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diff --git a/old/65007-0.txt b/old/65007-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0f8a134..0000000 --- a/old/65007-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11937 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 -Volume I (of 5), by Lynn Montross - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume I (of 5) - The Pusan Perimeter - -Author: Lynn Montross - Nicholas Canzona - -Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65007] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME I (OF 5) *** - - - - -[Illustration: (Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)] - -[Illustration: THE PUSAN PERIMETER - -AUG.-SEP. 1950 - -GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES] - - - - - U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA - 1950–1953 - - - VOLUME I - - _The Pusan Perimeter_ - - by - LYNN MONTROSS - and - CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC - - [Illustration] - - Historical Branch, G-3 - Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps - Washington, D. C., 1954 - - - - -Foreword - - -An ability to furnish skilled forces to meet emergency situations on -short notice has long been a hallmark of the Marine Corps. When the -call came for such a force to be dispatched to Korea on 2 July 1950, -the Corps was handicapped by the strictures of a peacetime economy. -Nevertheless, a composite brigade consisting of a regiment and an air -group was made available within a week’s time. - -With a reputation built largely on amphibious warfare, Marines of the -1st Brigade were called upon to prove their versatility in sustained -ground action. On three separate occasions within the embattled -Perimeter--south toward Sachon and twice along the Naktong River--these -Marine units hurled the weight of their assault force at the enemy. All -three attacks were successful, and at no point did Marines give ground -except as ordered. The quality of their performance in the difficult -days of the Pusan Perimeter fighting made them a valuable member of the -United Nations team and earned new laurels for their Corps. - -[Illustration: (Signature)] - - LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - _General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commandant of the Marine Corps_. - - - - -Preface - - -This is the first volume of a planned series dealing with United States -Marine Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 -July 1953. Volume I is designed to give the military student and the -casual reader an accurate and detailed account of the operations in -which Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade and Marine Air Group 33 -participated during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, from the date -of their landing on 2 August until their withdrawal on 13 September -1950, in preparation for the Inchon landing. - -Since this is primarily a Marine Corps story, the activities of other -services during this period are not described in detail except to -present a proper background to the overall account. - -Many officers and men who participated in this campaign have -contributed to the preparation of the book by answering inquiries, -submitting to interviews, and commenting on the preliminary manuscript. -Their assistance has been invaluable. Special acknowledgment is also -extended to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of -the Army, Pacific Section, and particularly Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. -Appleman, USA, for enemy intelligence material; to the Marine Corps -Board Study: _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on -the Course of the Korean War_ for its interpretations and conclusions; -and to _Life Magazine_ for courtesy shown in permitting use of Korean -photographs made by Mr. David D. Duncan. Maps included herein were -prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, -Va. United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps photographs have also -been used to illustrate this monograph. - -[Illustration: (Signature)] - - T. A. WORNHAM, - _Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps_. - _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._ - - - - -Contents - - - _Page_ - I Korea, Doorstep of Strategy 1 - The Korean Question--The Russo-Japanese War--Korea as a - Japanese Colony--The Partition of Korea--Red Victory in - China--Civil Strife in Korea - - II Red Aggression in Korea 19 - Units of the NKPA--NKPA Command and Leadership--The NKPA - Infantry Division--NKPA Air and Armor--NKPA Officer - Procurement Conscription--The NKPA Order of Battle - - III The Marine Brigade 37 - NKPA Gains of First Week--Early U. S. Decisions--Geography - of Korea--U. S. Ground Forces in Korea--Requests for - U. S. Marines--Activation of the Brigade - - IV The Advance Party 55 - Conference with CINCFE--The Washington Scene--The Advance - Party in Japan--Voyage of the Brigade--The Advance Party - in Korea--Crisis of the Eighth Army - - V Prelude to Battle 87 - Reconnaissance by Jeep--Brigade Air Lands--Landing of - Ground Force--Bedlam on Pusan Water Front--The Brigade - at Changwon--The Pusan Perimeter--Brigade Air Strikes - First--Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive - - VI Action on Hill 342 103 - First Platoon Fight--The Perimeter on Hill 342--Call for - Artillery Fires--Task Force Kean Stalled--General Craig - Assumes Control--Enemy Attack at Dawn - - VII Advance to Kosong 119 - Heavy NKPA Resistance--Assault on Hill 255--Confusion at - Tosan Junction--Brigade Artillery in Support--Encounter - with Japanese Maps--Ambush at Taedabok Pass--The - Seizure of Kosong - - VIII Fight on Two Fronts 139 - The Kosong Turkey Shoot--The Changchon Ambush--Marines - Ordered to New Sector--Attack of 3/5 to the Rear--Enemy - Dawn Attack at Changchon--Breaking Off Action - - IX Battle of the Naktong 173 - Task Force Hill Organized--Planning the Next Operation-- - Reconnaissance of Terrain--Air and Artillery Preparation - --Company D on Objective--Attack of Company E - - X Obong-ni Ridge 189 - Company B to the Attack--Advance of Company A--Defeat of - Enemy Tanks--End of the First Day--Enemy Counterattack - on Ridge--Obong-ni Ridge Secured--Supporting Arms Clear - the Bulge - - XI Second Naktong 207 - The Famous Bean Patch--Planning for Inchon Landing-- - Return to the Naktong Bulge--All-Out NKPA Offensive--The - Marines Jump Off--Progress of Brigade Attack--Assault - on Hill 117 - - XII Mission Completed 227 - Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division--Attacks of 5 - September--Two Marine Tanks Killed--The Brigade’s - Final Action--Brigade Embarkation at Pusan--Results - of Brigade Operations--Summaries and Conclusions - - - _Appendixes_ - - A Glossary of Military Terms 245 - - B Command and Staff List 247 - - C Citations and Commendations 253 - - Bibliography 257 - - Index 261 - - - - -Illustrations - - - _Photographs_ - - Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 70 and 156. - - - _Maps and Sketches_ - - _Page_ - - The Strategic Triangle 2 - - The Far East 5 - - Korea 11 - - NKPA Order of Battle 35 - - NKPA Invasion, 15 July 1950 44 - - Japan and Korea 61 - - Eighth Army, Situation of Late July 69 - - Brigade Action on the Southwestern Front 102 - - Chindong-ni Area 107 - - Sachon Offensive, 8–10 August 1950 130 - - Sachon Offensive, 10 August 1950 133 - - Sachon Offensive, 11 August 1950 134 - - Sachon Offensive--Changchon Ambush 145 - - Sachon Offensive, Situation 12–14 August 149 - - Enemy Counterattack, Hill 202 154 - - First Naktong Counteroffensive 180 - - First Naktong, Situation 17 August 1950 185 - - First Naktong, Situation 18 August 1950 199 - - First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Two 202 - - First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Three 205 - - Second Naktong Counteroffensive, 3–5 September 1950 218 - - Second Naktong, Marine Attacks of 3–4 September 1950 223 - - Second Naktong, Enemy Counterattack 232 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -Korea, Doorstep of Strategy - -_The Historical Background--The Russo-Japanese War--Korea as a Japanese -Colony--The Partition of Korea--Red Victory in China--Civil Strife in -Korea_ - - -It meant little to most Americans on 25 June 1950 to read in their -Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea. They -could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to -become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American -history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year. Yet the -danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World -War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the -political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan. - -The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the -Cairo Conference of December 1943. With Soviet Russia not yet being -represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great -Britain and China agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free -and independent.”[1] - - [1] Quoted in James F. Byrnes, _Speaking Frankly_ (New York: - Harper, 1947), 221. - -Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea’s -status as a Japanese possession since 1910. Government, industry, -commerce, agriculture, transportation--every phase of Korean life -had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan. As -a consequence, the 25,000,000 inhabitants of the peninsula were -woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of -independence. - -Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring -for recognition of his Korean government in exile. The United States -hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet -dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally. Moscow -had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving -military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan. Such -an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint -early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese _kamikaze_ -tactics. In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten -the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D. -Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin. - -[Illustration: THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE] - -The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that -Korea should be independent “... and that if a transition period were -necessary, a trusteeship should be established,” according to James F. -Byrnes, United States Secretary of State. He added in his memoirs that -“a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that -would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration -for President Roosevelt’s acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.”[2] - - [2] Byrnes, _loc. cit._ - -The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice. -Although Czar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger -in Communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the “wrongs” resulting from -the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later. The price of Soviet -military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian -territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905. - - -_The Historical Background_ - -It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any -such readjustment. Korea is one of those tragic areas of the earth’s -surface which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy. -As the focal point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula -offers each of these powers a threshold for aggression against either -of the other two. Possession of Korea has been for centuries an aim of -aspiring conquerors in the Far East, and all three rival nations have -had a turn. - -China was first. From ancient times down to the last quarter of the -19th century, the Chinese Empire held a loose suzerainty acknowledged -by the Koreans. Japan won a brief foothold in the 16th century under -the great war lord Hideyoshi, only to learn the painful lesson that -control of the sea is requisite to a seaborne invasion of a peninsula. -Naval victories by the Koreans cut Hideyoshi’s line of communications, -and he withdrew after frightful devastations which left an enduring -tradition of fear and hate. Both Japan and Korea then entered upon -a period of self-imposed isolation lasting until their political -hibernation was rudely interrupted by Western nations clamoring for -trade. - -The United States took the lead in inaugurating a new era in the Far -East. Commodore Perry and his American warships opened up Japan to -commerce in 1853. Several persuasive bombardments of coastal cities by -American, British and French naval guns were required to end Japan’s -seclusion; and in 1871 an American squadron was sent to Korea after -the destruction of an American merchant ship and massacre of its crew. -United States Marines and bluejackets stormed Korean river forts -defended by cannon. All objectives were taken and heavy casualties -inflicted, but it remained for Japan to open up the “Hermit Kingdom” to -trade 4 years later with the threat of war. - -Russia had not been a disinterested bystander during this era of -cannon-ball diplomacy. Her participation in Far Eastern affairs dated -back to the 17th century and had once extended to the North American -mainland. The sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 indicated a -renunciation of this phase of expansion, but Russia had no intention of -abandoning her ambitions in the Far East. Shortly after Japan compelled -Korea to sign a treaty of amity, the Russians offered to train Korean -officers and lend military aid to the faction-ridden kingdom. - -At this point China took a hand. Suspecting that the two rival nations -were dabbling in Korean affairs for purposes of their own, the -Celestial Empire attempted to restore her suzerainty. - -This policy was bound to lead to a collision. Western nations were not -surprised when Japan and China resorted to arms, but few observers -expected the supposed dwarf to beat the giant with ease. Japan’s well -led army, equipped with the best modern weapons, landed at Chemulpo -(Inchon) and captured the Chinese fortress at Pyongyang in northwest -Korea. Sweeping across the Yalu into Manchuria, the invaders overran -the strategic Liaotung Peninsula, taking Port Arthur and Dairen. - -It was all over in a few months. When the Empire proper was threatened -with invasion, the Chinese government sued for peace in 1895. - -The Japanese terms were more than severe, they were humiliating. They -included: (1) a large indemnity; (2) the cession “in perpetuity” of the -Liaotung Peninsula as well as Formosa and the Pescadores group; and (3) -Chinese recognition of what the Japanese were pleased to call “Korean -independence.” - -But the victors had overdone it. Russia, Germany, and France formed -the Triple Intervention which compelled Japan to relinquish the -Liaotung Peninsula. The three European powers preferred that this -strategic bastion remain in the possession of China, which was ripe for -despoiling at the convenience of the Western nations. - -Russia now assumed the role of a friend binding China’s wounds. The -secret treaty of alliance signed by the two empires in 1896 was aimed -like a pistol at Japan. In return for promises of support in the event -of further Japanese aggressions, China gave Russia the right to extend -the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok across Chinese territory in -Manchuria. - -The precept was not lost upon other European nations. England, Germany, -and France also established spheres of influence in China after -forcing the government to lease territory or grant special privileges. -And Russia added to former gains by a 25-year lease of the Liaotung -Peninsula. - -[Illustration: THE FAR EAST] - -China’s Boxer Rebellion of 1900 interrupted the march of events, but -two treaties in 1902 indicated that Japan and Russia would soon be at -each other’s throats. Japan acquired an ally in England, as a result of -that nation’s alarms over Muscovite designs, so that the neutrality of -European powers was practically assured. Russia and China drew closer -meanwhile with a new treaty of alliance. The stage was set for a fight -to the finish in the Far East. - -Possession of the Philippine Islands had given the United States a new -interest in Far Eastern affairs since the Spanish-American War of 1898. -John Hay, Secretary of State, realized that the American “open door” -policy was imperiled by the situation in Asia.[3] But he admitted in -April 1903 that nothing short of the threat of armed force could have -checked Russia’s encroachments. - - [3] Pauline Tompkins, _American-Russian Relations in the Far - East_ (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 21. - - -_The Russo-Japanese War_ - -A candid comparison would reveal a striking similarity between the -aggressions of Czarist Russia in the early 1900’s and those of Soviet -Russia half a century later. The expression “cold war” was not current -in 1903, but the account of Russia’s threats, seizures and violated -agreements has a dismally familiar aspect to the modern reader. Rudyard -Kipling paid a bitter tribute at the turn of the century to these -techniques of the Russian Bear in his lines: - - When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near and near; - When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise, - When he veils the hate and cunning of his little swinish eyes; - When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer, - That is the time of peril--the time of the Truce of the Bear! - -Following the Sino-Japanese War, the truce between Russia and Japan in -“independent” Korea was broken by both nations whenever a favorable -opportunity arose. Both of them intrigued constantly at Seoul. For -a time, indeed, the Korean government was directed from the Russian -legation with the backing of Russian troops. - -Twice, in 1896 and 1898, Russia and Japan signed agreements reaffirming -Korea’s independence and promising anew to withdraw their forces. -These pacts were promptly violated by both contestants for power, but -Japan prepared more realistically for the forthcoming struggle. On -a February night in 1904, without the formality of a declaration of -war, a Japanese squadron attacked the Russian warships anchored at -Port Arthur. This surprise blow was followed shortly by the landing -of Japanese troops at Chemulpo. They advanced to the frontier and -defeated the Russians in the battle of the Yalu--a victory that has -been compared with the battle of Valmy in the French Revolution as a -landmark of history. - -Certainly the West was made aware that an Oriental nation had risen -to the stature of a world power for the first time in modern history. -The value of Korea as a strategic springboard was demonstrated when -Japanese land and sea forces isolated the fortresses on the Liaotung -Peninsula. Port Arthur fell after a bloody siege of 6 months. Next, the -Japanese invaders of Manchuria defeated an army of 350,000 Russians and -inflicted 150,000 casualties in the four-week battle of Mukden. This -was the decisive clash on land; and in the one-sided naval battle of -Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Baltic fleet which the Czar had -ordered on the long voyage to the Pacific. - -The end came abruptly in the summer of 1905. In the Treaty of -Portsmouth, signed on 5 September, Russia ceded the southern part of -Sakhalin Island to the victors while recognizing their “paramount” -interests in Korea. All rights in the Liaotung Peninsula went to Japan -as well as important concessions in Manchuria. Not much was left -to Russia in the Far East except a precarious foothold in northern -Manchuria. - - -_Korea as a Japanese Colony_ - -For 5 years Japan kept up a pretense of a protectorate in Korea. Then, -in 1910, came outright annexation. - -Europe’s “balanced antagonisms” soon flared up in World War I, leaving -Japan free to exploit Korea as a colony. Western observers might -have noted such evidences of modernization as new docks, railroads, -factories and highways. But they were administered by Japanese -overseers as Koreans sank to the level of coolies without a voice in -the government. - -Although Japan joined the fight against the Central Powers in World -War I, her military efforts were made against allies as well as -enemies. Using Korea as a beachhead, she attempted to enlarge her -empire on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of Russia, then in the -throes of revolution. Three years after the Armistice, a Japanese army -still occupied the Vladivostok area; but the United States took such a -firm diplomatic stand that Tokyo backed down. - -This retreat was only a postponement. During the next decade Japan -set up a strategic shield to the east and south by fortifying the -mandated islands of the Pacific, awarded to her after the war. Treaties -and agreements were violated whenever convenient, and in 1931 she -turned westward again to satisfy her appetite for Russian and Chinese -territory. - -The time was well chosen. With the Western nations in the depths of an -industrial depression, Japan began a series of aggressions against the -Chinese in Manchuria. The gains were consolidated in a puppet state -known as Manchukuo, comprising a fertile and populous area as large -as California. China was unable to offer much resistance, and Soviet -Russia could not risk a major war in the Far East. Even so, some of -the Soviet border clashes with the Japanese in time of “peace” were -actually battles fought with tanks and planes. - -In 1937 came the Japanese invasion of China proper. Germany and Italy -were launching aggressions of the same stamp in Europe and Africa, and -the world was to know little stability until all three totalitarian -states had been crushed in World War II. - -Soviet Russia had a grim struggle for survival while resisting the full -tide of Nazi invasion. But at the time of the Yalta Conference, Stalin -was in a position to ask a stiff price for military aid in the Pacific. -The United States agreed that the Port Arthur area and southern -Sakhalin should be returned to Russia to redress the “wrongs” of 1905. -Concessions were also made in Manchuria and outer Mongolia. - -Stalin, for his part, consented to sign a treaty of friendship with -Nationalist China as an ally of the United States. Later events made -it evident that he had no intention of keeping his pledges. On the -contrary, Soviet policy already visioned a Communist empire in the Far -East which would include China as well as Korea. - -The Yalta Agreement was stridently criticized in the United States -after Stalin’s duplicity became apparent. But the War Department took a -realistic view as early as the spring of 1945: - - “The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at - Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of - Russia to obtain regardless of United States military action short of - war.... The Russians can, if they choose, await the time when United - States efforts will have practically completed the destruction of - Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire - at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by - their entry into the war at an early date.”[4] - - [4] U. S. War Dept memo for Acting Sec of State, 21 May 45, - quoted in Joseph C. Grew, _Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic - Record of Forty Years_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), - 2:1457–1458. - -This was precisely what happened. Moscow waited to declare war -until 8 August 1945--6 days before the imminent collapse of Japan. -Soviet forces fought only a few actions in Siberia with a Japanese -army stripped of planes for home defense. As a consequence, Russian -propagandists found it hard to paint a convincing picture of “the -heroic deeds of our brave Far Eastern warriors.”[5] Obviously they had -met little resistance while overrunning Manchuria and northern Korea to -accept the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese troops, including 148 -generals. These prisoners were sent to Siberia for years of servitude; -and the “conquerors” despoiled Manchuria of heavy machinery, turbines, -dynamos and rolling stock.[6] - - [5] David J. Dallin, _Soviet Russia and the Far East_ (New - Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 213. - - [6] _Ibid._, 214, 244. Such seizures were in violation of - international law, of course, and Soviet Russia had - pledged the prompt repatriation of Japanese prisoners at - the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. - -The value of this booty has been estimated at a billion dollars, and -the forced labor of Japanese war prisoners during the next 5 years -was worth at least another billion. Not satisfied with these spoils, -Moscow also demanded a share in the occupation of Japan. This design -was balked by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied -commander, who made it plain that he needed no such assistance.[7] - - [7] _Ibid._, 214, 239. - -Even after the guns fell silent, there was no peace. One enemy had been -exchanged for another, since Soviet Russia took advantage of war-weary -allies to follow in the footsteps of Germany and Japan. There was the -same familiar pattern of encroachment both in Europe and the Far East. -There were the same violations of treaties, the same unfriendly acts -falling just short of hostilities. The cold war had begun. - -Oppression at home and aggression abroad--this had been the policy -of Russia’s czars, and it became the policy of Russia’s dictators. -Despotism had been replaced by Communism, but there was little -difference. Communism proved to be an old tyranny presented as a -new ideology, and Joseph Stalin succeeded where Nicholas II failed. -Circumstances were kinder to Stalin, and he gobbled up territory in -Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, -Rumania, Mongolia and Manchuria. - -Never before had one man ruled so much of the earth’s surface. Yet -there was something neurotic and fear-ridden about the Kremlin’s -outlook which success could not cure. It has long been a historical -theory that this psychosis may be traced back to Russia’s bondage in -the Middle Ages under the Mongols and Tartars. At any rate, victory -and enormous spoils did not give Moscow a sense of security in 1945. -Buffer state was piled upon buffer state, and thousands of World War II -prisoners were enslaved behind the “iron curtain” to build new Soviet -military installations. - - -_The Partition of Korea_ - -The importance of Korea in the Soviet scheme of things was indicated by -the haste with which Russian troops crossed the frontier on 12 August -1945, three days after the declaration of war. They were the vanguard -of an army numbering a quarter of a million men led by General Ivan -Chistyakov, a hero of the battle of Stalingrad. - -The surrender terms called for a joint American and Soviet occupation, -with the 38th parallel serving as a temporary line of demarcation. Not -until 8 September, however, did Lieutenant General John R. Hodge reach -southern Korea with the first American troops. - -By that time the Russians had gone through their usual routine, and the -machinery taken from northern Korea was estimated at 30 to 40 percent -of the industrial potential. Looting by Soviet troops went unpunished, -and regular supplies of food for the huge army were demanded from an -impoverished people just freed of the Japanese yoke.[8] - - [8] _Ibid._, 285. - -The Russians had a tremendous advantage over United States occupation -forces. Since World War I more than a million Koreans had found a -refuge from Japanese bondage on Russian or Chinese soil. Thousands of -men had been indoctrinated with Communist principles and given military -training to aid the Chinese Reds fighting the Japanese invaders of -China. Thus in 1945 the Russians could count on the efforts of Korean -revolutionists to establish Communist rule in their homeland behind a -façade of democracy. - -[Illustration: KOREA] - -The United States forces, on the contrary, did not even have enough -interpreters. They impressed the Koreans at first as being alien -occupation troops setting up a military government. Meanwhile, the -Russians had installed an interim civil government at Pyongyang. Korean -Reds filled the key positions, and Stalin’s portraits and the hammer -and sickle emblem were seen at political rallies. - -Koreans of all persuasions opposed the division of their country into -two zones on either side of the 38th parallel. The Reds at Pyongyang -contrived to lay the blame on the Americans. They made a further appeal -to Koreans on both sides of the boundary by announcing a land reform -in the northern zone. Ever since 1905 a Japanese landlord had been the -hated symbol of oppression. Pyongyang won a great propaganda victory, -therefore, by announcing the confiscation of all large estates, Korean -as well as Japanese, and the division of the land among the peasantry. - -The bait was so tempting that the hook did not become apparent until -too late. Then the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform discovered that -they could neither sell nor rent the land, nor could they use it as -security for loans. If anyone ceased to work his holding, it reverted -to the People’s Committee, which allocated it to some other family. -The State retained possession, in short, and the peasant remained as -much of a serf as ever. Worse yet, the taxes disguised as “production -quotas” eventually amounted to 60 percent of the total crop, which was -more than the Japanese had extorted.[9] - - [9] Robert T. Oliver, _Why War Came to Korea_ (New York: - Fordham University Press, 1950), 149. - -This is a sample of the methods used to reduce North Korea to a police -state, just as similar states were being organized in occupied lands -of Europe by local Reds doing the bidding of Moscow. In the Soviet -zone of Korea all banks, factories and industries of any consequence -were nationalized by the so-called People’s Committee.[10] Military -training for offensive warfare was given to men armed with captured -Japanese weapons. Pressure was put upon these recruits to “volunteer” -for combat service with the Chinese Reds waging a civil war against the -Nationalists.[11] - - [10] Dallin, _op. cit._, 291. - - [11] Oliver, _op. cit._, 5. - - -_Red Victory in China_ - -Moscow was secretly backing the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung in -their efforts to wrest China from the Nationalist government of -Chiang Kai-shek. Such activities, of course, were in violation of the -treaty of friendship and alliance with Nationalist China which Stalin -had signed on 14 August 1945. But agreements were never allowed to -interfere with Soviet ambitions, and Moscow aimed to create in Asia a -bulwark of Communist puppet states extending from the Arctic to the -tropics. - -Asiatic soil was peculiarly suited to the growth of such institutions. -Although Communism derived originally from the theories of a German -revolutionist, Karl Marx, it was adapted by Lenin and Stalin to the -political climate of Asia. Human lives and liberties have always -been held cheaply in the East, and absolutism has been the rule in -government. Communism, as it developed in Russia after the revolution -of 1917, would probably have been better understood by Genghis Khan -than Marx. For it is significant that no Western nation has ever -embraced this political faith voluntarily, even though it has attracted -a minority of radicals and malcontents in nearly every country. - -Asia was ripe for change after World War II. In spite of Japan’s -defeat, that nation had made a good deal of progress with its “Asia for -the Asiatics” propaganda. The Far East seethed with unrest in 1946, and -Communism spread ominously through a China weakened by three decades of -invasion, revolution and civil war. - -While Nationalists and Communist armies contended for the ancient -empire, an undeclared war went on in the background. This was the cold -war between the United States and Soviet Russia as they supplied arms -and munitions to the opposing forces. Russia also supplied troops and -laborers. For it has been estimated that no less than 250,000 North -Korean Reds were induced to serve in various capacities with the -Chinese Communists in Manchuria.[12] There the soldiers completed their -military training in actual combat, with veteran Chinese officers as -instructors. - - [12] GHQ, FECOM, MilIntelSec, GS, Allied Translator - and Interpreter Sec (FECOM, ATIS), _Enemy Forces_ - (Interrogation Reports [InterRpt], Sup No. 4), 16. - -By 1948 there was no longer much doubt about the outcome in China. In -the battles of Tsinan, Changchun and Mukden, the Nationalists lost -33 divisions, totaling more than 320,000 men, in killed, wounded -and missing. Losses of equipment included 250,000 rifles and vast -quantities of other arms and equipment. During the four and a half -months following the fall of Tsinan in September 1948, the Nationalist -losses were estimated at a million men and 400,000 rifles. Even -planes of United States manufacture were captured by the Reds, who -also acquired a cruiser that the British had transferred to the -Nationalists.[13] - - [13] U. S. Dept of State, _United States Relations With China_ - (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office [GPO], - 1949), 357. - -“The unfortunate but inescapable fact,” concluded the United States -State Department in 1949, “is that the ominous result of the civil war -in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. -Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable -limits of those capabilities could have changed that result; nothing -that was left undone by this country could have contributed to it. It -was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country -tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within -China, if only a decision by default.”[14] - - [14] _Ibid._, xvi. - -As a result, Mao Tse-tung’s forces could claim a sweeping victory by -the end of 1949. Only the island of Formosa was left to Chiang Kai-shek -and his battered remnants. Meanwhile, it grew increasingly plain that -Korea was destined to be the scene of the next great tug-of-war between -Communism and the free nations. - - -_Civil Strife in Korea_ - -Not only had the Russians made the 38th Parallel a political boundary -in Korea; they had also resisted all American attempts at unification. -This meant that economic recovery was badly handicapped. For the mines, -heavy industries and hydroelectric plants were located in the north, -while the south had most of the agriculture. Products once exchanged -with mutual benefit now had to be imported from abroad. - -Trusteeship was hotly resented by all Koreans, even though few of them -had gained administrative or technical experience under the Japanese. -This prejudice was exploited by Soviet propagandists who denounced -the “undemocratic” American policy of bringing in administrators, -technicians and educators. As a consequence, the United States -military government made a poor showing at first in comparison to the -puppet government of Communist-trained Koreans installed at Pyongyang -by Russians pulling the strings behind the scenes. Anti-American -propaganda won converts to the south as well as north of the 38th -Parallel, with General Hodge being accused of maintaining a harsh -military rule. - -At the Moscow Conference of 1945 the Soviet Union had agreed -with the United States that the whole of Korea was to be given a -democratic government after passing through the trusteeship phase. A -Soviet-American Joint Commission was to meet and make recommendations -for this purpose; but as early as 1946 it became evident that the -Soviet representatives had been instructed to sabotage any attempt to -create a united Korea with its own government. - -After the failure of the first year’s efforts, Hodge ordered the -establishment of an Interim Legislature at Seoul as the counterpart -of the People’s Assembly at Pyongyang. Of the 90 seats, half were to -be filled by popular vote and the remaining 45 by Korean appointees -of the Military Government. The election was a triumph for the -American-educated Dr. Syngman Rhee and the rightists. Hodge tried to -give the other South Korean factions a voice by appointing moderates -and liberals, but the Interim Legislature had no solution for the -discontent in Korea as the economic situation went from bad to worse in -spite of American aid. - -Although the Americans on the Joint Commission did their best, they -were blocked by all manner of Soviet-contrived delays and obstacles. -Finally, in 1947, the United States submitted the question to the -United Nations. After long discussion, the General Assembly resolved -that all the people of Korea be given an opportunity in the spring of -1948 to elect a national assembly for the entire country. - -A commission representing nine member nations was appointed to visit -Korea and supervise the voting. But the Russians not only refused -to participate in the election; they went so far as to bar the -commissioners from entering North Korea. - -The new National Assembly elected in May 1948 by South Korea had the -task of forming a government. On 17 July the first constitution in -40 years of Korean history was approved by the deputies, who elected -Syngman Rhee to a 4-year term as president. - -It was an eventful summer south of the 38th Parallel. The Republic -of Korea came into being on 15 August, and on that day the American -military government ended. John J. Muccio was appointed by President -Truman to represent the United States in Korea with the rank of -ambassador. Plans were made to withdraw the 50,000 United States -occupation troops during the next 8 months, leaving only 500 officers -and men as military instructors for the training of a Republic of Korea -security force. - -In the northern zone the Communists organized demonstrations against -the United Nations Commission. Strikes and disorders were fomented -south of the 38th Parallel, and 200,000 North Koreans marched in -protest at Pyongyang. - -There was an air of urgency about such attempts to prevent the election -in South Korea. The exposure of the Agrarian Reform as a fraud had -hurt the Communists, and the disinterested spirit of the United States -occupation was gaining recognition throughout Korea in spite of -initial blunders. Pyongyang could not afford to let South Korea take -the lead in forming a government, and July 1948 dated the creation -of a Communist state known as the People’s Democratic Republic of -Korea. After adopting a constitution modeled after that of Communist -Bulgaria, the Supreme People’s Council claimed to represent all Korea. -In justification it was charged that “American imperialists carried out -a ruinous separate election and organized a so-called National Assembly -with the support of a traitor minority and with the savage oppression -of the majority of the Korean people.”[15] - - [15] _New York Times_, 12 Jul 48, quoted in Redvers Opie et - al., _The Search for Peace Settlements_ (Washington: - Brookings Institution, 1951), 311. - -The Russians announced in December 1948 that they were withdrawing -all occupation troops. It was no secret, however, that they would -leave behind them an NK army that far surpassed the ROK military -establishment.[16] Kim Il Sung, the Red Korean prime minister, referred -to it pointedly as a “superior army” in an address at Pyongyang. - - [16] ROK, of course, denotes the Republic of Korea, and NK - (North Korea) is the abbreviation usually applied to the - self-styled People’s Democratic Republic of Korea at - Pyongyang. Both sets of initials are used more often as - adjectives than nouns. See the Glossary in Appendix A for - definitions of other symbols and military terms found in - text. - -“We must strengthen and improve it,” he declared. “Officers and men -must establish iron discipline and must be proficient in the military -and in combat techniques.”[17] - - [17] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, 23. - -Numbers at the end of 1948 were estimated at 60,000 regulars in -addition to constabulary, railroad guards, and trainees. These troops -were equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese weapons, and -Russian arms were shipped into northern Korea to meet the needs of an -expanding army.[18] - - [18] _Ibid._ - -It was a military force of an entirely different character that -American officers organized on the other side of the 38th Parallel. The -new ROK army was strictly a defensive force, trained and equipped to -maintain internal security and guard the border and seacoast. Neither -tanks nor military planes were provided by the Americans, who leaned -backward to avoid any suspicion of creating an instrument for offensive -internecine warfare. - -Raids by Red Korean troops across the border became a frequent -occurrence throughout 1949. One of these forays, supported by -artillery, was a large-scale NK thrust into the Ongjin Peninsula. Heavy -fighting resulted before the invaders were driven back into their own -territory. - -Having failed to prevent the formation of a democratic Korean -government--the only government in Korea recognized by the United -Nations--the Reds at Pyongyang were making every effort to wreck it. -Since 80 percent of the ROK electric power originated north of the -frontier, they were able to retard economic recovery by cutting off -the current at intervals. There was no other unfriendly act in the -Communist bagful of tricks that Pyongyang neglected to employ while its -radio stations blared forth a propaganda of hatred. - -Early in 1950 the situation grew more tense daily as thousands of -veterans returned to North Korea after serving in the Communist armies -which overran China. When Radio Pyongyang began making appeals for -peace that spring, it should have become obvious to practiced observers -of Communist techniques that preparations were afoot for war. On 10 -June 1950 the Pyongyang government announced a new plan for unification -and peace after branding the top ROK officials as “traitors.” The -motive behind this proposal was apparently the usual Communist attempt -to divide an enemy on the eve of an aggression. For the long-planned -blow fell at 0400 (Korean time) on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950. -Russian-made tanks spearheaded the advance of the NK ground forces -across the 38th Parallel, and Russian-made planes strafed Seoul and -other strategic centers. - -Captured NK documents offer proof that the invaders had already set the -machinery of aggression in motion while making their plea for peace. -This evidence included the written report of instructions given by one -Lieutenant Han to a group of picked men on an intelligence mission. On -1 June 1950 they were to proceed by power boat to an island off Inchon, -where confederates would help them make their way to the mainland. -“Our mission,” explained Han, “is to gather intelligence information -concerning South Korean forces and routes of advance ahead of our -troops. We will perform this task by contacting our comrades who are -scattered throughout the length and breadth of South Korea.”[19] - - [19] FECOM, ATIS, _Documentary Evidence of North Korean - Aggression_ (InterRpt, Sup No. 2), 65. - -The lieutenant explained that the forthcoming attack on South Korea was -to be the first step toward the “liberation” of the people of Asia. -And his concluding remarks leave no doubt as to the complete confidence -with which the Korean Communists began the venture: - - “Within 2 months from the date of attack, Pusan should have fallen - and South Korea will be again united with the North. The timetable - for this operation of 2 months’ duration was determined by the - possibility of United States forces intervening in the conflict. If - this were not so, it would take our forces only 10 days to overrun - South Korea.”[20] - - [20] _Ibid._ - - - - -CHAPTER II - -Red Aggression in Korea - -_Units of North Korean Army--NKPA Command and Leadership--The NKPA -Infantry Division--NKPA Air and Armor--NKPA Officer Procurement and -Conscription--The NKPA Order of Battle_ - - -It was an army of veterans that broke the world’s peace in Korea. There -were thousands of veterans of the Chinese civil war and Manchurian -guerrilla operations. There were even a few scarred warriors who had -served with the Soviet forces in such World War II operations as the -defense of Stalingrad. - -Practically all the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were -battle-hardened, and a majority of the rank and file had seen action. -The origins of this army were deeply rooted in Asiatic soil. During -World War II an endless stream of Koreans escaped from Japanese bondage -and found a refuge in Soviet or Chinese territory. Some of them took -to banditry, others were absorbed into the Soviet or Red Chinese armed -forces. These refugees dreamed of a united and independent homeland; -and at Yenan, China, the Chinese Communists encouraged this movement -as early as 1939 by supplying arms to a force known as the Korean -Volunteer Army. During the first month alone the KVA attracted 3,000 -recruits, and at the end of the war an advance column marched back to -Korea under a leader named Kim Mu Chong.[21] - - [21] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, _op. - cit._, 17–28. - -Although the heads of the KVA had been thoroughly impregnated with -Communist doctrine at Yenan, they were coldly received by General -Chistyakov and the Russian occupation forces. It was a Soviet puppet -state that the Kremlin wished to see established in Korea, not a -Red-tinted independent Korean government. Communist right-thinking did -not save Kim Mu Chong and his KVA troops from the humiliation of being -stopped at the frontier in September 1945 and disarmed. - -The Russian commander piously justified his decision on grounds of -upholding international law. But he offered to return the confiscated -arms if the Korean Reds would retrace their steps and join the CCF -fight against the Nationalists. He promised that after the struggle had -been won, the KVA would be welcomed back to Korea.[22] - - [22] _Ibid._ - -Accepting these terms, Kim Mu Chong marched into Manchuria to aid the -Chinese Reds. His force numbered nearly 20,000 the following spring, -but the KVA lost its identity when the men were mingled with Chinese -and Mongolians in the CCF Northeast Democratic United Army. Most of -the officers and NCO’s of the former KVA were organized into teams to -recruit and train Korean volunteers both in Manchuria and Korea. As -combined military instructors and political commissars, they created -an integrated Communist force out of such oddly assorted material as -peasants, guerrillas and bandits. Used first as security troops and -later welded into a regular army structure, these thousands of Korean -Reds undoubtedly had the principal part in “liberating” Manchuria from -the Chinese Nationalists. - -Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces did not neglect the conversion -of North Korea into a satellite state. One of the first steps was the -establishment of a military academy at Pyongyang in the autumn of 1945. -Founded ostensibly for the training of police, it had as its primary -purpose the instruction of army officers. Graduates of the first and -second classes became teachers when branches of the academy were set -up at Nanam, Sinuiju and Hamhung. These offshoots, known as the Peace -Preservation Officers’ Schools, turned out the cadres which were later -activated as the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions of the new North Korean -army. For more than 2 years, however, the fiction was maintained that -graduates were to patrol rural areas, protect railroads and guard the -frontier. - - -_Units of North Korean Army_ - -Not until 8 February 1948 did the “North Korean People’s Army” -come into official being with the activation of the 1st, 2d and 3d -Infantry Divisions. At that time there were some 30,000 troops and -170,000 trainees in North Korea, according to later United States Army -intelligence estimates.[23] - - [23] _Ibid._, 23–24. - -The 4th Infantry Division was formed in 1948 from trainees plus a -veteran regiment transferred from the 2d Division. Two new infantry -divisions, the 5th and 6th, were organized the following year when -Korean veterans of the 164th and 166th CCF Divisions returned as units -with their arms and equipment.[24] - - [24] _Ibid._, 52–75. - -It is probable that the leaders of the North Korean state were -committed early in 1950 to the invasion of the Republic of Korea. At -any rate, the training and organization of new units was accelerated -during the spring months. From February to June nine new divisions -were activated--the 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry -Divisions, 10th Mechanized Infantry Division and 105th Armored -Division.[25] - - [25] _Ibid._ - -Two factors combined to hasten the NKPA aggression. It had undoubtedly -become evident to the Kremlin in 1949 that the Republic of Korea could -never be brought into the Communist fold by propaganda, subversion, -incitation of disorders or any other means short of a victorious civil -war. Moreover, a successful war of invasion was equally desirable as a -cure for political discontent at home. Not only was the Agrarian Reform -resented everywhere in North Korea, but taxes had gone up as high as 60 -percent of the crops to maintain the top-heavy military structure and -pay for tanks, planes, howitzers and other arms supplied by the Soviet -Union. - -Although most of the heavy industries of Korea were located north of -the 38th Parallel, they included no arms plants with the exception of -a small factory capable of turning out submachineguns and ammunition. -North Korea was also able to produce 80 percent of its own POL products -for military purposes and some of the army uniforms. Other supplies, -all the way from the Tokarev semiautomatic pistol (adapted from the -U. S. .45 Colt) to the T-34 tank, were imported from the U. S. S. R.[26] - - [26] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_ (InterRpt, Sup No. 1), - 17–23. - -Most of the weapons were old models of recent manufacture. The heaviest -load came by rail from Siberia through Manchuria via Antung and crossed -the Yalu into Korea at Sinuiju. As many as three freight trains a day -rumbled over the bridge between those cities and continued along the -west coast to Pyongyang. Supplies were also received from Vladivostok -by water to Chongjin or by the east coast rail line to Wonsan.[27] - - [27] _Ibid._ - -It must also be remembered that thousands of Korean veterans of the -Chinese civil war returned with their arms and equipment, including -American-manufactured weapons surrendered by the Nationalists. The NKPA -was second only to the Soviet Army itself in the spring of 1950 as the -best armed and equipped military force of its size in the Far East. - -The U. S. S. R. did not limit its aid to arms. Lieutenant General -Vasilev and a group of Soviet military instructors arrived at Pyongyang -in 1949 to train NKPA staff and line officers for offensive warfare. -About 3,000 promising NKPA candidates were sent to Soviet schools that -year for courses in such specialties as artillery, air and tank tactics. - -Of the original 14 NKPA divisions, the first 6 were composed largely of -well trained troops. The 12th Division, like the 5th and 6th, consisted -of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war. Constabulary troops made -up the 8th and 9th, while the 7th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry -Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division were formed of -conscripted trainees for the most part.[28] - - [28] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, _op. - cit._, 52–75. - -The picture grows confused in the spring of 1950, with 8 new divisions -being organized in 5 months. Many of the recently drafted men received -only the most sketchy training; and some of the older units were -weakened by drawing off well trained men to stiffen the new outfits. -All accounts agree, however, that the NKPA leaders anticipated an -effort of only a few days, ending with the destruction of the ROK army. -This was not an unreasonable assumption, since a swarm of NKPA spies -had brought back accurate reports of unpreparedness. Not only was the -Republic of Korea weak militarily, but a bad economic situation had -been made worse by increased population due to immigration. - -Altogether, Pyongyang could put nearly 100,000 fairly well-trained and -armed troops in the field, with about half of that number in reserve as -replacements, occupation troops or constabulary. But the problem of man -power did not worry Communists who were not squeamish about violations -of international law. For the aggressors planned to make war nourish -war by conscripting both soldiers and laborers in invaded regions of -the Republic of Korea. It was an old Asiatic custom. - - -_NKPA Command and Leadership_ - -With few exceptions, the North Korean war leaders proved to be willing -and able instruments of policies formulated in Moscow. Kim Il Sung, -the prime minister and commander in chief, was an imposter named Kim -Sung Chu who made a bid for popular support by taking the name of a -dead Korean resistance hero. As a youth he had fled from Korea and -joined the Communist party in Manchuria. There he distinguished himself -in guerrilla operations against the Japanese. In 1938, after rising to -the stature of a corps commander, he met military reverses and found -a refuge in Soviet territory. Legend has it that he attended a Soviet -military academy and took part in the battle of Stalingrad. However -this may be, he returned to Korea in August 1945 as a 35-year-old -captain in the Soviet army of occupation.[29] - - [29] _Ibid._, 90–99. Communist chiefs preferred to work - behind a screen of secrecy and deception, so that it was - difficult to obtain accurate personal data. Not only - did some of the NKPA war leaders have obscure origins, - but they added to the difficulties of biographers by - deliberately falsifying the record for propaganda - purposes. It is to the credit of U.S. Army intelligence - officers that they have managed to piece out this - material from prisoner interrogations and captured enemy - documents. - -South Korean descriptions of Kim Il Sung as an uneducated ruffian were -doubtless prejudiced, but certainly he was a ruthless guerrilla leader -who showed an uncommon aptitude for politics. His rise in the new North -Korean state was spectacular, for in September 1948 he became the first -prime minister. The following year he went to Moscow for conferences at -the Kremlin, and nine days after the outbreak of civil war in Korea he -was appointed commander in chief of the invading army while retaining -his position as prime minister. - -In contrast to this rough diamond, Marshal Choe Yong Gun cut a reserved -and dignified figure as deputy commander in chief and minister of -national defense. Born in Hongchon, Korea, at the turn of the century, -he had the equivalent of a high school education. In 1925 he went to -China and is believed to have attended the Whampoa Military Academy at -Nanking and the Yenan Military School. At Yenan, after being converted -to communism, he became a political instructor and later served in the -8th Route Army. Choe was commander of the Korean Volunteer Army in 1941 -and fought against the Japanese in Manchuria. Returning to Korea in -1945, he commanded the Cadre Training Center until 1948, when he was -named the first commander in chief. - -Even Choe’s enemies in South Korea credited him with a high order of -intellectual capacity and moral courage. Despite his Communist party -membership, he opposed the invasion of the Republic of Korea. He was -cool, moreover, toward Lieutenant General Vasilev and the other Soviet -advisers who reached Pyongyang in 1949 to prepare the Korean armed -forces for an offensive war. This attitude probably explains why he -was sidetracked in March 1950, when Vasilev took charge of the combat -training and re-equipment program. Although Choe was not on good terms -with Kim Il Sung at this time, he was regarded as a superior strategist -and administrator. And after being bypassed temporarily, he continued -to be respected as a leader by the North Korean army and peasantry. - -Nam Il stood out as the most cosmopolitan and polished of the North -Korean war leaders. Born in 1911, he was Kim Il Sung’s schoolmate in -Manchuria and the two remained lifelong friends. As a young man, Nam Il -made his way across the U. S. S. R. to Smolensk and attended college -and a military academy. He entered the Soviet army at the outbreak of -World War II and is said to have participated along with Kim Il Sung in -the Stalingrad defense. - -Both of them returned to Korea with the rank of captain in the Soviet -army of occupation, and both entered upon successful Communist -political careers. In 1948 Nam Il was elected to the Supreme People’s -Council and became vice-minister of education in charge of military -instruction. The most Russianized of the North Korean leaders, he took -pains to cultivate the good will of the Soviet advisers. Speaking -English, Russian, and Chinese as well as Korean, he held an advantage -over his North Korean rivals in such contacts. He also made a better -appearance, being tall for an Oriental and always well turned out in a -meticulously pressed uniform and gleaming boots. - -A major general without an active field command at the outbreak of war, -he was rapidly advanced to the rank of lieutenant general and chief of -staff. His stern demeanor, while seated stiffly in his black Chrysler -driven by a uniformed chauffeur, soon became one of the most impressive -sights of Pyongyang. But his talents remained more political than -military, and he never won the respect which the army accorded to Choe -Yong Gun. - -Among the corps commanders, there was none more able than Lieutenant -General Kim Ung. About 40 years old at the outbreak of war, he had -graduated from the Kumchon Commercial School in Korea and the Whampoa -Military Academy in China. As an officer of the 8th Route Army, he -won a reputation for daring in 1939 by tossing hand grenades into -a conference of Japanese generals at Peiping and escaping after -inflicting numerous casualties. Returning to Korea in 1946, he started -as a regimental commander and made a relatively slow rise because of -his CCF background. But after lining up with the Soviet faction in the -army, he was promoted to the command of the 1st Division in 1948 and of -I Corps during the invasion. - -The rapid ascent of Lieutenant General Yu Kyong Su to the command of -III Corps would indicate that promotion was sometimes due to political -influence. A graduate of a Red Army tank school in 1938 at the age of -33, Yu served throughout World War II as a company grade officer in a -Soviet tank unit. After his return to Korea, he married Kim Il Sung’s -sister and shot up from the command of an NK tank regiment in 1948 to -the rank of corps commander late in 1950. During the first few weeks of -the invasion, he was awarded the highest NKPA decoration, the “Hero of -the Korean Democratic People’s Republic,” with a concurrent award, the -“Order of the National Flag, 1st Class.” - -On the other hand, the career of former Lieutenant General Kim Mu -Chong, ex-commander of II Corps and ex-chief of artillery, was blasted -by the opposition of Kim Il Sung and Nam Il. A CCF veteran, Mu had -served under Mao Tse-tung on the “Long March” as one of 30 Koreans to -survive the ordeal. He commanded a Chinese artillery brigade and was -rated the best CCF artilleryman. In 1945 he came back to Korea and -conducted a speaking tour stressing the desirability of cooperating -with Red China and omitting any reference to the Soviet Union. This -lapse explains his failure in North Korean politics, but in deference -to his high military reputation he was given command of II Corps in -June 1950. The poor showing made by his units on the central front was -ascribed by Mu to the fact that Kim Il Sung picked him for missions -which could not succeed. Although he did not lack for support in the -army, Mu was relieved of his command and other positions in the late -summer of 1950. Expulsion from the North Korean Labor Party followed -after Kim Il Sung denounced him in a speech for disobedience of orders. - -Mu’s downfall was only one chapter in the bitter struggle for power -waged by two opposing tactical schools in the North Korean army from -1948 to 1950. Veterans of CCF campaigns against the Japanese and -Chinese Nationalists upheld a system of large-scale guerrilla warfare -refined into a military science. Approach marches under cover of -darkness, infiltrations, probing night attacks--these were the basic -tactics employed by Mao Tse Tung’s forces for the conquest of China. -Although mobility was the keynote, a rigid tactical system allowed -little latitude of decision to officers below the regimental level. -School solutions were provided for every military problem that could be -foreseen, and many of the North Korean officers had graduated from the -CCF military academy at Yenan. - -Another group of officers advocated the tactics learned at Soviet -military schools and in Soviet campaigns of World War II. This system, -of course, made the CCF tactics seem primitive in comparison. For -the Russians placed much more dependence in armor and artillery as -preparation for infantry envelopments. Such tactics called for more -supplies and ammunition than could have been provided by the elementary -CCF logistics. - -The CCF veterans seemed to have the upper hand in the North Korean army -early in 1948. But a survey of NKPA officers’ careers during the next 2 -years indicates that their opponents triumphed. Thus, at the onset of -civil war, most of the key positions in the army were filled by men who -had hitched their wagons to the red star of Moscow, both militarily and -politically. - -This does not mean that CCF tactics had been put aside entirely. On the -contrary, these methods had evolved out of military poverty and were -admirably adapted to an Asiatic peasant army. The North Korean forces, -being compelled to import arms, were never able to afford enough -planes, tanks, and artillery to make the best of the Soviet system. And -it was inevitable that heavy losses of such equipment in combat would -cause a reversion to CCF tactics. - - -_The NKPA Infantry Division_ - -No child ever bore a more striking likeness to its parent than did the -NKPA to the Soviet organization of World War II. - -The army as a whole came under the overall control of General -Headquarters at Pyongyang, which planned and directed the invasion of -ROK territory. As the troops advanced, a Front Headquarters was set up -to control corps operations. This organization of Soviet origin was the -highest tactical echelon of command. Normally including three or four -corps of several divisions each, it resembled an army group in military -establishments of other nations. Front Headquarters had only a wartime -mission and could be disbanded in time of peace.[30] - - [30] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 3–13. - -Next to the corps in the chain of command was the infantry division, -the basic tactical formation, modeled after that of the Red Army in -World War II. Of triangular design, numbering some 11,000 men, it was -reported by POW’s to consist of a headquarters, three rifle regiments, -an artillery regiment, a signal battalion, an antitank battalion, a -training battalion, a reconnaissance troop, and such division rear -services as medical, veterinary, transport, and supply units.[31] - - [31] _Ibid._ - -Division Headquarters, with about 120 men, included the commander, a -major general, and officers of the division and special staff. Closely -associated with the CG, and possessing almost as much power and -responsibility, was the division political deputy, usually a senior -colonel, who supervised politico-military activities and reported -any deviations from doctrine. This was a peculiarly Communistic -institution, of course, and it was the duty of the deputy to see that -officers and men of the division remained well indoctrinated. - -The NKPA rifle regiment, with a T/O strength of about 2,500 men, -consisted of 3 rifle battalions and supporting artillery. Each of these -battalions, numbering some 650 officers and men, included 3 rifle -companies, a heavy machinegun company, a mortar company, an antitank -gun platoon and an antitank rifle platoon in addition to signal, -medical, and supply platoons. - -An NKPA rifle company, which had a T/O strength of about 150 men, was -made up of a headquarters, 3 rifle platoons and a heavy machinegun -section. The rifle platoon had 4 squads and a T/O strength of 45 men. -Squad weapons were said to include a light machinegun, a submachinegun -and Soviet M1891/30 rifles. Two hand grenades were carried by each -rifleman. - -An army patterned after the Soviet system was certain to emphasize -artillery, and the NKPA artillery reserve at the outset of the invasion -consisted of 3 regiments--1 attached to GHQ, and 1 to each of the 2 -corps operating at that time. But shortages of equipment and logistical -problems made it necessary in actual combat for the NKPA to concentrate -most of its artillery potential within the rifle division. - -The organic artillery support of each division included a regiment with -a T/O total of approximately 1,000 men. Two 76-mm. gun battalions, a -122-mm. howitzer battalion and a headquarters company numbered some 250 -men each. A battalion consisted of 3 firing batteries with 12 artillery -pieces each, and personnel carried M1938 carbines. - -There was also a self-propelled artillery battalion made up of 3 gun -companies, a signal platoon and a rear services section with a total of -16 SU-76 pieces. A lieutenant colonel commanded this unit, which had a -T/O strength of 110 officers and men. - -The other major components of the NKPA infantry division were as -follows: - -SIGNAL BATTALION.--a wire company, radio company and headquarters -company, making a total of 260 officers and men. - -ANTITANK BATTALION.--about 190 officers and men in three 45-mm. -antitank companies and an antitank rifle company. - -ENGINEER BATTALION.--T/O of 250 officers and men carrying M1944 rifles -and equipped with picks, shovels, axes, saws and mine detectors. - -TRAINING BATTALION.--About 500 officers and men charged with the -responsibility of training NCO’s for the division. - -RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY.--an estimated strength of 4 officers and 90 -enlisted men equipped with 80 submachineguns, 20 Tokarev pistols, 4 -telescopes and 5 pairs of binoculars. - -REAR SERVICES.--a medical battalion, a transport company, a veterinary -unit and a supply section. Of the 200 personnel in the medical -battalion, about 60 were women, according to POW testimony. The -transport company, with some 70 men, was composed of 50 2½-ton trucks, -6 or 7 motorcycles and 10 horse-drawn wagons.[32] - - [32] _Ibid._ - -The NKPA infantry division, in short, was a faithful copy of the World -War II Soviet model. But it must be remembered that the foregoing T/O -and T/E statistics represented the ideal more often than the reality. -Owing to the speeding up of preparations in anticipation of an easy -victory, many NKPA units lacked their full quotas of men and equipment -at the outset of the invasion. - - -_NKPA Air and Armor_ - -POW interrogations revealed that NKPA military aviation evolved from -the North Korean Aviation Society, founded in 1945 at the Sinuiju -Airfield by Colonel Lee Hwal, a Korean who had served in the Japanese -air force. The organization consisted at first of about 70 students -and 17 pilots who were veterans of Japanese air operations. Equipment -included a few aircraft of Japanese manufacture and several gliders.[33] - - [33] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Air Force_ (InterRpt, Sup No. - 100), 2–15. - -In 1946 the Society was required to transfer its aircraft and -trained personnel to the Aviation Section of the Pyongyang Military -Academy. Soviet-trained Korean officers were placed in positions of -responsibility under the command of Colonel Wang Yun, a former captain -in the Soviet air force who replaced Lee Hwal. - -The Aviation Section numbered about 100 officers, 250 enlisted men and -500 students by November 1948. Estimates of aircraft are contradictory, -but one source reported 7 Japanese trainers, 6 Japanese fighters and -a Japanese twin-engine transport. Shortly afterwards the first Soviet -aircraft were received, and the NKPA Air Force was created from the -Aviation Section and moved to the Pyongyang air base. - -The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion -of the air regiment into a division under the command of Wang Yun, -promoted to major general. Strength of the unit in April 1950 was -estimated at about 1,675 officers and men, including 364 officers, 76 -pilots, 875 enlisted men, and 360 cadets. The receipt of more Soviet -planes at this time brought the number of aircraft up to 178, including -78 YAK-7B fighters, 30 PO-2 primary and YAK-18 advanced trainers, and -70 Il-10 ground attack bombers. - -Captured documents indicate that the aviation training program was -speeded up along with other NKPA activities during the last few months -before the invasion. In June 1950 each pilot was required to fly 40 -training missions and attend 40 hours of lectures. As preparations for -the invasion neared completion, a forward displacement of tactical -aircraft was put into effect.[34] - - [34] _Ibid._ - -The North Korean armored division, a copy of its Soviet counterpart, -had only about half of the overall strength. Thus the NKPA 105th -Armored Division, comprising some 6,000 officers and men, included 3 -medium tank regiments, the 107th, 109th, and 203d, with 40 tanks each. -Organic supporting units were the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment -and the 308th Armored Battalion equipped with self-propelled 76-mm. -guns. POW reports also mentioned reconnaissance, engineer, signal, -ordnance and medical battalions and a mixed unit identified as the -849th Antitank Regiment, attached to the division after the invasion -started.[35] - - [35] FECOM, ATIS, _Enemy Forces_, _op. cit._, 27–32. - -All reports indicate that the division was split in combat, with each -tank regiment being assigned to an infantry division. Even the training -of the regiments had been conducted separately, and there is no -evidence of prewar maneuvers on the division level. - -Each tank regiment had an estimated T/O strength of about 600 officers -and men. The three medium tank battalions were supported by a -regimental submachinegun company, a supply and maintenance company and -a headquarters section in addition to engineer, signal, reconnaissance, -and medical platoons. Forty T-34/85 medium tanks were divided into 13 -for each battalion and 1 for the headquarters section, which also rated -a CAZ/67 jeep. - -Responsibility for the indoctrination of the regiment rested with a -political section headed by a lieutenant colonel. As assistants he had -2 officers and 3 sergeants. - -An NKPA tank battalion included a headquarters section and three 25-man -companies. A company contained three platoons, each of which was -assigned a medium tank. The standard crew consisted of the commander, -usually a senior lieutenant, the driver and assistant driver, the -gunner in charge of the 85-mm. rifle, and the assistant gunner -operating the 7.62-mm. machinegun. The usual ammunition load was 55 -85-mm. shells and 2,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition. - -Not much was known about the 206th Mechanized infantry Regiment, but -it was believed to consist of three motorized infantry battalions, -a 76-mm. howitzer battalion, a 45-mm. antitank battalion, a 120-mm. -mortar battalion, a signal company, and an NCO training company.[36] - - [36] _Ibid._ - - -_NKPA Officer Procurement and Conscription_ - -Officer procurement problems were solved in large part by the fact -that thousands of North Koreans had seen combat service with the CCF -forces. Many of these veterans were qualified as junior officers or -NCO’s without further training. Remaining vacancies for company-grade -officers were filled by officer candidate schools or the commissioning -of qualified NCO’s. - -The West Point of the NKPA, located at Pyongyang, turned out an -estimated 4,000 junior officers from the time of its activation in 1946 -to the beginning of the invasion. Courses normally ranged in length -from 6 to 10 months, but were abbreviated to 3 months during the autumn -of 1949 in anticipation of the invasion. After hostilities began, the -need for replacement officers became so urgent that one entire class at -the Pyongyang academy was commissioned wholesale on 10 July 1950 and -sent to the front after 20 days of instruction.[37] - - [37] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 35–42. - -Three Soviet officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels, -reportedly acted as advisers to a faculty composed of NKPA majors. The -five departments of the Academy were devoted to infantry, artillery, -engineering, signaling, and quartermasters’ duties. - -A second military academy at Pyongyang specialized in subjects -which Communists termed “cultural.” So much importance was attached -to political indoctrination that graduates of this school were -commissioned as senior lieutenants and given unusual authority in their -units. Although a 2-year Russian language course was offered, most of -the candidates took the standard 9-month term. - -Branches of the Pyongyang military academy were established as officer -candidate schools in Hamhung, Chinnampo, Chorwon, Mesanjin, Kaechon -and Kanggye. Applicants were required to have an acceptable political -background and a 6-year minimum of schooling, though the last was -sometimes waived. - -A command and staff school at Pyongyang offered advanced tactical -and administrative courses at the battalion and regimental level to -selected officers. At the other extreme, NCO schools were located at -Sadong, Sinuiju, Sinchon and Nanam. Tactical instruction was given -at the platoon and squad level with emphasis on weapons courses. NCO -training was accelerated in preparation for hostilities, and 4,000 -veterans of CCF service in Manchuria completed 2-month courses at the -Sadong school alone in the spring of 1950. - -Technical training in aircraft, artillery, tank and engineering -specialties was offered in schools for junior officers as well as -enlisted men. But it appears that most of the officers above the -company level received their instruction in Soviet schools.[38] - - [38] _Ibid._ - -Conscription, according to POW accounts, was introduced as early as -1948. In the rural districts each _myon_ (a political subdivision -smaller than a county but comprising several villages) was given its -quota of recruits to be furnished between the ages of 18 and 35. The -village chiefs then assembled all the men in this age group and made -their decisions on an arbitrary basis. Selectees had little or no hope -of appeal, but were assured that provision would be made for their -families during the 3-year term of service.[39] - - [39] _Ibid._, 29–31. - -The system was much the same in North Korean cities, which were divided -into sections for conscription purposes. Sometimes the leaders in -urban areas called for volunteers. If the response was lacking in -enthusiasm, men were singled out and requested to “volunteer.” This -method was invariably successful, since a man who refused could be -deprived of employment. - -The conscription program was speeded up along with other preparations -as invasion plans neared completion. About 12,000 men were inducted -from March through May 1950 and given 6 weeks of basic training at such -camps as the No. 2 People’s Training Center at Sinuiju. - -In some communities the men eligible for military service were -requested to attend a meeting. Upon arrival, they were taken in trucks -to a training center and compelled to enlist. - -Harsh as such methods might seem, they were gentle as compared to the -forced conscription of ROK civilians after the invasion got underway. -Both men and women in captured cities were crowded into school -buildings, given political indoctrination and forced to learn Communist -songs. After a week of this curriculum, the men were inducted both as -combat recruits and laborers. And though the women were told that their -service would be limited to duty as nurses or clerks, some of them were -coerced into carrying out reconnaissance or espionage missions.[40] - - [40] _Ibid._ - - -_The NKPA Order of Battle_ - -The transition from a cold war to a shooting war in Korea should not -have surprised anyone familiar with the events of the past 2 years. For -several hours, indeed, there was a reasonable doubt on the historic -morning of 25 June 1950 whether an undeclared war had begun or merely -another large-scale NKPA raid across the frontier. - -But this time it was the real thing. Commencing at 0400, 7 infantry -divisions and an armored division swept across the 38th Parallel, with -2 infantry divisions in reserve. From right to left, the NKPA order of -battle was as follows: - -The 6th Infantry Division along the west coast, sealing off the Ongjin -Peninsula and moving on Kaesong; the 1st Infantry Division advancing on -Kaesong and Seoul; the 4th and 3d Infantry Divisions and 105th Armored -Division attacking in west-central Korea and converging on Seoul; the -2d and 15th Infantry Divisions driving toward the Hwachon-Chunchon -axis in east-central Korea; and the 5th Infantry Division taking the -route along the east coast. Following close behind were the two reserve -infantry divisions, the 13th and 15th.[41] - - [41] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, 25–27. - -There was no question as to the outcome in the minds of observers who -knew the composition of the ROK army. The very name was misleading, for -it might more accurately have been described as a large constabulary in -process of being converted into an army. Given another year of training -and added arms and equipment, the Republic of Korea would perhaps have -built up an adequate defense establishment. But the enemy took good -care to strike while this development was still at the blueprint stage. - -In June 1949, at the conclusion of the occupation, the United -States forces turned over arms and equipment to the value of about -$110,000,000. These supplies included 100,000 small arms (rifles, -pistols and machineguns) and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; more than -4,900 vehicles of all types; about 2,000 2.36″ rocket launchers and -40,000 rounds of ammunition; and a large number of 105-mm. howitzers, -37-mm. and 57-mm. antitank guns, and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, -together with 700,000 rounds of ammunition for those weapons. Twenty -training planes (L4 and L5 types) were transferred as well as 79 light -naval craft suitable for patrolling the coast.[42] - - [42] U. S. Military Academy, Dept of Mil Art and Eng (U. S. - MilAcad), _Operations in Korea_ (West Point, 1953), 4–5. - -It is noteworthy that this list was limited to light arms for a -constabulary of about 50,000 men. Tanks, military aircraft and medium -or heavy artillery were significantly lacking. - -At the request of the ROK government, a Korean Military Advisory -Group remained in South Korea after the conclusion of the American -occupation. Composed of 500 United States Army officers and enlisted -men, the KMAG took on the task of directing the training of a ROK -constabulary. The group was under the control of Ambassador Muccio, -since General MacArthur’s responsibility for the defense had ended -along with the occupation.[43] - - [43] _Ibid._ - -After the NKPA invasion, the United States was severely criticized -in some quarters for failing to provide the Republic of Korea with -arms and training equal to those of the enemy. American reluctance -was due in some measure to indiscreet declarations by that fiery old -Korean patriot, Syngman Rhee. The ROK president, 74 years old at the -outbreak of civil war, did not shrink from advocating the unification -of Korea by armed force. On 20 February 1949 he predicted that his -troops “could defeat North Korea within 2 weeks” if the U. S. S. R. did -not interfere. Eight months later, on 7 October, his confidence had -increased to the point where he was “sure that we could take Pyongyang -in 3 days.”[44] - - [44] A. Wigfall Green, _Epic of Korea_ (Washington: Public - Affairs Press, 1950), 125–26. - -Such remarks placed the United States in an uncomfortable position. If -aid to the Republic of Korea were to include tanks, military aircraft -and training for offensive warfare, Americans would be open to the -charge of inciting civil strife. Communist propagandists would scream -that accusation in any event, of course, but there would be grounds -for the suspicion of other members of the United Nations. Ambassador -Muccio made sure, therefore, that United States assistance did not -extend beyond the legitimate needs of ROK frontier defense and internal -security. - -The triangular ROK infantry division was modeled after the United -States unit but numbered about 9,500 troops. Eight divisions and a -regiment had been organized and partially trained by June 1950. They -were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions and the -17th Regiment.[45] Only 4 of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 6th, and -7th, had their full complement of 3 regiments. All the others had 2 -except the 5th, which had 2 and a battalion.[46] - - [45] The absence of a 4th Division is explained by an old - Korean superstition. Because the symbol for that number - resembled the ancient symbol for death, it was regarded - as unlucky. Apparently the North Koreans managed to - overcome this superstition, however, in numbering their - units. - - [46] LtCol Roy E. Appleman, USA, ms. history of UN operations - in Korea, Jul–Nov 50. - -ROK military strength was estimated at 98,808 troops by the KMAG in -June 1950. About 65,000 of them had been given unit training for -combat. They were fairly proficient in the employment of small arms and -mortars, but their instruction had not included defense against tanks. -Command and staff work were still at a rudimentary stage, and both -officers and NCO’s needed seasoning. - -The ROK Army of June 1950 had made good progress, in short, when it -is considered that most of its components had been activated within -the past year. But it was no match for the Red Korean columns which -attacked at dawn on 25 June 1950. The ROK order of battle, if such it -could be called, consisted of a regiment and four infantry divisions -ranged from left to right across the peninsula--the 17th Regiment and -the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions. The remaining divisions were -dispersed for purposes of internal security: the Capital at Seoul; the -2d at Chongju and Taejon; the 3d at Taegu; and the 5th at Kwangju. - -[Illustration: NKPA ORDER OF BATTLE 25 JUNE 1950] - -The ROK frontier forces were not well disposed for defense in depth. -Taken by surprise, they put up an ineffectual resistance despite brave -fights here and there against odds. On other occasions the sight of an -enemy tank or armored car was enough to scatter ROK riflemen, and the -progress of the invading columns resembled an occupation rather than an -attack. - -Before sundown on the day of invasion it appeared that NKPA leaders -had not erred in allowing a timetable of 10 days for overrunning the -Republic of Korea. The question now was whether the conflict could -be confined to that Asiatic peninsula. Communist aggressions were -no novelty, to be sure, either in Asia or Europe. But in the past -there had always been some show of peaceable intentions, however -hypocritical, or some shadow of legality. This was the first time that -a Soviet puppet nation had been permitted to go as far as open warfare. -Matters had come to a showdown, and it could only be interpreted as a -challenge issued by Communism to the free nations of the world. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -The Marine Brigade - -_NKPA Gains of First Week--Early United States Decisions--Geography of -Korea--United States Ground Forces in Korea--Requests for United States -Marines--Activation of the Brigade--Brigade Leadership_ - - -At three o’clock in the morning of 25 June 1950 the telephone rang in -the New York suburban home of Trygve Lie, secretary-general of the -United Nations. He was informed that North Korean forces had crossed -the 38th Parallel to invade the Republic of Korea. - -The news had just been received by the United States Department of -State directly from Seoul. Ambassador Muccio had emphasized that this -was not one of the large-scale North Korean raids into ROK territory -which had become an old story during the past 2 years. For his report -concluded: - - “It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in - which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive - against the Republic of Korea.”[47] - - [47] U. S. Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_ - (Washington: GPO, 1951). - -The implications were disturbing. Every middle-aged American could -recall the failure of the League of Nations to halt Japanese, Italian, -and German aggressions of the 1930’s with moral suasions. Even when -economic sanctions were invoked, the aggressors went their way -defiantly without respect for anything short of armed force. And now -history seemed to be repeating itself with dismaying fidelity as new -aggressors challenged the new union of nations striving to maintain -peace after World War II. - -There was even an ominous parallel in the fact that another civil -conflict in another peninsula had been the prelude to Armageddon in the -1930’s. For it might well have been asked if the Korea of 1950 were -destined to become the Spain of a new world war. - -The answer of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. At 2 o’clock -in the afternoon on 25 June 1950, a meeting of the Security Council was -called to order at New York. A dispatch had just been received from -UNCOK--the United Nations Commission on Korea--reporting that four -Soviet YAK-type aircraft had destroyed planes and jeeps on an airfield -outside of Seoul. The railway station in the industrial suburb of -Yongdungpo had also been strafed.[48] - - [48] _Ibid._ - -By a unanimous vote of nine member nations (with the U. S. S. R. being -significantly absent and Yugoslavia not voting) the blame for the -aggression was placed squarely upon the North Korean invaders. They -were enjoined to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw from ROK -territory. - -The United Nations had no armed might to enforce its decisions. But -the Security Council did not intend to rely merely upon moral suasion -or economic sanctions. At a second meeting, on 27 June, the Council -proclaimed the NKPA attack a breach of world peace and asked member -nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion. - -For the first time in the war-racked 20th century, a group of nations -banded together for peace had not only condemned an aggression but -appealed to armed force to smite the aggressor. On the same day that -the Security Council passed its historic resolution, the United States -announced that it was giving immediate military aid to the Republic of -Korea. - -President Truman, as commander in chief, ordered American naval and -air forces into action. Fifty-two other members of the United Nations -approved the recommendations of the Security Council. Their pledges of -assistance included aircraft, naval vessels, medical supplies, field -ambulances, foodstuffs and strategic materials. - -Only 3 of the 56 nations responding to the Council were opposed to the -majority decision. They were the Soviet Union and her two satellites, -Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been brought into the Communist -orbit by compulsion after World War II. - -On 29 June President Truman authorized General MacArthur to send -certain supporting United States ground force units to Korea. An -American naval blockade of the entire Korean coast was ordered, and -Japan-based Air Force planes were given authority to bomb specific -military targets north of the 38th Parallel. - -These decisions were upheld by the wholehearted approval of nearly all -Americans, according to contemporary newspapers.[49] Virtually the only -dissenters were such left-wing extremists as the 9,000 who attended -a “Hands off Korea” rally held early in July 1950 under Communist -auspices in New York.[50] Barring such rule-proving exceptions, -Americans had long been smoldering with indignation at Soviet cold-war -tactics. They applauded the resolute stand taken by the United Nations, -and they were proud of their country for its response. Unfortunately, -they did not anticipate that anything more serious than a brief “police -action” would be necessary to settle affairs. Never in their wildest -imaginations had it occurred to them that an Asiatic peasant army might -be more than a match for all the United States ground forces in the Far -East. - - [49] _Newsweek_, 10 Jul 50, 17. - - [50] _Ibid._, 29. - - -_NKPA Gains of First Week_ - -It was by no means a contemptible army, judged even by Western military -standards, which ripped through ROK defenses after crossing the 38th -Parallel. The major effort was the two-pronged attack on Seoul, -conducted with precision by the 1st NKPA Infantry Division, advancing -through Kaesong and Munsan while the 4th and 3d united south of the -frontier with elements of the 105th Armored to proceed by way of the -Yonchon-Uijongbu and Pochon-Uijongbu corridors. - -On the right the 6th Infantry Division made short work of overrunning -the isolated Ongjin Peninsula and thrusting eastward toward Kaesong. -On the left the offensive was covered by the drive of the 2d and 12th -Infantry Divisions on Chunchon while the 5th made rapid gains along the -east coast. - -In this area the North Koreans initiated the first amphibious -operations of the war with four Soviet-manufactured torpedo boats. -Built entirely of aluminum, of about 16 gross tons displacement when -fully loaded, these craft measured slightly over 19 meters in length -and were powered by two 10-Cylinder engines rated at 850 horsepower -each. With a crew of 8 men, a cruising speed of 20 to 25 knots and a -range of 15 hours, the boats carried 2 torpedoes and were armed with a -12.7-mm. heavy machinegun and 2 submachineguns.[51] - - [51] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 45–6. - -During the first 5 days of the invasion, the 4 torpedo boats escorted -convoys which transported NKPA troops down the east coast for -unopposed landings as far south as Samchok. But on 2 July 1950 the -tiny North Korean “navy” was almost literally blown out of the water -when it encountered UN Task Group 96.5 off Chuminjin while escorting -10 converted trawlers. With more bravery than discretion, the small -North Korean craft accepted battle with the American light cruiser -_Juneau_ and two British warships, the light cruiser _Jamaica_ and the -frigate _Black Swan_. Evidently the enemy hoped to score with a few -torpedoes at the cost of a suicidal effort, but the U. N. guns sank -2 of the aluminum craft and drove a third to the beach, where it was -soon destroyed along with 7 of the convoy vessels. The North Koreans -were credited with “great gallantry” in the British dispatch after the -fourth torpedo boat escaped.[52] But it was the last naval effort of -any consequence by an enemy strangled in the net of the UN blockade. - - [52] Capt Walter Karig, USN, _Battle Report: The War in Korea_ - (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 58–59. - -On land the NKPA columns advanced almost at will during the first -4 days. Nearly a hundred tanks and as many planes were employed by -the two main columns advancing on Seoul, and on 27 June 1950 the ROK -seat of government was removed to Taejon while Far East Air Force -planes were evacuating United States citizens. ROK fugitives, winding -southward in an endless stream of humanity, choked every road and -multiplied the difficulties of the defense. To add to their misery, one -of the bridges across the river Han was blown prematurely when masses -of Koreans were crossing. - -The fall of Seoul on the 28th ended the first stage of the offensive -as the NKPA forces halted for regrouping. Chunchon had surrendered in -east-central Korea, so that the invaders held a ragged line stretching -from Chumunjin on the east coast through Chunchon, Kapyong and Seoul to -the port of Inchon on the west coast. - -The beaten and in some instances shattered ROK forces were meanwhile -falling back through Suwon in the hope of establishing new positions of -defense. - - -_Early United States Decisions_ - -A strategy of delaying actions was the only course open to General -MacArthur for the time being. One of his first decisions led to the -establishment on 27 June of the GHQ Advanced Command Group at Suwon -under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA. This group -had as its primary mission the reorganization of the demoralized ROK -forces, which were already reporting thousands of men missing in -action. Secondary missions were to keep Tokyo informed as to military -developments and expedite the delivery of supplies. As early as 27 -June, 119 tons of emergency supplies had been sent to Korea by air, and -an additional 5,600 tons were being loaded on ships in Japan.[53] - - [53] U. S. MilAcad, _op. cit._, 7–8. - -American naval and air forces lost no time at getting into action after -President Truman’s authorization. United States Naval Forces in the Far -East, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, had as their -principal element the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur -D. Struble. Its tactical organization, Task Force 77, immediately -clamped down a blockade on the Korean coast after wiping out enemy -naval opposition. Other warships of the Seventh Fleet were meanwhile -blockading Formosa to guard against the possibility of Chinese -Communist intervention by means of an attack on the last Nationalist -stronghold. - -The United States Far East Air Forces, commanded by Lieutenant General -George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, consisted of eight and a half combat -groups responsible for the defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam and the -Philippines. Primary missions assigned to the fighter and bomber -squadrons were the elimination of NKPA air opposition and the retarding -of enemy ground forces by means of interdictory air strikes on bases -and supply routes. - - -_Geography of Korea_ - -Geography being a first cousin of strategy, maps of Korea were almost -literally worth their weight in diamonds both in Tokyo and at the -Pentagon. For that matter, they were nearly as rare as diamonds, and it -became necessary in many instances to work with outdated Japanese maps. - -On the map of Asia the Korean peninsula resembles a thumb dipping down -into the Yellow and Japan seas. For centuries it has been the sore -thumb of Asiatic power politics, so that trouble in Korea resulted in a -twinge being felt in the capitals of Europe. But small as Korea appears -on the map, it is actually about 575 miles in length--a peninsula -resembling Florida in shape but having about the area of Minnesota. - -Variations in climate are comparable to the gradient from Maine to -Georgia along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. Extremes -ranging from summer weather of 105° F. to winter temperatures of 40° -below zero have been recorded. A monsoon season of floods is to be -expected in July and August, followed by a period when typhoons are a -possibility. Altogether, it is a climate which can contribute no little -to the difficulties of a mechanized invader. - -It would be almost an understatement to say that Korea is mountainous. -Few areas of the earth’s surface are so consistently rugged. Bleak -cliffs seem to thrust themselves dripping out of the sea on the East -Korean littoral. The peaks become higher and more perpendicular as they -march inland, until altitudes of 9,000 feet are reached. - -The principal chain of mountains extends from the Yalu in the north -along the east coast to the Pusan area. Just south of the 38th parallel -a spur branches off diagonally to southwest Korea in the region of -Mokpu. The remainder of the peninsula consists largely of smaller -ranges and foothills. - -The few broad valleys are found chiefly on the west coast, which has -a good many indentations and estuaries. Here also are most of Korea’s -large rivers, flowing west and south. Of little aid to navigation, -these streams are broad and deep enough to hamper military operations; -and in the monsoon season, floods become a menace. - -As if the west coast were paying a penalty for being less mountainous, -mud flats and islands hamper navigation. And here the tides are among -the highest in the world, with an extreme range of about 30 feet -existing at Inchon in contrast to unusually moderate tides along the -east coast. - -The west and south are the agricultural areas of Korea. Nothing is -wasted by peasants who till every inch of the lowland flats, rice -paddies, and terraced hills. Due to their back-breaking toil rather -than many natural advantages, Korea was able to export as much as -half of its two food staples, rice and fish, under the Japanese -administration. - -The population, estimated at 25,000,000 in 1945, increased both by -immigration and a high birth rate during the next 5 years until as -many as 29,000,000 inhabitants were claimed. Seoul was a capital of a -million and a half residents, and the two leading seaports, Pusan and -Inchon, had not far from a quarter of a million each. Modern office -buildings, factories and street railways were found in combination with -muddy streets and thatched huts on the outskirts. - -A standard-gauge rail network, built largely by the Japanese, linked -the principal cities and connected in the north with the Manchurian -railways. The highway system was good for an Asiatic country but -inadequate for the purpose of an invader on wheels and tracks. -Hard-surfaced roads were few and far between, and the ordinary -earth roads were churned into bogs during the monsoon season. Air -transportation was limited to only a few large airfields and emergency -landing facilities. - -Altogether, Korea promised to be a tough nut to crack, when it came to -geography, for the officers poring over maps in Tokyo. - - -_United States Ground Forces in Korea_ - -The United States ground forces in the Far East comprised the -understrength 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st -Cavalry (dismounted) Division of the Eighth United States Army, which -had been stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. These -divisions had only about 70 percent of their personnel, the regiments -being limited to two battalions. - -The explanation of these deficiencies goes back to the end of World War -II. Popular clamor for the speedy discharge of the victorious United -States forces had resulted in American military sinews becoming flabby -during the next few years. Strenuous recruiting had been necessary to -maintain the small army of occupation in Japan at part strength, and it -was no secret that many of the men were attracted by the expectation -of travel and light occupation duties. The possibility of battle had -scarcely been anticipated when the invasion began, and combat readiness -left a good deal to be desired. Training on the company level had been -good on the whole, but both officers and men were handicapped by the -lack of maneuvers for units larger than a battalion. - -Shortages in equipment were equally serious. There were not enough -mortars, recoilless rifles and other weapons even if there had been -enough maintenance parts and trained maintenance technicians. Most of -the arms, moreover, consisted of worn World War II equipment which -had seen its best days. Finally, the divisional armored units had -been provided with light M-24 tanks, instead of the heavier machines -normally employed, because of the weak bridges in Japan.[54] - - [54] U. S. MilAcad, _loc. cit._ - -It was, in brief, an unprepared and ill-equipped little army of -occupation which represented the first line of United States defense in -the Far East. - -[Illustration: NKPA INVASION - -15 JULY 1950] - -On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded -by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea. Two -days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the -United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8 -miles south of Suwon. - -The American force consisted of 2 infantry companies, a battery of -artillery, two 4.2″ mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless -rifles, and six 2.36″ rocket-launcher teams. Named Task Force Smith -after its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, -the first United States contingent collided on the morning of 5 July -with a whole NKPA division supported by 30 T-34 tanks. Despite the -odds against it, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of 4 or -5 hours before pulling out with the loss of all equipment save small -arms.[55] - - [55] 24th InfDiv, Supporting Documents, 24 Jul-16 Aug 50, 6–7. - -On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a -unified command in Korea, and President Truman named General MacArthur -as commander in chief. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, who had -been one of Patton’s best officers in World War II, was appointed -commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 12 July, -and 4 days later he assumed control of all ROK ground forces. - -The ROK army, as might be supposed, was badly battered and much in need -of reorganization. At the end of the first week of invasion, the ROK -missing in action had reached a total of about 34,000. Whole battalions -had been scattered like chaff, yet it speaks well for the spirit of the -troops that most of the missing eventually returned to their units.[56] -The odds against them had made it a hopeless fight, but these Korean -soldiers would give a good account of themselves when they had better -training and equipment. - - [56] Appleman, _op. cit._ - -The United States forces were finding it hard sledding, for that -matter. The remaining units of the 24th Infantry Division were in -action by 7 July, having arrived by sea from Japan. They were followed -by the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B. -Kean, which completed the movement to Korea on 14 July. - -These first outweighed United States forces had no choice except to -trade space for time in a series of delaying actions. Although the -units had to be employed piecemeal at first, they slowed up the -main thrust of the enemy--the advance of three NKPA divisions, well -supported by armor, down the Seoul-Taejon axis. - -Seldom in history have American forces ever endured a worse ordeal by -fire. Unprepared morally as well as materially, snatched from soft -occupation duties in Japan, they were suddenly plunged into battle -against heavier battalions. The “Land of the Morning Calm” was to them -a nightmare land of sullen mountains and stinking rice paddies. There -was not even the momentary lift of band music and flag waving for these -occupation troops, and they were not upheld by the discipline which -stiffens the spines of old regulars. - -Considering what they were up against, the soldiers of the 24th and -25th have an abiding claim to a salute from their countrymen. They -fought the good fight, even though they could keep militarily solvent -only by withdrawals between delaying actions. - -Officers as well as men were expendables in this Thermopylae of -the rice paddies. Because of the large proportion of green troops, -colonels and even generals literally led some of the counterattacks -in the 18th-century manner. Colonel Robert R. Martin, commanding the -34th Infantry of the 24th Division, fell in the thick of the fighting -while rallying his troops. General Dean stayed with his forward units, -personally firing one of the new 3.5″ bazookas until the enemy broke -through. He was reported missing for months, but turned up later as -the highest ranking United States military prisoner of the conflict in -Korea. - -American light tanks could not cope with the enemy’s T-34’s; and even -when the first few medium tanks arrived, they were equipped only with -75-mm. guns against the heavier NKPA armament. Not until the third week -of ground force operations, moreover, did the United States artillery -units receive 155-mm. howitzers to supplement their 105’s. - -There was nothing that the ground forces could do but withdraw toward -the line of the river Kum. Here a stand was made by 24th Division units -at Taejon, an important communications center. But the enemy managed to -establish bridgeheads, and the fall of the town on 20 July marked the -end of the first phase. - -Two days later the 24th Division, now commanded by General Church, was -relieved south of Taejon by Major General Hobart R. Gay’s 1st Cavalry -(dismounted) Division, which had landed at Pohang-dong on the 18th. And -on 26 July the separate 29th Infantry RCT disembarked at Chinju on the -south coast after a voyage from Okinawa. - -The reinforced Eighth Army was still too much outnumbered to vary its -strategy of delaying actions with sustained counterattacks. While the -new American units and the 25th Division fell slowly back toward the -line of the Naktong, the regrouped ROK divisions were assigned sectors -toward the north and east, where a secondary NKPA offensive threatened -Pohang-dong. Meanwhile, the exhausted 24th Division went into Eighth -Army reserve. - -The ground forces would doubtless have been in a worse situation if -it had not been for hard-hitting United States naval and air support. -Major General Emmett O’Donnell’s B-29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber -Command took off from Japanese bases to fly strikes on enemy supply -routes, communications hubs, marshaling yards and other strategic -targets all the way back to the Yalu. - -Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave Pyongyang its first -large-scale bombing on 3 July. Gull-winged F4U Corsairs, leading off -from the _Valley Forge_ flight deck with 5-inch rockets, were followed -by AD Skyraiders and new Douglas dive bombers. Bridges and railway -yards were destroyed by raiders who shot down two YAK-type planes in -the air and destroyed two on the ground. - -Along the east coast the _Juneau_ and other warships of the -Anglo-American blockading force patrolled the enemy’s MSR, which -followed the shoreline. Salvos from the cruisers, fired at the sheer -cliffs, loosed avalanches of earth and rock to block the highway. -Railways were mined and tunnels dynamited by commando parties landing -from ships’ boats. - -The combined U. N. efforts inflicted heavy material and personnel -losses while slowing up the NKPA offensive. But it is a testimonial -to Soviet and Red Korean preparations for aggression that the army of -invasion kept on rolling. There was even some prospect late in July -that the enemy would yet make good his boast of being able to take -Pusan within 2 months in spite of United States intervention. - - -_Requests for United States Marines_ - -Upholding their long tradition as America’s force-in-readiness, the -Marines have usually been among the first troops to see action on a -foreign shore. Thus it might have been asked what was holding them back -at a time when Army troops in Korea were hard-pressed. - -The answer is that the Marines actually were the first United States -ground forces to get into the fight after completing the long voyage -from the American mainland. There were no Marine units of any size -in the Far East at the outset of the invasion. But not an hour was -lost at the task of assembling an air-ground team at Camp Pendleton, -California, and collecting the shipping. - -The spirit of impatience animating the Marine Corps is shown by an -entry on the desk calendar of General Clifton B. Cates under the date -of 26 June 1950. This was the day after the news of the invasion -reached Washington, and the Commandant commented: - -“SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.”[57] - - [57] Gen Clifton B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54 (Cates, 7 - Apr 54). - -On the 28th General Cates had his first conference with Admiral Forrest -P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He noted on his calendar the -next day: “Recommended to CNO and SecNav that FMF be employed.” Two -days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” And on 3 July -his calendar recorded more history: - - “Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”[58] - - [58] _Ibid._ - -The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the -conference of 28 June, when Cates gave Sherman a summary of the -strength of the Marine Corps. Along with other branches of the service, -it had taken cuts in appropriations since World War II, so that total -numbers were 74,279 men on active duty--97 percent of authorized -strength. The Fleet Marine Force had a strength of 27,656--11,853 in -FMFPac (1st Marine Division, Reinf., and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) and -15,803 in FMFLant (2d Marine Division, Reinf., and 2d Marine Aircraft -Wing).[59] - - [59] Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps - Reserve in the Korean Conflict_ (Washington, HQMC, G-3, - HistSec, 1951), 1–2. - -Neither of these understrength divisions, General Cates pointed -out, could raise much more than an RCT of combat-ready troops with -supporting air. - -Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to -move (_a_) a Marine BLT and (_b_) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast. -Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT in 4 -days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail -in 10.[60] - - [60] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 1 Jul 50; and CinCPacFlt disp to - CNO, 2 Jul 50. - -Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a -Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it. -COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from -a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE -accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his -appreciation.[61] - - [61] Marine Corps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence of - Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_ (4 - Aug-15 Dec 50) (MCBS) I-B-1, I-B-2. - -Sunday 2 July was the date of the message from General MacArthur -requesting the immediate dispatch of a Marine RCT with supporting air -to the Far East. CNO acted that same day. With the concurrence of JCS -and the President, he ordered Admiral Radford to move a Marine RCT with -appropriate air to the Far East for employment by General MacArthur.[62] - - [62] CINCFE disp to CNO, 2 Jul 50; CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 2 - Jul 50; and JCS disp to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. - -Later, when General Cates asked CNO how the historical decision had -been accomplished, Admiral Sherman replied cryptically in baseball -language, “From Cates to Sherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, to JCS!”[63] - - [63] Cates, 7 Apr 54. - - -_Activation of the Brigade_ - -Even at this early date there was talk both in Washington and Tokyo of -forming an entire Marine division after mobilizing the Reserve. For the -present, however, it sufficed to organize the RCT requested by General -MacArthur. There could be little doubt that the assignment would be -given to an air-ground team built around the two main West Coast units, -the 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33. They were activated along -with supporting units on 7 July as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, -commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, senior officer at Camp -Pendleton. The air component, consisting of three squadrons of MAG-33, -was placed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman, -who was named deputy commander of the Brigade. - -Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of -FMFPac, and a G-3 staff officer, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, had been -ordered on 4 July to proceed immediately to Tokyo and confer with -General MacArthur. Before leaving, Shepherd found time to recommend -formation of third platoons for rifle companies of the 5th Marines, and -CNO gave his approval the following day.[64] - - [64] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 5 Jul 50. - -Unfortunately, there was not enough time to add third rifle companies -to the battalions of the 5th Marines which had been training with two -companies on a peacetime basis. Camp Pendleton and its neighboring -Marine Air Station, El Toro, hummed with day and night activity as the -Brigade prepared to sail in a week. Weapons and clothing had to be -issued, immunization shots given, and insurance and pay allotments made -out. Meanwhile, telegrams were sent to summon Marines from posts and -stations all over the United States. - -Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United -States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat -service. Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too -late to have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few -Sikorsky machines had been used experimentally both in the European and -Pacific theaters toward the end of the conflict. But it remained for -the United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat -techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron, -HMX-1, at Quantico in 1947. - -Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and 4 HO3S-1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters -were detached from HMX-1 on 8 July 1950 for service with the Brigade. -Upon arrival at El Toro, these elements were combined with 8 fixed-wing -aircraft pilots, 33 enlisted men and 8 OY planes to form the Brigade’s -air observation squadron, VMO-6. - -This is an example of how units were assembled at Pendleton and El -Toro. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, appointed commanding officer -of VMO-6 on 3 July, had orders to ready his squadron for shipment -overseas by the 11th. Thus he had just 48 hours, after the arrival of -the Quantico contingent, in which to weld the elements of his outfit -together. Among his other problems, Gottschalk had to grapple with the -fact that there were not enough OY’s in good condition at El Toro. He -found a solution by taking eight of these light observation planes -overseas with a view to cannibalizing four of them for parts when the -need arose.[65] - - [65] Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New York: Harper, - 1954), Chapter VII. This book is devoted entirely to the - operations of the U. S. Marine helicopter units organized - from 1947 to 1953 for service both in the United States - and overseas. - -There was not enough time in most instances for weapons familiarization -training. Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had been accustomed -to the M4A3 Medium tank with either the 75-mm. gun or the 105-mm. -howitzer. Activated on 7 July for service with the Brigade, the unit -was equipped with M-26 “Pershing” tanks and 90-mm. guns. Captain Gearl -M. English, the commanding officer, managed to snatch 1 day in which -to take his men to the range with 2 of the new machines. Each gunner -and loader was limited to 2 rounds, and the 90-mm. guns were never -fired again until they were taken into combat in Korea.[66] - - [66] 1st Tank Bn Special Action Report (SAR), 7 Jul-29 Aug 50, - in 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Brig) SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep - 50. - -Support battalions were cut down to company size, generally speaking, -for service with the Brigade. Thus Company A of the 1st Motor Transport -Battalion numbered 6 officers and 107 men; and Company A of the 1st -Engineer Battalion (reinf.) totaled 8 officers and 209 men. - -The largest unit of the ground forces, of course, was the 5th Marines -with 113 officers and 2,068 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond -L. Murray. Next came the 1st Battalion (reinf.) of the 11th Marines, -numbering 37 officers and 455 men under the command of Lieutenant -Colonel Ransom H. Wood. - -Altogether, according to a report of 9 July 1950, the Brigade ground -forces reached a total of 266 officers and 4,503 men.[67] - - [67] CinCPacFlt disp to CINCFE, 9 Jul 50. - -On this same date, the Brigade’s air component amounted to 192 officers -and 1,358 men. The principal units were as follows: - - VMF-214 29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft. - VMF-323 29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft. - VMF(N)-513 15 officers, 98 men, 12 F4U5N aircraft. - VMO-6 15 officers, 63 men, 8 OY and 4 HO3S-1 aircraft.[68] - - [68] _Ibid._ - -Adding the ground force and air figures gives a grand total of -6,319--458 officers and 5,861 men--on 9 July 1950. Before sailing, -however, the activation of third rifle platoons and the last-minute -attachment of supporting troops brought the strength of the Brigade and -its air components up to 6,534. - -Most of the equipment came from the great Marine supply depot at -Barstow in the California desert. Here were acres of “mothballed” -trucks, jeeps, DUKW’s and amphibian tractors dating back to World War -II. It has been aptly remarked, in fact, that “there were more veterans -of Iwo and Okinawa among the vehicles than there were among the men who -would drive them.”[69] - - [69] Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York: Harper, 1952), - 2–7. This book about U. S. Marine operations of 1950 in - Korea contains an excellent account of the mounting out - of the Brigade from Camp Pendleton. - -Rail and highway facilities were taxed to the limit by the endless -caravan of equipment moving from Barstow to Pendleton and El Toro -after being hastily reconditioned and tested. Not all the arms were -of World War II vintage, however, and the Marines of the Brigade were -among the first American troops to be issued the new 3.5″ rocket -launcher. - - -_Brigade Leadership_ - -It appeared to be a scene of mad confusion at Pendleton as Marines -arrived hourly by train, bus, and plane. But the situation was kept -well in hand by General Craig, who had seen many other departures -for battle during his 33 years in the Corps. Born in Connecticut and -educated at the St. Johns Military Academy, Delafield, Wis., he was -commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in 1917 at the age of 21. -Throughout the next 3 decades he served with distinction both as a line -and staff officer, and both as student and instructor at the Marine -Corps Schools. - -During World War II he was executive and later commanding officer of -the 9th Marine Regiment, which he led in the landing at Empress Augusta -Bay on Bougainville and the recapture of Guam in the Marianas. Awarded -the Bronze Star and Navy Cross for gallantry in these operations, Craig -became operations officer of the V Amphibious Corps in time to help -plan the Iwo Jima operation. After the war he returned to Guam for 2 -years in 1947 to command the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Fleet -Marine Force, before becoming ADC to Major General Graves B. Erskine, -CG 1st Marine Division, in 1949. - -The white hair and slender, erect figure of the dynamic Brigade -commander would soon become a familiar sight to every platoon leader -at the front. His assistant, General Cushman, was born in St. Louis, -Mo. in 1895 and attended the University of Washington. Enlisting in the -Marine Corps shortly after the outbreak of World War I, he completed -flight training and was designated a naval aviator. Subsequent tours -of aviation duty in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guam were varied with -assignments as instructor at Pensacola and administrative officer with -BuAer in Washington. Cushman was a wing commander in World War II and -was awarded a Bronze Star and Legion of Merit while serving in that -capacity and later as chief of staff to the CG of Marine Aircraft -Wings, Pacific. After the war he became commander of the Marine Corps -Air Bases and CG of Aircraft, FMFPac. - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray, CO of the 5th Marines, was born in Los -Angeles in 1913. He graduated from Texas A. and M. College in 1935 -and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant. After prewar service -in China and Iceland, he became a troop leader in three of the -hardest-fought Marine operations of World War II--Guadalcanal, Tarawa, -and Saipan. Awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and the Purple -Heart medal, Murray made a name for heroism that was noteworthy even in -Marine circles. - -This was no light achievement, for both CMC and CG FMFPac--General -Cates and General Shepherd--had distinguished themselves as Marine -combat leaders. Both were wounded in Marine operations of World War I, -and both won later honors during Caribbean actions of the Marine Corps. - -On 11 July, as Brigade preparations for sailing neared a climax, -General Shepherd sent the first report of his visit to Korea. He and -Colonel Krulak had held conferences with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy -and Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Planning Group -1. The commander in chief, said Shepherd, already envisioned a great -amphibious operation with a complete Marine division and air components -as his landing force. Not only was he “enthusiastic,” about the -employment of Marines, but he believed in the necessity for employing -them as an air-ground team.[70] - - [70] CG FMFPac memo for record, “Visit to Far East Command,” - 11 Jul 50. - -MacArthur was “not sanguine” about the situation in Korea. He felt that -the nature of enemy resistance, combined with the rugged terrain and -the possibilities of Soviet or Red Chinese intervention, threatened to -protract operations. Thus he favored a Marine amphibious landing far -in the enemy’s rear to cut off and destroy the North Korean columns of -invasion.[71] - - [71] _Ibid._ - -General Shepherd’s report made it seem likely, just before the Brigade -sailed, that its units would probably be absorbed soon into a Marine -division with an amphibious mission. For the present, however, it was -enough to start the movement from Pendleton and El Toro to San Diego, -where the convoy awaited. MAG-33 had orders to embark in the transports -_Anderson_ and _Achernar_ and the carrier (CVE-116) _Badoeng Strait_. -The ground forces would make the voyage in the LSD’s _Fort Marion_ and -_Gunston Hall_, the AKA’s _Alshain_ and _Whiteside_, and the APA’s -_Pickaway_, _Clymer_ and _Henrico_.[72] - - [72] For the Brigade’s task organization in detail, with - names of commanding officers and strength of units, see - Appendix B. - -General Cates was on hand at the docks from 12 to 14 July when the -Brigade sailed. His long cigarette holders were famous, and no second -lieutenant in the Corps could throw a more military salute. As he eyed -the ground forces filing past, the Commandant could only have felt -that Marine traditions would be upheld. A good many of the PFC’s, it -is true, were too young to have seen action in World War II, though -nearly all had been well grounded in fundamentals. Perhaps at the front -they might become victims at first of their own over-anxiety. But -they would doubtless grin sheepishly about it afterwards and become -combat-hardened in a short time. - -A glance at the NCO’s, the platoon leaders and company commanders -of the Brigade could only have brought a gleam of pride to the -Commandant’s battlewise eye. With few exceptions, they were veterans of -World War II who could be relied upon to get the best out of their men. -And it may be that the Commandant was reminded of the remark attributed -to General William T. Sherman during the Civil War: - - “We have good corporals and sergeants and some good lieutenants and - captains, and those are far more important than good generals.”[73] - - [73] Quoted in Lynn Montross, _War Through the Ages_ (New - York: Harper, 1946), 609. - -Nobody could give a more smooth and eloquent talk than General Cates -before a Washington audience. But when it came to saying farewell to -the Brigade troops, he addressed them in the language of Marines. - -“You boys clean this up in a couple of months,” said the Commandant, -“or I’ll be over to see you!”[74] - - [74] Geer, _op. cit._, 6. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -The Advance Party - -_Conference With CINCFE--The Washington Scene--The Advance Party in -Japan--Voyage of the Brigade--The Advance Party in Korea--Crisis of the -Eighth Army_ - - -As the ships of the Brigade vanished over the horizon, Generals Craig -and Cushman rushed to complete final administrative details at their -respective West Coast bases. Then, in the early morning of 16 July, -the advance party, consisting of the two commanders and parts of their -staffs, boarded a transport plane at the Marine Corps Air Station, El -Toro, and began the long journey westward. - -The first stop was Pearl Harbor, T. H., island “Pentagon” of America’s -vast defensive network in the Pacific. On arrival, Craig and Cushman -immediately reported to General Shepherd. In company with him, the -two visitors called briefly on Admiral Radford. Later, Shepherd, his -staff, and the advance party met at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters -for a conference on the problems incident to the Marine commitment in -combat.[75] - - [75] LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Jan 54 (Craig, 25 - Jan 54). - -The Brigade commander painted a vivid picture of his provisional -fighting force, stressing both its potential and its handicaps. He -repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the addition of a third rifle -company to each infantry battalion. With equal fervor he spoke of the -need for two more 105-mm. howitzers in each battery of his artillery -battalion. He told how the Brigade had been forced to leave behind -much of its motor transport because of limited shipping space, and he -requested that replacement vehicles be provided as soon as possible. - -His presentation was not falling on deaf ears; for combat-wise -officers knew only too well how such shortages would restrict the -maneuverability, firepower, and mobility of the Brigade. Finally, -Craig repeated his earlier request that steps be taken immediately -to provide for monthly replacement drafts of 800 men. If the -peace-strength Marine unit were committed to combat in the near future, -he said, it could ill afford to watch its already thin ranks dwindle -indefinitely.[76] - - [76] Col J. L. Stewart interv with authors, 15 Jan 54 - (Stewart, 15 Jan 54). - -Leaving behind a maze of support and reinforcement problems for FMFPac -Headquarters, the Brigade advance party boarded its plane and set out -for Japan. On 19 July the big aircraft discharged its passengers at -the Haneda Airport, near Tokyo. General Craig immediately reported to -his naval superior, Admiral Joy. Later the Brigade commander, General -Cushman, and the other officers of the advance party, assembled at -General Headquarters, Far East, where they would get their first -glimpse of the war through the eyes of the United States Army. - -They conferred first with Major General Edward A. Almond, USA, and -Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, USA. The former was Chief of Staff -to General MacArthur, while the latter served as G-3 on the staff. -After Almond and Wright had received a report on the organization and -capabilities of the Brigade air-ground team, they ushered the two -Marine generals into the office of MacArthur.[77] - - [77] _Ibid._; and Col K. H. Weir ltr to CMC, 16 Apr 54 (Weir, - 16 Apr 54). - - -_Conference With CINCFE_ - -The commander in chief greeted his visitors cordially and expressed -his pleasure at having Marines in his command again. He commented -briefly on the excellence of the 1st Marine Division and certain -Marine air units which had served under him during World War II. The -general smiled as he mentioned a rumor to the effect that he had been -prejudiced against Marines during the Pacific War. Sweeping aside this -tale as being unfounded, he said that he had always held the greatest -admiration for the Corps and would welcome its units to his command any -time.[78] - - [78] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Following this reception, MacArthur meticulously briefed Craig -and Cushman on the critical situation in Korea, where the war was -already entering its fourth week. The commander in chief disclosed -his tentative plans for commitment of the Marines: he would hold -the Brigade in Japan as a force in readiness until an entire Marine -division could be assembled. If he could have this division by -September, he intended to launch an amphibious assault against the port -of Inchon on the west coast. Striking deep in the Communist rear, he -would sever the long lines of communications linking North Korean bases -to the Communist invaders at the front. Thus isolated, the latter would -quickly wither, and Walker’s Eighth Army could smash out of the Pusan -Perimeter.[79] - - [79] _Ibid._; and Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, basic rpt. - -When MacArthur concluded, he and Craig discussed the organization of -the Brigade. The Marine general emphasized that his command was an -air-ground team; and though few in numbers, the Brigade had a powerful -potential if its air arm remained integral. MacArthur assured him that -the Marine combination would remain intact, unless some emergency -dictated otherwise. - -Craig next mentioned that the infantry and artillery units of the -Brigade were at peace strength. MacArthur was surprised to learn that -each battalion had just 2 rifle companies, and each battery only 4 guns -instead of 6. He was even more surprised to find that each of the 6 -infantry companies had 50 men less than the number called for in Marine -war tables. The Army leader had been aware of certain shortages when he -sent a message to the Pentagon on 10 July, requesting the Joint Chiefs -of Staff to authorize expansion of the Brigade to a full war-strength -division.[80] He believed at the time, however, that the Brigade itself -would be formed on a wartime basis. Now, confronted with reality, he -ordered his chief of staff to prepare another dispatch to the Joint -Chiefs, asking that the Brigade be expanded to full war strength and -reiterating his request for an entire division.[81] - - [80] CINCFE disp to JCS, 10 Jul 50. - - [81] CINCFE disp to JCS, 19 Jul 50. - -MacArthur concluded the conference by informing Craig that the Marine -fighting team would remain in Japan under operational control of Joy’s -headquarters. This was good news to the Brigade commander. Being -attached to the Naval command meant that his Marines would be free -to train and otherwise prepare for their future amphibious mission; -whereas an assignment to the Eighth Army’s rear echelon might have -entailed time-consuming occupational and administrative duties.[82] - - [82] Brig SAR, _loc. cit._ - - -_The Washington Scene_ - -Although the solution to Marine Corps problems had seemed simple enough -in MacArthur’s office, it was quite another story on the other side -of the world in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had rendered -no decision on the general’s 10 July request for a Marine division. -Nevertheless, General Cates ordered his staff to draw up detailed plans -for expansion so that immediate action could be taken if authorization -were forthcoming. As a result, Plans Able and Baker were prepared, -the one designed to augment the Brigade to war strength, the other to -explore the requirements for creating a full division. To cover these -possibilities together with the Corps’ other irrevocable commitments -throughout the world, Marine planners were drawn more and more toward -a single basic conclusion--if President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of -Staff granted MacArthur’s request, the Marine Corps Reserve would have -to be mobilized at once. - -When the Joint Chiefs received the message which MacArthur had dictated -in General Craig’s presence, they requested an estimate from the Marine -Corps on how long it would take to form a war-strength division. -General Cates summed up his case: the Marine Corps, numbering only -74,279 officers and men,[83] was committed on a global basis. There -was a brigade on its way to Korea, a peace-strength division on the -Atlantic Coast,[84] and a battalion landing team permanently assigned -to the Mediterranean Fleet. There were detachments of Marines assigned -for domestic security, shipboard duty, and overseas security. Moreover, -in order to carry out any expansion program on a sound basis, it would -be necessary to maintain cadres of experienced personnel in various -training centers. The Commandant’s presentation made it clear that any -immediate expansion would, as proved by simple arithmetic, be dependent -upon mobilization of the Reserve. - - [83] Figure as of 30 Jun 1950. - - [84] The 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N. C. - -Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Truman -that the Organized Marine Corps Reserve be called to active duty. -That same morning, 19 July, Admiral Sherman notified General Cates -of this decision. The Commandant lost no time at ordering his staff -to alert all Reserve units. His grounds for haste were well founded; -for in the afternoon a presidential proclamation announced that the -“citizen-Marines” would be mobilized. The following day Cates called -CNO and submitted Plans Able and Baker, the proposed procedures for -building both the Brigade and 1st Marine Division to war strength. - -In the meantime JCS had notified MacArthur that his request could not -be granted until late fall “without unacceptable weakening [of] the -Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.”[85] When the U. N. commander received -this message, he countered immediately with the reply: - - “... Most urgently request reconsideration of decision with reference - to First Marine Division. It is an absolutely vital development - to accomplish a decisive stroke and if not made available will - necessitate a much more costly and longer operational effort both in - blood and expense. - - “It is essential the Marine Division arrive by 10 September 1950 as - requested. While it would be unwise for me to attempt in this message - to give in detail the planned use of this unit I cannot emphasize - too strongly my belief of the complete urgency of my request. There - can be no demand for its potential use elsewhere that can equal the - urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.[86] - - “Signed MacArthur” - - [85] JCS disp to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50. - - [86] CINCFE disp to JCS, 21 Jul 50. - -On 22 July the gears of mobilization were already enmeshed. Taking this -into account along with the urgency of MacArthur’s last communication, -the Joint Chiefs showed the first signs of relenting in their reply -to Tokyo. This time they informed the Army general that they were -reconsidering his problem, but added that he must advise them of -the proposed employment of the Brigade up to 10 September and the -possibility of adjusting that deadline. The same message carried the -encouraging news that a directive had already been issued to bring both -the Brigade and its air group to full war strength.[87] - - [87] JCS msg 86778 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50. - -In answer, MacArthur stated his intention to retain the Brigade in -Japan, unless a more critical situation developed in Korea prior to -10 September. He described his operation planned for mid-September -as an amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy’s lines. This -seaborne attack, he added, would be designed to envelop and destroy -the Communist invader in conjunction with an offensive from the south -by the Eighth Army. The General concluded his message on notes of -conditional optimism and grave warning: - - “Although exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy - reaction during month of August, I am convinced that an early - and strong effort behind his front will sever his main lines of - communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. - Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. - The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a - protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of - the 38th parallel.”[88] - - [88] CINCFE msg C-58473 to JCS, 23 Jul 50. - -On 25 July these exchanges came to a climax when the Pentagon directed -the Marine Corps to build its 1st Division to full war strength. - -At this point the change of heart among the joint Chiefs of Staff is -pertinent because of its direct effects on the 1st Provisional Marine -Brigade. As previously noted, the Pentagon on 22 July approved the -Marine Corps’ plan Able which provided for the expansion of the Brigade -to war strength. General Cates immediately set machinery in motion to -bolster the ranks of that unit. With the approval of Admiral Sherman, -he cut into the rosters of Marine security detachments throughout -the United States and arranged for the personnel thus released to be -channelled to Craig’s command. It was also possible now to implement -an earlier plan relating to casualty replacements for the Brigade. As -far back as 14 July, the Commandant had ordered activation of the First -Replacement Draft, fixing its departure for Korea at 10 August.[89] -Thus Craig could be assured of early reinforcement by more than 800 -officers and men if the course of the war necessitated a premature -commitment of his Brigade. - - [89] CMC disp to FMFPac, 22 Jul 50. - - -_The Advance Party in Japan_ - -Generals Craig and Cushman were meanwhile assigned a large office -in General Headquarters, Tokyo. There they cleared away much -administrative detail which accumulates in the path of every military -operation. - -On 20 July the two commanders called on General Stratemeyer. Marine -Air was the focal point of discussion as they again explained the -organization of their fighting team. When they informed Stratemeyer of -MacArthur’s decision to keep the Brigade intact, the air officer gave -them further assurance that MAG-33 would always be available to support -the Marine ground force.[90] - - [90] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Originally, the Army planned to base the Marine ground elements at -Sasebo, Japan, and the air group 400 miles away at Itami Field, near -Kobe. Craig and Cushman realized that the resulting large gap would -give rise to problems in liaison, training, and supply. Hoping to -change such an undesirable arrangement, the Brigade staff carefully -studied the layout of available land and facilities. Armed with the -results of this research, Craig proposed to General Headquarters that -all Marines be based in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area. After he outlined -the advantages of keeping the Brigade and its supporting aviation close -together, Wright responded encouragingly to the recommendation.[91] - - [91] _Ibid._ - -[Illustration: (Japan and Korea)] - -Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered, -the advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed -reconnaissance of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While -Craig inspected the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the -air base facilities and established his headquarters according to the -initial plan. The Marine officers then returned to Tokyo 2 days later -to push the request for getting both air and ground forces located in -the same area. To support his proposal, Craig submitted a complete -“floor plan” not only for the Brigade but also for the entire 1st -Marine Division. MacArthur’s staff promptly approved.[92] - - [92] _Ibid._; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 15 Apr 54 - (Craig, 15 Apr 54); Weir, 16 Apr 54; and Brig SAR, _loc. - cit._ - -On the 25th the advance party again set out for Itami, this time to -prepare for the arrival of the Brigade. Their plane was a scant 20 -minutes out of Tokyo when an urgent message from General Headquarters -directed their return to that city at once. The big aircraft roared -back to the field, and a few minutes later the Marines were driving -through the Japanese capital. - -At headquarters, Wright summed up the most recent reports from the -front. The American forward wall was crumbling under continuous -hammering. A wide envelopment had just netted the whole southwestern -tip of the peninsula for the Communists, who were now pressing in on -Pusan from the west as well as north. Lacking sufficient troops to -defend its broad frontage, the Eighth Army was falling back. If the Red -tide continued unabated, there was imminent danger of losing Pusan, the -one remaining major port in American hands. Should this coastal city -fall, South Korea would be lost. - -Wright told Craig that all available troops had to be thrown into the -line to meet this threat. Therefore, General MacArthur had diverted -the seaborne Brigade from Japan to Korea, where it would join General -Walker’s beleaguered forces.[93] - - [93] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; and Brig SAR, _loc. cit._ - -Obviously, the Marines were not far from a fight. - - -_Voyage of the Brigade_ - -At sea the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was unaware of the decisions -and difficulties developing on higher levels. Nevertheless, that -tactical organization was having enough trouble of its own. On 12 -July, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Amphibious Tractor -Company departed San Diego on board the LSD’s _Fort Marion_ and -_Gunston Hall_. Designated Task Unit 53.7.3, the twin amphibious -ships sailed 2 days before the rest of the Brigade and were scheduled -to join the main convoy, Task Group 53.7, before crossing 160° east -longitude.[94] - - [94] Brig SAR, _loc. cit._ - -At noon on 13 July, the well deck of the _Fort Marion_ accidentally -flooded, the water rising to a height of 5 feet among the Brigade’s -M-26 tanks. An hour passed before the ship’s pumps could drain the -compartment, and briny water damaged 14 of the new armored vehicles, -300 90-mm. projectiles (then in critical supply), and 5,000 rounds of -.30-caliber ammunition. - -When news of the flood damage reached Brigade headquarters, then still -at San Diego, the message was rushed to Craig. He immediately sent a -dispatch to Captain English, authorizing him to jettison the ruined -ammunition. He added that replacement armor would be requisitioned from -the Barstow depot without delay. Craig then contacted the supply base -and was promised that 14 M-26’s would be commissioned and on their way -to San Diego within 24 hours. The Brigade commander was preparing to -request additional shipping for the vehicles when messages from the -_Fort Marion_ reported that 12 tanks could be restored to operating -condition at sea. The remaining two would require new parts and 72 -hours of repair work upon debarkation.[95] - - [95] _Ibid._; and Craig, 15 Apr 54. - -As already noted, the Marines were placing heavy reliance on their -armor, confident that it was a match for the enemy’s Russian-built T-34 -tank in Korea. Consequently, Craig’s staff reacted to the flood reports -with concern. Headquarters FMFPac was asked to include four M-26’s in -its first resupply shipment to the Brigade; arrangements were made for -new parts to be flown to the port of debarkation, and ammunition to -replace that damaged in the flood was loaded on board the larger convoy. - -Misfortune struck again a few hours after Task Group 53.7 steamed from -San Diego on 14 July. The transport _Henrico_ developed a serious -mechanical failure and was declared temporarily unseaworthy. This -ship was carrying Lieutenant Colonel Murray, his regimental staff, -and the entire 1st Battalion Landing Team.[96] After Murray and his -headquarters transferred to the APA _Pickaway_ off San Clemente island, -the _Henrico_ limped back toward California with about one-third of the -Brigade’s fighting force. The vessel docked at the United States Naval -Supply Depot, Oakland, on the 16th. Repairs were started in urgent -haste, since there was no other ship available. For security reasons, -the Marines were forbidden to leave ship except for training on the -dock. On the nights of the 16th and 17th, they sat on deck and gazed -longingly at the beckoning lights of San Francisco. Twice during this -time the _Henrico_ weighed anchor and passed westward under the Golden -Gate bridge; twice it was forced to return for additional repairs. -Finally, on the evening of the 18th, the vessel steamed under the great -bridge for its third attempt. This time it kept going, but it would not -overtake the convoy until the morning of the very day the ships reached -their destination. - - [96] 1st Bn, 5th Marines, with supporting units. - -During the voyage, strict wartime security measures, including radio -silence, were enforced on all ships. While the North Koreans were -believed to have no warships left afloat, their naval capabilities -remained hidden from the outside world by a blur of question marks. No -one realized more than the commander of Task Group 53.7[97] that it was -much too early to take Soviet Russia for granted. - - [97] Capt L. D. Sharp, Jr., USN. - -The _Henrico_, now travelling independently, had a spine-chilling -experience during her second night out of Oakland. The ship’s radar -picked up two “unidentified submarines” which appeared to be converging -on the stern of the lone vessel. General Quarters was sounded. -While sailors peered into the darkness from their battle stations, -several hundred Marines joked weakly in the troop compartments below -the waterline. After an anxious hour, the persistent spots on the -electronic screen vanished. - -Shipboard life for the Brigade was otherwise uneventful. The troops -took part in physical drills as vigorously as the limited confines -of vessels would allow. Daily classes and conferences emphasized -those subjects most relevant to the news reports trickling back from -the front. Success of North Korean armor stimulated keen interest in -land mines and the new rocket launchers. Press commentaries on the -battleground’s primitive environment made even field sanitation a -serious matter. Since there was no military intelligence available on -the North Korean forces, officers and NCO’s turned to publications on -Russian tactics and weapons. - -As previously noted, Sasebo, Japan, was the original destination of -the ships transporting the Brigade’s ground elements. The _Achernar_, -_Anderson_, and _Badoeng Strait_ were bound for Kobe with MAG-33. -When Craig’s proposal for consolidation was approved by General -Headquarters, the entire convoy was ordered to Kobe. Then, on 25 July, -Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff, received the dispatch -sending the ground force directly to Pusan. - -This announcement came as no surprise to the majority of officers -and men. Day by day, news reports had been outlining the course of -the war. The shrinking perimeter of Walker’s army was traced on maps -and sketches throughout every ship. After the Communist “end run” in -southwest Korea, Marines began to wonder if there would be any front at -all by the time they arrived. In the captain’s mess of the _Pickaway_, -senior Marine and naval officers were giving odds that the Brigade -would reach the South Korean port only in time to cover a general -evacuation of the peninsula.[98] - - [98] Col R. L. Murray interv with author, 15 Feb 54 (Murray, - 15 Feb 54). - - -_The Advance Party in Korea_ - -With the Brigade well beyond the halfway point in its Pacific voyage, -Craig and his staff could not afford to waste a minute. At 1700 on 25 -July they left Tokyo by plane for Korea. En route they landed at Itami, -where the Brigade commander and Cushman made hurried adjustments to -meet the new situation.[99] - - [99] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Leaving Itami on the 26th, they flew to Fukuoka, Japan. There they -transferred from their 4-engine Marine aircraft to a smaller Air Force -plane which could be accommodated on the primitive landing fields of -Korea. On the last lap of their journey, they reached Taegu at 1400. - -Taegu was a dismal place during this crucial phase of the UN delaying -action. Hastily chosen as a headquarters by General Walker, the ancient -town gave the appearance of a remote outpost. Its airstrip was crude. -The fewness of the airmen and soldiers among the handful of transport -and fighter planes served only to emphasize the critical situation of -the UN forces.[100] - - [100] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -General Craig reported to General Walker immediately, while the Brigade -G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, met with his Eighth Army -opposite, Colonel William E. Bartlett. Later, Walker’s chief of staff, -Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, assembled all the Marine officers for an -official briefing. He explained that the Brigade had not been earmarked -for any specific mission. The battle situation was too fluid for -firm plans. Information from the field was sketchy and unreliable, -as outnumbered Army forces slowly retreated. From the time of first -contact by American units, the front had been more of a blur than -a distinct line. Landrum concluded by saying that the Brigade must -be prepared to move anywhere after debarkation--and on a moment’s -notice.[101] - - [101] _Ibid._ - -After he and his officers had been assigned rooms in a temporary -barracks, Craig requested permission to reconnoiter the combat -zone.[102] Walker assented, providing his own plane and pilot for -the trip. Accompanied by Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. -Chidester, his G-4, Craig flew first to Pusan, where he checked harbor -facilities, roads, and railways. There he conferred with Brigadier -General Crump Garvin, USA, to initiate preparations for the Brigade’s -arrival.[103] - - [102] The _combat zone_ comprises that part of the theater - of operations required for the conduct of war by field - forces. In this case it included all of Korea remaining - in UN hands. - - [103] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Leaving Pusan, the Marine officers flew over Chinhae, which they -discovered to be a suitable base, if necessary, for VMO-6 and the -Brigade’s air support control unit. Cruising westward, they passed -over Masan, then continued toward Chinju. From the latter vicinity, -the enemy’s envelopment was then threatening the western approaches -to Pusan. Veering northward, the reconnaissance party paralleled the -Naktong River. The pilot, who was familiar with the ground, briefed his -passengers along the way. By the time the plane returned to Taegu, the -Marines had a broad picture of the critical areas most likely to become -Brigade battlefields.[104] - - [104] _Ibid._ - -General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days. -Attending daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a -sound knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major -General Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,[105] the -Marines were brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its -policy for supporting UN ground forces.[106] - - [105] Hq 5th AF was also located at Taegu. - - [106] Craig, 15 Apr 54. - -In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently -withdrawn and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from -the battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than -fact for the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth -Army staff officers.[107] - - [107] _Ibid._; and Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -In the Taejon area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers -and men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61 -were known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.[108] Among -the missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental -commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion -commander.[109] - - [108] 24th InfDiv Periodic Personnel Rpt No. 2, 15–22 Jul 50. - - [109] _Ibid._ - -Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently -arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th -Division in the Kumchon area. ROK divisions held to the north and east, -where NKPA forces were driving toward Pohang-dong. - -The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when -two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the open -UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled -eastward for a drive on Pusan. - -General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th -Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from Kumchon -to block the enemy near Hadong. With the recently landed 29th Infantry -attached, the division totalled only 13,351 officers and men.[110] -Its front extended from the southern coast near Hadong to the town of -Kochang, 40 miles north.[111] In addition to manning this mountainous -line, the 24th had troops in action at Pohang-dong, more than 100 miles -away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task Force -Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.[112] - - [110] _Ibid._, No. 3, 29 Jul 50. Actually, as the report - itself states, this figure is a meaningless statistic, - and exceeds the _real_ total by several hundred. It - was the practice not to subtract missing-in-action - casualties until 30 days after losses were reported. - Also, casualty reports from far-flung subordinate units - were received irregularly, and some of these undoubtedly - were not available when this tally was made. - - [111] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50. - - [112] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50. - -The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed when they -found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. Although they -sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were compelled to -give up Hadong and fall back toward Chinju.[113] - - [113] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50. - -As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander -shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to Pusan, -he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong near -Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern front in 48 -hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across the Naktong -in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges. - -After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined -the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions -east of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast -approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy move -toward Chinju.[114] - - [114] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50. - -At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about -prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground -team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry -had been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju -area, and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore, -to remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the -indivisible air-ground team.[115] - - [115] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -MAG-33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare them -for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set up -co-ordinated tactical air support.[116] - - [116] _Ibid._; and Craig, 15 Apr 54. - - -_Crisis of Eighth Army_ - -As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and -southwestern fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew -apparent that the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even -more, so that defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas. -Landrum indicated for the first time that the Brigade was being -considered primarily for a mission on the left flank.[117] Guided by -this possibility, Craig and his staff officers devoted a day to drawing -up a flexible operation plan. The purpose of this directive was to -advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders of possible commitment in -the Chinju, Kochang, or Kumchon areas, in that order of probability. -Also included were detailed instructions for movement to forward -assembly areas, broad missions for supporting units, security measures -to be taken, and a general outline of the situation ashore.[118] - - [117] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - - [118] Brig Op Plan No. 3-50, 31 Jul 50; Craig, 25 Jan 54. The - “Kochan” and “Kumwan” referred to in the operations plan - are actually Kochang and Kumchon. The odd assortment - of maps available in the early days of the war offered - a variety of spelling along with far more serious - inaccuracies. - -[Illustration: 8th ARMY SITUATION - -LATE JULY 1950] - -The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order -suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth -Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the -Brigade at sea.[119] Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would -have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.[120] - - [119] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - - [120] _Ibid._ - -At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN -left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and -Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to Pusan. -Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed in -the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up -elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually -must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.[121] - - [121] Craig, 25 Jan 54 and 17 Apr 54. - -With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander immediately -sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine air group be -made available to support the ground force by 2 August, and that VMO-6 -be transported to Korea as quickly as possible.[122] Time was drawing -short. - - [122] _Ibid._ - -On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals Walker -and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader that -the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once -committed, would be free to push forward without interference from -Eighth Army.[123] Partridge interjected that his planes would be -available to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive -in time.[124] - - [123] _Ibid._ - - [124] _Ibid._ - -Immediately after the conference, the Marine officers set out for Pusan -by jeep. While their vehicles bounced southward on the ancient road, -army headquarters in Taegu was sinking to new depths of dejection. -Chinju had just fallen, and the Red column was pounding on toward -Masan.[125] - - [125] _Ibid._ - -[Illustration: _Commandant Says Farewell--General Clifton B. Cates -visits San Diego for embarkation of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade -(Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _All Aboard--Marines of the Brigade waiting to embark at -San Diego for the Far East (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Mountains of Supplies--Hundreds of tons of equipment -ready for loading aboard ships taking Marines to the Far East (Marine -Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Arrival at Pusan--Marines catch their first glimpse of -Korea as the U. S. S. _Pickaway_ docks (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Movement to the Front--Brigade troops preparing to -entrain at Pusan for the Changwon bivouac area (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Visit to the Front--Above, General of the Army Douglas -MacArthur with Ambassador John J. Muccio and Major General Edward M. -Almond, Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC; and, below, with Lieutenant General -Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (U. S. Army -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Air Strikes First--Above, the U. S. S. _Badoeng -Strait_ (CVE 116) nearing Japan with Corsairs on deck; and, below, an -F4U armed with eight rockets and a 500-lb. bomb takes off from the -U. S. S. _Sicily_ (CVE 118) (U. S. Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Korea the Vertical--Marines of the Brigade literally -climb into battle during their first fights in the Chindong-ni area -(Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marines in Action--Above, Brigade infantry and M-26 -tank, advancing under fire, pass body of dead United States soldier on -left; and, below, ambushed Marines are pinned down temporarily by enemy -machinegun fire at Naktong Bulge (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _At the Brigade CP--Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. -Stewart, Brigade G-3 and Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, with -Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Brigade chief-of-staff, in background (Life -Magazine Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Combat Leaders of 5th Marines--Front row, Lieutenant -Colonel Raymond L. Murray, regimental commander, and Lieutenant -Colonel L. C. Hays, Jr., Executive Officer; rear, Lieutenant Colonel -H. R. Roise, CO 2d Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Newton, CO -1st Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Taplett, CO 3d Battalion -(Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Air in Action--Above, rocket-laden planes of -VMF-214 warming up on the flight deck of the _Sicily_; and, below, a -Corsair takes off for the front in Korea (U. S. Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Mortar Crew--Supporting the infantry advance -with 81-mm. shells are, left to right, Private First Class Jesse W. -Haney, Jr., Bakersfield, Calif.; Private First Class Bennie M. John, -Ardmore, Okla.; Private First Class Richard A. Robey, Houston, Tex.; -and an unidentified Marine in background (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Introducing the Enemy--No prisoner of war appears at -his best, but Marine veterans of the Brigade can attest that some of -the tough well-trained NKPA soldiers put up a good fight in Pusan -Perimeter operations (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Crest of the Ridge--Two Marine PFC’s, Harold R. Bates -(left) of Los Angeles, and Richard N. Martin, of Elk River, Minn., take -a break after fighting their way to the top of a ridge in the Naktong -Bulge (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _The Flying Windmills--Above, Generals Craig (left) -and Cushman waiting for the pilot to take them aloft in an HO3S-1 -helicopter; and, below, a VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artillery -positions of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (Marine Corps Photo)._] - - - - -CHAPTER V - -Prelude to Battle - -_Reconnaissance by Jeep--Brigade Air Lands--Landing of Ground -Force--Bedlam on Pusan Water Front--The Brigade at Changwon--The Pusan -Perimeter--Brigade Air Strikes First--Planning the Sachon-Chinju -Offensive_ - - -After the advance party reached Pusan, General Craig established a -temporary command post in the headquarters building of General Garvin’s -Base Command. Then the Marine officers plunged into the final phase -of planning and preparation for the Brigade, although they were still -handicapped by the undisclosed secret of the convoy’s arrival date. -Staff gears were meshing smoothly by this time, with solutions being -ground out for one problem after another. - -On the night of 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and other staff -officers were discussing whether MAG-33 would be able to get its planes -airborne in time to support the Brigade in its initial combat. Acting -on a hunch, Stewart picked up a telephone in the slim hope of placing a -call through to Japan. The long shot paid off. After some wrangling by -startled operators, he managed to contact Itami Air Force Base and talk -to Colonel Kenneth H. Weir, Cushman’s chief of staff. - -Stewart briefed the Marine aviator on the latest developments, -emphasizing that the Brigade would undoubtedly get into the fight -soon after arrival. He asked Weir to send the Air Support Section and -helicopters to Korea by LST as quickly as possible after unloading in -Japan.[126] - - [126] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -Craig received a radio message that same night from FMFPac, informing -him that the replacements for the Brigade would not be sent directly to -Pusan, as requested. They were to be assembled at Camp Pendleton for -travel with the 1st Marine Division, and this meant a delay which could -be critical. Craig immediately insisted that the reinforcements be -sent to Pusan to replace Brigade battle losses and form the third rifle -companies.[127] The Marine leader’s determination in this instance -proved to be a blessing a few weeks later. - - [127] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - - -_Reconnaissance by Jeep_ - -On the morning of 31 July, Craig and Stewart set out by jeep to -reconnoiter the rear areas of the crumbling southwestern sector. Kean’s -25th Division, having just replaced the 24th in line, was now blocking -the threatened western approaches to Pusan. Since all indications -pointed to the Brigade’s commitment in this area, Craig wanted to walk -and ride over the terrain he had previously scouted from the air.[128] - - [128] _Ibid._ - -He returned to Pusan just in time to receive a telephone call from -Colonel Landrum of Eighth Army Headquarters. The chief of staff told -him of General Walker’s intention to attach the Army’s 5th Regimental -Combat Team, newly arrived from Hawaii, to the 1st Provisional Marine -Brigade. With two regiments under his command, Craig would be assigned -a vital area of responsibility along the Nam River, near its confluence -with the Naktong north of Masan.[129] Unfortunately, the Brigade -reached Korea 1 day too late. When the 5th RCT debarked at Pusan on 1 -August, it was earmarked for the 25th Division and placed in Eighth -Army reserve.[130] - - [129] _Ibid._ - - [130] MCBS, II-A-7. - -Also debarking on the 1st was the Army’s skeletonized 2d Division. This -unit cleared Pusan and hurried to the hard-pressed Taegu area where it -also passed into Eighth Army reserve.[131] - - [131] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 3 Jul 50. - -During the last hours before the Brigade’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel -Chidester was diligently engaged in the task--or art--of procurement. -It has already been explained why the Marine ground force would debark -for combat with little more than what its troops could carry on -their backs. In order to offset partially the deficiencies, the G-4 -successfully negotiated with Army authorities for 50 cargo trucks, -several jeeps, some radio vans, and various other items of equipment. -Officers of the Pusan Base Command reacted to all of Chidester’s -requests with as much generosity as their meager stocks of materiel -would allow.[132] - - [132] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Not until the morning of 2 August did General Craig learn that Task -Group 53.7 was scheduled to dock at Pusan that very evening. The -last-minute disclosure relieved him of considerable anxiety, but he was -still disturbed for want of specific orders concerning departure of the -Brigade from Pusan. His instructions from General Walker were to debark -the ground force immediately and have it prepared to move forward by -0600 the following morning. The same orders advised him that a specific -destination “would be given later.”[133] - - [133] _Ibid._ - -“Later” did not come soon enough for the Marine commander. As the -long column of ships steamed into Pusan Harbor in the early evening, -he still did not know where he would lead his Brigade the next -morning.[134] - - [134] _Ibid._ - - -_Brigade Air Lands_ - -When Task Group 53.7 entered Far Eastern waters, the ships transporting -the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing veered toward -Japan, while the others continued to Korea. The Brigade’s air arm -arrived at Kobe late in the afternoon of 31 July. - -Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading was -in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control -Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6. By the -next morning it was steaming toward Pusan, carrying the vital link in -General Craig’s air-ground team. Cushman and Weir were making good -their promises.[135] - - [135] Annexes Charlie and Fox to MAG-33 SAR, 5 Jul-6 Sep 50. - -Since harbor facilities at Kobe were unsuitable for offloading -aircraft, the _Badoeng Strait_ stood out to sea on 1 August and -catapulted 44 of its Marine fighter planes into the air. The aircraft -sped to the field at Itami, where they were quickly checked by pilots -and crews for their imminent role in combat. On the following day, the -other 26 fighters left the carrier and joined the first group ashore -for maintenance and testing.[136] - - [136] Annex Charlie, _ibid._ - -To achieve maximum mobility and striking power, Marine and Navy -commanders agreed to base VMF’s 214 and 323 aboard aircraft carriers -for initial operations over Korea. After only 1 day of refresher -flights at Itami, the pilots of VMF-214 landed their planes aboard the -U. S. S. _Sicily_. Two days later, on 5 August, Major Arnold Lund led -his VMF-323 back to the _Badoeng Strait_.[137] - - [137] VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50. - -The squadron of night fighters, VMF(N)-513, was land-based. Having been -assigned to the Fifth Air Force, it would be controlled by the Itazuke -field for night heckler missions over Korea. This unit had time for -only a few night training flights before being committed to combat.[138] - - [138] Annex Charlie, _op. cit._ - -Kobe’s waterfront was the scene of feverish activity around the clock. -The light observation planes and helicopters of VMO-6 were unloaded, -assembled, and--to the amazement of local Japanese--flown from the very -streets of the city to the base at Itami. There they were hurriedly -checked by mechanics and prepared for the short ferry flight to -Korea.[139] - - [139] _Ibid._ - -Headquarters and Service Squadrons of MAG-33 were left with the task of -unloading supplies and equipment from the _Achernar_ and _Anderson_. -Since the three fighter squadrons were farmed out to the carriers and -Air Force, Group headquarters turned its attention to administrative -and maintenance matters. For the next month it would be hard-pressed to -keep the carrier squadrons supplied with spare parts while providing -replacement aircraft for the seaborne units, handling a variety of -airlift requests with its lone transport plane, and making arrangements -for the support of VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke.[140] - - [140] _Ibid._ - - -_Landing of Ground Force_ - -The hapless _Henrico_ finally overtook Task Group 53.7 in the Tsushima -Straits on the morning of 2 August. A few hours later the Marines of -the Brigade got their first glimpse of Korea’s skyline. Seen from a -distance, the wall of forbidding, gray peaks was hardly a welcome -sight to men who had been broiled and toughened on the heights of Camp -Pendleton. - -For reasons unknown, neither Colonel Snedeker nor anyone else had -received the operations plan which Craig had sent via Eighth Army -at Taegu. Although every Marine in the convoy realized the gravity -of the situation ashore, there could be no specific preparations by -troop leaders whose only source of information was an occasional news -broadcast. - -Having heard nothing from his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Murray was -thinking in terms of a purely administrative landing. Had he known -what awaited his 5th Marines ashore, he would have had his troops draw -ammunition and rations while still at sea. Throughout the sleepless -night that followed, he had ample time to reflect sourly on the -fortunes of war.[141] - - [141] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -Shortly after 1700 on 2 August, the first ship steamed into Pusan -Harbor. As it edged toward the dock, Leathernecks crowding the rail -were greeted by a tinny and slightly tone-deaf rendition of the Marine -Corps Hymn, blared by a South Korean band. Army troops scattered -along the waterfront exchanged the usual barbed courtesies with their -webfooted brethren aboard ship, and old salts smiled while noting that -tradition remained intact. - -When the _Clymer_ approached its berth, Craig waved a greeting to -Snedeker and shouted, “What battalion is the advance guard?”[142] - - [142] BrigGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 54. - -The chief of staff registered an expression of astonishment. - -“Did you get my orders?” Craig called to Murray when the _Pickaway_ -slid against the dock. - -“No, sir!”[143] replied the CO of the 5th Marines. - - [143] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -Craig ordered a conference at 2100 for the Brigade staff, Murray, -battalion commanders, and the leaders of supporting units. When the -officers entered the wardroom of the _Clymer_ at the specified time, -the last ship of Task Group 53.7 was being moored in its berth. - -After introductory remarks by the general, his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel -Ellsworth G. Van Orman, launched the briefing with a grim narrative -of the enemy situation. Next came Stewart, who outlined tentative -operations plans. The Brigade would definitely begin moving forward at -0600 the next morning, although a specific destination had yet to be -assigned by the Army. Travel would be by road and rail. The necessary -trains were already awaiting in the Pusan terminal, and the 50 trucks -procured by Chidester were standing by, complete with Army drivers.[144] - - [144] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -Craig then summed up his earlier discussions with Walker. The Army -leader had voiced a strong desire to use the Marines in an attack, for -he felt it was high time to strike back at the Red invader. Employment -of the Brigade as an offensive force was a natural conclusion to its -commander, and he told his subordinates how he had won assurances for -the integrity of the air-ground team. This was an encouraging note on -which to close one of the strangest combat briefings in the history of -the Corps. The leaders of over 4,000 Marines rushed from the ship to -alert their units for movement into a critical tactical situation. They -would leave in a few hours, but didn’t know where they were going.[145] - - [145] _Ibid._ - - -_Bedlam on Pusan Waterfront_ - -It is not surprising that the Pusan waterfront turned into a bedlam. As -darkness settled, thousands of Marines poured onto the docks. Cranes -and working parties unloaded vehicles, supplies and equipment, while -a chorus of commands and comments was added to the roar of machinery. -Supply points were set up under searchlights, and long lines of -Marines formed on the docks, in buildings and along streets. Armfuls -of C-rations, machinegun belts, grenades, and bandoleers gave men the -appearance of harried Christmas shoppers caught in a last-minute rush. - -The activity and din continued all night. Few men could sleep through -the noise, crowding, and shuffling. Before dawn, new lines began to -form in reverse as groggy Marines filed back aboard ships to get their -last hot meal for many a day. - -After the conference aboard the _Clymer_, Brigade headquarters resumed -its efforts to obtain specific information from Taegu. Finally, at -2325, Landrum telephoned Craig and announced Walker’s decision--the -Brigade would go westward to the vicinity of Changwon, where it would -remain for the time being in Eighth Army reserve. Only Walker himself -could order any further move. If some extreme emergency arose and -communications with Eighth Army were lost, the Brigade would then come -under the control of the CG, 25th Infantry Division.[146] - - [146] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -The long-awaited message gave added impetus to the unloading -operations. Major William L. Batchelor’s shore party company devoted -one of its principal efforts to the big howitzers and vehicles of 1/11, -while English and his tankmen struggled to get their steel monsters -ashore from the LSD’s. Engineer heavy equipment, mobile maintenance -shops of the Ordnance Detachment, fuel, ammunition, and medical -supplies swung from decks to docks, where waiting Marines rushed them -off to staging areas around the waterfront. - -Altogether, 9,400 tons of supplies were unloaded, and the vast majority -were turned over to Army quartermaster authorities in Pusan. Four -officers and 100 men of Major Thomas J. O’Mahoney’s Combat Service -Detachment were designated as the Brigade rear echelon. This group -would remain in the port city to handle logistical and administrative -matters. Supplies were moved into Army warehouses, where they became -part of the common pool shared by all units at the front. This led to -confusion later, when the Brigade requested its own Class II and IV -items, only to discover that they had already been issued to other -outfits. But the Army divisions had already been fighting for a month -in a war which caught the nation unprepared, so that the Pusan Base -Command had no alternative but to issue supplies on the basis of -immediate need, not ownership.[147] - - [147] Brig SAR, basic rpt. - -The Brigade was prepared to travel light. Not only the bulk of supplies -but also all personal baggage was left behind in Pusan, to be stored -and safeguarded by the rear echelon. When dawn broke on 3 August, each -Marine carried only his pack, weapon, ammunition, and rations.[148] - - [148] Annex Queen, _ibid._ - - -_The Brigade at Changwon_ - -Despite the tumult of the sleepless night at Pusan, Lieutenant Colonel -George R. Newton’s 1st Battalion set out for Changwon shortly after -0600 on 3 August. As advance guard for the Brigade, it made the 40-mile -trip in Marine and Army trucks, reaching a point 1 mile west of the -town at 1400. There the battalion took up defensive positions astride -the Changwon-Masan road in order to cover the arrival of the remainder -of the Brigade.[149] - - [149] Annex How. - -Although he had orders to bivouac at Changwon, General Craig decided to -deploy the Brigade defensively to the west of the town. This decision -was prompted by the enemy situation west of Masan, which was a scant 6½ -miles from Changwon. Then, too, the Marine commander saw the layover as -a final opportunity to check the field discipline of the Brigade.[150] - - [150] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Between 0630 and 0700, the main body of the Marine ground force moved -out of Pusan by road and rail. Vehicles over 2½ tons, all heavy -equipment, and the M-26 tanks were transported on flatcars. - -The roads were narrow and bumpy, and the churning wheels of the -trucks threw up clouds of stifling dust that hung in the air and -painted Marines and equipment a ghostly gray. Aboard the primitive -trains, which frequently jolted to stops for no apparent reason, men -tried vainly to fit themselves to miniature wooden seats constructed -in perfect right angles. And always, the troops inhaled that -characteristic odor drifting in from well-fertilized rice paddies. - -By 1600, all combat and support elements of the Brigade, with -the exception of one tank platoon, had arrived in the Changwon -area. Southwest of the city the 1st Battalion was relieved of its -responsibility on the left side of the Changwon-Masan road, when 3/5 -occupied the high ground in that area. Newton was then able to extend -his right flank farther along the towering ridge north of the road.[151] - - [151] Annex How. - -South of the MSR, a wide rice paddy stretched between 3/5’s positions -and the town. Almost in the center of this low ground was a hill -commanding a good all-around view of the entire area. It was on this -dominating height that Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed -his 2d Battalion. Behind Roise, General Craig established his CP in a -small basin among hills in the immediate vicinity of Changwon. Close-in -protection for his headquarters was provided by the engineer company -and various headquarters units. Throughout the interior of the bivouac -area were tank platoons and the batteries of Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s -artillery battalion. - -As night settled on 3 August, an army of phantoms invaded the Brigade -perimeter and drove to the very fringe of Craig’s CP. The reaction of -green troops was typical of men new to combat. Shortly after 2200, a -rifle shot cracked. Many Brigade Marines had never heard a weapon fired -in combat, so they concluded that likely targets were present in the -perimeter area. As nerve-taut men stared fixedly into the blackness, -forms that had been harmless bushes and rocks took on the guise of -Communist infiltrators. - -The first shot was soon followed by others. Toward midnight, the firing -developed into a continuous crackle, particularly in the immediate -vicinity of the Brigade CP. Palpitating hearts pounded even more -strenuously when two Marine machineguns began chattering in positions -occupied by Brigade headquarters troops. - -Anxiety also spread to the foxholes of the 5th Marines. In 2/5’s area -one man was shot. The 1st Battalion suffered 2 casualties, 1 resulting -from mistaken identity during challenging, the other inflicted when a -weapon discharged accidentally.[152] - - [152] _Ibid._ - -The commotion finally died down around 0300, after cursing NCO’s -convinced the military novices that they had been firing at delusions -of their own overwrought imaginations. - -Although such a reaction is not uncommon among untried troops, this -realization was no balm to a wrathful Brigade commander at dawn on -4 August. Craig called in leaders of the most obvious offenders and -severely reprimanded them. He made it known in no uncertain terms that -such conduct would not be tolerated again; and from that time on, every -man in the Brigade took him at his word. - -The remainder of the stay at Changwon was relatively calm. On one -occasion a group of seven unidentified persons was spotted atop a -mountain overlooking the Brigade area. Closer scrutiny disclosed that -the individuals had radios and were carefully observing all activity -within the Marine perimeter. A platoon of infantry was dispatched to -destroy what was apparently an enemy observation post; but by the -time the rifleman scaled the height, both intruders and radios had -disappeared. - -The climb caused a number of heat prostration cases within the platoon, -for Korean terrain and heat were giving Marines their first bitter -taste of a crippling combination. Brigade helicopters, flown to Pusan -on 2 August, set a combat precedent by delivering rations and water to -the infantrymen on the mountain, and by evacuating the more severe heat -casualties.[153] - - [153] Brig SAR, basic rpt. - -While Craig’s ground force spent its time patrolling and training -around Changwon, VMO-6 and the Air Support Section (MTACS-2) were -readying themselves. Accompanying the 4 HO3S helicopters in the flight -to Pusan from Japan on 2 August were 4 of VMO-6’s OY-2 observation -planes. The other 4 light aircraft remained in Japan, to be used as -spares. On 4 August the LST which had been dispatched by Cushman and -Weir also arrived at the South Korean port. While two helicopters flew -to Changwon to operate from Craig’s CP, the others, together with the -rest of VMO-6 and the Air Support Section, moved to the airfield at -Chinhae. By 5 August, MTACS-2 had established communications with the -_Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_ and was ready for business. - - -_The Pusan Perimeter_ - -The big picture, militarily speaking, was outlined in somber colors -during the first few days of August 1950. Only the southeast corner of -Korea was left to the Eighth Army and its battered ROK allies. Space -had been traded for time until there remained in effect merely a UN -beachhead about 90 miles long and 60 wide. - -Unremitting enemy pressure throughout July had pushed the UN forces -back to positions stretching raggedly from Pohang-dong on the east -coast to Masan on the south coast by way of Taegu in the center. The -logistical lifeline extended from Pusan to Taegu both by road and rail, -and some 300,000 tons of supplies were moved in July by the Pusan -Logistical Command. - -The vital seaport had to be held if the UN forces were to retain a -foothold in the peninsula, and the enemy was already threatening both -Pohang-dong and Masan, each within 50 miles. Only by courtesy could the -irregular chain of UN positions have been called a line. Gaps were the -rule rather than exception, and an entire enemy corps might have driven -through the mountainous area between Andong and Yongdok without meeting -serious opposition. Nor was this the only spot where the dangerously -stretched UN forces had to depend on the terrain for support. Yet the -time had come to make a stand, and this final UN beachhead has gone -down in history by the name of the Pusan Perimeter. - -From Taegu in the center to the eastern coast, five depleted ROK -divisions were arrayed during the first week in August. East of the -Naktong, from the Taegu-Waegwan area southward, the 1st Cavalry and the -24th Infantry Division held defensive positions. This left the southern -sector to the 25th Division, reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and the 1st -Provisional Marine Brigade. - -The principal enemy units pressing toward Masan and Pusan in the -southern sector were identified as the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and -the 83d Motorcycle Regiment. Composed entirely of Chinese civil war -veterans in July 1949, the 6th Division had at that time been the 166th -Division, 56th CCF Army, which later entered Korea as a completely -equipped unit. Its three infantry regiments, the 13th, 14th, and 15th, -were distinguished throughout the invasion for a high esprit de corps. -After capturing Yongdungpo, an industrial suburb of Seoul, the 6th had -pushed southward and won fresh honors by forcing the river Kum and -taking Kunsan by storm.[154] - - [154] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean 6th Infantry Division_ - (InterRpt, Sup No. 100), 33–6. - -On the eve of the Kunsan operation, according to a captured enemy -document, troops of the 6th were informed that they were facing a -United States Army regiment. “Since this unit is planning to advance to -the north, it is our mission to envelop and annihilate it.... We are -fully prepared and confident of success in this operation.”[155] - - [155] _Ibid._ - -A numerical superiority as well as good combat discipline enabled -the initial assault waves to cross the Kum in pneumatic floats and -establish a bridgehead before noon on 16 July 1950. Half of the town -of Kunsan was occupied before nightfall, and the United States and ROK -defenders withdrew under cover of darkness. - -Next came the “end run,” with 6th Division units racing toward the -capture of Namwon, Kwangju, Yosu, and Mokpu in the southwest corner -of the peninsula. No opposition awaited except ineffectual delaying -actions by ROK constabulary troops. After mopping up a few small -pockets of resistance, the 6th Division pushed eastward to lead the -North Korean drive toward Pusan. - -The capture of Sunchon gave the division an assembly area for the -attack on Chinju. And on 28 July the commander. Major General Pang, -issued a message to his troops: - - “Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the - liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants - of the enemy. We have liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yosu and have - thereby accelerated the liberation of all Korea. However, the - liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the - windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our - division! Men of the 6th Division, let us annihilate the enemy and - distinguish ourselves!”[156] - - [156] _Ibid._ - -Up to that time the division’s total casualties had been remarkably -few. Only 400 killed and wounded were reported from 25 June until after -the capture of Kunsan, and the 6th had met scarcely any opposition -since that action. It was just prior to the assault on Chinju, -moreover, that the 83d Motorcycle Regiment was attached to reinforce -the drive toward Pusan. - -This unit had been part of the 105th Armored Division until June -1950, when it was given a separate existence. Equipment consisted -of motorcycles with sidecars and jeeps of Soviet manufacture. Fixed -machineguns on both types of vehicles were operated by the crews in -addition to submachineguns. Not much is known about the numbers of -the 83d at this time, but it had experienced little combat since the -beginning of the invasion.[157] - - [157] _Ibid._, _Enemy Forces_, _op. cit._, 36–7. - -During the advance on Chinju the NKPA column ran into elements of the -United States 24th Infantry Division and was stopped by machinegun fire -at Hadong. All three regiments of the 6th Division had to be committed -before this halfway point could be secured, and the 83d Motorcycle -Regiment was blooded in the attack. More hard fighting awaited on the -road to Chinju, but the two NKPA outfits battled their way into the -town on or about 30 July 1950. - - -_Brigade Air Strikes First_ - -These North Korean units were destined to become the opponents of the -Brigade a few days later. Before the Marine ground forces could get -into action, however, the air components struck the first blow. - -When Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid’s VMF-214 landed on board -the _Sicily_ on 3 August, eight of its Corsairs were immediately -refueled and armed. At 1630, the initial Marine offensive action of the -war was launched as the fighter planes roared up from the carrier’s -flight deck. Minutes later their incendiary bombs and rockets were -hitting Red-held Chinju and the village of Sinban-ni. A series of -strafing runs concluded the Marines’ greeting to the North Korean -People’s Army.[158] - - [158] VMF-214 SAR, 14 Jul-6 Sep 50. - -While the 2 Red bases were erupting in smoke and flame, 2 other pilots -of the squadron flew from the _Sicily_ to Taegu to be briefed on the -broad tactical situation. They returned from their visit with maps and -intelligence material for guidance in future operations.[159] - - [159] _Ibid._ - -The squadron flew 21 sorties on 4 August against enemy bases -controlling the pressure on Eighth Army’s southern flank. Racing in -from the sea, gull-winged Marine planes struck at bridges, railroads, -and troop concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas. - -On 5 August, the _Sicily_ steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes -descended on Inchon, Seoul, and Mokpo, battering airfields, factories, -warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern -of destruction was repeated the following day.[160] - - [160] _Ibid._ - -On 6 August came a thundering bid for fame by VMF-323, as its sleek -Corsairs streaked toward Korea. Operating from the deck of the _Badoeng -Strait_, the squadron flew 30 sorties in deep support forward of Eighth -Army lines. Carrying the mail with 500-pound bombs, 20-mm. cannon and -5-inch rockets, Marine pilots struck at Communist troop concentrations, -vehicles, supply dumps, bridges and railroads.[161] - - [161] VMF-323 SAR, _op. cit._ - - -_Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive_ - -As early as 3 August, during the Brigade move from Pusan to Changwon, -General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had flown by helicopter to -Masan for a conference of troop commanders. There they joined General -Walker and General Kean at the latter’s 25th Division command post. -Also present was Brigadier General George B. Barth, artillery officer -of the 25th.[162] - - [162] Craig, 25 Jan 54. - -Craig suggested to the Eighth Army commander that some ROK army -trainees be attached to the Brigade. There were thousands of such -Korean recruits, and a few serving as scouts, interpreters, and -rear-area guards would be of great value to the Marines. Walker agreed -to provide the native troops and arm them as well.[163] - - [163] _Ibid._ - -The Army leader confirmed the previous night’s telephonic orders which -had caused the Brigade’s move to Changwon. After the four generals had -discussed the tactical situation on the southern flank, Walker directed -Craig to have the Brigade prepared for commitment to combat any time -after the evening of 5 August.[164] - - [164] _Ibid._ - -This schedule worked out perfectly from Craig’s point of view. The Air -Support Section at Chinhae had just established communications with the -two carrier-based squadrons. Army-Navy-Marine co-operation thus enabled -the Brigade commander to lead his entire air-ground team into battle. - -On 5 August Craig and Stewart flew to Masan for a final meeting -with Walker and Kean. The Eighth Army commander outlined his plans -for the first UN counteroffensive. In forceful terms, he expressed -his dissatisfaction with the course of the war up to that time. He -announced that the strategy of trading space for time had come to an -end, and he did not mince words in referring to past UN defeats. With -firm conviction in the cause, he had ordered all units to stand to the -death. The Eighth Army could not and would not lose more ground or -equipment.[165] Advances had been made by the enemy with such rapidity -that he had extended his supply lines almost to the breaking point, -concluded Walker. The time had come to strike back.[166] - - [165] _Ibid._ - - [166] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -To the 25th Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and 5th RCT would -go the honor of launching the counterattack from Chindong-ni, a small -coastal village 8 miles southwest of Masan on the road to Chinju. In -its effort to roll up the southern UN flank, the NKPA 6th Division was -exerting heavy pressure on Chindong-ni from both the west and north. - -A few miles west, the irregular coastline takes a sharp turn to the -south to form a stubby peninsula about 25 miles wide and 15 miles long. -Near the western base is the important town of Sachon. About 10 miles -above this western junction of peninsula and coast lies Chinju. Both -Sachon and Chinju were the targets of Walker’s counteroffensive. - -Approximately 3½ miles west of Chindong-ni is the tiny thatched-hut -hamlet of Tosan, an unimpressive road junction which could be easily -overlooked. The western fork is merely the continuation of the main -route leading directly to Chinju, some 25 miles distant. The other -fork branches south from Tosan and also goes to Chinju; but it skirts -the coastline of the peninsula just described, passing through the -communication hubs of Paedun-ni, Kosong, and Sachon. Thus, while both -roads lead to Chinju, the southern or peninsular route is 17 miles -longer. - -Since it was known that enemy forces were present on the small -peninsula, any UN thrust astride the main road to Chinju would be -exposed to a constant flanking threat from the left. To eliminate this -danger. Walker had decided to send the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade -around the southern route from Tosan to Sachon. After the peninsula was -secured, the 5th RCT would strike out for Chinju along the main road, -while the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division guarded its right flank in -the mountains to the north.[167] - - [167] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. - -Craig and Stewart opposed this plan, arguing that the Brigade itself -would be exposed to flanking danger on the right, if it made the -initial advance alone.[168] - - [168] _Ibid._ - -After further discussion, it was decided that all three units would -attack simultaneously along the routes already designated. However, -the 5th RCT was given a preparatory mission of uncovering the Tosan -junction before the Brigade began its advance.[169] D-day was scheduled -for 7 August. All participating units were to be part of Task Force -Kean, so named after the 25th Division commanding general who would -exercise overall control. - - [169] Annex How; and Brig Op Plan 4-50. - -Craig hurried from the conference to alert the Brigade. In a past -military age a general might have sprung into the saddle, but the -Brigade commander had discovered a steed that covered more ground. He -and Stewart climbed into a HO3S-1 helicopter piloted by Lieutenant -Gustave F. Lueddeke of VMO-6, and a few minutes later they landed at -Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP to brief him on the forthcoming action. - -[Illustration: BRIGADE ACTION ON SOUTHWESTERN FRONT - -7–13 AUGUST 1950] - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -Action on Hill 342 - -_First Platoon Fight--The Perimeter on Hill 342--Call for Artillery -Fires--Task Force Kean Stalled--General Craig Assumes Control--Enemy -Attack at Dawn_ - - -On 6 August 1950 the Brigade was attached to the 25th Infantry Division -and ordered forward to Chindong-ni. The area from that village westward -toward the Tosan junction was occupied by thinly spread elements of the -5th RCT and the 27th Infantry. While the former took over front line -positions preparatory to launching the main attack on the next day, -the latter was gradually displacing rearward to go into Eighth Army -reserve.[170] - - [170] Annexes 1 and 2 to 25th InfDiv War Diary, Sep 50, Book - VIII; and Brig SAR, basic rpt. - -To facilitate the early relief of the 27th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel -Robert D. Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, departed from Changwon -at 1040, 6 August, and arrived at Chindong-ni less than 2 hours later. -The infantry unit was accompanied by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; -the 2d Platoon, 75-mm. Recoilless Guns; and the 3d Platoon, Company A -Engineers. After assembling in a schoolyard north of the village, 3/5 -relieved the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, on and around Hill 255.[171] - - [171] All hill numbers given in this text refer to the highest - peak of the specific high ground being considered. - Numbers indicate height in meters above sea level, - and Hill 255 is therefore more than 800 feet high. - Chindong-ni, being almost at the water’s edge, may be - taken as sea level. - -One and a half miles out of Chindong-ni, the road from Masan takes a -sharp turn so that it is running generally north and south before it -enters the village. Hill 255 borders the west side of the road, rising -from the valley floor just above Chindong-ni and climbing northward to -its summit in a series of prominent steps. Its ridgeline is narrow, -with the eastern slopes falling steeply to the Masan route while -its western wall plunges sharply to the valley and road connecting -Chindong-ni and Haman. - -Taplett set up his CP, headquarters units, and weapons company along -the first step of the hill. Higher up, at the top of the second rise, -Captain Joseph C. Fegan deployed Company H in defensive positions -facing generally north. Forward, a long narrow plateau stretched -for 250 yards before the third step of the ridge rose abruptly to -the second highest peak on the hill. Noting the advantages of the -commanding ground to his north, Fegan requested permission to move his -company forward to that area. Since this would have placed him 500 -yards from the nearest 3/5 unit, the request could not be granted.[172] - - [172] Maj Joseph C. Fegan interv with authors, 17 Apr 54 - (Fegan, 17 Apr 54). - -The battalion commander intended to keep his defenses as tightly -knit as possible in order to discharge his mission of blocking the -approaches to the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR. Despite vigorous patrolling by -25th Division units in the mountains between the coastal village and -Haman, intelligence reported increasing numbers of enemy troops, heavy -weapons, and equipment in the area to the north. It appeared that large -NKPA forces were slipping through and descending on Chindong-ni to “cut -off the windpipe” of Walker’s southern flank. - -First Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn, commander of Company G, deployed his -2d and 3d Platoons on Hill 99, to the west and across the valley from -255. He arranged his defenses to block the approaches from the high -ground on his north (actually an extension of Hill 99) and from the -valley to the west, separating him from massive Hill 342.[173] - - [173] Capt R. D. Bohn interv with authors, 17 Apr 54 (Bohn, 17 - Apr 54). - -On a small knoll at the base of Hill 255 was deployed Company G’s 1st -Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant John H. Cahill. With the 75-mm. -recoilless gun platoon attached, this unit guarded the Haman road 600 -yards from Chindong-ni.[174] - - [174] _Ibid._ - -On high ground east of the MSR and beyond the village sat the -2d Platoon of Company H, with the mission of defending against -infiltration from the direction of the sea and the mountains southeast -of the road to Masan.[175] - - [175] Fegan, 17 Apr 54. - -This completed the infantry deployment. Company H had its three -platoons spread over 1,500 yards, while those of Company G ranged at -least an equal distance. Due to the lack of a third company, Taplett -had no reserve other than a handful of headquarters troops. Thus 3/5 -got its taste of things to come in a strange war of mountains and men. - -As the riflemen were digging their hilltop holes with traditional -distaste, other supporting elements of the Brigade and 5th Marines -began to arrive at Chindong-ni and set up for business. These included -the Brigade Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of the regimental -4.2-inch Mortar Company.[176] All Marine units in the area temporarily -came under control of 3/5’s Battalion Commander. Taplett was given the -added responsibility of handling all area requests for tactical air -support.[177] - - [176] Annex How. - - [177] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv with authors, 20 Apr 54 - (Taplett, 20 Apr 54). - -For the time being, the 3d Battalion itself was under operational -control of Colonel John H. Michaelis, USA, commander of the 27th -Infantry “Wolfhounds.” Verbal instructions from Major General Kean -on 6 August had given the Army officer control of all troops in the -Chindong-ni area. When a second Marine battalion arrived in the locale, -command would then pass to General Craig.[178] - - [178] Brig SAR, basic rpt. - -By 1600, Taplett had reported his command post location and defensive -positions to Michaelis. Immediately afterwards he ordered mortars and -artillery to lay registration fires on the northern approaches to -Chindong-ni.[179] Having left the phantoms of Changwon far behind, the -Marines of the reinforced battalion settled down for the night. - - [179] _Ibid._; and Annex How. - - -_First Platoon Fight_ - -Shortly after midnight, the 3d Battalion received an unexpected message -which precipitated the first Marine infantry action of the war. Colonel -Michaelis radioed Taplett and passed on a directive from 25th Division, -ordering the Marine battalion to commit immediately one reinforced -platoon for the defense of Hill 342. He explained that this unit was to -relieve a beleaguered Army company being slowly eaten away in a private -war of attrition. Taplett informed the regimental commander that he -could ill afford to spare 1 of his 6 rifle platoons, but was told in -return that General Kean had ordered 342 held at all costs.[180] - - [180] This section of the narrative is derived from: LtCol - R. D. Taplett interv with the author, 18 Nov 53 and 19 - May 54; Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Capt J. H. - Cahill ltr to authors, 9 Dec 53. - -Tagged with the ominous sounding name “Yaban-san” by Koreans, this -hill resembles a huge molar whose roots rise from the MSR west of -Chindong-ni and lead to a tremendous mass about 2,000 yards north -of the road. There the ground climbs sharply, culminating in a peak -1,100 feet high. Beyond, a long saddle extends a few thousand yards -northwest, connecting 342 with a height of almost 2,000 feet. The -latter was a stronghold of NKPA 6th Division elements, making a -determined bid to carry 342 and cut the MSR. - -Assigned the mission of making the Brigade’s first ground contact was -young Lieutenant Cahill of Company G. His 1st Platoon was reinforced -with a machinegun squad and SCR-300 operator before he led it from -3/5’s perimeter. - -Moving westward on the MSR, the platoon reached Michaelis’ CP, located -near the bridges south of Hill 99. Cahill was told that he would be met -by a guide at a road junction 700 yards farther down the MSR. From this -point the platoon followed a soldier who escorted Cahill to the CP of -the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. This headquarters was situated just north of -the road, on the tip of 342’s eastern “root,” 1 of the 2 long ridges -leading to the hill itself. - -The Marine officer was told to relieve the Army company on the summit -and hold the hill with his platoon. Following a quick briefing, Cahill -and the guide led the column northward from the CP, skirting the -western base of the ridge. A few hundred yards along the way, the guide -discovered that he had miscalculated in the darkness. More time was -lost while the platoon descended to resume the correct route. - -As the men threaded their way along the unseen trail, a few enemy -artillery shells burst nearby. The column reached the end of the valley -separating the two long spurs of 342, and a volley of rifle fire -cracked in the darkness. Two of Cahill’s Marines were painfully wounded. - -Since the column was still in friendly territory, the guide advised -Cahill not to climb 342 until dawn shed light on the mystery. It was -then 0500, 7 August, and the Marine platoon had marched 3 miles from -its original position. - -Shortly after first light, it was discovered that soldiers of the -2d Battalion, 5th RCT, had fired on the Marines, not realizing that -friendly units were moving within the area. - -As the sun rose in a cloudless sky, Cahill took the lead. First, he -climbed the high ground joining 342 with its eastern spur, then crossed -over and continued toward the peak from a southeasterly direction. - -[Illustration: CHINDONG-NI AREA 6–9 AUG. ’50 - -SHOWING 1st PROV. MAR. BRIGADE’S DISPOSITION, BLOCKING ACTION, & LOCAL -ATTACKS] - -The platoon made good progress at the outset, but the heat became -stifling; and all the while the slopes of 342 stretched ahead like -a continuous wall. Stumbling, gasping for breath, soaked with -perspiration, every Marine reached the point at which he barely managed -to drag himself up the steep incline. There were choked curses as men -gained a few feet, only to slip and fall back even farther. - -Water discipline collapsed as canteens were quickly emptied. Marines -began to drop along the slope, some unconscious, others doubled over -and retching. The tactical formation of the platoon became ragged, but -Cahill and his NCO’s urged the men upward. - -Accompanied by Sergeant Lee Buettner, Cahill set out to contact -the Army company commander on the summit and reconnoiter the area. -Seventy-five yards from the top, he was fired on from the eastern -slopes. Since he was in sight of the Army troops on the crest, it was -obvious that the North Korean People’s Army had officially greeted the -1st Provisional Marine Brigade. - - -_The Perimeter on Hill 342_ - -Convinced that he was encountering only sniper fire, Cahill ordered -Buettner to stay behind and keep the platoon moving up a draw affording -cover. Then, ignoring enemy marksmen, the young officer climbed up to -the crest and entered a grim little company perimeter under constant -rifle and machinegun fire from its front and both flanks. - -It was 0830 when the Army company commander greeted Cahill and -explained his defenses. It had been customary, he said, to man a broad -front during the day and draw back into a tight perimeter at night. -But the intense enemy fire of the previous night had not diminished -after daybreak, with the result that his men still occupied their night -perimeter. The Army officer added that he had returned his mortars -to the base of the hill, since they had drawn too much fire to be -effective. Deployed around a triangular perimeter conforming to the -shape of 347’s peak were the remnants of his three shattered platoons. - -While Cahill appraised the situation, his platoon labored up the hill -under prodding by Buettner and other NCO’s. Well up the southeastern -slope, the column suddenly came under automatic weapons fire from -invisible enemy positions. The exhausted Marines set up weapons along -the hillside and fired at area targets. Despite the blistering sun and -whine of bullets, NCO’s led their fire teams and squads up toward the -peak. - -When the Marines reached Cahill, he learned that 1 man had been killed -and 6 wounded, including Staff Sergeant Robert Robinson, platoon -sergeant, and Sergeant Thomas Blackmon, platoon guide. A number of heat -casualties were recuperating far down the slope, and one Marine had -suffered an emotional collapse. Blackmon, despite a mortal wound, had -been so intent on joining his platoon leader at the crest that four -weary men were required to carry him down the hillside to safety. Three -other able-bodied Marines also had to assist wounded men down the hill. - -Of the 52 men who had set out the previous night, only 37, including -those recovered from heat sickness, finally reached Cahill. As they -assembled on the reverse slope of 342, a group of soldiers on the -crest broke under a heavy volume of enemy fire and bolted from the -perimeter. The Army company was on the verge of panic until a young -Army lieutenant restored order and led the men back to their foxholes. - -Cahill and his remaining NCO’s crawled around the perimeter to insert -Marines in positions among those of the Army troops. This psychology -was sound, for each infantryman, eyeing his Army or Marine neighbor, -prided himself on setting a high standard of military conduct. From -that time on, every man discharged his responsibility in a most -exemplary manner. - -Two more Marines had been killed instantly while being led to their -positions by Sergeant Jack Macy. These casualties brought the platoon’s -total to 3 KIA and 8 WIA. - -It is not likely that Cahill’s men were interested enough in historic -dates to recall that it was the eighth anniversary of the Marine -landing on Guadalcanal in World War II. For at noon, the fight on Hill -342 took on aspects of a siege. Swarms of North Koreans inched upward -toward the crest, taking advantage of cover and concealment as they -kept a steady stream of rifle and machinegun fire cutting across the -hilltop. Despite the visual handicap resulting from the enemy’s use -of smokeless powder, the Marines and soldiers returned the fire with -determination. - -Due to the urgency of the situation on 342, the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, -ordered its company to remain on the crest with Cahill’s platoon. Plans -were already underway for a larger Marine force to clear the high -ground. - - -_Call for Artillery Fires_ - -In the meantime Cahill used his initiative to improve the situation. -With his SCR-300, he called for Army artillery fire to silence the -Communist mortars. When the first shells were fired for registration, -he searched the perimeter and located an artillery forward observer. -Accurate bursts were laid on likely looking mortar OP’s in enemy -territory, yet the Communist tubes continued to fire. - -With ammunition and water in critical supply, the Marine officer -radioed 3/5’s CP and requested an air drop. Taplett’s Tactical Air -Control Party relayed the message to the Brigade Air Section, and an -Air Force R4D transport flew over the restricted drop area atop Hill -342. The precious supplies tumbled from the big plane--into enemy -territory. A single recovered packet contained carbine cartridges, the -one type not needed. - -The Brigade Air Section then turned the mission over to VMO-6. -Every 5-gallon water can owned by the squadron was donated, and the -more maneuverable OY-2’s were able to drop them within the confined -perimeter. Unhappily, the containers burst upon striking the ground, -so that the parched hill defenders were able to salvage only a few -mouthfuls of water apiece. - -Sergeant Macy reacted with vigor. With Cahill’s permission, he -organized a few volunteers into a patrol to search for water. -Descending the perilous southeastern slope under fire, the little group -struck out for the village of Taepyong-ni, located along the base of -342’s eastern spur and facing Hill 99 across the valley. - -As the afternoon wore on, the Army-Marine defenders clung to their -precarious perch, despite swollen tongues and Communist fire. The enemy -had succeeded in surrounding the entire peak with a ring of fire. -Several more casualties were inflicted on the infantry company, and a -Marine machinegunner was killed instantly by a sniper who had worked -his way to the south of the perimeter. - - -_Task Force Kean Stalled_ - -Although the night of 6–7 August had been uneventful for 3/5’s front -lines around Chindong-ni, Taplett’s CP near the base of Hill 255 came -under sporadic shelling between 0100 and 0400. The first messages -from Cahill, received about 0600, caused anxiety over the fate of his -platoon.[181] - - [181] Annex How. - -At 0200 that morning, a long column of trucks had set out from -Changwon, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion, -5th Marines. The head of the convoy reached Chindong-ni about 0500 -and entered the truck turn-around in a schoolyard at the base of Hill -255.[182] As 2/5 unloaded, the turn-around became a bottleneck of -vehicles, men, and equipment which slowed movement on the MSR itself -almost to a standstill. To make matters worse, the heavy traffic -gradually pounded the schoolyard into a quagmire, so that trucks bogged -down and added to the confusion. - - [182] _Ibid._; and LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 5 Feb 54 - (Roise, 5 Feb 54). - -While Roise was assembling his battalion, the entire area came under -heavy mortar and artillery fire from the north. The sudden shelling, -which caused 2/5’s first battle casualties, brought all traffic on the -road from Changwon to an abrupt halt. - -Although the Marines of the 2d Battalion were well covered behind Hill -255, bursts from shells striking the trees high on the ridge filled -the air with fragments. Before the enemy mortars ceased, 1 Marine had -been killed and 11 wounded, including Captain George E. Kittredge, Jr., -commander of Company E.[183] - - [183] _Ibid._ - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray, whose headquarters was behind Roise’s unit -in the convoy, was still north of Chindong-ni when the column slowed -almost to a standstill. He radioed 2/5’s commander and told him to -keep the trucks moving despite the shelling. Roise replied that the -muddy schoolyard, not enemy fire, was the main cause of the delay. -Thus Murray received the first of many object lessons in Korean -geography. He sat patiently in his jeep, while the column inched into -Chindong-ni.[184] - - [184] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -After the regimental commander arrived in Chindong-ni, the 3d -Battalion, less Cahill’s platoon, reverted to his control. Because of -the battle in progress on Hill 342 and enemy activity to the north -of the village perimeter, Murray ordered 2/5 to occupy and defend an -expanse of 255 above Company H’s positions. He directed 1/5 (following -his headquarters in the column from Changwon) to occupy Hill 99, thus -relieving Company G to bolster Taplett’s lines on lower 255.[185] - - [185] Annex How. - -General Craig arrived at Chindong-ni shortly after 0700, just in time -to be warmly greeted by the enemy shelling as he stepped from his -helicopter. Since the Brigade attack scheduled for 7 August hinged on -the 5th RCT’s success at the Tosan junction, Craig quickly arranged -for a telephone line to that unit, so that his CP would be in constant -contact.[186] - - [186] LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 12 Jan 54 (Craig, 12 - Jan 54). - -News from the front was not good. At 0630, after air and artillery -preparations, the 5th RCT had jumped off on schedule. Just beyond the -line of departure, it came to a sudden halt as a result of increased -enemy activity north of the road. Elements of the NKPA 6th Division, -paying little attention to the plans of Task Force Kean, had launched -an attack of their own above the MSR. - -The situation on Hill 342 kept the entire 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, tied -down in a fight to hold the Chinju road open. With the help of Cahill’s -platoon on the crest, this mission was being accomplished; but the -battalion was temporarily lost to its regiment, and the road itself was -choked with men and vehicles unable to move.[187] - - [187] Brig SAR, basic rpt. - - -_General Craig Assumes Control_ - -The Brigade was ordered to provide a battalion for the relief of the -Army unit on Yaban-san, so that the 5th RCT could strike harder at the -road junction 2½ miles to the west.[188] - - [188] _Ibid._ - -Just as 2/5 was ascending Hill 255, Lieutenant Colonel Murray received -word from Brigade of the Marine commitment. The 5th Marines commander -canceled Roise’s orders and directed him to relieve both Cahill’s -platoon and the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, and to seize the remainder of -Hill 342.[189] - - [189] _Ibid._; and Annex How. - -At 1120 on 7 August, General Craig received a telephone message from -General Kean directing the Brigade commander to assume control of all -troops in the Chindong-ni area until further orders. With this overall -responsibility, Craig went forward to observe the 5th RCT in action. He -ascertained by personal reconnaissance that enemy resistance was light, -although few friendly gains were being made because of the scattered -and confused nature of the fighting.[190] The MSR between Sangnyong-ni, -at the base of Hill 342’s spurs, and the vital Tosan junction was -jammed with men, vehicles, and equipment, while infantrymen probed -the surrounding high ground in an effort to weed out snipers and -infiltrators. - - [190] Craig, 12 Jan 54. - -When 2/5 reached the road junction at which Cahill had been met by the -Army guide during the night, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered Company D -to move up the north fork, tracing the base of 342’s eastern spur, and -seize both the spur and great hill itself. Company E, now commanded by -1st Lieutenant William E. Sweeney, was to pass behind Sangnyong-ni and -seize the west spur. Such a deployment would leave the battalion spread -thinly, but Roise’s orders were to protect the wide valley formed by -the two long ridges. This could be done only by occupying both spurs -and 342 itself.[191] - - [191] Roise, 5 Feb 54. - -Outside of Chindong-ni, Major Morgan J. McNeely, 2d Battalion S-3, had -picked up Captain John Finn, Jr., CO of Company D, and the two officers -drove ahead by jeep to the village of Taepyong-ni at the eastern base -of Hill 342. The staff officer informed Finn that Dog Company was to -relieve a 5th RCT unit on the high ground above the clump of thatched -huts. Both McNeely and an Army guide said that the Marines would meet -no organized resistance in their climb.[192] - - [192] Capt J. Finn, Jr., ltr to authors, 1 Mar 54 (Finn, 1 Mar - 54). - -Having spent a sleepless night on the road from Changwon to -Chindong-ni, Finn’s infantrymen were fagged. It was now midafternoon, -and the heat began to take its toll of Dog Company. - -Just as the leading elements reached Finn at Taepyong-ni--30 minutes -after McNeely’s departure--the column came under rifle and machinegun -fire from the high ground above the road and from the hamlet of -Tokkong-ni across the valley on the right. The Marines thought they -were being shot at by Army troops, but the chatter of Communist -“burp guns”[193] soon convinced them that they were meeting enemy -resistance.[194] - - [193] PPS-1943, Soviet 7.62-mm. submachinegun. - - [194] Capt R. T. Hanifin ltr to authors, 15 Feb 54 (Hanifin, - 15 Feb 54). - -Finn ordered his men into the rice paddies bordering the road. Calling -his platoon leaders, he told them that there was no real intelligence, -but that the fire from Tokkong-ni would be ignored due to the company’s -mission on 342. He assigned routes of ascent to each platoon. The 2d, -under Second Lieutenant Wallace J. Reid, would push through Taepyong-ni -and on up the hill at its juncture with the spur. On the left, Second -Lieutenant Edward T. Emmelman would lead his 3d Platoon to the top of -the spur. The 1st Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Arthur A. -Oakley, would hold the right flank and ascend the southern slopes of -342 itself.[195] - - [195] _Ibid._; and Finn, 1 Mar 54. - -Company D met scattered opposition. By the time it moved over the -crest of the spur, five Marines had been wounded. The sun, however, -had been more effective; for twelve men were completely unconscious -from the 100° heat, and the rest of the company had neared the point of -exhaustion. - -Finn ordered his executive officer, First Lieutenant Robert T. Hanifin, -Jr., to set up headquarters and the 60-mm. mortars on the high ground -directly above Taepyong-ni. It was already early in the evening when -Hanifin established a thin perimeter of headquarters personnel to -safeguard the CP.[196] - - [196] Hanifin, 15 Feb 54. - -In the meantime, Finn was leading his three rifle platoons up the same -southeastern approach to 342’s summit which Cahill’s platoon had scaled -12 hours earlier. The company commander could no longer overlook the -combined effects on his men of heat and overexertion. A few hundred -yards from the summit, he radioed Roise that Company D was exhausted. -During the halt, Lieutenant Oakley climbed to the summit to contact the -Army and Marine defenders. He returned just before dark with Cahill and -the Army company commander.[197] - - [197] Finn, 1 Mar 54. - -In the hurried conference that followed, the Army officer advised Finn -against finishing the rugged climb and assured him that his soldiers -and Cahill’s platoon could defend the peak through the night. Informed -of this by radio, Roise allowed Company D to hold its present position -and relieve at dawn.[198] - - [198] _Ibid._ - -Earlier in the day, Lieutenant Sweeney had led Company E up the lower -tip of 342’s western spur, then along the ridgeline toward the large -hill mass. At intervals the company came under long range, ineffectual -machinegun fire. But, as in the case of Finn’s unit, the heat and -terrain were more damaging than enemy bullets. At dusk, Company E had -reached the midway point along the ridge, and there it dug in for the -night. - - -_Enemy Attack at Dawn_ - -Under cover of darkness, Red Korean troops wormed their way around -the little perimeter on the summit of Hill 342. Just before dawn the -soldiers and Marines were greeted by bursts of short-range rifle and -machinegun fire. The defenders returned the fire and hurled grenades -down the slopes, but a small force of North Koreans succeeded in -crawling close enough to launch an assault against the northeast leg -of the triangle.[199] - - [199] Cahill, 9 Dec 53. - -A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued at the point of contact, and the -Communists were thrown back down the hill. One of Cahill’s men died of -bayonet and gunshot wounds, and another Marine and several soldiers -were wounded.[200] - - [200] _Ibid._ - -Finn’s men struck out for the summit shortly after daybreak on 8 -August. With three platoons abreast along the southern face of 342, Dog -Company pushed upward swiftly, brushing aside light resistance. Upon -reaching the perimeter, the Marines came under a storm of fire from NK -positions which ringed the northern half of the hill.[201] - - [201] Finn, 1 Mar 54; and Roise, 5 Feb 54. - -The relief was effected, nevertheless, and Cahill’s thinned squads -descended Hill 342 together with the shattered Army company. The Marine -platoon had lost 6 killed and 12 wounded--more than a third of the 52 -men who had set out from Chindong-ni.[202] But its determined stand -with the beleaguered Army unit had saved the height and frustrated the -Communist attempts to establish a bastion overlooking the MSR. - - [202] Annex Able to Annex How. - -Company D fared no better than its predecessors at consolidating the -crest of 342 and clearing upper slopes which were crawling with North -Koreans. Finn’s unit took several casualties in the fire fight that -accompanied and followed the relief of the original defenders. Two -of those killed in action were Second Lieutenants Oakley and Reid. -The only surviving platoon leader, Lieutenant Emmelman, received -a serious head wound as he was pointing out targets to a Marine -machinegunner.[203] - - [203] Finn, 1 Mar 54; and Hanifin, 15 Feb 54. - -Captain Finn, seeing Reid’s motionless form lying ahead of the company -lines, crawled forward to recover the body. Having moved only a short -distance with his burden, the company commander himself was struck in -the head and shoulder by enemy bullets. Barely conscious and almost -blinded by blood, Finn crept back to his lines on his hands and knees. - -A corpsman administered first aid and Company D’s first sergeant -helped the officer down the steep slope.[204] On the way the pair -met Lieutenant Hanifin, who was leading company headquarters and the -mortar section to the high ground from their positions of the previous -night. Finn informed the executive officer that he was now in command -of the company.[205] - - [204] _Ibid._ - - [205] _Ibid._ - -Reaching the summit, Hanifin had just enough time to reorganize -his defensive positions and emplace the 60-mm. mortars before the -Communists launched another attack. Again Marine rifles, machineguns, -and grenades scorched the northern slopes. Again the enemy was -beaten back, leaving the hillside littered with dead. But Company -D’s casualties had mounted meanwhile to 6 killed in action and 25 -wounded.[206] - - [206] Annex How; Hanifin, 15 Feb 54; and Maj A. M. Zimmer ltr - to author, 18 Feb 54 (Zimmer, 18 Feb 54). This breakdown - of casualties is as nearly correct as can be ascertained - from recollections of participants and a comparison with - the final total given after 2/5 was relieved on position. - -About 1130, as the fire fight slackened, Roise phoned Hanifin from -his OP on the eastern spur. The conversation had no sooner begun -when the company commander collapsed from heat exhaustion. A veteran -NCO and a young officer promptly filled the command vacuum. Company -D’s gunnery sergeant, Master Sergeant Harold Reeves, assumed control -of the three rifle platoons with the confidence of long experience. -Second Lieutenant Leroy K. Wirth, a forward observer of 1/11, took -responsibility for all supporting arms, including the planes of MAG-33 -circling overhead. The NCO of almost 30 years service and the young -officer repeatedly ranged forward of the front lines to spot enemy -positions for air strikes and make new appraisals of the situation. -Company D remained steady, and never again did the North Koreans -seriously threaten the hilltop.[207] - - [207] Hanifin, 15 Feb 54. - -The 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, was scheduled to relieve 2/5 on Hill -342 during the afternoon of 8 August; but the Army unit was unable -to reach the area for reasons to be explained later. Informed of the -change in plans, Roise kept his battalion busy with consolidation of -positions and evacuation of casualties. - -Company E moved forward a few hundred yards along the western spur -of 342 and dug new foxholes. Captain Andrew M. Zimmer reported from -regiment, where he had been an assistant S-3, and took command of -Company D.[208] - - [208] Annex How. - -Although the North Koreans continued to harass the “iron triangle” on -the crest, there was no more hard fighting. A few additional casualties -were taken by Zimmer’s company, most of them occurring while Marines -tried to retrieve airdropped supplies which had fallen wide of their -mark.[209] - - [209] Zimmer, 18 Feb 54. - -During the fighting on 342, Major Walter Gall, commander of 2/5’s -Weapons Company, had dispatched a small patrol to eliminate the enemy -machineguns in Tokkong-ni. After a brief fire fight which cost three -friendly casualties, the withdrawal of the patrol left the Communists -still entrenched in the village. When the Marines returned to Weapons -Company lines on the eastern spur, First Lieutenant Ira T. Carr turned -his 81-mm. mortars on Tokkong-ni and brought the enemy fire to an -end.[210] - - [210] Maj Walter Gall interv with authors, 9 Feb 54. - -The night of 8–9 August was relatively quiet on 342. Obviously weakened -by casualties, the enemy gave the Marine positions a wide berth. -NKPA harassing fires consisted of periodic bursts from long-range -machineguns and antitank guns.[211] There was desultory sniping during -the morning of the 9th, but Brigade intelligence reported a gradual -withdrawal of the enemy northward.[212] - - [211] Zimmer, 18 Feb 54. - - [212] Brig Periodic IntelRpt No. 6. - -That afternoon Company D was relieved by an Army unit when 2/5 turned -over responsibility for the hill to the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry. -The fight had made veterans out of the men Zimmer led down to the road, -but the company paid with 8 dead and 28 wounded.[213] - - [213] Zimmer, 18 Feb 54; and Annex How. - -Documents taken from enemy dead disclosed that the defenders of Hill -342 had been opposed by elements of the 13th and 15th Regiments of the -NK 6th Division. Lieutenant Cahill qualified his report of 150 enemy -dead as “conservative,”[214] and 2/5 set the total at 400 after its -fight.[215] The actual number of fatalities inflicted by Marine-Army -infantry and supporting arms probably lies somewhere between these two -estimates. - - [214] Cahill, 9 Dec 53. - - [215] Annex How. - -At any rate, the Red Korean commander had committed at least two rifle -companies supported by machineguns, mortars and artillery. The force -thrown against Yaban-san could be estimated at 500 to 600 troops, and -they had failed in their attempt to cut the MSR.[216] - - [216] _Ibid._; and Brig Periodic IntelRpts Nos. 5 and 6. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Advance to Kosong - -_Heavy NKPA Resistance--Assault on Hill 255--Confusion at Tosan -Junction--Brigade Artillery in Support--Encounter With Japanese -Maps--Ambush at Taedabok Pass--The Seizure of Kosong_ - - -While 2/5 and the 1st Platoon of Company G were fighting the enemy -and weather on 7 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion -sat out an ominous calm at Chindong-ni. From their positions on Hills -253 and 99, Captain Fegan and Lieutenant Bohn periodically called for -supporting fires to check enemy movement in the northern approaches to -the village. - -At 1015 Second Lieutenant Lawrence W. Hetrick and his 3d Platoon, -Company A Engineers, completed the laying of the first Marine -minefield, located across the Haman road a half mile above -Chindong-ni.[217] - - [217] Annex How. - -Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion reached the village in the -afternoon of the 7th and relieved Company G’s two platoons on Hill -99. Bohn took his company back across the valley and deployed on the -lower slopes of 255 facing the Haman road. These positions were hit by -close-in sniper fire during the night of 7–8 August, and at dawn the -Marine infantrymen were startled to discover four NK soldiers emplaced -less than 100 yards away in the valley. Both the enemy position and its -occupants were quickly destroyed.[218] - - [218] _Ibid._; and Bohn, 17 Apr 50. - -Shortly after daybreak on 8 August--while Cahill was being relieved on -Yaban-san--the Marines of Company H noted a column of troops climbing -Hill 255 from the direction of the Haman road. Believing the newcomers -to be ROK soldiers, Fegan’s men watched as the long file reached the -high peak beyond the plateau forward of the Marine positions. When the -group set up facing Company H, Fegan became skeptical enough to alert -his riflemen and machinegunners. His precautions were timely, for the -visitors immediately opened fire on the Marines.[219] - - [219] Fegan, 17 Apr 54. - -This surprise attack had a critical effect on the Task Force Kean -sector. In possession of the high ground above 3/5, the North Koreans -were able to block the Masan-Chindong-ni stretch of the MSR, leaving -most of the American ground forces out on a limb for supply and -reinforcement purposes. Thus when the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, -advanced from Masan to relieve both 3/5 and 2/5 on their respective -hills, it was driven off the fire-swept road north of Chindong-ni.[220] - - [220] Brig SAR, basic rpt; and Craig, 12 Jan 54. - -Upon being informed of the enemy’s presence, Taplett ordered Company -H to attack and destroy the Communist position. Fegan called his two -platoon leaders[221] while the Marine infantrymen in the line exchanged -shots with the enemy across the plateau. After a quick briefing, -Second Lieutenant John O. Williams led his 1st Platoon to the long -tableland.[222] - - [221] The 2d Platoon was still in position east of the MSR. - - [222] Fegan, 17 Apr 54. - -Echeloned to the right, the skirmish line pushed aggressively over -the open area, firing on the enemy as it moved forward. The platoon -closed to within 30 yards of the Communist-held peak, but showers of -hand grenades and continuous machinegun fire pinned down the attackers. -Fegan sent a message forward, directing Williams to work around the -enemy’s left flank. Although one fire team succeeded in reaching the -rocks below the NK positions, the flanking maneuver failed. - - -_Heavy NKPA Resistance_ - -The 3d Platoon had taken several casualties. Marines still in the -open area were unable to advance, while those who had attempted the -envelopment could only cling to the steep slopes above the MSR. When -some of this group were struck by enemy fire, the impact sent them -rolling helplessly down the sharp incline. - -Convinced that Williams could not carry the peak, Fegan ordered him -to pull his platoon back toward the line of departure and reorganize. -While the withdrawal was in progress, the company commander ordered the -3d Platoon to pass through the 1st and continue the attack. There was -no response to the order.[223] - - [223] _Ibid._ - -Fegan realized that the men were momentarily unnerved after witnessing -the failure of the first attack. The company commander, therefore, -assumed control and personally led the 3rd Platoon forward on the -plateau. Halfway across the open area, the new skirmish line passed -through Williams’ outfit as it was reforming. - -The Marines of the 3d Platoon responded with confidence to Fegan’s -leadership. They crossed the tableland in a wedge formation with 1 -squad at the apex and the other 2 slightly withheld. Air strikes and -artillery preparations had little effect against the rocky crag beyond -the plateau, so that the final assault was fought to a finish with -small arms and grenades.[224] - - [224] _Ibid._; and Annex How. - -Staff Sergeant John I. Wheatley, one of the prime movers, fell wounded -along with several of his men. Sergeant Edward F. Barrett, shot in the -elbow and hip, lay helpless, exposed to enemy fire, until Captain Fegan -carried him back to safety. - -The 3d Platoon gained the rocky summit and worked its way through the -NKPA position, a foxhole at a time, while the enemy resisted to the -death. Corporal Melvin James[225] hit the Red Korean left flank with -his squad and drove deep into the enemy position. The NKPA right flank -was rolled up by a vigorous assault sparked by Technical Sergeant Ray -Morgan and Private First Class Donald Terrio[226] as each knocked out a -Communist machinegun and its crew. - - [225] James was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for - this action. - - [226] Morgan and Terrio received Silver Star medals. - -Having wiped out the main enemy position, the 3d Platoon advanced -northward about 200 yards to a gulf where the high ground fell -away abruptly. Beyond this depression rose the highest step of the -ridgeline’s rugged staircase: Hill 255 with a height of mote than 800 -feet above the MSR. The three squads held up here to await further -orders. - -How Company’s fight up to this time had cost the Marines 6 dead and 32 -wounded.[227] - - [227] Annex How. - - -_Assault on Hill 255_ - -A column of NKPA reinforcements bound for Hill 255 was spotted during -the action by Company G from its positions facing the Haman road. The -enemy platoon struck out across the valley from the high ground north -of Hill 99, then attempted to ascend 255 via the same route used by -comrades at dawn. - -The Marines of Company G and their supporting arms cut loose with a -hurricane of fire. And after scattering in panic, the enemy survivors -scuttled back to their starting point.[228] - - [228] Bohn, 17 Apr 54. - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray, upon being informed of the progress made -by How Company, directed Taplett to halt the attack and dig in for -the night. While Fegan’s men were carrying out this order under NKPA -artillery and mortar fire, MAG-33 and the Marine artillery roared -into action. The saddle north of How Company’s lines was pounded so -mercilessly that the enemy pulled back from Fegan’s immediate front. -Throughout the night of 8–9 August, 1/11 and 3/5’s mortar platoon -dropped a steel curtain across the battalion front, with the result -that no enemy activity was noted.[229] - - [229] Annex How. - -The systematic reduction of enemy positions on Hill 255 the next -morning was a triumph of supporting arms. Marine artillery shells led -off at 0825, followed by Marine air which worked the enemy over with -the first close-support payload of napalm recorded so far in the Korean -conflict. And four minutes before Company H launched its final attack -on the hill, airborne TAC reported the objective neutralized.[230] - - [230] _Ibid._ - -Fegan’s men scaled the peak against negligible opposition. Two -knocked-out machineguns and a few enemy dead were all that remained at -the summit.[231] - - [231] Fegan, 17 Apr 54. - -The plan for eliminating the threat to the MSR called for a Marine -advance along Hill 255 to grid line 1350. North of this boundary, the -ridge would be cleared by Army troops approaching from Masan. - -Company H sighted soldiers of the 24th Infantry at 1125 as they moved -southward to the grid line, and the long ridge was considered secure. -It had been no light price, however, that 3/5 paid to open the MSR. -Casualties on Hill 255 totalled 16 dead and 36 wounded, and since -nearly all had been taken by Company H, Fegan’s outfit was reduced by -25 percent.[232] - - [232] Annex How. - - -_Confusion at Tosan Junction_ - -On the whole, Task Force Kean’s scheduled drive on Chinju and Sachon -had not met with much success during the first 48 hours. The only -advance was made on the right, where the 35th Infantry seized its first -objective and inflicted an estimated 350 casualties on the enemy.[233] - - [233] Annexes 1 and 3 to 25th InfDiv War Diary, Book VIII. - -In his capacity as provisional commander of all units along the -Masan-Chinju axis, General Craig was directing the Army operations at -the front and in the rear areas of the Task Force sector. Thus on 8 -August he ordered the 5th RCT to continue its attack and take Tosan, so -that his Marines could make progress on the road to Sachon. - -After preparatory fires, the Army regiment again pushed forward toward -its immediate objective. Enemy resistance was much heavier than on -the day before; nevertheless, some gains were made from the starting -point near the village of Singi. The attack was also slowed by the -narrow MSR carrying the entire traffic load for the Task Force. Heavy -fighting above the road on Hills 255 and 342 added to the congestion -and confusion on the vital artery. - -Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been -ordered to move forward from Chindong-ni at 0600, 8 August, with -the mission of attacking along the south fork of the Tosan junction -preparatory to seizing a regimental objective which would be designated -later.[234] - - [234] Annex How; Brig Op Plan 5-50; and Col G. R. Newton, ltr - to author, 3 Jan 54 (Newton, 3 Jan 54). - -Leaving its positions on Hill 99 at the assigned time, the battalion -was stalled immediately at the bridges on the MSR below. The road was -still clogged with soldiers and Army vehicles, making it impossible for -the Marine unit to proceed.[235] - - [235] LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 30 Dec 53 (Olson, - 30 Dec 53). - -General Craig, who was in the vicinity, told Newton to hold up until -the situation at the front became clarified. Company B, commanded by -Captain John L. Tobin, was ordered back up on the hill it had just -descended; and the battalion waited, three miles from its line of -departure.[236] - - [236] Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 19 Jan 54 (Newton, 19 - Jan 54). - -Finally the word came to move up. While 1/5 worked its way along -the crowded road, Newton walked ahead and reached the CP of the 1st -Battalion, 5th RCT, located on a hillside between Singi and Oryong. -There he learned that the Army unit’s companies were already on the -high ground all around the junction and that the rice paddies between -the battalion CP and these companies were full of North Koreans. The -Army commander considered his subordinate units cut off.[237] - - [237] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -Shortly afterwards, at about 1400, the head of 1/5’s column reached -Newton and again came to a halt, a mile and a half from its line of -departure. - -Arriving on the scene at this time was a dispirited Army staff -sergeant, dripping with mud and water. He said that he had just -returned from Hill 308, south of the road junction, where his unit was -heavily engaged with the enemy. And he added that Communist machineguns -covering the wide rice paddy between 308 and the MSR had forced him to -crawl almost the whole distance.[238] - - [238] Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray, while driving from Chindong-ni to the -front, was stopped on the road by Major General Kean himself. The 25th -Division commander directed the Marine officer to arrange for a night -relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT. Kean stated that he would inform -Brigade headquarters of this change in plans as soon as possible.[239] - - [239] Col R. L. Murray, ltr to author, 7 Jan 54 (Murray, 7 Jan - 54). - -It had become a question as to whether Task Force Kean or the NKPA 6th -Division controlled Tosan. Newton radioed the 5th Marines commander and -asked for enlightenment. Murray, having just finished his conversation -with General Kean, ordered the battalion commander to postpone the -jumpoff until nightfall.[240] - - [240] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -After withdrawing to the outskirts of Sangnyong-ni, 1/5 went into an -assembly area beneath the western spur of Hill 342. There the battalion -commander received specific orders to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th -RCT, on positions southwest of Tosan at midnight, 8 August, and secure -the troublesome road junction once and for all.[241] - - [241] Annex How; Brig Op Plan 6-50; and Newton, 3 Jan 54. - -Newton was to have his battalion at the Army CP no later than 2300, -when it would be furnished guides to lead the way across the broad rice -paddy to Hill 308. As it proved, the Marine unit actually reached the -designated rendezvous at 2200. But even though an hour early, Newton -discovered that the soldiers on 308 were already withdrawing. Moreover, -no guides had been provided.[242] - - [242] Newton, 3 Jan 54 and 19 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -The Marine battalion continued westward through Singi and stopped on -the MSR about a half-mile short of Tosan. Here a narrow dike branched -south from the road, and the soldiers were returning along this trail -from Hill 308 to the MSR. Since the footpath was pointed out as -Newton’s route of approach, he had little choice but to wait until the -Army troops made the crossing. This was accomplished shortly after -midnight, and the column of Marines was left alone in the night on -unfamiliar ground reported to be crawling with enemy.[243] - - [243] _Ibid._ - -The promised guides reported for duty at this time. They turned out -to be two South Korean civilians. Without further ado, the advance on -Sachon was launched when a long single file of skeptical Marines fell -in behind two unknown natives whose loyalty had to be accepted on faith. - -Following the 1,200-yard trail in the darkness was time-consuming as -well as nerve-chilling. A misstep on the narrow, slippery dike usually -meant a spill into the muck and filth of the paddy for some hapless -infantryman. Not only would he delay all those behind, but he would -not be as fragrant as a rose in the nostrils of his comrades when he -regained the dike. - -Finally the head of the file reached the base of Hill 308, having -encountered not a single enemy on the way. As more and more men -threaded their way in from the paddy, tactical integrity was slowly -regained. Dawn of 9 August was already breaking when the rear of the -column completed the crossing.[244] - - [244] Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -Daybreak brought a radio message from Murray, directing 1/5 to continue -the attack to the southwest immediately and seize Hill 308. With -Tobin’s company leading, the battalion ascended the northern slopes -in a long column. The climb took the Marines more than 1,000 feet -upward and 2,000 yards to the south. Before the summit was reached, the -relentless sun and terrain had taken its toll of Newton’s infantrymen. -Fortunately, enemy resistance amounted to mere sniping; and by noon, 9 -August, the massive terrain feature belonged to the Brigade.[245] - - [245] _Ibid._ - -At 1700 that afternoon Craig’s operational control of all troops in the -area came to a close. At the end of the 54-hour period of the Marine -general’s overall command, the road junction had been cleared, and both -Army and Marine columns were making progress toward the objective. - - -_Brigade Artillery in Support_ - -Nearly all the infantry actions of the first 3 days owed a good deal -to the support of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Consisting of three -4-gun batteries, Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood’s outfit had -relieved the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at Chindong-ni on the eve -of D-day. Since the terrain afforded no suitable alternate areas, the -Marine gunners moved into the positions vacated by the Army artillery, -partly in the village and partly on the outskirts. - -A total of 87 rounds were fired that first night in support of the 5th -Marines, with the FO’s reporting good results. Before long, however, -enemy counterbattery fires searched out friendly positions in the -village. Early the next morning a Marine battery took a direct hit from -an NKPA 122-mm. shell. Two men were killed and 8 wounded by a blast -which destroyed a 105-mm. howitzer. Thus, reversing the usual rule, the -artillery suffered heavier casualties than the infantry at the jumpoff -of the Brigade attack.[246] - - [246] Annex Item to Brig SAR. - -The gunners needed no further admonitions to dig foxholes, gunpits and -ammunition pits. During the confused fighting around Chindong-ni, it -was not unusual to have one battery laid on an azimuth generally east, -another west, and a third to the north. - -“I think that this is one of the most important lessons we learned in -fighting infiltrating troops,” commented Wood; “artillery must be able -and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment’s notice.”[247] - - [247] LtCol Ransom M. Wood, “Artillery Support for the Brigade - in Korea,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 35, No. 6:16–17 (Jun - 51). - -From 7 to 9 August, with the battalion displacing forward as the -infantry advanced, 89 missions and 1,892 rounds were fired. Targets -consisted largely of enemy mortar positions. The terrain offered some -knotty problems in firing close support missions, due to steep slopes; -but the OY’s of VMO-6 did a good job of spotting. - -Fifty ROK policemen were attached to 1/11 at this time to be used as -security troops. Wearing bright green uniforms and rubber shoes upon -arrival, they became the responsibility of the battalion to feed, -equip and train in marksmanship, sanitation and ammunition handling. -The rice-eating Koreans turned up their noses at American food for -a few days, but soon they could compete with any chow-hounds in the -outfit.[248] - - [248] _Ibid._ - -Another difficulty was experienced in convincing the newcomers that -NKPA prisoners were to be brought in alive. Many personal scores -remained to be paid off in war-torn Korea, but eventually the ROK’s -learned to control their hatred for the invaders. - - -_Encounter With Japanese Maps_ - -As the men of 1/5 were consolidating their hilltop and searching -for water to relieve heat prostration cases, Murray radioed Newton -to withdraw his unit to the road below and continue the attack to -Paedun-ni. The regimental commander was determined to speed up the -advance to the south, since intelligence had reported no enemy on the -high ground south of Hill 308.[249] - - [249] Murray, 7 Jan 54. - -With almost half of Companies A and B stricken by heat sickness, Newton -had no choice but to leave them in position on the high ground for -the time being. He descended the hill to form a tactical column with -Headquarters and Weapons Companies and an attached platoon of tanks. - -Reaching the low ground northwest of Hill 308, the battalion commander -discovered that his Japanese maps, as usual, bore only a slight -resemblance to the actual ground. - -During the early weeks in Korea, the map situation was a thorn in the -side of every tactical commander. Not only were maps of local areas -extremely scarce, but the few available were of early Japanese vintage, -almost consistently at variance with the terrain. Grid systems were -confusing, villages misnamed and misplaced, and roads either not -illustrated at all or else plotted inaccurately. Lack of contouring -left the conformation and extent of ridges entirely to the imagination -of the map reader. These shortcomings were a constant source of -concern; for troop leaders often were misled, even to the extent of -getting completely lost. - -On the ground itself, there is an intersection called Oso-ri some 600 -yards south of the Tosan junction. The routes leading both south and -west from this crossroads go to Paedun-ni. An unimproved road, the -southward passage is more rugged, while the other, being good by Korean -standards, follows a smoother course through the town of Taesil-li. - -Newton’s map showed only the latter improved road, so he formed his -column and headed it toward Taesil-li, a thousand yards west of the -intersection.[250] Murray’s map showed both roads, but in this case -the southern route was erroneously drawn in as the better road. It was -thus Murray’s intention that 1/5 use this avenue of approach. And since -he had spoken of it as the “improved” road, Newton was misled into -choosing the route to Taesil-li.[251] - - [250] Newton, 3 Jan 53. - - [251] _Ibid._; and Murray, 7 Jan 54. - -The quickly formed column of tanks and infantry had gone only a few -hundred yards when the point stopped at a stretch of road littered with -land mines. A call went out for a demolitions team. From his CP near -Chindong-ni, Captain George W. King dispatched his 1st Platoon, Able -Company Engineers. Arriving at the scene, the Marine troubleshooters -discovered the obstacles to be merely American antitank mines, -apparently spilled on the road from an Army vehicle. - -About this time. Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at Oso-ri and -informed 1/5’s commander that he was on the wrong road. Newton reasoned -that his unit was following the correct route. After comparing the -conflicting maps, the regimental commander studied the terrain and -directed Newton to pull his column back and take the road to the south. -Then Murray returned to Sangnyong-ni, climbed into an observation -plane, and was flown over the route to confirm his decision.[252] - - [252] Murray, 7 Jan 54. - -There was no small amount of confusion as the long column of tanks, -infantrymen, and engineers pulled back along the narrow road to the -intersection. And it was unfortunate for 1/5 that General Craig reached -the area while the milling was at its worst. Unaware of what had taken -place earlier, the Brigade commander did not refer to the delay and -congestion in the most soothing terms.[253] - - [253] Craig, 12 Jan 54. - -While the column was being reformed on the southern road, villagers -from Taesil-li informed the Marines that a badly wounded American was -lying in the hamlet. Craig’s jeep driver sped to the clump of thatched -huts and returned with a soldier who was more dead than alive, having -been left behind by retreating NKPA forces. The man was rushed to the -rear for medical attention, while Craig stayed forward to supervise the -attack.[254] - - [254] _Ibid._; and Newton, 19 Jan 54. - -The long file of Marines and tanks began moving southward along the -winding road below Hill 308. Newton had notified his company commanders -of the change, so that they could meet him by descending the western -slope of the high ground. - -About a mile south of the confusing intersection, the point of 1/5’s -column rounded a sharp curve. It was greeted by a lone North Korean -machinegun hidden in a native hut at the center of the bend. While -a Marine brigadier watched with professional satisfaction, a team -of infantrymen with a rocket launcher closed on the hut and quickly -destroyed the enemy position. - -It was late afternoon as the column resumed its march to the south. -Covering several hundred more yards without incident, it reached the -top of a 400-foot pass where the road knifed between Hills 308 and 190. -There Newton was joined by Companies A and B from Objective One.[255] -The 1st Battalion was ordered to hold up and take defensive positions -astride the pass. - - [255] Olson, 30 Dec 53. - -Thus, the drive toward Sachon had finally taken shape, and the Brigade -was entering its own zone of responsibility. As darkness fell on -9 August, 1/5 was in position 2 miles south of the Tosan line of -departure, and General Craig had already set in motion plans for a -night attack. - - -_Ambush at Taedabok Pass_ - -On 9 August the Brigade commander was convinced that the absence of -resistance in 1/5’s path indicated unpreparedness on the part of the -enemy. To exploit the advantage, he ordered Murray to execute a night -attack and capture Paedun-ni before daylight, 10 August.[256] - - [256] Brig Op Plan 7-50. - -At 1600 on 9 August, the Brigade was relieved of mopping up duties in -the Chindong-ni area, leaving 2/5 immediately available to the 5th -Marines commander. The 3d Battalion was delayed overnight by several -hours of security duty until Army units could take over.[257] - - [257] This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan - 54; Zimmer, 18 Feb 54; Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54; and - Gall, 9 Feb 54. - -Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion, having been relieved on Hill -342, entrucked at Sangnyong-ni in the evening and reached its assembly -area near Hill 308 at 2100. Two hours later the unit marched southward -on the new MSR to make the night attack on Paedun-ni. Passing through -1/5’s lines at 0115, 10 August, the weary Marines pressed on toward -their target against no resistance. - -The point of the column included three M-26’s of First Lieutenant -William D. Pomeroy’s tank platoon. At 0500, with the advance elements -only a short distance from Paedun-ni, the lead tank crashed through -a concrete bridge. The badly damaged vehicle proved to be wedged -immovably between the two abutments. - -The second tank, while attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next to -the bridge, threw a track in the center of the stream and stalled the -long column behind. Two hours elapsed before the advance could be -resumed. South Korean laborers constructed a bypass for light vehicles -next to the bridge, and an engineer tractor-dozer arrived to build a -detour for heavy trucks and tanks. - -[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE - -SITUATION MAP FOR 8–10 AUG. ’50] - -Reaching Paedun-ni at 0800, 2/5 reconnoitered the town and found it -clear of enemy. By 0930 the battalion column was reformed and pounding -the dusty road south. - -Murray decided to shuttle troops by truck from Paedun-ni to Kosong, -since the 8-mile stretch was believed to be free of enemy. The heavier -vehicles being tied up at the collapsed bridge, some delay resulted in -motorizing the first increment of 2/5. - -General Craig arrived on the scene by helicopter in mid-morning. Not -satisfied with the progress of the advance, he ordered Murray and Roise -to march on Kosong with “all speed.” When the infantry column was a -short distance out of Paedun-ni, the 5th Marines commander managed to -get five 2½-ton trucks forward to help transport the first serial to -the target. - -A motorized column was formed of 4 lead jeeps carrying a Reconnaissance -Company detachment, followed by part of Company D aboard 6 more jeeps -and the 5 trucks. Owing to the shortage of vehicles, Captain Zimmer’s -first echelon included only the 1st and 2d Platoons, the 60-mm. -mortars, an assault squad, and one machinegun section. - -Lacking either air or artillery support, the column rolled southward -with orders to occupy Kosong and coordinate a defense of the city with -its mayor. The remainder of 2/5 continued on foot until more vehicles -could be provided. - -The road makes a sharp turn 2½ miles southwest of Paedun-ni to climb -through Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards long. Just beyond, -at the village of Pugok, a sharp turn to the left skirts the base of a -large hill overlooking the entire length of the pass. - -The first jeep of the reconnaissance detachment was almost abreast of -Pugok at 1500 when NKPA machineguns opened up from the big hill at the -bend. Enemy automatic weapons on the high ground above the pass raked -the vehicles filled with Dog Company men. - -As the Marines were taking cover in roadside ditches, a Communist -antitank gun opened fire from the large hill and hit one of the jeeps. -The reconnaissance troops gradually withdrew from their exposed -positions and fell back on Zimmer’s group. After sizing up the -situation, the Company D commander ordered his 1st Platoon to seize -the high ground on the right side of the road about midway through the -pass. No resistance was met, so that the Marines set up their weapons -quickly and returned the Communist fire. Meanwhile the 2d Platoon -moved up on the right after clearing small enemy groups from the high -ground on both sides of the road at the entrance to the defile. - -Zimmer had spotted the location of the enemy’s antitank gun, and Marine -60-mm. fire put an end to this nuisance. The effort used up all the -mortar ammunition, and the Company D commander decided to wait in -position for Brigade supporting arms. Two tanks arrived at 1630, and -their 90-mm. guns drove the enemy into hiding. - -While Marine tanks and air were working over the hill, 3/5 reached -Paedun-ni after being relieved of its final security mission in the -Chindong-ni area. Murray ordered Taplett to be prepared to pass through -2/5 and continue the attack. - -The 3d Battalion reached the entrance to Taedabok Pass in trucks -shortly after the arrival of the 2d Battalion troops who had followed -their motorized column on foot. Some confusion resulted on the narrow -road after Murray’s arrival while he waited to confer with Taplett. -Unable to find Roise, the two officers climbed the high ground on the -left. From this vantage point they could see Kosong, 5 miles away. The -regimental commander ordered Taplett to pass through 2/5 immediately -and continue the attack. - -Company G had already crossed the line of departure and was deploying -to assault the hill at the road bend when Murray located Roise in -Zimmer’s area to the right of the road. The exact location of enemy -positions remained in some doubt. In order to clear up the uncertainty, -Major McNeely volunteered to lead out a patrol. About 1730, therefore, -Roise’s S/3 took off in a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team -from Dog Company. - -By this time, Taplett had a fairly accurate picture of the situation in -mind. From his OP on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw -that McNeely was headed for danger. The 3/5 commander radioed Bohn to -stop the jeep, but it was too late. McNeely and his men vanished from -sight around the bend where the road skirted the large hill, and the -Marines heard a furious clatter of machinegun and small arms fire. - -The fate of the patrol remained in doubt as Company G moved out to the -attack, with First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon in the lead. -Communist fire held up the advance, but Bohn sent Second Lieutenant -Edward F. Duncan’s platoon on a sweeping envelopment to the right which -outflanked the enemy and drove him from the high ground. Westerman was -then able to reach the crest with his platoon. From this position he -could see McNeely’s bullet-riddled jeep, but that officer and his five -men were stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and behind the -vehicle. - -[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE - -10 AUG. 1950 - -SHOWING PAEDUN-NI & TAEDABOK PASS] - -[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE - -11 AUG. 1950 - -SHOWING KOSONG] - -At great risk, Westerman made a dash to the jeep and brought back -McNeely, mortally wounded. Enemy fire prevented further rescues, but -it was ascertained that 3 men had been killed outright and 2 severely -wounded. These survivors could only continue to take cover behind the -wrecked vehicle until 3/5 troops advanced. - -When Company G jumped off again, the men were held up by two concealed -machineguns at the far end of the road bend. Taplett committed How -Company on the left side of the MSR, and Fegan seized the hill opposite -Bohn’s position. It was almost dark before the Marines could silence -the 2 enemy machineguns around the bend, and at 2015 Murray ordered 3/5 -to secure for the night and defend the 2 hills already occupied. On -the premise that the enemy had prepared an ambush for rescue parties -approaching the wrecked jeep, it was decided to wait until morning to -bring back the wounded men. - - -_The Seizure of Kosong_ - -The night passed quietly except for scattered rifle fire along the 3d -Battalion’s 700-yard front. To carry out General Craig’s orders for -11 August, the two rifle companies prepared to continue the attack on -Kosong at first light.[258] - - [258] This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan - 54; Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54 (with comments by LtCol - R. D. Taplett). - -The enemy had different plans. At the crack of dawn a small force of -North Koreans emerged from the fog and charged recklessly into Company -G’s front. There was a furious hand-to-hand clash as the attackers -converged on Bohn’s OP in the center of the line. The company commander -directed the defense amid grenade explosions, one of which drove a -fragment into his shoulder. At his side Staff Sergeant Charles F. -Kurtz, Jr., called down effective 60-mm. mortar fire on the Reds while -throwing grenades and ducking submachinegun bursts. - -The melee ended after a half hour with Company G driving the battered -remnants of the NKPA platoon back down the hill Despite his wound, Bohn -stayed with his company and reorganized it for the attack on Kosong. -He also had the satisfaction of overseeing the evacuation of the two -wounded survivors of McNeely’s ill-fated patrol. - -At 0800, the Brigade moved out in a route column, with 3/5 as the -advance guard and Company G in the role of advance party. Bohn’s point -consisted of Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman’s 3d Platoon, whose -leading element, under Corporal Raymond Giaquinto, was on the MSR with -flank guards slightly withheld on each side. - -The Brigade column moved swiftly. About a mile beyond the line of -departure, Giaquinto braked his roadbound unit in the face of doubtful -ground ahead. Simultaneously, the flank guards surged forward and -wrapped around the suspected area. Then Giaquinto’s force raced -down the road, and the 3 prongs of the point converged on an enemy -machinegun emplacement, killing the 5 occupants before they could fire -a shot. - -With Bohn calling the shots and Giaquinto setting the pace, the point -swept aside three more enemy positions along the route. The effective -combination of limited frontal attacks and envelopments brought the -head of the column to the bridge north of Kosong at 1000. Here Company -H passed through on the road and pushed into the town. - -Using 1 rifle platoon and 2 tanks, Fegan easily cleared northern Kosong -of light resistance. Then he gradually wheeled his force to the right, -tracing the road to Sachon. His other two platoons continued southward -with the mission of seizing a high hill below Sunam-dong. - -General Craig reached Kosong by jeep just as Taplett was setting up his -CP in a schoolyard north of the town. A small group of enemy snipers -suddenly opened up from positions in and around the schoolhouse, and -the Brigade commander observed sniper teams of 3/5’s headquarters -spring into action and destroy the North Koreans. - -Shortly after Fegan entered Kosong, Bohn swung his company to the -southwest from above the town, drove through the western suburbs and -launched an attack against Hill 88 below the Sachon road. Approaching -the hill, Company G sustained a few casualties while eliminating a -stubborn Communist pocket in the low ground on its right flank. - -MAG-33 preceded the attack on Hill 88 with a thundering air strike -on 100 enemy entrenched along the crest. This attack coupled with a -thorough shelling by 1/11, shattered the Reds’ will to fight, and -Company G found only evidence of a hasty flight when it reached the -summit at 1330. - -General Craig ordered Taplett to cancel all further missions around -the captured town and attack toward Sachon immediately. Company G was -quickly recalled from Hill 88; the high ground above Sunam-dong was -ignored, and Fegan assembled his unit at the western edge of Kosong -preparatory to leading the attack. - -Just as Company H was reforming, a jeep ambulance driven by Corpsman -William H. Anderson raced into the area to pick up casualties from -Bohn’s earlier skirmish below Hill 88. Passing through Fegan’s troops, -the vehicle failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sachon. -Two enemy antitank guns lying in wait west of Kosong blasted the jeep -as it rounded a bend, killing Anderson and spilling two passengers out -of the wrecked vehicle. - -Fegan led two M-26 tanks to the bend, and Technical Sergeant Johnnie C. -Cottrell quickly destroyed the North Korean position. Three rounds from -his 90-mm. gun wiped out the last NKPA opposition in the area, and the -3d Battalion moved out for the drive on Sachon. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -Fight on Two Fronts - -_The Kosong Turkey Shoot--The Changchon Ambush--Marines Ordered -to New Sector--Attack of 3/5 to the Rear--Enemy Dawn Attack at -Changchon--Breaking Off Action_ - - -Marine air and artillery had a field day on 11 August 1950 that the -rifle companies will never forget. The occasion was known as “the -Kosong Turkey Shoot,” and it was a victory won entirely by supporting -arms. - -It happened just as 3/5 was about to enter Kosong. As a preliminary, -1/11 was called upon just before noon for preparatory fires. Shells -from the 105’s landed in the town, sending up geysers of rubble in the -bright sunlight. Then, suddenly, the Marine artillery flushed out a -column of enemy vehicles making a frantic dash for safety. - -This flight explains the light resistance which the Marine infantry met -in Kosong. But the enemy could hardly have chosen a less propitious -moment, for he had merely escaped from the frying pan into the fire. -Overhead, to his sorrow, was a division of VMF-323 planes from the -_Badoeng Strait_, which the forward TACP had sent on a search and -attack mission just beyond the town.[259] Major Lund and his pilots -were thus presented with a fabulous target of opportunity--an estimated -100 vehicles of the NKPA 83d Motorcycle Regiment, including jeeps, -motorcycles and troop-carrying trucks.[260] - - [259] VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50. - - [260] Estimates as to the number of vehicles vary widely. - Apparently no exact count was ever made. - - -_The Kosong Turkey Shoot_ - -The Corsairs came screaming down in low-level strafing runs the -entire length of the column for the purpose of bringing it to a halt. -Vehicles crashed into one another or piled up in the ditch while enemy -troops scrambled out for cover. The Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles -were now sitting ducks for F4U’s which worked over individual targets -with rocket or 20-mm. fire. After the Marine planes had set about 40 -vehicles on fire, they were relieved by another flight of VMF-323 -machines and Air Force F-51’s which added the finishing touches to the -picture of destruction.[261] - - [261] Ernest Giusti, “Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, No. 5:20–21 (May 52). - -Under the circumstances the enemy put up a creditable fight. Lund and -his low-flying pilots encountered fierce small arms and automatic -weapons fire. Two of the four Corsairs in the first flight were badly -damaged and had to try for emergency landings. Lieutenant Doyle Cole -ditched into the bay just as General Craig was making a tour of -inspection by helicopter; and the Brigade commander operated the hoist -which pulled the dripping flier up to safety. - -Captain Vivian Moses was not so fortunate. While putting his crippled -plane down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious from the -cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy a few minutes before a VMO-6 -helicopter arrived. Only the day before, this gallant Marine pilot -had been rescued by helicopter, after being shot down behind the NKPA -lines, and flown back unhurt to his carrier. Despite this experience, -Captain Moses volunteered for duty on 11 August, when he became the -first death casualty of MAG-33. - -Several hours later, after securing Kosong and resuming the attack -toward Sachon, the Marine ground forces caught up with the scene of -chaos left by the F4U’s. Among the twisted and charred vehicles were -some that the enemy had abandoned in perfect condition. Tolerant -NCO’s relaxed discipline for a moment while their men tried out the -motorcycles with sidecars and the sleek, black Soviet jeeps, most of -which had gone into the attack practically new. Almost identical in -design to American jeeps, these vehicles were found to be powered by -familiar Ford-type engines--a throwback to United States Lend Lease to -Russia in World War II. - -Generals Craig and Cushman surveyed the wreckage from a helicopter -next day. This strike, however, was only one of the more dramatic -examples of the Brigade air-ground team in action. MAG-33 aircraft -were constantly orbiting on station over the front line as the ground -forces advanced. Flown by infantry-trained pilots briefed on the local -ground situation, the Corsairs were available for employment on short -notice. It was a simple and flexible system; and the fact that VMF-214 -and VMF-323 were based on the two carriers meant that they could arrive -on station with more fuel and ordnance for strikes as compared to -Japan-based squadrons.[262] - - [262] This summary of tactical air operations is derived from - MCBS, I-IV-B, 9–14; Maj George J. King, interv with - author, n. d. - -Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea was exercised -by the Fifth Air Force. Marine aviation units, as components of an -integrated Fleet Marine Force, operated in support of the Brigade as -their highest priority, and in support of other UN forces as a lower -priority. After checking in with Fifth AF TACC at the Joint Operations -Center (JOC), Marine aviation units came under Marine operational -control when supporting Brigade ground forces. When providing tactical -air support for other UN forces, Marine air units operated under the -Air Force-Army system for tactical air support. - -The Brigade control organization included 3 battalion TACP’s and 1 -regimental TACP, each consisting of an officer and 6 enlisted men, -and each equipped with a radio jeep, portable radios and remoting -equipment. MAG-33 provided a Brigade control agency consisting of the -Air Support Section of MTACS-2. Other Brigade units associated with -control of aircraft were: - -(1) The Air Section of the Brigade Staff, consisting of the Brigade -Air officer and six enlisted men responsible for planning as well as -tactical control and coordination of supporting aircraft; - -(2) The Brigade observation section, consisting of the tactical air -observer, three gunnery observers, and the OY and rotary-wing aircraft -of VMO-6. - -Carrier-based Marine aviation units maintained a TAC and one or more -flights of aircraft on station during daylight hours. Night heckler -and intruder missions of VMF(N)-513 from Itazuke reported to the Fifth -AF TACC and were routed by that agency to the Air Support Section -(MTACS-2) with the Brigade. During the early Brigade operations, -with the Air Force TACC located at Taegu, delays of incoming flights -reporting to JOC were caused by overloaded communications nets. An -improvement resulted when such flights by-passed JOC and reported -directly to the Air Support Section of Brigade. And when JOC moved -back to Pusan, improved communications resulted in incoming flights -reporting first to JOC again. - -The Brigade control agency (Air Support Section) made use of the -following communications for the control of tactical air operations: - -(1) TAR net connecting battalion TACP’s, the regimental TACP, and the -Air Support Section, and monitored by the Brigade Air Section. This was -an HF net. - -(2) TAD net connecting above-named agencies as well as TAC flights of -support aircraft and on occasion the TAO. This was a VHF net of four -frequencies used to brief and control aircraft reporting for support -missions. - -(3) TAO net connecting observation aircraft, the Brigade CP (Air -Section) and the Air Support Section. This was an HF net. - -(4) An administrative (HF) net connecting the Air Support Section and -the carriers _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. - -The workings of the control organization of the Brigade air-ground team -in the Pusan Perimeter have been described as follows in the survey of -the Marine Corps Board Study: - - “Battalion TACP’s made requests for air support missions direct by - TAR net to the Air Support Section. The regimental TACP and Brigade - Air Section monitored this net. The Brigade control agency having - received a request for a mission, contacted the TAC and the Flight - Leader (FL) of the aircraft orbiting on station awaiting a mission. - The TAC and the FL were then directed to the vicinity of the TACP - from whom the request had originated. - - “The TACP controlled the execution of the mission in accordance with - the wishes of the battalion commander. The TACP gave the location of - the target to the TAC. The latter designated the target to the FL and - his flight of supporting aircraft. The unit being supported marked - its front lines. The TAC directed the attacking aircraft in making - attacks on the target. His directions related to the technique of - attacking specific targets with aircraft. Control of the attack was - exercised by the ground unit being supported. - - “In many instances the TAC or the TAO would locate targets not yet - located by ground units. This was often done in response to a request - from ground units. Both the TAC and TAO located targets beyond the - vision of ground units, and both were capable of, and did, designate - these targets to flights of supporting aircraft and directed attacks - on such targets, when requested to do so by ground units. Conditions - favored delegating control to forward TACP’s beyond convenient VHF - range between them and the Brigade (Air Support Section). Brigade - attack formations frequently consisted of battalions in column. - The forward battalion was free to employ air support at a moment’s - notice.” - -This was the situation on the afternoon of 11 August 1950 as the 3d -Battalion of the 5th Marines attacked toward Sachon, followed by 2/5 -in trace. Overhead a flight of VMF-323 Corsairs orbited on station, -and OY observers reported the enemy to be pulling back rapidly toward -Sachon. - -How Company led the Marine attack, with lead tanks employing -reconnaissance by fire. At 1800, after the column had covered several -miles, a lone enemy machinegun in a valley on the left held up the -advance by wounding three Marines. By the time the tanks silenced the -weapon with .50-caliber fire, it was decided to halt. Taplett deployed -his battalion on two hills north of the road, and the infantrymen -settled down for a quiet night. - -The gravel crunchers could thank air and other supporting arms for -an impressive demonstration of power that day. There was even the -suggestion of an amphibious operation in the Brigade advance, for -an LST followed the column and anchored near the fishing village of -Tanghong-ni after the securing of Kosong. - -This was LST QO119, a supply ship manned by Team No. 1 of Major William -L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion. Team No. 2 set -up forward dumps along the MSR as the infantry advanced, while No. 3 -unloaded supplies and equipment at the Masan railhead. Shore Party -personnel also assisted in salvage operations, which were conducted -mainly at Changwon.[263] - - [263] Annex Mike to Brig SAR. - -LST QO119 was not only the workhorse of normal Shore Party missions; -it served also as an improvised hospital ship. For the Medical Section -and Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, had an extra responsibility these -sweltering days in caring for victims of heat prostration as well as -the wounded. Thus it may have set some sort of a record when casualties -were evacuated at one time by land, sea and air--motor ambulance, LST -and helicopter. - - -_The Changchon Ambush_ - -At sundown on 11 August, as Taplett’s battalion dug in for the night -on the road to Sachon, the enemy seemed to be disorganized if not -actually demoralized. For the first time since the invasion began, a -sustained Eighth Army counterattack had not only stopped the Red Korean -steamroller but sent it into reverse. - -With the Marines a day’s march from Sachon, the Army 5th RCT was -running a dead heat on the shorter Chinju route to the north, where -opposition had been light the last 2 days. It might even have appeared -on the evening of the 11th that the combined operation had turned -into a friendly rivalry between two outfits racing toward their final -objective by parallel roads. But any such assumption would have been -premature, as General Craig and his staff well realized. They looked -for further resistance and were not disillusioned. Within the next 48 -hours, in fact, Craig’s men were destined to carry out one of the most -astonishing operations in the history of the Marine Corps--simultaneous -BLT attacks in opposite directions on two fronts 25 miles apart. - -There was no hint of any such development at 0630 on the morning of 12 -August, when the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines passed through the -3d Battalion with a mission of seizing Sachon. If anything, the front -was too quiet to suit veteran NCO’s, who suspected the enemy of being -up to no good. The column moved out behind a 15-man detachment of Recon -Company acting as the point under the command of Captain Kenneth J. -Houghton. Next came Baker Company with the 1st, 2d, and 3d Platoons in -that order. Two Marine tanks were sandwiched in between the 1st and 2d -Platoons, and three more M-26’s brought up the rear of Captain Tobin’s -company, followed by the main body of the battalion. - -No opposition awaited the column. This unnatural calm continued for -4½ hours as the Marines advanced about 11 miles. At noon, with Sachon -only 4 miles away, Houghton and the point rounded a bend into the -thatched-hut hamlet of Changchon. The first enemy soldiers of the day -were sighted when two skulking figures took cover. Several Marines -opened fire, and in reply the hills on both sides of the road erupted -into flame.[264] - - [264] This section is derived from: Brig SAR, 5th Marines, - 1st Bn rpt; Maj John L. Tobin, ltr to author, 26 Apr 54 - (Tobin, 26 Apr 54); Maj John R. Stevens, ltr to author, - 11 Jan 54; and T/Sgt F. J. Lischeski, ltr to author, 14 - Jan 54. - -The enemy had obviously planned to allow the entire column to come -within range. But the trap was sprung prematurely as NKPA machineguns -blazed away from the high ground in front and on both flanks. Captain -Tobin immediately sent the 1st Platoon to the aid of the point. First -Lieutenant Hugh C. Schryver led his men forward along the roadside -ditches, and at the cost of three casualties they reinforced the thin -line of Recon troops returning the enemy’s fire. - -Next, the company commander ordered First Lieutenant David S. Taylor’s -2d Platoon to move up behind three Marine tanks. The M-26’s were unable -to maneuver off the road because of the danger of bogging down in -rice paddies, but as mobile fortresses they added to Marine fire power. - -[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE - -CHANGCHON AMBUSH - -12 AUGUST 1950] - -Tobin’s whole company became more or less pinned down when the 3d -Platoon and headquarters, farther back on the road, received automatic -weapons fire from Hill 250 on the right. Newton immediately requested -the battalion air controller, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, to call -for a strike in this area. This was the only supporting arm available -at the moment, since the mortar and artillery crews were just setting -up their weapons in hastily selected positions. - -After the Corsairs worked over Hill 250, Tobin ordered Second -Lieutenant David R. Cowling’s 3d Platoon to attack the high ground. -A rifle platoon and machinegun section had been sent forward from -Able Company by the battalion commander, and Newton gave these -reinforcements the mission of seizing Hill 301, also on the right side -of the road. - -As Cowling’s men were crossing the open rice paddy, the Marine tank -guns and mortars added their fires to the air strike. But enough enemy -machineguns survived to catch the 3d Platoon in a crossfire which -forced it to fall back with 1 man killed and 4 wounded. The Able -Company contingent occupied Hill 301 meanwhile without meeting any -resistance. - -During the course of these actions, the FAC reported to Newton that -2 of the Corsairs overhead had 5 minutes of time left. The battalion -commander directed that they search for targets of opportunity along -the road leading from Changchon to Sachon. The result was a repetition -on a small scale of the Kosong turkey shoot, for the Marine planes -surprised a little column of enemy vehicles and personnel. After the -Corsairs unloaded their remaining ordnance, the road was strewn with -twisted and burning vehicles. - -The 3d Platoon fell back on Hill 301 as Newton ordered Captain John -R. Stevens to secure the nearby high ground on the right side of the -road with the rest of his Able Company troops. This left Hill 250 as -the center of enemy resistance on the right. A total of 113 Marine -mortar rounds were delivered on these positions, followed by a second -air strike. The concentration of fire finally silenced the enemy’s -remaining machineguns, and the Baker Company right flank was secured. - -The other two Baker Company platoons and Houghton’s men had their hands -full meanwhile on the left flank. They kept up a brisk fire fight from -the roadside ditches until the Marine artillery took charge of the -situation. One enemy position after another was knocked out in this -quarter as Newton called for three more air strikes. These preparatory -fires enabled the 1st and 2d Platoons to attack on the left after a -laborious crossing of an intervening rice paddy. - -The Marines proceeded to clean up the remaining NKPA positions -methodically. A climax was reached when Lieutenant Taylor spotted an -enemy group approaching the crest of Hill 202 from the reverse slope. -He sent Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski with a squad to prepare -a welcome. The veteran NCO coolly formed a line along the ridge and -directed his men to wait until the enemy came within 75 feet before -opening fire. - -It would be hard to find a more striking example of Marine infantry -firepower. Of the 39 men in the NKPA group, all were killed outright in -a matter of seconds except a single officer. This survivor was so badly -wounded that he died on the way to the regimental CP. - -The fight had lasted all afternoon, and darkness fell before Company -B could complete its movement to the high ground on the left side of -the road and set up a perimeter of defense. It was estimated that an -enemy company was operating in the area, covering the retreat of sorely -battered elements of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and 83d Motorcycle -Regiment. - -Marine losses were 3 killed and 13 wounded. After the securing of the -high ground to the right, casualties were evacuated by road on the lee -side of slowly moving tanks which provided shelter from enemy fire on -the left. - - -_Marines Ordered to New Sector_ - -The Marines of 1/5 anticipated that the next day’s advance would take -them to Sachon. At midnight on 12 August, however, Lieutenant Colonel -Newton received orders from the regimental commander to form the -battalion on the road at 0630 in preparation for a lift by trucks to -another sector, where the Marines were to reinforce Army units. - -While Newton’s men were fighting at Changchon, the Brigade commander -had come up against a most unusual command situation. It began late -on the morning of the 12th, when General Craig received orders from -CG Task Force Kean, directing him to move a reinforced Marine rifle -battalion back to Chindong-ni. General Kean emphasized that the shift -be made without delay. Infiltrating enemy forces had penetrated far -back in the rear to overrun positions of Battery C, 555th (“Triple -Nickel”) Field Artillery Battalion and Headquarters and Able Batteries, -90th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 25th Division. The MSR -being endangered, Marine reinforcements were urgently needed for a -counterattack.[265] - - [265] This section is derived from: Craig, 18 May 5 and 12 Jan - 54; Murray, 14 Jan 54; and Brig SAR, 5th Marines, 1st Bn - and 3d Bn rpts. - -At 0800 that morning Craig had set up his CP at Kosong. It was his -custom to keep a terse and factual record of events from day to day, -and the following chronological account is derived from entries in the -Brigade commander’s field notebook: - - “1130--Received telephonic orders from CG 25th Div, stating that - enemy was attacking in force across our MSR near Chindong-ni. He - directed that I send one reinforced battalion to rear at once - to give assistance to 24th Infantry engaged in that area and to - recapture artillery pieces. - - “1200--Proceeded by helicopter to CP 5th Marines to give necessary - instructions. Made two landings en route to gather trucks for - troop lift. - - “1300--The reinforced 3d Bn., 5th Marines, now on way to Chindong-ni - area. - - “1330--Sent my G-3, LtCol Stewart, and LtCol Taplett, CO of 3/5, by - helicopter to bridge indicated by CG 25th Div. to reconnoiter and - formulate plans prior to arrival of battalion. Marines to operate - directly under 25th Division for this action. - - “1400--We are out on a limb with only two battalions left and Sachon - still to take. Went to leading elements to check. They were - engaged in a heavy fire fight at an attempted ambush position. - Air brought to bear and helped, plus artillery. Enemy positions - taken by 1/5, which dug in on high ground while 2/5 was disposed - to protect rest of Brigade column. - - “1730--Returned to Brigade CP at Kosong and received orders to - proceed via helicopter to Masan to confer with CG 25th Division. - - “1815--On flight to Masan I detoured to Chindong-ni area to make sure - by air observation that 3/5 had arrived and apparently was not - having any trouble. - - “1830--Arrived Masan and was directed by General Kean to commence a - tactical withdrawal from Sachon. - - “1945--Returned by helicopter to my Kosong CP in early darkness and - issued necessary orders.” - -The preparations for withdrawal lowered the spirits of Marines who -believed that they had broken the back of enemy resistance in the -Sachon area. This reaction may even be noted in the first paragraph of -the Brigade withdrawal order: - - “1. GENERAL SITUATION. Following Brigade rapid advance from - Chindong-ni to Sachon in which this Brigade attacked, overcame, - and pursued the enemy, the 25th Infantry Division has directed the - withdrawal of this Brigade in order to hold a defensive position and - mop up enemy resistance in the zone of action of elements of the 25th - Division.” - -[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE - -SITUATION MAP FOR 12–14 AUG. ’50] - -It would later be known that the basic reason for the Brigade -withdrawal was a decision by the Eighth Army command and staff. The -enemy had crossed the river Naktong, the last natural barrier of the -Pusan Perimeter, and this emergency had caused the Marines to be pulled -back in readiness for a counterattack in the Naktong bulge. - - -_Attack of 3/5 to the Rear_ - -The foregoing chronology makes it evident that General Craig could -never have handled this situation in an afternoon without helicopter -transportation. Jeeps could not have reached so many destinations over -narrow, twisting roads choked with traffic; and fixed-wing planes, -even the adaptable OY’s, could not have landed wherever the Brigade -commander willed. Marine helicopters set a good many precedents in -Korea, and the events of 12 August 1950 established the usefulness of -these versatile machines for command and staff flights. - -Early that afternoon, as Craig had directed, Stewart and Taplett flew -back to the Chindong-ni area for reconnaissance and planning prior -to the arrival of 3/5. The Brigade commander had been able to give -them very little initial information. About 2,000 to 2,500 enemy had -infiltrated to the vicinity, according to Army estimates. The two -Marine officers were instructed to fly to a bridge over a dry stream -bed, where they would be met and briefed by a 25th Division liaison -officer awaiting them in a jeep with a red air panel on the hood.[266] - - [266] This section is derived from LtCol Robert D. Taplett’s - detailed statement to Marine Corps Evaluation Board, - n. d. - -Stewart and Taplett found the bridge, though no jeep was in sight. -After landing in the stream bed, they discovered a camouflaged Army -light tank; but the officers of the armored company could not offer any -enlightenment. - -A number of wire lines lay in the roadside ditch, and the Marine -officers checked them, one by one. At length, by a process of trial -and error, they found a line leading to the 25th Division CP and -talked to the G-3. He instructed them to “look the situation over” -and decide upon a course of action to eliminate enemy activity in the -area and provide security for the remaining artillery unit--a battery -of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion which had been attached to the -555th. Then the Marine officers were to report to General Barth, ADC -of the 25th Division, upon his arrival in the area to take the overall -command. - -Ever since the jump-off of 7 August, the operations of Task Force -Kean had been distinguished for informality. Oral orders were the -rule rather than exception, with unusual latitude of decision being -permitted to officers in the field. After their telephone conversation, -Stewart and Taplett made a helicopter reconnaissance of the area, -followed by a flight back over the MSR to locate 3/5. Upon their -return, they encountered Colonel John Daly, USA, CO of the 555th Field -Artillery Battalion. Battery C of that unit, he informed them, had -been surprised the night before, along with two batteries of the 90th, -and completely overrun about 3,000 yards up the stream bed. They were -destroyed as a fighting force, though scattered survivors and wounded -men remained in the area. Daly briefed the Marine officers as to the -location of enemy forces; and they decided to seize two key ridges -commanding the MSR, which ran parallel to the stream bed. The troops of -3/5 were just then piling out of the trucks at the debarkation point, -and Taplett ordered them to attack without waiting for Barth, since it -would soon be dark. - -These Marines, contrary to standing operating procedure, had turned -their backs on the roar of battle at Changchon early that afternoon -and ridden away in the opposite direction. Then, to complete the -mystery, they traveled 25 miles to the rear to assault a ridge which -was supposedly secured. How Company jumped off with George following -in trace. Colonel Daly provided a 15-minute artillery preparation, -though he had no orders, and Taplett’s FAC managed to summon a flight -of Corsairs with partial loads aboard, including napalm. No one had -any idea of the enemy’s strength, and after receiving some fire from -the ridge, Captain Fegan picked the locations for an air strike. How -Company moved in rapidly afterwards against such light resistance that -the Marines seized the first position without a single casualty. Only -one casualty was inflicted upon the enemy, who apparently had put up a -rearguard fight while withdrawing. - -At 1900, when General Barth arrived, he asked when the Marine battalion -would be ready to attack. Taplett replied that he already had one -company on the first objective, and the 25th Division ADC congratulated -the Marines on their promptness. He approved Taplett’s course of action -and gave his sanction for the seizure of the rest of the dominating -high ground the following morning. - -Again the Marines received the most cordial cooperation from the Army. -General Barth ordered several light tanks and three M-44 armored -personnel carriers to support the attack at 0700 on 13 August. The same -Army artillery battery was assigned to the operation, and Battery C -of the 11th Marines took part after arriving the night before. As it -proved, the infantry needed little assistance to seize the remaining -objectives against negligible resistance. By 1000 the Marine rifle -companies were in full possession of the two commanding ridgelines. No -casualties were suffered or inflicted. - -Despite the lack of opposition, the enemy had not pulled out of the -area. When Lieutenant Colonel Murray made a helicopter flight to drop -a message to survivors of the 555th, his helicopter was ambushed in -a defile by NKPA marksmen concealed on both sides. Only the pilot’s -skillful maneuvering got them out safely, and they were unable to -complete their mission. - -A plan for the Marines to advance to the west across the valley floor -while the Army 5th RCT attacked rearward to meet them was considered -by the 25th Division. Taplett’s battalion would have been accompanied -by 2/5, then on the way to the Chindong-ni area. But this scheme of -maneuver was canceled, and the 2d Battalion of the 5th RCT relieved 3/5 -on 14 August. By that time, as will be related later, other elements -of the Brigade were on the way to an assembly area at Miryang in -preparation for an operation in another sector. - -At least the attack by 3/5 enabled elements of the 25th Division to -rescue survivors of the artillery batteries who straggled back. Both -Taplett and Stewart believed that enemy numbers in the area had been -much smaller than the original Army estimate of 2,000 to 2,500 men. The -3/5 commander wanted to complete his mission by attacking to recover -the howitzers and other lost equipment while the opportunity still -existed. But he was unable to accomplish this aim because of orders for -Brigade withdrawal, and the artillery pieces were never recaptured. -Air strikes were called to destroy them after the relief of the Marine -battalion, and the area itself was abandoned a few days later when 25th -Division units fell back before renewed NKPA attacks. - - -_Enemy Dawn Attack at Changchon_ - -On the other Marine front, 25 miles distant, 1/5 had a return -engagement before dawn on 13 August with the enemy in the Changchon -area. Company commanders had received orders the night before to alert -their units at 0400 for the withdrawal. General Craig’s Op Order 10-50 -was a complete and well planned field order, despite the need for -haste; but the enemy interrupted with a surprise attack launched from -concealed positions occupied under cover of darkness.[267] - - [267] Craig, 12 Jan 54. - -Baker Company’s defense setup for the night on Hill 202 consisted of -the 3d, 1st, and 2d Platoons tied in from left to right in that order. -The action began at 0450 with enemy automatic weapons fire. Marine -60-mm. mortar illuminating shells revealed an NKPA infiltration on the -right in the area of the 2d Platoon. - -This effort soon proved to be a diversionary attack for the purpose -of masking the main blow. At 0455 3 enemy flares went up, 2 red and 1 -green. They were the signal for an assault on the left flank at the -other end of the Baker Company position. The enemy, as a wounded Marine -NCO put it afterwards, was “right on top of the 3d Platoon in a few -seconds” with grenades and burp guns.[268] - - [268] Tobin, of 26 Apr 54. - -This was one of the occasions when the Marines were painfully reminded -that the NKPA 6th Division had been made up originally of veterans of -the Chinese civil war, conditioned by experience for the rigors of -night fighting. Marine security had not been at fault, yet the enemy -had managed to creep forward in uncanny silence to positions within -grenade-throwing distance. - -In an instant the Marine position was overrun, with the machinegun -section being wiped out except for two men. Communication troubles -added to the confusion. Platoon radios had been rendered inoperative -by mud and water while crossing rice paddies, and telephone wires were -believed to have been cut. Two runners were killed during Tobin’s -efforts to maintain contact with the hard-pressed troops on the left -flank. A third runner got through with orders for the remnants of the -platoon to fall back within the perimeter of the adjacent 1st Platoon. - -The troubles of Baker Company were compounded at this stage when the -enemy turned two of the Marines’ own machineguns against them. - -During the next hour the fight became a slugging match. When the first -gray light of dawn permitted some visibility, Baker Company 3.5″ rocket -launchers knocked out the two Marine machineguns being fired by the -enemy. The left flank was holding well when the 60-mm. mortars ran -out of ammunition. To make matters worse, the artillery FO’s radio -took destructive hits from machinegun fire just as the enemy changed -the direction of his attack. Now his main effort was being channeled -up the draw between the 1st and 2d Platoons for the obvious purpose -of splitting the company and beating it in detail. The attackers had -been bled white by casualties, however, and Tobin’s men had little -difficulty in beating off the new assault. - -[Illustration: ENEMY COUNTERATTACK: - -HILL 202 - -NIGHT OF 12–13 AUG. 1950] - - -_Breaking Off Action_ - -Battalion orders were received through Able Company to disengage at -0630 and pull down from the high ground to the trucking point at -Newton’s CP. Tobin was now depending on Company A radios for 4.2″ and -81-mm. mortar support which slowed up enemy efforts. As his first move -toward breaking off action, he ordered his 3d and 1st Platoons to -withdraw into the perimeter of the 2d.[269] - - [269] _Ibid._ - -By this time the enemy had fallen back toward the lower levels of Hill -202. Small arms fire had slackened but the Marines still received -mortar bursts. - -Tobin ordered his executive officer, Captain Francis I. Fenton, to take -the wounded across the rice paddies to the road with the 3d Platoon -and Headquarters troops. The company commander remained on the hill to -cover this movement with the other two platoons. After Fenton got well -underway, Tobin ordered the 2d Platoon down to the road. Then, a squad -at a time, the remaining Marines disengaged; and the Baker Company -commander came off Hill 202 with the last squad at 0815. The entire -movement had been accomplished with precision, and a final air strike -kept the enemy quiet at the climax. - -Considering the fury of the fighting on Hill 202, a Marine casualty -list of 12 KIA, 18 WIA, and 8 MIA was not as large as might have been -expected. The idea of men missing in action is always disturbing to -Marine officers, but it was considered a moral certainty that the -eight casualties of this type were killed when the enemy overran the -machinegun section on the Baker Company left flank.[270] Before leaving -Hill 202, Captain Tobin asked permission to lead an attack for the -purpose of recovering the bodies. He believed that he could retake -the lost ground in an hour, but his request could not be granted at a -time when the battalion was belated in carrying out Brigade withdrawal -orders.[271] - - [270] Seven of these casualties were transferred from the MIA - to the KIA column in September 1950 after the recovery - of their bodies, following enemy withdrawal from the - area. The eighth continued to be listed as MIA until - November 1953, when the man was assumed to be dead. - - [271] _Ibid._ - -It fell to the engineers and armor to cover the rear after the infantry -pulled out. Midway between Sachon and Kosong, the MSR is joined by -a road from Samchonpo, a minor seaport on the tip of the peninsula. -In order to block this approach to the Brigade’s southern flank, -General Craig ordered the engineers to mine the road. First Lieutenant -Nicholas A. Canzona was assigned to the task with a detachment of his -1st Platoon of Able Company, 1st Engineer Battalion. After laying an -extensive field, this officer discovered to his embarrassment that he -had erred in arming nearly half of the mines with wrong fuses, so that -they were harmless. Apparently the moral effect was enough, however, to -keep the enemy at a distance. - -Lieutenant Hetrick’s 3d Platoon of the engineer company brought up the -Brigade rear on the morning of 13 August to crater roads, lay antitank -minefields and destroy bridges and culverts. Personnel left behind for -such missions had the privilege of riding the rearmost tank to catch up -with the column.[272] Thus the withdrawal proceeded systematically and -was completed without enemy interference. - - [272] Annex Jig to Brig SAR. - -[Illustration: _The Iron Cavalry--Brigade infantry and tank supporting -each other during advance of Marines to Sachon (Life Magazine Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Guests of the Brigade--Above, Lieutenant General -Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (center) is shown captured NKPA motorcycle -by Brigadier General Craig (left) and First Lieutenant N. G. Rhodes -(right); below, left to right, General Craig introduces ROK President -Syngman Rhee to Second Lieutenant F. W. Muetzel and Technical Sergeant -E. L. DeFazio, both wounded three times (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Marine Chiefs--Above, left to right, Major General -Field Harris, CG of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Major General Oliver -P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, and Brigadier General Thomas -J. Cushman, commanding MAG-33, meet at a conference in Tokyo; and, -below, left to right, Congressman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., of Pennsylvania -and Henry J. Latham, New York are shown captured gun by Brigadier -General Edward A. Craig while visiting the Naktong front (Marine Corps -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Naktong Fights--Above, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. -Chidester, Brigade G-4, watches while tank 90-mm. gun fires across -Observation Hill to knock out enemy machinegun on Obong-ni Ridge; and, -below, Marine infantry advancing in second battle of the Naktong as -Marine air and artillery hit the enemy up ahead (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Fight for a Foothold--Above, Marines advancing in first -battle of the Naktong pass casualties on way to the rear; and, below, -Private First Class Eugene A. Obregon (left) of Los Angeles and Private -First Class Ralph J. Summers, of Tehama, Calif., in a Marine machinegun -position (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Graveyard of Enemy Tanks--Three dead T-34’s at the bend -where the road skirts Hill 125, with Obong-ni Ridge looming up ahead. -Bodies of three Marines show in the foreground (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Naktong Casualties--Above, wounded Marine, with right -leg bandaged, passes M-26 tank on his way to the rear; and, below, -a stretcher casualty being evacuated through rice paddy, with South -Korean laborer bringing up the rear (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Burning Enemy Tank--Marines advancing past Hill 117 -(background) along MSR west of Yongsan are giving a wide berth to -the dying T-34 in anticipation of exploding ammunition (Marine Corps -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Combat Leadership--Marine platoon leader calls for -another rush on enemy hill position in second battle of the Naktong -(Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Interlude at the Bean Patch--Above, Marine truck column -on way to Masan area after first battle of the Naktong; and, below, -Brigade riflemen renew their acquaintance with hot food at the Bean -Patch (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _The Quick and the Dead--Marine tank, advancing along -MSR at second Naktong, passes burning hull of enemy T-34 (Life Magazine -Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Readying for a Strike--Effectiveness of Marine air -attacks depends not only on Corsair pilots but also on crewmen such as -Staff Sergeant Carl W. Peters (left) and Sergeant Melvin R. Bataway, of -VMF-214, shown while arming rockets on the flight deck of the U. S. S. -_Sicily_ in preparation for a strike in Korea (U. S. Navy Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Enemy Mortar Fire--Marines hit the deck as NKPA mortar -fire reaches out for them while advancing in the second battle of the -Naktong (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Between Attacks--Above, tired Marines take a short -break during first battle of Naktong, with body of NKPA soldier in -foreground; and, below, Marine walking wounded are helped back to the -rear (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Supporting Arms--Above, headquarters officers keep -careful tab on Marine advances in order to co-ordinate fires of -supporting weapons; and, below, the 105-mm. howitzers of 1/11 cleaned -up, packed and ready for embarkation at Pusan (Marine Corps Photo)._] - -[Illustration: _Objective Secured--Marine patrol moves out from Hill -311, overlooking the river Naktong, after Brigade troops take their -final objective in the first battle of the Naktong (Marine Corps -Photo)._] - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -The Battle of the Naktong - -_Task Force Hill Organized--Planning the Next Operation--Reconnaissance -of Terrain--Air and Artillery Preparation--Company D on -Objective--Attack of Company E_ - - -The movement of the Brigade to Miryang was completed by rail, LST and -shuttling trucks on 15 August. For the infantry, it meant the first hot -meal in Korea, and the bivouac area seemed a cool, green paradise as -compared to the sun-scorched hills the men had been climbing under fire -this past week. A grove of stately trees provided shade; and thanks to -the frugality of peasants who picked up every twig, the grass and moss -were like a well-swept carpet. There the troops of the Brigade slept -under the stars that night and swam in the nearby Miryang river. It was -a veritable reunion for Leathernecks who swapped tales of experiences -in the recent combats. - -Being Marines, they realized of course that this was merely an -interlude between operations. The Brigade had passed under operational -control of the 24th Infantry Division upon arrival in the Miryang area. -And on the 15th General Craig reported to General Church’s CP to be -briefed on the situation in the Naktong Bulge, where the next assault -would be launched. - -The ability of the Russians to cross the widest rivers in World War -II, using only determination and field expedients, constantly amazed -_Wehrmacht_ generals with much better equipment.[273] This know-how -seemed to have been passed on to the NKPA, judging by the crossings of -the Han and Kum Rivers early in the Korean conflict. On 6 August 1950, -the Red Koreans gave a repeat performance when they forced a 1,000-man -bridgehead across the Naktong river, thus breaching the last natural -barrier protecting the lifeline from Pusan to Taegu. - - [273] U. S. Dept of the Army, _Russian Combat Methods in World - War II_, DA Pamphlet No. 20-230. - -The 24th Infantry Division was unsuccessful in its immediate attempts -to dislodge the enemy.[274] Wading through chest-deep water by night, -pulling crude rafts loaded with vehicles, heavy weapons and supplies, -the North Koreans placed an entire reinforced regiment on the east bank -by 8 August. Termite tactics during the next 2 days broadened their -foothold until the Naktong Bulge was overrun by most of the NKPA 4th -Division. - - [274] Capt R. A. Gugeler, “Attack Along a Ridgeline,” in - _Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington; Combat Forces - Press, 1954). - -Consisting of the 5th, 16th, and 18th Infantry Regiments and strongly -supported by artillery and armor, the 4th Division was among the -most distinguished of the major Communist units. With the 107th Tank -Regiment attached at the outset of the invasion, it had breezed through -Uijongbu before sharing in the capture of Seoul. On 5 July 1950, the -4th became the first NKPA outfit to tangle with the newly arrived -United States Army forces. Task Force Smith delayed it a few hours near -Osan, despite the Reds’ great advantage in numbers and armor. Later, -after capturing Nonsan and aiding in the reduction of Taejon, the unit -was selected to spearhead the assault over the Naktong. - - -_Task Force Hill Organized_ - -In an effort to plug the hole in the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker -attached the 9th Infantry (2d Infantry Division) commanded by Colonel -John G. Hill, to the 24th Division. In turn, General Church placed -Colonel Hill in control of all units in his southern zone and ordered a -counterstroke against the Naktong Bulge. - -Task Force Hill attacked on 11 August but lost its momentum in a -confused situation which found the enemy attacking at the same -time. Reinforced to a strength of three infantry regiments, Hill’s -provisional unit again struck out against the bridgehead on 14 and 15 -August. After encountering a stone wall of resistance, the task force -was ordered to cease the attack and defend the ground it occupied east -of the enemy pocket.[275] - - [275] _Ibid._ - -This was the situation as outlined to General Craig at the planning -conference, and he was also briefed on the topography of the target -area. The Naktong Bulge west of Yongsan results from a bend in the -river resembling a stubby thumb pointing westward. Bounded on three -sides by the stream, with its inland border formed by a long valley, -the bulge is an isolated terrain feature--a fortress of mountains -topped by Hill 311, the key height. - -As the Yongsan road reaches the Bulge from the east, it turns -southwest, winds around Hill 311, and stops at the tip of the “thumb” -where a ferry links it to the road west of the river. - -Guarding the eastern approach to the natural fortress are two hills -astride the Yongsan road--Finger Ridge to the north and Hill 207 to the -south. The former is set off on the east by a deep gully containing -the village of Tugok. Eastward from Hill 207 and directly below Tugok -is Obong-ni Ridge--so called because of a village by that name at its -eastern base. - -Not only had the NKPA 4th Division overrun the Naktong Bulge; it had -pushed on along the road to Yongsan, seizing Hill 207, Tugok, and both -Finger and Obong-ni Ridges. These latest gains and the Bulge itself -were being consolidated by elements of all three regiments. - -Although units were somewhat depleted, at least 6 infantry battalions -occupied the area, supported by 4 mortar companies, over 100 -machineguns, and several artillery pieces. There were 4 or more T-34 -tanks within the bridgehead, and a signal and engineer company for -overall support. As the spoils of earlier victories, particularly the -one at Taejon, enemy arms were generously augmented by a number of -American carbines and two 105-mm. howitzers.[276] - - [276] Brig Op Plan 13-50; Brig Periodic IntelRpts Nos. 12–14; - Annex How. - - -_Planning the Next Operation_ - -It was decided by General Church and General Craig at their conference -of 15 August that the entire 24th Division, Reinforced, would assault -the enemy bridgehead at 0800, 17 August, after strong air and artillery -preparations. The 19th and 34th Infantry would converge on the Bulge -from the northeast. In the center, the 9th RCT and the Marine Brigade -would strike frontally astride the MSR, the former on the north of the -road and the latter on the south. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was -to hold blocking positions in the south to protect the left flank of -the Brigade.[277] - - [277] _Ibid._; and Brig Op Plan 13-50. - -On 15 August, front lines in the center of the zone were on Hill 125 -and Observation Hill, both defended by the 9th RCT. A thousand yards -to the rear, the 34th Infantry occupied Cloverleaf Hill and adjacent -high ground. Before the attack, the Brigade was to relieve the 34th on -position so that the Army unit could move to the north for its assigned -mission. Then, at H-hour, the Marines would jump off from Observation -Hill and seize Obong-ni Ridge--Objective One. Simultaneously, the 9th -RCT would drive forward through Tugok and take Finger Ridge, from -which it was to support the Brigade’s advance. The 1st Battalion, -11th Marines, would be under operational control of the 24th Division -artillery commander, and priority for all supporting fires would go to -the Marines.[278] - - [278] Brig Op Plan 13-60 - -During the planning, General Church emphasized that Cloverleaf Hill -must remain occupied and defended until Brigade Objective One was -seized. He considered this hill of utmost importance in blocking the -MSR to the 24th Division CP and Miryang. This collateral responsibility -would tie up a number of Brigade troops and have strong influence on -the tactics used against Obong-ni Ridge.[279] - - [279] Craig, 4 Mar 54. - -Before the conference closed, Church promised Craig that 145 Army -trucks would be available the next day to transport the Marines -from their Miryang bivouac to an assembly area near the line of -departure.[280] - - [280] _Ibid._; and Brig SAR, basic rpt. - -At 1900, 15 August, Craig briefed his staff and unit commanders. The -next morning the Brigade commander flew by helicopter to Church’s CP -and received the actual attack order, which was identical with the -planning of the previous day.[281] - - [281] Craig, 4 Mar 54. - -Later on the 16th, Craig drove to the front to reconnoiter the area -marked for the Brigade jump-off. He visited the 9th RCT command -post where Colonel Hill informed him that the Army unit was in good -condition as it stood by for the great attack.[282] - - [282] _Ibid._ - - -_Reconnaissance of Terrain_ - -After Craig’s reconnaissance, Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at the -front to discuss the tactical plan with the 9th RCT Commander. Although -Colonel Hill spoke confidently of his outfit’s readiness for the -attack, Murray observed that the ranks of soldiers on Observation Hill -and Hill 125 were dun and the men obviously wearied by the fighting of -the previous 5 days.[283] - - [283] 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26 for this period showed - the 9th RCT(-) at 47 percent strength and 44 percent - estimated combat efficiency. Morale for the consistently - hard-hit 24th Division was gauged “Fair.” - -With this impression in mind, the 5th Marines commander studied the -terrain soon to be his regiment’s battleground. Between Observation -Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, a 300-yard rice paddy was flanked to the north -of the road by the 9th RCT positions on Hill 125. Across the MSR from -the northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge was the congested village of Tugok. -West of the hamlet and northwest of Brigade Objective One was long, low -Finger Ridge, target of Hill’s RCT.[284] - - [284] _Ibid._ - -Murray quickly concluded from the terrain that both regiments should -not attack together and become exposed simultaneously in the low ground -ahead. Since Obong-ni Ridge was closer than the Army objective and -dominated both Tugok and Finger Ridge, Murray suggested that the 5th -Marines jump off alone at 0800, 17 August. If the 9th RCT would support -him by fire from Hill 125, he would cake Obong-ni Ridge and return the -courtesy while the Army unit cleared Tugok and seized its objective. -And though offering his plan on a tactical basis, Murray also took into -consideration the condition and numbers of Hill’s troops.[285] - - [285] _Ibid._ - -The 9th RCT commander agreed, and the responsibility of delivering the -first punch lay with the 5th Marines.[286] - - [286] _Ibid._ - -Time and chance were against the Brigade throughout 16 August and the -following morning. Banking on the use of 145 Army trucks, Craig and -Murray hoped to move quickly on the 16th, in order to have one infantry -battalion take over Observation Hill and the other two available for -the attack on the 17th. Unfortunately, only 43 trucks were actually -provided, with the result that time schedules were thrown off and -troops forced to march long distances the night before the attack.[287] - - [287] Brig SAR, basic rpt; Annex How; and Craig, 4 Mar 54. - -At 1900, 16 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion entrucked -at Miryang and rode to the 5th Marines CP about 3,000 yards behind the -front. Dismounting, 3/5 marched to Cloverleaf Hill and relieved the -34th Infantry on position. Control of the area south of the MSR passed -to Taplett at 0445, 17 August.[288] - - [288] Annex How. - -The 2d Battalion proceeded on foot to its assembly area near Cloverleaf -Hill at 0130 on the 17th, and Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s men got little -sleep as they prepared for the jump-off a few hours later. Owing to the -shortage of trucks, the 1st Battalion arrived at the forward assembly -area several hours later than planned.[289] - - [289] _Ibid._ - -Overloaded trucks had shuttled Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery -battalion forward on 16 August. Although registration fires were -completed by evening, the haste of the displacement and the doubtful -information at the front left much to be desired from the standpoint of -accuracy.[290] - - [290] Annex item to Brig SAR; and Craig, 4 Mar 54. - -While Obong-ni Ridge was known to be heavily defended, it was generally -thought that Hill 207--Brigade Objective Two--would be the hard nut to -crack. And the potential of Objective Three, towering Hill 311, was by -no means minimized in preattack estimates.[291] Later events proved -these assumptions to be the reverse of reality, but Marine planners -could do no better with the meager intelligence then available. - - [291] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -The regimental commander and General Craig concluded that a frontal -assault on Obong-ni Ridge with a column of battalions was the only -answer to the problems posed by the terrain and situation. - -Since the Brigade commander had been specifically charged with the -security of the MSR, it was necessary that 3/5 remain in position on -Cloverleaf Hill until Objective One was taken. Taplett’s battalion had -a second responsibility in guarding the Brigade’s left (south) flank, -because Craig considered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, too far out -to provide the required close-in protection.[292] - - [292] Craig, 4 Mar 54. - -The Brigade commander, unaware of Murray’s arrangement with Colonel -Hill, could not have envisioned an approach to the enemy’s left through -the 9th RCT zone. He expected the Army unit to advance side by side -with the Brigade and give supporting fire as directed by General -Church. On the other hand, an envelopment of the enemy’s right seemed -out of the question. Using the southern approach to Obong-ni Ridge -would have created a gap of several thousands yards in the center of -the critical area, and the low, barren marshland to the left would have -impeded the movement of tanks and the employment of the 5th Marines’ -integral supporting arms.[293] - - [293] _Ibid._ - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s reasoning closely paralleled that of his -superior. He did not visualize an envelopment from the north because -he expected a comparable effect from supporting fire by the 9th RCT. -An attempt to flank the North Korean right would have placed the -attacking unit far from the power consolidated along the MSR. The enemy -situation in the hills and swamps to the south was unknown, and the -Marine regimental commander did not relish the thought of one or two -of his battalions becoming isolated in that remote area. Then too, the -southern peaks on Obong-ni Ridge were considerably higher and more -rugged than those nearer the MSR. So it seemed logical to Murray to -retain depth and strength by striking frontally, quickly gaining a -foothold on the lower, northern reaches of the ridge, then exploiting -the penetration rapidly and vigorously.[294] - - [294] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -When asked about his tactical plan by General Craig, he stated that -the 5th Marines would attack in a column of battalions, 2/5 seizing -Objective One, 1/5 passing through to take Hill 207, and 3/5 completing -the reduction of the bulge by following with an assault on Objective -Three.[295] - - [295] _Ibid._; and Annex How. - -The Brigade commander voiced his concurrence, and the plan was put in -motion.[296] - - [296] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - - -_Air and Artillery Preparation_ - -Obong-ni Ridge sprawled across the Marine front like some huge -prehistoric reptile. Its blunt head overlooked the MSR below Tugok, and -the elongated body stretched to the southeast more than 2,000 yards -before losing its identity in a complex of swamps and irregular hill -formations. The high, narrow spine was marked by a series of peaks, -beginning with Hill 102 at the neck, followed by 109, 117, 143, 147, -and 153. There were still other peaks to the southeast, but so small -and irregular as to be almost indistinguishable. - -A procession of steep spurs, separated from one another by pronounced -gullies, ran down from the numbered peaks to the rice paddies far -below. At the top of a gully extending down from the saddle between -Hills 109 and 117 was a fault caused by erosion of the red clay and -shale. Gaping like an ugly wound, the raw blemish inspired one of the -ridge’s first names--“Red Slash Hill.” It was also dubbed “No Name -Ridge” by some of the newspaper correspondents. - -[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -1st PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE ATTACHED TO 24th INF DIV. - -SHOWING MARINE & ARMY ATTACKS & N.K. POSITIONS, COUNTERATTACK, & -WITHDRAWALS] - -Marine air and artillery were to pound the ridge on 17 August from 0725 -to H-hour, 0800, after which MAG-33 would strafe the hill to cover the -advancing infantrymen.[297] Brigade artillery fired its preparation as -planned; but due either to the hasty registration of the previous day -or to error on the part of observers, the shelling was not effective -against the enemy on Objective One. It was so inacurrate, in fact, that -many officers of 2/5 thought there had been no preparation at all.[298] -To make matters worse, air attacks scheduled to begin at 0725 did not -materialize until 0740; and the 18 Corsairs assigned to the job had -time for only one strike before H-hour.[299] - - [297] Brig Op Plan 13-50. - - [298] Annexes How and Item to Brig SAR; Maj A. M. Zimmer, - ltr to author, 6 May 54 (Zimmer, 6 May 54); and W. E. - Sweeney, ltr to author, 22 May 54 (Sweeney, 22 May 54). - - [299] Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Brig Op Plan 13-50. - -The two rifle companies of the 2d Battalion jumped off abreast at 0800. -On the right was Captain Zimmer’s Company D, emerging into the open -from the road cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.[300] - - [300] Co D Action is derived from: Annex How; Zimmer, 6 May - 54; and Capt M. J. Shinka, ltr to author, 7 Jun 54. - -Zimmer ordered the 2d Platoon into reserve on the southern spur of Hill -125 and established his OP there. The 3d Platoon, commanded by Second -Lieutenant Michael J. Shinka, stepped from the road bend below the spur -into the rice paddy. Advancing behind this unit were the 1st Platoon -and a rocket section, the latter stopping in positions along the road -bend to protect the MSR. - -Halfway across the rice paddy, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson led his -1st Platoon to the right from behind the 3d, and both units approached -the base of the ridge on line. On Shinka’s left was the 2d Platoon -of Company E. An eerie silence pervaded the front while the assault -platoons crossed the wide open area unmolested. - -Providing covering fire from its positions on Hill 125, Technical -Sergeant Sidney S. Dickerson’s 2d Platoon was hit by long-range -machinegun bursts from Hills 117 and 143 on Obong-ni. Company D’s first -two casualties were taken. - - -_Company D on Objective_ - -While General Craig watched from the road cut, and Lieutenant Colonel -Roise from his OP on Observation Hill, Company D’s assault platoons -began to ascend the objective. Gradually turning its back on the -village of Tugok, Crowson’s unit traced the draw on the right of the -spur leading to Hill 102, while Shinka led his 3d Platoon up the -gully on the left. The infantrymen were almost halfway up the slope -when a battalion of the NKPA 18th Regiment opened fire with dozens of -machineguns. - -Despite the hail of lead, Shinka and Crowson edged their units upwards. -The fire from Hills 117 and 143 finally became so intense, however, -that the 3d Platoon was momentarily unable to emerge from its gully. -Almost simultaneously, enemy machineguns poured it into the 1st -Platoon, pinning that unit down and inflicting heavy casualties. - -Again pushing upward despite mounting casualties, the 3d Platoon -attempted to assault Hill 109 about 1000. Communist automatic weapons -and a shower of hand grenades from the crest sent the thin skirmish -line of Marines reeling back down the barren slope. - -As the 3d Platoon came under increasing machinegun and mortar fire from -Hills 117 and 143, Zimmer decided to commit his reserve. Realizing the -apparent futility of pressing the attack up the 3d Platoon’s gully, he -ordered Dickerson to attempt an assault through the draw in which the -1st Platoon was pinned down. - -The 2d Platoon crossed the rice paddy, following the route used earlier -by the 3d. Reaching the draw in which the latter was regrouping after -its abortive assault, Dickerson led his men over Hill 102’s spur, -attempting to gain the avenue of approach being used by Crowson’s unit. -In the process he came under heavy automatic weapons fire from both -flanks--Hills 117 and 143 on the left, and the hillside north of Tugok -across the MSR. - -At this time the company commander spotted North Korean positions above -the village and realized why his pinned-down 1st Platoon was taking -so many casualties. From their vantage point in the 9th RCT zone, the -Communists were firing on the flank and rear of the Marines along the -northwest approaches of Objective One. - -Zimmer requested that 2/5 lay supporting fires on Tugok. When he got -no response, his forward observer, Lieutenant Wirth, transferred the -mission to 1/11. But the 105’s had scarcely begun firing when they were -cut off because the impact area was in the 9th RCT’s zone. The company -commander turned his own 60-mm. mortars on the enemy machineguns, only -to discover that the target lay beyond effective range. - -Zimmer had more success with supporting arms when the enemy posed -another threat. Practically all the machinegun fire had been coming -from the north and south of Hills 102 and 109, while the enemy on these -summits relied on rifles and vast numbers of hand grenades. Then, -apparently shaken by the 3d Platoon’s tenacity, the Communists tried -to wheel a heavy machinegun into position on the saddle between the -northernmost peaks. Twice the mounted weapon was hauled up, and twice -pulled back under heavy Marine fire. By this time Zimmer had requested -battalion to use a 75-mm. recoilless rifle on the target. When the -persistent North Koreans wheeled the machinegun onto the saddle a third -time, one round from a Marine 75 obliterated gun and crew. - -With only 15 men left in his platoon, Shinka prepared for a second -assault on Hill 109. Following an air strike at 1100, the Marines -stormed the high ground and overran enemy positions on the crest. -Only a squad of North Koreans could show similar determination on the -reverse slope, but the enemy’s small-scale counterattack was stopped -cold by Company D’s riflemen. - -One of the few Marines who reached Obong-ni’s summit during 2/5’s -attack and lived to tell the story, Shinka later related the events -following his seizure of Hill 109: - - “Fire from Hill 143 was gaining in intensity, and they had - observation over our position. Fire was also coming from the hill to - our front [Hill 207]. I reported the situation to Captain Zimmer. A - short time later phosphorus shells were exploding in Hill 143. This - slowed the fire but it never did stop. - - “My resupply of ammo did not arrive. Running short of ammo and - taking casualties, with the shallow enemy slit trenches for cover, I - decided to fall back until some of the fire on my left flank could - be silenced. I gave the word to withdraw and take all wounded and - weapons. About three-quarters of the way down, I had the men set up - where cover was available. I had six men who were able to fight. - - “I decided to go forward to find out if we left any of our wounded. - As I crawled along our former position (on the crest of Hill 109), I - came across a wounded Marine between two dead. As I grabbed him under - the arms and pulled him from the foxhole, a bullet shattered my chin. - Blood ran into my throat and I couldn’t breath. I tossed a grenade at - a gook crawling up the slope, didn’t wait for it to explode, turned - and reached under the Marine’s arms and dragged him as far as the - military crest. - - “Another bullet hit my right arm, and the force spun me around. I - rolled down the hill for a considerable distance before I could stop - myself. - - “I walked into my lines and had a battle dressing tied on my face - and arm, I learned that the ammo was up and that a relief was - contemplated; and then I walked back to 2/5’s aid station where they - placed me on a jeep and took me to regimental aid.” - -Lieutenant Shinka was later awarded the Bronze Star for this action. - - -_Attack of Company E_ - -At 0800 Lieutenant Sweeney had ordered his 1st and 2d Platoons of Easy -Company into the attack from their line of departure on the southern -portion of Observation Hill. Although the boundary separating the -zones of Companies E and D extended from the left of Hill 109 and down -through the red slash, Sweeney centered his advance on the village of -Obong-ni, directly below Hills 143 and 147.[301] - - [301] This section is derived from: Annex How; and Sweeney, 22 - May 54. - -The leading platoons encountered nothing more than scattered shots -crossing the rice paddy. Before they could gain a foothold on the slope -of the objective, however, heavy fire from the village ripped into the -skirmish line. - -In the center, Second Lieutenant Nickolas A. Arkadis led his 1st -Platoon through the hail of bullets and drove through the village to -the slopes of the ridge. On the right the 2d Platoon faltered and lost -its momentum. Then a number of North Korean machineguns poured in -flanking fire from Hills 147 and 153. - -Sweeney, from his OP on the southern slope of Observation Hill, tried -to get an artillery mission on the two dominating peaks, but his -forward observer was unable to contact the rear. Nor could the 4.2 -mortar observer be located. - -Faced with the necessity of giving his assault elements some -protection, the company commander committed 2d Lieutenant Rodger E. -Eddy’s 3d Platoon, sending it to the spur on the left of the village. -Working its way up the nose which led to Hills 147 and 153, Eddy’s unit -was able to concentrate its fire on the enemy-held peaks and relieve -pressure on the other two platoons. - -With enemy fire gradually increasing from new positions on the lower -slopes of the ridge to the south of the village, Sweeney ordered the -mortar section and all of his headquarters personnel into the valley to -block the southern approach through the rice paddy. Leaving this flank -guard in command of his executive officer, First Lieutenant Paul R. -Uffelman, the company commander rushed to the base of the objective. -Every single man in his unit was now committed. - -Sweeney found the 2d Platoon leaderless and disorganized. The 1st had -fought its way well up the slope, aided by excellent supporting fire -from 2/5’s 81-mm. mortars. As that dogged group of Marines neared the -crest, it was stopped when a friendly artillery barrage fell short, -searing the skirmish line with white phosphorus. - -[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -SITUATION 17 AUG.--OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI RIDGE)] - -Late morning found part of the company closing on the crest; but -shortly before 1130, the attackers were ordered to pull back in -preparation for an air strike by MAG-33. The planes came in quickly, -and some of Company E’s men, within 25 yards of the summit, were caught -in the strafing. - -During the hammering by the Corsairs, the 3d Platoon slipped back 100 -yards, leaving the critical left flank open to enemy-infested peaks 147 -and 153. This time the hail of enfilade fire from Communist machineguns -caught the remnant of Easy Company rifleman exposed on the higher -slopes, and the Marine advance crumbled. - -By noon on 17 August, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was wobbling. In -4 hours of fighting it had lost 23 dead and 119 wounded, practically -all of the casualties being taken by the 2 rifle companies. Every -officer in the Brigade could lament the lack of a third company in each -battalion; for just when 2/5’s assault needed the added punch of a -reserve unit, the outcome of battle had to rest on the failing strength -of six depleted rifle platoons. The ridge could not be taken. - -This was unfortunate, since there was clear evidence that the NKPA 4th -Division was weakening. Although not apparent to the men of Companies D -and E, their repeated attempts to carry the ridge had torn gaps in the -enemy’s defenses. Bodies, weapons and wreckage were strewn along the -entire northern crest.[302] - - [302] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr to author. 17 Mar 54 (Craig, 17 - Mar 54); Annex Easy to Brig SAR. - -Marine air and artillery, having settled down after a fumbling start, -not only blasted the North Korean lines, but also wrought havoc -throughout the entire bridgehead. A large number of enemy mortars -and field pieces were knocked out, troop concentrations cut down or -scattered while trying to reinforce the front lines, and supply points -obliterated. There were definite signs of increasing confusion in the -enemy’s rear.[303] - - [303] _Ibid._ - -General Craig had become alarmed at the lack of activity in the 9th -RCT’s zone, resulting in the enemy being left free to pound the -Brigade’s right flank from the Tugok area. When he inquired concerning -the Army’s supposed failure to advance on schedule, he first learned of -the prebattle agreement reached by Murray and Hill. It was then that he -requested the village be taken under fire. - -Deeply concerned himself over the situation on the right, particularly -since no supporting fire at all had been received from the 9th RCT, -Murray tried to contact Hill and request that he commit his regiment. -Unable to get the message through immediately, he was forced to leave -the matter dangling while directing the conduct of the battle.[304] - - [304] Murray, 15 Feb 54. - -About 1300 the 5th Marines commander ordered the 1st Battalion to pass -through the 2d and seize Obong-ni Ridge. While Newton moved his unit -forward from its assembly area, MAG-33, 1/11 and Able Company tanks -laid down devastating fires on the blackened objective. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -Obong-ni Ridge - -_Company B to the Attack--Advance of Company A--Defeat of Enemy -Tanks--End of the First Day--Enemy Counterattack on Ridge--Obong-ni -Ridge Secured--Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge_ - - -Shortly after 1330, while reporting his situation to the battalion -commander, Captain Zimmer was wounded by enemy machinegun fire which -ripped into his OP and caused several other casualties. Crawling to the -company CP on the reverse slope of the spur, he turned his command over -to Lieutenant Hanifin, who went forward. Zimmer then joined the steady -stream of casualties returning through the road cut to the battalion -aid station.[305] - - [305] This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Zimmer, 6 May - 54; and Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., ltr to author, 8 May 54 - (Fenton, 8 May 54). - -On the way, he met Captain Tobin leading Company B forward for the -attack, and paused long enough to warn him about the enemy guns in -Tugok. - -Company D, its part in the battle having come to an end, prepared to -withdraw to positions on Observation Hill. The long list of wounded for -17 August included the names of Dickerson and Wirth.[306] - - [306] Lt Wirth was actually attached from 1/11. - -Newton established his OP near that of Roise on Observation Hill. -The 1st Battalion CP and aid station were set up with those of 2/5 -immediately behind the road cut, while farther back Major John W. -Russell placed 1/5’s Weapons Company in position. - - -_Company B to the Attack_ - -Tobin deployed his 3d Platoon and machineguns on the forward slopes -of Observation Hill to support Company B’s attack. The 1st and 2d -Platoons, the latter on the left, crossed the rice paddy and at 1500 -passed through Company D on the slopes of the objective. Lieutenant -Schryver led his 1st Platoon toward Hill 102 along the same avenue used -by Crowson before him, while Lieutenant Taylor moved the 2d Platoon up -the gully leading to the saddle between 102 and 109. - -On Observation Hill Captain Tobin noted the rapidity of the advance and -called his executive officer, Captain Fenton, preparatory to joining -the two assault units. While briefing his assistant at the road bend, -he was felled by a burst of machinegun fire. Fenton directed the -evacuation of the seriously wounded officer, then took command of the -company and joined the attackers on the ridge. - -By this time both assault platoons had been pinned down, the 1st about -two-thirds of the way up the slope, the 2d only half that distance. The -latter was taking heavy casualties from Communist guns on Hills 109, -117, and 143, Taylor himself sustaining a mortal wound. - -Fenton and his gunnery sergeant, Master Sergeant Edward A. Wright, were -stalled with the 2d Platoon. Since Schryver’s unit was also held up, -the company commander radioed Observation Hill and committed his 3d -Platoon. - -Schryver realized that the main obstacle to his advance was the fire -hitting his flank from Tugok, and he requested a fire mission from -1/5’s Weapons Company. As 81-mm. mortar shells rained down on the -village, the 1st Platoon worked westward to the spur above the MSR and -outflanked the NKPA 18th Regiment. A quick assault carried Hill 102 at -1710. - -With Schryver’s men driving down from the south and Company B’s -machineguns pouring fire on peaks 117 and 143, the 2d Platoon barreled -its way up the draw and seized Hill 109 at 1725. - - -_Advance of Company A_ - -Leaving the line of departure from the southern reaches of Observation -Hill, the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A crossed the rice paddy while -Marine air and artillery savagely blasted the forward and reverse -slopes of the objective. The two assault units, each with a machinegun -section attached, passed through Company E at 1500 and scrambled up the -scarred hillside.[307] - - [307] This section is derived from: Annex How; Maj J. R. - Stevens and Capt G. C. Fox, interv with author, 24 Feb - 54 (Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54); and 1st Lt Francis - W. Muetzel, USMC Ret., interv with author, 5–6 Jan 54 - (Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54). - -Sweeney’s battle-worn company withdrew, carrying its dead and wounded -back to Observation Hill. The list of casualties included Lieutenant -Arkadis, wounded while spearheading the unit’s advance. - -As Company A’s assault wave passed the halfway point of ascent, it met -only sniping fire from the crest and forward slopes of Obong-ni Ridge. -But any delusions that the enemy had quit were soon shattered when the -summit suddenly came alive with Communist machineguns. - -Intense fire poured down on the attackers, and Marines pitched forward -to roll limply down the hillside. First Lieutenant Robert C. Sebilian, -leading the 1st Platoon up the draw between Hills 109 and 117, ignored -the storm of steel and urged his men forward. Standing fully exposed -while pointing out enemy positions to his NCO’s, the young officer -was struck by an explosive bullet which shattered his leg. Technical -Sergeant Orval F. McMullen took command and resolutely pressed the -attack. - -The 1st Platoon reached the saddle above the draw just as Company B was -taking Hill 109. When McMullen tried to advance southward to 117, he -and his men were pinned down by a solid sheet of Communist fire. - -On the left, North Korean guns had already cut Second Lieutenant Thomas -H. Johnston’s 2d Platoon in half. The pint-sized platoon leader proved -to be a giant in courage. He pushed doggedly up the draw between Hills -117 and 143, but casualties bled his skirmish line white and finally -brought it to a stop. - -Marines watching the battle from Observation Hill saw Company A’s -attack bog down, despite the ceaseless pounding of Hills 117 and 143 by -Brigade supporting arms. Startled, the observers noted a lone figure -who bolted forward from the 2d Platoon’s draw and stubbornly scrambled -up the hill. It was Johnston attempting a single-handed assault on the -core of enemy resistance. - -The astonished onlookers saw him reach the saddle north of Hill 143. -That he survived to this point was remarkable enough, yet he continued -to push forward. Then, at the base of the blazing peak, the little -figure sagged to the ground and lay motionless. - -Technical Sergeant Frank J. Lawson immediately took over the platoon, -displaying outstanding leadership in his attempt to continue the -attack. Communist guns and grenades prevailed, however, and again the -line of infantrymen stalled. The 2d Platoon now consisted of a squad. - -Captain Stevens radioed Lieutenant Colonel Newton from his OP and -requested permission to commit his 3d Platoon, then deployed on -Observation Hill as battalion reserve. The request granted, First -Lieutenant George C. Fox led the platoon forward into the rice paddy -just as a heavy mortar barrage fell in the area. One of Fox’s men was -killed outright. - -Moving quickly to Obong-ni Ridge and ascending the slope, the 3d -Platoon was joined by Lawson and the remnants of Johnston’s outfit. -The skirmish line passed the critical halfway point, and again enemy -machineguns and grenades opened up. - -Twice Fox attempted to develop an assault, failing both times to -get his platoon through the curtain of fire above the gully. While -Technical Sergeant Stanley G. Millar was reorganizing the skirmish -line, the platoon leader and Private First Class Benjamin C. Simpson of -the 2d Platoon made an attempt to reach Johnston. - -The pair climbed to a point above the gully from which Simpson could -see the fallen officer. Assured now that Johnston was dead, and unable -to recover the body because of interlocking machinegun fire across the -area, Fox and the rifleman slid down the draw to the 3d Platoon lines. - -By this time Stevens had moved to the base of Obong-ni Ridge, but he -had lost radio contact with the three units high on the hillside. He -could see the combined 2d and 3d Platoons; but the 1st was out of -sight, leaving the company commander unaware of a limited success that -could have been exploited. - - -_Defeat of Enemy Tanks_ - -Shortly after 2/5’s jump-off on 17 August, the M-26’s of the 3d -Platoon, Able Company Tanks, moved forward of the road cut and -supported the advance by 90-mm. and machinegun fire. The Marine armor, -led by Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet, concentrated on heavy -NKPA weapons along the crest of Objective One and knocked out at least -12 antitank guns and several automatic weapons. In return, 1 M-26 -withstood 3 direct hits by enemy mortars, and the 4 vehicles combined -were struck by a total of 23 antitank projectiles. Neither tanks -nor crews were bothered appreciably, and only one man was slightly -wounded.[308] - - [308] This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and - Fox, 24 Feb 54; Capt Almarion S. Bailey, interv with - author, 17 Dec 53; T/Sgt C. R. Fullerton, ltr to Opns - Research Office, Johns Hopkins University (cover ltr: - OIC RS Cleveland, ser. 527–53, 31 Dec 53). - -After the 1st Battalion had passed through 2/5, a section of tanks -moved forward on the road and blasted several North Korean positions -in Tugok. When Company B seized the northern tip of the objective, -Sweet led all his vehicles back to the tank CP, 1,000 yards east of -Observation Hill. - -At 2000, while still refueling and replenishing ammunition stocks, the -tankmen learned that four enemy T-34’s were approaching the Brigade -lines on the MSR. The Marine armor was clanking toward the front within -a matter of seconds. About 300 yards from the road cut, the tankmen had -to jump from their vehicles to remove trucks blocking the MSR. Then, -approaching the narrow defile, Sweet ordered his 1st Section to load -with 90-mm. armor-piercing shells. - -Company B, consolidating its positions on Hills 102 and 109, had first -noticed the four NKPA tanks and a column of infantry moving toward its -lines at 2000. Corsairs of MAG-33 screamed down immediately, destroying -the fourth armored vehicle and dispersing the Red riflemen. The first -three tanks came on alone, passed Finger and Obong-ni Ridges, and -approached the road bend at Hill 125. - -Preparing a reception for the T-34’s were the 1st 75-mm. Recoilless Gun -Platoon on Observation Hill, and the rocket section of 1/5’s antitank -assault platoon on Hill 125. As the first enemy tank reached the bend, -it took a hit in the right track from a 3.5″ rocket. Shooting wildly, -the black hulk continued until its left track and front armor were -blasted by Second Lieutenant Paul R. Fields’ 75’s. The enemy vehicle -burst into flame as it wobbled around the curve and came face to face -with Technical Sergeant Cecil R. Fullerton’s M-26. - -Still aimlessly firing its 85-mm. rifle and machinegun, the T-34 took -two quick hits from the Marine tank’s 90-mm. gun and exploded. One -North Korean got out of the burning vehicle but was cut down instantly -by rifle fire. He crawled beneath the blazing wreckage and died. - -The second T-34 charged toward the bend, taking a 3.5 rocket hit from -Company A’s assault squad. Weaving crazily around the curve, with -its right track damaged, the cripple was struck in the gas tank by a -rocket from 1/5’s assault section before meeting the fury of Field’s -recoilless rifles. It lurched to a stop off the road behind the first -tank, and the 85-mm. gun fired across the valley into the blue yonder. - -By this time a second M-26 had squeezed next to that of Fullerton on -the narrow firing line, and the two Marine tanks blasted the T-34 -with six 90-mm. shells. Miraculously, the Communist vehicle kept on -shooting, although its fire was directionless. Marine armor poured in -seven more rounds, which ripped through the turret and exploded the -hull. - -Before the kill, one Red tankman opened the turret hatch in an effort -to escape. A 2.36″ white phosphorus round, fired by a 1st Battalion -rocket man, struck the open lid and richocheted into the turret. The -enemy soldier was knocked back into the tank as the interior turned -into a furnace. - -The third T-34 raced around the road bend to a stop behind the blazing -hulks of the first two. Marine tanks, recoilless rifles, and rockets -ripped into it with a thundering salvo. The enemy tank shuddered, then -erupted in a violent explosion and died. - -Thus the Brigade shattered the myth of the T-34 in five flaming -minutes. Not only Corsairs and M-26’s, but also every antitank weapon -organic to Marine infantry had scored an assist in defeating the -Communist armor. - - -_End of the First Day_ - -Throughout 17 August the evacuation of dead and wounded had been -a major concern of every Marine, from fire team leaders up to the -Brigade commander. Men risked their lives dragging casualties off the -blazing slopes of Obong-ni Ridge to relative safety at the base. Litter -bearers plodded back and forth across the fire-swept rice paddy, and a -steady stream of wounded passed through the 1st and 2d Battalion aid -stations behind the road cut. Medical officers of the two battalions, -Lieutenants (jg) Bentley G. Nelson and Chester L. Klein, worked -tirelessly with their corpsmen. - -In the rear, Lieutenant Commander Byron D. Casteel had to commandeer -every ambulance in the area--including 16 Army vehicles--to evacuate -wounded to and from his 5th Marines aid station. So acute was the -shortage of hospital corpsmen that the Brigade’s Malaria and Epidemic -Control Unit was used to reinforce the regimental medical staff. Even -so, the hospital tents were busy for a straight 18 hours.[309] - - [309] Annexes Love and Tare to Brig SAR. - -The small number of deaths from wounds attested to the speed and -effectiveness of helicopter evacuations; for the pilots of VMO-6 were -ferrying the more serious casualties from the regimental aid station to -the Army’s 8076 Surgical Hospital at Miryang, some 20 miles away. - -While medics toiled to save lives, the spiritual needs of casualties -were filled by the inspiring labor of the 5th Marines’ naval chaplains, -Lieutenant Commander Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., Lieutenant William G. -Tennant, and Lieutenant (jg) Bernard L. Hickey. A familiar figure at -the front, frequently exposed to enemy fire as he administered to -fallen Marines, was Lieutenant Commander Otto E. Sporrer, beloved -chaplain of 1/11. - -Two serious obstacles to the various missions behind the front were the -dud-infested area east of Observation Hill and a section of collapsed -MSR in the river bed occupied by the 5th Marines CP. First Lieutenant -Wayne E. Richards and his 2d Platoon, Able Company Engineers, spent -most of 17 August at the tedious task of removing unexploded missiles -from the forward assembly areas. The engineers’ 1st Platoon had to -tear down part of an unoccupied village for material to reinforce the -sinking road over which the jeep ambulances and supply trucks were -struggling. - -As the sun dropped behind Obong-ni Ridge, activity on the MSR continued -unabated, although the battle for Objective One had diminished to a -crackle of rifle fire and occasional machinegun bursts. - -Company A had been unable to take Hills 117 and 143, still bristling -with enemy automatic weapons. At 2030, shortly after the smashing -victory over North Korean armor, Captain Stevens contacted his 1st -Platoon and learned that it was on the saddle between peaks 109 and -117. Although tied in on the right with Company B, the platoon was -separated by a 100-yard gap from Stevens’ other two platoons on the -slopes to the left.[310] - - [310] Annex How; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54. - -The company commander called Fox, Lawson, and McMullen together near -the base of the ridge to consult them on continuing the attack. All -platoon leaders advised against it, since darkness was falling and -their units needed rest, food, water, and ammunition. Moreover, the -enemy’s bold tank attack had convinced the infantry leaders that a -larger counterstroke by the Communists was imminent, and they wanted -time for preparation.[311] - - [311] _Ibid._ - -Stevens informed Newton of the situation by radio, and the battalion -commander ordered him to discontinue the attack and tie in with -Fenton’s unit for the night. It was already dark when the 2d and 3d -Platoons shifted to the right from their positions below Hills 117 and -143. - -Company B had been busily consolidating its high ground since the -seizure of Hills 102 and 109 earlier in the evening. While Fenton’s -machineguns dueled with those of the Reds on 117, his 1st and 2d -Platoons deployed defensively on the forward slopes of the two captured -peaks, and the 3d went into reserve on the reverse slope.[312] - - [312] Annex How; and Fenton, 8 May 54. - -Company A’s front extended left from the southern part of Hill -109--where the 1st Platoon was linked to Fenton’s unit--to the center -of the saddle toward 117. There the line bent down in an arch, formed -by the 2d Platoon, to the spur below the enemy-held peak. Able -Company’s left was actually perpendicular to the ridgeline, for Fox’s -3d Platoon was deployed up and down Hill 117’s spur.[313] - - [313] Brig SAR; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54. - -To complete the Brigade front, Headquarters Company of 1/5 was to have -extended across the rice paddy from Observation Hill and tied in with -Company A’s left flank. Due to the casualties and workload of the -headquarters troops, this connection was never made, with the result -that Fox’s platoon remained dangling.[314] - - [314] _Ibid._ - -When General Craig returned to his CP near Yongsan on the night of -17 August, he was not unduly concerned about the tactical situation. -Although the Brigade had been thinned by heavy casualties, Murray’s -disposition in depth across a narrow front gave the Marines the -advantages of concentrated strength and firepower. If the enemy -attempted his usual night envelopment, both 2/5 and 3/5 could strike -back from their reserve positions on Observation and Cloverleaf -Hills.[315] - - [315] Craig, 17 Mar 54; and Col R. L. Murray, 20 Mar 54. - -Across the MSR, the 9th RCT had launched its attack earlier in the -evening, clearing Tugok and seizing Finger Ridge against negligible -resistance. By darkness, the 19th and 34th Regiments were also sitting -on their objectives to the north, leaving the 4th NKPA Division clamped -in a vice. To the southeast, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was -holding its blocking position with no difficulty.[316] - - [316] 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26. - - -_Enemy Counterattack on Ridge_ - -Late on 17 August, when the attack on Obong-ni Ridge ceased, General -Craig sent a message to his subordinate commanders, directing them to -“... consolidate positions for night, account for location of each -individual and be prepared for counterattack; carefully prepare plan -of fires for night to include plans for fires within and in rear of -positions; wire in where possible in front line elements.”[317] - - [317] This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and - Fox, 24 Feb 54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54; and Fenton, 8 May - 54. - -Long after nightfall, the weary Marines of both front line companies -were still digging foxholes and organizing their defenses. While this -work continued in spite of sporadic Communist fire from Hill 117, the -South Korean laborers were transporting supplies to the ridgeline or -carrying casualties back to the rear. - -Captain Stevens established Company A’s command post at the top of the -draw leading to the saddle between Hills 109 and 117. His 60-mm. mortar -section set up its weapons in the gully itself. - -Shortly before 2200, the telltale whine and rattle of mortar shells -cut through the darkness and the men of Able Company crouched in their -holes. The explosions were followed by a shower of fire as white -phosphorus enveloped the center of the company area. Almost every man -in the gully was painfully wounded, leaving Stevens without a mortar -section. The edge of the barrage hit the 3d Platoon’s area, wounding -Fox and several of his men. Two riflemen had to be evacuated, but the -platoon leader and the others applied first aid and remained in the -line. - -After this brief flurry the front settled down to an ominous quiet -interrupted only occasionally by North Korean guns to the south. - -At 0230 on 18 August, the Marines of Company A heard enemy movement -on Hill 117. Suddenly there was a hail of bullets from Communist -machineguns on the peak, and hand grenades began to roll down into the -Marine positions. A North Korean platoon made a few bounds from the -high ground and landed almost literally on top of Stevens’ depleted 2d -Platoon. - -Simultaneously, Company B’s position on Hill 109 was struck hard -by two platoons advancing up the draw to the west. Heedless of -illuminating shells fired by 1/5’s 81-mm. mortars, the enemy assaulted -methodically by alternately throwing small groups of grenadiers and -submachinegunners against Marine positions. The NKPA infantrymen were -covered by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire pouring down from -Hill 117. - -An enemy squad emerged from the gully west of the saddle between peaks -102 and 109, attempting to divert strength from Fenton’s main defensive -effort to the south. Failing in this effort, the group fell back to -fire harassing shots. - -Company A’s 2d Platoon slugged it out with three times its own numbers -for a full half hour. This stand was due largely to the courage and -leadership of Lawson, who stuck to his guns and refused evacuation, -though wounded three times. About 0300, with Marines on the right -devoting more attention to the heavier attack against Hill 109, the -exhausted survivors of the 2d Platoon were overrun and the Brigade line -penetrated. - -For some unknown reason, enemy troops did not pour down the eastern -slopes after the breakthrough. Only one squad drove through, and it -split Company A in half by invading Stevens’ CP, directly behind the 2d -Platoon’s lines. The company commander and his headquarters were slowly -forced down the draw by the methodical grenade and submachinegun fire -from above. - -The remainder of the North Korean platoon which had hit Company A -remained on the crest for a joint effort with the larger force striking -Hill 109. Stevens’ 1st Platoon, with its left flank now exposed on the -saddle, gradually fell back and curled around the southern face of 109. - -Although Company B’s left front held firm against the two-platoon -assault, a few Reds slipped by the Marine foxholes and charged into -Fenton’s CP on Hill 109. Rocket gunners, mortarmen and clerks responded -to the challenge and quickly eliminated the attackers. - -When Fenton became aware that the saddle south of Hill 109 had been -taken, he tightened his left flank by drawing it in to his 3d Platoon’s -reverse slope positions. This portion of his defense now took the shape -of a football, and successfully withstood pressure from the south. - -By 0400 Stevens had temporarily lost control of Company A, although -the situation looked worse than it actually was. While the company -commander stabilized his center near the bottom of the draw, his -executive officer, First Lieutenant Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., made -single-handed forays up the gully. He was eventually aided in his -private war by the company’s machinegun officer, Second Lieutenant -Francis W. Muetzel. After the breakthrough, the latter had been wounded -and left for dead in his foxhole behind the 2d Platoon. Upon regaining -consciousness, he made his way down the draw, fighting it out with -enemy soldiers until he reached the Marine lines. Company A’s 3d -Platoon along the spur below Hill 117 enjoyed a seemingly illogical -immunity during the counterattack. Although isolated after the -penetration and deployed ideally from the enemy’s point of view, Fox’s -men had only occasional brushes with Red infantrymen who displayed a -remarkable lack of interest. After the platoon leader learned of the -situation on his right, he redeployed into an elongated perimeter which -included a few survivors of the 2d Platoon. - -[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -SITUATION 18 AUG.--OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI)] - -Lieutenant Colonel Newton, when notified of Company A’s withdrawal on -the left front, called down such a tremendous volume of artillery fire -on enemy approaches that 1/11 asked him to conserve a few shells for -the Brigade attack scheduled for 0700. The battalion commander replied -that the Brigade would be fighting to retake Objective One at 0700 if -his beleaguered companies did not get maximum supporting fire. While -the artillerymen continued to pound Obong-ni Ridge, Newton’s 81-mm. -mortars, strengthened by 2/5’s entire stock of ammunition, added to -the hot metal thrown at the enemy. It can only be conjectured why the -NKPA thrust against the Brigade lines never developed above the company -level, but Newton’s generosity with high explosives probably did not -encourage Communist aspirations. - - -_Obong-ni Ridge Secured_ - -By dawn of 18 August, the North Korean attackers had spent their -strength, leaving Company B in undisputed control of Hills 102 and 109. -As if in frustration, enemy machineguns on 117 spat angrily at the -Marines while the few surviving Red infantrymen withdrew to their lines. - -Stevens prepared at first light to complete the unfinished business -of the previous day. Thanks to the heroism of his wounded gunnery -sergeant, Technical Sergeant Paul A. Hodge, the company commander had -regained contact with Fox before dawn and was able to prepare for an -attack. At 0700, after moving forward to the 3d Platoon’s area and -clearing with Newton, he ordered Fox to continue the attack and seize -Hill 117. - -The platoon leader shouted to his men who arose as a body to begin the -ascent. When a lone Red machinegun broke the silence on 117, Stevens -spotted the weapon immediately and called for an air strike. Within -seconds a Marine fighter plane glided over the 3d Platoon and dropped a -500-pound bomb squarely on the enemy position. The response from Marine -air had been so prompt that every one of the attackers was knocked off -his feet and one of Fox’s automatic riflemen was killed. - -While the echoes of the shattering explosion were still reverberating -through the morning haze, the thin skirmish line of Marines scrambled -up the slope and carried Hill 117. McMullen’s 1st Platoon drove in from -109, and the North Koreans fled in panic from the crest and reverse -slope positions. A full company of Reds raced down the western slope, -with Stevens’ riflemen and machinegunners firing from the crest to rip -into the enemy groups. - -Capitalizing on a psychological advantage, Company A wheeled southward -to sweep the crest. Fox, using a skirmish line of only 20 men, -assaulted Hill 143 and took the peak against light resistance. A -quick call to Newton brought Stevens immediate permission for maximum -exploitation. - -The 3d Platoon attacked Hill 147 vigorously, and though a few Red -soldiers fought to the bitter end, the majority again chose to flee. -The high ground was taken easily. - -As the Marines moved over the crest of 147, they saw 150 enemy troops -in formation halfway down the western slope. The withdrawal commenced -in an orderly column of fours but the formation broke down quickly -under Marine fire and turned into a routed mob. - -Fox turned his attention to Hill 153, Obong-ni’s crowning peak, -reasoning that it would be the logical place for the enemy’s last-ditch -stand. But it was the same old story when the 3d Platoon rushed to -the summit--abandoned weapons and equipment, a few scattered dead, -and blasted foxholes. There was a variation, however, when a supposed -clump of scrub pines arose from the reverse slope and rushed downward -in headlong flight. The Leathernecks were reminded of Birnham Wood in -Shakespeare’s _Macbeth_ as the camouflaged North Koreans disappeared -with the agility of mountain goats before Marine marksmen could score -more than a few hits. - -While the 1st and 2d Platoons consolidated the central peaks, the 3d -combed the southern reaches below Hill 153 without incident. The 1st -Platoon, Able Company Engineers, patrolled the swampland south of the -ridge and secured Fox’s left flank with a minefield extending from the -southern crest to the valley below and eastward across the swamp. By -midafternoon all of Obong-ni Ridge belonged to the Brigade. - - -_Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge_ - -At midnight, 17 August, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had issued 3/5 a -warning order for continuing the attack on the 18th. Shortly after -dawn, Taplett and his two company commanders, Fegan and Bohn, visually -reconnoitered Hill 207--Objective Two--from vantage points north and -south of the MSR. Then, while the battalion commander set up his OP on -the northern part of Obong-ni Ridge, Companies G and H advanced to an -assembly area at the base of the Ridge.[318] - - [318] This section is derived from: Annexes Easy and How to - Brig SAR; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; and Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr - 54. - -Taplett called down heavy artillery, air, and mortar preparations on -Objective Two. Occasionally he shifted fires to blast large groups of -enemy fleeing to Hill 207 from Company A’s advance on Obong-ni Ridge. - -[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTERATTACK - -SEIZURE OF OBJ. 2--18 AUG.] - -Directly south of Finger Ridge, two large spurs form the northern -approach to Hill 207. Company H emerged into the open at 1000 from the -MSR between Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and attacked up the eastern -spur. Following Fegan’s unit was Company G, which veered to the right -and advanced up the western spur. The two infantry units slowly -ascended, separated by a deep gully, while the 3d Platoon of Able -Company tanks fired overhead and to the flanks from its positions in -the valley. - -When Fegan’s unit was halfway up the eastern spur, the Marine tankmen -saw a platoon of North Koreans attempting to flank the attackers. -Machinegun and 90-mm. fire from the M-26’s killed or dispersed the Reds -at a range of 300 yards. - -As Lieutenant Williams worked How Company’s 1st Platoon close enough -for an assault of the summit, several NKPA soldiers rose from their -holes and threw down hand grenades. The Marines hit the deck until -the missiles exploded, then bounded up and rushed the crest. Unnerved -by Williams’ perfect timing, most of the North Koreans fled southward -along the ridge. The remainder died in their positions during a brief -but bitter fight. - -Moving up on Fegan’s right, Bohn’s men pushed over the western half -of the objective, finding only a handful of enemy who were quickly -destroyed. Company G’s assault completed the seizure of Objective Two -at 1237. - -During the last minutes of the fight on Hill 207, the entire Naktong -Bulge suddenly swarmed with panic-stricken remnants of the 4th NKPA -Division. What had been a retreat of small forces now became a -widespread rout. Enemy troops poured down from Objective Two, some -scurrying up the slopes of Hill 311 across the MSR, others making for -the Naktong River. - -Air, artillery, and mortars were now offered a profusion of targets by -an enemy who ordinarily did not reveal himself during daylight hours. -MAG-33 plastered the suspected CP of the 18th NKPA Regiment on a peak -south of 207, shattering communications equipment and weapons. Other -Marine planes alternated strafing runs with 1/11’s continual artillery -barrages along the river banks, where enemy troops were gathering by -the hundreds. - -Victory turned into slaughter when the Brigade supporting arms -concentrated on the masses of Communists plunging into the river. All -artillery having been turned loose on the river crossings, Taplett used -his mortars, machineguns, and the supporting tanks to cut down targets -in the valley and on Hills 207 and 311. He requested permission to -attack the latter immediately, but was told to remain on Objective Two -while the Brigade gave all of its attention to the astounding situation -at the river. - -At 1530 Companies G and H descended Hill 207. They were met at the -bottom by First Lieutenant Pomeroy’s 1st Platoon of tanks and escorted -across the valley to the base of Hill 311--Objective Three. In advance -of the infantrymen, MAG-33 scorched the high ground with napalm while -artillery, mortars, and 75-mm. recoilless rifles worked over the slopes. - -Again Fegan and Bohn moved up companion spurs which converged on their -target, the 1,000-foot height. Progress was good until Company H came -within 200 yards of the crest. Then a volley of rifle fire from the -summit and forward slopes forced the Marines to the ground. Although -confronted by only a platoon, Fegan was at a disadvantage. Scrub -growth not only concealed the Communist riflemen, but also prevented -the use of Company H’s machineguns. Maneuver to the right or left was -impossible, since the steep draws on either side were well covered -by camouflaged enemy positions. Several Marines who tried to advance -frontally were cut down by rifle fire. - -The enemy platoon’s defense was not based on the usual machinegun -fire and grenade throwing. With calm, business-like efficiency, NKPA -riflemen kept Company H pinned to the ground, finally wounding Fegan -himself as the officer attempted to regain the initiative. After his -evacuation, the attack bogged down completely. - -At 1730, Company G had reached the southern portion of the long, -narrow crest by brushing aside light resistance. Turning its attention -northward, the company entered into a small-arms duel with the -Communist force opposing Fegan’s unit. When supporting arms failed to -dislodge the enemy rifleman, Bohn enveloped the troublesome pocket by -sending Cahill’s 1st Platoon around to the left (west). - -The young platoon leader completed the maneuver just before nightfall -and overran the Reds on the northern half of the summit. But the enemy -on the forward slopes facing Company H suddenly showed fight. The 1st -Platoon, pushed rearward a short distance by the surprise resistance, -slugged it out at close quarters. - -With darkness closing in and the platoon so far beyond Marines lines, -Bohn ordered it to withdraw. Cahill, wounded himself, reported on his -return that the platoon had suffered 10 casualties, including 2 killed. - -[Illustration: 1_st_ NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -SEIZURE OF OBJ. 3–18 AUG.] - -Taplett ordered the two companies to deploy defensively in their -present positions. Thus, during the quiet night of 18–19 August, -Companies G and H faced the enemy pocket at right angles to each other. - -Earlier on the 18th Lieutenant (jg) Robert J. Harvey, 3d Battalion -surgeon, had the unpleasant task of examining an abandoned Army aid -station under the bridge near the tip of Finger Ridge. The improvised -hospital had been overrun during Army reverses a week before; and -about 30 dead found by the Marines bore mute evidence of the enemy’s -brutality in dealing with captured wounded and medical personnel. - -At 0610 on the morning of 19 August, 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars prepared the -way for the final drive on Objective Three. Following close in the wake -of the mortar bursts, Second Lieutenant Thomas P. Lennon led Company H -through evacuated enemy positions. He reached the northern part of Hill -311 without meeting any opposition. - -This last Brigade objective was secured at 0645, leaving 1/5 atop -Obong-ni Ridge, 2/5 on Hill 207 to which it had displaced on the 18th, -and 3/5 in possession of the dominating height of the Naktong Bulge. -The reduction of the enemy bridgehead cost the Marines 66 dead, 1 -missing in action, and 278 wounded. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -Second Naktong - -_The Famous Bean Patch--Planning for Inchon Landing--Return to the -Naktong Bulge--All-Out NKPA Offensive--The Marines Jump Off--Progress -of Brigade Attack--Assault on Hill 117_ - - -It was all over but the mopping-up operations. Battalion areas were -carefully patrolled on 19 August to clear them of NKPA snipers or -stragglers. During this process a patrol ranging along the Naktong -river discovered three enemy 122-mm. howitzers hidden in a strip of -woods on a hill. The pieces had not been touched by Marine air or -artillery. What was more surprising, they were emplaced in a column to -fire over one another--something new and wonderful that the Marines had -never seen before.[319] General Craig concluded that these howitzers -had fired the shells which landed on Marine positions to the bitter end. - - [319] This section is derived from: LtGen Edward A. Craig - (Ret), ltr to author, 23 May 54 (Craig, 23 May 54). - -The next day the Brigade commander took a helicopter to 24th Division -Headquarters to confer with General Church. There he was informed that -the Marines had been detached from 24th Division operational control -to Eighth Army reserve. Church complimented the Brigade warmly on its -performance, and letters of commendation were later received both from -him and CG EUSAK. - -At 1300 on the 21st Craig arrived by helicopter at a new Brigade -bivouac area near Masan that was to be recorded in capital letters -as the Bean Patch. It was just that--a bean patch large enough to -accommodate a brigade. But from this historic spot the Marines were -to fight their way around the peninsula during the next 5 months and -complete the circuit to their identical starting point. - -General Craig arrived along with the Brigade advance elements. After -setting up his CP, he reported to General Kean, of the 25th Division, -who was in control of the bivouac area. Kean divulged that the -situation in his sector had deteriorated. The enemy had made several -penetrations, and Brigade assistance might be required in the event of -further breakthroughs. As it was, Kean had been authorized by Eighth -Army to employ Brigade artillery along with his own; and 1/11 proceeded -the next day to the familiar Chindong-ni area in support of 25th -Division Infantry. - -Orders were received from Eighth Army for the Brigade infantry to be -prepared to counterattack in the 25th Division sector as part of its -reserve mission. General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart made a -helicopter reconnaissance of the areas of greatest activity, but events -proved that the Marine rifle battalions were not needed. - - -_The Famous Bean Patch_ - -Unit training, including the checking and firing of all weapons, was -conducted at the Bean Patch; and Marine patrols were sent out to the -rear of the 25th Division to watch for infiltrating forces. Patrols in -rugged country were fed hot meals delivered in special containers by -the versatile helicopters of VMO-6. - -Truckloads of supplies rolled in daily from Pusan, including some of -the equipment left behind at the docks when the Brigade landed. But no -tentage was available, and the exhausting marches of combat had forced -the men to discard everything except fighting tools. In the lack of -shelter tents, therefore, the Marines lived in the open at the Bean -Patch. - -General Craig conferred on 23 August with General Kean and a -distinguished visitor, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, USA. -Collins was keenly interested in Marine methods of knocking out NKPA -tanks and requested Craig to prepare a memorandum on the subject. - -That evening the entire Brigade attended an outdoor entertainment -given on an improvised stage by South Korean girls, who sang and -played native instruments which sounded out of tune to Western ears. -Translations of the songs were forthcoming, since some of the girls -were English-speaking refugees from Seoul University. Afterwards, -General Craig addressed the Brigade, paying a high tribute to his -Marines for their conduct in battle. NKPA prisoners, he said, had told -G-2 interviewers that they earnestly wished to steer clear of “the -Americans in yellow leggings.” - -Letters from home and beer from Pusan[320] contributed to good Marine -morale, even though no liberty was granted to nearby towns. On the 29th -an honor guard of 87 Marines received Purple Heart medals at a ceremony -attended by President Syngman Rhee, who arrived in a helicopter -provided by VMO-6. General Craig had paid an official call on him the -day before at Chinhae, being most courteously received. And after the -presentation of medals, President Rhee gave a talk to the Marines. - - [320] The offer of Stateside breweries to send free beer to - Korea precipitated a controversy in civilian circles. - Opponents protested on the grounds that some of the - troops were as young as 18. Proponents argued that if - a man was old enough to fight, he was mature enough to - drink a can of beer without harm. The issue was never - definitely settled, though it resulted in a temporary - drought. - -He confided to Craig afterwards that he would like to confer some sort -of an award on every man in the Brigade for heroic service in Korea. -This was undoubtedly the inception of the Korean Presidential Unit -Citation which the Brigade later received from the ROK executive. - - -_Planning for Inchon Landing_ - -General Craig, it may be recalled, had insisted that replacements be -sent to the Brigade. Thanks to his determination, a long column of -trucks arrived at the Bean Patch with more than 800 Marines just landed -at Pusan. - -Some of the 5th Marines outfits had been so thinned by combat that -an appeal was made for volunteers from supporting units to serve -temporarily in rifle companies, with the privilege of returning to -their former status after the emergency. The hearty response was a -tribute to Marine morale as well as Marine basic training which made -every man a potential rifleman. Engineers, shore party troops and -headquarters personnel came forward in such numbers that some could not -be accepted after the arrival of replacements eased the situation. - -No attempt was made at the Bean Patch to form the newcomers into third -rifle companies. They were simply used to build up the strength of the -present companies and given intensive unit training. - -Rumors of an impending Marine amphibious operation had already filtered -down to every PFC, and there were wild speculations as to when and -where. At least, it could hardly be denied that the Brigade would soon -be taking another voyage; for convoys of tracks left the Bean Patch -every day laden with heavy supplies and equipment to be unloaded at -Pusan.[321] - - [321] Brig SAR. - -This was once that lower-echelon “scuttlebutt” came close to the mark. -In fact, planning for the Inchon landing had already gone so far that -General Craig sent his chief of staff, G-3 and G-4 to Tokyo to confer -with staff officers of the 1st Marine Division about the projected -operation.[322] - - [322] Craig, 23 May 54. - -Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, had -relieved General Erskine early in July when the latter was sent on a -secret State Department mission. As the ADC of the Division during the -fight for Peleliu in 1944, Smith knew how tough an amphibious operation -can become when it encounters unexpected obstacles. He was determined -to keep his Division intact with its three infantry regiments, the 1st, -5th, and 7th Marines. And after his arrival in Japan with the advance -party, he returned a firm negative to proposals that the 5th Marines -and other Brigade troops remain with the Eighth Army. - -It would be putting the case mildly to say that this was the eleventh -hour, The 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) had landed at -Kobe from 28 August to 3 September. And though a typhoon caused a good -deal of damage, little time was lost at the gigantic task of unloading -mixed-type shipping and combat-loading it into assault-type shipping. -The LST’s had to be ready to sail for the target area by 10 September, -and the transports by the 12th. - -The Marines at the Bean Patch would have been flattered to know that -they were the objects of an official tug of war at Tokyo. It was -maintained by the EUSAK command and staff that Army morale would be -hurt by taking the Brigade away from the Pusan Perimeter at a critical -moment. On the other hand, General Smith contended that he needed the -Brigade all the more urgently because the 7th Marines,[323] sailing -belatedly from San Diego, would not be able to reach Inchon until a -week after the proposed D-day of 15 September 1950. - - [323] Less a battalion making the voyage from the - Mediterranean, where it had been afloat with the Sixth - Fleet. - -The Marine general was informed that the decision would depend upon -the tactical situation in Korea. On 30 August he sent a dispatch -to X Corps--the new Army tactical organization activated by CINCFE -especially for the Inchon operation--requesting that the Brigade be -released from its Army commitments on 1 September. In response, -General MacArthur issued an order restoring the unit to the 1st Marine -Division on the 4th.[324] - - [324] MCBS, I-II-B-4-6. - -At this point the enemy rudely interrupted by launching an all-out -offensive against the Pusan Perimeter on 1 September, and General -MacArthur’s order was rescinded. Even though most of the Brigade’s -heavy equipment was at the Pusan docks, waiting for shipping, GHQFEC -decided that General Craig’s troops should again be used as “firemen” -to extinguish an NKPA conflagration. - -Colonel Edward H. Forney, the Marine officer recently named deputy -chief of staff of X Corps, suggested to General Smith the possibility -of substituting an Army unit, the 32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry -Division, for the 5th Marines. Smith demurred on the grounds that these -troops had not been trained for amphibious warfare. - -On 3 September, with D-day less than 2 weeks away, a conference was -held in Tokyo to decide the question once and for all. X Corps was -represented by General Wright, the G-3, and General Edward S. Almond, -the new commanding general and former chief of staff, GHQFEC. COMNAVFE -(Admiral Joy), COMSEVENTHFLT (Admiral Struble) and COMPHIBGRUONE -(Admiral Doyle) were the Navy officers present. General Almond -opened the discussion by reiterating that the 32d Infantry would be -substituted for the 5th Marines. In reply, General Smith mentioned -the complications of an amphibious assault landing and urged that the -operations plan be amended if the untrained Army regiment were to be -employed. - -Another solution, offered by Admiral Struble, was baited with -reciprocal concessions. He suggested that the Brigade be employed -briefly for counterattacks in the Pusan Perimeter, but that meanwhile -the 32d or some other 7th Infantry Division regiment be moved from -Japan to Korea. There it would become a floating reserve for EUSAK, -thus releasing the Brigade units to take their former places in the 1st -Marine Division for the Inchon operation. This compromise was finally -accepted, and orders were issued for the Brigade to be withdrawn from -Eighth Army control at midnight on 5 September. - -The first intimations to reach the troops at the Bean Patch were -received on the 1st, at 0810, when the Brigade was alerted for a -possible move by CG EUSAK to an unknown destination. At 1109 came -the warning order for a road lift to the Miryang assembly area. The -confirmation followed at 1215, with all units being scheduled to move -out at 1330.[325] - - [325] Brig SAR. - -The Marines had another date with destiny. - - -_Return to the Naktong Bulge_ - -General Craig set up his CP in the Miryang area at 1800 on 1 September. -Billeting officers, having gone ahead by helicopter, were prepared -to take care of Brigade units as they arrived. Among them was the -1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, which had been returned from 25th -Division control to the Brigade. - -The news from the front was depressing. Heavy attacks had been received -all day along the 2d and 25th Infantry Division fronts. An enemy -penetration of 4,000 yards was made at the expense of the 2d Division, -with the old familiar Naktong Bulge being occupied again by Red Koreans -who had gained a firm foothold on the east bank of the river. - -This meant that General Craig’s men, now under operational control of -the 2d Division, were likely to revisit some scarred parcels of Korean -real estate they had hoped never to see again. Major General Lawrence -B. Keiser, commanding the 2d Division, informed the Brigade commander -that several of his companies had been cut off by enemy advances which -pushed his lines back almost to Yongsan.[326] There was a good deal of -NKPA infiltration, he added, in his rear. - - [326] Craig, 23 May 54. - -It had been a full day, and at 2230 that night Craig received orders -from the Eighth Army to move the Brigade at first light to a reserve -position south of Yongsan and in the rear of the 9th Infantry of the 2d -Division. - -At 0630, on 2 September, the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines arrived -at its assigned covering position on the road leading to Yongsan. The -remainder of the Brigade moved out to assembly positions during the -day.[327] - - [327] Brig SAR. - -Craig proceeded by helicopter at 0830 to the 2d Infantry Division -headquarters for a conference with Keiser to plan the move of the -Brigade into his lines. Afterwards, the Marine general devoted the rest -of the morning to reconnaissance of the terrain by helicopter. On the -way he stopped at Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP and learned that the -5th Marines units were well established along the road leading to the -front. - -The planning conference for the projected counterattack began at 1430 -in the 2d Infantry Division CP. General Craig was accompanied by his -assistant G-3, Major Frank R. Stewart, Jr., since his regular G-3 -had not yet returned from the 1st Marine Division briefing at Tokyo. -General Keiser and his staff officers emphasized the gravity of the -situation in the 2d Division sector. They wanted General Craig to -counterattack that very afternoon on a widely extended front, but he -objected on both counts. - -As for the time element, he pointed out that the hour was late. Some of -his units were not even in their assembly positions, and others were -still detraining or in trucks. Smoke and haze had resulted in such low -visibility that planes could not operate effectively. Finally, Craig’s -TACRON had not arrived and he was out of touch with the aircraft -carriers. He did not wish to commit his force piecemeal without air -support; and in the end the Army staff officers agreed with him on the -advisability of the Marines attacking in the morning.[328] - - [328] Craig, 23 May 54. - -Next came a discussion as to the nature of the Marine counterattack. -Craig cited the risks and disadvantages of advancing on too wide a -front. He suggested that the 2d Infantry Division specify the Marine -objectives and allow him to attack in such formations as he deemed -most effective. Keiser and his staff assented, and the Marine officers -hurried back to the Brigade CP. - - -_All-Out NKPA Offensive_ - -Glancing at the big picture, there could be no doubt that the enemy was -making an all-out effort to smash through the Pusan Perimeter. Late -in August it became evident that he was massing troops. The blow fell -in the early morning hours of 1 September. The direction of the main -attack remained in doubt until that afternoon, when it was revealed as -a bid for a breakthrough in the Naktong Bulge which would expose the -Pusan-Taegu lifeline. - -Despite heavy casualties of the past 2 months, NKPA overall strength -was estimated as high as 133,000 men as the result of filling the -ranks with hastily trained replacements. Thirteen infantry regiments, -3 security regiments and the remnants of the original 3 armored -regiments were believed to be participating in the offensive.[329] - - [329] Maj H. D. Stewart, “Rise and Fall of an Army,” _Military - Review_, 30, no. 11:32–35 (Feb 51). - -For 2 months the Eighth Army had been purchasing time with space, -and the enemy realized that time was now fighting on the side of the -United Nations. The first ground force unit sent by a member nation to -reinforce United States and ROK troops was the British 27th Infantry -Brigade, which landed and took over a sector early in September. But -the enemy knew that other UN contingents had been promised. - -The reorganized ROK army, moreover, had recovered from its early -disasters and was giving a good account of itself in the northern -sectors of the Pusan Perimeter. There the 1st, 3d, 6th, 8th, and -Capital Divisions had not only maintained their tactical integrity -throughout August but even delivered several counterattacks.[330] - - [330] U. S. Dept of State, “Fifth Report to the Security - Council, October 5, 1950,” _United Nations Action in - Korea under Unified Command_ (Washington: GPO, 1950). - -The NKPA numerical superiority, in short, could not last much longer. -It was now or never if the invaders hoped to batter their way to Pusan, -and Pyongyang staked everything on a final offensive. - -The brunt fell upon the United States 2d Infantry Division. Troops from -four enemy divisions were identified on this sensitive front, well -supported by armor and artillery. Within a few hours pressure became so -great that EUSAK decided to send the Marine mobile reserve to the aid -of the Army troops. - -Not only was the terrain familiar to Marines who had fought their way -up Obong-ni Ridge, but they were renewing acquaintance with the same -enemy outfit. For G-2 reports confirmed that the NKPA 4th Infantry -Division was back again at the old stand--or at least such survivors as -had emerged with a whole skin from their defeat of 17–18 August in this -area. - -Perhaps because of the large numbers of new recruits filling the ranks, -the retreaded outfit followed in reserve just behind the NKPA 9th -Infantry Division as it crossed the Naktong and drove eastward. The 9th -was one of the enemy units hastily raised from constabulary forces for -purposes of the invasion. Assigned to guard duty at Seoul throughout -July and half of August, the troops devoted themselves wholeheartedly -to the pleasant mission of forcing South Koreans to “volunteer” as -soldiers or laborers against their own people. Thus the division could -be considered a fresh and rested outfit, though deficient in training -and combat discipline as compared to the older NKPA units. - -Troops from the enemy’s 2d and 10th Divisions were also identified on -the front of the United States 2d Infantry Division, but the Marines -had no contacts with these units.[331] - - [331] _Ibid._ - - -_The Marines Jump Off_ - -General Keiser’s operational directive for the 3 September -counterattack was half a page in length. As in the case of the first -Naktong counterstroke, the Marine brigade was placed opposite the -center of the Bulge, with the mission of driving westward “to restore -former 9th Infantry positions.” This time, however, Craig’s force was -scheduled to jump off 4 miles east of Observation Hill; for the North -Koreans were knocking at the gates of Yongsan. - -The Brigade’s line of departure was a long north-south ridgeline about -a thousand yards west of Yongsan and directly south of Myong-ni. This -high ground was occupied on 2 September by the 9th Infantry. When the -Marines passed through the next morning, the Army unit was to swing -northward to attack on the Brigade right. Still farther north, the -23d Infantry had orders to hold positions on the right of the 9th and -maintain contact with friendly units by patrolling.[332] - - [332] 2d InfDiv Op Dir, 2 Sep 50; and Brig Op Order 19-50. - -On the Brigade’s left, a special task force of the Army’s 72d Tank -Battalion and 2d Engineer Battalion was to attack southward from Il-li -to the Naktong River line below the Bulge. There it would link with the -25th Division’s right. - -The fact that the Communists upset the plan by smashing through the 9th -Infantry lines on the night of 2–3 September was both bad and good news -from the standpoint of the Marines. It was bad because an overextended -friendly unit had been shattered by many times its numbers and forced -into a disorganized withdrawal. It was good because the enemy was -plowing ahead at full steam, obviously unaware that he was shortly due -for a blow that would find him off balance and send him reeling. - -Low hanging clouds and smoke made for poor visibility on the morning -of the 3d when General Craig set out on his customary prebattle -reconnaissance by helicopter. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel -Stewart, who had just returned from the 1st Marine Division planning -conferences at Tokyo. - -“We couldn’t see anything but an occasional mountain peak,” Craig -recalled at a later date. “After flying around for some time, we had -almost decided to return to the CP and complete the tour by jeep. Then -Colonel Stewart noticed a hole in the clouds, and we dropped to an -altitude where we had a good view of the front.”[333] - - [333] Craig, 23 May 54. - -What Craig and Stewart saw was a long column of Marines fighting their -way toward the line of departure. - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s plan of attack for the 5th Marines called -for the 1st and 2d Battalions to advance westward astride the Yongsan -road, with 2/5 on the right. Taplett’s 3d Battalion would initially be -in reserve, blocking the southern approaches to Yongsan.[334] - - [334] Annex How. - -At 0450, 3 September, 2/5 detrucked about 800 yards from Yongsan -and marched forward in a route column. Moving into the town a short -time later, the Marines received small arms fire from snipers hidden -in buildings, ditches and culverts. Most of them were liquidated as -the column pushed through to the road junction at the western end of -Yongsan by 0630.[335] - - [335] _Ibid._ - -At this fork a secondary route branches from the main road through the -large village of Myong-ni, about 2,000 yards northwest of Yongsan. - -Although still 1,000 yards from the designated line of departure, the -2d Battalion came under moderate fire from its right front. Moreover, -dawn had brought indications of considerable activity and confusion -ahead of the Marines. Ignoring the fire, Roise went forward about 500 -yards to a low hill lying athwart the MSR. There he was jolted by the -discovery that the 9th Infantry’s lines had collapsed.[336] - - [336] _Ibid._ - -On the right of the road there was no friendly situation worthy of the -name. To the left of the MSR, an Army tank unit was parked behind the -little hill which Roise had reached, and to the front were 4 of its -tanks--2 destroyed and 2 abandoned. Included in the wreckage ahead were -2 burned-out NKPA T-34’s. - -Three hundred yards to the west, on the high ground south of the main -road, Army troops were retreating from 1/5’s line of departure. The -soldiers had buckled under an onslaught by the NKPA 9th Division, -which had launched an all-out attack at first light.[337] - - [337] _Ibid._ - -Having observed evidence of the confusing situation from their -helicopter, Craig and Stewart landed some distance behind Yongsan and -proceeded forward by jeep and foot. The Brigade commander located 1/5’s -CP south of Yongsan and discovered that the battalion was slightly out -of position. During 2/5’s delay in moving through the city, Murray had -ordered Newton to swing westward and align his unit for the attack as -best he could. Darkness, coupled with confusion caused by the Army’s -withdrawal and 2/5’s fight, had caused the 1st Battalion to move south -of Chukchon-ni instead of Yongsan, as planned. Craig instructed 1/5’s -commander to make a 500-yard correction northward during the actual -attack.[338] - - [338] Craig, 23 May 54 (with comments by LtCol M. R. Olson, 17 - Jun 54). - -Roise was meanwhile taking the situation in hand north of the MSR. At -0645 he called Marine tanks forward to cover the withdrawal of 9th -Infantry troops from the high ridge in 1/5’s zone. - -Second Lieutenant Robert M. Winter led his platoon of M-26’s into hull -defilade next to 2/5’s OP on the low hill and unleashed overhead fire -in support of the Army troops. The pursuit by the North Koreans began -to lag. - - -_Progress of Brigade Attack_ - -Despite enemy artillery fire in the 2d Battalion zone, Companies -D and E jumped off from the road junction at 0715 to clear the -Yongsan-Myong-ni road and secure the 5th Marines’ right flank.[339] - - [339] This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Muetzel, 5–6 - Jan 50 (with comments by Col G. R. Newton, Maj J. R. - Stevens, and Capt G. C. Fox); and Craig, 23 May 54. - -While this move was in progress, the last of the 9th Infantry troops -vacated 1/5’s line of departure to the left front. Roise immediately -smothered that ridgeline with fire from Marine tanks, artillery, air, -mortars, and machineguns. - -Despite this blanket of steel, enemy guns from the high ground were -able to fire across the MSR at Company E as it cleared a series of -hills below Myong-ni. These hills had been designated 2/5’s line of -departure the previous day, but now were considered part of the first -objective. - -At 0800, when Captain Samuel Jaskilka reported that Easy Company had -completed its mission, Roise ordered Company D to push through Myong-ni -and take the hill just northwest of that village. - -[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -3–5 SEPTEMBER 1950 - -1st PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE ATTACHED TO 2nd INFANTRY DIVISION - -SHOWING PRINCIPAL MARINE ATTACKS AND ENEMY POSITIONS, WITHDRAWALS, & -COUNTERATTACK] - -By this time the entire Brigade was shifting into high gear. Winter’s -tanks on the little hill straddling the MSR were joined by the 1st -Platoon, Able Company Engineers. The Army armored unit behind the -southern portion of the hill suddenly went into hull defilade and added -its firepower to that of the Marine M-26’s. Craig, Snedeker and Stewart -crawled to the crest of the hill on the right side of the MSR and -studied the front from positions between the Marine tanks and Roise’s -OP. - -The NKPA 9th Division had been stopped in its tracks when the Brigade’s -supporting arms connected. Then the Reds concentrated their fire on the -little hill where Craig’s OP was located. Lieutenant Winter was shot -through the neck and one of his men wounded while aiding him. Before -being evacuated, the painfully wounded tank officer offered General -Craig a bottle of whiskey left in his M-26. - -Chaplains Sporrer and Hickey were taken under machinegun fire as they -walked forward on the MSR toward the hill. “It’s lucky they’re poor -shots,” said Sporrer as a second and third burst cracked over his head. -The two chaplains arrived just in time to administer to the wounded -being carried off the hill by the engineers. - -At 0855, the 1st Battalion jumped off from below Chukchon-ni. The -attack having been launched too far to the south, Companies A and B had -to veer northwest as they advanced toward the enemy-held ridge 1,000 -yards away. Fenton’s unit was on the right, gradually closing on the -MSR as it moved forward. - -To the south, Stevens deployed his 1st, 2d, and 3d Platoons from right -to left in that order, the latter being slightly withheld to protect -the open left flank. - -As the men of 1/5 waded into the knee-deep muck of the rice paddy, they -came under long-range small-arms fire from their objective. Newton -countered immediately by plastering the ridge with artillery and mortar -fire. The advance continued and only a few casualties were taken by -the time the companies reached a drainage ditch midway across the rice -paddy. Here the long skirmish line paused to check its direction and -place the wounded on dikes where they would be seen by corpsmen. - -During the advance from the drainage ditch to the base of the ridge, -1/5’s commander frequently called on air, artillery and mortars to -blast enemy automatic weapons on the crest and forward slopes of the -objective. Company A had the added support of an Army tank destroyer -which gave overhead fire from the hill south of Chukchon-ni. On one -occasion Marine 75’s joined with the Army weapon to silence Communist -guns in a small village at the base of the ridge. - -Throughout the rice-paddy crossing, the Marines were constantly meeting -Army stragglers, some of whom had been isolated in enemy territory for -as long as three days. Most of the soldiers were wounded, and all were -weaponless and near exhaustion. - -At 1100 Fenton and Stevens radioed Newton that they were ready for the -assault, and the battalion commander immediately showered the objective -with 81-mm. mortar fire to smother North Korean machineguns. - -Beyond the edge of the rice paddy in Company A’s zone, a sharp step led -to the gentle incline at the base of the ridge. After a few yards, the -gradual slope gave way to a steep rise which shot up abruptly to the -crest of the high hill. - -Lieutenant Muetzel’s 2d Platoon held up at the step, using its -protection against enemy fire while 1/5’s mortar barrage was falling. -During the pause Technical Sergeant McMullen brought the 1st Platoon -into position on Muetzel’s right and Lieutenant Fox aligned his 3d -Platoon on the left. - -As soon as the supporting fire lifted, Muetzel jumped to his feet and -shouted the command to assault. Every man in Company A’s skirmish -line responded by scrambling up the hillside. The Marines made such a -fearful racket that a whole company of alarmed North Koreans suddenly -jumped up from concealed foxholes on the forward slope and fled toward -the summit. - -The panic-stricken Reds were easy targets for Company A’s riflemen and -BAR men. Halting on the gentle incline, the Marines carefully took aim -and killed most of the enemy soldiers. When the Communist survivors -disappeared over the crest, Company A again surged upward and within -minutes carried the summit. - - -_Assault on Hill 117_ - -The 1st Battalion secured its initial objective about noon on 3 -September. Company B’s next target was a continuation of the ridge -running parallel to the MSR for 1,000 yards and topped by 4 conspicuous -peaks. Able Company’s second objective was a hill stretching across its -front beyond a 200-yard valley. This hill was connected to Stevens’ -first objective by a narrow razorback ridge on the right which offered -a poor route of approach.[340] - - [340] _Ibid._ - -The two companies paused on their newly won positions to reorganize, -evacuate wounded, and wait for a resupply of ammunition. There they -came under heavy fire from the reverse slopes of their first objective -and the high ground to the west. Several casualties were taken before -Corsairs, requested by Newton, appeared for an air strike. As the -Marine fighter planes unloaded their ordnance, large groups of enemy -broke. Most of the Reds fled down the northern slopes, crossed the MSR -and ascended Hill 117 in 2/5’s zone. - -Newton reacted to reports of the rout by throwing heavy artillery fire -across the enemy’s avenues of retreat. The hillsides and road were soon -littered with bodies and equipment. - -While 1/5’s attack on its first objective was in progress, Company -D had secured the 5th Marines’ right flank by clearing Myong-ni of -moderate resistance and seizing the hill to the northwest of the large -village. The new company commander, First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, -reported to Roise that he was receiving considerable machinegun and -mortar fire from Hill 117. This high ground lay directly across 2/5’s -front, stretching northward from the MSR to a point about 500 yards -west of Myong-ni. - -Smith’s reports, together with the news of the enemy’s withdrawal -to Hill 117 from 1/5’s zone, led Roise to order Company D to attack -the high ground from the north and cut off the North Korean retreat. -Shortly after 1200, Smith’s company jumped off to the southwest from -its positions above Myong-ni and fought across the rice paddies -circling the objective. - -Company E could not advance from the chain of hills won earlier in the -day because of enemy troops along the high ridge in Baker Company’s -zone south of the MSR. But Jaskilka’s men supported the attack on 117 -by fire. - -A platoon of 75’s from First Lieutenant Almarion S. Bailey’s Anti-Tank -Company, taking positions on Jaskilka’s right, quickly knocked out an -enemy gun on the objective. The Communists answered with 85-mm. fire -from a concealed T-34 tank, killing 2 and wounding 7 of the recoilless -rifle crews. - -Company D gained a foothold on one of Hill 117’s spurs against light -resistance. As the unit advanced south toward the crest, however, enemy -troops pouring across the MSR from 1/5’s zone had boosted the ranks -of the defenders to approximately two battalions. Smith’s company was -caught in its isolated position 500 yards from the rest of 2/5 and -blasted by North Korean artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons. -Casualties mounted at such a staggering rate that the Marines were hard -put to retain their foothold on the northern tip of the hill. - -While the 2d Battalion was maneuvering and fighting on the right of -the road, the 2d Platoon of tanks pushed westward along the MSR from -its early morning position 500 yards west of Yongsan. The Brigade -armor became heavily engaged with enemy antitank weapons, and several -casualties were taken as Marines exposed themselves from unbuttoned -M-26’s to spot Communist emplacements. Second Lieutenant John S. -Carson, who had taken over the platoon after Winter was wounded, fell -before enemy machinegun fire and died instantly. - -Going into hull defilade on another low hill overlooking the MSR, the -2d Platoon surprised three T-34 tanks on the road ahead and quickly -destroyed them with 90-mm. fire. The tankmen then turned their -guns on a wealth of targets spread across the front: Red antitank -weapons, machinegun positions, troop concentrations, and groups either -retreating or attempting to reinforce. - -About noon, Second Lieutenant Sweet’s 3d Platoon joined the 2d and -added its firepower to the fusillade. Another T-34 was knocked out when -Sweet’s men blasted a thicket suspected of concealing an antitank gun. -A fifth North Korean tank went out of action when it was abandoned by -its crew on the left side of the road. - -In the afternoon of 3 September, enemy resistance across 1/5’s front -weakened proportionately as it grew stronger in the 2d Battalion zone. -Newton launched his attack on Objective Two at 1510, after MAG-33 and -1/11 had softened up the North Korean positions.[341] - - [341] _Ibid._ - -Company B drove down the ridgeline paralleling the MSR and in little -more than an hour had seized its part of the objective, a peak directly -across the road from Hill 117. During the 1,000-yard advance, Fenton -reported another large group of enemy fleeing to 2/5’s zone. The -information was quickly relayed to Roise, who had ample reason by this -time to curse the fortunes of war. - -In Company A’s zone, Stevens and his platoon leaders worked out a -classic scheme of maneuver for seizing Hill 91, their part of the -battalion objective. McMullen’s 1st Platoon and the company machineguns -were to remain in position as the base of fire, while Muetzel’s 2d -Platoon feinted across the 200-yard valley to the front. Fox’s 3d -Platoon, earmarked for the main effort, would then circle to the south -and flank the enemy’s right. - -[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE] - -Muetzel’s unit jumped off with Company B at 1510, crossed the -low ground, and ascended a draw leading to Hill 91. The Marines -miscalculated, however, and climbed too far up the slope, so that -they came within grenade range of the crest and were pinned down by -machinegun fire. The platoon was split, with Muetzel and two squads on -the left of the draw and Corporal Raymond E. Stephens and his squad on -the right. - -During the preparatory artillery barrage, Fox had led his platoon -around to the enemy’s right Hank, concealed en route by a rice-paddy -bank. Not knowing when the supporting fire would lift, he withheld his -squads from an assault line by a wide safety margin. Thus when the -artillery ceased, the North Koreans had time to come out of their holes -and hit the envelopment with small arms fire. Fox was wounded, and -command passed to Technical Sergeant George W. Bolkow who worked the -platoon up into the enemy positions. - -The 3d Platoon’s assault was sparked by Corporal Virgil W. Henderson -and his 3d Squad, who worked to the rear of a troublesome machinegun -position and destroyed it. During the attack Henderson was painfully -wounded in the jaw by a Communist bullet. - -Since both forward platoons had SCR 300 radios, Muetzel heard the -report that Fox was wounded. Concluding that the envelopment had faded, -the 2d Platoon leader requested and received permission to make a -frontal assault on Hill 91 from his position on the forward slopes. -Enemy mortar fire had added to the woes of Muetzel’s diversionary -thrust. And though an OY-2 of VMO-6 had given information leading to -the destruction of the mortar position, the beleaguered platoon leader -sought the relative safety of a frontal assault. - -Corporal Stephens, acting on his own initiative across the draw, had -worked his squad up to the razorback ridge and around the enemy’s left -flank. Thus the hapless North Koreans on Hill 91 were hit by a “triple -envelopment” when Stephens struck from the north, Muetzel from the east -and Bolkow from the south. - -Company A reported its objective seized at 1630, and Newton ordered -Stevens and Fenton to dig in for the night. - -Both Roise and Newton were confronted by serious space factors on the -night of 3–4 September. The 2d Battalion’s front was more than 2,000 -yards long and formed a right angle. A gap of 500 yards stretched -between Company D’s precarious position on the northern tip of Hill 117 -and Easy Company’s lines below Myong-ni. This left Smith’s depleted -unit isolated and Jaskilka’s right dangling. - -The 1st Battalion’s right flank was exposed more than 1,000 yards along -the MSR; and its front was almost a mile in length, with a 200-yard -valley separating the two rifle companies. The Brigade Reconnaissance -Company was deployed on high ground far out on Newton’s left flank, but -this was hardly ample protection for the many avenues of approach in -the south. - -Exhibiting his characteristic faith in high explosives, Newton -called on the 1st Platoon, Able Company Engineers, to contribute -their sundry lethal devices to 1/5’s infantry defense. Beginning at -1800, 3 September, one group of engineers fanned out to the front -and right flank of Company B’s lines. Despite fire from Hill 117 and -enemy positions to the west, the demolitions men strung out dozens of -antipersonnel mines, hand grenades, and blocks of TNT wrapped with -60-penny spikes. Before darkness set in, Baker Company’s forward slopes -had the potential of an active volcano. - -In Company A’s zone, Technical Sergeant David N. Duncan and Sergeant -Bryan K. White led the other half of the engineer platoon in laying -a similar field of obstacles. Duncan crowned his handiwork with a -40-pound shaped charge hooked up in a gully with a trip wire. - -Staff Sergeant Saweren J. Dennis and his 2d Squad of engineers crept -forward at midnight 1,000 yards on the MSR and laid an antitank -minefield across the road near the southern tip of Hill 117. On the way -Dennis discovered an enemy antitank minefield embedded in the road. -Although the engineers had never seen a Russian wooden-box mine before, -knowledge gained from the study of intelligence manuals during the -Brigade’s sea voyage enabled them to detect, remove, and disarm every -mine in the field during darkness. The work was delayed a few minutes -when Dennis traced a clanking sound to the roadside ditch and killed a -Communist soldier frantically trying to insert a loaded magazine into -his submachinegun. - -Before the engineers completed their work and retired to 1/5’s -lines, Nature added an obstacle of her own to any enemy plans for a -counterattack. A rainstorm broke, and the heavy downpour, accompanied -by unseasonably icy winds, wrought misery on friend and foe alike for -the rest of the night. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -Mission Completed - -_Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division--Attacks of 5 September--Two Marine -Tanks Killed--The Brigade’s Final Action--Brigade Embarkation at -Pusan--Results of Brigade Operations--Summaries and Conclusions_ - - -The casualties of 2/5 for 3 September totaled 18 dead and 77 wounded, -most of them being taken by Company D. Lieutenant Colonel Murray -ordered the 3d Battalion to pass through the 2d, therefore, and -continue the attack on the right of the MSR at 0800 the next morning. -The 1st Battalion was to resume its advance south of the MSR, while the -Reconnaissance Company far out on the left would move forward to a new -blocking position.[342] - - [342] This section is derived from: Brig SAR 3d Bn, 5th - Marines (3/5) SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; Craig, 23 May 54; and - Taplett, 20 Apr 54. - -Shortly after dawn on the 4th, the 1st Platoon of engineers went -forward and removed the mines ahead of 1/5’s positions. Preparatory -fires by 1/11 at 0750 routed a group of enemy on the peak on Baker -Company’s front, and the Marine riflemen had a field day as the Reds -threw away their weapons and pelted westward. - -Companies A and B jumped off at 0800 and advanced rapidly over the high -ground south of the MSR against negligible resistance. The attackers -frequently observed small groups of enemy fleeing in all directions, -and many of the Communists were cut down by Brigade air, artillery, and -armor. Twelve prisoners were captured before 1/5 reached its half of -Brigade Objective One at 1505. This was the high ground south of the -MSR at Kang-ni, over 3,000 yards from the line of departure. - -Shortly after 0800, 3/5 had launched a two-pronged assault against -Hill 117, core of the NKPA 9th Division’s resistance the previous day. -Company G advanced through Easy Company’s lines just above the MSR and -pushed across the intervening rice paddies. The Marines charged over -a small knoll in their path but found the enemy positions unoccupied -except for several dead. Bohn quickly led the company to the southern -slopes of Hill 117, which was strangely quiet by comparison with the -tumult of the previous day. In capturing the southern half of the hill, -Company G killed only 15 North Koreans. - -Simultaneously with Bohn’s advance, Company H swung wide to the right -and passed through the thin ranks of Dog Company on the northern tip of -Hill 117. The attackers drove south against negligible resistance and -quickly linked with Company G, securing the objective at 0840. - -A connecting road runs from Myong-ni to the MSR, tracing the eastern -base of Hill 117. Since engineers on the previous night had located the -enemy minefield east of the junction on the main road, Taplett moved -his headquarters to the MSR via the connecting road. The lead vehicle, -a personnel carrier loaded with communications men, struck a Communist -mine on the secondary route east of the newly captured objective. The -resulting explosion caused 10 casualties. - -By noon the engineers had cleared the road of several Russian-type -mines identical to those found during the night. The two anti-vehicular -minefields were among the first such obstacles encountered by the UN -forces in the Korean conflict. - -After seizing Hill 117, Companies G and H continued the attack westward -by advancing abreast on the high ground north of the MSR. Contact with -1/5 on the left was maintained, but the 9th Infantry on the right soon -fell behind and disappeared from sight. - -At 1045 Company G ran into machinegun fire coming from the 3/5 area of -the Brigade objective, the hill north of Kang-ni. Taplett blasted the -hill with Marine air and artillery, and the North Koreans were in full -retreat within an hour. MAG-33 and 1/11 rained death on the retreating -Reds and continued to pound the hill preparatory to an assault by -Company G. Bohn led his troops forward and secured the objective at -1515. - -Looking across the stream bed to the north of their new positions, the -Marines of George Company spotted enemy infantry escorting a T-34 tank -and withdrawing into the 9th Infantry zone. The Communist column was -quickly dispersed by machinegun fire. - - -_Collapse of NKPA 9th Division_ - -Marines following up the 3,000-yard advance along the MSR saw, a -picture of devastation unequalled even by the earlier defeat of the -NKPA 4th Division. Hundreds of enemy dead were strewn along the road, -hillsides and ridgelines. On the MSR between Hill 117 and Kang-ni lay -a long column of North Koreans who had been caught by Marine air and -artillery while attempting to reinforce Red lines. The dead leader was -a lieutenant colonel whose briefcase contained a lengthy artillery -treatise among other less scholarly documents.[343] - - [343] _Ibid._ - -In addition to knocked-out and abandoned Communist tanks, vehicles, -mortars, and antitank guns, the countryside was littered with enough -small arms, ammunition, and gear to equip several hundred men. Even the -North Korean paymaster had been caught in the sweeping tide of Brigade -arms, and Marines distributed a huge quantity of worthless currency -among themselves. - -Not only did the Marines reap a harvest of enemy materiel; they also -recaptured a great quantity of United States Army equipment lost -during the Communist drive. American tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, -vehicles, small arms, and ammunition and supply dumps were turned over -to the 2d Division by the Brigade. - -The destruction of the enemy camp left Army and Marine intelligence -officers inundated by captured enemy documents. Muster rolls, ledgers, -maps, orders, textbooks, and propaganda material were heaped into -separate piles. - -Late in the afternoon of 4 September, the 9th Infantry moved into -positions on the high ground northeast of 3/5. This completed the -advance to Phase Line One of the 2d Division’s counterattack plan. -The second phase line on G-3 maps was drawn through Hill 125 and -Observation Hill, 3,000 yards west of Kang-ni. - -When informed that the Brigade had completed the first part of its -mission, General Keiser authorized General Craig to advance toward -Phase Line Two. - -Beyond Kang-ni, the Brigade’s right boundary became the MSR, so that -3/5 could not advance westward from its half of Objective One. Major -Charles H. Brush, Murray’s S-3, radioed Newton and passed on orders -for the battalion commander to take the next piece of high ground, -Cloverleaf Hill, just south of the MSR at Hwayong-ni, about a thousand -yards away. - -The 1st Battalion struck out through the intervening rice paddy, -Company A on the left and Baker Company just below the MSR. Fenton’s -unit had hardly begun the advance when it was stopped by heavy -machinegun fire coming from the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Newton -then called for an air strike on the ridge and also requested 3/5 to -keep it covered with supporting fire during Company B’s attack. - -Enemy resistance evaporated with accustomed rapidity, and the Marines -reported Cloverleaf Hill secure at 1800. Murray then ordered both front -line battalions to establish night defenses and be prepared to continue -the attack at 0800, 5 September. - -The extent and trace of the Brigade front line on the night of 4–5 -September was almost identical to that of 24 hours before. Again -Newton’s battalion was in front on the left by a good 1,000 yards, and -Companies A and B were stretched across a line almost a mile long, with -the left flank wide open. - -Separated from both 1/5 on the left and the 9th Infantry on the right, -the 3d Battalion established a perimeter defense, even though it was in -the center of the counterattack zone. - -There was considerable tension and excitement after darkness on 4 -September, although the Brigade lines were never seriously threatened. -The engineers were busy in 1/5’s zone until after midnight, creeping to -the front and flanks to lay mines. The 3d Battalion was shelled heavily -throughout the night, and 1/5’s CP took direct hits killing 1 Marine -and wounding 2 others. One of the wounded was Second Lieutenant James -R. Young, Newton’s Assistant S-3. The artillery liaison officer, First -Lieutenant Joris J. Snyder, was knocked unconscious for several hours, -though he received not a scratch from the 120-mm. explosion a few yards -away. - -At 0230 night-fighter planes of Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513 -bombed the North Korean mortar position causing most of the damage, and -the shelling slackened appreciably. Completing this mission, the Marine -pilots dumped general purpose and fragmentation bombs on enemy vehicles -and troops in the area.[344] - - [344] VMF(N)-513 SAR, Appendix 6, 16. - -Companies G and H reported movement forward of their lines before dawn, -and 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars quickly illuminated the front, disclosing -several small groups of enemy. There was a flurry of fire, but the Reds -gave no indication of organizing for an assault. One of the groups, -either by error or suicidal folly, stumbled into the area of Taplett’s -CP. A listening post of Weapons Company took the intruders under fire, -killing an NKPA officer and routing the others. - - -_Attacks of 5 September_ - -Marines of the 3d Battalion were startled at daybreak, 5 September, -when a company of North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry’s left flank -in full view of 3/5’s positions on the adjacent high ground. George, -How, and H & S Companies poured machinegun fire into the mass of Reds -at ranges of 600–1,000 yards. Most of the Red attackers were cut down -before they could flee into the hills west of the Army lines.[345] - - [345] This section is derived from: Annex How; 3/5 SAR, 1–6 - Sep 50; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; and Fenton, 8 May 54. - -Company B, on its high ground south of Hwayong-ni, heard the firing in -3/5’s area at daybreak and steeled itself for a possible counterattack -from the right flank. When Newton received word of the abortive attack -on the 9th Infantry, he ordered his two rifle companies to prepare to -move out at 0800 as planned. - -The Marines of Companies A and B were organizing their attack -formation on Cloverleaf Hill when two Air Force P-51’s came in for -an uncontrolled air strike on the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. -Strafing the ridge from north to south, the planes riddled Cloverleaf -Hill as they pulled out of their dives. The 2 exposed companies were -showered with bullets, and it seemed miraculous that only 1 Marine was -wounded. - -At 0820, 1/5 jumped off to the west to seize the Brigade’s portion -of Phase Line Two--Hill 125 and Observation Hill. Beyond these hills -lay Obong-ni Ridge, blocking the path to the Naktong River, third and -final phase line of the 2d Division counterattack. Because of its -tactical importance and great significance, battle-scarred Obong-ni was -designated a special objective, apart from the phase lines. - -Half a mile west of Hwayong-ni the MSR makes a right-angle turn to the -south, proceeds in that direction for 1,000 yards, then resumes its -westward course through the cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill. - -Companies A and B, with the latter on the right, moved rapidly through -the rice paddy below the MSR after leaving their line of departure -on Cloverleaf Hill. At the road bend mentioned above, the MSR turned -across Baker Company’s front. When Fenton’s unit crossed over to the -base of the high ground leading to Hill 125, Companies A and B were -separated by the MSR as it resumed its westward course. Stevens’ unit -started up the long eastern slopes of Observation Hill, while Fenton’s -men secured the eastern extension of Hill 125. - -Obong-ni Ridge rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when mortars -and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements around -the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and Newton’s -81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued the advance to -Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100. - -[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE - -ENEMY COUNTERATTACK--5 SEP. ’50] - -Murray ordered 1/5 to hold up until the 9th Infantry tied in on -Fenton’s right. Communist automatic weapons on Obong-ni Ridge fired on -the Marines sporadically during this interlude. - -At 1000, while 1/5 was attacking to the west, the 3d Battalion had -swung southward behind Cloverleaf Hill to take positions on the 5th -Marines’ left. This was in preparation for Murray’s contemplated -assault on Obong-ni Ridge by two battalions. It was planned that -Newton’s unit would take the northern half of the long hill and 3/5 the -southern portion. - -Company G led the 3d Battalion advance through the rice paddy south of -Cloverleaf Hill. Artillery and 75-mm. recoilless guns paved the way -by raking possible enemy hiding places, enabling the infantrymen to -proceed rapidly. Bohn’s destination was Hill 91, a shoe-like projection -jutting out from the southern reaches of Obong-ni Ridge. Reaching -the base of the high ground, Bohn requested that supporting fires -be lifted. Attached tanks, 75’s, and 1/11 immediately shifted their -destruction to Obong-ni Ridge. - -Company G started up the slopes of Hill 91, while an attached 75-mm. -recoilless gun obliterated a wheel-mounted machinegun and its crew -going into position on the crest. The Marines had climbed only a few -yards when Bohn was ordered by Taplett at 1230 to withdraw the company -to Observation Hill. - -Company H, then passing between Hill 91 and Observation Hill on its -way to Obong-ni’s eastern approaches, received the same order from the -Battalion commander. The assault on the ridge had been canceled, and -Murray was concentrating his regiment along the MSR. - - -_Two Marine Tanks Killed_ - -Throughout the Brigade advance on 5 September, the Marines were -hampered by heavy rain and fog which prevented MAG-33 and VMO-6 from -operating effectively. Thus the enemy was offered a rare opportunity to -mount a daylight attack.[346] - - [346] This section is derived from: Annex How; LtCol M. R. - Olson, interv with author, 15 Jun 54; Taplett, 20 Apr - 54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54 (with comments by Maj J. R. - Stevens); and Fenton, 8 May 54. - -After Company B received orders to hold up on Hill 125, Fenton -ordered his men to dig foxholes along the rain-soaked crest facing -Tugok village and Finger Ridge to the west and Obong-ni Ridge to the -southwest. The company commander directed the attached 1st Platoon of -tanks to remain in the road cut, just to the rear of the famous bend -around the forward slopes of Hill 125. Peering through the rain and -fog, the Marine tankmen could see the dead, black hulls of the three -T-34’s knocked out by the Brigade 2 weeks earlier. - -At 1420 the sporadic sniping from the front suddenly increased to the -intensity of preparatory fire, and Baker Company was pinned down on its -ridgeline positions. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge blazed with -NKPA machineguns, whose chatter was soon joined by that of automatic -weapons concealed in Tugok and at the northern base of Observation -Hill. A Communist antitank gun on Finger Ridge added its voice -intermittently to the chorus. - -Fenton’s radio went dead just as he reported the situation to Newton -at his OP on the high ground to the east. As luck would have it, every -other radio in the company area was inoperative because of the mud and -rain; and Fenton was unable to warn the Marine tanks in the road cut -that enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the road bend from -the west. - -As the Communist vehicles swung into the turn, a company of Red -soldiers left the road and assaulted Company B’s positions by advancing -up the draw on the Marines’ left front. The intense overhead fire -supporting the Red Infantry enabled them to get well up the forward -slopes. Meanwhile, a squad of North Koreans advanced up the draw -leading from Tugok and harassed Fenton’s right front. - -To stop the attack, the Marines were forced to man the crest of Hill -125. Thus exposed to the enemy’s supporting fire, Company B had to pay -a heavy price in casualties. - -During the advance of the Communist armor, it was determined that -the first 2 of the 3 vehicles were T-34 tanks and the last a tracked -armored personnel carrier. Fenton immediately deployed his assault -squad on the slopes below his left flank to meet the threat on the MSR. - -Lieutenant Pomeroy, unaware of the enemy tanks around the bend, -advanced his M-26’s so that the machineguns on Obong-ni Ridge could be -taken under massed fire. Thus, as the first Marine tank reached the -bend, its 90-mm. gun was pointing to the left front, a quarter turn -away from the enemy armor. - -The lead T-34 fired on the Marine vehicle as soon as it came into -view. Before the turret of the M-26 could be turned to take aim, -several more 85-mm. projectiles struck; and the Brigade lost its first -tank to enemy action. The second M-26 in column tried to squeeze by the -first to render assistance, and it too was knocked out by 85-mm. fire -in the restricted passageway. - -The crews of both Marine tanks managed to get out of their vehicles -through the escape hatches. Some of the wounded were aided by the -engineer mine-clearance team accompanying the tank column. - -Since the road bend was now blocked, the remainder of Pomeroy’s tanks -could do nothing but park in the road cut. It was Marine infantrymen -who stepped in at this point and blunted the NKPA victory on the MSR. - -Company B’s assault squad plastered the lead T-34 with 3.5″ rocket fire -and stopped it cold. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battalion’s assault -platoon reached the fight scene and went into action with its 3.5’s. In -short order the infantrymen had completed the destruction of the first -tank, knocked out the second, and destroyed the enemy personnel carrier. - -The historic road bend, as seen through the rain and mist, had become a -graveyard of armor. A total of 8 steel monsters were sprawled there in -death: 5 T-34’s and 1 armored carrier of the NKPA, and 2 Pershing tanks -of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. - - -_The Brigade’s Final Action_ - -On Hill 125 the fight reached a climax as Marines exchanged grenades -and small-arms fire with the North Koreans slithering up the slopes -in the driving rain. Company B had used all of its 60-mm. mortar -shells and was running low on grenades and small arms ammunition. -Enemy automatic weapons on the ridges to the front were still cutting -down the Marine defenders at 1500 when Fenton sent a runner to Newton -requesting more ammunition.[347] - - [347] _Ibid._ - -The endurance contest was still in progress half an hour later, as the -9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground north of Hill 125. -Having no communications with his own supporting arms, Fenton sent a -messenger to the Army unit commander, asking that he place artillery -fire on the Marine front. - -When Army shells began falling in answer to the request, 1/5’s 81-mm. -mortars belatedly got into the fight and worked over the forward -slopes of Hill 125 to within 50 yards of Company B’s positions. The -heavy supporting fire turned the tide, and enemy pressure slackened -considerably. - -During the final stage of the enemy’s attack, Company A was being -relieved on Observation Hill by 3/5. Stevens told his platoon leaders -to leave their grenades and extra ammunition on the hill, since his -orders were to withdraw to the rear. While the relief was taking place, -however, Company A was ordered to reinforce Fenton’s unit against the -enemy’s attack on Hill 125. Muetzel’s 2d Platoon, after recovering its -ammunition, was augmented by a machinegun section, mortar squad, and -two SCR-300 radios, before the young officer led the unit across the -MSR to lend a hand. - -When Stevens’ relief by 3/5 was completed, he added the 1st Platoon to -Company B’s reinforcements, and himself withdrew to Cloverleaf Hill -with the 3d Platoon as ordered. - -The reinforcements were fed into Fenton’s line as fast as they reached -the summit of Hill 125. By this time every man in Company B had been -committed to the forward wall--mortarmen, clerks, signalmen, and all. -Lieutenant Howard Blank combined his Able Company mortars with those -of the defenders and immediately followed up the artillery and 81-mm. -fire which had blunted the attack. These final concentrations of 60-mm. -mortar fire on Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and the forward slopes of -Hill 125 ended the enemy attack. The surviving Reds withdrew to Tugok. - -At 1600, during the dying minutes of the Brigade’s final action in the -Pusan Perimeter, Newton was ordered back to the regimental CP for a -conference. The executive officer, Major Merlin R. Olson, took over 1/5 -from the battalion OP on the ridge east of Hill 125. - -The 5th Marines commander had called the leaders of his battalions to -brief them on General Craig’s last field directive, which began with -the long awaited words: - - “THIS MY OPN ORDER 22-50 X COMMENCING AT 2400 5 SEPT BRIG MOVES BY - RAIL AND MOTOR TO STAGING AREA PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPERATION AGAINST - THE ENEMY X PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF MOVEMENT 5TH MARS WILL STAND - RELIEVED BY ELMS OF 2ND INF DIV COMMENCING AT DARKNESS ... CONCEAL - FROM THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH YOUR WITHDRAWAL....” - -Taplett’s 3d Battalion had sustained 24 casualties from artillery and -mortar fire between its occupation of Observation Hill and the time it -was relieved by a company of the 23d Infantry shortly after midnight. -Plodding rearward through mud and driving rain, 3/5’s long column began -its three-and-a-half-mile march to an entrucking point 2,000 yards west -of Yongsan. - -Following 3/5 were the weary, mud-soaked troops of the 1st Battalion. -Having successfully defended Hill 125 at a cost of 2 killed and 23 -wounded, Baker Company had filed down to the road after being relieved -by another company of the 23d Infantry. Muetzel brought up the rear -with Company A’s contingent, and a battalion column was formed at -Olson’s check point east of Hill 125. - -By dawn of 6 September, the two battalions were loading aboard trucks -to follow the rest of the Brigade. Numbed by fatigue and icy rain, the -bent forms huddled together in the cargo vehicles had no regrets as -they bade good-bye to the Pusan perimeter. - - -_Brigade Embarkation at Pusan_ - -The movement to Pusan was completed by the morning of 7 September, and -the Brigade troops found themselves back at the docks where they had -landed a little more than a month before. In fact, the docks were to be -their bivouac area during the next 6 days; the men slept in the open -and took their meals on board the transports in which they would soon -be sailing around the peninsula. - -The survivors of the Naktong fights--even the latecomers who had joined -the Brigade at the Bean Patch--felt old and worn when they saw the -large draft of shiny new Marines just landed as third rifle companies -organized with their own NCO’s and platoons. The veterans had forgotten -how young and untroubled a Marine could look; how neat and clean he -could appear in a recently issued utility jacket. - -The new companies were immediately assigned to their battalions. It -was another job for officers and NCO’s who had the responsibility of -replacing equipment lost in action as well as servicing ordnance, motor -transport and other heavy equipment which had been sent from the Bean -Patch to Pusan late in August.[348] - - [348] Col J. L. Stewart, interv with author, 10 Jun 54. - -General Craig and his staff had their headquarters in one of the Pusan -University buildings. There was no opportunity for planning, let alone -rehearsals, for the forthcoming amphibious assault at Inchon. Craig -and his officers had all they could do to get the Brigade ready for -embarkation. - -Among the tasks to be accomplished in less than a week, it remained -to give some weapons training to the 3,000 troops of the 1st Korean -Marine Regiment. This newly raised unit, attached to the Brigade for -embarkation, was to make a name for itself within the next year and -become the fourth rifle regiment of the 1st Marine Division. But in -September 1950 there were great gaps in the training of the KMC’s. The -men kept their rifles scrupulously clean, and they could strip an M-1 -expertly, but few of them had ever fired a shot. - -Marine NCO’s had the hazardous duty of giving the eager and excited -KMC’s their first target practice after eight rounds of ammunition for -each man had been acquired. No Marine casualties resulted, fortunately, -but puffed and bruised cheeks were the rule among Koreans having their -first experience with an M-1’s recoil. - -There was, of course, no end of “scuttlebutt” going the rounds of the -Marines as to their destination. One day the troops were lined up in -formation and read a long lecture on the hydrographic aspects of the -west coast port of Kunsan. It is to be hoped that this red herring made -some impression upon the Koreans who were listening, since Pusan was a -headquarters of enemy spies. As for the Marines, most of them concluded -that at least Kunsan could be eliminated from the list of possible -objectives. - -The secret was well kept by Brigade officers in the higher echelons. -Two engineer officers, First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt and -Commissioned Warrant Officer Willard C. Downs, were given the secret -mission of constructing wooden scaling ladders for the next operation. -This project gave rise to more rumors, but it is safe to say that few -men in the ranks knew the answer when the Brigade was deactivated at -0001 on 13 September 1950. The components immediately resumed their old -unit designations in the 1st Marine Division and sailed to take part in -the amphibious assault on Inchon scheduled for the 15th.[349] - - [349] The Inchon-Seoul operation of the 1st Marine Division - and 1st Marine Air Wing from 15 September to 7 October - 1950 is to be the subject of Volume II of this - historical series devoted to Marine operations in Korea. - - -_Results of Brigade Operations_ - -As the mountains behind Pusan faded from sight, General Craig and his -men could reflect that the Brigade’s 67 days of existence had been -productive. Altogether, the Marine air-ground team had fought three -difficult offensive operations in a month while traveling 380 miles -with a third of its organic transportation plus Army vehicles. - -Total casualties for the Brigade included 148 KIA, 15 DOW, 9 MIA (seven -of whom were later reclassified as KIA after recovery of the bodies) -and 730 WIA.[350] It was estimated that the Marines inflicted total -casualties of 9,900 killed and wounded on opposing NKPA units. Enemy -losses of arms and equipment were on such a scale as to impair the -effectiveness of the forces concerned. - - [350] Brig SAR, basic report. - -In its initial operation, as a component of Task Force Kean, the -Brigade had the major part in the first sustained Eighth Army -counterattack--the military equivalent of a hard left jab which rocks -an opponent back on his heels. General MacArthur, when reporting to -the United Nations, asserted that “this attack not only secured the -southern approaches to the beachhead, but also showed that the North -Korean forces will not hold under attack.”[351] - - [351] MCBS, I-II-A-18-19. This valuable operational study - by Marine senior officers has been the guide for the - summaries and analyses of Brigade results in these pages. - -The Communist drive in this sensitive area came closest of all NKPA -thrusts to the vital UN supply port of Pusan. Up to that time the NKPA -units spearheading the advance--the 6th Infantry Division and the 83d -Motorcycle Regiment--had never suffered a reverse worth mentioning -since the outset of the invasion. Then the counterattack by the 1st -Provisional Marine Brigade hurled the enemy back 26 miles in 4 days -from the Chindong-ni area to Sachon. - -It was estimated that the Marine air-ground team killed and wounded -1,900 of the enemy while destroying nearly all the vehicles of an NKPA -motorized battalion in addition to infantry armament and equipment. The -enemy threat in this critical area was nullified for the time being, -and never again became so serious. Marine efforts assisted Army units -of Task Force Kean in taking new defensive positions and defending -them with fewer troops, thus freeing some elements for employment on -other fronts. Finally, the Marines earned more time and space for the -building up of Eighth Army forces in preparation for a decisive UN -counteroffensive. - -The next Brigade operation, the first battle of the Naktong, ranks with -the hardest fights of Marine Corps history. The enemy, after showing -skill and aggressiveness in breaching the last natural barrier of -the Pusan Perimeter, widened his Naktong bridgehead and took strong -defensive positions in preparation for an all-out offensive while still -maintaining his material superiority. - -Only two Eighth Army units were available for a counterattack--the 27th -Infantry and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The Army regiment -being needed in reserve on the southern front, the “firemen of the -Pusan Perimeter” were placed under the operational control of the 24th -Infantry Division on the central front. There the Marines had the -mission of clearing the enemy from Obong-ni Ridge and two other large -hill masses of the Naktong Bulge. - -The NKPA 4th Infantry Division had taken maximum advantage of strong -defensive terrain in accordance with the precepts taught by Soviet and -Chinese Communist military instructors. This enlarged bridgehead was -credited by CINCFE with giving the enemy the capability of mounting a -serious threat to the main railroad from Pusan to Taegu. - -It took a bitter and costly effort on the part of the Brigade, but the -result was the most smashing defeat ever given an NKPA major unit up to -this time. This reverse turned into a rout and slaughter toward the end -as Marine air, artillery, armor, and mortars inflicted terrible losses. -Broken NKPA forces were cut down in flight or while trying to swim the -Naktong. - -If the Brigade’s first operation may be likened to a hard left jab, -the fight in the Naktong Bulge is comparable to a solid right dealing -a knockdown blow. The enemy lurched back to his feet, it is true, but -the three rifle regiments of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division had to be -filled up with hastily trained recruits. - -Arms ranging from rifles to howitzers were abandoned as impediments -by the routed Communists, so that the rebuilt NKPA 4th Infantry -Division needed new armament and equipment of all sorts. General -MacArthur’s summary of the action, reported to the UN Security Council -on 18 September 1950, stated that “attacks by the United States 24th -Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the Naktong -defense line on 18 August. Here, the enemy 4th Division was decisively -defeated, lost its bridgehead, and was thrown westward across the -Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and -equipment.” - -Never before had a major NKPA unit taken such a staggering defeat. As -evidence of recent victories won over United States troops, the 4th -Infantry Division had brought captured American machineguns and 105-mm. -howitzers into the Naktong Bulge. Among the most important results -achieved by the Brigade, therefore, was the hurt done to Red Korean -morale. - -Not only was the enemy’s Naktong bridgehead liquidated; he also lost -heavily in time, which was becoming more valuable to him than space if -he hoped to profit from his rapidly dwindling advantage in numbers. Not -until 10 days later did the Communists establish another bridgehead in -the Naktong Bulge area, and then it was their misfortune to encounter -the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade again. - -During the early morning hours of 1 September 1950, the enemy made his -final effort to smash through to Pusan. Again the 27th Infantry was -needed on another front, so that the Marines, as the only other mobile -reserve unit, were committed under the operational control of the 2d -Infantry Division, The seriousness of the situation in the Naktong -Bulge is indicated by the fact that the enemy had enlarged his new -bridgehead with a penetration of about 4,000 yards in the sector of -the 2d Division. Elements of four enemy divisions had been identified -on the central front when the Marines jumped off on the morning of 3 -September. - -The Brigade’s 3-day fight did not end as decisively as the first battle -of the Naktong. That is because it was an unfinished fight. The Marines -were pulled out on the night of 5 September, after gains of 2,500 to -3,000 yards that day, and it can only be conjectured what General Craig -and his men might have accomplished during the next 48 hours. - -As it was, the Brigade had a prominent part in disrupting the enemy’s -effort to sever the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. Heavy losses both in -personnel and equipment were inflicted on NKPA forces, and the Marines -helped to reduce the enemy’s new bridgehead by 8,000 to 10,000 yards. - -Not only had the enemy lost the battle; he had lost the war, as it -proved, for EUSAK staff officers were even then planning a great -UN counterstroke in the Pusan Perimeter. This drive was to be in -conjunction with the amphibious assault on Inchon. - -The turning point in the UN fortunes of war owed in no small measure to -the three counterattacks by the Marines in the Pusan Perimeter. As for -the overall effects, it would be hard to improve upon the analysis and -evaluation in the Marine Corps Board Study: - - “A careful examination of any of these operations in which Marines - engaged discloses that a single failure would have a profound - effect upon the entire UN effort.... On 3 separate occasions the - Brigade was attached to the defending UN forces at points of - dangerous enemy penetrations and 3 times Marine units spearheaded - the counterattacking elements and effectively stopped the enemy’s - efforts, seizing the initiative from him, inflicting serious losses - upon him, and forcing the abandonment of immediate attempts at - decisive penetration.”[352] - - [352] MCBS, I-II-A-36. - - -_Summaries and Conclusions_ - -No Marine tactical organization of history ever did more than the -Brigade to uphold the tradition of the Corps as a force-in-readiness. -The transition from activation to embarkation took only 6 days, and it -may be recalled that the Brigade became the first United States unit -to get into the fight after crossing the Pacific from the American -mainland. - -Although the components had been hastily thrown together without -opportunity for training or rehearsals, there were singularly few -instances of tactical fumbling during the early actions. Some of the -men had their only weapons familiarization instruction in actual -battle, when they fired new arms for the first time. But thanks to the -steadying influence of combat-wise company officers and NCO’s, the -Marines of the Brigade soon gained competence. - -The Brigade command and staff faced unusual problems arising from -such factors as emergency situations, hurried planning, oral orders, -incomplete intelligence, and lack of adequate maps. There were -decisions now and then which officers would not have made if they had -been endowed with the wisdom of knowledge after the event. But on the -basis of information at the time, the Brigade command and staff need -no whitewashing from history. Marine victories, on the other hand, -may be attributed in large degree to a high order of leadership and -professional ability in the upper echelons as well as on the company -and platoon level. - -It might have been argued that it was a waste to commit amphibious -specialists to the operations of mountain warfare. But Marines were -also trained as infantry, and gravel-crunching fighting men were needed -to correct an illusion held by many of their countrymen. Atomic bombs, -guided missiles, jet planes, and other marvelous new weapons had -convinced a large section of the public that the day of push-button -warfare was at hand. These Americans sincerely believed that wars could -be waged at long distance, and the Marines of the Brigade served their -country well by demonstrating that even in the tactical millenium it -was necessary to seek out the enemy and close with him. For if there -was any outstanding figure of the conflict in Korea, it was some second -lieutenant making split-second decisions which meant life or death for -a platoon holding a hill position against enemy attack in the darkness. - -The three squadrons of MAG-33 provided support which the Brigade -reported as “the best close air support in the history of the Marine -Corps ... outstanding in its effectiveness.” Army infantry officers -were frankly envious on occasion; and Colonel Paul L. Freeman, USA, -commanding the 23d Infantry, commented that “the Marines on our left -were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal -to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it -like artillery. It was ‘Hey, Joe--This is Smitty--Knock the left of -that ridge in front of Item Company.’ They had it _day and night_. It -came off nearby carriers, and not from Japan with only 15 minutes of -fuel to accomplish mission.”[353] - - [353] Quoted in MCBS, I-II-A-35; and I-IV-B-9. - -The UN forces, of course, had complete supremacy in the air. On two -occasions the Marines of the Brigade were briefly strafed by NKPA night -hecklers making a “scalded-cat” raid. During the interlude at the Bean -Patch an enemy plane winged its way under cover of darkness to cut -loose with a brief burst of machinegun bullets before disappearing into -the night. But United States Air Force planes had virtually destroyed -the little NKPA air force during the first few weeks of the war, so -that the men of the Brigade were virtually unopposed in the air. - -The time interval between a request for Marine air support and -the actual delivery varied according to local conditions, but the -ground forces seldom had cause for complaint. All-weather Squadron -VMF(N)-513, based at Itazuke, Japan, was prevented by reason of -faulty communications and liaison from responding to every request -for dawn, dusk or night support during early Brigade operations, but -such missions were flown effectively in the Naktong Bulge. Meanwhile, -the Corsairs of VMF-214 and VMF-323, orbiting on station and always -available for short notice employment, gave fresh proof that the -Navy-Marine concept of carrier-based tactical aircraft was sound in -practice. Following are the statistics of MAG-33 operations in Korea -from 3 August to 14 September 1950: - - _Missions in close support_ - _Squadron_ _Total _Miscellaneous ------------------------------- - sorties_ sorties_ _USMC_ _Army_ _ROK_ _Total_ - - VMF-214 670 162 337 111 60 508 - VMF-323 498 90 304 83 21 408 - VMF(N)-513 343 264 21 50 8 79 - ------------------------------------------------------ - Totals 1511 516 662 244 8 995[354] - - [354] MCBS, II, Appendix 64. - -Demands on the time of the original 4 helicopters of VMO-6 made it -necessary to fly 2 more machines in from Japan. The rotary-wing -aircraft had so many “firsts” to their credit in the Pusan Perimeter -that a major tactical innovation was obviously in the making. The -flights of General Craig, Colonel Snedeker and Lieutenant Colonel -Stewart alone were enough to indicate that the helicopter was capable -of working a revolution in command and staff procedures. - -Altogether, the participation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was -an important factor in stopping the NKPA invasion in August 1950 and -punishing the invaders so severely that they were ripe for a crushing -defeat the following month. The Marines, moreover, did a great deal -to restore the national pride of countrymen who had been hurt and -bewildered by the outcome of the first month’s operations. - -It was humiliating to read on the front page that only 5 years after -reaching our greatest military strength of history, United States -troops were being pushed around by Asiatic peasants of a Soviet-trained -organization calling itself the North Korean People’s Army. Perhaps -these Americans did not remember that the decline in our Armed Forces -was due to overwhelming popular demands for the disbanding of our -victorious armies of 1945. At any rate, the United States paid the -penalty of unpreparedness in 1950 when its first ground-force units -were beaten by better trained and equipped NKPA troops. Worse yet, -correspondents at the front intimated that these defeats were due to -the softness of our youth. It was charged that United States troops had -been so pampered by motor transport that they could no longer march, -let alone fight. - -The Marines helped to change all that. The Marines and the better Army -units proved that they were more than a match for the enemy when it -came to marching as well as fighting. The Marines did their best to -restore the pride of Americans who read about the advance to Kosong or -the fight on Obong-ni Ridge. The Marines, in short, deserved the pat on -the back conveyed in a dispatch to the Brigade on 23 August 1950 from -their Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates: - - “I AM VERY PROUD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR AIR-GROUND TEAM. KEEP ON - HITTING THEM, FRONT, FLANKS, REAR, AND TOPSIDE! WELL DONE!” - - - - -APPENDIX A - -Glossary of Military and Aeronautical Terms - - - AKA--Attack cargo ship. - APA--Attack transport ship. - ADC--Assistant Division Commander. - BAR--Browning automatic rifle. - BLT--Battalion landing team. - BuAer--Bureau of Aeronautics - CCF--Chinese Communist Forces (refers to entire Chinese force employed - in Korea). - CG--Commanding general. - CINCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. - CincPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. - CINCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. - CNO--Chief of Naval Operations. - CO--Commanding officer. - COMNAGFE--Commander Naval Air Group Far East - COMNAVFE--Commander Navy Far East. - COMPHIBGRUONE--Commander Amphibious Group One. - COMSEVENTHFLT--Commander Seventh Fleet. - COS--Combined Operations Section. - CP--Command Post. - CSG--Combat Service Group. - CTF--Commander Task Force. - CVG--Carrier Air Group. - DOW--Died of wounds. - EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea. - FAC--Forward Air Controller. - FEAF--Far East Air Force. - FECOM--Far East Command. - FL--Flight leader. - FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac = Pacific; Lant = Atlantic). - GHQFEC--General Headquarters, Far East Command. - HF--High frequency (radio). - InfDiv--Infantry Division. - JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. - JOC--Joint Operations Center. - KIA--Killed in action. - KMC--Korean Marine Corps. - KVA--Korean Volunteer Army. - LSD--Landing ship, dock. - LST--Landing ship, tank. - MAG--Marine Aircraft Group. - MCBS--Marine Corps Board Study. - MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron. - MIA--Missing in action. - MSR--Main supply route. - MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. - NCO--Noncommissioned officer. - NK--North Korea(n). - NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. - OP--Observation post. - OY--Light observation plane. - POL--Petroleum oil lubricants. - POW--Prisoner of war. - ProvCasCo--Provisional Casual Company. - RCT--Regimental Combat Team. - ROK--Republic of Korea. - SAC--Supporting Arms Center. - SAR--Special Action Report. - SecNav--Secretary of the Navy. - TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator. - TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps. - TACC--Tactical Air Control Center. - TACP--Tactical Air Control Party. - TACRON--Tactical Air Control Squadron. - TAD--Tactical Air Direction. - TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. - TAO--Tactical Air Observer. - TAR--Tactical air request. - T/E--Table of equipment. - T/O--Table of organization. - UN--United Nations. - VHF--Very high frequency (radio). - VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron). - VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron). - VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron). - VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron). - WIA--Wounded in action. - - - - -APPENDIX B - -Command and Staff List of the First Provisional Marine Brigade - - -_7 July--13 September 1950_ - - Commanding General BrigGen Edward A. Craig - Deputy Commander BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman - Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker - G-1 Maj Donald W. Sherman - G-2 LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman - G-3 LtCol Joseph L. Stewart - G-4 LtCol Arthur A. Chidester - - - _Special Staff Section_ - - Adjutant Capt Harold G. Schrier - Supply Officer Maj James K. Eagan - Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp - Signal Officer Maj Elwin M. Stimpson - Air Observer Capt Edwin L. Rives - Signal Supply Officer 1stLt Joseph E. Conners - Engineer Supply Officer Capt William R. Gould - Liaison Officer LtCol Edward R. Hagenah - Brigade Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN - Brigade Dental Officer LtComdr Jack J. Kelly, USN - - - _Headquarters and Service Battalion_ - - (32 officers--183 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Maj Richard E. Sullivan - Executive Officer Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 18 Aug 50) - CoComdr, Hq Co 1stLt Nathaniel F. Mann, Jr. - - - _Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion_ - - (4 officers--99 enlisted men) - - DetComdr Capt Earl F. Stanley - - - _Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion_ - - (6 officers--112 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Capt Arthur W. Ecklund - - - _Company C, 1st Medical Battalion_ - - (5 officers--94 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Comdr Robert A. Freyling, USN - - - _Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion_ - - (12 officers--213 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Maj William L. Batchelor - - - _Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion_ - - (9 officers--209 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Capt George W. King - - - _Detachment, 1st Ordnance Battalion_ - - (5 officers--119 enlisted men) - - DetComdr 1stLt Meyer La Bellman - - - _Company A, 1st Tank Battalion_ - - (9 officers--173 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Capt Gearl M. English - PlatComdr 1st Plat 1stLt William D. Pomeroy - PlatComdr 2d Plat 2dLt Robert M. Winter - (to 3 Sep 50, WIA) - 2dLt John S. Carson (3 Sep 50, KIA) - PlatComdr, 3d Plat 2dLt Granville G. Sweet - - - _1st Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - (44 officers--474 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood - Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger - Headquarters Battery: - Commanding Officer Capt James W. Brayshay - Service Battery: - Commanding Officer 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch - Battery A: - Commanding Officer Capt James D. Jordan - Battery B: - Commanding Officer Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter - Battery C: - Commanding Officer Capt William J. Nichols, Jr. - - - _Detachment, 1st Service Battalion_ - - (11 officers--161 enlisted men) - - DetComdr Capt Thomas M. Sagar - - - _Detachment, 1st Combat Service Group_ - - (5 officers--104 enlisted men) - - DetComdr Maj Thomas J. O’Mahoney - - - _Detachment, Reconnaissance Company_ - - (2 officers--37 enlisted men) - - DetComdr Capt Kenneth J. Houghton - - - _Detachment, Military Police Company_ - - (2 officers--36 enlisted men) - - DetComdr 1stLt Nye G. Rodes - - - _1st Amphibian Tractor Company_ - - (10 officers--244 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer Maj James P. Treadwell - - - _1st Amphibian Truck Platoon_ - - (1 officer--75 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer 1stLt James E. Condra - - - _VMO-6_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk - - - _5th Marines_ - - (132 officers--2452 enlisted men) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray - Executive Officer LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. - S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed - S-2 Maj William C. Esterline - S-3 LtCol George F. Waters, Jr. - (to 29 Aug 50) - Maj Charles H, Brush, Jr. - S-4 Maj Harold Wallace - - Special Staff, 5th Marines: - - Chaplain LtComdr Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., USN - Medical Officer Lt (jg) William E. Larsen, USN - (to 11 Aug 50) - LtComdr Byron D. Casteel - Supply Officer Capt John V. Huff - Motor Transport Officer Capt William F. A. Trax (to 15 Aug 50) - 1stLt James O. Alison - Ordnance Officer CWO Bill E. Parrish - Disbursing Officer Capt Kenneth L. Shaw - Communications Officer Maj Kenneth B. Boyd - Naval Gunfire Officer Lt Jerry C. Ragon, USN - Air Officer 1stLt Leo R. Jillisky - - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines: - - Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton - Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson - CO, H & S Company Capt Walter E. Godenius - CO, Company A Capt John R. Stevens - CO, Company B Capt John L. Tobin (to 17 Aug 50, WIA) - Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr. - CO, Weapons Company Maj John W. Russell - - 2d Battalion, 5th Marines: - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise - Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II - CO, H & S Company 1stLt David W. Walsh - CO, Company D Capt John Finn, Jr. (to 8 Aug 50, WIA) - Capt Andrew M. Zimmer (to 17 Aug 50, WIA) - 1stLt Robert T. Hanifin, Jr. - (to 22 Aug 50) - 1stLt H. J. Smith - CO, Company E Capt George E. Kittredge - (to 7 Aug 50, WIA) - 1stLt William E. Sweeney (to 18 Aug 50) - Capt Samuel Jaskilka - CO, Weapons Company Maj Walter Gall (to 10 Aug 50) - Maj Theodore F. Spiker - - 3d Battalion, 5th Marines: - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett - Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney - CO, H & S Company 1stLt Arthur E. House, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50) - 1stLt Harold D. Fredericks - CO, Company G 1stLt Robert D. Bohn - CO, Company H Capt Joseph C. Fegan, Jr. - (to 18 Aug 50, WIA) - Capt Patrick E. Wildman - CO, Weapons Company Capt Patrick E. Wildman (to 19 Aug 50) - Maj Murray Ehrlich - - - _Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Air Wing_ - - Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman - Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir - - Marine Air Group 33: - - Commanding Officer Col Allen C. Koonce (to 20 Aug 50) - Col Frank G. Dailey - Deputy Commander LtCol Norman J. Anderson - Executive Officer LtCol Radford C. West - CO, VMF-214 LtCol Walter E. Lischeid - CO, VMF-323 Maj Arnold A. Lund - CO, VMF(N)-513 Maj Joseph H. Reinburg - CO, Hq Squadron Capt Norman D. Glenn - CO, Service Squadron LtCol James C. Lindsay - CO, MTACS-2 Maj Christian C. Lee - - - - -APPENDIX C - -Citations and Commendations - - - September 29, 1950 - -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION - -The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in -citing for outstanding and heroic performance of duty on the field of -battle during the period 2 August 1950–6 September 1950. - - THE FIRST UNITED STATES PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE - for the Award of - THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION - -The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade was a vital element -in the first major counterattack against the enemy. - -In late July and early August 1950, the enemy had swept through the -Chulla Provinces and had rapidly approached along the south Korean -coast to a point only 35 miles from the vital port of Pusan. Together -with the 25th Infantry Division, the First United States Provisional -Marine Brigade, from 7 August to 12 August 1950, played a major role in -attacking and driving back the enemy. - -During the period 17 August to 20 August 1950 in conjunction with the -24th Infantry Division and units of the 2d Infantry Division, the -First United States Provisional Marine Brigade attacked a great pocket -of enemy forces who had successfully crossed the Naktong River and -established a firm beachhead on the eastern bank. The Brigade attacked -with such determination and skill as to earn the admiration of all who -saw or knew of its battle conduct. - -Later, on the night of 31 August-1 September, the enemy again launched -an all-out offensive against the United Nations Forces. The First -United States Provisional Marine Brigade was in Army reserve at that -time. With the 2d Infantry Division, the Brigade again was committed in -almost the same area of its earlier action against the Naktong pocket -in the neighborhood of Yongsan. Again the gallant Marine forces were -instrumental in preventing the enemy from capturing their objective and -cutting the north-south lines of communication of the United Nations -Forces. - -The brilliant performance of duty in combat in Korea of each individual -of the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade is in accord with -the highest traditions of the military service. - -This citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential -Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual of the First United States -Provisional Marine Brigade which served in Korea in the stated period. - - (Signed) SYNGMAN RHEE - - -THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - -WASHINGTON - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the - - FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - -“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces -in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950. Functioning as a mobile, -self-contained, air-ground team, the First Provisional Marine Brigade, -Reinforced, rendered invaluable service during the fierce struggle to -maintain the foothold established by friendly forces in the Pusan area -during the early stages of the Korean conflict. Quickly moving into -action as numerically superior enemy forces neared the Naktong River -on the central front and penetrated to within 35 miles of Pusan in the -southern sector, threatening the integrity of the entire defensive -perimeter, this hard-hitting, indomitable team counterattacked serious -enemy penetrations at three different points in rapid succession. -Undeterred by roadblocks, heavy hostile automatic weapons and highly -effective artillery fire, extremely difficult terrain and intense heat, -the Brigade met the invaders with relentless determination and, on each -crucial occasion, hurled them back in disorderly retreat. By combining -sheer resolution and esprit de corps with sound infantry tactics and -splendid close air support, the Brigade was largely instrumental in -restoring the line of defense, in inflicting thousands of casualties -upon the enemy and in seizing large amounts of ammunition, equipment -and other supplies. The brilliant record achieved by the unit -during the critical early days of the Korean conflict attests to -the individual valor and competence of the officers and men and -reflects the highest credit upon the First Provisional Marine Brigade, -Reinforced, and the United States Naval Service.” - -All of the First Provisional Marine Brigade except the First Amphibian -Tractor Company participated in operations against enemy aggressor -forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950. - -The following reinforcing units of the First Provisional Marine Brigade -participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from -7 August to 7 September 1950: - - Forward Echelon, First Marine Aircraft Wing (less ground personnel) - - Marine Air Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced (less ground personnel) - - Marine Observation Squadron Six plus Helicopter Section, Headquarters - Squadron - - Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two - - United States Army: Counter Intelligence Corps and Military - Intelligence Special Detachment personnel attached to the - Headquarters Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, First - Provisional Marine Brigade. - - For the President, - (Signed) R. A. ANDERSON - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - -HEADQUARTERS - -EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK) - -Office of the Commanding General - -APO 301 - - 22 August 1950 - -Subject: Commendation - -Thru: Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division - -To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade - -1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you, your officers and men, -for the part your organization played in the successful attack which -began 17 August 50 against a determined enemy occupying a bridgehead -east of the NAKTONG RIVER in the vicinity of KUJIN-SAN and ended only -when the bridgehead had been eliminated with great loss of men and -equipment to the enemy. - -2. Through excellence in leadership and grit and determination in all -ranks, your organization helped materially in preventing the enemy from -penetrating our lines at a critical time. In so doing it has upheld -the fine tradition of the Marines in a glorious manner and by close -cooperation has proved unification of the services a success. - -3. Please accept my sincere thanks and congratulations. I ask that you -convey to your splendid command, the traditional “Well Done.” - - WALTON H. WALKER - _Lieutenant General, United States Army_ - _Commanding_ - - -HEADQUARTERS - -24TH INFANTRY DIVISION - -APO 24, 28 August 1950 - -To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, APO 25 - -1. I am pleased and privileged to add my personal commendation to that -of the Army Commander. And, on behalf of all officers and enlisted -personnel of my command, I desire to express our sincere appreciation -for the decisive and valiant offensive actions conducted by your -command which predominately contributed to the total destruction of the -Naktong pocket. - -2. The esprit, aggressiveness and sheer determination continuously -displayed by all personnel of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in -the face of fierce enemy resistance and counteraction has aroused the -highest admiration of every member of my command. - - JOHN E. CHURCH - _Maj Gen, USA_ - _Commanding_ - - -HEADQUARTERS - -1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF (REINFORCED) - -_c/o_ Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. - - 1355 - 1:DWS/1dp - Ser 596 - 9 Sep 1950 - -From: The Commanding General - -To: All officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF -(Reinforced) - - Subj: Letter of commendation from the Commanding General, Eighth - United States Army in Korea, of 22 August 1950 with first - endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division - -Encl: (1) Copy of subj ltr and endorsement - -1. It is with extreme pride in your accomplishments that I publish to -all officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade the enclosed -copy of a letter from the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army -in Korea, and endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry -Division, United States Army, commending the Brigade. - -2. The realization that your professional skill, esprit de corps, -outstanding bravery, and determination to succeed in all missions -has been specifically commended by the Army and Division Commanders -under whom the Brigade was serving at the time is indeed a source of -gratification to me as it will also be to you. - - (Signed) E. A. Craig - E. A. CRAIG - - - - -Bibliography - - -_Primary Sources_ - - U. S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) incoming and - outgoing dispatches, 1949–50, HQMC Secret and Classified Files, - Naval Records Management Center, Alexandria, Va. - - U. S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War, - 1951–54. Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC, Historical Branch, Records - and Research Section (Historical). - - U. S. Marine Corps. Letters to Historical Branch concerning Korean - operations. Monograph and Comments File, HQMC Historical. - - Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. War diaries and supporting - documents, July–September 1950. Army Record Group (RG) 207-0.3, - Code 208, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General’s - Office, Alexandria, Va. (DRB, TAGO). - - 2d Infantry Division. War diaries, supporting documents, histories, - and General and Special Staff activities reports, July–September - 1950. RG 207-0.3, Code 302, DRB, TAGO. - - 24th Infantry Division. War Diaries supporting documents, histories, - and General and Special Staff activities reports, July–September - 1950. RG 207-0.3, Code 324, DRB, TAGO. - - 25th infantry Division. War diaries supporting documents, histories, - and General and Special Staff activities reports, July–September - 1950. RG 207-0.3, Code 325, DRB, TAGO. - - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Messages, plans, and reports. - Classified Correspondence File, HQMC Historical. - - -- --. G-2 Journal, 5 August-5 September 1950. Classified - Correspondence File, HQMC Historical. - - -- --. G-3 Journal, 2–14 August 1950. Classified Correspondence - File, HQMC Historical. - - -- --. G-4 Journal, 3 August-9 September 1950. Classified - Correspondence File, HQMC Historical. - - -- --. Special Action Report, 2 August-6 September 1950: Operations - with Eighth U.S. Army Korea, dtd 11 September 1950. 3 Folders. - - Basic Report - Annex Able, G-1 Report - Annex Baker, G-2 Report - Annex Charlie, G-3 Report - Annex Dog, Logistics - Annex Easy, Air Section Report - Annex Fox, Signal Section Report - Annex George, Motor Transport Section - Annex How, Special Action Report (SAR) 5th Marines - SAR 1st Bn, 5th Marines - SAR 2d Bn, 5th Marines - SAR 3d Bn, 5th Marines - SAR 4.2″ Mtr Co, 5th Marines - SAR Anti-Tk Co, 5th Marines - SAR, Co. A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines - Annex Item, 1st Bn, 11th Marines - Annex Jig, Co A, 1st Engr Bn - Annex King, Co A, 1st MT Bn - Annex Love, Co C, 1st Med Bn - Annex Mike, 1st Shore Party Bn - Annex Nan, Reconn Co - Annex Oboe, VMO-6 - Annex Peter, Military Police Det - Annex Queen, Combat Serv Grp - Annex Roger, 1st Ord Bn - Annex Sugar, 1st Serv Bn - Annex Tare, Med Sec - “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - 5th Marines, Periodic reports, 4–31 August 1950, Classified - Correspondence File, HQMC Historical. - - MAG-33. Special Action Report, 5 July-6 September 1950. “SAR” File - (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - VMF-214. Special Action Report, 14 July-6 September 1950. “SAR” File - (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - VMF-323. Special Action Report, 3 August-6 September 1950. “SAR” File - (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - VMF(N)-513. Special Action Report, July-6 September 1950. “SAR” File - (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - -_Secondary Sources_ - - Appleman, Roy E., LtCol, USA, Ms history of UN operations in Korea, - July–November, 1950. Copy in Office of the Chief of Military - History, Washington, D. C. (OCMH). - - Byrnes, James F. _Speaking Frankly._ New York: Harper and Brothers, - 1947. - - Dallin, David J. _Soviet Russia and the Far East._ New York: Yale - University Press, 1948. - - Geer, Andrew. _The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in - Korea._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. - - General Headquarters, Far East Command, General Staff, Allied - Translator and Interpreter Section. - - Interrogation Reports Series. - - Research Supplement No. 1, _North Korean Forces_. - - Research Supplement No. 2, _Documentary Evidence of North Korean - Aggression_. - - Research Supplement No. 4, _Enemy Forces_. - - Research Supplement No. 94, _North Korean Security Forces_; - _North Korean Second Infantry Division_; _North Korean Fourth - Infantry Division_. - - Research Supplement No. 100, _North Korean Air Force_; _North - Korean Sixth Infantry Division_. - - Research Supplement No. 106, _North Korean Artillery_. - - General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence - Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, Order of - Battle Branch. _Supplement: Order of Battle Information, North - Korean Army, General History of North Korean Units._ Processed; - copy at OCMH. - - Giusti, Ernest H. “Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter.” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, 36, No. 5:20–21 (May 1952). - - -- --. _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps in the Korean Conflict._ - Processed; copy at USMC Historical. - - Green, A. Wigfall. _Epic of Korea._ Washington: Public Affairs Press, - 1950. - - Grew, Joseph C. _Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years._ - Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. 2 vols. - - Karig, Walter, Capt, USN. _Battle Report: The War in Korea._ New - York: Rinehart, 1952. - - Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky._ New York: Harper and Brothers, - 1954. - - -- --. _War Through the Ages._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. - - Oliver, Robert T. _Why War Came to Korea._ New York: Fordham - University Press, 1950. - - Opie, Redvers, _et al._ _The Search for Peace Settlements._ - Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1951. - - Stewart, H. D., Maj. “Rise and Fall of an Army.” _Military Review_, - 30, No. 11:32–35 (February 1951). - - Tompkins, Pauline. _American-Russian Relations in the Far East._ New - York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. - - Gugeler, R. A., Capt, “Attack Along a Ridgeline.” _Combat Actions in - Korea._ Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954, 20–30. - - U. S. Department of the Army. _Russian Combat Methods in World War - II._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. (DA Pamphlet No. - 20-230). - - U. S. Department of State. “Fifth Report to the Security Council, - October 5, 1950.” _United Nations Action in Korea under Unified - Command._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950 (State Dept - Publications 3986, International Organization and Conference Series - III 6). - - U. S. Department of State. _Guide to the UN in Korea._ Washington: - Government Printing Office, 1951 (State Dept Publications 4229, Far - Eastern Series 47). - - U. S. Department of State. _United States Relations with China, with - Special Reference to the Period 1944–49, Based on the Files of the - Department of State._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949 - (State Dept Publications 3573, Far Eastern Series 30). - - U. S. Marine Corps Board. _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine - Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50)._ - Processed; copy in USMC Historical. 2 vols. - - U. S. Military Academy, Department of Military Art and Engineering. - _Operations in Korea._ West Point, 1953. - - Wood, Ransom M. “Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea.” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, 35, No. 6:16–17 (June 1951). - - - - -Index - - - _Achernar_ (AK), USS, 53, 64, 90 - - Africa, 8 - - Aircraft, American: - AD (Skyraider), 47 - B-29 (Superforts), 47 - F4U (Corsair), 48, 98, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 151, 181, 186, 193, - 194, 221, 243 - F-51 (Mustangs), 140, 231 - Four-engine Marine aircraft, 65 - Helicopters, 50, 87, 90, 95, 111, 131, 140, 148, 150 - HO3S-1 helicopter, 50, 95, 101 - Japan-based Air Force planes, 38 - Light Observation planes, 50, 90, 126, 150, 151 - OY-2 observation planes, 95, 110, 224 - R4D transport, 110 - - Aircraft, enemy: - Il-10 ground attack bombers, 29 - PO-2 primary trainers, 29 - YAK-type, 38, 47 - YAK-7B fighters, 29 - YAK-18 advanced trainers, 29 - Russian-made, 17 - - Air Force, U. S., 140, 231, 243 - Far East Air Forces, U. S., 47, 110 - Fifth Air Force, 66, 90, 141 - Bomber Command, Far East Air Force, 47 - - Air Support, U. S., 47, 110 - - Air Support Section. _See_ Marine Units - - Almond, MajGen Edward A., USA, 56, 211 - - Alaska, 4 - - Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). _See_ Far - East Command - - _Alshain_ (AKA) USS, 53 - - American Military Government. _See_ Korea, Republic of - - Ammunition, American, 98 - 90-mm., 63, 193 - 81-mm. mortar, 190 - 60-mm. mortar, 153, 235 - 3.5-inch rocket, 193, 235 - - Ammunition, enemy: - 122-mm., 126 - 85-mm., 235 - - Anderson, Corpsman William H., USN, 137 - - _Anderson_ (APA), USS, 53, 64, 90 - - Andong, 96 - - Anglo-American blockading force, 47. - _See also_ Navy, U. S. - - Antung, 21 - - Appleman, LtCol Roy E., USA, 34_n_, 45 - - Arkadis, 2dLt Nickolas A., 184, 191 - - Armageddon, 37 - - Army forces, U. S., 174 - - Army, U. S. troops. _See_ U. S. Ground Forces; and Army units - - Army, U. S., Units: - General Headquarters, Far East, 41, 56, 60, 62 - Army of occupation in Japan, U. S., 43 - Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 43, 45, 46, 47, 57, 59, 62, - 65–68, 69 _map_, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 99, 103, 143, 150, - 207, 208, 210–212, 214, 239, 240 - X Corps, 210, 211 - 2d Infantry Division, 88, 174, 212–215, 229, 236, 241 - 7th Infantry Division, 43, 211 - 24th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 96, 98, 173–176, 207, - 240 - 25th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 99, 100, 103–106, - 124, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208, 212, 215 - 1st Cavalry Division, 43, 46, 67, 68, 96 - 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 88, 96, 100, 103, 106, 111–113, - 123, 143,152 - 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, 123, 124 - 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, 112, 152 - 9th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 175–179, 182, 186, 187, 196 - 29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 46, 67, 68 - 9th Infantry Regiment, 174, 212, 215–218, 228–231, 233, 235 - 19th Infantry Regiment, 175, 196 - 21st Infantry Regiment: - 1st Battalion, 175, 178, 196 - 23d Infantry Regiment, 215, 236, 237, 243 - 24th Infantry Regiment, 122, 148 - 2d Battalion, 116, 117, 120 - 27th Infantry Regiment, 103, 105, 240, 241 - 2d Battalion, 103 - 32d Infantry Regiment, 211 - 34th Infantry Regiment, 46, 175–177, 196 - 35th Infantry Regiment, 100, 123 - 8th Field Artillery Battalion, 126 - 90th Field Artillery Battalion, 147 - 159th Field Artillery Battalion, 150 - 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 147, 150–152 - 2d Engineer Battalion, 215 - 72d Tank Battalion, 215 - 8076th Surgical Hospital, 194 - Task Force Hill, 174 - Task Force Kean, 101, 112, 120, 122–124, 147, 151, 239 - Task Force Perry, 67 - Task Force Smith, 45, 174 - Korean Military Advisory Group, 33 - Pusan Logistical Command, 88, 96 - - Asia, 6, 13, 17, 41 - - Austria, 10 - - - _Badoeng Strait_ (CVE-116), USS, 53, 64, 89, 90, 92, 95, 98, 139, 142 - - Bailey, Cant Almarion S., 192_n_, 221 - - Barstow, California, 51, 63. _See also_ Marine Corps Supply Depot - - Barth, BrigGen George B., USA, 99, 150 - - Barrett, Sgt Edward F., 121 - - Bartlett, Col Eugene M., USA, 65 - - Bataway, Sgt Melvin R., 168 _pic._ - - Batchelor, Maj William L., 143 - - Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 48, 58 - - Battles: - Changchun, 13 - Mukden, 7, 13 - Stalingrad, 10, 19, 23, 24 - Tsinan, 13 - Tsushima, 7 - Valmy, 7 - Yalu, 7 - - Bean Patch, 166 _pic._, 207, 208, 210, 211, 237, 243 - - Blackmon, Sgt Thomas, 109 - - _Black Swan_, HMS, 40 - - Blank, Lt Howard, 236 - - Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., 104, 104_n_, 119, 122, 129_n_, 132, 135, - 135_n_, 136, 137, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204, 206, 228, 233 - - Bolkow, TSgt George W., 224 - - Bougainville, 52 - - Boxer Rebellion, 6 - - Brigade Commander. _See_ Craig, BrigGen E. A. - - Brush, Maj Charles H., 174 - - Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), 52 - - Buettner, Sgt Lee, 108 - - Bulgaria, 16 - - Byrnes, James F., U. S. Secretary of State, 2, 3_n_. - - - Cahill, 2dLt John H., 104, 105_n_, 106, 108–115, 115_n_, 117, - 119, 204, 206 - - Cairo Conference, 1 - - Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., 156 - - Caribbean, 53 - - Carr, 1stLt Ira T., 117 - - Carson, 2dLt John S., 222 - - Casteel, LtCdr Byron D., USN, 194 - - Casualties: - Army, 67 - enemy, 97, 123 - Marine, 109–111, 113, 116, 117, 122, 155, 161 _pic._, 163 _pic._, - 186, 206, 227, 237, 239 - - Cates, Gen Clifton B., 48, 48_n_, 49_n_, 49, 53, 54, 58, 60, 244 - - Central Powers, 7 - - Changchon, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152 - ambush, 145 _map_ - - Changchun, Battle of, 13 - - Changwon, 92–95, 99, 103, 105, 110, 111, 113, 143 - - Chemulpo (Inchon), 4, 7 - - Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 12, 14 - - Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 66, 88, 91, 160 _pic._ - - Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ Sherman, Adm Forrest P. - - Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. _See_ Almond, MajGen Edward A., - USA - - China, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12–14, 16, 23, 25, 53 - Civil War in, 13, 14, 22 - Japanese invasion of, 1937, 8, 10 - - China-Russia-Japan Triangle, 3 - - Chindong-ni, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104–106, 107 _map_, 110–113, 115, 119, - 120, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 132, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208, - 239 - - Chinese Civil War, 153 - - Chinese Communists, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20 - - Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 20, 31 - 8th Route Army, 23, 24 - 56th Army, 96 - 164th Infantry Division, 21 - 166th Infantry Division, 21, 96 - Northeast Democratic United Army, 20 - - Chinese Nationalists, 12, 13, 20, 22, 25 - - Chinese Nationalist army, 13 - - Chinhae, 66, 95, 99, 209 - - Chinju, 46, 66, 67, 68, 70, 97, 98, 100, 112, 122, 123, 143 - - Chinnampo, 31 - - Chistyakov, Gen Ivan (Russian), 10, 19 - - Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA, 23, 24 - - Chongjin, 21 - - Chongju, 36 - - Chorwon, 31 - - Chukchon-ni, 217, 219 - - Chuminjin, 40 - - Chunchon, 32, 39, 40 - - Church, BrigGen John H., USA, 41, 46, 173–176, 178, 207 - - “Citizen-Marines”. _See_ Marine Corps Organized Reserve - - Civil War, U. S., 54 - - _Clymer_ (APA), USS, 53, 91, 92 - - “Cold War”, 6, 9, 13 - - Cole, Lt Doyle, 140 - - Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 208 - - Combat zone, reconnaissance of, 66 - - Commandant of the Marine Corps. _See_ Cates, Gen Clifton B. - - Commander in Chief, Far East. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas - - Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. _See_ Radford, Adm Arthur W. - - Commander Naval Forces, Far East. _See_ Joy, VAdm C. Turner - - Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. _See_ Shepherd, LtGen - Lemuel C., Jr. - - Commanding General, Eighth Army. _See_ Walker, Gen Walton H., USA - - Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Craig, - BrigGen Edward A. - - Commanding General, 25th Division. _See_ Kean, MajGen W. B. - - Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. _See_ Murray, LtCol R. L. - - Commanding Officer, VMO-6. _See_ Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J. - - Commando parties, 47 - - Communications: - HF net, 142 - radio vans, 88 - SCR-300 radios, 106, 109, 224, 236 - TAD net, 142 - TAO net, 142 - TAR net, 142 - VHF net, 142 - - Communism, 9, 13, 14 - - Communists, 13, 17, 62 - army, 13 - doctrine, 3 - Empire, 8 - - Cottrell, TSgt Johnnie C., 137 - - Counselman, 2dLt John D., 136 - - Counterattack, enemy, 12–13 Aug 50, 154 _map_ - - Cowling, 2dLt David R., 146 - - Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 49, 52, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 57, 58, 60, - 60_n_, 62, 62_n_, 63–66, 68, 70, 87, 88, 88_n_, 89–95, 99–101, - 105, 111, 111_n_, 112, 112_n_, 120_n_, 123, 125, 128, 128_n_, - 129, 129_n_, 131, 135, 135_n_, 136, 140, 144, 147, 147_n_, - 148, 148_n_, 150, 152, 156, 158 _pic._, 159 _pic._, 173, 174, - 177, 178, 178_n_, 179, 181, 186_n_, 194, 196, 207, 207_n_, - 210–212, 212_n_, 213, 213_n_, 215, 216, 216_n_, 217, 217_n_, - 219, 227_n_, 229, 236–238, 241, 244 - - Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, 181, 182, 190 - - Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H., 49, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62, 65, 87, 89, 95, - 140, 159 _pic._ - - Czar Nicholas II, 3, 9 - - Czar, Russian, 7 - - Czechoslovakia, 10, 38 - - - D-Day, Sachon Offensive, 100, 126 - - D-Day, Inchon Landing, 210, 211 - - Dairen, 4 - - Dallin, David J., 9_n_, 12_n_ - - Daly, Col John, USA, 151 - - Dean, MajGen William F., USA, 45, 46, 67 - - DeFazio, T/Sgt Ernest L., 158 _pic._ - - Delafield, Wisconsin, 52 - - Dennis, S/Sgt Saweren J., 225 - - Department of State, U. S., 14, 37 - - Deputy Commander, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Cushman, - BrigGen Thomas H. - - Dickerson, T/Sgt Sidney S., 181, 182, 189 - - Downs, CWO Willard C., 238 - - Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 24, 53 - - Duncan, 2dLt Edward F., 132 - - Duncan, T/Sgt David N., 225 - - - Eddy, 2dLt Rodger E., 184 - - El Toro, California, 50, 51, 53, 55 - - Emmelman, 2dLt Edward T., 113, 115 - - Empress Augusta Bay, 52 - - England. _See_ Great Britain - - English, Capt Gearl M., 50, 63, 92 - - Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 52, 210 - - Estonia, 10 - - Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr., 198 - - Europe, 8, 9, 12, 41 - - - Far East, 1, 3, 4, 6–9, 13, 22, 39, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49 - - Far East Command: - General Headquarters, Tokyo, 41, 56, 60, 62, 64 - Military Intelligence Section, GS, Allied Translator and - Interpreter Section, 16_n_, 17_n_, 19_n_, 21_n_, 22_n_, 26_n_, - 27_n_, 28_n_, 30_n_, 33_n_, 39_n_, 130_n_ - - Fegan, Capt Joseph C., Jr., 104, 104_n_, 119, 120_n_, 120–122, 129, - 135, 135_n_, 136, 137, 151, 155, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204 - - Fenton, Capt Francis I., Jr., 189_n_, 190, 195, 196, 196_n_, 198, 219, - 220, 222, 224, 229, 231, 231_n_, 233, 233_n_, 234–236 - - Field, 2dLt Paul R., 193 - - Finger Ridge, 175–177, 193, 196, 203, 206, 234, 236 - - Finn, Capt John, Jr., 113–116 - - Florida, 42 - - Formosa, 4, 14, 41 - - Forney, Col Edward H., 211 - - _Fort Marion_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63 - - Fox, Capt George C., 190_n_, 192, 192_n_, 195_n_, 196, 196_n_, 197, - 198, 200, 201, 217_n_, 220, 222, 224 - - France, 4 - - Freeman, Col Paul L., USA, 243 - - French Revolution, 7 - - Fukuoka, Japan, 65 - - Fullerton, TSgt C. R., 192_n_, 193 - - - Gall, Maj Walter, 117, 117_n_, 129 - - Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, 66, 87 - - Gay, MajGen Hobart R., USA, 46 - - Geer, Andrew, 51_n_, 54_n_ - - General Headquarters (GHQ). _See_ Far East Command - - Genghis Khan, 13 - - Georgia, 42 - - Germany, 4, 6, 8–10 - - Giaquinto, Cpl Raymond, 136 - - Giusti, Maj Ernest H., 48_n_, 140_n_ - - Golden Gate Bridge, 64 - - Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 50 - - Great Britain: 27th Infantry Brigade, 2, 14 - - Green, A. Wigfall, 34_n_ - - Grew, Joseph C., 9_n_ - - Guadalcanal, 53, 109 - - Guam, Marianas Islands, 42, 52 - - Gugeler, Capt R. A., USA, 174_n_ - - _Gunston Hall_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63 - - - Hadong, 67, 98 - - Haiti, 52 - - Haman, 104, 119, 121 - - Hamhung, 20, 31 - - Han, Lt (NKPA), 17 - - Han River, 40, 173 - - Haneda Airport, 56 - - Hanifin, Capt R. T., Jr., 113_n_, 114–116, 189 - - Harris, MajGen Field, 159 _pic._ - - Harvey, Lt(jg) Robert J., USN, 206 - - Hawaii, 88 - - Hay, John, U. S. Secretary of State, 6 - - Helicopters. _See_ Aircraft, American - - Henderson, Cpl Virgil W., 224 - - _Henrico_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 64, 90 - - Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence W., 119, 156 - - Hickey, Lt(jg) Bernard L., USN, 194, 219 - - Hideyoshi, Japanese war lord, 3 - - Hill, Col John G., USA, 174, 176–178, 186 - - Hill: - Hill 88--136, 137 - Hill 91--222, 224, 233 - Hill 99--104, 106, 110, 111, 119, 121, 123 - Hill 102--179, 182, 183, 190, 193, 195, 197, 200 - Hill 109--179, 182–184, 190, 191, 193, 195–198, 200 - Hill 117--179, 181, 182, 190, 191, 195–198, 200, 220, 221, 222, 224, - 225, 227–229 - Hill 125--175, 177, 181, 193, 229, 231, 234–237 - Hill 190--129 - Hill 143--179, 181–184, 190, 191, 195, 201 - Hill 147--179, 184, 186, 201 - Hill 153--179, 184, 186, 201 - Hill 202--147, 153, 155 - Hill 207--175, 178, 179, 183, 201, 203, 204, 206 - Hill 250--146 - Hill 255--103, 104, 110–112, 119, 121–123 - Hill 301--146 - Hill 308--124, 125, 127, 129 - Hill 311--175, 178, 203, 204, 206, 207 - Hill 342--104–106, 109–117, 123, 124, 129 - Hill 347--108 - Cloverleaf, 176–178, 229–231, 233, 236 - Observation, 175–178, 181, 184, 189, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 229, - 231, 233, 234, 236 - Red Slash, 179 - - Hodge, LtGen John R., USA, 10, 14, 15 - - Hodge, TSgt Paul A., 200 - - Hongchon, 23 - - Houghton, Capt Kenneth J., 144, 146 - - Hungary, 10 - - Hwachon, 32 - - Hwayong-ni, 229–231 - - - Iceland, 53 - - Il-li, 215 - - Inchon, 17, 40, 42, 56, 98, 210, 211, 237, 238, 241 - - Ingvolstad, LtCdr Orlando, Jr., USN, 194 - - Intelligence, U. S.: - Army, 20, 23_n_ - Captured NK documents, 17, 29 - Japanese maps, 127 - POW interrogations, 28, 29, 31 - - Italy, 8 - - Itami, Japan, 62, 65, 89 - Air Force Base, 60, 87, 89, 90 - - Itazuke, Japan, 243 - Airfield, 90, 141 - - “Iron Curtain,” 10 - - Iwo Jima, 51, 52 - - - _Jamaica_, HMS, 40 - - James, Cpl Melvin, 121, 121_n_ - - Japan, 1–4, 6–9, 41, 43, 45, 46, 56, 57, 61 _map_, 62, 87, - 89, 211, 243 - Celestial Empire, 4 - Russian WWII declaration of war on, 9 - U. S. occupation of, WWII, 9 - Japan sea, 41 - _Kamikaze_ tactics of, 2 - - Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 217, 221, 224 - - Johnston, 2dLt Thomas H., 191, 192 - - Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 48, 49, 57–60 - - Joint Operations Center (JOC), 141 - - Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 41, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 70, 211 - - _Juneau_ (CL), USS, 40, 47 - - - Kaechon, 31 - - Kaesong, 32, 39 - - Kanggye, 31 - - Kang-ni, 227, 229 - - Kapyong, 40 - - Karig, Capt Walter, USNR, 40_n_ - - Kean, MajGen William B., USA, 45, 88, 92, 99, 101, 105, 112, - 124, 147, 207 - - Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA, 212, 213, 215, 229 - - Kim Il Sung, Red Korean prime minister, 16, 22, 23, 25 - - Kim Mu Chong, LtGen, NKPA, 19, 20, 25 - - Kim Sung Chu, 23 - - Kim Ung, LtGen, NKPA, 24 - - King, Maj George J., 141_n_ - - King, Capt George W., 128 - - Kipling, Rudyard, 6 - - Kittredge, Capt George E., Jr., 111 - - Klein, Lt (jg) Chester L., USN, 194 - - Kobe, Japan, 60, 64, 65, 89, 90, 210 - - Kochang, 67, 68, 68_n_ - - Korea, 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11 _map_, 14–17, 19–21, 23, 24, 32, 37, 41–43, - 45–47, 51, 53, 56, 58–60, 61 _map_, 62, 63, 65, 70, 87–90, 96, - 97, 126, 127, 141, 150, 173, 209, 210, 242, 243 - American landing in, 1871, 3 - Annexation of by Japan, 1910, 7 - Civil War in, 14, 23. - _See also_ Republic of Korea and North Korean Peoples Democratic - Republic - Conflict in, historical background, 3 - Japanese possession, 1 - North. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of - Partition of, 10 - People’s Army. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of - People’s Democratic Republic of, 12, 14, 16, 16_n_, 19, 20, 21, 34, - 36, 114–116, 120, 123, 135, 136, 174, 183, 193, 200, 201, 203, - 217, 220, 224, 228, 231, 234, 235, 239 - Agrarian Reform, 16, 21 - People’s Army, 19, 20, 22, 23_n_, 67, 98, 104, 108, 128, 135, 173, - 200, 203, 212, 244 - Air Force, 29 - armament, 21 - Aviation Section of Pyongyang Military Academy, organization - of, 29 - Casualties, 239 - Commander in Chief. _See_ Kim Il Sung - conscription program of, 31 - Decoration “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic”, 25; - “Order of the National Flag, 1st Class”, 25 - Deputy Commander in Chief. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA - Division Headquarters, organization of, 26 - First Amphibious Operation in Korea, 39 - Front Headquarters, organization of, 26 - infantry division, organization of, 27 - invasion of South Korea, 32, 37, 44 _map_ - Order of Battle in, 35 _map_ - organization of, 26 - rifle regiment, organization of, 27 - rifle company, organization of, 27 - rifle platoon, organization of, 27 - spies, 22 - strength of, 213 - training of, 22, 31, 32 - Units: - I Corps, 25 - II Corps, 25 - III Corps, 25 - 105th Armored Division, 21, 29, 32, 39, 97 - 1st Infantry Division, 20, 25, 32, 39 - 2d Infantry Division, 20, 21, 32, 39, 215 - 3d Infantry Division, 20, 30, 32, 39 - 4th Infantry Division, 21, 32, 39, 174, 175, 186, 196, 203, - 214, 228, 240 - 5th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39 - 6th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39, 96–98, 100, 106, 108, - 112, 117, 124, 147, 153, 239 - 7th Infantry Division, 21, 22 - 8th Infantry Division, 21, 22 - 9th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 214, 216, 219, 227 - 10th Infantry Division, 215 - 12th Infantry Division, 21, 22 - 13th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 33 - 14th Infantry Division, 21, 22 - 15th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 33, 39 - 10th Mechanized Infantry Division, 21, 22 - 849th Anti-tank Regiment, 29 - 5th Infantry Regiment, 174 - 6th Infantry Regiment, 96 - 13th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117 - 14th Infantry Regiment, 96 - 15th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117 - 16th Infantry Regiment, 174 - 18th Infantry Regiment, 174, 182, 190, 203 - 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, 29, 30 - 107th Medium Tank Regiment, 29, 174 - 109th Medium Tank Regiment, 29 - 203d Medium Tank Regiment, 29 - 83d Motorcycle Regiment, 96–98, 139, 147, 239 - 308th Armored Battalion, 29 - Aviation Society, 28 - Labor Party of, 25 - Minister of National Defense. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA. - Navy, 40 - People’s Assembly at Pyongyang, 15 - People’s Committee, 12 - Prime Minister. _See_ Kim Il Sung - Supreme People’s Council, 16, 24 - population of, 42 - Republic of, 15, 16, 16_n_, 21–23, 26, 33, 34, 36–38, 47, 62, 67, 214 - American Military Government of, 15 - army, 16, 33, 34, 40, 45 - Army units: - Capital Division, 34, 214 - 1st Infantry Division, 34, 214 - 2d Infantry Division, 34 - 3d Infantry Division, 34, 36, 214 - 5th Infantry Division, 34, 36 - 6th Infantry Division, 34, 214 - 7th Infantry Division, 34 - 8th Infantry Division, 34, 214 - 17th Regiment, 34 - Interim Legislature of, 15 - invasion of, 17, _map_ front endpaper - National Assembly of, 15, 16 - Navy units: 1st Korean Marine Regiment, 238 - Security Force, 15 - Russian Occupation of, 1945, 10, 19, 20 - South. _See_ Republic of - Terrain, 42 - trusteeship of, 2, 14, 15 - United States occupation of, 10, 16 - Volunteer Army, 19, 20, 23 - - Kosong, 100, 131, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, 143, 148, 156, 244 - - Kosong Turkey Shoot, 139, 146 - - Kremlin, 19, 21, 23 - - Krulak, Col Victor H., 49, 53 - - Kumchon, 67, 68 - - Kum River, 46, 96, 97, 173 - - Kumwan, 68_n_ - - Kunsan, 96, 97, 238 - - Kurtz, SSgt Charles F., Jr., 135 - - Kwangju, 36, 97 - - Kyoto, 60 - - - Landrum, Col Eugene M., USA, 65, 68, 88, 92 - - Latham, Henry J., 159 _pic._ - - Latvia, 10 - - Lawson, TSgt Frank J., 197 - - League of Nations, 37 - - Lee Hwal, Col, NKPA, 28 - - Lenin, Nickolai, 13 - - Lennon, 2dLt Thomas P., 206 - - Liaotung Peninsula, 4, 7, 8 - Russian 25-year lease of, 6 - - Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., 98 - - Lischeski, TSgt F. J., 144_n_, 147 - - “Long March”, 25 - - Lueddeke, Lt Gustave F., 101 - - Lund, Maj Arnold A., 90, 139, 140 - - - MacArthur, Gen of the Army Douglas, 9, 33, 38, 40, 45, 48, 49, 53, - 56–60, 62, 210, 211, 239, 240 - - McMullen, TSgt Orval F., 191, 195, 200, 220, 222 - - McNeely, Maj Morgan J., 113, 132, 135 - - Macy, Sgt Jack, 110 - - Main Supply Route (MSR): - enemy, 47 - Marine, 94, 104, 106, 111, 112, 115, 117, 120, 120_n_, 122–124, 129, - 135, 136, 143, 151, 156, 175, 177–179, 181, 182, 190, 193, - 195, 196, 203, 216–222, 224, 225, 227–229, 231–236 - - Manchukuo, 8. _See also_ Manchuria. - - Manchuria, 4, 7–10, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31. _See also_ Manchukuo. - puppet state in, 8 - Russia in (World War II), 9 - - Mao Tse-tung, 12, 14, 25 - - Marines, U. S., 3, 47, 52, 53, 56–58, 62–65, 70, 90, 92, 105, 106, - 108, 113, 116, 119, 123, 125, 128, 129, 157 _pic._, 176, 182, - 183, 240, 244 - Air, 60, 62, 70, 98, 122, 132, 134, 186, 190, 207, 229, 240 - Air crews, 168 _pic._ - Air-ground team, 57, 68, 89, 91, 99, 238, 239, 244 - Air Support Section, 87, 99 - Equipment, 51 - Expansion program, 58 - Ground forces, 53, 54, 60, 62, 65, 70, 88, 93, 95, 98, 108, 140; - landing of, 90 - request for, 47 - Units: - Air - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 48, 89 - 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 48 - Marine Air Group-33, 49, 53, 60, 64, 68, 87, 90, 116, 122, 136, - 140, 141, 181, 186, 187, 193, 203, 204, 221, 233, 242, 243 - VMF-214, 89, 98, 141, 243 - VMF-323, 89, 90, 98, 139–143 - VMF(N)-513, 90, 141, 230, 230_n_, 243 - VMO-6, 50, 66, 70, 89, 90, 95, 101, 110, 126, 140, 141, 194, 208, - 209, 222, 224, 233, 243 - Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two (MTACS-2), 89, 95, 141, 142 - Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental) One (HMX-1), 50 - Ground, - Fleet Marine Force, 48, 141 - Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 48, 59 - Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 48, 55, 56, 63, 87 - V Amphibious Corps, 52 - 1st Marine Division, 48, 52, 56, 58, 59, 60, 87, 210, 211, 213, 216 - 2d Marine Division, 48 - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 49, 50, 52–60, 62–65, 68, 70, 87–93, - 96, 98–101, 103, 105, 108, 111, 112, 124–126, 129, 136, 141, - 148, 152, 155, 173, 175, 176, 178, 186, 194, 207–209, 211, - 212, 219, 222, 229, 234, 235, 237–244; - Action on Southwestern Front, 7–13 Aug 50, 102 _map_; - activation of, 49; - Advance Party, 56, 61, 65, 70; - air component, number of personnel, 51; - air-ground team, 56, 140, 141; - departure of, 54, 55; - expansion of, 60; - ground forces, number of personnel, 51; - ground elements, 64, 141; - mobilization of, 59; - Observation Section, organization of, 141; - rear echelon, 93 - 1st Marine Regiment, 210 - 5th Marine Regiment, 49–52, 91, 94, 105, 126, 177–179, 194, 195, - 209–211, 213, 216, 217, 221, 236; - CO. _See_ Murray, LtCol Raymond L.; - organization of, 49; - 4.2-inch Mortar Company, 105; - Anti-Tank Company, 103, 193, 221 - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 63, 93, 94, 111, 119, 123–125, 127–129, - 144, 147, 148, 152, 178, 179, 187, 189, 194, 196, 197, 206, - 216, 217, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227–231, 233, 235–237; - CO. _See_ Newton, LtCol George R. - Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 129, 190–193, 195–198, - 146, 155, 200, 201, 203, 219–225, 227, 229–231, 236, 237 - Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 123, 127, 129, 144, 146, 147, - 153, 155, 189–193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 219–222, 225, 227, - 229–231, 234–237 - Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 189, 190, 193 - Anti-tank assault platoon, 193 - 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 129, - 131, 132, 142, 148, 152, 178, 179, 181–184, 186, 187, 189, - 192, 194, 196, 200, 206, 216, 217, 221, 222, 224, 227; - CO, _see_ Roise, LtCol H. S. - Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 112–117, 131, 132, 181–184, - 189, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227, 228 - Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 111, 113, 114, 116, 181, 183, - 184, 186, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227 - Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 117 - 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 103–106, 110, 111, 119, 120, 122, - 129, 132, 135–137, 139, 142, 144, 148, 150–152, 177–179, 196, - 206, 216, 227, 229, 231, 233, 236, 237; - CO. _See_ Taplett, LtCol Robert D. - Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 106, 111, 112, 114, 119, - 121, 122, 132, 135, 136, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 227, 228, - 230, 231, 233 - Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 111, 119–122, 135–137, - 143, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 228, 230, 231 - Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 230 - 7th Marine Regiment, 210 - 9th Marine Regiment, 52 - 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 51, 92, 103, 116, 122, 125, 126, 136, - 139, 152, 176, 182, 187, 203, 208, 212, 222, 227, 228, 233 - Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, 51, 103, 119, 128, 156, 195, 201, - 219, 225, 227 - Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, 50, 63, 187, 192, 193, 203, - 204, 222, 234 - Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 51 - 1st Amphibious Tractor Company, 63 - Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 143 - Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, 143 - Brigade Reconnaissance Company Detachment, 105, 131, 144, 227 - Brigade Medical Section, 143 - Combat Service Detachment, 92 - Brigade Air Section, 110 - Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit, 194 - First Replacement Draft, activation of, 60 - - Marine Corps, U. S., 48, 50, 52, 56–58, 60, 92, 144, 147, 151, 153. - _See also_ Marines, U. S. - Air Station, El Toro, California. _See_ El Toro, California - Hymn, 91 - Organized Reserve, mobilization of, 58 - Schools. _See_ Quantico, Virginia - Supply Depot, Barstow, California, 51, 63 - - Martin, Col Robert R., USA, 46 - - Marx, Karl, 13 - - Masan, 66, 70, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 120, 122, 123, - 143, 148, 207 - - Matthews, Francis P., 48 - - Medical Aid Stations, 194 - - Mediterranean, 210_n_ - - Mediterranean Fleet. _See_ Navy, U. S., 6th Fleet - - Mesanjin, 31 - - Michaelis, Col John H., USA, 105, 106 - - Millar, TSgt Stanley G., 192 - - Miryang, 152, 173, 176, 177, 194, 211, 212; - River, 173 - - Mokpo, 97, 98 - - Mokpu, 42, 97 - - Mongolia, 8, 10 - - Mongols, 10, 20 - - Montross, Lynn J., 50_n_, 54_n_ - - Morgan, TSgt Ray, 121 - - Moscow, 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, 26; - Conference, 1945, 141 - - Moses, Captain Vivian, 140 - - Muccio, Ambassador John J., 15, 33, 34, 37 - - Muetzel, 2dLt Francis W., 158 _pic._, 190_n_, 196_n_, 198, 217, 220, - 222, 224, 233_n_, 236, 237 - - Mukden, 7; - Battle of, 7, 13 - - Munsan, 39 - - Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 51–53, 63, 65, 65_n_, 70, 90, 91, 91_n_, - 101, 111, 112, 122, 124, 124_n_, 125, 127, 127_n_, 128, - 128_n_, 129, 131, 132, 135, 143, 148_n_, 152, 176, 177–179, - 186, 186_n_, 187, 196, 201, 213, 216, 217, 227, 229, 230, 233 - - Myong-ni, 216, 217, 221, 224, 228 - - - Naktong, 96, 174, 214, 215, 237, 239, 240, 241; - Bulge, 150, 173, 174, 175, 180, 185 _map_, 203, 206, 212, 213, - 215, 240, 241, 243; - River, 47, 66–68, 88, 150, 172 _pic._, 203, 207, 215, 231, 240 - First Battle of, 17–19 Aug 50, 173–206, 199 _map_, 202 _map_, - 205 _map_; - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 129, 176–179, - 192, 195, 198; - Objective Two, 178, 201, 203, 204; - Objective Three, 178, 179, 204, 206 - Second Battle of, 3–6 Sep 50, 207-235, 218 _map_, 223 _map_, - 232 _map_; - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 217, 220, - 221, 227, 229; - Objective Two, 222 - - Nam Il, LtGen, NKPA, 24, 25 - - Nam River, 88 - - Namwon, 97 - - Nanking, 23 - - Nanam, 20, 31 - - Naval Blockade: - United Nations, 40; - U. S., of Formosa, 41; - of Korean Coast, 41 - - Naval Forces in the Far East, 41 - - Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, California, 64 - - Naval Support, U. S., 47 - - Navy, U. S.: - Sixth Fleet, U. S., 58, 210_n_ - Seventh Fleet, U. S., 41, 211 - Task Force 77, 47 - Task Group 53.7, 63, 64, 89–91 - Task Group 96.5, 40 - PhibGroup One, 211 - Amphibious Planning Group 1, 53 - Task Unit 53.7.3, 63 - - Nazi invasion of Russia, 8 - - Nelson, Lt(jg) Bentley G., USN, 194 - - _Newsweek_, 39_n_ - - Newton, LtCol George R., 93, 94, 119, 123, 123_n_, 124, 124_n_, 125, - 127, 128, 129, 146, 147, 155, 187, 189, 191, 195, 198, 200, - 201, 217, 217_n_, 219, 221, 222, 224, 225 - - _New York Times_, 16_n_ - - No Name Ridge, 179, 180 - - Nonsan, 174 - - - Oakley, 2dLt Arthur A., 113–115 - - Obong-ni, 183, 184 - - Obong-ni Ridge, 162 _pic._, 175–179, 181, 185 _map_, 187, 191–196, 199 - _map_, 200–203, 206, 231, 233, 234, 236 - - Obregon, PFC Eugene A., 161 _pic._ - - O’Donnell, MajGen Emmett, USAF, 47 - - Offensive, Sachon, 145 _map_, 148 _map_ - - Okinawa, 41, 46, 51 - - Oliver, Robert T., 12_n_ - - Olson, Maj Merlin R., 236, 237; - LtCol, 123_n_, 124_n_, 125_n_, 129_n_, 217_n_, 233_n_ - - O’Mahoney, Maj Thomas J., 92 - - Ongjin Peninsula, 17, 32, 39 - - “Open Door” Policy, 6 - - Osaka, 60 - - Osan, 45, 74 - - Oso-ri, 127, 128 - - - Pacific Ocean, 7, 8 - - Paedun-ni, 100, 127, 129, 131, 132, 149 _map_ - - Pang, MajGen, NKPA, 97 - - Partridge, MajGen Earle E., USAF, 66, 70 - - Patton, Gen George S., USA, 45 - - Pearl Harbor, T. H., 55 - - Peiping, 24 - - Peleliu, 210 - - Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, 48–51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 87, 90 - - Pentagon, 41, 57, 59, 60 - - Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 3 - - Pescadores Group, 4 - - Peters, SSgt Carl W., 168 _pic._ - - Philippine Islands, 6, 41 - - _Pickaway_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 65, 91 - - Plan Able, 58, 60 - - Plan Baker, 58 - - Pochon, 39 - - Pohang-dong, 46, 47, 67, 96 - - Poland, 10, 38 - - “Police Action”, 39 - - Pomeroy, 1stLt William D., 129, 204, 234, 235 - - Port Arthur, 4, 7 - - Potsdam Conference, July 1947, 9_n_ - - Pugok, 131 - - Pusan, 18, 42, 47, 62, 65–67, 70, 87–89, 92, 93, 95–97, 99, 141, 173, - 208–211, 213, 214, 236–241 - Harbor, 89, 91 - Perimeter, 57, 96, 142, 150, 174, 210, 211, 213, 214, 236, 237, - 239–242, 244. _See_ map inside back cover - Terminal, 91 - University, 237 - - Pyongyang, 4, 12, 14–16, 16_n_, 20–24, 26, 29, 34, 47, 214 - Military Academy, 28, 30, 31 - - - Quantico, Virginia, 50, 52 - - - Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 48, 49 - - Reeves, MSgt Harold, 116 - - Regimental Combat Team (RCT). _See_ Army units, Marine units - - Reid, 2dLt Wallace J., 113, 115 - - Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., 230 - - Rhodes, 1stLt Nye G., 158 _pic._ - - Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 195 - - Robinson, SSgt Robert, 108 - - Roise, LtCol Harold S., 94, 110, 111, 111_n_, 112–114, 116, 129, 131, - 132, 178, 181, 189, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222 - - Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 2, 3 - - Rumania, 10 - - Russell, Maj John W., 189 - - Russia, 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 13, 140; - Czarist, 6; - Nazi invasion of, 8. - _See also_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Baltic Fleet, 7 - - Russian-Japanese Border Clashes, 8 - - Russian revolution of 1917, 8, 13 - - Russo-Japanese War, 3, 6 - - - Sachon, 98, 100, 122, 125, 129, 136, 140, 142–144, 146–148, 156, 239 - - Sachon Offensive, 130 _map_, 133 _map_, 134 _map_ - - Sachon Offensive Situation Map, 149 - - Sadong, 31 - - Saint Johns Military Academy, 52 - - Saipan, 53 - - Sakhalin Island, 7, 8 - - Samchok, 40 - - Samchonpo, 156 - - San Clemente Island, 63 - - San Diego, California, 53, 63, 210 - - Sangnyong-ni, 112, 113, 124, 128, 129 - - Sasebo, Japan, 60, 64 - - Schryver, 1stLt Hugh C., 144, 190 - - Scott, Hugh D., Jr., 159 _pic._ - - Sebilian, 1stLt Robert C., 191 - - Secretary of the Navy. _See_ Matthews, Francis P. - - Seoul, 6, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 96, 98, 174 - attack on, 39 - fall of, 40 - Russian legation at, 6 - strafing of, 17 - University, 208, 214 - - Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 49, 53, 55, 158 _pic._ - - Sharp, Capt L. D., Jr., 64_n_ - - Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 48, 49, 58, 60 - - Sherman, Gen William T., USA, 54 - - Shinka, 2dLt M. J., 181_n_, 182, 183 - - Ships: - American: LST Q0119, 143 - Enemy: Torpedo Boat, 39 - - Siban-ni, 98 - - Siberia, 9, 21 - - _Silcily_ (CVE), USS, 90, 95, 98, 142 - - Simpson, PFC Benjamin C., 192 - - Sinchon, 31 - - Singi, 123, 124 - - “Sino-Japanese War”, 4, 6 - - Sinuiju, 20, 21, 31, 32 - - Sinuiju Airfield, 28 - - Skelt, 1stLt Ernest P., 238 - - Smith, LtCol Charles B., USA, 45 - - Smith, 1stLt H. J., 221, 224 - - Smith, 1stLt James W., 146 - - Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 159 _pic._, 210, 211 - - Smolensk, 24 - - Snedeker, Col Edward W., 65, 70, 90, 91, 219 - - Snyder, 1stLt Joris J., 230 - - Soviet Russia, _See_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - Spain, 37 - - Spanish-American War, 1898, 6 - - Spotter, LtComdr Otto E., USN, 195, 219 - - Stalin, Joseph, 1–3, 8, 9, 13 - - Stalingrad, Battle of, 10, 19, 23, 24 - - Stephens, Cpl Raymond E., 224 - - Stevens, Capt John R., 191, 192, 192_n_, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 217, - 219, 220, 222, 224; - Maj., 144_n_, 146, 190_n_, 196_n_, 233_n_ - - Stewart, Maj Frank R., Jr., 213, 214_n_ - - Stewart, Col J. L., 55, 56_n_, 62_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 66_n_, 68_n_, 70, - 70_n_, 87, 87_n_, 88, 91, 91_n_, 99, 100, 100_n_, 101, 148, - 150, 151, 178_n_, 208, 216, 217, 219, 237_n_, 244 - - Strategic triangle. _See_ China-Russia-Japan triangle - - Strategy, Communist: - “end run,” 65, 67 - United Nations: delaying action, 40, 45, 46, 65 - - Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 41, 60 - - Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 41, 211 - - Summers, PFC Ralph J., 161 _pic._ - - Sunam-dong, 136 - - Sunchon, 97 - - Suwon, 40, 41, 45 - - Sweeney, 1stLt William E., 113, 114, 181_n_, 184, 191 - - Sweet, 2dLt Granville G., 192, 193, 222 - - Syngman, Dr. Rhee, 1, 15, 33, 158 _pic._, 209 - - Syngman, Madame Rhee, 209 - - - Tactical Air Control Center, U. S. Air Force (TACC), 141 - - Tactical Air Control Party, 110, 139 - - Tactics: - NKPA, 25 - air, 22 - artillery, 22 - tank, 22 - Soviet cold-war, 39 - - Taedabok Pass, 131, 132 - - Taegu, 36, 65, 66, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 141, 173, 213, 240, 241 - - Taejon, 36, 40, 46, 67, 174, 175 - - Taepyong-ni, 110, 113, 114 - - Taesil-li, 127, 128, 149 _map_ - - Tanghong-ni, 143 - - Taplett, LtCol Robert D., 103–105, 105_n_, 110, 111, 119, 122, 132, - 135, 135_n_, 136, 143, 148, 150–152, 177, 178, 201, 201_n_, - 204, 206, 216, 227_n_, 228, 230, 233, 233_n_, 236 - - Tarawa, 53 - - Tartars, 10 - - Taylor, 1stLt David S., 147, 190 - - Tennant, Lt William G., USN, 194 - - Terrio, PFC Donald, 121, 121_n_ - - Thirty-eighth Parallel, 10, 12, 14–17, 21, 32, 37–39, 42, 59 - - Tobin, Cape John L., 123, 125, 144, 146, 153, 155, 189, 190 - - Togo, Adm, Japanese, 7 - - Tokkong-ni, 113, 117 - - Tokyo, 41, 43, 49, 56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 210, 211, 213, 216 - - Tompkins, Pauline, 6_n_ - - Tosan, 100, 103, 111, 112, 123, 124, 129, 149 _map_ - - Transportation: - motor transport, 55 - American: - cargo trucks, 88 - jeeps, 131, 140 - M-44 armored personnel carriers, 151 - motorcycles, 140 - 2½-ton trucks, 131 - Army trucks, 93, 177 - Marine truck, 166 _pic._ - enemy, 139, 140 - motorcycles, 139, 140, 158 _pic._ - - Trans-Siberian Railroad, 4 - - Treaties: - Japan-England, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6 - Japan-Korea, treaty of amity, 1887, 4 - Portsmouth, treaty of, 5 September 1905, 7 - Russia-China treaty of alliance, 1896, 4 - Russia-China, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6 - Russia-Japan, 1896, 7 - Russia-Japan, 1898, 7 - Russia-Nationalist China treaty of friendship, 8, 13 - - Triple Intervention (Russia-Germany-France), 4 - - Truce of the Bear, 6 - - Truman, President Harry S., 15, 38, 41, 45, 49, 58 - - Trygve Lie (U. N. Secretary-General), 37 - - Tsinan: - battle of, 13 - fall of, 13 - - Tsushima: - battle of, 7 - Straits, 90 - - Tugok, 175–177, 179, 182, 186, 189, 190, 193, 196, 234, 236 - - - Uffelman, 1stLt Paul R., 184 - - Uijongbu, 39, 194 - - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, - 22, 25, 38, 64 - American Joint Commission, 15 - army, 22 - army of occupation, 24 - Nationalist China treaty of friendship and alliance, 1945, 13 - withdrawal of occupation troops in Korea, 16 - - United Nations, 15, 16, 34, 37–39, 214 - Commander. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas - Commission on Korea, 15, 38 - Ground Forces, 66 - forces, 96, 141, 228, 241, 243 - General Assembly, 15 - Naval blockade, 40 - Security Council, 38, 45, 240 - - United States, 1, 3, 8, 13–15, 33, 34, 38, 40, 42, 50, 60 - air-ground team, 48, 49 - ground forces, 45–47, 120 - commitment of, 38 - first enemy contact by, 45 - Lend Lease, 140 - Naval blockade of Korean coast, 41 - - - _Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 48 - - Valmy, Battle of, 7 - - Van Orman, LtCol Ellsworth G., 91 - - Vasilev, LtGen, Russian, 22, 23 - - Vladivostok, 4, 21 - Occupation of by Japan, 8 - - - Waegwan, 67, 96 - - Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 45, 57, 62, 65–67, 70, 88, 89, 91, 92, - 100, 104, 174 - - Wang Yun, Col, NKPA, 29 - - Wang Yun, MajGen, NKPA, 29 - - Washington, D. C., 48, 49, 52, 58 - - Washington, University of, 52 - - Weapons: - enemy: - antitank guns, 117, 131, 132, 137, 192, 222 - automatic weapons, 131 - “burp guns,” 113. _See also_ automatic weapons - hand grenades, 120, 183 - howitzers, 122-mm, 207 - machineguns, 117, 124, 131, 135, 182–184 - machinegun, 7.62-mm., 30 - mortar, 111 - mortar, 120-mm., 230 - rifle, 85-mm., 30, 193, 221 - self-propelled guns, 76-mm., 29 - semiautomatic pistol, Tokarev, 21 - small arms, 140, 155, 216, 224 - tanks, Russian-made, 16 - tank, T-34, 21, 30, 45, 46, 63, 162 _pic._, 175, 193, 208, 216, - 221, 222, 228, 234 - United States: - guns, 20-mm., 140 - guns, 75-mm., 46 - guns, 90-mm., 50, 132, 137, 192, 193, 203, 222 - howitzers, 105-mm., 46, 50, 55, 126, 139, 171 _pic._, 182, 240 - howitzers, 155-mm., 46 - machineguns, .50-caliber, 143 - mortars, 60-mm., 114, 116, 131, 135, 153, 182, 197, 236 - mortars, 81-mm., 117, 155, 184, 197, 200, 206, 220, 230, 235, 236 - mortar, 4.2-inch, 105, 155, 184 - rifle, 75-mm. recoilless, 104, 183, 193, 204, 219, 221 - rifle, M-1, 238 - rockets, air, 168 _pic._ - rocket, 2.36″, 194 - rocket, 5-inch, 47 - rocket launchers, 3.5″, 46, 52, 153 - tanks, 143, 157 _pic._, 160 _pic._, 167 - tanks, light, 46, 150, 151 - tanks, M-24, 43 - tanks, M-26 “Pershing,” 50, 63, 93, 129, 137, 144, 163 _pic._, - 192, 193, 203, 217, 219, 222, 234, 235 - tanks, M4A3 medium, 50 - supporting arms, 171 _pic._ - - Weir, Col Kenneth H., 56_n_, 62_n_, 87, 89, 95 - - Westerman, 1stLt Jack, 132, 135 - - Whampoa Military Academy, 23, 24 - - Wheatley, SSgt John I., 121 - - White, Sgt Bryan K., 225 - - _Whiteside_ (AKA), USS, 53 - - Williams, 2dLt John O., 120, 121, 203 - - Winter, 2dLt Robert M., 217, 219, 222 - - Wirth, 2dLt Leroy K., 116, 182, 189 - - “Wolfhounds.” _See_ 27th Infantry Regiment - - Wonsan, 21 - - Wood, LtCol Ransom H., 51, 94, 126, 178 - - World War I, 7, 10, 52, 53 - Armistice ending, 8 - - World War II, 1, 8, 10, 13, 19, 24–26, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 50–54, 56, - 109, 140, 173 - - Wright, MSgt Edward A., 190 - - Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 56, 62, 211 - - - Yaban-san, 105, 112, 117, 119 - - Yalta: - conference, 2 - agreement, 8 - - Yalu River, 4, 21, 42, 47; - battle of, 7 - - Yellow Sea, 41, 98 - - Yenan, 19, 23, 25; - Military School, 23, 25 - - Yonchon, 39 - - Yongdok, 96 - - Yongdungpo, 38, 96 - - Yongsan, 164 _pic._, 174, 175, 196, 212, 216, 217, 222, 237 - - Yosu, 97 - - Young, 2dLt James R., 230 - - Yugoslavia, 38 - - Yu Kyong Su, LtGen, NKPA, 25 - - - Zimmer, Capt Andrew M., 116, 116_n_, 117, 117_n_, 129_n_, 131, 132, - 181, 181_n_, 182, 183, 189, 189_n_ - - - - - SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED - STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT SET BY PHOTO - COMPOSITION IN 12-POINT GARAMOND AND PRINTED ON MAX-OPAQUE VELLUM - STOCK BY DEEP-ETCH OFFSET. - - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government - Printing Office - Washington 25, D. C. - Price $2 - -[Illustration: (Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)] - -[Illustration: THE PUSAN PERIMETER - -AUG.-SEP. 1950 - -GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES] - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page -references. - -When illustrations had no captions or useful headings that could -be used as captions, Transcriber added them and placed them in -parentheses, usually by copying them from the List of Illustrations on -page ix. Those parenthetical captions will be visible only in versions -of this eBook that do not display the actual illustrations. - -The first two maps are identical to the last two maps. - -Footnote 265, originally footnote 7 on page 148: “18 May 5” was printed -that way, with an incomplete year. - -Footnote 278, originally footnote 6 on page 176: “Plan 13-60” was -printed that way. All other Plans are numbered as “nn-50”, so this may -be a misprint. - -Page 245: Transcriber added “BuAer” and “LSD” to the Glossary. - -Page 266: “Ground,” an index entry following “Marine Helicopter -Squadron (Experimental)” under “Marines,” did not include a page -reference. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME I (OF 5) *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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