from - | | | | this unit withdrew - | | | | across the Han River. - | | | | - 42d Mech | 11 |Between | 500 |Arrived in Seoul from - (Tank) Regt | | Inchon and | | Sinuiju in early Sept. - | | Seoul. | | 18 T-34 tanks. - | | | | - | | | | - 107th Security| 270 |Kimpo Area | 2,500 |In the Kimpo area when - Regt | | | | we landed. A - | | | | quasi-military - | | | | organization. - | | | | - Rehabilitation| 16 |West of | 230 |This unit was organized - Bn (Special | | Yongdungpo.| | on 19 Sept and contained - Cultural) | | | | NK prisoners serving - Bn. | | | | sentence in Seoul. - | | | | Officers were also - | | | | former prisoners. Most - | | | | were serving sentence - | | | | for desertion. - | | | | - 3d Regt, 9th | 23 |Yongdungpo | 2,000 |Remainder of the division - Rifle Div | | | | on the southern front. - | | | | - 25th Inf Brig | 179 |Seoul |4,000- | Arrived from Chorwon on - | | | 5,000 | 20 Sept. An excellent - | | | | unit which opposed the - | | | | 5th Marines on the - | | | | western approaches - | | | | to Seoul. - | | | | - 18th Rifle Div| 301 |Seoul and |8,000- |Arrived from Chorwon in - | | Yongdungpo.| 10,000| mid-August. Known as - | | | | the Seoul Defense - | | | | Division. It was the - | | | | only unit of division - | | | | strength in the area. - | | | | - 43d Tank Regt | 56 |Seoul | 500 |Arrived from Wonsan 23 - | | | | Sept. 10–15 T-34 - | | | | tanks. - | | | | - 19th AA Regt | 5 | do | 1,200 |In Seoul when we landed. - | | | | 37mm, 85mm, and 12.7mm - | | | | AT guns. - | | | | - 76th Ind Regt,| 218 | do | 3,000 |Arrived from Wonsan after - 42d Div | | | | 17 Sept. Was opposite - | | | | the 5th Marines but - | | | | withdrew from Seoul - | | | | almost intact. - | | | | - 78th Ind Regt | 528 | do | 2,000 |Arrived from Sariwon on - | | | | 20 Sept. Opposed the - | | | | 5th and 1st Marines. - | | | | Put up stubborn defense - | | | | and suffered heavy - | | | | losses. - | | | | - 513th Art Regt| 33 | do | 1,500 |Arrived from Chorwon on - | | | | 23 Sept. 1 76mm and 5 - | | | | 45mm guns. Most of - | | | | the regiment served - | | | | as infantry. - | | | | - 10th Railroad | 17 | do | 900 |In Seoul when we landed. - Regt. | | | | Its mission was to - | | | | maintain the security - | | | | of the railroad lines - | | | | and keep them in - | | | | operation. It - | | | | participated in the - | | | | defense of Seoul. - | | | | - 31st Rifle | 345 | do | 3,600 |In Seoul when we landed. - Div/or Seoul| | | | Formed as a division - City Regt. | | | | on 20 Sept by an - | | | | amalgamation of units - | | | | in Seoul. Participated - | | | | in the defense of Seoul - | | | | and delayed our advance - | | | | north to Uijongbu. - | | | | - 36th Bn, 111th| 32 | do | 750 |In Seoul when we landed. - Security | | | | - Regt | | | | - | | | | - 2d Regt 17th | 41 |Seoul- | 3,500 |Withdrawn from the - Rifle Div | | Uijongbu | | southern front after - (Reinforced)| | | | the landing at - | | | | Inchon. - | | | | - 75th Ind Regt.| 16 |Uijongbu | 2,000 |Arrived from Hamhung on - | | | | 30 Sept. Used as a - | | | | covering force to - | | | | cover the withdrawal - | | | | through Uijongbu. - | | | | - 27th Inf Brig.| 123 |Suyuhyon | 5,000 |Arrived from Kumchon on - | | | | 1 Oct. Withdrew in - | | | | the face of the - | | | | advance of the 5th - | | | | Marines to Suyuhyon, - | | | | 17 miles northwest - | | | | of Seoul. - | | | | - Total Enemy Strength 44,380 - - [485] Unknown. - -A total of 428 prisoners interrogated did not know enough of their own -units to be further identified. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were not -interrogated due to the heavy initial influx. - -Prisoners were captured from some 24 units not listed above, but the -number of prisoners captured from individual units was not sufficient -to accept the presence of the unit. Further, many of these POWs were -deserters or wounded from the southern front. - -The identification, by date, of North Korean units opposing the 1st -Marine Division is indicated below: - - 15 September 226th Ind Marine Regt 2,000 defending Wolmi-do - (2 Bns). and Inchon - 918th Art Regt (2 Cos) 200 defending Wolmi-do - - 16 September 18th Rifle Div (Opposing 300 POWs and 1,350 - 1st Marines) enemy casualties for - the first two days, - 15 and 16 Sep - - 17 September 42d Mech (Tank) Regt Lost 14 T-34 tanks - (Opposing 1st Marines) - 107th Security Regt 400 POWs and 350 enemy - (Kimpo) (Opposing casualties - KMC & 5th Marines) - - 18 September NK Air Force EngBn 197 POWs and 450 enemy - (Opposing 5th Marines) casualties - - 19 September No additional 126 POWs and 600 enemy - identifications on casualties - fronts of 1st and - 5th Marines - - 20 September 78th Ind Regt (Opposing 326 POWs and 600 enemy - 5th Marines) No casualties - additional identifications - on front of 1st Marines - - 21 September No additional identifications 355 POWs and 1,350 - enemy casualties - - 22 September Rehabilitation Bn (Opposing 395 POWs and 1,250 - 1st Marines). casualties - 25th Inf Brig (Opposing - 5th Marines) - 31st Rifle Div (Seoul City - Regt) (Opposing 5th Marines) - - 23 September No additional identifications 169 POWs and 900 - casualties - - 24 September do 67 POWs and 950 - casualties - - 25 September do 142 POWs and 1,750 - casualties - - 26 September 76th Ind Regt 407 POWs and 950 - 43d Tank Regt casualties - 19th AA Regt - 513th Art Regt - 17th Rifle Div - (Opposing 1st & 5th - Marines) - - 27 September No additional identifications 139 POWs and 1,252 - casualties - - 28 September do 206 POWs and 332 - casualties - - 29 September do 507 POWs and 102 - casualties - - 30 September do 328 POWs and 305 - casualties - - 1 October do 124 POWs and 75 casualties - - 2 October 27th Inf Brig (Opposing 5th 82 POWs and 350 casualties - Marines) - 75th Ind Regt (Opposing 7th - Marines) - - 3 October No additional identifications 103 POWs and 800 casualties - - 4 October do 118 POWs - - 5 October do 57 POWs - - 6 October do 144 POWs - -In the above tabulation, a unit is shown only for the first day upon -which it was identified by the capture of prisoners. In the cases of -most of the units there were recurring captures of prisoners. - - - - -APPENDIX I - -Congratulatory Messages - - -The following messages, of a commendatory nature, were transmitted -to the 1st Marine Division by the X Corps upon completion of the -Inchon-Seoul Campaign. - - -_From CG, X Corps to CG, 1st Marine Division under date of 28 September -1950_ - -“On this date the X Corps attained one of its distinct objectives--the -securing of the city of Seoul. In recognition of the heroic efforts of -the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division I extend my deepest -thanks and my continuing admiration for a task well done.” Signed -Edward M. Almond, Major General, United States Army, Commanding. - - -_From the President to General MacArthur_ - -“I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you -my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved -under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can -match either the delaying action where you traded space; for time in -which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now -resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by -the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. I wish you -would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those -services--Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. -Joy and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of -our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My -thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to -your gallant forces--soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen--from the -United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the -United Nations Banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all -of us at home, ‘well and nobly done.’” Signed Harry S. Truman. - - -_From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur_ - -“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are proud of the great successes you have -achieved. We realize that they would have been impossible without -brilliant and audacious leadership and without the full coordination -and the fighting spirit of all forces and all arms. From the sudden -initiation of hostilities you have exploited to the utmost all -capabilities and opportunities. Your transition from defensive to -offensive operations was magnificently planned, timed, and executed. -You have given new inspiration to the freedom-loving peoples of the -world. We remain completely confident that the great task entrusted to -you by the United Nations will be carried to a successful conclusion.” - - -_From CG, X Corps to all units of the X Corps under date of 2 October -1950_ - -“It is desired that this message be disseminated to all members of -your command. The achievements of the U. N. forces comprising the X -Corps should be a pride and inspiration to all who participated in -the recent operations so successfully concluded and which resulted in -the liberation of Seoul, the capital city of Korea. Your efforts have -greatly contributed in freeing the Republic of Korea of the forces of -Communism that threatened to enslave her people. Koreans may now take -their rightful place among the freedom-loving people of the world. -History will long remember the feat of arms that you, through your -untiring efforts and superb valor have accomplished. I am proud of the -units comprising the X Corps. Each of you should be proud of the unit -in which you serve, the nation it represents, and your part in this -military operation. I am confident that the tasks that are before us -will be accomplished with the same splendid cooperation, leadership, -and determination that you have so recently displayed.” Signed Major -General Edward M. Almond, Commanding General, X Corps. - - -_Division Commander’s Message to the 1st Marine Division upon -Completion of the Inchon-Seoul Campaign_ - -On 8 October 1950, the Division Commander issued Division Memorandum -No. 192-50, quoted below, in recognition of the accomplishments of the -1st Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign: - -“1. Upon completion of the campaign in the Inchon-Seoul area of Korea -I desire to express my appreciation and admiration of the superb -manner in which all hands have cooperated in bringing to a successful -conclusion a very difficult operation. - -“2. From the time the decision was made to bring the Division to -war strength and to commit it in Korea until the city of Seoul was -captured, urgency has been the order of the day. Urgency has been -necessary because tidal conditions dictated that a landing at Inchon be -made on September 15th. For the Division this meant that its elements -in the United States had to be brought to war strength immediately, had -to be re-equipped and, in the absence of amphibious shipping, had to be -loaded on such other ships as could hurriedly be made available. Upon -arrival in Kobe, Japan, there was the pressing necessity of reloading -in minimum time in amphibious shipping, with the disruption caused by -a destructive typhoon. Elements of the Division comprising the First -Provisional Marine Brigade were not released from combat in South Korea -until midnight of September 5th and between that date and September -12th were required to move to Pusan, re-equip and mount out. - -“3. It is now history that the First Marine Division did meet its -commitments, did land at Inchon on September 15th under conditions -which required the maximum of coordination, aggressive action, and -devotion to duty; went on to capture the Kimpo airfield three days -after landing, to effect a difficult amphibious crossing of the Han -River, and to liberate the city of Seoul by driving the North Korean -invaders far beyond its limits. - -“4. I fully appreciate, and I am sure the American people now fully -appreciate and realize, that only well-trained and determined troops, -completely devoted to duty, could have accomplished what the First -Marine Division did in Korea. You have established your place in -history. The memory of those who made the supreme sacrifice in the -accomplishment of this mission will forever remain an inspiration to -all Marines.” - - - - -APPENDIX J - -Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign - - -Following is a daily breakdown of the casualties suffered by the 1st -Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign (15 September-7 -October 1950), together with a tabulation of the number of POWs -captured by the Division and the estimated casualties inflicted on the -enemy. - - ------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+--------------- - Date |KIA |DOW |MIA | WIA | Total | POWs | Estimated - |[486]|[486]|[486]| [486]| battle | captured | enemy - | | | | |casualties| [487] |casualties[488] - ------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+--------------- - 15 Sep| 20 | 1 | 1 | 174 | 196 | [488] | [489] - 16 Sep| 2 | 1 | 1 | 22 | 26 | 300 | [489]1,350 - 17 Sep| 6 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 76 | 400 | 350 - 18 Sep| 7 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 102 | 197 | 450 - 19 Sep| 10 | 1 | 0 | 61 | 72 | 126 | 600 - 20 Sep| 24 | 1 | 3 | 119 | 147 | 326 | 600 - 21 Sep| 30 | 3 | 0 | 198 | 231 | 355 | 1,350 - 22 Sep| 27 | 3 | 0 | 135 | 165 | 395 | 1,200 - 23 Sep| 19 | 7 | 0 | 117 | 143 | 169 | 900 - 24 Sep| 68 | 4 | 0 | 217 | 289 | 67 | 950 - 25 Sep| 33 | 4 | 1 | 238 | 276 | 142 | 1,750 - 26 Sep| 29 | 7 | 0 | 167 | 203 | 407 | 950 - 27 Sep| 33 | 3 | 0 | 153 | 189 | 139 | 1,252 - 28 Sep| 8 | 4 | 0 | 31 | 43 | 206 | 332 - 29 Sep| 19 | 1 | 0 | 49 | 69 | 507 | 102 - 30 Sep| 11 | 2 | 0 | 48 | 61 | 328 | 305 - 1 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 16 | 19 | 124 | 75 - 2 Oct| 15 | 1 | 0 | 81 | 97 | 82 | 350 - 3 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 38 | 103 | 800 - 4 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 118 | 0 - 5 Oct| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 57 | 0 - 6 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 0 - 7 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 - +-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+--------------- - Total | 366 | 49 | 6 |2,029 | 2,450 | 6,492 | 13,666 - ------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+--------------- - - [486] Based on compilation on 15 March 1951 by Casualty - Reporting Officer. - - [487] Based on G-2 Report included in the Special Action - Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign. The figures - shown are less than the total of regimental reports of - captures, as only those POWs remaining after processing - by the G-2 were counted. Oftentimes civilians were - turned over to the G-2 as POWs. A lag is also reflected - in the figures of the G-2 Section. Both regiments - captured prisoners on D-Day, 15 September, but the - prisoners were not processed until 16 September. - - [488] Estimated enemy casualties do not include POWs. Figures - shown are based on the G-2 Report included in the - Special Action Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign. - - [489] The figure shown for 16 September includes the - casualties inflicted on the enemy on 15 September. - - - - -APPENDIX K - -Comments on Close Air Support Provided by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing - - - HEADQUARTERS - 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY - Office of the Commanding General - APO 7 - - 10 January 1951 - - Subject: Marine Air Support - To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C. - Thru: Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7. - -1. In my capacity as Division Artillery Commander and Fire Support -Coordinator of the Seventh Infantry Division I have been able to -observe closely the most effective system of close air support -currently used by the Marines. During the period 19 September to 20 -December 1950, close air support of this division was furnished almost -exclusively by the First Marine Air Wing. - -2. In an effort to parallel as nearly as possible the Marine system of -controlling close support air this division had attached to it the Far -East Detachment, ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic. This detachment was augmented -by nine (9) Tactical Air Control Parties, Fifth U. S. Air Force, -trained in the Marine system of control by the ANGLICO detachment. -This enabled the placement of Tactical Air Control Parties with each -infantry battalion. Such placement proved to be ideal and gave the -battalion commander a means of controlling and coordinating the close -air support he received. - -3. It is worthy to note that in 57 days of combat 1024 sorties were -flown by Marine Aircraft in close support of the division without a -single casualty among our own troops due to friendly air action. This -record I attribute to the fact that adequate control was available with -front line units. In many instances Marine planes were bombing and -strafing within 200 yards of our front lines. - -4. I wish to express my appreciation for the superior cooperation -of Captain Charles E. Crew, 023897, USMC, Far East Detachment, -ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic and his enlisted assistants during the period -19 September 1950 to 20 December 1950. In his capacity as Marine -Air Liaison Officer to the Seventh Infantry Division Captain Crew -functioned as a member of the division team with a common objective. -The excellent air support received by this division was due in no -small part to the enthusiastic manner in which Captain Crew performed. -Unfortunately, I was not able to observe the work of the other two -Marine Forward Air Controllers attached to the division. Reports -indicate that they performed equally as well. - -5. Again, allow me to reemphasize my appreciation for the outstanding -air support received by this division. The Marine system of control, in -my estimation, approaches the ideal and I firmly believe that a similar -system should be adopted as standard for Army Divisions. - - (s) HOMER W. KIEFER - _Brigadier General, USA_ - _Commanding_ - - -[1st Endorsement] - - Subject: Marine Air Support - Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7 12 January 1951 - To: Commanding General, X Corps, APO 909 - -I wish to express my own appreciation to all members of the 1st Marine -Air Wing who assisted in the fine air support given to the 7th Infantry -Division and also to commend Forward Air Controllers, Captain Edward P. -Stamford and 1st Lieutenant Jack R. Grey as well as Captain Crew for -outstanding performances of duty in connection with the support. - - (s) DAVID G. BARR - _Maj Gen., USA_ - _Commanding_ - - -[2nd Endorsement] - - Headquarters, X Corps, APO 909, 16 January 1951 - To: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, APO 301 - -1. The effective close air support rendered by the 1st Marine Air Wing -through the Forward Air Controllers with the 7th Infantry Division -greatly aided in the successful accomplishment of X Corps operations. -The actions of the personnel concerned are worthy of commendation, and -I wish to add my appreciation for their assistance. - -2. Further, I wish to emphasize the statements of General Kiefer in -paragraph 5, basic letter, in which he endorses the Marine system of -Tactical Air Control. It has proved itself on every occasion. - - (s) EDWARD M. ALMOND - _Major General, United States Army_ - _Commanding_ - - -[3rd Endorsement] - - CHO FEC-SCAP - AG RECORDS - FIEDAG 330.13 - 4795 - - AG 373 KAR (10 Jan 51) - Subject: Marine Air Support - Hq Eighth U. S. Army Korea (EU AK), APO 301 30 JAN 1951 - TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, APO 500 - -I note with gratification the splendid spirit of cooperation that -existed between the 1st Marine Air Wing and the 7th Infantry Division -in recent combat operations. I congratulate not only Captain Crew, -Captain Stamford, and Lieutenant Grey but all officers and men of the -1st Marine Air Wing for their magnificent performance. - - (s) M. B. RIDGWAY - _Lieutenant General, United States Army_ - _Commanding_ - - -[4th Endorsement] - - AG 330.13 (10 Jan 51) GA - General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500, 4 February 1951 - To: Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Navy No. 1165 - -Commander-in-Chief, Far East, takes pleasure in forwarding this -correspondence which again illustrated the outstanding support that -Marine Air is providing ground forces in the Korean operations. - -By Command of General MacArthur - - (s) K. B. BUSH - _Brigadier General, USA_ - _Adjutant General_ - - CNFE/P15 05/RVW/the - Serial: 1213 12 Feb 1951 - - Fifth Endorsement on CG, 7th INFDIVART ltr of 10 Jan 1951 - From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East - To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps - Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing - (2) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet - Subj: Marine Air Support - -1. Readdressed and forwarded. - -2. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, takes great pleasure in -forwarding correspondence and desires to recognize also the outstanding -performance of duty of Marine Corps personnel concerned. - - (s) C. T. JOY - - - - -APPENDIX L - -Presidential Unit Citation - - - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - WASHINGTON - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the - - FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following Citation: - -“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces -in Korea from 15 September to 11 October 1950. In the face of a -determined enemy and against almost insurmountable obstacles, including -disadvantageous tidal and beach conditions on the western coast of -Korea, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, rapidly and successfully -effected the amphibious seizure of Inch’on in an operation without -parallel in the history of amphibious warfare. Fully aware that the -precarious situation of friendly ground forces fighting desperately -against the continued heavy pressure of a numerically superior hostile -force necessitated the planning and execution of this extremely -hazardous operation within a period of less than thirty days, and -cognizant of the military importance of its assigned target, the -Division moved quickly into action and, on 15 September, by executing -three well-coordinated attacks over highly treacherous beach approaches -defended by resolute enemy troops, captured the island of Wolmi-do, -the city of Inch’on and Kimp’o Airfield, and rendered invaluable -assistance in the capture of Seoul. As a result of its aggressive -attack, the Division drove the hostile forces in hasty retreat over -thirty miles in the ensuing ten days, completely severed vital hostile -communication and supply lines and greatly relieved enemy pressure on -other friendly ground units, thereby permitting these units to break -out from their Pusan beachhead and contributing materially to the total -destruction of hostile ground forces in southern Korea. The havoc and -destruction wrought on an enemy flushed with previous victories and the -vast accomplishments in turning the tide of battle from a weakening -defensive to a vigorous offensive action reflect the highest credit -upon the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, and -the United States Naval Service.” - -The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division -participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from -15 September to 11 October 1950: - -_Fleet Marine Force Units and Detachments_: Radio Relay Platoon, 1st -Signal Operations Company; Battery C, 1st 4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion; -1st Amphibian Truck Company; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less -Company “D”); 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command; 1st -Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Aerial Delivery Platoon; 7th Motor -Transport Battalion, Service Command; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; -Detachment Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two; Team #1, First -Provisional Historical Platoon; Marine Observation Squadron Six; -Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced, including Headquarters -Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine Service Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine -Ground Control Intercept Squadron One, Marine Fighter Squadron Two -Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Two Hundred Fourteen, Marine -Fighter Squadron Three Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Three -Hundred Twenty-Three, Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred -Thirteen, and Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred Forty-Two. - -_United States Navy Units_: Naval Beach Group One. - -_United States Army Units_: Detachment 205th Signal Repair Company; -Detachment 4th Signal Battalion; 163rd Military Intelligence Service -Detachment; Company “A” Reinforced, 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; -96th Field Artillery Battalion; 441st Counter-Intelligence Corps -Detachment; 2nd Engineer Special Brigade; 73rd Engineer (C) Battalion; -50th Engineer Port Construction Company; 65th Ordnance Ammunition -Company; 32nd Regimental Combat Team; Special Operations Company; -3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team; and the 50th -Antiaircraft Artillery Air Warning Battalion. - - For the President, - - (s) DAN A. KIMBALL - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - - -Bibliography - -_Documents_ - - - Earney, William R. Maj, USMC. Notes on operations of Third Battalion, - Seventh Marines, in South Korea. MS. Manuscript File, Records and - Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps - (HQMC Historical). - - Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of special report. n. d. MS. - Manuscript File, HQMC Historical. - - Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the operations of the 1st - Marine Division during the first nine months of the Korean War, - 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Notes on the operations of the 1st Marine Division during the - first nine months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript - File, HQMC Historical. - - U. S. Congress. _National Security Act of 1947._ 61 _U. S. Stat. at - L._ 495. - - Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Survey. No. 75. Copy at HQMC Secret and - Confidential Files, Naval Records Management Center, Alexandria, - Va. (S&C Files, NRMC). - - Joint Landing Force Board. Study on the conduct of training of - landing forces for joint amphibious operations during World War II. - Project no. 13-52. Copy at HQMC S&C Files, NRMC. - - U. S. Marine Corps. U. S. Marine Corps Board. An evaluation of the - influence of Marine Corps forces on the course of the Korean War (4 - Aug 50–15 Dec 50). Processed; copy in HQMC Historical. 2 v. - - ----. Interviews with participants in the Korean War, 1951–54. - Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Headquarters Marine Corps incoming and outgoing dispatches, - 1949–50. HQMC S&C Files, NRMC. - - ----. Letters and memoranda to Historical Branch, G-3, concerning - Korean operations. Monograph and Comments File, HQMC Historical. - - Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation report - no. 1. Period 25 June to 15 November 1950. 20 January 1951. v. XV: - Annexes. - - ZEBRA. Fleet Marine Force Pacific. A report on activities - of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, from 25 June 1950 to the - amphibious assault at Inchon. n. d. - - ABLE ABLE. Commander Amphibious Group ONE (CTF 90). Report of - ComPhibGru ONE (CTF 90) operations for period 25 June 1950 to 1 - January 1951. 17 January 1951. - - BAKER BAKER. Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, - Pacific. Historical report. 24 November 1950. - - CHARLIE CHARLIE. Operations of 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF, in - Korea. 25 June-15 November 1950. n. d. - - DOG DOG. Headquarters, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF. Special - report, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF. Period 1 August-15 - November 1950. n. d. Processed; copy in HQMC Historical. - -Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Historical diary, 1–31 August 1950. -Historical Diary (Korea) File, HQMC Historical. - -Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF. Special action report for -period 7 September to October 1950. 20 February 1951. - -Basic report - -Annexes - - ABLE Tactical Air Command, X Corps, USA. - BAKER G-1 - CHARLIE G-2 - DOG G-3 - EASY G-4 - ITEM Marine Air Group 33 - Basic report - Annexes - Able Personnel - Baker Intelligence (including combat narrative) - Charlie Operations - Dog Supply - Easy Communications - Fox Logistics - George Medical - How Public Information - Item Buildings and Grounds - Jig Ordnance - King Transportation - Love Base Security - Mike Electronics - Nan Photographic Unit - Oboe Engineering - Peter Comments and recommendations - Queen VMF-312 - Roger VMF-212 - Sugar VMF(n)-542 - Tare MGCIS-1 - Uncle MTACS-2 - - JIG Marine Aircraft Group 12. - Basic report - Annexes - Able Personnel - Baker Intelligence - Charlie Operations - Dog Supply - Easy VMF-214 - Fox VMF-323 - George VMF(N)-513 - How Logistics - Item Medical - Jig Communications - King Building and Grounds - Love Engineering - Mike Ordnance - Nan Transportation - Oboe Base Security - Peter Electronics - Queen Mess - Roger Plans and Directives - -“SAR” File (Korea), USMC Historical. - - 1st Marine Division, FMF. Field journals, correspondence, dispatches, - orders, reports, and miscellaneous matter. August-October 1950. - Classified Correspondence File, (1st Marine Division) HQMC - Historical. - - 1st Marine Division. 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment and its - relationship to the 1st Marine Division. “_SAR_” File (Korea), Type - “C” Reports, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Marine Division, FMF. Special action report for the Inchon-Seoul - operation, 15 September-7 October 1950. 2 May 1951. 3 sections: - - 1. Division (20 April 1951.) - - 2. Commanding General’s remarks on comments and recommendations - - 3. Annexes - - ABLE G-1 - BAKER G-2 - CHARLIE G-3 - DOG G-4 - EASY Adjutant - FOX Anti-Tank - GEORGE Chaplain - HOW Chemical Warfare & Radiological Defense - ITEM Dental - JIG Embarkation - KING Engineer - LOVE Headquarters Commandant - MIKE Food Director - NAN Historical - OBOE Inspector - PETER Legal - QUEEN Medical - ROGER Motor Transport - SUGAR Ordnance - TARE Post Exchange - UNCLE Public Information - VICTOR Signal - WILLIAM Special Services - XRAY Supply - YOKE Disbursing - ZEBRA Civil Affairs - ABLE ABLE Division Administration Center - BAKER BAKER Fire Support Coordination Center - CHARLIE CHARLIE Air & Air Observers - DOG DOG Naval Gunfire - EASY EASY Headquarters Bn - FOX FOX 1st Service Bn - GEORGE GEORGE 1st Signal Bn - HOW HOW 1st Medical Bn - ITEM ITEM 1st Motor Transport Bn - JIG JIG 1st Amphibious Truck Co - LOVE LOVE 1st Ordnance Bn - MIKE MIKE 1st Shore Party Bn - NAN NAN 1st Engineer Bn - OBOE OBOE 1st Tank Bn - PETER PETER 1st Marines - QUEEN QUEEN 5th Marines - ROGER ROGER 7th Marines - SUGAR SUGAR 11th Marines - TARE TARE 1st Amphibious Tractor Bn - UNCLE UNCLE 1st Combat Service Group - VICTOR VICTOR 7th Motor Transport Bn - WILLIAM WILLIAM Marine Observation Squadron 6 - - -“SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical - - 7th Infantry Division. War diaries, supporting documents, histories, - and general and special staff activities reports, September 1950. - Army Record Group 207-0.3, Code 307, Departmental Records Branch, - The Adjutant General’s Office, Alexandria, Va. - - Commander Air Support Group and Commander Carrier Division 15. Report - of operations, 6–21 September 1950. Classified Correspondence File - (1st Marine Division) HQMC Historical. - - 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special action report for Inchon-Seoul - operation. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special action report for Inchon-Seoul - operation. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - -_Books and Periodicals_ - - Almond, Edward M. LtGen, USA. _Conference on United Nations - Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950–31 December 1951._ - Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: The Army War College. 1952. - - Cole, Eli K. BGen, USMC. “Joint Overseas Operations.” _U.S. Naval - Institute Proceedings_, 35, no. 321: 927–937 (November, 1929). - - Condit, Kenneth W. “Marine Supply in Korea.” _Marine Corps - Gazette_, 37, no. 1: 48–55 (January, 1953). - - Fuller, J. F. C. MajGen, British Army. _The Second World War._ - London: Hutchinson, 1948. - - Geer, Andrew. _The New Breed: The Story of the U. S. Marines in - Korea._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. - - Giusti, Ernest H. _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve - in the Korean Conflict._ Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, - HQMC, 1952. - - ----, and Condit, Kenneth W. “Marine Air Over Inchon-Seoul,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 6: 19–27 (June, 1952). - - Gugeler, Russell A. Capt, USA. _Combat Actions in Korea._ - Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954. - - Isely, Jeter A., and Crowl, Philip A. _The U.S. Marines and - Amphibious War._ Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. - - Karig, Walter, Capt, USN, Cagle, Malcolm, Cdr, USN, and Manson, - Frank A., LtCdr. _Battle Report: The War in Korea._ New York: - Rinehart, 1952. - - Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U. S. Marine - Combat Helicopters._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. - - ---- “Fleet Marine Force Korea.” _U.S. Naval Institute - Proceedings_, 37, no. 8: 836–839 (August, 1953). - - ---- “They Make Men Whole Again.” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. - 12: 42–49 (December, 1952). - - Sleger, J., Jr. 2dLt, USA. Report to Dr. A. D. Coax, n. d. - Department of the Army, Operations Research Office. - - U. S. Department of Defense, Office of Armed Forces Information - and Education. _The United States Marine Corps._ Washington: - Department of Defense Printing, 1950. (Armed Forces Talk No. - 317.) - - ----, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military - History. The Korean conflict. By James F. Schnabel. Maj, USA. - MS. v. I. - - U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. _Historical - Outline of the Development of FMFPac 1941–1950 - (Preliminary)._ Processed; copy at HQMC Historical. - - U. S. Military Academy, Department of Military Art and - Engineering. _Operations in Korea._ West Point: U. S. - Military Academy, 1953. - - U. S. Department of State. _Guide to the U.N. in Korea._ - Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. - - ----, Office of the Solicitor. _Right To Protect Citizens in - Foreign Countries by Landing Forces._ 3d revised edition with - supplementary appendix to 1933. Washington: U. S. Government - Printing Office, 1934. (State Dept. Publication No. 538.) - - - - -Index - - - Adams, Cape Nate L. II, 117_n_, 136_n_ - - Adelman, LtCol Merritt, 215 - - Advance Attack Group. _See_ U.S. Navy, Task Group 90.1 - - Africa, 50 - - _African Patriot_, SS, 32 - - Air attacks, North Korean, 104, 295 - - Air drop, 268 - - Air Force, U.S., 297 - Intelligence, 165 - Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 2, 8, 13, 71, 170 - Combat Cargo Command, 71, 169 - Fifth Air Force, 144, 295 - - Air strikes. _See_ Air support. - - Air support, U.S., 8, 67, 69–71, 102, 144, 145, 153, 166, 167, 170, - 180, 181, 201, 208, 223, 235, 236, 243, 246–250, 256, 258, - 268, 273, 274, 278, 286, 289, 294, 295 - - Aircraft, U. S., 13, 70, 145, 236, 243, 295 - Air Force, 59, 144 - Marine, 69, 86, 88, 93, 170, 215, 223, 226, 238, 295 - Navy, 84–87, 102 - AD (Skyraiders), 102, 105, 180 - Bombers, 144 - B-26 (Invader), 13 - B-29 (Superfort), 13 - F4U (Corsair), 47, 87, 88, 93, 102, 134, 171, 195, 196, 208, 223, - 247, 248, 250, 257, 279, 289 - F7F (Tigercat), 169, 170, 257 - F-51 (Mustang), 13 - Helicopter, 27, 144, 167, 172, 187, 202, 290, 295 - HO3S-1 Helicopter, 165, 166 - OY (Grasshopper), 166, 295 - - Transport planes, 30 - - Aircraft, North Korean - Bombers, 2 - Stormovik, 165 - YAK, 2, 202 - YAK III, 165 - - Aircraft carriers (CV), 81 - - Aircraft losses, U. S., 294 - - Allen, Sgt Charles D., 105 - - Allmon, LCdr Clyde E., USN, 45, 102, 103_n_ - - _Alma Victory_, SS, 32 - - Almond, MajGen Edward M., USA, 3_n_, 4, 6, 7, 12, 38, 39, 43–45, - 65–67, 71, 77, 78, 151, 183, 244, 262, 291 - - Altaire, Sgt Marion C., 176, 260 - - Ambush, North Korean, 220 - - _American Press_, SS, 32 - - American Revolution, 48 - - _American Victory_, SS, 32 - - Ammunition - North Korean, 177 - South Korean, 145 - U.S., 125, 127, 169, 170, 228, 231, 235, 238, 268 - Bombs, 88, 248 - Rockets, 69, 70, 88, 107, 134, 169, 248, 263, 278 - 3.5-inch rockets, 173 - WP rockets, 163 - - Ammunition dump, North Korean, 228, 274 - - Ammunition dump, U. S., 96 - - Amphibian tractors, 98, 191–193, 296 - - Amphibious Doctrine, development, 48–50 - - Amphibious force flagship (AGC), 79 - - Amphibious vessels, 81 - - Anderson, 2d Lt Tilton A., 155–157, 240_n_, 241, 245, 246, 247_n_, 249 - - Andrewes, RAdm Sir William G., RN, 67, 85 - - ANGLICO, 5, 6, 13, 41, 166 - - Anyang, 225 - - ARKANSAS, Point, 81, 83, 84 - - Armstrong, Capt Victor A., 165 - - Army Chief of Staff. _See_ Gen J. Lawton Collins - - Army, U. S., 5, 8, 47, 49, 50, 59, 75, 103, 296, 297 - Amphibious Training, 4, 5 - Demobilization 1945–46, 6 - - Army Units, U. S. - Far East Command. _See_ Far East Command. - Army of Occupation, Japan, 6 - Headquarters, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea, 7 - Sixth Army, 5, 19 - Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 3, 5–9, 15, 28, 42, 46, 47, 59, - 65–67, 73, 85, 144, 170, 171, 184, 198, 253, 254, 285, - 291, 292, 295, 298 - Tenth Army, 17 - I Corps, 171, 253 - IX Corps, 171 - X Corps, 38, 40, 46, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 107, 172, 201, - 253, 254, 264, 275, 283, 285, 286, 290, 291, 298; - Inception, 43; - Staff, 58; - Tactical Air Command (TAC), 71, 100, 104, 167, 169, 295 - 1st Cavalry Division, 7, 9, 13, 41, 171, 253, 254, 285 - 2d Infantry Division, 9, 28, 41, 47, 171, 254 - 3d Infantry Division, 58, 172 - 7th Infantry Division, 7, 9, 41, 58, 66, 67, 78, 153, 172, 184, 197, - 212, 221, 244, 254, 255, 285, 286, 296 - 11th Airborne Division, 172 - 24th Infantry Division, 6–8, 14, 15, 171, 253 - 25th Infantry Division, 6–9, 171, 254 - 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 9, 65, 76, 80, 127, 129 - 187th Airborne RCT, 172, 286, 290, 296 - 2d Battalion, 238 - 3d Battalion, 256, 264 - 5th Regimental Combat Team, 28 - 17th Infantry Regiment, 67, 184, 279 - 2d Battalion, 274 - 31st Infantry Regiment, 184, 221, 254 - 32d Infantry Regiment, 66, 78, 153, 184, 209, 210, 212, 216, 221, - 225, 244, 254, 255, 271, 273, 279, 296 - 1st Battalion, 225 - 2d Battalion, 211, 225, 263, 273 - 3d Battalion, 273, 274 - 56th Amphibian Tank and Tractor Battalion, 172, 196, 202 - Company A, 76, 100, 188, 254 - 50th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 286, 291 - 2d Engineer Combat Group, 172 - 73d Engineer (c) Battalion, 76 - 93d Field Artillery Battalion, 172 - 96th Field Artillery Battalion, 172, 254 - 73d Tank Battalion, 79, 172 - 50th Engineer Port Construction Company, 76 - X Corps Special Operations Company, 77, 78_n_, 256 - 65th Ordnance and Ammunition Company, 76 - 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Team, 59 - 163d Military Intelligence Service Detachment (MISD), 59 - - Arsenal, North Korean, 178 - - Artillery. _See_ Weapons. - - Artillery Support, 243, 246, 268, 270, 273, 278 - - Asahi Brewery, 106 - - Ascom City, 138–140, 147, 148, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 164, 173, 175, - 180, 214, 292 - - Assault Shipping, 75, 79 - - Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division. _See_ Brig Gen - Edward A. Craig. - - Attack Force. _See_ U. S. Navy, Task Force 90. - - Attacks, North Korean, 206, 213, 231, 258, 276 - - Austria, 48 - - Aviation Gasoline, 169 - - - Babashanian, Maj John G., 34 - - Babe, 1stLt George A., 210, 259, 260 - - _Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 70, 85, 86, 168, 257 - - BAKER Ferry, 200 - - Band, 75, 283 - - Banks, Capt David W., 276 - - Barges, Japanese, 79 - - Barome, Hospitalman Philip A., USN, _pic._ - - Barr, MajGen David G., USA, 41, 44, 197, 212, 255, 284, 291, _pic._ - - Barracks ships, 75 - - Barrett, Maj A. J., 35 - - Barricades, 277, 279 - - Barron, Lt. Charles R., USN, 45 - - Barrow, Maj R. H., 121_n_, 212, 213, 216_n_, 220, 226–228, 231 - - Barstow, California, Annex, Depot of Supplies, 31, 132 - - Bartley, Maj Whitman S., 123 - - Bates, Maj W. L., 117_n_, 121_n_, 213_n_, 216, 226_n_ - - Battleship, 202 - - Beaches - BLUE, 63–65, 69, 94, 98, 100–105, 113–118, 120–123, 128, 131, 142, - 198, 294, _pic._ - BLUE One, 98, 100, 113, 116, 121, 122 - BLUE Two, 100, 113, 116–118, 121, 122 - BLUE Three, 100, 113, 118, 121, 123 - - GREEN, 64–65, 69, 78, 86–88, 90, 92, 93, 95, 103, 128, 131, - 132, 142, 195 - - RED, 64–65, 69, 94, 95, 98, 101–102, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110–113, - 125–128, 132, 139, 142, 152, 198, 294, _pic._ - - YELLOW, 129, 132, 142, 151 - - Beauchamp, Col Charles E., 221, _pic._ - - Beckley, Lt R. M., USN, 110 - - Belbusti, 1stLt Albert F., 241 - - _Belgian Victory_, USS, 32 - - Belleau Wood, 11 - - Benedict, LtCol William E., 45 - - Berry, LCdr Reuben W., USN, 102_n_, 103 - - _Bexar_ (APA), USS, 53 - - Bey, Capt Robert T., 289_n_ - - Bland, Capt Richard F., 220, 222 - - Blockade, 2 - - Blood plasma, 228 - - Bloodsworth Island, 49 - - BLUEHEARTS, Operation, 6, 172 - - Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., 90, 91, 93 - - Bolkow, TSgt George W., 279 - - Boston, TSgt Kenneth C., 159 - - Bougainville, 51 - - Bowser, Col Alpha L., 30_n_, 34_n_, 37_n_, 262 - - _Boxer_ (CV), USS, 84, 86 - - Breen, Capt Richard R., 267, 268 - - Bridge, 184, 188, 197, 199, 216, 219–221, 223, 225, 232, 252, 254. - _See also_ Floating Bridge, Kalchon Bridge. - - Bridges, Maj David W., 117_n_, 121_n_, 122, 123, 213, 226_n_, 251_n_, - 279_n_, 280_n_ - - Bridging equipment, 40 - - Briggs, Capt Cameron, USN, 84 - - British Consulate Hill, 104 - - Brock, Capt P. W., RN, 178 - - Brower, Col James H., 131 - - Brush, Maj Charles H., Jr., 188, 193 - - Bulldozers, 126 - - Burris, Cpl Charles E., _pic._ - - Bushe, 1stLt Eugene A., 215, 216_n_ - - - CALIFORNIA, Point, 81, 85 - - CAMID, Operation, 19 - - Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., 159 - - _Cape Esperance_ (CVE), USS, 54 - - Capps, LCdr Arlie G., USN, 45 - - Cargo Ships, Attack (AKA), 63, 79, 80, 84 - - Caribbean, 49 - - Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., 216_n_, 217, 273, 279_n_, 280_n_ - - Carpenter, 1stLt Stanley H., 195 - - Carter, 2dLt Johnny L., 121_n_, 135_n_, 140_n_, 141_n_, 173, 175, 178 - - Cashion, 2dLt Dana M., 190, 192 - - Casualties - North Korean, 94, 123, 141, 150, 156, 158, 159, 161, 164, 171, 173, - 177, 196, 211, 215, 228, 231, 241, 260, 263, 284, 286, - 289, 297, _pic._ - - United States, 86, 93, 105, 107, 111, 112, 122, 126, 130, 133, 140, - 144, 150, 156, 158, 159, 164, 177, 178, 181, 183, 195, - 196, 202, 208, 209, 211, 221–223, 225, 234, 236, 240, 241, - 246, 247, 249–252, 261, 267, 273, 274, 276, 284, - 290, 297, _pic._ - - Cates, Gen Clifton B., 3, 11, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 32, 42, 53, 76, 290 - - _Cavalier_ (APA) USS, 83, 98, 102 - - Caves, 91, 92, 94, 197, 260 - - Cemetery Hill, 95, 98, 104, 106, 107, 110–113, 127, 132 - - Ceylon, 54 - - Changsa-dong, 145 - - _Charity_ (DD), HMS, 61 - - Chase, Capt Lester T., 287 - - Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 73 - - Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ Adm Forrest P. Sherman. - - Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. _See_ Gen J. Lawton Collins. - - China, 12, 49 - - China, Communist, 57, 292, 297; - Possible intervention in Korea, 9 - - Chinese Communist Forces, 1, 2 - - Chindong-ni, 38 - - Chinju, 30, 254 - - Chinnampo, 144 - - Chongdong, 202 - - Chonsong-ni, 256 - - Chosin Reservoir, 285 - - Church, BrigGen John H., USA, 7 - - Civil Government, 143, 281 - - Clark Lt Eugene F., USN, 61, 62, 85, 87 - - Clark, LtGen Mark W., USA, 5 - - Clark, Lt Theodore B., USN, 102, 103_n_, 115, 120, 121_n_ - - Clothing, 75, 77 - - Close air support. _See_ Air support. - - Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., 113_n_, 116_n_, 117_n_, 140_n_, 183, 210_n_, - 211_n_, 213_n_, 221_n_, 223_n_, 271_n_ - - Cole, BrigGen Eli K., 48_n_ - - Cole, LtCol J. Frank, 170 - - Coleman lanterns, 187 - - _Collett_ (DD), USS, 86, 87 - - Collins, Cpl Charles E., 262, 263 - - Collins, 2dLt Edward E., 278 - - Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 44, 46, 172 - - Comiskey, TSgt Donald, 159 - - Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 19 - - Commander, Amphibious Group 1. _See_ RAdm James H. Doyle. - - Commander in Chief, Far East. _See_ General Douglas MacArthur. - - Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. _See_ Adm Arthur W. Radford. - - Commander Naval Forces, Far East. _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy. - - Commander, Task Force 90. _See_ RAdm James H. Doyle. - - Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. _See_ LtGen Lemuel C. - Shepherd, Jr. - - Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. _See_ MajGen Oliver P. Smith. - - Commiskey, 2d Lt Henry A., 217, 219 - - Communications - Equipment, 75 - Radio Frequencies, 70 - SCR-300, 191, 192, 228 - - Condit, Kenneth W., 129_n_, 223_n_, 294_n_ - - Conference of 4 July, 4 - - Conference of 10 July, 9 - - Cooney, Capt Thomas E., 268, 276 - - Cooper, LtCol Francis H., 76 - - Coox, Dr. A. D., 139_n_ - - “Copper Mine Hill”, 221, 225 - - Corbet, 2dLt Robert H., 208 - - Corduroy road, 199 - - Correspondents, 151, 187 - - Costigan, Capt James G., 117_n_, 129_n_ - - Counselman, 2dLt John D., 88_n_, 93 - - Counterattacks - North Korean, 235, 241, 245, 246, 262, 263, 283 - United States, 263, 264 - - Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 18, 28, 47, 94, 100_n_, 101, 135n, 142, 152, - 165, 172, 183, 187, 194, 199, 202, 203, 254, 283. _pic._ - - Craven, 1stLt William A., 217 - - Creal, LtCol Albert, 35 - - Crete, 146 - - Crocker, 1stLt Robert O., 289 - - Crook, Capt Welby, 223 - - Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., 188_n_, 191, 192 - - CROSSOVER Operation, 19 - - CROSSROADS Operation, 27 - - Crowe, LtCol Henry P., 126 - - Crowl, Philip A., 4_n_, 9_n_ - - Crowley, Capt Richard W., 117_n_, 136_n_ - - Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, 240 - - Cruisers, 67, 70, 81, 86, 88, 102–104, 145, 202 - - Cuba, 12, 27 - - Cuban, 48 - - Culebra, 48, 49 - - Culpepper, Cape Theodore T., 279_n_ - - Cummings, Lt Bryan J., 175, 176, 260, 261, 271, 278, 278_n_ - - Cunliffe, 2dLt Bruce F., 116_n_, 123, 134_n_, 135_n_, 173_n_, 177_n_, - 178_n_, 183_n_, 211_n_, 213_n_ - - Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 18, 71, 104, 167, 170, 250_n_, 295, _pic._ - - - Dai Ichi building, 45 - - Davis, Sgt, G. O., Jr., 34 - - Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 201, 268, 276, 287, 289 - - Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., Jr., 208 - - Dean, MajGen William F., USA, 7 - - DeArmond, Sgt David R., 163 - - DeFazio, 1stLt Ernest L., 190, 192_n_, 193 - - Defenses, North Korean, 83, 90, 92, 95, 106, 107, 219 - - _De Haven_ (DD), USS, 86, 87 - - Delamar, Capt Richard F., III, 276 - - Denny, 2dLt Paul E., 275 - - DEMON III Operation, 19 - - Department or State, U. S., 2_n_, 11, 12_n_, 18 - - Deptula, 2dLt Edwin A., 104_n_, 105, 108, 156–158, 161, 250_n_, 257, 258 - - Destroyers (DD), 63, 67, 69, 70, 81, 83, 86, 102–104, 115, 144, 145 - - _Diachenko_ (APD), USS, 102, 103 - - Dibble, Maj John G., 35 - - Dolan, 1stLt John E., 290_n_, 291 - - _Dolly Thurman_, SS, 32 - - Dominican Republic, 12 - - Douglas, Cpl Okey J., 150 - - Dowsett, LtCol Frederick R., 53, 54_n_, 146 - - Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 35, 38, 40, 43–47, 66, - 70, 77, 81, 83, 84, 102, 142, 292, 293, _pic._ - - Dunbar, 1stLt Michael J., 112 - - - Earney, Maj William R., 275_n_2 - - East Channel, 81 - - East China Sea, 81 - - Eddy, 2dLt Samuel L., Jr., 258 - - Edwards, PFC Clayton O., 220 - - Edwards, LtGen Idwal H., USAF, 44 - - El Toro, California, 1, 18, 26, 27, 54, 55, 170 - - Ellis, Maj Earl H., 48 - - Ely, Col Louis B., USA, 77, 78, 144 - - Embarkation Plans. _See_ Plans and orders. - - Embarkation Groups, 79 - ABLE, 79 - BAKER, 79 - CHARLIE, 79, 80 - DOG, 80 - EASY, 80 - FOX, 80 - - English, Capt Gearl M., 148_n_, 156, 157 - - Epley, 2dLt James W., 258 - - Equipment, abandoned, 215 - - Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 18 - - Escort Carriers (CVE), 85, 166 - - Esterline, Maj William C., 188 - - Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr. - - Europe, 50. - - Evacuation stations, 185, 200 - - - Far East Command, 7, 8, 38, 40, 43, 45, 59, 293 - Advanced Command Group, 7 - Headquarters, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 28, 38, 44, 57 - Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 6, 43, 61 - Special Planning Staff, 57–59 - - Farrington, SSgt Arthur, 259, 260 - - Febrey, Pvt G. W. _pic._ - - Fellers, BrigGen William S., 4, 6, 27 - - Fenton, Capt Francis I. Jr., 111_n_, 206, 208, 213 - - Ferry, 185, 200, 203, 261, 294. _See also_ BAKER Ferry, Haengju Ferry. - - Fire Support Areas, 69 - - Fire Support Coordination Center, 71, 166 - - Fire Support Units, 87 - - “Fireproof Phil”, 243 - - Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 118, 141_n_ - - _Fleet Training Publication 167_, 49 - - Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., USN, 181 - - Floating Bridge, 200 - - Floeck, Maj Robert, 256, 257 - - Flying Fish channel, 62, 81, 86 - - Food shortages, 282 - - Force Beachhead Line, 136, 153 - - Force in Readiness Concept, 11, 12 - - Formosa, 2 - - Forney, Col Edward S., 4–7, 66, 67_n_, 77_n_, 284_n_ - - Forrestal, James V., 50 - - _Fort Marion_ (LSD), USS, 93 - - Forward observer, 192 - - Fraser, LtCol Loren S., 35 - - Fridrich, Maj Raymond V., 268 - - Frigates (PF), 83 - - Fuller, MajGen John F. C., 50 - - - Gallipoli, 48 - - Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, 7 - - Gasoline, 125 - - Gavin, MajGen James M., USA, 153 - - Gay, MajGen Hobart H., USA, 7, 15 - - Geer, Andrew, 26_n_ - - _George Clymer_ (APA), USS, 104 - - Germany, 48 - - _General Buckner_, (T-AP), USNS, 32 - - _General Butner_ (AP), USS, 32 - - _General Meigs_ (T-AP), USNS, 32 - - _General Morton_, (T-AP), USNS, 54 - - _General Weigel_ (T-AP), USNS, 32 - - Gettysburg, 37 - - Gifford, MSgt B. W., 127_n_ - - Giusti, Ernest H., 11_n_, 54_n_, 223_n_, 294_n_ - - Godbold, LtCol Brygthe D., 35 - - Goggin, 1stLt William F., 267 - - Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 166 - - Gover, 1stLt Robert L., 175 - - GRACE, Typhoon, 15 - - Great Britain - Ground forces, 171 - 27th Brigade, 171, 253 - Marines, 61 - Naval forces, 144 - Frigate, 77 - - Green, 1stLt Melvin K., 96 - - _Green Bay Victory_, SS, 32 - - GREEN Beach. _See_ Beach, GREEN. - - Green Island, 27 - - Grenell, SSgt H. M., 127_n_ - - Grimes, 2dLt George, 248, 249 - - Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 272 - - Grove, PFC W. D., 35 - - Guadalcanal, 27, 38 - - Guam, 17, 30, 37 - - Guantanamo Bay, 48 - - Gugeler, Capt Russell A., USA, 8_n_ - - Guild, 2dLt John N., 216, 217 - - Gunther, Capt Albert J., 35 - - _Gurke_ (DD), USS, 86, 87 - - - Haengju, 180, 181, 183, 187, 188, 190, 194, 196, 197, 234, 238, 259 - - Haengju ferry, 231, 259 - - Haiti, 12,17 - - Hammond, Maj James D., 267_n_, 268, 275_n_, 289_n_ - - Han Choi Han, Col, NKPA, 160 - - Han River, 40, 58, 160, 163, 165, 172, 173, 180, 181, 183–185, 187, - 196–202, 205, 206, 208, 219, 220, 222, 232, 238, 243, 244, - 246, 254, 256, 285, 286, 294 - - Han River, crossing of, 187, 188, 190–195 - - Haneda Airfield, 35 - - Hanes, 1stLt J. V., _pic._ - - Hanlon, 2dLt Robert C, 173, 178 - - Harer, Lt Arnold W., USN, 110_n_ - - Harmon, Capt Lester G., 118 - - Harney, Cpl James P., 193 - - Harrell, 2dLt James E., 147_n_, 148_n_, 150, 161, 163 - - Harris, MajGen Field, 27, 51, 55, 71, 167–170, 295, _pic._ - - Harris, Cpl Welden D, 245, 249, 270_n_ - - Hart, MajGen Franklin A., 32 - - Hawaii, 1, 5, 19, 30 - - Hawkins, LtCol Jack, 121, 122, 136_n_, 138_n_, 177, 178, 212, 213, - 216, 219, 222, 226, 227, 251, 252 - - Hayden, Col Reynolds H., 53_n_ - - Hays, LtCol Lawrence C, Jr., 188, 233 - - Heck, 2dLt Ray, 112, 240 - - _Helena_ (CA), USS, 144, 145 - - Helicopter evacuation, 295 - - Helicopter rescue missions, 166 - - Helicopters. _See_ Aircraft, U. S. - - _Henderson_ (DD), USS, 86, 87 - - _Henrico_ (APA), USS, 83, 98, 102 - - Hering, Capt Eugene R., Jr., USN, 73, 130, 282 - - Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence, 159 - - Hickey, BrigGen Doyle G., USA, 43, 77 - - Higgins, Sgt James I., 234, 235 - - Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, 67, 85–87, 102, 103 - - Higgins, Marguerite, 152 - - Hill 51----188, 192, 194, 196 - - Hill 55----220 - - Hill 56----235, 239–241, 243, 245–247, 249 - - Hill 68----203, 234, 238 - - Hill 72----210, 235, 250, 257, 258 - - Hill 79----251, 252, 259 - - Hill 80----206, 208, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 226 - - Hill 82----264, 271, 273 - - Hill 85----206, 208, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222 - - Hill 88----235, 245, 246, 258 - - Hill 94----90, 123 - - Hill 95----192, 194, 196, 197 - - Hill 96----203 - - Hill 97----261, 264, 272 - - Hill 104----204, 234, 235, 238–240, 246 - - Hill 105----234 - - Hill 105-C----234, 235, 239, 250 - - Hill 105-N----234, 239, 245, 246, 249, 250, 256, 258, 270 - - Hill 105-S----234–236, 238, 243, 246, 251, 252, 260 - - Hill 108----232, 252 - - Hill 117----100, 117, 122, 133–135 - - Hill 118----181, 206, 208, 209, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 220 - - Hill 123----178, 181, 209 - - Hill 125----180, 187, 188, 190–192, 194, 195, 197, 203, 276, _pic._ - - Hill 131----163, 201 - - Hill 133----264, 283 - - Hill 137----140 - - Hill 146----210–212 - - Will 171----264 - - Hill 180----123 - - Hill 186----140, 141, 148, 173, 186 - - Hill 208----173, 175 - - Hill 216----203, 234–236, 246, 256, 259 - - Hill 233----180, 120, 122, 123, 135 - - Hill 296----235, 236, 241, 245, 246, 250, 256–259, 267, 268, - 270, 271, 277 - - Hill 338----235, 258, 264, 267, 268, 275, 279 - - Hill 342----264, 276 - - Hill 343----264, 268, 275, 276 - - Hinkle, LtCol Thornton M., 201, 268, 289_n_ - - Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, 78, 151, 153 - - Hodges, LtCol Charles T., 34 - - Hoengjeoe-ri, 267, 268, 275 - - Hofstetter, Capt Arnold C., 245 - - Holcomb, Col Bankson T. Jr., 34 - - Holzhaus, Lt Ralph L, USN, 110_n_ - - Honor guard, 144, 283 - - _Horace A. Bass_ (APD), USS, 48, 102, 108 - - Hoskins, RAdm John M., USN, 14 - - Houghton, Cape Kenneth J., 141, 177, 178_n_, 188, 190–194 - - Houston, Lt Trumond E., USN, 110_n_, 127 - - Howard, 2dLt Lee R., 148, 150, 248 - - - Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, 17 - - Inchon, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18, 22, 41, 74, 143, 145, 146, 152, 153, 167, - 172, 180, 195, 198, 200, 201, 215, 238, 291, 295, 297, - _pic._ _See also_: Inner tidal basin, outer tidal basin. - Hospital, 281 - North Korean garrison, 94 - Railway station, _pic._ - - Inchon Landing, 9, 10, 22, 27, 97–142, 144, 146, 198, 293, 296, _pic._ - Air support, 87, 104 - Artillery, 131 - Assault plan, 64, 65 - BLUE Beach. _See_ Beach BLUE. - Command relationships, 56, 81 - Conception, 6 - Fire Support Areas, 69 - Gunfire support, 87, 103, 115 - H-Hour, 101 - Intelligence, 59–61, 77 - Logistics, 71, 76, 125, 127–129 - Medical, 130 - Movement to, 81, 83, 84 - Objections to, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 58 - Planning, 6, 37, 38, 40–46, 48, 55–60, 62–64, 67, 69–71, 73, 78, 100 - Preliminary bombardment, 85, 86, 145 - Tanks, 131, 132 - Weather, 102, 114 - - Inchon-Anyang road, 221 - - Inchon Peninsula, 133, 136 - - Inchon Railroad Yards, 129 - - Inchon-Seoul highway, 122, 133, 136, 138, 140, 147, 148, 153, 155, - 173, 209, 213, 220, 221, 225, 227–229 - - Inchon-Seoul operation, 244, 250, 257, 285, 290, 291, 294, 297 - - Inchon-Seoul railroad, 129 - - Indian Ocean, 146 - - Inner tidal basin, Inchon, 98, 113, 133 - - Intelligence, U. S., 59–61, 77, 165, 180–181 - - Interdictory strikes, 3 - - IOWA, Point, 81, 83 - - Irick, Cape Joseph N., 194_n_, 195, 255_n_ - - Irwin, Cpl C. V., 35 - - Isely, Jeter A., 49_n_ - - Itami Air Force Base, 13, 70, 71, 80, 168, 169 - - Itazuke Air Force Base, 168, 171 - - Iwo Jima, 37 - - - _Jamaica_ (CL), HMS, 86, 87 - - JANE, Typhoon, 75, 79 - - Jacobs, LCdr M. Ted, Jr., USN, 45 - - Jacobs, Capt Walter F., 35 - - Japan, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 28, 30, 33, 48, 49, 54, 55, 71, 81, 114, 146, 172 - - Japanese freighters, 15 - - Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 108, 112, 133, 135, 155, 158_n_, 161, 249, 257 - - Jerome, MajGen Clayton C., 290 - - Johnson, Cdr Howard B., USN, 130 - - Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), 41 - - Joint Board of the Army and Navy, 48, 49 - - Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4, 20, 22–24, 32, 44, 46, 50, 172, 198 - - Joint Landing Force Board, 5_n_ - - Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). _See_ Far - East Command. - - Jones, 2dLt Charles M., 150, 161 - - Jones, 2dLt Donald R., 226 - - Jordan, Maj James D., 159 - - Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 3, 4, 12, 45, 47, 66, 71, 73, 144 - - - Kaesong, 276 - - Kaesong-Seoul highway, 256, 264, 267, 268, 275 - - Kaesong-Seoul railroad, 187, 196 - - Kalchon Bridge, 220, 222 - - Kalchon River, 205, 206, 208, 209, 216, 219–221, 223, 225, 226 - - Kansong-ni, 134, 135, 138, 140 - - Karig, Capt Walter, USN, 45_n_, 46_n_, 61_n_, 87_n_, 126_n_, 144_n_, - 145_n_, 257_n_ - - Kean, MajGen William B., USA., 8 - - Kearl, Sgt Ray D., 163 - - Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA., 41 - - Kent, WO Bartley D., 183 - - _Kenya_ (CL), HMS, 86, 87, 178 - - Key West Conference, 5_n_, 50 - - KEZIA, Typhoon, 81, 83, 84 - - Kikta, SSgt Robert J., 163 - - Kim, Capt, KMC, 287 - - Kimpo Air Field, 42, 58, 71, 77, 78, 138, 142, 144, 153, 156–161, 163, - 165, 167–170, 172, 175, 180, 183, 184, 187, 191, 193, - 198–202, 206, 212, 219, 236, 238, 257, 264, 284, 294, _pic._ - Proposed commando raid on, 77, 78 - Refueling facilities, 170 - - Kimpo-Yongdungpo highway, 219 - - King, Capt George W., 167 - - Knox, TSgt Edwin L., 88_n_, 93, 105, 193 - - Kobe, Japan, 31, 74–79, 83, 114, 146, 166, 293 - - Korea, 5, 81 - Geography, 2 - Hydrographic conditions, 40, 41 - North. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of. - People’s Democratic Republic of, 1 - Air Force, 2 - 1st Air Force Division, 159, 160 - 877th Air Force Unit, 160 - Invasion of South Korea, 2 - Marines, 94 - 226th Marine Regiment, 94, 95, 107, 160 - Navy: Minelayers, 85 - People’s Army, 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 13, 46, 47, 57, 58, 60–62, 64, 66, - 90, 93, 97, 101, 124, 136, 144, 145, 152, 161, 169–171, - 173, 178, 180, 181, 201–203, 236, 253, 254, 270, 276, 280, - 285, 287, 291, 298 - Infantry, 86 - Logistics, 2 - Units - Headquarters, 145 - 1st Division, 171, 253, 254 - 2d Division, 254 - 3d Division, 171, 253, 254 - 4th Division, 47, 254 - 5th Division, 253 - 6th Division, 171, 254 - 7th Division, 171, 254 - 8th Division, 253 - 9th Division, 254 - 10th Division, 171, 254 - 12th Division, 253 - 13th Division, 171, 254 - 15th Division, 253 - 17th Division, 290 - 18th Division, 148, 205 - Seoul Division, 290 - 25th Brigade, 233, 234, 263 - 31st Regiment, 290 - 42d Mechanized Regiment, 148 - 78th Independent Regiment, 233, 234 - 107th Regiment, 160 - 2d Battalion, 918th Coast Artillery Regiment, 94 - Republic of Korea, 1, 2, 7, 9 - Army, 2, 6, 13, 253, 282, 285, 296 - Reorganization, 9 - Army Units - I Corps, 171 - II Corps, 171 - 1st Division, 171, 253 - 3d Division, 171 - 17th Regiment, 64, 74, 180, 255, 274 - Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ RAdm Sohn Won Yil. - Guerrillas, 145 - Marines, 64, 144, 199 - 1st Regiment, 64, 73, 133, 143, 167, 203, 256, 264, 286, - 291, 296, _pic._ - 1st Battalion, 180, 204, 234, 235, 238, 239, 246, 256, 259, - 264, 271, 286 - 2d Battalion, 184, 188, 196, 255, 264, 282 - 3d Battalion, 153, 180, 201, 202, 264, 286, 290 - 5th Battalion, 264, 287 - Navy: - LST, 145 - Picket boat, 77 - - Korean national anthem, 143 - - Kraince, 1stLt Francis R., 192, 193 - - Krieger, 2dLt Roy E., 195 - - Krulak, Col Victor H., 7, 165, 197_n_ - - Kum River, 14 - - Kumchon, 253, 254 - - Kumpo Peninsula, 180, 181, 264, 286, 290 - - Kung Chan So, Maj, NKPA, 160 - - Kunsan, 41, 46, 144, 285 - - Kyongan-ni, 58 - - Kyushu, 84 - - - LCM, 54, 102, 126 - - LCP, _pic._ - - LCVP, 54, 63, 64, 88, 93, 102–105, 108, 121, 122, 128, _pic._ - - LSM, 83 - LSM 419, 32 - - LSMR, 69, 83, 88, 92, 103–105, 215 - LSMR 401, 87 - LSMR 403, 87 - LSMR 404, 87 - - LSMR Movement Element, 83 - - LST, 14, 41, 63, 64, 78–80, 84, 102, 108, 110, 125–128, 130, 167, 175, - 178, 184, 185, _pic._ - LST 799, 110_n_, 127 - LST 802, _pic._ - LST 845, 32 - LST 857, 110, 126 - LST 859, 110, 127 - LST 883, 110_n_ - LST 898, 110_n_, 130 - LST 914, 110 - LST 973, 110_n_, 126 - LST 975, 110, 111 - LST 1123, _pic._ - - LSU, 65, 79, 83, 88, 96, 102 - - LVT, 31, 59, 63, 64, 100, 102, 115–118, 120, 121, 135, 178, 184, 185, - 188, 190–197, 200, 203, 251, 255, 294 - - LVT(A), 100, 102, 103, 115, 117 - - Land mines. _See_ Mines, land. - - Landing Craft, 41, 45, 88, 102, 108 - - Landing Ships, Dock (LSD), 63, 79, 80, 83 - - Lareau, Cpl J. N., 34 - - Ledet, PFC Alphonse O., Jr., 192, 196 - - Lee, Col, ROKA, 291 - - Lee, Mayor, 281, 282 - - Lejeune, MajGen John A., 48, 49 - - Lejeune, Camp, 33, 31, 24, 19, 22 - - _Leyte_ (CV), USS, 53 - - Liberation ceremony, 283, 284, _pic._ - - Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., 105, 243, 250, 256, 257, _pic._ - - Little Creek, Virginia, 19 - - Litzenberg, Col Homer L., 33, 54, 80, 146, 201, 238, 239, 264, 267, - 275, 276, 283, 287, 289, 290, _pic._ - - Liversedge, BrigGen Harry B., 18 - - Locomotive, 129, 170, 234 - - Lookout Hill, 209, 211, 216, 220, 225 - - Lopez, 1stLt Baldomero, 106 - - Lowe, MajGen Frank, USA, 152, 190 - - Lowentrout, LCdr Jack L., USN, 45 - - Lund, Maj Arnold A., 105 - - - McAlee, 2dLt George E., 173 - - McAlister, Col Francis M., 35, 199 - - MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 3, 4, 5_n_, 6, 7, 9–12, 18, - 20, 22, 23, 28, 38–46, 48, 57, 65, 84, 90, 92, 100, 103, - 142, 151, 152, 170, 172, 197, 198, 283, 284, 297, _pic._ - - McAvinue, PFC H. J., 34 - - McClelland, 1stLt William A., 226, 227, 231 - - MacDonald, SSgt. Arthur J., 176, 278 - - McGee, 1stLt James M., 216_n_, 217 - - McGill, Camp, 80 - - McLean, Maj Charles E, 289 - - McMillan, Lt(jg) Leo D., USN, 291 - - McMullen, TSgt Orval F., 105, 106 - - McMullen, Capt Robert A., 88_n_, 90, 91, 95, 156_n_, 188, 194–196, - 258_n_, 270 - - McNaughton, Capt George C., 104, 112_n_, 148_n_, 152, 240_n_, 247–249 - - McPherson, SSgt Stanley B., 250 - - McReynolds, Maj William, 215 - - Magness, 2dLt Byron L., 111, 112_n_, 113 - - Mahang-ri, 138, 173, 175 - - Mann, 1stLt Nathaniel F. Jr., 236 - - _Mansfield_ (DD), USS, 86, 87, 95 - - Manson, LCdr Frank A., USN, 45_n_ - - Marianas Islands, 81 - - _Marine Phoenix_ (T-AP), USNS, 32, 75 - - Marine Corps, U. S., 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 20, 24, 46–50, 61, 66, 74, 103, - 105, 110, 113, 145, 297, _pic._ - Air-Ground Team, 12, 294 - Enlistments extended, 23 - Headquarters, 18, 22, 25 - Request for Marines, 3, 4, 11, 18, 20, 22 - Reserve, 12, 19, 21–27, 33 - Mobilization, 12, 20, 22, 24, _pic._ - Reserve District directors, 22, 26 - Reserve Units - 12th Amphibian Tractor Company, 24 - 3d Engineer Company, 24 - 13th Infantry Company, 24 - Schools, 17, 48, 49 - Strength, 20 - Training, 13, 18, 19 - Units - Expeditionary Force, 49 - Fleet Marine Force, 10, 12, 49, 30 - Atlantic, 19, 21, 22, 31, 146 - Pacific, 11, 21, 22, 32, 43, 54 - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 19, 21, 27, 54, 55, 58, 70, 71, 167, - 169, 250, 292, 294 - 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 19, 21 - Wing Headquarters Squadron 1, 54 - MAG-12, 54, 71, 168 - Headquarters Squadron 12, 54 - Service Squadron 12, 54 - Marine Aircraft Group 33, 4, 18, 28, 47, 70, 71, 166–170, 236, 295 - Headquarters Squadron 33, 168 - Service Squadron 33, 168 - VMF-212, 54, 71, 168, 170, 236, 257, 294 - VMF-214, 85–87, 93, 102, 105, 134, 138, 139, 168, 176, 181, 195, - 196, 210, 211, 223, 243, 249, 250, 256, 257, 294 - VMF-312, 54, 71, 289, 294, 295 - VMF-323, 85–87, 102, 105, 168, 181, 213, 238, 246–248, 257, 294 - VMF(N)-513, 54, 71, 168, 171 - VMF(N)-542, 54, 71, 168, 169, 236, 257, 294 - VMR-152, 169 - VMO-6, 165, 166, 169, 202, 295 - MGCIS-1, 168, 169 - MTACS-2, 168, 169 - Air Support Section, 71 - 1st Marine Division, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20–23, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35, - 38, 40, 53–56, 58–60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 74, 75, 77, 79, 100, - 147, 148, 160, 168, 172, 180, 183, 197, 201–203, 221, 238, - 244, 245, 250, 253, 255, 256, 261, 264, 278, 283, 284, - 286, 287, 290, 292–295, 297 - Advance party, 34, 35 - Arrival in Japan, 74 - ADC Group, 94, 142 - Command Post, 151, 172 - Departure from San Diego, 31, 32, _pic._ - Expansion, 10, 18, 23, 24, 26, 293 - Logistic support, 30, 31 - Outloading from Kobe, 77, 79, 80 - Rear Echelon, 33 - Staff, 55 - Training, 28 - Withdrawal of 17-year-olds, 75 - 2d Marine Division, 19, 21, 23, 24, 33 - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinf), 4, 9, 18, 23, 28, 30, 34, - 46, 48, 55, 63, 65, 70, 195, 234, 293 - Activation, 7 - Availability, 65–67 - Dispatch of, 4, 30 - 1st Marines, 31, 63–66, 79, 100, 103, 104, 113, 114, 128, 131, - 133, 138, 140, 141, 147, 148, 150, 153, 167, 169, 173, - 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 197, 202–204, 212, 213, - 215, 216, 220, 225, 228, 231–233, 243, 244, 246, 247, 251, - 253–255, 259, 262, 264, 267, 277, 279, 280, 282, 285, 287, - 290, 291, _pic._; - Command Post, 152. _See_ Col Lewis B. Puller. - 1st Battalion, 121, 122, 135, 136, 138, 141, 177, 178, 184, 188, - 212, 216, 217, 219, 236, 251, 259, 261, 271, 273, 279, - 280, 282. _See also_ LtCol Jack Hawkins. - Headquarters & Service Company, 123 - Company A, 122, 123, 212, 213, 216, 217, 220, 222, 226–228, - 236, 273, 279 - Company B, 122, 123, 206, 208, 212, 223, 226–229, 231, 236, 273 - Company C, 122, 209, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 223, - 236, 273, 279 - Weapons Company, 216, 217, 223, 226 - 2d Battalion, 84, 100, 116, 117, 121, 122, 134, 135, 138, 140, - 141, 151, 173, 175, 177, 178, 183, 209–211, 213, 215, 216, - 220, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 251, 252, 259, 261, 271–273, - 279, 280, 282, 283. _See also_ LtCol Allan Sutter. - Headquarters & Service Company, 117 - Company D, 116, 117, 122, 123, 135, 140, 173, 175, 178, 210, - 211, 214, 223, 225, 279 - Company E, 117, 123, 140, 173, 175, 178, 211, 214, - 223, 271, 272 - Company F, 116, 117, 122, 123, 135, 140, 148, 151, 173, 175, - 210, 211, 214, 223, 271, 272. - Weapons Company, 117, 123 - 3d Battalion, 100, 115, 117, 122, 135, 136, 138, 141, 175, 177, - 178, 181, 209, 211, 216, 220, 225, 231, 232, 252, 259, - 261, 262, 263, 271, 282, 284. _See also_ LtCol - Thomas L. Ridge. - Headquarters & Service Company, 114 - Company G, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 135, 175, 176, 225, 263 - Company H, 123, 209 - Company I, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 135, 209, 225, 252 - Weapons Company, 114 - Fifth Marines, 30, 47, 53, 64–67, 73, 79, 98, 100, 101, 104, 107, - 108, 112, 131–133, 138, 143, 147, 148, 151–153, 155, 158, - 160, 167, 170, 175, 180, 183, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194, - 196, 200, 202–204, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 241, 243–246, - 251, 252, 254–256, 259, 262–264, 267, 271, 274, 277–279, - 282, 284–286, 290, 291, 294, _pic._; - Command Post, 152, 191. _See also_ LtCol Raymond L. Murray. - Antitank Company, 150 - Headquarters & Service Company, 159 - 1st Battalion, 98, 101, 112, 113, 133, 138, 153, 158, 163, 180, - 184, 185, 196, 197, 203, 206, 212, 213, 219, 234, 236, - 238, 239, 243, 246, 251, 256, 258, 259, 277. _See also_ - LtCol George R. Newton. - Company A, 100, 104–107, 112, 132, 158, 236, 243, 278 - Company B, 111, 158, 163, 206, 212, 236, 243 - Company C, 108, 110, 111, 158, 163, 180, 206, 213, - 236, 251, 286 - 2d Battalion, 98, 112, 133, 135, 138–140, 147, 148, 150, 151, - 153, 155–157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 180, 188, 196, 197, 203, - 234, 235, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 256, - 258, 259, 271, 277, 286; - Command Post, 158. _See also_ LtCol Harold S. Roise. - Headquarters & Service Company, 110 - Company D, 108, 110, 112, 113, 133, 135, 139, 140, 147, 148, - 150, 157, 158, 161, 163, 197, 240, 241, 245–250, 257, 258 - Company E, 104, 105, 112, 133–135, 139, 155, 157, 158, 161, - 163, 183, 197, 240, 246, 248, 249, 257, 258 - Company F, 113, 133, 135, 139, 155, 158, 161, 163, 197, 240, - 241, 245, 246, 249, 257, 258, 259 - Weapons Company, 110 - 3d Battalion, 64, 69, 86, 88, 90–95, 101, 103, 105, 132, 133, - 138, 140, 155, 156, 158, 188, 194, 196, 197, 199, 203, - 234–236, 239, 246, 256–258, 262, 270, 271, 277, 278, 286. - _See also_ LtCol Robert D. Taplett. - Company G, 88, 90, 93, 140, 156, 194, 196, 246, 258, - 270, 271, 277 - Company H, 86, 90, 91, 140, 156, 194, 196, 235, 243, 246, 258 - Company I, 90–92, 140, 136, 194–196, 235, 236, 246, 258, 270, - 271, 273, 277 - Weapons Company, 241 - 6th Marines, 33, 53, 54, 146 - 3d Battalion, 33, 54 - 7th Marines, 25, 32, 33, 37, 54, 65, 66, 80, 130, 131n, 146, 201, - 203, 238, 244–246, 254, 256, 259, 262, 264, 268, 270, 276, - 279, 282, 284, 285, 287, 289–292; - Command post, 275. _See also_ Col Homer L. Litzenberg. - Headquarters & Service Company, 201 - 1st Battalion, 201, 238, 239, 268, 287, 289. _See also_ LtCol - Raymond G. Davis. - Company A, 276 - Company B, 276 - Company C, 276 - 2d Battalion, 201, 238, 259, 268, 273, 277, 282, 287, 289, 290. - _See also_ LtCol Thornton M. Hinkle, and Maj Webb D. Sawyer. - Company D, 267, 268, 275 - Company E, 268, 275 - Company F, 268, 275 - 3d Battalion, 53, 146, 201, 238, 268, 277, 282, 287, 289. _See - also_ Maj Maurice E. Roach - Company G, 268, 275, 276 - Company H, 268, 275 - Company I, 275 - 11th Marines, 63, 64, 71, 80, 96, 131, 166, 167, 173, 188, 192, - 210, 211, 215, 221, 222, 243, 248, 254, 262, 263, 291 - 1st Battalion, 64, 131, 194, 254, 286 - Battery A, 159 - Battery B, 245 - 2d Battalion, 64, 131, 215, 254 - 3d Battalion, 33, 131n, 201, 254, 287 - 4th Battalion, 131, 194, 215, 254 - 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 65, 79, 184, 188, 202, 254, 255 - Company A, 251 - 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 76 - 1st Combat Service Group, 76, 79, 96, 127, 129 - 1st Engineer Battalion, 65, 142, 184, 188, 202 - Company A, 91, 93, 142, 156, 159, 163, 167, 178, 191, 220, 250 - Company C, 118, 210, 251, 259 - Company D, 33, 275, 287 - 1st Medical Battalion, 93, 130, 131, 281 - Company E, 33 - 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 286 - Company D, 33 - 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 76, 127, 129 - 1st Ordnance Battalion, 31, 96, 202 - Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, 215 - 1st Service Battalion, 96 - 1st Shore Party Battalion, 65, 76, 126, 127, 185, 188, 200, 202 - Headquarters & Service Company, 126 - Group A, 96, 125 - Group B, 128 - Company C, 33 - 1st Signal Battalion, 166, 167, 219, 291 - 1st Tank Battalion, 65, 76, 80, 132, 202 - Headquarters Company, 132 - Company A, 105, 132, 135, 139, 147, 148, 156, 158, 163, - 188, 199, 286 - Company B, 132, 249, 251, 259, 271 - Company C, 132, 209, 211 - Company D, 33, 132, 286, 287 - Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, 47, 138, 141, - 177, 184, 188, 194, 256, 259, 264, 271 - 1st Replacement Draft, 30 - - Marshall, Cdr Edmund S. L. USN, 45 - - Martson, Sgt Richard L., 161 - - Masan, 28, 171, 254 - - Medical collecting points, 281 - - Medical supplies, 281 - - Mediterranean, 33, 53 - - Merritt, 2dLt Max A, 111–113 - - Mexico, 12 - - MICOWEX, Operation, 50, 19 - - MIKI, Operation, 5, 19, 41 - - Miller, Lt C. M., USN, 110_n_ - - Milne, LtCol Harry T., 132 - - Mine field - North Korean, 210, 211, 250, 251, 259, 261, 276, 277, 287 - United States, 91, 271 - - Mines, land - North Korean, 92, 93, 178, 181, 210, 221, 247, 278, 279, 284, 289 - United States, 45, 214, 220, 263, 271 - - Mines, naval, North Korean, 85, 86, 104 - - Mine, land, clearance, 272, 281 - - Minesweepers (AM), 83 - - Minesweepers, Auxiliary Motor (AMS), 83 - - Minette, Col W. P., 35 - - _Missouri_ (BB), USS, 144, 202 - - Mize, 1stLt Charles D., 271 - - Monegan, PFC Walter C. Jr., 151, 173, 213_n_, 214 - - Monroe Doctrine, 11 - - _Montague_ (AKA), USS, 54 - - Montross, Lynn, 27_n_, 86_n_, 130_n_ - - Moody, Capt Richard E., 34 - - Mooney, 2dLt Arthur R., 276 - - Moore, Cdr Theophilus H., USN, 45 - - Moore, LtCol Floyd R., 34 - - Morgan, Cpl James, 193 - - Moses, Maj Emile P. Jr., 33 - - Mount, LtCol Charles M., USA, 221 - - _Mount McKinley_ (ACC), USS, 14, 35, 37, 55–57, 60, 62, 63, 71, 74, - 75, 77, 78, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90–93, 95, 101, 103, 104, 142, - 166–168, _pic._ - - Muetzel, 2dLt Francis, W., 104_n_, 105, 133_n_ - - Mullaney, 1stLt Paul V., 267 - - Munhang Peninsula, 100, 135, 136, 138, 141 - - Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 73, 113, 136, 138, 152, 158, 159, 187, 190, - 193, 194, 206, 233, 238, 239, 258, 283, _pic._ - - Musical instruments, 283 - - Myers, Maj Reginald R., 117_n_, 115, 183_n_, 209_n_ - - - Naktong River, 47, 171 - - Naktong Bulge, 66 - - Namdong Peninsula, 138, 141, 153, 177 - - Napalm, 67, 85, 86, 93, 125, 134, 169, 248, 260 - - National Security Act of 1947, 5_n_, 50 - - Naval gunfire support, 67, 69, 71, 95, 102, 144, 145, 163, 166, 167, - 178, 202, 291 - - Naval vessels. _See_ individual ships and types. - - Navy, U. S., 5, 15, 45, 46, 48, 49, 59, 103, 145, 146, 297 - Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific - Fleet, 4–6, 28, 77 - Mobile Training Team Able, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 58, 66, 67 - Sixth Fleet, 53, 146 - Seventh Fleet, 2, 14, 144 - Joint Task Force (JTF-7), 70, 73, 81, 102, 201, 295 - Task Force 77, 2, 70, 85–87, 102, 145 - Task Force 90, 73 - Task Group 90.1, 81, 87 - Task Group 90.3, 83 - Task Group 90.5, 70, 145 - Task Group 95.5, 85 - Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1) 5–7, 9, 13–15, 45, 46, 56, 57, 59, - 62, 63, 67, 71, 166, 293 - Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), 47, 88, 115 - Underwater Demolition Team 1, 121 - Surgical teams, 130 - - Nebergal, 1stLt Max N., 166 - - New Britain operation, 9–11, 17 - - Newton, LtCol George R., 98, 108_n_, 111, 112, 127, 158, 163, 188, - 206, 212, 246 - - Nicaragua, 12, 49 - - Nippon Flour Company, 108, 111 - - Noble, MajGen Alfred H., 33–35 - - _Noble_ (APA), USS, 32 - - Nokpon-ni, 236, 241 - - Nolan, 2dLt Harry J., 113, 241, 245, 246 - - _Normday_, SS, 32, 75 - - Norfolk, Virginia, 53 - - North Point, 92, 95, 96 - - Northern Solomons, 27 - - - Objective - Able, 100, 108, 111, 112, 117, 122, 126 - Baker, 100, 108, 111–113, 126 - Charlie, 100, 112, 120, 122, 126 - Dog, 100, 115, 122 - - Obong-ni Ridge, 47 - - Observatory Hill, 95, 98, 108, 110–113, 133 - - Oeoso-ri, 172, 185, 200, 283 - - _Oglethorpe_ (AKA), USS, 14 - - O’Grady, TSgt W., 34 - - Okinawa, 17, 51, 84 - - Olson, LtCol Merlin R., 104_n_ - - Omaha, Nebraska, 42 - - O’Neil, Pvt Oliver, Jr., 214 - - Operation Order (OpnO). _See_ Plans and orders. - - Osan, 7, 8, 44 - - Outer tidal basin, Inchon, 121 - - - PC 703 (ROKN), 61 - PCEC, 83 - PCEC 896----102, 103 - - Pak Han Lin, Col, NKPA, 233 - - Palmi-do, 62, 87 - - Panama, 48 - - Panama Canal, 53 - - Paolino, TSgt Pasquale, 210_n_, 260 - - Paris, France, 17 - - Parrish, CWO Bill E., 158 - - Parry, Maj Francis F., 201, 287 - - Partridge, LtCol John H., 142, 184, 184_n_, 199 - - Patton, Gen George C., USA, 8 - - Paul, Capt John F., 193 - - Pearl Harbor, 1, 3, 4, 7, 13, 30, 43, 84 - - Pedersen, Capt Pool F., 108, 111, 180, 208 - - Peleliu, 17, 51 - - Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, 17, 18, 22–25, 27, 28, 30, 32, - 33, 35, 54, 76, 80, 113, 127, 132, 293 - - Pensacola, Florida, 27 - - Pentagon, 3, 22, 44 - - Peters, Capt Uel D., 117, 240, 241, 245 - - Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., 195, 196, 208 - - Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants (POL), 169 - - Phase Line CC, 153, 167, 175 - - _Philippine Sea_ (CV), USS, 87 - - Philippines, 27 - - Phillips, Capt Walter D., Jr., 275 - - _Pickaway_ (APA), USS, 83 - - Plans and orders - Operation Plan 712, 49 - Plan ABLE, 20 - Plan BAKER, 14, 20 - FECOM - Operation Plan CHROMITE, 57 - Operation Plan 110-B, 57 - ComNavFE Operation Plan 108-50, 73 - X Corps - Operational Instructions No. 1, 183 - Operation Order 1, 73 - Operation Order 2, 212 - Operation Order 5, 292 - 1st Marine Division - Embarkation Plan 1-50, 28, 31, 73 - Operation Order 1-50, 28 - Operation Order 2-50, 62, 73 - Operation Order 3-50, 133 - Operation Order 4-50, 136 - Operation Order 5-50, 153 - Operation Order 6-50, 183 - Operation Order 7-50, 187 - Operation Order 9-50, 238 - Operation Order 10-50, 251 - Operation Order 11-50, 255 - Operation Order 12-50, 264 - Operation Order 13-50, 285, 286 - Operation Order 14-50, 286, 287 - Operation Order 15-50, 291 - 5th Marines - Operation Order 24-50, 235 - Operation Order 26-50, 245 - - Pohang-dong, 9, 13, 14, 145, 171 - Landing, 14, 15 - - Pollock, MajGen Edwin A., 32, 290 - - Pomeroy, Capt William D, 148_n_, 150, 156 - - Pontoon Movement Group, 83 - - Port Said, Egypt, 54 - - PORTREX Operation, 19 - - Posung-Myon, 44, 48 - - Premature air bursts, 178 - - _President Jackson_ (APA), USS, 32, 166 - - Prisoner of war stockade, 92, 128 - - Prisoners of war. North Korean, 59, 90, 91, 94, 106, 107, 133, 141, - 147, 152, 159, 190, 197, 202, 206, 235, 252, 260, 263, - 264, 285, 287, _pic._ - - Puckett, 2dLt Charles, 192 - - Pukhan river, 285, 286 - - Puller, Col Lewis B., 120, 121, 136, 138, 152, 181, 209, 216, 225, - 232, 245, 251, 261–263, 272, 283, _pic._ - - Pusan, 47, 66, 67, 74, 79–81, 83, 195, 281, 293, 298 - Logistical Command, 7 - Perimeter, 28, 42, 46, 47, 58, 65, 74, 98, 130, 139, 144, 166, 170, - 171, 178, 198, 253, 296 - - Pyo Yang Moon, 143 - - Pyongyang, 144, 145 - - - Quantico, Virginia, 1, 17, 48, 49 - - Quebec, 46 - - - Radford, Adm Arthur W., 1, 4, 23, 43, 47 - - Radio Hill, 88, 90–93, 93 - - Raft, 184, 199, 200 - - Rapp, Capt David A., 216_n_ - - Reclamation depot, 73 - - Reconnaissance raids, 47, 48 - - Recruit Depot, San Diego, California, 31 - - RED Beach. _See_ Beach, RED. - - Reeve, LtCol Douglas E., 35 - - Refugees, 282 - - Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., 171 - - Rendezvous areas, 81 - - Repair Ship, Landing Craft (ARL), 83 - - Rhee, President Syngman, 284, _pic._ - - Rice, 282 - - Rice paddies, 197 - - Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 156 - - Richardson, SSgt P., 33 - - Rickert, LtCol Robert W., 113, 118_n_, 121 - - Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., 100_n_, 113_n_, 115, 118, 122, 135, 136_n_, - 138_n_, 141_n_, 175_n_, 178, 183, 223_n_, 232, 262 - - Roach, Maj Maurice E., 146, 201, 268, 287, 289 - - Roadblock, 178, 191, 211, 261, 263, 287 - - _Rochester_ (CA), USS, 84, 86, 87, 92, 202 - - Roise, LtCol Harold S., 98, 104_n_, 110, 111_n_, 112, 113_n_, 139, - 148, 133–157, 163, 188, 197_n_, 239, 246, 248, - 250, 256, 258 - - Rosegoom, Hospitalman R. E., _pic._ - - Rouse, Maj Jules M., 35 - - Rowny, LtCol Edward L., USA, 200 - - Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, 67 - - Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, 40, 45, 58, 66, 67, 151, 153, 262 - - Russell, MajGen John H., 49 - - Russia, _See_ USSR. - - Ryokoku, 276 - - - SCAJAP LSTs, 79 - SCAJAP LST QO79, 166 - - Sachon Creek, 204 - - Salt Lake Cry, Utah, 1 - - Salvage vessel (ARS), 83 - - Samchok, 144, 285 - - Sampson, RAdm William P., USN, 48 - - San Clemente Island, 49 - - San Diego, California, 5, 27, 31, 34, 75–77, 114, 146, 293 - - San Francisco, California, 1, 30 - - San Nicholas Island, California, 19 - - Sansing, 2dLt S. E., 240 - - Santiago, Cuba, 48 - - Sartwell, 1stLt Paul P., 267 - - Sasebo, Japan, 6, 61, 83, 86, 114 - - Sawyer, Maj Webb D., 289 - - Scaling ladders, 60, 103, 118, _pic._ - - Schimmenti, Capt Joseph A., 236 - - Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, 43_n_, 43_n_ - - Schneelock, LCdr Ralph H., USN, 102, 103, 108_n_, 126_n_ - - Schreier, Maj Robert L., 166 - - Schwyhart, Cdr Robert M., USN, 291 - - Sea bags, 76 - - Sea wall, 98, 100, 105, 108, 110, 118, 126, _pic._ - - Sears, Capt Norman W., USN, 87, 88 - - Seattle, Washington, _pic._ - - Seeburger, 1stLt Edward H., 267 - - Seeley, Maj Henry W., Jr., 35 - - Seigle. Ensign John, USN, 190, 193_n_ - - _Seminole_ (AKA), USS, 83 - - Sengewald, Capt Richard H., 275 - - Seoul, 2, 6, 40, 58, 76, 136, 144, 147, 148, 160, 165, 172, 181, 183, - 187, 190, 196, 198–200, 202–205, 220, 222, 225, 227, - 233–235, 238, 243, 245, 249, 251–283, 285–287, 292, 293, - 296, 299, _pic._ - Ducksoo Palace, 255, 283 - Government Palace, 204, 255, 264, 278, 284 - Hospital, 281 - Hotel Banta, _pic._ - Middle School, 277, 278 - Railroad station, 271, 273, 279 - Sodaemun Prison, 267 - Women’s University, 282, 283 - - Seoul-Ujiongbu road, 256 - - Sexton, Capt Martin J., 35 - - Seydel, 1stLt Karle, 247–249, 257 - - Shefchik, Cpl L., 35 - - Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 3, 9, 44, 78, 84, 151, 165, 197, _pic._ - - Sherman, Maj Donald W., 73, 74 - - Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 3, 4, 18, 22, 24, 33, 41, 46, 47, 53, 54 - - Shields, Capt Nicholas L., 268–270, 275 - - Shore Fire Control Party, 95 - - Shutler, 2dLt Philip D., 192, 193 - - _Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 70, 85, 87, 168, 256, 257 - - Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 113_n_, 114, 116, 136_n_, 141_n_, 225_n_, 263 - - Simpson, Capt William F., 134, 256 - - _Siskoh Bay_ (CVE), USS, 54 - - Sleger, 2dLt J., Jr., 139_n_ - - Smith, Sgt Alvin E., 90 - - Smith, 1stLt H. J., 240, 247, 248 - - Smith, 1stLt James W., 105, 112, 113 - - Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 33–35, 37, 38, 40, 44, - 47, 48, 51, 56_n_, 58, 59, 65–67, 73, 74_n_, 75–78, 80_n_, - 81, 83, 84_n_, 88_n_, 97_n_, 98, 101_n_, 133_n_, 136, - 141–144, 148, 151–153, 170, 172, 183, 184, 190, 197, 198, - 201–203, 204_n_, 239_n_, 241, 244, 250_n_, 251_n_, 254, - 255, 256_n_, 259_n_, 261_n_, 262, 282_n_, 283, 284, - 285_n_, 291, 292, _pic._ - Conference with Gen Ruffner, 40 - Interview with Gen MacArthur, 38, 39 - - Smith, Sgt Robert, 247 - - Smith’s Ridge, 240, 245–247, 250, 257 - - Smoke pots, 243 - - Snedeker, Col Edward W., 73, 142_n_, 200_n_ - - Snipers, North Korean, 197, 217, 276, 280, 284 - - Sogam-ni, 135 - - Sohn Won Yil, RAdm, ROKN, 143, 144, 152 - - Sojong, 197 - - Soper, Capt James B., 61_n_ - - Soryu-li, 158, 161 - - Sosa, 153, 167, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 209, 212 - - South Mountain, 203, 255, 263, 273, 274, 279, 283 - - _Southerland_ (DD), USS, 87 - - _Southwind_, SS, 32 - - Soviet-American occupation of Korea, 2 - - Soviet Union. _See_ USSR. - - Sowolmi-do, 42, 67, 92–94 - - Spanish-American War, 11 - - Sparks, 1stLt William F., 195 - - Stamford, Cape Edward P., 5_n_ - - Stanford, Capt Norman R., 273 - - Stein, TSgt, Max, 111 - - Stevens, Capt John R., 104_n_, 105–107 - - Stewart, Cape Gerald H., 158_n_, 235_n_ - - Stewart, LtCol Joseph L., 73, 142 - - Strategic bombing, 3 - - Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 2, 12, 144, 170 - - Stratton, 1stLt Franklin, 289 - - Struble, VAdm A. D., USN, 45_n_, 57, 66, 67, 84, 85, 92, 145, 151, - 197, 295_n_, _pic._ - - Stumpges, MSgt F. J., 35 - - Suda Bay, Crete, 53 - - Suez Canal, 33, 54, 146 - - Supplies - North Korean, 232 - United States, 79, 200, 243 - Medical, 228 - - Supply Dumps - North Korean, 289 - United States, 127–129, 185 - Medical, 200 - - Sutter, LtCol, Allan, 113_n_, 116, 123, 135, 140_n_, 173, 183, 210, - 211, 213, 221, 223_n_, 271_n_, 273 - - Suwon, 58, 181, 225, 254 - - Suyuhyon, 286, 287 - - SWARMER Operation, 19 - - Sweet, Lt Granville G., 91, 93, 139 - - _Swanson_ (DD), USS, 86, 87 - - Swords, 2dLt John J., 226, 227, 231 - - - Tactical Air Control, 70, 181 - - Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 104, 168 - - Taebu-do, 61 - - Taegu, 28, 171 - - Taejon, 14, 15, 28, 253, 254 - - Taejong-ni, 155 - - Talasea, 17 - - Tanks. See Weapons. - - Tank support, U.S., 251 - - Taplett, LtCol Robert D., 88, 91–95, 101, 140, 155, 156, 188, 243, - 256, 258, 277 - - Tarawa, 103 - - Task Force Kumpo, 286, 290 - - Taylor, Capt Richard M., 209 - - _Tentative Manual on Landing Operations_, 49 - - Thach, Capt John H., USN, 257 - - Thirty-Eighth Parallel, 181 - - Thompson, 2dLt Carl B., Jr., 279 - - Tide, 94 - - Tinsley, Lt Leland, USN, 110_n_ - - _Titania_ (AKA), USS, 14, 32 - - Tokyo, 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 28, 35, 37, 44, 46–48, 75, 144, 197, 198 - - _Toledo_ (CA), USS, 86, 87, 202 - - Tongdok Mountains, 216, 221 - - Tractor Movement Group. _See_ U. S. Navy, Task Group 90.3. - - Traffic control, 200 - - Training, 75, 196 - - Training Bulletin No. 36–50 (1st Marine Division), 28 - - Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., 278 - - Transport Group, 84 - - Transport Movement Group, 83 - - Transports (AP), 75, 83, 84 - - Transports, Attack (APA), 63, 79, 83 - - Transports, High speed (APD), 63, 79, 83 - - Transportation, - North Korean - Vehicles, 171, 181, 213, 274 - Trucks, 140, 147, 213–215, 278, 289 - Jeeps, 140 - United States - Vehicles, 127, 188, 287 - DUKWs, 102, 131, 178, 185, 196, 199, 200, 294 - Jeeps, 178, 197, 221, 290 - Trucks, 169, 220 - “Weasel”, 219 - - Trapp, LCdr R. I., USN, 110_n_ - - Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 117_n_, 209 - - Truman, President Harry S., 2, 4, 9, 22, 152, 190 - - Tsushima Strait, 81 - - Tugs, 83, 85 - - Tulagi, 38 - - Turkey, 48 - - Turner, Capt Craig B., 287 - - _Twin Falls Victory_, SS, 32 - - - Uijongbu, 282, 286, 287, 290 - - Underwood, TSgt George C., 256 - - Underwood, Lt Horace, USN, 190 - - _Union_ (AKA), USS, 14 - - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, 2, 57, 233, 292; - possible intervention in Korean War, 9 - - United Nations, 1, 2 - Blockade and Covering Force, 65 - Cemetery, Inchon, 291, _pic._ - Command, 9, 28, 57, 297, 298 - Security Council, 2, 9, 297 - Supreme Commander. _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. - - United States, 2, 7 - Forces in the Far East, 2 - Ground Forces - 1st enemy contact by, 7 - intervention,3 - Military Academy, 7_n_ - - _Valley Forge_ (CV). USS, 87 - - Van Cleve, Capt Roy R., 270_n_, 275_n_ - - Vieques, 49 - - Vining, 1stLt Norm, 223 - - Volcansek, LtCol Max J. Jr., 169, 257 - - - Waegwon, 171 - - Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 8, 9, 46, 171 - - Walseth, Col Harvey S., 35 - - Wan Yong, BrigGen (NKPA), 160 - - _Wantuch_ (APD), USS, 102, 115 - - Washington. D C., 3, 17, 23, 27, 44 - - Water, 125 - - Water Barge (YW), 83 - - Water Point, 142 - - Wayerski, 2dLt Joseph R., 95, 202_n_ - - Weapons - North Korean - Antiaircraft guns, 85, 289, 295 - Antitank guns, 92, 177, 208, 246, 247, 250, 261, 272, 279, _pic._ - 76mm, 92, 140 - 14.5mm, 194 - Armor, 8, 205, 214 - Artillery, 93, 97, 171, 205, 209, 210, 215, 235, 241, 245–247, - 274, 289, 290 - Heavy, 234 - Automatic Weapon, 157, 222, 245, 261, 279 - Bayonets, 277 - Grenades, 101, 112, 260 - Guns, 45, 84–86 - Coast defense, 136 - 76mm, 94, 233 - 76mm self-propelled, 262, 263, 278 - Howitzer, 278 - Machine guns, 94, 106, 110, 111, 120, 136, 156, 159, 194, 195, - 208, 210, 250, 267, 277 - Mortar, 95, 110, 209, 215, 245–247, 257, 261, 263, 289 - 120mm, 136, 234 - 122mm, 140 - Pistols, 2 - Rifles, 136, 160, 267, 272, 277 - Small arms, 177, 209 - Submachine guns, 160, 272 - Tanks, 2, 95, 97, 132, 134, 139, 171, 181, 229, 262, 263, - 274, 290, 297 - T-34, 2, 8, 134, 139, 148, 150, 151, 161, 175, 213–215, 229, - 231, 263, _pic._ - South Korea: 105mm howitzers, 2 - United States - Artillery, 31, 63, 64, 70, 166, 180, 194, 222, 235, 236, 238, 239, - 248, 251, 252, 257, 258, 263, 286, 296 - Shortages of, 8 - BAR, 150, 161, 196, 229 - Carbine, 161 - Flame thrower, 94, 106 - Grenades, 86, 94, 105, 106, 107, 112, 157, 214, 228 - Howitzers, 96, 208, 210, 215, 221, 222, 243, 248, 263, _pic._ - Machine guns, 105, 148, 150, 208, 214, 217, 229, 247 - Heavy, 163, 226, 227, 263 - Light, 226, 228 - 50-caliber, 236 - Mortar, 70, 105, 217, 236, 273, 278, 263 - 4.2 inch, 251, 252 - 81mm, 206, 214, 248, 263, 270, 278 - 60mm, 226, 229, 240, 267, 278 - Recoilless rifles, 163, 173 - 75mm, 148, 150, 263 - Rifles, 150, 161 - Rocket-launchers, 148, 214 - 2.36-inch, 8, 150 - 3.5-inch, 148, 150, 229, 263 - Submachine guns (Tommy guns), 86 - Tanks, 31, 91, 93, 94, 138, 163, 188, 199, 208, 210, 221, 235, - 239, 243, 247, 250, 257, 259, 260, 272, 277–280, 286, - 287, 289, _pic._ - Dozer, 211 - Flame, 260, 272, 279 - M-4A3, 132 - M-24, 8 - M-26, 91, 105, 138, 139, 147, 150, 156, 157, 175–177, 209, 220, - 240, 260, 261, 271, 272 - - Weidemeyer, Lt Dick, 110_n_, 127_n_ - - Weir, Col Kenneth H., 169 - - Westover, Capt George C., 118, 141_n_ - - _Whitesand Bay_ (PF), HMS, 144 - - Wilcox, Capt Myron E., 276 - - Wildman, Capt Patrick W., 90, 92, 188 - - Williams, Capt Albert L., 183 - - Williams, Capt Bruce F., 259, 260 - - Williams, Lt Edward B., USN, 5 - - Williams, Col Gregon A., 35, 78 - - Williams, Maj Lloyd O., 35 - - Williamson, lstLt Wallace, 195, 270 - - Wilson, LCdr James C., USN, 110_n_ - - Wirth, lstLt Karl, 248 - - Wol Ki Chan, MajGen, NKPA, 233 - - Wolmi-do, 42, 45, 59, 63, 64, 67, 69, 74, 77, 78, 85–94, 101, 103–105, - 129, 131, 142, 145, 152, 167, _pic._ - - Wonjong-ni, 201, 212 - - Wonsan, 41, 285, 292 - - World Series, 291 - - World War I, 48 - - World War II, 7, 49, 51, 59, 97, 130, 292 - - Wray, Capt Robert P., 121_n_, 216, 217, 219, 273 - - Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 6, 9, 43, 45, 66, 67, 151, _pic._ - - Wyczawski, LtCol Richard W., 170, 257 - - - Yasso, Hospitalman Frank J., _pic._ - - YELLOW Beach. _See_ Beaches, YELLOW. - - Yellow Sea, 81, 85, 87 - - _Yellowstone_ (AD), USS, 53 - - Yellowstone Park, 1 - - Yokohama, Japan, 13, 14, 80, 81, 83 - - Yokosuka, Japan, 5_n_, 80 - - Yongdok, 145 - - Yongdong, 15 - - Yonghung-do, 61, 62 - - Yongdungpo, 180, 181, 183, 184, 197–199, 203–206, 208, 209, 212, 213, - 215, 216, 220–222, 225–229, 231–233, 243, 244, 254, 281 - Brewery, _pic._ - Hospital, 281 - - Yongil Bay, 14 - - Young People’s Anti-Communist Resistance League, 141 - - - Zorn, Capt Elmer J., 275 - - - - -SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED STATES -GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT SET IN 12-POINT GRANJON AND -PRINTED ON OFFSET VELLUM STOCK. - - -For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing -Office Washington 25, D.C.--Price $2.50 - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support -hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to -the corresponding illustrations. - -The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page -references. - -The index reference to page 186 is incorrect: that page is blank. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME II (OF 5) *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |