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page-break-before: always; - } - -} - -@media handheld -{ - body {margin: 0;} - - hr { - margin-top: .1em; - margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - ul {margin-left: 1em; padding-left: 0;} - li {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1.5em;} - - blockquote {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .poem-container {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%;} - .poem {display: block; max-width: 25em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} - .poem .stanza {page-break-inside: avoid;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } - - .index {margin-left: 0;} - - .covernote {visibility: visible; display: block; text-align: center;} -} - </style> - </head> - -<body> - -<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume I (of 5), by Lynn Montross</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<table style='min-width:0; padding:0; margin-left:0; border-collapse:collapse'> - <tr><td>Title:</td><td>U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume I (of 5)</td></tr> - <tr><td></td><td>The Pusan Perimeter</td></tr> -</table> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65007]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA 1950-1953 VOLUME I (OF 5) ***</div> - -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Note</p> - -<p class="covernote">Cover created by Transcriber, using the original -cover and the text of the Title page, and placed -into the Public Domain.</p> - -<p>Larger versions of most illustrations may be seen by right-clicking them -and selecting an option to view them separately, or by double-tapping and/or -stretching them.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="newpage"> -<div id="if_frontispiece_1" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/frontispiece_1.jpg" width="1421" height="2100" alt="(Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)" /> - </div> - -<div id="if_frontispiece_2" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/frontispiece_2.jpg" width="1447" height="2118" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>THE PUSAN PERIMETER</p> - <p class="smaller">AUG.-SEP. 1950<br /> - <span class="smaller">GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES</span></p></div></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<h1> -<span class="small">U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA<br /> -1950–1953</span><br /> - -<span class="subhead">VOLUME I<br /> -<span class="large"><i>The Pusan Perimeter</i></span></span></h1> - -<p class="p1 center vspace">by<br /> -LYNN MONTROSS<br /> -and<br /> -CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC</p> - -<div id="if_i_001" class="figcenter land" style="max-width: 15em;"> - <img src="images/i_001.png" width="475" height="473" alt="" /></div> - -<p class="p2 center vspace larger">Historical Branch, G-3<br /> -Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps<br /> -Washington, D. C., 1954 -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">iii</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="Foreword">Foreword</h2> -</div> - -<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">An ability to</span> furnish skilled forces to meet emergency situations on -short notice has long been a hallmark of the Marine Corps. When -the call came for such a force to be dispatched to Korea on 2 July 1950, -the Corps was handicapped by the strictures of a peacetime economy. -Nevertheless, a composite brigade consisting of a regiment and an air -group was made available within a week’s time.</p> - -<p>With a reputation built largely on amphibious warfare, Marines of the -1st Brigade were called upon to prove their versatility in sustained -ground action. On three separate occasions within the embattled Perimeter—south -toward Sachon and twice along the Naktong River—these -Marine units hurled the weight of their assault force at the enemy. All -three attacks were successful, and at no point did Marines give ground -except as ordered. The quality of their performance in the difficult days -of the Pusan Perimeter fighting made them a valuable member of the -United Nations team and earned new laurels for their Corps.</p> - -<div id="if_i_001sig1" class="figright sig"> - <img src="images/i_001sig1.png" width="565" height="95" alt="" /></div> - -<p class="sigright clear"> -<span class="l2"><span class="smcap">Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="l1"><i>General, U. S. Marine Corps,</i></span><br /> -<i>Commandant of the Marine Corps</i>. -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">v</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="Preface">Preface</h2> -</div> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">This is the</span> first volume of a planned series dealing with United -States Marine Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 -to 27 July 1953. Volume I is designed to give the military student and -the casual reader an accurate and detailed account of the operations in -which Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade and Marine Air Group 33 -participated during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, from the date of -their landing on 2 August until their withdrawal on 13 September 1950, -in preparation for the Inchon landing.</p> - -<p>Since this is primarily a Marine Corps story, the activities of other -services during this period are not described in detail except to present -a proper background to the overall account.</p> - -<p>Many officers and men who participated in this campaign have contributed -to the preparation of the book by answering inquiries, submitting -to interviews, and commenting on the preliminary manuscript. -Their assistance has been invaluable. Special acknowledgment is also -extended to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of -the Army, Pacific Section, and particularly Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. -Appleman, USA, for enemy intelligence material; to the Marine Corps -Board Study: <cite>An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the -Course of the Korean War</cite> for its interpretations and conclusions; and to -<cite>Life Magazine</cite> for courtesy shown in permitting use of Korean photographs -made by Mr. David D. Duncan. Maps included herein were prepared -by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, -Va. United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps photographs have also -been used to illustrate this monograph.</p> - -<div id="if_i_001sig2" class="figright sig"> - <img src="images/i_001sig2.png" width="576" height="104" alt="" /></div> - -<p class="sigright clear"> -<span class="l2"><span class="smcap">T. A. Wornham</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="l1"><i>Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps</i>.</span><br /> -<i>Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.</i> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="Contents">Contents</h2> -</div> - -<table id="toc" summary="Contents"> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">I</td> - <td class="tdl">Korea, Doorstep of Strategy</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">The Korean Question—The Russo-Japanese War—Korea as a Japanese Colony—The Partition of Korea—Red Victory in China—Civil Strife in Korea</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">II</td> - <td class="tdl">Red Aggression in Korea</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">19</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Units of the NKPA—NKPA Command and Leadership—The NKPA Infantry Division—NKPA Air and Armor—NKPA Officer Procurement Conscription—The NKPA Order of Battle</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">III</td> - <td class="tdl">The Marine Brigade</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">37</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">NKPA Gains of First Week—Early U. S. Decisions—Geography of Korea—U. S. Ground Forces in Korea—Requests for U. S. Marines—Activation of the Brigade</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IV</td> - <td class="tdl">The Advance Party</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">55</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Conference with CINCFE—The Washington Scene—The Advance Party in Japan—Voyage of the Brigade—The Advance Party in Korea—Crisis of the Eighth Army</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">V</td> - <td class="tdl">Prelude to Battle</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">87</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Reconnaissance by Jeep—Brigade Air Lands—Landing of Ground Force—Bedlam on Pusan Water Front—The Brigade at Changwon—The Pusan Perimeter—Brigade Air Strikes First—Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VI</td> - <td class="tdl">Action on Hill 342</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">103</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">First Platoon Fight—The Perimeter on Hill 342—Call for Artillery Fires—Task Force Kean Stalled—General Craig Assumes Control—Enemy Attack at Dawn</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VII</td> - <td class="tdl">Advance to Kosong</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">119</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Heavy NKPA Resistance—Assault on Hill 255—Confusion at Tosan Junction—Brigade Artillery in Support—Encounter with Japanese Maps—Ambush at Taedabok Pass—The Seizure of Kosong</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VIII</td> - <td class="tdl">Fight on Two Fronts</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">139</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">The Kosong Turkey Shoot—The Changchon Ambush—Marines Ordered to New Sector—Attack of 3/5 to the Rear—Enemy Dawn Attack at Changchon—Breaking Off Action</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IX</td> - <td class="tdl">Battle of the Naktong</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">173</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Task Force Hill Organized—Planning the Next Operation—Reconnaissance of Terrain—Air and Artillery Preparation—Company D on Objective—Attack of Company E</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">X</td> - <td class="tdl">Obong-ni Ridge</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">189</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Company B to the Attack—Advance of Company A—Defeat of Enemy Tanks—End of the First Day—Enemy Counterattack on Ridge—Obong-ni Ridge Secured—Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XI</td> - <td class="tdl">Second Naktong</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">207</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">The Famous Bean Patch—Planning for Inchon Landing—Return to the Naktong Bulge—All-Out NKPA Offensive—The Marines Jump Off—Progress of Brigade Attack—Assault on Hill 117</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XII</td> - <td class="tdl">Mission Completed</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">227</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdj">Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division—Attacks of 5 September—Two Marine Tanks Killed—The Brigade’s Final Action—Brigade Embarkation at Pusan—Results of Brigade Operations—Summaries and Conclusions</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="3"><i>Appendixes</i></td></tr> - <tr class="vspace"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">A <span class="in1">Glossary of Military Terms</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_A">245</a></td></tr> - <tr class="vspace"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">B <span class="in1">Command and Staff List</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_B">247</a></td></tr> - <tr class="vspace"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">C <span class="in1">Citations and Commendations</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_C">253</a></td></tr> - <tr class="vspace"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Bibliography</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Bibliography">257</a></td></tr> - <tr class="vspace"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Index</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Index">261</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">ix</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="Illustrations">Illustrations</h2> -</div> - -<table id="loi" summary="Illustrations"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Photographs</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc" colspan="2">Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages <a href="#photos1">70</a> and <a href="#photos2">156</a>.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Maps and Sketches</i></td></tr> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Strategic Triangle</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_2">2</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Far East</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_5">5</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Korea</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_11">11</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">NKPA Order of Battle</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_35">35</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">NKPA Invasion, 15 July 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_44">44</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Japan and Korea</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_61">61</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Eighth Army, Situation of Late July</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_69">69</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Brigade Action on the Southwestern Front</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_102">102</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Chindong-ni Area</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_107">107</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sachon Offensive, 8–10 August 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_130">130</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sachon Offensive, 10 August 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_133">133</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sachon Offensive, 11 August 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_134">134</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sachon Offensive—Changchon Ambush</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_145">145</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sachon Offensive, Situation 12–14 August</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_149">149</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Enemy Counterattack, Hill 202</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_154">154</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First Naktong Counteroffensive</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_180">180</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First Naktong, Situation 17 August 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_185">185</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First Naktong, Situation 18 August 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_199">199</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Two</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_202">202</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Three</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_205">205</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Second Naktong Counteroffensive, 3–5 September 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_218">218</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Second Naktong, Marine Attacks of 3–4 September 1950</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_223">223</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Second Naktong, Enemy Counterattack</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_232">232</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p> - -<h2 id="CHAPTER_I" class="vspace">CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Korea, Doorstep of Strategy</span></h2> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>The Historical Background—The Russo-Japanese War—Korea as a -Japanese Colony—The Partition of Korea—Red Victory in China—Civil -Strife in Korea</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It meant little</span> to most Americans on 25 June 1950 to read in their -Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea. They -could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to -become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American -history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year. Yet the -danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World -War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the -political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.</p> - -<p>The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the Cairo -Conference of December 1943. With Soviet Russia not yet being represented -as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great Britain -and China agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and -independent.”<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Quoted in James F. Byrnes, <cite>Speaking Frankly</cite> (New York: Harper, 1947), 221.</p></div> - -<p>Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea’s -status as a Japanese possession since 1910. Government, industry, commerce, -agriculture, transportation—every phase of Korean life had been -administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan. As a consequence, the -25,000,000 inhabitants of the peninsula were woefully lacking in experience -to fit them for the responsibilities of independence.</p> - -<p>Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring -for recognition of his Korean government in exile. The United States -hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, -at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally. Moscow had a -strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving military<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span> -aid to the United States in the fight against Japan. Such an alliance was -particularly desirable from the American viewpoint early in 1945 because -of the losses resulting from Japanese <i>kamikaze</i> tactics. In the belief that -active Soviet participation might shorten the war and save thousands of -American lives, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was disposed to compromise -with Stalin.</p> - -<div id="ip_2" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_002.jpg" width="1358" height="1380" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE -STRATEGIC -TRIANGLE</div></div> - -<p>The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 -that Korea should be independent “... and that if a transition period -were necessary, a trusteeship should be established,” according to James -F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State. He added in his memoirs<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span> -that “a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that -would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration -for President Roosevelt’s acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.”<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Byrnes, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice. Although -Czar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger -in Communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the “wrongs” resulting -from the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later. The price of -Soviet military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian -territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905.</p> - -<h3><i>The Historical Background</i></h3> - -<p>It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any such -readjustment. Korea is one of those tragic areas of the earth’s surface -which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy. As the focal -point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula offers each of -these powers a threshold for aggression against either of the other two. -Possession of Korea has been for centuries an aim of aspiring conquerors -in the Far East, and all three rival nations have had a turn.</p> - -<p>China was first. From ancient times down to the last quarter of the -19th century, the Chinese Empire held a loose suzerainty acknowledged -by the Koreans. Japan won a brief foothold in the 16th century under -the great war lord Hideyoshi, only to learn the painful lesson that control -of the sea is requisite to a seaborne invasion of a peninsula. Naval -victories by the Koreans cut Hideyoshi’s line of communications, and he -withdrew after frightful devastations which left an enduring tradition of -fear and hate. Both Japan and Korea then entered upon a period of self-imposed -isolation lasting until their political hibernation was rudely interrupted -by Western nations clamoring for trade.</p> - -<p>The United States took the lead in inaugurating a new era in the Far -East. Commodore Perry and his American warships opened up Japan to -commerce in 1853. Several persuasive bombardments of coastal cities by -American, British and French naval guns were required to end Japan’s -seclusion; and in 1871 an American squadron was sent to Korea after the -destruction of an American merchant ship and massacre of its crew. -United States Marines and bluejackets stormed Korean river forts defended -by cannon. All objectives were taken and heavy casualties<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span> -inflicted, but it remained for Japan to open up the “Hermit Kingdom” -to trade 4 years later with the threat of war.</p> - -<p>Russia had not been a disinterested bystander during this era of cannon-ball -diplomacy. Her participation in Far Eastern affairs dated back -to the 17th century and had once extended to the North American -mainland. The sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 indicated a -renunciation of this phase of expansion, but Russia had no intention of -abandoning her ambitions in the Far East. Shortly after Japan compelled -Korea to sign a treaty of amity, the Russians offered to train Korean officers -and lend military aid to the faction-ridden kingdom.</p> - -<p>At this point China took a hand. Suspecting that the two rival nations -were dabbling in Korean affairs for purposes of their own, the Celestial -Empire attempted to restore her suzerainty.</p> - -<p>This policy was bound to lead to a collision. Western nations were -not surprised when Japan and China resorted to arms, but few observers -expected the supposed dwarf to beat the giant with ease. Japan’s well -led army, equipped with the best modern weapons, landed at Chemulpo -(Inchon) and captured the Chinese fortress at Pyongyang in northwest -Korea. Sweeping across the Yalu into Manchuria, the invaders overran -the strategic Liaotung Peninsula, taking Port Arthur and Dairen.</p> - -<p>It was all over in a few months. When the Empire proper was threatened -with invasion, the Chinese government sued for peace in 1895.</p> - -<p>The Japanese terms were more than severe, they were humiliating. -They included: (1) a large indemnity; (2) the cession “in perpetuity” -of the Liaotung Peninsula as well as Formosa and the Pescadores group; -and (3) Chinese recognition of what the Japanese were pleased to call -“Korean independence.”</p> - -<p>But the victors had overdone it. Russia, Germany, and France formed -the Triple Intervention which compelled Japan to relinquish the Liaotung -Peninsula. The three European powers preferred that this strategic -bastion remain in the possession of China, which was ripe for despoiling -at the convenience of the Western nations.</p> - -<p>Russia now assumed the role of a friend binding China’s wounds. The -secret treaty of alliance signed by the two empires in 1896 was aimed -like a pistol at Japan. In return for promises of support in the event of -further Japanese aggressions, China gave Russia the right to extend the -Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok across Chinese territory in -Manchuria.</p> - -<p>The precept was not lost upon other European nations. England, -Germany, and France also established spheres of influence in China after<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_5">5</a><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -forcing the government to lease territory or grant special privileges. And -Russia added to former gains by a 25-year lease of the Liaotung -Peninsula.</p> - -<div id="ip_5" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_005.jpg" width="2074" height="1359" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE FAR EAST</div></div> - -<p>China’s Boxer Rebellion of 1900 interrupted the march of events, but -two treaties in 1902 indicated that Japan and Russia would soon be at -each other’s throats. Japan acquired an ally in England, as a result of that -nation’s alarms over Muscovite designs, so that the neutrality of European -powers was practically assured. Russia and China drew closer meanwhile -with a new treaty of alliance. The stage was set for a fight to the -finish in the Far East.</p> - -<p>Possession of the Philippine Islands had given the United States a -new interest in Far Eastern affairs since the Spanish-American War of -1898. John Hay, Secretary of State, realized that the American “open -door” policy was imperiled by the situation in Asia.<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> But he admitted in -April 1903 that nothing short of the threat of armed force could have -checked Russia’s encroachments.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Pauline Tompkins, <cite>American-Russian Relations in the Far East</cite> (New York: Macmillan, -1949), 21.</p></div> - -<h3><i>The Russo-Japanese War</i></h3> - -<p>A candid comparison would reveal a striking similarity between the aggressions -of Czarist Russia in the early 1900’s and those of Soviet Russia -half a century later. The expression “cold war” was not current in 1903, -but the account of Russia’s threats, seizures and violated agreements has -a dismally familiar aspect to the modern reader. Rudyard Kipling paid a -bitter tribute at the turn of the century to these techniques of the Russian -Bear in his lines:</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near and near;<br /></span> -<span class="i0">When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">When he veils the hate and cunning of his little swinish eyes;<br /></span> -<span class="i0">When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">That is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p>Following the Sino-Japanese War, the truce between Russia and -Japan in “independent” Korea was broken by both nations whenever a -favorable opportunity arose. Both of them intrigued constantly at Seoul. -For a time, indeed, the Korean government was directed from the Russian -legation with the backing of Russian troops.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span> -Twice, in 1896 and 1898, Russia and Japan signed agreements reaffirming -Korea’s independence and promising anew to withdraw their forces. -These pacts were promptly violated by both contestants for power, but -Japan prepared more realistically for the forthcoming struggle. On a -February night in 1904, without the formality of a declaration of war, a -Japanese squadron attacked the Russian warships anchored at Port -Arthur. This surprise blow was followed shortly by the landing of Japanese -troops at Chemulpo. They advanced to the frontier and defeated -the Russians in the battle of the Yalu—a victory that has been compared -with the battle of Valmy in the French Revolution as a landmark of -history.</p> - -<p>Certainly the West was made aware that an Oriental nation had risen -to the stature of a world power for the first time in modern history. The -value of Korea as a strategic springboard was demonstrated when Japanese -land and sea forces isolated the fortresses on the Liaotung Peninsula. -Port Arthur fell after a bloody siege of 6 months. Next, the Japanese -invaders of Manchuria defeated an army of 350,000 Russians and -inflicted 150,000 casualties in the four-week battle of Mukden. This was -the decisive clash on land; and in the one-sided naval battle of Tsushima, -Admiral Togo annihilated the Baltic fleet which the Czar had ordered on -the long voyage to the Pacific.</p> - -<p>The end came abruptly in the summer of 1905. In the Treaty of Portsmouth, -signed on 5 September, Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin -Island to the victors while recognizing their “paramount” interests -in Korea. All rights in the Liaotung Peninsula went to Japan as well as -important concessions in Manchuria. Not much was left to Russia in -the Far East except a precarious foothold in northern Manchuria.</p> - -<h3><i>Korea as a Japanese Colony</i></h3> - -<p>For 5 years Japan kept up a pretense of a protectorate in Korea. Then, -in 1910, came outright annexation.</p> - -<p>Europe’s “balanced antagonisms” soon flared up in World War I, -leaving Japan free to exploit Korea as a colony. Western observers -might have noted such evidences of modernization as new docks, railroads, -factories and highways. But they were administered by Japanese -overseers as Koreans sank to the level of coolies without a voice in the -government.</p> - -<p>Although Japan joined the fight against the Central Powers in World<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span> -War I, her military efforts were made against allies as well as enemies. -Using Korea as a beachhead, she attempted to enlarge her empire on the -Asiatic mainland at the expense of Russia, then in the throes of revolution. -Three years after the Armistice, a Japanese army still occupied -the Vladivostok area; but the United States took such a firm diplomatic -stand that Tokyo backed down.</p> - -<p>This retreat was only a postponement. During the next decade Japan -set up a strategic shield to the east and south by fortifying the mandated -islands of the Pacific, awarded to her after the war. Treaties and agreements -were violated whenever convenient, and in 1931 she turned westward -again to satisfy her appetite for Russian and Chinese territory.</p> - -<p>The time was well chosen. With the Western nations in the depths -of an industrial depression, Japan began a series of aggressions against -the Chinese in Manchuria. The gains were consolidated in a puppet -state known as Manchukuo, comprising a fertile and populous area as -large as California. China was unable to offer much resistance, and Soviet -Russia could not risk a major war in the Far East. Even so, some of -the Soviet border clashes with the Japanese in time of “peace” were -actually battles fought with tanks and planes.</p> - -<p>In 1937 came the Japanese invasion of China proper. Germany and -Italy were launching aggressions of the same stamp in Europe and -Africa, and the world was to know little stability until all three totalitarian -states had been crushed in World War II.</p> - -<p>Soviet Russia had a grim struggle for survival while resisting the full -tide of Nazi invasion. But at the time of the Yalta Conference, Stalin -was in a position to ask a stiff price for military aid in the Pacific. The -United States agreed that the Port Arthur area and southern Sakhalin -should be returned to Russia to redress the “wrongs” of 1905. Concessions -were also made in Manchuria and outer Mongolia.</p> - -<p>Stalin, for his part, consented to sign a treaty of friendship with Nationalist -China as an ally of the United States. Later events made it evident -that he had no intention of keeping his pledges. On the contrary, -Soviet policy already visioned a Communist empire in the Far East -which would include China as well as Korea.</p> - -<p>The Yalta Agreement was stridently criticized in the United States -after Stalin’s duplicity became apparent. But the War Department took -a realistic view as early as the spring of 1945:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are -generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless -of United States military action short of war.... The Russians can, if they choose,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span> -await the time when United States efforts will have practically completed the destruction -of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at -a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the -war at an early date.”<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> U. S. War Dept memo for Acting Sec of State, 21 May 45, quoted in Joseph C. Grew, -<cite>Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years</cite> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), -2:1457–1458.</p></div> - -<p>This was precisely what happened. Moscow waited to declare war -until 8 August 1945—6 days before the imminent collapse of Japan. -Soviet forces fought only a few actions in Siberia with a Japanese army -stripped of planes for home defense. As a consequence, Russian propagandists -found it hard to paint a convincing picture of “the heroic deeds -of our brave Far Eastern warriors.”<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Obviously they had met little -resistance while overrunning Manchuria and northern Korea to accept -the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese troops, including 148 generals. -These prisoners were sent to Siberia for years of servitude; and the “conquerors” -despoiled Manchuria of heavy machinery, turbines, dynamos -and rolling stock.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> David J. Dallin, <cite>Soviet Russia and the Far East</cite> (New Haven: Yale University Press, -1948), 213.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 214, 244. Such seizures were in violation of international law, of course, and -Soviet Russia had pledged the prompt repatriation of Japanese prisoners at the Potsdam -Conference in July 1945.</p></div> - -<p>The value of this booty has been estimated at a billion dollars, and -the forced labor of Japanese war prisoners during the next 5 years was -worth at least another billion. Not satisfied with these spoils, Moscow -also demanded a share in the occupation of Japan. This design was -balked by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied -commander, who made it plain that he needed no such assistance.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 214, 239.</p></div> - -<p>Even after the guns fell silent, there was no peace. One enemy had -been exchanged for another, since Soviet Russia took advantage of war-weary -allies to follow in the footsteps of Germany and Japan. There was -the same familiar pattern of encroachment both in Europe and the Far -East. There were the same violations of treaties, the same unfriendly -acts falling just short of hostilities. The cold war had begun.</p> - -<p>Oppression at home and aggression abroad—this had been the policy -of Russia’s czars, and it became the policy of Russia’s dictators. Despotism -had been replaced by Communism, but there was little difference. -Communism proved to be an old tyranny presented as a new ideology, -and Joseph Stalin succeeded where Nicholas II failed. Circumstances<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span> -were kinder to Stalin, and he gobbled up territory in Poland, Estonia, -Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Mongolia -and Manchuria.</p> - -<p>Never before had one man ruled so much of the earth’s surface. Yet -there was something neurotic and fear-ridden about the Kremlin’s outlook -which success could not cure. It has long been a historical theory -that this psychosis may be traced back to Russia’s bondage in the Middle -Ages under the Mongols and Tartars. At any rate, victory and enormous -spoils did not give Moscow a sense of security in 1945. Buffer state was -piled upon buffer state, and thousands of World War II prisoners were -enslaved behind the “iron curtain” to build new Soviet military -installations.</p> - -<h3><i>The Partition of Korea</i></h3> - -<p>The importance of Korea in the Soviet scheme of things was indicated -by the haste with which Russian troops crossed the frontier on 12 -August 1945, three days after the declaration of war. They were the vanguard -of an army numbering a quarter of a million men led by General -Ivan Chistyakov, a hero of the battle of Stalingrad.</p> - -<p>The surrender terms called for a joint American and Soviet occupation, -with the 38th parallel serving as a temporary line of demarcation. -Not until 8 September, however, did Lieutenant General John R. Hodge -reach southern Korea with the first American troops.</p> - -<p>By that time the Russians had gone through their usual routine, and -the machinery taken from northern Korea was estimated at 30 to 40 -percent of the industrial potential. Looting by Soviet troops went unpunished, -and regular supplies of food for the huge army were -demanded from an impoverished people just freed of the Japanese yoke.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 285.</p></div> - -<p>The Russians had a tremendous advantage over United States occupation -forces. Since World War I more than a million Koreans had found -a refuge from Japanese bondage on Russian or Chinese soil. Thousands -of men had been indoctrinated with Communist principles and given -military training to aid the Chinese Reds fighting the Japanese invaders -of China. Thus in 1945 the Russians could count on the efforts of -Korean revolutionists to establish Communist rule in their homeland -behind a façade of democracy.</p> - -<div id="ip_11" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_011.jpg" width="1380" height="2081" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">KOREA</div></div> - -<p>The United States forces, on the contrary, did not even have enough<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_11">11</a><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -interpreters. They impressed the Koreans at first as being alien occupation -troops setting up a military government. Meanwhile, the Russians -had installed an interim civil government at Pyongyang. Korean Reds -filled the key positions, and Stalin’s portraits and the hammer and sickle -emblem were seen at political rallies.</p> - -<p>Koreans of all persuasions opposed the division of their country into -two zones on either side of the 38th parallel. The Reds at Pyongyang -contrived to lay the blame on the Americans. They made a further appeal -to Koreans on both sides of the boundary by announcing a land reform -in the northern zone. Ever since 1905 a Japanese landlord had been the -hated symbol of oppression. Pyongyang won a great propaganda victory, -therefore, by announcing the confiscation of all large estates, Korean as -well as Japanese, and the division of the land among the peasantry.</p> - -<p>The bait was so tempting that the hook did not become apparent until -too late. Then the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform discovered that -they could neither sell nor rent the land, nor could they use it as security -for loans. If anyone ceased to work his holding, it reverted to the People’s -Committee, which allocated it to some other family. The State retained -possession, in short, and the peasant remained as much of a serf as ever. -Worse yet, the taxes disguised as “production quotas” eventually -amounted to 60 percent of the total crop, which was more than the -Japanese had extorted.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Robert T. Oliver, <cite>Why War Came to Korea</cite> (New York: Fordham University Press, -1950), 149.</p></div> - -<p>This is a sample of the methods used to reduce North Korea to a -police state, just as similar states were being organized in occupied lands -of Europe by local Reds doing the bidding of Moscow. In the Soviet -zone of Korea all banks, factories and industries of any consequence were -nationalized by the so-called People’s Committee.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Military training for -offensive warfare was given to men armed with captured Japanese weapons. -Pressure was put upon these recruits to “volunteer” for combat -service with the Chinese Reds waging a civil war against the -Nationalists.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Dallin, <i>op. cit.</i>, 291.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> Oliver, <i>op. cit.</i>, 5.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Red Victory in China</i></h3> - -<p>Moscow was secretly backing the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung in -their efforts to wrest China from the Nationalist government of Chiang<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> -Kai-shek. Such activities, of course, were in violation of the treaty of -friendship and alliance with Nationalist China which Stalin had signed -on 14 August 1945. But agreements were never allowed to interfere with -Soviet ambitions, and Moscow aimed to create in Asia a bulwark of -Communist puppet states extending from the Arctic to the tropics.</p> - -<p>Asiatic soil was peculiarly suited to the growth of such institutions. -Although Communism derived originally from the theories of a German -revolutionist, Karl Marx, it was adapted by Lenin and Stalin to the -political climate of Asia. Human lives and liberties have always been -held cheaply in the East, and absolutism has been the rule in government. -Communism, as it developed in Russia after the revolution of -1917, would probably have been better understood by Genghis Khan -than Marx. For it is significant that no Western nation has ever embraced -this political faith voluntarily, even though it has attracted a -minority of radicals and malcontents in nearly every country.</p> - -<p>Asia was ripe for change after World War II. In spite of Japan’s defeat, -that nation had made a good deal of progress with its “Asia for the -Asiatics” propaganda. The Far East seethed with unrest in 1946, and -Communism spread ominously through a China weakened by three -decades of invasion, revolution and civil war.</p> - -<p>While Nationalists and Communist armies contended for the ancient -empire, an undeclared war went on in the background. This was the cold -war between the United States and Soviet Russia as they supplied arms -and munitions to the opposing forces. Russia also supplied troops and -laborers. For it has been estimated that no less than 250,000 North -Korean Reds were induced to serve in various capacities with the -Chinese Communists in Manchuria.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> There the soldiers completed their -military training in actual combat, with veteran Chinese officers as -instructors.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> GHQ, FECOM, MilIntelSec, GS, Allied Translator and Interpreter Sec (FECOM, -ATIS), <cite>Enemy Forces</cite> (Interrogation Reports [InterRpt], Sup No. 4), 16.</p></div> - -<p>By 1948 there was no longer much doubt about the outcome in China. -In the battles of Tsinan, Changchun and Mukden, the Nationalists lost -33 divisions, totaling more than 320,000 men, in killed, wounded and -missing. Losses of equipment included 250,000 rifles and vast quantities -of other arms and equipment. During the four and a half months following -the fall of Tsinan in September 1948, the Nationalist losses were -estimated at a million men and 400,000 rifles. Even planes of United -States manufacture were captured by the Reds, who also acquired a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> -cruiser that the British had transferred to the Nationalists.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> U. S. Dept of State, <cite>United States Relations With China</cite> (Washington, U. S. Government -Printing Office [GPO], 1949), 357.</p></div> - -<p>“The unfortunate but inescapable fact,” concluded the United States -State Department in 1949, “is that the ominous result of the civil war in -China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. -Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable -limits of those capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that -was left undone by this country could have contributed to it. It was the -product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to -influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only -a decision by default.”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, xvi.</p></div> - -<p>As a result, Mao Tse-tung’s forces could claim a sweeping victory by -the end of 1949. Only the island of Formosa was left to Chiang Kai-shek -and his battered remnants. Meanwhile, it grew increasingly plain that -Korea was destined to be the scene of the next great tug-of-war between -Communism and the free nations.</p> - -<h3><i>Civil Strife in Korea</i></h3> - -<p>Not only had the Russians made the 38th Parallel a political boundary -in Korea; they had also resisted all American attempts at unification. -This meant that economic recovery was badly handicapped. For the -mines, heavy industries and hydroelectric plants were located in the -north, while the south had most of the agriculture. Products once exchanged -with mutual benefit now had to be imported from abroad.</p> - -<p>Trusteeship was hotly resented by all Koreans, even though few of -them had gained administrative or technical experience under the Japanese. -This prejudice was exploited by Soviet propagandists who denounced -the “undemocratic” American policy of bringing in administrators, -technicians and educators. As a consequence, the United States -military government made a poor showing at first in comparison to the -puppet government of Communist-trained Koreans installed at Pyongyang -by Russians pulling the strings behind the scenes. Anti-American -propaganda won converts to the south as well as north of the 38th -Parallel, with General Hodge being accused of maintaining a harsh military -rule.</p> - -<p>At the Moscow Conference of 1945 the Soviet Union had agreed with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span> -the United States that the whole of Korea was to be given a democratic -government after passing through the trusteeship phase. A Soviet-American -Joint Commission was to meet and make recommendations -for this purpose; but as early as 1946 it became evident that the Soviet -representatives had been instructed to sabotage any attempt to create -a united Korea with its own government.</p> - -<p>After the failure of the first year’s efforts, Hodge ordered the establishment -of an Interim Legislature at Seoul as the counterpart of the People’s -Assembly at Pyongyang. Of the 90 seats, half were to be filled by -popular vote and the remaining 45 by Korean appointees of the Military -Government. The election was a triumph for the American-educated -Dr. Syngman Rhee and the rightists. Hodge tried to give the other -South Korean factions a voice by appointing moderates and liberals, but -the Interim Legislature had no solution for the discontent in Korea as -the economic situation went from bad to worse in spite of American aid.</p> - -<p>Although the Americans on the Joint Commission did their best, they -were blocked by all manner of Soviet-contrived delays and obstacles. -Finally, in 1947, the United States submitted the question to the United -Nations. After long discussion, the General Assembly resolved that all -the people of Korea be given an opportunity in the spring of 1948 to -elect a national assembly for the entire country.</p> - -<p>A commission representing nine member nations was appointed to -visit Korea and supervise the voting. But the Russians not only refused -to participate in the election; they went so far as to bar the commissioners -from entering North Korea.</p> - -<p>The new National Assembly elected in May 1948 by South Korea had -the task of forming a government. On 17 July the first constitution in 40 -years of Korean history was approved by the deputies, who elected -Syngman Rhee to a 4-year term as president.</p> - -<p>It was an eventful summer south of the 38th Parallel. The Republic -of Korea came into being on 15 August, and on that day the American -military government ended. John J. Muccio was appointed by President -Truman to represent the United States in Korea with the rank of ambassador. -Plans were made to withdraw the 50,000 United States occupation -troops during the next 8 months, leaving only 500 officers and men as -military instructors for the training of a Republic of Korea security force.</p> - -<p>In the northern zone the Communists organized demonstrations -against the United Nations Commission. Strikes and disorders were -fomented south of the 38th Parallel, and 200,000 North Koreans -marched in protest at Pyongyang.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span> -There was an air of urgency about such attempts to prevent the election -in South Korea. The exposure of the Agrarian Reform as a fraud -had hurt the Communists, and the disinterested spirit of the United -States occupation was gaining recognition throughout Korea in spite of -initial blunders. Pyongyang could not afford to let South Korea take -the lead in forming a government, and July 1948 dated the creation of -a Communist state known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. -After adopting a constitution modeled after that of Communist Bulgaria, -the Supreme People’s Council claimed to represent all Korea. In -justification it was charged that “American imperialists carried out a -ruinous separate election and organized a so-called National Assembly -with the support of a traitor minority and with the savage oppression of -the majority of the Korean people.”<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> <cite>New York Times</cite>, 12 Jul 48, quoted in Redvers Opie et al., <cite>The Search for Peace Settlements</cite> -(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1951), 311.</p></div> - -<p>The Russians announced in December 1948 that they were withdrawing -all occupation troops. It was no secret, however, that they would -leave behind them an NK army that far surpassed the ROK military -establishment.<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Kim Il Sung, the Red Korean prime minister, referred -to it pointedly as a “superior army” in an address at Pyongyang.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> ROK, of course, denotes the Republic of Korea, and NK (North Korea) is the -abbreviation usually applied to the self-styled People’s Democratic Republic of Korea at -Pyongyang. Both sets of initials are used more often as adjectives than nouns. See the -Glossary in <a href="#APPENDIX_A">Appendix A</a> for definitions of other symbols and military terms found in text.</p></div> - -<p>“We must strengthen and improve it,” he declared. “Officers and men -must establish iron discipline and must be proficient in the military and -in combat techniques.”<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>History of the North Korean Army</cite>, 23.</p></div> - -<p>Numbers at the end of 1948 were estimated at 60,000 regulars in addition -to constabulary, railroad guards, and trainees. These troops were -equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese weapons, and Russian -arms were shipped into northern Korea to meet the needs of an expanding -army.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>It was a military force of an entirely different character that American -officers organized on the other side of the 38th Parallel. The new ROK -army was strictly a defensive force, trained and equipped to maintain -internal security and guard the border and seacoast. Neither tanks nor -military planes were provided by the Americans, who leaned backward -to avoid any suspicion of creating an instrument for offensive internecine -warfare.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span> -Raids by Red Korean troops across the border became a frequent -occurrence throughout 1949. One of these forays, supported by artillery, -was a large-scale NK thrust into the Ongjin Peninsula. Heavy fighting -resulted before the invaders were driven back into their own territory.</p> - -<p>Having failed to prevent the formation of a democratic Korean government—the -only government in Korea recognized by the United -Nations—the Reds at Pyongyang were making every effort to wreck it. -Since 80 percent of the ROK electric power originated north of the frontier, -they were able to retard economic recovery by cutting off the current -at intervals. There was no other unfriendly act in the Communist -bagful of tricks that Pyongyang neglected to employ while its radio stations -blared forth a propaganda of hatred.</p> - -<p>Early in 1950 the situation grew more tense daily as thousands of -veterans returned to North Korea after serving in the Communist armies -which overran China. When Radio Pyongyang began making appeals -for peace that spring, it should have become obvious to practiced observers -of Communist techniques that preparations were afoot for war. -On 10 June 1950 the Pyongyang government announced a new plan for -unification and peace after branding the top ROK officials as “traitors.” -The motive behind this proposal was apparently the usual Communist -attempt to divide an enemy on the eve of an aggression. For the long-planned -blow fell at 0400 (Korean time) on Sunday morning, 25 June -1950. Russian-made tanks spearheaded the advance of the NK ground -forces across the 38th Parallel, and Russian-made planes strafed Seoul -and other strategic centers.</p> - -<p>Captured NK documents offer proof that the invaders had already set -the machinery of aggression in motion while making their plea for peace. -This evidence included the written report of instructions given by one -Lieutenant Han to a group of picked men on an intelligence mission. -On 1 June 1950 they were to proceed by power boat to an island off Inchon, -where confederates would help them make their way to the mainland. -“Our mission,” explained Han, “is to gather intelligence information -concerning South Korean forces and routes of advance ahead of our -troops. We will perform this task by contacting our comrades who are -scattered throughout the length and breadth of South Korea.”<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression</cite> (InterRpt, Sup No. -2), 65.</p></div> - -<p>The lieutenant explained that the forthcoming attack on South Korea -was to be the first step toward the “liberation” of the people of Asia.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span> -And his concluding remarks leave no doubt as to the complete confidence -with which the Korean Communists began the venture:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Within 2 months from the date of attack, Pusan should have fallen and South -Korea will be again united with the North. The timetable for this operation of 2 -months’ duration was determined by the possibility of United States forces intervening -in the conflict. If this were not so, it would take our forces only 10 days to overrun -South Korea.”<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_II" class="vspace">CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Red Aggression in Korea</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Units of North Korean Army—NKPA Command and Leadership—The -NKPA Infantry Division—NKPA Air and Armor—NKPA -Officer Procurement and Conscription—The NKPA Order -of Battle</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It was an</span> army of veterans that broke the world’s peace in Korea. -There were thousands of veterans of the Chinese civil war and Manchurian -guerrilla operations. There were even a few scarred warriors who -had served with the Soviet forces in such World War II operations as -the defense of Stalingrad.</p> - -<p>Practically all the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were -battle-hardened, and a majority of the rank and file had seen action. The -origins of this army were deeply rooted in Asiatic soil. During World -War II an endless stream of Koreans escaped from Japanese bondage -and found a refuge in Soviet or Chinese territory. Some of them took to -banditry, others were absorbed into the Soviet or Red Chinese armed -forces. These refugees dreamed of a united and independent homeland; -and at Yenan, China, the Chinese Communists encouraged this movement -as early as 1939 by supplying arms to a force known as the Korean -Volunteer Army. During the first month alone the KVA attracted 3,000 -recruits, and at the end of the war an advance column marched back to -Korea under a leader named Kim Mu Chong.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>History of the North Korean Army</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 17–28.</p></div> - -<p>Although the heads of the KVA had been thoroughly impregnated -with Communist doctrine at Yenan, they were coldly received by General -Chistyakov and the Russian occupation forces. It was a Soviet puppet -state that the Kremlin wished to see established in Korea, not a Red-tinted -independent Korean government. Communist right-thinking did -not save Kim Mu Chong and his KVA troops from the humiliation of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span> -being stopped at the frontier in September 1945 and disarmed.</p> - -<p>The Russian commander piously justified his decision on grounds of -upholding international law. But he offered to return the confiscated -arms if the Korean Reds would retrace their steps and join the CCF -fight against the Nationalists. He promised that after the struggle had -been won, the KVA would be welcomed back to Korea.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Accepting these terms, Kim Mu Chong marched into Manchuria to -aid the Chinese Reds. His force numbered nearly 20,000 the following -spring, but the KVA lost its identity when the men were mingled with -Chinese and Mongolians in the CCF Northeast Democratic United -Army. Most of the officers and NCO’s of the former KVA were organized -into teams to recruit and train Korean volunteers both in Manchuria -and Korea. As combined military instructors and political commissars, -they created an integrated Communist force out of such oddly -assorted material as peasants, guerrillas and bandits. Used first as security -troops and later welded into a regular army structure, these thousands of -Korean Reds undoubtedly had the principal part in “liberating” Manchuria -from the Chinese Nationalists.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces did not neglect the conversion -of North Korea into a satellite state. One of the first steps was -the establishment of a military academy at Pyongyang in the autumn of -1945. Founded ostensibly for the training of police, it had as its primary -purpose the instruction of army officers. Graduates of the first and second -classes became teachers when branches of the academy were set up -at Nanam, Sinuiju and Hamhung. These offshoots, known as the Peace -Preservation Officers’ Schools, turned out the cadres which were later -activated as the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions of the new North Korean army. -For more than 2 years, however, the fiction was maintained that graduates -were to patrol rural areas, protect railroads and guard the frontier.</p> - -<h3><i>Units of North Korean Army</i></h3> - -<p>Not until 8 February 1948 did the “North Korean People’s Army” come -into official being with the activation of the 1st, 2d and 3d Infantry -Divisions. At that time there were some 30,000 troops and 170,000 -trainees in North Korea, according to later United States Army intelligence -estimates.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 23–24.</p></div> - -<p>The 4th Infantry Division was formed in 1948 from trainees plus a -veteran regiment transferred from the 2d Division. Two new infantry -divisions, the 5th and 6th, were organized the following year when -Korean veterans of the 164th and 166th CCF Divisions returned as units -with their arms and equipment.<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 52–75.</p></div> - -<p>It is probable that the leaders of the North Korean state were committed -early in 1950 to the invasion of the Republic of Korea. At any -rate, the training and organization of new units was accelerated during -the spring months. From February to June nine new divisions were activated—the -7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Divisions, -10th Mechanized Infantry Division and 105th Armored Division.<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Two factors combined to hasten the NKPA aggression. It had undoubtedly -become evident to the Kremlin in 1949 that the Republic of -Korea could never be brought into the Communist fold by propaganda, -subversion, incitation of disorders or any other means short of a victorious -civil war. Moreover, a successful war of invasion was equally desirable -as a cure for political discontent at home. Not only was the -Agrarian Reform resented everywhere in North Korea, but taxes had -gone up as high as 60 percent of the crops to maintain the top-heavy -military structure and pay for tanks, planes, howitzers and other arms -supplied by the Soviet Union.</p> - -<p>Although most of the heavy industries of Korea were located north -of the 38th Parallel, they included no arms plants with the exception of -a small factory capable of turning out submachineguns and ammunition. -North Korea was also able to produce 80 percent of its own POL -products for military purposes and some of the army uniforms. Other -supplies, all the way from the Tokarev semiautomatic pistol (adapted -from the U. S. .45 Colt) to the T-34 tank, were imported from the -U. S. S. R.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean Forces</cite> (InterRpt, Sup No. 1), 17–23.</p></div> - -<p>Most of the weapons were old models of recent manufacture. The -heaviest load came by rail from Siberia through Manchuria via Antung -and crossed the Yalu into Korea at Sinuiju. As many as three freight -trains a day rumbled over the bridge between those cities and continued -along the west coast to Pyongyang. Supplies were also received from -Vladivostok by water to Chongjin or by the east coast rail line to -Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>It must also be remembered that thousands of Korean veterans of the -Chinese civil war returned with their arms and equipment, including -American-manufactured weapons surrendered by the Nationalists. The -NKPA was second only to the Soviet Army itself in the spring of 1950 -as the best armed and equipped military force of its size in the Far East.</p> - -<p>The U. S. S. R. did not limit its aid to arms. Lieutenant General -Vasilev and a group of Soviet military instructors arrived at Pyongyang -in 1949 to train NKPA staff and line officers for offensive warfare. About -3,000 promising NKPA candidates were sent to Soviet schools that year -for courses in such specialties as artillery, air and tank tactics.</p> - -<p>Of the original 14 NKPA divisions, the first 6 were composed largely -of well trained troops. The 12th Division, like the 5th and 6th, consisted -of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war. Constabulary troops -made up the 8th and 9th, while the 7th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry -Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division were formed of -conscripted trainees for the most part.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>History of the North Korean Army</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 52–75.</p></div> - -<p>The picture grows confused in the spring of 1950, with 8 new divisions -being organized in 5 months. Many of the recently drafted men -received only the most sketchy training; and some of the older units -were weakened by drawing off well trained men to stiffen the new outfits. -All accounts agree, however, that the NKPA leaders anticipated an -effort of only a few days, ending with the destruction of the ROK army. -This was not an unreasonable assumption, since a swarm of NKPA spies -had brought back accurate reports of unpreparedness. Not only was the -Republic of Korea weak militarily, but a bad economic situation had -been made worse by increased population due to immigration.</p> - -<p>Altogether, Pyongyang could put nearly 100,000 fairly well-trained -and armed troops in the field, with about half of that number in reserve -as replacements, occupation troops or constabulary. But the problem of -man power did not worry Communists who were not squeamish about -violations of international law. For the aggressors planned to make war -nourish war by conscripting both soldiers and laborers in invaded -regions of the Republic of Korea. It was an old Asiatic custom.</p> - -<h3><i>NKPA Command and Leadership</i></h3> - -<p>With few exceptions, the North Korean war leaders proved to be willing -and able instruments of policies formulated in Moscow. Kim Il<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span> -Sung, the prime minister and commander in chief, was an imposter -named Kim Sung Chu who made a bid for popular support by taking -the name of a dead Korean resistance hero. As a youth he had fled from -Korea and joined the Communist party in Manchuria. There he distinguished -himself in guerrilla operations against the Japanese. In 1938, -after rising to the stature of a corps commander, he met military reverses -and found a refuge in Soviet territory. Legend has it that he attended -a Soviet military academy and took part in the battle of Stalingrad. -However this may be, he returned to Korea in August 1945 as a -35-year-old captain in the Soviet army of occupation.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 90–99. Communist chiefs preferred to work behind a screen of secrecy and deception, -so that it was difficult to obtain accurate personal data. Not only did some of the -NKPA war leaders have obscure origins, but they added to the difficulties of biographers by -deliberately falsifying the record for propaganda purposes. It is to the credit of U.S. Army -intelligence officers that they have managed to piece out this material from prisoner interrogations -and captured enemy documents.</p></div> - -<p>South Korean descriptions of Kim Il Sung as an uneducated ruffian -were doubtless prejudiced, but certainly he was a ruthless guerrilla leader -who showed an uncommon aptitude for politics. His rise in the new -North Korean state was spectacular, for in September 1948 he became -the first prime minister. The following year he went to Moscow for conferences -at the Kremlin, and nine days after the outbreak of civil war in -Korea he was appointed commander in chief of the invading army while -retaining his position as prime minister.</p> - -<p>In contrast to this rough diamond, Marshal Choe Yong Gun cut a -reserved and dignified figure as deputy commander in chief and minister -of national defense. Born in Hongchon, Korea, at the turn of the century, -he had the equivalent of a high school education. In 1925 he went -to China and is believed to have attended the Whampoa Military -Academy at Nanking and the Yenan Military School. At Yenan, after -being converted to communism, he became a political instructor and -later served in the 8th Route Army. Choe was commander of the Korean -Volunteer Army in 1941 and fought against the Japanese in Manchuria. -Returning to Korea in 1945, he commanded the Cadre Training Center -until 1948, when he was named the first commander in chief.</p> - -<p>Even Choe’s enemies in South Korea credited him with a high order -of intellectual capacity and moral courage. Despite his Communist party -membership, he opposed the invasion of the Republic of Korea. He was -cool, moreover, toward Lieutenant General Vasilev and the other Soviet -advisers who reached Pyongyang in 1949 to prepare the Korean armed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span> -forces for an offensive war. This attitude probably explains why he was -sidetracked in March 1950, when Vasilev took charge of the combat -training and re-equipment program. Although Choe was not on good -terms with Kim Il Sung at this time, he was regarded as a superior strategist -and administrator. And after being bypassed temporarily, he continued -to be respected as a leader by the North Korean army and -peasantry.</p> - -<p>Nam Il stood out as the most cosmopolitan and polished of the -North Korean war leaders. Born in 1911, he was Kim Il Sung’s schoolmate -in Manchuria and the two remained lifelong friends. As a young -man, Nam Il made his way across the U. S. S. R. to Smolensk and attended -college and a military academy. He entered the Soviet army at -the outbreak of World War II and is said to have participated along with -Kim Il Sung in the Stalingrad defense.</p> - -<p>Both of them returned to Korea with the rank of captain in the Soviet -army of occupation, and both entered upon successful Communist -political careers. In 1948 Nam Il was elected to the Supreme People’s -Council and became vice-minister of education in charge of military instruction. -The most Russianized of the North Korean leaders, he took -pains to cultivate the good will of the Soviet advisers. Speaking English, -Russian, and Chinese as well as Korean, he held an advantage over his -North Korean rivals in such contacts. He also made a better appearance, -being tall for an Oriental and always well turned out in a meticulously -pressed uniform and gleaming boots.</p> - -<p>A major general without an active field command at the outbreak of -war, he was rapidly advanced to the rank of lieutenant general and chief -of staff. His stern demeanor, while seated stiffly in his black Chrysler -driven by a uniformed chauffeur, soon became one of the most impressive -sights of Pyongyang. But his talents remained more political than -military, and he never won the respect which the army accorded to Choe -Yong Gun.</p> - -<p>Among the corps commanders, there was none more able than Lieutenant -General Kim Ung. About 40 years old at the outbreak of war, he -had graduated from the Kumchon Commercial School in Korea and the -Whampoa Military Academy in China. As an officer of the 8th Route -Army, he won a reputation for daring in 1939 by tossing hand grenades -into a conference of Japanese generals at Peiping and escaping after inflicting -numerous casualties. Returning to Korea in 1946, he started as -a regimental commander and made a relatively slow rise because of his -CCF background. But after lining up with the Soviet faction in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span> -army, he was promoted to the command of the 1st Division in 1948 and -of I Corps during the invasion.</p> - -<p>The rapid ascent of Lieutenant General Yu Kyong Su to the command -of III Corps would indicate that promotion was sometimes due to -political influence. A graduate of a Red Army tank school in 1938 at the -age of 33, Yu served throughout World War II as a company grade -officer in a Soviet tank unit. After his return to Korea, he married Kim Il -Sung’s sister and shot up from the command of an NK tank regiment -in 1948 to the rank of corps commander late in 1950. During the first -few weeks of the invasion, he was awarded the highest NKPA decoration, -the “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic,” with a -concurrent award, the “Order of the National Flag, 1st Class.”</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the career of former Lieutenant General Kim Mu -Chong, ex-commander of II Corps and ex-chief of artillery, was blasted -by the opposition of Kim Il Sung and Nam Il. A CCF veteran, Mu had -served under Mao Tse-tung on the “Long March” as one of 30 Koreans -to survive the ordeal. He commanded a Chinese artillery brigade and -was rated the best CCF artilleryman. In 1945 he came back to Korea and -conducted a speaking tour stressing the desirability of cooperating with -Red China and omitting any reference to the Soviet Union. This lapse -explains his failure in North Korean politics, but in deference to his -high military reputation he was given command of II Corps in June -1950. The poor showing made by his units on the central front was -ascribed by Mu to the fact that Kim Il Sung picked him for missions -which could not succeed. Although he did not lack for support in the -army, Mu was relieved of his command and other positions in the late -summer of 1950. Expulsion from the North Korean Labor Party followed -after Kim Il Sung denounced him in a speech for disobedience of orders.</p> - -<p>Mu’s downfall was only one chapter in the bitter struggle for power -waged by two opposing tactical schools in the North Korean army from -1948 to 1950. Veterans of CCF campaigns against the Japanese and -Chinese Nationalists upheld a system of large-scale guerrilla warfare -refined into a military science. Approach marches under cover of darkness, -infiltrations, probing night attacks—these were the basic tactics -employed by Mao Tse Tung’s forces for the conquest of China. Although -mobility was the keynote, a rigid tactical system allowed little latitude -of decision to officers below the regimental level. School solutions were -provided for every military problem that could be foreseen, and many of -the North Korean officers had graduated from the CCF military -academy at Yenan.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span> -Another group of officers advocated the tactics learned at Soviet military -schools and in Soviet campaigns of World War II. This system, of -course, made the CCF tactics seem primitive in comparison. For the -Russians placed much more dependence in armor and artillery as preparation -for infantry envelopments. Such tactics called for more supplies -and ammunition than could have been provided by the elementary CCF -logistics.</p> - -<p>The CCF veterans seemed to have the upper hand in the North -Korean army early in 1948. But a survey of NKPA officers’ careers -during the next 2 years indicates that their opponents triumphed. Thus, -at the onset of civil war, most of the key positions in the army were -filled by men who had hitched their wagons to the red star of Moscow, -both militarily and politically.</p> - -<p>This does not mean that CCF tactics had been put aside entirely. On -the contrary, these methods had evolved out of military poverty and -were admirably adapted to an Asiatic peasant army. The North Korean -forces, being compelled to import arms, were never able to afford -enough planes, tanks, and artillery to make the best of the Soviet system. -And it was inevitable that heavy losses of such equipment in -combat would cause a reversion to CCF tactics.</p> - -<h3><i>The NKPA Infantry Division</i></h3> - -<p>No child ever bore a more striking likeness to its parent than did the -NKPA to the Soviet organization of World War II.</p> - -<p>The army as a whole came under the overall control of General Headquarters -at Pyongyang, which planned and directed the invasion of ROK -territory. As the troops advanced, a Front Headquarters was set up to -control corps operations. This organization of Soviet origin was the -highest tactical echelon of command. Normally including three or four -corps of several divisions each, it resembled an army group in military -establishments of other nations. Front Headquarters had only a wartime -mission and could be disbanded in time of peace.<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean Forces</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 3–13.</p></div> - -<p>Next to the corps in the chain of command was the infantry division, -the basic tactical formation, modeled after that of the Red Army in -World War II. Of triangular design, numbering some 11,000 men, it -was reported by POW’s to consist of a headquarters, three rifle regiments,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> -an artillery regiment, a signal battalion, an antitank battalion, a -training battalion, a reconnaissance troop, and such division rear services -as medical, veterinary, transport, and supply units.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Division Headquarters, with about 120 men, included the commander, -a major general, and officers of the division and special staff. Closely associated -with the CG, and possessing almost as much power and responsibility, -was the division political deputy, usually a senior colonel, who -supervised politico-military activities and reported any deviations from -doctrine. This was a peculiarly Communistic institution, of course, and -it was the duty of the deputy to see that officers and men of the division -remained well indoctrinated.</p> - -<p>The NKPA rifle regiment, with a T/O strength of about 2,500 men, -consisted of 3 rifle battalions and supporting artillery. Each of these -battalions, numbering some 650 officers and men, included 3 rifle companies, -a heavy machinegun company, a mortar company, an antitank -gun platoon and an antitank rifle platoon in addition to signal, medical, -and supply platoons.</p> - -<p>An NKPA rifle company, which had a T/O strength of about 150 -men, was made up of a headquarters, 3 rifle platoons and a heavy machinegun -section. The rifle platoon had 4 squads and a T/O strength of -45 men. Squad weapons were said to include a light machinegun, a submachinegun -and Soviet M1891/30 rifles. Two hand grenades were -carried by each rifleman.</p> - -<p>An army patterned after the Soviet system was certain to emphasize -artillery, and the NKPA artillery reserve at the outset of the invasion -consisted of 3 regiments—1 attached to GHQ, and 1 to each of the 2 -corps operating at that time. But shortages of equipment and logistical -problems made it necessary in actual combat for the NKPA to concentrate -most of its artillery potential within the rifle division.</p> - -<p>The organic artillery support of each division included a regiment -with a T/O total of approximately 1,000 men. Two 76-mm. gun battalions, -a 122-mm. howitzer battalion and a headquarters company numbered -some 250 men each. A battalion consisted of 3 firing batteries with -12 artillery pieces each, and personnel carried M1938 carbines.</p> - -<p>There was also a self-propelled artillery battalion made up of 3 gun -companies, a signal platoon and a rear services section with a total of 16 -SU-76 pieces. A lieutenant colonel commanded this unit, which had a -T/O strength of 110 officers and men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> -The other major components of the NKPA infantry division were as -follows:</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Signal Battalion.</span>—a wire company, radio company and headquarters -company, making a total of 260 officers and men.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Antitank Battalion.</span>—about 190 officers and men in three 45-mm. -antitank companies and an antitank rifle company.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Engineer Battalion.</span>—T/O of 250 officers and men carrying M1944 -rifles and equipped with picks, shovels, axes, saws and mine detectors.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Training Battalion.</span>—About 500 officers and men charged with -the responsibility of training NCO’s for the division.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Reconnaissance Company.</span>—an estimated strength of 4 officers and -90 enlisted men equipped with 80 submachineguns, 20 Tokarev pistols, -4 telescopes and 5 pairs of binoculars.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Rear Services.</span>—a medical battalion, a transport company, a veterinary -unit and a supply section. Of the 200 personnel in the medical battalion, -about 60 were women, according to POW testimony. The -transport company, with some 70 men, was composed of 50 2½-ton -trucks, 6 or 7 motorcycles and 10 horse-drawn wagons.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The NKPA infantry division, in short, was a faithful copy of the -World War II Soviet model. But it must be remembered that the foregoing -T/O and T/E statistics represented the ideal more often than the -reality. Owing to the speeding up of preparations in anticipation of an -easy victory, many NKPA units lacked their full quotas of men and -equipment at the outset of the invasion.</p> - -<h3><i>NKPA Air and Armor</i></h3> - -<p>POW interrogations revealed that NKPA military aviation evolved -from the North Korean Aviation Society, founded in 1945 at the Sinuiju -Airfield by Colonel Lee Hwal, a Korean who had served in the Japanese -air force. The organization consisted at first of about 70 students -and 17 pilots who were veterans of Japanese air operations. Equipment -included a few aircraft of Japanese manufacture and several gliders.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean Air Force</cite> (InterRpt, Sup No. 100), 2–15.</p></div> - -<p>In 1946 the Society was required to transfer its aircraft and trained -personnel to the Aviation Section of the Pyongyang Military Academy. -Soviet-trained Korean officers were placed in positions of responsibility<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> -under the command of Colonel Wang Yun, a former captain in the -Soviet air force who replaced Lee Hwal.</p> - -<p>The Aviation Section numbered about 100 officers, 250 enlisted men -and 500 students by November 1948. Estimates of aircraft are contradictory, -but one source reported 7 Japanese trainers, 6 Japanese fighters -and a Japanese twin-engine transport. Shortly afterwards the first Soviet -aircraft were received, and the NKPA Air Force was created from the -Aviation Section and moved to the Pyongyang air base.</p> - -<p>The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion -of the air regiment into a division under the command of -Wang Yun, promoted to major general. Strength of the unit in April -1950 was estimated at about 1,675 officers and men, including 364 -officers, 76 pilots, 875 enlisted men, and 360 cadets. The receipt of more -Soviet planes at this time brought the number of aircraft up to 178, including -78 YAK-7B fighters, 30 PO-2 primary and YAK-18 advanced -trainers, and 70 Il-10 ground attack bombers.</p> - -<p>Captured documents indicate that the aviation training program was -speeded up along with other NKPA activities during the last few -months before the invasion. In June 1950 each pilot was required to fly -40 training missions and attend 40 hours of lectures. As preparations for -the invasion neared completion, a forward displacement of tactical aircraft -was put into effect.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The North Korean armored division, a copy of its Soviet counterpart, -had only about half of the overall strength. Thus the NKPA 105th -Armored Division, comprising some 6,000 officers and men, included 3 -medium tank regiments, the 107th, 109th, and 203d, with 40 tanks each. -Organic supporting units were the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment -and the 308th Armored Battalion equipped with self-propelled 76-mm. -guns. POW reports also mentioned reconnaissance, engineer, signal, -ordnance and medical battalions and a mixed unit identified as the 849th -Antitank Regiment, attached to the division after the invasion started.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>Enemy Forces</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 27–32.</p></div> - -<p>All reports indicate that the division was split in combat, with each -tank regiment being assigned to an infantry division. Even the training -of the regiments had been conducted separately, and there is no evidence -of prewar maneuvers on the division level.</p> - -<p>Each tank regiment had an estimated T/O strength of about 600 -officers and men. The three medium tank battalions were supported by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> -a regimental submachinegun company, a supply and maintenance company -and a headquarters section in addition to engineer, signal, reconnaissance, -and medical platoons. Forty T-34/85 medium tanks were divided -into 13 for each battalion and 1 for the headquarters section, which -also rated a CAZ/67 jeep.</p> - -<p>Responsibility for the indoctrination of the regiment rested with a -political section headed by a lieutenant colonel. As assistants he had 2 -officers and 3 sergeants.</p> - -<p>An NKPA tank battalion included a headquarters section and three -25-man companies. A company contained three platoons, each of which -was assigned a medium tank. The standard crew consisted of the commander, -usually a senior lieutenant, the driver and assistant driver, the -gunner in charge of the 85-mm. rifle, and the assistant gunner operating -the 7.62-mm. machinegun. The usual ammunition load was 55 85-mm. -shells and 2,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition.</p> - -<p>Not much was known about the 206th Mechanized infantry Regiment, -but it was believed to consist of three motorized infantry battalions, -a 76-mm. howitzer battalion, a 45-mm. antitank battalion, a -120-mm. mortar battalion, a signal company, and an NCO training -company.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>NKPA Officer Procurement and Conscription</i></h3> - -<p>Officer procurement problems were solved in large part by the fact that -thousands of North Koreans had seen combat service with the CCF -forces. Many of these veterans were qualified as junior officers or NCO’s -without further training. Remaining vacancies for company-grade officers -were filled by officer candidate schools or the commissioning of -qualified NCO’s.</p> - -<p>The West Point of the NKPA, located at Pyongyang, turned out an -estimated 4,000 junior officers from the time of its activation in 1946 to -the beginning of the invasion. Courses normally ranged in length from -6 to 10 months, but were abbreviated to 3 months during the autumn -of 1949 in anticipation of the invasion. After hostilities began, the need -for replacement officers became so urgent that one entire class at the -Pyongyang academy was commissioned wholesale on 10 July 1950 and -sent to the front after 20 days of instruction.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean Forces</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 35–42.</p></div> - -<p>Three Soviet officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels, reportedly -acted as advisers to a faculty composed of NKPA majors. The five departments -of the Academy were devoted to infantry, artillery, engineering, -signaling, and quartermasters’ duties.</p> - -<p>A second military academy at Pyongyang specialized in subjects which -Communists termed “cultural.” So much importance was attached to -political indoctrination that graduates of this school were commissioned -as senior lieutenants and given unusual authority in their units. Although -a 2-year Russian language course was offered, most of the candidates -took the standard 9-month term.</p> - -<p>Branches of the Pyongyang military academy were established as -officer candidate schools in Hamhung, Chinnampo, Chorwon, Mesanjin, -Kaechon and Kanggye. Applicants were required to have an acceptable -political background and a 6-year minimum of schooling, though the -last was sometimes waived.</p> - -<p>A command and staff school at Pyongyang offered advanced tactical -and administrative courses at the battalion and regimental level to -selected officers. At the other extreme, NCO schools were located at -Sadong, Sinuiju, Sinchon and Nanam. Tactical instruction was given at -the platoon and squad level with emphasis on weapons courses. NCO -training was accelerated in preparation for hostilities, and 4,000 veterans -of CCF service in Manchuria completed 2-month courses at the Sadong -school alone in the spring of 1950.</p> - -<p>Technical training in aircraft, artillery, tank and engineering specialties -was offered in schools for junior officers as well as enlisted men. But it -appears that most of the officers above the company level received their -instruction in Soviet schools.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Conscription, according to POW accounts, was introduced as early as -1948. In the rural districts each <em>myon</em> (a political subdivision smaller -than a county but comprising several villages) was given its quota of -recruits to be furnished between the ages of 18 and 35. The village chiefs -then assembled all the men in this age group and made their decisions -on an arbitrary basis. Selectees had little or no hope of appeal, but were -assured that provision would be made for their families during the 3-year -term of service.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 29–31.</p></div> - -<p>The system was much the same in North Korean cities, which were -divided into sections for conscription purposes. Sometimes the leaders in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span> -urban areas called for volunteers. If the response was lacking in enthusiasm, -men were singled out and requested to “volunteer.” This method -was invariably successful, since a man who refused could be deprived of -employment.</p> - -<p>The conscription program was speeded up along with other preparations -as invasion plans neared completion. About 12,000 men were -inducted from March through May 1950 and given 6 weeks of basic -training at such camps as the No. 2 People’s Training Center at Sinuiju.</p> - -<p>In some communities the men eligible for military service were -requested to attend a meeting. Upon arrival, they were taken in trucks -to a training center and compelled to enlist.</p> - -<p>Harsh as such methods might seem, they were gentle as compared to -the forced conscription of ROK civilians after the invasion got underway. -Both men and women in captured cities were crowded into school -buildings, given political indoctrination and forced to learn Communist -songs. After a week of this curriculum, the men were inducted both as -combat recruits and laborers. And though the women were told that -their service would be limited to duty as nurses or clerks, some of them -were coerced into carrying out reconnaissance or espionage missions.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>The NKPA Order of Battle</i></h3> - -<p>The transition from a cold war to a shooting war in Korea should not -have surprised anyone familiar with the events of the past 2 years. For -several hours, indeed, there was a reasonable doubt on the historic -morning of 25 June 1950 whether an undeclared war had begun or -merely another large-scale NKPA raid across the frontier.</p> - -<p>But this time it was the real thing. Commencing at 0400, 7 infantry -divisions and an armored division swept across the 38th Parallel, with -2 infantry divisions in reserve. From right to left, the NKPA order of -battle was as follows:</p> - -<p>The 6th Infantry Division along the west coast, sealing off the Ongjin -Peninsula and moving on Kaesong; the 1st Infantry Division advancing -on Kaesong and Seoul; the 4th and 3d Infantry Divisions and 105th -Armored Division attacking in west-central Korea and converging on -Seoul; the 2d and 15th Infantry Divisions driving toward the Hwachon-Chunchon -axis in east-central Korea; and the 5th Infantry Division taking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span> -the route along the east coast. Following close behind were the two -reserve infantry divisions, the 13th and 15th.<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>History of the North Korean Army</cite>, 25–27.</p></div> - -<p>There was no question as to the outcome in the minds of observers -who knew the composition of the ROK army. The very name was misleading, -for it might more accurately have been described as a large -constabulary in process of being converted into an army. Given another -year of training and added arms and equipment, the Republic of Korea -would perhaps have built up an adequate defense establishment. But the -enemy took good care to strike while this development was still at the -blueprint stage.</p> - -<p>In June 1949, at the conclusion of the occupation, the United States -forces turned over arms and equipment to the value of about -$110,000,000. These supplies included 100,000 small arms (rifles, pistols -and machineguns) and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; more than -4,900 vehicles of all types; about 2,000 2.36″ rocket launchers and 40,000 -rounds of ammunition; and a large number of 105-mm. howitzers, -37-mm. and 57-mm. antitank guns, and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, -together with 700,000 rounds of ammunition for those weapons. Twenty -training planes (L4 and L5 types) were transferred as well as 79 light -naval craft suitable for patrolling the coast.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> U. S. Military Academy, Dept of Mil Art and Eng (U. S. MilAcad), <cite>Operations in -Korea</cite> (West Point, 1953), 4–5.</p></div> - -<p>It is noteworthy that this list was limited to light arms for a constabulary -of about 50,000 men. Tanks, military aircraft and medium or heavy -artillery were significantly lacking.</p> - -<p>At the request of the ROK government, a Korean Military Advisory -Group remained in South Korea after the conclusion of the American -occupation. Composed of 500 United States Army officers and enlisted -men, the KMAG took on the task of directing the training of a ROK -constabulary. The group was under the control of Ambassador Muccio, -since General MacArthur’s responsibility for the defense had ended -along with the occupation.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>After the NKPA invasion, the United States was severely criticized in -some quarters for failing to provide the Republic of Korea with arms -and training equal to those of the enemy. American reluctance was due -in some measure to indiscreet declarations by that fiery old Korean patriot, -Syngman Rhee. The ROK president, 74 years old at the outbreak -of civil war, did not shrink from advocating the unification of Korea by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span> -armed force. On 20 February 1949 he predicted that his troops “could -defeat North Korea within 2 weeks” if the U. S. S. R. did not interfere. -Eight months later, on 7 October, his confidence had increased to the -point where he was “sure that we could take Pyongyang in 3 days.”<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> A. Wigfall Green, <cite>Epic of Korea</cite> (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950), 125–26.</p></div> - -<p>Such remarks placed the United States in an uncomfortable position. -If aid to the Republic of Korea were to include tanks, military aircraft -and training for offensive warfare, Americans would be open to the -charge of inciting civil strife. Communist propagandists would scream -that accusation in any event, of course, but there would be grounds for -the suspicion of other members of the United Nations. Ambassador -Muccio made sure, therefore, that United States assistance did not extend -beyond the legitimate needs of ROK frontier defense and internal -security.</p> - -<p>The triangular ROK infantry division was modeled after the United -States unit but numbered about 9,500 troops. Eight divisions and a regiment -had been organized and partially trained by June 1950. They were -the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions and the 17th -Regiment.<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> Only 4 of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 6th, and 7th, had -their full complement of 3 regiments. All the others had 2 except the -5th, which had 2 and a battalion.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> The absence of a 4th Division is explained by an old Korean superstition. Because -the symbol for that number resembled the ancient symbol for death, it was regarded as -unlucky. Apparently the North Koreans managed to overcome this superstition, however, -in numbering their units.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> LtCol Roy E. Appleman, USA, ms. history of UN operations in Korea, Jul–Nov 50.</p></div> - -<p>ROK military strength was estimated at 98,808 troops by the KMAG -in June 1950. About 65,000 of them had been given unit training for -combat. They were fairly proficient in the employment of small arms -and mortars, but their instruction had not included defense against tanks. -Command and staff work were still at a rudimentary stage, and both -officers and NCO’s needed seasoning.</p> - -<p>The ROK Army of June 1950 had made good progress, in short, -when it is considered that most of its components had been activated -within the past year. But it was no match for the Red Korean columns -which attacked at dawn on 25 June 1950. The ROK order of battle, if -such it could be called, consisted of a regiment and four infantry divisions -ranged from left to right across the peninsula—the 17th Regiment -and the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions. The remaining divisions were -dispersed for purposes of internal security: the Capital at Seoul; the 2d<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_35">35</a><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -at Chongju and Taejon; the 3d at Taegu; and the 5th at Kwangju.</p> - -<div id="ip_35" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_035.jpg" width="1377" height="2101" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><span class="gesperrt">NKPA</span><br /> - ORDER OF BATTLE<br /> - <span class="smaller">25 JUNE 1950</span></div></div> - -<p>The ROK frontier forces were not well disposed for defense in -depth. Taken by surprise, they put up an ineffectual resistance despite -brave fights here and there against odds. On other occasions the sight -of an enemy tank or armored car was enough to scatter ROK riflemen, -and the progress of the invading columns resembled an occupation -rather than an attack.</p> - -<p>Before sundown on the day of invasion it appeared that NKPA leaders -had not erred in allowing a timetable of 10 days for overrunning the -Republic of Korea. The question now was whether the conflict could -be confined to that Asiatic peninsula. Communist aggressions were no -novelty, to be sure, either in Asia or Europe. But in the past there had -always been some show of peaceable intentions, however hypocritical, -or some shadow of legality. This was the first time that a Soviet puppet -nation had been permitted to go as far as open warfare. Matters had -come to a showdown, and it could only be interpreted as a challenge -issued by Communism to the free nations of the world.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_III" class="vspace">CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">The Marine Brigade</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>NKPA Gains of First Week—Early United States Decisions—Geography -of Korea—United States Ground Forces in Korea—Requests -for United States Marines—Activation of the Brigade—Brigade -Leadership</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">At three o’clock</span> in the morning of 25 June 1950 the telephone rang -in the New York suburban home of Trygve Lie, secretary-general -of the United Nations. He was informed that North Korean forces had -crossed the 38th Parallel to invade the Republic of Korea.</p> - -<p>The news had just been received by the United States Department of -State directly from Seoul. Ambassador Muccio had emphasized that this -was not one of the large-scale North Korean raids into ROK territory -which had become an old story during the past 2 years. For his report -concluded:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was -launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.”<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> U. S. Dept of State, <cite>Guide to the U. N. in Korea</cite> (Washington: GPO, 1951).</p></div> - -<p>The implications were disturbing. Every middle-aged American could -recall the failure of the League of Nations to halt Japanese, Italian, and -German aggressions of the 1930’s with moral suasions. Even when economic -sanctions were invoked, the aggressors went their way defiantly -without respect for anything short of armed force. And now history -seemed to be repeating itself with dismaying fidelity as new aggressors -challenged the new union of nations striving to maintain peace after -World War II.</p> - -<p>There was even an ominous parallel in the fact that another civil conflict -in another peninsula had been the prelude to Armageddon in the -1930’s. For it might well have been asked if the Korea of 1950 were -destined to become the Spain of a new world war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span> -The answer of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. At 2 -o’clock in the afternoon on 25 June 1950, a meeting of the Security -Council was called to order at New York. A dispatch had just been -received from UNCOK—the United Nations Commission on Korea—reporting -that four Soviet YAK-type aircraft had destroyed planes and -jeeps on an airfield outside of Seoul. The railway station in the industrial -suburb of Yongdungpo had also been strafed.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>By a unanimous vote of nine member nations (with the U. S. S. R. -being significantly absent and Yugoslavia not voting) the blame for the -aggression was placed squarely upon the North Korean invaders. They -were enjoined to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw from ROK -territory.</p> - -<p>The United Nations had no armed might to enforce its decisions. But -the Security Council did not intend to rely merely upon moral suasion -or economic sanctions. At a second meeting, on 27 June, the Council -proclaimed the NKPA attack a breach of world peace and asked member -nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion.</p> - -<p>For the first time in the war-racked 20th century, a group of nations -banded together for peace had not only condemned an aggression but -appealed to armed force to smite the aggressor. On the same day that the -Security Council passed its historic resolution, the United States announced -that it was giving immediate military aid to the Republic of -Korea.</p> - -<p>President Truman, as commander in chief, ordered American naval and -air forces into action. Fifty-two other members of the United Nations -approved the recommendations of the Security Council. Their pledges -of assistance included aircraft, naval vessels, medical supplies, field ambulances, -foodstuffs and strategic materials.</p> - -<p>Only 3 of the 56 nations responding to the Council were opposed to -the majority decision. They were the Soviet Union and her two satellites, -Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been brought into the Communist -orbit by compulsion after World War II.</p> - -<p>On 29 June President Truman authorized General MacArthur to send -certain supporting United States ground force units to Korea. An American -naval blockade of the entire Korean coast was ordered, and Japan-based -Air Force planes were given authority to bomb specific military -targets north of the 38th Parallel.</p> - -<p>These decisions were upheld by the wholehearted approval of nearly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> -all Americans, according to contemporary newspapers.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Virtually the -only dissenters were such left-wing extremists as the 9,000 who attended -a “Hands off Korea” rally held early in July 1950 under Communist -auspices in New York.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> Barring such rule-proving exceptions, Americans -had long been smoldering with indignation at Soviet cold-war tactics. -They applauded the resolute stand taken by the United Nations, -and they were proud of their country for its response. Unfortunately, -they did not anticipate that anything more serious than a brief “police -action” would be necessary to settle affairs. Never in their wildest -imaginations had it occurred to them that an Asiatic peasant army might -be more than a match for all the United States ground forces in the Far -East.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> <cite>Newsweek</cite>, 10 Jul 50, 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 29.</p></div> - -<h3><i>NKPA Gains of First Week</i></h3> - -<p>It was by no means a contemptible army, judged even by Western military -standards, which ripped through ROK defenses after crossing the -38th Parallel. The major effort was the two-pronged attack on Seoul, -conducted with precision by the 1st NKPA Infantry Division, advancing -through Kaesong and Munsan while the 4th and 3d united south -of the frontier with elements of the 105th Armored to proceed by way -of the Yonchon-Uijongbu and Pochon-Uijongbu corridors.</p> - -<p>On the right the 6th Infantry Division made short work of overrunning -the isolated Ongjin Peninsula and thrusting eastward toward -Kaesong. On the left the offensive was covered by the drive of the 2d -and 12th Infantry Divisions on Chunchon while the 5th made rapid -gains along the east coast.</p> - -<p>In this area the North Koreans initiated the first amphibious operations -of the war with four Soviet-manufactured torpedo boats. Built -entirely of aluminum, of about 16 gross tons displacement when fully -loaded, these craft measured slightly over 19 meters in length and were -powered by two 10-Cylinder engines rated at 850 horsepower each. With -a crew of 8 men, a cruising speed of 20 to 25 knots and a range of 15 -hours, the boats carried 2 torpedoes and were armed with a 12.7-mm. -heavy machinegun and 2 submachineguns.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean Forces</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 45–6.</p></div> - -<p>During the first 5 days of the invasion, the 4 torpedo boats escorted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span> -convoys which transported NKPA troops down the east coast for unopposed -landings as far south as Samchok. But on 2 July 1950 the tiny -North Korean “navy” was almost literally blown out of the water when -it encountered UN Task Group 96.5 off Chuminjin while escorting 10 -converted trawlers. With more bravery than discretion, the small North -Korean craft accepted battle with the American light cruiser <i>Juneau</i> and -two British warships, the light cruiser <i>Jamaica</i> and the frigate <i>Black -Swan</i>. Evidently the enemy hoped to score with a few torpedoes at the -cost of a suicidal effort, but the U. N. guns sank 2 of the aluminum -craft and drove a third to the beach, where it was soon destroyed along -with 7 of the convoy vessels. The North Koreans were credited with -“great gallantry” in the British dispatch after the fourth torpedo boat -escaped.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> But it was the last naval effort of any consequence by an enemy -strangled in the net of the UN blockade.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Capt Walter Karig, USN, <cite>Battle Report: The War in Korea</cite> (New York: Rinehart, -1952), 58–59.</p></div> - -<p>On land the NKPA columns advanced almost at will during the first -4 days. Nearly a hundred tanks and as many planes were employed by -the two main columns advancing on Seoul, and on 27 June 1950 the -ROK seat of government was removed to Taejon while Far East Air -Force planes were evacuating United States citizens. ROK fugitives, -winding southward in an endless stream of humanity, choked every -road and multiplied the difficulties of the defense. To add to their -misery, one of the bridges across the river Han was blown prematurely -when masses of Koreans were crossing.</p> - -<p>The fall of Seoul on the 28th ended the first stage of the offensive -as the NKPA forces halted for regrouping. Chunchon had surrendered -in east-central Korea, so that the invaders held a ragged line stretching -from Chumunjin on the east coast through Chunchon, Kapyong and -Seoul to the port of Inchon on the west coast.</p> - -<p>The beaten and in some instances shattered ROK forces were meanwhile -falling back through Suwon in the hope of establishing new positions -of defense.</p> - -<h3><i>Early United States Decisions</i></h3> - -<p>A strategy of delaying actions was the only course open to General -MacArthur for the time being. One of his first decisions led to the establishment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> -on 27 June of the GHQ Advanced Command Group at Suwon -under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA. This -group had as its primary mission the reorganization of the demoralized -ROK forces, which were already reporting thousands of men missing in -action. Secondary missions were to keep Tokyo informed as to military -developments and expedite the delivery of supplies. As early as 27 June, -119 tons of emergency supplies had been sent to Korea by air, and an -additional 5,600 tons were being loaded on ships in Japan.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> U. S. MilAcad, <i>op. cit.</i>, 7–8.</p></div> - -<p>American naval and air forces lost no time at getting into action after -President Truman’s authorization. United States Naval Forces in the -Far East, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, had as -their principal element the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral -Arthur D. Struble. Its tactical organization, Task Force 77, immediately -clamped down a blockade on the Korean coast after wiping out enemy -naval opposition. Other warships of the Seventh Fleet were meanwhile -blockading Formosa to guard against the possibility of Chinese Communist -intervention by means of an attack on the last Nationalist -stronghold.</p> - -<p>The United States Far East Air Forces, commanded by Lieutenant -General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, consisted of eight and a half -combat groups responsible for the defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam -and the Philippines. Primary missions assigned to the fighter and -bomber squadrons were the elimination of NKPA air opposition and -the retarding of enemy ground forces by means of interdictory air strikes -on bases and supply routes.</p> - -<h3><i>Geography of Korea</i></h3> - -<p>Geography being a first cousin of strategy, maps of Korea were almost -literally worth their weight in diamonds both in Tokyo and at the Pentagon. -For that matter, they were nearly as rare as diamonds, and it became -necessary in many instances to work with outdated Japanese maps.</p> - -<p>On the map of Asia the Korean peninsula resembles a thumb dipping -down into the Yellow and Japan seas. For centuries it has been the sore -thumb of Asiatic power politics, so that trouble in Korea resulted in a -twinge being felt in the capitals of Europe. But small as Korea appears -on the map, it is actually about 575 miles in length—a peninsula<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span> -resembling Florida in shape but having about the area of Minnesota.</p> - -<p>Variations in climate are comparable to the gradient from Maine to -Georgia along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. Extremes -ranging from summer weather of 105° F. to winter temperatures of 40° -below zero have been recorded. A monsoon season of floods is to be -expected in July and August, followed by a period when typhoons are -a possibility. Altogether, it is a climate which can contribute no little -to the difficulties of a mechanized invader.</p> - -<p>It would be almost an understatement to say that Korea is mountainous. -Few areas of the earth’s surface are so consistently rugged. -Bleak cliffs seem to thrust themselves dripping out of the sea on the -East Korean littoral. The peaks become higher and more perpendicular -as they march inland, until altitudes of 9,000 feet are reached.</p> - -<p>The principal chain of mountains extends from the Yalu in the north -along the east coast to the Pusan area. Just south of the 38th parallel a -spur branches off diagonally to southwest Korea in the region of -Mokpu. The remainder of the peninsula consists largely of smaller -ranges and foothills.</p> - -<p>The few broad valleys are found chiefly on the west coast, which has -a good many indentations and estuaries. Here also are most of Korea’s -large rivers, flowing west and south. Of little aid to navigation, these -streams are broad and deep enough to hamper military operations; and -in the monsoon season, floods become a menace.</p> - -<p>As if the west coast were paying a penalty for being less mountainous, -mud flats and islands hamper navigation. And here the tides are among -the highest in the world, with an extreme range of about 30 feet existing -at Inchon in contrast to unusually moderate tides along the east -coast.</p> - -<p>The west and south are the agricultural areas of Korea. Nothing is -wasted by peasants who till every inch of the lowland flats, rice paddies, -and terraced hills. Due to their back-breaking toil rather than many -natural advantages, Korea was able to export as much as half of its two -food staples, rice and fish, under the Japanese administration.</p> - -<p>The population, estimated at 25,000,000 in 1945, increased both by -immigration and a high birth rate during the next 5 years until as many -as 29,000,000 inhabitants were claimed. Seoul was a capital of a million -and a half residents, and the two leading seaports, Pusan and Inchon, -had not far from a quarter of a million each. Modern office buildings, -factories and street railways were found in combination with muddy -streets and thatched huts on the outskirts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span> -A standard-gauge rail network, built largely by the Japanese, linked the -principal cities and connected in the north with the Manchurian railways. -The highway system was good for an Asiatic country but inadequate -for the purpose of an invader on wheels and tracks. Hard-surfaced -roads were few and far between, and the ordinary earth roads were -churned into bogs during the monsoon season. Air transportation was -limited to only a few large airfields and emergency landing facilities.</p> - -<p>Altogether, Korea promised to be a tough nut to crack, when it came -to geography, for the officers poring over maps in Tokyo.</p> - -<h3><i>United States Ground Forces in Korea</i></h3> - -<p>The United States ground forces in the Far East comprised the understrength -7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) -Division of the Eighth United States Army, which had been -stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. These divisions had -only about 70 percent of their personnel, the regiments being limited to -two battalions.</p> - -<p>The explanation of these deficiencies goes back to the end of World -War II. Popular clamor for the speedy discharge of the victorious -United States forces had resulted in American military sinews becoming -flabby during the next few years. Strenuous recruiting had been -necessary to maintain the small army of occupation in Japan at part -strength, and it was no secret that many of the men were attracted by -the expectation of travel and light occupation duties. The possibility of -battle had scarcely been anticipated when the invasion began, and combat -readiness left a good deal to be desired. Training on the company -level had been good on the whole, but both officers and men were -handicapped by the lack of maneuvers for units larger than a battalion.</p> - -<p>Shortages in equipment were equally serious. There were not enough -mortars, recoilless rifles and other weapons even if there had been -enough maintenance parts and trained maintenance technicians. Most -of the arms, moreover, consisted of worn World War II equipment -which had seen its best days. Finally, the divisional armored units had -been provided with light M-24 tanks, instead of the heavier machines -normally employed, because of the weak bridges in Japan.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> U. S. MilAcad, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>It was, in brief, an unprepared and ill-equipped little army of<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_44">44</a><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -occupation which represented the first line of United States defense in -the Far East.</p> - -<div id="ip_44" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_044.jpg" width="1379" height="2104" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><span class="gesperrt">NKPA</span><br />INVASION<br /> - <span class="smaller">15 JULY 1950</span></div></div> - -<p>On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded -by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to -Korea. Two days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact -of the United States ground forces with the enemy was made near -Osan, about 8 miles south of Suwon.</p> - -<p>The American force consisted of 2 infantry companies, a battery of -artillery, two 4.2″ mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles, -and six 2.36″ rocket-launcher teams. Named Task Force Smith after its -commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, the first -United States contingent collided on the morning of 5 July with a whole -NKPA division supported by 30 T-34 tanks. Despite the odds against -it, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of 4 or 5 hours before -pulling out with the loss of all equipment save small arms.<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> 24th InfDiv, Supporting Documents, 24 Jul-16 Aug 50, 6–7.</p></div> - -<p>On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for -a unified command in Korea, and President Truman named General -MacArthur as commander in chief. Lieutenant General Walton H. -Walker, who had been one of Patton’s best officers in World War II, -was appointed commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea -(EUSAK) on 12 July, and 4 days later he assumed control of all ROK -ground forces.</p> - -<p>The ROK army, as might be supposed, was badly battered and much -in need of reorganization. At the end of the first week of invasion, the -ROK missing in action had reached a total of about 34,000. Whole battalions -had been scattered like chaff, yet it speaks well for the spirit of -the troops that most of the missing eventually returned to their units.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> -The odds against them had made it a hopeless fight, but these Korean -soldiers would give a good account of themselves when they had better -training and equipment.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Appleman, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>The United States forces were finding it hard sledding, for that matter. -The remaining units of the 24th Infantry Division were in action by -7 July, having arrived by sea from Japan. They were followed by the -25th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B. -Kean, which completed the movement to Korea on 14 July.</p> - -<p>These first outweighed United States forces had no choice except to -trade space for time in a series of delaying actions. Although the units<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span> -had to be employed piecemeal at first, they slowed up the main thrust -of the enemy—the advance of three NKPA divisions, well supported by -armor, down the Seoul-Taejon axis.</p> - -<p>Seldom in history have American forces ever endured a worse ordeal -by fire. Unprepared morally as well as materially, snatched from soft -occupation duties in Japan, they were suddenly plunged into battle -against heavier battalions. The “Land of the Morning Calm” was to -them a nightmare land of sullen mountains and stinking rice paddies. -There was not even the momentary lift of band music and flag waving -for these occupation troops, and they were not upheld by the discipline -which stiffens the spines of old regulars.</p> - -<p>Considering what they were up against, the soldiers of the 24th and -25th have an abiding claim to a salute from their countrymen. They -fought the good fight, even though they could keep militarily solvent -only by withdrawals between delaying actions.</p> - -<p>Officers as well as men were expendables in this Thermopylae of the -rice paddies. Because of the large proportion of green troops, colonels -and even generals literally led some of the counterattacks in the 18th-century -manner. Colonel Robert R. Martin, commanding the 34th Infantry -of the 24th Division, fell in the thick of the fighting while rallying -his troops. General Dean stayed with his forward units, personally -firing one of the new 3.5″ bazookas until the enemy broke through. He -was reported missing for months, but turned up later as the highest -ranking United States military prisoner of the conflict in Korea.</p> - -<p>American light tanks could not cope with the enemy’s T-34’s; and -even when the first few medium tanks arrived, they were equipped only -with 75-mm. guns against the heavier NKPA armament. Not until the -third week of ground force operations, moreover, did the United States -artillery units receive 155-mm. howitzers to supplement their 105’s.</p> - -<p>There was nothing that the ground forces could do but withdraw toward -the line of the river Kum. Here a stand was made by 24th Division -units at Taejon, an important communications center. But the enemy -managed to establish bridgeheads, and the fall of the town on 20 July -marked the end of the first phase.</p> - -<p>Two days later the 24th Division, now commanded by General -Church, was relieved south of Taejon by Major General Hobart R. Gay’s -1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division, which had landed at Pohang-dong -on the 18th. And on 26 July the separate 29th Infantry RCT disembarked -at Chinju on the south coast after a voyage from Okinawa.</p> - -<p>The reinforced Eighth Army was still too much outnumbered to vary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> -its strategy of delaying actions with sustained counterattacks. While the -new American units and the 25th Division fell slowly back toward the -line of the Naktong, the regrouped ROK divisions were assigned sectors -toward the north and east, where a secondary NKPA offensive -threatened Pohang-dong. Meanwhile, the exhausted 24th Division went -into Eighth Army reserve.</p> - -<p>The ground forces would doubtless have been in a worse situation if -it had not been for hard-hitting United States naval and air support. -Major General Emmett O’Donnell’s B-29 Superforts of the FEAF -Bomber Command took off from Japanese bases to fly strikes on enemy -supply routes, communications hubs, marshaling yards and other strategic -targets all the way back to the Yalu.</p> - -<p>Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave Pyongyang its first -large-scale bombing on 3 July. Gull-winged F4U Corsairs, leading off -from the <i>Valley Forge</i> flight deck with 5-inch rockets, were followed by -AD Skyraiders and new Douglas dive bombers. Bridges and railway -yards were destroyed by raiders who shot down two YAK-type planes in -the air and destroyed two on the ground.</p> - -<p>Along the east coast the <i>Juneau</i> and other warships of the Anglo-American -blockading force patrolled the enemy’s MSR, which followed -the shoreline. Salvos from the cruisers, fired at the sheer cliffs, loosed -avalanches of earth and rock to block the highway. Railways were mined -and tunnels dynamited by commando parties landing from ships’ boats.</p> - -<p>The combined U. N. efforts inflicted heavy material and personnel -losses while slowing up the NKPA offensive. But it is a testimonial to -Soviet and Red Korean preparations for aggression that the army of invasion -kept on rolling. There was even some prospect late in July that -the enemy would yet make good his boast of being able to take Pusan -within 2 months in spite of United States intervention.</p> - -<h3><i>Requests for United States Marines</i></h3> - -<p>Upholding their long tradition as America’s force-in-readiness, the Marines -have usually been among the first troops to see action on a foreign -shore. Thus it might have been asked what was holding them back at a -time when Army troops in Korea were hard-pressed.</p> - -<p>The answer is that the Marines actually were the first United States -ground forces to get into the fight after completing the long voyage -from the American mainland. There were no Marine units of any size<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> -in the Far East at the outset of the invasion. But not an hour was lost -at the task of assembling an air-ground team at Camp Pendleton, -California, and collecting the shipping.</p> - -<p>The spirit of impatience animating the Marine Corps is shown by an -entry on the desk calendar of General Clifton B. Cates under the date of -26 June 1950. This was the day after the news of the invasion reached -Washington, and the Commandant commented:</p> - -<p>“SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.”<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Gen Clifton B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54 (Cates, 7 Apr 54).</p></div> - -<p>On the 28th General Cates had his first conference with Admiral Forrest -P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He noted on his calendar -the next day: “Recommended to CNO and SecNav that FMF be employed.” -Two days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” -And on 3 July his calendar recorded more history:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the conference -of 28 June, when Cates gave Sherman a summary of the strength -of the Marine Corps. Along with other branches of the service, it had -taken cuts in appropriations since World War II, so that total numbers -were 74,279 men on active duty—97 percent of authorized strength. The -Fleet Marine Force had a strength of 27,656—11,853 in FMFPac (1st -Marine Division, Reinf., and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) and 15,803 in -FMFLant (2d Marine Division, Reinf., and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing).<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Ernest H. Giusti, <cite>The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict</cite> -(Washington, HQMC, G-3, HistSec, 1951), 1–2.</p></div> - -<p>Neither of these understrength divisions, General Cates pointed out, -could raise much more than an RCT of combat-ready troops with supporting -air.</p> - -<p>Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take -to move (<i>a</i>) a Marine BLT and (<i>b</i>) a Marine RCT from the Pacific -Coast. Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT -in 4 days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and -sail in 10.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 1 Jul 50; and CinCPacFlt disp to CNO, 2 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced -that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired -it. COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just -returned from a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> -did CINCFE accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in -expressing his appreciation.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> Marine Corps Board, <cite>An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course -of the Korean War</cite> (4 Aug-15 Dec 50) (MCBS) I-B-1, I-B-2.</p></div> - -<p>Sunday 2 July was the date of the message from General MacArthur -requesting the immediate dispatch of a Marine RCT with supporting -air to the Far East. CNO acted that same day. With the concurrence of -JCS and the President, he ordered Admiral Radford to move a Marine -RCT with appropriate air to the Far East for employment by General -MacArthur.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> CINCFE disp to CNO, 2 Jul 50; CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 2 Jul 50; and JCS disp to -CINCFE, 3 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>Later, when General Cates asked CNO how the historical decision -had been accomplished, Admiral Sherman replied cryptically in baseball -language, “From Cates to Sherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, to JCS!”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Cates, 7 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Activation of the Brigade</i></h3> - -<p>Even at this early date there was talk both in Washington and Tokyo -of forming an entire Marine division after mobilizing the Reserve. -For the present, however, it sufficed to organize the RCT requested -by General MacArthur. There could be little doubt that the assignment -would be given to an air-ground team built around the two -main West Coast units, the 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33. -They were activated along with supporting units on 7 July as the 1st -Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Edward -A. Craig, senior officer at Camp Pendleton. The air component, consisting -of three squadrons of MAG-33, was placed under the command -of Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman, who was named deputy -commander of the Brigade.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of -FMFPac, and a G-3 staff officer, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, had been -ordered on 4 July to proceed immediately to Tokyo and confer with -General MacArthur. Before leaving, Shepherd found time to recommend -formation of third platoons for rifle companies of the 5th Marines, and -CNO gave his approval the following day.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 5 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>Unfortunately, there was not enough time to add third rifle companies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span> -to the battalions of the 5th Marines which had been training with two -companies on a peacetime basis. Camp Pendleton and its neighboring -Marine Air Station, El Toro, hummed with day and night activity as the -Brigade prepared to sail in a week. Weapons and clothing had to be issued, -immunization shots given, and insurance and pay allotments made -out. Meanwhile, telegrams were sent to summon Marines from posts -and stations all over the United States.</p> - -<p>Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United -States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat service. -Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too late to -have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few Sikorsky -machines had been used experimentally both in the European and Pacific -theaters toward the end of the conflict. But it remained for the -United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat -techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron, -HMX-1, at Quantico in 1947.</p> - -<p>Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and 4 HO3S-1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters -were detached from HMX-1 on 8 July 1950 for service with the -Brigade. Upon arrival at El Toro, these elements were combined with 8 -fixed-wing aircraft pilots, 33 enlisted men and 8 OY planes to form the -Brigade’s air observation squadron, VMO-6.</p> - -<p>This is an example of how units were assembled at Pendleton and El -Toro. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, appointed commanding officer of -VMO-6 on 3 July, had orders to ready his squadron for shipment overseas -by the 11th. Thus he had just 48 hours, after the arrival of the -Quantico contingent, in which to weld the elements of his outfit together. -Among his other problems, Gottschalk had to grapple with the -fact that there were not enough OY’s in good condition at El Toro. He -found a solution by taking eight of these light observation planes overseas -with a view to cannibalizing four of them for parts when the need -arose.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Lynn Montross, <cite>Cavalry of the Sky</cite> (New York: Harper, 1954), Chapter VII. This -book is devoted entirely to the operations of the U. S. Marine helicopter units organized -from 1947 to 1953 for service both in the United States and overseas.</p></div> - -<p>There was not enough time in most instances for weapons familiarization -training. Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had been accustomed -to the M4A3 Medium tank with either the 75-mm. gun or the -105-mm. howitzer. Activated on 7 July for service with the Brigade, the -unit was equipped with M-26 “Pershing” tanks and 90-mm. guns. Captain -Gearl M. English, the commanding officer, managed to snatch 1 day<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> -in which to take his men to the range with 2 of the new machines. Each -gunner and loader was limited to 2 rounds, and the 90-mm. guns -were never fired again until they were taken into combat in Korea.<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> 1st Tank Bn Special Action Report (SAR), 7 Jul-29 Aug 50, in 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade (Brig) SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50.</p></div> - -<p>Support battalions were cut down to company size, generally speaking, -for service with the Brigade. Thus Company A of the 1st Motor -Transport Battalion numbered 6 officers and 107 men; and Company A -of the 1st Engineer Battalion (reinf.) totaled 8 officers and 209 men.</p> - -<p>The largest unit of the ground forces, of course, was the 5th Marines -with 113 officers and 2,068 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel -Raymond L. Murray. Next came the 1st Battalion (reinf.) of the 11th -Marines, numbering 37 officers and 455 men under the command of -Lieutenant Colonel Ransom H. Wood.</p> - -<p>Altogether, according to a report of 9 July 1950, the Brigade ground -forces reached a total of 266 officers and 4,503 men.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> CinCPacFlt disp to CINCFE, 9 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>On this same date, the Brigade’s air component amounted to 192 officers -and 1,358 men. The principal units were as follows:</p> - -<table class="p1 b1 w30" summary="Brigage principle units"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF-214</td> - <td class="tdl">29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF-323</td> - <td class="tdl">29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF(N)-513</td> - <td class="tdl">15 officers, 98 men, 12 F4U5N aircraft.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMO-6</td> - <td class="tdl">15 officers, 63 men, 8 OY and 4 HO3S-1 aircraft.<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Adding the ground force and air figures gives a grand total of 6,319—458 -officers and 5,861 men—on 9 July 1950. Before sailing, however, -the activation of third rifle platoons and the last-minute attachment of -supporting troops brought the strength of the Brigade and its air components -up to 6,534.</p> - -<p>Most of the equipment came from the great Marine supply depot at -Barstow in the California desert. Here were acres of “mothballed” -trucks, jeeps, DUKW’s and amphibian tractors dating back to World -War II. It has been aptly remarked, in fact, that “there were more veterans -of Iwo and Okinawa among the vehicles than there were among -the men who would drive them.”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Andrew Geer, <cite>The New Breed</cite> (New York: Harper, 1952), 2–7. This book about -U. S. Marine operations of 1950 in Korea contains an excellent account of the mounting -out of the Brigade from Camp Pendleton.</p></div> - -<p>Rail and highway facilities were taxed to the limit by the endless -caravan of equipment moving from Barstow to Pendleton and El Toro<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span> -after being hastily reconditioned and tested. Not all the arms were of -World War II vintage, however, and the Marines of the Brigade were -among the first American troops to be issued the new 3.5″ rocket -launcher.</p> - -<h3><i>Brigade Leadership</i></h3> - -<p>It appeared to be a scene of mad confusion at Pendleton as Marines -arrived hourly by train, bus, and plane. But the situation was kept well -in hand by General Craig, who had seen many other departures for -battle during his 33 years in the Corps. Born in Connecticut and educated -at the St. Johns Military Academy, Delafield, Wis., he was commissioned -a Marine second lieutenant in 1917 at the age of 21. Throughout the -next 3 decades he served with distinction both as a line and staff officer, -and both as student and instructor at the Marine Corps Schools.</p> - -<p>During World War II he was executive and later commanding officer -of the 9th Marine Regiment, which he led in the landing at Empress -Augusta Bay on Bougainville and the recapture of Guam in the -Marianas. Awarded the Bronze Star and Navy Cross for gallantry in -these operations, Craig became operations officer of the V Amphibious -Corps in time to help plan the Iwo Jima operation. After the war he returned -to Guam for 2 years in 1947 to command the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, before becoming ADC to Major -General Graves B. Erskine, CG 1st Marine Division, in 1949.</p> - -<p>The white hair and slender, erect figure of the dynamic Brigade commander -would soon become a familiar sight to every platoon leader at -the front. His assistant, General Cushman, was born in St. Louis, Mo. -in 1895 and attended the University of Washington. Enlisting in the -Marine Corps shortly after the outbreak of World War I, he completed -flight training and was designated a naval aviator. Subsequent tours of -aviation duty in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guam were varied with assignments -as instructor at Pensacola and administrative officer with BuAer -in Washington. Cushman was a wing commander in World War II and -was awarded a Bronze Star and Legion of Merit while serving in that -capacity and later as chief of staff to the CG of Marine Aircraft Wings, -Pacific. After the war he became commander of the Marine Corps Air -Bases and CG of Aircraft, FMFPac.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray, CO of the 5th Marines, was born in Los -Angeles in 1913. He graduated from Texas A. and M. College in 1935<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span> -and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant. After prewar service -in China and Iceland, he became a troop leader in three of the hardest-fought -Marine operations of World War II—Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and -Saipan. Awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and the Purple Heart -medal, Murray made a name for heroism that was noteworthy even in -Marine circles.</p> - -<p>This was no light achievement, for both CMC and CG FMFPac—General -Cates and General Shepherd—had distinguished themselves as -Marine combat leaders. Both were wounded in Marine operations of -World War I, and both won later honors during Caribbean actions of the -Marine Corps.</p> - -<p>On 11 July, as Brigade preparations for sailing neared a climax, -General Shepherd sent the first report of his visit to Korea. He and -Colonel Krulak had held conferences with General MacArthur, Admiral -Joy and Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious -Planning Group 1. The commander in chief, said Shepherd, already envisioned -a great amphibious operation with a complete Marine division -and air components as his landing force. Not only was he “enthusiastic,” -about the employment of Marines, but he believed in the necessity for -employing them as an air-ground team.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> CG FMFPac memo for record, “Visit to Far East Command,” 11 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>MacArthur was “not sanguine” about the situation in Korea. He felt -that the nature of enemy resistance, combined with the rugged terrain -and the possibilities of Soviet or Red Chinese intervention, threatened -to protract operations. Thus he favored a Marine amphibious landing -far in the enemy’s rear to cut off and destroy the North Korean columns -of invasion.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>General Shepherd’s report made it seem likely, just before the Brigade -sailed, that its units would probably be absorbed soon into a Marine -division with an amphibious mission. For the present, however, it was -enough to start the movement from Pendleton and El Toro to San -Diego, where the convoy awaited. MAG-33 had orders to embark in the -transports <i>Anderson</i> and <i>Achernar</i> and the carrier (CVE-116) <i>Badoeng -Strait</i>. The ground forces would make the voyage in the LSD’s <i>Fort -Marion</i> and <i>Gunston Hall</i>, the AKA’s <i>Alshain</i> and <i>Whiteside</i>, and the -APA’s <i>Pickaway</i>, <i>Clymer</i> and <i>Henrico</i>.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> For the Brigade’s task organization in detail, with names of commanding officers and -strength of units, see <a href="#APPENDIX_B">Appendix B</a>.</p></div> - -<p>General Cates was on hand at the docks from 12 to 14 July when<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span> -the Brigade sailed. His long cigarette holders were famous, and no -second lieutenant in the Corps could throw a more military salute. As -he eyed the ground forces filing past, the Commandant could only have -felt that Marine traditions would be upheld. A good many of the PFC’s, -it is true, were too young to have seen action in World War II, though -nearly all had been well grounded in fundamentals. Perhaps at the front -they might become victims at first of their own over-anxiety. But they -would doubtless grin sheepishly about it afterwards and become combat-hardened -in a short time.</p> - -<p>A glance at the NCO’s, the platoon leaders and company commanders -of the Brigade could only have brought a gleam of pride to the Commandant’s -battlewise eye. With few exceptions, they were veterans of -World War II who could be relied upon to get the best out of their men. -And it may be that the Commandant was reminded of the remark attributed -to General William T. Sherman during the Civil War:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“We have good corporals and sergeants and some good lieutenants and captains, -and those are far more important than good generals.”<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Quoted in Lynn Montross, <cite>War Through the Ages</cite> (New York: Harper, 1946), 609.</p></div> - -<p>Nobody could give a more smooth and eloquent talk than General -Cates before a Washington audience. But when it came to saying -farewell to the Brigade troops, he addressed them in the language of -Marines.</p> - -<p>“You boys clean this up in a couple of months,” said the Commandant, -“or I’ll be over to see you!”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> Geer, <i>op. cit.</i>, 6.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_IV" class="vspace">CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">The Advance Party</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Conference With CINCFE—The Washington Scene—The Advance -Party in Japan—Voyage of the Brigade—The Advance Party in -Korea—Crisis of the Eighth Army</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">As the ships</span> of the Brigade vanished over the horizon, Generals Craig -and Cushman rushed to complete final administrative details at -their respective West Coast bases. Then, in the early morning of 16 -July, the advance party, consisting of the two commanders and parts -of their staffs, boarded a transport plane at the Marine Corps Air Station, -El Toro, and began the long journey westward.</p> - -<p>The first stop was Pearl Harbor, T. H., island “Pentagon” of America’s -vast defensive network in the Pacific. On arrival, Craig and Cushman -immediately reported to General Shepherd. In company with him, the -two visitors called briefly on Admiral Radford. Later, Shepherd, his staff, -and the advance party met at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters for a -conference on the problems incident to the Marine commitment in -combat.<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Jan 54 (Craig, 25 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>The Brigade commander painted a vivid picture of his provisional -fighting force, stressing both its potential and its handicaps. He repeatedly -emphasized the necessity for the addition of a third rifle company -to each infantry battalion. With equal fervor he spoke of the need -for two more 105-mm. howitzers in each battery of his artillery battalion. -He told how the Brigade had been forced to leave behind much of its -motor transport because of limited shipping space, and he requested that -replacement vehicles be provided as soon as possible.</p> - -<p>His presentation was not falling on deaf ears; for combat-wise officers -knew only too well how such shortages would restrict the maneuverability, -firepower, and mobility of the Brigade. Finally, Craig repeated his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span> -earlier request that steps be taken immediately to provide for monthly -replacement drafts of 800 men. If the peace-strength Marine unit were -committed to combat in the near future, he said, it could ill afford to -watch its already thin ranks dwindle indefinitely.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> Col J. L. Stewart interv with authors, 15 Jan 54 (Stewart, 15 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>Leaving behind a maze of support and reinforcement problems for -FMFPac Headquarters, the Brigade advance party boarded its plane and -set out for Japan. On 19 July the big aircraft discharged its passengers -at the Haneda Airport, near Tokyo. General Craig immediately reported -to his naval superior, Admiral Joy. Later the Brigade commander, General -Cushman, and the other officers of the advance party, assembled at -General Headquarters, Far East, where they would get their first glimpse -of the war through the eyes of the United States Army.</p> - -<p>They conferred first with Major General Edward A. Almond, USA, -and Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, USA. The former was Chief of -Staff to General MacArthur, while the latter served as G-3 on the staff. -After Almond and Wright had received a report on the organization -and capabilities of the Brigade air-ground team, they ushered the two -Marine generals into the office of MacArthur.<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Col K. H. Weir ltr to CMC, 16 Apr 54 (Weir, 16 Apr 54).</p></div> - -<h3><i>Conference With CINCFE</i></h3> - -<p>The commander in chief greeted his visitors cordially and expressed his -pleasure at having Marines in his command again. He commented briefly -on the excellence of the 1st Marine Division and certain Marine air -units which had served under him during World War II. The general -smiled as he mentioned a rumor to the effect that he had been prejudiced -against Marines during the Pacific War. Sweeping aside this tale as being -unfounded, he said that he had always held the greatest admiration for -the Corps and would welcome its units to his command any time.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Following this reception, MacArthur meticulously briefed Craig and -Cushman on the critical situation in Korea, where the war was already -entering its fourth week. The commander in chief disclosed his tentative -plans for commitment of the Marines: he would hold the Brigade -in Japan as a force in readiness until an entire Marine division could be -assembled. If he could have this division by September, he intended to -launch an amphibious assault against the port of Inchon on the west<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span> -coast. Striking deep in the Communist rear, he would sever the long -lines of communications linking North Korean bases to the Communist -invaders at the front. Thus isolated, the latter would quickly wither, and -Walker’s Eighth Army could smash out of the Pusan Perimeter.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<p>When MacArthur concluded, he and Craig discussed the organization -of the Brigade. The Marine general emphasized that his command was -an air-ground team; and though few in numbers, the Brigade had a -powerful potential if its air arm remained integral. MacArthur assured -him that the Marine combination would remain intact, unless some -emergency dictated otherwise.</p> - -<p>Craig next mentioned that the infantry and artillery units of the -Brigade were at peace strength. MacArthur was surprised to learn that -each battalion had just 2 rifle companies, and each battery only 4 guns -instead of 6. He was even more surprised to find that each of the 6 infantry -companies had 50 men less than the number called for in Marine -war tables. The Army leader had been aware of certain shortages when -he sent a message to the Pentagon on 10 July, requesting the Joint -Chiefs of Staff to authorize expansion of the Brigade to a full war-strength -division.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> He believed at the time, however, that the Brigade -itself would be formed on a wartime basis. Now, confronted with reality, -he ordered his chief of staff to prepare another dispatch to the Joint -Chiefs, asking that the Brigade be expanded to full war strength and -reiterating his request for an entire division.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> CINCFE disp to JCS, 10 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> CINCFE disp to JCS, 19 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>MacArthur concluded the conference by informing Craig that the -Marine fighting team would remain in Japan under operational control -of Joy’s headquarters. This was good news to the Brigade commander. -Being attached to the Naval command meant that his Marines would be -free to train and otherwise prepare for their future amphibious mission; -whereas an assignment to the Eighth Army’s rear echelon might have -entailed time-consuming occupational and administrative duties.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> Brig SAR, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>The Washington Scene</i></h3> - -<p>Although the solution to Marine Corps problems had seemed simple -enough in MacArthur’s office, it was quite another story on the other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> -side of the world in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had rendered -no decision on the general’s 10 July request for a Marine division. Nevertheless, -General Cates ordered his staff to draw up detailed plans for -expansion so that immediate action could be taken if authorization were -forthcoming. As a result, Plans Able and Baker were prepared, the one -designed to augment the Brigade to war strength, the other to explore -the requirements for creating a full division. To cover these possibilities -together with the Corps’ other irrevocable commitments throughout -the world, Marine planners were drawn more and more toward a single -basic conclusion—if President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff -granted MacArthur’s request, the Marine Corps Reserve would have to -be mobilized at once.</p> - -<p>When the Joint Chiefs received the message which MacArthur had -dictated in General Craig’s presence, they requested an estimate from -the Marine Corps on how long it would take to form a war-strength -division. General Cates summed up his case: the Marine Corps, numbering -only 74,279 officers and men,<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> was committed on a global basis. -There was a brigade on its way to Korea, a peace-strength division on -the Atlantic Coast,<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> and a battalion landing team permanently assigned -to the Mediterranean Fleet. There were detachments of Marines assigned -for domestic security, shipboard duty, and overseas security. Moreover, -in order to carry out any expansion program on a sound basis, it would -be necessary to maintain cadres of experienced personnel in various -training centers. The Commandant’s presentation made it clear that any -immediate expansion would, as proved by simple arithmetic, be -dependent upon mobilization of the Reserve.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> Figure as of 30 Jun 1950.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> The 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N. C.</p></div> - -<p>Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President -Truman that the Organized Marine Corps Reserve be called to active -duty. That same morning, 19 July, Admiral Sherman notified General -Cates of this decision. The Commandant lost no time at ordering his -staff to alert all Reserve units. His grounds for haste were well founded; -for in the afternoon a presidential proclamation announced that the -“citizen-Marines” would be mobilized. The following day Cates called -CNO and submitted Plans Able and Baker, the proposed procedures for -building both the Brigade and 1st Marine Division to war strength.</p> - -<p>In the meantime JCS had notified MacArthur that his request could -not be granted until late fall “without unacceptable weakening [of] the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> -Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.”<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> When the U. N. commander received -this message, he countered immediately with the reply:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“... Most urgently request reconsideration of decision with reference to First -Marine Division. It is an absolutely vital development to accomplish a decisive -stroke and if not made available will necessitate a much more costly and longer -operational effort both in blood and expense.</p> - -<p>“It is essential the Marine Division arrive by 10 September 1950 as requested. -While it would be unwise for me to attempt in this message to give in detail the -planned use of this unit I cannot emphasize too strongly my belief of the complete -urgency of my request. There can be no demand for its potential use elsewhere that -can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a></p> - -<p class="sigright"> -“Signed MacArthur” -</p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> JCS disp to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> CINCFE disp to JCS, 21 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>On 22 July the gears of mobilization were already enmeshed. Taking -this into account along with the urgency of MacArthur’s last communication, -the Joint Chiefs showed the first signs of relenting in their reply -to Tokyo. This time they informed the Army general that they were -reconsidering his problem, but added that he must advise them of the -proposed employment of the Brigade up to 10 September and the possibility -of adjusting that deadline. The same message carried the encouraging -news that a directive had already been issued to bring both the -Brigade and its air group to full war strength.<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="fnanchor">87</a> JCS msg 86778 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>In answer, MacArthur stated his intention to retain the Brigade in -Japan, unless a more critical situation developed in Korea prior to 10 -September. He described his operation planned for mid-September as an -amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy’s lines. This seaborne -attack, he added, would be designed to envelop and destroy the Communist -invader in conjunction with an offensive from the south by the -Eighth Army. The General concluded his message on notes of conditional -optimism and grave warning:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Although exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during -month of August, I am convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front -will sever his main lines of communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and -crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. -The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive -campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th parallel.”<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> CINCFE msg C-58473 to JCS, 23 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>On 25 July these exchanges came to a climax when the Pentagon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> -directed the Marine Corps to build its 1st Division to full war strength.</p> - -<p>At this point the change of heart among the joint Chiefs of Staff is -pertinent because of its direct effects on the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. -As previously noted, the Pentagon on 22 July approved the Marine -Corps’ plan Able which provided for the expansion of the Brigade to -war strength. General Cates immediately set machinery in motion to -bolster the ranks of that unit. With the approval of Admiral Sherman, -he cut into the rosters of Marine security detachments throughout the -United States and arranged for the personnel thus released to be channelled -to Craig’s command. It was also possible now to implement an -earlier plan relating to casualty replacements for the Brigade. As far back -as 14 July, the Commandant had ordered activation of the First Replacement -Draft, fixing its departure for Korea at 10 August.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> Thus Craig -could be assured of early reinforcement by more than 800 officers and -men if the course of the war necessitated a premature commitment of his -Brigade.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> CMC disp to FMFPac, 22 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<h3><i>The Advance Party in Japan</i></h3> - -<p>Generals Craig and Cushman were meanwhile assigned a large office in -General Headquarters, Tokyo. There they cleared away much administrative -detail which accumulates in the path of every military operation.</p> - -<p>On 20 July the two commanders called on General Stratemeyer. -Marine Air was the focal point of discussion as they again explained the -organization of their fighting team. When they informed Stratemeyer of -MacArthur’s decision to keep the Brigade intact, the air officer gave them -further assurance that MAG-33 would always be available to support -the Marine ground force.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Originally, the Army planned to base the Marine ground elements at -Sasebo, Japan, and the air group 400 miles away at Itami Field, near -Kobe. Craig and Cushman realized that the resulting large gap would -give rise to problems in liaison, training, and supply. Hoping to change -such an undesirable arrangement, the Brigade staff carefully studied the -layout of available land and facilities. Armed with the results of this -research, Craig proposed to General Headquarters that all Marines be -based in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area. After he outlined the advantages -of keeping the Brigade and its supporting aviation close together,<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_61">61</a><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -Wright responded encouragingly to the recommendation.<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div id="ip_61" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_061.jpg" width="2081" height="1364" alt="(Japan and Korea)" /> - </div> - -<p>Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered, the -advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed reconnaissance -of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While Craig inspected -the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the air base facilities -and established his headquarters according to the initial plan. The Marine -officers then returned to Tokyo 2 days later to push the request for -getting both air and ground forces located in the same area. To support -his proposal, Craig submitted a complete “floor plan” not only for the -Brigade but also for the entire 1st Marine Division. MacArthur’s staff -promptly approved.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 15 Apr 54 (Craig, 15 Apr 54); Weir, 16 Apr -54; and Brig SAR, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>On the 25th the advance party again set out for Itami, this time to -prepare for the arrival of the Brigade. Their plane was a scant 20 minutes -out of Tokyo when an urgent message from General Headquarters -directed their return to that city at once. The big aircraft roared back to -the field, and a few minutes later the Marines were driving through the -Japanese capital.</p> - -<p>At headquarters, Wright summed up the most recent reports from the -front. The American forward wall was crumbling under continuous -hammering. A wide envelopment had just netted the whole southwestern -tip of the peninsula for the Communists, who were now pressing -in on Pusan from the west as well as north. Lacking sufficient troops -to defend its broad frontage, the Eighth Army was falling back. If the -Red tide continued unabated, there was imminent danger of losing -Pusan, the one remaining major port in American hands. Should this -coastal city fall, South Korea would be lost.</p> - -<p>Wright told Craig that all available troops had to be thrown into the -line to meet this threat. Therefore, General MacArthur had diverted the -seaborne Brigade from Japan to Korea, where it would join General -Walker’s beleaguered forces.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54; and Brig SAR, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>Obviously, the Marines were not far from a fight.</p> - -<h3><i>Voyage of the Brigade</i></h3> - -<p>At sea the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was unaware of the decisions -and difficulties developing on higher levels. Nevertheless, that tactical<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> -organization was having enough trouble of its own. On 12 July, Company -A, 1st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Amphibious Tractor Company -departed San Diego on board the LSD’s <i>Fort Marion</i> and <i>Gunston Hall</i>. -Designated Task Unit 53.7.3, the twin amphibious ships sailed 2 days -before the rest of the Brigade and were scheduled to join the main convoy, -Task Group 53.7, before crossing 160° east longitude.<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> Brig SAR, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>At noon on 13 July, the well deck of the <i>Fort Marion</i> accidentally -flooded, the water rising to a height of 5 feet among the Brigade’s M-26 -tanks. An hour passed before the ship’s pumps could drain the compartment, -and briny water damaged 14 of the new armored vehicles, 300 -90-mm. projectiles (then in critical supply), and 5,000 rounds of -.30-caliber ammunition.</p> - -<p>When news of the flood damage reached Brigade headquarters, then -still at San Diego, the message was rushed to Craig. He immediately -sent a dispatch to Captain English, authorizing him to jettison the -ruined ammunition. He added that replacement armor would be requisitioned -from the Barstow depot without delay. Craig then contacted the -supply base and was promised that 14 M-26’s would be commissioned -and on their way to San Diego within 24 hours. The Brigade commander -was preparing to request additional shipping for the vehicles -when messages from the <i>Fort Marion</i> reported that 12 tanks could be -restored to operating condition at sea. The remaining two would require -new parts and 72 hours of repair work upon debarkation.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Craig, 15 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>As already noted, the Marines were placing heavy reliance on their -armor, confident that it was a match for the enemy’s Russian-built T-34 -tank in Korea. Consequently, Craig’s staff reacted to the flood reports -with concern. Headquarters FMFPac was asked to include four M-26’s -in its first resupply shipment to the Brigade; arrangements were made -for new parts to be flown to the port of debarkation, and ammunition to -replace that damaged in the flood was loaded on board the larger convoy.</p> - -<p>Misfortune struck again a few hours after Task Group 53.7 steamed -from San Diego on 14 July. The transport <i>Henrico</i> developed a serious -mechanical failure and was declared temporarily unseaworthy. This ship -was carrying Lieutenant Colonel Murray, his regimental staff, and the -entire 1st Battalion Landing Team.<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> After Murray and his headquarters -transferred to the APA <i>Pickaway</i> off San Clemente island, the <i>Henrico</i> -limped back toward California with about one-third of the Brigade’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span> -fighting force. The vessel docked at the United States Naval Supply -Depot, Oakland, on the 16th. Repairs were started in urgent haste, since -there was no other ship available. For security reasons, the Marines were -forbidden to leave ship except for training on the dock. On the nights of -the 16th and 17th, they sat on deck and gazed longingly at the beckoning -lights of San Francisco. Twice during this time the <i>Henrico</i> weighed -anchor and passed westward under the Golden Gate bridge; twice it was -forced to return for additional repairs. Finally, on the evening of the -18th, the vessel steamed under the great bridge for its third attempt. -This time it kept going, but it would not overtake the convoy until the -morning of the very day the ships reached their destination.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> 1st Bn, 5th Marines, with supporting units.</p></div> - -<p>During the voyage, strict wartime security measures, including radio -silence, were enforced on all ships. While the North Koreans were -believed to have no warships left afloat, their naval capabilities remained -hidden from the outside world by a blur of question marks. No one -realized more than the commander of Task Group 53.7<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> that it was -much too early to take Soviet Russia for granted.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> Capt L. D. Sharp, Jr., USN.</p></div> - -<p>The <i>Henrico</i>, now travelling independently, had a spine-chilling -experience during her second night out of Oakland. The ship’s radar -picked up two “unidentified submarines” which appeared to be converging -on the stern of the lone vessel. General Quarters was sounded. While -sailors peered into the darkness from their battle stations, several hundred -Marines joked weakly in the troop compartments below the waterline. -After an anxious hour, the persistent spots on the electronic screen -vanished.</p> - -<p>Shipboard life for the Brigade was otherwise uneventful. The troops -took part in physical drills as vigorously as the limited confines of vessels -would allow. Daily classes and conferences emphasized those subjects -most relevant to the news reports trickling back from the front. Success -of North Korean armor stimulated keen interest in land mines and the -new rocket launchers. Press commentaries on the battleground’s primitive -environment made even field sanitation a serious matter. Since there -was no military intelligence available on the North Korean forces, officers -and NCO’s turned to publications on Russian tactics and weapons.</p> - -<p>As previously noted, Sasebo, Japan, was the original destination of the -ships transporting the Brigade’s ground elements. The <i>Achernar</i>, <i>Anderson</i>, -and <i>Badoeng Strait</i> were bound for Kobe with MAG-33. When -Craig’s proposal for consolidation was approved by General Headquarters,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span> -the entire convoy was ordered to Kobe. Then, on 25 July, Colonel -Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff, received the dispatch sending the -ground force directly to Pusan.</p> - -<p>This announcement came as no surprise to the majority of officers and -men. Day by day, news reports had been outlining the course of the war. -The shrinking perimeter of Walker’s army was traced on maps and -sketches throughout every ship. After the Communist “end run” in -southwest Korea, Marines began to wonder if there would be any front -at all by the time they arrived. In the captain’s mess of the <i>Pickaway</i>, -senior Marine and naval officers were giving odds that the Brigade would -reach the South Korean port only in time to cover a general evacuation -of the peninsula.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> Col R. L. Murray interv with author, 15 Feb 54 (Murray, 15 Feb 54).</p></div> - -<h3><i>The Advance Party in Korea</i></h3> - -<p>With the Brigade well beyond the halfway point in its Pacific voyage, -Craig and his staff could not afford to waste a minute. At 1700 on 25 -July they left Tokyo by plane for Korea. En route they landed at Itami, -where the Brigade commander and Cushman made hurried adjustments -to meet the new situation.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Leaving Itami on the 26th, they flew to Fukuoka, Japan. There they -transferred from their 4-engine Marine aircraft to a smaller Air Force -plane which could be accommodated on the primitive landing fields of -Korea. On the last lap of their journey, they reached Taegu at 1400.</p> - -<p>Taegu was a dismal place during this crucial phase of the UN delaying -action. Hastily chosen as a headquarters by General Walker, the -ancient town gave the appearance of a remote outpost. Its airstrip was -crude. The fewness of the airmen and soldiers among the handful of -transport and fighter planes served only to emphasize the critical situation -of the UN forces.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>General Craig reported to General Walker immediately, while the -Brigade G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, met with his Eighth -Army opposite, Colonel William E. Bartlett. Later, Walker’s chief of -staff, Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, assembled all the Marine officers for -an official briefing. He explained that the Brigade had not been earmarked -for any specific mission. The battle situation was too fluid for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span> -firm plans. Information from the field was sketchy and unreliable, as -outnumbered Army forces slowly retreated. From the time of first contact -by American units, the front had been more of a blur than a distinct -line. Landrum concluded by saying that the Brigade must be prepared to -move anywhere after debarkation—and on a moment’s notice.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">101</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>After he and his officers had been assigned rooms in a temporary barracks, -Craig requested permission to reconnoiter the combat zone.<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> -Walker assented, providing his own plane and pilot for the trip. Accompanied -by Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, his G-4, -Craig flew first to Pusan, where he checked harbor facilities, roads, and -railways. There he conferred with Brigadier General Crump Garvin, -USA, to initiate preparations for the Brigade’s arrival.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">103</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> The <em>combat zone</em> comprises that part of the theater of operations required for the conduct -of war by field forces. In this case it included all of Korea remaining in UN hands.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Leaving Pusan, the Marine officers flew over Chinhae, which they discovered -to be a suitable base, if necessary, for VMO-6 and the Brigade’s -air support control unit. Cruising westward, they passed over Masan, -then continued toward Chinju. From the latter vicinity, the enemy’s -envelopment was then threatening the western approaches to Pusan. -Veering northward, the reconnaissance party paralleled the Naktong -River. The pilot, who was familiar with the ground, briefed his passengers -along the way. By the time the plane returned to Taegu, the Marines -had a broad picture of the critical areas most likely to become -Brigade battlefields.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">104</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days. Attending -daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a sound -knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major General -Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> the Marines were -brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its policy for -supporting UN ground forces.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">106</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> Hq 5th AF was also located at Taegu.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> Craig, 15 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently withdrawn -and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from the -battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than fact for -the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth Army -staff officers.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">107</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>In the Taejon area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers and -men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61 were -known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> Among the -missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental -commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion -commander.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">109</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> 24th InfDiv Periodic Personnel Rpt No. 2, 15–22 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently -arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th -Division in the Kumchon area. ROK divisions held to the north -and east, where NKPA forces were driving toward Pohang-dong.</p> - -<p>The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when -two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the -open UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled -eastward for a drive on Pusan.</p> - -<p>General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th -Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from -Kumchon to block the enemy near Hadong. With the recently landed -29th Infantry attached, the division totalled only 13,351 officers and -men.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">110</a> Its front extended from the southern coast near Hadong to the -town of Kochang, 40 miles north.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> In addition to manning this mountainous -line, the 24th had troops in action at Pohang-dong, more than -100 miles away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task -Force Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">112</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="fnanchor">110</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 3, 29 Jul 50. Actually, as the report itself states, this figure is a meaningless -statistic, and exceeds the <em>real</em> total by several hundred. It was the practice not to subtract -missing-in-action casualties until 30 days after losses were reported. Also, casualty -reports from far-flung subordinate units were received irregularly, and some of these -undoubtedly were not available when this tally was made.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="fnanchor">112</a> Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed -when they found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. -Although they sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were -compelled to give up Hadong and fall back toward Chinju.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">113</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="fnanchor">113</a> 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander -shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to -Pusan, he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong -near Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> -front in 48 hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across -the Naktong in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges.</p> - -<p>After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined -the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions east -of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast -approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy -move toward Chinju.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">114</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="fnanchor">114</a> Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about -prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground -team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry had -been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju area, -and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore, to -remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the -indivisible air-ground team.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">115</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="fnanchor">115</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>MAG-33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare -them for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set -up co-ordinated tactical air support.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">116</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="fnanchor">116</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Craig, 15 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Crisis of Eighth Army</i></h3> - -<p>As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and southwestern -fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew apparent that -the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even more, so that -defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas. Landrum indicated -for the first time that the Brigade was being considered primarily for a -mission on the left flank.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">117</a> Guided by this possibility, Craig and his staff -officers devoted a day to drawing up a flexible operation plan. The purpose -of this directive was to advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders -of possible commitment in the Chinju, Kochang, or Kumchon -areas, in that order of probability. Also included were detailed instructions -for movement to forward assembly areas, broad missions for supporting -units, security measures to be taken, and a general outline of the -situation ashore.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">118</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="fnanchor">117</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="fnanchor">118</a> Brig Op Plan No. 3-50, 31 Jul 50; Craig, 25 Jan 54. The “Kochan” and “Kumwan” -referred to in the operations plan are actually Kochang and Kumchon. The odd assortment -of maps available in the early days of the war offered a variety of spelling along with -far more serious inaccuracies.</p></div> - -<div id="ip_69" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_069.jpg" width="1361" height="2096" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>8th ARMY SITUATION</p> - <p class="smaller">LATE JULY 1950</p></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> -The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning -order suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to -Eighth Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to -the Brigade at sea.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">119</a> Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray -would have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">120</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="fnanchor">119</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="fnanchor">120</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN -left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and -Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to -Pusan. Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed -in the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up -elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually -must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">121</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="fnanchor">121</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54 and 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander -immediately sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine -air group be made available to support the ground force by 2 -August, and that VMO-6 be transported to Korea as quickly as possible.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">122</a> -Time was drawing short.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="fnanchor">122</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals -Walker and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader -that the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once -committed, would be free to push forward without interference from -Eighth Army.<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">123</a> Partridge interjected that his planes would be available -to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive in time.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">124</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="fnanchor">123</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="fnanchor">124</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Immediately after the conference, the Marine officers set out for Pusan -by jeep. While their vehicles bounced southward on the ancient road, -army headquarters in Taegu was sinking to new depths of dejection. -Chinju had just fallen, and the Red column was pounding on toward -Masan.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">125</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="fnanchor">125</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div id="photos1" class="newpage"> -<div id="ip_71" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_071.jpg" width="1692" height="2280" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Commandant Says Farewell—General Clifton B. Cates visits San Diego for -embarkation of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span></p> - -<div id="ip_72" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_072.jpg" width="2513" height="1445" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>All Aboard—Marines of the Brigade waiting to embark at San Diego for the Far East (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span></p> - -<div id="ip_73" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_073.jpg" width="2521" height="1429" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Mountains of Supplies—Hundreds of tons of equipment ready for loading aboard ships taking Marines to the Far East -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span></p> - -<div id="ip_74" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_074.jpg" width="2563" height="1380" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Arrival at Pusan—Marines catch their first glimpse of Korea as the U. S. S. </i>Pickaway<i> docks (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span></p> - -<div id="ip_75" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_075.jpg" width="2468" height="1478" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Movement to the Front—Brigade troops preparing to entrain at Pusan for the Changwon bivouac area (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span></p> - -<div id="ip_76" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_076.jpg" width="1667" height="2201" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Visit to the Front—Above, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur with -Ambassador John J. Muccio and Major General Edward M. Almond, Chief -of Staff, GHQ, FEC; and, below, with Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, -commanding the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (U. S. Army Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span></p> - -<div id="ip_77" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_077.jpg" width="1683" height="2245" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Marine Air Strikes First—Above, the U. S. S. </i>Badoeng Strait<i> (CVE 116) -nearing Japan with Corsairs on deck; and, below, an F4U armed with eight -rockets and a 500-lb. bomb takes off from the U. S. S. </i>Sicily<i> (CVE 118) (U. S. -Navy Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span></p> - -<div id="ip_78" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_078.jpg" width="1667" height="2242" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Korea the Vertical—Marines of the Brigade literally climb into battle during -their first fights in the Chindong-ni area (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span></p> - -<div id="ip_79" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_079.jpg" width="1684" height="2145" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Marines in Action—Above, Brigade infantry and M-26 tank, advancing under -fire, pass body of dead United States soldier on left; and, below, ambushed -Marines are pinned down temporarily by enemy machinegun fire at Naktong -Bulge (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span></p> - -<div id="ip_80" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_080.jpg" width="2559" height="1425" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>At the Brigade CP—Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, Brigade G-3 and Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, with -Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Brigade chief-of-staff, in background (Life Magazine Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span></p> - -<div id="ip_81" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_081.jpg" width="2505" height="1410" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Combat Leaders of 5th Marines—Front row, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, regimental commander, and -Lieutenant Colonel L. C. Hays, Jr., Executive Officer; rear, Lieutenant Colonel H. R. Roise, CO 2d Battalion. Lieutenant -Colonel G. R. Newton, CO 1st Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Taplett, CO 3d Battalion (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span></p> - -<div id="ip_82" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_082.jpg" width="1661" height="2288" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Marine Air in Action—Above, rocket-laden planes of VMF-214 warming up -on the flight deck of the </i>Sicily<i>; and, below, a Corsair takes off for the front in -Korea (U. S. Navy Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span></p> - -<div id="ip_83" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_083.jpg" width="1667" height="2156" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Marine Mortar Crew—Supporting the infantry advance with 81-mm. shells -are, left to right, Private First Class Jesse W. Haney, Jr., Bakersfield, Calif.; -Private First Class Bennie M. John, Ardmore, Okla.; Private First Class -Richard A. Robey, Houston, Tex.; and an unidentified Marine in background -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span></p> - -<div id="ip_84" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_084.jpg" width="1613" height="2257" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Introducing the Enemy—No prisoner of war appears at his best, but Marine -veterans of the Brigade can attest that some of the tough well-trained NKPA -soldiers put up a good fight in Pusan Perimeter operations (Marine Corps -Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span></p> - -<div id="ip_85" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_085.jpg" width="1659" height="2244" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Crest of the Ridge—Two Marine PFC’s, Harold R. Bates (left) of Los Angeles, -and Richard N. Martin, of Elk River, Minn., take a break after fighting their -way to the top of a ridge in the Naktong Bulge (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span></p> - -<div id="ip_86" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_086.jpg" width="1621" height="2244" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>The Flying Windmills—Above, Generals Craig (left) and Cushman waiting -for the pilot to take them aloft in an HO3S-1 helicopter; and, below, a VMO-6 -helicopter lands near the artillery positions of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_V" class="vspace">CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Prelude to Battle</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Reconnaissance by Jeep—Brigade Air Lands—Landing of Ground -Force—Bedlam on Pusan Water Front—The Brigade at Changwon—The -Pusan Perimeter—Brigade Air Strikes First—Planning -the Sachon-Chinju Offensive</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">After the advance</span> party reached Pusan, General Craig established a -temporary command post in the headquarters building of General -Garvin’s Base Command. Then the Marine officers plunged into the final -phase of planning and preparation for the Brigade, although they were -still handicapped by the undisclosed secret of the convoy’s arrival date. -Staff gears were meshing smoothly by this time, with solutions being -ground out for one problem after another.</p> - -<p>On the night of 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and other staff -officers were discussing whether MAG-33 would be able to get its planes -airborne in time to support the Brigade in its initial combat. Acting on -a hunch, Stewart picked up a telephone in the slim hope of placing a call -through to Japan. The long shot paid off. After some wrangling by -startled operators, he managed to contact Itami Air Force Base and talk -to Colonel Kenneth H. Weir, Cushman’s chief of staff.</p> - -<p>Stewart briefed the Marine aviator on the latest developments, emphasizing -that the Brigade would undoubtedly get into the fight soon after -arrival. He asked Weir to send the Air Support Section and helicopters -to Korea by LST as quickly as possible after unloading in Japan.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">126</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="fnanchor">126</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Craig received a radio message that same night from FMFPac, informing -him that the replacements for the Brigade would not be sent directly -to Pusan, as requested. They were to be assembled at Camp Pendleton -for travel with the 1st Marine Division, and this meant a delay which -could be critical. Craig immediately insisted that the reinforcements be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span> -sent to Pusan to replace Brigade battle losses and form the third rifle -companies.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">127</a> The Marine leader’s determination in this instance proved -to be a blessing a few weeks later.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="fnanchor">127</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Reconnaissance by Jeep</i></h3> - -<p>On the morning of 31 July, Craig and Stewart set out by jeep to reconnoiter -the rear areas of the crumbling southwestern sector. Kean’s 25th -Division, having just replaced the 24th in line, was now blocking the -threatened western approaches to Pusan. Since all indications pointed to -the Brigade’s commitment in this area, Craig wanted to walk and ride -over the terrain he had previously scouted from the air.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">128</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="fnanchor">128</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>He returned to Pusan just in time to receive a telephone call from -Colonel Landrum of Eighth Army Headquarters. The chief of staff told -him of General Walker’s intention to attach the Army’s 5th Regimental -Combat Team, newly arrived from Hawaii, to the 1st Provisional Marine -Brigade. With two regiments under his command, Craig would be -assigned a vital area of responsibility along the Nam River, near its confluence -with the Naktong north of Masan.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">129</a> Unfortunately, the Brigade -reached Korea 1 day too late. When the 5th RCT debarked at Pusan on -1 August, it was earmarked for the 25th Division and placed in Eighth -Army reserve.<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">130</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="fnanchor">129</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="fnanchor">130</a> MCBS, II-A-7.</p></div> - -<p>Also debarking on the 1st was the Army’s skeletonized 2d Division. -This unit cleared Pusan and hurried to the hard-pressed Taegu area where -it also passed into Eighth Army reserve.<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">131</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="fnanchor">131</a> Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 3 Jul 50.</p></div> - -<p>During the last hours before the Brigade’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel -Chidester was diligently engaged in the task—or art—of procurement. -It has already been explained why the Marine ground force would debark -for combat with little more than what its troops could carry on -their backs. In order to offset partially the deficiencies, the G-4 successfully -negotiated with Army authorities for 50 cargo trucks, several jeeps, -some radio vans, and various other items of equipment. Officers of the -Pusan Base Command reacted to all of Chidester’s requests with as much -generosity as their meager stocks of materiel would allow.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">132</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="fnanchor">132</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Not until the morning of 2 August did General Craig learn that Task -Group 53.7 was scheduled to dock at Pusan that very evening. The last-minute -disclosure relieved him of considerable anxiety, but he was still -disturbed for want of specific orders concerning departure of the Brigade -from Pusan. His instructions from General Walker were to debark the -ground force immediately and have it prepared to move forward by 0600 -the following morning. The same orders advised him that a specific -destination “would be given later.”<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">133</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="fnanchor">133</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>“Later” did not come soon enough for the Marine commander. As the -long column of ships steamed into Pusan Harbor in the early evening, -he still did not know where he would lead his Brigade the next morning.<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">134</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="fnanchor">134</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>Brigade Air Lands</i></h3> - -<p>When Task Group 53.7 entered Far Eastern waters, the ships transporting -the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing veered toward -Japan, while the others continued to Korea. The Brigade’s air arm -arrived at Kobe late in the afternoon of 31 July.</p> - -<p>Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading -was in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control -Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6. By -the next morning it was steaming toward Pusan, carrying the vital link -in General Craig’s air-ground team. Cushman and Weir were making -good their promises.<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">135</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="fnanchor">135</a> Annexes Charlie and Fox to MAG-33 SAR, 5 Jul-6 Sep 50.</p></div> - -<p>Since harbor facilities at Kobe were unsuitable for offloading aircraft, -the <i>Badoeng Strait</i> stood out to sea on 1 August and catapulted 44 of its -Marine fighter planes into the air. The aircraft sped to the field at Itami, -where they were quickly checked by pilots and crews for their imminent -role in combat. On the following day, the other 26 fighters left the carrier -and joined the first group ashore for maintenance and testing.<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">136</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="fnanchor">136</a> Annex Charlie, <i>ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>To achieve maximum mobility and striking power, Marine and Navy -commanders agreed to base VMF’s 214 and 323 aboard aircraft carriers -for initial operations over Korea. After only 1 day of refresher flights at -Itami, the pilots of VMF-214 landed their planes aboard the U. S. S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span> -<i>Sicily</i>. Two days later, on 5 August, Major Arnold Lund led his VMF-323 -back to the <i>Badoeng Strait</i>.<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">137</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="fnanchor">137</a> VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50.</p></div> - -<p>The squadron of night fighters, VMF(N)-513, was land-based. Having -been assigned to the Fifth Air Force, it would be controlled by the -Itazuke field for night heckler missions over Korea. This unit had time -for only a few night training flights before being committed to combat.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">138</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="fnanchor">138</a> Annex Charlie, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div> - -<p>Kobe’s waterfront was the scene of feverish activity around the clock. -The light observation planes and helicopters of VMO-6 were unloaded, -assembled, and—to the amazement of local Japanese—flown from the -very streets of the city to the base at Itami. There they were hurriedly -checked by mechanics and prepared for the short ferry flight to Korea.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">139</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="fnanchor">139</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Headquarters and Service Squadrons of MAG-33 were left with the -task of unloading supplies and equipment from the <i>Achernar</i> and <i>Anderson</i>. -Since the three fighter squadrons were farmed out to the carriers -and Air Force, Group headquarters turned its attention to administrative -and maintenance matters. For the next month it would be hard-pressed -to keep the carrier squadrons supplied with spare parts while providing -replacement aircraft for the seaborne units, handling a variety of airlift -requests with its lone transport plane, and making arrangements for the -support of VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">140</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="fnanchor">140</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>Landing of Ground Force</i></h3> - -<p>The hapless <i>Henrico</i> finally overtook Task Group 53.7 in the Tsushima -Straits on the morning of 2 August. A few hours later the Marines of the -Brigade got their first glimpse of Korea’s skyline. Seen from a distance, -the wall of forbidding, gray peaks was hardly a welcome sight to men -who had been broiled and toughened on the heights of Camp Pendleton.</p> - -<p>For reasons unknown, neither Colonel Snedeker nor anyone else had -received the operations plan which Craig had sent via Eighth Army at -Taegu. Although every Marine in the convoy realized the gravity of the -situation ashore, there could be no specific preparations by troop leaders -whose only source of information was an occasional news broadcast.</p> - -<p>Having heard nothing from his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Murray -was thinking in terms of a purely administrative landing. Had he known<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span> -what awaited his 5th Marines ashore, he would have had his troops -draw ammunition and rations while still at sea. Throughout the sleepless -night that followed, he had ample time to reflect sourly on the fortunes -of war.<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">141</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="fnanchor">141</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>Shortly after 1700 on 2 August, the first ship steamed into Pusan Harbor. -As it edged toward the dock, Leathernecks crowding the rail were -greeted by a tinny and slightly tone-deaf rendition of the Marine Corps -Hymn, blared by a South Korean band. Army troops scattered along the -waterfront exchanged the usual barbed courtesies with their webfooted -brethren aboard ship, and old salts smiled while noting that tradition remained -intact.</p> - -<p>When the <i>Clymer</i> approached its berth, Craig waved a greeting to -Snedeker and shouted, “What battalion is the advance guard?”<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">142</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="fnanchor">142</a> BrigGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>The chief of staff registered an expression of astonishment.</p> - -<p>“Did you get my orders?” Craig called to Murray when the <i>Pickaway</i> -slid against the dock.</p> - -<p>“No, sir!”<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">143</a> replied the CO of the 5th Marines.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="fnanchor">143</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>Craig ordered a conference at 2100 for the Brigade staff, Murray, battalion -commanders, and the leaders of supporting units. When the officers -entered the wardroom of the <i>Clymer</i> at the specified time, the last -ship of Task Group 53.7 was being moored in its berth.</p> - -<p>After introductory remarks by the general, his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel -Ellsworth G. Van Orman, launched the briefing with a grim narrative -of the enemy situation. Next came Stewart, who outlined tentative -operations plans. The Brigade would definitely begin moving forward -at 0600 the next morning, although a specific destination had yet to be -assigned by the Army. Travel would be by road and rail. The necessary -trains were already awaiting in the Pusan terminal, and the 50 trucks -procured by Chidester were standing by, complete with Army drivers.<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">144</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="fnanchor">144</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Craig then summed up his earlier discussions with Walker. The -Army leader had voiced a strong desire to use the Marines in an attack, -for he felt it was high time to strike back at the Red invader. Employment -of the Brigade as an offensive force was a natural conclusion to its -commander, and he told his subordinates how he had won assurances -for the integrity of the air-ground team. This was an encouraging note -on which to close one of the strangest combat briefings in the history<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> -of the Corps. The leaders of over 4,000 Marines rushed from the ship to -alert their units for movement into a critical tactical situation. They -would leave in a few hours, but didn’t know where they were going.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">145</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="fnanchor">145</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>Bedlam on Pusan Waterfront</i></h3> - -<p>It is not surprising that the Pusan waterfront turned into a bedlam. As -darkness settled, thousands of Marines poured onto the docks. Cranes -and working parties unloaded vehicles, supplies and equipment, while -a chorus of commands and comments was added to the roar of machinery. -Supply points were set up under searchlights, and long lines of -Marines formed on the docks, in buildings and along streets. Armfuls -of C-rations, machinegun belts, grenades, and bandoleers gave men the -appearance of harried Christmas shoppers caught in a last-minute rush.</p> - -<p>The activity and din continued all night. Few men could sleep -through the noise, crowding, and shuffling. Before dawn, new lines -began to form in reverse as groggy Marines filed back aboard ships to -get their last hot meal for many a day.</p> - -<p>After the conference aboard the <i>Clymer</i>, Brigade headquarters resumed -its efforts to obtain specific information from Taegu. Finally, at 2325, -Landrum telephoned Craig and announced Walker’s decision—the -Brigade would go westward to the vicinity of Changwon, where it -would remain for the time being in Eighth Army reserve. Only Walker -himself could order any further move. If some extreme emergency arose -and communications with Eighth Army were lost, the Brigade would -then come under the control of the CG, 25th Infantry Division.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">146</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="fnanchor">146</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>The long-awaited message gave added impetus to the unloading operations. -Major William L. Batchelor’s shore party company devoted one -of its principal efforts to the big howitzers and vehicles of 1/11, while -English and his tankmen struggled to get their steel monsters ashore -from the LSD’s. Engineer heavy equipment, mobile maintenance shops -of the Ordnance Detachment, fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies -swung from decks to docks, where waiting Marines rushed them off to -staging areas around the waterfront.</p> - -<p>Altogether, 9,400 tons of supplies were unloaded, and the vast majority -were turned over to Army quartermaster authorities in Pusan. Four -officers and 100 men of Major Thomas J. O’Mahoney’s Combat Service<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span> -Detachment were designated as the Brigade rear echelon. This group -would remain in the port city to handle logistical and administrative -matters. Supplies were moved into Army warehouses, where they became -part of the common pool shared by all units at the front. This led -to confusion later, when the Brigade requested its own Class II and IV -items, only to discover that they had already been issued to other outfits. -But the Army divisions had already been fighting for a month in a -war which caught the nation unprepared, so that the Pusan Base Command -had no alternative but to issue supplies on the basis of immediate -need, not ownership.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">147</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="fnanchor">147</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<p>The Brigade was prepared to travel light. Not only the bulk of supplies -but also all personal baggage was left behind in Pusan, to be stored -and safeguarded by the rear echelon. When dawn broke on 3 August, -each Marine carried only his pack, weapon, ammunition, and rations.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">148</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="fnanchor">148</a> Annex Queen, <i>ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>The Brigade at Changwon</i></h3> - -<p>Despite the tumult of the sleepless night at Pusan, Lieutenant Colonel -George R. Newton’s 1st Battalion set out for Changwon shortly after -0600 on 3 August. As advance guard for the Brigade, it made the 40-mile -trip in Marine and Army trucks, reaching a point 1 mile west of -the town at 1400. There the battalion took up defensive positions astride -the Changwon-Masan road in order to cover the arrival of the remainder -of the Brigade.<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">149</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="fnanchor">149</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Although he had orders to bivouac at Changwon, General Craig decided -to deploy the Brigade defensively to the west of the town. This -decision was prompted by the enemy situation west of Masan, which -was a scant 6½ miles from Changwon. Then, too, the Marine commander -saw the layover as a final opportunity to check the field -discipline of the Brigade.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">150</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="fnanchor">150</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Between 0630 and 0700, the main body of the Marine ground force -moved out of Pusan by road and rail. Vehicles over 2½ tons, all heavy -equipment, and the M-26 tanks were transported on flatcars.</p> - -<p>The roads were narrow and bumpy, and the churning wheels of the -trucks threw up clouds of stifling dust that hung in the air and painted -Marines and equipment a ghostly gray. Aboard the primitive trains,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> -which frequently jolted to stops for no apparent reason, men tried vainly -to fit themselves to miniature wooden seats constructed in perfect right -angles. And always, the troops inhaled that characteristic odor drifting -in from well-fertilized rice paddies.</p> - -<p>By 1600, all combat and support elements of the Brigade, with the -exception of one tank platoon, had arrived in the Changwon area. -Southwest of the city the 1st Battalion was relieved of its responsibility -on the left side of the Changwon-Masan road, when 3/5 occupied the -high ground in that area. Newton was then able to extend his right -flank farther along the towering ridge north of the road.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">151</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="fnanchor">151</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>South of the MSR, a wide rice paddy stretched between 3/5’s positions -and the town. Almost in the center of this low ground was a hill -commanding a good all-around view of the entire area. It was on this -dominating height that Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed -his 2d Battalion. Behind Roise, General Craig established his CP in a -small basin among hills in the immediate vicinity of Changwon. Close-in -protection for his headquarters was provided by the engineer company -and various headquarters units. Throughout the interior of the -bivouac area were tank platoons and the batteries of Lieutenant Colonel -Wood’s artillery battalion.</p> - -<p>As night settled on 3 August, an army of phantoms invaded the -Brigade perimeter and drove to the very fringe of Craig’s CP. The reaction -of green troops was typical of men new to combat. Shortly after -2200, a rifle shot cracked. Many Brigade Marines had never heard a weapon -fired in combat, so they concluded that likely targets were present -in the perimeter area. As nerve-taut men stared fixedly into the blackness, -forms that had been harmless bushes and rocks took on the guise -of Communist infiltrators.</p> - -<p>The first shot was soon followed by others. Toward midnight, the firing -developed into a continuous crackle, particularly in the immediate -vicinity of the Brigade CP. Palpitating hearts pounded even more -strenuously when two Marine machineguns began chattering in positions -occupied by Brigade headquarters troops.</p> - -<p>Anxiety also spread to the foxholes of the 5th Marines. In 2/5’s area -one man was shot. The 1st Battalion suffered 2 casualties, 1 resulting -from mistaken identity during challenging, the other inflicted when a -weapon discharged accidentally.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">152</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="fnanchor">152</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The commotion finally died down around 0300, after cursing NCO’s -convinced the military novices that they had been firing at delusions of -their own overwrought imaginations.</p> - -<p>Although such a reaction is not uncommon among untried troops, -this realization was no balm to a wrathful Brigade commander at dawn -on 4 August. Craig called in leaders of the most obvious offenders and -severely reprimanded them. He made it known in no uncertain terms -that such conduct would not be tolerated again; and from that time on, -every man in the Brigade took him at his word.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the stay at Changwon was relatively calm. On one -occasion a group of seven unidentified persons was spotted atop a -mountain overlooking the Brigade area. Closer scrutiny disclosed that -the individuals had radios and were carefully observing all activity within -the Marine perimeter. A platoon of infantry was dispatched to destroy -what was apparently an enemy observation post; but by the time the -rifleman scaled the height, both intruders and radios had disappeared.</p> - -<p>The climb caused a number of heat prostration cases within the platoon, -for Korean terrain and heat were giving Marines their first bitter -taste of a crippling combination. Brigade helicopters, flown to Pusan on -2 August, set a combat precedent by delivering rations and water to the -infantrymen on the mountain, and by evacuating the more severe heat -casualties.<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">153</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="fnanchor">153</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<p>While Craig’s ground force spent its time patrolling and training -around Changwon, VMO-6 and the Air Support Section (MTACS-2) -were readying themselves. Accompanying the 4 HO3S helicopters in -the flight to Pusan from Japan on 2 August were 4 of VMO-6’s OY-2 -observation planes. The other 4 light aircraft remained in Japan, to be -used as spares. On 4 August the LST which had been dispatched by -Cushman and Weir also arrived at the South Korean port. While two -helicopters flew to Changwon to operate from Craig’s CP, the others, -together with the rest of VMO-6 and the Air Support Section, moved to -the airfield at Chinhae. By 5 August, MTACS-2 had established communications -with the <i>Sicily</i> and <i>Badoeng Strait</i> and was ready for business.</p> - -<h3><i>The Pusan Perimeter</i></h3> - -<p>The big picture, militarily speaking, was outlined in somber colors -during the first few days of August 1950. Only the southeast corner of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span> -Korea was left to the Eighth Army and its battered ROK allies. Space -had been traded for time until there remained in effect merely a UN -beachhead about 90 miles long and 60 wide.</p> - -<p>Unremitting enemy pressure throughout July had pushed the UN -forces back to positions stretching raggedly from Pohang-dong on the -east coast to Masan on the south coast by way of Taegu in the center. -The logistical lifeline extended from Pusan to Taegu both by road and -rail, and some 300,000 tons of supplies were moved in July by the Pusan -Logistical Command.</p> - -<p>The vital seaport had to be held if the UN forces were to retain a -foothold in the peninsula, and the enemy was already threatening both -Pohang-dong and Masan, each within 50 miles. Only by courtesy could -the irregular chain of UN positions have been called a line. Gaps were -the rule rather than exception, and an entire enemy corps might have -driven through the mountainous area between Andong and Yongdok -without meeting serious opposition. Nor was this the only spot where -the dangerously stretched UN forces had to depend on the terrain for -support. Yet the time had come to make a stand, and this final UN -beachhead has gone down in history by the name of the Pusan -Perimeter.</p> - -<p>From Taegu in the center to the eastern coast, five depleted ROK divisions -were arrayed during the first week in August. East of the Naktong, -from the Taegu-Waegwan area southward, the 1st Cavalry and the 24th -Infantry Division held defensive positions. This left the southern sector -to the 25th Division, reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade.</p> - -<p>The principal enemy units pressing toward Masan and Pusan in the -southern sector were identified as the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and -the 83d Motorcycle Regiment. Composed entirely of Chinese civil war -veterans in July 1949, the 6th Division had at that time been the 166th -Division, 56th CCF Army, which later entered Korea as a completely -equipped unit. Its three infantry regiments, the 13th, 14th, and 15th, -were distinguished throughout the invasion for a high esprit de corps. -After capturing Yongdungpo, an industrial suburb of Seoul, the 6th had -pushed southward and won fresh honors by forcing the river Kum and -taking Kunsan by storm.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">154</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="fnanchor">154</a> FECOM, ATIS, <cite>North Korean 6th Infantry Division</cite> (InterRpt, Sup No. 100), 33–6.</p></div> - -<p>On the eve of the Kunsan operation, according to a captured enemy -document, troops of the 6th were informed that they were facing a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span> -United States Army regiment. “Since this unit is planning to advance to -the north, it is our mission to envelop and annihilate it.... We are -fully prepared and confident of success in this operation.”<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">155</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="fnanchor">155</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>A numerical superiority as well as good combat discipline enabled the -initial assault waves to cross the Kum in pneumatic floats and establish -a bridgehead before noon on 16 July 1950. Half of the town of Kunsan -was occupied before nightfall, and the United States and ROK defenders -withdrew under cover of darkness.</p> - -<p>Next came the “end run,” with 6th Division units racing toward the -capture of Namwon, Kwangju, Yosu, and Mokpu in the southwest -corner of the peninsula. No opposition awaited except ineffectual delaying -actions by ROK constabulary troops. After mopping up a few small -pockets of resistance, the 6th Division pushed eastward to lead the -North Korean drive toward Pusan.</p> - -<p>The capture of Sunchon gave the division an assembly area for the -attack on Chinju. And on 28 July the commander. Major General Pang, -issued a message to his troops:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the liberation of -Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy. We have -liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yosu and have thereby accelerated the liberation of -all Korea. However, the liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to -cut off the windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our -division! Men of the 6th Division, let us annihilate the enemy and distinguish -ourselves!”<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">156</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="fnanchor">156</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Up to that time the division’s total casualties had been remarkably -few. Only 400 killed and wounded were reported from 25 June until -after the capture of Kunsan, and the 6th had met scarcely any opposition -since that action. It was just prior to the assault on Chinju, moreover, -that the 83d Motorcycle Regiment was attached to reinforce the -drive toward Pusan.</p> - -<p>This unit had been part of the 105th Armored Division until June -1950, when it was given a separate existence. Equipment consisted of -motorcycles with sidecars and jeeps of Soviet manufacture. Fixed machineguns -on both types of vehicles were operated by the crews in addition -to submachineguns. Not much is known about the numbers of -the 83d at this time, but it had experienced little combat since the beginning -of the invasion.<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">157</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="fnanchor">157</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, <cite>Enemy Forces</cite>, <i>op. cit.</i>, 36–7.</p></div> - -<p>During the advance on Chinju the NKPA column ran into elements -of the United States 24th Infantry Division and was stopped by machinegun -fire at Hadong. All three regiments of the 6th Division had -to be committed before this halfway point could be secured, and the 83d -Motorcycle Regiment was blooded in the attack. More hard fighting -awaited on the road to Chinju, but the two NKPA outfits battled their -way into the town on or about 30 July 1950.</p> - -<h3><i>Brigade Air Strikes First</i></h3> - -<p>These North Korean units were destined to become the opponents of -the Brigade a few days later. Before the Marine ground forces could get -into action, however, the air components struck the first blow.</p> - -<p>When Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid’s VMF-214 landed on -board the <i>Sicily</i> on 3 August, eight of its Corsairs were immediately refueled -and armed. At 1630, the initial Marine offensive action of the war -was launched as the fighter planes roared up from the carrier’s flight deck. -Minutes later their incendiary bombs and rockets were hitting Red-held -Chinju and the village of Sinban-ni. A series of strafing runs concluded -the Marines’ greeting to the North Korean People’s Army.<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">158</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="fnanchor">158</a> VMF-214 SAR, 14 Jul-6 Sep 50.</p></div> - -<p>While the 2 Red bases were erupting in smoke and flame, 2 other -pilots of the squadron flew from the <i>Sicily</i> to Taegu to be briefed on the -broad tactical situation. They returned from their visit with maps and -intelligence material for guidance in future operations.<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">159</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="fnanchor">159</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The squadron flew 21 sorties on 4 August against enemy bases controlling -the pressure on Eighth Army’s southern flank. Racing in from -the sea, gull-winged Marine planes struck at bridges, railroads, and troop -concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas.</p> - -<p>On 5 August, the <i>Sicily</i> steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes -descended on Inchon, Seoul, and Mokpo, battering airfields, factories, -warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern of -destruction was repeated the following day.<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">160</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="fnanchor">160</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>On 6 August came a thundering bid for fame by VMF-323, as its -sleek Corsairs streaked toward Korea. Operating from the deck of the -<i>Badoeng Strait</i>, the squadron flew 30 sorties in deep support forward of -Eighth Army lines. Carrying the mail with 500-pound bombs, 20-mm.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span> -cannon and 5-inch rockets, Marine pilots struck at Communist troop -concentrations, vehicles, supply dumps, bridges and railroads.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">161</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="fnanchor">161</a> VMF-323 SAR, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive</i></h3> - -<p>As early as 3 August, during the Brigade move from Pusan to Changwon, -General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had flown by helicopter -to Masan for a conference of troop commanders. There they -joined General Walker and General Kean at the latter’s 25th Division -command post. Also present was Brigadier General George B. Barth, -artillery officer of the 25th.<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">162</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="fnanchor">162</a> Craig, 25 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Craig suggested to the Eighth Army commander that some ROK -army trainees be attached to the Brigade. There were thousands of such -Korean recruits, and a few serving as scouts, interpreters, and rear-area -guards would be of great value to the Marines. Walker agreed to provide -the native troops and arm them as well.<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">163</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="fnanchor">163</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The Army leader confirmed the previous night’s telephonic orders -which had caused the Brigade’s move to Changwon. After the four -generals had discussed the tactical situation on the southern flank, -Walker directed Craig to have the Brigade prepared for commitment to -combat any time after the evening of 5 August.<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">164</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="fnanchor">164</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>This schedule worked out perfectly from Craig’s point of view. The -Air Support Section at Chinhae had just established communications -with the two carrier-based squadrons. Army-Navy-Marine co-operation -thus enabled the Brigade commander to lead his entire air-ground team -into battle.</p> - -<p>On 5 August Craig and Stewart flew to Masan for a final meeting with -Walker and Kean. The Eighth Army commander outlined his plans for -the first UN counteroffensive. In forceful terms, he expressed his dissatisfaction -with the course of the war up to that time. He announced -that the strategy of trading space for time had come to an end, and he -did not mince words in referring to past UN defeats. With firm conviction -in the cause, he had ordered all units to stand to the death. The -Eighth Army could not and would not lose more ground or equipment.<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">165</a> -Advances had been made by the enemy with such rapidity that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> -he had extended his supply lines almost to the breaking point, concluded -Walker. The time had come to strike back.<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">166</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="fnanchor">165</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="fnanchor">166</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>To the 25th Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and 5th RCT -would go the honor of launching the counterattack from Chindong-ni, a -small coastal village 8 miles southwest of Masan on the road to Chinju. -In its effort to roll up the southern UN flank, the NKPA 6th Division -was exerting heavy pressure on Chindong-ni from both the west and -north.</p> - -<p>A few miles west, the irregular coastline takes a sharp turn to the south -to form a stubby peninsula about 25 miles wide and 15 miles long. Near -the western base is the important town of Sachon. About 10 miles above -this western junction of peninsula and coast lies Chinju. Both Sachon -and Chinju were the targets of Walker’s counteroffensive.</p> - -<p>Approximately 3½ miles west of Chindong-ni is the tiny thatched-hut -hamlet of Tosan, an unimpressive road junction which could be -easily overlooked. The western fork is merely the continuation of the -main route leading directly to Chinju, some 25 miles distant. The other -fork branches south from Tosan and also goes to Chinju; but it skirts the -coastline of the peninsula just described, passing through the communication -hubs of Paedun-ni, Kosong, and Sachon. Thus, while both -roads lead to Chinju, the southern or peninsular route is 17 miles longer.</p> - -<p>Since it was known that enemy forces were present on the small -peninsula, any UN thrust astride the main road to Chinju would be -exposed to a constant flanking threat from the left. To eliminate this -danger. Walker had decided to send the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade -around the southern route from Tosan to Sachon. After the peninsula -was secured, the 5th RCT would strike out for Chinju along the main -road, while the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division guarded its right flank -in the mountains to the north.<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">167</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="fnanchor">167</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Craig and Stewart opposed this plan, arguing that the Brigade itself -would be exposed to flanking danger on the right, if it made the initial -advance alone.<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">168</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="fnanchor">168</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>After further discussion, it was decided that all three units would -attack simultaneously along the routes already designated. However, the -5th RCT was given a preparatory mission of uncovering the Tosan junction -before the Brigade began its advance.<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">169</a> D-day was scheduled for 7<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span> -August. All participating units were to be part of Task Force Kean, so -named after the 25th Division commanding general who would exercise -overall control.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="fnanchor">169</a> Annex How; and Brig Op Plan 4-50.</p></div> - -<p>Craig hurried from the conference to alert the Brigade. In a past military -age a general might have sprung into the saddle, but the Brigade -commander had discovered a steed that covered more ground. He and -Stewart climbed into a HO3S-1 helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Gustave -F. Lueddeke of VMO-6, and a few minutes later they landed at Lieutenant -Colonel Murray’s CP to brief him on the forthcoming action.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span></p> - -<div id="ip_102" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_102.jpg" width="2031" height="1355" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>BRIGADE ACTION ON - SOUTHWESTERN FRONT<br /> - <span class="smaller">7–13 AUGUST 1950</span></p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_VI" class="vspace">CHAPTER VI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Action on Hill 342</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>First Platoon Fight—The Perimeter on Hill 342—Call for Artillery -Fires—Task Force Kean Stalled—General Craig Assumes Control—Enemy -Attack at Dawn</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">On 6 August 1950</span> the Brigade was attached to the 25th Infantry -Division and ordered forward to Chindong-ni. The area from that -village westward toward the Tosan junction was occupied by thinly -spread elements of the 5th RCT and the 27th Infantry. While the former -took over front line positions preparatory to launching the main attack -on the next day, the latter was gradually displacing rearward to go into -Eighth Army reserve.<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">170</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="fnanchor">170</a> Annexes 1 and 2 to 25th InfDiv War Diary, Sep 50, Book VIII; and Brig SAR, basic -rpt.</p></div> - -<p>To facilitate the early relief of the 27th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel -Robert D. Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, departed from Changwon -at 1040, 6 August, and arrived at Chindong-ni less than 2 hours later. -The infantry unit was accompanied by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; -the 2d Platoon, 75-mm. Recoilless Guns; and the 3d Platoon, Company -A Engineers. After assembling in a schoolyard north of the village, 3/5 -relieved the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, on and around Hill 255.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">171</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="fnanchor">171</a> All hill numbers given in this text refer to the highest peak of the specific high ground -being considered. Numbers indicate height in meters above sea level, and Hill 255 is therefore -more than 800 feet high. Chindong-ni, being almost at the water’s edge, may be taken -as sea level.</p></div> - -<p>One and a half miles out of Chindong-ni, the road from Masan takes -a sharp turn so that it is running generally north and south before it -enters the village. Hill 255 borders the west side of the road, rising from -the valley floor just above Chindong-ni and climbing northward to its -summit in a series of prominent steps. Its ridgeline is narrow, with the -eastern slopes falling steeply to the Masan route while its western wall<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span> -plunges sharply to the valley and road connecting Chindong-ni and -Haman.</p> - -<p>Taplett set up his CP, headquarters units, and weapons company -along the first step of the hill. Higher up, at the top of the second rise, -Captain Joseph C. Fegan deployed Company H in defensive positions -facing generally north. Forward, a long narrow plateau stretched for 250 -yards before the third step of the ridge rose abruptly to the second -highest peak on the hill. Noting the advantages of the commanding -ground to his north, Fegan requested permission to move his company -forward to that area. Since this would have placed him 500 yards from -the nearest 3/5 unit, the request could not be granted.<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">172</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="fnanchor">172</a> Maj Joseph C. Fegan interv with authors, 17 Apr 54 (Fegan, 17 Apr 54).</p></div> - -<p>The battalion commander intended to keep his defenses as tightly knit -as possible in order to discharge his mission of blocking the approaches -to the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR. Despite vigorous patrolling by 25th -Division units in the mountains between the coastal village and Haman, -intelligence reported increasing numbers of enemy troops, heavy -weapons, and equipment in the area to the north. It appeared that large -NKPA forces were slipping through and descending on Chindong-ni to -“cut off the windpipe” of Walker’s southern flank.</p> - -<p>First Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn, commander of Company G, deployed -his 2d and 3d Platoons on Hill 99, to the west and across the -valley from 255. He arranged his defenses to block the approaches from -the high ground on his north (actually an extension of Hill 99) and -from the valley to the west, separating him from massive Hill 342.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">173</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="fnanchor">173</a> Capt R. D. Bohn interv with authors, 17 Apr 54 (Bohn, 17 Apr 54).</p></div> - -<p>On a small knoll at the base of Hill 255 was deployed Company G’s -1st Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant John H. Cahill. With -the 75-mm. recoilless gun platoon attached, this unit guarded the -Haman road 600 yards from Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">174</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="fnanchor">174</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>On high ground east of the MSR and beyond the village sat the 2d -Platoon of Company H, with the mission of defending against infiltration -from the direction of the sea and the mountains southeast of the -road to Masan.<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">175</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="fnanchor">175</a> Fegan, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>This completed the infantry deployment. Company H had its three -platoons spread over 1,500 yards, while those of Company G ranged at -least an equal distance. Due to the lack of a third company, Taplett had -no reserve other than a handful of headquarters troops. Thus 3/5 got its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> -taste of things to come in a strange war of mountains and men.</p> - -<p>As the riflemen were digging their hilltop holes with traditional distaste, -other supporting elements of the Brigade and 5th Marines began -to arrive at Chindong-ni and set up for business. These included the -Brigade Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of the regimental -4.2-inch Mortar Company.<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">176</a> All Marine units in the area temporarily -came under control of 3/5’s Battalion Commander. Taplett was given -the added responsibility of handling all area requests for tactical air -support.<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">177</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="fnanchor">176</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="fnanchor">177</a> LtCol R. D. Taplett interv with authors, 20 Apr 54 (Taplett, 20 Apr 54).</p></div> - -<p>For the time being, the 3d Battalion itself was under operational control -of Colonel John H. Michaelis, USA, commander of the 27th -Infantry “Wolfhounds.” Verbal instructions from Major General Kean -on 6 August had given the Army officer control of all troops in the -Chindong-ni area. When a second Marine battalion arrived in the locale, -command would then pass to General Craig.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">178</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="fnanchor">178</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<p>By 1600, Taplett had reported his command post location and defensive -positions to Michaelis. Immediately afterwards he ordered mortars -and artillery to lay registration fires on the northern approaches to -Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">179</a> Having left the phantoms of Changwon far behind, the -Marines of the reinforced battalion settled down for the night.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="fnanchor">179</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Annex How.</p></div> - -<h3><i>First Platoon Fight</i></h3> - -<p>Shortly after midnight, the 3d Battalion received an unexpected message -which precipitated the first Marine infantry action of the war. Colonel -Michaelis radioed Taplett and passed on a directive from 25th Division, -ordering the Marine battalion to commit immediately one reinforced -platoon for the defense of Hill 342. He explained that this unit was to -relieve a beleaguered Army company being slowly eaten away in a private -war of attrition. Taplett informed the regimental commander that -he could ill afford to spare 1 of his 6 rifle platoons, but was told in return -that General Kean had ordered 342 held at all costs.<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">180</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="fnanchor">180</a> This section of the narrative is derived from: LtCol R. D. Taplett interv with the -author, 18 Nov 53 and 19 May 54; Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Capt -J. H. Cahill ltr to authors, 9 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>Tagged with the ominous sounding name “Yaban-san” by Koreans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span> -this hill resembles a huge molar whose roots rise from the MSR west of -Chindong-ni and lead to a tremendous mass about 2,000 yards north of -the road. There the ground climbs sharply, culminating in a peak 1,100 -feet high. Beyond, a long saddle extends a few thousand yards northwest, -connecting 342 with a height of almost 2,000 feet. The latter was a -stronghold of NKPA 6th Division elements, making a determined bid -to carry 342 and cut the MSR.</p> - -<p>Assigned the mission of making the Brigade’s first ground contact was -young Lieutenant Cahill of Company G. His 1st Platoon was reinforced -with a machinegun squad and SCR-300 operator before he led it from -3/5’s perimeter.</p> - -<p>Moving westward on the MSR, the platoon reached Michaelis’ CP, -located near the bridges south of Hill 99. Cahill was told that he would -be met by a guide at a road junction 700 yards farther down the MSR. -From this point the platoon followed a soldier who escorted Cahill to -the CP of the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. This headquarters was situated just -north of the road, on the tip of 342’s eastern “root,” 1 of the 2 long -ridges leading to the hill itself.</p> - -<p>The Marine officer was told to relieve the Army company on the -summit and hold the hill with his platoon. Following a quick briefing, -Cahill and the guide led the column northward from the CP, skirting -the western base of the ridge. A few hundred yards along the way, the -guide discovered that he had miscalculated in the darkness. More time -was lost while the platoon descended to resume the correct route.</p> - -<p>As the men threaded their way along the unseen trail, a few enemy -artillery shells burst nearby. The column reached the end of the valley -separating the two long spurs of 342, and a volley of rifle fire cracked in -the darkness. Two of Cahill’s Marines were painfully wounded.</p> - -<p>Since the column was still in friendly territory, the guide advised -Cahill not to climb 342 until dawn shed light on the mystery. It was -then 0500, 7 August, and the Marine platoon had marched 3 miles from -its original position.</p> - -<p>Shortly after first light, it was discovered that soldiers of the 2d Battalion, -5th RCT, had fired on the Marines, not realizing that friendly -units were moving within the area.</p> - -<p>As the sun rose in a cloudless sky, Cahill took the lead. First, he -climbed the high ground joining 342 with its eastern spur, then crossed -over and continued toward the peak from a southeasterly direction.</p> - -<div id="ip_107" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_107.jpg" width="2080" height="1360" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>CHINDONG-NI AREA<br /> - <span class="smaller">6–9 AUG. ’50</span></p> - -<p class="small">SHOWING 1st PROV. MAR. BRIGADE’S DISPOSITION, -BLOCKING ACTION, & LOCAL ATTACKS</p></div></div> - -<p>The platoon made good progress at the outset, but the heat became -stifling; and all the while the slopes of 342 stretched ahead like a<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_107">107</a><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -continuous wall. Stumbling, gasping for breath, soaked with perspiration, -every Marine reached the point at which he barely managed to drag -himself up the steep incline. There were choked curses as men gained a -few feet, only to slip and fall back even farther.</p> - -<p>Water discipline collapsed as canteens were quickly emptied. Marines -began to drop along the slope, some unconscious, others doubled over -and retching. The tactical formation of the platoon became ragged, but -Cahill and his NCO’s urged the men upward.</p> - -<p>Accompanied by Sergeant Lee Buettner, Cahill set out to contact the -Army company commander on the summit and reconnoiter the area. -Seventy-five yards from the top, he was fired on from the eastern slopes. -Since he was in sight of the Army troops on the crest, it was obvious -that the North Korean People’s Army had officially greeted the 1st -Provisional Marine Brigade.</p> - -<h3><i>The Perimeter on Hill 342</i></h3> - -<p>Convinced that he was encountering only sniper fire, Cahill ordered -Buettner to stay behind and keep the platoon moving up a draw affording -cover. Then, ignoring enemy marksmen, the young officer climbed -up to the crest and entered a grim little company perimeter under constant -rifle and machinegun fire from its front and both flanks.</p> - -<p>It was 0830 when the Army company commander greeted Cahill and -explained his defenses. It had been customary, he said, to man a broad -front during the day and draw back into a tight perimeter at night. But -the intense enemy fire of the previous night had not diminished after -daybreak, with the result that his men still occupied their night perimeter. -The Army officer added that he had returned his mortars to the base -of the hill, since they had drawn too much fire to be effective. Deployed -around a triangular perimeter conforming to the shape of 347’s peak -were the remnants of his three shattered platoons.</p> - -<p>While Cahill appraised the situation, his platoon labored up the hill -under prodding by Buettner and other NCO’s. Well up the southeastern -slope, the column suddenly came under automatic weapons fire from -invisible enemy positions. The exhausted Marines set up weapons along -the hillside and fired at area targets. Despite the blistering sun and whine -of bullets, NCO’s led their fire teams and squads up toward the peak.</p> - -<p>When the Marines reached Cahill, he learned that 1 man had been -killed and 6 wounded, including Staff Sergeant Robert Robinson, platoon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span> -sergeant, and Sergeant Thomas Blackmon, platoon guide. A number -of heat casualties were recuperating far down the slope, and one -Marine had suffered an emotional collapse. Blackmon, despite a mortal -wound, had been so intent on joining his platoon leader at the crest that -four weary men were required to carry him down the hillside to safety. -Three other able-bodied Marines also had to assist wounded men down -the hill.</p> - -<p>Of the 52 men who had set out the previous night, only 37, including -those recovered from heat sickness, finally reached Cahill. As they assembled -on the reverse slope of 342, a group of soldiers on the crest broke -under a heavy volume of enemy fire and bolted from the perimeter. The -Army company was on the verge of panic until a young Army lieutenant -restored order and led the men back to their foxholes.</p> - -<p>Cahill and his remaining NCO’s crawled around the perimeter to -insert Marines in positions among those of the Army troops. This psychology -was sound, for each infantryman, eyeing his Army or Marine -neighbor, prided himself on setting a high standard of military conduct. -From that time on, every man discharged his responsibility in a most -exemplary manner.</p> - -<p>Two more Marines had been killed instantly while being led to their -positions by Sergeant Jack Macy. These casualties brought the platoon’s -total to 3 KIA and 8 WIA.</p> - -<p>It is not likely that Cahill’s men were interested enough in historic -dates to recall that it was the eighth anniversary of the Marine landing -on Guadalcanal in World War II. For at noon, the fight on Hill 342 took -on aspects of a siege. Swarms of North Koreans inched upward toward -the crest, taking advantage of cover and concealment as they kept a steady -stream of rifle and machinegun fire cutting across the hilltop. Despite -the visual handicap resulting from the enemy’s use of smokeless powder, -the Marines and soldiers returned the fire with determination.</p> - -<p>Due to the urgency of the situation on 342, the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, -ordered its company to remain on the crest with Cahill’s platoon. Plans -were already underway for a larger Marine force to clear the high ground.</p> - -<h3><i>Call for Artillery Fires</i></h3> - -<p>In the meantime Cahill used his initiative to improve the situation. With -his SCR-300, he called for Army artillery fire to silence the Communist -mortars. When the first shells were fired for registration, he searched the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span> -perimeter and located an artillery forward observer. Accurate bursts were -laid on likely looking mortar OP’s in enemy territory, yet the Communist -tubes continued to fire.</p> - -<p>With ammunition and water in critical supply, the Marine officer -radioed 3/5’s CP and requested an air drop. Taplett’s Tactical Air Control -Party relayed the message to the Brigade Air Section, and an Air Force -R4D transport flew over the restricted drop area atop Hill 342. The -precious supplies tumbled from the big plane—into enemy territory. A -single recovered packet contained carbine cartridges, the one type not -needed.</p> - -<p>The Brigade Air Section then turned the mission over to VMO-6. -Every 5-gallon water can owned by the squadron was donated, and the -more maneuverable OY-2’s were able to drop them within the confined -perimeter. Unhappily, the containers burst upon striking the ground, so -that the parched hill defenders were able to salvage only a few mouthfuls -of water apiece.</p> - -<p>Sergeant Macy reacted with vigor. With Cahill’s permission, he -organized a few volunteers into a patrol to search for water. Descending -the perilous southeastern slope under fire, the little group struck out for -the village of Taepyong-ni, located along the base of 342’s eastern spur -and facing Hill 99 across the valley.</p> - -<p>As the afternoon wore on, the Army-Marine defenders clung to their -precarious perch, despite swollen tongues and Communist fire. The -enemy had succeeded in surrounding the entire peak with a ring of fire. -Several more casualties were inflicted on the infantry company, and a -Marine machinegunner was killed instantly by a sniper who had worked -his way to the south of the perimeter.</p> - -<h3><i>Task Force Kean Stalled</i></h3> - -<p>Although the night of 6–7 August had been uneventful for 3/5’s front -lines around Chindong-ni, Taplett’s CP near the base of Hill 255 came -under sporadic shelling between 0100 and 0400. The first messages from -Cahill, received about 0600, caused anxiety over the fate of his platoon.<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">181</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="fnanchor">181</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>At 0200 that morning, a long column of trucks had set out from -Changwon, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion, -5th Marines. The head of the convoy reached Chindong-ni about 0500<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span> -and entered the truck turn-around in a schoolyard at the base of Hill -255.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">182</a> As 2/5 unloaded, the turn-around became a bottleneck of vehicles, -men, and equipment which slowed movement on the MSR itself almost -to a standstill. To make matters worse, the heavy traffic gradually -pounded the schoolyard into a quagmire, so that trucks bogged down -and added to the confusion.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="fnanchor">182</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 5 Feb 54 (Roise, 5 Feb 54).</p></div> - -<p>While Roise was assembling his battalion, the entire area came under -heavy mortar and artillery fire from the north. The sudden shelling, -which caused 2/5’s first battle casualties, brought all traffic on the road -from Changwon to an abrupt halt.</p> - -<p>Although the Marines of the 2d Battalion were well covered behind -Hill 255, bursts from shells striking the trees high on the ridge filled the -air with fragments. Before the enemy mortars ceased, 1 Marine had been -killed and 11 wounded, including Captain George E. Kittredge, Jr., -commander of Company E.<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">183</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="fnanchor">183</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray, whose headquarters was behind Roise’s -unit in the convoy, was still north of Chindong-ni when the column -slowed almost to a standstill. He radioed 2/5’s commander and told him -to keep the trucks moving despite the shelling. Roise replied that the -muddy schoolyard, not enemy fire, was the main cause of the delay. Thus -Murray received the first of many object lessons in Korean geography. -He sat patiently in his jeep, while the column inched into Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">184</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="fnanchor">184</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>After the regimental commander arrived in Chindong-ni, the 3d Battalion, -less Cahill’s platoon, reverted to his control. Because of the battle -in progress on Hill 342 and enemy activity to the north of the village -perimeter, Murray ordered 2/5 to occupy and defend an expanse of 255 -above Company H’s positions. He directed 1/5 (following his headquarters -in the column from Changwon) to occupy Hill 99, thus relieving -Company G to bolster Taplett’s lines on lower 255.<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">185</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="fnanchor">185</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>General Craig arrived at Chindong-ni shortly after 0700, just in time -to be warmly greeted by the enemy shelling as he stepped from his helicopter. -Since the Brigade attack scheduled for 7 August hinged on the -5th RCT’s success at the Tosan junction, Craig quickly arranged for a -telephone line to that unit, so that his CP would be in constant contact.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">186</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="fnanchor">186</a> LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 12 Jan 54 (Craig, 12 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>News from the front was not good. At 0630, after air and artillery<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> -preparations, the 5th RCT had jumped off on schedule. Just beyond the -line of departure, it came to a sudden halt as a result of increased enemy -activity north of the road. Elements of the NKPA 6th Division, paying -little attention to the plans of Task Force Kean, had launched an attack -of their own above the MSR.</p> - -<p>The situation on Hill 342 kept the entire 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, tied -down in a fight to hold the Chinju road open. With the help of Cahill’s -platoon on the crest, this mission was being accomplished; but the battalion -was temporarily lost to its regiment, and the road itself was -choked with men and vehicles unable to move.<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">187</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="fnanchor">187</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<h3><i>General Craig Assumes Control</i></h3> - -<p>The Brigade was ordered to provide a battalion for the relief of the Army -unit on Yaban-san, so that the 5th RCT could strike harder at the road -junction 2½ miles to the west.<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">188</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="fnanchor">188</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Just as 2/5 was ascending Hill 255, Lieutenant Colonel Murray -received word from Brigade of the Marine commitment. The 5th Marines -commander canceled Roise’s orders and directed him to relieve -both Cahill’s platoon and the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, and to seize the -remainder of Hill 342.<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">189</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="fnanchor">189</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>At 1120 on 7 August, General Craig received a telephone message -from General Kean directing the Brigade commander to assume control -of all troops in the Chindong-ni area until further orders. With this -overall responsibility, Craig went forward to observe the 5th RCT in -action. He ascertained by personal reconnaissance that enemy resistance -was light, although few friendly gains were being made because of the -scattered and confused nature of the fighting.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">190</a> The MSR between -Sangnyong-ni, at the base of Hill 342’s spurs, and the vital Tosan junction -was jammed with men, vehicles, and equipment, while infantrymen -probed the surrounding high ground in an effort to weed out snipers and -infiltrators.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="fnanchor">190</a> Craig, 12 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>When 2/5 reached the road junction at which Cahill had been met by -the Army guide during the night, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered -Company D to move up the north fork, tracing the base of 342’s eastern<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> -spur, and seize both the spur and great hill itself. Company E, now commanded -by 1st Lieutenant William E. Sweeney, was to pass behind -Sangnyong-ni and seize the west spur. Such a deployment would leave -the battalion spread thinly, but Roise’s orders were to protect the wide -valley formed by the two long ridges. This could be done only by occupying -both spurs and 342 itself.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">191</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="fnanchor">191</a> Roise, 5 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>Outside of Chindong-ni, Major Morgan J. McNeely, 2d Battalion -S-3, had picked up Captain John Finn, Jr., CO of Company D, and the -two officers drove ahead by jeep to the village of Taepyong-ni at the -eastern base of Hill 342. The staff officer informed Finn that Dog Company -was to relieve a 5th RCT unit on the high ground above the clump -of thatched huts. Both McNeely and an Army guide said that the Marines -would meet no organized resistance in their climb.<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">192</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="fnanchor">192</a> Capt J. Finn, Jr., ltr to authors, 1 Mar 54 (Finn, 1 Mar 54).</p></div> - -<p>Having spent a sleepless night on the road from Changwon to Chindong-ni, -Finn’s infantrymen were fagged. It was now midafternoon, and -the heat began to take its toll of Dog Company.</p> - -<p>Just as the leading elements reached Finn at Taepyong-ni—30 minutes -after McNeely’s departure—the column came under rifle and machinegun -fire from the high ground above the road and from the hamlet of -Tokkong-ni across the valley on the right. The Marines thought they -were being shot at by Army troops, but the chatter of Communist “burp -guns”<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">193</a> soon convinced them that they were meeting enemy resistance.<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">194</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="fnanchor">193</a> PPS-1943, Soviet 7.62-mm. submachinegun.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194" class="fnanchor">194</a> Capt R. T. Hanifin ltr to authors, 15 Feb 54 (Hanifin, 15 Feb 54).</p></div> - -<p>Finn ordered his men into the rice paddies bordering the road. Calling -his platoon leaders, he told them that there was no real intelligence, but -that the fire from Tokkong-ni would be ignored due to the company’s -mission on 342. He assigned routes of ascent to each platoon. The 2d, -under Second Lieutenant Wallace J. Reid, would push through Taepyong-ni -and on up the hill at its juncture with the spur. On the left, Second -Lieutenant Edward T. Emmelman would lead his 3d Platoon to the top -of the spur. The 1st Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Arthur -A. Oakley, would hold the right flank and ascend the southern slopes of -342 itself.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">195</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195" class="fnanchor">195</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Finn, 1 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>Company D met scattered opposition. By the time it moved over the -crest of the spur, five Marines had been wounded. The sun, however, -had been more effective; for twelve men were completely unconscious<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> -from the 100° heat, and the rest of the company had neared the point of -exhaustion.</p> - -<p>Finn ordered his executive officer, First Lieutenant Robert T. Hanifin, -Jr., to set up headquarters and the 60-mm. mortars on the high ground -directly above Taepyong-ni. It was already early in the evening when -Hanifin established a thin perimeter of headquarters personnel to safeguard -the CP.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">196</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196" class="fnanchor">196</a> Hanifin, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>In the meantime, Finn was leading his three rifle platoons up the same -southeastern approach to 342’s summit which Cahill’s platoon had -scaled 12 hours earlier. The company commander could no longer overlook -the combined effects on his men of heat and overexertion. A few -hundred yards from the summit, he radioed Roise that Company D was -exhausted. During the halt, Lieutenant Oakley climbed to the summit -to contact the Army and Marine defenders. He returned just before dark -with Cahill and the Army company commander.<a id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">197</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197" class="fnanchor">197</a> Finn, 1 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>In the hurried conference that followed, the Army officer advised Finn -against finishing the rugged climb and assured him that his soldiers and -Cahill’s platoon could defend the peak through the night. Informed of -this by radio, Roise allowed Company D to hold its present position -and relieve at dawn.<a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">198</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198" class="fnanchor">198</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Earlier in the day, Lieutenant Sweeney had led Company E up the -lower tip of 342’s western spur, then along the ridgeline toward the -large hill mass. At intervals the company came under long range, ineffectual -machinegun fire. But, as in the case of Finn’s unit, the heat and -terrain were more damaging than enemy bullets. At dusk, Company E -had reached the midway point along the ridge, and there it dug in for -the night.</p> - -<h3><i>Enemy Attack at Dawn</i></h3> - -<p>Under cover of darkness, Red Korean troops wormed their way around -the little perimeter on the summit of Hill 342. Just before dawn the -soldiers and Marines were greeted by bursts of short-range rifle and machinegun -fire. The defenders returned the fire and hurled grenades down -the slopes, but a small force of North Koreans succeeded in crawling<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span> -close enough to launch an assault against the northeast leg of the -triangle.<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">199</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199" class="fnanchor">199</a> Cahill, 9 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued at the point of contact, and the -Communists were thrown back down the hill. One of Cahill’s men died -of bayonet and gunshot wounds, and another Marine and several soldiers -were wounded.<a id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">200</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200" class="fnanchor">200</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Finn’s men struck out for the summit shortly after daybreak on 8 -August. With three platoons abreast along the southern face of 342, -Dog Company pushed upward swiftly, brushing aside light resistance. -Upon reaching the perimeter, the Marines came under a storm of fire -from NK positions which ringed the northern half of the hill.<a id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">201</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201" class="fnanchor">201</a> Finn, 1 Mar 54; and Roise, 5 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>The relief was effected, nevertheless, and Cahill’s thinned squads -descended Hill 342 together with the shattered Army company. The -Marine platoon had lost 6 killed and 12 wounded—more than a third of -the 52 men who had set out from Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">202</a> But its determined -stand with the beleaguered Army unit had saved the height and frustrated -the Communist attempts to establish a bastion overlooking the -MSR.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202" class="fnanchor">202</a> Annex Able to Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Company D fared no better than its predecessors at consolidating the -crest of 342 and clearing upper slopes which were crawling with North -Koreans. Finn’s unit took several casualties in the fire fight that accompanied -and followed the relief of the original defenders. Two of those -killed in action were Second Lieutenants Oakley and Reid. The only surviving -platoon leader, Lieutenant Emmelman, received a serious head -wound as he was pointing out targets to a Marine machinegunner.<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">203</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203" class="fnanchor">203</a> Finn, 1 Mar 54; and Hanifin, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>Captain Finn, seeing Reid’s motionless form lying ahead of the company -lines, crawled forward to recover the body. Having moved only a -short distance with his burden, the company commander himself was -struck in the head and shoulder by enemy bullets. Barely conscious and -almost blinded by blood, Finn crept back to his lines on his hands and -knees.</p> - -<p>A corpsman administered first aid and Company D’s first sergeant -helped the officer down the steep slope.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">204</a> On the way the pair met Lieutenant -Hanifin, who was leading company headquarters and the mortar<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> -section to the high ground from their positions of the previous night. -Finn informed the executive officer that he was now in command of the -company.<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">205</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204" class="fnanchor">204</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205" class="fnanchor">205</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Reaching the summit, Hanifin had just enough time to reorganize his -defensive positions and emplace the 60-mm. mortars before the Communists -launched another attack. Again Marine rifles, machineguns, and -grenades scorched the northern slopes. Again the enemy was beaten -back, leaving the hillside littered with dead. But Company D’s casualties -had mounted meanwhile to 6 killed in action and 25 wounded.<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">206</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206" class="fnanchor">206</a> Annex How; Hanifin, 15 Feb 54; and Maj A. M. Zimmer ltr to author, 18 Feb 54 -(Zimmer, 18 Feb 54). This breakdown of casualties is as nearly correct as can be ascertained -from recollections of participants and a comparison with the final total given after -2/5 was relieved on position.</p></div> - -<p>About 1130, as the fire fight slackened, Roise phoned Hanifin from -his OP on the eastern spur. The conversation had no sooner begun -when the company commander collapsed from heat exhaustion. A veteran -NCO and a young officer promptly filled the command vacuum. -Company D’s gunnery sergeant, Master Sergeant Harold Reeves, assumed -control of the three rifle platoons with the confidence of long -experience. Second Lieutenant Leroy K. Wirth, a forward observer of -1/11, took responsibility for all supporting arms, including the planes -of MAG-33 circling overhead. The NCO of almost 30 years service and -the young officer repeatedly ranged forward of the front lines to spot -enemy positions for air strikes and make new appraisals of the situation. -Company D remained steady, and never again did the North Koreans -seriously threaten the hilltop.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">207</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207" class="fnanchor">207</a> Hanifin, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>The 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, was scheduled to relieve 2/5 on Hill -342 during the afternoon of 8 August; but the Army unit was unable to -reach the area for reasons to be explained later. Informed of the change -in plans, Roise kept his battalion busy with consolidation of positions -and evacuation of casualties.</p> - -<p>Company E moved forward a few hundred yards along the western -spur of 342 and dug new foxholes. Captain Andrew M. Zimmer reported -from regiment, where he had been an assistant S-3, and took command -of Company D.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">208</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208" class="fnanchor">208</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Although the North Koreans continued to harass the “iron triangle” -on the crest, there was no more hard fighting. A few additional casualties -were taken by Zimmer’s company, most of them occurring while Marines<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> -tried to retrieve airdropped supplies which had fallen wide of their -mark.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">209</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209" class="fnanchor">209</a> Zimmer, 18 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>During the fighting on 342, Major Walter Gall, commander of 2/5’s -Weapons Company, had dispatched a small patrol to eliminate the enemy -machineguns in Tokkong-ni. After a brief fire fight which cost three -friendly casualties, the withdrawal of the patrol left the Communists still -entrenched in the village. When the Marines returned to Weapons Company -lines on the eastern spur, First Lieutenant Ira T. Carr turned his -81-mm. mortars on Tokkong-ni and brought the enemy fire to an end.<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">210</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210" class="fnanchor">210</a> Maj Walter Gall interv with authors, 9 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>The night of 8–9 August was relatively quiet on 342. Obviously -weakened by casualties, the enemy gave the Marine positions a wide -berth. NKPA harassing fires consisted of periodic bursts from long-range -machineguns and antitank guns.<a id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">211</a> There was desultory sniping during -the morning of the 9th, but Brigade intelligence reported a gradual -withdrawal of the enemy northward.<a id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">212</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_211" href="#FNanchor_211" class="fnanchor">211</a> Zimmer, 18 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_212" href="#FNanchor_212" class="fnanchor">212</a> Brig Periodic IntelRpt No. 6.</p></div> - -<p>That afternoon Company D was relieved by an Army unit when 2/5 -turned over responsibility for the hill to the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry. -The fight had made veterans out of the men Zimmer led down to the -road, but the company paid with 8 dead and 28 wounded.<a id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">213</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_213" href="#FNanchor_213" class="fnanchor">213</a> Zimmer, 18 Feb 54; and Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Documents taken from enemy dead disclosed that the defenders of -Hill 342 had been opposed by elements of the 13th and 15th Regiments -of the NK 6th Division. Lieutenant Cahill qualified his report of 150 -enemy dead as “conservative,”<a id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">214</a> and 2/5 set the total at 400 after its -fight.<a id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">215</a> The actual number of fatalities inflicted by Marine-Army infantry -and supporting arms probably lies somewhere between these two -estimates.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_214" href="#FNanchor_214" class="fnanchor">214</a> Cahill, 9 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_215" href="#FNanchor_215" class="fnanchor">215</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>At any rate, the Red Korean commander had committed at least two -rifle companies supported by machineguns, mortars and artillery. The -force thrown against Yaban-san could be estimated at 500 to 600 troops, -and they had failed in their attempt to cut the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">216</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_216" href="#FNanchor_216" class="fnanchor">216</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Brig Periodic IntelRpts Nos. 5 and 6.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_118">118</a><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_VII" class="vspace">CHAPTER VII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Advance to Kosong</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Heavy NKPA Resistance—Assault on Hill 255—Confusion at -Tosan Junction—Brigade Artillery in Support—Encounter With -Japanese Maps—Ambush at Taedabok Pass—The Seizure of Kosong</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">While 2/5 and</span> the 1st Platoon of Company G were fighting the -enemy and weather on 7 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d -Battalion sat out an ominous calm at Chindong-ni. From their positions -on Hills 253 and 99, Captain Fegan and Lieutenant Bohn periodically -called for supporting fires to check enemy movement in the northern -approaches to the village.</p> - -<p>At 1015 Second Lieutenant Lawrence W. Hetrick and his 3d Platoon, -Company A Engineers, completed the laying of the first Marine minefield, -located across the Haman road a half mile above Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">217</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_217" href="#FNanchor_217" class="fnanchor">217</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion reached the village in the -afternoon of the 7th and relieved Company G’s two platoons on Hill 99. -Bohn took his company back across the valley and deployed on the -lower slopes of 255 facing the Haman road. These positions were hit by -close-in sniper fire during the night of 7–8 August, and at dawn the Marine -infantrymen were startled to discover four NK soldiers emplaced -less than 100 yards away in the valley. Both the enemy position and its -occupants were quickly destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_218" href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">218</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_218" href="#FNanchor_218" class="fnanchor">218</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Bohn, 17 Apr 50.</p></div> - -<p>Shortly after daybreak on 8 August—while Cahill was being relieved -on Yaban-san—the Marines of Company H noted a column of troops -climbing Hill 255 from the direction of the Haman road. Believing the -newcomers to be ROK soldiers, Fegan’s men watched as the long file -reached the high peak beyond the plateau forward of the Marine positions. -When the group set up facing Company H, Fegan became skeptical -enough to alert his riflemen and machinegunners. His precautions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> -were timely, for the visitors immediately opened fire on the Marines.<a id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">219</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_219" href="#FNanchor_219" class="fnanchor">219</a> Fegan, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>This surprise attack had a critical effect on the Task Force Kean sector. -In possession of the high ground above 3/5, the North Koreans -were able to block the Masan-Chindong-ni stretch of the MSR, leaving -most of the American ground forces out on a limb for supply and reinforcement -purposes. Thus when the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, advanced -from Masan to relieve both 3/5 and 2/5 on their respective hills, -it was driven off the fire-swept road north of Chindong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">220</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_220" href="#FNanchor_220" class="fnanchor">220</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt; and Craig, 12 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Upon being informed of the enemy’s presence, Taplett ordered Company -H to attack and destroy the Communist position. Fegan called -his two platoon leaders<a id="FNanchor_221" href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">221</a> while the Marine infantrymen in the line -exchanged shots with the enemy across the plateau. After a quick briefing, -Second Lieutenant John O. Williams led his 1st Platoon to the -long tableland.<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">222</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_221" href="#FNanchor_221" class="fnanchor">221</a> The 2d Platoon was still in position east of the MSR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_222" href="#FNanchor_222" class="fnanchor">222</a> Fegan, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>Echeloned to the right, the skirmish line pushed aggressively over the -open area, firing on the enemy as it moved forward. The platoon closed -to within 30 yards of the Communist-held peak, but showers of hand -grenades and continuous machinegun fire pinned down the attackers. -Fegan sent a message forward, directing Williams to work around the -enemy’s left flank. Although one fire team succeeded in reaching the -rocks below the NK positions, the flanking maneuver failed.</p> - -<h3><i>Heavy NKPA Resistance</i></h3> - -<p>The 3d Platoon had taken several casualties. Marines still in the open -area were unable to advance, while those who had attempted the envelopment -could only cling to the steep slopes above the MSR. When -some of this group were struck by enemy fire, the impact sent them rolling -helplessly down the sharp incline.</p> - -<p>Convinced that Williams could not carry the peak, Fegan ordered -him to pull his platoon back toward the line of departure and reorganize. -While the withdrawal was in progress, the company commander -ordered the 3d Platoon to pass through the 1st and continue the attack. -There was no response to the order.<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">223</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_223" href="#FNanchor_223" class="fnanchor">223</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Fegan realized that the men were momentarily unnerved after witnessing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> -the failure of the first attack. The company commander, therefore, -assumed control and personally led the 3rd Platoon forward on the -plateau. Halfway across the open area, the new skirmish line passed -through Williams’ outfit as it was reforming.</p> - -<p>The Marines of the 3d Platoon responded with confidence to Fegan’s -leadership. They crossed the tableland in a wedge formation with 1 -squad at the apex and the other 2 slightly withheld. Air strikes and artillery -preparations had little effect against the rocky crag beyond the -plateau, so that the final assault was fought to a finish with small arms -and grenades.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" class="fnanchor">224</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_224" href="#FNanchor_224" class="fnanchor">224</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>Staff Sergeant John I. Wheatley, one of the prime movers, fell -wounded along with several of his men. Sergeant Edward F. Barrett, -shot in the elbow and hip, lay helpless, exposed to enemy fire, until Captain -Fegan carried him back to safety.</p> - -<p>The 3d Platoon gained the rocky summit and worked its way through -the NKPA position, a foxhole at a time, while the enemy resisted to the -death. Corporal Melvin James<a id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">225</a> hit the Red Korean left flank with his -squad and drove deep into the enemy position. The NKPA right flank -was rolled up by a vigorous assault sparked by Technical Sergeant Ray -Morgan and Private First Class Donald Terrio<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">226</a> as each knocked out a -Communist machinegun and its crew.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_225" href="#FNanchor_225" class="fnanchor">225</a> James was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for this action.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_226" href="#FNanchor_226" class="fnanchor">226</a> Morgan and Terrio received Silver Star medals.</p></div> - -<p>Having wiped out the main enemy position, the 3d Platoon advanced -northward about 200 yards to a gulf where the high ground fell away -abruptly. Beyond this depression rose the highest step of the ridgeline’s -rugged staircase: Hill 255 with a height of mote than 800 feet above the -MSR. The three squads held up here to await further orders.</p> - -<p>How Company’s fight up to this time had cost the Marines 6 dead -and 32 wounded.<a id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">227</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_227" href="#FNanchor_227" class="fnanchor">227</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Assault on Hill 255</i></h3> - -<p>A column of NKPA reinforcements bound for Hill 255 was spotted -during the action by Company G from its positions facing the Haman -road. The enemy platoon struck out across the valley from the high -ground north of Hill 99, then attempted to ascend 255 via the same -route used by comrades at dawn.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> -The Marines of Company G and their supporting arms cut loose with -a hurricane of fire. And after scattering in panic, the enemy survivors -scuttled back to their starting point.<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">228</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_228" href="#FNanchor_228" class="fnanchor">228</a> Bohn, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray, upon being informed of the progress -made by How Company, directed Taplett to halt the attack and dig in -for the night. While Fegan’s men were carrying out this order under -NKPA artillery and mortar fire, MAG-33 and the Marine artillery roared -into action. The saddle north of How Company’s lines was pounded so -mercilessly that the enemy pulled back from Fegan’s immediate front. -Throughout the night of 8–9 August, 1/11 and 3/5’s mortar platoon -dropped a steel curtain across the battalion front, with the result that -no enemy activity was noted.<a id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">229</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_229" href="#FNanchor_229" class="fnanchor">229</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>The systematic reduction of enemy positions on Hill 255 the next -morning was a triumph of supporting arms. Marine artillery shells led -off at 0825, followed by Marine air which worked the enemy over with -the first close-support payload of napalm recorded so far in the Korean -conflict. And four minutes before Company H launched its final attack -on the hill, airborne TAC reported the objective neutralized.<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">230</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_230" href="#FNanchor_230" class="fnanchor">230</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Fegan’s men scaled the peak against negligible opposition. Two -knocked-out machineguns and a few enemy dead were all that remained -at the summit.<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231" class="fnanchor">231</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_231" href="#FNanchor_231" class="fnanchor">231</a> Fegan, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>The plan for eliminating the threat to the MSR called for a Marine -advance along Hill 255 to grid line 1350. North of this boundary, the -ridge would be cleared by Army troops approaching from Masan.</p> - -<p>Company H sighted soldiers of the 24th Infantry at 1125 as they -moved southward to the grid line, and the long ridge was considered -secure. It had been no light price, however, that 3/5 paid to open the -MSR. Casualties on Hill 255 totalled 16 dead and 36 wounded, and since -nearly all had been taken by Company H, Fegan’s outfit was reduced by -25 percent.<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">232</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_232" href="#FNanchor_232" class="fnanchor">232</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Confusion at Tosan Junction</i></h3> - -<p>On the whole, Task Force Kean’s scheduled drive on Chinju and -Sachon had not met with much success during the first 48 hours. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> -only advance was made on the right, where the 35th Infantry seized its -first objective and inflicted an estimated 350 casualties on the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233" class="fnanchor">233</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_233" href="#FNanchor_233" class="fnanchor">233</a> Annexes 1 and 3 to 25th InfDiv War Diary, Book VIII.</p></div> - -<p>In his capacity as provisional commander of all units along the Masan-Chinju -axis, General Craig was directing the Army operations at the -front and in the rear areas of the Task Force sector. Thus on 8 August -he ordered the 5th RCT to continue its attack and take Tosan, so that -his Marines could make progress on the road to Sachon.</p> - -<p>After preparatory fires, the Army regiment again pushed forward toward -its immediate objective. Enemy resistance was much heavier than -on the day before; nevertheless, some gains were made from the starting -point near the village of Singi. The attack was also slowed by the narrow -MSR carrying the entire traffic load for the Task Force. Heavy fighting -above the road on Hills 255 and 342 added to the congestion and -confusion on the vital artery.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been -ordered to move forward from Chindong-ni at 0600, 8 August, with the -mission of attacking along the south fork of the Tosan junction preparatory -to seizing a regimental objective which would be designated later.<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">234</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_234" href="#FNanchor_234" class="fnanchor">234</a> Annex How; Brig Op Plan 5-50; and Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 3 Jan 54 -(Newton, 3 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>Leaving its positions on Hill 99 at the assigned time, the battalion -was stalled immediately at the bridges on the MSR below. The road was -still clogged with soldiers and Army vehicles, making it impossible for -the Marine unit to proceed.<a id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">235</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_235" href="#FNanchor_235" class="fnanchor">235</a> LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 30 Dec 53 (Olson, 30 Dec 53).</p></div> - -<p>General Craig, who was in the vicinity, told Newton to hold up until -the situation at the front became clarified. Company B, commanded by -Captain John L. Tobin, was ordered back up on the hill it had just descended; -and the battalion waited, three miles from its line of -departure.<a id="FNanchor_236" href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">236</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_236" href="#FNanchor_236" class="fnanchor">236</a> Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 19 Jan 54 (Newton, 19 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>Finally the word came to move up. While 1/5 worked its way along -the crowded road, Newton walked ahead and reached the CP of the 1st -Battalion, 5th RCT, located on a hillside between Singi and Oryong. -There he learned that the Army unit’s companies were already on the -high ground all around the junction and that the rice paddies between -the battalion CP and these companies were full of North Koreans. The -Army commander considered his subordinate units cut off.<a id="FNanchor_237" href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">237</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_237" href="#FNanchor_237" class="fnanchor">237</a> Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>Shortly afterwards, at about 1400, the head of 1/5’s column reached -Newton and again came to a halt, a mile and a half from its line of departure.</p> - -<p>Arriving on the scene at this time was a dispirited Army staff sergeant, -dripping with mud and water. He said that he had just returned from -Hill 308, south of the road junction, where his unit was heavily engaged -with the enemy. And he added that Communist machineguns covering -the wide rice paddy between 308 and the MSR had forced him to crawl -almost the whole distance.<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">238</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_238" href="#FNanchor_238" class="fnanchor">238</a> Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray, while driving from Chindong-ni to the -front, was stopped on the road by Major General Kean himself. The -25th Division commander directed the Marine officer to arrange for a -night relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT. Kean stated that he would inform -Brigade headquarters of this change in plans as soon as possible.<a id="FNanchor_239" href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">239</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_239" href="#FNanchor_239" class="fnanchor">239</a> Col R. L. Murray, ltr to author, 7 Jan 54 (Murray, 7 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>It had become a question as to whether Task Force Kean or the -NKPA 6th Division controlled Tosan. Newton radioed the 5th Marines -commander and asked for enlightenment. Murray, having just finished -his conversation with General Kean, ordered the battalion commander -to postpone the jumpoff until nightfall.<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">240</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_240" href="#FNanchor_240" class="fnanchor">240</a> Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>After withdrawing to the outskirts of Sangnyong-ni, 1/5 went into an -assembly area beneath the western spur of Hill 342. There the battalion -commander received specific orders to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th -RCT, on positions southwest of Tosan at midnight, 8 August, and secure -the troublesome road junction once and for all.<a id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">241</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_241" href="#FNanchor_241" class="fnanchor">241</a> Annex How; Brig Op Plan 6-50; and Newton, 3 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Newton was to have his battalion at the Army CP no later than 2300, -when it would be furnished guides to lead the way across the broad rice -paddy to Hill 308. As it proved, the Marine unit actually reached the -designated rendezvous at 2200. But even though an hour early, Newton -discovered that the soldiers on 308 were already withdrawing. Moreover, -no guides had been provided.<a id="FNanchor_242" href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">242</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_242" href="#FNanchor_242" class="fnanchor">242</a> Newton, 3 Jan 54 and 19 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>The Marine battalion continued westward through Singi and stopped -on the MSR about a half-mile short of Tosan. Here a narrow dike -branched south from the road, and the soldiers were returning along this -trail from Hill 308 to the MSR. Since the footpath was pointed out as -Newton’s route of approach, he had little choice but to wait until the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span> -Army troops made the crossing. This was accomplished shortly after -midnight, and the column of Marines was left alone in the night on unfamiliar -ground reported to be crawling with enemy.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">243</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_243" href="#FNanchor_243" class="fnanchor">243</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The promised guides reported for duty at this time. They turned out -to be two South Korean civilians. Without further ado, the advance on -Sachon was launched when a long single file of skeptical Marines fell in -behind two unknown natives whose loyalty had to be accepted on faith.</p> - -<p>Following the 1,200-yard trail in the darkness was time-consuming as -well as nerve-chilling. A misstep on the narrow, slippery dike usually -meant a spill into the muck and filth of the paddy for some hapless infantryman. -Not only would he delay all those behind, but he would not -be as fragrant as a rose in the nostrils of his comrades when he regained -the dike.</p> - -<p>Finally the head of the file reached the base of Hill 308, having encountered -not a single enemy on the way. As more and more men -threaded their way in from the paddy, tactical integrity was slowly regained. -Dawn of 9 August was already breaking when the rear of the -column completed the crossing.<a id="FNanchor_244" href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">244</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_244" href="#FNanchor_244" class="fnanchor">244</a> Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>Daybreak brought a radio message from Murray, directing 1/5 to continue -the attack to the southwest immediately and seize Hill 308. With -Tobin’s company leading, the battalion ascended the northern slopes in -a long column. The climb took the Marines more than 1,000 feet upward -and 2,000 yards to the south. Before the summit was reached, the -relentless sun and terrain had taken its toll of Newton’s infantrymen. -Fortunately, enemy resistance amounted to mere sniping; and by noon, -9 August, the massive terrain feature belonged to the Brigade.<a id="FNanchor_245" href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">245</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_245" href="#FNanchor_245" class="fnanchor">245</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>At 1700 that afternoon Craig’s operational control of all troops in the -area came to a close. At the end of the 54-hour period of the Marine general’s -overall command, the road junction had been cleared, and both -Army and Marine columns were making progress toward the objective.</p> - -<h3><i>Brigade Artillery in Support</i></h3> - -<p>Nearly all the infantry actions of the first 3 days owed a good deal to the -support of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Consisting of three 4-gun<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span> -batteries, Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood’s outfit had relieved the -8th Field Artillery Battalion at Chindong-ni on the eve of D-day. Since -the terrain afforded no suitable alternate areas, the Marine gunners -moved into the positions vacated by the Army artillery, partly in the village -and partly on the outskirts.</p> - -<p>A total of 87 rounds were fired that first night in support of the 5th -Marines, with the FO’s reporting good results. Before long, however, -enemy counterbattery fires searched out friendly positions in the village. -Early the next morning a Marine battery took a direct hit from an -NKPA 122-mm. shell. Two men were killed and 8 wounded by a blast -which destroyed a 105-mm. howitzer. Thus, reversing the usual rule, -the artillery suffered heavier casualties than the infantry at the jumpoff -of the Brigade attack.<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">246</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_246" href="#FNanchor_246" class="fnanchor">246</a> Annex Item to Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>The gunners needed no further admonitions to dig foxholes, gunpits -and ammunition pits. During the confused fighting around Chindong-ni, -it was not unusual to have one battery laid on an azimuth generally -east, another west, and a third to the north.</p> - -<p>“I think that this is one of the most important lessons we learned in -fighting infiltrating troops,” commented Wood; “artillery must be able -and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment’s notice.”<a id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">247</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_247" href="#FNanchor_247" class="fnanchor">247</a> LtCol Ransom M. Wood, “Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea,” <cite>Marine Corps -Gazette</cite>, 35, No. 6:16–17 (Jun 51).</p></div> - -<p>From 7 to 9 August, with the battalion displacing forward as the infantry -advanced, 89 missions and 1,892 rounds were fired. Targets consisted -largely of enemy mortar positions. The terrain offered some knotty -problems in firing close support missions, due to steep slopes; but the -OY’s of VMO-6 did a good job of spotting.</p> - -<p>Fifty ROK policemen were attached to 1/11 at this time to be used -as security troops. Wearing bright green uniforms and rubber shoes -upon arrival, they became the responsibility of the battalion to feed, -equip and train in marksmanship, sanitation and ammunition handling. -The rice-eating Koreans turned up their noses at American food for a -few days, but soon they could compete with any chow-hounds in the -outfit.<a id="FNanchor_248" href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">248</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_248" href="#FNanchor_248" class="fnanchor">248</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Another difficulty was experienced in convincing the newcomers that -NKPA prisoners were to be brought in alive. Many personal scores remained -to be paid off in war-torn Korea, but eventually the ROK’s -learned to control their hatred for the invaders.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span></p> - -<h3><i>Encounter With Japanese Maps</i></h3> - -<p>As the men of 1/5 were consolidating their hilltop and searching for -water to relieve heat prostration cases, Murray radioed Newton to withdraw -his unit to the road below and continue the attack to Paedun-ni. -The regimental commander was determined to speed up the advance to -the south, since intelligence had reported no enemy on the high ground -south of Hill 308.<a id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">249</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_249" href="#FNanchor_249" class="fnanchor">249</a> Murray, 7 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>With almost half of Companies A and B stricken by heat sickness, -Newton had no choice but to leave them in position on the high -ground for the time being. He descended the hill to form a tactical column -with Headquarters and Weapons Companies and an attached platoon -of tanks.</p> - -<p>Reaching the low ground northwest of Hill 308, the battalion commander -discovered that his Japanese maps, as usual, bore only a slight -resemblance to the actual ground.</p> - -<p>During the early weeks in Korea, the map situation was a thorn in -the side of every tactical commander. Not only were maps of local areas -extremely scarce, but the few available were of early Japanese vintage, -almost consistently at variance with the terrain. Grid systems were confusing, -villages misnamed and misplaced, and roads either not illustrated -at all or else plotted inaccurately. Lack of contouring left the conformation -and extent of ridges entirely to the imagination of the map -reader. These shortcomings were a constant source of concern; for troop -leaders often were misled, even to the extent of getting completely lost.</p> - -<p>On the ground itself, there is an intersection called Oso-ri some 600 -yards south of the Tosan junction. The routes leading both south and -west from this crossroads go to Paedun-ni. An unimproved road, the -southward passage is more rugged, while the other, being good by Korean -standards, follows a smoother course through the town of Taesil-li.</p> - -<p>Newton’s map showed only the latter improved road, so he formed -his column and headed it toward Taesil-li, a thousand yards west of the -intersection.<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" class="fnanchor">250</a> Murray’s map showed both roads, but in this case the -southern route was erroneously drawn in as the better road. It was thus -Murray’s intention that 1/5 use this avenue of approach. And since he -had spoken of it as the “improved” road, Newton was misled into -choosing the route to Taesil-li.<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">251</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_250" href="#FNanchor_250" class="fnanchor">250</a> Newton, 3 Jan 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_251" href="#FNanchor_251" class="fnanchor">251</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Murray, 7 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>The quickly formed column of tanks and infantry had gone only a few -hundred yards when the point stopped at a stretch of road littered with -land mines. A call went out for a demolitions team. From his CP near -Chindong-ni, Captain George W. King dispatched his 1st Platoon, Able -Company Engineers. Arriving at the scene, the Marine troubleshooters -discovered the obstacles to be merely American antitank mines, apparently -spilled on the road from an Army vehicle.</p> - -<p>About this time. Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at Oso-ri and informed -1/5’s commander that he was on the wrong road. Newton reasoned -that his unit was following the correct route. After comparing the -conflicting maps, the regimental commander studied the terrain and directed -Newton to pull his column back and take the road to the south. -Then Murray returned to Sangnyong-ni, climbed into an observation -plane, and was flown over the route to confirm his decision.<a id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">252</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_252" href="#FNanchor_252" class="fnanchor">252</a> Murray, 7 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>There was no small amount of confusion as the long column of tanks, -infantrymen, and engineers pulled back along the narrow road to -the intersection. And it was unfortunate for 1/5 that General Craig -reached the area while the milling was at its worst. Unaware of what -had taken place earlier, the Brigade commander did not refer to the delay -and congestion in the most soothing terms.<a id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">253</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_253" href="#FNanchor_253" class="fnanchor">253</a> Craig, 12 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>While the column was being reformed on the southern road, villagers -from Taesil-li informed the Marines that a badly wounded American was -lying in the hamlet. Craig’s jeep driver sped to the clump of thatched -huts and returned with a soldier who was more dead than alive, having -been left behind by retreating NKPA forces. The man was rushed to the -rear for medical attention, while Craig stayed forward to supervise the -attack.<a id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">254</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_254" href="#FNanchor_254" class="fnanchor">254</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Newton, 19 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>The long file of Marines and tanks began moving southward along -the winding road below Hill 308. Newton had notified his company -commanders of the change, so that they could meet him by descending -the western slope of the high ground.</p> - -<p>About a mile south of the confusing intersection, the point of 1/5’s -column rounded a sharp curve. It was greeted by a lone North Korean -machinegun hidden in a native hut at the center of the bend. While a -Marine brigadier watched with professional satisfaction, a team of infantrymen -with a rocket launcher closed on the hut and quickly destroyed -the enemy position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> -It was late afternoon as the column resumed its march to the south. -Covering several hundred more yards without incident, it reached the -top of a 400-foot pass where the road knifed between Hills 308 and 190. -There Newton was joined by Companies A and B from Objective -One.<a id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">255</a> The 1st Battalion was ordered to hold up and take defensive positions -astride the pass.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_255" href="#FNanchor_255" class="fnanchor">255</a> Olson, 30 Dec 53.</p></div> - -<p>Thus, the drive toward Sachon had finally taken shape, and the Brigade -was entering its own zone of responsibility. As darkness fell on 9 -August, 1/5 was in position 2 miles south of the Tosan line of departure, -and General Craig had already set in motion plans for a night attack.</p> - -<h3><i>Ambush at Taedabok Pass</i></h3> - -<p>On 9 August the Brigade commander was convinced that the absence -of resistance in 1/5’s path indicated unpreparedness on the part of the -enemy. To exploit the advantage, he ordered Murray to execute a night -attack and capture Paedun-ni before daylight, 10 August.<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" class="fnanchor">256</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_256" href="#FNanchor_256" class="fnanchor">256</a> Brig Op Plan 7-50.</p></div> - -<p>At 1600 on 9 August, the Brigade was relieved of mopping up duties -in the Chindong-ni area, leaving 2/5 immediately available to the 5th -Marines commander. The 3d Battalion was delayed overnight by several -hours of security duty until Army units could take over.<a id="FNanchor_257" href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">257</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_257" href="#FNanchor_257" class="fnanchor">257</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan 54; Zimmer, 18 Feb 54; -Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54; and Gall, 9 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion, having been relieved on Hill -342, entrucked at Sangnyong-ni in the evening and reached its assembly -area near Hill 308 at 2100. Two hours later the unit marched southward -on the new MSR to make the night attack on Paedun-ni. Passing -through 1/5’s lines at 0115, 10 August, the weary Marines pressed on -toward their target against no resistance.</p> - -<p>The point of the column included three M-26’s of First Lieutenant -William D. Pomeroy’s tank platoon. At 0500, with the advance elements -only a short distance from Paedun-ni, the lead tank crashed -through a concrete bridge. The badly damaged vehicle proved to be -wedged immovably between the two abutments.</p> - -<p>The second tank, while attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next -to the bridge, threw a track in the center of the stream and stalled the -long column behind. Two hours elapsed before the advance could be<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_130">130</a><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -resumed. South Korean laborers constructed a bypass for light vehicles -next to the bridge, and an engineer tractor-dozer arrived to build a -detour for heavy trucks and tanks.</p> - -<div id="ip_130" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_130.jpg" width="2081" height="1357" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>SACHON OFFENSIVE</p> - <p class="smaller">SITUATION MAP FOR - 8–10 AUG. ’50</p></div></div> - -<p>Reaching Paedun-ni at 0800, 2/5 reconnoitered the town and found it -clear of enemy. By 0930 the battalion column was reformed and pounding -the dusty road south.</p> - -<p>Murray decided to shuttle troops by truck from Paedun-ni to Kosong, -since the 8-mile stretch was believed to be free of enemy. The heavier -vehicles being tied up at the collapsed bridge, some delay resulted in -motorizing the first increment of 2/5.</p> - -<p>General Craig arrived on the scene by helicopter in mid-morning. -Not satisfied with the progress of the advance, he ordered Murray and -Roise to march on Kosong with “all speed.” When the infantry column -was a short distance out of Paedun-ni, the 5th Marines commander -managed to get five 2½-ton trucks forward to help transport the first -serial to the target.</p> - -<p>A motorized column was formed of 4 lead jeeps carrying a Reconnaissance -Company detachment, followed by part of Company D aboard -6 more jeeps and the 5 trucks. Owing to the shortage of vehicles, Captain -Zimmer’s first echelon included only the 1st and 2d Platoons, the -60-mm. mortars, an assault squad, and one machinegun section.</p> - -<p>Lacking either air or artillery support, the column rolled southward -with orders to occupy Kosong and coordinate a defense of the city with -its mayor. The remainder of 2/5 continued on foot until more vehicles -could be provided.</p> - -<p>The road makes a sharp turn 2½ miles southwest of Paedun-ni to -climb through Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards long. Just -beyond, at the village of Pugok, a sharp turn to the left skirts the base -of a large hill overlooking the entire length of the pass.</p> - -<p>The first jeep of the reconnaissance detachment was almost abreast of -Pugok at 1500 when NKPA machineguns opened up from the big hill -at the bend. Enemy automatic weapons on the high ground above the -pass raked the vehicles filled with Dog Company men.</p> - -<p>As the Marines were taking cover in roadside ditches, a Communist -antitank gun opened fire from the large hill and hit one of the jeeps. The -reconnaissance troops gradually withdrew from their exposed positions -and fell back on Zimmer’s group. After sizing up the situation, the Company -D commander ordered his 1st Platoon to seize the high ground on -the right side of the road about midway through the pass. No resistance -was met, so that the Marines set up their weapons quickly and returned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> -the Communist fire. Meanwhile the 2d Platoon moved up on the right -after clearing small enemy groups from the high ground on both sides -of the road at the entrance to the defile.</p> - -<p>Zimmer had spotted the location of the enemy’s antitank gun, and -Marine 60-mm. fire put an end to this nuisance. The effort used up all -the mortar ammunition, and the Company D commander decided to wait -in position for Brigade supporting arms. Two tanks arrived at 1630, and -their 90-mm. guns drove the enemy into hiding.</p> - -<p>While Marine tanks and air were working over the hill, 3/5 reached -Paedun-ni after being relieved of its final security mission in the -Chindong-ni area. Murray ordered Taplett to be prepared to pass -through 2/5 and continue the attack.</p> - -<p>The 3d Battalion reached the entrance to Taedabok Pass in trucks -shortly after the arrival of the 2d Battalion troops who had followed -their motorized column on foot. Some confusion resulted on the narrow -road after Murray’s arrival while he waited to confer with Taplett. -Unable to find Roise, the two officers climbed the high ground on the -left. From this vantage point they could see Kosong, 5 miles away. The -regimental commander ordered Taplett to pass through 2/5 immediately -and continue the attack.</p> - -<p>Company G had already crossed the line of departure and was deploying -to assault the hill at the road bend when Murray located Roise in -Zimmer’s area to the right of the road. The exact location of enemy -positions remained in some doubt. In order to clear up the uncertainty, -Major McNeely volunteered to lead out a patrol. About 1730, therefore, -Roise’s S/3 took off in a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team from -Dog Company.</p> - -<p>By this time, Taplett had a fairly accurate picture of the situation in -mind. From his OP on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw -that McNeely was headed for danger. The 3/5 commander radioed Bohn -to stop the jeep, but it was too late. McNeely and his men vanished from -sight around the bend where the road skirted the large hill, and the -Marines heard a furious clatter of machinegun and small arms fire.</p> - -<p>The fate of the patrol remained in doubt as Company G moved out to -the attack, with First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon in the lead. -Communist fire held up the advance, but Bohn sent Second Lieutenant -Edward F. Duncan’s platoon on a sweeping envelopment to the right -which outflanked the enemy and drove him from the high ground. -Westerman was then able to reach the crest with his platoon. From this -position he could see McNeely’s bullet-riddled jeep, but that officer and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span> -his five men were stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and -behind the vehicle.</p> - -<div id="ip_133" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_133.jpg" width="2086" height="1354" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>SACHON OFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">10 AUG. 1950</span></p> - <p class="smaller">SHOWING PAEDUN-NI & TAEDABOK PASS</p></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_134">134</a><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p> - -<div id="ip_134" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_134.jpg" width="2130" height="1368" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>SACHON OFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">11 AUG. 1950</span></p> - <p class="smaller">SHOWING KOSONG</p></div></div> - -<p>At great risk, Westerman made a dash to the jeep and brought back -McNeely, mortally wounded. Enemy fire prevented further rescues, but -it was ascertained that 3 men had been killed outright and 2 severely -wounded. These survivors could only continue to take cover behind the -wrecked vehicle until 3/5 troops advanced.</p> - -<p>When Company G jumped off again, the men were held up by two -concealed machineguns at the far end of the road bend. Taplett committed -How Company on the left side of the MSR, and Fegan seized the -hill opposite Bohn’s position. It was almost dark before the Marines -could silence the 2 enemy machineguns around the bend, and at 2015 -Murray ordered 3/5 to secure for the night and defend the 2 hills already -occupied. On the premise that the enemy had prepared an ambush for -rescue parties approaching the wrecked jeep, it was decided to wait until -morning to bring back the wounded men.</p> - -<h3><i>The Seizure of Kosong</i></h3> - -<p>The night passed quietly except for scattered rifle fire along the 3d -Battalion’s 700-yard front. To carry out General Craig’s orders for 11 -August, the two rifle companies prepared to continue the attack on -Kosong at first light.<a id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">258</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_258" href="#FNanchor_258" class="fnanchor">258</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan 54; Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr -54 (with comments by LtCol R. D. Taplett).</p></div> - -<p>The enemy had different plans. At the crack of dawn a small force -of North Koreans emerged from the fog and charged recklessly into -Company G’s front. There was a furious hand-to-hand clash as the -attackers converged on Bohn’s OP in the center of the line. The company -commander directed the defense amid grenade explosions, one of -which drove a fragment into his shoulder. At his side Staff Sergeant -Charles F. Kurtz, Jr., called down effective 60-mm. mortar fire on the -Reds while throwing grenades and ducking submachinegun bursts.</p> - -<p>The melee ended after a half hour with Company G driving the -battered remnants of the NKPA platoon back down the hill Despite his -wound, Bohn stayed with his company and reorganized it for the attack -on Kosong. He also had the satisfaction of overseeing the evacuation of -the two wounded survivors of McNeely’s ill-fated patrol.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span> -At 0800, the Brigade moved out in a route column, with 3/5 as the -advance guard and Company G in the role of advance party. Bohn’s -point consisted of Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman’s 3d Platoon, -whose leading element, under Corporal Raymond Giaquinto, was on the -MSR with flank guards slightly withheld on each side.</p> - -<p>The Brigade column moved swiftly. About a mile beyond the line of -departure, Giaquinto braked his roadbound unit in the face of doubtful -ground ahead. Simultaneously, the flank guards surged forward and -wrapped around the suspected area. Then Giaquinto’s force raced down -the road, and the 3 prongs of the point converged on an enemy machinegun -emplacement, killing the 5 occupants before they could fire a shot.</p> - -<p>With Bohn calling the shots and Giaquinto setting the pace, the point -swept aside three more enemy positions along the route. The effective -combination of limited frontal attacks and envelopments brought the -head of the column to the bridge north of Kosong at 1000. Here Company -H passed through on the road and pushed into the town.</p> - -<p>Using 1 rifle platoon and 2 tanks, Fegan easily cleared northern -Kosong of light resistance. Then he gradually wheeled his force to the -right, tracing the road to Sachon. His other two platoons continued -southward with the mission of seizing a high hill below Sunam-dong.</p> - -<p>General Craig reached Kosong by jeep just as Taplett was setting up -his CP in a schoolyard north of the town. A small group of enemy -snipers suddenly opened up from positions in and around the schoolhouse, -and the Brigade commander observed sniper teams of 3/5’s headquarters -spring into action and destroy the North Koreans.</p> - -<p>Shortly after Fegan entered Kosong, Bohn swung his company to the -southwest from above the town, drove through the western suburbs and -launched an attack against Hill 88 below the Sachon road. Approaching -the hill, Company G sustained a few casualties while eliminating a stubborn -Communist pocket in the low ground on its right flank.</p> - -<p>MAG-33 preceded the attack on Hill 88 with a thundering air strike -on 100 enemy entrenched along the crest. This attack coupled with a -thorough shelling by 1/11, shattered the Reds’ will to fight, and Company -G found only evidence of a hasty flight when it reached the summit -at 1330.</p> - -<p>General Craig ordered Taplett to cancel all further missions around -the captured town and attack toward Sachon immediately. Company G -was quickly recalled from Hill 88; the high ground above Sunam-dong -was ignored, and Fegan assembled his unit at the western edge of -Kosong preparatory to leading the attack.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span> -Just as Company H was reforming, a jeep ambulance driven by Corpsman -William H. Anderson raced into the area to pick up casualties from -Bohn’s earlier skirmish below Hill 88. Passing through Fegan’s troops, -the vehicle failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sachon. -Two enemy antitank guns lying in wait west of Kosong blasted the jeep -as it rounded a bend, killing Anderson and spilling two passengers out -of the wrecked vehicle.</p> - -<p>Fegan led two M-26 tanks to the bend, and Technical Sergeant -Johnnie C. Cottrell quickly destroyed the North Korean position. Three -rounds from his 90-mm. gun wiped out the last NKPA opposition in the -area, and the 3d Battalion moved out for the drive on Sachon.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_138">138</a><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_VIII" class="vspace">CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Fight on Two Fronts</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>The Kosong Turkey Shoot—The Changchon Ambush—Marines -Ordered to New Sector—Attack of 3/5 to the Rear—Enemy Dawn -Attack at Changchon—Breaking Off Action</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Marine air and</span> artillery had a field day on 11 August 1950 that -the rifle companies will never forget. The occasion was known -as “the Kosong Turkey Shoot,” and it was a victory won entirely by -supporting arms.</p> - -<p>It happened just as 3/5 was about to enter Kosong. As a preliminary, -1/11 was called upon just before noon for preparatory fires. Shells from -the 105’s landed in the town, sending up geysers of rubble in the bright -sunlight. Then, suddenly, the Marine artillery flushed out a column of -enemy vehicles making a frantic dash for safety.</p> - -<p>This flight explains the light resistance which the Marine infantry met -in Kosong. But the enemy could hardly have chosen a less propitious -moment, for he had merely escaped from the frying pan into the fire. -Overhead, to his sorrow, was a division of VMF-323 planes from the -<i>Badoeng Strait</i>, which the forward TACP had sent on a search and attack -mission just beyond the town.<a id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">259</a> Major Lund and his pilots were thus -presented with a fabulous target of opportunity—an estimated 100 -vehicles of the NKPA 83d Motorcycle Regiment, including jeeps, -motorcycles and troop-carrying trucks.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">260</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_259" href="#FNanchor_259" class="fnanchor">259</a> VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_260" href="#FNanchor_260" class="fnanchor">260</a> Estimates as to the number of vehicles vary widely. Apparently no exact count was ever -made.</p></div> - -<h3><i>The Kosong Turkey Shoot</i></h3> - -<p>The Corsairs came screaming down in low-level strafing runs the entire -length of the column for the purpose of bringing it to a halt. Vehicles<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span> -crashed into one another or piled up in the ditch while enemy troops -scrambled out for cover. The Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles were -now sitting ducks for F4U’s which worked over individual targets with -rocket or 20-mm. fire. After the Marine planes had set about 40 vehicles -on fire, they were relieved by another flight of VMF-323 machines and -Air Force F-51’s which added the finishing touches to the picture of -destruction.<a id="FNanchor_261" href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">261</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_261" href="#FNanchor_261" class="fnanchor">261</a> Ernest Giusti, “Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, 36, No. -5:20–21 (May 52).</p></div> - -<p>Under the circumstances the enemy put up a creditable fight. Lund -and his low-flying pilots encountered fierce small arms and automatic -weapons fire. Two of the four Corsairs in the first flight were badly -damaged and had to try for emergency landings. Lieutenant Doyle Cole -ditched into the bay just as General Craig was making a tour of inspection -by helicopter; and the Brigade commander operated the hoist which -pulled the dripping flier up to safety.</p> - -<p>Captain Vivian Moses was not so fortunate. While putting his -crippled plane down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious -from the cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy a few minutes before a -VMO-6 helicopter arrived. Only the day before, this gallant Marine -pilot had been rescued by helicopter, after being shot down behind the -NKPA lines, and flown back unhurt to his carrier. Despite this experience, -Captain Moses volunteered for duty on 11 August, when he -became the first death casualty of MAG-33.</p> - -<p>Several hours later, after securing Kosong and resuming the attack -toward Sachon, the Marine ground forces caught up with the scene of -chaos left by the F4U’s. Among the twisted and charred vehicles were -some that the enemy had abandoned in perfect condition. Tolerant -NCO’s relaxed discipline for a moment while their men tried out the -motorcycles with sidecars and the sleek, black Soviet jeeps, most of -which had gone into the attack practically new. Almost identical in -design to American jeeps, these vehicles were found to be powered by -familiar Ford-type engines—a throwback to United States Lend Lease to -Russia in World War II.</p> - -<p>Generals Craig and Cushman surveyed the wreckage from a helicopter -next day. This strike, however, was only one of the more dramatic examples -of the Brigade air-ground team in action. MAG-33 aircraft were -constantly orbiting on station over the front line as the ground forces -advanced. Flown by infantry-trained pilots briefed on the local ground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> -situation, the Corsairs were available for employment on short notice. -It was a simple and flexible system; and the fact that VMF-214 and -VMF-323 were based on the two carriers meant that they could arrive on -station with more fuel and ordnance for strikes as compared to Japan-based -squadrons.<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">262</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_262" href="#FNanchor_262" class="fnanchor">262</a> This summary of tactical air operations is derived from MCBS, I-IV-B, 9–14; Maj -George J. King, interv with author, n. d.</p></div> - -<p>Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea was exercised by -the Fifth Air Force. Marine aviation units, as components of an integrated -Fleet Marine Force, operated in support of the Brigade as their -highest priority, and in support of other UN forces as a lower priority. -After checking in with Fifth AF TACC at the Joint Operations Center -(JOC), Marine aviation units came under Marine operational control -when supporting Brigade ground forces. When providing tactical air -support for other UN forces, Marine air units operated under the Air -Force-Army system for tactical air support.</p> - -<p>The Brigade control organization included 3 battalion TACP’s and 1 -regimental TACP, each consisting of an officer and 6 enlisted men, and -each equipped with a radio jeep, portable radios and remoting equipment. -MAG-33 provided a Brigade control agency consisting of the Air -Support Section of MTACS-2. Other Brigade units associated with -control of aircraft were:</p> - -<p>(1) The Air Section of the Brigade Staff, consisting of the Brigade Air -officer and six enlisted men responsible for planning as well as tactical -control and coordination of supporting aircraft;</p> - -<p>(2) The Brigade observation section, consisting of the tactical air -observer, three gunnery observers, and the OY and rotary-wing aircraft -of VMO-6.</p> - -<p>Carrier-based Marine aviation units maintained a TAC and one or -more flights of aircraft on station during daylight hours. Night heckler -and intruder missions of VMF(N)-513 from Itazuke reported to the -Fifth AF TACC and were routed by that agency to the Air Support Section -(MTACS-2) with the Brigade. During the early Brigade operations, -with the Air Force TACC located at Taegu, delays of incoming flights -reporting to JOC were caused by overloaded communications nets. An -improvement resulted when such flights by-passed JOC and reported -directly to the Air Support Section of Brigade. And when JOC moved -back to Pusan, improved communications resulted in incoming flights -reporting first to JOC again.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span> -The Brigade control agency (Air Support Section) made use of the -following communications for the control of tactical air operations:</p> - -<p>(1) TAR net connecting battalion TACP’s, the regimental TACP, and -the Air Support Section, and monitored by the Brigade Air Section. -This was an HF net.</p> - -<p>(2) TAD net connecting above-named agencies as well as TAC flights -of support aircraft and on occasion the TAO. This was a VHF net of -four frequencies used to brief and control aircraft reporting for support -missions.</p> - -<p>(3) TAO net connecting observation aircraft, the Brigade CP (Air -Section) and the Air Support Section. This was an HF net.</p> - -<p>(4) An administrative (HF) net connecting the Air Support Section -and the carriers <i>Sicily</i> and <i>Badoeng Strait</i>.</p> - -<p>The workings of the control organization of the Brigade air-ground -team in the Pusan Perimeter have been described as follows in the survey -of the Marine Corps Board Study:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Battalion TACP’s made requests for air support missions direct by TAR net to -the Air Support Section. The regimental TACP and Brigade Air Section monitored -this net. The Brigade control agency having received a request for a mission, contacted -the TAC and the Flight Leader (FL) of the aircraft orbiting on station awaiting -a mission. The TAC and the FL were then directed to the vicinity of the TACP -from whom the request had originated.</p> - -<p>“The TACP controlled the execution of the mission in accordance with the wishes -of the battalion commander. The TACP gave the location of the target to the TAC. -The latter designated the target to the FL and his flight of supporting aircraft. The -unit being supported marked its front lines. The TAC directed the attacking aircraft -in making attacks on the target. His directions related to the technique of attacking -specific targets with aircraft. Control of the attack was exercised by the ground unit -being supported.</p> - -<p>“In many instances the TAC or the TAO would locate targets not yet located by -ground units. This was often done in response to a request from ground units. Both -the TAC and TAO located targets beyond the vision of ground units, and both were -capable of, and did, designate these targets to flights of supporting aircraft and -directed attacks on such targets, when requested to do so by ground units. Conditions -favored delegating control to forward TACP’s beyond convenient VHF range -between them and the Brigade (Air Support Section). Brigade attack formations frequently -consisted of battalions in column. The forward battalion was free to employ -air support at a moment’s notice.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>This was the situation on the afternoon of 11 August 1950 as the 3d -Battalion of the 5th Marines attacked toward Sachon, followed by 2/5 -in trace. Overhead a flight of VMF-323 Corsairs orbited on station, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> -OY observers reported the enemy to be pulling back rapidly toward -Sachon.</p> - -<p>How Company led the Marine attack, with lead tanks employing -reconnaissance by fire. At 1800, after the column had covered several -miles, a lone enemy machinegun in a valley on the left held up the advance -by wounding three Marines. By the time the tanks silenced the -weapon with .50-caliber fire, it was decided to halt. Taplett deployed his -battalion on two hills north of the road, and the infantrymen settled -down for a quiet night.</p> - -<p>The gravel crunchers could thank air and other supporting arms for -an impressive demonstration of power that day. There was even the suggestion -of an amphibious operation in the Brigade advance, for an LST -followed the column and anchored near the fishing village of Tanghong-ni -after the securing of Kosong.</p> - -<p>This was LST QO119, a supply ship manned by Team No. 1 of Major -William L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion. Team -No. 2 set up forward dumps along the MSR as the infantry advanced, -while No. 3 unloaded supplies and equipment at the Masan railhead. -Shore Party personnel also assisted in salvage operations, which were -conducted mainly at Changwon.<a id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">263</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_263" href="#FNanchor_263" class="fnanchor">263</a> Annex Mike to Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>LST QO119 was not only the workhorse of normal Shore Party missions; -it served also as an improvised hospital ship. For the Medical Section -and Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, had an extra responsibility -these sweltering days in caring for victims of heat prostration as well as -the wounded. Thus it may have set some sort of a record when casualties -were evacuated at one time by land, sea and air—motor ambulance, LST -and helicopter.</p> - -<h3><i>The Changchon Ambush</i></h3> - -<p>At sundown on 11 August, as Taplett’s battalion dug in for the night on -the road to Sachon, the enemy seemed to be disorganized if not actually -demoralized. For the first time since the invasion began, a sustained -Eighth Army counterattack had not only stopped the Red Korean -steamroller but sent it into reverse.</p> - -<p>With the Marines a day’s march from Sachon, the Army 5th RCT was -running a dead heat on the shorter Chinju route to the north, where<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span> -opposition had been light the last 2 days. It might even have appeared -on the evening of the 11th that the combined operation had turned into -a friendly rivalry between two outfits racing toward their final objective -by parallel roads. But any such assumption would have been premature, -as General Craig and his staff well realized. They looked for further resistance -and were not disillusioned. Within the next 48 hours, in fact, -Craig’s men were destined to carry out one of the most astonishing operations -in the history of the Marine Corps—simultaneous BLT attacks in -opposite directions on two fronts 25 miles apart.</p> - -<p>There was no hint of any such development at 0630 on the morning -of 12 August, when the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines passed through -the 3d Battalion with a mission of seizing Sachon. If anything, the front -was too quiet to suit veteran NCO’s, who suspected the enemy of being -up to no good. The column moved out behind a 15-man detachment of -Recon Company acting as the point under the command of Captain -Kenneth J. Houghton. Next came Baker Company with the 1st, 2d, and -3d Platoons in that order. Two Marine tanks were sandwiched in between -the 1st and 2d Platoons, and three more M-26’s brought up the -rear of Captain Tobin’s company, followed by the main body of the -battalion.</p> - -<p>No opposition awaited the column. This unnatural calm continued -for 4½ hours as the Marines advanced about 11 miles. At noon, with -Sachon only 4 miles away, Houghton and the point rounded a bend into -the thatched-hut hamlet of Changchon. The first enemy soldiers of the -day were sighted when two skulking figures took cover. Several Marines -opened fire, and in reply the hills on both sides of the road erupted into -flame.<a id="FNanchor_264" href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">264</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_264" href="#FNanchor_264" class="fnanchor">264</a> This section is derived from: Brig SAR, 5th Marines, 1st Bn rpt; Maj John L. Tobin, -ltr to author, 26 Apr 54 (Tobin, 26 Apr 54); Maj John R. Stevens, ltr to author, 11 Jan 54; -and T/Sgt F. J. Lischeski, ltr to author, 14 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>The enemy had obviously planned to allow the entire column to come -within range. But the trap was sprung prematurely as NKPA machineguns -blazed away from the high ground in front and on both flanks. -Captain Tobin immediately sent the 1st Platoon to the aid of the point. -First Lieutenant Hugh C. Schryver led his men forward along the roadside -ditches, and at the cost of three casualties they reinforced the thin -line of Recon troops returning the enemy’s fire.</p> - -<p>Next, the company commander ordered First Lieutenant David S. -Taylor’s 2d Platoon to move up behind three Marine tanks. The M-26’s -were unable to maneuver off the road because of the danger of bogging<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_145">145</a><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -down in rice paddies, but as mobile fortresses they added to Marine fire -power.</p> - -<div id="ip_145" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_145.jpg" width="1352" height="2133" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>SACHON OFFENSIVE</p> - <p class="smaller">CHANGCHON AMBUSH<br /> - 12 AUGUST 1950</p></div></div> - -<p>Tobin’s whole company became more or less pinned down when the -3d Platoon and headquarters, farther back on the road, received automatic -weapons fire from Hill 250 on the right. Newton immediately -requested the battalion air controller, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, -to call for a strike in this area. This was the only supporting arm available -at the moment, since the mortar and artillery crews were just setting -up their weapons in hastily selected positions.</p> - -<p>After the Corsairs worked over Hill 250, Tobin ordered Second Lieutenant -David R. Cowling’s 3d Platoon to attack the high ground. A -rifle platoon and machinegun section had been sent forward from Able -Company by the battalion commander, and Newton gave these -reinforcements the mission of seizing Hill 301, also on the right side -of the road.</p> - -<p>As Cowling’s men were crossing the open rice paddy, the Marine tank -guns and mortars added their fires to the air strike. But enough enemy -machineguns survived to catch the 3d Platoon in a crossfire which forced -it to fall back with 1 man killed and 4 wounded. The Able Company -contingent occupied Hill 301 meanwhile without meeting any resistance.</p> - -<p>During the course of these actions, the FAC reported to Newton that -2 of the Corsairs overhead had 5 minutes of time left. The battalion -commander directed that they search for targets of opportunity along -the road leading from Changchon to Sachon. The result was a repetition -on a small scale of the Kosong turkey shoot, for the Marine planes surprised -a little column of enemy vehicles and personnel. After the Corsairs -unloaded their remaining ordnance, the road was strewn with -twisted and burning vehicles.</p> - -<p>The 3d Platoon fell back on Hill 301 as Newton ordered Captain -John R. Stevens to secure the nearby high ground on the right side of the -road with the rest of his Able Company troops. This left Hill 250 as the -center of enemy resistance on the right. A total of 113 Marine mortar -rounds were delivered on these positions, followed by a second air strike. -The concentration of fire finally silenced the enemy’s remaining machineguns, -and the Baker Company right flank was secured.</p> - -<p>The other two Baker Company platoons and Houghton’s men had -their hands full meanwhile on the left flank. They kept up a brisk fire -fight from the roadside ditches until the Marine artillery took charge of -the situation. One enemy position after another was knocked out in this -quarter as Newton called for three more air strikes. These preparatory<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> -fires enabled the 1st and 2d Platoons to attack on the left after a laborious -crossing of an intervening rice paddy.</p> - -<p>The Marines proceeded to clean up the remaining NKPA positions -methodically. A climax was reached when Lieutenant Taylor spotted an -enemy group approaching the crest of Hill 202 from the reverse slope. -He sent Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski with a squad to prepare a -welcome. The veteran NCO coolly formed a line along the ridge and -directed his men to wait until the enemy came within 75 feet before -opening fire.</p> - -<p>It would be hard to find a more striking example of Marine infantry -firepower. Of the 39 men in the NKPA group, all were killed outright -in a matter of seconds except a single officer. This survivor was so badly -wounded that he died on the way to the regimental CP.</p> - -<p>The fight had lasted all afternoon, and darkness fell before Company -B could complete its movement to the high ground on the left side of -the road and set up a perimeter of defense. It was estimated that an -enemy company was operating in the area, covering the retreat of sorely -battered elements of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and 83d Motorcycle -Regiment.</p> - -<p>Marine losses were 3 killed and 13 wounded. After the securing of the -high ground to the right, casualties were evacuated by road on the lee -side of slowly moving tanks which provided shelter from enemy fire on -the left.</p> - -<h3><i>Marines Ordered to New Sector</i></h3> - -<p>The Marines of 1/5 anticipated that the next day’s advance would take -them to Sachon. At midnight on 12 August, however, Lieutenant Colonel -Newton received orders from the regimental commander to form the -battalion on the road at 0630 in preparation for a lift by trucks to another -sector, where the Marines were to reinforce Army units.</p> - -<p>While Newton’s men were fighting at Changchon, the Brigade commander -had come up against a most unusual command situation. It -began late on the morning of the 12th, when General Craig received -orders from CG Task Force Kean, directing him to move a reinforced -Marine rifle battalion back to Chindong-ni. General Kean emphasized -that the shift be made without delay. Infiltrating enemy forces had penetrated -far back in the rear to overrun positions of Battery C, 555th -(“Triple Nickel”) Field Artillery Battalion and Headquarters and Able -Batteries, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 25th Division.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> -The MSR being endangered, Marine reinforcements were urgently -needed for a counterattack.<a id="FNanchor_265" href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">265</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_265" href="#FNanchor_265" class="fnanchor">265</a> This section is derived from: Craig, 18 May 5 and 12 Jan 54; Murray, 14 Jan 54; and -Brig SAR, 5th Marines, 1st Bn and 3d Bn rpts.</p></div> - -<p>At 0800 that morning Craig had set up his CP at Kosong. It was his -custom to keep a terse and factual record of events from day to day, and -the following chronological account is derived from entries in the -Brigade commander’s field notebook:</p> - -<blockquote class="itemlist"> - -<p>“1130—Received telephonic orders from CG 25th Div, stating that enemy was attacking -in force across our MSR near Chindong-ni. He directed that I send -one reinforced battalion to rear at once to give assistance to 24th Infantry engaged -in that area and to recapture artillery pieces.</p> - -<p>“1200—Proceeded by helicopter to CP 5th Marines to give necessary instructions. -Made two landings en route to gather trucks for troop lift.</p> - -<p>“1300—The reinforced 3d Bn., 5th Marines, now on way to Chindong-ni area.</p> - -<p>“1330—Sent my G-3, LtCol Stewart, and LtCol Taplett, CO of 3/5, by helicopter to -bridge indicated by CG 25th Div. to reconnoiter and formulate plans prior to -arrival of battalion. Marines to operate directly under 25th Division for this -action.</p> - -<p>“1400—We are out on a limb with only two battalions left and Sachon still to take. -Went to leading elements to check. They were engaged in a heavy fire fight -at an attempted ambush position. Air brought to bear and helped, plus artillery. -Enemy positions taken by 1/5, which dug in on high ground while 2/5 -was disposed to protect rest of Brigade column.</p> - -<p>“1730—Returned to Brigade CP at Kosong and received orders to proceed via helicopter -to Masan to confer with CG 25th Division.</p> - -<p>“1815—On flight to Masan I detoured to Chindong-ni area to make sure by air observation -that 3/5 had arrived and apparently was not having any trouble.</p> - -<p>“1830—Arrived Masan and was directed by General Kean to commence a tactical -withdrawal from Sachon.</p> - -<p>“1945—Returned by helicopter to my Kosong CP in early darkness and issued -necessary orders.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>The preparations for withdrawal lowered the spirits of Marines who -believed that they had broken the back of enemy resistance in the Sachon -area. This reaction may even be noted in the first paragraph of the -Brigade withdrawal order:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“1. <span class="smcap">General Situation.</span> Following Brigade rapid advance from Chindong-ni to -Sachon in which this Brigade attacked, overcame, and pursued the enemy, the 25th -Infantry Division has directed the withdrawal of this Brigade in order to hold a defensive -position and mop up enemy resistance in the zone of action of elements of -the 25th Division.”</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span></p> - -<div id="ip_149" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_149.jpg" width="2080" height="1352" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>SACHON OFFENSIVE</p> - <p class="smaller">SITUATION MAP FOR - 12–14 AUG. ’50</p></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span> -It would later be known that the basic reason for the Brigade withdrawal -was a decision by the Eighth Army command and staff. The -enemy had crossed the river Naktong, the last natural barrier of the -Pusan Perimeter, and this emergency had caused the Marines to be -pulled back in readiness for a counterattack in the Naktong bulge.</p> - -<h3><i>Attack of 3/5 to the Rear</i></h3> - -<p>The foregoing chronology makes it evident that General Craig could -never have handled this situation in an afternoon without helicopter -transportation. Jeeps could not have reached so many destinations over -narrow, twisting roads choked with traffic; and fixed-wing planes, even -the adaptable OY’s, could not have landed wherever the Brigade commander -willed. Marine helicopters set a good many precedents in Korea, -and the events of 12 August 1950 established the usefulness of these -versatile machines for command and staff flights.</p> - -<p>Early that afternoon, as Craig had directed, Stewart and Taplett flew -back to the Chindong-ni area for reconnaissance and planning prior to -the arrival of 3/5. The Brigade commander had been able to give them -very little initial information. About 2,000 to 2,500 enemy had infiltrated -to the vicinity, according to Army estimates. The two Marine officers -were instructed to fly to a bridge over a dry stream bed, where they -would be met and briefed by a 25th Division liaison officer awaiting -them in a jeep with a red air panel on the hood.<a id="FNanchor_266" href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">266</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_266" href="#FNanchor_266" class="fnanchor">266</a> This section is derived from LtCol Robert D. Taplett’s detailed statement to Marine -Corps Evaluation Board, n. d.</p></div> - -<p>Stewart and Taplett found the bridge, though no jeep was in sight. -After landing in the stream bed, they discovered a camouflaged Army -light tank; but the officers of the armored company could not offer any -enlightenment.</p> - -<p>A number of wire lines lay in the roadside ditch, and the Marine officers -checked them, one by one. At length, by a process of trial and error, -they found a line leading to the 25th Division CP and talked to the G-3. -He instructed them to “look the situation over” and decide upon a -course of action to eliminate enemy activity in the area and provide -security for the remaining artillery unit—a battery of the 159th Field -Artillery Battalion which had been attached to the 555th. Then the -Marine officers were to report to General Barth, ADC of the 25th Division, -upon his arrival in the area to take the overall command.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span> -Ever since the jump-off of 7 August, the operations of Task Force -Kean had been distinguished for informality. Oral orders were the rule -rather than exception, with unusual latitude of decision being permitted -to officers in the field. After their telephone conversation, Stewart and -Taplett made a helicopter reconnaissance of the area, followed by a flight -back over the MSR to locate 3/5. Upon their return, they encountered -Colonel John Daly, USA, CO of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion. -Battery C of that unit, he informed them, had been surprised the night -before, along with two batteries of the 90th, and completely overrun -about 3,000 yards up the stream bed. They were destroyed as a fighting -force, though scattered survivors and wounded men remained in the -area. Daly briefed the Marine officers as to the location of enemy forces; -and they decided to seize two key ridges commanding the MSR, which -ran parallel to the stream bed. The troops of 3/5 were just then piling -out of the trucks at the debarkation point, and Taplett ordered them to -attack without waiting for Barth, since it would soon be dark.</p> - -<p>These Marines, contrary to standing operating procedure, had turned -their backs on the roar of battle at Changchon early that afternoon and -ridden away in the opposite direction. Then, to complete the mystery, -they traveled 25 miles to the rear to assault a ridge which was supposedly -secured. How Company jumped off with George following in trace. -Colonel Daly provided a 15-minute artillery preparation, though he had -no orders, and Taplett’s FAC managed to summon a flight of Corsairs -with partial loads aboard, including napalm. No one had any idea of the -enemy’s strength, and after receiving some fire from the ridge, Captain -Fegan picked the locations for an air strike. How Company moved in -rapidly afterwards against such light resistance that the Marines seized -the first position without a single casualty. Only one casualty was inflicted -upon the enemy, who apparently had put up a rearguard fight -while withdrawing.</p> - -<p>At 1900, when General Barth arrived, he asked when the Marine battalion -would be ready to attack. Taplett replied that he already had one -company on the first objective, and the 25th Division ADC congratulated -the Marines on their promptness. He approved Taplett’s course of -action and gave his sanction for the seizure of the rest of the dominating -high ground the following morning.</p> - -<p>Again the Marines received the most cordial cooperation from the -Army. General Barth ordered several light tanks and three M-44 armored -personnel carriers to support the attack at 0700 on 13 August. -The same Army artillery battery was assigned to the operation, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> -Battery C of the 11th Marines took part after arriving the night before. -As it proved, the infantry needed little assistance to seize the remaining -objectives against negligible resistance. By 1000 the Marine rifle companies -were in full possession of the two commanding ridgelines. No -casualties were suffered or inflicted.</p> - -<p>Despite the lack of opposition, the enemy had not pulled out of the -area. When Lieutenant Colonel Murray made a helicopter flight to drop -a message to survivors of the 555th, his helicopter was ambushed in a -defile by NKPA marksmen concealed on both sides. Only the pilot’s -skillful maneuvering got them out safely, and they were unable to complete -their mission.</p> - -<p>A plan for the Marines to advance to the west across the valley floor -while the Army 5th RCT attacked rearward to meet them was considered -by the 25th Division. Taplett’s battalion would have been accompanied -by 2/5, then on the way to the Chindong-ni area. But this scheme -of maneuver was canceled, and the 2d Battalion of the 5th RCT relieved -3/5 on 14 August. By that time, as will be related later, other elements -of the Brigade were on the way to an assembly area at Miryang in preparation -for an operation in another sector.</p> - -<p>At least the attack by 3/5 enabled elements of the 25th Division to -rescue survivors of the artillery batteries who straggled back. Both Taplett -and Stewart believed that enemy numbers in the area had been much -smaller than the original Army estimate of 2,000 to 2,500 men. The 3/5 -commander wanted to complete his mission by attacking to recover the -howitzers and other lost equipment while the opportunity still existed. -But he was unable to accomplish this aim because of orders for Brigade -withdrawal, and the artillery pieces were never recaptured. Air strikes -were called to destroy them after the relief of the Marine battalion, and -the area itself was abandoned a few days later when 25th Division units -fell back before renewed NKPA attacks.</p> - -<h3><i>Enemy Dawn Attack at Changchon</i></h3> - -<p>On the other Marine front, 25 miles distant, 1/5 had a return engagement -before dawn on 13 August with the enemy in the Changchon area. -Company commanders had received orders the night before to alert their -units at 0400 for the withdrawal. General Craig’s Op Order 10-50 was a -complete and well planned field order, despite the need for haste; but the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> -enemy interrupted with a surprise attack launched from concealed -positions occupied under cover of darkness.<a id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">267</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_267" href="#FNanchor_267" class="fnanchor">267</a> Craig, 12 Jan 54.</p></div> - -<p>Baker Company’s defense setup for the night on Hill 202 consisted of -the 3d, 1st, and 2d Platoons tied in from left to right in that order. The -action began at 0450 with enemy automatic weapons fire. Marine 60-mm. -mortar illuminating shells revealed an NKPA infiltration on the right in -the area of the 2d Platoon.</p> - -<p>This effort soon proved to be a diversionary attack for the purpose of -masking the main blow. At 0455 3 enemy flares went up, 2 red and 1 -green. They were the signal for an assault on the left flank at the other -end of the Baker Company position. The enemy, as a wounded Marine -NCO put it afterwards, was “right on top of the 3d Platoon in a few -seconds” with grenades and burp guns.<a id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">268</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_268" href="#FNanchor_268" class="fnanchor">268</a> Tobin, of 26 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>This was one of the occasions when the Marines were painfully -reminded that the NKPA 6th Division had been made up originally of -veterans of the Chinese civil war, conditioned by experience for the rigors -of night fighting. Marine security had not been at fault, yet the enemy -had managed to creep forward in uncanny silence to positions within -grenade-throwing distance.</p> - -<p>In an instant the Marine position was overrun, with the machinegun -section being wiped out except for two men. Communication troubles -added to the confusion. Platoon radios had been rendered inoperative by -mud and water while crossing rice paddies, and telephone wires were -believed to have been cut. Two runners were killed during Tobin’s -efforts to maintain contact with the hard-pressed troops on the left -flank. A third runner got through with orders for the remnants of the -platoon to fall back within the perimeter of the adjacent 1st Platoon.</p> - -<p>The troubles of Baker Company were compounded at this stage when -the enemy turned two of the Marines’ own machineguns against them.</p> - -<p>During the next hour the fight became a slugging match. When the -first gray light of dawn permitted some visibility, Baker Company 3.5″ -rocket launchers knocked out the two Marine machineguns being fired -by the enemy. The left flank was holding well when the 60-mm. mortars -ran out of ammunition. To make matters worse, the artillery FO’s radio -took destructive hits from machinegun fire just as the enemy changed -the direction of his attack. Now his main effort was being channeled up -the draw between the 1st and 2d Platoons for the obvious purpose of<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_154">154</a><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -splitting the company and beating it in detail. The attackers had been -bled white by casualties, however, and Tobin’s men had little difficulty -in beating off the new assault.</p> - -<div id="ip_154" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_154.jpg" width="1366" height="2139" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>ENEMY COUNTERATTACK:<br /> - HILL 202<br /> - NIGHT OF 12–13 AUG. 1950</p></div></div> - -<h3><i>Breaking Off Action</i></h3> - -<p>Battalion orders were received through Able Company to disengage at -0630 and pull down from the high ground to the trucking point at Newton’s -CP. Tobin was now depending on Company A radios for 4.2″ and -81-mm. mortar support which slowed up enemy efforts. As his first -move toward breaking off action, he ordered his 3d and 1st Platoons to -withdraw into the perimeter of the 2d.<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">269</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_269" href="#FNanchor_269" class="fnanchor">269</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>By this time the enemy had fallen back toward the lower levels of Hill -202. Small arms fire had slackened but the Marines still received mortar -bursts.</p> - -<p>Tobin ordered his executive officer, Captain Francis I. Fenton, to take -the wounded across the rice paddies to the road with the 3d Platoon and -Headquarters troops. The company commander remained on the hill to -cover this movement with the other two platoons. After Fenton got well -underway, Tobin ordered the 2d Platoon down to the road. Then, a -squad at a time, the remaining Marines disengaged; and the Baker Company -commander came off Hill 202 with the last squad at 0815. The entire -movement had been accomplished with precision, and a final air -strike kept the enemy quiet at the climax.</p> - -<p>Considering the fury of the fighting on Hill 202, a Marine casualty list -of 12 KIA, 18 WIA, and 8 MIA was not as large as might have been -expected. The idea of men missing in action is always disturbing to Marine -officers, but it was considered a moral certainty that the eight casualties -of this type were killed when the enemy overran the machinegun -section on the Baker Company left flank.<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">270</a> Before leaving Hill 202, Captain -Tobin asked permission to lead an attack for the purpose of recovering -the bodies. He believed that he could retake the lost ground in an -hour, but his request could not be granted at a time when the battalion -was belated in carrying out Brigade withdrawal orders.<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">271</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_270" href="#FNanchor_270" class="fnanchor">270</a> Seven of these casualties were transferred from the MIA to the KIA column in September -1950 after the recovery of their bodies, following enemy withdrawal from the area. -The eighth continued to be listed as MIA until November 1953, when the man was -assumed to be dead.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_271" href="#FNanchor_271" class="fnanchor">271</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>It fell to the engineers and armor to cover the rear after the infantry -pulled out. Midway between Sachon and Kosong, the MSR is joined by -a road from Samchonpo, a minor seaport on the tip of the peninsula. In -order to block this approach to the Brigade’s southern flank, General -Craig ordered the engineers to mine the road. First Lieutenant Nicholas -A. Canzona was assigned to the task with a detachment of his 1st Platoon -of Able Company, 1st Engineer Battalion. After laying an extensive -field, this officer discovered to his embarrassment that he had erred in -arming nearly half of the mines with wrong fuses, so that they were -harmless. Apparently the moral effect was enough, however, to keep the -enemy at a distance.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Hetrick’s 3d Platoon of the engineer company brought up -the Brigade rear on the morning of 13 August to crater roads, lay antitank -minefields and destroy bridges and culverts. Personnel left behind -for such missions had the privilege of riding the rearmost tank to catch -up with the column.<a id="FNanchor_272" href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">272</a> Thus the withdrawal proceeded systematically -and was completed without enemy interference.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_272" href="#FNanchor_272" class="fnanchor">272</a> Annex Jig to Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<div id="photos2" class="newpage"> -<div id="ip_157" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_157.jpg" width="1688" height="2299" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>The Iron Cavalry—Brigade infantry and tank supporting each other during -advance of Marines to Sachon (Life Magazine Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span></p> - -<div id="ip_158" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_158.jpg" width="1637" height="2094" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Guests of the Brigade—Above, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. -(center) is shown captured NKPA motorcycle by Brigadier General Craig -(left) and First Lieutenant N. G. Rhodes (right); below, left to right, General -Craig introduces ROK President Syngman Rhee to Second Lieutenant F. W. -Muetzel and Technical Sergeant E. L. DeFazio, both wounded three times -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span></p> - -<div id="ip_159" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_159.jpg" width="1670" height="2050" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Marine Chiefs—Above, left to right, Major General Field Harris, CG of the -1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG of the 1st -Marine Division, and Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, commanding -MAG-33, meet at a conference in Tokyo; and, below, left to right, Congressman -Hugh D. Scott, Jr., of Pennsylvania and Henry J. Latham, New York are -shown captured gun by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig while visiting the -Naktong front (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span></p> - -<div id="ip_160" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_160.jpg" width="1670" height="2188" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Naktong Fights—Above, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, Brigade -G-4, watches while tank 90-mm. gun fires across Observation Hill to knock out -enemy machinegun on Obong-ni Ridge; and, below, Marine infantry advancing -in second battle of the Naktong as Marine air and artillery hit the enemy up -ahead (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span></p> - -<div id="ip_161" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_161.jpg" width="1680" height="2209" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Fight for a Foothold—Above, Marines advancing in first battle of the Naktong -pass casualties on way to the rear; and, below, Private First Class Eugene A. -Obregon (left) of Los Angeles and Private First Class Ralph J. Summers, of -Tehama, Calif., in a Marine machinegun position (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span></p> - -<div id="ip_162" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_162.jpg" width="1662" height="2239" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Graveyard of Enemy Tanks—Three dead T-34’s at the bend where the road -skirts Hill 125, with Obong-ni Ridge looming up ahead. Bodies of three -Marines show in the foreground (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span></p> - -<div id="ip_163" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_163.jpg" width="1678" height="2227" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Naktong Casualties—Above, wounded Marine, with right leg bandaged, -passes M-26 tank on his way to the rear; and, below, a stretcher casualty being -evacuated through rice paddy, with South Korean laborer bringing up the rear -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span></p> - -<div id="ip_164" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_164.jpg" width="2550" height="1440" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Burning Enemy Tank—Marines advancing past Hill 117 (background) along MSR west of Yongsan are giving a wide berth -to the dying T-34 in anticipation of exploding ammunition (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span></p> - -<div id="ip_165" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_165.jpg" width="2537" height="1436" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Combat Leadership—Marine platoon leader calls for another rush on enemy hill position in second battle of the Naktong -(Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span></p> - -<div id="ip_166" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_166.jpg" width="1656" height="2270" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Interlude at the Bean Patch—Above, Marine truck column on way to Masan -area after first battle of the Naktong; and, below, Brigade riflemen renew their -acquaintance with hot food at the Bean Patch (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span></p> - -<div id="ip_167" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_167.jpg" width="2540" height="1391" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>The Quick and the Dead—Marine tank, advancing along MSR at second Naktong, passes burning hull of enemy T-34 -(Life Magazine Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span></p> - -<div id="ip_168" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_168.jpg" width="2546" height="1397" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Readying for a Strike—Effectiveness of Marine air attacks depends not only on Corsair pilots but also on crewmen such as -Staff Sergeant Carl W. Peters (left) and Sergeant Melvin R. Bataway, of VMF-214, shown while arming rockets on the -flight deck of the U. S. S. </i>Sicily<i> in preparation for a strike in Korea (U. S. Navy Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span></p> - -<div id="ip_169" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_169.jpg" width="2501" height="1432" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Enemy Mortar Fire—Marines hit the deck as NKPA mortar fire reaches out for them while advancing in the second battle of -the Naktong (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span></p> - -<div id="ip_170" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_170.jpg" width="1614" height="2241" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Between Attacks—Above, tired Marines take a short break during first battle -of Naktong, with body of NKPA soldier in foreground; and, below, Marine -walking wounded are helped back to the rear (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span></p> - -<div id="ip_171" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_171.jpg" width="1689" height="2235" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Supporting Arms—Above, headquarters officers keep careful tab on Marine -advances in order to co-ordinate fires of supporting weapons; and, below, the -105-mm. howitzers of 1/11 cleaned up, packed and ready for embarkation at -Pusan (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span></p> - -<div id="ip_172" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_172.jpg" width="1642" height="2245" alt="" /> - <div class="captionl"><i>Objective Secured—Marine patrol moves out from Hill 311, overlooking the -river Naktong, after Brigade troops take their final objective in the first battle -of the Naktong (Marine Corps Photo).</i></div></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_IX" class="vspace">CHAPTER IX<br /> - -<span class="subhead">The Battle of the Naktong</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Task Force Hill Organized—Planning the Next Operation—Reconnaissance -of Terrain—Air and Artillery Preparation—Company -D on Objective—Attack of Company E</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The movement of</span> the Brigade to Miryang was completed by rail, -LST and shuttling trucks on 15 August. For the infantry, it meant -the first hot meal in Korea, and the bivouac area seemed a cool, green -paradise as compared to the sun-scorched hills the men had been climbing -under fire this past week. A grove of stately trees provided shade; -and thanks to the frugality of peasants who picked up every twig, the -grass and moss were like a well-swept carpet. There the troops of the -Brigade slept under the stars that night and swam in the nearby Miryang -river. It was a veritable reunion for Leathernecks who swapped tales of -experiences in the recent combats.</p> - -<p>Being Marines, they realized of course that this was merely an interlude -between operations. The Brigade had passed under operational -control of the 24th Infantry Division upon arrival in the Miryang area. -And on the 15th General Craig reported to General Church’s CP to be -briefed on the situation in the Naktong Bulge, where the next assault -would be launched.</p> - -<p>The ability of the Russians to cross the widest rivers in World War II, -using only determination and field expedients, constantly amazed <i>Wehrmacht</i> -generals with much better equipment.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">273</a> This know-how seemed to -have been passed on to the NKPA, judging by the crossings of the Han -and Kum Rivers early in the Korean conflict. On 6 August 1950, the -Red Koreans gave a repeat performance when they forced a 1,000-man -bridgehead across the Naktong river, thus breaching the last natural -barrier protecting the lifeline from Pusan to Taegu.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_273" href="#FNanchor_273" class="fnanchor">273</a> U. S. Dept of the Army, <cite>Russian Combat Methods in World War II</cite>, DA Pamphlet No. -20-230.</p></div> - -<p>The 24th Infantry Division was unsuccessful in its immediate -attempts to dislodge the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_274" href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">274</a> Wading through chest-deep water by -night, pulling crude rafts loaded with vehicles, heavy weapons and supplies, -the North Koreans placed an entire reinforced regiment on the -east bank by 8 August. Termite tactics during the next 2 days broadened -their foothold until the Naktong Bulge was overrun by most of the -NKPA 4th Division.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_274" href="#FNanchor_274" class="fnanchor">274</a> Capt R. A. Gugeler, “Attack Along a Ridgeline,” in <cite>Combat Actions in Korea</cite> (Washington; -Combat Forces Press, 1954).</p></div> - -<p>Consisting of the 5th, 16th, and 18th Infantry Regiments and strongly -supported by artillery and armor, the 4th Division was among the most -distinguished of the major Communist units. With the 107th Tank -Regiment attached at the outset of the invasion, it had breezed through -Uijongbu before sharing in the capture of Seoul. On 5 July 1950, the 4th -became the first NKPA outfit to tangle with the newly arrived United -States Army forces. Task Force Smith delayed it a few hours near Osan, -despite the Reds’ great advantage in numbers and armor. Later, after -capturing Nonsan and aiding in the reduction of Taejon, the unit was -selected to spearhead the assault over the Naktong.</p> - -<h3><i>Task Force Hill Organized</i></h3> - -<p>In an effort to plug the hole in the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker -attached the 9th Infantry (2d Infantry Division) commanded by Colonel -John G. Hill, to the 24th Division. In turn, General Church placed -Colonel Hill in control of all units in his southern zone and ordered a -counterstroke against the Naktong Bulge.</p> - -<p>Task Force Hill attacked on 11 August but lost its momentum in a -confused situation which found the enemy attacking at the same time. -Reinforced to a strength of three infantry regiments, Hill’s provisional -unit again struck out against the bridgehead on 14 and 15 August. After -encountering a stone wall of resistance, the task force was ordered to -cease the attack and defend the ground it occupied east of the enemy -pocket.<a id="FNanchor_275" href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">275</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_275" href="#FNanchor_275" class="fnanchor">275</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>This was the situation as outlined to General Craig at the planning -conference, and he was also briefed on the topography of the target area. -The Naktong Bulge west of Yongsan results from a bend in the river -resembling a stubby thumb pointing westward. Bounded on three sides<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span> -by the stream, with its inland border formed by a long valley, the bulge -is an isolated terrain feature—a fortress of mountains topped by Hill 311, -the key height.</p> - -<p>As the Yongsan road reaches the Bulge from the east, it turns southwest, -winds around Hill 311, and stops at the tip of the “thumb” where -a ferry links it to the road west of the river.</p> - -<p>Guarding the eastern approach to the natural fortress are two hills -astride the Yongsan road—Finger Ridge to the north and Hill 207 to -the south. The former is set off on the east by a deep gully containing -the village of Tugok. Eastward from Hill 207 and directly below Tugok -is Obong-ni Ridge—so called because of a village by that name at its -eastern base.</p> - -<p>Not only had the NKPA 4th Division overrun the Naktong Bulge; -it had pushed on along the road to Yongsan, seizing Hill 207, Tugok, -and both Finger and Obong-ni Ridges. These latest gains and the Bulge -itself were being consolidated by elements of all three regiments.</p> - -<p>Although units were somewhat depleted, at least 6 infantry battalions -occupied the area, supported by 4 mortar companies, over 100 machineguns, -and several artillery pieces. There were 4 or more T-34 tanks within -the bridgehead, and a signal and engineer company for overall support. -As the spoils of earlier victories, particularly the one at Taejon, -enemy arms were generously augmented by a number of American carbines -and two 105-mm. howitzers.<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">276</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_276" href="#FNanchor_276" class="fnanchor">276</a> Brig Op Plan 13-50; Brig Periodic IntelRpts Nos. 12–14; Annex How.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Planning the Next Operation</i></h3> - -<p>It was decided by General Church and General Craig at their conference -of 15 August that the entire 24th Division, Reinforced, would assault -the enemy bridgehead at 0800, 17 August, after strong air and artillery -preparations. The 19th and 34th Infantry would converge on the Bulge -from the northeast. In the center, the 9th RCT and the Marine Brigade -would strike frontally astride the MSR, the former on the north of the -road and the latter on the south. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was to -hold blocking positions in the south to protect the left flank of the -Brigade.<a id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">277</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_277" href="#FNanchor_277" class="fnanchor">277</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Brig Op Plan 13-50.</p></div> - -<p>On 15 August, front lines in the center of the zone were on Hill 125 -and Observation Hill, both defended by the 9th RCT. A thousand yards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span> -to the rear, the 34th Infantry occupied Cloverleaf Hill and adjacent high -ground. Before the attack, the Brigade was to relieve the 34th on position -so that the Army unit could move to the north for its assigned mission. -Then, at H-hour, the Marines would jump off from Observation -Hill and seize Obong-ni Ridge—Objective One. Simultaneously, the -9th RCT would drive forward through Tugok and take Finger Ridge, -from which it was to support the Brigade’s advance. The 1st Battalion, -11th Marines, would be under operational control of the 24th Division -artillery commander, and priority for all supporting fires would go to -the Marines.<a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" class="fnanchor">278</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_278" href="#FNanchor_278" class="fnanchor">278</a> Brig Op Plan 13-60</p></div> - -<p>During the planning, General Church emphasized that Cloverleaf -Hill must remain occupied and defended until Brigade Objective One -was seized. He considered this hill of utmost importance in blocking -the MSR to the 24th Division CP and Miryang. This collateral responsibility -would tie up a number of Brigade troops and have strong influence -on the tactics used against Obong-ni Ridge.<a id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">279</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_279" href="#FNanchor_279" class="fnanchor">279</a> Craig, 4 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>Before the conference closed, Church promised Craig that 145 Army -trucks would be available the next day to transport the Marines from -their Miryang bivouac to an assembly area near the line of departure.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280" class="fnanchor">280</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_280" href="#FNanchor_280" class="fnanchor">280</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Brig SAR, basic rpt.</p></div> - -<p>At 1900, 15 August, Craig briefed his staff and unit commanders. The -next morning the Brigade commander flew by helicopter to Church’s -CP and received the actual attack order, which was identical with the -planning of the previous day.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">281</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_281" href="#FNanchor_281" class="fnanchor">281</a> Craig, 4 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>Later on the 16th, Craig drove to the front to reconnoiter the area -marked for the Brigade jump-off. He visited the 9th RCT command -post where Colonel Hill informed him that the Army unit was in good -condition as it stood by for the great attack.<a id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">282</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_282" href="#FNanchor_282" class="fnanchor">282</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>Reconnaissance of Terrain</i></h3> - -<p>After Craig’s reconnaissance, Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at the -front to discuss the tactical plan with the 9th RCT Commander. Although -Colonel Hill spoke confidently of his outfit’s readiness for the -attack, Murray observed that the ranks of soldiers on Observation Hill -and Hill 125 were dun and the men obviously wearied by the fighting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span> -of the previous 5 days.<a id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">283</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_283" href="#FNanchor_283" class="fnanchor">283</a> 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26 for this period showed the 9th RCT(-) at 47 percent -strength and 44 percent estimated combat efficiency. Morale for the consistently hard-hit -24th Division was gauged “Fair.”</p></div> - -<p>With this impression in mind, the 5th Marines commander studied -the terrain soon to be his regiment’s battleground. Between Observation -Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, a 300-yard rice paddy was flanked to the -north of the road by the 9th RCT positions on Hill 125. Across the -MSR from the northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge was the congested village -of Tugok. West of the hamlet and northwest of Brigade Objective -One was long, low Finger Ridge, target of Hill’s RCT.<a id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">284</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_284" href="#FNanchor_284" class="fnanchor">284</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Murray quickly concluded from the terrain that both regiments -should not attack together and become exposed simultaneously in the -low ground ahead. Since Obong-ni Ridge was closer than the Army objective -and dominated both Tugok and Finger Ridge, Murray suggested -that the 5th Marines jump off alone at 0800, 17 August. If the 9th RCT -would support him by fire from Hill 125, he would cake Obong-ni -Ridge and return the courtesy while the Army unit cleared Tugok and -seized its objective. And though offering his plan on a tactical basis, -Murray also took into consideration the condition and numbers of Hill’s -troops.<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">285</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_285" href="#FNanchor_285" class="fnanchor">285</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The 9th RCT commander agreed, and the responsibility of delivering -the first punch lay with the 5th Marines.<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286" class="fnanchor">286</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_286" href="#FNanchor_286" class="fnanchor">286</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Time and chance were against the Brigade throughout 16 August and -the following morning. Banking on the use of 145 Army trucks, Craig -and Murray hoped to move quickly on the 16th, in order to have one -infantry battalion take over Observation Hill and the other two available -for the attack on the 17th. Unfortunately, only 43 trucks were -actually provided, with the result that time schedules were thrown off -and troops forced to march long distances the night before the attack.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287" class="fnanchor">287</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_287" href="#FNanchor_287" class="fnanchor">287</a> Brig SAR, basic rpt; Annex How; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>At 1900, 16 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion entrucked -at Miryang and rode to the 5th Marines CP about 3,000 yards -behind the front. Dismounting, 3/5 marched to Cloverleaf Hill and relieved -the 34th Infantry on position. Control of the area south of the -MSR passed to Taplett at 0445, 17 August.<a id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">288</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_288" href="#FNanchor_288" class="fnanchor">288</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>The 2d Battalion proceeded on foot to its assembly area near Cloverleaf -Hill at 0130 on the 17th, and Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s men got -little sleep as they prepared for the jump-off a few hours later. Owing to -the shortage of trucks, the 1st Battalion arrived at the forward assembly -area several hours later than planned.<a id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">289</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_289" href="#FNanchor_289" class="fnanchor">289</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Overloaded trucks had shuttled Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery -battalion forward on 16 August. Although registration fires were completed -by evening, the haste of the displacement and the doubtful information -at the front left much to be desired from the standpoint of accuracy.<a id="FNanchor_290" href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">290</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_290" href="#FNanchor_290" class="fnanchor">290</a> Annex item to Brig SAR; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>While Obong-ni Ridge was known to be heavily defended, it was -generally thought that Hill 207—Brigade Objective Two—would be the -hard nut to crack. And the potential of Objective Three, towering Hill -311, was by no means minimized in preattack estimates.<a id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">291</a> Later events -proved these assumptions to be the reverse of reality, but Marine planners -could do no better with the meager intelligence then available.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_291" href="#FNanchor_291" class="fnanchor">291</a> Stewart, 15 Jan 54; Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>The regimental commander and General Craig concluded that a -frontal assault on Obong-ni Ridge with a column of battalions was the -only answer to the problems posed by the terrain and situation.</p> - -<p>Since the Brigade commander had been specifically charged with the -security of the MSR, it was necessary that 3/5 remain in position on -Cloverleaf Hill until Objective One was taken. Taplett’s battalion had -a second responsibility in guarding the Brigade’s left (south) flank, because -Craig considered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, too far out to -provide the required close-in protection.<a id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">292</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_292" href="#FNanchor_292" class="fnanchor">292</a> Craig, 4 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>The Brigade commander, unaware of Murray’s arrangement with -Colonel Hill, could not have envisioned an approach to the enemy’s -left through the 9th RCT zone. He expected the Army unit to advance -side by side with the Brigade and give supporting fire as directed by -General Church. On the other hand, an envelopment of the enemy’s -right seemed out of the question. Using the southern approach to -Obong-ni Ridge would have created a gap of several thousands yards -in the center of the critical area, and the low, barren marshland to the -left would have impeded the movement of tanks and the employment -of the 5th Marines’ integral supporting arms.<a id="FNanchor_293" href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">293</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_293" href="#FNanchor_293" class="fnanchor">293</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s reasoning closely paralleled that of his -superior. He did not visualize an envelopment from the north because -he expected a comparable effect from supporting fire by the 9th RCT. -An attempt to flank the North Korean right would have placed the attacking -unit far from the power consolidated along the MSR. The enemy -situation in the hills and swamps to the south was unknown, and -the Marine regimental commander did not relish the thought of one or -two of his battalions becoming isolated in that remote area. Then too, -the southern peaks on Obong-ni Ridge were considerably higher and -more rugged than those nearer the MSR. So it seemed logical to Murray -to retain depth and strength by striking frontally, quickly gaining -a foothold on the lower, northern reaches of the ridge, then exploiting -the penetration rapidly and vigorously.<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">294</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_294" href="#FNanchor_294" class="fnanchor">294</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>When asked about his tactical plan by General Craig, he stated that -the 5th Marines would attack in a column of battalions, 2/5 seizing Objective -One, 1/5 passing through to take Hill 207, and 3/5 completing -the reduction of the bulge by following with an assault on Objective -Three.<a id="FNanchor_295" href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">295</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_295" href="#FNanchor_295" class="fnanchor">295</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; and Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>The Brigade commander voiced his concurrence, and the plan was put -in motion.<a id="FNanchor_296" href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">296</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_296" href="#FNanchor_296" class="fnanchor">296</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Air and Artillery Preparation</i></h3> - -<p>Obong-ni Ridge sprawled across the Marine front like some huge prehistoric -reptile. Its blunt head overlooked the MSR below Tugok, and -the elongated body stretched to the southeast more than 2,000 yards before -losing its identity in a complex of swamps and irregular hill formations. -The high, narrow spine was marked by a series of peaks, beginning -with Hill 102 at the neck, followed by 109, 117, 143, 147, and 153. There -were still other peaks to the southeast, but so small and irregular as to -be almost indistinguishable.</p> - -<p>A procession of steep spurs, separated from one another by pronounced -gullies, ran down from the numbered peaks to the rice paddies -far below. At the top of a gully extending down from the saddle -between Hills 109 and 117 was a fault caused by erosion of the red clay -and shale. Gaping like an ugly wound, the raw blemish inspired one of -the ridge’s first names—“Red Slash Hill.” It was also dubbed “No<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_180">180</a><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -Name Ridge” by some of the newspaper correspondents.</p> - -<div id="ip_180" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_180.jpg" width="2101" height="1355" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE</p> - <p class="smaller">1st PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE - ATTACHED TO 24th INF DIV.</p> - <p class="small">SHOWING MARINE & ARMY ATTACKS & N.K. - POSITIONS, COUNTERATTACK, & WITHDRAWALS</p></div></div> - -<p>Marine air and artillery were to pound the ridge on 17 August from -0725 to H-hour, 0800, after which MAG-33 would strafe the hill to -cover the advancing infantrymen.<a id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">297</a> Brigade artillery fired its preparation -as planned; but due either to the hasty registration of the previous day -or to error on the part of observers, the shelling was not effective against -the enemy on Objective One. It was so inacurrate, in fact, that many -officers of 2/5 thought there had been no preparation at all.<a id="FNanchor_298" href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">298</a> To make -matters worse, air attacks scheduled to begin at 0725 did not materialize -until 0740; and the 18 Corsairs assigned to the job had time for only -one strike before H-hour.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299" class="fnanchor">299</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_297" href="#FNanchor_297" class="fnanchor">297</a> Brig Op Plan 13-50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_298" href="#FNanchor_298" class="fnanchor">298</a> Annexes How and Item to Brig SAR; Maj A. M. Zimmer, ltr to author, 6 May 54 -(Zimmer, 6 May 54); and W. E. Sweeney, ltr to author, 22 May 54 (Sweeney, -22 May 54).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_299" href="#FNanchor_299" class="fnanchor">299</a> Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Brig Op Plan 13-50.</p></div> - -<p>The two rifle companies of the 2d Battalion jumped off abreast at -0800. On the right was Captain Zimmer’s Company D, emerging into -the open from the road cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.<a id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">300</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_300" href="#FNanchor_300" class="fnanchor">300</a> Co D Action is derived from: Annex How; Zimmer, 6 May 54; and Capt M. J. -Shinka, ltr to author, 7 Jun 54.</p></div> - -<p>Zimmer ordered the 2d Platoon into reserve on the southern spur of -Hill 125 and established his OP there. The 3d Platoon, commanded by -Second Lieutenant Michael J. Shinka, stepped from the road bend below -the spur into the rice paddy. Advancing behind this unit were the 1st -Platoon and a rocket section, the latter stopping in positions along the -road bend to protect the MSR.</p> - -<p>Halfway across the rice paddy, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson led -his 1st Platoon to the right from behind the 3d, and both units approached -the base of the ridge on line. On Shinka’s left was the 2d Platoon -of Company E. An eerie silence pervaded the front while the -assault platoons crossed the wide open area unmolested.</p> - -<p>Providing covering fire from its positions on Hill 125, Technical Sergeant -Sidney S. Dickerson’s 2d Platoon was hit by long-range machinegun -bursts from Hills 117 and 143 on Obong-ni. Company D’s first two -casualties were taken.</p> - -<h3><i>Company D on Objective</i></h3> - -<p>While General Craig watched from the road cut, and Lieutenant Colonel -Roise from his OP on Observation Hill, Company D’s assault<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span> -platoons began to ascend the objective. Gradually turning its back on -the village of Tugok, Crowson’s unit traced the draw on the right of the -spur leading to Hill 102, while Shinka led his 3d Platoon up the gully -on the left. The infantrymen were almost halfway up the slope when a -battalion of the NKPA 18th Regiment opened fire with dozens of machineguns.</p> - -<p>Despite the hail of lead, Shinka and Crowson edged their units upwards. -The fire from Hills 117 and 143 finally became so intense, however, -that the 3d Platoon was momentarily unable to emerge from its -gully. Almost simultaneously, enemy machineguns poured it into the -1st Platoon, pinning that unit down and inflicting heavy casualties.</p> - -<p>Again pushing upward despite mounting casualties, the 3d Platoon -attempted to assault Hill 109 about 1000. Communist automatic weapons -and a shower of hand grenades from the crest sent the thin skirmish -line of Marines reeling back down the barren slope.</p> - -<p>As the 3d Platoon came under increasing machinegun and mortar fire -from Hills 117 and 143, Zimmer decided to commit his reserve. Realizing -the apparent futility of pressing the attack up the 3d Platoon’s gully, -he ordered Dickerson to attempt an assault through the draw in which -the 1st Platoon was pinned down.</p> - -<p>The 2d Platoon crossed the rice paddy, following the route used -earlier by the 3d. Reaching the draw in which the latter was regrouping -after its abortive assault, Dickerson led his men over Hill 102’s spur, attempting -to gain the avenue of approach being used by Crowson’s unit. -In the process he came under heavy automatic weapons fire from both -flanks—Hills 117 and 143 on the left, and the hillside north of Tugok -across the MSR.</p> - -<p>At this time the company commander spotted North Korean positions -above the village and realized why his pinned-down 1st Platoon -was taking so many casualties. From their vantage point in the 9th RCT -zone, the Communists were firing on the flank and rear of the Marines -along the northwest approaches of Objective One.</p> - -<p>Zimmer requested that 2/5 lay supporting fires on Tugok. When he -got no response, his forward observer, Lieutenant Wirth, transferred the -mission to 1/11. But the 105’s had scarcely begun firing when they were -cut off because the impact area was in the 9th RCT’s zone. The company -commander turned his own 60-mm. mortars on the enemy machineguns, -only to discover that the target lay beyond effective range.</p> - -<p>Zimmer had more success with supporting arms when the enemy -posed another threat. Practically all the machinegun fire had been coming<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span> -from the north and south of Hills 102 and 109, while the enemy on -these summits relied on rifles and vast numbers of hand grenades. Then, -apparently shaken by the 3d Platoon’s tenacity, the Communists tried to -wheel a heavy machinegun into position on the saddle between the -northernmost peaks. Twice the mounted weapon was hauled up, and -twice pulled back under heavy Marine fire. By this time Zimmer had requested -battalion to use a 75-mm. recoilless rifle on the target. When -the persistent North Koreans wheeled the machinegun onto the saddle -a third time, one round from a Marine 75 obliterated gun and crew.</p> - -<p>With only 15 men left in his platoon, Shinka prepared for a second -assault on Hill 109. Following an air strike at 1100, the Marines stormed -the high ground and overran enemy positions on the crest. Only a squad -of North Koreans could show similar determination on the reverse -slope, but the enemy’s small-scale counterattack was stopped cold by -Company D’s riflemen.</p> - -<p>One of the few Marines who reached Obong-ni’s summit during 2/5’s -attack and lived to tell the story, Shinka later related the events following -his seizure of Hill 109:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Fire from Hill 143 was gaining in intensity, and they had observation over our -position. Fire was also coming from the hill to our front [Hill 207]. I reported the -situation to Captain Zimmer. A short time later phosphorus shells were exploding -in Hill 143. This slowed the fire but it never did stop.</p> - -<p>“My resupply of ammo did not arrive. Running short of ammo and taking casualties, -with the shallow enemy slit trenches for cover, I decided to fall back until some -of the fire on my left flank could be silenced. I gave the word to withdraw and take -all wounded and weapons. About three-quarters of the way down, I had the men -set up where cover was available. I had six men who were able to fight.</p> - -<p>“I decided to go forward to find out if we left any of our wounded. As I crawled -along our former position (on the crest of Hill 109), I came across a wounded Marine -between two dead. As I grabbed him under the arms and pulled him from the -foxhole, a bullet shattered my chin. Blood ran into my throat and I couldn’t breath. -I tossed a grenade at a gook crawling up the slope, didn’t wait for it to explode, -turned and reached under the Marine’s arms and dragged him as far as the military -crest.</p> - -<p>“Another bullet hit my right arm, and the force spun me around. I rolled down -the hill for a considerable distance before I could stop myself.</p> - -<p>“I walked into my lines and had a battle dressing tied on my face and arm, I -learned that the ammo was up and that a relief was contemplated; and then I -walked back to 2/5’s aid station where they placed me on a jeep and took me to -regimental aid.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>Lieutenant Shinka was later awarded the Bronze Star for this action.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span></p> - -<h3><i>Attack of Company E</i></h3> - -<p>At 0800 Lieutenant Sweeney had ordered his 1st and 2d Platoons of Easy -Company into the attack from their line of departure on the southern -portion of Observation Hill. Although the boundary separating the -zones of Companies E and D extended from the left of Hill 109 and -down through the red slash, Sweeney centered his advance on the village -of Obong-ni, directly below Hills 143 and 147.<a id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">301</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_301" href="#FNanchor_301" class="fnanchor">301</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; and Sweeney, 22 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>The leading platoons encountered nothing more than scattered shots -crossing the rice paddy. Before they could gain a foothold on the slope -of the objective, however, heavy fire from the village ripped into the -skirmish line.</p> - -<p>In the center, Second Lieutenant Nickolas A. Arkadis led his 1st Platoon -through the hail of bullets and drove through the village to the -slopes of the ridge. On the right the 2d Platoon faltered and lost its -momentum. Then a number of North Korean machineguns poured in -flanking fire from Hills 147 and 153.</p> - -<p>Sweeney, from his OP on the southern slope of Observation Hill, -tried to get an artillery mission on the two dominating peaks, but his -forward observer was unable to contact the rear. Nor could the 4.2 mortar -observer be located.</p> - -<p>Faced with the necessity of giving his assault elements some protection, -the company commander committed 2d Lieutenant Rodger E. -Eddy’s 3d Platoon, sending it to the spur on the left of the village. -Working its way up the nose which led to Hills 147 and 153, Eddy’s -unit was able to concentrate its fire on the enemy-held peaks and relieve -pressure on the other two platoons.</p> - -<p>With enemy fire gradually increasing from new positions on the -lower slopes of the ridge to the south of the village, Sweeney ordered -the mortar section and all of his headquarters personnel into the valley -to block the southern approach through the rice paddy. Leaving this -flank guard in command of his executive officer, First Lieutenant Paul -R. Uffelman, the company commander rushed to the base of the objective. -Every single man in his unit was now committed.</p> - -<p>Sweeney found the 2d Platoon leaderless and disorganized. The 1st -had fought its way well up the slope, aided by excellent supporting fire -from 2/5’s 81-mm. mortars. As that dogged group of Marines neared -the crest, it was stopped when a friendly artillery barrage fell short,<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_185">185</a><a id="Page_186">186</a></span> -searing the skirmish line with white phosphorus.</p> - -<div id="ip_185" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_185.jpg" width="1357" height="2038" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">SITUATION 17 AUG.—OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI RIDGE)</span></p></div></div> - -<p>Late morning found part of the company closing on the crest; but -shortly before 1130, the attackers were ordered to pull back in preparation -for an air strike by MAG-33. The planes came in quickly, and some -of Company E’s men, within 25 yards of the summit, were caught in the -strafing.</p> - -<p>During the hammering by the Corsairs, the 3d Platoon slipped back -100 yards, leaving the critical left flank open to enemy-infested peaks -147 and 153. This time the hail of enfilade fire from Communist machineguns -caught the remnant of Easy Company rifleman exposed on -the higher slopes, and the Marine advance crumbled.</p> - -<p>By noon on 17 August, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was wobbling. -In 4 hours of fighting it had lost 23 dead and 119 wounded, practically -all of the casualties being taken by the 2 rifle companies. Every -officer in the Brigade could lament the lack of a third company in each -battalion; for just when 2/5’s assault needed the added punch of a reserve -unit, the outcome of battle had to rest on the failing strength of -six depleted rifle platoons. The ridge could not be taken.</p> - -<p>This was unfortunate, since there was clear evidence that the NKPA -4th Division was weakening. Although not apparent to the men of -Companies D and E, their repeated attempts to carry the ridge had torn -gaps in the enemy’s defenses. Bodies, weapons and wreckage were -strewn along the entire northern crest.<a id="FNanchor_302" href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">302</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_302" href="#FNanchor_302" class="fnanchor">302</a> LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr to author. 17 Mar 54 (Craig, 17 Mar 54); Annex Easy to -Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>Marine air and artillery, having settled down after a fumbling start, -not only blasted the North Korean lines, but also wrought havoc -throughout the entire bridgehead. A large number of enemy mortars -and field pieces were knocked out, troop concentrations cut down or -scattered while trying to reinforce the front lines, and supply points -obliterated. There were definite signs of increasing confusion in the enemy’s -rear.<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">303</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_303" href="#FNanchor_303" class="fnanchor">303</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>General Craig had become alarmed at the lack of activity in the 9th -RCT’s zone, resulting in the enemy being left free to pound the Brigade’s -right flank from the Tugok area. When he inquired concerning -the Army’s supposed failure to advance on schedule, he first learned of -the prebattle agreement reached by Murray and Hill. It was then that he -requested the village be taken under fire.</p> - -<p>Deeply concerned himself over the situation on the right, particularly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span> -since no supporting fire at all had been received from the 9th RCT, -Murray tried to contact Hill and request that he commit his regiment. -Unable to get the message through immediately, he was forced to leave -the matter dangling while directing the conduct of the battle.<a id="FNanchor_304" href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">304</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_304" href="#FNanchor_304" class="fnanchor">304</a> Murray, 15 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>About 1300 the 5th Marines commander ordered the 1st Battalion to -pass through the 2d and seize Obong-ni Ridge. While Newton moved -his unit forward from its assembly area, MAG-33, 1/11 and Able Company -tanks laid down devastating fires on the blackened objective.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_188">188</a><a id="Page_189">189</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_X" class="vspace">CHAPTER X<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Obong-ni Ridge</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Company B to the Attack—Advance of Company A—Defeat of -Enemy Tanks—End of the First Day—Enemy Counterattack on -Ridge—Obong-ni Ridge Secured—Supporting Arms Clear the -Bulge</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Shortly after 1330, while</span> reporting his situation to the battalion -commander, Captain Zimmer was wounded by enemy machinegun -fire which ripped into his OP and caused several other casualties. Crawling -to the company CP on the reverse slope of the spur, he turned his -command over to Lieutenant Hanifin, who went forward. Zimmer then -joined the steady stream of casualties returning through the road cut to -the battalion aid station.<a id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">305</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_305" href="#FNanchor_305" class="fnanchor">305</a> This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Zimmer, 6 May 54; and Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., -ltr to author, 8 May 54 (Fenton, 8 May 54).</p></div> - -<p>On the way, he met Captain Tobin leading Company B forward for -the attack, and paused long enough to warn him about the enemy guns -in Tugok.</p> - -<p>Company D, its part in the battle having come to an end, prepared to -withdraw to positions on Observation Hill. The long list of wounded -for 17 August included the names of Dickerson and Wirth.<a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">306</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_306" href="#FNanchor_306" class="fnanchor">306</a> Lt Wirth was actually attached from 1/11.</p></div> - -<p>Newton established his OP near that of Roise on Observation Hill. -The 1st Battalion CP and aid station were set up with those of 2/5 -immediately behind the road cut, while farther back Major John W. -Russell placed 1/5’s Weapons Company in position.</p> - -<h3><i>Company B to the Attack</i></h3> - -<p>Tobin deployed his 3d Platoon and machineguns on the forward slopes -of Observation Hill to support Company B’s attack. The 1st and 2d<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span> -Platoons, the latter on the left, crossed the rice paddy and at 1500 passed -through Company D on the slopes of the objective. Lieutenant Schryver -led his 1st Platoon toward Hill 102 along the same avenue used by -Crowson before him, while Lieutenant Taylor moved the 2d Platoon up -the gully leading to the saddle between 102 and 109.</p> - -<p>On Observation Hill Captain Tobin noted the rapidity of the advance -and called his executive officer, Captain Fenton, preparatory to joining -the two assault units. While briefing his assistant at the road bend, he -was felled by a burst of machinegun fire. Fenton directed the evacuation -of the seriously wounded officer, then took command of the company -and joined the attackers on the ridge.</p> - -<p>By this time both assault platoons had been pinned down, the 1st -about two-thirds of the way up the slope, the 2d only half that distance. -The latter was taking heavy casualties from Communist guns on Hills -109, 117, and 143, Taylor himself sustaining a mortal wound.</p> - -<p>Fenton and his gunnery sergeant, Master Sergeant Edward A. Wright, -were stalled with the 2d Platoon. Since Schryver’s unit was also held up, -the company commander radioed Observation Hill and committed his -3d Platoon.</p> - -<p>Schryver realized that the main obstacle to his advance was the fire -hitting his flank from Tugok, and he requested a fire mission from 1/5’s -Weapons Company. As 81-mm. mortar shells rained down on the village, -the 1st Platoon worked westward to the spur above the MSR and -outflanked the NKPA 18th Regiment. A quick assault carried Hill 102 -at 1710.</p> - -<p>With Schryver’s men driving down from the south and Company B’s -machineguns pouring fire on peaks 117 and 143, the 2d Platoon barreled -its way up the draw and seized Hill 109 at 1725.</p> - -<h3><i>Advance of Company A</i></h3> - -<p>Leaving the line of departure from the southern reaches of Observation -Hill, the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A crossed the rice paddy while -Marine air and artillery savagely blasted the forward and reverse slopes -of the objective. The two assault units, each with a machinegun section -attached, passed through Company E at 1500 and scrambled up the -scarred hillside.<a id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">307</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_307" href="#FNanchor_307" class="fnanchor">307</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; Maj J. R. Stevens and Capt G. C. Fox, interv -with author, 24 Feb 54 (Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54); and 1st Lt Francis W. Muetzel, -USMC Ret., interv with author, 5–6 Jan 54 (Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54).</p></div> - -<p>Sweeney’s battle-worn company withdrew, carrying its dead and -wounded back to Observation Hill. The list of casualties included Lieutenant -Arkadis, wounded while spearheading the unit’s advance.</p> - -<p>As Company A’s assault wave passed the halfway point of ascent, it -met only sniping fire from the crest and forward slopes of Obong-ni -Ridge. But any delusions that the enemy had quit were soon shattered -when the summit suddenly came alive with Communist machineguns.</p> - -<p>Intense fire poured down on the attackers, and Marines pitched forward -to roll limply down the hillside. First Lieutenant Robert C. Sebilian, -leading the 1st Platoon up the draw between Hills 109 and 117, ignored -the storm of steel and urged his men forward. Standing fully exposed -while pointing out enemy positions to his NCO’s, the young officer was -struck by an explosive bullet which shattered his leg. Technical Sergeant -Orval F. McMullen took command and resolutely pressed the attack.</p> - -<p>The 1st Platoon reached the saddle above the draw just as Company -B was taking Hill 109. When McMullen tried to advance southward to -117, he and his men were pinned down by a solid sheet of Communist -fire.</p> - -<p>On the left, North Korean guns had already cut Second Lieutenant -Thomas H. Johnston’s 2d Platoon in half. The pint-sized platoon leader -proved to be a giant in courage. He pushed doggedly up the draw between -Hills 117 and 143, but casualties bled his skirmish line white and -finally brought it to a stop.</p> - -<p>Marines watching the battle from Observation Hill saw Company A’s -attack bog down, despite the ceaseless pounding of Hills 117 and 143 by -Brigade supporting arms. Startled, the observers noted a lone figure who -bolted forward from the 2d Platoon’s draw and stubbornly scrambled up -the hill. It was Johnston attempting a single-handed assault on the core -of enemy resistance.</p> - -<p>The astonished onlookers saw him reach the saddle north of Hill 143. -That he survived to this point was remarkable enough, yet he continued -to push forward. Then, at the base of the blazing peak, the little figure -sagged to the ground and lay motionless.</p> - -<p>Technical Sergeant Frank J. Lawson immediately took over the platoon, -displaying outstanding leadership in his attempt to continue the attack. -Communist guns and grenades prevailed, however, and again the line of -infantrymen stalled. The 2d Platoon now consisted of a squad.</p> - -<p>Captain Stevens radioed Lieutenant Colonel Newton from his OP and -requested permission to commit his 3d Platoon, then deployed on Observation -Hill as battalion reserve. The request granted, First Lieutenant<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span> -George C. Fox led the platoon forward into the rice paddy just as a -heavy mortar barrage fell in the area. One of Fox’s men was killed -outright.</p> - -<p>Moving quickly to Obong-ni Ridge and ascending the slope, the 3d -Platoon was joined by Lawson and the remnants of Johnston’s outfit. -The skirmish line passed the critical halfway point, and again enemy -machineguns and grenades opened up.</p> - -<p>Twice Fox attempted to develop an assault, failing both times to get -his platoon through the curtain of fire above the gully. While Technical -Sergeant Stanley G. Millar was reorganizing the skirmish line, the platoon -leader and Private First Class Benjamin C. Simpson of the 2d -Platoon made an attempt to reach Johnston.</p> - -<p>The pair climbed to a point above the gully from which Simpson -could see the fallen officer. Assured now that Johnston was dead, and -unable to recover the body because of interlocking machinegun fire -across the area, Fox and the rifleman slid down the draw to the 3d -Platoon lines.</p> - -<p>By this time Stevens had moved to the base of Obong-ni Ridge, but -he had lost radio contact with the three units high on the hillside. He -could see the combined 2d and 3d Platoons; but the 1st was out of sight, -leaving the company commander unaware of a limited success that could -have been exploited.</p> - -<h3><i>Defeat of Enemy Tanks</i></h3> - -<p>Shortly after 2/5’s jump-off on 17 August, the M-26’s of the 3d Platoon, -Able Company Tanks, moved forward of the road cut and supported the -advance by 90-mm. and machinegun fire. The Marine armor, led by -Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet, concentrated on heavy NKPA -weapons along the crest of Objective One and knocked out at least 12 -antitank guns and several automatic weapons. In return, 1 M-26 withstood -3 direct hits by enemy mortars, and the 4 vehicles combined were -struck by a total of 23 antitank projectiles. Neither tanks nor crews were -bothered appreciably, and only one man was slightly wounded.<a id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">308</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_308" href="#FNanchor_308" class="fnanchor">308</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54; Capt Almarion -S. Bailey, interv with author, 17 Dec 53; T/Sgt C. R. Fullerton, ltr to Opns Research -Office, Johns Hopkins University (cover ltr: OIC RS Cleveland, ser. 527–53, 31 Dec 53).</p></div> - -<p>After the 1st Battalion had passed through 2/5, a section of tanks -moved forward on the road and blasted several North Korean positions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span> -in Tugok. When Company B seized the northern tip of the objective, -Sweet led all his vehicles back to the tank CP, 1,000 yards east of -Observation Hill.</p> - -<p>At 2000, while still refueling and replenishing ammunition stocks, the -tankmen learned that four enemy T-34’s were approaching the Brigade -lines on the MSR. The Marine armor was clanking toward the front -within a matter of seconds. About 300 yards from the road cut, the -tankmen had to jump from their vehicles to remove trucks blocking the -MSR. Then, approaching the narrow defile, Sweet ordered his 1st Section -to load with 90-mm. armor-piercing shells.</p> - -<p>Company B, consolidating its positions on Hills 102 and 109, had first -noticed the four NKPA tanks and a column of infantry moving toward -its lines at 2000. Corsairs of MAG-33 screamed down immediately, destroying -the fourth armored vehicle and dispersing the Red riflemen. -The first three tanks came on alone, passed Finger and Obong-ni Ridges, -and approached the road bend at Hill 125.</p> - -<p>Preparing a reception for the T-34’s were the 1st 75-mm. Recoilless -Gun Platoon on Observation Hill, and the rocket section of 1/5’s antitank -assault platoon on Hill 125. As the first enemy tank reached the -bend, it took a hit in the right track from a 3.5″ rocket. Shooting wildly, -the black hulk continued until its left track and front armor were -blasted by Second Lieutenant Paul R. Fields’ 75’s. The enemy vehicle -burst into flame as it wobbled around the curve and came face to face -with Technical Sergeant Cecil R. Fullerton’s M-26.</p> - -<p>Still aimlessly firing its 85-mm. rifle and machinegun, the T-34 took -two quick hits from the Marine tank’s 90-mm. gun and exploded. One -North Korean got out of the burning vehicle but was cut down instantly -by rifle fire. He crawled beneath the blazing wreckage and died.</p> - -<p>The second T-34 charged toward the bend, taking a 3.5 rocket hit -from Company A’s assault squad. Weaving crazily around the curve, -with its right track damaged, the cripple was struck in the gas tank by a -rocket from 1/5’s assault section before meeting the fury of Field’s recoilless -rifles. It lurched to a stop off the road behind the first tank, and -the 85-mm. gun fired across the valley into the blue yonder.</p> - -<p>By this time a second M-26 had squeezed next to that of Fullerton on -the narrow firing line, and the two Marine tanks blasted the T-34 with -six 90-mm. shells. Miraculously, the Communist vehicle kept on shooting, -although its fire was directionless. Marine armor poured in seven -more rounds, which ripped through the turret and exploded the hull.</p> - -<p>Before the kill, one Red tankman opened the turret hatch in an effort<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span> -to escape. A 2.36″ white phosphorus round, fired by a 1st Battalion -rocket man, struck the open lid and richocheted into the turret. The -enemy soldier was knocked back into the tank as the interior turned into -a furnace.</p> - -<p>The third T-34 raced around the road bend to a stop behind the blazing -hulks of the first two. Marine tanks, recoilless rifles, and rockets -ripped into it with a thundering salvo. The enemy tank shuddered, then -erupted in a violent explosion and died.</p> - -<p>Thus the Brigade shattered the myth of the T-34 in five flaming -minutes. Not only Corsairs and M-26’s, but also every antitank weapon -organic to Marine infantry had scored an assist in defeating the Communist -armor.</p> - -<h3><i>End of the First Day</i></h3> - -<p>Throughout 17 August the evacuation of dead and wounded had been a -major concern of every Marine, from fire team leaders up to the Brigade -commander. Men risked their lives dragging casualties off the blazing -slopes of Obong-ni Ridge to relative safety at the base. Litter bearers -plodded back and forth across the fire-swept rice paddy, and a steady -stream of wounded passed through the 1st and 2d Battalion aid stations -behind the road cut. Medical officers of the two battalions, Lieutenants -(jg) Bentley G. Nelson and Chester L. Klein, worked tirelessly with -their corpsmen.</p> - -<p>In the rear, Lieutenant Commander Byron D. Casteel had to commandeer -every ambulance in the area—including 16 Army vehicles—to -evacuate wounded to and from his 5th Marines aid station. So acute was -the shortage of hospital corpsmen that the Brigade’s Malaria and Epidemic -Control Unit was used to reinforce the regimental medical staff. -Even so, the hospital tents were busy for a straight 18 hours.<a id="FNanchor_309" href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">309</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_309" href="#FNanchor_309" class="fnanchor">309</a> Annexes Love and Tare to Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>The small number of deaths from wounds attested to the speed and -effectiveness of helicopter evacuations; for the pilots of VMO-6 were -ferrying the more serious casualties from the regimental aid station to -the Army’s 8076 Surgical Hospital at Miryang, some 20 miles away.</p> - -<p>While medics toiled to save lives, the spiritual needs of casualties were -filled by the inspiring labor of the 5th Marines’ naval chaplains, Lieutenant -Commander Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., Lieutenant William G. -Tennant, and Lieutenant (jg) Bernard L. Hickey. A familiar figure at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span> -front, frequently exposed to enemy fire as he administered to fallen Marines, -was Lieutenant Commander Otto E. Sporrer, beloved chaplain -of 1/11.</p> - -<p>Two serious obstacles to the various missions behind the front were -the dud-infested area east of Observation Hill and a section of collapsed -MSR in the river bed occupied by the 5th Marines CP. First Lieutenant -Wayne E. Richards and his 2d Platoon, Able Company Engineers, spent -most of 17 August at the tedious task of removing unexploded missiles -from the forward assembly areas. The engineers’ 1st Platoon had to tear -down part of an unoccupied village for material to reinforce the sinking -road over which the jeep ambulances and supply trucks were struggling.</p> - -<p>As the sun dropped behind Obong-ni Ridge, activity on the MSR -continued unabated, although the battle for Objective One had diminished -to a crackle of rifle fire and occasional machinegun bursts.</p> - -<p>Company A had been unable to take Hills 117 and 143, still bristling -with enemy automatic weapons. At 2030, shortly after the smashing victory -over North Korean armor, Captain Stevens contacted his 1st Platoon -and learned that it was on the saddle between peaks 109 and 117. -Although tied in on the right with Company B, the platoon was separated -by a 100-yard gap from Stevens’ other two platoons on the slopes -to the left.<a id="FNanchor_310" href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">310</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_310" href="#FNanchor_310" class="fnanchor">310</a> Annex How; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>The company commander called Fox, Lawson, and McMullen together -near the base of the ridge to consult them on continuing the attack. All -platoon leaders advised against it, since darkness was falling and their -units needed rest, food, water, and ammunition. Moreover, the enemy’s -bold tank attack had convinced the infantry leaders that a larger counterstroke -by the Communists was imminent, and they wanted time for -preparation.<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311" class="fnanchor">311</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_311" href="#FNanchor_311" class="fnanchor">311</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Stevens informed Newton of the situation by radio, and the battalion -commander ordered him to discontinue the attack and tie in with -Fenton’s unit for the night. It was already dark when the 2d and 3d Platoons -shifted to the right from their positions below Hills 117 and 143.</p> - -<p>Company B had been busily consolidating its high ground since the -seizure of Hills 102 and 109 earlier in the evening. While Fenton’s machineguns -dueled with those of the Reds on 117, his 1st and 2d Platoons -deployed defensively on the forward slopes of the two captured peaks, -and the 3d went into reserve on the reverse slope.<a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312" class="fnanchor">312</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_312" href="#FNanchor_312" class="fnanchor">312</a> Annex How; and Fenton, 8 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>Company A’s front extended left from the southern part of Hill 109—where -the 1st Platoon was linked to Fenton’s unit—to the center of the -saddle toward 117. There the line bent down in an arch, formed by the -2d Platoon, to the spur below the enemy-held peak. Able Company’s -left was actually perpendicular to the ridgeline, for Fox’s 3d Platoon -was deployed up and down Hill 117’s spur.<a id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">313</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_313" href="#FNanchor_313" class="fnanchor">313</a> Brig SAR; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54.</p></div> - -<p>To complete the Brigade front, Headquarters Company of 1/5 was -to have extended across the rice paddy from Observation Hill and tied -in with Company A’s left flank. Due to the casualties and workload of -the headquarters troops, this connection was never made, with the result -that Fox’s platoon remained dangling.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314" class="fnanchor">314</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_314" href="#FNanchor_314" class="fnanchor">314</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>When General Craig returned to his CP near Yongsan on the night -of 17 August, he was not unduly concerned about the tactical situation. -Although the Brigade had been thinned by heavy casualties, Murray’s -disposition in depth across a narrow front gave the Marines the advantages -of concentrated strength and firepower. If the enemy attempted his -usual night envelopment, both 2/5 and 3/5 could strike back from their -reserve positions on Observation and Cloverleaf Hills.<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315" class="fnanchor">315</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_315" href="#FNanchor_315" class="fnanchor">315</a> Craig, 17 Mar 54; and Col R. L. Murray, 20 Mar 54.</p></div> - -<p>Across the MSR, the 9th RCT had launched its attack earlier in the -evening, clearing Tugok and seizing Finger Ridge against negligible resistance. -By darkness, the 19th and 34th Regiments were also sitting on -their objectives to the north, leaving the 4th NKPA Division clamped -in a vice. To the southeast, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was holding -its blocking position with no difficulty.<a id="FNanchor_316" href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">316</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_316" href="#FNanchor_316" class="fnanchor">316</a> 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Enemy Counterattack on Ridge</i></h3> - -<p>Late on 17 August, when the attack on Obong-ni Ridge ceased, General -Craig sent a message to his subordinate commanders, directing them to -“... consolidate positions for night, account for location of each individual -and be prepared for counterattack; carefully prepare plan of fires -for night to include plans for fires within and in rear of positions; wire -in where possible in front line elements.”<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">317</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_317" href="#FNanchor_317" class="fnanchor">317</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54; Muetzel, 5–6 -Jan 54; and Fenton, 8 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>Long after nightfall, the weary Marines of both front line companies -were still digging foxholes and organizing their defenses. While this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span> -work continued in spite of sporadic Communist fire from Hill 117, the -South Korean laborers were transporting supplies to the ridgeline or -carrying casualties back to the rear.</p> - -<p>Captain Stevens established Company A’s command post at the top of -the draw leading to the saddle between Hills 109 and 117. His 60-mm. -mortar section set up its weapons in the gully itself.</p> - -<p>Shortly before 2200, the telltale whine and rattle of mortar shells cut -through the darkness and the men of Able Company crouched in their -holes. The explosions were followed by a shower of fire as white phosphorus -enveloped the center of the company area. Almost every man in -the gully was painfully wounded, leaving Stevens without a mortar section. -The edge of the barrage hit the 3d Platoon’s area, wounding Fox -and several of his men. Two riflemen had to be evacuated, but the platoon -leader and the others applied first aid and remained in the line.</p> - -<p>After this brief flurry the front settled down to an ominous quiet -interrupted only occasionally by North Korean guns to the south.</p> - -<p>At 0230 on 18 August, the Marines of Company A heard enemy -movement on Hill 117. Suddenly there was a hail of bullets from Communist -machineguns on the peak, and hand grenades began to roll down -into the Marine positions. A North Korean platoon made a few bounds -from the high ground and landed almost literally on top of Stevens’ -depleted 2d Platoon.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously, Company B’s position on Hill 109 was struck hard -by two platoons advancing up the draw to the west. Heedless of illuminating -shells fired by 1/5’s 81-mm. mortars, the enemy assaulted methodically -by alternately throwing small groups of grenadiers and submachinegunners -against Marine positions. The NKPA infantrymen were -covered by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire pouring down -from Hill 117.</p> - -<p>An enemy squad emerged from the gully west of the saddle between -peaks 102 and 109, attempting to divert strength from Fenton’s main -defensive effort to the south. Failing in this effort, the group fell back -to fire harassing shots.</p> - -<p>Company A’s 2d Platoon slugged it out with three times its own -numbers for a full half hour. This stand was due largely to the courage -and leadership of Lawson, who stuck to his guns and refused evacuation, -though wounded three times. About 0300, with Marines on the right -devoting more attention to the heavier attack against Hill 109, the exhausted -survivors of the 2d Platoon were overrun and the Brigade line -penetrated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span> -For some unknown reason, enemy troops did not pour down the -eastern slopes after the breakthrough. Only one squad drove through, -and it split Company A in half by invading Stevens’ CP, directly behind -the 2d Platoon’s lines. The company commander and his headquarters -were slowly forced down the draw by the methodical grenade and -submachinegun fire from above.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the North Korean platoon which had hit Company -A remained on the crest for a joint effort with the larger force striking -Hill 109. Stevens’ 1st Platoon, with its left flank now exposed on the -saddle, gradually fell back and curled around the southern face of 109.</p> - -<p>Although Company B’s left front held firm against the two-platoon -assault, a few Reds slipped by the Marine foxholes and charged into -Fenton’s CP on Hill 109. Rocket gunners, mortarmen and clerks -responded to the challenge and quickly eliminated the attackers.</p> - -<p>When Fenton became aware that the saddle south of Hill 109 had -been taken, he tightened his left flank by drawing it in to his 3d Platoon’s -reverse slope positions. This portion of his defense now took the -shape of a football, and successfully withstood pressure from the south.</p> - -<p>By 0400 Stevens had temporarily lost control of Company A, although -the situation looked worse than it actually was. While the company -commander stabilized his center near the bottom of the draw, his executive -officer, First Lieutenant Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., made single-handed -forays up the gully. He was eventually aided in his private war by the -company’s machinegun officer, Second Lieutenant Francis W. Muetzel. -After the breakthrough, the latter had been wounded and left for dead -in his foxhole behind the 2d Platoon. Upon regaining consciousness, he -made his way down the draw, fighting it out with enemy soldiers until -he reached the Marine lines. Company A’s 3d Platoon along the spur -below Hill 117 enjoyed a seemingly illogical immunity during the counterattack. -Although isolated after the penetration and deployed ideally -from the enemy’s point of view, Fox’s men had only occasional brushes -with Red infantrymen who displayed a remarkable lack of interest. After -the platoon leader learned of the situation on his right, he redeployed -into an elongated perimeter which included a few survivors of the 2d -Platoon.</p> - -<div id="ip_199" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_199.jpg" width="1367" height="2101" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">SITUATION 18 AUG.—OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI)</span></p></div></div> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Newton, when notified of Company A’s withdrawal -on the left front, called down such a tremendous volume of artillery -fire on enemy approaches that 1/11 asked him to conserve a few -shells for the Brigade attack scheduled for 0700. The battalion commander -replied that the Brigade would be fighting to retake Objective<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_199">199</a><a id="Page_200">200</a></span> -One at 0700 if his beleaguered companies did not get maximum supporting -fire. While the artillerymen continued to pound Obong-ni -Ridge, Newton’s 81-mm. mortars, strengthened by 2/5’s entire stock of -ammunition, added to the hot metal thrown at the enemy. It can only -be conjectured why the NKPA thrust against the Brigade lines never -developed above the company level, but Newton’s generosity with high -explosives probably did not encourage Communist aspirations.</p> - -<h3><i>Obong-ni Ridge Secured</i></h3> - -<p>By dawn of 18 August, the North Korean attackers had spent their -strength, leaving Company B in undisputed control of Hills 102 and 109. -As if in frustration, enemy machineguns on 117 spat angrily at the -Marines while the few surviving Red infantrymen withdrew to their -lines.</p> - -<p>Stevens prepared at first light to complete the unfinished business of -the previous day. Thanks to the heroism of his wounded gunnery sergeant, -Technical Sergeant Paul A. Hodge, the company commander had -regained contact with Fox before dawn and was able to prepare for an -attack. At 0700, after moving forward to the 3d Platoon’s area and clearing -with Newton, he ordered Fox to continue the attack and seize Hill -117.</p> - -<p>The platoon leader shouted to his men who arose as a body to begin -the ascent. When a lone Red machinegun broke the silence on 117, -Stevens spotted the weapon immediately and called for an air strike. -Within seconds a Marine fighter plane glided over the 3d Platoon and -dropped a 500-pound bomb squarely on the enemy position. The response -from Marine air had been so prompt that every one of the attackers -was knocked off his feet and one of Fox’s automatic riflemen was -killed.</p> - -<p>While the echoes of the shattering explosion were still reverberating -through the morning haze, the thin skirmish line of Marines scrambled -up the slope and carried Hill 117. McMullen’s 1st Platoon drove in from -109, and the North Koreans fled in panic from the crest and reverse -slope positions. A full company of Reds raced down the western slope, -with Stevens’ riflemen and machinegunners firing from the crest to rip -into the enemy groups.</p> - -<p>Capitalizing on a psychological advantage, Company A wheeled -southward to sweep the crest. Fox, using a skirmish line of only 20 men,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span> -assaulted Hill 143 and took the peak against light resistance. A quick -call to Newton brought Stevens immediate permission for maximum -exploitation.</p> - -<p>The 3d Platoon attacked Hill 147 vigorously, and though a few Red -soldiers fought to the bitter end, the majority again chose to flee. The -high ground was taken easily.</p> - -<p>As the Marines moved over the crest of 147, they saw 150 enemy -troops in formation halfway down the western slope. The withdrawal -commenced in an orderly column of fours but the formation broke down -quickly under Marine fire and turned into a routed mob.</p> - -<p>Fox turned his attention to Hill 153, Obong-ni’s crowning peak, reasoning -that it would be the logical place for the enemy’s last-ditch stand. -But it was the same old story when the 3d Platoon rushed to the summit—abandoned -weapons and equipment, a few scattered dead, and -blasted foxholes. There was a variation, however, when a supposed -clump of scrub pines arose from the reverse slope and rushed downward -in headlong flight. The Leathernecks were reminded of Birnham Wood -in Shakespeare’s <i>Macbeth</i> as the camouflaged North Koreans disappeared -with the agility of mountain goats before Marine marksmen -could score more than a few hits.</p> - -<p>While the 1st and 2d Platoons consolidated the central peaks, the 3d -combed the southern reaches below Hill 153 without incident. The 1st -Platoon, Able Company Engineers, patrolled the swampland south of -the ridge and secured Fox’s left flank with a minefield extending from -the southern crest to the valley below and eastward across the swamp. -By midafternoon all of Obong-ni Ridge belonged to the Brigade.</p> - -<h3><i>Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge</i></h3> - -<p>At midnight, 17 August, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had issued 3/5 -a warning order for continuing the attack on the 18th. Shortly after -dawn, Taplett and his two company commanders, Fegan and Bohn, -visually reconnoitered Hill 207—Objective Two—from vantage points -north and south of the MSR. Then, while the battalion commander set -up his OP on the northern part of Obong-ni Ridge, Companies G and -H advanced to an assembly area at the base of the Ridge.<a id="FNanchor_318" href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">318</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_318" href="#FNanchor_318" class="fnanchor">318</a> This section is derived from: Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; Taplett, 20 Apr -54; and Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>Taplett called down heavy artillery, air, and mortar preparations on<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_202">202</a><a id="Page_203">203</a></span> -Objective Two. Occasionally he shifted fires to blast large groups of -enemy fleeing to Hill 207 from Company A’s advance on Obong-ni -Ridge.</p> - -<div id="ip_202" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_202.jpg" width="2085" height="1342" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>1st NAKTONG COUNTERATTACK<br /> - <span class="smaller">SEIZURE OF OBJ. 2—18 AUG.</span></p></div></div> - -<p>Directly south of Finger Ridge, two large spurs form the northern -approach to Hill 207. Company H emerged into the open at 1000 from -the MSR between Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and attacked up the -eastern spur. Following Fegan’s unit was Company G, which veered to -the right and advanced up the western spur. The two infantry units -slowly ascended, separated by a deep gully, while the 3d Platoon of Able -Company tanks fired overhead and to the flanks from its positions in the -valley.</p> - -<p>When Fegan’s unit was halfway up the eastern spur, the Marine tankmen -saw a platoon of North Koreans attempting to flank the attackers. -Machinegun and 90-mm. fire from the M-26’s killed or dispersed the -Reds at a range of 300 yards.</p> - -<p>As Lieutenant Williams worked How Company’s 1st Platoon close -enough for an assault of the summit, several NKPA soldiers rose from -their holes and threw down hand grenades. The Marines hit the deck -until the missiles exploded, then bounded up and rushed the crest. Unnerved -by Williams’ perfect timing, most of the North Koreans fled -southward along the ridge. The remainder died in their positions during -a brief but bitter fight.</p> - -<p>Moving up on Fegan’s right, Bohn’s men pushed over the western -half of the objective, finding only a handful of enemy who were quickly -destroyed. Company G’s assault completed the seizure of Objective Two -at 1237.</p> - -<p>During the last minutes of the fight on Hill 207, the entire Naktong -Bulge suddenly swarmed with panic-stricken remnants of the 4th NKPA -Division. What had been a retreat of small forces now became a widespread -rout. Enemy troops poured down from Objective Two, some -scurrying up the slopes of Hill 311 across the MSR, others making for -the Naktong River.</p> - -<p>Air, artillery, and mortars were now offered a profusion of targets by -an enemy who ordinarily did not reveal himself during daylight hours. -MAG-33 plastered the suspected CP of the 18th NKPA Regiment on a -peak south of 207, shattering communications equipment and weapons. -Other Marine planes alternated strafing runs with 1/11’s continual artillery -barrages along the river banks, where enemy troops were gathering -by the hundreds.</p> - -<p>Victory turned into slaughter when the Brigade supporting arms<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span> -concentrated on the masses of Communists plunging into the river. All -artillery having been turned loose on the river crossings, Taplett used his -mortars, machineguns, and the supporting tanks to cut down targets in -the valley and on Hills 207 and 311. He requested permission to attack -the latter immediately, but was told to remain on Objective Two while -the Brigade gave all of its attention to the astounding situation at the -river.</p> - -<p>At 1530 Companies G and H descended Hill 207. They were met at -the bottom by First Lieutenant Pomeroy’s 1st Platoon of tanks and -escorted across the valley to the base of Hill 311—Objective Three. In -advance of the infantrymen, MAG-33 scorched the high ground with -napalm while artillery, mortars, and 75-mm. recoilless rifles worked over -the slopes.</p> - -<p>Again Fegan and Bohn moved up companion spurs which converged -on their target, the 1,000-foot height. Progress was good until Company -H came within 200 yards of the crest. Then a volley of rifle fire from the -summit and forward slopes forced the Marines to the ground. Although -confronted by only a platoon, Fegan was at a disadvantage. Scrub growth -not only concealed the Communist riflemen, but also prevented the use -of Company H’s machineguns. Maneuver to the right or left was impossible, -since the steep draws on either side were well covered by camouflaged -enemy positions. Several Marines who tried to advance frontally -were cut down by rifle fire.</p> - -<p>The enemy platoon’s defense was not based on the usual machinegun -fire and grenade throwing. With calm, business-like efficiency, NKPA -riflemen kept Company H pinned to the ground, finally wounding -Fegan himself as the officer attempted to regain the initiative. After his -evacuation, the attack bogged down completely.</p> - -<p>At 1730, Company G had reached the southern portion of the long, -narrow crest by brushing aside light resistance. Turning its attention -northward, the company entered into a small-arms duel with the Communist -force opposing Fegan’s unit. When supporting arms failed to -dislodge the enemy rifleman, Bohn enveloped the troublesome pocket -by sending Cahill’s 1st Platoon around to the left (west).</p> - -<p>The young platoon leader completed the maneuver just before nightfall -and overran the Reds on the northern half of the summit. But the -enemy on the forward slopes facing Company H suddenly showed fight. -The 1st Platoon, pushed rearward a short distance by the surprise resistance, -slugged it out at close quarters.</p> - -<p>With darkness closing in and the platoon so far beyond Marines lines,<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_205">205</a><a id="Page_206">206</a></span> -Bohn ordered it to withdraw. Cahill, wounded himself, reported on his -return that the platoon had suffered 10 casualties, including 2 killed.</p> - -<div id="ip_205" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_205.png" width="2099" height="1356" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>1<i>st</i> NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">SEIZURE OF OBJ. 3–18 AUG.</span></p></div></div> - -<p>Taplett ordered the two companies to deploy defensively in their -present positions. Thus, during the quiet night of 18–19 August, Companies -G and H faced the enemy pocket at right angles to each other.</p> - -<p>Earlier on the 18th Lieutenant (jg) Robert J. Harvey, 3d Battalion -surgeon, had the unpleasant task of examining an abandoned Army aid -station under the bridge near the tip of Finger Ridge. The improvised -hospital had been overrun during Army reverses a week before; and -about 30 dead found by the Marines bore mute evidence of the enemy’s -brutality in dealing with captured wounded and medical personnel.</p> - -<p>At 0610 on the morning of 19 August, 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars prepared -the way for the final drive on Objective Three. Following close in the -wake of the mortar bursts, Second Lieutenant Thomas P. Lennon led -Company H through evacuated enemy positions. He reached the northern -part of Hill 311 without meeting any opposition.</p> - -<p>This last Brigade objective was secured at 0645, leaving 1/5 atop -Obong-ni Ridge, 2/5 on Hill 207 to which it had displaced on the 18th, -and 3/5 in possession of the dominating height of the Naktong Bulge. -The reduction of the enemy bridgehead cost the Marines 66 dead, 1 -missing in action, and 278 wounded.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XI" class="vspace">CHAPTER XI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Second Naktong</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>The Famous Bean Patch—Planning for Inchon Landing—Return -to the Naktong Bulge—All-Out NKPA Offensive—The Marines -Jump Off—Progress of Brigade Attack—Assault on Hill 117</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It was all</span> over but the mopping-up operations. Battalion areas were -carefully patrolled on 19 August to clear them of NKPA snipers or -stragglers. During this process a patrol ranging along the Naktong river -discovered three enemy 122-mm. howitzers hidden in a strip of woods -on a hill. The pieces had not been touched by Marine air or artillery. -What was more surprising, they were emplaced in a column to fire over -one another—something new and wonderful that the Marines had never -seen before.<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">319</a> General Craig concluded that these howitzers had fired the -shells which landed on Marine positions to the bitter end.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_319" href="#FNanchor_319" class="fnanchor">319</a> This section is derived from: LtGen Edward A. Craig (Ret), ltr to author, 23 May 54 -(Craig, 23 May 54).</p></div> - -<p>The next day the Brigade commander took a helicopter to 24th Division -Headquarters to confer with General Church. There he was informed -that the Marines had been detached from 24th Division -operational control to Eighth Army reserve. Church complimented the -Brigade warmly on its performance, and letters of commendation were -later received both from him and CG EUSAK.</p> - -<p>At 1300 on the 21st Craig arrived by helicopter at a new Brigade -bivouac area near Masan that was to be recorded in capital letters as the -Bean Patch. It was just that—a bean patch large enough to accommodate -a brigade. But from this historic spot the Marines were to fight their -way around the peninsula during the next 5 months and complete the -circuit to their identical starting point.</p> - -<p>General Craig arrived along with the Brigade advance elements. After -setting up his CP, he reported to General Kean, of the 25th Division,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span> -who was in control of the bivouac area. Kean divulged that the situation -in his sector had deteriorated. The enemy had made several penetrations, -and Brigade assistance might be required in the event of further breakthroughs. -As it was, Kean had been authorized by Eighth Army to employ -Brigade artillery along with his own; and 1/11 proceeded the next -day to the familiar Chindong-ni area in support of 25th Division -Infantry.</p> - -<p>Orders were received from Eighth Army for the Brigade infantry to be -prepared to counterattack in the 25th Division sector as part of its reserve -mission. General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart made a -helicopter reconnaissance of the areas of greatest activity, but events -proved that the Marine rifle battalions were not needed.</p> - -<h3><i>The Famous Bean Patch</i></h3> - -<p>Unit training, including the checking and firing of all weapons, was -conducted at the Bean Patch; and Marine patrols were sent out to the -rear of the 25th Division to watch for infiltrating forces. Patrols in -rugged country were fed hot meals delivered in special containers by the -versatile helicopters of VMO-6.</p> - -<p>Truckloads of supplies rolled in daily from Pusan, including some of -the equipment left behind at the docks when the Brigade landed. But -no tentage was available, and the exhausting marches of combat had -forced the men to discard everything except fighting tools. In the lack of -shelter tents, therefore, the Marines lived in the open at the Bean Patch.</p> - -<p>General Craig conferred on 23 August with General Kean and a distinguished -visitor, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, USA. -Collins was keenly interested in Marine methods of knocking out NKPA -tanks and requested Craig to prepare a memorandum on the subject.</p> - -<p>That evening the entire Brigade attended an outdoor entertainment -given on an improvised stage by South Korean girls, who sang and -played native instruments which sounded out of tune to Western ears. -Translations of the songs were forthcoming, since some of the girls were -English-speaking refugees from Seoul University. Afterwards, General -Craig addressed the Brigade, paying a high tribute to his Marines for -their conduct in battle. NKPA prisoners, he said, had told G-2 interviewers -that they earnestly wished to steer clear of “the Americans in -yellow leggings.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span> -Letters from home and beer from Pusan<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320" class="fnanchor">320</a> contributed to good Marine -morale, even though no liberty was granted to nearby towns. On the -29th an honor guard of 87 Marines received Purple Heart medals at a -ceremony attended by President Syngman Rhee, who arrived in a helicopter -provided by VMO-6. General Craig had paid an official call on -him the day before at Chinhae, being most courteously received. And -after the presentation of medals, President Rhee gave a talk to the -Marines.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_320" href="#FNanchor_320" class="fnanchor">320</a> The offer of Stateside breweries to send free beer to Korea precipitated a controversy -in civilian circles. Opponents protested on the grounds that some of the troops were as -young as 18. Proponents argued that if a man was old enough to fight, he was mature -enough to drink a can of beer without harm. The issue was never definitely settled, though -it resulted in a temporary drought.</p></div> - -<p>He confided to Craig afterwards that he would like to confer some -sort of an award on every man in the Brigade for heroic service in Korea. -This was undoubtedly the inception of the Korean Presidential Unit -Citation which the Brigade later received from the ROK executive.</p> - -<h3><i>Planning for Inchon Landing</i></h3> - -<p>General Craig, it may be recalled, had insisted that replacements be sent -to the Brigade. Thanks to his determination, a long column of trucks -arrived at the Bean Patch with more than 800 Marines just landed at -Pusan.</p> - -<p>Some of the 5th Marines outfits had been so thinned by combat that -an appeal was made for volunteers from supporting units to serve temporarily -in rifle companies, with the privilege of returning to their -former status after the emergency. The hearty response was a tribute to -Marine morale as well as Marine basic training which made every man a -potential rifleman. Engineers, shore party troops and headquarters personnel -came forward in such numbers that some could not be accepted -after the arrival of replacements eased the situation.</p> - -<p>No attempt was made at the Bean Patch to form the newcomers into -third rifle companies. They were simply used to build up the strength of -the present companies and given intensive unit training.</p> - -<p>Rumors of an impending Marine amphibious operation had already -filtered down to every PFC, and there were wild speculations as to when -and where. At least, it could hardly be denied that the Brigade would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span> -soon be taking another voyage; for convoys of tracks left the Bean Patch -every day laden with heavy supplies and equipment to be unloaded at -Pusan.<a id="FNanchor_321" href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">321</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_321" href="#FNanchor_321" class="fnanchor">321</a> Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>This was once that lower-echelon “scuttlebutt” came close to the -mark. In fact, planning for the Inchon landing had already gone so far -that General Craig sent his chief of staff, G-3 and G-4 to Tokyo -to confer with staff officers of the 1st Marine Division about the projected -operation.<a id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">322</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_322" href="#FNanchor_322" class="fnanchor">322</a> Craig, 23 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, had -relieved General Erskine early in July when the latter was sent on a -secret State Department mission. As the ADC of the Division during -the fight for Peleliu in 1944, Smith knew how tough an amphibious operation -can become when it encounters unexpected obstacles. He was -determined to keep his Division intact with its three infantry regiments, -the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. And after his arrival in Japan with the advance -party, he returned a firm negative to proposals that the 5th Marines -and other Brigade troops remain with the Eighth Army.</p> - -<p>It would be putting the case mildly to say that this was the eleventh -hour, The 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) had landed at -Kobe from 28 August to 3 September. And though a typhoon caused a -good deal of damage, little time was lost at the gigantic task of unloading -mixed-type shipping and combat-loading it into assault-type shipping. -The LST’s had to be ready to sail for the target area by 10 -September, and the transports by the 12th.</p> - -<p>The Marines at the Bean Patch would have been flattered to know -that they were the objects of an official tug of war at Tokyo. It was -maintained by the EUSAK command and staff that Army morale would -be hurt by taking the Brigade away from the Pusan Perimeter at a critical -moment. On the other hand, General Smith contended that he -needed the Brigade all the more urgently because the 7th Marines,<a id="FNanchor_323" href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">323</a> sailing -belatedly from San Diego, would not be able to reach Inchon until a -week after the proposed D-day of 15 September 1950.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_323" href="#FNanchor_323" class="fnanchor">323</a> Less a battalion making the voyage from the Mediterranean, where it had been afloat -with the Sixth Fleet.</p></div> - -<p>The Marine general was informed that the decision would depend -upon the tactical situation in Korea. On 30 August he sent a dispatch to -X Corps—the new Army tactical organization activated by CINCFE -especially for the Inchon operation—requesting that the Brigade be released<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span> -from its Army commitments on 1 September. In response, General -MacArthur issued an order restoring the unit to the 1st Marine -Division on the 4th.<a id="FNanchor_324" href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">324</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_324" href="#FNanchor_324" class="fnanchor">324</a> MCBS, I-II-B-4-6.</p></div> - -<p>At this point the enemy rudely interrupted by launching an all-out -offensive against the Pusan Perimeter on 1 September, and General -MacArthur’s order was rescinded. Even though most of the Brigade’s -heavy equipment was at the Pusan docks, waiting for shipping, -GHQFEC decided that General Craig’s troops should again be used as -“firemen” to extinguish an NKPA conflagration.</p> - -<p>Colonel Edward H. Forney, the Marine officer recently named deputy -chief of staff of X Corps, suggested to General Smith the possibility of -substituting an Army unit, the 32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division, -for the 5th Marines. Smith demurred on the grounds that these -troops had not been trained for amphibious warfare.</p> - -<p>On 3 September, with D-day less than 2 weeks away, a conference was -held in Tokyo to decide the question once and for all. X Corps was represented -by General Wright, the G-3, and General Edward S. Almond, -the new commanding general and former chief of staff, GHQFEC. -COMNAVFE (Admiral Joy), COMSEVENTHFLT (Admiral Struble) -and COMPHIBGRUONE (Admiral Doyle) were the Navy officers -present. General Almond opened the discussion by reiterating that the -32d Infantry would be substituted for the 5th Marines. In reply, General -Smith mentioned the complications of an amphibious assault landing -and urged that the operations plan be amended if the untrained Army -regiment were to be employed.</p> - -<p>Another solution, offered by Admiral Struble, was baited with reciprocal -concessions. He suggested that the Brigade be employed briefly for -counterattacks in the Pusan Perimeter, but that meanwhile the 32d or -some other 7th Infantry Division regiment be moved from Japan to -Korea. There it would become a floating reserve for EUSAK, thus releasing -the Brigade units to take their former places in the 1st Marine -Division for the Inchon operation. This compromise was finally accepted, -and orders were issued for the Brigade to be withdrawn from -Eighth Army control at midnight on 5 September.</p> - -<p>The first intimations to reach the troops at the Bean Patch were received -on the 1st, at 0810, when the Brigade was alerted for a possible -move by CG EUSAK to an unknown destination. At 1109 came -the warning order for a road lift to the Miryang assembly area. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span> -confirmation followed at 1215, with all units being scheduled to move -out at 1330.<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325" class="fnanchor">325</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_325" href="#FNanchor_325" class="fnanchor">325</a> Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>The Marines had another date with destiny.</p> - -<h3><i>Return to the Naktong Bulge</i></h3> - -<p>General Craig set up his CP in the Miryang area at 1800 on 1 September. -Billeting officers, having gone ahead by helicopter, were prepared -to take care of Brigade units as they arrived. Among them was the 1st -Battalion of the 11th Marines, which had been returned from 25th Division -control to the Brigade.</p> - -<p>The news from the front was depressing. Heavy attacks had been received -all day along the 2d and 25th Infantry Division fronts. An enemy -penetration of 4,000 yards was made at the expense of the 2d Division, -with the old familiar Naktong Bulge being occupied again by Red -Koreans who had gained a firm foothold on the east bank of the river.</p> - -<p>This meant that General Craig’s men, now under operational control -of the 2d Division, were likely to revisit some scarred parcels of Korean -real estate they had hoped never to see again. Major General Lawrence -B. Keiser, commanding the 2d Division, informed the Brigade commander -that several of his companies had been cut off by enemy advances -which pushed his lines back almost to Yongsan.<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326" class="fnanchor">326</a> There was a -good deal of NKPA infiltration, he added, in his rear.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_326" href="#FNanchor_326" class="fnanchor">326</a> Craig, 23 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>It had been a full day, and at 2230 that night Craig received orders -from the Eighth Army to move the Brigade at first light to a reserve -position south of Yongsan and in the rear of the 9th Infantry of the 2d -Division.</p> - -<p>At 0630, on 2 September, the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines arrived -at its assigned covering position on the road leading to Yongsan. The -remainder of the Brigade moved out to assembly positions during the -day.<a id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">327</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_327" href="#FNanchor_327" class="fnanchor">327</a> Brig SAR.</p></div> - -<p>Craig proceeded by helicopter at 0830 to the 2d Infantry Division -headquarters for a conference with Keiser to plan the move of the Brigade -into his lines. Afterwards, the Marine general devoted the rest of -the morning to reconnaissance of the terrain by helicopter. On the way<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span> -he stopped at Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP and learned that the -5th Marines units were well established along the road leading to the -front.</p> - -<p>The planning conference for the projected counterattack began at 1430 -in the 2d Infantry Division CP. General Craig was accompanied by his -assistant G-3, Major Frank R. Stewart, Jr., since his regular G-3 had not -yet returned from the 1st Marine Division briefing at Tokyo. General -Keiser and his staff officers emphasized the gravity of the situation in -the 2d Division sector. They wanted General Craig to counterattack that -very afternoon on a widely extended front, but he objected on both -counts.</p> - -<p>As for the time element, he pointed out that the hour was late. Some -of his units were not even in their assembly positions, and others were -still detraining or in trucks. Smoke and haze had resulted in such low -visibility that planes could not operate effectively. Finally, Craig’s -TACRON had not arrived and he was out of touch with the aircraft -carriers. He did not wish to commit his force piecemeal without air support; -and in the end the Army staff officers agreed with him on the -advisability of the Marines attacking in the morning.<a id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">328</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_328" href="#FNanchor_328" class="fnanchor">328</a> Craig, 23 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>Next came a discussion as to the nature of the Marine counterattack. -Craig cited the risks and disadvantages of advancing on too wide a front. -He suggested that the 2d Infantry Division specify the Marine objectives -and allow him to attack in such formations as he deemed most effective. -Keiser and his staff assented, and the Marine officers hurried back to the -Brigade CP.</p> - -<h3><i>All-Out NKPA Offensive</i></h3> - -<p>Glancing at the big picture, there could be no doubt that the enemy -was making an all-out effort to smash through the Pusan Perimeter. Late -in August it became evident that he was massing troops. The blow fell -in the early morning hours of 1 September. The direction of the main -attack remained in doubt until that afternoon, when it was revealed as a -bid for a breakthrough in the Naktong Bulge which would expose the -Pusan-Taegu lifeline.</p> - -<p>Despite heavy casualties of the past 2 months, NKPA overall strength -was estimated as high as 133,000 men as the result of filling the ranks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span> -with hastily trained replacements. Thirteen infantry regiments, 3 security -regiments and the remnants of the original 3 armored regiments were -believed to be participating in the offensive.<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329" class="fnanchor">329</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_329" href="#FNanchor_329" class="fnanchor">329</a> Maj H. D. Stewart, “Rise and Fall of an Army,” <cite>Military Review</cite>, 30, no. 11:32–35 -(Feb 51).</p></div> - -<p>For 2 months the Eighth Army had been purchasing time with space, -and the enemy realized that time was now fighting on the side of the -United Nations. The first ground force unit sent by a member nation to -reinforce United States and ROK troops was the British 27th Infantry -Brigade, which landed and took over a sector early in September. But the -enemy knew that other UN contingents had been promised.</p> - -<p>The reorganized ROK army, moreover, had recovered from its early -disasters and was giving a good account of itself in the northern sectors -of the Pusan Perimeter. There the 1st, 3d, 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions -had not only maintained their tactical integrity throughout August -but even delivered several counterattacks.<a id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">330</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_330" href="#FNanchor_330" class="fnanchor">330</a> U. S. Dept of State, “Fifth Report to the Security Council, October 5, 1950,” <cite>United -Nations Action in Korea under Unified Command</cite> (Washington: GPO, 1950).</p></div> - -<p>The NKPA numerical superiority, in short, could not last much -longer. It was now or never if the invaders hoped to batter their way to -Pusan, and Pyongyang staked everything on a final offensive.</p> - -<p>The brunt fell upon the United States 2d Infantry Division. Troops -from four enemy divisions were identified on this sensitive front, well -supported by armor and artillery. Within a few hours pressure became -so great that EUSAK decided to send the Marine mobile reserve to the -aid of the Army troops.</p> - -<p>Not only was the terrain familiar to Marines who had fought their -way up Obong-ni Ridge, but they were renewing acquaintance with the -same enemy outfit. For G-2 reports confirmed that the NKPA 4th -Infantry Division was back again at the old stand—or at least such -survivors as had emerged with a whole skin from their defeat of 17–18 -August in this area.</p> - -<p>Perhaps because of the large numbers of new recruits filling the ranks, -the retreaded outfit followed in reserve just behind the NKPA 9th -Infantry Division as it crossed the Naktong and drove eastward. The 9th -was one of the enemy units hastily raised from constabulary forces for -purposes of the invasion. Assigned to guard duty at Seoul throughout -July and half of August, the troops devoted themselves wholeheartedly -to the pleasant mission of forcing South Koreans to “volunteer” as -soldiers or laborers against their own people. Thus the division could be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span> -considered a fresh and rested outfit, though deficient in training and -combat discipline as compared to the older NKPA units.</p> - -<p>Troops from the enemy’s 2d and 10th Divisions were also identified -on the front of the United States 2d Infantry Division, but the Marines -had no contacts with these units.<a id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">331</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_331" href="#FNanchor_331" class="fnanchor">331</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<h3><i>The Marines Jump Off</i></h3> - -<p>General Keiser’s operational directive for the 3 September counterattack -was half a page in length. As in the case of the first Naktong counterstroke, -the Marine brigade was placed opposite the center of the Bulge, -with the mission of driving westward “to restore former 9th Infantry -positions.” This time, however, Craig’s force was scheduled to jump off -4 miles east of Observation Hill; for the North Koreans were knocking -at the gates of Yongsan.</p> - -<p>The Brigade’s line of departure was a long north-south ridgeline about -a thousand yards west of Yongsan and directly south of Myong-ni. This -high ground was occupied on 2 September by the 9th Infantry. When -the Marines passed through the next morning, the Army unit was to -swing northward to attack on the Brigade right. Still farther north, the -23d Infantry had orders to hold positions on the right of the 9th and -maintain contact with friendly units by patrolling.<a id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">332</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_332" href="#FNanchor_332" class="fnanchor">332</a> 2d InfDiv Op Dir, 2 Sep 50; and Brig Op Order 19-50.</p></div> - -<p>On the Brigade’s left, a special task force of the Army’s 72d Tank Battalion -and 2d Engineer Battalion was to attack southward from Il-li to -the Naktong River line below the Bulge. There it would link with the -25th Division’s right.</p> - -<p>The fact that the Communists upset the plan by smashing through -the 9th Infantry lines on the night of 2–3 September was both bad and -good news from the standpoint of the Marines. It was bad because an -overextended friendly unit had been shattered by many times its numbers -and forced into a disorganized withdrawal. It was good because the -enemy was plowing ahead at full steam, obviously unaware that he was -shortly due for a blow that would find him off balance and send him -reeling.</p> - -<p>Low hanging clouds and smoke made for poor visibility on the morning -of the 3d when General Craig set out on his customary prebattle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span> -reconnaissance by helicopter. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel -Stewart, who had just returned from the 1st Marine Division -planning conferences at Tokyo.</p> - -<p>“We couldn’t see anything but an occasional mountain peak,” Craig -recalled at a later date. “After flying around for some time, we had -almost decided to return to the CP and complete the tour by jeep. Then -Colonel Stewart noticed a hole in the clouds, and we dropped to an -altitude where we had a good view of the front.”<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333" class="fnanchor">333</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_333" href="#FNanchor_333" class="fnanchor">333</a> Craig, 23 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>What Craig and Stewart saw was a long column of Marines fighting -their way toward the line of departure.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s plan of attack for the 5th Marines called -for the 1st and 2d Battalions to advance westward astride the Yongsan -road, with 2/5 on the right. Taplett’s 3d Battalion would initially be in -reserve, blocking the southern approaches to Yongsan.<a id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">334</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_334" href="#FNanchor_334" class="fnanchor">334</a> Annex How.</p></div> - -<p>At 0450, 3 September, 2/5 detrucked about 800 yards from Yongsan -and marched forward in a route column. Moving into the town a short -time later, the Marines received small arms fire from snipers hidden in -buildings, ditches and culverts. Most of them were liquidated as the -column pushed through to the road junction at the western end of -Yongsan by 0630.<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">335</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_335" href="#FNanchor_335" class="fnanchor">335</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>At this fork a secondary route branches from the main road through -the large village of Myong-ni, about 2,000 yards northwest of Yongsan.</p> - -<p>Although still 1,000 yards from the designated line of departure, the -2d Battalion came under moderate fire from its right front. Moreover, -dawn had brought indications of considerable activity and confusion -ahead of the Marines. Ignoring the fire, Roise went forward about 500 -yards to a low hill lying athwart the MSR. There he was jolted by the -discovery that the 9th Infantry’s lines had collapsed.<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">336</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_336" href="#FNanchor_336" class="fnanchor">336</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>On the right of the road there was no friendly situation worthy of the -name. To the left of the MSR, an Army tank unit was parked behind the -little hill which Roise had reached, and to the front were 4 of its tanks—2 -destroyed and 2 abandoned. Included in the wreckage ahead were 2 -burned-out NKPA T-34’s.</p> - -<p>Three hundred yards to the west, on the high ground south of the -main road, Army troops were retreating from 1/5’s line of departure. -The soldiers had buckled under an onslaught by the NKPA 9th Division,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span> -which had launched an all-out attack at first light.<a id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">337</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_337" href="#FNanchor_337" class="fnanchor">337</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Having observed evidence of the confusing situation from their helicopter, -Craig and Stewart landed some distance behind Yongsan and -proceeded forward by jeep and foot. The Brigade commander located -1/5’s CP south of Yongsan and discovered that the battalion was slightly -out of position. During 2/5’s delay in moving through the city, Murray -had ordered Newton to swing westward and align his unit for the attack -as best he could. Darkness, coupled with confusion caused by the Army’s -withdrawal and 2/5’s fight, had caused the 1st Battalion to move south -of Chukchon-ni instead of Yongsan, as planned. Craig instructed 1/5’s -commander to make a 500-yard correction northward during the actual -attack.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">338</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_338" href="#FNanchor_338" class="fnanchor">338</a> Craig, 23 May 54 (with comments by LtCol M. R. Olson, 17 Jun 54).</p></div> - -<p>Roise was meanwhile taking the situation in hand north of the MSR. -At 0645 he called Marine tanks forward to cover the withdrawal of 9th -Infantry troops from the high ridge in 1/5’s zone.</p> - -<p>Second Lieutenant Robert M. Winter led his platoon of M-26’s into -hull defilade next to 2/5’s OP on the low hill and unleashed overhead -fire in support of the Army troops. The pursuit by the North Koreans -began to lag.</p> - -<h3><i>Progress of Brigade Attack</i></h3> - -<p>Despite enemy artillery fire in the 2d Battalion zone, Companies D and -E jumped off from the road junction at 0715 to clear the Yongsan-Myong-ni -road and secure the 5th Marines’ right flank.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339" class="fnanchor">339</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_339" href="#FNanchor_339" class="fnanchor">339</a> This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 50 (with comments by -Col G. R. Newton, Maj J. R. Stevens, and Capt G. C. Fox); and Craig, 23 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>While this move was in progress, the last of the 9th Infantry troops -vacated 1/5’s line of departure to the left front. Roise immediately -smothered that ridgeline with fire from Marine tanks, artillery, air, mortars, -and machineguns.</p> - -<p>Despite this blanket of steel, enemy guns from the high ground were -able to fire across the MSR at Company E as it cleared a series of hills -below Myong-ni. These hills had been designated 2/5’s line of departure -the previous day, but now were considered part of the first objective.</p> - -<p>At 0800, when Captain Samuel Jaskilka reported that Easy Company -had completed its mission, Roise ordered Company D to push through -Myong-ni and take the hill just northwest of that village.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span></p> - -<div id="ip_218" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_218.jpg" width="2088" height="1350" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>2<sup>ND</sup> NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">3–5 SEPTEMBER 1950</span></p> - <p class="smaller">1<sup>ST</sup> PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE - ATTACHED TO 2<sup>ND</sup> INFANTRY DIVISION</p> - <p class="small">SHOWING PRINCIPAL MARINE ATTACKS AND ENEMY - POSITIONS, WITHDRAWALS, & COUNTERATTACK</p></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span> -By this time the entire Brigade was shifting into high gear. Winter’s -tanks on the little hill straddling the MSR were joined by the 1st Platoon, -Able Company Engineers. The Army armored unit behind the -southern portion of the hill suddenly went into hull defilade and added -its firepower to that of the Marine M-26’s. Craig, Snedeker and Stewart -crawled to the crest of the hill on the right side of the MSR and studied -the front from positions between the Marine tanks and Roise’s OP.</p> - -<p>The NKPA 9th Division had been stopped in its tracks when the -Brigade’s supporting arms connected. Then the Reds concentrated their -fire on the little hill where Craig’s OP was located. Lieutenant Winter -was shot through the neck and one of his men wounded while aiding -him. Before being evacuated, the painfully wounded tank officer offered -General Craig a bottle of whiskey left in his M-26.</p> - -<p>Chaplains Sporrer and Hickey were taken under machinegun fire as -they walked forward on the MSR toward the hill. “It’s lucky they’re poor -shots,” said Sporrer as a second and third burst cracked over his head. -The two chaplains arrived just in time to administer to the wounded -being carried off the hill by the engineers.</p> - -<p>At 0855, the 1st Battalion jumped off from below Chukchon-ni. The -attack having been launched too far to the south, Companies A and B -had to veer northwest as they advanced toward the enemy-held ridge -1,000 yards away. Fenton’s unit was on the right, gradually closing on -the MSR as it moved forward.</p> - -<p>To the south, Stevens deployed his 1st, 2d, and 3d Platoons from right -to left in that order, the latter being slightly withheld to protect the -open left flank.</p> - -<p>As the men of 1/5 waded into the knee-deep muck of the rice paddy, -they came under long-range small-arms fire from their objective. Newton -countered immediately by plastering the ridge with artillery and -mortar fire. The advance continued and only a few casualties were taken -by the time the companies reached a drainage ditch midway across the -rice paddy. Here the long skirmish line paused to check its direction and -place the wounded on dikes where they would be seen by corpsmen.</p> - -<p>During the advance from the drainage ditch to the base of the ridge, -1/5’s commander frequently called on air, artillery and mortars to blast -enemy automatic weapons on the crest and forward slopes of the objective. -Company A had the added support of an Army tank destroyer -which gave overhead fire from the hill south of Chukchon-ni. On one -occasion Marine 75’s joined with the Army weapon to silence Communist -guns in a small village at the base of the ridge.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span> -Throughout the rice-paddy crossing, the Marines were constantly -meeting Army stragglers, some of whom had been isolated in enemy -territory for as long as three days. Most of the soldiers were wounded, -and all were weaponless and near exhaustion.</p> - -<p>At 1100 Fenton and Stevens radioed Newton that they were ready for -the assault, and the battalion commander immediately showered the -objective with 81-mm. mortar fire to smother North Korean machineguns.</p> - -<p>Beyond the edge of the rice paddy in Company A’s zone, a sharp step -led to the gentle incline at the base of the ridge. After a few yards, the -gradual slope gave way to a steep rise which shot up abruptly to the -crest of the high hill.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Muetzel’s 2d Platoon held up at the step, using its protection -against enemy fire while 1/5’s mortar barrage was falling. During -the pause Technical Sergeant McMullen brought the 1st Platoon into -position on Muetzel’s right and Lieutenant Fox aligned his 3d Platoon -on the left.</p> - -<p>As soon as the supporting fire lifted, Muetzel jumped to his feet and -shouted the command to assault. Every man in Company A’s skirmish -line responded by scrambling up the hillside. The Marines made such a -fearful racket that a whole company of alarmed North Koreans suddenly -jumped up from concealed foxholes on the forward slope and fled toward -the summit.</p> - -<p>The panic-stricken Reds were easy targets for Company A’s riflemen -and BAR men. Halting on the gentle incline, the Marines carefully took -aim and killed most of the enemy soldiers. When the Communist survivors -disappeared over the crest, Company A again surged upward and -within minutes carried the summit.</p> - -<h3><i>Assault on Hill 117</i></h3> - -<p>The 1st Battalion secured its initial objective about noon on 3 September. -Company B’s next target was a continuation of the ridge running -parallel to the MSR for 1,000 yards and topped by 4 conspicuous peaks. -Able Company’s second objective was a hill stretching across its front -beyond a 200-yard valley. This hill was connected to Stevens’ first objective -by a narrow razorback ridge on the right which offered a poor route -of approach.<a id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">340</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_340" href="#FNanchor_340" class="fnanchor">340</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The two companies paused on their newly won positions to reorganize, -evacuate wounded, and wait for a resupply of ammunition. There -they came under heavy fire from the reverse slopes of their first objective -and the high ground to the west. Several casualties were taken before -Corsairs, requested by Newton, appeared for an air strike. As the Marine -fighter planes unloaded their ordnance, large groups of enemy broke. -Most of the Reds fled down the northern slopes, crossed the MSR and -ascended Hill 117 in 2/5’s zone.</p> - -<p>Newton reacted to reports of the rout by throwing heavy artillery fire -across the enemy’s avenues of retreat. The hillsides and road were soon -littered with bodies and equipment.</p> - -<p>While 1/5’s attack on its first objective was in progress, Company D -had secured the 5th Marines’ right flank by clearing Myong-ni of moderate -resistance and seizing the hill to the northwest of the large village. -The new company commander, First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, reported -to Roise that he was receiving considerable machinegun and mortar fire -from Hill 117. This high ground lay directly across 2/5’s front, stretching -northward from the MSR to a point about 500 yards west of Myong-ni.</p> - -<p>Smith’s reports, together with the news of the enemy’s withdrawal to -Hill 117 from 1/5’s zone, led Roise to order Company D to attack the -high ground from the north and cut off the North Korean retreat. -Shortly after 1200, Smith’s company jumped off to the southwest from -its positions above Myong-ni and fought across the rice paddies circling -the objective.</p> - -<p>Company E could not advance from the chain of hills won earlier in -the day because of enemy troops along the high ridge in Baker Company’s -zone south of the MSR. But Jaskilka’s men supported the attack -on 117 by fire.</p> - -<p>A platoon of 75’s from First Lieutenant Almarion S. Bailey’s Anti-Tank -Company, taking positions on Jaskilka’s right, quickly knocked -out an enemy gun on the objective. The Communists answered with -85-mm. fire from a concealed T-34 tank, killing 2 and wounding 7 of the -recoilless rifle crews.</p> - -<p>Company D gained a foothold on one of Hill 117’s spurs against light -resistance. As the unit advanced south toward the crest, however, enemy -troops pouring across the MSR from 1/5’s zone had boosted the ranks of -the defenders to approximately two battalions. Smith’s company was -caught in its isolated position 500 yards from the rest of 2/5 and blasted -by North Korean artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons. Casualties -mounted at such a staggering rate that the Marines were hard put to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span> -retain their foothold on the northern tip of the hill.</p> - -<p>While the 2d Battalion was maneuvering and fighting on the right of -the road, the 2d Platoon of tanks pushed westward along the MSR from -its early morning position 500 yards west of Yongsan. The Brigade armor -became heavily engaged with enemy antitank weapons, and several casualties -were taken as Marines exposed themselves from unbuttoned -M-26’s to spot Communist emplacements. Second Lieutenant John S. -Carson, who had taken over the platoon after Winter was wounded, fell -before enemy machinegun fire and died instantly.</p> - -<p>Going into hull defilade on another low hill overlooking the MSR, -the 2d Platoon surprised three T-34 tanks on the road ahead and quickly -destroyed them with 90-mm. fire. The tankmen then turned their guns -on a wealth of targets spread across the front: Red antitank weapons, -machinegun positions, troop concentrations, and groups either retreating -or attempting to reinforce.</p> - -<p>About noon, Second Lieutenant Sweet’s 3d Platoon joined the 2d and -added its firepower to the fusillade. Another T-34 was knocked out when -Sweet’s men blasted a thicket suspected of concealing an antitank gun. -A fifth North Korean tank went out of action when it was abandoned -by its crew on the left side of the road.</p> - -<p>In the afternoon of 3 September, enemy resistance across 1/5’s front -weakened proportionately as it grew stronger in the 2d Battalion zone. -Newton launched his attack on Objective Two at 1510, after MAG-33 -and 1/11 had softened up the North Korean positions.<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341" class="fnanchor">341</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_341" href="#FNanchor_341" class="fnanchor">341</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>Company B drove down the ridgeline paralleling the MSR and in -little more than an hour had seized its part of the objective, a peak -directly across the road from Hill 117. During the 1,000-yard advance, -Fenton reported another large group of enemy fleeing to 2/5’s zone. The -information was quickly relayed to Roise, who had ample reason by this -time to curse the fortunes of war.</p> - -<p>In Company A’s zone, Stevens and his platoon leaders worked out a -classic scheme of maneuver for seizing Hill 91, their part of the battalion -objective. McMullen’s 1st Platoon and the company machineguns were -to remain in position as the base of fire, while Muetzel’s 2d Platoon -feinted across the 200-yard valley to the front. Fox’s 3d Platoon, earmarked -for the main effort, would then circle to the south and flank the -enemy’s right.</p> - -<div id="ip_223" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_223.jpg" width="1393" height="2119" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE</div></div> - -<p>Muetzel’s unit jumped off with Company B at 1510, crossed the low<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_223">223</a><a id="Page_224">224</a></span> -ground, and ascended a draw leading to Hill 91. The Marines miscalculated, -however, and climbed too far up the slope, so that they came -within grenade range of the crest and were pinned down by machinegun -fire. The platoon was split, with Muetzel and two squads on the left of -the draw and Corporal Raymond E. Stephens and his squad on the right.</p> - -<p>During the preparatory artillery barrage, Fox had led his platoon -around to the enemy’s right Hank, concealed en route by a rice-paddy -bank. Not knowing when the supporting fire would lift, he withheld -his squads from an assault line by a wide safety margin. Thus when -the artillery ceased, the North Koreans had time to come out of their -holes and hit the envelopment with small arms fire. Fox was wounded, -and command passed to Technical Sergeant George W. Bolkow who -worked the platoon up into the enemy positions.</p> - -<p>The 3d Platoon’s assault was sparked by Corporal Virgil W. Henderson -and his 3d Squad, who worked to the rear of a troublesome machinegun -position and destroyed it. During the attack Henderson was -painfully wounded in the jaw by a Communist bullet.</p> - -<p>Since both forward platoons had SCR 300 radios, Muetzel heard the -report that Fox was wounded. Concluding that the envelopment had -faded, the 2d Platoon leader requested and received permission to make -a frontal assault on Hill 91 from his position on the forward slopes. -Enemy mortar fire had added to the woes of Muetzel’s diversionary -thrust. And though an OY-2 of VMO-6 had given information leading -to the destruction of the mortar position, the beleaguered platoon leader -sought the relative safety of a frontal assault.</p> - -<p>Corporal Stephens, acting on his own initiative across the draw, had -worked his squad up to the razorback ridge and around the enemy’s left -flank. Thus the hapless North Koreans on Hill 91 were hit by a “triple -envelopment” when Stephens struck from the north, Muetzel from the -east and Bolkow from the south.</p> - -<p>Company A reported its objective seized at 1630, and Newton ordered -Stevens and Fenton to dig in for the night.</p> - -<p>Both Roise and Newton were confronted by serious space factors on -the night of 3–4 September. The 2d Battalion’s front was more than -2,000 yards long and formed a right angle. A gap of 500 yards stretched -between Company D’s precarious position on the northern tip of Hill -117 and Easy Company’s lines below Myong-ni. This left Smith’s -depleted unit isolated and Jaskilka’s right dangling.</p> - -<p>The 1st Battalion’s right flank was exposed more than 1,000 yards -along the MSR; and its front was almost a mile in length, with a 200-yard<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span> -valley separating the two rifle companies. The Brigade Reconnaissance -Company was deployed on high ground far out on Newton’s left -flank, but this was hardly ample protection for the many avenues of -approach in the south.</p> - -<p>Exhibiting his characteristic faith in high explosives, Newton called -on the 1st Platoon, Able Company Engineers, to contribute their sundry -lethal devices to 1/5’s infantry defense. Beginning at 1800, 3 September, -one group of engineers fanned out to the front and right flank of Company -B’s lines. Despite fire from Hill 117 and enemy positions to the -west, the demolitions men strung out dozens of antipersonnel mines, -hand grenades, and blocks of TNT wrapped with 60-penny spikes. Before -darkness set in, Baker Company’s forward slopes had the potential -of an active volcano.</p> - -<p>In Company A’s zone, Technical Sergeant David N. Duncan and Sergeant -Bryan K. White led the other half of the engineer platoon in -laying a similar field of obstacles. Duncan crowned his handiwork with -a 40-pound shaped charge hooked up in a gully with a trip wire.</p> - -<p>Staff Sergeant Saweren J. Dennis and his 2d Squad of engineers crept -forward at midnight 1,000 yards on the MSR and laid an antitank minefield -across the road near the southern tip of Hill 117. On the way -Dennis discovered an enemy antitank minefield embedded in the road. -Although the engineers had never seen a Russian wooden-box mine before, -knowledge gained from the study of intelligence manuals during -the Brigade’s sea voyage enabled them to detect, remove, and disarm -every mine in the field during darkness. The work was delayed a few -minutes when Dennis traced a clanking sound to the roadside ditch and -killed a Communist soldier frantically trying to insert a loaded magazine -into his submachinegun.</p> - -<p>Before the engineers completed their work and retired to 1/5’s lines, -Nature added an obstacle of her own to any enemy plans for a counterattack. -A rainstorm broke, and the heavy downpour, accompanied by -unseasonably icy winds, wrought misery on friend and foe alike for the -rest of the night.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_226">226</a><a id="Page_227">227</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XII" class="vspace">CHAPTER XII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Mission Completed</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="chapsmy"><i>Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division—Attacks of 5 September—Two -Marine Tanks Killed—The Brigade’s Final Action—Brigade -Embarkation at Pusan—Results of Brigade Operations—Summaries -and Conclusions</i></p> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The casualties of</span> 2/5 for 3 September totaled 18 dead and 77 -wounded, most of them being taken by Company D. Lieutenant -Colonel Murray ordered the 3d Battalion to pass through the 2d, therefore, -and continue the attack on the right of the MSR at 0800 the next -morning. The 1st Battalion was to resume its advance south of the MSR, -while the Reconnaissance Company far out on the left would move -forward to a new blocking position.<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342" class="fnanchor">342</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_342" href="#FNanchor_342" class="fnanchor">342</a> This section is derived from: Brig SAR 3d Bn, 5th Marines (3/5) SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; -Craig, 23 May 54; and Taplett, 20 Apr 54.</p></div> - -<p>Shortly after dawn on the 4th, the 1st Platoon of engineers went -forward and removed the mines ahead of 1/5’s positions. Preparatory -fires by 1/11 at 0750 routed a group of enemy on the peak on Baker -Company’s front, and the Marine riflemen had a field day as the Reds -threw away their weapons and pelted westward.</p> - -<p>Companies A and B jumped off at 0800 and advanced rapidly over the -high ground south of the MSR against negligible resistance. The attackers -frequently observed small groups of enemy fleeing in all directions, -and many of the Communists were cut down by Brigade air, artillery, -and armor. Twelve prisoners were captured before 1/5 reached its -half of Brigade Objective One at 1505. This was the high ground south -of the MSR at Kang-ni, over 3,000 yards from the line of departure.</p> - -<p>Shortly after 0800, 3/5 had launched a two-pronged assault against -Hill 117, core of the NKPA 9th Division’s resistance the previous day. -Company G advanced through Easy Company’s lines just above the -MSR and pushed across the intervening rice paddies. The Marines<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span> -charged over a small knoll in their path but found the enemy positions -unoccupied except for several dead. Bohn quickly led the company to -the southern slopes of Hill 117, which was strangely quiet by comparison -with the tumult of the previous day. In capturing the southern half -of the hill, Company G killed only 15 North Koreans.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously with Bohn’s advance, Company H swung wide to the -right and passed through the thin ranks of Dog Company on the northern -tip of Hill 117. The attackers drove south against negligible resistance -and quickly linked with Company G, securing the objective at 0840.</p> - -<p>A connecting road runs from Myong-ni to the MSR, tracing the -eastern base of Hill 117. Since engineers on the previous night had located -the enemy minefield east of the junction on the main road, Taplett -moved his headquarters to the MSR via the connecting road. The lead -vehicle, a personnel carrier loaded with communications men, struck a -Communist mine on the secondary route east of the newly captured objective. -The resulting explosion caused 10 casualties.</p> - -<p>By noon the engineers had cleared the road of several Russian-type -mines identical to those found during the night. The two anti-vehicular -minefields were among the first such obstacles encountered by the UN -forces in the Korean conflict.</p> - -<p>After seizing Hill 117, Companies G and H continued the attack westward -by advancing abreast on the high ground north of the MSR. Contact -with 1/5 on the left was maintained, but the 9th Infantry on the -right soon fell behind and disappeared from sight.</p> - -<p>At 1045 Company G ran into machinegun fire coming from the 3/5 -area of the Brigade objective, the hill north of Kang-ni. Taplett blasted -the hill with Marine air and artillery, and the North Koreans were in -full retreat within an hour. MAG-33 and 1/11 rained death on the -retreating Reds and continued to pound the hill preparatory to an -assault by Company G. Bohn led his troops forward and secured the -objective at 1515.</p> - -<p>Looking across the stream bed to the north of their new positions, the -Marines of George Company spotted enemy infantry escorting a T-34 -tank and withdrawing into the 9th Infantry zone. The Communist -column was quickly dispersed by machinegun fire.</p> - -<h3><i>Collapse of NKPA 9th Division</i></h3> - -<p>Marines following up the 3,000-yard advance along the MSR saw, a -picture of devastation unequalled even by the earlier defeat of the NKPA<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span> -4th Division. Hundreds of enemy dead were strewn along the road, hillsides -and ridgelines. On the MSR between Hill 117 and Kang-ni lay a -long column of North Koreans who had been caught by Marine air and -artillery while attempting to reinforce Red lines. The dead leader was a -lieutenant colonel whose briefcase contained a lengthy artillery treatise -among other less scholarly documents.<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">343</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_343" href="#FNanchor_343" class="fnanchor">343</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>In addition to knocked-out and abandoned Communist tanks, vehicles, -mortars, and antitank guns, the countryside was littered with enough -small arms, ammunition, and gear to equip several hundred men. Even -the North Korean paymaster had been caught in the sweeping tide of -Brigade arms, and Marines distributed a huge quantity of worthless -currency among themselves.</p> - -<p>Not only did the Marines reap a harvest of enemy materiel; they also -recaptured a great quantity of United States Army equipment lost during -the Communist drive. American tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, -vehicles, small arms, and ammunition and supply dumps were turned -over to the 2d Division by the Brigade.</p> - -<p>The destruction of the enemy camp left Army and Marine intelligence -officers inundated by captured enemy documents. Muster rolls, ledgers, -maps, orders, textbooks, and propaganda material were heaped into -separate piles.</p> - -<p>Late in the afternoon of 4 September, the 9th Infantry moved into -positions on the high ground northeast of 3/5. This completed the advance -to Phase Line One of the 2d Division’s counterattack plan. The -second phase line on G-3 maps was drawn through Hill 125 and -Observation Hill, 3,000 yards west of Kang-ni.</p> - -<p>When informed that the Brigade had completed the first part of its -mission, General Keiser authorized General Craig to advance toward -Phase Line Two.</p> - -<p>Beyond Kang-ni, the Brigade’s right boundary became the MSR, so -that 3/5 could not advance westward from its half of Objective One. -Major Charles H. Brush, Murray’s S-3, radioed Newton and passed on -orders for the battalion commander to take the next piece of high -ground, Cloverleaf Hill, just south of the MSR at Hwayong-ni, about a -thousand yards away.</p> - -<p>The 1st Battalion struck out through the intervening rice paddy, -Company A on the left and Baker Company just below the MSR. -Fenton’s unit had hardly begun the advance when it was stopped by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span> -heavy machinegun fire coming from the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. -Newton then called for an air strike on the ridge and also -requested 3/5 to keep it covered with supporting fire during Company -B’s attack.</p> - -<p>Enemy resistance evaporated with accustomed rapidity, and the Marines -reported Cloverleaf Hill secure at 1800. Murray then ordered both -front line battalions to establish night defenses and be prepared to continue -the attack at 0800, 5 September.</p> - -<p>The extent and trace of the Brigade front line on the night of 4–5 -September was almost identical to that of 24 hours before. Again Newton’s -battalion was in front on the left by a good 1,000 yards, and Companies -A and B were stretched across a line almost a mile long, with the -left flank wide open.</p> - -<p>Separated from both 1/5 on the left and the 9th Infantry on the right, -the 3d Battalion established a perimeter defense, even though it was in -the center of the counterattack zone.</p> - -<p>There was considerable tension and excitement after darkness on 4 -September, although the Brigade lines were never seriously threatened. -The engineers were busy in 1/5’s zone until after midnight, creeping to -the front and flanks to lay mines. The 3d Battalion was shelled heavily -throughout the night, and 1/5’s CP took direct hits killing 1 Marine and -wounding 2 others. One of the wounded was Second Lieutenant James -R. Young, Newton’s Assistant S-3. The artillery liaison officer, First -Lieutenant Joris J. Snyder, was knocked unconscious for several hours, -though he received not a scratch from the 120-mm. explosion a few -yards away.</p> - -<p>At 0230 night-fighter planes of Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s -VMF(N)-513 bombed the North Korean mortar position causing most -of the damage, and the shelling slackened appreciably. Completing this -mission, the Marine pilots dumped general purpose and fragmentation -bombs on enemy vehicles and troops in the area.<a id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">344</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_344" href="#FNanchor_344" class="fnanchor">344</a> VMF(N)-513 SAR, Appendix 6, 16.</p></div> - -<p>Companies G and H reported movement forward of their lines before -dawn, and 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars quickly illuminated the front, disclosing -several small groups of enemy. There was a flurry of fire, but the -Reds gave no indication of organizing for an assault. One of the groups, -either by error or suicidal folly, stumbled into the area of Taplett’s CP. -A listening post of Weapons Company took the intruders under fire, -killing an NKPA officer and routing the others.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span></p> - -<h3><i>Attacks of 5 September</i></h3> - -<p>Marines of the 3d Battalion were startled at daybreak, 5 September, -when a company of North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry’s left flank -in full view of 3/5’s positions on the adjacent high ground. George, -How, and H & S Companies poured machinegun fire into the mass of -Reds at ranges of 600–1,000 yards. Most of the Red attackers were cut -down before they could flee into the hills west of the Army lines.<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345" class="fnanchor">345</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_345" href="#FNanchor_345" class="fnanchor">345</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; 3/5 SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; -and Fenton, 8 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>Company B, on its high ground south of Hwayong-ni, heard the firing -in 3/5’s area at daybreak and steeled itself for a possible counterattack -from the right flank. When Newton received word of the abortive -attack on the 9th Infantry, he ordered his two rifle companies to prepare -to move out at 0800 as planned.</p> - -<p>The Marines of Companies A and B were organizing their attack formation -on Cloverleaf Hill when two Air Force P-51’s came in for an -uncontrolled air strike on the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Strafing -the ridge from north to south, the planes riddled Cloverleaf Hill as -they pulled out of their dives. The 2 exposed companies were showered -with bullets, and it seemed miraculous that only 1 Marine was wounded.</p> - -<p>At 0820, 1/5 jumped off to the west to seize the Brigade’s portion of -Phase Line Two—Hill 125 and Observation Hill. Beyond these hills lay -Obong-ni Ridge, blocking the path to the Naktong River, third and -final phase line of the 2d Division counterattack. Because of its tactical -importance and great significance, battle-scarred Obong-ni was designated -a special objective, apart from the phase lines.</p> - -<p>Half a mile west of Hwayong-ni the MSR makes a right-angle turn -to the south, proceeds in that direction for 1,000 yards, then resumes its -westward course through the cut between Hill 125 and Observation -Hill.</p> - -<p>Companies A and B, with the latter on the right, moved rapidly -through the rice paddy below the MSR after leaving their line of departure -on Cloverleaf Hill. At the road bend mentioned above, the MSR -turned across Baker Company’s front. When Fenton’s unit crossed over -to the base of the high ground leading to Hill 125, Companies A and B -were separated by the MSR as it resumed its westward course. Stevens’ -unit started up the long eastern slopes of Observation Hill, while Fenton’s -men secured the eastern extension of Hill 125.</p> - -<p>Obong-ni Ridge rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when<span class="pagenum"><a class="hidep" id="Page_232">232</a><a id="Page_233">233</a></span> -mortars and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements -around the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and -Newton’s 81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued -the advance to Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100.</p> - -<div id="ip_232" class="figcenter land"> - <img src="images/i_232.jpg" width="2112" height="1371" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE<br /> - <span class="smaller">ENEMY COUNTERATTACK—5 SEP. ’50</span></p></div></div> - -<p>Murray ordered 1/5 to hold up until the 9th Infantry tied in on Fenton’s -right. Communist automatic weapons on Obong-ni Ridge fired on -the Marines sporadically during this interlude.</p> - -<p>At 1000, while 1/5 was attacking to the west, the 3d Battalion had -swung southward behind Cloverleaf Hill to take positions on the 5th -Marines’ left. This was in preparation for Murray’s contemplated assault -on Obong-ni Ridge by two battalions. It was planned that Newton’s -unit would take the northern half of the long hill and 3/5 the southern -portion.</p> - -<p>Company G led the 3d Battalion advance through the rice paddy -south of Cloverleaf Hill. Artillery and 75-mm. recoilless guns paved the -way by raking possible enemy hiding places, enabling the infantrymen -to proceed rapidly. Bohn’s destination was Hill 91, a shoe-like projection -jutting out from the southern reaches of Obong-ni Ridge. Reaching -the base of the high ground, Bohn requested that supporting fires -be lifted. Attached tanks, 75’s, and 1/11 immediately shifted their destruction -to Obong-ni Ridge.</p> - -<p>Company G started up the slopes of Hill 91, while an attached 75-mm. -recoilless gun obliterated a wheel-mounted machinegun and its -crew going into position on the crest. The Marines had climbed only a -few yards when Bohn was ordered by Taplett at 1230 to withdraw the -company to Observation Hill.</p> - -<p>Company H, then passing between Hill 91 and Observation Hill on -its way to Obong-ni’s eastern approaches, received the same order from -the Battalion commander. The assault on the ridge had been canceled, -and Murray was concentrating his regiment along the MSR.</p> - -<h3><i>Two Marine Tanks Killed</i></h3> - -<p>Throughout the Brigade advance on 5 September, the Marines were -hampered by heavy rain and fog which prevented MAG-33 and VMO-6 -from operating effectively. Thus the enemy was offered a rare opportunity -to mount a daylight attack.<a id="FNanchor_346" href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">346</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_346" href="#FNanchor_346" class="fnanchor">346</a> This section is derived from: Annex How; LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 15 -Jun 54; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54 (with comments by Maj J. R. Stevens); -and Fenton, 8 May 54.</p></div> - -<p>After Company B received orders to hold up on Hill 125, Fenton ordered -his men to dig foxholes along the rain-soaked crest facing Tugok -village and Finger Ridge to the west and Obong-ni Ridge to the southwest. -The company commander directed the attached 1st Platoon of -tanks to remain in the road cut, just to the rear of the famous bend -around the forward slopes of Hill 125. Peering through the rain and fog, -the Marine tankmen could see the dead, black hulls of the three T-34’s -knocked out by the Brigade 2 weeks earlier.</p> - -<p>At 1420 the sporadic sniping from the front suddenly increased to the -intensity of preparatory fire, and Baker Company was pinned down on -its ridgeline positions. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge blazed with -NKPA machineguns, whose chatter was soon joined by that of automatic -weapons concealed in Tugok and at the northern base of Observation -Hill. A Communist antitank gun on Finger Ridge added its voice -intermittently to the chorus.</p> - -<p>Fenton’s radio went dead just as he reported the situation to Newton -at his OP on the high ground to the east. As luck would have it, every -other radio in the company area was inoperative because of the mud and -rain; and Fenton was unable to warn the Marine tanks in the road cut -that enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the road bend -from the west.</p> - -<p>As the Communist vehicles swung into the turn, a company of Red -soldiers left the road and assaulted Company B’s positions by advancing -up the draw on the Marines’ left front. The intense overhead fire supporting -the Red Infantry enabled them to get well up the forward -slopes. Meanwhile, a squad of North Koreans advanced up the draw -leading from Tugok and harassed Fenton’s right front.</p> - -<p>To stop the attack, the Marines were forced to man the crest of Hill -125. Thus exposed to the enemy’s supporting fire, Company B had to -pay a heavy price in casualties.</p> - -<p>During the advance of the Communist armor, it was determined that -the first 2 of the 3 vehicles were T-34 tanks and the last a tracked -armored personnel carrier. Fenton immediately deployed his assault -squad on the slopes below his left flank to meet the threat on the MSR.</p> - -<p>Lieutenant Pomeroy, unaware of the enemy tanks around the bend, -advanced his M-26’s so that the machineguns on Obong-ni Ridge could -be taken under massed fire. Thus, as the first Marine tank reached the -bend, its 90-mm. gun was pointing to the left front, a quarter turn away -from the enemy armor.</p> - -<p>The lead T-34 fired on the Marine vehicle as soon as it came into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span> -view. Before the turret of the M-26 could be turned to take aim, several -more 85-mm. projectiles struck; and the Brigade lost its first tank to -enemy action. The second M-26 in column tried to squeeze by the first -to render assistance, and it too was knocked out by 85-mm. fire in the -restricted passageway.</p> - -<p>The crews of both Marine tanks managed to get out of their vehicles -through the escape hatches. Some of the wounded were aided by the -engineer mine-clearance team accompanying the tank column.</p> - -<p>Since the road bend was now blocked, the remainder of Pomeroy’s -tanks could do nothing but park in the road cut. It was Marine infantrymen -who stepped in at this point and blunted the NKPA victory on the -MSR.</p> - -<p>Company B’s assault squad plastered the lead T-34 with 3.5″ rocket -fire and stopped it cold. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battalion’s assault -platoon reached the fight scene and went into action with its 3.5’s. In -short order the infantrymen had completed the destruction of the first -tank, knocked out the second, and destroyed the enemy personnel carrier.</p> - -<p>The historic road bend, as seen through the rain and mist, had become -a graveyard of armor. A total of 8 steel monsters were sprawled there in -death: 5 T-34’s and 1 armored carrier of the NKPA, and 2 Pershing -tanks of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.</p> - -<h3><i>The Brigade’s Final Action</i></h3> - -<p>On Hill 125 the fight reached a climax as Marines exchanged grenades -and small-arms fire with the North Koreans slithering up the slopes in -the driving rain. Company B had used all of its 60-mm. mortar shells -and was running low on grenades and small arms ammunition. Enemy -automatic weapons on the ridges to the front were still cutting down -the Marine defenders at 1500 when Fenton sent a runner to Newton requesting -more ammunition.<a id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">347</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_347" href="#FNanchor_347" class="fnanchor">347</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<p>The endurance contest was still in progress half an hour later, as the -9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground north of Hill 125. -Having no communications with his own supporting arms, Fenton sent -a messenger to the Army unit commander, asking that he place artillery -fire on the Marine front.</p> - -<p>When Army shells began falling in answer to the request, 1/5’s 81-mm. -mortars belatedly got into the fight and worked over the forward<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span> -slopes of Hill 125 to within 50 yards of Company B’s positions. The -heavy supporting fire turned the tide, and enemy pressure slackened -considerably.</p> - -<p>During the final stage of the enemy’s attack, Company A was being -relieved on Observation Hill by 3/5. Stevens told his platoon leaders to -leave their grenades and extra ammunition on the hill, since his orders -were to withdraw to the rear. While the relief was taking place, however, -Company A was ordered to reinforce Fenton’s unit against the enemy’s -attack on Hill 125. Muetzel’s 2d Platoon, after recovering its ammunition, -was augmented by a machinegun section, mortar squad, and -two SCR-300 radios, before the young officer led the unit across the -MSR to lend a hand.</p> - -<p>When Stevens’ relief by 3/5 was completed, he added the 1st Platoon -to Company B’s reinforcements, and himself withdrew to Cloverleaf -Hill with the 3d Platoon as ordered.</p> - -<p>The reinforcements were fed into Fenton’s line as fast as they reached -the summit of Hill 125. By this time every man in Company B had been -committed to the forward wall—mortarmen, clerks, signalmen, and all. -Lieutenant Howard Blank combined his Able Company mortars with -those of the defenders and immediately followed up the artillery and -81-mm. fire which had blunted the attack. These final concentrations of -60-mm. mortar fire on Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and the forward -slopes of Hill 125 ended the enemy attack. The surviving Reds withdrew -to Tugok.</p> - -<p>At 1600, during the dying minutes of the Brigade’s final action in the -Pusan Perimeter, Newton was ordered back to the regimental CP for a -conference. The executive officer, Major Merlin R. Olson, took over 1/5 -from the battalion OP on the ridge east of Hill 125.</p> - -<p>The 5th Marines commander had called the leaders of his battalions -to brief them on General Craig’s last field directive, which began with -the long awaited words:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“THIS MY OPN ORDER 22-50 X COMMENCING AT 2400 5 SEPT BRIG MOVES -BY RAIL AND MOTOR TO STAGING AREA PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPERATION -AGAINST THE ENEMY X PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF MOVEMENT -5TH MARS WILL STAND RELIEVED BY ELMS OF 2ND INF DIV COMMENCING -AT DARKNESS ... CONCEAL FROM THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES CONNECTED -WITH YOUR WITHDRAWAL....”</p></blockquote> - -<p>Taplett’s 3d Battalion had sustained 24 casualties from artillery and -mortar fire between its occupation of Observation Hill and the time it -was relieved by a company of the 23d Infantry shortly after midnight.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span> -Plodding rearward through mud and driving rain, 3/5’s long column began -its three-and-a-half-mile march to an entrucking point 2,000 yards -west of Yongsan.</p> - -<p>Following 3/5 were the weary, mud-soaked troops of the 1st Battalion. -Having successfully defended Hill 125 at a cost of 2 killed and 23 -wounded, Baker Company had filed down to the road after being relieved -by another company of the 23d Infantry. Muetzel brought up the -rear with Company A’s contingent, and a battalion column was formed -at Olson’s check point east of Hill 125.</p> - -<p>By dawn of 6 September, the two battalions were loading aboard -trucks to follow the rest of the Brigade. Numbed by fatigue and icy rain, -the bent forms huddled together in the cargo vehicles had no regrets as -they bade good-bye to the Pusan perimeter.</p> - -<h3><i>Brigade Embarkation at Pusan</i></h3> - -<p>The movement to Pusan was completed by the morning of 7 September, -and the Brigade troops found themselves back at the docks where they -had landed a little more than a month before. In fact, the docks were to -be their bivouac area during the next 6 days; the men slept in the open -and took their meals on board the transports in which they would soon -be sailing around the peninsula.</p> - -<p>The survivors of the Naktong fights—even the latecomers who had -joined the Brigade at the Bean Patch—felt old and worn when they saw -the large draft of shiny new Marines just landed as third rifle companies -organized with their own NCO’s and platoons. The veterans had forgotten -how young and untroubled a Marine could look; how neat and -clean he could appear in a recently issued utility jacket.</p> - -<p>The new companies were immediately assigned to their battalions. It -was another job for officers and NCO’s who had the responsibility of replacing -equipment lost in action as well as servicing ordnance, motor -transport and other heavy equipment which had been sent from the -Bean Patch to Pusan late in August.<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348" class="fnanchor">348</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_348" href="#FNanchor_348" class="fnanchor">348</a> Col J. L. Stewart, interv with author, 10 Jun 54.</p></div> - -<p>General Craig and his staff had their headquarters in one of the Pusan -University buildings. There was no opportunity for planning, let alone -rehearsals, for the forthcoming amphibious assault at Inchon. Craig and -his officers had all they could do to get the Brigade ready for embarkation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span> -Among the tasks to be accomplished in less than a week, it remained -to give some weapons training to the 3,000 troops of the 1st Korean -Marine Regiment. This newly raised unit, attached to the Brigade for -embarkation, was to make a name for itself within the next year and become -the fourth rifle regiment of the 1st Marine Division. But in September -1950 there were great gaps in the training of the KMC’s. The -men kept their rifles scrupulously clean, and they could strip an M-1 -expertly, but few of them had ever fired a shot.</p> - -<p>Marine NCO’s had the hazardous duty of giving the eager and excited -KMC’s their first target practice after eight rounds of ammunition for -each man had been acquired. No Marine casualties resulted, fortunately, -but puffed and bruised cheeks were the rule among Koreans having -their first experience with an M-1’s recoil.</p> - -<p>There was, of course, no end of “scuttlebutt” going the rounds of the -Marines as to their destination. One day the troops were lined up in formation -and read a long lecture on the hydrographic aspects of the west -coast port of Kunsan. It is to be hoped that this red herring made some -impression upon the Koreans who were listening, since Pusan was a -headquarters of enemy spies. As for the Marines, most of them concluded -that at least Kunsan could be eliminated from the list of possible -objectives.</p> - -<p>The secret was well kept by Brigade officers in the higher echelons. -Two engineer officers, First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt and Commissioned -Warrant Officer Willard C. Downs, were given the secret mission -of constructing wooden scaling ladders for the next operation. This -project gave rise to more rumors, but it is safe to say that few men in -the ranks knew the answer when the Brigade was deactivated at 0001 on -13 September 1950. The components immediately resumed their old -unit designations in the 1st Marine Division and sailed to take part in -the amphibious assault on Inchon scheduled for the 15th.<a id="FNanchor_349" href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">349</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_349" href="#FNanchor_349" class="fnanchor">349</a> The Inchon-Seoul operation of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing from -15 September to 7 October 1950 is to be the subject of Volume II of this historical series -devoted to Marine operations in Korea.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Results of Brigade Operations</i></h3> - -<p>As the mountains behind Pusan faded from sight, General Craig and -his men could reflect that the Brigade’s 67 days of existence had been -productive. Altogether, the Marine air-ground team had fought three -difficult offensive operations in a month while traveling 380 miles with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span> -a third of its organic transportation plus Army vehicles.</p> - -<p>Total casualties for the Brigade included 148 KIA, 15 DOW, 9 MIA -(seven of whom were later reclassified as KIA after recovery of the -bodies) and 730 WIA.<a id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">350</a> It was estimated that the Marines inflicted total -casualties of 9,900 killed and wounded on opposing NKPA units. Enemy -losses of arms and equipment were on such a scale as to impair the -effectiveness of the forces concerned.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_350" href="#FNanchor_350" class="fnanchor">350</a> Brig SAR, basic report.</p></div> - -<p>In its initial operation, as a component of Task Force Kean, the Brigade -had the major part in the first sustained Eighth Army counterattack—the -military equivalent of a hard left jab which rocks an opponent -back on his heels. General MacArthur, when reporting to the United -Nations, asserted that “this attack not only secured the southern approaches -to the beachhead, but also showed that the North Korean -forces will not hold under attack.”<a id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">351</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_351" href="#FNanchor_351" class="fnanchor">351</a> MCBS, I-II-A-18-19. This valuable operational study by Marine senior officers has -been the guide for the summaries and analyses of Brigade results in these pages.</p></div> - -<p>The Communist drive in this sensitive area came closest of all NKPA -thrusts to the vital UN supply port of Pusan. Up to that time the -NKPA units spearheading the advance—the 6th Infantry Division and -the 83d Motorcycle Regiment—had never suffered a reverse worth mentioning -since the outset of the invasion. Then the counterattack by the -1st Provisional Marine Brigade hurled the enemy back 26 miles in 4 -days from the Chindong-ni area to Sachon.</p> - -<p>It was estimated that the Marine air-ground team killed and wounded -1,900 of the enemy while destroying nearly all the vehicles of an NKPA -motorized battalion in addition to infantry armament and equipment. -The enemy threat in this critical area was nullified for the time being, -and never again became so serious. Marine efforts assisted Army units -of Task Force Kean in taking new defensive positions and defending -them with fewer troops, thus freeing some elements for employment on -other fronts. Finally, the Marines earned more time and space for the -building up of Eighth Army forces in preparation for a decisive UN -counteroffensive.</p> - -<p>The next Brigade operation, the first battle of the Naktong, ranks -with the hardest fights of Marine Corps history. The enemy, after showing -skill and aggressiveness in breaching the last natural barrier of the -Pusan Perimeter, widened his Naktong bridgehead and took strong defensive -positions in preparation for an all-out offensive while still maintaining -his material superiority.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span> -Only two Eighth Army units were available for a counterattack—the -27th Infantry and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The Army regiment -being needed in reserve on the southern front, the “firemen of the -Pusan Perimeter” were placed under the operational control of the 24th -Infantry Division on the central front. There the Marines had the -mission of clearing the enemy from Obong-ni Ridge and two other large -hill masses of the Naktong Bulge.</p> - -<p>The NKPA 4th Infantry Division had taken maximum advantage of -strong defensive terrain in accordance with the precepts taught by Soviet -and Chinese Communist military instructors. This enlarged bridgehead -was credited by CINCFE with giving the enemy the capability of -mounting a serious threat to the main railroad from Pusan to Taegu.</p> - -<p>It took a bitter and costly effort on the part of the Brigade, but the -result was the most smashing defeat ever given an NKPA major unit up -to this time. This reverse turned into a rout and slaughter toward the -end as Marine air, artillery, armor, and mortars inflicted terrible losses. -Broken NKPA forces were cut down in flight or while trying to swim -the Naktong.</p> - -<p>If the Brigade’s first operation may be likened to a hard left jab, the -fight in the Naktong Bulge is comparable to a solid right dealing a -knockdown blow. The enemy lurched back to his feet, it is true, but the -three rifle regiments of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division had to be filled -up with hastily trained recruits.</p> - -<p>Arms ranging from rifles to howitzers were abandoned as impediments -by the routed Communists, so that the rebuilt NKPA 4th Infantry -Division needed new armament and equipment of all sorts. General -MacArthur’s summary of the action, reported to the UN Security -Council on 18 September 1950, stated that “attacks by the United States -24th Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the -Naktong defense line on 18 August. Here, the enemy 4th Division was -decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead, and was thrown westward across -the Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and -equipment.”</p> - -<p>Never before had a major NKPA unit taken such a staggering defeat. -As evidence of recent victories won over United States troops, the 4th -Infantry Division had brought captured American machineguns and -105-mm. howitzers into the Naktong Bulge. Among the most important -results achieved by the Brigade, therefore, was the hurt done to Red -Korean morale.</p> - -<p>Not only was the enemy’s Naktong bridgehead liquidated; he also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span> -lost heavily in time, which was becoming more valuable to him than -space if he hoped to profit from his rapidly dwindling advantage in numbers. -Not until 10 days later did the Communists establish another -bridgehead in the Naktong Bulge area, and then it was their misfortune -to encounter the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade again.</p> - -<p>During the early morning hours of 1 September 1950, the enemy -made his final effort to smash through to Pusan. Again the 27th Infantry -was needed on another front, so that the Marines, as the only other -mobile reserve unit, were committed under the operational control of -the 2d Infantry Division, The seriousness of the situation in the Naktong -Bulge is indicated by the fact that the enemy had enlarged his new -bridgehead with a penetration of about 4,000 yards in the sector of the -2d Division. Elements of four enemy divisions had been identified on -the central front when the Marines jumped off on the morning of 3 -September.</p> - -<p>The Brigade’s 3-day fight did not end as decisively as the first battle -of the Naktong. That is because it was an unfinished fight. The Marines -were pulled out on the night of 5 September, after gains of 2,500 to -3,000 yards that day, and it can only be conjectured what General Craig -and his men might have accomplished during the next 48 hours.</p> - -<p>As it was, the Brigade had a prominent part in disrupting the enemy’s -effort to sever the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. Heavy losses both in personnel -and equipment were inflicted on NKPA forces, and the Marines helped -to reduce the enemy’s new bridgehead by 8,000 to 10,000 yards.</p> - -<p>Not only had the enemy lost the battle; he had lost the war, as it -proved, for EUSAK staff officers were even then planning a great UN -counterstroke in the Pusan Perimeter. This drive was to be in conjunction -with the amphibious assault on Inchon.</p> - -<p>The turning point in the UN fortunes of war owed in no small measure -to the three counterattacks by the Marines in the Pusan Perimeter. -As for the overall effects, it would be hard to improve upon the analysis -and evaluation in the Marine Corps Board Study:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“A careful examination of any of these operations in which Marines engaged discloses -that a single failure would have a profound effect upon the entire UN effort.... -On 3 separate occasions the Brigade was attached to the defending UN forces -at points of dangerous enemy penetrations and 3 times Marine units spearheaded -the counterattacking elements and effectively stopped the enemy’s efforts, seizing -the initiative from him, inflicting serious losses upon him, and forcing the abandonment -of immediate attempts at decisive penetration.”<a id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">352</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_352" href="#FNanchor_352" class="fnanchor">352</a> MCBS, I-II-A-36.</p></div> - -<h3><i>Summaries and Conclusions</i></h3> - -<p>No Marine tactical organization of history ever did more than the Brigade -to uphold the tradition of the Corps as a force-in-readiness. The -transition from activation to embarkation took only 6 days, and it may -be recalled that the Brigade became the first United States unit to get -into the fight after crossing the Pacific from the American mainland.</p> - -<p>Although the components had been hastily thrown together without -opportunity for training or rehearsals, there were singularly few instances -of tactical fumbling during the early actions. Some of the men -had their only weapons familiarization instruction in actual battle, when -they fired new arms for the first time. But thanks to the steadying influence -of combat-wise company officers and NCO’s, the Marines of the -Brigade soon gained competence.</p> - -<p>The Brigade command and staff faced unusual problems arising from -such factors as emergency situations, hurried planning, oral orders, incomplete -intelligence, and lack of adequate maps. There were decisions -now and then which officers would not have made if they had been endowed -with the wisdom of knowledge after the event. But on the basis -of information at the time, the Brigade command and staff need no -whitewashing from history. Marine victories, on the other hand, may be -attributed in large degree to a high order of leadership and professional -ability in the upper echelons as well as on the company and platoon -level.</p> - -<p>It might have been argued that it was a waste to commit amphibious -specialists to the operations of mountain warfare. But Marines were also -trained as infantry, and gravel-crunching fighting men were needed to -correct an illusion held by many of their countrymen. Atomic bombs, -guided missiles, jet planes, and other marvelous new weapons had convinced -a large section of the public that the day of push-button warfare -was at hand. These Americans sincerely believed that wars could be -waged at long distance, and the Marines of the Brigade served their -country well by demonstrating that even in the tactical millenium it was -necessary to seek out the enemy and close with him. For if there was any -outstanding figure of the conflict in Korea, it was some second lieutenant -making split-second decisions which meant life or death for a -platoon holding a hill position against enemy attack in the darkness.</p> - -<p>The three squadrons of MAG-33 provided support which the Brigade -reported as “the best close air support in the history of the Marine -Corps ... outstanding in its effectiveness.” Army infantry officers were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span> -frankly envious on occasion; and Colonel Paul L. Freeman, USA, commanding -the 23d Infantry, commented that “the Marines on our left -were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal -to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like -artillery. It was ‘Hey, Joe—This is Smitty—Knock the left of that ridge -in front of Item Company.’ They had it <em>day and night</em>. It came off nearby -carriers, and not from Japan with only 15 minutes of fuel to accomplish -mission.”<a id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">353</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_353" href="#FNanchor_353" class="fnanchor">353</a> Quoted in MCBS, I-II-A-35; and I-IV-B-9.</p></div> - -<p>The UN forces, of course, had complete supremacy in the air. On two -occasions the Marines of the Brigade were briefly strafed by NKPA night -hecklers making a “scalded-cat” raid. During the interlude at the Bean -Patch an enemy plane winged its way under cover of darkness to cut -loose with a brief burst of machinegun bullets before disappearing into -the night. But United States Air Force planes had virtually destroyed the -little NKPA air force during the first few weeks of the war, so that the -men of the Brigade were virtually unopposed in the air.</p> - -<p>The time interval between a request for Marine air support and the -actual delivery varied according to local conditions, but the ground -forces seldom had cause for complaint. All-weather Squadron VMF(N)-513, -based at Itazuke, Japan, was prevented by reason of faulty communications -and liaison from responding to every request for dawn, dusk -or night support during early Brigade operations, but such missions were -flown effectively in the Naktong Bulge. Meanwhile, the Corsairs of -VMF-214 and VMF-323, orbiting on station and always available for -short notice employment, gave fresh proof that the Navy-Marine concept -of carrier-based tactical aircraft was sound in practice. Following are -the statistics of MAG-33 operations in Korea from 3 August to 14 -September 1950:</p> - -<table id="mag33ops" summary="MAG-33 operations statistics"> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td> </td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdc bb" colspan="4"><i>Missions in close support</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc"><i>Squadron</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Total<br />sorties</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Miscellaneous<br />sorties</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>USMC</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Army</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>ROK</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Total </i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF-214</td> - <td class="tdc"> 670</td> - <td class="tdc">162</td> - <td class="tdc">337</td> - <td class="tdc">111</td> - <td class="tdc">60</td> - <td class="tdc">508 </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF-323</td> - <td class="tdc"> 498</td> - <td class="tdc"> 90</td> - <td class="tdc">304</td> - <td class="tdc"> 83</td> - <td class="tdc">21</td> - <td class="tdc">408 </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">VMF(N)-513</td> - <td class="tdc"> 343</td> - <td class="tdc">264</td> - <td class="tdc"> 21</td> - <td class="tdc"> 50</td> - <td class="tdc"> 8</td> - <td class="tdc"> 79 </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl in2">Totals</td> - <td class="tdc bt">1511</td> - <td class="tdc bt">516</td> - <td class="tdc bt">662</td> - <td class="tdc bt">244</td> - <td class="tdc bt"> 8</td> - <td class="tdc bt">995<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354" class="fnanchor">354</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_354" href="#FNanchor_354" class="fnanchor">354</a> MCBS, II, Appendix 64.</p></div> - -<p>Demands on the time of the original 4 helicopters of VMO-6 made it -necessary to fly 2 more machines in from Japan. The rotary-wing aircraft<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span> -had so many “firsts” to their credit in the Pusan Perimeter that a major -tactical innovation was obviously in the making. The flights of General -Craig, Colonel Snedeker and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart alone were -enough to indicate that the helicopter was capable of working a -revolution in command and staff procedures.</p> - -<p>Altogether, the participation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade -was an important factor in stopping the NKPA invasion in August 1950 -and punishing the invaders so severely that they were ripe for a crushing -defeat the following month. The Marines, moreover, did a great deal to -restore the national pride of countrymen who had been hurt and -bewildered by the outcome of the first month’s operations.</p> - -<p>It was humiliating to read on the front page that only 5 years after -reaching our greatest military strength of history, United States troops -were being pushed around by Asiatic peasants of a Soviet-trained organization -calling itself the North Korean People’s Army. Perhaps these -Americans did not remember that the decline in our Armed Forces was -due to overwhelming popular demands for the disbanding of our victorious -armies of 1945. At any rate, the United States paid the penalty of -unpreparedness in 1950 when its first ground-force units were beaten by -better trained and equipped NKPA troops. Worse yet, correspondents at -the front intimated that these defeats were due to the softness of our -youth. It was charged that United States troops had been so pampered by -motor transport that they could no longer march, let alone fight.</p> - -<p>The Marines helped to change all that. The Marines and the better -Army units proved that they were more than a match for the enemy -when it came to marching as well as fighting. The Marines did their best -to restore the pride of Americans who read about the advance to Kosong -or the fight on Obong-ni Ridge. The Marines, in short, deserved the pat -on the back conveyed in a dispatch to the Brigade on 23 August 1950 -from their Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“I AM VERY PROUD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR AIR-GROUND -TEAM. KEEP ON HITTING THEM, FRONT, FLANKS, REAR, AND TOPSIDE! -WELL DONE!”</p></blockquote> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span></p> - -<div class="chapter" id="APPENDIX_A"> -<h2>APPENDIX A<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Glossary of Military and -Aeronautical Terms</span></h2> - -<p>AKA—Attack cargo ship.</p> -<p>APA—Attack transport ship.</p> -<p>ADC—Assistant Division Commander.</p> -<p>BAR—Browning automatic rifle.</p> -<p>BLT—Battalion landing team.</p> -<p>BuAer—Bureau of Aeronautics</p> -<p>CCF—Chinese Communist Forces (refers to entire Chinese force employed in Korea).</p> -<p>CG—Commanding general.</p> -<p>CINCFE—Commander in Chief, Far East.</p> -<p>CincPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.</p> -<p>CINCUNC—Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.</p> -<p>CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.</p> -<p>CO—Commanding officer.</p> -<p>COMNAGFE—Commander Naval Air Group Far East</p> -<p>COMNAVFE—Commander Navy Far East.</p> -<p>COMPHIBGRUONE—Commander Amphibious Group One.</p> -<p>COMSEVENTHFLT—Commander Seventh Fleet.</p> -<p>COS—Combined Operations Section.</p> -<p>CP—Command Post.</p> -<p>CSG—Combat Service Group.</p> -<p>CTF—Commander Task Force.</p> -<p>CVG—Carrier Air Group.</p> -<p>DOW—Died of wounds.</p> -<p>EUSAK—Eighth United States Army in Korea.</p> -<p>FAC—Forward Air Controller.</p> -<p>FEAF—Far East Air Force.</p> -<p>FECOM—Far East Command.</p> -<p>FL—Flight leader.</p> -<p>FMF—Fleet Marine Force (Pac = Pacific; Lant = Atlantic).</p> -<p>GHQFEC—General Headquarters, Far East Command.</p> -<p>HF—High frequency (radio).</p> -<p>InfDiv—Infantry Division.</p> -<p>JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p> -<p>JOC—Joint Operations Center.</p> -<p>KIA—Killed in action.</p> -<p>KMC—Korean Marine Corps.</p> -<p>KVA—Korean Volunteer Army.</p> -<p>LSD—Landing ship, dock.</p> -<p>LST—Landing ship, tank.</p> -<p>MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.</p> -<p>MCBS—Marine Corps Board Study.</p> -<p>MGCIS—Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron.</p> -<p>MIA—Missing in action.</p> -<p>MSR—Main supply route.</p> -<p>MTACS—Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.</p> -<p>NCO—Noncommissioned officer.</p> -<p>NK—North Korea(n).</p> -<p>NKPA—North Korean Peoples Army.</p> -<p>OP—Observation post.</p> -<p>OY—Light observation plane.</p> -<p>POL—Petroleum oil lubricants.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span></p> -<p>POW—Prisoner of war.</p> -<p>ProvCasCo—Provisional Casual Company.</p> -<p>RCT—Regimental Combat Team.</p> -<p>ROK—Republic of Korea.</p> -<p>SAC—Supporting Arms Center.</p> -<p>SAR—Special Action Report.</p> -<p>SecNav—Secretary of the Navy.</p> -<p>TAC—Tactical Air Coordinator.</p> -<p>TAC X Corps—Tactical Air Command, X Corps.</p> -<p>TACC—Tactical Air Control Center.</p> -<p>TACP—Tactical Air Control Party.</p> -<p>TACRON—Tactical Air Control Squadron.</p> -<p>TAD—Tactical Air Direction.</p> -<p>TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center.</p> -<p>TAO—Tactical Air Observer.</p> -<p>TAR—Tactical air request.</p> -<p>T/E—Table of equipment.</p> -<p>T/O—Table of organization.</p> -<p>UN—United Nations.</p> -<p>VHF—Very high frequency (radio).</p> -<p>VMF—Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron).</p> -<p>VMF(N)—Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron).</p> -<p>VMO—Marine observation type aircraft (squadron).</p> -<p>VMR—Marine transport type aircraft (squadron).</p> -<p>WIA—Wounded in action.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="APPENDIX_B">APPENDIX B<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Command and Staff List of the -First Provisional Marine Brigade</span></h2> -</div> - -<p class="b2 center larger"><i>7 July—13 September 1950</i></p> - -<table id="appxb" summary="Command and Staff List, First Provisional Marine Brigade"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding General</td> - <td class="tdl">BrigGen Edward A. Craig</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Deputy Commander</td> - <td class="tdl">BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Chief of Staff</td> - <td class="tdl">Col Edward W. Snedeker</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">G-1</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Donald W. Sherman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">G-2</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">G-3</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph L. Stewart</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">G-4</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Arthur A. Chidester</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Special Staff Section</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Adjutant</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Harold G. Schrier</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Supply Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj James K. Eagan</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Air Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj James N. Cupp</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Signal Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Elwin M. Stimpson</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Air Observer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Edwin L. Rives</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Signal Supply Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Joseph E. Conners</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Engineer Supply Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt William R. Gould</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Liaison Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Edward R. Hagenah</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Brigade Surgeon</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Brigade Dental Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtComdr Jack J. Kelly, USN</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Headquarters and Service Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(32 officers—183 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Richard E. Sullivan</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 18 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CoComdr, Hq Co</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Nathaniel F. Mann, Jr.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(4 officers—99 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Earl F. Stanley</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(6 officers—112 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Arthur W. Ecklund</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Company C, 1st Medical Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(5 officers—94 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Comdr Robert A. Freyling, USN</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(12 officers—213 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj William L. Batchelor</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(9 officers—209 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt George W. King</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, 1st Ordnance Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(5 officers—119 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Meyer La Bellman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Company A, 1st Tank Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(9 officers—173 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Gearl M. English</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">PlatComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">1st Plat 1stLt William D. Pomeroy</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">PlatComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">2d Plat 2dLt Robert M. Winter (to 3 Sep 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">2dLt John S. Carson (3 Sep 50, KIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">PlatComdr, 3d Plat</td> - <td class="tdl">2dLt Granville G. Sweet</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>1st Battalion, 11th Marines</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(44 officers—474 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Ransom M. Wood</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Francis R. Schlesinger</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad2"> - <td class="tdl">Headquarters Battery:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt James W. Brayshay</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad2"> - <td class="tdl">Service Battery:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad2"> - <td class="tdl">Battery A:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt James D. Jordan</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad2"> - <td class="tdl">Battery B:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad2"> - <td class="tdl">Battery C:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, 1st Service Battalion</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(11 officers—161 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Thomas M. Sagar</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, 1st Combat Service Group</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(5 officers—104 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Thomas J. O’Mahoney</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, Reconnaissance Company</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(2 officers—37 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Kenneth J. Houghton</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Detachment, Military Police Company</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(2 officers—36 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">DetComdr</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Nye G. Rodes</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>1st Amphibian Tractor Company</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(10 officers—244 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj James P. Treadwell</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>1st Amphibian Truck Platoon</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(1 officer—75 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt James E. Condra</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>VMO-6</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>5th Marines</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2">(132 officers—2452 enlisted men)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond L. Murray</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">S-1</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Alton C. Weed</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">S-2</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj William C. Esterline</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">S-3</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol George F. Waters, Jr. (to 29 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Maj</td> - <td class="tdl">Charles H, Brush, Jr.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">S-4</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Harold Wallace</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad1"> - <td class="tdl">Special Staff, 5th Marines:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Chaplain</td> - <td class="tdl">LtComdr Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., USN</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Medical Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Lt (jg) William E. Larsen, USN (to 11 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">LtComdr Byron D. Casteel</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Supply Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt John V. Huff</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Motor Transport Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt William F. A. Trax (to 15 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">1stLt</td> - <td class="tdl">James O. Alison</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Ordnance Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">CWO Bill E. Parrish</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Disbursing Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Kenneth L. Shaw</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Communications Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Kenneth B. Boyd</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Naval Gunfire Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Lt Jerry C. Ragon, USN</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Air Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Leo R. Jillisky</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad1"> - <td class="tdl">1st Battalion, 5th Marines:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol George R. Newton</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Merlin R. Olson</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, H & S Company</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Walter E. Godenius</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company A</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt John R. Stevens</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company B</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt John L. Tobin (to 17 Aug 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Weapons Company</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj John W. Russell</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad1"> - <td class="tdl">2d Battalion, 5th Marines:<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Harold S. Roise</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol John W. Stevens, II</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, H & S Company</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt David W. Walsh</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company D</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt John Finn, Jr. (to 8 Aug 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Andrew M. Zimmer (to 17 Aug 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert T. Hanifin, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt H. J. Smith</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company E</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt George E. Kittredge (to 7 Aug 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt William E. Sweeney (to 18 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel Jaskilka</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Weapons Company</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Walter Gall (to 10 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Theodore F. Spiker</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad1"> - <td class="tdl">3d Battalion, 5th Marines:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert D. Taplett</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj John J. Canney</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, H & S Company</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Arthur E. House, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Harold D. Fredericks</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company G</td> - <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert D. Bohn</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Company H</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Joseph C. Fegan, Jr. (to 18 Aug 50, WIA)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Patrick E. Wildman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Weapons Company</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Patrick E. Wildman (to 19 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Murray Ehrlich</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc head" colspan="2"><i>Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Air Wing</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding General</td> - <td class="tdl">BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Chief of Staff</td> - <td class="tdl">Col Kenneth H. Weir</td></tr> - <tr class="tbpad1"> - <td class="tdl">Marine Air Group 33:</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">Col Allen C. Koonce (to 20 Aug 50)</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">Col Frank G. Dailey</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Deputy Commander</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Norman J. Anderson</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Radford C. West</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, VMF-214</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol Walter E. Lischeid</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, VMF-323</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Arnold A. Lund</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, VMF(N)-513</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Joseph H. Reinburg</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Hq Squadron</td> - <td class="tdl">Capt Norman D. Glenn</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, Service Squadron</td> - <td class="tdl">LtCol James C. Lindsay</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">CO, MTACS-2</td> - <td class="tdl">Maj Christian C. Lee</td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="APPENDIX_C">APPENDIX C<br /> - -<span class="subhead">Citations and Commendations</span></h2> - -<div class="smaller"> -<p class="sigright">September 29, 1950</p> - -<p class="p1 b1 center larger">PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION</p> - -<p class="in0">The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing for outstanding -and heroic performance of duty on the field of battle during the period -2 August 1950–6 September 1950.</p> - -<p class="p1 b1 center vspace"> -<span class="smcap">The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade</span><br /> -for the Award of<br /> -<span class="smcap">The Presidential Unit Citation</span> -</p> - -<p>The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade was a vital element in the first -major counterattack against the enemy.</p> - -<p>In late July and early August 1950, the enemy had swept through the Chulla -Provinces and had rapidly approached along the south Korean coast to a point only -35 miles from the vital port of Pusan. Together with the 25th Infantry Division, the -First United States Provisional Marine Brigade, from 7 August to 12 August 1950, -played a major role in attacking and driving back the enemy.</p> - -<p>During the period 17 August to 20 August 1950 in conjunction with the 24th -Infantry Division and units of the 2d Infantry Division, the First United States Provisional -Marine Brigade attacked a great pocket of enemy forces who had successfully -crossed the Naktong River and established a firm beachhead on the eastern -bank. The Brigade attacked with such determination and skill as to earn the admiration -of all who saw or knew of its battle conduct.</p> - -<p>Later, on the night of 31 August-1 September, the enemy again launched an all-out -offensive against the United Nations Forces. The First United States Provisional -Marine Brigade was in Army reserve at that time. With the 2d Infantry Division, -the Brigade again was committed in almost the same area of its earlier action -against the Naktong pocket in the neighborhood of Yongsan. Again the gallant -Marine forces were instrumental in preventing the enemy from capturing their objective -and cutting the north-south lines of communication of the United Nations -Forces.</p> - -<p>The brilliant performance of duty in combat in Korea of each individual of the -First United States Provisional Marine Brigade is in accord with the highest traditions -of the military service.</p> - -<p>This citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon -by each individual of the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade which -served in Korea in the stated period.</p> - -<p class="sigright">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Syngman Rhee</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span></p> - -<p class="newpage p4 center larger">THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY</p> - -<p class="center b1"><span class="smcap">Washington</span></p> - -<p class="in0">The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the <span class="smcap">Presidential -Unit Citation</span> to the</p> - -<p class="p1 b1 center"> -<span class="smcap">First Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced</span> -</p> - -<p class="in0">for service as set forth in the following <span class="smcap">Citation</span>:</p> - -<p>“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea -from 7 August to 7 September 1950. Functioning as a mobile, self-contained, air-ground -team, the First Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced, rendered invaluable -service during the fierce struggle to maintain the foothold established by friendly -forces in the Pusan area during the early stages of the Korean conflict. Quickly -moving into action as numerically superior enemy forces neared the Naktong River -on the central front and penetrated to within 35 miles of Pusan in the southern -sector, threatening the integrity of the entire defensive perimeter, this hard-hitting, -indomitable team counterattacked serious enemy penetrations at three different -points in rapid succession. Undeterred by roadblocks, heavy hostile automatic -weapons and highly effective artillery fire, extremely difficult terrain and intense -heat, the Brigade met the invaders with relentless determination and, on each crucial -occasion, hurled them back in disorderly retreat. By combining sheer resolution -and esprit de corps with sound infantry tactics and splendid close air support, the -Brigade was largely instrumental in restoring the line of defense, in inflicting thousands -of casualties upon the enemy and in seizing large amounts of ammunition, -equipment and other supplies. The brilliant record achieved by the unit during the -critical early days of the Korean conflict attests to the individual valor and competence -of the officers and men and reflects the highest credit upon the First Provisional -Marine Brigade, Reinforced, and the United States Naval Service.”</p> - -<p>All of the First Provisional Marine Brigade except the First Amphibian Tractor -Company participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from -7 August to 7 September 1950.</p> - -<p>The following reinforcing units of the First Provisional Marine Brigade participated -in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 -September 1950:</p> - -<p class="hang">Forward Echelon, First Marine Aircraft Wing (less ground personnel)</p> - -<p class="hang">Marine Air Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced (less ground personnel)</p> - -<p class="hang">Marine Observation Squadron Six plus Helicopter Section, Headquarters Squadron</p> - -<p class="hang">Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two</p> - -<p class="hang">United States Army: Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Intelligence Special -Detachment personnel attached to the Headquarters Company, Headquarters -and Service Battalion, First Provisional Marine Brigade.</p> -<p class="in8">For the President,</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l2">(Signed) <span class="smcap">R. A. Anderson</span></span><br /> -<i>Secretary of the Navy</i> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span></p> - -<p class="newpage p4 b1 center larger vspace">HEADQUARTERS<br /> -EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)<br /> -Office of the Commanding General<br /> -APO 301</p> - -<p class="sigright">22 August 1950</p> - -<p class="in0">Subject: Commendation</p> - -<p class="in0">Thru: Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division</p> - -<p class="in0">To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade</p> - -<p>1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you, your officers and men, for the part -your organization played in the successful attack which began 17 August 50 against -a determined enemy occupying a bridgehead east of the <span class="smcap">Naktong River</span> in the -vicinity of <span class="smcap">Kujin-San</span> and ended only when the bridgehead had been eliminated -with great loss of men and equipment to the enemy.</p> - -<p>2. Through excellence in leadership and grit and determination in all ranks, your -organization helped materially in preventing the enemy from penetrating our lines -at a critical time. In so doing it has upheld the fine tradition of the Marines in a -glorious manner and by close cooperation has proved unification of the services a -success.</p> - -<p>3. Please accept my sincere thanks and congratulations. I ask that you convey to -your splendid command, the traditional “Well Done.”</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l4"><span class="smcap">Walton H. Walker</span></span><br /> -<span class="l2"><i>Lieutenant General, United States Army</i></span><br /> -<i>Commanding</i> -</p> - -<p class="newpage p4 b1 center vspace larger">HEADQUARTERS<br /> -24TH INFANTRY DIVISION<br /> -APO 24, 28 August 1950</p> - -<p class="in0">To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, APO 25</p> - -<p>1. I am pleased and privileged to add my personal commendation to that of the -Army Commander. And, on behalf of all officers and enlisted personnel of my command, -I desire to express our sincere appreciation for the decisive and valiant offensive -actions conducted by your command which predominately contributed to the -total destruction of the Naktong pocket.</p> - -<p>2. The esprit, aggressiveness and sheer determination continuously displayed by -all personnel of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the face of fierce enemy resistance -and counteraction has aroused the highest admiration of every member of -my command.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l4"><span class="smcap">John E. Church</span></span><br /> -<span class="l2"><i>Maj Gen, USA</i></span><br /> -<i>Commanding</i> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span></p> - -<p class="newpage p4 center larger vspace">HEADQUARTERS<br /> -1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF (REINFORCED)<br /> -<i>c/o</i> Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.</p> - -<p class="in0 in75 b1"> -1355<br /> -1:DWS/1dp<br /> -Ser 596<br /> -9 Sep 1950 -</p> - -<p class="in0">From: The Commanding General</p> - -<p class="hang">To: All officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)</p> - -<p class="hang">Subj: Letter of commendation from the Commanding General, Eighth United States -Army in Korea, of 22 August 1950 with first endorsement by the Commanding -General, 24th Infantry Division</p> - -<p class="in0">Encl: (1) Copy of subj ltr and endorsement</p> - -<p>1. It is with extreme pride in your accomplishments that I publish to all officers -and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade the enclosed copy of a letter from the -Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea, and endorsement by -the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, United States Army, commending -the Brigade.</p> - -<p>2. The realization that your professional skill, esprit de corps, outstanding bravery, -and determination to succeed in all missions has been specifically commended by -the Army and Division Commanders under whom the Brigade was serving at the -time is indeed a source of gratification to me as it will also be to you.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l1">(Signed) E. A. Craig</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">E. A. CRAIG</span> -</p> - -</div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span></p> - -<div id="Bibliography" class="chapter"> -<h2>Bibliography</h2> - -<h3><i>Primary Sources</i></h3> - -<p>U. S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, Marine -Corps (HQMC) incoming and outgoing -dispatches, 1949–50, HQMC -Secret and Classified Files, Naval Records -Management Center, Alexandria, -Va.</p> - -<p>U. S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants -in the Korean War, 1951–54. -Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC, Historical -Branch, Records and Research -Section (Historical).</p> - -<p>U. S. Marine Corps. Letters to Historical -Branch concerning Korean operations. -Monograph and Comments File, -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army in -Korea. War diaries and supporting documents, -July–September 1950. Army -Record Group (RG) 207-0.3, Code -208, Departmental Records Branch, -The Adjutant General’s Office, Alexandria, -Va. (DRB, TAGO).</p> - -<p>2d Infantry Division. War diaries, supporting -documents, histories, and General -and Special Staff activities reports, -July–September 1950. RG 207-0.3, -Code 302, DRB, TAGO.</p> - -<p>24th Infantry Division. War Diaries supporting -documents, histories, and General -and Special Staff activities reports, -July–September 1950. RG 207-0.3, -Code 324, DRB, TAGO.</p> - -<p>25th infantry Division. War diaries supporting -documents, histories, and General -and Special Staff activities reports, -July–September 1950. RG 207-0.3, -Code 325, DRB, TAGO.</p> - -<p>1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Messages, -plans, and reports. Classified Correspondence -File, HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>— —. G-2 Journal, 5 August-5 September -1950. Classified Correspondence File, -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>— —. G-3 Journal, 2–14 August 1950. -Classified Correspondence File, HQMC -Historical.</p> - -<p>— —. G-4 Journal, 3 August-9 September -1950. Classified Correspondence File, -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>— —. Special Action Report, 2 August-6 -September 1950: Operations with -Eighth U.S. Army Korea, dtd 11 September -1950. 3 Folders.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>Basic Report</p> -<p>Annex Able, G-1 Report</p> -<p>Annex Baker, G-2 Report</p> -<p>Annex Charlie, G-3 Report</p> -<p>Annex Dog, Logistics</p> -<p>Annex Easy, Air Section Report</p> -<p>Annex Fox, Signal Section Report</p> -<p>Annex George, Motor Transport Section</p> -<p>Annex How, Special Action Report (SAR) 5th Marines</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>SAR 1st Bn, 5th Marines</p> -<p>SAR 2d Bn, 5th Marines</p> -<p>SAR 3d Bn, 5th Marines</p> -<p>SAR 4.2″ Mtr Co, 5th Marines</p> -<p>SAR Anti-Tk Co, 5th Marines</p> -<p>SAR, Co. A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Annex Item, 1st Bn, 11th Marines</p> -<p>Annex Jig, Co A, 1st Engr Bn</p> -<p>Annex King, Co A, 1st MT Bn</p> -<p>Annex Love, Co C, 1st Med Bn</p> -<p>Annex Mike, 1st Shore Party Bn</p> -<p>Annex Nan, Reconn Co</p> -<p>Annex Oboe, VMO-6</p> -<p>Annex Peter, Military Police Det</p> -<p>Annex Queen, Combat Serv Grp</p> -<p>Annex Roger, 1st Ord Bn</p> -<p>Annex Sugar, 1st Serv Bn</p> -<p>Annex Tare, Med Sec</p> -<p>“SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>5th Marines, Periodic reports, 4–31 August -1950, Classified Correspondence File, -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span> -MAG-33. Special Action Report, 5 July-6 -September 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>VMF-214. Special Action Report, 14 July-6 -September 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), -HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>VMF-323. Special Action Report, 3 August-6 -September 1950. “SAR” File -(Korea), HQMC Historical.</p> - -<p>VMF(N)-513. Special Action Report, -July-6 September 1950. “SAR” File -(Korea), HQMC Historical.</p> - -<h3><i>Secondary Sources</i></h3> - -<p>Appleman, Roy E., LtCol, USA, Ms history -of UN operations in Korea, July–November, -1950. Copy in Office of the -Chief of Military History, Washington, -D. C. (OCMH).</p> - -<p>Byrnes, James F. <cite>Speaking Frankly.</cite> New -York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.</p> - -<p>Dallin, David J. <cite>Soviet Russia and the Far -East.</cite> New York: Yale University Press, -1948.</p> - -<p>Geer, Andrew. <cite>The New Breed: The Story -of the U.S. Marines in Korea.</cite> New York: -Harper and Brothers, 1952.</p> - -<p>General Headquarters, Far East Command, -General Staff, Allied Translator and Interpreter -Section.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Interrogation Reports Series.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 1, <cite>North -Korean Forces</cite>.</p> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 2, <cite>Documentary -Evidence of North Korean -Aggression</cite>.</p> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 4, <cite>Enemy -Forces</cite>.</p> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 94, -<cite>North Korean Security Forces</cite>; <cite>North -Korean Second Infantry Division</cite>; -<cite>North Korean Fourth Infantry -Division</cite>.</p> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 100, -<cite>North Korean Air Force</cite>; <cite>North -Korean Sixth Infantry Division</cite>.</p> - -<p>Research Supplement No. 106, -<cite>North Korean Artillery</cite>.</p></blockquote> -</blockquote> - -<p>General Headquarters, Far East Command, -Military Intelligence Section, General -Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, -Order of Battle Branch. <cite>Supplement: -Order of Battle Information, North Korean -Army, General History of North Korean -Units.</cite> Processed; copy at OCMH.</p> - -<p>Giusti, Ernest H. “Marine Air Over the -Pusan Perimeter.” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, -36, No. 5:20–21 (May 1952).</p> - -<p>— —. <cite>The Mobilization of the Marine Corps -in the Korean Conflict.</cite> Processed; copy at -USMC Historical.</p> - -<p>Green, A. Wigfall. <cite>Epic of Korea.</cite> Washington: -Public Affairs Press, 1950.</p> - -<p>Grew, Joseph C. <cite>Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic -Record of Forty Years.</cite> Boston: -Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. 2 -vols.</p> - -<p>Karig, Walter, Capt, USN. <cite>Battle Report: -The War in Korea.</cite> New York: Rinehart, -1952.</p> - -<p>Montross, Lynn. <cite>Cavalry of the Sky.</cite> New -York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.</p> - -<p>— —. <cite>War Through the Ages.</cite> New York: -Harper and Brothers, 1946.</p> - -<p>Oliver, Robert T. <cite>Why War Came to Korea.</cite> -New York: Fordham University Press, -1950.</p> - -<p>Opie, Redvers, <i>et al.</i> <cite>The Search for Peace -Settlements.</cite> Washington: The Brookings -Institution, 1951.</p> - -<p>Stewart, H. D., Maj. “Rise and Fall of an -Army.” <cite>Military Review</cite>, 30, No. 11:32–35 -(February 1951).</p> - -<p>Tompkins, Pauline. <cite>American-Russian Relations -in the Far East.</cite> New York: The -Macmillan Company, 1949.</p> - -<p>Gugeler, R. A., Capt, “Attack Along a -Ridgeline.” <cite>Combat Actions in Korea.</cite> -Washington: Combat Forces Press, -1954, 20–30.</p> - -<p>U. S. Department of the Army. <cite>Russian -Combat Methods in World War II.</cite> -Washington: Government Printing -Office, 1950. (DA Pamphlet No. 20-230).</p> - -<p>U. S. Department of State. “Fifth Report -to the Security Council, October 5, -1950.” <cite>United Nations Action in Korea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span> -under Unified Command.</cite> Washington: -Government Printing Office, 1950 -(State Dept Publications 3986, International -Organization and Conference -Series III 6).</p> - -<p>U. S. Department of State. <cite>Guide to the -UN in Korea.</cite> Washington: Government -Printing Office, 1951 (State Dept Publications -4229, Far Eastern Series 47).</p> - -<p>U. S. Department of State. <cite>United States -Relations with China, with Special Reference -to the Period 1944–49, Based on the -Files of the Department of State.</cite> Washington: -Government Printing Office, -1949 (State Dept Publications 3573, Far -Eastern Series 30).</p> - -<p>U. S. Marine Corps Board. <cite>An Evaluation -of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on -the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 -Dec 50).</cite> Processed; copy in USMC -Historical. 2 vols.</p> - -<p>U. S. Military Academy, Department of -Military Art and Engineering. <cite>Operations -in Korea.</cite> West Point, 1953.</p> - -<p>Wood, Ransom M. “Artillery Support for -the Brigade in Korea.” <cite>Marine Corps -Gazette</cite>, 35, No. 6:16–17 (June 1951).</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="index"> -<h2 id="Index" class="nobreak intact p1">Index</h2> - -<ul class="index nobreak"> -<li class="ifrst"><i>Achernar</i> (AK), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Africa, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Aircraft_American"></a>Aircraft, American:</li> -<li class="isub1">AD (Skyraider), <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1">B-29 (Superforts), <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1">F4U (Corsair), <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">F-51 (Mustangs), <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Four-engine Marine aircraft, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Helicopters, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> -<li class="isub1">HO3S-1 helicopter, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japan-based Air Force planes, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Light Observation planes, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> -<li class="isub1">OY-2 observation planes, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> -<li class="isub1">R4D transport, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Aircraft, enemy:</li> -<li class="isub1">Il-10 ground attack bombers, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub1">PO-2 primary trainers, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub1">YAK-type, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1">YAK-7B fighters, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub1">YAK-18 advanced trainers, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russian-made, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Air Force, U. S., <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Far East Air Forces, U. S., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fifth Air Force, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bomber Command, Far East Air Force, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Air Support, U. S., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Air Support Section. <i>See</i> <a href="#Marine_Units">Marine Units</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Almond"></a>Almond, MajGen Edward A., USA, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Alaska, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). <i>See</i> <a href="#Far_East_Command">Far East Command</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Alshain</i> (AKA) USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">American Military Government. <i>See</i> <a href="#Republic_of">Korea, Republic of</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ammunition, American, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">90-mm., <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">81-mm. mortar, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">60-mm. mortar, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a href="#Page_3">3</a>.5-inch rocket, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ammunition, enemy:</li> -<li class="isub1">122-mm., <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> -<li class="isub1">85-mm., <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Anderson, Corpsman William H., USN, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Anderson</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Andong, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-American blockading force, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1"><i>See also</i> <a href="#Navy_U_S">Navy, U. S.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Antung, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Appleman, LtCol Roy E., USA, <a href="#Page_34">34<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Arkadis, 2dLt Nickolas A., <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Armageddon, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Army forces, U. S., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Army, U. S. troops. <i>See</i> <a href="#Army_units">U. S. Ground Forces</a>; and <a href="#Army_units">Army units</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Army_units"></a>Army, U. S., Units:</li> -<li class="isub1">General Headquarters, Far East, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Army of occupation in Japan, U. S., <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65–68</a>, <a href="#ip_69">69 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210–212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">X Corps, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">2d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212–215</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">7th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">24th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–47</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173–176</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">25th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–47</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103–106</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> -<li class="isub1">5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–113</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>,<a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, 5th RCT, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> -<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, 5th RCT, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">9th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), <a href="#Page_175">175–179</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> -<li class="isub1">9th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215–218</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228–231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">19th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">21st Infantry Regiment:</li> -<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">23d Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">24th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> -<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a id="Infantry_Regiment"></a>27th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> -<li class="isub1">32d Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">34th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175–177</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">35th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">8th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> -<li class="isub1">90th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">159th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> -<li class="isub1">555th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150–152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">2d Engineer Battalion, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">72d Tank Battalion, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">8076th Surgical Hospital, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Force Hill, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Force Kean, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122–124</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Force Perry, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Force Smith, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Korean Military Advisory Group, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span></li> -<li class="isub1">Pusan Logistical Command, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Asia, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Austria, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Badoeng Strait</i> (CVE-116), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bailey, Cant Almarion S., <a href="#Page_192">192<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Barstow, California, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps Supply Depot</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Barth, BrigGen George B., USA, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Barrett, Sgt Edward F., <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bartlett, Col Eugene M., USA, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bataway, Sgt Melvin R., <a href="#ip_168">168 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Batchelor, Maj William L., <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Battalion Landing Team (BLT), <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Battles:</li> -<li class="isub1">Changchun, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mukden, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Stalingrad, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tsinan, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tsushima, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Valmy, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Yalu, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bean Patch, <a href="#ip_166">166 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Blackmon, Sgt Thomas, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Black Swan</i>, HMS, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Blank, Lt Howard, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bolkow, TSgt George W., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bougainville, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Boxer Rebellion, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brigade Commander. <i>See</i> <a href="#Craig">Craig, BrigGen E. A.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brush, Maj Charles H., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Buettner, Sgt Lee, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bulgaria, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Byrnes, James F., U. S. Secretary of State, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3<i>n</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Cahill, 2dLt John H., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108–115</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cairo Conference, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Caribbean, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Carr, 1stLt Ira T., <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Carson, 2dLt John S., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Casteel, LtCdr Byron D., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Casualties:</li> -<li class="isub1">Army, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> -<li class="isub1">enemy, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Marine, <a href="#Page_109">109–111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#ip_161">161 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#ip_163">163 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Cates"></a>Cates, Gen Clifton B., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_49">49<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Central Powers, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Changchon, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">ambush, <a href="#ip_145">145 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Changchun, Battle of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Changwon, <a href="#Page_92">92–95</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chemulpo (Inchon), <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#ip_160">160 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chief of Naval Operations. <i>See</i> <a href="#Sherman_Adm_Forrest_P">Sherman, Adm Forrest P.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. <i>See</i> <a href="#Almond">Almond, MajGen Edward A.</a>, USA</li> - -<li class="indx">China, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12–14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Civil War in, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japanese invasion of, 1937, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="China-Russia-Japan_Triangle"></a>China-Russia-Japan Triangle, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chindong-ni, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104–106</a>, <a href="#ip_107">107 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinese Civil War, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinese Communists, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> -<li class="isub1">8th Route Army, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> -<li class="isub1">56th Army, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> -<li class="isub1">164th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> -<li class="isub1">166th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Northeast Democratic United Army, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinese Nationalists, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinese Nationalist army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinhae, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinju, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chinnampo, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chistyakov, Gen Ivan (Russian), <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Choe_Yong_Gun"></a>Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chongjin, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chongju, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chorwon, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chukchon-ni, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chuminjin, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chunchon, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Church, BrigGen John H., USA, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173–176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Citizen-Marines”. <i>See</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps Organized Reserve</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Civil War, U. S., <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Clymer</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Cold War”, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cole, Lt Doyle, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Combat zone, reconnaissance of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commandant of the Marine Corps. <i>See</i> <a href="#Cates">Cates, Gen Clifton B.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commander in Chief, Far East. <i>See</i> <a href="#MacArthur">MacArthur, Gen Douglas</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. <i>See</i> <a href="#Radford">Radford, Adm Arthur W.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commander Naval Forces, Far East. <i>See</i> <a href="#Joy">Joy, VAdm C. Turner</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. <i>See</i> <a href="#Shepherd">Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr.</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span></li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding General, Eighth Army. <i>See</i> <a href="#Walker">Walker, Gen Walton H.</a>, USA</li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. <i>See</i> <a href="#Craig">Craig, BrigGen Edward A.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding General, 25th Division. <i>See</i> <a href="#Kean">Kean, MajGen W. B.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. <i>See</i> <a href="#Murray">Murray, LtCol R. L.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commanding Officer, VMO-6. <i>See</i> <a href="#Gottschalk">Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Commando parties, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Communications:</li> -<li class="isub1">HF net, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">radio vans, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">SCR-300 radios, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">TAD net, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">TAO net, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">TAR net, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">VHF net, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Communism, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Communists, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> -<li class="isub1">army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">doctrine, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Empire, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cottrell, TSgt Johnnie C., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Counselman, 2dLt John D., <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Counterattack, enemy, 12–13 Aug 50, <a href="#ip_154">154 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cowling, 2dLt David R., <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Craig"></a>Craig, BrigGen Edward A., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_63">63–66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–95</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99–101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_210">210–212</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236–238</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Cushman"></a>Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Czar Nicholas II, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Czar, Russian, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Czechoslovakia, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">D-Day, Sachon Offensive, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> - -<li class="indx">D-Day, Inchon Landing, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dairen, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dallin, David J., <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_12">12<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Daly, Col John, USA, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dean, MajGen William F., USA, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> - -<li class="indx">DeFazio, T/Sgt Ernest L., <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Delafield, Wisconsin, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dennis, S/Sgt Saweren J., <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Department of State, U. S., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Deputy Commander, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. <i>See</i> <a href="#Cushman">Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dickerson, T/Sgt Sidney S., <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Downs, CWO Willard C., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Duncan, 2dLt Edward F., <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Duncan, T/Sgt David N., <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Eddy, 2dLt Rodger E., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="El_Toro"></a>El Toro, California, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Emmelman, 2dLt Edward T., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Empress Augusta Bay, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">England. <i>See</i> <a href="#Great_Britain">Great Britain</a></li> - -<li class="indx">English, Capt Gearl M., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Erskine, MajGen Graves B., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Estonia, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Europe, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Far East, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6–9</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Far_East_Command"></a>Far East Command:</li> -<li class="isub1">General Headquarters, Tokyo, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Military Intelligence Section, GS, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, <a href="#Page_16">16<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_17">17<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_19">19<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_21">21<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_22">22<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_26">26<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_27">27<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_28">28<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_30">30<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_33">33<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_39">39<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_130">130<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fegan, Capt Joseph C., Jr., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120–122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fenton, Capt Francis I., Jr., <a href="#Page_189">189<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_234">234–236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Field, 2dLt Paul R., <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Finger Ridge, <a href="#Page_175">175–177</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Finn, Capt John, Jr., <a href="#Page_113">113–116</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Florida, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Formosa, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Forney, Col Edward H., <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Fort Marion</i> (LSD), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fox, Capt George C., <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_195">195<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">France, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Freeman, Col Paul L., USA, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">French Revolution, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fukuoka, Japan, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fullerton, TSgt C. R., <a href="#Page_192">192<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Gall, Maj Walter, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gay, MajGen Hobart R., USA, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Geer, Andrew, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">General Headquarters (GHQ). <i>See</i> <a href="#Far_East_Command">Far East Command</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Genghis Khan, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Georgia, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Germany, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Giaquinto, Cpl Raymond, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Giusti, Maj Ernest H., <a href="#Page_48">48<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_140">140<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Golden Gate Bridge, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Gottschalk"></a>Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., <a href="#Page_50">50</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Great_Britain"></a>Great Britain: 27th Infantry Brigade, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Green, A. Wigfall, <a href="#Page_34">34<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Grew, Joseph C., <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Guadalcanal, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Guam, Marianas Islands, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gugeler, Capt R. A., USA, <a href="#Page_174">174<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Gunston Hall</i> (LSD), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Hadong, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haiti, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haman, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hamhung, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Han, Lt (NKPA), <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Han River, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haneda Airport, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hanifin, Capt R. T., Jr., <a href="#Page_113">113<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_114">114–116</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harris, MajGen Field, <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harvey, Lt(jg) Robert J., USN, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hawaii, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hay, John, U. S. Secretary of State, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Helicopters. <i>See</i> <a href="#Aircraft_American">Aircraft, American</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Henderson, Cpl Virgil W., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Henrico</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence W., <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hickey, Lt(jg) Bernard L., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hideyoshi, Japanese war lord, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hill, Col John G., USA, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176–178</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hill:</li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 88—<a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 91—<a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 99—<a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 102—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 109—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182–184</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195–198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 117—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195–198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227–229</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 125—<a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234–237</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 190—<a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 143—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181–184</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 147—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 153—<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 202—<a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 207—<a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 250—<a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 255—<a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–112</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121–123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 301—<a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 308—<a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 311—<a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 342—<a href="#Page_104">104–106</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–117</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hill 347—<a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Cloverleaf, <a href="#Page_176">176–178</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229–231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Observation, <a href="#Page_175">175–178</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Red Slash, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hodge, LtGen John R., USA, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hodge, TSgt Paul A., <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hongchon, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Houghton, Capt Kenneth J., <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hungary, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hwachon, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hwayong-ni, <a href="#Page_229">229–231</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Iceland, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Il-li, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inchon, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ingvolstad, LtCdr Orlando, Jr., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Intelligence, U. S.:</li> -<li class="isub1">Army, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23<i>n</i></a></li> -<li class="isub1">Captured NK documents, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japanese maps, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> -<li class="isub1">POW interrogations, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Italy, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Itami, Japan, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air Force Base, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Itazuke, Japan, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Airfield, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Iron Curtain,” <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Iwo Jima, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Jamaica</i>, HMS, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">James, Cpl Melvin, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Japan, <a href="#Page_1">1–4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6–9</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#ip_61">61 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Celestial Empire, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russian WWII declaration of war on, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li class="isub1">U. S. occupation of, WWII, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japan sea, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><i>Kamikaze</i> tactics of, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Johnston, 2dLt Thomas H., <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Joint Operations Center (JOC), <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Joy"></a>Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Juneau</i> (CL), USS, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kaechon, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kaesong, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kanggye, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kang-ni, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kapyong, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Karig, Capt Walter, USNR, <a href="#Page_40">40<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Kean"></a>Kean, MajGen William B., USA, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Kim_Il_Sung"></a>Kim Il Sung, Red Korean prime minister, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kim Mu Chong, LtGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kim Sung Chu, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kim Ung, LtGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">King, Maj George J., <a href="#Page_141">141<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">King, Capt George W., <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kipling, Rudyard, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kittredge, Capt George E., Jr., <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Klein, Lt (jg) Chester L., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span></li> - -<li class="indx">Kobe, Japan, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kochang, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Korea"></a>Korea, <a href="#Page_1">1–4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6–8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#ip_11">11 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_14">14–17</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19–21</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41–43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58–60</a>, <a href="#ip_61">61 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87–90</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">American landing in, 1871, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Annexation of by Japan, 1910, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Civil War in, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub2"><i>See also</i> <a href="#Republic_of">Republic of Korea</a> and <a href="#Peoples_Democratic_Republic_of">North Korean Peoples Democratic Republic</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Conflict in, historical background, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japanese possession, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> -<li class="isub1">North. <i>See</i> <a href="#Peoples_Democratic_Republic_of">People’s Democratic Republic of</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Partition of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> -<li class="isub1">People’s Army. <i>See</i> <a href="#Peoples_Democratic_Republic_of">People’s Democratic Republic of</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a id="Peoples_Democratic_Republic_of"></a>People’s Democratic Republic of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114–116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Agrarian Reform, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> -<li class="isub2">People’s Army, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Air Force, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub3">armament, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Aviation Section of Pyongyang Military Academy, organization of, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Casualties, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Commander in Chief. <i>See</i> <a href="#Kim_Il_Sung">Kim Il Sung</a></li> -<li class="isub3">conscription program of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Decoration “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic”, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub4">“Order of the National Flag, 1st Class”, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Deputy Commander in Chief. <i>See</i> <a href="#Choe_Yong_Gun">Choe Yong Gun</a>, Marshal, NKPA</li> -<li class="isub3">Division Headquarters, organization of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> -<li class="isub3">First Amphibious Operation in Korea, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Front Headquarters, organization of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> -<li class="isub3">infantry division, organization of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> -<li class="isub3">invasion of South Korea, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#ip_44">44 <i>map</i></a></li> -<li class="isub3">Order of Battle in, <a href="#ip_35">35 <i>map</i></a></li> -<li class="isub3">organization of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> -<li class="isub3">rifle regiment, organization of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> -<li class="isub3">rifle company, organization of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> -<li class="isub3">rifle platoon, organization of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> -<li class="isub3">spies, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub3">strength of, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> -<li class="isub3">training of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li class="isub3">Units:</li> -<li class="isub4">I Corps, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub4">II Corps, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub4">III Corps, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub4">105th Armored Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li class="isub4">1st Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub4">2d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub4">3d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub4">4th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub4">5th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub4">6th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96–98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub4">7th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub4">8th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub4">9th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub4">10th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub4">12th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub4">13th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> -<li class="isub4">14th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub4">15th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub4">10th Mechanized Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub4">849th Anti-tank Regiment, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub4">5th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub4">6th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> -<li class="isub4">13th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> -<li class="isub4">14th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> -<li class="isub4">15th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> -<li class="isub4">16th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub4">18th Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub4">206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> -<li class="isub4">107th Medium Tank Regiment, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub4">109th Medium Tank Regiment, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub4">203d Medium Tank Regiment, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub4">83d Motorcycle Regiment, <a href="#Page_96">96–98</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub4">308th Armored Battalion, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Aviation Society, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Labor Party of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Minister of National Defense. <i>See</i> <a href="#Choe_Yong_Gun">Choe Yong Gun</a>, Marshal, NKPA.</li> -<li class="isub2">Navy, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li class="isub2">People’s Assembly at Pyongyang, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub2">People’s Committee, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Prime Minister. <i>See</i> <a href="#Kim_Il_Sung">Kim Il Sung</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Supreme People’s Council, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> -<li class="isub1">population of, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a id="Republic_of"></a>Republic of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_21">21–23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–38</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub2">American Military Government of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub2">army, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Army units:</li> -<li class="isub3">Capital Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub3">1st Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub3">2d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> -<li class="isub3">3d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub3">5th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span></li> -<li class="isub3">6th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub3">7th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> -<li class="isub3">8th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub3">17th Regiment, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Interim Legislature of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub2">invasion of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <i>map</i> front endpaper</li> -<li class="isub2">National Assembly of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Navy units: 1st Korean Marine Regiment, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Security Force, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russian Occupation of, 1945, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> -<li class="isub1">South. <i>See</i> <a href="#Republic_of">Republic of</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Terrain, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> -<li class="isub1">trusteeship of, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub1">United States occupation of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Volunteer Army, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kosong, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kosong Turkey Shoot, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kremlin, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Krulak, Col Victor H., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kumchon, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kum River, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kumwan, <a href="#Page_68">68<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kunsan, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kurtz, SSgt Charles F., Jr., <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kwangju, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Kyoto, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Landrum, Col Eugene M., USA, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Latham, Henry J., <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Latvia, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lawson, TSgt Frank J., <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> - -<li class="indx">League of Nations, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lee Hwal, Col, NKPA, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lenin, Nickolai, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lennon, 2dLt Thomas P., <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Liaotung Peninsula, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russian 25-year lease of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lischeski, TSgt F. J., <a href="#Page_144">144<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Long March”, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lueddeke, Lt Gustave F., <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lund, Maj Arnold A., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="MacArthur"></a>MacArthur, Gen of the Army Douglas, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56–60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - -<li class="indx">McMullen, TSgt Orval F., <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">McNeely, Maj Morgan J., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Macy, Sgt Jack, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Main Supply Route (MSR):</li> -<li class="isub1">enemy, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Marine, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_122">122–124</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216–222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227–229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231–236</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Manchukuo"></a>Manchukuo, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Manchuria">Manchuria</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Manchuria"></a>Manchuria, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7–10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Manchukuo">Manchukuo</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">puppet state in, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia in (World War II), <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mao Tse-tung, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Marines"></a>Marines, U. S., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56–58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62–65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#ip_157">157 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air crews, <a href="#ip_168">168 <i>pic.</i></a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air-ground team, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air Support Section, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Equipment, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Expansion program, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Ground forces, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">landing of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> -<li class="isub1">request for, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a id="Marine_Units"></a>Units:</li> -<li class="isub2">Air</li> -<li class="isub2">1st Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> -<li class="isub2">2d Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Marine Air Group-33, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub2">VMF-214, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub2">VMF-323, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–143</a></li> -<li class="isub2">VMF(N)-513, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub2">VMO-6, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two (MTACS-2), <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental) One (HMX-1), <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Ground,</li> -<li class="isub1">Fleet Marine Force, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> -<li class="isub1">V Amphibious Corps, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Marine Division, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> -<li class="isub1">2d Marine Division, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Provisional Marine Brigade, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52–60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62–65</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87–93</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98–101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124–126</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207–209</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237–244</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Action on Southwestern Front, 7–13 Aug 50, <a href="#ip_102">102 <i>map</i></a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">activation of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Advance Party, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span></li> -<li class="isub2">air component, number of personnel, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">air-ground team, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">departure of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">expansion of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">ground forces, number of personnel, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">ground elements, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">mobilization of, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Observation Section, organization of, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">rear echelon, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Marine Regiment, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">5th Marine Regiment, <a href="#Page_49">49–52</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209–211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">CO. <i>See</i> <a href="#Murray">Murray, LtCol Raymond L.</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">organization of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2"><a href="#Page_4">4</a>.2-inch Mortar Company, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Anti-Tank Company, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123–125</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127–129</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227–231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235–237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">CO. <i>See</i> <a href="#Newton">Newton, LtCol George R.</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190–193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195–198</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219–225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229–231</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189–193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219–222</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229–231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234–237</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Anti-tank assault platoon, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">2d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181–184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">CO, <i>see</i> <a href="#Roise">Roise, LtCol H. S.</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_112">112–117</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181–184</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> -<li class="isub1">3d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103–106</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150–152</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">CO. <i>See</i> <a href="#Taplett">Taplett, LtCol Robert D.</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119–122</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">7th Marine Regiment, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">9th Marine Regiment, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Battalion, 11th Marines, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> -<li class="isub1">1st Amphibious Tractor Company, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Brigade Reconnaissance Company Detachment, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Brigade Medical Section, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Combat Service Detachment, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Brigade Air Section, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">First Replacement Draft, activation of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Marine_Corps"></a>Marine Corps, U. S., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56–58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Marines">Marines, U. S.</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Air Station, El Toro, California. <i>See</i> <a href="#El_Toro">El Toro</a>, California</li> -<li class="isub1">Hymn, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Organized Reserve, mobilization of, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Schools. <i>See</i> <a href="#Quantico">Quantico</a>, Virginia</li> -<li class="isub1">Supply Depot, Barstow, California, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Martin, Col Robert R., USA, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Marx, Karl, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Masan, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Matthews"></a>Matthews, Francis P., <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Medical Aid Stations, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_210">210<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mediterranean Fleet. <i>See</i> <a href="#Sixth_Fleet">Navy, U. S., 6th Fleet</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mesanjin, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Michaelis, Col John H., USA, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Millar, TSgt Stanley G., <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Miryang, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">River, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mokpo, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mokpu, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mongolia, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mongols, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Montross, Lynn J., <a href="#Page_50">50<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Morgan, TSgt Ray, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moscow, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Conference, 1945, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moses, Captain Vivian, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Muccio, Ambassador John J., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Muetzel, 2dLt Francis W., <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_196">196<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mukden, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Battle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Munsan, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Murray"></a>Murray, LtCol Raymond L., <a href="#Page_51">51–53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span></li> - -<li class="indx">Myong-ni, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Naktong, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Bulge, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#ip_185">185 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">River, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66–68</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#ip_172">172 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">First Battle of, 17–19 Aug 50, <a href="#Page_173">173–206</a>, <a href="#ip_199">199 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_202">202 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_205">205 <i>map</i></a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176–179</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Objective Two, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Objective Three, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Second Battle of, 3–6 Sep 50, <a href="#Page_207">207-235</a>, <a href="#ip_218">218 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_223">223 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_232">232 <i>map</i></a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Objective Two, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nam Il, LtGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nam River, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Namwon, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nanking, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nanam, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Naval Blockade:</li> -<li class="isub1">United Nations, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">U. S., of Formosa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of Korean Coast, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Naval Forces in the Far East, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, California, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Naval Support, U. S., <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Navy_U_S"></a>Navy, U. S.:</li> -<li class="isub1"><a id="Sixth_Fleet"></a>Sixth Fleet, U. S., <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210<i>n</i></a></li> -<li class="isub1">Seventh Fleet, U. S., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Force <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Group <a href="#Page_53">53</a>.<a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Group <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.<a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li class="isub1">PhibGroup One, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Amphibious Planning Group <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Task Unit <a href="#Page_53">53</a>.<a href="#Page_7">7</a>.<a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nazi invasion of Russia, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nelson, Lt(jg) Bentley G., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Newsweek</i>, <a href="#Page_39">39<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Newton"></a>Newton, LtCol George R., <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>New York Times</i>, <a href="#Page_16">16<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">No Name Ridge, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nonsan, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Oakley, 2dLt Arthur A., <a href="#Page_113">113–115</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obong-ni, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obong-ni Ridge, <a href="#ip_162">162 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_175">175–179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#ip_185">185 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191–196</a>, <a href="#ip_199">199 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#Page_200">200–203</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obregon, PFC Eugene A., <a href="#ip_161">161 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">O’Donnell, MajGen Emmett, USAF, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Offensive, Sachon, <a href="#ip_145">145 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_149">148 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Okinawa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Oliver, Robert T., <a href="#Page_12">12<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Olson, Maj Merlin R., <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">LtCol, <a href="#Page_123">123<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_124">124<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_125">125<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_217">217<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_233">233<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">O’Mahoney, Maj Thomas J., <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ongjin Peninsula, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Open Door” Policy, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Osaka, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Osan, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Oso-ri, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Pacific Ocean, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Paedun-ni, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#ip_149">149 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pang, MajGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Partridge, MajGen Earle E., USAF, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Patton, Gen George S., USA, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pearl Harbor, T. H., <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Peiping, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Peleliu, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, <a href="#Page_48">48–51</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pentagon, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Perry, Commodore Matthew C., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pescadores Group, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Peters, SSgt Carl W., <a href="#ip_168">168 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Philippine Islands, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Pickaway</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Plan Able, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Plan Baker, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pochon, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pohang-dong, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Poland, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Police Action”, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pomeroy, 1stLt William D., <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Potsdam Conference, July 1947, <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pugok, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pusan, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65–67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87–89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95–97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208–211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236–241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Harbor, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Perimeter, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239–242</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>. <i>See</i> <a href="#if_i_endpiece_2">map inside back cover</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Terminal, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">University, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pyongyang, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14–16</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_20">20–24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Military Academy, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="Quantico"></a>Quantico, Virginia, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="Radford"></a>Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reeves, MSgt Harold, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Regimental Combat Team (RCT). <i>See</i> <a href="#Army_units">Army units</a>, <a href="#Marine_Units">Marine units</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reid, 2dLt Wallace J., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rhodes, 1stLt Nye G., <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Robinson, SSgt Robert, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Roise"></a>Roise, LtCol Harold S., <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span></li> - -<li class="indx">Roosevelt, President Franklin D., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rumania, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Russell, Maj John W., <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Russia, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6–8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Czarist, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">Nazi invasion of, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>.</li> -<li class="isub2"><i>See also</i> <a href="#Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics">Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Baltic Fleet, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Russian-Japanese Border Clashes, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Russian revolution of 1917, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Russo-Japanese War, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Sachon, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142–144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–148</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sachon Offensive, <a href="#ip_130">130 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_133">133 <i>map</i></a>, <a href="#ip_134">134 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sachon Offensive Situation Map, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sadong, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Saint Johns Military Academy, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Saipan, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sakhalin Island, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Samchok, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Samchonpo, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> - -<li class="indx">San Clemente Island, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="indx">San Diego, California, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sangnyong-ni, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sasebo, Japan, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Schryver, 1stLt Hugh C., <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scott, Hugh D., Jr., <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sebilian, 1stLt Robert C., <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Secretary of the Navy. <i>See</i> <a href="#Matthews">Matthews, Francis P.</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Seoul, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">attack on, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li class="isub1">fall of, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russian legation at, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> -<li class="isub1">strafing of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> -<li class="isub1">University, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Shepherd"></a>Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sharp, Capt L. D., Jr., <a href="#Page_64">64<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Sherman_Adm_Forrest_P"></a>Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sherman, Gen William T., USA, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Shinka, 2dLt M. J., <a href="#Page_181">181<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ships:</li> -<li class="isub1">American: LST Q0119, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Enemy: Torpedo Boat, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Siban-ni, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Siberia, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Silcily</i> (CVE), USS, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Simpson, PFC Benjamin C., <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sinchon, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Singi, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Sino-Japanese War”, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sinuiju, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sinuiju Airfield, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Skelt, 1stLt Ernest P., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, LtCol Charles B., USA, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, 1stLt H. J., <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, 1stLt James W., <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, MajGen Oliver P., <a href="#ip_159">159 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smolensk, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Snedeker, Col Edward W., <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Snyder, 1stLt Joris J., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Soviet Russia, <i>See</i> <a href="#Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics">Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spain, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spanish-American War, 1898, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spotter, LtComdr Otto E., USN, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stalin, Joseph, <a href="#Page_1">1–3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stalingrad, Battle of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stephens, Cpl Raymond E., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stevens, Capt John R., <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Maj., <a href="#Page_144">144<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_196">196<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_233">233<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stewart, Maj Frank R., Jr., <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stewart, Col J. L., <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_68">68<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Strategic triangle. <i>See</i> <a href="#China-Russia-Japan_Triangle">China-Russia-Japan triangle</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Strategy, Communist:</li> -<li class="isub1">“end run,” <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> -<li class="isub1">United Nations: delaying action, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Summers, PFC Ralph J., <a href="#ip_161">161 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sunam-dong, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sunchon, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Suwon, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sweeney, 1stLt William E., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sweet, 2dLt Granville G., <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Syngman, Dr. Rhee, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Syngman, Madame Rhee, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Tactical Air Control Center, U. S. Air Force (TACC), <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tactical Air Control Party, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tactics:</li> -<li class="isub1">NKPA, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub2">air, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub2">artillery, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tank, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Soviet cold-war, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Taedabok Pass, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Taegu, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Taejon, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Taepyong-ni, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Taesil-li, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#ip_149">149 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tanghong-ni, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Taplett"></a>Taplett, LtCol Robert D., <a href="#Page_103">103–105</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150–152</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tarawa, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tartars, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span></li> - -<li class="indx">Taylor, 1stLt David S., <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tennant, Lt William G., USN, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Terrio, PFC Donald, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thirty-eighth Parallel, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14–17</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37–39</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tobin, Cape John L., <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Togo, Adm, Japanese, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tokkong-ni, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tokyo, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tompkins, Pauline, <a href="#Page_6">6<i>n</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tosan, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#ip_149">149 <i>map</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Transportation:</li> -<li class="isub1">motor transport, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> -<li class="isub1">American:</li> -<li class="isub2">cargo trucks, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> -<li class="isub2">jeeps, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li class="isub2">M-44 armored personnel carriers, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> -<li class="isub2">motorcycles, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li class="isub2">2½-ton trucks, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Army trucks, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub2">Marine truck, <a href="#ip_166">166 <i>pic.</i></a></li> -<li class="isub1">enemy, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li class="isub2">motorcycles, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#ip_158">158 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Trans-Siberian Railroad, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Treaties:</li> -<li class="isub1">Japan-England, treaty of alliance, 1902, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Japan-Korea, treaty of amity, 1887, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Portsmouth, treaty of, 5 September 1905, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia-China treaty of alliance, 1896, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia-China, treaty of alliance, 1902, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia-Japan, 1896, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia-Japan, 1898, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Russia-Nationalist China treaty of friendship, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Triple Intervention (Russia-Germany-France), <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Truce of the Bear, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Truman, President Harry S., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Trygve Lie (U. N. Secretary-General), <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tsinan:</li> -<li class="isub1">battle of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">fall of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tsushima:</li> -<li class="isub1">battle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Straits, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tugok, <a href="#Page_175">175–177</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Uffelman, 1stLt Paul R., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Uijongbu, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics"></a>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> -<li class="isub1">American Joint Commission, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub1">army, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> -<li class="isub1">army of occupation, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Nationalist China treaty of friendship and alliance, 1945, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> -<li class="isub1">withdrawal of occupation troops in Korea, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> - -<li class="indx">United Nations, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37–39</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Commander. <i>See</i> <a href="#MacArthur">MacArthur, Gen Douglas</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Commission on Korea, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Ground Forces, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> -<li class="isub1">forces, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">General Assembly, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Naval blockade, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Security Council, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="United_States"></a>United States, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13–15</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> -<li class="isub1">air-ground team, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> -<li class="isub1">ground forces, <a href="#Page_45">45–47</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> -<li class="isub2">commitment of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> -<li class="isub2">first enemy contact by, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Lend Lease, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Naval blockade of Korean coast, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Valley Forge</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Valmy, Battle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Van Orman, LtCol Ellsworth G., <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vasilev, LtGen, Russian, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vladivostok, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Occupation of by Japan, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Waegwan, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Walker"></a>Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65–67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wang Yun, Col, NKPA, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wang Yun, MajGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Washington, D. C., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Washington, University of, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Weapons:</li> -<li class="isub1">enemy:</li> -<li class="isub2">antitank guns, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> -<li class="isub2"><a id="automatic_weapons"></a>automatic weapons, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li class="isub2">“burp guns,” <a href="#Page_113">113</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#automatic_weapons">automatic weapons</a></li> -<li class="isub2">hand grenades, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> -<li class="isub2">howitzers, 122-mm, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub2">machineguns, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182–184</a></li> -<li class="isub2">machinegun, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.62-mm., <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> -<li class="isub2">mortar, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub2">mortar, 120-mm., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rifle, 85-mm., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub2">self-propelled guns, 76-mm., <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> -<li class="isub2">semiautomatic pistol, Tokarev, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> -<li class="isub2">small arms, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, Russian-made, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tank, T-34, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#ip_162">162 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1">United States:</li> -<li class="isub2">guns, 20-mm., <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li class="isub2">guns, 75-mm., <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> -<li class="isub2">guns, 90-mm., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> -<li class="isub2">howitzers, 105-mm., <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#ip_171">171 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span></li> -<li class="isub2">howitzers, 155-mm., <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> -<li class="isub2">machineguns, .50-caliber, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub2">mortars, 60-mm., <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub2">mortars, 81-mm., <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub2">mortar, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>.2-inch, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rifle, 75-mm. recoilless, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rifle, M-1, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rockets, air, <a href="#ip_168">168 <i>pic.</i></a></li> -<li class="isub2">rocket, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.36″, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rocket, 5-inch, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li class="isub2">rocket launchers, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.5″, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#ip_157">157 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#ip_160">160 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, light, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, M-24, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, M-26 “Pershing,” <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#ip_163">163 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> -<li class="isub2">tanks, M4A3 medium, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> -<li class="isub2">supporting arms, <a href="#ip_171">171 <i>pic.</i></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Weir, Col Kenneth H., <a href="#Page_56">56<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Westerman, 1stLt Jack, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Whampoa Military Academy, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wheatley, SSgt John I., <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">White, Sgt Bryan K., <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Whiteside</i> (AKA), USS, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Williams, 2dLt John O., <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Winter, 2dLt Robert M., <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wirth, 2dLt Leroy K., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Wolfhounds.” <i>See</i> <a href="#Infantry_Regiment">27th Infantry Regiment</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wonsan, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wood, LtCol Ransom H., <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">World War I, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Armistice ending, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">World War II, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24–26</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50–54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wright, MSgt Edward A., <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Yaban-san, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yalta:</li> -<li class="isub1">conference, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> -<li class="isub1">agreement, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yalu River, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">battle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yellow Sea, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yenan, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Military School, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yonchon, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yongdok, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yongdungpo, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yongsan, <a href="#ip_164">164 <i>pic.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yosu, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Young, 2dLt James R., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yugoslavia, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yu Kyong Su, LtGen, NKPA, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Zimmer, Capt Andrew M., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189<i>n</i></a></li> -</ul> -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 in0 narrow vspace smaller">SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES -MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED STATES -GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT -SET BY PHOTO COMPOSITION IN 12-POINT -GARAMOND AND PRINTED ON MAX-OPAQUE -VELLUM STOCK BY DEEP-ETCH OFFSET.</p> - -<p class="p4 center smaller"> -For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office<br /> -Washington 25, D. C. <span class="in1">-</span> <span class="in1">Price $2</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<div id="if_i_endpiece_1" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_endpiece_1.jpg" width="1428" height="2110" alt="(Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)" /> - </div> - -<div id="if_i_endpiece_2" class="figcenter port"> - <img src="images/i_endpiece_2.jpg" width="1456" height="2135" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>THE PUSAN PERIMETER</p> - <p class="smaller">AUG.-SEP. 1950<br /> - <span class="smaller">GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES</span></p> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="transnote"> -<h2 id="Transcribers_Notes" class="nobreak p1">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made -consistent when a predominant preference was found -in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced -quotation marks were remedied when the change was -obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.</p> - -<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization -or correct page references. It has many references to -footnotes as well as to regular text, and this eBook -links the footnote references to the original pages, -not to the footnotes themselves.</p> - -<p>When illustrations had no captions or useful headings that could -be used as captions, Transcriber added them and placed them in -parentheses, usually by copying them from the List of Illustrations -on <a href="#Illustrations">page ix</a>. Those parenthetical captions -will be visible only in versions of this eBook that do not display the -actual illustrations.</p> - -<p>The first two maps are identical to the last two maps.</p> - -<p><a href="#Footnote_265">Footnote 265</a>, originally footnote 7 on <a href="#Page_148">page 148</a>: -“18 May 5” was printed that way, with an incomplete year.</p> - -<p><a href="#Footnote_278">Footnote 278</a>, originally footnote 6 on <a href="#Page_176">page 176</a>: -“Plan 13-60” was printed that way. All other Plans are -numbered as “nn-50”, so this may be a misprint.</p> - -<p><a href="#Page_245">Page 245</a>: Transcriber added “BuAer” and “LSD” to the Glossary.</p> - -<p><a href="#Page_266">Page 266</a>: “Ground,” an index entry following -“Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental)” under “Marines,” -did not include a page reference.</p> -</div></div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA 1950-1953 VOLUME I (OF 5) ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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