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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-14 18:11:25 -0700 |
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diff --git a/64943-h/64943-h.htm b/64943-h/64943-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ad4aeb --- /dev/null +++ b/64943-h/64943-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,36383 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> + <title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 10 by Various</title> + <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg"/> + <meta name="cover" content="images/cover.jpg" /> + <meta name="DC.Title" content="Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 10"/> + <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Various"/> + <meta name="DC.Language" content="en"/> + <meta name="DC.Created" content="1947"/> + <meta name="DC.Subject" content="Law"/> + <meta name="DC.date.issued" content="1947"/> + <meta name="Tags" content="World War II, Germany, law, non-fiction"/> + <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Project Gutenberg"/> + <meta name="generator" content="fpgen 4.63a"/> + <meta name="Series" content="The Blue Series [10]"/> + <style type="text/css"> + body { margin-left:8%;margin-right:10%; } + .pageno { right: 1%; font-size: x-small; background-color: inherit; color: silver; + text-indent: 0em; text-align: right; position: absolute; + border:1px solid silver; padding:1px 3px; font-style:normal; + font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration:none; } + .pageno:after { color: gray; content: attr(title); } + .it { font-style:italic; } + .gesp { letter-spacing:0.2em; } + p { text-indent:0; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; + text-align: justify; } + div.lgc { } + div.lgc p { text-align:center; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0; } + h1 { + text-align:center; + font-weight:normal; + page-break-before: always; + font-size:1.2em; margin:2em auto 1em auto + } + + h2 { + text-align:center; + font-weight:normal; + font-size:1.1em; + margin:1em auto 0.5em auto; + } + + h3 { + text-align:center; + font-weight:normal; + font-size:1.0em; + margin:1em auto 0.5em auto; + page-break-after:avoid; + } + + hr.tbk100{ border:none; border-bottom:2px solid black; width:40%; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; text-align:center; margin-left:30%; margin-right:30% } + hr.tbk101{ border:none; border-bottom:2px solid black; width:40%; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; text-align:center; margin-left:30%; margin-right:30% } + hr.pbk { border:none; border-bottom:1px solid silver; width:100%; margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:2em } + .figcenter { + text-align:center; + margin:1em auto; + page-break-inside: avoid; + } + + div.blockquote { margin:1em 2em; text-align:justify; } + .nobreak { page-break-before: avoid; } + p.line { text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0; } + table { page-break-inside: avoid; } + table.center { margin:0.5em auto; border-collapse: collapse; padding:3px; } + table.flushleft { margin:0.5em 0em; border-collapse: collapse; padding:3px; } + table.left { margin:0.5em 1.2em; border-collapse: collapse; padding:3px; } + .tab1c1 { } + .tab1c2 { } + .tab1c3 { } + .tab1c1-col3 { border-right: 0px solid black; } + .tdStyle0 { + padding: 0px 5px; text-align:center; vertical-align:top; + } + .tdStyle1 { + padding: 0px 5px; text-align:left; vertical-align:top; + } + .tdStyle2 { + padding: 0px 5px; text-align:right; vertical-align:top; + } + .pindent { margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0; text-indent:1.5em; } + .noindent { margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0; text-indent:0; } + .hang { padding-left:1.5em; text-indent:-1.5em; } + .literal-container { text-align:center; margin:0 0; } + .literal { display:inline-block; text-align:left; } + </style> + <style type="text/css"> + h1 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; line-height:150%; margin-top:4em;} + h2 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center;} + h3 {font-size:.9em; text-align:center; margin-bottom:1em; margin-top:1em;} + .literal-container { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } + div.lgc { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } + p { text-indent:0; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; text-align: justify; } + div.blockquote { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em; } + .pindent {margin-top: 0.2em; margin-bottom: 0em; text-indent:2em; } + body { margin-left:8%; margin-right:10%; max-width:40em;} + </style> + </head> + <body> +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.1em; font-weight:bold; margin-bottom:1em;'> +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 10, by Various +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> + +<div style='display:table;margin-bottom:1em;margin-top:1em;'> + <div style='display:table-row;'> + <div style='display:table-cell;padding-right:0.5em;'>Title:</div> + <div style='display:table-cell;'>Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 10</div> + </div> + <div style='display:table-row;'> + <div style='display:table-cell;padding-right:0.5em;'></div> + <div style='display:table-cell;'>Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946</div> + </div> +</div> + <div style='display:table-row;'> + <div style='display:table-cell;padding-right:0.5em;'>Author: </div> + <div style='display:table-cell;'>Various</div> + </div> +<div style='height:10px'></div> +<div style='margin-bottom:1em;'> +Release Date: Mar 27, 2021 [eBook #64943] +</div> + +<div style='margin-bottom:1em;'> +Language: English +</div> + +<div style='display:table;margin-bottom:1em;'> + <div style='display:table-row;'> + <div style='display:table-cell;vertical-align:top;'>Produced by: </div> + <div style='display:table-cell;'>John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online Project Gutenberg team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<div style='margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:1.5em;'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG BOOK OF TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 10 ***</div> + +<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> +<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> +</div> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<div class='figcenter'> +<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/> +</div> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:4em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1947</span></p> +</div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p> +</div></div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<p class='line'>VOLUME X</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<hr class='tbk100'/> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<hr class='tbk101'/> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>25 March 1946—6 April 1946</p> +</div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'> +<colgroup> +<col span='1' style='width: 6em;'/> +<col span='1' style='width: 17.5em;'/> +<col span='1' style='width: 2.5em;'/> +</colgroup> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle0' colspan='3'><span style='font-size:larger'>CONTENTS</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninetieth Day, Monday, 25 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_34'>34</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-first Day, Tuesday, 26 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_75'>75</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_90'>90</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-second Day, Wednesday, 27 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_119'>119</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_156'>156</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-third Day, Thursday, 28 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_184'>184</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_196'>196</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-fourth Day, Friday, 29 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_230'>230</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_255'>255</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-fifth Day, Saturday, 30 March 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_279'>279</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-sixth Day, Monday, 1 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_311'>311</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_346'>346</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-seventh Day, Tuesday, 2 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_395'>395</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_433'>433</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-eighth Day, Wednesday, 3 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_466'>466</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_480'>480</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>Ninety-ninth Day, Thursday, 4 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_508'>508</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_535'>535</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundredth Day, Friday, 5 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_556'>556</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_583'>583</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and First Day, Saturday, 6 April 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_617'>617</a></td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETIETH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 25 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Court: +the Defendants Streicher and Ribbentrop are absent from this +session.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): +Dr. Seidl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Mr. President, +Your Honors, on Friday last I stated that I would not read anything +from the first volume of the document book; that does not mean, +however, that I should not like to refer to one or another document +in my final speech. The question now arises whether, under these +circumstances, documents to which I may refer, but which I will +not read now should be submitted as evidence to the Court, or +whether it is sufficient if these documents are copied down in the +book. I would be grateful if the Court would help me regarding +this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the +United Kingdom): My Lord, I have a suggestion to make: That the +Tribunal take these documents <span class='it'>de bene esse</span> at the moment, and that +when Dr. Seidl comes to make his final speech, then any point as to +admissibility can be discussed. With regard to the third book, for +example, that consists of a number of opinions of various politicians +and economists in various countries. The Prosecution will, in due +course, submit that these have no evidential value and in fact relate +to a matter too remote to be relevant. But I should have thought the +convenient course would have been to discuss that when we find +what ultimate use Dr. Seidl makes of the documents, at the moment +letting them go in, as I suggest, <span class='it'>de bene esse</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal think that you should +offer the documents in evidence now, and that they should be numbered +consecutively. Probably the best way would be with the letter +“H” in front of them—H Number 1 and so on—and that then, as Sir +David says, as they are being offered all together, objection, if +necessary, can be taken to them at a later stage—objection on the +ground of admissibility or relevance. +<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'> DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn once more to Volume I of the +document book. The first document is a speech made by the Defendant +Rudolf Hess on 8 July 1934. This document will bear the +Number H-1, Page 23 of the document book. The second document +can be found on Page 27 of the document book...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. To what issue has +this speech got relevance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The speech of 8 July 1934?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, it is the one on Page 23. It is +8 July 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, this speech deals with the question +of war and peace. Since the Defendant Hess is accused of +having participated in the psychological preparation of aggressive +war, and thus also of being a participant in the conspiracy, it seems +to me that the attitude of the Defendant Hess toward the question +of war is of considerable importance as regards evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will allow you to read it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to read the speech +now. I only want to bring up the speech as an exhibit so as to be +able to refer to it in my final speech, if necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I shall read nothing at all from the first document +book. I shall only mention certain documents as exhibits.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 28 of the document book. This is another speech +by the Defendant Hess, delivered on 27 November 1934. The number +of this exhibit will be H-2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The speech of 8 December 1934 begins on +Page 27.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Page 27, that is right. It was marked here incorrectly. +As the third exhibit I submit a speech—that is to say, an +excerpt from a speech—of 17 November 1935, Page 31 of the document +book, Exhibit Number H-3.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 32 of the document book, an excerpt from a +speech of 11 October 1936, Exhibit Number H-4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then comes a speech of 14 March 1936, Page 33 of the document +book, Exhibit Number H-5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next exhibit is on Page 35 of the document book, a speech +of 21 March 1936, Exhibit Number H-6.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number H-7 is a speech on Page 36 of the document +book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number H-8 is a speech of 6 June 1936, on Page 40 of +the document book. +<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, I turn to Page 43 of the document book, a speech at the +Reichsparteitag in Nuremberg 1936, Exhibit Number H-9.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There follow excerpts of a speech on Page 59 of the document +book, Exhibit Number H-10.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A speech of 14 May 1938 at Stockholm is found on Page 70 of +the document book, Exhibit Number H-11.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next exhibit is on Page 78 of the document book, Exhibit +Number H-12.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>So much for the first volume of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I pass on to the second volume, to the affidavit which I submitted +last Friday. It can be found on Page 164 of the document book. It +is an affidavit made by the former Secretary, Hildegard Fath, and +it will bear the Exhibit Number H-13.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next exhibit is on Page 86 of the document book, Volume 2, +a decree of 3 June 1936, Exhibit Number H-14.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And now I come to the point where I shall read certain excerpts +from the minutes of the meeting between the Defendant Hess and +Lord Simon, which took place on 10 June 1941. These minutes begin +on Page 93 of the document book. The minutes will have the Exhibit +Number H-15.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, the Defendant Hess, on 10 May 1941, flew to England. +Nobody except his then adjutant, Hitsch, knew of this flight. +The Führer himself was informed about the flight and the intentions +connected therewith in a letter which was delivered to the +Führer after Hess had already landed in England. After his arrival +in England Hess was frequently questioned by officials of the Foreign +Office, and, as already mentioned, a meeting took place between him +and Lord Simon on 10 June 1941. This meeting lasted two hours +and a half. In the course of this meeting the Defendant Hess told +Lord Simon the reasons for his extraordinary undertaking and he +then submitted four proposals, or four points, which he claimed +would give the intentions of Adolf Hitler, and which he considered +to be the basis for an understanding and a conclusion of peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>For the conference Lord Simon assumed a pseudonym; in the +minutes which were given to the Defendant Hess shortly after the +meeting, he is referred to as Dr. Guthrie.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as I know, this measure was probably taken to prevent +the stenographers or the translators from knowing at once +what it was all about. In the minutes mention is also made of +a Dr. Mackenzie, an official of the Foreign Office, and of Mr. Kirkpatrick, +who had previously already spoken with the Defendant Hess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After a few introductory remarks by Lord Simon, the Defendant +Hess began to explain the reasons which led him to take his singular +step, and I quote liberally from Page 93 of the document book, +<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span> +about the middle of the page. I must add that in the minutes, the +Defendant Hess is referred to by the name “J.” The Defendant Hess, +after the introductory remarks, said the following...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, there seems to be a typographical +error, probably in the date. The date is given as the 9th of August. +You said the 10th of June, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: 10 June, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this a mistake at the top of Page 93—9. 8. 41?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: On the cover of the document there is the following +remark: “Minutes of the conversation which took place on 9 June +1941 somewhere in England.” On the inside of the document, there +is also the entry 9. 6. 41; so there must obviously be a typographical +error here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it must have been. They put “8” instead +of “6.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>DR. SEIDL: “I know that probably nobody has correctly +understood my coming; but in view of the extraordinary step +that I have taken, that can by no means be expected. Therefore +I would like to begin by explaining how I came to +do this.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I continue on Page 94:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The idea came to me in June of last year, during the time +of the French campaign, while visiting the Führer....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe I may omit the following incidental remarks and continue +quoting further:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I must admit that I came to the Führer convinced, as we all +were, that sooner or later in the end we would surely conquer +England, and I expressed the opinion to the Führer that we +must naturally demand from England the restitution of +property—such as the equivalent of our merchant fleet, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>—which had been taken from us by the Versailles +Treaty.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 95:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer then immediately contradicted me. He was of +the opinion that the war could possibly be an occasion for +coming to an agreement with England for which he had +striven ever since he had been politically active. To this I can +testify, that ever since I have known the Führer, since 1921, +<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span> +the Führer has always said that an agreement between Germany +and England had to be achieved. He said he would bring +this about as soon as he was in power. He told me at that +time in France that one should not impose any severe conditions, +even if victorious, on a country with which one desired +to come to an agreement. Then I conceived the idea that if +this were known in England, it might be possible that England +also might be ready for an agreement.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn now to Page 96 of the document book.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Then, at the conclusion of the French campaign came the +Führer’s offer to England. The offer, as is known, was refused. +This made me all the more firm in my belief that under these +circumstances I had to execute my plan. During the subsequent +period came the air war between Germany and England, +which, on the whole, meant heavier losses and damages +for England than for Germany. Consequently, I had the +impression that England could not give in at all without +suffering considerable loss of prestige. That is why I said to +myself, ‘Now I must realize my plan all the more, for if I +were over in England, England could be enabled to take up +negotiations with Germany without loss of prestige.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn now to Page 97 of the document book. After a short incidental +remark by Dr. Mackenzie, Hess continued:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I was of the opinion that, apart from the question of the +terms for an agreement, there would be still in England a +certain general distrust to overcome. I must confess that I +faced a very grave decision, the gravest in my life, of course, +and I believe I was aided by continuously keeping before my +inner vision the picture of an endless row of children’s coffins +with the mothers weeping behind them on the German side +as well as on the English side...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you got the original document +there before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Might it be handed up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the President.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>DR. SEIDL: “...and vice versa, the coffins of mothers with +the children behind them.</p> + +<p>“I want to mention certain points which, I believe, have a certain +importance from the psychological point of view. I must +go back a bit. After Germany’s defeat in the World War, the +<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span> +Versailles Treaty was imposed on her, and no serious historian +is today still of the opinion that Germany was responsible for +the World War. Lloyd George has said that the nations +stumbled into the war. I recently read an English historian, +Farrar, who wrote about Edward VII and his policy at that +time. This historian, Farrar, lays the main guilt for the war, +on the policies of Edward VII. After her collapse Germany +had this treaty imposed upon her, which was not only a +frightful calamity for Germany but also for the whole world. +All attempts of politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before +the Führer came to power—that is to say, when Germany was +a pure democracy—to obtain any sort of relief failed.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I forego the reading of the following part of the minutes literally. +A conversation followed on various points. Among other things the +subject of the conversation then was the air strength of Germany at +that time and the preparations with regard to the building of +U-boats. I do not believe that these questions are relevant in the +present connection, and so I shall turn at once to that part of the +minutes where mention is made of the proposals which Hess made +to Lord Simon. This is on Page 152 of the document book. From +the minutes we can see that Hess had previously written down +the proposals which he wanted to submit. He gave these notes to +Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Kirkpatrick, who then read and translated +them, and now I quote on Page 152, at the bottom of the page, +literally:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“Basis for an understanding.” And here I have to ask the Tribunal +to turn from Page 152 of the document book to Page 159 of +the document book because the first point in the proposal obviously +has been presented in the wrong fashion. On Page 159, about the +middle of the page, there is a statement by Dr. Mackenzie which +expresses the first point correctly, and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England, +the limits of the spheres of interest should be defined. +The sphere of interest of the Axis is Europe, and England’s +sphere of interest is the Empire.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask now that you turn back, namely to Page 153 of the document +book. Here we find on the last line the second point of the +proposals which Hess made. Dr. Mackenzie is reading:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“2. Return of German Colonies.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 154 of the document book and begin to quote at +the top of the page—it is possible that the figure “2” is inadvertently +repeated here in the document book. It should be:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“3. Indemnification of German citizens who before or during +the war had their residence within the British Empire, and +who suffered damage to life and property through measures +<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span> +of a Government of the Empire or as a result of pillage, riot, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>; indemnification of British subjects by Germany on +the same basis.</p> + +<p>“4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the +same time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there is a personal remark by Hess as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer in our conversation repeatedly presented these +points to me in general as the basis for an understanding with +England.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I shall not read any further excerpts from these minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I forego the reading of the other passages marked in red. The +conference was terminated by a statement made by Lord Simon to +the effect that he would bring the proposals made by Hess to the +knowledge of the British Government. That was Exhibit Number H-15.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, the Defendant Rudolf Hess is accused in the Indictment +of helping the Nazi conspirators to seize power and of furthering +the military, economic, and psychological preparations for +the war as mentioned under Count One of the Indictment; of participating +in the political planning and preparation of aggressive wars +and of war in violation of international treaties, agreements and +promises, as mentioned in Counts One and Two, and of participating +in the preparation and planning of foreign political plans of the +Nazi conspirators as listed under Count One.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That accusation is the nucleus of the Indictment against Rudolf +Hess. It is therefore my duty to discuss also briefly in evidence the +circumstances which in 1939 led to the outbreak of war. In that +respect I have the following to say:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 23 August 1939, at Moscow a non-aggression pact was concluded +between Germany and the Soviet Union, which has already +been submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit GB-145 (Document +TC-25). On the same day, that is to say but 1 week before the +outbreak of the war and 3 days before the planned attack on Poland, +these two nations made another secret agreement. This secret agreement +essentially contained the definition of the spheres of interest +of both nations within the European territory lying between Germany +and the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you are not forgetting, are you, the +Tribunal’s ruling that this is not the opportunity for making a +speech, but simply the occasion for introducing documents and +calling witnesses. You will have the opportunity of making your +speech at a later stage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I do not intend to make a speech, but +I intend to say a few introductory words on a document which I +shall submit to the Tribunal. +<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Germany, in the secret documents, declared herself disinterested +in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we have not yet seen the document. +If you are going to put in the document, put in the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I can submit the document at once. It +is an affidavit of the former ambassador, Dr. Friedrich Gaus. In the +year 1939 he was the Chief of the Legal Department of the Foreign +Office. He was present at the negotiations as the assistant of the +then German plenipotentiary in Moscow, and it was he who drafted +the non-aggression pact which has already been submitted as an +exhibit, as well as the secret agreement, the contents of which I +want to submit now to the Tribunal as facts which are important +as evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you hand in the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Surely. However, I intend to read parts of this document +later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal does not quite understand +what this document is, because it is not included in your +document book and it does not appear that you made any application +for it or made any reference to it, and it is in German; it is not +translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, when I prepared the document book +for the Defendant Hess, I did not as yet have this affidavit in my +possession. It dates from 15 March 1946. At that time, when the +relevancy of the applications for Defendant Hess were discussed, I +had as yet no definite knowledge of the context which would have +enabled me to make a proper application. The excerpts which I +intend to read from this document are short, and it will be possible +to have them translated immediately by the interpreters present +here in the courtroom.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy for the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Surely, a German copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that would not be any use to me. +I do not know whether it is to all the members of the Prosecution. +Have the Prosecuting Counsel any objection to passages being read +from this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): +Mr. President, I did not know about the existence of this document, +and I therefore strenuously object to having it read into the record. +I would wish that the procedure established by the Tribunal be +observed by the Defense. The Prosecution, in the past, when +presenting its evidence invariably presented copies of these documents +to the Defense Counsel. Counsel for Hess is now presenting +<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span> +a completely unknown document, and the Prosecution, with every +reason, would like to familiarize itself with this document beforehand. +I do not know what secrets or what secret agreements Counsel +for the Defense is talking about and on what facts he is basing his +statements. I would therefore, to say the least, define them as +unfounded. I request that this document should not be read into the +record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecutor for the Soviet Union states that he +has no knowledge of the existence of this secret document which +shall be established by this affidavit. Under these circumstances I +am compelled to move that Foreign Commissar Molotov of the +Soviet Union be called as a witness, so that it can be established, +firstly whether this agreement was actually concluded, secondly, +what the contents of this agreement are, and thirdly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the first thing for you to do is to +have a translation of this document made, and until you have a +translation of this document made, the Tribunal is not prepared to +hear you upon it. We do not know what the document contains.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: As to what the document contains, I already wanted +to explain that before. In the document there is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear from +you what the document contains. We want to see the document +itself and see it in English and also in Russian. I do not mean, of +course, you have to do it yourself, Dr. Seidl. If you would furnish +this copy to the Prosecution they will have it translated into the +various languages and then, after that has been done, we can +reconsider the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn then to another document, the +reading of which can certainly raise no objections, because it is a +document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It +is the address made by the Führer to the Commanders-in-Chief of +the Armed Forces on 22 August 1939. It was submitted by the +Prosecution of the Soviet Union as 798-PS and as Exhibit Number +US-29. I quote from Page 6 of the German photostat: “Thereupon +Hitler declared...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or +not, I mean just for convenience?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The document was already submitted by the Prosecution +in full.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean it is not here. I have not got the +document before me. It is not in your document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, it is not in the document book because the Court +has already ruled that each defendant’s counsel has the right to +<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span> +refer to any document which has already been submitted by the +Prosecution. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...I have gradually brought about a change in our attitude +towards Russia. In connection with the trade agreement, we +got into a political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression +pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four +days ago I took a special step which had as a result that +Russia answered yesterday she was ready for settlement. +Personal contact with Stalin has been established. Von +Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty the day after tomorrow. +Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her to be.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>End of the quotation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, Gentlemen: I had now the intention to call the +witness Bohle who has already been approved by the Tribunal. The +Defendant Hess, however, has asked me to forego the personal +appearance of that witness and read an affidavit concerning the +facts of evidence in reference to which the witness was to be heard.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have prepared such an affidavit, and undoubtedly it would +accelerate the proceedings if the Tribunal would permit the reading +of this affidavit. If however, the Tribunal should have the opinion +that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the opportunity +of seeing the affidavit. As previously advised, if the witness covers +the ground for which he was asked, I should want him for cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is the witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: He is here. With the permission of the Tribunal I +would like to call the witness Bohle now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to call him or to read his +affidavit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed; since Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe apparently +protests against the reading of the affidavit, I would like to +call the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not seen the affidavit, of +course, My Lord, so at the moment, as I say, if the affidavit covers +the ground that the witness should speak upon, then I shall want +to cross-examine him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Unless the Prosecution are agreeable that the +affidavit should be put in, the witness must be called, but if the +Prosecution are agreeable to the affidavit being read and then the +witness presented for cross-examination, the Tribunal is quite willing +that it should be done. +<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not mind that in the least, +My Lord. Of course, I am in slight difficulty not knowing what is +in the affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be for the +Tribunal to have a 10-minute adjournment now, and you could perhaps +just see what is in the affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a pleasure, My Lord.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal did not wish to hurry counsel, +but we thought we had better get on with other witnesses, and this +document can be translated and considered and possibly dealt with +after the main adjournment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have +not had the chance of reading the translation. A preliminary view +of the affidavit convinced my staff that it was not of very great +importance, and I was going to consider whether the quickest way +might be to let the affidavit be read, if the Tribunal would then +permit me to read three documents which I was going to put in +cross-examination to the witness. That might be more convenient +than to take the course which Your Lordship suggests, of waiting +until we have seen the full affidavit and then consider what would +be the best way to deal with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have perhaps seen part of the document, +and you can perhaps judge better which would be the more +convenient course. Whichever you think more convenient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am quite content if +Dr. Seidl reads it, but it would have to be on the terms that the +documents which I was going to put in cross-examination to the +witness are read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he had better be called.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes; Dr. Seidl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If I understood the High Tribunal correctly, they +do not wish to have the affidavit read but to have the witness interrogated +before the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the affidavit has been translated, +and the Prosecution have had an opportunity of considering +it, they can let us know whether they think it will be better to +treat the affidavit as the examination of the witness, and he must +<span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span> +then be produced here for the purpose of cross-examination unless +you prefer to examine him orally yourself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I believe that under these circumstances it would be +best to call the witness immediately to the witness stand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Bohle took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>ERNST WILHELM BOHLE (Witness): Ernst Wilhelm Bohle.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were ultimately the leader of the Auslands-Organisation +of the NSDAP? Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You were also State Secretary of the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd of the American Prosecution +just made the suggestion that, in order to save time, it might be +possible to follow the same procedure as in the case of witness +Blaha, that is, first of all, to read the affidavit in the presence of +the witness and then afterwards hear him in cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL [<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>]: You made an affidavit +which I shall now read to you. Concerning the matter:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1. The Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP was founded +on 1 May 1931 at Hamburg upon suggestion of some Germans +abroad. Gregor Strasser, Reich Organization Chief at the time, +appointed as its leader the NSDAP Member of the Reichstag, +Dr. Hans Nieland.</p> + +<p>“I myself became a volunteer assistant of the Auslands-Organisation +in December 1931 and was taken into the Party on +1 March 1932. On 8 May 1933 Dr. Nieland resigned as leader +of the Auslands-Organisation, having become in the meantime +a member of the Hamburg Government and also, as a German +who had always stayed at home, being less interested in questions +concerning Germans abroad. On account of my experience—and +my connections abroad—I was born in England and +raised in South Africa—I was charged with the leadership of +the Auslands-Organisation.</p> + +<p>“2. The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was, upon the +assumption of power, to hold together in an organized way +<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span> +the approximately 3,300 Party members living outside the +boundaries of Germany at the time of the seizure of power. +Further, through it Germans abroad, who could have only a +vague idea of the political happenings at home, were to be +taught the philosophy and the political program of the new +state.</p> + +<p>“3. Only German nationals could become members of the Party. +The acceptance of foreigners or former Germans who had +acquired citizenship in another state was strictly prohibited.</p> + +<p>“4. The guiding principle of the Auslands-Organisation of the +Party concerning its attitude to foreign countries was found +on the Ausland pass of every German national who was a +member of the Party, in the following passage: ‘Observe the +laws of the country whose guest you are. Let the citizens of +the country in which you stay take care of their internal +politics; do not interfere in these matters, not even by way of +conversation.’</p> + +<p>“This principle was basic for the work and the attitude of the +Auslands-Organisation with respect to foreign countries from +the day of its founding up to its end. I myself referred to this +in many public speeches, and in so doing coined, among others, +the phrase: ‘The National Socialist honors foreign folkdom +because he loves his own.’</p> + +<p>“My speeches in Porchester Hall in London on 2 October 1937 +and in Budapest at the end of January 1938 give a comprehensive +picture of the attitude of the Auslands-Organisation of +the NSDAP toward foreign countries.</p> + +<p>“Winston Churchill in the late summer of 1937 repeatedly +attacked the activity of the Auslands-Organisation in newspaper +articles, and in his well-known article, ‘Friendship with +Germany,’ in the London <span class='it'>Evening Standard</span> of 17 September +1937, designated it as an encumbrance on German-English +relations. In the same article he said that he was ready to +converse with me in the most cordial manner about this question. +The German Embassy in London informed the Foreign +Office at that time that a question by Churchill in the House +of Commons regarding the activity of the Auslands-Organisation +would be extremely undesirable. As a result a meeting +between Churchill and myself was advocated as urgent. This +took place on the day of my speech to the Reich Germans in +London, in Winston Churchill’s London home, and lasted more +than an hour. I had ample opportunity in this thoroughly +cordial conversation to describe the activity of the Auslands-Organisation +and to dispel his misgivings. At the end he accompanied +me to my car and let himself be photographed with +<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span> +me, in order, as he said, to show the world that we were +parting as friends. There was no inquiry in the House of +Commons. From that day Churchill never uttered a word of +objection again about the activity of the Auslands-Organisation. +My speech of the same date, which was published +shortly afterwards in English in pamphlet form by an English +concern, was very favorably received. <span class='it'>The Times</span> published +from it a lengthy excerpt under the heading ‘Herr Bohle’s Plea +for an Understanding.’ After this conversation Churchill wrote +me a letter in which he voiced his satisfaction with the result +of our conversation.</p> + +<p>“6. In the trial of the murderer of the Landesgruppenleiter of +the Auslands-Organisation in Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff, +which was held in a Swiss court at Chur in 1936, the legality +of the activity of the Auslands-Organisation was the subject +of investigation by the court. The Defendant, David Frankfurter, +was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. From what +I remember, I can say that the Swiss authorities, who were in +no way friendly to Nazis, had to testify that Gustloff and the +Landesgruppen of the Auslands-Organisation had never in +any way given reason for complaint with regard to their +activity. The testimony of Federal Councillor Baumann, who, +to my knowledge, was then Minister of the Interior and of the +Police in Switzerland, was at that time decisive.</p> + +<p>“7. I should further like to point out in this connection that +also after the outbreak of the war the Landesgruppen of the +Auslands-Organisation in neutral countries continued to function +until the end of the war. That is especially true of +Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal.</p> + +<p>“From 1943 on, at the latest, the Reich would hardly have been +able to take any steps against suppression, if the Auslands-Organisation +had come into conflict with the internal laws of +these countries; and suppression would have been the inevitable +result.</p> + +<p>“8. Aside from the indisputable legality of the Auslands-Organisation, +as its leader I have repeatedly expressed the +idea that the Auslandsdeutschen (Germans abroad) would +certainly be the last people who would let themselves be +misused as warmongers or as conspirators against the peace. +From bitter experience they knew that with the outbreak of +the war they would face at once internment, persecution, confiscation +of property, and destruction of their economic existence.</p> + +<p>“9. As a result of the knowledge of the situation abroad, no +one knew better than the Auslandsdeutschen that any activity +<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span> +in the sense of a Fifth Column would be just as foolish as +detrimental to the interests of the Reich. To my knowledge, +moreover, the expression ‘Fifth Column’ can be traced back +to the Spanish Civil War. It is in any case a foreign invention. +When Franco attacked Madrid with four columns of troops, it +was asserted that a Fifth Column consisting of nationalist +elements was doing its seditious work underground within the +besieged city.</p> + +<p>“10. There is no basis whatsoever for applying the term ‘Fifth +Column’ to the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. If this +assertion were true, it would mean that members of the Auslands-Organisation +working together with local oppositional +elements in one or more foreign countries had been delegated, +or had by themselves tried, to undermine this state from +within. Any such assertion would be pure invention.</p> + +<p>“11. Neither from the former Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf +Hess, nor from me, as the leader of the Auslands-Organisation, +has this organization or members of this organization +in any way received orders the execution of which might +be considered as Fifth Column activity. Even Hitler himself +never gave me any directive in that respect. In summary, +I can say that the Auslands-Organisation at no time, as +long as I was its leader, displayed any activity in the sense +of a Fifth Column. Never did the Deputy of the Führer give +orders or directives to the Auslands-Organisation which +might have led to such activity. On the contrary, Rudolf +Hess most urgently desired that members of the Auslands-Organisation +should under no circumstances take part in the +internal affairs of the country in which they were living +as guests.</p> + +<p>“12. Of course, it is known that just as citizens of the +then enemy countries, so also Germans were employed in +the espionage and intelligence services abroad. This activity +had however nothing at all to do with membership in the +Auslands-Organisation. In order not to imperil the existence +of the Auslands-Organisation groups, which worked legally +and entirely in the open, I constantly demanded that members +of the Auslands-Organisation would not be used for such +purposes or that I should previously be given the opportunity +to relieve them of their functions within the Auslands-Organisation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And that is the end of the statement of the witness Bohle. For +the moment I have no questions to ask the witness, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to +ask the witness any questions? +<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): I +would like to put several questions to this witness, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I represent the Defendant Von Schirach, the former +leader of the German Youth. Therefore the following would interest +me: Did the Hitler Youth (HJ) also exist in foreign countries or +only in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The Hitler Youth existed among German nationals in +foreign countries also.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please tell me whether this HJ, the Hitler +Youth abroad, was subject to the political directives of the competent +Landesleiter of the Auslands-Organisation, or is that +not right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, the Hitler Youth abroad was politically under +the control of the Hoheitsträger of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Once in the course of the proceedings the assertion +was made that members of the Hitler Youth were trained +for service as agents and for espionage work abroad and also +were used for these purposes. Specific facts, that is, specific +instances, were certainly not mentioned, but only a general assertion +was made, and it was also asserted that Hitler Youth abroad +were even used as paratroopers, that is, that they had been trained +at home as paratroopers in order to be used abroad in this capacity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the assertion which I submit to you, and I now ask +to have your opinion on this, whether, on the basis of your knowledge +as the competent leader of the Auslands-Organisation, +something like that did occur or whether anything like that was +at all possible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I would like to say the following in reply: I consider +it entirely out of the question that members of the Hitler Youth +abroad were misused in this way. I can assert that so much the +more since I know I would have heard anything to the contrary +from the leaders of the Party in the various foreign countries. +I know also nothing at all about the training of the Hitler Youth +as paratroopers or anything similar. I consider these assertions +as absolutely pure invention.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then I may assume, as the result of your testimony, +that things of that sort on the basis of the entire organization +would certainly have come to your knowledge, if something +like that had occurred or perhaps even only had been planned; +is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then, Witness, I have a last question:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Here in the courtroom a further assertion was also made about +the HJ, that is, about the Hitler Youth. It has been asserted that +<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span> +at Lvov it once happened that the Hitler Youth or members of +the Hitler Youth had used little children as targets. Also in this +report no details of course were given, but only the assertion +was made. The following would interest me:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As you know the Hitler Youth had, I believe, a membership +toward the end of about 7 to 8 million.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, does that have anything to do +with the Auslands-Organisation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, it does insofar as my client, the Defendant +Von Schirach, is charged with the fact that the Hitler Youth abroad +committed such atrocities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It was not suggested that they did this +abroad, was it—that Hitler Youth ever used children as targets +abroad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, indeed, it was said that at Lvov, in the +Government General, not in Germany, but in Lvov, which means +abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean after the war began?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought this witness was speaking about +the same organization before the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I do not know whether he was also talking about +the Auslands-Organisation during the war. But in any case, +Mr. President, the witness knows these facts, for he was the head +of the Auslands-Organisation. Therefore this witness seems to me +especially qualified to give us information on these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we are very far from +the point, but you can go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President, for otherwise I would have +to call expressly this witness for my client again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, do you at all recall the last question I put to you, +whether you had any knowledge that the Hitler Youth, or members +of the Hitler Youth abroad, which was under your jurisdiction, +is supposed to have committed atrocities of that nature?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I regret to tell you, Mr. Attorney, that the Government +General did not belong to the Auslands-Organisation, that +I was never there and therefore am not in a position to state +anything on that point. Obviously the erroneous opinion seems +to exist that the Government General, from the point of view +of the organization of the Party, was connected with the Auslands-Organisation; +however that was not the case. I had no organizational +powers there. +<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Otherwise, I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps +of the Nazi Party): Witness, to what extent, in your capacity as +Reichsleiter of the Auslands-Organisation, were you informed +about the foreign political intentions of the Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I was not Reichsleiter, but Gauleiter, and was never +informed of the foreign political intentions of the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the Führer basically +advocated to your organization an understanding with England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I do not quite understand your question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Hitler, before the war, in your presence +and before the other Gauleiter, frequently emphasize the fact that +he wanted at all costs an understanding with England, and that +you also were to work for its achievement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I received no orders in this respect from the Führer, +but certainly from the Deputy of the Führer. The Führer never +discussed foreign political matters with me during the 12 years I +was in office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Defense Counsel want +to ask any other questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior +Counsel for the United Kingdom): Your Auslands-Organisation was +organized in the same way as the Party in Germany was organized; +is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Not in all points, because there were various organizations +within the body of the Party in the Reich which were not +intended for foreign countries, for example, the Office for Municipal +Policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can shorten my question: +Did you have Hoheitsträger abroad in the same way as you had +them in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The organization in each country +was under the Landesgruppenleiter; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: In almost all countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And under many there were lower-ranking +Hoheitsträger?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, the Ortsgruppenleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was the result of that, that you had +your German population in foreign countries well organized and +known to the leaders in those countries? +<span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: To a great extent that might be correct, but it was not +so thoroughly organized, nor could it actually be so, because the +leader of the Party did not know all the Reich Germans in the +country concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did it never occur to you that in +the event of your army’s invading a country where you had a well-organized +organization, that organization would be of extreme military +value?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, that was not the sense and the purpose of the Auslands-Organisation +and no offices ever approached me in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling this Tribunal now +that when the various countries of Europe were in fact invaded by +the German Army your local organizations did nothing to assist +them in a military or semimilitary capacity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, let me ask you +about something else for a moment: You had, had you not, an efficient +system of reporting from your Landesgruppenleiter to your +head office in Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I think you have said yourself, did +you not, in your interrogations, that you took an especial pride in +the speed with which your reports came back?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I did not say that, I believe, with respect to speed but +rather with respect to the accuracy of their political survey.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, your reports did come back +with great speed, did they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I cannot say that in general. It depended on the possibility +of dispatching these reports quickly to Berlin, and how far +that was the case in individual instances, I naturally cannot say +today. In any case, I had no special speed or acceleration measures +at my disposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, you told your interrogator—and +I can refer you to it if necessary—that on occasion you got +back information before Himmler or the Foreign Office had got +similar information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That must be a misunderstanding. It concerns the +political reports from the Landesgruppenleiter which I transmitted +from Berlin to the different offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we will leave the speed +out. I have it from you that you had an efficient system of reporting, +had you not? +<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: In order to answer that question I would have to know +in respect to what reports I am supposed to have had an efficient +system of reporting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was going to be my next question. +I was going to ask you: What in fact did your Landesgruppenleiter +report to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter reported of their own accord +to me, whenever they had anything of importance which they wanted +to report to the competent offices in the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they ever report anything +which might have been of military or semimilitary value?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That may have been the case in some instances, although +at present I cannot recall any specific cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They were never given any instructions, +were they, to report that kind of information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, generally not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: How did you get your reports +back? Did you have wireless sets with your organization in foreign +countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, we did not have any such transmission or wireless +stations. Reports either came through courier in special cases or +were brought by individuals to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: After the war started, did your +organizations continue in neutral countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they never have wireless sets +reporting back information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I do not know anything about that. I do not believe +they had them, for I would have had to know about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to ask you about only +one or two documents. Would you look at 3258-PS—My Lord, that +is the exhibit already in, GB-262; I have copies of the extract for +the Tribunal and members of Defense Counsel. I expect you read +English—the book itself is coming.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There you have before you a copy +of some extracts from it. Would you look at the bottom of the +first page, last paragraph, commencing “In 1938...” Did you have +a Landesgruppenleiter in the Netherlands by the name of Butting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just pay attention to me for perhaps +one moment before you look at that document. Do you know +that Butting shared a house at The Hague with the military +intelligence office? Do you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I do not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to quote you quite +shortly two paragraphs of this document, which is a report, published +as an official United States publication, called “National +Socialism, Basic Principles, Their Application by the Nazi Party’s +Foreign Organization, and The Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi +Aims.” I just want you to tell the Tribunal what you think first +of all about this report, which is printed in that book:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In 1938 the German Legation owned two houses in The +Hague. Both were of course the subject of diplomatic +immunity and therefore inviolable as concerned search and +seizure by the Dutch police. I shall call the house in which +Dr. Butting had his office House Number 2. What went on +in House Number 2? It had been remodeled and was divided +like a two-family house—vertically, not horizontally, but +between the two halves there was a communicating door. +One side of the house was Dr. Butting’s. The other half +housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for Holland....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You say that you do not know anything about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Butting was Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands-Organisation. +I am hearing about this house—or these two houses—for +the first time, that is quite new to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I will just go on.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“S. B. (the military intelligence agent) may have had as many +as a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all subagents +of the Canaris bureau. These were professional spies who +knew their trade. But they could not possibly know Holland +as intimately as was required by the strategy of the German +High Command, as it was revealed following the invasion +of May 1940. For this, not a dozen but perhaps several +hundred sources of information were necessary. And it is at +this point that Butting and the military intelligence agent +come together. Through his German Citizens’ Association, +Butting had a pair of Nazi eyes, a pair of Nazi ears, in +every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the +eyes and ears of his minor Party officials. Whenever the +military intelligence agent needed information concerning +a corner of Holland which his people had not yet explored, +or was anxious to check information relayed to him by one +of his own people, he would go to Butting.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know whether Butting assisted the military intelligence +agent in Holland in any way like that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I was told later that he aided in Holland. To what +extent he helped him I do not know, for he had had no such mission +from me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand, he had no instructions +but he was doing it. Just turn now to the last paragraph +on that page, too:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“ ‘I know every stone in Holland,’ S. B. once boasted. By +‘stone’ he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway, +by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name +and location of Dutch Nazi sympathizers who would help the +invading army when the time came. Had Dr. Butting’s Party +organization not existed under the innocent cover of his +Citizens’ Association, S.B.’s knowledge of Holland would have +been as nothing compared with what it was. Thus the +Citizens’ Association served a double purpose; it was invaluable +for espionage at the same time as it fulfilled its primary +function as a Fifth Column agency.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know whether the members of your organization in +Holland were given instructions to learn about every canal, lock, +bridge, viaduct, railway, and so on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I had not the least idea of this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want you to be quite +clear. I am putting to you that your organization was in the first +place an espionage system reporting information of importance +back to the Reich, and, in the second place, it was an organization +aimed to help, and which did help, your invading German armies +when they overran the frontiers of their neighboring states. Do +you understand those two points?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your organization publish an +annual book, your <span class='it'>Year Book of the Foreign Organization</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And did that book contain information +as to the activities of your organization during the year?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Partially, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I suppose that the Tribunal would +be safe in assuming that what was published in that book was +accurate information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: One may assume that. +<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at the <span class='it'>Year Book +for 1942</span>? I have copies of the extracts. Would you turn to +Page 37 of that book? If you look back one or two pages in +the book, you will find that that is an article entitled “The Work +of the Norway Branch of the Auslands-Organisation in the War.” +Is that written by your Landesgruppenleiter in Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I assume so, I cannot recall this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 37, and +you will see that there are some passages in the book that you +have in front of you that have been lightly marked in pencil along +the side.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you find the paragraph which +starts, “Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September +1939...” Have you got that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will be so kind as to +follow me.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939, +the enlargement and extension...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I am following you.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “...the enlargement and extension +of the German Legation in Oslo and of the consulates +at Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Hamgesund, +Narvik and Kirkenes proved to be of primary importance. +This enlargement of the Reich agencies resulted in the local +organization of the NSDAP in Norway having to increase +its field of activity too, in the same proportion, in order +to support the work of the Reich agencies, particularly by +Party members and other Germans who had a thorough +knowledge of the country and language.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Why, in September ’39, was it necessary for the Party to +increase its organization in Norway with people having higher +knowledge of the country and language? Answer me that before +you read on. You need not worry about the rest; we are going +to deal with it. Why was it necessary in 1939 to enlarge your +organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: In Norway, as far as I recall, there were only 80 +members of the Party in all, and it goes without saying that +after the outbreak of the war the official agencies, not only of +Germany but also, as you know, those of other states, were enlarged +and were assisted by national elements, who knew the country +<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span> +concerned. That did not hold true for Germany alone but for +all the nations participating in the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I still do not understand +why your perfectly harmless organization should have found it +necessary to increase its membership with people who had a +profound knowledge of the language and the country. Why should +the Auslands-Organisation have found it necessary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Because the Reich agencies needed Germans who knew +the country and the people, especially to furnish information on +the German targets of attack in Norway—exactly what every +other nation did, too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, your answer is, is it, that +you required them to tell you about targets in Norway? Is that +your answer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I did not say that. I said that they were to be +at the disposal of the agencies in Norway in case they were needed +for public enlightenment, that is for German propaganda purposes +among the Norwegians. I would like to emphasize once again +that that was done not only by Germany but, of course, by all +the warring countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us go on and see +what happens next:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The choice and assignment of these supplementary collaborators +was carried out by the local leader of the organization +in close collaboration with the representatives of the Reich. +Therefore, from the first moment of the outbreak of war +a great number of Party members were taken away from +their jobs and employed in the service of the nation and +the fatherland. Without any hesitation and without considering +their personal interests, their families, their careers +or their property, they joined the ranks and devoted themselves +body and soul to the new and often dangerous tasks.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Tell me, was finding out and reporting about the Norwegian +people, was that an “often dangerous task”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What, then, were the often +dangerous tasks which your own Landesgruppenleiter is saying +members of his organization were undertaking from the very +moment war broke out, in September ’39?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I cannot tell you anything about that, for I have no +knowledge whatsoever about this and I cannot conceive any of +these dangerous tasks. I have the impression from this article, +which, incidentally I did not know about until now, that the +<span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span> +Landesgruppenleiter had the plausible desire to give more importance +to his organization than it had in reality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you say you did not know +about this. This appeared in the official yearbook of your organization. +Did you never read what appeared in that book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Certainly not everything, for I am not familiar with +this article.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have told us that the members +of your organization took no part in this. What about the +people who were responsible for publishing that book? Did they +not ever draw your attention to an article of that kind?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Obviously not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just look at the next little +paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The success of their work, which was done with all secrecy, +was revealed when, on 9 April 1940, German troops landed +in Norway and forestalled the planned flank attack of the +Allies.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>What work was revealed on the 9th of April? What work +which had been done with all secrecy was revealed on the 9th of +April, work carried out by members of your organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I am sorry I cannot reply, for I have no knowledge +whatsoever of this. I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see. Will you look down to the +last paragraph of that page? It is the second sentence—four, five +lines down—at the end of the fifth line. I beg your pardon. You +have the book in front of you. Will you look at Page 40 of the +book? In the center of a paragraph the last word of one of the +lines starts with “According to the task plan...” Have you got +it? It is Page 40. To save time, let me read it:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“According to the task plan which had been prepared +since the outbreak of the war, the Landeskreisleitung gave +orders on 7 April for Phase 1 of the state of employment...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>It does not sound, does it, like plans being made for different +phases of an operation? It does not sound, does it, as if the work +of your organization had been simply finding out about Norwegian +people?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That might have been since this is entirely new to +me, exclusively an agreement within the country itself with military +or other authorities. I have had no knowledge of it up to this +moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So I understand you to say. But +you were the head of this organization, were you not? +<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have come before this International +Tribunal and given them evidence, presumably saying you +are in a position to give them truthful and accurate evidence; is +that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I have understood that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, then, do I understand you to +say now that you do not know what was happening in your organization, +and therefore you are not in a position to give evidence as to +whether or not it was a Fifth Column business?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It is quite evident that in an organization of this size +the leader, who has his office at Berlin, cannot be closely acquainted +with everything which is going on abroad and, more so, what is done +against his instructions. I did not have the same disciplinary authority +over my Party members abroad as did, for instance, some Gauleiter +within the Reich. I need not elaborate on that, because it is +self-evident. It is also evident, and this I know, that some Germans +abroad, who were called on because of their patriotism in individual +cases let themselves be used for purposes without the knowledge of +the Auslands-Organisation and against its explicit instructions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In the interest of time we will not +pursue that particular sphere of activity in Norway, just in case it +may have been an exception which you did not know about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Let me turn to something else. Will you look at Page 65 of +that book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that an article by your Landesgruppenleiter in Greece?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Is it in the form of a day-to-day +diary of the activities of the Auslands-Organisation in Greece when +German troops invaded that country?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 65?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Sunday the 27th of April. Swastika on the Acropolis.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the heading. I beg your pardon. I do not know whether +it comes directly under that heading. This is the Landesgruppenleiter +talking:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I set out immediately, quickly visiting the other quarters,”—where +the German colony had been interned—“the Philadelphia +and the Institute. I enjoined the inmates of the house +<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span> +in Academy Street to give up returning home today, and to +hold themselves in readiness. After all, we did want to help +the German troops immediately with our knowledge of the +language and the district. Now the moment has come. We +must start in immediately.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I even know all about this. It certainly must be +evident that the moment German troops occupied a foreign city and +freed the Germans living abroad who had been interned, the latter +would put themselves at the disposal of the German troops and help +them in every respect as guides, interpreters, or the like. That is +certainly the most logical thing in the world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is in fact what they did do, +and the assistance that your organization appears to have given +them is that it managed to organize them and get them ready to +do it; is that not so? That is what your Landesgruppenleiter seems +to be doing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I did not understand this question. Will you please +repeat it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that it is your +Landesgruppenleiter who is organizing the members of your organization, +organizing them so that they can give their assistance most +beneficially to the invading armies?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is a completely wrong way to express it. The +Landesgruppenleiter in Greece, who filled that post from 1934, could +not possibly tell whether there was to be an invasion of Greece or +not. That had not the slightest thing to do with the nature of his +organization. The moment that German troops were in the country +it stands to reason that they would welcome their countrymen, act +as their hosts, and help them in every way. That was a patriotic +duty taken for granted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Just turn to Page 66, the next page. Will you find the paragraph +which commences “Meanwhile I organized the employment of all +Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you have that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I understand it...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had better find the place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Where shall I find that place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On Page 66. It is a new paragraph.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I have it now. +<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Meanwhile I organized the employment +of all Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed +Forces.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It really looks now as though the Landesgruppenleiter is organizing +them, does it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: In this instance, yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Soon our boys and girls could +be seen riding proud and radiant in their Hitler Youth uniforms, +beside the German soldiers on motorcycles and in +Army cars....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you yourself know of the organization and work that your +Landesgruppenleiter had put in in Greece to assist your armies in +semimilitary capacities, or was that another case like Norway which +you did not know anything about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter in Greece did not create a +semimilitary organization, but set up of course in this instance an +organization to aid the troops entering the country in a sector which +was entirely civilian.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well; I just want to ask you +about another matter. Have you got a document there which is a +telegram from somebody called Stohrer, in Madrid?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Stohrer, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did Stohrer have something to do +with the German Embassy in Madrid?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Stohrer was the German Ambassador himself; Doctor +Von Stohrer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This is dated 23 October 1939. Just +let us see what it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Landesgruppenleiter can obtain a very suitable house +for accommodating the Landesgruppe, as well as the German +Labor Front, the Ortsgruppe, the Hitler Youth, and the German +House Madrid, also room available in case of embassy +having to spread out, and especially a very suitable isolated +room for the possible installation of second secret radio transmitter, +which can no longer be housed at the school because +of reopening.</p> + +<p>“Landesgruppenleiter requests me to rent the house through +the embassy, in which way very considerable tax expense +will be avoided. Have no hesitation, in view of anticipated +partial use by embassy as mentioned above. If you do not +agree I request wire by return.</p> + +<p>“Please submit also to Gauleiter Bohle.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you telling the truth to this Tribunal when you told them +some 30 minutes ago that you had no knowledge of wireless sets +being used by your organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, because I have no knowledge of these transmitters, +or their use; I must assume that it concerns apparatus of the +embassy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The copy of the telegram, as I have it before me, +does not indicate to whom this wire was addressed. The last sentence +of the telegram leads one to assume that it was not in any +case addressed to the witness. According to my opinion, I think the +witness should next be asked whether he knew about this wire and +to whom it was addressed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will tell Dr. Seidl to +whom the Ambassador in Madrid was likely to send a telegram on +such matters as this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: To the Foreign Office at Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you, at that time, were State +Secretary at the Foreign Office of Berlin, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Quite right, in October 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Beneath his signature is set out the +distribution to—it mentions various persons in departments in the +Foreign Office in Berlin. Is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And are you saying now that all +of those departments which were asked to submit this matter to +you, that they all failed to do so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I do not claim that. They surely would have +done that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember yourself seeing +this telegram before?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I cannot recall it. I would have noticed it for I never +heard anything about two secret transmitters in Spain. It would +also be quite in order for me to admit it. But I cannot do so if I +do not know it. The distribution under Number 3 mentions "State +Secretary,” but that does not mean me, but the State Secretary of +the Foreign Office, the political one. My designation in the Foreign +Office was: Chief A.O.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can save you all that. I am not +suggesting that that “State Secretary” means you; otherwise it would +not be asked to be submitted to you. What I want to know is what +you or your embassy workers, or both of you working together, +<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span> +wanted with two secret wireless transmitting sets in Spain in October +1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you still saying that your organization was quite unconcerned +in reporting back information of military importance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Just how do you mean, “reporting back”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal—I +want you to be quite clear—are you telling the Tribunal that your +organization was not being used for espionage purposes in Spain?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes indeed, I am asserting that. A distinction must be +made between certain members of the Auslands-Organisation who +naturally without my knowledge—I protested against this often +enough—were used abroad for such purposes. I had no objection to +Germans abroad being utilized in time of war for such tasks, as was +the case very frequently with all other countries. However, I did +not want members or officials of the Auslands-Organisation to +become involved. A distinction must...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to stop you at all. +I do not want to stop you. Go on if you have anything to say. But, +in the interest of time, try and make it as short as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It seems to me there is some confusion between the Auslands-Organisation +as an organization and what certain Germans +abroad did during the war as their patriotic duty. This seems to me +to be the crucial point of the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I will not argue about that. +We see that your organization took sufficient interest to reproduce +accounts of what they were doing in its official book. I just want +to show you one thing further.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Well, I have one further document +to put to this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may as well go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is a document which I have just +had found. I have not had them copied. The Tribunal will forgive +me if I read extracts from them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] It is an original document you hold +in your hand and it appears to be, does it not, a carbon copy of a +letter from...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Seidl got one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, he has one in German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Is that a letter from your Landesgruppenleiter +Konradi? +<span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It seems to be a directive from Konradi, but not signed +by him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you will look at the end of the +letter you will see that it is actually signed “Konradi,” after the +usual “Heil Hitler”...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The copy that I have is not signed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you get that copy back? Perhaps +these documents...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was taken from the witness to Lt. Col. Griffith-Jones.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is in fact signed “Konradi.” Show it to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was returned to the witness.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It is not signed by Konradi, but typed in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to you. It +is my fault for not making myself clear. I told you that we have +here a carbon copy. A copy of a letter which was signed and sent +by Konradi. That appears to be so, does it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That I do not know, for of course I do not know about +all the letters written by Konradi.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You can take it, so far as you are +concerned, that that is a German document which has been captured, +that it is this bit of paper that you are holding in your hand which +was found by Allied troops and that bears a typewritten signature +of Konradi, who was your Landesgruppenleiter in Romania; is that +correct? You remember that you had a Landesgruppenleiter in +Romania?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: His name was Konradi.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And is this a letter of instructions +to the Zellenleiter in Constantsa?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is dated the 25th of October 1939. +Will you read the first paragraph?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“From 9 to 12 October conferences took place with the +Supreme Party functionaries, or their deputies, of the Southeastern +and Southern European groups at the head office of +the Auslands-Organisation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that mean Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes. Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That means your office, does it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, in my office, but not in my personal office. +<span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, but is it in the office over which +you had complete control?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Agreed. I imagine, before we go +on, that no orders would be issued from your head office at a +conference of that kind which were contrary to your direction, +would they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Not on important things, naturally not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to you.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I subsequently received direct instructions from the competent +department of the head office of the Auslands-Organisation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>So it appears that the direction given at the conference was confirmed +in writing.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“During the war, every National Socialist abroad must directly +serve the fatherland, either through propaganda for the German +cause or by counteracting enemy measures.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now perhaps you will turn over, or rather, you will miss out—I +am reading from copy—the English, the next paragraph, and +the next plus one paragraph, and go on to the paragraph commencing:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As everywhere else it is extremely important to know where +the enemy is and what he is doing...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I want you to be quite clear about this and keep it in mind. +These are directions coming directly from your head office in Berlin.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It has been ascertained that the I.S. (Intelligence Service) +has attempted, sometimes most successfully, to gain admittance +for seemingly trustworthy persons into the activities +of the Party group and its associate organizations. It is therefore +necessary that you thoroughly investigate not only all +those persons coming into contact with you who are not very +well known to you, and above all you must scrutinize any +new persons and visitors appearing in your immediate vicinity. +If possible, let them be taken in hand by a comrade whose +absolute Nazi convictions are not generally known to the man +in the street....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I think we can leave the rest of that.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even +though it may at first appear very insignificant. Rumors +suddenly arising also come in this category, however false +they may be.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember your members in Romania being told to report +everything? Everything they saw? +<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, of course.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both +your work and that of your comrades’ work must be industrial +concerns, business enterprises, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Not only can +you spread your propaganda very well in this way, but it is +precisely in such concerns that you can easily pick up information +concerning strange visitors. It is known that the +enemy espionage organizations are especially active in industrial +circles both in gathering information and carrying out +acts of sabotage. Members with close connections with shipping +and forwarding companies are particularly suitable for +this work. It goes without saying that you must be meticulous +and cautious when selecting your assistants.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you have some more to read from this +document? If so, we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is +absent from this session.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Witness, will you look again at the +document we were reading before the Court adjourned. Would you +look at the paragraph which commences “as everywhere else it is +extremely important to know where the enemy is and what he is +doing.” My Lord, I am not absolutely certain that I did not start +reading.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, you had read that and the next one +and the one at the top of Page 3 in the English text. At least I think +you have. You read the one beginning “An important section.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can start the paragraph +commencing “An important section.” Have you got that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both +your work and that of your comrades must be industrial concerns, +business enterprises, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Not only can you spread +your propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in +such concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning +strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage +organizations are especially active in industrial circles, both +in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage. +Comrades with close connections with shipping and forwarding +companies are particularly suitable for this work. Naturally +you must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your +assistants.</p> + +<p>“In this connection a reference to interstate organizations and +exchange organizations is relevant.”—I particularly want you +to note these next lines:</p> + +<p>“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as +camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of +the Foreign Intelligence Department.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, doesn’t that exactly describe the way in which the Auslands-Organisation +was carrying on its business? Read it again:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as +camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of +the Foreign Intelligence Department.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Doesn’t that fit in with the directions that this Landesgruppenleiter +of yours has been writing to his members in this document? +<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: On the contrary, I find that this is clear proof of the +fact that the organizations mentioned here were in a foreign espionage +service and not in the German espionage service. My interpretation +is the exact opposite of that of the British Prosecutor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you not giving instructions +here, or is not your Landesgruppenleiter giving instructions, to carry +out counterespionage—the work that is carried on by the intelligence +service? Isn’t that what the writer is writing about so far?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The letter, with which I am not personally familiar, +apparently instructs Germans abroad to turn in a report whenever +they encounter the intelligence service at work. I do not think that +any objection can be raised to that in time of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. We will not go on +arguing about it. I understand that you know nothing about the +instructions which are contained in that letter. This is the first you +have ever seen or heard of it; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, this letter is new to me, and I do not know whether +it is true, for there is no original here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it then that, of the +countries around Germany in which your organization worked, you +have no knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in +Belgium? You have no knowledge of the activities that they were +carrying out in Norway, none about what they were doing in Spain, +and not very much about what they were doing in Romania either; +is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, that is not correct. Of course I knew of the activity +of these groups abroad; but the particular activity that the British +Prosecutor wishes to point out as the aim of the Auslands-Organisation +is not quite clear to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you had knowledge of any of +their activities—I understand from your evidence that you had none +of the activities about which your own Auslands-Organisation Yearbook +publishes a story. Both in Norway and Greece the activities +were recounted in those two stories. You knew nothing about them +at all; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I did not know about the activity in Norway. I have +already testified to that effect. I was very familiar with the activity +in Greece which was along perfectly normal lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want to leave that, +and I just want to ask you two questions about another matter. Am +I right in saying that the information—and I am not going to argue +with you now as to what type of information it was—but the information +that your organization sent back, was that passed on to the +Defendant Hess? +<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It depended upon the +nature of the information. If it was information on foreign policy +it was, of course, sent to another office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were in fact acting as a pool +of information, were you not? Let me explain myself: You were +forwarding information that you received, to the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Sometimes, yes; if not to the SS then probably...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Sometimes also to the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And to the Abwehr, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Very seldom, but it happened occasionally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say very seldom. Did you not +have a liaison officer attached to your organization from the Abwehr?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No. I had only one assistant who maintained an unofficial +connection with the Abwehr, if the occasion arose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps we are talking about the +same gentleman. Did you not have a Captain Schmauss attached to +your head office in Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Mr. Schmauss has never been a captain but he was a +political leader and honorary SS-leader. In the Army, I believe he +was a sergeant. Moreover, he did not come from the Abwehr; he +was chief of personnel of the Auslands-Organisation and his function +as liaison was purely unofficial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say he was not a liaison officer +between your organization and the Abwehr?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, he was not an officer at all. He was not a member +of the Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to quibble with you +about his rank. Was he, in effect, whatever he was, acting in a +capacity of liaison between you and the Abwehr?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, in addition to the +information that Hess obtained through your system of reporting, +that is, the Auslands-Organisation, did he also obtain information +from those organizations which were dealing with the Volksdeutsche, +that is to say, non-German citizens, racial Germans abroad who were +not members of your organization, because you allowed only German +citizens to become members of your organization. But others—Volksdeutsche, +I think you call them—did Hess receive information +from other sources about their activities?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I could not say, because I did not discuss it with Hess, +and the affairs of the Volksdeutsche were entirely out of my field. +<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Dr. Karl Haushofer was for some +time in 1938 and 1939 president of the VDA, was he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I believe so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Which was an organization dealing +with the activities of the Volksdeutsche in foreign countries. Is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, I believe so. I am not familiar with this field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, as you know, Hess and Karl +Haushofer were great friends, were they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Haushofer had been Hess’ pupil at +Munich University; did you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It was the other way around.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you not know that Hess received +information from Haushofer as to the activities of these other +organizations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I know nothing about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, I do not want to catch +you out. Is that your answer? Are you being honest to this Tribunal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No. I wanted to add that the Deputy of the Führer very +painstakingly separated the “Auslandsdeutsche,” that is, citizens of +the Reich who worked abroad, and the “Volksdeutsche,” and with +equal care he made certain that I should have nothing to do with +the question of Volksdeutsche. Therefore I knew nothing of these +matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Hess as Deputy to the Führer was +in fact in charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad; was +he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, that is so, because he was born abroad. However, +to my knowledge, he did not take charge of these matters in his +capacity as Deputy to the Führer. I do not believe that there was +any connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal that +just because he was born in a foreign country he had charge of all +matters concerning Germanism abroad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I believe so, because any other Reichsleiter of the Party +might just as well have taken care of these matters. However, I +assume that Hess took over these functions simply because he was +familiar with foreign countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to be quite clear. Whatever +the reason was, he in fact did have charge of them. That is your +evidence? +<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I just want to remind you of +a passage in your interrogation in this building on the 9th of November. +Do you remember that you were interrogated on the 9th...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>]: September?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On 9 November last.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: November, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were interrogated by a Lieutenant +Martin, the afternoon of that day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: By Lieutenant Martin, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me read a short extract from +the transcript of that interrogation and ask you whether, in fact, it +is correct. You were being asked about the information which came +back through the Auslands-Organisation.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘He would have to rely on you for his information +on matters of that kind?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Not entirely; I think Hess had a great many connections +in Hamburg through which he obtained information +which he did not relay to me.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘What were his connections in Hamburg?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The shipping companies.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘Rather like your Landesgruppenleiter instructions +in Romania?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I think he knew a number of people there. I have +always been convinced that he knew them.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘Is that Helferich?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Helferich was one, but then there were many +people from whom he received information. I believe from +Professor Haushofer, his old teacher, with whom he was very +friendly. But he always made it a point not to inform us of +anything that concerned the Volksdeutsche; he said, “It is not +your affair at all.” ’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is quite correct, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And as you have said it there, is +that a correct description of the position that Hess was in with +regard to information from abroad, from agents abroad? Does that +correctly state the facts as they were?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: So far as I can see, it is probably correct. I myself can +judge only to the extent to which the reports concerned the Auslands-Organisation. +About the others I can make only a guess; I +<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span> +cannot give definite information, because I was not acquainted +with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps +I might get the exhibits in order, the ones that I have referred to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Yearbook of the Auslands-Organisation from which the +stories about Norway and Greece came, becomes Exhibit GB-284. +The two translations that you have are numbered Documents M-153 +and M-156, both of which become Exhibit GB-284.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The secret wireless telegram, which was Document Number +M-158, becomes Exhibit GB-285; and the letter from Landesgruppenleiter +Konradi, which was Document Number 3796-PS, becomes +Exhibit GB-286.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: May I add something to a point which was brought up +by the British cross-examination?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: May I begin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may give a short explanation. You are +not here to make a speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I do not want to make a speech. I merely wish to +say the following on the question of secret transmitters which was +brought up this morning: Although I am not familiar with the +technique of these secret transmitters, I assume that a secret transmitter +would be of use in a foreign country only if there were a +receiving set in Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am quite certain that to my knowledge there was never such a +receiving set, either in my office in Berlin or in any other office of +the Auslands-Organisation, and therefore I may assume that such a +receiving set did not exist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for +the United States): Do you recall being interrogated on 11 September +1945, by Colonel Brundage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I want to read you a few questions and answers +from your interrogation and ask you whether you recall being asked +those questions and having made those answers:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘Now, when you started, your immediate superior +was who?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Rudolf Hess, until 1941 when he left for England.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘Who succeeded him?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Martin Bormann. Martin Bormann automatically +succeeded Hess, but he did not really fill Hess’ position, +<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span> +because Hess had been born abroad in Egypt, while Martin +Bormann understood nothing about foreign affairs. He paid +no attention to them at all, but of course, he was my superior.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘But he was nominally your chief?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘He was technically my chief, but he gave me no +orders, directives or similar instructions, because he did not +understand anything about these things.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘So that everything that was done in your office, +you would say you were responsible for?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Absolutely.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘And you are willing to accept the responsibility +for that?’</p> + +<p>“Answers ‘Naturally.’”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember being asked those questions and having made +those answers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is absolutely correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And were those answers true when you made them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Absolutely true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And are they still true today?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: They are still true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So that you accept responsibility for everything +which your office was conducting, is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who was Von Strempel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Von Strempel was, I believe, counsellor to a secretary +of a legation (Gesandtschaftsrat) in the foreign office, but I do not +know him very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was he not the first secretary of the German +Embassy in the United States from 1938 until Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I cannot say definitely. I knew him only slightly and +had absolutely no contact with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, he was interrogated with respect to the +support of the German-American Bund by the Auslands-Organisation +prior to 1938, and I want to read you just one or two questions and +answers which he made and ask you whether they conform to your +understanding of the facts. Do you understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Was the German-American Bund +supported by the Auslands-Organisation?’ +<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span></p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I am positive that it was connected with the foreign +section of the Party. For example, the Bund received instructions +from the Party on how to build up their political organization, +how, where, and when to hold mass meetings and how +to handle their propaganda. Personally, I do not know whether +it received financial support.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that conform with your understanding of the facts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, that is a completely false representation. The Auslands-Organisation +gave no financial support whatever and had no +connection with the German-American Bund. I have stated that +clearly in many interrogations here in Nuremberg, and have signed +an affidavit to that effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I know you have. So that if Von Strempel has +sworn that that is a fact, your testimony is that he was not telling +the truth. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I am of the opinion that if Von Strempel was legation +secretary, or secretary of another office, he could not have known +of the matter and he therefore testified about something which was +not quite clear to him. In any event, what he said is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the fact that in 1938 an +order was issued prohibiting members of the German embassies and +consulates to continue relations or connections with the Bund?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It was a general order for German citizens abroad to +resign from the Bund if they were members. But as far as I know, +that order was issued some years previously about 1935 or 1936, by +the Deputy of the Führer upon my request.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I object to this question; it has no connection with +the evidence for which the witness Bohle was called. During his +direct examination he was not questioned on any subject which has +the slightest relation to the question of the activity of the German-American +Bund. I do not believe that this form of interrogation is +designed to test the witness, as it has not the slightest bearing on +the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: It seems to me to have a very direct bearing on +whether or not this organization was engaged in espionage work +abroad and within the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly; in the opinion of the Tribunal the +questions are perfectly proper.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that in spite of that order the foreign +section of the Nazi Party nevertheless continued to support the Bund?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, I was not aware of that and I consider it to be +impossible. +<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now I would like to read you one or two further +extracts from the interrogation of Strempel and ask you whether +these statements conform with your knowledge of the facts:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘Did the foreign section of the Party continue to +support the Bund after the order you mentioned before was +issued?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I am sure that Mr. Draeger, consul in New York +City and representative of the foreign section of the Party, +did continue to have relations with Bund officials.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Does that conform with your recollection of the facts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No. In my opinion, that does not correspond to the facts. +Naturally, I cannot say whether the consul, Dr. Draeger, maintained +his contacts against my order, but there was an imperative order to +withdraw completely from the Bund, because from the very beginning +I objected strenuously to the activities of the Bund and was +supported in my objections by the Deputy of the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You were acquainted with Draeger, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was his position in the United States, insofar +as your organization was concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: He was a liaison man (Vertrauensmann) of the Auslands-Organisation +for the individual Party members in the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: He was what was known as a confidential agent, +was he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, he was not, naturally, but we had...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, you called him a “confidential +agent” in your interrogation, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No. I called him a “Vertrauensmann,” and this was +translated into “confidence man.” I did...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I will accept that correction. He was a confidence +man for your organization in the United States. Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Correct, yes, that is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And in addition to him there were other confidence +men of your organization in the United States? Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes, correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what their names were +and where they were located?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: One was Wiedemann, consul general in San Francisco. +There was also Consul Dr. Gissling in Los Angeles and Consul Von +Spiegel in New Orleans I believe, but I do not know; perhaps it +was Boston. It was one of the two. I believe these are all. +<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And each of those individuals made reports from +time to time which were forwarded to you through Draeger. Is that +not a fact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: No, they made no reports to me. I cannot recall that I +ever saw a report from Wiedemann, Spiegel, or Gissling. That was +not their job.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Draeger made the reports to you, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Draeger made the reports to the Auslands-Organisation +in Berlin or to me personally. Mostly to my office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And contained in those reports were various items +of information collected by other confidential agents? Isn’t that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I do not know, because I am not familiar with these +reports and I cannot say whether there was anything to report. We +had no Party organization in the United States, because it had been +dissolved by Rudolf Hess in April 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So you say; but you nevertheless had an individual +in Germany whose duty it was to read and pass upon these reports +from Draeger as they came in. Is that not a fact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: So far as I know, and I believe my information is +correct; the reports that we received were of a purely technical +nature. We merely had few Party members in the United States +whose card index and membership fees had to be looked after in +order to preserve their privileges as Party members. Political +activity in the United States was forbidden and did not actually +exist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But I am suggesting to you that in spite of the +order the activities of your organization nevertheless continued. +Now, is it not a fact that there was an individual in your organization +in Germany who received these reports from the United +States regularly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe, who...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I beg your pardon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Correct. Why didn’t you tell me that before when +I asked you about the individual who read these reports from the +United States as they came in?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Please repeat the question. I did not fully understand it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I will withdraw that question. After Grothe +received these reports from the United States regularly, to whom +did he report the substance of those reports? +<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: So far as I know, he usually kept them, because they +contained nothing of interest and he himself was not in a position +to use them. Mr. Grothe had an honorary position with us because +of his advanced age and took over this branch of the office because +it was of no importance at all in the Auslands-Organisation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So that you were in no position to know what was +contained in those reports? Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is for the most part correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So you do not know whether they were important +or not and you do not know whether they contained information +relative to espionage matters or not. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I am sure that if they had contained such information, +Grothe would have submitted them to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, outside of that, you have no knowledge of it +whatsoever. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, let me just read you one or two more excerpts +from the interrogation of Von Strempel:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘These relationships seem to have violated the order +you mentioned before. Did you report these violations to the +Foreign Office?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Yes, several times. In reports that I drafted for +Thomsen when I was in the Embassy, we called the attention +of Berlin to the fact that this relationship to the Bund was +very detrimental... and stated that the continued support of +the Bund by the foreign section of the Party was harming +diplomatic relations with the United States.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘What action was taken in Berlin to halt the activities +of which you complained?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I know of no action.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Does that conform to your knowledge of the facts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I have not the slightest idea of this report by Herr Von +Thomsen. This is the first time that I have heard of protests from +the Embassy in Washington regarding prohibited connections between +Dr. Draeger and the Bund.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You know who Thomsen was, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Thomsen was Chargé d’Affaires in Washington.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you know that from time to time various officials +of the Bund came over here and had conferences with representatives +of your organization and of the Führer, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I have heard that they visited the Führer but they did +not visit me and we had no conferences of any description. +<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I did not say with you. I said with representatives +of your office; perhaps your friend, Mr. Grothe?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That might be possible but I cannot say definitely +because he did not report to me on this matter. They could not +have discussed any official matters with Grothe, because he knew +very well that I completely repudiated the activities of the German +Volksbund in America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In any event, however, you accept responsibility +for everything which was done in your organization. Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Naturally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do either of the other Chief Prosecutors wish +to cross-examine? [<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>] Then, Dr. Seidl, you can +re-examine if you wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have already answered a question that +I intended to ask you, that is, that there was no secret transmitter +in Germany which would have been in a position to broadcast secret +communications to foreign countries. I ask you now, did you yourself +have a transmitter in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I myself had no transmitter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Auslands-Organisation have such a transmitter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: I consider that to be absolutely impossible; if there had +been one, I would have known of it. I never saw one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that in order to communicate with Germans +overseas by radio you yourself did not use code on the German +network?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You stated previously that the Deputy of the Führer, +Hess, was your immediate superior?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were the directives given to you by the Deputy of +the Führer of a general nature, or did he go into the details of the +work of the Auslands-Organisation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BOHLE: The Deputy of the Führer gave only general directives +and left all the details to me because I had his complete confidence. +In his general directives he impressed upon me repeatedly in the +sharpest terms the fact that it was my duty to avoid any measures +by the Auslands-Organisation that might be detrimental to foreign +relations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>] +<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Your Honors, before I go on to my next witness—that +is the witness Strölin—I should like to submit the suggestion +or rather the application to the Tribunal that the affidavit of the +witness Gaus be handled in the same way as the interrogation of +the witness Bohle. Gaus has already been admitted as a witness for +another defendant. However, the Defense Counsel for the other defendant +waived his right to call this witness. The situation is the +same as it was in the case of Bohle; therefore it would be preferable, +in my opinion, to hear the witness Gaus now and to read his +sworn statement to him during his examination as has been done in +other cases, for instance in the case of Blaha.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet and +submitted in the various languages to the Chief Prosecutors?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the translation is complete. +At any rate, this noon I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the +Translation Division.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me, Sir David or Colonel +Pokrovsky?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not seen this +affidavit, and, My Lord, with regard to the last one, we got it +hurriedly translated into English, but it was only by the kindness +of my Soviet colleagues, who allowed the matter to go on without a +Russian translation and left it to my delegation to deal with, that +the matter went on. Otherwise, my Soviet colleagues would have +asked the Tribunal to have it put back.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is very difficult when these affidavits are sought to be put in +at the last minute without having given us a chance of seeing them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky could tell me +whether he has seen this affidavit or had it translated yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the +U.S.S.R.): Members of the Tribunal, I fully share the viewpoint of +Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. It appears to me absolutely unacceptable +to have this document presented immediately to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I understood Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe correctly, he did not +receive this affidavit. The Soviet delegation is in the same position. +Besides, I would like to remind you that the question of this witness +has already been discussed, that it has been definitely solved, and it +seems to me there are no grounds for a further revision of this +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal considers that the +course which must be taken is that that affidavit must be translated +and submitted to the Tribunal for their consideration, for this +witness was allowed to the Defendant Ribbentrop, I think, and then +<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span> +he withdrew his application for the witness. You have not applied +for the witness Gaus, and I would point out to you and to the other +counsel for the defendants that it is very inconvenient that documents +of this sort—after all the question of witnesses and documents +has been thoroughly gone into by the Tribunal—should be presented +at the last moment and without any translation whatever. But we +will not go into it now, and it must be translated and submitted to +the Tribunal in the three languages.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might make one short remark in regard +to the last point. Up to now I was always under the impression that +a formal application to call a witness would not be necessary in the +case of a witness who has already been admitted by the Tribunal +for another defendant. That was undoubtedly so in the case of Gaus +who was named as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. +Consequently I had no reason to make a formal application, since +I would have the opportunity to interrogate the witness in cross-examination +anyhow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have just been informed by counsel for the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop that, as his representative said last Saturday, he will +forego calling the witness Gaus, and now I, in turn, apply to call +Ambassador Dr. Gaus as witness regarding the statements in his +sworn affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean by saying you +call him. You can apply to call him if you like, but you do not call +him until you apply.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When we have seen this document, we will +determine the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the +Defendant Hess is the witness Karl Strölin. In order to save time I +have also prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal +to inform me whether we will follow the same procedure +with this witness as with the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution +agree that only the affidavit should be presented.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation +of the affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution +want to put to the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient +course would be if Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to +read the affidavit, and then after the affidavit is read, the few +questions that the Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. +<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that +as far as this document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has +violated the procedure you have established; the Soviet Prosecution +received this affidavit only a very short time ago—about 1 or 2 hours +ago—and it was not received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, +I had the opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very +slightly, and I ask to have the presentation of this document postponed +until such time when the order of the Tribunal is complied +with, in other words, not until we have received our document in +Russian.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the +time of the Tribunal, wouldn’t it be better to get on with it now? +Sir David has apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, +and if he is satisfied upon that, wouldn’t it be better to go on with +it now rather than to postpone it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that +it is only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when +he can call him, and he can then ask him questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized +myself with this document very slightly. As far as I can understand, +it is of no particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater +interest to the British Delegation...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was +allowed to Dr. Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the +witness box and could have asked him questions, and the only reason +for doing it by way of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly +and more quickly. So if we were to order that this affidavit was not +to be used, we should then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, +and probably, I am afraid, taking up rather longer than it +would to read the affidavit, and you would not object to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable +to have Dr. Seidl ask the witness those questions which have +already been answered in the affidavit? It seems to me that that +would give us an opportunity to reconcile this contradiction, especially +since there are only a few questions, and the first three, as far +as I can understand, are mostly of a historical nature and connected +with the organization of the Institute in Stuttgart in 1917.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit +yet so I am afraid I am not in a position to present the question +which you wish me to present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Strölin took the stand.</span>] +<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>What is your name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KARL STRÖLIN (Witness): Karl Strölin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of +Stuttgart; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President +of the German Auslands-Institut?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I +shall now read to you.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart +in the year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the +seat of this institute is connected with the fact that the +Swabian district has always furnished a particularly high +percentage of emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in +Stuttgart the need to create an institution for the purpose of +preserving the national ties between the old and the new +homeland. The German Auslands-Institut was to serve this +purpose. It had the following aims:</p> + +<p>“(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world.</p> + +<p>“(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants.</p> + +<p>“(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad +and about foreign countries.</p> + +<p>“For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a +library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folklore +and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism +abroad. For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were +published abroad in the German language and a large number +of newspapers in foreign languages were subscribed to and +their contents evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures +was in one filing room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly +interested in the homeland, genealogical research +took on ever greater proportions.</p> + +<p>“In addition to its activities of collecting and registering, the +German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and representative +functions. The question of emigration was also a subject +for consultation for a long time. This required that the German +Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living +<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span> +conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the +individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the +German Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the +various offices and organizations upon request. The representative +activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted +mainly in organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity +was the Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart.</p> + +<p>“The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found +expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars +about the homeland which it published. The connections with +the Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such +publications. The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut +in its relations with the Germans abroad was that +these Germans abroad were to be the connecting links between +nations in order to strengthen mutual understanding and the +desire for co-operation. They were to be the envoys of friendship +between their old and their new homeland.</p> + +<p>“As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly +emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison +Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the +occasion of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut +had no agencies or representatives abroad acting as +liaison for these corresponding members. Direct or individual +care for Germans abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. +The welfare of German nationals abroad was +taken care of by the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. +Relations with the Volksdeutsche were maintained by the +Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans +Abroad).</p> + +<p>“2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities +which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one +has ever made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut.</p> + +<p>“3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Führer, did not exert any +influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no directives +or instructions which could have induced the Institute +to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth Column +work.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Witness, are these statements correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: These statements are correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct +to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask +any questions of this witness? +<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for +Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal +I should like to ask you a few questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: From 1933 until the end of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known +the Defendant Von Neurath? What was his position at that time and +what was his reputation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World +War. At that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief +of the Cabinet of the King of Württemberg, and his reputation was +excellent. In my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath +frequently. In 1938 Von Neurath became an honorary citizen of the +city of Stuttgart.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations +with him later when he returned from Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von +Neurath retired to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, +and here I had closer and more active connection with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, +his family, his education, his personality, in general?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His +father was Lord Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg. His +grandfather and his great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath +was very much respected as a high-minded character, a distinguished +personality, always ready to help, extraordinarily humane, very +conscientious, straightforward and frank.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign +Minister and possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss +politics with him and particularly his views on foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with +me, but of course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister +he was convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful +means the place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any +other way. He strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual +confidence with other European powers, particularly with England. +He was convinced that it was precisely in this field that he had done +everything possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson’s book <span class='it'>Two +Years with Hitler</span>, which particularly emphasized how extremely +popular Von Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that +we also discussed the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged +Von Neurath’s honest devotion to peace and to peaceful +<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span> +and friendly relations with England. Von Neurath was also greatly +concerned with the cultivation of better relations with the United +States. I recall that he discussed the subject with me after my trip +to America and said that I had done well to emphasize in my various +speeches Germany’s desire for friendship with the United States. I +also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized the tone of +Hitler’s speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to Roosevelt’s +message. He said at that time that the international tension had +been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the +Munich Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. +Later he very frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in +the fact that, despite all efforts, the relation between England and +Germany had not remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed +out how tragic it was for Europe and for the world. All my conversations +with Von Neurath convinced me that he desired an understanding +and a peaceful settlement, and that he would never have +pursued a policy that might lead to war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his +appointment as an honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened +after he resigned his office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th +birthday on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to +Von Neurath the gratitude and appreciation not only of the people +of Stuttgart but of all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the +calm and prudence with which he had conducted foreign affairs. It +was also a token of respect for his honest and incorruptible character.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution +assert that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign governments +or their representatives that Germany had no military or +aggressive intentions toward these states, but that these assurances +were, in fact, given for the sake of appearances, in order to lull +these states into a false sense of security, because even then Von +Neurath knew and approved of the fact that Hitler actually had +aggressive intentions toward these states.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von +Neurath capable of such infamy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, +at the time, of his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign +Ministry on 4 February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation +was accepted. He described how this resignation came about. +He said that until the end of the year 1937 he had been convinced +that Hitler was completely in sympathy with the foreign policy +<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span> +which he was pursuing and that Hitler as well as himself had not +wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at the end of 1937 Hitler +had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude; he had suddenly +struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide whether it +was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in a +personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade +him to give up this altered view, but that he had the impression +that he had lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to +submit his resignation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with +his discharge from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed +President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything +about this appointment—how and why he received it and what he +did in this capacity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: He received this appointment as President of the +Secret Cabinet Council at the same time that his resignation was +accepted, but this Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the +Reich Cabinet. The Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler +personally, and Hitler had simply not done this. Von Neurath believed +later that he had been appointed to this post as president only +in order to conceal from foreign countries that the former Foreign +Minister no longer had any influence on the policy of the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, I do not see how this witness +can know whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. +In any event we have already heard it from Göring, and presumably +we shall hear it again from the Defendant Von Neurath, in which +case it is grossly cumulative. I do not think we should waste the +time of the Tribunal with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von +Neurath regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Party was critical +and disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what +would develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party +was of the opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the +policy of the Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the +Catholic and the Protestant Church?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved +of the policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He particularly +supported Bishop Bohr’s efforts to maintain freedom of +religion. He repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries +which had been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion +with Von Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally +and discussed with him the question of the policy toward the Church. +<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span> +I discovered that Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every +effort to represent and carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. +However, he did not succeed because his work was continually +sabotaged, particularly by Himmler and Bormann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath +retired to his estate of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as +Reich Protector with him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich +Protector in Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he +had refused it twice, but finally decided that he must make this +sacrifice. He believed that it was precisely there that he could act +as an intermediary and bring about reconciliation. He had personal +difficulties with Himmler and Frank; he told me of his efforts to +gain better treatment for the Czechs, and of the protests which he +made to Hitler in vain. Once, when I visited Von Neurath in Prague, +I was invited to visit President Hacha, who told me emphatically +how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been sent to Bohemia and +Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and performed in every +respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me that he was +recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs he was +too mild for the Führer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy +SS-leader in that position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to +that post?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: That was Heydrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath’s reason +for resigning?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Evidently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an +Honorary Gruppenführer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained +this—let us say—honor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of +the SS without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, +Hitler told him that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, +Hitler, wanted everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since +Von Neurath had no uniform he appointed him an honorary leader +of the SS. Von Neurath said he did not intend to become one of +Himmler’s subordinates. Thereupon Hitler told him that that was +not necessary; it was merely a question of wearing a uniform.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s +attitude toward war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the +railroad station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called +<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span> +the war a terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. +He said that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. +I understood that during the war he saw the Führer +occasionally, and on each such occasion he used the opportunity to +ask Hitler to consider the idea of peace. That he, Neurath...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not +present at these meetings; how can the witness tell us what the +Defendant Von Neurath said to the Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is +what the defendant told him. That was told the witness by the +defendant directly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness +himself needs only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that +the Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the +Tribunal does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was +told to them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with +any further questions along those lines. I should like to ask only +one more question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did not Von Neurath, with you and +other people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the +Hitler regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on +several occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly +to bring about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other +ministers, but he did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this +Reich Cabinet as a “defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for +ending the war Von Neurath tried to bring about a change of +ministers and the appointment of a Reich Chancellor, which was also +widely demanded. This also failed. During the year 1943 Neurath +became more and more convinced...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing +about what Von Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said +to this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only +preliminary remarks to clarify what is to follow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question? +<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The +question shows the attempts he made to carry out his intentions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, +that is, when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude +was negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, +at the beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete +destruction must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered +the question of how to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him +to end the war. He thought of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me +to discuss the matters with him. Rommel was at that time very +popular in Germany and abroad, and Von Neurath believed that due +to the position he held, Rommel was the right person to replace +Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944, I went to Field +Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel was +just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World +War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion +that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary +bloodshed and senseless destruction...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all +this conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want +it. We will not hear the conversation between this witness and +Rommel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss +this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you +stop him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the +defendant himself, but from the person who was employed by the +defendant to take these steps. That in my opinion has more weight +than if the defendant makes the statement himself. That is why I +asked the witness about it. But it is almost finished now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will +not hear him on these subjects.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, +as far as I know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. +Please, Witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a +letter to Hitler saying that because of the military situation he +believed that it would not be possible to continue the war, and that +he, Rommel, suggested to Hitler that he start political negotiations. +Consequently, as he told me, after his accident Rommel fell from +favor for this reason, and thus Von Neurath’s attempt to end the +war with Rommel’s aid also failed. +<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon +afterwards the end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want +to ask questions of this witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 +(Document Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document +of which an extract has already been handed up to the Tribunal +while I was cross-examining the last witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the +Deutsches Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no +connection with either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection +with Hess. The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due +to the fact that the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at +Stuttgart.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation +and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their +meetings at Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two +organizations; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not +consult the German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it +had its own collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, +as far as I know, created in the year ’32, and...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, +but if you can answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all +a great deal of time. I will repeat my question in case you are not +quite clear about it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations +held their meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection +between the two? Now you can answer that “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say +that the connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of +foreign Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans +abroad, because of its past history.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: A little.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the +book that you have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see +<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span> +reproduced a copy of an article from the <span class='it'>Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt</span> +of 21 September 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, +after its reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. +I want to read just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask +you for your comments.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord +Mayor, Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is yourself presumably; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted +in particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion +in Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the +supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as +representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the +Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning +Germans in foreign countries....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was +for me the representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how +he could have been the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it +is probably true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe +in taking it that the <span class='it'>Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt</span> on the day after that +celebration would accurately report what you said in your opening +address?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not +likely that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not +remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the +deputy of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches +Auslands-Institut as such.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying +there, and you are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing +Hess, and that Hess has been charged by the Führer with the +supreme command of all matters concerning Germans in foreign +countries. Do you understand what you are saying there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but +in practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind +from Rudolf Hess. +<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be +said to concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign +countries, could it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches +Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in +foreign countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will +you look down the page and omit the next...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time +that I made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the +speech was, of course drafted with the approval of the personalities +who were to be welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that +Haushofer was present in that capacity on that occasion and can +merely repeat my statement that as the honorary president of the +Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess having given directives to +the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing +about it, but you were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut +at that time, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the +Institute was a special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was +merely one of my many extra duties to act as president of the +Institute. It is quite impossible for me to remember which personalities +I greeted at the time, and how I did it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering +the particular question I put to you: Were you or were you +not the chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September +1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because +you were a good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power +and was reorganizing this institution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor +of Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the +“City of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition +it had always had very close connection with Germans abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will +you miss out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph +which starts off, “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, +stated the local Party leadership...” +<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: What page is that on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Page 461?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page +462. And it is the third paragraph in the center of the page.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing +Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership +(Gauleitung) is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin +with the new officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t +he—the Gauleiter? We will go on:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans +as its historic right.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you +look now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in +his capacity as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy +of Rudolf Hess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I +will make it quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under +Hess was going to co-operate with your institution through thick +and thin. You appreciate that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: That is obvious.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and +on the second paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated: +‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German +people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we +see that all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are +standing in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for +our German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany +is united.’</p> + +<p>“ ‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a +happy consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that +position has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. +It gives us a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are +bridges for the German Lebensraum.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut +was? +<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans +abroad were bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum +also applied, for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and +Romania and to that extent it is true when he says the Germans are +“bridges” to this Lebensraum, that is, the space in which Germans +live. This has also always been the attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; +to build bridges to the Lebensraum in which these +Germans live.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever +read a book by Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: <span class='it'>Die Auslands-Organisation +der NSDAP</span>? You need not look at that. Have you +ever read that book? A title of that kind?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I do not think so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich +was the personal adviser to Bohle?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the +book that you have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears +on Page 5 of the document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction +of Dr. Emil Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second +paragraph on Page 305, half way down that paragraph, starting:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the +‘City of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the Auslands-Organisation +of the NSDAP assumed protection of this beautiful +city, which also houses within its walls the German Auslands-Institut, +which works in hearty co-operation with the +Auslands-Organisation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, +from 1933 onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in +the heartiest co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical +or scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut +and the Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have +already mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans +had their meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation +between them. There was no co-operation in practical matters since +it was not necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this +book? I want you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether +that is an accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this +is, I beg your pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling +work conducted by the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did +in fact, did you not, assist the foreign organizations in training their +Landesgruppenleiter and other leaders abroad? +<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed +that report. I asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut +assist in training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation +abroad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, +second paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the curriculum +for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as +serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who +run these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend +them.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You still say that that report is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you +one or two very short questions on the evidence that you have given +about the Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a +man of peace, with an excellent, kind character. Do you know that +on the 5th of November 1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler +addressed the leaders of his Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of +that meeting, on the 5th of November 1937?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until +I was imprisoned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you +quite shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among +other things, that the only way out of the German difficulties was +to secure greater living space, and he said that that problem could +be solved only by force. And, having said that, he then went on to +say that he had decided to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You +never heard of that meeting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and +concluded only later that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me +that he had serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was +toward the end of 1937. It was only later that I realized that he +must have meant the conference with Hitler and the attitude +<span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span> +which he took on 5 November; however, it was only when I was in +prison that I heard through the newspapers that such a conference +actually took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a +moment. I just want you to get a picture of what happened at +this meeting, and I quote four lines from the minutes of that +meeting:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably +France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and +were satisfied that this question would one day be cleared +up by Germany.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia +and Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or +6 million people, and that he visualized the compulsory immigration +of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know +that some 4 months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was +giving an assurance to M. Masaryk, and among other things he +assured him, on behalf of Herr Hitler, that Germany still considered +herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration +Convention of 1925? Do you know that he said that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I do not recall it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I +have told you that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who +had been at that conference and had heard what Hitler had said +on 5 November giving an assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months +later in terms of that kind? Can you understand any honest man +doing that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. +I do not know from whom Von Neurath might have received an +order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at +that time. I am asking you now what your opinion is of a man +who can do that sort of thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive +picture of that situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any +circumstances object to this type of suggestive question. It is not +permissible to put such a question to the witness without giving +him the complete picture of how this assurance was given. The +fact is, and it is correct, that in the speech of 5 November 1937, +Hitler for the first time developed plans which were no longer +in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von Neurath, and Von +<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span> +Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or early in +January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out to +him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted +to embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When +from Hitler’s reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler +would nevertheless insist on this policy which would lead to aggression +in the future he submitted his resignation. On 4 February +1938 Herr Von Neurath was permitted to resign. He no longer +participated in active politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, +an invasion of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that +day, Hitler called him...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? +The question was put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man +who had heard the conference of the 5th of November 1937 could +have given the assurance of the 5th of March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, +if I may. The question put by Minister Mastny was whether +any military action against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately +or soon after the invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath +believed that he could, honestly and as a gentleman, answer this +question in the negative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We have to take into consideration the circumstances under +which this statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of +5 November 1937, spoke of the years to come. When he marched +into Austria on 12 March, that is at a time which from 5 March...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have +all this argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion +of a man who had done that. That was all the question that was +asked, and that question is put to credit...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; +no one can answer that question unless he knows in what connection +it was put. Mr. Mastny asked whether the march into Austria +would entail any aggressive action against Czechoslovakia and +Von Neurath answered that question. No more and no less. He +did not want to give an answer regarding the future. The Minister +wanted to know whether in connection with the march of the +German troops into Austria any military actions against Czechoslovakia +were intended. According to the information which my +client had, he could in the given situation answer this question +in the negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible +only if the witness is informed about what I have just said. The +point is not that he declared once and for all Germany will never +march into Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech +<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span> +Minister Mastny’s question: Is there any danger that in connection +with the march into Austria, military measures will also be taken +against Czechoslovakia? This question he could answer the way +he did. Therefore, the question in the form in which it was put +by the British Prosecution is in my opinion not admissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly +admissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the +matter. I ask you just this one further question, so that I make +myself quite clear. You said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, +that the Defendant Von Neurath was well thought of, dignified +and of noble character. Having heard what I have told you, are +you still prepared to tell the Court that you think he is well thought +of, dignified, and of noble character? Is that your opinion now? +I just want to get the value of your evidence; do you see? After +what you have been told is that your opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a +man of distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under +what circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations +prompted him to act this way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of +peace and did all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit +of that kind doing everything possible to avoid war? Is that what +your idea of a peaceful policy is—giving assurance 4 months after +you know perfectly well that the German intention is to overrun +their country? Is that what you call doing everything to avoid war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not +sufficiently understand the essential points and ramifications of +this question to form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things +cannot be as simple as they have been pictured here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of +this matter. We have been told at great length that he disapproved +of Hitler’s policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having +resigned, he was appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia +in March 1939? Do you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of +Czechoslovakia had been overrun, occupied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he +accepted this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to +accept it but later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in +order to achieve his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told +me later, Von Neurath’s personal influence was of great benefit +<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span> +because, as Hacha told me, Von Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had +a balancing and conciliatory effect. As I said before, he was +recalled because he was too mild.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and +we have heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite +unnecessary for you to say it again. Do try to answer my question +shortly. Let me ask you this question. Have you ever thought +that the reason for that appointment might have been as a reward +for his assistance in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia +that had followed so shortly before?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may +mention it, I have read quite a different version in the book by +Henderson, that is, that Von Neurath had been put into that post +so that his international prestige could be discredited. I wanted +to bring in this version in order to point out that there were other +possibilities that might come into question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described +him as a disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The poster was submitted to the witness.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the +Tribunal. It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in +the Czechoslovak report on the German occupation. I will give +Your Lordship the number: Document Number USSR-60.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you see that this is signed by the +Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed +for a period of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This +announcement, however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly +why this was done. Consequently I cannot pass judgment on +the announcement, because I do not know what Von Neurath +proclaimed in it. The announcement does not tell me anything, if +I do not know the reason why the announcement was issued. That +universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have been for +convincing reasons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? +I would like to say this in order to save time. This question +of Czechoslovakia and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, +will, of course, be dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s +case, and at that stage of the proceedings. I will then have the +opportunity to bring the proof that this poster did not originate +with the Defendant Von Neurath. This witness was not in Prague +<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span> +and can relate only things which he did not know of his own +experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him. Therefore, I +believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking up time +unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe +the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness +which, though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, +questions which are based on inaccurately reported facts which +actually occurred in a different manner. I shall prove that at the +time when this poster was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath +was not in Prague and was not informed of what was going on +during his absence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question +today, since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything +about it from his own observation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this +poster was put up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that +he gave no authority for it. That would clear him with reference +to this poster; but what is being put to this witness is: Assuming +that this poster was put up by Von Neurath, is it right to describe +him as a humane man? That is all the cross-examination means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of +this poster. He cannot answer the question correctly if he does +not know the ramifications, if he does not know that this poster +actually did not originate with Herr Von Neurath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by +you to show he was a humane man and had a very good character. +Under such circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the +witness circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that +humane character. That is all that is being done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness +could say would be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot +call it humane.” Any one of us can say that. The witness does not +need to say it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is +inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that +either, for the simple reason that he does not know the circumstances +under which this poster was published. Frankly I cannot see +the purpose of this question, for if the question is put in that way, +every decent individual will say that it is inhumane; but this would +not alter the fact that the witness would be judging facts which do +not exist and which are not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this +is really taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know +<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span> +anything about it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination +to discredit the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. +The point of that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed +to say, this: This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence +on his oath before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, +then it goes down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this +Tribunal from regarding this witness as a man who is in a position +to give reliable evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is +rather to show that this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully +or untruthfully, is certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given +as to the good character of this defendant does not bear investigation—that +is quite clear—and the Tribunal is not saying we are not +entitled to cross-examine as to character. However, I do not think +I need occupy the time of the Tribunal with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square +Garden; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took +place on 6 October.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American +Bund, is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the +auspices of the German-American Bund, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned +by all German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand +of them in New York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united +in one festival committee which organized the “German Day.” I did +not know the composition of this committee in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American +Bund that you made your speech, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee +of the German clubs of New York. +<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members +of the German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the +members of your organization at that time who were active members +of the German-American Bund; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences +with them, both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no +further conferences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members +of your organization were at that time members of the German-American +Bund?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [<span class='it'>To the witness</span>]: I have just taken down that +you have said that was so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Precisely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in +response to a previous question, that many members of your organization +were members of the German-American Bund at the time of +your speech at the rally in Madison Square Garden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean +members of the German Auslands-Institut?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you +making this speech in Madison Square Garden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly +before been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. +I was Lord Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver +the address. Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since +the Swabians furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason +Stuttgart was to be the home city of foreign Germans.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the +Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the +German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many +members of the Institute were also members of the German-American +Bund? Yes or no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; +they were students who had studied in America and returned to +Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these +members of the German-American Bund, who were likewise +members of the Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were +indicted and tried and convicted for various espionage offenses +in the Federal courts of the United States? Yes or no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You never heard that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of +Kappe, but that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you +know some others too, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather +than trying to tell you the answers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please +question me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it +is getting late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you +pronounce it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who is he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in +France. I believe he is a jurist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether +he is a jurist or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one +occasion? +<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean +the Alfred Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped +during the war so that he was not sentenced to death, and was +later released from prison. However, that took place during the +period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know another Alfred Weninger. +There may be two Alfred Weningers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with +12 other comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General +at the People’s Court?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and +Justice in Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum +regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to +have the Alsatians pardoned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people +received temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked +Herr Von Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he +wrote to Hitler that these Alsatians were pardoned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under +a considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know +if the people are grateful for it or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question +the truth of what he might report as a conversation with you, +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him +in June of 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me +what it was about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by +him to have said and I ask you whether you recall having said +that to him, either in the exact words which I put to you, or in +substance. Do you understand? +<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against +National Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, +and which makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals +and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” +or “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will +you please repeat it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in +English by one of our interrogators, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but +I believe that he did not understand me correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just +read to you, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation +of what you said and the substance of your question is not clear +to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest +that you are merely taking this time in order to find out what +answer you want to make. I ask you again whether you said to +Weninger in words or in substance, in June of 1940, the following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil +before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. +They are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out +of it.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made +that statement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when +I tell you that Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have +just told us has every obligation to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made +critical statements, but I do not recall the wording.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer +yes or no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in +this form.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that +statement? +<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to +Weninger in 1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with +Weninger in 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot recall.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at +a moment’s notice recall the date I was there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg +in 1936, in words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad +I am ashamed to be a German”? “Yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, +since in the year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was +a German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement +to Weninger?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement +in the year 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When did you make it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to +Weninger at all, at least not in 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger +or anybody else? In what year did you decide to make statements +like that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one +was no longer proud of Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [<span class='it'>The witness +left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any +other evidence to offer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the +questionnaire of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the +meantime. The Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form +of a questionnaire. I would then like to refer to various documents +<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span> +in Document Book Number 3, but before going into that and to +conclude today’s proceedings, I would like to establish upon the +request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to Volume 2 of the document +book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as the official +representative of the British Government; I therefore read a few +sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93):</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that +you had come here feeling charged with a mission and that +you wished to speak of it to someone who would be able +to receive it with Government authority. You know I am +Dr. Guthrie and therefore I come with the authority of the +Government and I shall be willing to listen and to discuss +with you as far as seems good anything you would wish +to state for the information of the Government.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading +of the Simon minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we +went on for a few minutes or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are +rather long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that +the Prosecution also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination +and I do not believe this would be possible today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-FIRST DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 26 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will +be absent from this session of the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading +of the interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the interrogation +of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not been +possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet. This +witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from +whom I received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness +made a few preliminary remarks which are as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the +Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England +of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. +Therefore, the following statements are valid only for the +period up to 12 May 1941.</p> + +<p>“Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the +Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the +cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in +foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party +members or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was +to be a bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. +Its purpose was to foster and maintain love for and ties with +the distant home country and to keep alive understanding for +the fatherland, as well as to awaken the understanding of +Germans at home for the hard battle for existence of their +compatriots all over the world. The German abroad, through +<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span> +his dignified, upright bearing, was to make himself popular in +the country of his adoption, and thus act as the best representative +of his fatherland.’</p> + +<p>“Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the Auslands-Organisation?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no +such thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; +just as little, for example, as there was a membership in the +Foreign Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the +Reich.’</p> + +<p>“Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each +Reich German Party member the following principle was +printed as a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: +“Follow the laws of the country whose guest you are, let its +people make the internal policy of that country, do not interfere +in this, not even in conversation”?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar +ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If +I am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the +warning even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle +was not observed. This latter is to be ascertained without +great difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession +of every Party member in a foreign country.’</p> + +<p>“Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP +develop any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘ “Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly +used. In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or +sabotage activity. According to its guiding principles, the +Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such +activity.’</p> + +<p>“ ‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign +press was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever +bluff of the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine +amusement. Seriously, no state could conceive that such a +widely known, rather suspect and vulnerable organization +could be suited for any service in the nature of the Fifth +Column. I consider it natural that some individual Germans +abroad had secret missions, services such as other nationals +performed likewise for their fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation +was certainly not the giver of such assignments +nor the intermediary for such agents.’</p> + +<p>“Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the +Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its +activity?’ +<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span></p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of +the Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are +such as those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. +He pointed out again and again, with special emphasis, his +strict instructions that the groups abroad were not to do +anything which could be detrimental to the countries affording +them hospitality, or which could be considered an interference +in the affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also +be that National Socialism was a purely German movement, +not an article for export which one wanted to force on other +countries as suitable for them.’</p> + +<p>“Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation +any directions or orders which could have caused +them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth +Column?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued +any such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, +laid down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity +of the sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’</p> + +<p>“Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of +the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances +interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption +was to be avoided?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the +Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the Auslands-Organisation +abroad in such a way that no interference of any +kind should take place in the internal affairs of the country of +residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were unavoidable +with the then very large number of German nationals +abroad—already amounting to several million—were correspondingly +severely punished.’</p> + +<p>“Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund +für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans +Abroad)?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had +the cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche +are racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship +either voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that +is, had acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance, +America, Hungary, Transylvania, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.’</p> + +<p>“Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland +ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop +any activity which could have given it the appearance of a +Fifth Column?’ +<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span></p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of +the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with +the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have +no insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the +question that my brother could have given the Volksbund +tasks of a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen +within the jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have +corresponded with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund +für das Deutschtum im Ausland.’</p> + +<p>“Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and +instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the +activity of this Bund?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘Directions, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, which my brother gave as to +the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already +stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no +way connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im +Ausland.’ ”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed +on 19 March 1946.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection +with his interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to +submit this cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if +this cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not +yet been translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done +directly, in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United +States): If it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories +but I suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time +to read them, we offer them and if the Court will permit us, have +them translated into the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes +or so to read them and we are not interested in doing it unless +the Tribunal feels that we should.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether +the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has +been translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations +already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the +information office and have heard nothing further since.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal +what the position is?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has +not had a copy of this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. +We suggest that perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of +that until we have had a chance to consider it. +<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, +in substance, statements and quotations taken from books and +speeches of foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, +regarding the history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents +of the Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this +treaty, such as the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the +disastrous economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany +and also for the rest of the world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents +in this book and I should like just to say one or two words +about them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, +including politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions +that are expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, +and with most of them one is familiar and knew them when they +were expressed 15 to 25 years ago.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that +the whole subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope +the Tribunal will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, +as I suggested yesterday, let this book go in at the moment <span class='it'>de bene +esse</span> and that when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he +can adopt the arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen +whom he quotes, if he thinks they are right. He can use the +points as illustrations, always provided the thesis that he is developing +is one which the Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before +it. That will preserve for Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use +these documents subject, as I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but +I suggest that it would be quite wrong to read them as evidence at +the moment. They are merely polemical and journalistic opinions +and directed to an issue which the Prosecution has submitted, and +I do submit, is too remote.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every +advantage for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient +if they were put in without being read at the moment and +were left subject to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered +when all the evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to +make use of in his final speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you +in a moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to +<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span> +say now. Do you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe +would be one which would be acceptable to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir +David Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I +must say that if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties +will arise for the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, +which in their nature belong in the presentation of evidence and +must be heard there, will be postponed until the final speech of the +Defense. This would mean that the defense counsel in his final +speech would be interrupted again and again; that he would have +to argue for the relevancy of his quotations; that perhaps whole +parts of his speech would fall by the wayside in that manner; and +that in that way the danger would arise that the cohesion of the +speech will be broken completely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which +every advocate has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may +not be deemed relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful +way out. But if it is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully +but very strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the +Treaty of Versailles are not relevant to this Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at +great length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which +are raised by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of +political controversy in practically every country in Europe, and +different opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality +of the provisions, especially the economic provisions of the +Treaty of Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of +controversy, but I am saying that it is not a controversy that should +come before this Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all +the quotations from the English statesmen here as a politician over +the past years, and I am sure many people in this Court must have +taken one view or the other, but that is not a relevant issue to this +Tribunal, and, of course, especially is it wrong in my view to put +forward as evidential matter opinions expressed by one side in the +controversy. Every one of these speeches, as far as they were +English, was either preceded by matters to which it was a reply or +was followed by a reply, and I should think the same applies to +those of Senator Borah in the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, +and this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what +is a convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a +relevant issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that +it was better to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of +<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span> +fact had been put before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from +my suggestion, to make quite clear that as regards relevance, the +Prosecution unitedly submit that the rightness or practicality of the +provisions of the Treaty of Versailles is not a relevant matter. The +other argument—I want to distinguish between the two—the other +argument has been adumbrated by Dr. Stahmer as to the actual +terms of the preamble to the military clauses. That is quite a +different point which we can discuss when, as I understand, certain +propositions of law are to be put forward by one of the defense +counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the rightness and +practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic clauses is a +subject of enormous controversy on which there are literally thousands +of different opinions from one shade to the other, and I submit +it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I submit this is not +evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it were an issue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be +that Dr. Seidl could not quote from any of these documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my +premise that it is irrelevant matter, he could not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of +course, leaving over the discussion of whether they are admissible +until all the evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, +I submit bluntly if I may use the word with all respect—that they +are not admissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my +intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document +book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles +is an expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with +that here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather +there is to be brought under discussion:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, +in the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s +Fourteen Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the +<span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span> +general treaty obligations, whether a <span class='it'>culpa in contrahendo</span> is not to +be assumed here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show +whether the opposite side complied with the obligations arising from +the treaty, in order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the +opportunity of establishing—in this way the legal inferences which +Germany might draw from this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants +forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the +Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying +to a question of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said +to have started, has said that the date might be set as far back +as 1921.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by +the last point. I do not understand what you said in the last point +in the least.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy +alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a +decisive part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between +the origin of this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there +can be talk of illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established +which were causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on +the development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were +submitted to the Court to show the growth in membership, to +demonstrate the increase in the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this +evidence was relevant, it is my assertion that also the circumstances +and the facts that first enabled this rise of the Party at all must be +relevant, if only from the viewpoint of causal nexus.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a +journalist after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in +his opinion, the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would +be admissible either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any +other purpose with which this Tribunal is concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated +opinion of a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant +document. But I do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State +Lansing on the coming about of the Treaty of Versailles and his +connection with the history of this treaty must be of some evidential +relevance. What weight attaches to his opinion is a question which +cannot yet be established at this point. This question can be decided +by the Tribunal only when the complete evidence has been submitted. +I maintain further that the opinion of the Chairman of the +<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span> +Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate of the United States on +the Treaty of Versailles, about its formulation, about its effects +within the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution which purportedly +is said to be directed chiefly against the Treaty of Versailles can +<span class='it'>prima facie</span> have value as evidence. The same applies to most of the +other statements quoted in this document book. I would like to call +attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes, the official +financial advisor of the British Government, and to a number of +others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions +of the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those +provisions by the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making +an aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I +have not heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, +however, that by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite +side, under certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could +infer the right to rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of +Versailles with which the defendants are charged. As far as the right +to an aggressive war is concerned, I should not like to make any +positive statements at least until such time as the Tribunal has taken +official notice of the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: +Are you saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by +President Wilson are admissible evidence to construe the written +document of the Versailles Treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, +<span class='it'>per se</span>, are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that +the connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the +Treaty of Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of +causal significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles +Treaty, insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an +unjust treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is +a point which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. +Whether the treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which +perhaps is beyond the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, +however, that the treaty, at least in many of its terms, did not bring +that which the victorious states themselves expected of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a +very fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion +<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> +by Sir David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the +possibility that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision +on the question of whether and how far such documentary material +as that discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to +add to the statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I +agree fully, just a few supplementary words. And I would like to +reply to the very precise question of Your Lordship which starts, +“Do you consider it relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any +repetition—that a very vital point as far as relevancy is concerned +has not been brought out yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that +is the relevancy of the investigation of evidence and of facts regarding +the subjective state of the individual defendant, that is, of the +facts as seen from within.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which +was, considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles, +then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it +from the subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the +opinion of reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted +with an attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his +special viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various +nations and also of those nations which fought against Germany in +the years 1914-18. In order not to be too abstract, I should like to +cite a concrete example:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not +to aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers +rearmament justified, either because the treaty has not been kept +by the other side or because owing to <span class='it'>expressis verbis</span>, or to some +action, it is to be considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive +relevancy whether this defendant with this point of view, which +explains his action, is alone in all the world, or whether the opinion +which guides his action is held by men who are to be taken seriously, +and who belonged to other nations, even to those who in the years +1914-18 stood on the other side and were his enemies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is +not a crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a +charge for the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive +war. If, now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean +and decent views, views which, as stated, were held by such men of +other nations as I have described, and acted conscientiously and with +a clear conscience both as regards international law and international +morals and also as regards the needs of his country, then +this material, which contains opinions, literary statements, speeches, +that coincide with the views of the defendant in question, is not only +of relevant, but of entirely decisive significance. This viewpoint +I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it desires to decide now the +<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> +question of principle which Sir David has just now raised for debate, +and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize. Moreover I am also +now in the agreeable position of being able to agree with Sir David +in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am speaking +now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this +question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as +I am concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is +right in seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal +decides this question at that time, since it will then have a much +larger view on all questions and shades which are important for the +decision. And at this point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively +about them, for I do not want to make any summarizing +speech, but just to treat one aspect of this question of evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): +I should like to add a few remarks to those made by my colleague +Dr. Dix. I request the Tribunal...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many +of the Defense Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. +If Dr. Horn wishes to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared +to hear it, but they are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ +counsel upon points such as this, at this stage, and if any of the +other defendants’ counsel desires to address them, they will decide +now whether they will hear any more or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short +argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide +whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in +this question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to +make only a very brief statement on the legal points.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. +President, I must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, +to what has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this +decision has for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular +interest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>For myself personally I would like to make the following +remarks: The Prosecution...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other +defendants’ counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that +<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span> +you should be heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon +which I am prepared to hear you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I +shall make the last statements on this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital +questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the Versailles +Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely necessary, +in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality of this +treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was signed +under duress. It is recognized in international law that such treaties +from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are +infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts +that serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. +A further question—and if I have understood correctly, this +is Sir David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, +political, and economic consequences of this treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but +I would like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal +documentary facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on +the legal value of the Versailles Treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if +I might deal first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. +As I understood his first main proposition, it was this: That if a +defendant has committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty +and can show that in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated +men in the states who were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty +was so bad that an infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible +argument.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound +argument and baseless, from any principle either of law or of +materiality. Once it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an +infraction is made, and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was +dealing with that, these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to +say that a number of admirable people in the countries which were +parties to the treaty believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty +is there and the person who knowingly makes an infraction is +breaking the treaty, however strong is his support.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He +said that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to +the question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty +was considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing +doctrine of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, +<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span> +can be abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would +not contest that you cannot get examples of that, although they are +very rare and generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence +which is before the Tribunal at the moment is not directed to +that point at all. This is, in the main, contemporary polemic evidence +saying that certain aspects of the treaty were bad, either as regards +political standards or economic standards. That is a totally different +argument from the one which Dr. Dix admirably adumbrated—which +is one which if it came up would have to be faced—that a +treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have been condoned +and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to exist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that +point at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was +mine, I did not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. +But insofar as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very +good answer: that if he seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may +be less because he, that defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, +that is essentially a matter which can be judged by the Tribunal +who will hear that defendant and appreciate and evaluate his point +of view. It really does not help in deciding whether the Defendant +Hess acted because he thought that the Treaty of Versailles was a +bad treaty, to know what the editor of the <span class='it'>Observer</span>, which is a +Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views some twenty years +ago, or the <span class='it'>Manchester Guardian</span> or indeed, with all respect to them, +what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their reminiscences +years after a matter occurred. The subjective point is—this +is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence. The +subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the +view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one +which I submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these +proceedings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles +was signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the +whole consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the +position of the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons +who negotiated the treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain +quite clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred +at the time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence +that is given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, +and indeed of the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles +was accepted as the legal and actual basis on which they must work, +and various different methods were adopted in order to try to secure +<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span> +changes of the treaty, and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the +whole frame work of the Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, +which were signed in 1925, and which were treated as existing and +in operation by the Nazi Government itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be +completely remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the +Charter, for this Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the +Treaty of Versailles was signed under duress.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic +clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully +remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them +at the moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and +I do not want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed +by people of varying eminence and with varying degrees of +responsibility at the time that they expressed them. And while +strongly maintaining the position which I have endeavored to express +with regard to the treaty, I do equally impress my second point: +That to accept as matters of evidence statements which in the main +are made from a polemical standpoint, either in answer to an attack +or in an attack with background of the politics of the state in which +they were made, is simply a misuse of the term “evidence”. That +is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not equally because the +first point is one of primary importance, which I respectfully urge +to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in evidence +matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that they +are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument +is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence +by the Tribunal for that reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United +States): Sir David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that +either calls for disarmament by the signatories other than Germany +or which looks to such disarmament; and, if there is, could you give +us the reference to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the +Military Clauses. That is the point which is usually relied on. It is +about four lines at the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in +quite general terms, it looks to a general disarmament after Germany +has disarmed. Of course, the position was that—I think I have got +the dates right—disarmament was accepted. Whether, in view of +the evidence in this case, it should have been accepted does not +matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that, you may remember, +there were a number of disarmament conferences which examined +that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then existing +disarmament conference. +<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put +the Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you +say “accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called +for had been accepted by Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that +Germany’s response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by +the Allies in 1927, and the Disarmament Commission which had been +in Germany then left Germany under, I think, a French General +Denoue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to +argue is that nothing contained in this folder has anything to do +with that possible issue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean +we will deal with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought +from some words that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one +of the points which we should meet in the general argument on law +which will be presented, which the Defense Counsel...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. +In Book 3 of the document book for the Defendant Hess there +are also a number of citations of foreign statesmen that refer to this +military clause in the Versailles Treaty and in which it is stated that +Germany fulfilled her obligations in the Versailles Treaty, but that +the reciprocal obligations in it for the opposite side were not fulfilled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. I did not +remember any. I have read it through, and there may be some +collateral matters dealing with that, but—and I do not think that +I am doing Dr. Seidl’s great industry in collecting these matters an +injustice in saying that if they do exist they are collateral and the +main point of this is an attack on the political and economic clauses +of the treaty. I hope that I have done him justice. I certainly intended +to do so. That is the impression made on me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, may I report that the +Defendant Streicher will be absent from this session of Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the +injustice of the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under +duress is inadmissible, and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the +documents on behalf of the Defendant Hess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors. Since Volume 3 of the +document book for the Defendant Rudolf Hess is not admissible +as documentary evidence, I am, so far as the submission of documents +is concerned, at the end of my submission of evidence. Now, +we are further concerned only with the affidavit of Ambassador +Gaus, which I have already submitted, and I ask you not to decide +on the admissibility of this document until I have had opportunity +to present arguments on the relevance of it and of the secret +treaty. But I should like to point out that with this affidavit only +the facts and the contents of this secret treaty are to be proved; +and therefore I shall read only excerpts from it, so that other +events and the history prior to the treaty are not to be demonstrated +by me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we understand that this affidavit +of the witness Gaus is now being translated and is going to be +submitted to the various prosecutors. They will then inform us +of their position, and we shall be able to see whether it is admissible +or not, and the Prosecution will likewise be able to tell us +whether they want to have the Ambassador here for the purpose +of cross-examining him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: So we must postpone that until we get the +translations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I had then the further intention of calling the +defendant himself as a witness. In view of his attitude as to the +question of the competency of this Court, he has asked me, however, +to dispense with this procedure. I therefore forego the testimony +of the defendant as a witness and have no further evidence to +put in at this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the Tribunal will now deal with the case against the +Defendant Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Your Lordship, Your Honors, my client, Joachim +von Ribbentrop, had instructed me to make the following statement +for him at the beginning of the evidence: +<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As Foreign Minister for the Reich, I had to carry through +the directions and orders of Adolf Hitler concerning foreign +policy. For the measures of foreign policy undertaken by +me I accept full responsibility.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought defendants’ counsel +knew that the rule which we have laid down is that at this stage +no speeches shall be made, but that the evidence should be called, +the oral evidence should be called, and the documents should be +briefly referred to and offered in evidence. Did you not understand +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I did not know, Mr. President, that one might not +submit a statement on behalf of his client.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has laid down on several +occasions, I think, verbally and certainly once in writing, that no +speeches can be made now, but that speeches can be made at +the time laid down in the Charter. The present opportunity is +for all evidence to be given and for documents to be offered in +evidence, with such explanatory observations upon the documents +as may be necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister for the Reich, Joachim +von Ribbentrop, is, according to the general Indictment and +according to the trial brief of the British Delegation and the verbally +presented special charges, held responsible for all crimes cited in +Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in the session of the International +Military Tribunal of 8 January 1946, described the facts of the +case against my client as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Firstly, the using of his offices and of his personal influence +and intimate connection with Hitler to facilitate the seizure of +power through the NSDAP and the preparation of wars.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, the participation in the political planning, and +preparation of the National Socialist Conspiracy for Wars of +Aggression...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, are you again making a speech or +what are you doing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I am just enumerating on one +page how I plan to arrange my evidence, and I ask to be allowed +to divide it in this way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Secondly, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe adduced the participation +in the political planning and preparation of the National +Socialist conspirators for aggressive war and the wars in violation +of international treaties. He accordingly bears the responsibility +<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span> +for the execution of the foreign policy planned by the political +conspirators.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, participation in and approval of Crimes against Peace, +War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, especially crimes +against persons and property in the occupied territories.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has declared himself not guilty +of all crimes charged against him. To refute the charges made +against him, I will begin now my presentation of evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The honorable prosecutor at the beginning of his statements +quoted from Exhibit Number USA-5, Document Number 2829-PS, +and brought out that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was an +SS Obergruppenführer. The honorable prosecutor asserted that this +rank was not an honorary one. In opposition to this, the defendant +asserts that the rank of an SS Gruppenführer and later of Obergruppenführer, +bestowed by Hitler, was bestowed upon him only +on an honorary basis, because Hitler wished that the members +of the Government should appear on official occasions in uniform, +and the rank of an SS Gruppenführer appeared in keeping with +the official position of the defendant. The defendant neither served +in the SS nor led an SS unit. Neither did he have any adequate +military training and preparation for this high military position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>To demonstrate this I will submit evidence from the defendant +himself as a witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has asserted that Von Ribbentrop, after the +taking over of power, for a short period of time was adviser of +the Party on foreign political matters. This assertion is refuted +by Document 2829-PS which is contained in the document book +in the hands of the Tribunal. I will read Paragraph 3, where +it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Foreign Policy Collaborator to the Führer, 1933-1938.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>This is the first document of the Ribbentrop document book. +According to it, in the years 1933 to 1938 Von Ribbentrop was +only Hitler’s adviser on foreign political questions. With reference +to Document D-472, Exhibit Number GB-130, the second document +in the Document Book Ribbentrop, which concerns an excerpt +from the International Biographical Archives, the honorable prosecutor +claimed that the defendant even before 1932 worked for +the NSDAP, after he had entered the Party service in 1930. The +Prosecution cites Paragraph II, Lines 6-9, of this document, +which says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Following up his connection with foreign countries, he +established new relations with England and France; having +been in the service of the NSDAP since 1930, he knew how +to extend them to political circles.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The statement is not correct. The defendant was until 1932 not +a member of any political party in Germany, particularly not of +the NSDAP. As far as his political views were concerned, he +leaned toward the Deutsche Volkspartei—that is the party of +Stresemann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the year 1932 the defendant came to know Hitler personally. +His views on domestic and foreign political matters brought him...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not want to interrupt you +unnecessarily, but I do not understand what you are doing now. +You seem to me to be stating a part of the evidence which presumably +the Defendant Von Ribbentrop will give, and, if so, when +he gives it it will be cumulative to your statement. Also, you +seem to be referring to documents which have been produced by +the Prosecution and answering them yourself. Well, that is not +what the Tribunal desires at this stage. It quite understands that +at the appropriate time you will make whatever argument you +think right with reference to the evidence which has been brought +forward, on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. But, as +I have already said—I thought quite clearly—what the Tribunal +wants done now is to hear all the evidence on behalf of Von Ribbentrop +and to have offered in evidence the documents upon which +you will rely, with any short explanatory statement as to the +meaning of the documents. And if there is any part of a document +which has been produced by the Prosecution but not cited by them +which you think it necessary to refer to, as explanatory of the +part of the document which has been used by them, then you are +at liberty to put in, to offer in evidence that part of the document +with any short explanatory words that you wish. But I do not +understand what you are doing now except making a speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I was using the opposing fact which +I wish to present against the claims of the Prosecution, because +according to my information and according to my documents, +they do not correspond to the facts. As far as the establishment +of Point 1 of what Mr. President has just said, I would like to +state the following: The health of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +is quite poor at present. This morning the doctor told me that +Ribbentrop is suffering from so-called vasomotor disturbances in +his speech. I wanted to take a part of his evidence statement from +my client by making a statement of it here and thus showing the +position of the defendant to the Tribunal. I do not know whether +the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in view of his present state of +health, that is, his impediment of speech, could make these explanations +as briefly as I myself can. Then, when the defendant is in +the box, he needs only to confirm these statements under oath. +<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is too ill +to give evidence today, then he must give evidence on some future +occasion. If you have any oral witnesses to call other than the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop, then they can give evidence today; and +with reference to the documentary evidence, it is perfectly simple +for you to offer those documents in evidence in the way that it +was done by Dr. Stahmer, in the way that it was done by Dr. Seidl, +and the way in which the Tribunal have explained over and +over again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I had intended to submit documents first and not +to call my witnesses until later. As far as Von Ribbentrop is concerned, +I have learned that his condition has become constantly +worse. I do not know therefore whether at the end of the presentation +of evidence I will be in a position to summon the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop; but I must be prepared for the possibility +that I might not be able to call him. And otherwise I am concerned +with only a very few very general points for rectification.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you cannot give evidence at any +rate and if you cannot call Von Ribbentrop, then you must, if it +is possible to do so, call some other witnesses who will give the +evidence which he would have given. If, unfortunately, it is not +possible to do so, then his case may suffer; but the Tribunal will +give every possible facility for his being called at any stage. If +he is in fact so ill, as you suggest, that he cannot give evidence, +then his evidence may be put off until the end of the defendants’ +case, subject of course to a proper medical certificate being produced.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: If the Court wants then later to hear the defendant, +I will postpone the matter with the request that if I cannot +hear him, that is, cannot hear him fully—for I emphasize again, +there is a speech disturbance—then he can at least confirm the +evidence as a witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may call any of the witnesses; the +Tribunal has not laid down that the defendant must be called first. +You have applied for eight witnesses, I think, in addition to the +defendant and you can call any of them or you can deal with +your documents, but whichever you do, you must do it in the way +which the Tribunal has ordered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then, I will turn now to the occupation of the +Rhineland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 27 February 1936, there was ratified between the French +Republic and the Soviet Union a mutual-assistance pact, the content +of which clearly violated the Locarno Treaty and the covenant of +the League of Nations, and was solely directed against Germany. +At the same time... +<span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have just said that something +or other is against international law. Now, that is not a reference +to any document which you are offering in evidence, nor is it any +comment upon the production of oral evidence. If you have a +document to offer, kindly offer it and then make any necessary +explanatory remarks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then, I wanted next to refer to Document Number 1 +in the Document Book Ribbentrop. We are concerned with a +memorandum of the German Government to the signatory powers +of the Locarno Pact, of 7 March 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: That is on Page 6 of the document book. In +explanation I may add that this memorandum was submitted to +the signatory powers, because between the French Government +and the Republic of the Soviet Union a treaty of mutual assistance +had been ratified and at the same time, the German Foreign Office +received knowledge of a plan which the French General Staff had +worked out and which arranged that the French Army was to +advance along the line of the Main, so that North and South +Germany in this way would be separated, and even to join hands +with the Russian Army across Czechoslovakia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, for the formality of the record, +it is necessary to offer each document in evidence and the document +should be given a number. You have not yet offered any of +these documents in evidence or given them any numbers, so far +as I know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I gave this document the number, Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 1. The number is in the upper right hand corner +of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: And I ask—perhaps I may say this in order to +save time—I ask that all these documents quoted as Ribbentrop +exhibit number be accepted in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, and in the order in which you +quote them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: They will be numbered that way. Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: As to the particulars just submitted on the reason +for this memorandum being lodged, and as evidence of the fact just +cited regarding the arrangement of the French General Staff, I +will call Von Neurath as a witness. I will question him on this +one point, when he is called into the box. In order to justify the +German view, which is contained in the memorandum and which +<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span> +consists in the fact that the Locarno Pact and the League of +Nations covenant were considered infringed upon, I would like to +refer to Page 3 of the document and wish to quote the following—this +is on Page 8 of the document book:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, was this document Exhibit Number +Ribbentrop-1, one of the documents for which you applied and +which you were allowed in the applications?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. This document is concerned with +excerpts from the <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span> (<span class='it'>Documents +of German Politics</span>), Volume 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to stress that this collection of documents was granted +to me at the same time as the two evidence books.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original +document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are not in a position to present +original documents, since the Foreign Office was confiscated by +the victorious powers and with it a great part of the documents. +Then I would have to make an application now that the signatory +powers concerned produce these original documents, for we simply +are not able to. We can only refer to document collections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where does the copy come from?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: This copy, Mr. President, is from the <span class='it'>Dokumente +der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 4, as is shown in the document +book which the President has before him. The document is found +on Page 123 of this document collection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like, Mr. President, to add an explanatory remark: If +the Court is interested in seeing the original, I should have to have +the collection, which is up in the document room now, brought +down. It is in German, and I do not believe that it would be +of any value to the Tribunal at this time. May I mention further...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality +and certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every +document which forms part of the record, whether it is an original +or whether it is a copy; and whatever the document is that is +offered in evidence, it ought to be handed in to the Tribunal and +kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be put in evidence, offered in +evidence, and handed to the General Secretary or his representative, +and then the Tribunal has a full record of every document +which is in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But we cannot have documents such as this, which is a mere +copy of the original document which ought to be offered in +evidence. If it is at the Information Center, then it is quite capable +of being produced here. +<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided that we are justified +in copying documents and certifying to the authenticity in +order that these documents may be submitted as evidence to the +Tribunal. Therefore, we have compared every document with the +original we had on hand, or with the printed copy of the document +and at the end of the document we attested the authenticity of +the copy. This document, certified with my own signature, is in +the hands of the Tribunal, I believe in five copies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn—Yes, Mr. Dodd.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We thought that we might be helpful. We say +that we are willing to accept this quotation from the volume +referred to, and I do think that we did put in some documents +ourselves and asked the Court’s indulgence at the time in something +of the same fashion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think the Court, if I may suggest respectfully, might take this +document on that same basis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have conferred only with Sir David, but I feel quite sure that +our French and Russian colleagues will agree as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is—and, of +course, it is probably only a formal point—that the only document +which is offered in evidence or put in evidence is a copy which +does not contain Dr. Horn’s signature and therefore there is nothing +to show that it is in fact a true copy. Of course, if we had had +Dr. Horn’s signature, we would be prepared to accept that it was +a true copy of the original. What we have before us is a mere +mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which has not been +produced to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I have not had an opportunity +to examine it carefully. We did not get these documents, +by the way, until pretty late last night. We have not had the +usual period of time to examine it, but in any event, I have suggested +it might go in, and if Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by +the President, and later furnish the original copy, it might be +all right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce +to us at some future date the actual document which you signed +yourself, to show that it was a true copy, that will be quite +satisfactory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there +is no document which I have not signed and given in five copies +to be translated. Of course, I cannot also sign all the translations. +This document which is contained in the document book submitted +to the President has my signature in the German text. +<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your +documents in to be translated, in German, with your signature +at the bottom, saying it is a true extract, and you do not know +where those documents are because they have gone into the Translation +Division? That is right, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed +in these documents, to the proper office, in German, and with +my signature. Then that office kept them and had them translated. +From the moment I handed them in I naturally have had no further +control of what happened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may also point out that the document books which we used +were available only in a single copy and must be used by all +attorneys, even now, for their future work. Because of that, +I cannot produce the original for the Tribunal since it is not my +property. That can be done in agreement only with the person +in charge of the document section, Lieutenant Commander Schrader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in the future, you and the +other defendants’ counsel could get your document books ready in +sufficient time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that +you hand in the document book, when you are offering it in +evidence, and then it would be capable of being handed to the +officer of the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility +exists at all, for these <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>—just to use +this example—are available only in one copy for the use of all +Defense Counsel attorneys; I cannot take these books away, if they +wish to continue work with them, in order to submit them to the +Tribunal as evidence. I would not receive them. I receive these +books only to use them, and make excerpts from them, and then +I have to return them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a +certain extract from the book, and all the Tribunal wants is that +that extract be certified, either by you or by some other person who +can be trusted, as a correct extract from the book, and that that +document, so signed, can be produced. It may be difficult to produce +it at the moment because you have handed it in to some official or +to somebody in the Translation Division and therefore you cannot +produce it, but it could be arranged that it should be produced in +the future. I do not mean this particular one, but in the future +other defendants’ counsel can produce their documents certified by +themselves or by some other person of authority.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five +document books of the same type, signed by me, were handed to +the Tribunal. +<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens +to be that they should be handed in, in this Court, at the time that +they are being used, as well as their being handed in to somebody +for the purpose of translation. That is the rule.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But now perhaps we had better get on as we are taking up too +much time over this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have just heard that the German documents which +I signed are being procured from the Secretariat General, so I will +be able to submit them to the Tribunal with signature, in the +German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I should like to continue and explain the afore-mentioned +opinion of the legal consequences of the Pact made between +France and Russia in 1936, and I refer to Page 3, that is, Page 8 of +the document book. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Consequently, the only question is whether France, in accepting +these treaty obligations, has kept within those limits +which, in her relation to Germany have been laid on her by +the Rhine Pact.</p> + +<p>“This, however, the German Government must deny.</p> + +<p>“The Rhine Pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing +peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one +hand, and France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all +time employing military force in their relations to each other. +If, by the conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this +renunciation of war, going beyond the right of self-defense, +were permitted, the political reason for this was, as is generally +known, solely the fact that France had already taken +on certain alliance obligations towards Poland and Czechoslovakia +which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea of +absolute peace security in the West. Germany at that time +accepted in good faith these reservations to the renunciation +of war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and +Czechoslovakia, placed on the table at Locarno by the representative +of France, only because of the self-understood supposition +that these treaties adapted themselves to the structure +of the Rhine Pact and did not contain any provisions on the +application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of +Nations, such as are provided for in the new French-Soviet +agreements. This was true also of the contents of these special +agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German +Government at that time. The exceptions permitted in the +Rhine Pact did, it is true, not expressly refer to Poland and +Czechoslovakia, but were formulated generally. But it was +<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span> +the sense of all negotiations about this matter to find a compromise +between the German-French renunciation of war and +the desire of France to maintain her already existent pact +obligations. If, therefore, France now takes advantage of the +abstract formulation of war possibilities allowed for in the +Rhine Treaty in order to conclude a new pact against Germany +with a highly armed state, if thus in such a decisive +manner she limits the scope of the renunciation of war mutually +agreed upon with Germany, and if, as set forth above, +she does not even observe the stipulated formal juridical +limits, then she has created thereby a completely new situation +and has destroyed the political system of the Rhine Pact +both in theory and literally.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I will omit the next paragraph and will quote from Page 9 of +the document book as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The German Government have always emphasized during +the negotiations of the last years that they would maintain +and carry out all obligations of the Rhine Pact as long as the +other partners to the Pact also were willing on their part +to adhere to this Pact. This natural supposition cannot any +longer be regarded as fulfilled by France. In violation of the +Rhine Pact, France has replied to the friendly offers and +peaceful assurances, made again and again by Germany, with +a military alliance with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively +against Germany. Therefore the Rhine Pact of Locarno has +lost its inner meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical +sense. For that reason Germany also on her side does not +consider herself bound any longer by this pact which has +become void.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In consideration of the Franco-Russian pact and the intentions +of the French General Staff, Hitler had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +come to him in order to question him about the presumable +attitude of England to a possible German reoccupation...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you +not, Dr. Horn? You begin to tell us something about Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted at the phrase “as bound by this +pact which has become void,” in order to bring in the role of +Ribbentrop briefly. On the basis of this pact and of the intentions +of the French General Staff, Hitler then had the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We shall hear that from Von Ribbentrop, +shall we not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to add a few connecting +words to the documents. I can now... +<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: As far as I can understand, the Tribunal +has already explained to Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel, Dr. Horn, +that the Defense is now submitting a document. Although Dr. Horn +does not consider it necessary to state when he deviates from the +document and when he quotes from it, I have had the opportunity +of noting that in the document he has just quoted, numbered +Ribbentrop-1, there is a complete absence of any reference to the +plans of the French General Staff. Among the documents in the +document book submitted by Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel I could +not find any copies of the plans of the French General Staff. It is +therefore quite incomprehensible to me how Dr. Horn happens to be +informed about the plans of the French General Staff, and on what +grounds he refers to these plans while presenting evidence, in +Ribbentrop’s case, since they appear to be completely absent among +the documents to which he refers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what you appeared to the Tribunal +to be doing then was not anything explanatory of the document, but +telling us what Hitler did, and what the Defendant Ribbentrop did, +in consequence of what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You +cannot tell us what is not in evidence. You can only give us +explanatory remarks to make the document itself intelligible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is +accused on account of the conduct of the entire foreign policy. The +Prosecution have presented the foreign political activity as they see +it, and we have been permitted, not to give a speech, but, in connection +with the documents submitted, to present our opposing view, +as the Defense see it. In order to do that, I must refer to certain +facts, documents and quotations. I can never give a complete picture +if I may just submit a document without giving a large frame +to this matter, a certain development in the entire policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting +you to give a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing at +the present moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to +give the complete picture when you make your final speech. It is +intelligible, this document. It is a document which is well known; +it is perfectly intelligible without telling us what Hitler or what the +Defendant Ribbentrop did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Regarding these questions raised by the Russian +Prosecutor, I have already asked for the Defendant Von Neurath +as a witness. I can interrogate him on this point only after the +Defendant Von Neurath is in the witness box. But I can still refer +now to these facts that are counterevidence. +<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that would be his function. If +you are going to tell us what you think the Defendant Von Neurath +is going to say in answer to questions which you put to him, that +would be making an opening statement. Well, that has not +been provided for by the Charter. We must wait until you call +Von Neurath or until you question Von Neurath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then I will read from this document just mentioned, +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 1, on Page 10 of the document book:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The German Government are now forced to face the new +situation created by this alliance, a situation which is made +more critical by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has found +its complement in a pact of alliance of exactly parallel nature +between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest +of the elementary right of a nation to safeguard its borders +and to guarantee its defensive capacities, the German Government +have therefore re-established the full and unrestricted +sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the +Rhineland, effective today.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to accept the entire document as evidence. +Through this step of the German Government certain articles of +the Treaty of Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization +of the Rhineland zone had become obsolete. Since this morning, +by decision of the Court, the taking of a position on the Versailles +Treaty is not permitted, I will omit the corresponding material +from the document book of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and turn +now to the document Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 8, which is on +Page 21 of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I put another question first, Mr. President?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it permitted to submit the official documents on +the Treaty of Versailles that were exchanged between governments +before the conclusion of the treaty? These are purely government +documents and not any arguments on the treaty itself. May these +documents be submitted after the decision of the Tribunal today?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which are they, the one on Page 21?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: This is in regard to the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 3.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It is on Page 14 of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know +what issue in this Trial this document is relevant to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I wanted to explain by it the German opinion of the +Treaty of Versailles. Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 2 is the note of +Germany to the United States that contains the offer for an armistice +and conclusion of peace. And I wanted further to show in the +<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span> +next note again that this offer was one based on the Wilsonian +Fourteen Points. Further, with Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 4, I +wanted to submit evidence that the peace and the armistice were +to be concluded on the basis of the Fourteen Points with two exceptions. +I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop Exhibit...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, +but really this is the issue that the Tribunal ruled on a +fortnight ago when the Defendant Göring, I think, applied for +documents on exactly this issue; and that also, as I understand, +the Tribunal ruled on again this morning. The issue is perfectly +clear; the only issue to which this can be directed is whether the +Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with the Fourteen Points +and if not, was therefore an unjust treaty which comes directly +within the Tribunal’s ruling of an hour ago.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I add something more?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as I and my colleagues have understood the ruling of the +Tribunal today, the only prohibition is against making before this +Tribunal statements on the injustice of the treaty and on the fact +that it purportedly was concluded under duress. We have not understood +the decision in any other way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue this +was relevant, and you said that it was relevant to showing what the +German opinion on the treaty was. Well, these are documents of the +period before the treaty was made, and they seem to be only relevant +upon the question of whether or not the treaty was a just +treaty or not a just treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I personally did not want to demonstrate through +this document either that it was a just or an unjust peace, but only +that it was a treaty which had many legal inadequacies, since the +main treaty was not in line with the agreements of the preliminary +treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the main treaty was not in accordance +with the preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according +to that argument be an unfair treaty. That is the very point +upon which the Tribunal has ruled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I have just omitted +these documents also and said that I will not refer to them in view +of this ruling. I will now turn to Document Number 8.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents +we might break off for 10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not want to take much of the Tribunal’s time, +but in view of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition +of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we +inform the Tribunal of the situation as we understand it, which is +something quite different from the understanding of Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have talked with Colonel Andrus and with one of the Army +doctors in attendance. Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them, +and our understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to +take the witness stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, +but he is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I come now to Page 21 of the document book, and +ask the Court to take judicial notice of the document appearing +under Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 8. It is a copy, again from the +<span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 4, which I turned over, +signed, to the Court. It is the speech of Ambassador Von Ribbentrop +at the 91st session of the League of Nations Council in London, +regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact and the German Peace +Plan. The speech was delivered on 19 March 1936. I refer to Page 3 +of the speech and begin my quotation with Number 5. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint themselves +judges on their own affairs by independently determining +the aggressor, if occasion arises without a resolution +or a recommendation of the League of Nations, and thereby +are able to go to war against Germany according to their own +judgment.</p> + +<p>“This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and +unequivocally evident from Paragraph 1 of the signatory +protocol to the Treaty of Alliance. That means: In a given +case France can decide, on her own judgment, whether Germany +or Soviet Russia is the aggressor. She merely reserves +the right not to be exposed, on account of military action +based on such an individual decision, to sanctions on the part +of the powers guaranteeing the Rhine Pact, namely, England +and Italy.</p> + +<p>“From the point of view of law and realistic politics, this +reservation is meaningless.</p> + +<p>“In terms of law: How will France be able to foresee, when +determining the aggressor herself, what attitude the guarantors +of the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her +one-sided definition? The answer to the question of whether +France would have to fear sanctions in such a case depends +in practice not only on the faithful adherence to the pact by +the guarantors—about which the German Government do not +wish to raise doubts in any way—but also on the most various +prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or +<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span> +improbability of which is not to be perceived in advance. In +addition, however, the evaluation of the relationship between +the new Treaty of Alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot be +made dependent on the treaty relationship between France +and Germany on the one hand and the Guaranteeing Powers +on the other, but only on the direct treaty relationship +between France and Germany themselves. Otherwise one +would have to expect Germany to tolerate silently every +possible violation of the Rhine Pact by France, in confidence +that the guarantors would have to provide for her security. +That certainly is not the intention of the Rhine Pact.</p> + +<p>“In terms of realistic politics: When a country is attacked by +such a superior military coalition as a consequence of a decision, +incorrect because taken in advance in one of the party’s +own interests, it is an empty consolation to obtain its right +in subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned by +the League of Nations Council. For what sanctions could +actually hit such a gigantic coalition reaching from East Asia +to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and +important members and especially militarily strong factors of +the League of Nations that according to all practical considerations, +sanctions would be unthinkable from the outset.</p> + +<p>“Therefore this second reservation dealing with the consideration +of probable sanctions is of no consequence at all from +a realistic political point of view.</p> + +<p>“I now ask the members of the Council to bear in mind not +only the legal and practical political scope of this obligation +of France’s to act independently, but to ask yourselves above +all whether the opinion can be advocated that the German +Government of that time, which signed the Locarno Pact, +would ever have taken upon themselves the obligations of +this Pact, had it contained such one-sided stipulations as have +now later developed.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I now go to Page 26 of the document book, and the same document, +and to clarify the German point of view, I add the following. +I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“But the Franco-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that—in +the German Government’s view of history—a complete +elimination of the hitherto existing European balance and +consequently of the fundamental political and legal conditions +under which the Locarno Pact was concluded at that time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>With this, Germany had expressed the legal basis of her attitude +toward the Locarno Pact and the Versailles stipulations regarding +the demilitarization of the Rhineland. In order to prove her will +to disarm, there is in the same document on Page 7, that is, Page 27 +<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span> +of the document book, an exhaustive and detailed disarmament +proposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, +so that I may later refer to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany’s +reasons for reoccupying the Rhineland. Regarding the role of the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop in the occupation of the Rhineland, I +shall enter upon that when I call the Defendant to the witness stand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the occupation of the Rhineland, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +returned to London, where he was then ambassador. On +4 February 1938 he was appointed Foreign Minister, and from +that time on, conducted the foreign policy along the lines laid down +by Hitler. In proof of this statement I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 10, to be found in the document book. This is a very short +document that I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. It is +an excerpt from the speech of the Führer before the German +Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on 19 July 1940. +I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I cannot conclude this appraisal without finally thanking the +man who for years has carried out my foreign political directions +in loyal, tireless, self-sacrificing devotion.</p> + +<p>“The name of Party member Von Ribbentrop will be linked +for all time with the political rise of the German Nation as +that of the Reich Foreign Minister.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit this quotation to the Tribunal to show according to +what principles the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had to conduct the +foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State +Secretary Von Steengracht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Steengracht took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>ADOLF FREIHERR STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND (Witness): +Adolf von Steengracht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was your last position in the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: From May 1943 I was State Secretary +of the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were your activities? +<span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In order to present my activities in a +comprehensible way, I must make the following prefatory remarks:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From the beginning of the war, the Foreign Minister had his +office in the neighborhood of Hitler’s headquarters; that is to say +in most instances several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. +There he carried on business with a restricted staff. The Foreign +Office in Berlin had duties of a routine and administrative nature. +But above all, its duty was also the execution of the regular intercourse +with foreign diplomats.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Within the limits of this field of duties, I bore the responsibility, +as State Secretary, from May 1943. The molding of foreign +political opinion, the decisions and instructions in foreign policy, +on the other hand, originated from headquarters, mostly without +any participation, sometimes also without any subsequent information +to the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Who determined the basic lines of the foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The foreign policy, not only on its basic +lines, but also usually down to the most minute details, was determined +by Hitler himself. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the +Führer needed no Foreign Minister, he simply wanted a foreign +political secretary. Ribbentrop, in my opinion, would have been +satisfied with such a position because then at least, backed by +Hitler’s authority, he could have eliminated partly the destructive +and indirect foreign political influences and their sway on Hitler. +Perhaps he might then have had a chance of influencing Hitler’s +speeches, which the latter was accustomed to formulate without +Ribbentrop, even in the foreign political field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Were there other offices or personalities, in addition +to the Foreign Office, that concerned themselves with foreign +policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, there was practically no office in +the Party or its organizations that, after 1933, had no foreign +political ambitions. Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign +bureau through which it took up connections with foreign countries +in the attempt to gain its own foreign political channels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty. +For example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, +the SS, the Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the +Propaganda Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the +Nordic Society; further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich +Railways (Reichsbahn) and others. Besides these offices, the +immediate entourage of Hitler and personalities like Himmler, +Goebbels, and Bormann had an influence in the shaping of foreign +policy. Göring, too, as I see it, had perhaps a certain influence, +<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> +but only until 1938—at any rate, in matters of foreign politics, +scarcely later than that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop make efforts to prevent such +influences or to exclude them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: From my own observation, I can give +only the following judgment: Almost every one of those persons, +who had never before lived in foreign countries and who, as an +occasional traveling salesman for the Third Reich, in peacetime, +or after the occupation of a foreign country, had eaten well in the +capital of this or that foreign country, considered himself an +unrivaled expert on this country. They all had a predilection for +bringing their enlightenment and discernment to Hitler. Unfortunately +the further they were removed from actual conditions, the more +they were in contradiction to the political requirements and necessities, +and especially, unfortunately, the more so-called strength +was shown and the more they stood in contradiction to the elementary +feelings of humanity, the more they pleased Hitler. For Hitler +regarded such statements and representations as sound judgment, +and they had sometimes an irreparable effect, and formed in Hitler’s +mind, together with his so-called intuition, the start of some +fundamental idea. To the possible objection that it should have +been easy for an expert to criticize such an opinion or view, I +should like to point out the following: As long as the future +German Ambassador in Paris was still a teacher of painting, Hitler +read his reports with interest; but when he became the official +representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly thrown unread +into the wastepaper basket. Himmler’s reports, the slanted opinions +of Goebbels, and Bormann’s influence played, on the other hand, +a decisive role, as did reports from agents which could not be +checked and which carried more weight than the opinions of experts +on the countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for relations +with all foreign countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to remark further here +that I have not yet answered the second part of your question, +namely, regarding the elimination of this influence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With Hitler’s methods of work, these so-called counterinfluences +simply could not be eliminated. Against this “organized disorganization” +Ribbentrop waged an unmitigating, bitter war, and that +against almost all German offices. I should like to state further +that at least 60 percent of his time was devoted to these things alone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for the relations +with all foreign countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In peacetime, yes. +<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did the position of the Foreign Office change with +the outbreak of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. In point of fact, the Foreign Office +lost its competency toward the country concerned at the moment +when the German bayonet crossed the border. The exclusive right +to maintain direct relations with foreign governments was eliminated +in all occupied territories; in most instances even the right to have +a representative of the Foreign Office whose post was for observation +only and without competency. This is particularly true for +the Eastern Territories and for Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Where Ribbentrop made the effort to maintain, in spite of the +occupation, a certain degree of independence of a country, as, for +example, in Norway, this activity of our diplomats was termed +weak, traitorous, stupid, and those responsible had to stop their +work at once, on Hitler’s orders, and disappeared from the Foreign +Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In general the changed position of the Foreign Office during the +war is best characterized by Hitler’s statement: “The Foreign Office +shall, as far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end +of the war.” Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign Office to about +20 to 40 people, and it was even partially forbidden to form or to +maintain any connection with the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Foreign Office, as such, and its officials were detested by +Hitler. He considered them objective jurists, defeatists, and cosmopolitans, +to whom a matter can be given only if it is not to be +carried out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was there any foreign policy, in a traditional sense, +in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No; at least, I never noticed anything of +it, for Hitler had in effect made the statement: “Diplomacy is defrauding +the people. Treaties are childish; they are respected only +as long as they seem useful to the respective partners.” That was +Hitler’s opinion of all diplomats in the world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did the Foreign Office have any influence in the +Eastern territories and the territories that were under civilian +administration?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: T have already touched on this question. +I have already said that in the territories in which there was a +military government or a civilian administration, a representative +of the Foreign Office—if he was tolerated at all—was tolerated +only as an observation post, at any rate had no functions; that was +the rule.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think I would be going too far if I went through the condition +in every country. The situations varied. +<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you consider Von Ribbentrop a typical National +Socialist or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop was, in his whole attitude, no +typical exponent of National Socialism. He knew extraordinarily +little of the dogma and doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself +only personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly +obedience, and he stood under a certain hypnotic dependence +on Hitler. However, I cannot characterize him as a typical exponent +of National Socialism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was Hitler a man who was accessible to suggestions +and objections?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said +still to have been; but during the course of years he shut himself +off more and more from expert objections and suggestions. From +the time that I became State Secretary, I saw him only twice on +official occasions. I can thus speak only on the success or lack of +success of our work. In the course of my activities, covering almost +2 years, I can now recall almost no case in which he agreed to one +of our suggestions. On the contrary, it was always to be feared that +by some suggestion of a personal nature he would be led to take +violent action in an opposite direction. The basic trait of his character +was probably lack of confidence, and this bore unprecedented fruit. +Thus, experts and decent people who tried to influence Hitler to +their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion, in an altogether +vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures who incited +him to take violent measures, or who voiced their suspicions, +unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were +then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even +halfway normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a +reasonable opinion voiced only once, the influence of that man could +be forever destroyed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory +viewpoints in respect to the contradicting persons?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general +terms. I have already shown it in my previous answers. First of +all the reaction depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood +of the Dictator at the time. It was also a matter of importance as +to who contradicted and how much strength or weakness he had +already shown or seemed to have shown. But what the atmosphere +was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following case, shortly +after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by Ribbentrop’s liaison +agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the +Führer, and reported on Germany’s prospects, as far as the +<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span> +Führer saw them affected by Roosevelt’s death, and he drew +up a very hopeful picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the +opinion that such a view was not justified and remarked as +much cautiously to Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called +me a spirit who demoralized everyone, who trampled on the +happy moods and hopes of every decent person. I was forced,” +Hewel reports, “to make a special trip to see Goebbels and to +ask him to keep the matter to himself. For if he had informed +the Führer of my attitude, Hitler would have merely pressed +a button, and called Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security +Service, and had me taken away and shot.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How do you explain the fact that so many people +remained in Hitler’s circle, although they could not agree with him +on basic matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained +in their positions although at heart they disapproved of Hitler’s +methods of government and, indeed, were inimical to those methods. +There are various reasons for this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power +according to the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the +strongest Party in the Reichstag. The officials employed had no +reason at all to retire from service on account of the change of +government. In consequence of the change to dictatorial government +and the completely different concept of the State which the +change of government involved, the individual suddenly found that +he was no longer allowed to take a position of his own concerning +this regime. The notorious reign of terror began. Everywhere, in +the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings, and in restaurants +there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for pay, were +willing to report everything they heard.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest +consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved +anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed +themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases +of the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore +had no effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment +vacated was filled by an especially radical man. Many people +realized this and remained at their posts in order to prevent the +development that I have just described. The great number of +atrocities committed or ordered by Hitler or Himmler have led +many foreigners to the conclusion that the German people as a +whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least had knowledge +of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even in +high government positions did not learn details of these matters—or +the extent to which they were carried on—until the war was +<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span> +over. Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler +delivered in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and +which I learned of for the first time here. This speech directed +that his special assignments—that means the actions against the +Jews and the concentration camps—were to be kept just as secret +as had been the events of 30 June 1934, of which the German +people have only now learned the authentic story.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small +group, to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who +carried out this unparalleled terror against the German people. But +those who thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be +thanked for the fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was +not renounced, that tens or even hundreds of thousands of English +or American airmen and prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate +prisoners, those seriously wounded, were returned during the +war to their families in their home countries; Greece in her dire +need received food; exchange was stabilized as far as possible, as +in Belgium and France, and militarily pointless destruction ordered +in foreign countries and in the home country could be in part +prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the principles of human +justice, in some places at least, remained alive. These circles were +discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact that no foreign +power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for breaking +off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the outbreak of +war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties and +even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist +Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National +Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more consideration, +understanding, and respect from foreign countries than +ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or +its integrity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants, +officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and +how could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants +of the nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would +they, above all, by taking such a step be useful to their country +and to humanity? Would they have frightened Hitler or even +warned him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political +nature to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no +official position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it +was a heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful +conditions again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of +the capitulation of the King of the Belgians, I suggested: +<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic +basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, +Poland, and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any +rate to have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries +as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time +Hitler considered such plans as premature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter +of 1942-43 on the same subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked +out very concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and +independence of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in +addition, a far-reaching economic collaboration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving +as reason the fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation +not favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign +of weakness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the +Russian campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck’s +statement about the danger of preventive wars?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that +he was very concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to +preventive war, he had stated to Hitler: “The good God does not +let anyone look at His cards.” I know too that Ribbentrop made +efforts to bring our experts on Russia to Hitler in order to explain +to him the situation there and to advise him against a war. Hitler +did not permit these people to see him, so far as I know. Only +Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short audience. He, +who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically rejected +the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and the +reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his +own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly +without letting him speak a word.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that +witnesses might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness +appears to the Tribunal to have read practically every word he has +said. That is not refreshing your memory with notes. That is +making a speech which you have written out beforehand, and if +that sort of thing goes on the Tribunal will have to consider whether +it is necessary to alter its rule and adhere to the ordinary rule, +<span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span> +which is that no witness is allowed to refer to any notes at all +except those made at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions +with the witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made +by the witness independently and without my knowledge of the +exact contents. I shall now ask the witness to answer my questions +without making use of any means which I do not know. I do not—that +I want to emphasize once again—know these answers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his +influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the +Church and the Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently +with Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about +the policy toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had +occasion to speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he +explained to me again and again when he returned from Hitler: +“Hitler cannot be spoken to on this point. Hitler says that these +problems have to be solved before he dies.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any +knowledge of the military planning?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he +was completely in the dark in military affairs. So far as the Foreign +Office was concerned, it had no ideas whatever of strategic planning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were the relations between Ribbentrop, +Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The relations between Ribbentrop and +the aforenamed gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There +was a perpetual fight between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop +would have been Himmler’s first victim if anything had happened +to Hitler. A constant struggle and feud, I should like to state, +went on between these men with an exceptionally sharp exchange +of letters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was the relationship in general between the +highest Party and Reich offices?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The relationship in the individual departments +naturally varied according to the character and the origin of +the department chiefs. But one can say that the relationship was +bad throughout, and, especially, that reciprocal information, so +urgently necessary for state business, practically never developed. +It was almost more difficult for one minister to discuss a question +with another minister by telephone than to have had the Angel +Gabriel himself come from heaven and speak with one of us. Even +on the most important and essential matters, a factual discussion +<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span> +could not take place. There was, in other words, practically no +connection between these departments. Moreover, they were very +different, both in their character and in their ideas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is anything known to you about objections on the +part of the Vatican, above all regarding the Polish clergy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I heard about that later, and there must +have been two protests concerning the Catholic Polish clergy. These +two notes were submitted by the Nuncio to the State Secretary of +that time. The then State Secretary turned these over to Ribbentrop +according to regulation, and Ribbentrop in his turn presented them +to Hitler. Since the Vatican had not recognized the Government +General, and accordingly the Nuncio was not competent for these +regions, Hitler declared when these notes were presented to him:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“They are just one blunt lie. Give these notes back to the +Nuncio through the State Secretary in a sharp form, and tell +him that you will never again accept such a matter.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Were these notes then dealt with by the Foreign +Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Sharp and precise instructions were then +issued that in all cases in which representatives of countries brought +up matters which were not within their authority, whether in conversations, +or notes, <span class='it'>note verbale</span>, memoranda, or other documents, +these were not to be accepted, and verbal protests were to be turned +down sharply.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop prevented +the shooting of about 10,000 prisoners of war after the terrible air +attack on Dresden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I know the following: Von Ribbentrop’s +liaison man with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement. +He informed me that on a suggestion by Goebbels, the Führer +intended, as reprisal for the holocaust of Dresden, to have English +and American prisoners of war—I believe mostly airmen—shot. I +went immediately to Ribbentrop and informed him of this. Ribbentrop +became very excited; he turned pale as death; he was in fact +almost stunned and thought it was impossible; picked up the phone +and called up this liaison man in person in order to verify this +report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentrop got up +immediately and went to Hitler, came back, I think after half an +hour, and told me that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw +this order. That is all I know about this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know anything about the convocation of an +anti-Jewish congress?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the convocation of an anti-Jewish +congress I know something; I believe our liaison man with +<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> +Hitler informed us that, on a suggestion of Bormann, Hitler had +ordered the calling of an anti-Jewish congress through the Rosenberg +office. Ribbentrop did not want to believe this; but nevertheless +had to accept this too as true, once he had spoken with our +liaison man. Then, since on the basis of this decision we could do +nothing more officially to prevent the thing, we nevertheless worked +our way into it, and we made efforts by a policy of hesitation, delay, +and obstruction to render the convocation impossible. And although +the order was given in the spring of 1944 and the war did not end +until April 1945, this congress never actually took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Could you observe whether Von Ribbentrop often +adopted a stern manner with his staff, for reasons of state, although +he sometimes thought entirely differently?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: This would be passing a judgment. But +I believe that I must affirm this: Thinking that he was being loyal +to Hitler, Ribbentrop—it seems to me—in those cases when he went +to Hitler with a preconceived opinion and returned with a totally +different view, tried afterwards to explain to us Hitler’s view. This +he always did with special vehemence. I would assume then that +this was contrary to his own most personal original ideas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop during the course of the war +ask that Rome and Florence be spared?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. He did speak +with Hitler on these subjects.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in +the <span class='it'>Reich</span>, or perhaps the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, dealing with lynch +justice?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop +when he was reading a paper and was again very excited. He +asked me if I had read the article yet, this shocking article by +Goebbels. It was an article on lynch justice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels +about this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press +chief who had the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against +this article. But to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest +was useless since the article had not only been inspired but, I +believe, ordered by Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to +be done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view +of the trend of this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article +vehemently, because it comprised an offense against international +<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> +law and thus made us depart from international law in another +field. Moreover, it appealed to the lower instincts of man, and both +in internal and external policy did great damage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred +thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We +therefore insisted that under no circumstances should such things +appear in the press again. I must regretfully state, however, that +we had a very difficult stand in this matter, especially since low-flying +enemy craft often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians +in the streets, that is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder +weapons. And our arguments that in our field we wanted to observe +international law under all circumstances, were not taken into +account at all either by most German officers, or above all by Hitler +personally. On the contrary, in this case too we were regarded +again only as formal jurists. But later we did try, as much as we +could, with the help of military offices, to prevent the carrying out +of this order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Günsberg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Günsberg. +I know, of course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg +in the Foreign Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg +received, as far as I recall—I did not at that time do any work +at all connected with these matters—received from Ribbentrop the +assignment of following, with a few people from the Foreign Office +and a few drivers, the fighting troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, +the foreign missions, for instance in Brussels and Paris, and so +forth, that stood under the protection of the protective powers, +should not be entered by our troops. And at the same time Günsberg +was charged with protecting the files in the Foreign ministries that +were of foreign political interest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the conclusion of the French campaign, Günsberg, as far +as I recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, +but was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had +received a uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these +countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How and when did Günsberg’s job end?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events +in Günsberg and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning +of the Russian campaign, Günsberg, so far as I remember, reported +again for duty and said that he intended to do the same thing in +the East, and Ribbentrop told him:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Yes, that is very good. You may go with a few people to +the army groups and see whether anything of interest for us +is happening there and also see to it that when we approach +<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span> +Moscow the foreign embassies <span class='it'>et cetera</span> are not entered, and +that the documents are preserved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the +Foreign Office and apparently received orders from other offices. +Then, as I later heard, he had a large number of men under him +and had many automobiles which he could not have received from +the Foreign Office any more than he could have received a military +uniform from the Foreign Office so he was apparently working for +other offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any +rate not in a military capacity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop +heard that he had undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally +to call immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, +did not want to have Günsberg any longer, and at that time I told +Obergruppenführer Wolff that I should like to point out that we +wanted nothing more to do with Günsberg. See to it that you keep +him with the Waffen-SS along with all his subordinates. That is +all I know about the matter of Günsberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination +or should I continue to put further questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost +immediately, we had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer +with this witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-SECOND DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 27 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when +did you meet him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political +sense, only personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; +probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working at +the time in the Protocol Department in the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, +I had no political experience with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von +Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances the French +franc should be sustained against inflation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time +when I was not yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic +attitude towards France and all occupied territories was that under +all circumstances their currency was to be preserved as far as +possible, or rather should be preserved by all means. That is why +we often sent gold to Greece in order to attempt to maintain the +value of the currency there to some extent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this +gold there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered +the rate of exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek +merchants who had hoarded food to a large extent, became +frightened and threw the food on the market, and in this way it +was made available to the Greek population again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest +orders not to undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but +to deal directly only with their governments?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is +basically correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we +had no functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no +power to confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of +other agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the +<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span> +foreign governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly +forbidden us to support any direct measures concerning an occupied +country which were carried out by other departments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to +put to this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): +Witness, are you well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the +period during which you were working in the Foreign Office and +particularly during the time you were active as State Secretary in +the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several +years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some +time and re-established contact with him when I became State +Secretary in the German Foreign Office. Then I was continually +associated with him in an official and unofficial capacity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of +your activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports +which Von Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports +directly to Von Ribbentrop—which may have been possible; I do +not know—I received them weekly through official channels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous +refusals Von Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, +in April 1939, on the day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an +acute danger of war arose in the Southeast?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary +and also had no political position, so that I am not acquainted with +the events of that period. But today I have the impression that he +took over that position after the Italians had occupied Albania. And +he himself told me later that at that time there was danger that the +Italians would advance further into the Balkans, possibly causing a +conflict with Turkey, as a result of which world peace would have +been endangered. For that reason he had decided at the time to +accept the post. Exactly on which day that was, I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr +Von Papen’s efforts toward peace?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von +Papen always strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly +considered that it would be a great disaster for Germany and +the world if war were to break out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made +during the war towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any +<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span> +annexations regardless of the military outcome and completely re-establishing +the sovereignty of occupied territories, in short, to +achieve, by means of reasonable renunciation, a bearable status for +all European states?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von +Papen always worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions +which would have re-established full sovereignty for all +countries, and so that no encroachment nor damage, material or +otherwise would be inflicted on any foreign countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen’s attitude even at the +time of the greatest German military successes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this +respect never changed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to +establish peace held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered +a disagreeable outsider in that connection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss +it with Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by +Hitler and other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge +that peace would be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party +existed in Germany and the necessary credit for negotiating abroad +was lacking?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about +April 1943 or May 1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about +the whole subject, since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. +At that time he very clearly voiced the opinion to me which +you have just sketched. It was quite plain to him that foreign countries +would conclude no peace with Hitler and the methods he +employed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment +accuses the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous +opportunist. You, Witness, know the defendant from the reports and +from all the official relations the defendant had with his superior +office for a number of years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, +get the impression that this characterization of Von Papen is +correct, or can you say, on the strength of these reports and these +official relations, that Von Papen appears to you to be a man who +always tells the truth, even when that truth is disagreeable to his +quite unpleasant superiors, and even when the voicing of that truth +involves personal danger for him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the +best evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely +<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span> +eliminated from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from +the government, then he became a private citizen and only in the +greatest emergency was he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen +made himself available only because he said to himself, “I have +still got a certain amount of credit, I am a good Catholic, and +accordingly I represent an attitude which is opposed to all inhumanity, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Perhaps I can, through my intervention, exercise +some influence in that direction.” I myself never attended a meeting +or a conference which took place between Hitler and Von Papen, +but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I often heard +that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many things +which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that through +his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you +have stated that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on +Dresden, intended to issue an order according to which thousands of +prisoners of war were to be killed in reprisal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, +that all you have said about this matter is information from, +or based on information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal +knowledge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only +know that our liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone +and told me that Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or +more British and American prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and +that Hitler would agree or had agreed. I immediately reported this +to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there at once and told me after half +an hour that the order had been withdrawn. About Field Marshal +Keitel I know nothing at all in that connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator +of that order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently +came from Goebbels according to the information which I received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Who?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop? +<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do +with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me +up and told me that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of +military men?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation +of military men.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High +Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one +question. Did you, as State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office +regularly inform military offices, for instance, the Army High Command +or the High Command of the Navy, with reference to pertinent +matters of German politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United +Kingdom): Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop +was against the persecution of the churches, was against +the persecution of Jews, and did not know what was going on in the +concentration camps. You have told us that he was not a typical +Nazi. What are the qualities of a typical Nazi?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean +a man who fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines +of National Socialism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but +he really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and +never bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated +in large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little +about the people and the mood of the people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean someone +who was persecuting the churches?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By “a typical Nazi,” do you +mean a man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler +considered it right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter. +<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share +in persecution and extermination of Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That +was limited to a certain circle of people. A large number even of +fanatical Nazis knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated +them and would have repudiated them, had they been properly +informed of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew +nothing of them yourself. Is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and +because I read foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact +with the opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration +camps. In all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I +intervened. But regarding the things which I have heard here now, +I knew nothing at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another +matter. You have told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in +the occupied territories. Your words were that “the Foreign Office +lost responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet +crossed the frontier.” Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the +German bayonet crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole +right to negotiate with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond +that, in most countries, the Foreign Office did not have the right to +have even a diplomatic observer without authority, particularly in +Norway and the Eastern Territories.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no +right to have an observer there, and that direct relations with +occupied territories were withdrawn, is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories +the Foreign Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the +government, since there was then either a civil administration in +those countries or a military government with auxiliary command +offices and a military administrative head, and that these offices +themselves then approached the foreign governments and their +executive organs in the countries occupied at that time. Consequently +one can no longer say that the Foreign Office had the sole +right to negotiate with the governments. But in some countries, as +in the North and the East, we no longer had any of our people at +all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our observers +<span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span> +from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on. +However, we did not do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador +reporting direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret +Field Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically +important documents and securing and seizure of public +property; further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property +on the basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn’t +that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only +since 1943 had I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I +understood your question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the +opinion that the Secret State Police and the German executive +organs in France were under our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked +you if the Minister Abetz had not got those duties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating +any French property or carrying out any action against the +Jews. No orders of that kind went through my hands during my +time, and he could...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: [<span class='it'>Handing the document to the witness.</span>] Will +you look at Document 3614-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on +the 4th of February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, +signed by Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces (OKW). It reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador +and after my report has decreed as follows:</p> + +<p>“I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to +the witness:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State +Police in connection with the impounding of politically important +documents.</p> + +<p>“7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of +private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of +instructions specially given for this case.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Then the concluding paragraphs:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“II. The Führer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador +Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all +<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span> +political questions in Occupied, and Unoccupied France. Insofar +as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz +will act only in agreement with the Military Commander in +France.</p> + +<p>“III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander +in France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as +heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks +from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these +matters.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You +have told us that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like +to know why this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not +have the task of confiscating property.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Why did you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive +powers, and he was expressly forbidden to intervene in French +internal affairs. He could, therefore, address himself exclusively to +the French Government, and if the French Government did anything +by means of their executive power, then that was a transaction on +the part of the French Government but never a confiscation carried +out by Abetz.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The +question is why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task +of advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the +impounding of politically important documents, did you not say so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my +hands, since I did not become State Secretary until May 1943. This +is an order of 3 August 1940. But here we are concerned only with +an official directive addressed to Ambassador Abetz.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop’s personal +adjutant, weren’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. +I was only...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned +with technical matters. At that time I never presented a +political report to him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a +directive to Ambassador Abetz and this directive was completely +outdated by actual conditions. Because advising the Secret Field +Police...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only +personal adjutant and not acting in political matters? +<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until +May 1945. Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded +with him, and during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought +against the measures which were carried out by the Secret State +Police anyway. It was a bitter struggle and he was personally +threatened in all possible matters. One can talk about advice, but +whether people heeded him—he had no power—that is quite another +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about +occupied territories applies only after 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak +only about the period after 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of +Jews. You have told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a +policy of delay, prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress +in 1944; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of +persecution of the Jews.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. +[<span class='it'>Handing the document to the witness.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to witness.</span>] Now you have got a photostat there. Will +you look at Page 4 of the German—that’s the first page of the +English. That is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of +anti-Jewish action in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom +of Page 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black +square at the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th +of April 1944, Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and +it is addressed to practically every German legation and mission +abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports +to be signed by you; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you +the first paragraph to refresh your memory. “The Reich Foreign +Minister...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. PHILLIMORE: “...has ordered the creation of Information +Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under +the leadership of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to +deepen and strengthen the anti-Jewish information service +abroad by the incorporation of all experts of the departments +and working units of the Foreign Office who have an interest +and take part in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, +in close co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office +which are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German +missions in Europe.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the +Foreign Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich +Security Main Office—that’s Himmler’s office, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of +Reichsleiter Rosenberg. That department just up above “Inland II,” +that is the Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called +Wagner and the assistant chief, Von Thadden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the +policy of persecution of the Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I +also say, as I have already said during earlier interrogations, that +even the holding of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not +have been directed against the Jews because what was happening in +Germany was all taking place under the seal of secrecy and no one +was informed in any way. The Jews disappeared. But if there had +been an international congress, one would have been forced in the +first place to bring up the question: where are these Jews anyway? +What is actually happening to these Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put +off an anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the +world, but you were quite prepared to set up an organization in the +Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely +different problems here. The one problem is this: There were +<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span> +offices in Germany which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish +measures. These organizations also reached abroad and there, +without the knowledge and without the participation of the Foreign +Office, did away with the people in foreign countries. Consequently, +an improvement and a policy guided to some extent into normal +channels could exist only if some German department had really +assumed responsibility for these things at that time. For we did not +hear of these matters; we always heard the complaints which we +received from foreign mission heads about events which took place. +But we had no means of control. If I applied to the inner German +offices...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish +policy, this department?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different +matters here today. The anti-Jewish congress had been +ordered. The fact that Rosenberg’s office was holding an anti-Jewish +congress...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The +question was: Was this organization, referred to in this letter, set up +to control the organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the +question. Can you not answer that by “yes” or “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise +general control since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt +with in Rosenberg’s office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this +organization of the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler’s order we had to contact all +German departments and archives in order to collect all the material +there, and we attached importance...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, +wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that +we get an idea in this way of what was actually happening to the +Jews, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and therefore we drew in people from all offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was +actually happening and out of your own files, but I just want to +put this to you:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was +simply because you did not want the world to know. You had not +the slightest objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in +Germany. +<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You will see there a letter from Rosenberg’s office to the Foreign +Office, signed by Bräutigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is +marked at the bottom of Page 32.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Bräutigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn’t he, +Witness? Was Bräutigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg’s office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No. Bräutigam was, I think, in the +Foreign Office in 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously +been working on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had +been transferred and was now in the Rosenberg office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is +referring to a conference with Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, that +is, the chief of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, +and he sends you a copy of an agreement made at Tighina in +Romania on the 30th of August 1941 with the request for acknowledgment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error +here. This letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary +in May 1943. I therefore know nothing about this matter. I should +like to remark...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked +a question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements... I have +already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and +Romanian General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on +Page 38 of the German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement +they made:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews +across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore, +be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a +deportation to the east is possible after the end of operations.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then there’s a note on the file on the next page of the German, +still on Page 27 of the English:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“According to information from Director General Lecca, today +110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia +into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he +could learn, this action is based upon an order issued by +Marshal Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation +of these Jews.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that +letter sent to the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement +for the first time today. Nothing of this entire affair...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do +you doubt that that letter and that agreement enclosed with it +would have been shown to the Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary +of State Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; +and I fought a bitter battle against him although I was not +called upon to do it, because he wanted to introduce National +Socialist methods. Whether he submitted this matter to Ribbentrop +or not I cannot decide.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you +were the State Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German +text, Page 20 of the English.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage +you have just read mean on Page 27: “Bucharest, 17 October 1941 +(Signature illegible)”—and below—“To be discussed with Vice +Minister President Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October +1943”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. “Bucharest, +17 October 1943” and then follows the next letter. The previous part +is a note on the file.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file +on Bucharest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the +following letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion +of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Now would you look at Page 31 of the +German, Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document +sent to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn’t +give the date in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the +head of the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March +’42 and marked with a foreign office stamp “Received 13th of +March 1942...” +<span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 +of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather +inconvenient documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date +at the bottom and then works up to 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Now, this is a communication from +Von Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department +Inland II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated +12 October 1943, and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And +he encloses a letter signed by Müller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, +to all German police authorities abroad. You will see that +it goes to the commander of the Security Police in Prague, The +Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Kraków, +Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October ’43. That is after you had +become Secretary of State, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the +subject is the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the +sphere of German power:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain +in the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called +home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the +following countries may now be included in the evacuation +measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, +Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey.</p> + +<p>“Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet +take place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, +a temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald +for male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration +Camp Ravensbrück for Jewesses and children.</p> + +<p>“The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following +dates:</p> + +<p>“a) for Jews with Italian citizenship, immediately;</p> + +<p>“b) for Jews with Turkish citizenship, on 20 October 1943;</p> + +<p>“c) for Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned +above, on 10 October 1943. +<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span></p> + +<p>“A special application for protective custody is not required +for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the concentration +camp headquarters are to be notified that the transfer +to the concentration camp is taking place in keeping with the +evacuation measures.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then there are arrangements about baggage. And if you +look at 31-e, you will see at the foot of Page 22, on the English, that +that had been signed by Müller and then was signed again by a +clerk of Himmler’s office. And then on the next page of the English, +still on 31-e of the German, Himmler’s office sends it to the Foreign +Office, to Von Thadden, on 2 October.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, did you not see that document when it got to the Foreign +Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, I see this document today for the +first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You were the State Secretary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. This obviously concerns a measure +which was ordered by another office. Within the German Reich the +Foreign Office had no executive powers at all and no possibilities +and consequently...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: No executive powers, but it was sent to +you for information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That was sent to us, this affair, solely +for our information, and it was not given to me, this affair.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You had a departmental liaison with the +SS, a Mr. Von Thadden. Was he not a competent official?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The exact content of this affair I do not +even know now, because I have not read it through at leisure. I +can imagine only the following in reference to this whole matter: +The question whether the Jews who were in Germany could be +returned to their home countries was discussed for a long time. +This, I think, is what we are concerned with here?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t think we are interested in your +imagination. Either you know or do not know. I asked you whether +Von Thadden was a competent official.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I have not seen this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. Was +Von Thadden a competent official?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Von Thadden was a man from the +Foreign Office who knew his job.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, knew his job. And do you not think +that as State Secretary he ought to have shown you this document? +<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He should have done that, certainly, if this +matter was not arranged in another office, and I was completely +excluded from the anti-Jewish action. Also instructions about anti-Jewish +actions abroad never went through my office. I pointed out +yesterday, at the beginning of my statement, that many matters +were arranged directly in the highest places, and that the Foreign +Office also was not notified afterwards, and orders in these matters...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a document you were informed +about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Müller sent it to the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And you sent it to your legation at Bucharest?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He ought certainly to have put that +before me. But I did not see it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: And if you just look again at the letter, +you notice how Müller’s instructions start. He begins, “In agreement +with the Foreign Office...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Where does it say so? Unfortunately I +have not found it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: At the start of the letter: “Subject: Treatment +of Jews of foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.” +And then he begins: “In agreement with the Foreign Office...” +Does that just mean in agreement with Mr. Von Thadden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that this type of thing went +to the competent experts, and since this concerns a basic matter it +was put directly before Herr Von Ribbentrop. I request that Herr +Von Ribbentrop should be asked whether he knows of this matter +or not. I have not seen this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a matter of such importance that it +could not have been agreed with the Foreign Office without Ribbentrop +being consulted; isn’t that the case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In my opinion, I would never have +decided alone on this matter if it had been put before me. I am of +the opinion that it was an affair which would have to be put before +Von Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Good. And, of course, Von Ribbentrop was +one of the most ruthless persecutors of Jews, wasn’t he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: I am going to read you a short passage +from a conference between the Führer, Ribbentrop and the Hungarian +Regent, Horthy. This is Document D-736, which was put in as Exhibit +GB-283 by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, to the Defendant Göring. This +<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span> +was a meeting at Klessheim Castle on the morning of 17 of April +1943. And you see the minutes are signed by Schmidt.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: The question of Jews was raised:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who +considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of +activity, even during the World War; in exactly the same way +as in England, sentences for rationing offenses, and the like, +now chiefly concern Jews. To Horthy’s counterquestion as to +what he should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived +them of almost all possibilities of livelihood—he could not +kill them off—the Reich Foreign Minister declared that the +Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration +camps. There was no other possibility.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then, you see, the Führer goes on to describe them as tuberculosis +bacilli. Now, in the face of that document, do you still say +that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution +and extermination of the Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday already that Herr Von +Ribbentrop, when he was with Hitler...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Never mind what you said yesterday. I +am putting it to you now, today. You have now seen that document. +Do you still say that Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution +and extermination of the Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Here, too, I should like to make a distinction +between the real instincts of Von Ribbentrop and what he said +when he was under Hitler’s influence. I said already yesterday that +he was completely hypnotized by Hitler and then became his tool.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, became his tool. And from then on, +he was prepared to do anything that Hitler wanted and was as +violent a Nazi as anyone; isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He followed blindly the orders given +by Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And to the extent of conniving at any +and every atrocity, isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Since he had no executive powers he +personally did not commit these cruelties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other chief prosecutors want +to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You testified yesterday that you did not consider +Ribbentrop to be a typical Nazi; is that correct? +<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Göring made speeches at every type of +meeting and fought for the seizure of power, and accordingly he had +a completely different position in the party than Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I think you can answer my question “yes” or +“no.” We are trying to save time as much as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi according +to the same standards that you were using with Ribbentrop, +yes or no?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: This question one cannot answer in that +way with “yes” or “no.” I am trying every...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You answered it that way with respect to Ribbentrop, +didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Göring was a peculiar type of person. I +cannot class him with the ordinary Nazis, as one usually expresses it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In other words, you don’t know whether you think +he is a typical Nazi or not, is that what you want the Tribunal to +understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical Nazi one understands the +“average” Nazi. Göring is a unique person and one cannot compare +his manner of living with the other National Socialists.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, are you acquainted with all of the gentlemen +in the box there in front of you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell me which of those individuals +you consider to be a typical Nazi, according to the standards which +you applied yesterday to Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I do not want to interrupt your +cross-examination, but want to say that there is too much laughter +and noise in Court, and I cannot have it. Go on, Colonel, with your +cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you understand my last question? Please name +those of the defendants in the box whom you consider to be typical +Nazis, on the same standard which you yesterday applied to +Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am convinced that here the witness +is making a decision which in my opinion should be made by the +<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span> +Court at the end of the proceedings. That is an evaluation which +the witness cannot make.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: This is the subject that was brought up by this +very Counsel yesterday with respect to Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it a perfectly proper +question. They understand that the phrase “a typical Nazi” was +used by the witness himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And please just give us the names and not a long +explanation, if you can.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday that by “typical Nazi” +I meant people who are familiar with the dogma and doctrine. I +want to add today that by “typical Nazis” I mean further those +people who during the time of struggle represented National Socialist +ideology and were propagandists of National Socialism. Rosenberg’s +book is known, Herr Frank, as President of the Academy for German +Law is known, these are really—Hess, of course, too—and these are +people whom I want to put into the foreground very particularly +because by their writings and so forth and by their speeches they +became known. No one ever heard Ribbentrop make an election +speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But you are not answering my question. Am I to +assume from that that in your opinion Rosenberg, Frank and Hess +are the only persons whom you could characterize as being typical +Nazis, according to your standards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Well, shall I go through the ranks of the +defendants to give an opinion on each one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Precisely. Just give me the names. No, I do not +want your opinion. I want to know under your standards which of +them you consider to be typical Nazis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I have already stated the standard before. +It can be proved by whether the people unreservedly represented +the National Socialist ideology in words or at meetings and in this +respect I named the prominent ones.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you consider all of the others not to be +typical Nazis? Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. Then I would have +to go through them individually.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I have asked you to do that three times. Will you +please name them individually?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I also see Herr Sauckel. Herr Sauckel +was Gauleiter and was active as a leader in the National Socialist +<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span> +movement. Then I see the Reich Youth Leader, who educated the +Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who else? Just give me the names. Do not give +these explanations, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Well, I think that with that I have +pointed out the typical representatives of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, how about Streicher?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not see him here, or I would have +answered in the affirmative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In other words, you consider him to be a typical +Nazi under your standards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but please do not attribute his +abuses to all National Socialists.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, while you were working with Ribbentrop, do +I understand that you knew nothing about the murders, tortures, +starvations and killings which were taking place in the concentration +camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: By the fact that foreign diplomats applied +to me, and by the fact that I was informed by opposition elements +in Germany, and from enemy propaganda, I knew of the existence +and some of the methods. But, I emphasize, only a part of the +methods. I learned about the total extent and degree only in internment +here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you know that priests were being tortured +and starved and killed in concentration camps while you were +working with Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, I heard nothing specific regarding +individual things that occurred there, and if that had happened or +has happened to priests, then I would consider the only authentic +information to be that which the Nuncio or the Vatican had given +me; but that did not occur. But in spite of the fact that, as I said +yesterday, the Vatican had no jurisdiction, I took care of all cases +based on humanity, that is, all humanitarian cases. I took care of +them, and always strove to handle them successfully. I handled 87 +cases in which my activity threatened to bring about my death. I +intervened in hundreds of cases, and thus saved, or at least improved, +the lives of thousands and thousands of people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: If you don’t confine your answers directly to my +questions, it is very difficult to get through and to save time. Now, +will you please try to answer my questions “yes” or “no,” if possible, +and make your explanations short. Do you understand? +<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I understand perfectly. As far as I can, +I shall of course do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you know that nuns were being tortured and +starved and killed in concentrations camps, while you were working +with Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You did not know either about what was happening +to priests or the nuns or to other inmates of concentrations camps? +Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I have just said that I have intervened +in hundreds of cases, in which I was approached by the Nuncio even +when it concerned Jews, for whom the Nuncio was not authorized to +act, and in cases in which the Nuncio was acting on behalf of Polish +clergymen, also a sphere for which he was not authorized. In spite +of the fact that I had strictest orders not to receive such cases, I +did receive the cases; and, in spite of the “Nacht und Nebel” decree, +I always gave information when I could get any information. Details +other than those which I received officially I did not have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And who gave you the instructions not to do +anything about these complaints?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: These orders came directly from Hitler +and came to me through Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: How do you know?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I have already said yesterday that the +two notes which before my time were passed by State Secretary +Von Weizsäcker to Hitler through Ribbentrop were rejected with +the remarks that they were blunt lies and, apart from that, this was +not within the jurisdiction of the Nuncio; these notes were to be +returned and in the future such documents were not to be accepted. +Furthermore, there were to be no discussions and that applied, not +only to the Nuncio, it applied to all unauthorized actions particularly +when foreign diplomats intervened in matters in which they +had no jurisdiction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But do you want the Tribunal to understand that +you went ahead and tried to do something about these complaints, +whereas Ribbentrop did nothing; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I tried to settle within my own sphere +of jurisdiction all cases which, according to instructions, I was not +permitted to accept at all. But if a case here and there was of +primary importance, or where the lives of several people could have +been saved, I always applied to Ribbentrop. In most of these cases +Ribbentrop took the matter before Hitler, after we had invented a +<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span> +new competence, so that he could not raise the objection that the +Nuncio had no jurisdiction. Upon this, Hitler either absolutely rejected +them or at least said that the police would have to investigate +the case first. This presented the grotesque picture that in a humanitarian +matter or an affair which under all circumstances had to be +handled as foreign politics, the Foreign Minister no longer made +the decision, but the Criminal Inspector Meier or Schulze who only +needed to state “Undesirable in the interests of state security.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did Ribbentrop obey the instructions which you +say were received from the Führer not to do anything about these +complaints or did he not? “Yes” or “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question since I do +not know how many orders he received from Hitler and whether +he obeyed in each individual case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, you have been testifying that you received +instructions not to do anything about these complaints from the +Vatican; is that not correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, and I did not obey them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I am now asking you whether Ribbentrop +obeyed those instructions or whether he did not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: But he was in a higher position. What +orders Hitler gave to Ribbentrop privately I cannot say since I do +not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Where did you receive your instructions from?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: From Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Ribbentrop has testified under interrogation that +he knew nothing of what went on in any of these concentration +camps until the Führer ordered Luther to be placed in a concentration +camp. Do you know who Luther was?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who was he, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Luther was an Under Secretary of State +of the Foreign Office who was the head of the “Deutschland” department.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And when was he placed in a concentration camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That must have been about February 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact, is it not true that Ribbentrop +had a whole deskful of complaints from the Vatican about +killings, atrocities, the starving of priests and nuns, to which he +never made any reply at all, even an acknowledgment? +<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, what happened before +May 1943, I do not know. As long as I was State Secretary, I never +failed to accept a note or failed to answer it. On the contrary, I +accepted all notes and attempted, as I said before, to assist these +people. Regarding conditions before my term of service, I cannot +give you any information because I do not know them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I am not talking about that time; I am talking +about the period immediately before and following your appearance +there in ’43. Now I want to read you from...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I am sorry. I would gladly answer your +question if I knew anything about the matter. During my time—I +cannot say anything about it because I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I will read to you from the interrogation of +Ribbentrop and ask you whether what he says conforms with your +recollection of the facts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I should only like to say that until May +1943 I was not active politically, so that from my own knowledge I +cannot make a statement about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, as I read the testimony to you, you will find +that the interrogation refers to communications which remained in +his desk unanswered for an indefinite period of time. Did you have +access to Ribbentrop’s desk? Did you know what was in it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Did you receive from the Vatican a +communication dated 2 March 1943 calling your attention to +a long list of persecutions of bishops and priests, such as imprisonment, +shooting, and other interferences with the exercise +of religious freedom?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I do not recollect at the moment, but I know that +we had protests from the Vatican, that is, we had a whole +deskful of protests from the Vatican.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that conform with your recollection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That was, I must unfortunately say +again, before my time. I cannot know whether he had a whole +drawer full of things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: If they had remained in his desk from March until +May, then you would know about them; isn’t that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I? No. I was not Herr Ribbentrop’s servant, +who went over his chairs or drawers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So that your testimony is that you knew nothing +about any protests from the Vatican other than those which you +have already referred to? +<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Apart from those I have mentioned, I +know nothing about protests. I emphasize again that during my +time in office I accepted them all and answered them all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I will read you further from the interrogation:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘Did you reply to these Papal protests?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I think there were very many we did not reply +to—quite a number.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that conform with your recollection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly, that is correct. That was in +accordance with the instructions which were originally given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: By whom?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler’s instructions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: To whom?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly to Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Those are the instructions which you say that you +were violating on the side, is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Which I did not obey, for otherwise I +would not have been allowed to accept the notes from the Vatican +in all those cases where the jurisdiction was questioned; nor would +I have been allowed to accept, for example, protests from the +Swedish Ambassador regarding mistreatment in Norway, which, +however, I also accepted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I will continue to read from the interrogation:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘Now, do you mean to say that you did not even +read a protest from the Vatican that came to your desk?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘It is really true. It is so that the Führer took such +a stand in these Vatican matters that from then on they did +not come to me any more.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that conform with your recollection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That Ribbentrop did not receive the +protests any more? Yes, that is correct, that tallies with what I said, +that in all these cases, where we could not accept them, I tried to +settle them on my own responsibility, since it was against orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And in the course of reading these complaints from +the Vatican which went unanswered, both you and Ribbentrop +learned full details of exactly what was going on in the concentration +camps, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: There was never anything about that in +these notes—the ones I saw—there was never anything about the +treatment in them. Instead they were concerned only with complaints +asking why the death sentence was ever imposed, or why +<span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span> +the clergyman was ever arrested, or similar cases, or the closing of +churches or the like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I do not want to take the time of the Tribunal to +read to you the documents which are already in evidence. I am +referring to Document Numbers 3261-PS, 3262-PS, 3264-PS, 3267-PS, +3268-PS and 3269-PS, but in those documents—I am sorry, sir, 3269 +is not in evidence. But in those documents, Witness, are set forth +the details of numerous individual and collective cases of just what +went on in concentration camps. You say you were not familiar +with any of those matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, I do not think that I +expressed myself in that way. I gave you to understand that everything +communicated to me by foreign diplomats I do, of course, +know. In other words, if detailed reports were received during my +term of office, then of course I know it. I never denied it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What you said, Witness, was—at least what +I took down and understood you to say was—that nothing was ever +mentioned in the notes about the treatment in concentration camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: But I remarked with reference to the +previous question, when the question was put generally as to +whether I knew about conditions in concentration camps and the +ill-treatment, I said that I knew everything that had been reported +to me by foreign diplomats, by people of the opposition, and what I +could learn from the foreign press. In other words, if these documents +contained details during my time in office, then I know that +too. But may I ask the date of the documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: There are many documents with many dates, which +can be obtained, but we don’t want to take too much of the Tribunal’s +time. What I want to find out is whether or not you and Ribbentrop +did not know all about the murders, tortures, starvations, and killings +that were taking place in the concentration camps, and which were +the subject of constant and continuous protests from the Vatican, +which Ribbentrop has testified were not even read or acknowledged? +Do you understand that, Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I understand that. I knew nothing at all +of the ill-treatment in concentration camps to the degree and in the +bestial way that I have heard about here. I must strongly protest +against the suggestion that I had heard things like that through the +Vatican at that time. Also, I am convinced that Herr Von Ribbentrop +had no idea of the details as we have heard them here and as they +have been shown in the films.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Isn’t it a fact, Witness, that if you had followed up +any of these complaints from the Vatican which Ribbentrop has +<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span> +testified were ignored, you would have found out everything which +was going on in the concentration camps to the last detail? “Yes” +or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, that is not correct. I said yesterday +already that perhaps the key to it can be found in the speech made +by Himmler on 3 October 1943, in which he said that the action +against Jews and the matter of concentration camps were to be +kept just as secret as the matter of 30 June 1934. And the great +majority of the German people will confirm the fact that until a +short time ago they could not discover anything at all about these +events. If I went to Gruppenführer Müller or other officials I was +always told that everything in those concentration camps was +functioning beautifully and that there could be no question of ill-treatment. +Then I insisted that the foreigners, particularly the Red +Cross, inspect a concentration camp, and the Danish Red Cross was +taken to the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt. After that inspection +took place—this was a camp for Jews—the Danish Minister +came to me and told me that contrary to expectation everything had +been favorable there. I expressed my astonishment and he told me, +“Yes, our people were there, there was a theater there, and their +own police force, their own hospital, their own money; the thing is +well-run.” I had no reason, therefore, to doubt that it was true. But +I myself could get no idea of the true conditions from any German +department, since they would certainly have been afraid to tell a +member of the Foreign Office anything about it. But I want to +emphasize again that we really had no idea of the atrocities and +such things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Why in the world should they be afraid to advise +the Foreign Office of these atrocities? Had the Foreign Office ever +done anything to discourage them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In all matters which were violations of +international law we attempted to bring the case to the attention +of the Red Cross in one way or another. We did this particularly in +all matters relating to prisoners of war and if anything appeared to +be wrong we drew the attention of the Swiss Delegate to it, on our +own initiative: “Go to this place and see what is going on.” And in +this case too, if I had gone to the Swiss and told them in confidence +that this and that has occurred in the concentration camps, Switzerland +and the Red Cross would probably have interfered, which could +ultimately have led to unpleasant measures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think we ought to have an +adjournment for 10 minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I have only a few more questions.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So far as you know, after Ribbentrop had received +this deskful of complaints from the Vatican, which he neither read +nor acknowledged, did Ribbentrop take any steps or do anything to +find out whether those complaints were justified and true, or did +he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the complaints made before +my time, I have no idea.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I am asking you about any complaints that were +received from the Vatican that ever came to your attention, with +particular reference, of course, to the deskful to which Ribbentrop +himself has testified. Do you know of any steps that were ever taken +by Ribbentrop in connection with complaints received from the +Vatican about the atrocities taking place in concentration camps? +Please try to answer “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I recall he submitted complaints +of this sort to Hitler, when he had the opportunity, and then waited +for Hitler’s order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: All right. And when Hitler told him to pay no +attention whatsoever to these complaints, he, as usual, did exactly +what the Führer told him to do, namely, nothing. Is that correct, +so far as you know?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, he obeyed Hitler’s orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And did nothing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: If that is how the order read, he did +nothing, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, didn’t you tell the Tribunal that is what the +directive from the Führer was, to pay no attention to these complaints? +“Yes” or “no,” please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And so, I say, Ribbentrop, as usual, did nothing +about any of these complaints after the Führer instructed him to +disregard them. Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I could not quite understand that question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I say after Ribbentrop received instructions from +the Führer to disregard these complaints from the Vatican, Ribbentrop, +as usual, did what he was directed, namely, nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I assume so, except for those cases where +he nevertheless tried again and then received the same answer. I +also know that he once appealed to Himmler and requested on +principle that the actions against the Jews should not be carried out; +and he proposed that Jewish children and women should, I believe, +be turned over to England and America. +<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you also know what reply he received to that +suggestion, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know the answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, you are certainly familiar with the fact that +no such thing was ever done, are you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That it was never carried out? I did not +understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: The suggestion which you claim that Ribbentrop +made to Himmler. That suggestion was never carried out, was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand; in what way not +carried out? So far as I know—Ribbentrop appealed directly to the +foreign countries at that time. I also do not know what answer he +received at that time, at least not in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, so far as you know, nothing ever came of that +suggestion, correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: No, nothing came of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you know that Ribbentrop +and Himmler were not on good terms anyway, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: That was a matter of common knowledge to everybody, +wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, the enmity became greater in the +course of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So far as you know, did Ribbentrop take bromides +every day?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That I do not know. He...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You never saw him taking any?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: It could be; I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, did you ever see him taking any, or did he +ever tell that he was taking them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I remember now that he took some +sort of red substance but I did not pay particular attention to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do we have anything to do with whether he +took bromides?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, your Lordship, we will, because in his interrogations +he claims that his memory as to many of these events has +been obscured or removed by the over-use of such medicine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right. +<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, Witness, were you incarcerated at one time +at a place known as “Ash Can”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Outside of Luxembourg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? I cannot remember it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Near Luxembourg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Locked in a refuse can? No, I do not +remember.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: After you were taken prisoner, where were you +incarcerated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Mondorf.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: For how long a period of time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In Mondorf altogether 11 weeks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And at that time were numerous of the defendants +in this case also incarcerated there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And while you were there you were free to have +conversations with some of the inmates?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you did, from time to time, have such conversations? +Right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I was not together with them all the +time, because I was transferred to another camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, in the course of your conversations with one +or another of the inmates there, did you make the statement which +I am about to read to you, either in exact words or in substance? Do +you understand the question? “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion +of decency and truth. The conception does not exist for him.” Please +answer “yes” or “no.” Did you say that, Witness, did you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I should be grateful if I could hear that +exactly again what I am supposed to have said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now remember, I am asking you whether you said +it either in the exact words or in substance. Do you understand that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not precisely understand the German +translation of your question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you now understand it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand. I did not exactly +understand the German translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, but do you understand my question, namely, +that you are to say, whether you used these exact words or some +other similar words? I will now read it to you again. Do you +understand? +<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I would be grateful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and +truth. The conception does not exist for him.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot recall that I ever made such a +statement. I would have to know to whom I am supposed to have +said it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement, or is it +simply that you can’t remember whether you did or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot remember having said that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is it possible that you did?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: It could be that I made such a statement, +in some connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very good.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the other prosecutors wish to ask any +questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the +U.S.S.R.): To save time, I shall restrict myself to a few questions +only. Insofar as I can understand the translation of your testimony, +which you submitted yesterday, you testified to the fact that besides +the Ministry for Foreign Affairs many individuals and organizations +had influenced Germany’s foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Tell me, which of the defendants in the present +Trial whom you see in the dock attempted to influence and did, to a +certain extent, influence Germany’s foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy was, of course, after the +beginning of the war...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you here and now not to make any +declaration on Germany’s foreign policy, but to indicate precisely, +in the form of a reply to my question, which of the defendants in +the present Trial attempted to influence and did influence Germany’s +foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The basic lines of foreign policy were +determined solely by Hitler. The fact that we had occupied many +countries and in these various countries had occupied the most +varied positions...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: We know all about that. I ask you to indicate by +name, which of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to +influence and did influence Germany’s foreign policy. Is my question +clear to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy, as I stated yesterday, was +in its broad outlines determined by Hitler alone; but those people +who were assigned to special fields naturally exercised some +<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span> +influence in one respect or another. For example, some one who had +a special assignment concerning the police, carried out police measures; +some one who had to take care of labor problems conducted +labor affairs. The same is true of other sectors.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: You still do not answer my question. I ask you to +indicate, regardless of the form and extent of his influence, which of +the defendants in the current Trial attempted to influence, and did +influence, in one form or another, Germany’s foreign policy, and this +apart from representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you are asking this question +in relation to Russia; as the Foreign Office no longer had jurisdiction +after the entrance of German troops into Russia...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I request you to understand my question thoroughly +and to answer which of the defendants, and in what form, regardless +of concrete facts of foreign policy, attempted to influence this foreign +policy of Germany and did, in effect, so influence it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. As regards Russia, the Eastern +ministry was competent for these questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: No, not as regards Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In Norway Terboven laid down the +policy. Quite naturally he influenced Hitler in his attitude toward +Norway and Norwegian problems. In the same way the individual +chiefs of the administrations in the individual countries exerted +influence depending on how close they could come to Hitler with +their reports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want you to make speeches; we +want you to answer the question. You weren’t asked who influenced +the foreign policy, but which of the defendants influenced foreign +policy. You may say none, or you may say some. It is a question +that you must be able to answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I would assume that Rosenberg had +something to say regarding Russia, Frank had something to say +regarding Poland, Seyss-Inquart had something to say regarding +Holland. Other matters touched only special sectors. Naturally the +SS had something to say; the Wehrmacht had something to say, also +the various other offices and they naturally all exerted a certain +influence but only a certain influence. However, the basic policy was +conducted solely by Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Do you not wish in this connection to name the +Defendant Göring?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Göring carried on the Four Year Plan +and in this capacity he naturally also exercised a certain influence +on Russia. +<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: What did this influence consist of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: There again I must say that I and the +Foreign Office had nothing to do with Russia, and that we were +strictly forbidden to intervene in Russian affairs. In the sphere of +propaganda and the press we were in no way permitted to become +active. For this reason I am especially badly informed on Russian +affairs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Did the Defendant Göring have any influence in +other questions besides the Russian question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand the question in +German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Besides the Russian question, did the Defendant +Göring exercise any influence on other questions in the sphere of +foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I would say that until the year 1938 he +certainly had influence over Hitler in matters of foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: You have stated in your testimony that in July +’44 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in preparations for +the anti-Jewish Congress which, it was assumed, would be held in +Kraków. Will you please answer this question briefly, “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Do you know who were the candidates for honorary +membership in this congress?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Probably there were many, Ribbentrop +among others, as far as I still remember today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Who else from among the defendants?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I really cannot say. As far as I remember, +Rosenberg and a large number of other leading personalities, but I +cannot recall their names any longer. Naturally there are documents +on the subject, so that it can be ascertained without trouble.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever +to protest against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary +members of this congress?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly +took over this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to +take any active part in this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have +recently testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and +Himmler were hostile.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations. +<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed +between Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained +this contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their +work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no +working contact such as would have been considered right in a well-organized +state. Of course, now and then there were matters somewhere +that concerned both of these men, and to that extent they did +have contact, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, +exactly, did it represent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that +Ribbentrop or Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides +that, we had a liaison man in the Foreign Office for the Reichsführer +SS Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility +which, as you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second +question I answered. In every normal state it was the case that the +ministers saw each other at least once a year and exchanged +opinions. This, however, did not take place, since, as we have already +heard today at some length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to +a great extent and the activity of one man touched very closely on +the activity of the other. Therefore some connection had to be +established whether one wanted it or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and +Ribbentrop never even met?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. +It might have been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by +chance, both Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the +same time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business +contact between them at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with +Document Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as +evidence to the Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement +between Himmler and Ribbentrop regarding the organization of +intelligence work. Are you familiar with this agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop +was evidently closer than you wished to describe. +<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I +wanted to give you any impression other than the one that actually +existed. This refers to Hitler’s order of 12 February 1944. On the +basis of this order Himmler took charge of all activity abroad +without the participation of the Foreign Office, and after he had +become the successor to Canaris, through this order he secured a +predominant position abroad. And if the Foreign Office in one way +or another had not tried to contact this organization, then the +Foreign Office would have had no influence at all even in foreign +countries. We had to fight vigorously over this document, for on +the basis of this document Himmler was obliged for the first time to +communicate to us also the information that he brought to Germany. +Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about them. +That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But +so far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler’s +order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an +agreement until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That +must be approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes +effective at the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put +into practice or hardly put into practice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with +your reply and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come +in contact with Kaltenbrunner?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? +Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: On what questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for +example, the Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who +because of the Nacht und Nebel decree had been deported from +abroad and about whom we were not allowed to give information, +I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner and pointed out to him that +this order was inhuman. As a favor Kaltenbrunner then frequently +gave me information; and I, contrary to the orders, transmitted this +information abroad because I considered it justified for humanity’s +sake. Those were the main points of contact which I had with +Kaltenbrunner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation +with him on the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the +Gestapo in a concentration camp without any concrete charges +presented against them? Please reply to this question by saying +“yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted +by an American interrogator, you stated that, although these +policemen were eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very +badly treated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through +the Danish Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment +consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who +were interned in a concentration camp without any concrete charges +being presented against them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from +Denmark. When I learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the +same day and asked him under all circumstances to treat these +people as civilian internees or as prisoners of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my +question. What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist +of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you want to know whether +Kaltenbrunner is personally responsible for it and to this I would +have to tell you the opposite. I am...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. +You must understand what the question is: What was the bad +treatment? Either you know or you do not know. If you know, you +can say so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of +these prisoners died.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I +was informed by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep +their uniforms and had to wear concentration camp clothes, that this +concentration camp clothing was too thin and the men frequently +died of inflammation of the lungs, also that the food was insufficient. +I did not learn any more at the time. They were also flogged.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across +the activities of the Defendant Sauckel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel’s activities +only insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad +were brought into Germany by force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which +both you and Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned +<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span> +this fact in the course of your interrogation prior to the opening of +the current Trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the +course of this interrogation: “But the measures adopted for recruiting +people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: In the session—I did not understand +the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 September +1945—I am quoting verbatim: “But the measures adopted for +recruiting people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description.” +Do you remember your testimony?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, +if only in brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures +adopted by the Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported +to me at the time. It concerned the fact that in a certain +sector, people were invited to a theatrical performance and the +theatre was surrounded, and the people who were inside were +brought to Germany for forced labor. It concerns these measures +of which I have heard.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more +question, or rather, to have one more question elucidated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already +indicated that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far +as possible, and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on +behalf of each of the four countries. It doesn’t wish to hear more +than one on behalf of each of the four countries. I am afraid +we can’t hear any further cross-examination from you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness +has not answered a question which was repeated four times.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of +the defendants influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness +replied, “The Armed Forces.” I wished to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have +given you the Tribunal’s ruling. We cannot hear more than one +counsel. I hope, as I say, that the prosecutors will make their +examination as short as possible. +<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French +Republic): This witness having been already interrogated at considerable +length, I wish to ask only a very short question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have +already declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the +authority of Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in +German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what +you know, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority +of Ribbentrop and that it was responsible only to him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by +the Embassy would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view +of the interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions +to ask.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o’clock.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): +Mr. President, I request permission to ask one question +which I could not ask before. The Russian Prosecutor asked +whether the witness had discussed the question of the Danish +policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection it remained +entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I simply +want to ask this one question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal +how Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question +of the Danish police who had been inhumanly treated—how +Kaltenbrunner behaved in this connection and what he did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct +the way you put it when you say “who had been inhumanly +treated,” for they could not have been dealt with. They had just +been turned over to the concentration camp. So the moment I heard +about it I went to Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people +could not be put into a concentration camp. They had to be treated +either as prisoners of war or as civilian internees.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that +opinion, and in my presence gave the order that these men should +be transferred from the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war +camp. I therefore assumed that the matter was thereby settled +and then found out a fortnight later that they were still in +the concentration camp. I appealed to Kaltenbrunner earnestly. +Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation for it. I could +not find any either, since the order to transfer these people had +been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many negotiations +regarding this matter. I had the impression that other +influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not +enforce his opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor +of their being put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a +substantial improvement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this +witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of +violating the Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that? +<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say “yes” or “no” and +then explain later?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the +reoccupation of the Rhineland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop +and consequently cannot answer this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to +rearmament?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, +because I did not know him at that time. I saw him for the first +time in the year 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite +Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Steengracht left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents +with the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-10)—on page 35 of the document +book. From this document I proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted +his foreign policy according to lines laid down by Hitler. I should +like to prove with the following documents what the foreign +political situation was that Ribbentrop found when he took office in +February of 1938. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the +following documents, the numbers of which I shall now communicate +to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them in +order that I may later be able to come back to them in my +final speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first of these documents is the document which bears the +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). +It is a question here again of an extract from the <span class='it'>Dokumente der +Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 1, and carries the heading “Proclamation +of the Reich Government to the German People of 1 February 1933.” +This document describes briefly Germany’s position at that time +and the intentions of the Hitler Government that came to power +on 30 January 1933. +<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial +notice of is Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop-15). +This document is also taken from the first volume of the +<span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>. It carries the title “Adolf Hitler’s +Address on the Occasion of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in +Potsdam”. In this document, too, basic expositions are made +regarding the internal and external policy agreed upon by the new +government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice +of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). +Again it is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. +It is headed “Adolf Hitler’s Speech on His Program at the +Meeting of the Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17). +It is again an excerpt from the <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not +one single document among those which he now mentions, beginning +with Number 14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, +inclusive, was put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I +cannot see any possibility of aiding the Tribunal in the study of +these documents until we have received them. I suppose that the +Tribunal will judge it necessary to put off the studying of these +documents until the Soviet Prosecution have received them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have +inquired as to what extent the translations have progressed. Three +weeks ago I turned in my documents in the prescribed manner, +the last of them about 10 days ago. I was informed that the Translation +Division unfortunately had too few French and Russian +translators available to have the translation of the documents in +these two languages as far advanced as is the case in the English +language up to now. These are, of course, things over which I have +no influence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you +have done what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and +they, therefore, think that the documents should go in, subject of +course to any objection being taken to them when the translations +are available.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, as a precaution I have already +informed Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without +knowing in detail what documents had been translated into Russian. +That was as far as I could possibly go to reach an understanding, +because the other thing was beyond my control. +<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to +indicate very briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents +as they come up. We will have objection to some, I know, +but some of that objection may be clarified if we hear beforehand +just what the purpose of the offer is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large +number of documents at the present moment and asking the Court +to take judicial notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that +there is something specific that they want to object to, wouldn’t it +be best that they should do that hereafter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from +rising very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which +the offer is made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? +Since 1933 my client has occupied official positions that were closely +tied up with foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that +had, as its aim, the waging of aggressive war, has been charged +against him. I now submit with these documents the evidence which +demonstrates how the policy developed and that the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop on his part made long and continuous efforts to avoid +a war of aggression, for example, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, +(Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I ask the Tribunal to +take judicial notice. It is in the document book on Page 40 and +contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German +Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 I cite as proof of +Germany’s general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich +Government made efforts to bring about a general pacification +of Europe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice +of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). +It is again a document from the same collection and is +headed “Treaty of Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933,” +known in brief as the “Four Power Pact.” It is on Page 42 of +the document book. This Four Power Pact between Germany, +France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini. Its purpose +was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to make +effective the revision article—Number 19—in the Covenant of the +League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because +France did not ratify it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice +of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20). +<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span> +It concerns a “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the +German People in Connection with the Withdrawal from the League +of Nations on 14 October 1933.” This proclamation of the +Reich Government affirms the failure of the disarmament conference +and gives a short account of Germany’s reasons for withdrawing +from the League of Nations. In connection with this proclamation, +Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio in order to +state the reasons for Germany’s withdrawal from the League of +Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal +to take judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document +book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people +as well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich +President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German +people to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is +contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-23), which is found on Page 48 of the document book. +I present it to the Court again with the request for judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit +Number 24 (Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text +of the question and the results of the election are to be found. It +is on Page 49 of the document book which is before you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on +18 December 1933, issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament +question and Germany’s attitude regarding the disarmament +problem. I offer the Court this document for judicial notice as +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document Number Ribbentrop-25).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document +book and describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and +Germany’s attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the +Court for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the +document book, and is headed “The German Memorandum on +Disarmament of 19 January 1934.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the +following document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-27), set forth on Page 53 of the document +book, and is entitled “German Memorandum of 13 March 1934.” +I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The German Government answered an English disarmament +memorandum on 16 April 1934 with an <span class='it'>aide-mémoire</span> to the English +Government. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this document +as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28). +<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934, +suggested a pact which became known under the name of the +“Eastern Pact.” Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government +expressed their view in a communiqué of the German Reich +Government of 10 September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the +document book, and to which I have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 30 (Document Number Ribbentrop-30), again with the +request that judicial notice be taken of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document, which is on Page 57, I present to the +Court for judicial notice: Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 31 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-31). It concerns a copy of the <span class='it'>Dokumente +der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 3, and shows the reply of the Reich +Government of 14 February 1935 to the suggestion for an air pact. +Germany’s comments on this air pact include the following—I read +Paragraph 2 from this exhibit and begin the quotation:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase +safety from sudden attacks from the air by an agreement to +be concluded as soon as possible, which provides for the +immediate use of the air forces of the signatories on behalf +of the victim of an unprovoked air attack.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In the year 1935 compulsory military service was reintroduced +in Germany. On this occasion the German Government addressed +a proclamation to the German people. This proclamation is on +Page 59 of the document book and carries the Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 33 (Document Number Ribbentrop-33). I request that this +excerpt from the proclamation be given judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As Ribbentrop Exhibit 34 (Document Number Ribbentrop-34), I +submit a communiqué of the German Reich Government of 14 April +1935 on Germany’s attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on +Pages 61 and following of the document book and I ask, without my +reading anything from it, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The introduction of compulsory military service was regarded +by the signatory countries of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction +of Part V of this treaty. The states protested against the reintroduction +of compulsory military service in Germany. A protest was +issued by the Reich Government against this decision of the Council +of the League of Nations of 17 April 1935. This protest is on Page +63 of the document book. I have this document the Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 35 (Document Number Ribbentrop-35), and ask +the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. In this document the +German Government dispute the right of the governments +represented in the Council of the League of Nations, who approved +the decision of 17 April, to set themselves up as judges over +Germany. In this protest it is stated that this attitude is interpreted +<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> +as a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and +consequently is rejected.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 36 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-36) which is on Page 64 of the document book. This +concerns the German memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 May +1935, and deals with the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the +Locarno Treaty. The Defendant Ribbentrop participated decisively +in the negotiations that led to the drawing up of this memorandum +and to the presentation of the German point of view before the +League of Nations and the Locarno Powers. I ask the Court to +take judicial notice of the document because it contains Germany’s +legal attitude toward this problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A further memorandum to the Locarno Powers is to be found +on Page 68 of the document book (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) +Exhibit Number Ribbentrop 36, and it again exposes briefly and +clearly the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno +Treaty. I ask that also this German memorandum to the Locarno +Powers—it is dated 25 May 1935—be given judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The legal point of view which formed the basis for this memorandum +was presented in a speech by Hitler, concerning the peace +policy in the German Reichstag on 21 May 1935, in order again +to prove German willingness for peace and disarmament. At the +same time a peace and disarmament proposal was submitted in +London by Ribbentrop. I ask that this document, this speech by +Hitler, be given judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 37 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-37). It is on Pages 69 and following +of my document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document to prove that Germany made continuous +efforts for disarmament and attempts at agreement, I submit Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 38 (Document Number Ribbentrop-38), for +judicial notice, which is on Page 77 of my document book. This +concerns the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935, +in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role, and for the ratification +of which Ribbentrop exerted himself particularly. He induced the +French Government in particular, by his own efforts, to agree to +this treaty. That was necessary because this naval agreement made +necessary a change in Part V of the Versailles Treaty, already +cited—it is the part that is concerned with disarmament instructions +and armament stipulations. At that time Ribbentrop succeeded in +persuading the French Government to give their approval to this +agreement. I submit this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38, +with the request for judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may, in addition, say in this connection that this treaty was +at that time considered, both by Ribbentrop and Hitler, as the +cornerstone of a far-reaching proposal for an understanding and an +<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> +alliance with England. During the succeeding years, as well as +during the time he served as ambassador in London and also as +Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made constant efforts to bring about +such a pact of agreement in some form or other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 39 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-39), which is on Page 79 of the +document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Again, and in view of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the +German Government found themselves compelled on 7 March 1936 +to present their attitude, through a memorandum, to the signatory +powers of the Locarno Pact. This point of view is found in the +document just mentioned and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial +notice of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The occupation of the Rhineland had led to a protest by the +powers interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a +speech before the Council of the League of Nations in London and +then delivered another protest before the Council of the League +of Nations against the protest of the signatory powers of Locarno. +This protest of the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, which I +present as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 40 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-40), which is on Page 83 of my document book, I also +submit for judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document I present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 41 (Document Number Ribbentrop-41), on Page 84 of the +document book, with the request for judicial notice. It contains the +last peace proposals by Germany in connection with the disarmament +and peace proposals of that time. It is headed “Peace Plan +of the German Government of 31 March 1936.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In subsequent years Germany made repeated efforts to bring +about the withdrawal of the war guilt lie. In the year 1937 German +and Italian relations became constantly closer; and in connection +with these relations Hitler, on 30 January 1937, on the fourth +anniversary of the National Socialist revolution, made a proposal +before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, +that agreements should be reached with other European nations +in Europe on the same basis as between Germany and Italy, in +order to attain harmonious relations. I ask that this document +be accepted as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. In this +document the withdrawal of the war guilt lie was clearly requested +once more. I quote from the third paragraph of the above:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Above all, therefore, I solemnly withdraw Germany’s +signature from that statement, extorted against her better +judgment from the weak German government of the day, +that Germany is to blame for the war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document I bring...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Are you referring to 44?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I was just referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the +document book. Please pardon me if I left that out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it +which does not appear to be translated here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did I correctly understand you to say, Mr. President, +that there was no English translation in the document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch +it myself. Did you read anything which is not in the document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I have cited only what is in the +document book. It is on Page 88, Paragraph 3 and it is specifically +the paragraph that begins, “And fourthly...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thirdly, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Paragraph 3, and this paragraph is again divided +into four subparagraphs and I have read the fourth subparagraph.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-44), which is on Page 90 in the document book. This +document contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated +13 October 1937. This document is of importance in view of the +events of 1940; and, in order to make clear the German view, I +should like to read the last paragraph, which in my document book +is on Page 91 and which is preceded by the Roman numeral II. +I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The German Government assert that the inviolability and +integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western +powers. They confirm their determination not to impair that +inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to +respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, +in the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed conflict +directed against Germany in which Germany would be +involved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask that this document be given judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With this I conclude the series of documents which are to serve +me, in my final speech, as the basis for expounding the conditions +of foreign policy that Ribbentrop found upon his entry into office +as Foreign Minister. I shall refer to these documents when the +occasion arises.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the +Secretary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, in connection with yesterday’s discussion +I again untied these documents and handed them, signed, +to the General Secretary. +<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next documents that I submit serve as substantiation of +what I shall say later regarding Ribbentrop’s participation in the +policy that led to the Anschluss with Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to refer, first of all, to Document 386-PS, already +presented by the Prosecution, which is contained in my document +book. I am unfortunately not in the position to read off the page +numbers to the Tribunal because we ourselves have not yet received +the files, that is, the document book which now follows. This document +follows Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44, which was on page 90 +of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit Number 44 is the last document in +the second document book. There are not any more, are there? +There are not any more?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English Document +Book was finished and had been presented to the Tribunal. We +unfortunately have not yet received a copy, so I cannot compare +the page numbers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven’t got it. We have only those +two and the last exhibit in the second book is Number 44, which +you have just read. But, Dr. Horn, as the document has already +been put into evidence, it is not necessary for you to produce it. +You can say that you rely upon it; that is all that is necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, but I believe that we must immediately decide +the question of the continuation of my presentation. I want to make +clear again that, after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which +documents were to be presented, I at that time immediately submitted +my documents to the Tribunal for translation in the prescribed way, +in that I presented 6 document books bearing my signature. Unfortunately +the Translation Division was unable to keep up with the +pace of the presentation of evidence by the Defense and I am in the +uncomfortable position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with +the assistance of pointing out the pages in order to continue my +delivery smoothly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on, +just notifying us which the documents are and whether they are +already in evidence or whether you are offering them in evidence +now. You have told us Document 386-PS. We can make a note of +that—that is already in evidence. I do not know whether all your +other documents are already in evidence or whether there are +any documents which are not and which you are now going to +offer in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to Document +386-PS, I should only like to make clear that Von Ribbentrop was +<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span> +not one of those present at that time. He has also learned here for +the first time of this document and its contents—it concerns the +well-known Hossbach Document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document to which I shall refer in my final speech is +Document Number 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution. +It is the official German communication regarding the meeting +between the Führer and Reich Chancellor with the Austrian Federal +Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden on 12 and 15 February +1938. I refer to this document to prove to what extent Ribbentrop +participated in this discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document to which I shall refer, and which I present +to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice, is Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 11 (Document Number Ribbentrop-11), which is in +my document book. This document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is +really necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely +in evidence already unless you are going to read some passage +in them and rely upon some passage in them which has not +already been read. I mean, supposing that the Prosecution read a +particular sentence out of a particular document and you want to +refer to some other sentence in it, then it will probably be right for +you to indicate that; but, if the document has been read in full, any +further reference is a mere matter of argument and is not really +a matter of evidence, and you will be at liberty, you see, to argue +it whenever you come to make your speech. So that, I mean, as +a matter of saving time, it would not be necessary to refer us to +386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which you +rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I may then go on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 +and present it to the Court for judicial notice. It concerns an agreement +between the German Reich Government and the Austrian +Federal Government on 11 July 1936. When, on 12 February 1938, +Ribbentrop drove with Hitler to Berchtesgaden to have a conference +with Dr. Schuschnigg, then Chancellor of Austria, he was not informed +about the deviation of Hitler’s plans from the agreement +of the year 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he conducted +his discussion with Schuschnigg also in the spirit of the agreement +of 1936. One month later the Anschluss with Austria came about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wish of the +Austrian population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-12), which I present to the Tribunal for +judicial notice. It is the result of the national plebiscite and of the +election to the Greater German Reichstag of 10 April 1938. From +this document it is to be seen that at that time in Austria a total +<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span> +of 4,484,475 people had the right to vote, 4,471,477 voted, 4,453,772 +voted for the Anschluss, and only 11,929 voted against it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this document? We do not have +it in our books. Does the clerk of the Court have it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 12.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from 10 to 14 for some reason. +Let me look at it. There is some mistake, apparently. It has not +been copied; that is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it +is all right. Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, it is to be seen from this document +that the Austrian people at that time expressed themselves in favor +of the Anschluss with 99.73 percent of the votes cast.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 13 +to the Tribunal for judicial notice. I submit this document as proof +that the Anschluss would hardly have come about by international +negotiations, according to the opinion not only of the German +Government, but also of the English Government. I should like as +proof of this assertion to read the following from this document. +It concerns a statement by Under Secretary of State Butler before +the House of Commons, which reads as follows—it was made on +14 March 1938:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The English Government discussed the new situation with +‘friends of the Geneva Entente’ and it was unanimously”—I +emphasize the word unanimously—“agreed that a discussion +in Geneva of the situation in Austria would not bring satisfactory +results but that the result would probably again be +some kind of humiliation. The Under Secretary of State stated +that England had never assumed any special guaranty for the +‘independence’ of Austria which had been forced in the treaty +of St. Germain.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. Subsequently +to this the reunion of Austria with the German Reich +took place as set down in the law of 13 March 1938, which also was +signed by Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herewith I end the submission of those documents of mine that +are related to the question of Austria. I may now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Horn, the only desire of the +Tribunal is to save time, and we observe from the index in your +document book that there are, I think, over three hundred separate +documents upon which you wish to rely, and most of them appear +to come from the various books, the <span class='it'>German White Books</span> and these +other books, which the Tribunal provisionally allowed to you. +<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span> +Wouldn’t the most convenient course be for you to put them in, in +bulk, saying that you are putting in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever +it may be, rather than simply detail each document by its +number? If you have a particular passage which you want to read +at this moment, you can do so; but it seems to take up unnecessary +time, simply to give each exhibit number one after the other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President, I shall mention those numbers +in this way which I should like only to bring to judicial notice, +briefly mention from such and such to such and such, when it is a +matter of several numbers; and I shall ask the Court to accept +them then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I will now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. +The American Prosecutor stated in his presentation on this question +that this marked the end of a series of events that struck him as +one of the saddest chapters in human history—the violation and +destruction of the weak and small Czechoslovak people. As proof +that there was no Czechoslovak people in the usual sense of the +term either before or after 1939, I would like to read a few extracts +from Lord Rothermere’s book <span class='it'>Warnings and Prophecies</span>, which has +been expressly granted me through a ruling by the Tribunal. This +is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 45 (Document Number Ribbentrop-45).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere’s +book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The Tribunal has granted it to me and even put at +my disposal an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the question of admissibility was to +be finally determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I +think you will remember that the Tribunal stated in one of its +orders that the opinions of particular authors upon matters of ethics, +history, and events would not be admitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Lord Rothermere is apparently an author and was not a member +of the British Government; and therefore, unless there is some very +particular reason, it would not appear that his books—or statements +in his books—are in any way evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The paragraphs to be presented are concerned +entirely with matters of fact; and I therefore request that the +Tribunal take judicial notice of these facts. There is no question +of any polemic discussions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal +under Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official +government documents, reports, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. This is not an official +government document. Therefore—you say it is factual evidence—it +<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span> +is not evidence, for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts +stated in it. So far as it is facts, it is not evidence of the facts, and +so far as it is opinion, it is Lord Rothermere’s opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I should like to prove by it, first, a few historical +facts; secondly that the difficulties of a state composed of many +nationalities, of which Czechoslovakia is an example, led to this conflict +with the German minority and consequently with the German +Government. I want to provide you with the reasons and motives +that led to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, on behalf of the United States +I wish to object very strongly to this offer for the reason given by +Dr. Horn—the first reason—and for the reason given secondly. If I +understood the translation correctly, I understood him to say in the +first place it was offered to prove that there was no such thing as +a Czech people. I don’t think that is a matter that can properly be +raised certainly here before this Court. We object that it is out +of place to offer such proof. We object furthermore for the reason +given in the second explanation by Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I again point out that I wish to demonstrate by +this means, the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland +in the year 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I wish to adopt an attitude toward some international offense +with which someone is charged and adjudge it, I must also be in a +position to judge the motives underlying it. Otherwise it is impossible +for me to conduct a legal investigation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may also point out that I had first of all asked the Tribunal for +documents of the League of Nations as evidence and I would have +referred to these official documents if this evidence had come into +my possession in time; but as I am not yet in possession of them, +I have resorted to presenting facts to the Tribunal instead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of +Nations? I did not catch what you said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have asked the League of Nations’ Library for the +appropriate documents regarding minorities which are in the possession +of the League of Nations, in order to submit them as evidence. +The office of the General Secretary is obtaining this evidence +for me, but so far I have not received it. Consequently I had to +refer to this weaker source of evidence in connection with documents +which are comparable to the government reports of Article 21, or +which are themselves such reports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book +to which you wish to refer? I mean, have you marked them somewhere +in some copy of the book? +<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have requested documents regarding minorities in +Czechoslovakia, as far as these questions have been decided by legal +proceedings conducted by the League of Nations and by the International +Court at The Hague. This is a collection published by +the League of Nations regarding minority matters and constantly +brought up to date. It is an official collection of documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking you whether you had specified +the particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you +want to put in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I am sorry. I did not understand your question. +Could I request you to repeat the question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was whether you have +specified the particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which +you want to use.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and they are on +Pages 137, 150, 138, 151, 161...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Not so fast, I want to get them down. +137, 138...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Pages 161, 162, 140, 144, 145, 157. They are in each +case just short paragraphs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to +break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will rule upon the +admissibility of these passages from Lord Rothermere’s book when +they have had the translation submitted to them. In the meantime, +will you go on presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, +and not stopping to detail any of them except those that you +particularly want to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I explain very briefly that the oppression of +German racial groups in the border territories of Czechoslovakia led +to the formation of the Sudeten German Party, and to the co-operation +and consultation of the latter with official German agencies. +Therefore the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in his capacity of Reich +Foreign Minister and within the scope of the directives he received, +held conferences with leaders of the national groups. A number +of documents have already been submitted in evidence by the +Prosecution and I shall refer to them later. In this connection +may I ask to make a correction in Document 2788-PS, where, on +Page 2, approximately in the middle, it says “by the extent and +gradual”—there is an error in translation here. Our document says +<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span> +“provocation,” whereas the original says “specification (Präzisierung) +of the demands in order to avoid entering the government.” I +request the correction of this error, as it distorts the meaning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of the Prosecution’s presentation Von Ribbentrop +was said to have supported the high-handed conduct of the Sudeten +German leaders. As evidence to the contrary I refer to a part of +Document 3060-PS which has not yet been read and from which the +contrary can be gathered, that is, that the then Foreign Minister +Von Ribbentrop took measures against the high-handedness of the +Sudeten German leaders with the help of his Ministry in Prague. +As evidence of this, may I quote the first and second paragraphs of +this document. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The rebuff to Frank”—that is, the leader of the Sudeten +German Party at that time—“has had a salutary effect. I have +discussed matters with Henlein, who had avoided me recently, +and with Frank, separately, and have received the following +promises:</p> + +<p>“1. The policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party must +follow exclusively the lines of German foreign policy as transmitted +through the German Legation. My directives must be +obeyed implicitly.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>These directives do not apply within the frame of the general +policy which had as its aim the avoidance of direct interference in +Czech affairs or in the policy of the Sudeten German Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Regarding the details of the activity of the German Government +and of the Foreign Office in their relations with the Sudeten German +Party, I shall question Herr Von Ribbentrop when he is called +as a witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now pass on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 46 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-46), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial +notice. This document is a report from the Legation of the Czechoslovak +Republic in Paris. It is concerned with the meaning and +purpose of Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague. It shows that that +mission was entrusted to him by England for the purpose of gaining +time for rearmament. I should like to read the document.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Paris, 5 August 1938. Secret. Mr. Minister,</p> + +<p>“Massigli considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague +a good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with +Ambassador Corbin (the French Ambassador to London) that +on earnest reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague +was a step in the right direction, as he is said to be going to +engage England more directly with Central Europe than has +been the case up to now. Massigli says that the English know +that there will be war, and that they are trying every means +<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span> +to delay it. He is perfectly aware that Lord Runciman’s mission +to Prague for the purpose of settling that dispute is per +se a danger to Czechoslovakia; for Lord Runciman might, for +the alleged purpose of gaining time, propose something which +could be tremendously detrimental to Czechoslovakia.</p> + +<p>“To this view of Massigli’s I add further information which is +extremely instructive. During the recent grain conference +held in London; the British, the Dominions, the United States, +and France conducted separate discussions. The French Delegate +had a discussion with Minister Elliot (British Minister +of Health) and Morrison (British Minister for Agriculture) as +well as with the distinguished expert, Sir Arthur Street, who +was in the Ministry of Agriculture and who had been entrusted +with a leading post in the Air Ministry. From the +speeches, conduct, and negotiations of the British Delegation, +the French Delegate gathered the positive impression that the +British were interested in organizing grain supplies not so +much to prevent the conflict as to win the conflict. The ministers +Elliot and Morrison are both supposed to believe in the +possibility of a conflict.</p> + +<p>“Sir Arthur Street said that in 6 months’ time he would have +put British aviation on its feet. Therefore much importance is +attached to the gaining of time in England.</p> + +<p>“I mention this information at this point in connection with +Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague; because, as I said already, +the question of gaining time plays an important if not decisive +role in the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague.</p> + +<p>“With best greetings, yours sincerely—Ususky.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>On 29 September 1938, the Munich Pact was concluded, in which +Von Ribbentrop also participated. Just how far, is something I shall +demonstrate when the defendant is examined in the witness box +regarding his policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 30 September there was a mutual declaration, which I submit +to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 47 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-47). That declaration by the Führer and the British +Prime Minister Chamberlain, dated 30 September 1938, was planned +to serve the purpose of removing all differences still pending between +Germany and England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The reaction to this agreement differed in Germany and in +England. As evidence for the British reaction I refer to Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 48 (Document Number Ribbentrop-48), which I +am offering to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice. +This is an extract from the speech of the British Prime Minister +Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 3 October 1938. May +I quote the following from its first paragraph: +<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If there is a lesson we can learn from the experiences of +these last weeks it is the fact that lasting peace cannot be +attained by sitting still and waiting for it. Active and positive +efforts are required to attain this peace. We, in this country +have already been busy for a long time with a rearmament +program whose speed and extent increase constantly. Nobody +should believe that, because of the signing of the Munich +Agreement by the four powers, we can at present afford to +reduce our efforts regarding this program....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>As evidence of this rearmament program, which Chamberlain +himself said was constantly growing in speed and size, I should like +to prove this assertion by reference to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 49 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-49). This is a speech of the British +Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, at the Mansion House in +London, given on 10 October 1938, and I request the Tribunal to +take judicial notice of this speech also, from the extracts which I +am submitting. May I quote a few words from them?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“More still, however, is to be done to give full force and +opportunity to the territorial army as a whole.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph, +Paragraph 5, which says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As regards the organization of new formations, infantry +brigades will in future have three battalions, as in the Regular +Army, instead of four. Employing the material that we have, +we find that we can form nine complete divisions on the +Regular Army model...</p> + +<p>“We have provided also a considerable number of modern +corps and army units, such as Army Field and Survey +regiments. R.A. and Signal Corps will be ready to take their +place in such formations should war eventuate. This is also +in accordance with Regular Army organization.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>So much for the quotation from the speech of the Secretary of +State for War.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 50 (Document Number Ribbentrop-50) +further stress is laid on armament. It concerns a speech of +Winston Churchill’s of 16 October 1938, and I beg the Tribunal to +take judicial notice of this speech in connection with extracts from +it as a document. I am quoting only a few sentences from it:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We must arm... We shall no doubt arm.</p> + +<p>“Britain, casting away habits of centuries, will decree national +service upon her citizens. The British people will stand erect +and will face whatever may be coming. But arms—instrumentalities, +as President Wilson called them—are not sufficient +by themselves. We must add to them the power of ideas. +People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn into +<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span> +a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and democracy, +but the antagonism is here now.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I prove the fact that England was arming energetically in the +air far beyond the normal needs of defense, by Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 51 (Document Number Ribbentrop-51), which I am offering +to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice. This is a +declaration of the British Secretary of State for Air in the House +of Commons, dated 16 November 1938...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the +Tribunal wanted you to do, which was to put in the documents +all together. I think I have said from 44—wasn’t it the document +that you had got to?—to 300 something, that you could put them +in all together. But now you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 +and 51, and you seem to be going through each one in detail, doing +exactly what I asked you not to do. Didn’t you understand what +I said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The way I understood you, Mr. President, was that +I may read important parts from them. That is what I did. It +concerns only important extracts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to find an important passage +in each of the 300 documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, certainly not; but if I cannot +read these documents, these extracts, then I would like to ask +the Tribunal to accept my whole document book as evidence so that +I can refer to it later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what we intended to do. What we +want you to do is to offer in evidence now, stating that you offer +from Exhibit 44 up to 300 or whatever the number is, and we +will allow you, of course, to refer to them at a later stage when +you make your speech; and if there is any passage which the Prosecution +object to, they can inform you about it beforehand and +the matter can then be argued. But what we do not desire to do +is to take up the time of the Tribunal by either offering each of +these documents by its number individually, 44, 45, and so on, or +that you should read anything except passages which are of especial +importance at this moment. After all, you are not putting forward +your whole case now; you are only introducing your evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I had...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am reminded that of these last few +exhibits to which you have been referring, you have referred to +about six, all of them upon British rearmament. That is obviously +cumulative, isn’t it? Therefore, it cannot be that all those are all +particularly important to you. +<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>We only desire to get on, and we desire you, as I have said, to +put in these documents, if I may use the phrase, in bulk; and we +do not desire you to refer to any of them beyond that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In that case I am offering Number 51...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>]: If I understand rightly, +Dr. Horn up to now has not drawn any conclusions from those +directions which were given him, time and again, by the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I had an opportunity, that is, as far as I could, actually to +acquaint myself with those translations that are gradually coming +to me, and, by the way, Dr. Horn turned over these documents, +not 3 weeks ago, as he said, but considerably later. As far as I +can see up to now, I have a whole series of objections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Most of the documents in general are altogether irrelevant to +the matter, and in particular, absolutely irrelevant to the case of +Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have already indicated +that we do not want to deal with questions of admissibility at +the moment, because the documents are not before us. I do not +understand the purpose of your objections. We haven’t got the +documents here. How can we tell whether they are admissible +or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have an objection in principle. Part +of the documents—I will not quote their contents but merely for +illustration will name two or three numbers. Some of them are +direct filthy and slanderous attacks by private persons against such +statesmen as Mr. Roosevelt, the late President of the United States. +I have in mind the Documents Number Ribbentrop-290(4), 290(3), +290(1). Some of them are just provocative forged documents. I +have in mind Document Number Ribbentrop-286.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is a whole series of documents which fall directly under +the terms of those directions that were given to Dr. Horn by the +Tribunal, and it seems to me that if Dr. Horn will continue reading +those documents into the record...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>]: Colonel Pokrovsky, as I have +said, we haven’t got these documents before us. You say documents +290(1), 290(3), 290(4), and 286—I don’t know even what the documents +are. I have never seen them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think the best way would be for the Chief Prosecutors to +submit their objections in writing, and then they will be considered +by the Tribunal. The documents aren’t here. We can’t do anything +until we see what the documents are. In order to try and get on +with this case, we are allowing Dr. Horn to put in the documents +in bulk. But your objections now are really simply taking up time +<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> +and doing no good at all. If you would put in your objections in +writing, saying that you object on certain grounds to these documents, +that matter would be considered; but we can’t consider +it without that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My objection was dictated by the wish to +save time and is of a very practical nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From the moment when a certain document—well, at least the +contents of it—from the moment even a brief account of it is +recorded in the transcript this material becomes the property of +the press; and it seems to me that it is not in our interests to have +a document which is a known falsification, and the fate of which +has not been determined by the Tribunal, that such a document +should be turned over to certain circles and that it should be +made public.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Meanwhile, among the documents which have been presented by +Dr. Horn, there are such documents; and it is not quite clear to +me why these particular documents were delayed in translation, +why these documents were presented later than others. And on +the basis of this consideration I thought it my duty to address the +Tribunal, and I think that the Tribunal will consider the reason +for my objections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I follow what you mean now with reference +to documents being communicated to the press, and steps ought +to be taken on that. The Tribunal will rule now that documents, +upon the admissibility of which the Tribunal has not ruled, are +not to be given to the press. I believe there have been some +infractions of that in the past; but that is the Tribunal’s ruling, +that documents should not be given to the press until they have +been admitted in evidence before this Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I ought perhaps to add that the Tribunal +are not in complete control of this matter. It is for the Prosecution +to see—and also possibly for the Defense—that documents should +not be given to the press until they have been admitted in +evidence here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Up to now the order was such if the documents +mentioned in Court are recorded in the transcript, then they +become public property.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I wonder if I could +help on that practical point, because it is one which has given us +a little concern.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As Your Lordship knows, the practice has been that the documents +have been given some 24 hours before they are produced +<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span> +in Court, on the understanding which has been practically entirely, +completely, complied with, that the press would not publish until +the document is put in evidence. And, My Lord, I am sure that if +the Tribunal expressed the wish that where any objection is taken +to a document and the Tribunal reserves the question of admissibility, +the press would, in the spirit with which they have +complied with the previous practice, comply at once with the +Tribunal’s desire and not publish it in these circumstances. I think +that in practice that would solve the difficulty which Your Lordship +has just mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The only thing is, of course, that we are now +dealing with a very large number of documents which Dr. Horn +wants to submit; and, as you have heard, for purposes of trying +to save time we have asked him to submit those documents in bulk.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And of course it is very difficult, if not +impossible, for members of the Prosecution to make their objections +to documents when they are offered in bulk in that way. Therefore, +I think the most convenient course would probably be if, as soon +as the translation of those documents has been made, the Prosecution +could indicate any objections they have to them and the +Tribunal would consider them. And after the order of the Tribunal +has been made upon them, they should then be made available +to the press.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully and +entirely agree. My Lord, the Prosecutors did confer. Of course the +only material that they, had to confer upon was the short description +of the document in Document Book Number 1, and on that it +appeared to all of us that there were a number of documents which +might be and probably were objectionable. But, clearly, from our +point of view it would be much more satisfactory if we had the +opportunity of seeing the actual document in translation, and then +we should gladly comply with what Your Lordship has suggested, +namely, that we will make the objections in writing to such of +those as we think are objectionable and let the Tribunal have them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them, I believe, +are in English, and you could let us have your objections as soon +as possible. Perhaps the press would act in accordance with our +wishes and not make public those documents to which objection +is taken until we have ruled upon them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. +We will make our objections as soon as we have had the opportunity +of reading the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. +<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I, Mr. President, state that none of my material +has been handed to the press by me up to now. I may further +state that by an order of the Tribunal only that part was to be +translated which was considered relevant by the Prosecution. On +the basis of this ruling I cannot rightly comprehend the one point +of Colonel Pokrovsky’s objection regarding the intrinsic value of +the documents. I do not believe that the Prosecution, on the strength +of that ruling, would translate anything which, as Colonel Pokrovsky +emphasized, must be designated as dirty in its contents. I think +that would have been rejected already before now by the Prosecution +and therefore the danger does not exist at all that any such +translation or original will reach the press.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t seen the documents, so I can’t say, +but if you would continue in accordance with the scheme that I +have suggested to you, I think that would be the best course for +you to take.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I now submit the documents referring to +armament, military as well as economic, which at the same time +show the co-operation between Britain and France? These are +the Documents Number Ribbentrop-51 to 62, in my document book. +I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I come to the question of Czechoslovakia. As evidence for the +fact that Slovakia requested to be taken under German protection +I shall present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Numbers 63, 64, and +65 (Documents Ribbentrop-63, 64, and 65) with the request that +they be given judicial notice. Furthermore, I shall examine the +Defendant Ribbentrop concerning this subject when he takes the +stand and, as far as is necessary, I shall have him express an +opinion regarding these particular documents. Now I shall submit +Documents Numbers 66 to 69 (Documents Ribbentrop-66 to 69) to +the Tribunal for judicial notice. They contain statements regarding +the reaction in Britain to the occupation of the rest of the Czech +country on 15 March 1939 by Germany. Regarding the details as +to how the creation of the protectorate came about I shall again +question the Defendant Von Ribbentrop concerning the individual +documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As the next group of exhibits, I present to the Tribunal the +document which refers to Article 99 of the dictate of Versailles +and which specifically refers to the international legal position of +the Memel territory. We are concerned here with Documents +Ribbentrop-70 and 71 of my document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Regarding the fact that in accordance with the presentation of +evidence up to now, I had timed myself not to proceed any further +today than to this document, I should like to ask your Lordship’s +permission to submit the rest of the documents to the Tribunal +<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span> +tomorrow. For up to now, on the strength of the existing practice +of the Tribunal that the documents be partly read with connecting +text, I had expected not to go any further than to this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, why don’t you put them all in +now? You say you have an index of them. All you have to say +is that you offer in evidence the documents from 71 to 300 and +something and then they go in, and then if the Prosecution should +take an objection to them, of course you can be heard upon the +question of the objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I have your permission to confer with my +colleague for one moment and see how much material he has here, +so that I can then offer evidence on the separate subjects to the +Tribunal? May I again ask Your Lordship?—I gather from this +ruling of the Tribunal that submission of evidence here is no +longer to take place but merely presentation of exhibits quite apart +from the contents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Presumably when these documents are submitted +for translation which I understand you say you have done—but +at any rate, if you haven’t done it already you will +be doing it—you will mark the passages upon which you rely. +Some may be in books, and there you will indicate only certain +parts; in documents you will indicate the parts upon which you +rely, which is what we desired you to do. You described all these +documents by numbers and gave them exhibit numbers in your +document book and all we want you to do now is to offer them +in evidence and then the Prosecution, when they have been translated, +will have the opportunity of objecting to them on the grounds +of their being cumulative or of their being inadmissible for some +other reasons; and, if necessary, you will be heard upon that. All +we want you to do now is to get on. What difficulty there can be +in submitting these documents, all of which you have indexed in +your document book, the Tribunal is quite unable to see.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Until now, however, the ruling of the Tribunal +was to this effect that we, in the Defense presentation, were not +only allowed to submit our documents but also to deliver them with +a connecting text so as to indicate the attitude of the Defense. Just +recently, Mr. Justice Jackson suggested that, on the contrary, the +documents should be handed over in their entirety and that objections +could be raised subsequently by the Prosecution against the +individual documents without their being presented. This suggestion +was turned down on the strength of representations made by +Dr. Dix, and the Tribunal intended to continue the established +procedure, namely, that the documents could be read and brought +forward with a connecting text. Now, we come today to a complete +departure from this procedure, in which only the documents, and +<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span> +these in bulk, are presented to the Tribunal for judicial notice. +That is naturally such a deviation that one first of all has to +regroup all these documents, in order to be able to submit them +to the Tribunal in their proper order, for up to now we had +planned to deliver at least some part of the contents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware of any order of the Tribunal +which refers to an interconnecting text. We did not rule that you +should not be allowed to read any passage from the documents, but +what we did rule was that we wished the documents to be presented +and put in evidence and that the passages upon which you relied +should be marked and that the Prosecution should, if they wished +to object to them as being so irrelevant that they needn’t be translated, +that they should do so, and that the Tribunal should rule, if +there was a conflict upon that. Dr. Horn, of course, you can put any +document to your witnesses in the course of their examination and +ask them to explain it. It isn’t as though you are confined to this +presentation of the documents in bulk.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I add another word? This matter +appears to me to be again such a question of principle that I do not +wish to prejudice my colleagues and I should like to have an opportunity +first of all to confer with my colleagues about it. That is indeed +a basic departure from the established procedure which was allowed +the Defense. I would not like therefore to take it upon myself now +simply to alter these matters for myself and then in so doing, also +commit my colleagues. I hope that Your Lordship will understand +that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the only material order which the +Tribunal has made, as far as I am aware, is this: It is the order of +the 4th of February 1946, 2(a):</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“During the presentation of a defendant’s case, the defendant’s +counsel will read documents, will question witnesses, and +will make such brief comments on the evidence as are necessary +to insure a proper understanding of it.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, this ruling could naturally only be +interpreted by us to the effect that we were granted approximately +the same procedure as the Prosecution, for that certainly belongs to +the fundamental principles of any trial, that a certain equality of +rights exists between Prosecution and Defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>So as to save time, we are prepared to adapt ourselves to the +Court to the extent that we submit the documents to the Tribunal +in bulk, insofar as they refer to a definite problem; but still +with the reservation to make those statements upon their contents +required in order to understand the whole problem. This possibility, +however, is taken away from us, if we must now simply submit the +<span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span> +entire documentary material and can make no statements about it +at all; for we certainly cannot make any comments on a document +if I now, for example, submit 10 pieces altogether for a specific +problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will adjourn now for +a few minutes to consider this question and will return in a short +time and announce their decision so that you can prepare yourself +for tomorrow on the lines which they wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Before the Tribunal confer, may I ask only one question. +I have understood the course of the discussion up to now in +this way: That the difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that as +the Russian and French translations are not available, some of the +Prosecution are still unable to form an opinion with reference to +this material and consequently cannot decide whether they wish to +raise objections or not. On the other hand the Tribunal wants to +avoid quotations being read here concerning matters on which it has +not yet been decided whether the Prosecution want to raise objections. +This is the situation which appears to me to be the cause of +the difficulties arising at present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have not understood the statements of the Tribunal, of His +Lordship, to mean—I beg to be corrected if I am wrong—that there +is to be a deviation from the already announced decision or from +the procedure followed up to now, that we may quote essential and +important portions of the documents submitted by us, when they +have been admitted as relevant by the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that I am right in my impression that no exception is +to be made to this principle and that no basic new decision is to +be made here now, but only an interim ruling is being sought: How +can we surmount the difficulties that Dr. Horn may not at the +moment read individual passages from his documents because the +Tribunal is not yet in a position to decide their relevancy and admit +them, because the Tribunal cannot yet hear the attitude of the +Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Before we adjourn, therefore, so that we have a definite basis +for our discussion, I should like to ask the Court if my interpretation +is correct. Is it now merely a question of finding a way +out while basically maintaining the right of the Defense to speak +connecting words, words of explanation of the documents, that is, +such words without which the documents could not be understood, +and to read individual relevant parts, but that on principle only +these technical interim questions are to be decided?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should be grateful to Your Lordship if I could be told if this +conception of mine, regarding the nature of these difficulties which +have arisen, is correct. +<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now and we will return +to Court very shortly and we will consider what you have said.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: On the 22 March 1946, the Tribunal made +this ruling, repeating a ruling of 8 March 1946:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To avoid unnecessary translations Defense Counsel shall +indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents +which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution +may have an opportunity to object to irrelevant +passages.</p> + +<p>“In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and +the Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the +Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant +to be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated +unless the Prosecution require translation of the entire document.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That rule has not, for very likely sufficient reason, been able to +be carried out, and therefore certainly the Tribunal have not got +the translations, and they understand that the Prosecution have not +got, at any rate, all the translations. The difficulty which has arisen, +the Tribunal thinks, is in part, at any rate, due to that fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal, in citing that order of 8 March 1946, on 22 March +1946, said this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In considering the matters which have been raised this +morning the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a +fair trial and at the same time for an expeditious trial, and +the Tribunal has decided that for the present it will proceed +under rules heretofore announced, that is to say:</p> + +<p>“First, documents translated into the four languages may be +introduced without being read, but in introducing them +counsel may summarize them or otherwise call their relevance +to the attention of the Court and may read such brief +passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed important.</p> + +<p>“Second, when a document is offered the Tribunal will hear +any objections that may be offered to it.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection the Tribunal then went on to read the order +of 8 March, which deals with translations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, in the present case, the translations not being in the hands +of the Tribunal or of all the prosecutors, it has been impossible for +the prosecutors to make their objections and impossible for the +Tribunal to rule upon the admissibility of the documents. Therefore, +it is natural that the Prosecution have objected to the Defense +reading from documents which they had not seen. +<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal understands that the translations of these documents +of Dr. Horn’s will be ready tomorrow. They hope, therefore, +that the order which I have just read will be able to be carried +out tomorrow, and they propose for the present, and if the order +is reasonably and fairly carried out by Defense Counsel, to adhere +to it. They would draw the attention of the defendants’ counsel +again to the first paragraph of the order and would remind them +that they must adhere strictly to that order:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The documents having been translated into the four languages +may be introduced without being read, but in introducing +them counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call +their relevance to the attention of the Court and may read +such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed +important.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>In that connection I would add: “and are not cumulative”.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal cannot sit here and have three or four hundred +documents read to them and commented upon and argued, and +therefore it is absolutely essential in the opinion of the Tribunal +that counsel must summarize briefly and indicate the relevance of +the documents briefly and read only such passages as are really +strictly relevant and are not cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal are prepared to adhere to that rule, as I say, if +counsel will adhere strictly to it themselves, and they think if +Dr. Horn will state, after offering the documents either in one complete +bulk or in a group or in groups, the relevancy of each group +and confine himself to the reading of only passages which are really +necessary to be read in order to understand the documents, that will +be satisfactory to them. But they cannot sit here to hear either each +of those documents offered in evidence by its number or to hear a +short speech or even a longer speech about the relevancy of each +of the documents or to hear passages read from each of those documents. +The number of documents is very great and it is impossible +for the Tribunal to carry on an expeditious trial unless the rule +which they have laid down is interpreted in the way in which I have +indicated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As I have already indicated in the emphasis which I threw upon +the words, this rule was expressly made for the present and unless +it is marked by the Defense Counsel in a reasonable way the rule +will be altered.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 28 March 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-THIRD DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 28 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In accordance with the request of the Tribunal, I am +now presenting in groups the documents not yet named, as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, the group concerning the Polish question. In my document +book, you will find a document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number +200 (Document Number Ribbentrop-200) which I am submitting +to the Tribunal for judicial notice. In this document, Prime Minister +Chamberlain, in a letter to Hitler dated 22 August 1939, defines his +attitude regarding the basis for conflict between Germany and +Poland. In this connection he emphasizes the question of minorities +as one of the main causes of the conflict. As proof of the fact that +this minority question already played an important part when the +Polish State came into being, I refer to the document, Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 72 (Document Number Ribbentrop-72), which I +submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This contains observations +by the German Peace Delegation on the peace conditions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In a further document—Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 74 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-74), which I submit to the Tribunal for +judicial notice—the President of the Supreme Council of the Allied +and Associated Powers, Clemenceau, once again draws the attention +of the Polish Prime Minister, Paderewski, to this problem. May I +offer as proof...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I want to explain the +position of the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We have not yet received these documents, and therefore we are +in the position that we have been able to make only a tentative +selection of those to which we object. All this book of documents +has been objected to as far as we know. I want only to make it +clear that we are admitting, without protest, the course taken by +Dr. Horn on the basis which Your Lordship announced yesterday, +that he is putting them in <span class='it'>en bloc</span>, subject to our right to object +formally when we have the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore it is only right that we must preserve our position, +because I have arranged, and all my colleagues agree, that there +should be objections to a number of these documents on our present +state of knowledge. +<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship to hear me for a moment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say something? Were you +going to add something to what Sir David had said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In view of the objections raised by the Prosecution +I request that a general ruling be made now as to whether the +Defense have to submit to disadvantages arising out of technical +deficiencies and for which they are not responsible, and whether our +already limited presentation of evidence shall be made practically +impossible by our being unable to discuss even in a general way, +documentary material with the Prosecution and the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I ask, therefore, that the presentation of documents in their +shortened form, as requested by the Tribunal yesterday, be postponed +until the document books are available.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty seems entirely to arise from +the fact that your document books are not ready. That is what +causes the difficulty. If the document books had been ready and had +been submitted to the Prosecution, the Prosecution would be in a +position to object to them. That is the reason why Sir David is +objecting in this provisional form. But if you have witnesses whom +you are going to call, why do you not call them while your books +are being got ready? That seems to the Tribunal to be the obvious +course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Call your witnesses and then we can have the documents introduced +at a later stage, when we can see them. That is the only +reasonable course and why you do not adopt it I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: An officer of the Translation Division informed me +recently, that he is not in a position, with the personnel at his disposal, +to catch up with translations. That is the cause of the trouble +and it is beyond my control. I submitted the documents in good +time for translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was not the point I was dealing with. +Perhaps the interpretation did not come through correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What I said was that if you have witnesses whom you propose +to call, why do you not call them now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I had intended to call the witnesses in the course of +my presentation of documents and in accordance with the groups of +questions on which witnesses could make statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you had, but as your documents +are not here to be presented to the Court, then you must get on, and +the only way to get on with your case is to call your witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In that case, may I ask for 5 minutes so that I can +have a short conversation with a woman witness and then I shall +call her? +<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Wait one moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Yes, Mr. Dodd?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I would not begrudge any +counsel 5 minutes. This woman witness has been here for a long +time. She stood outside all day yesterday. I think Dr. Horn has +talked to her before. He has had ample opportunity to confer with +her. He knew he was going to call her; he asked this Court for +permission to call her. I think we are faced here with almost a +one-man filibuster at this time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the witness must be +called at once.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In that case I wish to have Fräulein Blank called as +a witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Blank took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MARGARETE BLANK (Witness): My name is Margarete Blank.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did you first meet Herr Von Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: I met him at the beginning of November +1934 in Berlin, when he was delegate for disarmament questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did you become secretary of the former +Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: On 1 November 1934 I was engaged as +secretary in the Ribbentrop office. His personal secretary gave notice +and, as her successor did not turn up, Von Ribbentrop asked me +whether I was willing to take the post. I said “yes” and became his +personal secretary on 1 February 1935.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was Von Ribbentrop’s attitude towards Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge Herr Von Ribbentrop +always showed the greatest admiration and veneration for Adolf +Hitler. To enjoy the Führer’s confidence, to justify it by his conduct +and work was his chief aim, to which he devoted all his efforts. To +achieve this aim no sacrifice was too great. In carrying out the tasks +set him by the Führer he showed utter disregard for his own person. +When speaking of Hitler to his subordinates he did so with the +greatest admiration. Appreciation of his services by the Führer, as +for instance the award of the Golden Party Badge of Honor, the +<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span> +recognition of his accomplishments in a Reichstag speech, a letter +on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, full of appreciation and +praise, meant to him the highest recompense for his unlimited +devotion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop adhered to Hitler’s views +even if he himself was of a different opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: What I just said shows that in cases of +differences of opinion between himself and the Führer, Herr Von +Ribbentrop subordinated his own opinion to that of the Führer. +Once a decision had been made by Adolf Hitler there was no more +criticism afterwards. Before his subordinates Herr Von Ribbentrop +presented the Führer’s views as if they were his own. If the Führer +expressed his will, it was always equivalent to a military order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To what do you attribute this attitude?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: I attribute it first of all to Ribbentrop’s +view that the Führer was the only person capable of making the +right political decisions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, I attribute it to the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as +the son of an officer and as a former officer himself, having taken +the oath of allegiance to the Führer, felt himself bound in loyalty +and considered himself a soldier, so to say, who had to carry out +orders given him, and not to criticize or change them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Ribbentrop having +tendered his resignation several times?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, that happened several times. But +about such personal matters Ribbentrop would not speak to his +subordinates. I remember only the resignation handed in by him +in 1941. I assume that this resignation, as well as the later ones, +was tendered by a handwritten letter. The reason for this resignation +lay in differences with other departments as to competency; +in view of their encroachments upon the competence of the Foreign +Office, Herr Von Ribbentrop felt he could no longer take responsibility +for the Reich’s foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was the result of these offers to resign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: They were turned down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Were you with Von Ribbentrop while he was Ambassador +in England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop over a number of years +worked for close alliance between Germany and England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. For this reason Von Ribbentrop, in +the summer of 1936, asked the Führer to send him as ambassador to +<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span> +England. The Naval Agreement of 1935 was only a first step. Subsequently +an air pact was contemplated, but, for reasons unknown +to me, was not concluded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Von Ribbentrop’s views +on the British theory of balance of power on the continent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: From numerous statements by Ribbentrop +I know he was of the opinion that England still adhered to her +traditional balance of power policy. In this his ideas were opposed +to those of the Führer, who was of the opinion that with the +development of Russia a factor had arisen in the East which necessitated +a revision of the old balance of power policy—in other +words, that England had a vital interest in the steadily increasing +strength of Germany. From Ribbentrop’s attitude it could be inferred +that he expected that in the Polish crisis the English guarantee +for Poland would be honored.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What political aims did Von Ribbentrop want to +achieve by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Tripartite Pact was to be a pact for +the limitation of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know whether Ribbentrop endeavored to keep +America out of the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, the Tripartite Pact was signed with +this end in view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: And now another set of questions. What was Herr +Von Ribbentrop’s attitude in church questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge, his attitude in church +questions was very tolerant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>To my knowledge, he left the Church already in the twenties, +but in this respect he exercised no pressure or influence on his +personnel or, rather, he did not bother about it at all. His tolerance +went even so far that in 1935 he let his two eldest children have +their wish and rejoin the Church. His tolerance in personal questions +of religion was in line with his political attitude towards the Church. +In this connection I remember Von Ribbentrop’s sending the Führer +a fundamental memorandum in which he advocated a tolerant church +policy. In the winter of 1944 he received Bishop Heckel to discuss +church matters with him. On the occasion of a journey to Rome +in 1941 or 1942, he paid a long visit to the Pope.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop of an introspective and secluded +character, or was he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, although I was his personal secretary +for 10 years, I hardly ever saw him in a communicative mood. His +<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span> +time and thoughts were so completely occupied by his work, to +which he devoted himself wholeheartedly, that there was no room +for anything private. Apart from his wife and children there was +nobody with whom Von Ribbentrop was on terms of close friendship. +This, however, did not prevent him from having the welfare +of his subordinates at heart and from showing them generosity, +particularly in time of need.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that you often felt that there were certain +differences of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. True to his attitude, which I mentioned +before, Von Ribbentrop never discussed such differences with +his subordinates, but I do remember distinctly that there were times +when such differences surely did exist. At such times the Führer +refused for weeks to receive Herr Von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop +suffered physically and mentally under such a state of affairs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop independent in the attainment of +the goals of his foreign policy, or was he bound by orders and +directives of the Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Ribbentrop often used the phrase that he +was only the minister responsible for carrying out the Führer’s +foreign policy. By this he meant that, in formulating his policy, he +was not independent. In addition, even in carrying out the directives +given him by the Führer, he was to a large extent bound by +instructions from Hitler. Thus, for instance, the daily reports of a +purely informative nature transmitted by the liaison officer, Ambassador +Hewel, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the +Führer were often accompanied by requests for the Führer’s decision +on individual questions and by draft telegrams containing instructions +to the heads of missions abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop suffer by the fact that, although he +was responsible for foreign policy, he was not allowed to direct it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: He never complained about it in my presence, +but I had the feeling that he did suffer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Führer saw in the Foreign Office a +body of ossified red-tape civil servants, more or less untouched by +National Socialism. I gathered from men of his entourage, that he +often made fun of the Foreign Office. He considered it to be the +home of reaction and defeatism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In what way did Ribbentrop try to bring the Foreign +Office closer to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: When taking over the Foreign Office in +February 1938, Herr Von Ribbentrop intended to carry out a +<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span> +thorough reshuffle of the entire German diplomatic service. He +also intended to make basic changes in the training of young diplomats. +These plans did not go beyond the initial stage because of +the war. In the course of the war they were taken up again when +the question of new blood for the Foreign Office became acute. +Ribbentrop’s anxiety to counteract the Führer’s animosity towards +the Foreign Office led him to fill some of the posts of heads of +missions abroad, not with professional diplomats, but with tried SA +and SS leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were Ribbentrop’s views and intentions regarding +Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: His intentions regarding Russia were +shown by the Non-aggression Pact of August 1939, and the Trade +Agreement of September 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know that, in addition to the Non-aggression +Pact and the Trade Agreement, a further agreement was concluded +in Moscow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, there was an additional secret agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! It appears to me that the witness +who has been called to attend the present sitting of the Tribunal +is, by the very nature of her position as secretary to the former +Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, able to testify only to the +personality of the defendant, to his way of life, to the reticence or +frankness of his character, and so forth. But the witness is quite +incompetent to pass an opinion on matters pertaining to agreements, +foreign policy, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. In this sense I consider the questions of +the Defense absolutely inadmissible and request that they be withdrawn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that is +raised, is it not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gaus? I mean, you said +that you were going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus which dealt +with a secret agreement between—can’t you hear me? I beg your +pardon. I ought to have said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce +an affidavit of Dr. Gaus with reference to this alleged agreement. +That is right, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I assume so, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet Prosecutor objected to that agreement +being referred to until the affidavit should be admitted, until +it had been seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet +Government and Germany in writing? +<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes. It was put down in writing, but I am not in +possession of a copy of the agreement, and I should therefore like +to ask the Tribunal, in case the decision depends on the affidavit +of Ambassador Gaus, to allow me to obtain, at the appropriate time, +an affidavit from Fräulein Blank who saw the original. Would Your +Lordship be agreeable to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you a copy of the agreement +itself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, there are only two copies of this +agreement. One copy was left in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The +other copy was taken to Berlin by Von Ribbentrop. According to an +announcement in the press all the archives of the Foreign Office +were confiscated by the Soviet troops. May I, therefore, request +that the Soviet Government or the Soviet Delegation be asked to +submit to the Tribunal the original of the agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I asked you a question, Dr. Seidl. I did not +ask you for an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy +of that agreement available.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I, myself, am not in possession of a copy of the +agreement. The affidavit of Ambassador Gaus only states the contents +of the secret agreement. He was able to give the contents of +the secret agreement because he drafted it. The secret agreement, +as drafted by Ambassador Gaus, was signed by Foreign Commissar +Molotov and Herr Von Ribbentrop. That is all I have to say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following +statement: With regard to what was mentioned here by Defense +Counsel Seidl, about the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops +in connection with the capture of the archives of the Ministry for +Foreign Affairs—that is, the agreement concluded in Moscow in +August 1939—I would draw the attention of the Defense Counsel, +to the newspaper in which this agreement, the German-Soviet Non-aggression +Pact of 23 August 1939, was published. That is a known +fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution +considers that Dr. Seidl’s application for the incorporation into +the record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for +the following reasons:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Gaus’ testimony on this pact and on the history immediately +preceding the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. +The presentation of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed +a true light on events, can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. +This is clearly borne out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself +<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span> +repudiated this witness even though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop’s +activities, even though Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted +testimonies from this witness and applied for their incorporation +into the record, despite the fact that they contain no reference to +Hess. On the strength of these considerations, of these circumstances, +I request the Tribunal to reject the request made by Defense +Counsel Seidl and to consider the question submitted by Defense +Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter under our consideration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the +Soviet Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I +could not make out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether +that such an agreement was concluded or whether he wanted +only to state that the contents of this secret agreement are not +relevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign +Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; +in the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now +to submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this +secret agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection +to the evidence of this witness, so we won’t trouble with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel +for the Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty +in his application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the +witness box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal +rules that the witness may be questioned upon the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: [<span class='it'>To the witness.</span>] You were speaking about the secret +agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this +agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly +translated into the Russian language. At any rate, I don’t know +whether it was rightly translated into the German language; but +what I said was that the witness may be questioned, not that the +witness may not be questioned. Is that clear to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Taking up your previous statement +about the secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came +to know about the conclusion of this agreement? +<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany +Von Ribbentrop on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when +the preparatory work for the agreements was being done. I learned +of the existence of this secret agreement through a special sealed +envelope which, according to instructions, was filed separately and +bore an inscription something like “German-Russian secret or additional +agreement.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these +secret matters? Is this correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. +Did Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia +in any case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Having signed the German-Russian pacts, +Von Ribbentrop was, of course, interested in their being kept. +Moreover, he realized fully the great danger a German-Russian war +would mean for Germany; accordingly he informed and warned the +Führer. For this very purpose, as far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor +Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador Schnurre were called to +Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of 1941 Ambassador +Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report, to back up +and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop’s warnings +to the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed +beforehand of Hitler’s intent to attach Austria to the Reich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into +Austria, Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been +appointed Foreign Minister, was in London on his farewell visit. +There he heard to his surprise of the Anschluss of Austria. He himself +had had a different idea of a solution of the Austria question, +namely an economic union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated +efforts to end the war by diplomatic methods?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send +Minister Professor Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. +Later on these moves were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden +to Bern and Dr. Hesse to Stockholm. As the Führer had not +given official authority to initiate negotiations, it was possible +only to try to find out on what conditions discussions might be +opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar missions were +entrusted to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, Minister +Von Bibra, Consul General Möllhausen in Lisbon, and the Ambassador +to the Vatican, Von Weizsäcker. A former member of the +<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> +Office Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar +attempt with the British Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum +for the Führer in which he asked for official authorization +to initiate negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request +because I left Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know +what Hitler’s basic attitude to this question was?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his +entourage I know that the Führer did not expect much of it, or that +he would have been in favor of initiating negotiations only at a time +of military successes. If and when, however, there were military +successes, he was likewise against diplomatic initiative. As to the +mission of Dr. Hesse—after its failure, he, it was disclosed by an +indiscretion, remarked that he had not expected much of it anyway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop +was notified of the impending invasion of Norway and +Denmark only a very short time before this action?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von +Ribbentrop was of the opinion England would fight for Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England +would adhere to the old balance of power policy, he was of the +opinion that England would honor her guarantee to Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to +ask any questions of this witness? [<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>] Do the +Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have +very carefully considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal +will not hold it against them that they accept everything that this +witness says, but they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently +put to the defendant himself, and therefore they do not +intend to cross-examine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question +concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The +witness knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I please be told whether the admission of this question to +the witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal +on the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus’ affidavit, and +<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span> +whether I might now be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt +from this affidavit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Last Monday—that is, 3 days ago—I submitted six +copies of the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant +Schrader of the Defendants’ Information Center. I assume that in +the meantime, since 3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have +received a copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have +not received the copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither +has my friend Mr. Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General +Rudenko, or M. Champetier de Ribes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the +document is in the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be +considered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my +power to furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no +influence on the General Secretary’s business, and I should be +obliged if the Tribunal would assist in this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything +wrong about it, Dr. Seidl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Yes, Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister +Paul Schmidt.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Schmidt took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions +between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and +members of the Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is +it correct that you were present at the conference on 30 August 1939 +between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was a pause in proceedings.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter +to 2.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, is it correct that you were present at the +conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Where did that conference take place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: It took place in the office of the Minister for Foreign +Affairs in the Foreign Office in Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In what capacity did you take part in that conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I took part in that conference as interpreter and +recorder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Since when had you been employed in this capacity +in the Foreign Office and for whom did you work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I had been working in the Foreign Office as interpreter +for conferences since 1923, and in this capacity I interpreted +for all foreign ministers, from Stresemann to Von Ribbentrop, as +well as for a number of German Reich Chancellors such as Hermann +Müller, Marx, Brüning, Hitler, and for other cabinet members and +delegates who represented Germany at international conferences. In +other words, I participated as interpreter in all international conferences +at which Germany was represented since 1923.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you have the opportunity to act as interpreter +during the discussion between Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that opportunity as the discussion +was conducted in German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German +fluently?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson’s knowledge of German was +rather good, but not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments +of excitement he did not quite understand certain points, as is proved +by an incident which occurred during the conference just mentioned; +and it was not always easy for him to express himself in German; +but when speaking to Germans he usually preferred to conduct these +discussions in German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop +read out to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals +for a settlement of the questions pending between Germany +and Poland. And now I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask +you during that discussion to translate to him the contents of the +memorandum Ribbentrop had read out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that. +<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir +Nevile Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell +what goes on inside a person’s mind, but I doubt whether he understood +the document in all its details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to +Sir Nevile Henderson, give him any explanations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign +Minister now and then commented to Henderson about some points +which might not have been quite clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henderson himself ask for such +explanations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the +document being read out and the comments which were made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What atmosphere prevailed during that conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: The atmosphere during that conference was, I think +I can say, somewhat charged with electricity. Both participants were +extremely nervous. Henderson was very uneasy; and never before, +and perhaps only once afterwards, have I seen the Foreign Minister +so nervous as he was during that conference. An incident which +occurred during the first part of the discussion can perhaps serve to +illustrate the atmosphere. The matter under discussion was the +specifying of all the points Germany had against Poland and her +government, and the Foreign Minister had done that in all details +and concluded with the words: “So you see, Sir Nevile Henderson, +the situation is damned serious.” When Sir Nevile Henderson heard +those words, “damned serious” he started up, half raised himself and +pointing a warning finger at the Foreign Minister said: “You have +just said ‘damned.’ That is not the language of a statesman in so +serious a situation.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: To what charge in the Indictment is this +relevant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To the point in the Indictment that on 30 August +1939, Von Ribbentrop read out the memorandum, the decisive +memorandum, so quickly that Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson +was not able to grasp its contents and transmit it to his government +and have it forwarded to the Polish Government in order to continue +negotiations between Germany and Poland. England at that +time had offered her good offices as intermediary between both +governments. Germany on the basis...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you +referring to? You may be right, I do not know. I only want to know +which passage in the Indictment you are referring to. +<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I am referring to the preparation of, that is, to the +failure to prevent aggressive war for which Ribbentrop is indicted +as a co-conspirator.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is on Page 9, is it not, from (F) 4? There +is nothing about the way in which this document was handed over +to Sir Nevile Henderson. Presumably you have got the Indictment. +Where is it in the Indictment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has +also been presented in the House of Commons where Chamberlain +insisted that Ribbentrop had read it out so rapidly that it was +impossible to grasp the contents and transmit them through diplomatic +channels, which England had expressly offered to do. Thus the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop is directly indicted for having prevented +this last chance of further negotiations with Poland. The statement +of the witness will prove that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot +be charged with this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it +was read in that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment +at all. It may be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course of +the history. You have made the point, surely it is not necessary to +go on at length about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Then you had the impression that both +these statesmen were extremely agitated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I did have that impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To what causes do you attribute this agitation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: To the tension which prevailed during the negotiations, +to the numerous conferences which had taken place almost +without interruption during the preceding days and which had made +considerable demands upon the nerves of all participants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, as Sir Nevile Henderson +maintains in his book, said in the worst possible language +that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That I cannot remember. The Foreign Minister +merely said that he could receive the Polish Ambassador for negotiations +or discussions only if he came to him with the necessary +authority to negotiate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: He answered a question respecting this, put to him +by the Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was with him +with an emphatic “no.” He said he had no authority.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson +that he could not receive the ambassador, is that right? +<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the +Foreign Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of +which the latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. +To this he replied “no,” whereupon the Foreign Minister said that +in this case naturally no conversation could take place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum +which we mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you +have the impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the +ultimatum to Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not +wish to or because he was not allowed to do so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to +this question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions +which Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that +point before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, +have to rely on the impressions I got during the conference +with the British Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions +as to the instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign +Minister for this conference. In this connection I can say the +following:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When Henderson requested that the document containing the +German proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: +“No, I cannot give you the document.” These are the words he used. +This of course was a somewhat unusual procedure because normally +Sir Nevile Henderson had the right to expect that a document which +had just been read out would be handed to him. I myself was rather +surprised at the Foreign Minister’s answer and looked up because +I thought I had misunderstood. I looked at the Foreign Minister and +heard him say for the second time: “I cannot give you the document.” +But I saw that this matter caused him some discomfort and that he +must have been aware of the rather difficult position in which he +found himself by this answer, because an uneasy smile played on +his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile Henderson these +words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked at Sir +Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to translate +the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked at +Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the document, +knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete +transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had +been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at +dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this +roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the +German proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. +But Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my +glance so that the discussion soon came to an end and events took +their course. +<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive +the British ultimatum to the German Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, +the British Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was +still present with the Foreign Minister in order to be available for +possible conferences, to give the information that the British Ambassador +had received instructions from his government, according to +which, at exactly 9 o’clock, he was to make an important announcement +on behalf of the British Government to the Foreign Minister. +He therefore asked to be received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that +time. He was given the reply that Ribbentrop himself would not be +available but that a member of the Foreign Office, namely I, would +be authorized to receive the British Government’s announcement +from the British Ambassador on his behalf. Thus it happened that +at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British Ambassador in +Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated Henderson +refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known +ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, +according to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, +the British Government would consider themselves at war +with Germany at 11 o’clock that morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the +document to the Reich Chancellery.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to +say, I found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign +Minister and I translated the document into German for him. When +I had completed my translation, there was at first silence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, as I said before, he was in his office with the +Foreign Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both +gentlemen were absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly +see that this development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler +sat in his chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into +space. Then he broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to +the Foreign Minister, saying, “What shall we do now?” Thereupon +they began to discuss the next diplomatic steps to be taken, whether +this or that ambassador should be called, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I, of course, left +the room since I had nothing more to do. When I entered the anteroom, +I found assembled there—or rather I had already seen on my +way in—some Cabinet members and higher officials, to whose +<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span> +questioning looks—they knew I had seen the British Ambassador—I +had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I came +out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been +correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed +a British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The +faces suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Göring, for +instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and +said, “If we lose this war, then God help us.” Goebbels was standing +in a corner by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed, +expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those +present, and it naturally lives in my memory as something most +remarkable for the frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of +the Reich Chancellery on the first day of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these +men expected a declaration of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how +Ribbentrop reacted to the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office +it was generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the +Foreign Minister, as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by +surprise. This impression was confirmed by what a member of the +Press Department told me. The Press Department had a listening +station for radio news and the official on duty had instructions to +inform the Foreign Minister personally of important news at once. +When the first news of Pearl Harbor was received by the listening +station of the Press Department, the official on duty considered it of +sufficient importance to report it to his chief, that is to say, the head +of the Press Department, who in turn was to pass it on to the +Foreign Minister. He was, however—so I was told—rather harshly +rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it must be an invention +of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our Press Department +to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second and third +message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters report +had also been received by the listening station; and the head of the +Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the +order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him +this news.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting +and irrelevant to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared +aggressive war against the United States of America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of +the press. What have we got to do with the reactions of the press? +<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The witness described Von Ribbentrop’s reaction to +the attack on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the +Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about +to attack America at all. Neither was there such an agreement +between Japan and Germany. It is therefore not correct that +Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war against the United States +of America. That is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not +saying that you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister +knew nothing about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not +what I said. What I said was that the Tribunal was not interested +and thought it was irrelevant for you to go into the reactions of the +press.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding +the Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those +negotiations proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, +and what aims he pursued?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as +interpreter, went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been +overcome. The aims which the Foreign Minister...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this +is the Naval Agreement of 1935. In my recollection—I am just trying +to check it—that was one of the matters which we discussed on the +application for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into +the negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came +up on application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were +going to give the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal +with this exact point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, +namely, the state of mind of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one +or two—there is Lord Monsell, for example, who was on the list of +witnesses—who were denied by the Court, and a number of German +ones were denied on the same point. My Lord, it is in the Tribunal’s +statement of the 26th of February; and Your Lordship will see, on +Page 2, I think, certainly the witness Monsell, who happens to be the +one most familiar to myself; but I am sure there were other witnesses, +too. I know that we discussed this point quite fully on the +application for witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who +were refused. There is Admiral Schuster...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...who was relevant on this +question as to who initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert +Craigie, Number 24. There is Lord Monsell... +<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, +Number 25.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are +the three.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those +three witnesses—Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell—who as alleged by +you were to give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As +to the witness you are now examining, no such reference was contained +regarding him in the application. He was asked for only as +an interpreter in the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three +witnesses had been refused because they were cumulative and I was +not going to question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I +merely want to ask him about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop +when the agreement was concluded and afterwards in order to +prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was not, in any case at +that time, deliberately working towards an aggressive war, nor was +he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression, at +least not at that time. And I wish to prove further that this +agreement was not “eyewash” as the afore-mentioned British Ambassador, +Sir Nevile Henderson, put it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador +Craigie was this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 +Ribbentrop approached England with a proposal that the Naval +Treaty should be signed and Ribbentrop’s initiative brought about +an agreement by France to this treaty which involved the Treaty of +Versailles. Thus the treaty has come into effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask +this witness questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty +of 1935, then you can go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference +between Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop +also took part and during which the solution of the Jewish question +in Hungary was discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop say to you +about this question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain +difficulty, when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more +energetically in the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with +<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span> +some heat, “But what am I supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the +Jews to death?”—Whereupon there was rather a lull, and the +Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy and said, “Yes, there are +only two possibilities—either that, or to intern the Jews.” Afterwards +he said to me—and this was rather exceptional—that Hitler’s +demands in this connection might have gone a bit too far.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference +between Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop +and Hitler once more expressed their wish to come to an agreement +with Poland, using Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that +Ribbentrop then sent you with a draft note on this conference to +Henderson at the Embassy to ask him to back this proposal as far +as possible and to try to put it through? Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram +from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number +TC-72, Number 69.)</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August +1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile +Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and +Britain after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain’s +greatest wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop +and that Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is +that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in +question as an exhibit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the +document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the +Prosecution. It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another +number, and the second number has also been submitted by the +Prosecution. I submit it again to the Tribunal because I have +referred to it just now. (Document Number TC-72, Number 75).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an +interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact +with foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, +did Hitler make on foreign statesmen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this +question, as one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other +<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> +people. But as an observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions +from the attitude...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really +that this is a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler’s +demeanor had on foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in +the least.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further +questions to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants’ counsel who +wish to ask questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, +were you present at a conversation which, about one year before the +outbreak of war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field +Marshal Göring at Karinhall?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance +of this conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember +the details, but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was +the Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any +points of dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, +of course, quite a number of technical questions regarding +aviation and the air force were dealt with. I have always remembered +very clearly one particular remark made by Göring in the +course of this conversation, when at the end of a discussion which +was to prove how desirable it was that Germany and England be +friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If our two countries should be involved in a war against +each other, then there will naturally be a victor and a vanquished, +but the victor in this bitter conflict will in the +moment of victory have just enough strength left to strike +the last blow at the defeated and will then fall to the ground +himself gravely wounded and for this reason alone our two +countries should get along with each other without conflict +and without war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich +in the autumn of 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Göring also present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later +when the circle of those present became larger he likewise took part.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations? +<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser +importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that +through his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, +any difficulties arising from certain technical points which might +hamper the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was +anxious that the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such +technical points of procedure, which played an important role in the +second part of the negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took +place in the autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then +Field Marshal Göring and followed a conference between Lord Halifax +and Hitler at the Berghof?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, +please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation +with Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The +two partners could in no way come to an understanding, but in the +conversation with Göring the atmosphere improved. The same points +were dealt with as at Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the +foreground at the time, namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, +and finally the questions of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At +Obersalzberg Hitler had treated these matters rather uncompromisingly, +and he had demanded more or less that a solution as he conceived +it be accepted by England, whereas Göring in his discussions +always attached importance to the fact or always stressed that his +idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a solution through +negotiation, and that everything should be done in this direction, +and that he also believed that such a solution could be reached for +all three questions if the negotiations were properly conducted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political +conferences of Hitler’s. Did you notice on such occasions that +high military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German +territory in a peaceful way or by war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came +to my notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives +were for the most part not present at the beginning when the +large problems were dealt with and they were called in only when +purely military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they +stated their opinion only on purely military questions and did not +speak on any political matters. +<span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion +of such discussions, did you find that high military leaders +were anxious to exert political influence upon the Reich Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found +it, since they were hardly ever present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all +to tell the Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your +views. Do you remember on 28 November making an affidavit at +Oberursel; do you remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember +that I made an affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [<span class='it'>Handing +the document to the witness.</span>] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, +the number of conferences, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document +Number 3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis +of your experience. Would you follow it while I read:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign +Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times +to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under +discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge +of the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout +the Hitler Regime I constantly endeavored to keep myself +apprised as to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in +related organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it +was possible to have ready access to key officials and to key +personnel in their offices.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives +your impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign +policy:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent +from the start, namely, the domination of the European Continent, +to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all German-speaking +groups in the Reich, and secondly, by territorial +expansion under the slogan of ‘Lebensraum.’ The execution +of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized +by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently was carried +out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the +ultimate objectives mentioned above.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal +with particular matters, I want you to develop your impressions +a little further. You have told us that you acted under or with +every foreign minister since Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a +considerable difference between the style of living of the Nazi +ministers and those who had preceded them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were +certain differences, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant +Ribbentrop. Before the Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had +he one house in Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that +his possession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign +Minister, had he six houses? Let me remind you and take them +one by one. You can tell me if I am right. There was a house in +Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with an estate of 750 hectares, +and a private golf course. That was one, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I +did not know how large it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck +bei Düren, near Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near +Kitzbühl that he used for chamois hunting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence +was known?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the +house existed, but I have not heard any details about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the +Schloss Fuschl; that is in Austria, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was +taken over as a state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances +a little later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called “Pustepole,” +was there not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr +Von Ribbentrop sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing +regarding the proprietorship. +<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting +lodge, near Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near +Podersan, in Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I +do not know the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, +that given for Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the one—where Ciano +visited. That is the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right +that it previously belonged to Count Czernin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. +Was a salary—that is, a fixed annual remuneration—appointed for +Reich Ministers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any +information. I was not at all interested in how large a salary the +Reich Foreign Minister received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not +know, that is good enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer +this question. Had any previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to +run six country houses and estates of various sizes on his salary, +anyone that you had worked with?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he +did not do it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it +there for a moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is +about four months before the war, when the Polish question was +just coming up. I mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. +Do you remember what I think they call in the German Foreign +Office a <span class='it'>conduite de langage</span> that was issued by Ribbentrop about +that time and put out by Baron Von Weizsäcker?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say +that I cannot remember it. +<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to remind you, to +see if this draws it to your recollection:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the +Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to +Poland; the British Empire is doomed within the next 10 years; +France will bleed to death if she tries to intervene.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember a <span class='it'>conduite de langage</span> to that effect issued by +the Foreign Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a <span class='it'>conduite de langage</span> of that +kind. It appears to me rather to resemble a <span class='it'>conduite de langage</span> for +propaganda purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von +Ribbentrop issued instructions that no official of the Foreign Office +was to issue any different views?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those <span class='it'>conduites +de langage</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he +told Baron Von Weizsäcker to say would happen to anyone who +expressed different views?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that +severe penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But +I do not remember the actual case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he +said they would be shot by him personally?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him +on some occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, +but I do not believe that it was meant seriously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember—I +just suggest it to you—was the distress and difficulty +that Baron Von Weizsäcker had in deciding how he was to say it to +the official conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the +morning conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell +you anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary +may have had quite some trouble in translating that statement into +official language.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite +shortly with the points that have been put to you about August 1939. +I only want to get the facts quite clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he +was expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet +treaty? +<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and +therefore not with Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the +Defendant Ribbentrop on the 24th?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to +Berchtesgaden.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember +that Hitler saw Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave +him what has been called a <span class='it'>note verbale</span>? Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, +because just at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to +establish the date. I was not present at a conference between Hitler +and the British Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg +during the time of our Moscow journey. I think that is the conference +to which you are referring.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant +came back from Moscow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of +the day. If you were not present, I will pass from it; but were you +present when Signor Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a +communication from Mussolini?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking +you about. Do you remember that a communication came from +Signor Attolico that afternoon that the Italian Army and Air Force +were not in a condition to go to war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me +because it is rather important as to the time. Was that not about +3 o’clock in the afternoon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences +which took place at the time, the question of hours and dates is +naturally a bit confused.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news +that the Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming +through about 4 o’clock?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that. +<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about +4 o’clock M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview +with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, were you aware that on +that day the orders for an attack on Poland the next morning were +countermanded?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, +but just what orders these were I naturally never learned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, +Herr Schmidt, but you knew that orders had been countermanded. +I wondered if you could help me on this point: Was not the countermanding +of the orders at 6:15—1815 hours—after the interview +with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, was not that the time +when they were countermanded?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the +Tribunal on this point: Were they not issued about 2 o’clock—1400 +hours—after the interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on +that point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on +the night of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and +the Defendant Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told +us that the Defendant Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read +these terms over, did he raise his voice at times, shouting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, +then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I +mentioned before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously +during those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but +not during the reading of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, but you remember and +were very much astounded at the time at the refusal to hand over +the vital document to the British Ambassador?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to see if you can +help us with one or two other incidents. It has been suggested by +a witness that we heard yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop +<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span> +knew very little about concentration camps. I want to make it clear +that was suggested. I think perhaps you can help us on one or two +inhabitants of concentration camps that he knew about. Do you +remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the religious gentleman +but a contemporary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that the Defendant +Ribbentrop brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, +in 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I am not sure about the year, but I do know that he +got his job through the Bureau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I think it was not received +with great joy by the older members of the German Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: No, certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There had been some trouble +about a small matter of 4,000 Reichsmark that Mr. Luther had had +to deal with in the past?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes. We learned about that afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was taken into the Foreign +Office and received rapid promotion to counsellor, that is to say +minister, and Under Secretary of State, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, do you remember +that in 1943 he had a quarrel with the Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he sent to Himmler—I +think he did it through Lieutenant Büttner—suggesting that Ribbentrop’s +state of mind was not such that he ought to continue as +Foreign Secretary, and suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, +should be appointed. Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he +suggested Werner Best as successor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, he suggested that +Ribbentrop should go. I think he was quite blunt about it. I believe +he suggested that his mental powers were no longer up to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I did not see the report. I only heard rumors about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In consequence of that, of course, +after an interview with Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a +concentration camp, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I do not know whether that happened on Ribbentrop’s +initiative, or whether it came from some other source, but it was +<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span> +said among us in the office that Luther had landed in a concentration +camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, the sequence of +events was that Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop and +shortly afterwards he appeared in a concentration camp. And not +only did he go into a concentration camp, but is it not correct that +even the SS asked that he should come out of the concentration +camp, and Ribbentrop would not agree to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That I cannot say, because the whole matter was, of +course, treated rather confidentially in the office by Herr Von +Ribbentrop and the members of the old Foreign Office, of whom I +was one, did not have his confidence to such an extent that they +were informed of all such details. In other words, I heard about +the whole Luther affair only by way of rumor, through special +channels—actually through prohibited channels—so that I cannot +therefore give you any authentic information but I can repeat only +what I have heard unofficially.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you desire to be absolutely +frank with the Tribunal, and the point I am putting to you +is that everyone in the Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed +in a concentration camp and, quite clearly, the Defendant Ribbentrop +knew that he had landed in a concentration camp. That is right, is +it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let us just take one +other incident relating to this if I may comment as to his extraordinary +innocence about concentration camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You remember two unfortunate people called Herr and Frau Von +Remitz, to whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the +name is either Remitz or Raenitz. Do you remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Schloss Fuschl—would +you tell me how it is pronounced?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Well, regarding these matters I am so little...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I want you to tell me how +it is pronounced.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Fuschl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Schloss Fuschl used to belong to the people that I have just +mentioned. Frau Von Remitz was a sister of August Thyssen, was +she not? +<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I cannot say anything about that, since all these +questions refer to the private household of Herr Von Ribbentrop and +I had nothing to do with that. My connections with him were purely +official and limited at that to routine matters and the important +political interpretation affairs in the Foreign Office. I only heard +about the other matters, and naturally not in such a way that I could +make any authentic statements about them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will ask you only one +question. After the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate +had come to the use of the Foreign Minister, did not Herr Von +Remitz spend several years in a concentration camp, where he ultimately +died? You knew that, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I knew it as a rumor; I was told that it had happened +in that way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did he not hear of other +stories stronger than these, that came out of concentration camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I do not believe that any authentic reports were +made there regarding conditions because naturally, particularly in +front of the Foreign Office, it was treated as taboo by these people +who were responsible for concentration camps, since we were in +any case regarded as not quite reliable and as not belonging to +them. Such matters were of course diligently covered up and concealed +from us. Therefore, any concrete details never became known +to us at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you knew, did you not, even +in the Foreign Office, that there were a large number of concentration +camps in which a vast number of people were shut up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: We knew that, but our source of information was +mostly the foreign press, which we read, of course; and the foreign +radio reports which appeared on our table, translated, every morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that if you knew it from the +foreign press and the foreign radio, whoever else in that dock did +not know about concentration camps, the Defendant Ribbentrop, as +foreign Minister, did know. Is that not right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I would like to put it this way: Of course, he had +access to that foreign news material. Just how he evaluated it, +whether he considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, +naturally I cannot say. Of course he also received the reports as +such, but as reports from abroad and, during the war, as reports +from hostile countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doctor, I will not pursue that +further at the moment. I want you just to tell me this: You have +<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span> +given us your account of the interview between Hitler and the Defendant +Ribbentrop and Horthy when the question of the Jews was +discussed, on the 17th of April 1943. I just wanted on record that +your account is based on the fact that you actually made the minutes; +the minutes are signed by you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to pass to another point. +From 1943 to 1945 were you still going to Hitler’s headquarters for +occasional interpreting and attending of meetings and the like?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: For example—I do not know if +you can remember it, but I am sure you will try—on the 27th of +February 1944, do you remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you present at that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I remember I was always present during all the +visits of Antonescu, since the discussion could not take place any +other way. Regarding the date I cannot tell you anything exact at +the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was actually the 27th of +February. I wanted to try and fix it by an incident which might +remind you of it, that Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember +on that occasion that the Defendant Dönitz was present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: It is possible, but I have no exact recollection. It is +quite possible that he was present during the military discussions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, My Lord, is GB-207, +and it is dealt with on Page 2705 of the shorthand notes (Volume V, +Page 249). The document was originally Number D-648.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] I want you to tell the Tribunal about +the general governmental setup. There has been considerable +evidence given before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, +did not meet after the beginning of the war. Several people have +told us that. Instead of a cabinet meeting, was it not a fact that the +Government of Germany was carried on by these constant meetings +at Hitler’s headquarters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I consider it possible, but naturally I have no exact +knowledge, since I never took part in such internal conferences. I +went to headquarters only whenever I had to accompany a foreigner +there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You came only when there was +a foreign visitor, but you know that these meetings were continuously +taking place and that the Defendant Göring, the Defendant +<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span> +Speer, the Defendant Keitel, the Defendant Jodl, the Defendant +Dönitz were constantly attending these meetings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I do not know, of course, whether you can describe +that conference as a meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to play with +words with you at all. I used the word only to describe what was +happening. If you prefer to call it a conference, I am willing to +do that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: I admit that on occasions conferences with Hitler +took place or could have taken place, while these people you have +just named were present at the headquarters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you agree with me, do +you not, that as far as one can find any organism or organization +through which the government of the Reich was being carried on, it +was this succession of meetings or conferences at Hitler’s headquarters; +is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Well, I do not know whether you can regard that as +governmental activity, because if I drew a parallel with the conferences +at which I was present with these foreign gentlemen, then +you will find that the person who spoke and who pushed through +decisions was Hitler alone. If it was the same at those conferences, +then you could call it a government discussion; but it was only a +one-man government. The others were there only as an audience +or to be questioned regarding individual points. That is how I +imagine it, but I was not present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite appreciate your point, +but these were the occasions at which each service and each department +and each organization—like the SS through the Reichsführer +SS, Himmler—put its point of view and put the facts before Hitler +on which decisions were come to, were they not? And that is what +happened for the last 2 years of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: One could have drawn that conclusion from the +presence of those people, yes, but as I say it could of course have +been that there was only a sort of taking of orders at headquarters. +Both possibilities exist, but which is applicable I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, I think you will +agree with this, will you not, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other +place at which the government of Germany took place except that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes. That is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you be good enough to +look at your affidavit? I will just read the rest of it. It is quite short, +but I want it to be on the record. Paragraph 4: +<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss +on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of +the Foreign Office, because these events discredited Germany +in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the +Putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that +the attempted Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the +blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the +similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and domestic policy. +This concern over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch +was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these +episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet +Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement +which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis.</p> + +<p>“5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a +German Air Force and of the reintroduction of conscription +was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance +pact between France and the Soviet Union. The +career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a +further very serious warning as to the potential consequences +of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened +their attitude towards the Western Powers, declaring that +they were not going to be intimidated. At this time, the career +officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign +Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in +turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.</p> + +<p>“6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland +was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. +A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed +that the French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was incompatible +with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the +League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that +no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and +France. Considered against the background statements in +<span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, offensive to France, the circumstances were such +as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some +future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into +the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it +and discussed it approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. +Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military +circles, concerning the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears +were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common +knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was +the only person in government circles, consulted by Hitler, +who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized +without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath’s +<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span> +position throughout this period was one which would induce +Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run +of ‘old school’ diplomats whom Hitler tended to hold in disrespect.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I +do not think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in +Paragraph 8, I will go on:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi +program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the +murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach +to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy +by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military +strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. +When Göring visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that a +union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be +expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in +German, remained silent, and protested only mildly when I +translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss +was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen’s +role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the +surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing +conditions for the expected move. The speech delivered by +Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the Berchtesgaden meeting, +interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement as the first step +towards the establishment of a Central European Commonwealth +under the leadership of Germany. This was generally +recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy of a +Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The final paragraph says these matters are true and that you +have made this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That +is right, is it not, Herr Schmidt?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It +is correct, is it not, that in his period as Foreign Minister the Defendant +Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, +or, in the old days in the SA into the Foreign Office and made them +part of the staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes. Principally they were members of his so-called +Bureau—that is to say, his former organization. They were taken +into the Office, not all, but some of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other prosecutor want to cross-examine? +Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. +<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, I +have just one question to ask the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question +to the witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Dr. Löffler, Defense Counsel for the SA.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, you were, as a rule, personally +present during the visit of highly placed foreign statesmen. Were +you also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic +Games of 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Did any one of the foreign statesmen express the +wish to inspect the German institutions and the establishments set +up by the National Socialists—in particular in the social sphere—before +or after 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Whether any such wishes were expressed during the +Olympic Games I cannot remember at the moment; but that such +wishes were expressed and that they were fulfilled becomes clear +from a number of facts—for instance, from Lloyd George’s visit to +the Obersalzberg and, later on, his inspection of social institutions in +Germany; from the visit of a number of interested foreign persons +who, in my opinion, took a very lively interest in the social +institutions in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: You were present personally during these inspections. +Do you remember an inspection during which you were +present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Mostly I was not present at these inspections. I only +recollect that, for instance, the Labor Front had an organization +which was called “Joy and Work” and that was an international +organization which held a great annual congress at Hamburg, during +which I often acted as interpreter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Do you know anything about the impressions +made by these institutions on foreign statesmen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: The social institutions, as far as I know, always made +quite a favorable impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales +to Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: Yes. I acted as interpreter there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in +the Indictment? Dr. Löffler, your duty was to ask any question you +<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span> +have got at the same time as the other defense counsels. I asked +you whether you had any questions to ask. You said “no,” or you +indicated that you had not. You now get up and say you have one +question to ask and you have asked about—I don’t know how many +you are going to ask, but they are all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, +I think, irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting +are caused by the cross-examination by Sir David. Sir David has +mentioned the SA, and I want to put a corresponding counterquestion +to the witness, and apart from that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David had not asked any question as to +the social conditions of Germany, and he did not ask any questions +about the Olympic Games of 1936. In any event, you are not the +right person to re-examine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put +are important, because, through those visits which were made here +and through the statements made by the foreign statesmen afterwards, +a number of our members got the impression that the important +statesmen abroad were giving their recognition to the leaders +of National Socialism. And that is of quite decisive importance in +the question of the guilt or innocence of millions of Germans whom +I represent here, since these millions of Germans regarded the +attitude of those foreign statesmen as authoritative. It is therefore +not irrelevant, but for us, in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness +who can really make an authentic report about it. However, I am +finished with my questions about the Olympic Games and I have +only two more questions to ask. I ask you to permit me to put these +because Sir David...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the questions you +are putting do not arise out of the cross-examination and are +entirely irrelevant, and they will not hear any further questions +from you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, +this is not the time to put questions on behalf of Von Papen. You +have had your opportunity, and you have not done it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I merely propose to rectify +some words which were probably incorrectly repeated through +translation, since I did not receive copies of the affidavit. I heard +that in that affidavit a speech of Von Papen of 8 or 18 February 1938 +was mentioned...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that is correct, you can correct +anything in the translation you want to. +<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would like to mention that the names +“Hitler” and “Papen” were mentioned here just now. I heard +“Papen” in the translation, but Papen never made such a speech, +and any conclusions drawn about Papen from that speech are +incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. +You will have an opportunity to look at the affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, +apply in writing to have it rectified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit +it must be corrected.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says “Papen” in the text, but that +is completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. On +Page 4 of the text it says “The speech delivered by Papen.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is what the +affidavit said. Learned counsel says it is completely wrong; he did +not make a speech. But with the greatest respect to the learned +counsel, I must suggest, if he wants to refute the affidavit, he will +have the opportunity of recalling Von Papen and giving evidence +then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, in this case would it not be of +value to put the one short question to the witness as to whether he +really meant Papen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you think that you said that +Papen made a speech on 18 February 1938? Where was this speech +supposed to have been made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: That, in my opinion, is a mistake which may have +crept in when I made the affidavit; because if the speech was not +made—at any rate, at the moment I no longer remember such a +speech as I described in that affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly +possible that a mistake crept in. And perhaps that mistake is excusable +if you consider that this affidavit was submitted to me at a +time when I was rather seriously ill in bed in a hospital. It can very +well have happened that upon reading through the affidavit I did +not notice the mistake and I really consider it to be a mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: That makes the actual fact established and +the conclusions drawn from it unnecessary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHMIDT: After what I have said, yes. I cannot remember the +speech, and I think it can be traced to a mistake on my part and I +attribute it to the circumstances under which I signed the document; +I was seriously ill at the time. +<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The witness can now retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I once more ask the Tribunal whether it can be +ascertained if the translations of the documents will be available by +tomorrow morning. I would like to base the further presentation of +evidence on them. If I have translations in the morning, then I +would begin now to examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as a +witness. If translations cannot be completed by tomorrow morning, +then I would ask the Tribunal to allow me to submit my documents +now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this Trial has been going on for +many months, and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody +anticipated, at any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal +anticipated, and they cannot have it put off any longer. You must go +on. Have you got any further witnesses to call?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No, I have no further witnesses, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why can you not put him in the box now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether +I can have the assistance of the Tribunal, whether I can have the +documents by tomorrow morning. Then I would start now to +examine the Defendant as a witness and submit the documents when +the Prosecution have their documents too and can raise their objections +here at the same time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, +you shall have them, of course. We have sent out to find out +whether they will be available by tomorrow morning, but we have +got 35 minutes now before 5 o’clock. We want to occupy the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall examine +the Defendant as witness now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue to present the +documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop. We have not got the documents here, +and you must do as you said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then I request to be given permission to examine the +defendant as a witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Ribbentrop took the stand.</span>] +<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you say your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Defendant): Joachim Von Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Please give the Tribunal a brief explanatory report +about the most important points of your life.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was born on 30 April 1893 at Wesel. I +came from an old family of soldiers. My mother came from the +country. I went to school at Kassel and Metz in Alsace-Lorraine. +There, in Alsace-Lorraine, I had my first contact with the domain +of French culture; and at that time we learned to love that country +dearly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1908 my father resigned from active military service. The +reason was that there were differences at that time connected with +the person of the Kaiser. My father already had a strong interest +in foreign politics and also social interests, and I had a great +veneration for him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time we moved to Switzerland and after living there +for about one year I went to London as a young man, and there, for +about one year, I studied, mainly languages. It was then that I had +my first impression of London and of the greatness of the British +Empire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada. Originally I +wanted to go to the German colonies, but then I went to America +instead. I wanted to see the world. I remained in Canada for several +years, approximately two years as a worker, a plate layer on the +railroad, and later on I turned to the bank and building trade.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1914 the first World War caught me in Canada. Like all Germans +at the time we had only one thought—“Every man is needed +at home and how can we help the homeland?” Then I traveled to +New York, and finally in September 1914, after some difficulties, I +arrived in Germany. After serving at the front, for approximately +4 years, and after I had been wounded, I was sent to Constantinople, +to Turkey, where I witnessed the collapse of Germany in the first +World War. Then I had my first impression of the dreadful consequences +of a lost war. The Ambassador at that time, Count Bernstorff, +and the later Ambassador, Dr. Dieckhoff, were the representatives +of the Reich in Turkey. They were summoned to Berlin in order to +take advantage of Count Bernstorff’s connections with President +<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> +Wilson and to see—it was the hope of all of us—that on the strength +of these Points perhaps a peace could be achieved and with it +reconciliations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After some difficulties, in March 1919, I came to Berlin and I +became adjutant of the then General Von Seeckt for the peace +delegation at Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles +came, I read that document in one night and it was my impression +that no government in the world could possibly sign such a document. +That was my first impression of foreign policy at home.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1919 I resigned from the Armed Forces as a first lieutenant, +and I turned to the profession of a businessman. Through these +business contacts, I came to know particularly England and France +rather intimately during the following years. Several contacts with +politicians were already established at that time. I tried to help my +own country by voicing my views against Versailles. At first it was +very difficult but already in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, I found +a certain amount of understanding in those countries, in my own +modest way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, it was approximately since the years 1929 or 1930, I saw +that Germany after the seeming prosperity during the years 1926, 1927, +and 1928, was exposed to a sudden economic upheaval and that +matters went downhill very fast.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the year 1931 and 1932, one noticed as a businessman, +which I was at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles +were such that German economic life was becoming more and +more prostrate. Then I looked around. At that time, I was closely +attached to the German People’s Party and I saw how the parties +became always more and more numerous in Germany. I remember +that in the end we had something like 30 parties or more in Germany, +that unemployment was growing steadily, and that the +government was losing the confidence of the people more and more. +From these years I clearly recollect the efforts made by the then +Chancellor Brüning, which were doubtlessly meant sincerely and +honestly but which nevertheless had no success.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Other governments came, that is well known. They, too, had no +success. The export trade in Germany no longer paid for itself. The +gold reserves of the Reichsbank dwindled, there was tax evasion, +and no confidence at all in the measures introduced by the government. +That, roughly, was the picture which I saw in Germany in +the years 1930 and 1931. I saw then how strikes increased, how +discontented the people were, and how more and more demonstrations +took place on the streets and conditions became more and +more chaotic.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture +which presented itself in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, particularly +<span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span> +1932, in Germany was not unlike the symptoms of civil war. For me +as a German—and I think I have always been a patriot like many +other Germans—it made a frightful impression. Actually I was not +very close to the political world, but during those years I realized +that something had to be done and that everyone, wherever he might +be, would have to help or assist to create a national front on a +broad basis which would once more have the confidence of men and +particularly of the large working masses of the people. At the same +time, I was aware that most of the men who were responsible for +Versailles had not intended this—I am sure of it—but it was a fact +which I believe no one can deny today. I have already mentioned +the disappointment I experienced as a young officer through personal +contacts, in particular, with the German Ambassador at that +time, Dieckhoff, who is a distant relative of mine or relative by +marriage, the disappointment which in fact we all experienced in +the German Armed Forces, among the German people, and in +government circles naturally even more—that these Points of Wilson +had been so quickly abandoned. I do not propose to make a propaganda +speech here. I merely want to represent the facts soberly as +I experienced them at the time. There is no doubt that the defenselessness +of the German people at that time led to the fact that +unfortunately a tendency was maintained among our enemies not +toward conciliation but toward hatred or revenge. I am convinced +that this was certainly not the intention of Wilson, at that time +President of the United States, and I myself believe that in later +years, he suffered because of it. At any rate that was my first +contact with German politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This Versailles now became...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But it is known that even the severe stipulations of Versailles +as we experienced them, from the closest personal observation, were +not adhered to as is well known. That, too, is perhaps a consequence, +an after-effect of a war, in which men drifted in a certain +direction and just could not or would not adhere to certain things. +It is known that the stipulations of Versailles were not observed +then either territorially speaking or in other very important points. +May I mention that one of the most important questions—territorial +questions—at that time was Upper Silesia and particularly Memel, +that small territory. The events which took place made a deep +impression on me personally. Upper Silesia particularly, because I +had many personal ties there and because none of us could understand +that even those severe stipulations of Versailles were not observed. +It is a question of minorities which also played a very +important part. Later I shall have to refer to this point more in +detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But right +from the beginning, German minorities, as is known, suffered very +<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> +hard times. At that time it was again Upper Silesia particularly, +and those territories which were involved and suffering under that +problem, under that treatment. Further, the question of disarmament +was naturally one of the most important points of Versailles. +And that, too, has already been referred to in this courtroom. +Therefore I do not want to go into detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At any rate, it was the denial of equality in all these spheres, +the denial of equal rights, which made me decide that year to take +a greater part in politics. I would like to say here quite openly that +at that time I often talked to French and British friends, and of +course it was already a well-known fact, even then—after 1930 the +NSDAP received over 100 seats in the Reichstag—that here the +natural will of the German people broke through to resist this +treatment, which after all meant nothing more than that they wanted +to live. At the time these friends of mine spoke to me about Adolf +Hitler, whom I did not know at the time, they asked me, “What +sort of a man is Adolf Hitler? What will come of it? What is it?” +I said to them frankly at that time, “Give Germany a chance and +you will not have Adolf Hitler. Do not give her a chance, and Adolf +Hitler will come into power.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany was not given +the chance, so on 30 January 1933 he came—the National Socialists +seized power.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How and when did you come to know Adolf Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time on +13 August 1932 at the Berghof. Since about 1930 or 1931 I had +known Count Helldorf in Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist +is known. He was a regimental comrade of mine in my squadron, +and we went through 4 years of war together. Through him I +became acquainted with National Socialism in Berlin for the first +time. I had asked him at that time to arrange a meeting with +Hitler for me. He did so that time, as far as I remember, through +the mediation of Herr Röhm. I visited Adolf Hitler and had a long +discussion with him at that time, that is to say, Adolf Hitler explained +his ideas on the situation in the summer of 1932 to me. I +then saw him again in 1933—that has already been described here +by Party Member Göring—at my house at Dahlem which I placed +at their disposal so that I, on my part, should do everything possible +to create a national front. Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression +on me even then. I noticed particularly his blue eyes in his +generally dark appearance, and then, perhaps as outstanding, his +detached, I should say reserved—not unapproachable, but reserved—nature, +and the manner in which he expressed his thoughts. These +thoughts and statements always had something final and definite +<span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span> +about them, and they appeared to come from his innermost self. I +had the impression that I was facing a man who knew what he +wanted and who had an unshakable will and who was a very strong +personality. I can summarize by saying that I left that meeting with +Hitler convinced that this man, if anyone, could save Germany from +these great difficulties and that distress which existed at the time. +I need not go further into detail about the events of that January. +But I would like to tell about one episode which happened in my +house in Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to +become Reich Chancellor or not. I know that at that time, I believe, +he was offered the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what +enormous strength and conviction—if you like, also brutality and +hardness—he could state his opinion when he believed that obstacles +might appear which could lead to the rehabilitation and rescue of +his people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you believe in the possibility of a revision of +the Versailles Treaty by means of mutual understanding?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that the numerous business trips +which in the years of 1920 to 1932 took me abroad proved to me +how endlessly difficult it was or would have to be under the system +which then existed to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty +by means of negotiations. In spite of that, I felt how from year to +year the circles grew in England and France which were convinced +that somehow Germany would have to be helped. During those years, I +established many contacts with men of the business world, of public +life, of art and science, particularly in universities in England and +France. I learned thereby to understand the attitude of the English +and the French. I want to say now that even shortly after Versailles +it was my conviction that a change of that treaty could be carried +out only through an understanding with France and Britain. I also +believed that only in this way could the international situation be +improved and the very considerable causes of conflict existing everywhere +as consequences of the first World War be removed. It was +clear, therefore, that only by means of an understanding with the +Western Powers, with England and France, would a revision of +Versailles be possible. Even then, I had the distinct feeling that only +through such an understanding could a permanent peace in Europe +really be preserved. We young officers had experienced too much at +that time. And I am thinking of the Free Corps men in Silesia and +all those things in the Baltic, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I should like to add, and +say it quite openly, that right from the beginning, from the first +day in which I saw and read the Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, +felt it to be my duty to oppose it and to try to do everything so +that a better treaty could take its place. It was precisely Hitler’s +<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span> +opposition to Versailles that first brought me together with him and +the National Socialist Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you attempt to tell Hitler your views regarding +this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5 o’clock and the Tribunal +thinks they had better adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-FOURTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 29 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop goes on, the Tribunal desires me to draw the +attention of Dr. Horn and of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to what +the Tribunal has said during the last few days.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the first place, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has +allowed the Defendant Göring, who has given the evidence first +of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible +as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence +without any interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole +history of the Nazi regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany. +The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the other +defendants to go over the same ground in their evidence except +insofar as is necessary for their own defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, the Tribunal ruled that evidence as to the injustice of +the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is +inadmissible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, though this is not an order of the Tribunal, I must point +out that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the +view of the defendants and some of their witnesses that the Treaty +of Versailles was unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point, +apart from its being inadmissible, is cumulative, and the Tribunal +will not hear it for that reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that +it is the duty of counsel to examine their witnesses and not to leave +them simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence +which counsel knows is inadmissible according to the rulings of the +Tribunal it is the duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gaus’ affidavit the Tribunal +will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop has given evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I agreed with Dr. Horn, Counsel for +the Defendant Ribbentrop...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I do not care whether you spoke +to Dr. Horn or not or what arrangement you may have made with +<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span> +Dr. Horn; it is not convenient for the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gaus’ +evidence at the present moment; they want to go on with Ribbentrop’s +evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yesterday at the end you were speaking about your +political impressions in England and France. In connection with +that I should like to put the following question: Did you make +efforts to tell Hitler of your views on French and British politics +at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, after 30 January 1933 I saw Hitler +repeatedly and of course told him about the impressions which I +gathered on my frequent travels, particularly to England and +France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward France and England +at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler’s attitude was as follows: He saw in +France an enemy of Germany because of the entire policy which +France had pursued with regard to Germany since the end of World +War I, and especially because of the position which she took on +questions of equality of rights. This attitude of Hitler’s found +expression at the time in his book <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I knew France well, since for a number of years I had had connections +there. At that time I told the Führer a great deal about +France. It interested him, and I noticed that he showed an increasing +interest in French matters in the year 1933. Then I brought +him together with a number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of +these visits, and perhaps also some of my descriptions of the attitude +taken by many Frenchmen, and all of French culture...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What Frenchmen were they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There were a number of French economists, +there were journalists and also some politicians. These reports interested +the Führer, and gradually, he got the impression that there +were, after all, men in France who were not averse to the idea of +an understanding with Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Above all I acquainted the Führer with an argument which +sprang from my deepest conviction and my years of experience. It +was a great wish of the Führer, as is well known, to come to a +definitive friendship and agreement with England. At first the +Führer treated this idea as something apart from Franco-German +politics. I believe that at that time I succeeded in convincing the +Führer that an understanding with England would be possible only +by way of an understanding with France as well. That made, as +I still remember very clearly from some of our conversations, a +strong impression on him. He told me then that I should continue +<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span> +this purely personal course of mine for bringing about an understanding +between Germany and France and that I should continue +to report to him about these things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then you became Hitler’s foreign political advisor, +not the Party advisor? How was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I reported to Hitler +about my travel experiences. These impressions which I brought +from England and France were of interest to him, and, without +any special conferences or discussions being arranged, I was often +received by Hitler. I spoke with him repeatedly and in that way +it came about of itself that, apart from the official channels, he +acknowledged my co-operation and my advice as to what I had seen +and heard in foreign countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Of course, he was particularly interested in all questions concerning +England. I told him about public opinion and personalities +and introduced to him, besides Frenchmen, a number of Englishmen +with whom he could exchange ideas outside the official channels, +something which he loved to do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In what did your personal co-operation in the efforts +made by Hitler to come to an agreement with France in the years +1933 to 1935 consist?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: At that time the solution of the Saar question +was one of the first problems up for discussion. I tried through +my own private channels to make it clear to the French in Paris +that a reasonable and quiet solution of the Saar question in the +spirit of the plebiscite, as laid down in the Versailles Treaty, would +be a good omen for the relations between the two countries. I spoke +with a number of people during those years in Paris and also made +the first contact with members of the French Cabinet. I might +mention that I had conversations with the then French President +Doumergue, with the Foreign Minister Barthou, who was later +assassinated, with M. Laval, and especially with M. Daladier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I remember that in connection with the Saar question in particular +I met with considerable understanding on the part of the +latter. Then somewhat later I noticed during the visits of Frenchmen +to Hitler that it was always mentioned, “Yes, but there is +<span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> and your policy toward France is contained in that +book.” I tried to get the Führer to bring out an official revision of +this passage of <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>. The Führer said, however—and I +remember the exact words—that he was determined through his +policy, as put into practice, to prove to the world that he had +changed his view in this respect: Things once written down could +not be changed, they were a historical fact, and his former attitude +<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span> +toward France had been caused by France’s attitude toward Germany +at that time. But one could now turn over a new leaf in the +history of the two countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I asked Adolf Hitler to receive a French journalist, in order +that possibly by a public statement this revision of the view expressed +in his book <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> could be made known to the world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He agreed to this and then received a French journalist and gave +him an interview in 1933. I do not recall the exact date. I believe +this article appeared in <span class='it'>Le Matin</span> and created a great deal of excitement. +I was very glad, for thereby a large step toward an understanding +with France had been taken. Then I contemplated what +could further be done and how, from this simple public article, one +could work up to a direct contact between French and German +statesmen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: At that time were you not contemplating the means +for bringing Hitler and Daladier together? What practical efforts +did you make?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was just going to come to that. At that +time Daladier was the French Premier. I had several conversations +with him and suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that +quite frankly, man to man, they could carry on a discussion and +see whether Franco-German relations could not be put on an +entirely new basis. M. Daladier was quite taken by this idea. I +reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready to meet M. Daladier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The meeting place was to be in the German Odenwald and was +already agreed upon. I went to Paris to make the last arrangements +with Daladier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in +any respect with this examination of this defendant, but my colleagues +and I feel that this particular part of the examination is +quite immaterial and in any event much too detailed and that we +will never get along here. If counsel would abide by the instruction +of the Court given this morning, we could move along much +more directly and much more quickly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection +is really well founded. The defendant is dealing with a period +between 1933 and 1935 and the efforts which he made for good +relations with France. Well now, that is very remote from any +question which we have to decide in this case, and therefore to deal +with it in this detail seems to the Tribunal a waste of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his +direct co-operation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament? +<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I was appointed Commissioner +for Disarmament in the year—in March or April. The reason was +as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler was of the opinion that there should be equality of +armament. He believed that this would be possible only through +negotiations with France and England. That was also my point +of view. Because of my efforts to establish good relations between +Germany and England, since this was the earnest wish of the +Führer, I was at that time in London and there was able to make +contacts with men influential in English politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was mainly the contact with Lord Baldwin. I spoke to Lord +Baldwin and the then Prime Minister, MacDonald, about the German +desire for equality and found that these ministers had an +open ear. As the result of a long conversation which I had with +the Lord Chancellor of that time, the present Lord Baldwin—the +latter, I believe on 1 December 1933, made a speech in the House +of Commons, in which he pointed out that one should meet +Germany halfway. Armament equality had been promised and +therefore it would have to be reached somehow. For this purpose +there were three possibilities: One would be, that Germany arm up +to the level of the other powers, and that was not desired; the +second possibility, that the others would disarm to the level of +Germany, and that could not be carried out; and therefore one +would have to meet halfway and permit Germany a limited rearmament, +and the other countries for their part would have to disarm. +Adolf Hitler was very happy then about this attitude, for he considered +it a practicable way of carrying through equality for +Germany. Unfortunately it was not at all possible in the ensuing +course of events to put into practice these good and reasonable +ideas and statements made by Baldwin. Adolf Hitler therefore +took the view that within the system now prevailing in the world +it was apparently impossible to attain, by means of negotiations, +armament equality—equality of rights—for Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait. The interpreter isn’t hearing you +clearly. Could you put the microphone a little bit more in front +of you? And would you repeat the last few sentences you said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler saw that unfortunately, within +the international system prevailing at that time, the good ideas +of Lord Baldwin could not be carried out by means of negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What practicable steps in limitation of armament +did you obtain in London?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that Adolf Hitler, that means +Germany, left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference +because it was impossible to carry through the German +<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> +desires by way of negotiations. Hitler therefore saw no other +possibility, except to achieve this aim through the efforts of the +German people themselves. He knew and, of course, realized that +a risk was involved, but after the experiences of the preceding +few years no other means remained, so that then Germany started +to rearm independently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Dr. Horn attempted to interrupt.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to finish my answer to your +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As a practical result of this, the following happened: In the +course of the year 1934 there came about a closer contact between +the German and the British Governments. There followed visits +by British statesmen to Berlin, by Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden, +and during these visits the suggestion was brought up as to whether +it would not be possible to come to an agreement or an understanding +at least as far as naval matters were concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler was very much interested in this idea and in the course +of the negotiations between the British and the German Governments +it was agreed that I should be sent to London to attempt +to come to a naval agreement with the British Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is not necessary for me to go into details of the pact which +actually materialized. Hitler himself had said from the beginning +that, in order to come to a final understanding with England, one +would have to acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great +Britain once and for all. It was he who suggested the naval ratio +of 100 to 35, which was an entirely different ratio from that which +was negotiated between Germany and England before 1914.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After relatively short negotiations this naval agreement was +then concluded in London. It was very important for future Anglo-German +relations, and at that time it represented the first practical +result of an actual armament limitation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: At that time did France agree to this rearmament +and what were your personal efforts in this step?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I might say in advance that Hitler and +I were extremely happy about this pact. I know, it was then +styled once by certain circles, to use an English expression, an “eyewash.” +I can say here from my own personal experience that I have +never seen Adolf Hitler so happy as at the moment when I was +able to tell him personally, in Hamburg, of the conclusion of this +agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: And what was France’s attitude to this pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: With France the situation was, of course, +a little difficult. I had already noticed this while the negotiations +<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span> +were taking place, for one had deviated from the armament limitation +of the Versailles Treaty. Then I myself proposed to the +gentlemen of the Foreign Office—I can mention their names, they +were Sir Robert Craigie in particular and also Little, who was +then a British Admiral—that I would go to France so that I also +could utilize my relations with French statesmen and make clear +to them the usefulness of this agreement for a future German-Anglo-French +understanding.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to point out something here. In this courtroom, +sometime ago, a film was shown in which a speech I made for the +newsreels of that time, at the conclusion of this naval agreement, +was presented as proof of the duplicity of German diplomacy. At +that time I purposely made this speech in London in order to +record and to declare before the whole world that this did not +concern merely one-sided British-German matters, but that it was +the wish of Hitler—and also the spirit of the naval agreement—to +bring about a general limitation of armament, and that this naval +pact was also designed to improve finally the relations between +France and Germany. This wish was real and sincere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then went to France, spoke with French statesmen and, I +believe, did help to some extent so that this first step in the +limitation of armaments was considered a reasonable measure by +many Frenchmen in view of the fact that in the long run equality +of rights could not be withheld from the German people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Then you were appointed Ambassador to London. +What led to this appointment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That came about as follows: In the time +following the naval agreement, which was hailed with joy by the +widest circles in England, I made great efforts to bring Lord +Baldwin and the Führer together, and I should like to mention +here that the preliminary arrangements for this meeting had +already been made by a friend of Lord Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The +Führer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet Lord Baldwin, but +unfortunately Lord Baldwin declined at the last minute. What +led to his declining, I do not know, but there is no doubt that +certain forces in England at the time did not wish this German-British +understanding.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then in 1936, when the German Ambassador Von Hoesch died, +I said to myself, that on behalf of Germany one should make one +last supreme effort to come to a good understanding with England. +I might mention in this connection, that at that time I had already +been appointed State Secretary of the Foreign Office by Hitler +and had asked him personally that that appointment be cancelled +and that I be sent to London as Ambassador. +<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The following may have led to this decision of Hitler’s. Hitler +had a very definite conception of England’s balance of power theory, +but my view perhaps deviated somewhat from his. My conviction +was that England would always continue to support her old balance +of power theory, whereas Hitler was of the opinion that this theory +of balance of power was obsolete, and that from now on, England +should tolerate, that is, should welcome a much stronger Germany +in view of the changed situation in Europe, and in view of Russia’s +development of strength. In order to give the Führer a definite +and clear picture of how matters actually stood in England—that +was at any rate one of the reasons why the Führer sent me to +England. Another reason was that at that time we hoped, through +relations with the still very extensive circles in England which +were friendly to Germany and supported a German-English friendship, +to make the relations between the two countries friendly +and perhaps even to reach a permanent agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler’s goal was finally and always the German-English pact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In what way was your ambassadorial activity +hampered in England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say first that I was repeatedly +in England in the 1930’s, mainly from 1935 to 1936, and, +acting on instructions from the Führer, I sounded out the opinions +there on the subject of a German-British pact. The basis of this +pact is known. It was to make the naval ratio of 100 to 35 +permanent. Secondly the integrity of the so-called Low Countries, +Belgium and Holland, and also France was to be guaranteed by +the two countries forever and—this was the Führer’s idea—Germany +should recognize the British Empire and should be ready to stand +up, if necessary even with the help of her own power, for the +preservation and maintenance of the British Empire; and England, +in return, should recognize Germany as a strong power in Europe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It has already been said, and I should like to repeat, that these +efforts in the 1930’s unfortunately did not lead to any results. +It was one of the Führer’s deepest disappointments—and I must +mention that here, for it is very important for the further course +of events—that this pact upon which he had placed such very +great hopes and which he had regarded as the cornerstone of his +foreign policy did not materialize in these years. What the forces +were which prevented its materializing I cannot say, because I +do not know. In any case we got no further.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I came back to this question several times while I was Ambassador +in London and discussed it with circles friendly to Germany. +And I must say that there also were many Englishmen who had +a very positive attitude towards this idea. +<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you also meet with any attitude that was +negative?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There was naturally a strong element in +England which did not look favorably upon this pact or this idea +of close relations with Germany, because of considerations of +principle and perhaps because of traditional considerations of British +policy against definite obligations of this kind. I should like to +mention here briefly, even though this goes back to the year 1936, +that during the Olympic Games in the year 1936 I tried to win +the very influential British politician, the present Lord Vansittart, +to this idea. I had at that time a very long discussion of several +hours’ duration with him in Berlin. Adolf Hitler also received +him and likewise spoke with him about the same subject. Lord +Vansittart, even though our personal relations were good, showed +a certain reserve.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the year 1937, when I was in London, I saw that two clearly +different trends were gradually forming in England; the one trend +was very much in favor of promoting good relations with Germany; +the second trend did not wish such close relations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There were—I believe that I do not need to mention names, for +they are well known—those gentlemen who did not wish such +close relations with Germany, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was later +Prime Minister, and others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then made strenuous efforts in London in order to promote this +idea but other events occurred which made my activity there most +difficult. There was first of all, the Spanish policy. It is well-known +that civil war raged in Spain at that time and that in +London the so-called Nonintervention Commission was meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I therefore, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had a +difficult task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, +I wished to further German-English friendship and to bring about +the German-English pact, but on the other hand, I had to carry +out the instructions of my government in regard to the Nonintervention +Commission and Spain. These instructions, however, were +often in direct opposition to certain aims of British policy. Therefore +it came about that this sort of League of Nations which the +Nonintervention Commission represented at that time, and of +which I was the authorized German member, prejudiced the chief +aim with which Adolf Hitler had sent me to London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But I have to say here—if I may and am supposed to explain +that period openly in the interest of the case—that it was not only +the policy regarding Spain, but that in these years, 1937 until the +beginning of 1938, that section which did not want a pact with +Germany, doubtless made itself constantly more evident in England; +and that, today, is a historical fact. Why? The answer is very simple, +<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span> +very clear. These circles regarded a Germany strengthened by +National Socialism as a factor which might disturb the traditional +British balance of power theory and policy on the Continent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am convinced that Adolf Hitler at that time had no intention +at all of undertaking on his part anything against England, but +that he had sent me to London with the most ardent wish for +really reaching an understanding with England. From London I +reported to the Führer about the situation. And before this +Tribunal now I wish to clarify one point, a point which has been +brought up very frequently and which is relevant to my own +defense. It has often been asserted that I reported to the Führer +from England that England was degenerate and would perhaps +not fight. I may and must establish the fact here, that from the +beginning I reported exactly the opposite to the Führer. I informed +the Führer that in my opinion the English ruling class and the +English people had a definitely heroic attitude and that this +nation was ready at any time to fight to the utmost for the existence +of its empire. Later, in the course of the war and after a conference +with the Führer, I once discussed this subject in public, +in a speech made in 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Summarizing the situation in London in the years 1937 and +1938, while I was ambassador, I can at least say that I was fully +cognizant of the fact that it would be very difficult to conclude +a pact with England. But even so, and this I always reported, all +efforts would have to be made to come by means of a peaceful +settlement to an understanding with England as a decisive factor +in German policy, that is, to create such a relation between the +development of German power and the British basic tendencies and +views on foreign policy that these two factors would not conflict.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: During the time you were ambassador you concluded +the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. How was +it that just you, the ambassador, concluded that pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to make the preliminary +remark that in 1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. +On 4 February I was in Berlin. The Führer called me and informed +me that he had appointed me Foreign Minister. After that—I am +not sure, are you talking of the Three Power Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No, you have misunderstood me. During your activity +as ambassador you concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, +which in 1937 was joined by Italy and later on by Spain, as well +as other countries. How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded +this pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler at that time considered the +ideological difference between Germany, that is, National Socialism +<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> +and communism actually one of the decisive factors of his policy. +Therefore, the question arose as to how a way could be found at +all to win over other countries to counter communistic tendencies. +The problem, therefore, was an ideological one. In the year 1933, +I believe, Hitler discussed with me for the first time, the question +of whether a closer contact with Japan could be established in +some form or other. I replied that I personally had certain connections +with Japanese persons and would establish contact. When +I did so it came to light that Japan had the same anti-Comintern +attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of the years 1933, +1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized that one might +make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I believe it was +one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the Anti-Comintern +Pact. I presented this idea to the Führer and the Führer +approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological +question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the +official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me +to prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in +Berlin, as I believe, in the course of the year 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: If I understand you correctly, this pact was concluded +by you because you were the head of the Bureau +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. The Bureau Ribbentrop +consisted chiefly of me and just a few aides. But it is correct to +say that the Führer wished that I conclude this pact because he +did not wish to give it an official air.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did this pact have aims of practical policy or only +ideological aims?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain that this pact, on principle, +I should say, had an ideological aim. It was meant to oppose +the work of the Comintern in the various countries at that time. +But naturally it also contained a political element. This political +element was anti-Russian at the time, since Moscow was the +representative of the Comintern idea. Therefore, the Führer and +I had a notion that through this pact, a certain balance or counterbalance +against the Russian efforts or against Russia was being +created in a political sense as well, because Russia was at odds +with Germany in respect to ideology and also, of course, to politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you and the defendant really +think it is necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken +to tell us why he, as an ambassador in London, was called upon +to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear Your Honor. +<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and +the defendant think it necessary for the defendant to make such +a long speech in answer to your question, why he, as ambassador +in London, was employed to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact. He +has spoken for at least 5 minutes about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On 4 February 1938, you were made Foreign +Minister. What were the reasons for this appointment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that on 4 February +1938 I was in Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that, +because of a shift in various higher positions, he was going to +appoint a new Foreign Minister, also that he had appointed the +then Foreign Minister Von Neurath, President of the Secret Cabinet +Council. I replied to the Führer that I, of course, would be glad +to accept this appointment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On this occasion you also received a high rank in +the SS? The Prosecution have asserted that this rank was not +purely honorary. Is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must correct this point, I believe. I had +received a rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall +whether it was on the occasion of this appointment or later on +that I became SS Gruppenführer. The Führer bestowed on me +the rank and the uniform of an SS Gruppenführer. That was a +position, which formerly in the Army used to be known as a rank +<span class='it'>à la suite</span>. It happened that I agreed definitely with the SS idea +at that time. My relations with Himmler were also quite good +at the time. I considered the SS idea at that time the possible basis +for producing and creating an idealistic class of leaders, somewhat +like that existing in England, and such as emerged symbolically +through the heroism of our Waffen-SS during the war. Later +on, it is true, my attitude towards Himmler changed. But the +Führer bestowed this rank on me because he wished that within +the Party and at the Party meetings, I should wear the Party +uniform and have a Party rank.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I at this time state briefly my attitude toward the Party. +Yesterday or the day before yesterday, I believe, the question +was raised as to whether I was a true National Socialist. I do +not claim to be competent to judge this question. It is a fact +that it was only in later years that I joined Adolf Hitler. I did not +pay very much attention to the National Socialist doctrines and +program nor to the racial theories, with which I was not very +familiar. I was not anti-Semitic, nor did I fully understand the +church question, although I had left the church a long time ago. +I had my own inner reasons for doing so, reasons connected with +the early 20’s and the development of the church in Germany in +<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span> +those years. However, I believe that I have always been a good +Christian. What drew me to the Party, as I recognized at the time, +was the fact that the Party wanted a strong, flourishing, and socialistic +Germany. That was what I wanted too. For that reason, in +the year 1932, I did, after thorough deliberation, become a member +of the NSDAP.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Had you put your services at the disposal of the +Party before that date, as the Prosecution assert, namely, from +1930 on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was in 1930 when in the large Reichstag +election National Socialism obtained more than 100 seats in the +German Reichstag. I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need +to go into detail any more, what conditions in Germany were at that +time. However, during the years 1930, 1931 and 1932 I gradually +came nearer to the Party. Then from 1932 on—I believe I entered +the Party in August 1932—from that moment on until the end of +this war I devoted my entire strength to National Socialist Germany +and exhausted my strength in so doing. I wish to profess frankly +before this Tribunal and before the world that I have always endeavored +to be a good National Socialist and that I was proud of the +fact that I belonged to a little group of men, idealists, who did not +want anything else but to re-establish Germany’s prestige in the +world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What foreign political problems did Hitler describe +to you as requiring solution, when you took office? What directives +did he give you for the conduct of foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: When I took office, the Führer said relatively +little to me. He said only that Germany had now assumed +a new position, that Germany had once more joined the circle of +nations having equal rights and that it was clear that in the future +certain problems would also still have to be solved. In particular, +I recall that he pointed out four problems which, sooner or later, +would have to be solved. He emphasized that such problems could +be solved only with a strong Wehrmacht, not by using it, but through +its mere existence, because a country which was not strongly armed +could practice no foreign policy whatsoever, but rather such a +country operated, so to speak, in a vacuum as we had experienced +during the past years. He said we would have to achieve clear-cut +relations with our neighbors. The four problems he enumerated +were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned a solution of the +Sudeten questions, of the question of the tiny Memel district and +of the Danzig and the Corridor question, all problems which would +have to be solved in one way or another. It would be my duty, he +said, to assist him diplomatically in this task. From this moment +<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span> +on I did my best to assist the Führer in the preparation of some +solution of these problems in a way agreeable to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to +break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Which course did German foreign policy take after +you were appointed Foreign Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: First I tried to get an overall picture of +the pending affairs of the Foreign Office and of the situation. German +foreign policy, as I said before, had reached a certain stage, +that is, Germany had regained prestige in the eyes of the world, +and the future task would be to solve in some way or other the +important and vital problems created in Europe by the Versailles +Treaty. This was all the more necessary since, by way of example, +ethnic questions always were material for conflict, that is, contained +possibilities for conflict dangerous to a peaceful development in +Europe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the period following I familiarized myself with the affairs +of the ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with +altogether new men. I should like to mention here that Hitler’s +attitude towards the Foreign Office was not always positive and, in +continuing the efforts of Minister Von Neurath, my predecessor, I +considered it my most important task to bring the Foreign Office +closer to Hitler and to bridge the two spheres of ideas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was clear to me from the very beginning, after I took over +the ministry, that I would be working, so to speak, in the shadow +of a titan and that I would have to impose on myself certain limitations, +that is to say, that I would not be in a position, one might +almost say, to conduct the foreign policy as it is done by other +foreign ministers, who are responsible to a parliamentary system +or a parliament. The commanding personality of the Führer naturally +dominated the foreign policy as well. He occupied himself with +all its details. It went like this more or less: I reported to him and +forwarded to him important foreign policy reports through a liaison +man, and Hitler in turn gave me definite orders as to what views +I should take in regard to problems of foreign policy, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of these conversations the problem of Austria +crystallized as the first and most important problem which had to +be brought to some solution or other. Austria had always been a +matter very close to the Führer’s heart, because he was himself +a native of Austria and naturally, with Germany’s power growing, +<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span> +the efforts already long in existence for bringing Germany and +Austria more closely together became even more pronounced. At +that time I did not yet know very much about this problem, since +Hitler himself handled this problem for the most part.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When you took over your office, or later, did you +get to know the minutes of a conference of 5 November 1937 which +has become known here under the name of the Hossbach document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know this document, which has +been mentioned here in various connections. I saw it here for the +first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Hitler ever say anything to you which conforms +to the contents of this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall all the details of the contents +of this document, but it was the Führer’s practice to speak +very little at all about his aims and intentions and his attitude in +matters of principle. At any rate, this was his practice in dealing +with me. He did say that Germany had to solve certain problems +in Europe, as I said before, and that for this reason it was necessary +to be strong. He also mentioned the possibility that this might lead +to disagreements, but he said to me nothing more specific about this. +On the contrary, he always emphasized to me that it was his desire +to solve by diplomatic means these problems in Europe which had +to be solved and that, once he had solved these problems, he had the +intention of creating an ideal social state of the people and that the +Germany he would then create would be a model modern social +state with all the new edifices to which he attached special value. +In other words, to me he did casually admit the possibility of an +armed conflict, but he always said it was his unalterable aim, and +that it had always been and was his intention, to achieve this +solution of the “impossibility of Versailles,” as he sometimes called +it, in a peaceful way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment as Foreign Minister +you were called by Hitler to Berchtesgaden to the conference with +Schuschnigg. What was discussed there and what was your role in +these conferences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler informed me—I recall this was on +12 February 1938—that he was going to meet Federal Chancellor +Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. I do not remember the details. +I see from my notes that this was on 12 February. One thing I +know is that he told me that the solution to be achieved was that, +in some form or other, the German National Socialists in Austria +must be given assistance. Difficulties of all sorts had arisen there, +the details of which I no longer recall. At any rate, I believe, there +were a great many National Socialists in jail, and, as a consequence +<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span> +of the natural efforts of these Austrian people to bring about a +closer contact with the Reich, this Austrian problem threatened to +become a really serious problem between Germany and Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Adolf Hitler told me at the time that I should be present in the +Berghof. Later it was said, and I have heard it said here, that Adolf +Hitler once declared that he intended to fight for the right for these +6 million Germans to decide their own fate under all circumstances +during the year 1938. I do not recall that he said so but it is very +well possible that he did say so. On the occasion of Schuschnigg’s +reception I was at the Obersalzberg. Hitler received Schuschnigg +alone and had a long conversation with him. The details of this +conversation are not known to me because I was not present. I +recall that Schuschnigg saw me after this conversation and that I +in turn had a long conversation with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you at that time put Schuschnigg under political +pressure, as the Prosecution asserts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true. I remember very +clearly my conversation with Schuschnigg, whereas the other details +of what was going on at the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my +memory, since I was not present at either the first or the second +meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. My discussion with +Schuschnigg proceeded in a very amicable fashion. I felt that +Schuschnigg obviously was very greatly impressed by the Führer +and the Führer’s personality. I wish to say first that I do not know +exactly the details of what Hitler wanted to achieve or discuss with +Schuschnigg, so that on this subject matter I could say to him very +little, or rather nothing. Our discussion therefore was confined to +more general subjects. I told Schuschnigg that in my opinion these +two countries must come into closer contact and that perhaps it was +his historical task to assist in this and to co-operate; that the fact +was undeniable that both nations were German, and two such German +nations could not forever be separated by artificial barriers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was it already at this conference that a recision of +the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 was discussed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not discuss this point with Schuschnigg +and I believe that the Führer did not do so either in any way +because according to what Schuschnigg told me, the Führer had told +him that certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria +in order to eliminate the reasons for conflict between the two countries. +That is what I understood him to say without remembering +any details. As I said, my discussion with him was very amicable, +and I might mention that, when I suggested to Schuschnigg that the +two countries would have to get into closer contact, Schuschnigg +showed an altogether positive attitude towards this idea so that, to +<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span> +a certain extent, I was even surprised by his positive attitude +at that time. There can be no talk of any pressure exerted on +Schuschnigg during our discussion. However, the Führer’s discussion +with him, I believe, was conducted in very clear language, +because the Führer wanted to reach some improvement in relations +in order to solve the problems between the two countries, and to +achieve this it was necessary for the two statesmen to reveal their +thoughts openly. I have heard here, and I think this is from an +entry in General Jodl’s diary, that heavy political and military +pressure was exerted. I believe I can testify here that I knew +nothing of any military or strong political pressure at this meeting +between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may reiterate that I am sure +that the Führer used clear and frank language with Schuschnigg, +but I certainly did not notice any pressure of a military or a political +kind, or anything in the nature of an ultimatum. Also I assume +that General Jodl’s remark—I do not believe he was present—is a +diary entry based on hearsay. I should like to add that at that +time—and I have also stated this to several persons who were with +me and also to the Führer—I had an altogether positive and pleasant +impression of Schuschnigg’s personality. Schuschnigg even said that +the two countries, and I remember these words exactly, were bound +together by fate and that he would have to assist in some way in +bringing these two countries closer together. There was no mention +in this discussion of an Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the +Führer mentioned that, I do not know, but I do not believe so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: At that time, or shortly after, did Hitler mention to +you that he wished to deviate from the German-Austrian Treaty of +1936 and find some other solution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler did not discuss this matter with me. +If at all, I spoke very little with him about the Austrian problems. +This may sound surprising, but it can be understood from the fact +that it was only on 4 February that I took over the Foreign Office +and that I first had to get familiar with all the problems. The +Austrian problem was anyway, as I already said, a problem which +was always dealt with by Hitler himself and which consequently +was, so to speak, merely taken note of in the Foreign Ministry, +whereas it was directed by him personally. I know and I remember +that the then Ambassador Von Papen also had the right to report +directly to Hitler and that the Foreign Office received copies of +these reports. These reports, I believe, were presented directly to +Hitler by the Reich Chancellery, so that the problem was anchored +rather in the Reich Chancellery than in the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You then went back to London in order to give up +your post as ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding +the development of the Austrian question? +<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following in this connection: +I myself had always the idea that the Austrian problem should be +solved by bringing about a treaty, a customs and currency union, +between the two countries, since I personally believed that this was +the most natural and the easiest way to bring about a close connection +between the two countries. I might perhaps remind you at +this point, that this idea of a currency union, or at least a customs +union, was nothing new and had already been pursued by the +governments before Hitler; it did not materialize at that time, I +believe, because of the veto of the Allied powers. But it was a +long-cherished wish of both countries. I might first answer your +question concerning London. According to my notes, I went to +London on 8 March. As I have already mentioned, I happened to +be in Berlin for the celebration of the seizure of power on 30 January, +I believe, and then was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. +Because of this appointment I did not have the opportunity +to take official leave in London. On 8 March 1938 I went to London. +Before resigning my post I had a short conversation with Hitler, +primarily about English matters. I remember that he remarked on +this occasion that the Austrian problem beyond a doubt was progressing +very nicely in line with the arrangements agreed upon +with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I wish to add that I did not +know all the details of the agreements but I still remember a small +detail about which we sent an inquiry to the Reich Chancellery +only a few weeks later for the information of our specialist on the +Austrian question. After I arrived in London, I believe it was in +the afternoon, I happened to hear over the radio in the embassy +building a speech made by the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg +in Innsbruck or in Graz, I believe. I must say this speech took me +very much by surprise. To go into details would take too long. Nor +do I remember all the details. I do know that the entire manner, +and, as it seemed to me, also the tone of this speech, was such that +I immediately had the impression that the Führer would not tolerate +this, and that the entire speech, without any doubt, contradicted at +least the spirit of the agreements made with the Führer at the +Obersalzberg. As I said, I was convinced that Adolf Hitler would +do something about it; and I should like to say quite openly before +this Tribunal that it appeared quite in order to me that the question +be solved in some way or other, I mean, that one would have to +speak to Schuschnigg very frankly, to prevent matters leading to +a catastrophe, perhaps even a European catastrophe. Then, on the +next morning, I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord +Halifax had also received reports from Austria, and I tried, without +knowing the situation fully, to explain to him that it was better +to solve this problem now in one form or another, and that this +would be precisely in the interests of the German-English efforts +<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span> +toward friendly relations; that in the long run the assumption would +prove false that the friendship between Germany and England, as +striven for by both countries, could be broken up by such a problem. +Lord Halifax was not alarmed by the situation and told me, as far +as I remember, that I should still have an opportunity to discuss +these matters with the British Prime Minister Chamberlain at the +breakfast which was to follow. After this I had breakfast with the +then Prime Minister Chamberlain; during or after this breakfast +I had a long conversation with Chamberlain. During this conversation +Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized his desire to reach an +understanding with Germany. I was extremely happy to hear this +and told him that I was firmly convinced that this was also the +Führer’s attitude. He gave me a special message for the Führer +that this was his desire and that he would do everything he could +in this direction. Shortly after this conversation telegrams arrived +from Austria, from Vienna, I believe from the Minister or the British +Consul. Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me to come to +their office. I believe the breakfast took place at 10 Downing Street +and I went then to their office in order to discuss these telegrams. +I told them that of course I had no precise reports; then the news +of an ultimatum came, and later of the entry of German troops. We +arranged that I should try to contact my government and that Lord +Halifax would come to see me in the German Embassy in the afternoon +to discuss these things further. I wish to emphasize that +Mr. Chamberlain on this occasion also took a very composed and, +it seemed to me, very sensible attitude towards the Austrian question. +In the afternoon Lord Halifax visited me and we had a long +talk. In the meantime the entry of German troops had become +known. I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord +Halifax was very amicable and that at the end of it I invited the +English Foreign Minister to pay Germany another visit. He accepted +with the remark that he would be glad to come and perhaps another +exhibition of hunting trophies could be arranged.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On the next morning you had a telephone conversation +with the Defendant Göring. This telephone conversation has +been put in evidence by the Prosecution, with the assertion that it +is a proof of your double-crossing policy. What about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is not true. Reich Marshal Göring has +already testified that this was a diplomatic conversation, and diplomatic +conversations are carried on all over the world in the same +way. But I may say that through this telephone conversation I +learned for the first time of the details of the events in Austria. +Without going into details I heard, first of all, that this vote without +doubt was not in accordance with the true will of the Austrian +people, and a number of other points which Göring asked me to +<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span> +mention in my conversations with the British ministers. But I +should like to say that actually such conversations did not take +place because I had already taken leave of the official English circles. +In fact, I did not have any further talks after my conversation with +Göring; just a few hours after this conversation I left London and +went to Berlin and later to Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might say that first I flew to Karinhall to visit Göring and +talked to him and found him just as happy about the Anschluss—that +is, not about the Anschluss but about the whole Austrian development +as I myself was. We all were happy. Then I flew, I believe, +on the same day, to Vienna and arrived there at about the same +time as Adolf Hitler. In the meantime I heard about the Anschluss +and it was only in Vienna that I learned that the idea of the Anschluss, +had definitely not occurred to Hitler until his drive through +Austria. I believe it was prompted by a demonstration in Linz and +then he decided very quickly, I think, to accomplish the Anschluss.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What problem did Hitler mention to you as the next +one which you should solve following the Anschluss?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The next problem which Hitler outlined to +me on 4 February was the problem of the Sudeten Germans. This +problem, however, was not a problem posed by Hitler or the Foreign +Office or any office, it was a <span class='it'>de facto</span> problem that existed of itself. +I believe it was the American prosecutor who said here that with +the dissolution of Czechoslovakia a chapter ended which was one of +the saddest in the history of nations, namely, the oppression and +destruction of the small Czechoslovak nation. I should like to state +the following from my own knowledge of these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>One may speak in this sense of a Czechoslovak State but not of +a Czechoslovak nation, because it was a state of different nationalities, +a state which comprised the most varied national groups. I +mention, besides Czechs, only Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, +Carpatho-Ukrainians, Slovaks, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. This shows that quite +heterogeneous elements had been welded together in 1919 to form +the state. It is certain, and probably a historical fact, that the efforts +of the different nationalities within the artificially welded state were +divergent to a certain extent and that the Czechs, following their +own tendencies, tried to surround these nationalities with a strong +ring, I should like to say, with an iron ring. This produced pressure +as pressure always created counterpressure, counterpressure from +the various nationalities of this state, and it is evident that a strong +Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time, exerted a +strong power of attraction on all the national segments in Europe; +or, at any rate, on those living close to the German border and +partly, I might say, on the others as well. So it came about that the +German minorities in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been +<span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span> +constantly exposed to a considerable pressure on the part of Prague, +now were subjected to still greater pressure. I do not believe I have +to go into details, but I can say from my own knowledge, and even +from my own discussions while I was ambassador in London, that +the question of the Sudetenland was very clearly understood by the +Foreign Office in London and that it was precisely England that +very often before 1938 had supported certain interests of the Sudeten +Germans in co-operation with Konrad Henlein.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler the suppression of +these German minorities undoubtedly increased. I should also like +to point out, and I know this from having read the files of the +Foreign Office at the time, that the League of Nations’ Committee +for Minorities had a tremendous amount of documents on the Sudeten +Germans and the great impediments encountered by the Germans in +practicing and living their own cultural life.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which +the Sudetenland was treated by Prague was, even in the opinion of +the competent and unprejudiced authorities of the League of Nations, +in no way in accord with the provisions of the League of Nations +regarding minorities. I myself thought it was absolutely necessary +to reach some solution in order that this problem might not become +a matter of conflict, whereby again, as in the case of Austria, all +Europe would be stirred up. I should like to emphasize that the +Foreign Office and I always endeavored, from the very beginning, +to solve the Sudeten German problem by way of diplomatic negotiations +with the main signatory powers of Versailles. And I might +add that it was my personal conviction, which I also expressed to +Hitler, that with sufficient time on hand and appropriate action, the +Germany that we had in 1938 could solve this problem in a diplomatic, +that is, peaceful way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have charged me with having stirred up unrest +and discord in Czechoslovakia by illegal means and thereby with +having consciously helped to bring about the outbreak of this crisis. +I do not deny in any way that between the Sudeten German Party +and the NSDAP there had been connections for a long time which +aimed at taking care of the Sudeten-German interests. Nor do I +wish to deny, for example, what was mentioned here, that the +Sudeten German Party was supported with certain funds from the +Reich. I might even say, and I believe the Czechoslovak Government +will confirm this, that that was an open secret which was well +known in Prague. However, it is not correct to say that anything +was done on the part of the Foreign Office and by me to direct these +efforts in such a way that a really serious problem might arise. I do +not want to go into further detail, but I should like to mention one +more point. Documents have been mentioned about arrests of Czech +<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span> +nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Sudeten +Germans. To that I can say merely that these were measures which +can be understood and explained only in view of the situation at +that time, but which were not brought about by us in the Foreign +Office in order to make the situation more critical. On the contrary, +in the further course of events, I attempted through the legation in +Prague as well as through efforts of the gentlemen of my office to +restrain the activities of the Sudeten German Party. I believe that +this has to some extent been proved clearly by the documents which +have been made known here. I do not have these documents before +me, so I cannot deal with them in greater detail; but I believe that +perhaps the Defense have the opportunity to make these matters +clear in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What brought about the critical situation in the +summer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is natural and has always been the case +that such a nationality has its own dynamics. This question of the +split of German groups bordering on Germany was often referred +to by us in the Foreign Office as “the sinister problem,” that is a +problem which could not be solved in a way compatible with the +interests of foreign policy. We had to deal here not with letters and +paragraphs but with living people who had laws and dynamics of +their own. Therefore the Sudeten German Party naturally strove +for greater and greater independence; it cannot be denied that a +number of influential leaders, at least at that time, demanded absolute +autonomy, if not the possibility of joining the Reich. This is +perfectly clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten German +Party. For the Foreign Office and German foreign policy, as well as +for Hitler, of course, manifold difficulties arose because of this. As +I said before, I tried to get the foreign policy affairs under control. +At the time I received Konrad Henlein—I believe once or twice, I do +not remember exactly—and asked him not to do anything, as far as +Prague was concerned, in the pursuit of his political goals that might +put German foreign policy into a state of emergency. This was +perhaps not always so easy for Henlein either, and I know that the +leaders of the Sudeten German Party could naturally approach +and be received by other offices of the Reich; also Adolf Hitler +himself, who was interested in this problem, occasionally received +these leaders. The crisis, or rather the whole situation, developed +more and more critically, because on the one hand the Sudeten +Germans insisted on their demands in Prague more and more openly +and stubbornly and because the Czechs, the Government in Prague, +opposed these demands, which resulted in excesses, arrests and so +on. Thus the situation became even more critical. At that time I +often spoke with the Czech Minister. I asked him to meet the +<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span> +demands of the Sudeten Germans for autonomy and all their +demands to the furthest extent possible. However, matters developed +in such a way that the attitude displayed by Prague became more +stubborn, and so did the attitude of the Sudeten Germans.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What brought about Chamberlain’s visit? What were +the reasons for this visit and for the role played by you on that +occasion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to interpolate here that in the +summer of 1938 the situation was driving more and more toward +a crisis. Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin, with whom +I had often discussed this problem and who was making efforts on his +part to bridge matters, undoubtedly made continuous reports to his +government. I do not know exactly today, but I believe that it was +through his initiative that Lord Runciman went to Prague. Runciman +undoubtedly went to Prague in good faith and tried to get a clear +picture of the situation. He also rendered an opinion which, as far +as I recall, was to the effect—I do not remember the wording—that +the right to exercise self-determination, immediate self-determination, +should not be denied the Sudetenland. Thus, I believe, this +opinion was favorable for the Sudeten Germans. Nevertheless, the +crisis was there. I do not remember exactly what the date was, +but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson, +Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government. In this way +Chamberlain’s visit to the Führer at the Obersalzberg came about +during the first half of September. Regarding this visit, there is not +very much to be said. The Führer spoke alone with Chamberlain +on that occasion. I do know, however, and we all felt it, that the +visit took place in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. As +far as I remember the Führer told me that he had told Chamberlain +frankly that the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination +and freedom in some form or other would have to be met now. +Chamberlain, I believe—and this was the substance of that conference—replied +that he would inform the British Cabinet of these +wishes of the German Government and that he would then make +further statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg +come about afterwards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: As far as I recall, matters did not progress +satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult +and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only +within Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, +and thereby into a European crisis. The result was that +Chamberlain once more took the initiative and thus his visit to +Godesberg came about; I believe this was in the middle of September +or during the second half of September. +<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How, then, was the Sudeten German question solved, +and what was your part in this solution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I first report about Godesberg? In +view of the crisis which had developed, Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain +at Godesberg that now he had to have a solution of this +question under all circumstances. I might emphasize that I knew +nothing regarding details of a military nature at that time, but I do +know that the Führer concerned himself with the possibility that +this problem might have to be solved by military power. He told +Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg that a solution of the Sudeten +German problem would have to be found as rapidly as possible. +Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be difficult to +win Prague over so quickly to a solution, and finally things broke +down altogether at the conference. Adolf Hitler then personally +dictated a memorandum which he or I was to give to Mr. Chamberlain. +Then Sir Horace Wilson, a friend of Mr. Chamberlain, visited +me, a man who deserves much credit in bridging disagreements. I +succeeded in arranging for another meeting in the evening. During +this meeting, which started in a rather cool atmosphere, the Führer +received a report of Czechoslovakia’s mobilization. This was a most +deplorable circumstance since Hitler, just at this moment, resented +that very strongly, and both he and Mr. Chamberlain wanted to +break off the conference. This happened, I believe, exactly at the +moment when the interpreter was about to read the Führer’s +memorandum containing a proposal for the solution of the Sudeten +German problem. By a remark and a short conversation with Hitler +and then with Chamberlain, I succeeded in straightening matters +out. Negotiations were resumed, and after a few hours of negotiations +the result was that Mr. Chamberlain told the Führer he could +see now that something had to be done and that he was ready, on +his part, to submit this memorandum to the British Cabinet. I +believe he also said that he would suggest to the British Cabinet, +that is to say, to his ministerial colleagues, that compliance with +this memorandum be recommended to Prague. The memorandum +contained as a solution, in general outlines, the annexation of the +Sudetenland by the Reich. I believe, the Führer expressed his desire +in the memorandum that, in view of the critical situation there, it +would be advisable that this be carried out, if possible, within a +definite period of time—I believe, by 1 October, that was within +10 days or two weeks. Mr. Chamberlain then departed and a few +days passed. The crisis did not improve but rather became worse. +I remember that very well. Then, during the last part of September, +I do not have the date here, the French Ambassador came and +said that he had good news about the Sudeten German question. +Later on the British Ambassador also called. At the same time—Reich +<span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span> +Marshal Göring has already testified to this—Italy wanted to take +part in the solution of the crisis acting on a wish made known to +Göring by Mussolini and offered to mediate. Then came Mussolini’s +proposal that a conference be held, which proposal was accepted by +England, France, and Germany. The French Ambassador, and later +on the British Ambassador, saw the Führer and outlined on a map +the approximate solution which apparently was being proposed by +France, England, and Italy as a solution of the Sudeten problem. I +still remember that the Führer in the first place stated to the French +Ambassador that this proposal was not satisfactory, whereupon the +French Ambassador declared that of course further discussions +should be held regarding this question and the question of where +Germans really were living and how far the Sudetenland extended; +all these questions could still be discussed in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Anyway, as far the French Government was concerned—and I +believe, Sir Nevile Henderson used similar words later at his reception +by the Führer—the Führer could be assured that the British as +well as the French intended to contribute to the solution of this +problem in conformity with the German view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then came the Munich conference. I take it I need not go into +the details of this conference; I should like only to describe briefly +the results of it. The Führer explained to the statesmen, with the +aid of a map, the necessity, as he saw it, of annexing a particular +part of the Sudetenland to the German Reich to reach final satisfaction. +A discussion arose; Mussolini, the Italian Chief of Government, +agreed in general with Hitler’s ideas. The English Prime +Minister made at first certain reservations and also mentioned that +perhaps the details might be discussed with the Czechs, with Prague. +Daladier, the French Minister, said, as far as I recall, that he thought +that since this problem had already been broached, the four great +powers should make a decision here and now. In the end this opinion +was shared by all the four statesmen; as a result the Munich Agreement +was drawn up providing that the Sudetenland should be annexed +to Germany as outlined on the maps that were on hand. The +Führer was very pleased and happy about this solution, and, with +regard to other versions of this matter which I have heard during +the Trial here, I should like to emphasize here once more particularly +that I also was happy. We all were extremely happy that +in this way in this form the matter had been solved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 minutes past 2.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning +from 10 o’clock until 1 in open session. And now before going on, +Dr. Horn, the Tribunal wish me to say that they think that entirely +too much time is being taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts +of negotiations which led up to an agreement which is a +matter of history and which is perfectly well known to everybody. +That is not the case which the defendant has to meet; what the +defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements which are +perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by Germany +and any part which he may have played in the breach of +those agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal +should not be taken up by unnecessary details of that sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What foreign political reaction did the Munich +Agreement have?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Munich Agreement is well known. Its +contents were the following: Germany and England should never +again wage war; the naval agreement on the ratio of 100 to 35 was +to be permanent and, in important matters, consultations were to +be resorted to. Through this agreement the atmosphere between +Germany and England was undoubtedly cleared up to a certain +degree. It was to be expected that the success of this pact would +lead to a final understanding. The disappointment was great when, +a few days after Munich, rearmament at any cost was announced +in England. Then England started on a policy of alliance and close +relationship with France. In November 1938 trade policy measures +were taken against Germany, and in December 1938 the British +Colonial Secretary made a speech in which a “no” was put to any +revision of the colonial question. Contact with the United States +of America was also established. Our reports of that period, as I +remember them, showed an increased—I should like to say—stiffening +of the English attitude toward Germany; and the impression +was created in Germany of a policy which practically aimed at the +encirclement of Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You are accused by the Prosecution of having contributed +to the separation of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in violation +of international law. What part did you take in the Slovakian +declaration of independence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that there were relations +between Slovakians and quite a number of members of the National +Socialist German Workers Party. These tendencies naturally were +known to the Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we +in any way did not welcome them. But it is not correct to say that +<span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span> +the autonomy was demanded or forced by us in any way. I +remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed this autonomy; and the Prague +Government, under the influence of Munich, also recognized the +autonomy. What the situation was like at the time after Munich can +be seen from the fact that all minorities of Czechoslovakia wanted +autonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the Carpatho-Ukrainians +declared their independence and others as well had +similar aspirations. In the Munich Agreement, I should like to add, +there was a clause according to which Germany and Italy were to +give Czechoslovakia a guarantee; but a declaration to this effect was +not made. The reason for that was that Poland, after the Munich +Agreement, sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, and on her own +initiative, severed the Polish minorities and occupied these areas. +The Hungarians also wanted autonomy, or rather, incorporation of +Hungarian areas; and certain areas of Czechoslovakia were thereupon +given to Hungary by the Vienna decision. The situation in +Czechoslovakia, however, was not yet clear and also remained difficult +during the following period. Then the Slovak, Tuka, approached +us. He wanted to win Germany’s approval for Slovakia’s independence. +The Führer received Tuka at that time and, after a few +interludes, the final result was the declaration of independence of +Slovakia made by Tiso on 13 March. The Prosecution have submitted +a document in which I am alleged to have said, during the +conversation which took place between the Führer and Tiso, that +it was only a matter of hours, not of days, that Slovakia would +have to come to a decision. However, this was to be understood to +mean that at that time preparations for an invasion had been +made by Hungary in order to occupy Carpatho-Ukrainia as well as +some other regions of Slovakia. We wanted to prevent a war +between Slovakia and Hungary or between Czechoslovakia and +Hungary; Hitler was greatly concerned about it, and therefore he +gladly complied with Tiso’s desire. Later, after the declaration of +Slovakia’s independence by the Slovak parliament, he complied +with Tiso’s request and took over the protection of Slovakia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What brought about Hacha’s visit to Berlin on +14 March 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Events in Slovakia had their repercussions, +of course, and chiefly very strong excesses against racial Germans +in the area of Prague, Brünn, Iglau, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, were reported to +Hitler. Many fugitives came into the old Reich. In the winter of +1938-39 I repeatedly attempted to discuss these matters with the +Prague Government. Hitler was convinced that a development was +being initiated in Prague which could not be tolerated by the +German Reich. It was the attitude of the press and the influential +government circles in Prague. The Führer also wished that the +<span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span> +Czech nation should reduce her military power, but this was refused +by Prague.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During these months I tried repeatedly to maintain good German +relations with Prague. In particular I spoke frequently with Chvalkovsky, +the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister. In the middle of +March, Chvalkovsky, the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, turned +to our German representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler +would give Hacha the opportunity of a personal interview. I reported +this to the Führer and the Führer agreed to receive Hacha; +however, he told me that he wished to deal with this matter personally. +To that effect I had an exchange of telegrams with Prague: +A reserved attitude should be taken in Prague but Hacha should +be told that the Führer would receive him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At this point I should like to mention briefly that the Foreign +Office and I myself did not know anything at this date of impending +military events. We learned about these things only shortly before +they happened. Before the arrival of Hacha I asked the Führer +whether a treaty was to be prepared. The Führer answered, as I +recall distinctly, that he had the intention of going far beyond that. +After the arrival of Hacha in Berlin I visited him at once and he +told me he wanted to place the fate of the Czech State in the +Führer’s hands. I reported this to the Führer and the Führer instructed +me to draft an agreement. The draft was submitted to him +and corrected later on, as I remember. Hacha was then received by +the Führer and the results of this conference, as far as I know, are +already known here and have been submitted in documentary form +so that I do not need to go into it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I know that Adolf Hitler at that time spoke pointedly to Hacha +and told him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. It concerned +old historic territory which he intended to take under his +protection. The Czechs were to have complete autonomy and their +own way of living, and he believed that the decision which was +being made on that day would result in great benefit for the Czech +people. While Hacha talked to the Führer, or rather afterwards—I +was present at the Führer’s conference with Hacha—I had a long +discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky. He adopted our +point of view fairly readily and I asked him to influence Hacha so +that the Führer’s decision and the whole action might be carried out +without bloodshed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe it was the deep impression made on him first of all by +the Führer and then by what Adolf Hitler had told him which +caused Hacha to get in touch by telephone with his Government in +Prague and also, I believe, with the Chief of the General Staff. I do +not know this exactly. He obtained the approval of his Government +to sign the agreement which I mentioned at the beginning. This +<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span> +agreement was then signed by Hitler, Hacha, and both the Foreign +Ministers, that is by myself also. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave +instructions that the German Army should be received cordially and, +as far as I know; the march into and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, +that is Bohemia and Moravia, was completed without +serious incident of any kind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the occupation I went to Prague with the Führer. After +the occupation, or maybe it was in Prague, the Führer gave me in +the morning a proclamation in which the countries of Bohemia and +Moravia were declared to be a protectorate of the Reich. I read out +this proclamation in Prague which, I may say, was somewhat a +surprise to me. No protest of any sort was made as far as I recall, +and I believe I might mention that the occupation of Bohemia and +Moravia, which the Führer considered necessary in the ultimate +interest of the Reich, took place for historical and economic reasons +and above all for reasons of security for the German Reich. I believe +that Göring has given the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What did the European situation look like to you at +the time of the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I might say that after the proclamation at +Prague I had a lengthy discussion with the Führer. I pointed out to +the Führer that this occupation, of course, would have considerable +repercussions in British-French circles. In this connection I should +like to point out that in England those circles which had turned +against Germany had grown larger and were led by important +persons. In this connection I should like to come back to or mention +briefly one incident which took place while I was still Ambassador +in London, when Mr. Winston Churchill paid me a visit at the +Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in the government at that +time, and I believe he was not leader of the opposition—it has +already been discussed—but he was one of the most outstanding +personalities in England. I was especially interested in arranging a +meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and therefore had asked him +to come to see me at the Embassy. We had a conversation which +lasted several hours and the details of which I recall exactly. I +believe it would go too far to relate all the details of this conversation. +But whereas important men like Lord Vansittart in 1936...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston +Churchill at this time when he was not a member of the government +have already been ruled by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what +he said and such a conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to +be absolutely irrelevant and the Tribunal will not hear it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I called the Führer’s +attention to the British reaction. Adolf Hitler explained to me the +<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span> +necessity of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on +historic and strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection +he quoted especially the former French Minister of Aviation, Pierre +Cot, who had called Bohemia and Moravia, that is Czechoslovakia, +the “airplane carrier” against Germany. I believe it was Reich +Marshal Göring who already mentioned that at that time we +received intelligence reports of Russian pilots or Russian missions +being on Czech airdromes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler said to me, and I remember these words distinctly, that he +could not tolerate an inimical Czech thorn in the German flesh. One +could get along well enough with the Czechs, but it was necessary +for Germany to have in her hands the protection of these countries. +He mentioned Soviet Russia, allied with Czechoslovakia, as a factor +of inestimable power. When I mentioned England and her reaction +he said that England was in no position to take over the protection +of the Germans in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the structure of the +Czechoslovakian State had disintegrated and Slovakia had become +independent. Therefore he thought it was necessary in the interest +of future German-English relations that the countries of Bohemia +and Moravia should come into a close contact with the Reich. A +protectorate seemed to him to be the appropriate form. Adolf Hitler +said that while this question was utterly unimportant to England it +was absolutely vital for Germany. This becomes evident if one +glances at the map—this is what he literally said. Besides, he said, +he was unable to see how this solution could disturb the co-operation +which was being striven for between Germany and England. Hitler +pointed out that England—by chance I still remember the figure—had +about 600 dominions, protectorates, and colonies and therefore +should understand that such problems have to be solved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I told Adolf Hitler about the difficulties which might confront +Mr. Chamberlain personally because of this action on the part of +Germany, that England might consider this an increase of Germany’s +power and so on; but the Führer explained the whole question with +the reasons I have mentioned before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The English reaction at first, in the person of Mr. Chamberlain +in the House of Commons, was rather a positive one. He said it was +not a violation of the Munich Agreement and the British Government +was not bound by any obligation. The Czechoslovakian State +had disintegrated and the guarantee which England had said she +would give had not come into effect, or rather the obligations of the +guarantee did not apply under the circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might say that all of us were glad that this attitude was taken +in England. I believe it was 2 or 3 days later when Mr. Chamberlain +in Birmingham... +<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what have we got to do with the +reactions in England unless they took the form of a note? I do not +see what it has to do with it. What we want to know is the part +that the Defendant Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich +Agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused of having +participated in a conspiracy when he was Foreign Minister, and it +is charged that his foreign policy contributed to the bringing about +of aggressive war. If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wishes and is +allowed to defend himself against these charges then he must be +permitted to describe the circumstances as he saw them and the +motives behind his actions. I am putting only such questions to the +defendant in this case as have reference to his forming certain +opinions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t think you asked him any question +about it. He was just...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It is not coming through quite audibly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I did not think you asked +him any questions as to the reactions in England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE INTERPRETER: The channels seem to be disturbed in some +way. I think they are getting more than one language.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to +you when the system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal +that the defendant ought to be able to keep his evidence within +stricter limits and not to go into so much detail, and that, with +regard to the reactions, the political reactions in England, they are +not relevant in themselves, and that the bearing which they may +have upon the case is really remote.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What caused Hitler to commission you, in October +1938, to enter into negotiations with Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There had always been the minority +problem in Poland, which had caused great difficulties. Despite the +agreement of 1934, this situation had not changed. In the year 1938 +the “de-Germanization” measures against German minorities were +continued by Poland. Hitler wished to reach some clear settlement +with Poland, as well as with other countries. Therefore he charged +me, I believe during October 1938, to discuss with the Polish +ambassador a final clarification of the problems existing between +Germany and Poland. +<span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Besides the minority problem, what other problems +were involved?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There were two questions: One, the minority +problem, was the most burning one; the second problem was the +question of Danzig and the Corridor, that is to say, of a connection +with East Prussia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s and your attitude toward the +Danzig and Corridor questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is clear that these two questions were the +problems that had caused the greatest difficulties since Versailles. +Hitler had to solve these problems sooner or later one way or +another. I shared this point of view. Danzig was exposed to continual +pressure by the Poles; they wanted to “Polandize” Danzig more +and more and by October of 1938 from 800,000 to a million Germans, +I believe, had been expelled from the Corridor or had returned to +Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did the Polish Ambassador take your suggestions +in October 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Polish Ambassador was reticent at first. +He did not commit himself, nor could he do so. I naturally approached +him with the problem in such a way that he could discuss +it at ease with his government, and did not request, so to speak, a +definitive answer from him. He said that of course he saw certain +difficulties with reference to Danzig, and also a corridor to East +Prussia was a question which required much consideration. He was +very reticent, and the discussion ended with his promise to communicate +my statements, made on behalf of the German Government, +to his government, and to give me an answer in the near +future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did your second discussion with Ambassador +Lipski on 17 November 1938 end?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: On 17 November 1938 Lipski came to see +me and declared that the problem involved considerable difficulties +and that the Danzig question in particular was very difficult in view +of Poland’s entire attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you then, on Hitler’s order, submit the request +to Lipski to take up direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I invited Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Unfortunately, Minister Beck did not come +to Berlin; he went to London. +<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign +Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler had said that he wanted to speak +with Mr. Beck personally about this problem. Thereupon Mr. Beck +came; I do not know the date exactly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It was the beginning of January, on 5 January.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: ...to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk +with Adolf Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was the result of this talk?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was present at that conversation. The +result was that Adolf Hitler informed Beck, once more in detail, of +his desire for good German-Polish relations. He said that a completely +new solution would have to be found in regard to Danzig, +and that a corridor to East Prussia should not give rise to insurmountable +difficulties. During this conversation Mr. Beck was rather +receptive. He told the Führer that naturally the question of Danzig +was difficult because of the mouth of the Vistula, but he would think +the problem over in all its details. He did not at all refuse to discuss +this problem, but rather he pointed out the difficulties which, due to +the Polish attitude, confronted a solution of the problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Beck was, as a matter of principle, +willing to negotiate and therefore invited you, at the end of January, +to make a visit to Warsaw?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: One cannot put it quite that way. After the +meeting at Berchtesgaden with the Führer, I had another lengthy +conversation with Beck in Munich. During this conversation Beck +explained to me again that the problem was very difficult, but that +he would do everything he could; he would speak to his governmental +colleagues, and one would have to find a solution of some +kind. On this occasion we agreed that I would pay him a return +visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke about the minority +question, about Danzig and the Corridor. During this conversation +the matter did not progress either; Mr. Beck rather repeated the +arguments why it was difficult. I told him that it was simply +impossible to leave this problem the way it was between Germany +and Poland. I pointed out the great difficulties encountered by the +German minorities and the undignified situation, as I should like to +put it, that is, the always undignified difficulties confronting Germans +who wanted to travel to East Prussia. Beck promised to help +in the minority question, and also to re-examine the other questions. +Then, on the following day, I spoke briefly with Marshal Smygly-Rydz, +but this conversation did not lead to anything. +<span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: At that time did you ask Beck to pay another visit +to Berlin, and did this visit take place, or did Beck decide on a +different course?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: What happened was that I invited Foreign +Minister Beck to Berlin, because his first visit was not an official +one. Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as +I have already said, he went to London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was the effect of his visit to London on the +subsequent negotiations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The effect of this London visit was a complete +surprise to us. Minister Lipski, I believe it was on 21 March, +yes, it was, suddenly handed us a memorandum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Let me interrupt you. On 21 March you had previously +another conversation with Lipski regarding the partition of +Czechoslovakia and the problems arising from the establishment of +the Protectorate?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That may be true, in that case I meant 26.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is right; on the 21st I had a talk with +Lipski, that is true, and in this talk Lipski expressed certain doubts +concerning Slovakia and the protection afforded by Germany. He +expressed the wish that between Hungary and Poland, two countries +which had always had close relations with each other, a direct, +common boundary might be established and asked whether or not +this would be possible. He also inquired indirectly whether the +protection afforded to Slovakia was directed in any way against +Poland. I assured Mr. Beck that neither Hitler nor anybody else had +been motivated by the slightest intention of acting against Poland +when the protection was promised. It was merely a measure to +point out to Hungary that the territorial questions were now settled. +However, I believe I told Mr. Lipski to look forward to such a link +being established via the Carpatho-Ukraine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that consultations were initiated between +Poland and the British Government, the French Government and the +Russian Government about 20 March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. These consultations, as +far as I recall, go back to a suggestion made by Lord Simon. A +common declaration was to be made with regard to Poland. But +Poland did not regard this as satisfactory, and made it clear in +London that this solution was out of the question for Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Poland worked toward a concrete +alliance with England and France? +<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There can be no doubt, and it is a historical +fact that Poland strove for an alliance with England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did the German Government find out that +Poland had been promised support by England and France?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That became known, I cannot tell you the +date precisely, but it was, at any rate, during the latter part of +March. Anyway, I know, and we all were convinced of what, I +believe, is an established fact today, that these relations taken up +during the latter part of March between Warsaw and London determined +the answer which was, to our surprise, communicated to +us by memorandum on 26 March, I believe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that this memorandum stated that a +further pursuit of German aims regarding a change in the Danzig +and Corridor questions would mean war as far as Poland was +concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great +surprise to us. I know that I read the memorandum, and for a +moment I simply could not believe that such an answer had been +given, when one considers that for months we had tried to find a +solution, which—and I wish to emphasize this—only Adolf Hitler, at +that time, with his great authority over the German people could +bring about and be responsible for.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the +Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by +statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the +revision of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind +you of the statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by +Winston Churchill, who also elaborated on this subject, as well as +by Clemenceau, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. All these statesmen were undoubtedly of +the opinion that a territorial revision of this Corridor would really +have to be undertaken. But Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it +an overall settlement and reach an understanding with Poland on +the basis of his putting up with the Corridor and taking only Danzig +back into the Reich, whereby Poland was to be afforded a very +generous solution in the economic field. That, in other words, was +the basis of the proposals which I had been working on for 4 to 5 +months on Hitler’s order. All the greater was our surprise when, +suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these +plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would +mean war. I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that +Hitler received it very calmly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that on the following day you stated to +the Polish Ambassador that the memorandum of 26 March 1939 +could not serve as the basis for a solution? +<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. I just said that Hitler received +this harsh and serious message of the Polish Ambassador very +calmly. He said, however, that I should tell the Polish Ambassador +that of course no solution could be found on this basis. There should +be no talk of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that thereupon, on 6 April 1939, the Polish +Foreign Minister Beck traveled to London and returned with a +temporary agreement of mutual assistance between Poland, England, +and France?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual +assistance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The German reaction—here I might refer +to Hitler’s Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude toward +this whole problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between +Poland and England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish +pact of 1934, for in the 1934 pact any application of force was +excluded between Germany and Poland. By the new pact concluded +between Poland and England without previous consultation with +Germany, Poland had bound herself for example, to attack Germany +in case of any conflict, between Germany and England. I know that +Adolf Hitler felt that it was also not in conformity with the agreements +between him and Mr. Chamberlain in Munich, namely, the +elimination of any resort to force between Germany and England, +regardless of what might happen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Germany then sent through you a +memorandum to Poland on 28 April by which the German-Polish +declaration of 1934 was rescinded?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. It was, I believe, on the same +day as the Reichstag speech of the Führer. This memorandum stated +more or less what I have just summarized here, that the pact was +not in agreement with the treaty of 1934 and that Germany regarded +this treaty as no longer valid.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that as a consequence of this memorandum +German-Polish relations became more tense and that new difficulties +arose in the minority question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. During the preceding +period negotiations had been pending in order to put the minority +problem on a new basis. I still remember that no progress was made. +That was already the case before 28 May, and after 28 May the +situation of the German minority became even more difficult. In +particular the Polish association for the Western Territories was +very active at that time and persecution of Germans and their +expulsion from hearth and home was the order of the day. I know +<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span> +that just during the months following 28 May, that is to say, in the +summer of 1939, the so-called refugee reception camps for German +refugees from Poland showed a tremendous influx.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did you and Hitler react to the British-French +declarations of guarantee to Romania and Greece, and later on +Turkey?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: These declarations could be interpreted by +the German policy only as meaning that England was initiating a +systematic policy of alliances in Europe which was hostile to Germany. +That was Hitler’s opinion and also mine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that these declarations of guarantee and +Roosevelt’s message of 14 April 1939 were then, on 22 May 1939, +followed by the German-Italian pact of alliance? And what were the +reasons for this pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that between Germany and +Italy friendly relations had naturally existed for a long time; and +when the European situation became more acute these relations +were, at Mussolini’s suggestion, intensified and a pact of alliance, +which was discussed first by Count Ciano and me in Milan, was +drawn up and provisionally signed on the order of the Government +heads. This was an answer to the efforts of English-French policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became +acute through the fact that on 6 August in Danzig a dispute with +the customs inspectors took place by which Germany was forced to +take a stand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. A quarrel had arisen between +the Polish representative and the Senate of the City of Danzig. +The Polish representative had sent a note to the President of +the Senate informing him that certain customs officers of the Senate +wanted to disobey Polish regulations. This information proved later +to be false, was answered by the Senate, and led to a sharp exchange +of notes between the Senate and the Polish representative. On +Hitler’s order I told the State Secretary of the Foreign Office to +lodge appropriate protests with the Polish Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Weizsäcker, the then State Secretary, +on 15 August called the English and French Ambassadors in order +to inform both these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the +situation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. He did that on my order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On 18 August was Ambassador Henderson again +asked to see your State Secretary because the situation was becoming +more acute in Poland and Danzig?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. A conversation took place a few days +later between the English Ambassador and the State Secretary. The +<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span> +State Secretary explained to him in very clear words the great +seriousness of the situation and told him that things were taking a +very serious turn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up +your mind, on the basis of a suggestion made to you, to initiate +negotiations with Russia, and what were your reasons for doing that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Negotiations with Russia had already +started sometime previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered +a speech in which he made certain hints of his desire to have +better relations with Germany. I had submitted this speech to Adolf +Hitler and asked him whether we should not try to find out whether +this suggestion had something real behind it. Hitler was at first +reluctant, but later on he became more receptive to this idea. +Negotiations for a commercial treaty were under way, and during +these negotiations, with the Führer’s permission, I took soundings +in Moscow as to the possibility of a definite bridge between National +Socialism and Bolshevism and whether the interests of the two +countries could not at least be made to harmonize.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did the relations taken up by the Soviet Russian +commercial agency in Berlin with your Minister Schnurre develop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The negotiations of Minister Schnurre gave +me within a relatively short period of time a picture from which I +could gather that Stalin had meant this speech in earnest. Then an +exchange of telegrams took place with Moscow which, in the middle +of August, led to Hitler’s sending a telegram to Stalin, whereupon +Stalin in answer to this telegram invited a plenipotentiary to +Moscow. The aim in view, which had been prepared diplomatically, +was the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two +countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations +did you carry on there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: On the evening of 22 August I arrived in +Moscow. The reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very +friendly. We had at first a 2-hour conversation. During this conversation +the entire complex of Russo-German relations was discussed. +The result was, first, the mutual will of both countries to +put their relations on a completely new basis. This was to be expressed +in a pact of non-aggression. Secondly, the spheres of interests +of the two countries were to be defined; this was done by a secret +supplementary protocol. +<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Which cases were dealt with in this secret supplementary +protocol? What were its contents and what were the political +bases?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say, first of all, that this +secret protocol has been spoken about several times here in this +Court. I talked very frankly during the negotiations with Stalin +and Molotov, and the Russian gentlemen also used plain language +with me. I described Hitler’s desire that the two countries should +reach a definitive agreement, and, of course, I also spoke of the +critical situation in Europe. I told the Russian gentlemen that Germany +would do everything to settle the situation in Poland and to +settle the difficulties peacefully in order to reach a friendly agreement +despite everything.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, I left no doubt that the situation was serious and that +it was possible that an armed conflict might break out. That was +clear anyway. For both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, it was +a question of territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate +war. It is, therefore, wrong to look at these things from +any other point of view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion +which I expressed in Moscow, that in some form or other this +problem would have to be solved, so also the Russian side saw +clearly that this was the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We then discussed what should be done on the part of the +Germans and on the part of the Russians in the case of an armed +conflict. A line of demarcation was agreed upon, as is known, in +order that in the event of intolerable Polish provocation, or in the +event of war, there should be a boundary, so that the German and +Russian interests in the Polish theater could and would not collide. +The well-known line was agreed upon along the line of the Rivers +Vistula, San, and Bug in Polish territory. And it was agreed that in +the case of conflict the territories lying to the west of these rivers +would be the German sphere of interest, and those to the east would +be the Russian sphere of interest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is known that later, after the outbreak of the war, these zones +were occupied on the one side by Germany and on the other side +by Russian troops. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, +both from Hitler and Stalin, that the territories—that these +Polish territories and also the other territories which had been +marked off in these spheres of interest, about which I shall speak +shortly—that these were territories which both countries had lost +after an unfortunate war. And both statesmen undoubtedly held the +opinion that if these territories—if, I should like to say, the last +chance for a reasonable solution of this problem was exhausted—there +was certainly a justification for Adolf Hitler to incorporate +these territories into the German Reich by some other procedure. +<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Over and above that, it is also known that other spheres of interest +were defined with reference to Finland, the Baltic States, +and Bessarabia. This was a great settlement of the interest of two +great powers providing for a peaceful solution as well as for solution +by war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up +specifically only in the event that, on the basis of the non-aggression +pact and the political settlement between Russia and Germany, it +might not be possible to settle the Polish question diplomatically?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that it was clearly stated that this solution +was designed only to provide for the event that, despite the Pact +of Non-aggression with Russia, the Polish conflict might not be solved +by diplomatic means and that the treaty was to become effective +only in this case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that +on the German side everything would be attempted to solve the +problem in a diplomatic and peaceful way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Russia promise you diplomatic assistance or +benevolent neutrality in connection with this solution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It could be seen from the Pact of Non-aggression +and from all the conferences in Moscow that this was so. +It was perfectly clear, and we were convinced of it, that if, due to +the Polish attitude, a war broke out, Russia would assume a friendly +attitude towards us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: When did you fly back from Moscow, and what sort +of situation did you find in Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Pact of Non-aggression with the Soviet +Union was concluded on the 23rd. On the 24th I flew back to Germany. +I had thought at first that I would fly to the Führer, to the +Berghof in Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or prior to it—I do +not know exactly—I was asked to come to Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We flew to Berlin, and there I informed Hitler of the Moscow +agreements. The situation which I found there was undoubtedly +very tense. On the next day I noticed this particularly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To what circumstances was this aggravation of the +German-Polish situation to be attributed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In the middle of August all sorts of things +had happened which, as I should like to put it, charged the atmosphere +with electricity: frontier incidents, difficulties between Danzig +and Poland. On the one hand, Germany was accused of sending +arms to Danzig, and, on the other hand, we accused the Poles of +taking military measures in Danzig, and so on. +<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that on your return from Moscow to +Berlin, you were informed of the signing of the British-Polish Pact +of Guarantee and what was your reaction and that of Hitler to this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was on 25 August. On 25 August I +was informed about the conversation which the Führer had had with +Ambassador Henderson during my absence from Germany, I believe +at Berchtesgaden on 22 August. This was a very serious conversation. +Henderson had brought over a letter from the British Prime Minister +which stated clearly that a war between Germany and Poland would +draw England into the picture.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, early on the 25th I—the Führer then answered this letter, +I believe on the same day—and the answer was couched so as to mean +that at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be +expected. I discussed with the Führer on the 25th this exchange of +letters and asked him to consider this question once more and suggested +that one more attempt might be made with reference to England. +This was 25 August, a very eventful day. In the morning a +communication came from the Italian Government, according to +which Italy, in the case of a conflict over Poland, would not stand at +Germany’s side. The Führer decided then to receive Ambassador +Henderson once more in the course of that day. This meeting took +place at about noon of the 25th. I was present. The Führer went +into details and asked Henderson once more to bear in mind his +urgent desire to reach an understanding with England. He described +to him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him, I +believe, to take a plane and fly back to England in order to discuss +this whole situation once more with the British Government. Ambassador +Henderson agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course +of the afternoon, a memo or a <span class='it'>note verbale</span> in which the Führer put +in writing his ideas for such an understanding, or rather what he +had said during the meeting, so that the ambassador would be able +to inform his government correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that after the British-Polish Pact of +Guarantee became known, you asked Hitler to stop the military +measures which had been started in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I was just about to relate +that. During the course of the afternoon—I heard in the course of +the day that certain military measures were being taken and then in +the afternoon I received, I believe, a Reuters dispatch, at any rate +it was a press dispatch—saying that the Polish-British Pact of +Alliance had been ratified in London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe there was even a note appended that the Polish Ambassador +Raczynski had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly given +his signature in the Foreign Office. +<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was this treaty signed before or after it was known +that Italy refused to sign the Italian mobilization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This treaty was undoubtedly concluded +afterwards. Of course, I do not know the hour and the day, but I +believe it must have been on the afternoon of 25 August, and Italy’s +refusal had already reached us by noon; I believe in other words, it +had undoubtedly been definitively decided in Rome in the morning +or on the day before. At any rate, I can deduce this from another +fact. Perhaps I might, however, answer your other question first, +namely, what I did upon receipt of this news.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: When I received this press dispatch, of +which I was informed once more when I came to the Chancellery, +I went immediately to Hitler and asked him to stop at once the +military measures, whatever they were—I was not familiar with +military matters in detail—and I told him that it was perfectly +clear that this meant war with England and that England could +never disavow her signature. The Führer reflected only a short while +and then he said that was true and immediately called his military +adjutant, and I believe it was Field Marshal Keitel who came, in +order to call together the generals and stop the military measures +which had been started. On this occasion he made a remark that we +had received two pieces of bad news on one day. That was Italy +and this news, and I thought it was possible that the report about +Italy’s attitude had become known in London immediately, whereupon +the final ratification of this pact had taken place. I still remember +this remark of the Führer’s very distinctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you and Hitler, on this day, make efforts with +Henderson to settle the conflict, and what were your proposals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already stated that the Führer, I +believe it was in the early afternoon, saw Henderson on the 25th and +told him that he still had the intention of reaching some final understanding +with England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor +would have to be solved in some way and he wanted to approach +England with a comprehensive offer which was not contained in the +<span class='it'>note verbale</span>, in order to settle these things with England on a perfectly +regular basis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson’s +disposal so that the latter could submit these proposals to his +government at once and request his government to make their +promised mediation effective in regard to Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. I know that Henderson—I +believe it was on the next day, the 26th—flew to London in a +German airplane. I do not know the details, but I know that the +<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span> +Führer said during the meeting, “Take an airplane immediately and +fly to your government.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What results did Ambassador Henderson bring back +to Berlin on 28 August?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say in this connection, that +in view of the critical situation between Poland and Germany, +which, of course, was also known to the British Ambassador, Hitler +expressed to me a certain disappointment that the British Ambassador +had not returned more quickly with his answer, for the +atmosphere was charged with electricity on that day. On the 28th, +Henderson then had another discussion with the Führer. I was also +present. The answer brought back by Sir Nevile Henderson from +London appeared at first not very satisfactory to the Führer. It +contained various points which seemed unclear to the Führer. But +the main point was that England announced her readiness for a +wholesale solution of the existing problems between Germany and +England, on the condition that the German-Polish question could +be brought to a peaceful solution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the discussion Adolf Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson that he +would examine the note and would then ask him to come back. +Then he...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that in this memorandum England suggested +that Germany take up direct negotiations with Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. One of the points in the note—I +intended to go into that—was that the English suggested that German-Polish +direct negotiations would be the most appropriate +way to reach a solution and, secondly, that such negotiations should +take place as soon as possible, because England had to admit that +the situation was very tense because of the frontier incidents and in +every respect. Furthermore the note stated that no matter what +solution might be found—I believe this was in the note—it should +be guaranteed by the great powers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did England offer a mediator to forward to Poland +German proposals for direct negotiations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were these German proposals like, which on +29 August 1939, were given by Hitler to Henderson in answer to +Henderson’s memorandum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: On the 29th Adolf +Hitler again received the British Ambassador and on this occasion +told him that he was ready to take up the English suggestion of the +28th, that is to say, that despite the great tension and despite the +Polish attitude, which he resented so profoundly, he was prepared to +<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span> +offer his hand once more for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish +problems, as suggested in the British note of the 28th.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were the reasons for including in this German +proposal a request that a Polish plenipotentiary be sent by +30 August?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In Adolf Hitler’s communication to Ambassador +Henderson for the British Government it was stated that the +German Government, in view of the tense situation, would immediately +set about working out proposals for a solution of the Danzig +and Corridor problems. The German Government hoped to be in a +position to have these proposals available by the time a Polish negotiator +arrived who was expected during the course of 30 August.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler included this condition or +this request to send a plenipotentiary within 24 hours because he +was afraid that a conflict might arise due to the fact that the mobilized +armies of the two countries faced each other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely true. I might say that +during the meeting on the 29th Ambassador Henderson, as I recall, +asked the Führer whether this was an ultimatum. The Führer answered +“No,” that that was not an ultimatum, but rather, I believe +he said, a practical proposal or a proposal arising from the situation, +or something of that sort. I should like to repeat that it was a fact +that the situation near the frontiers of Danzig and the Corridor during +the last days of August looked, one might say, as if the guns would +go off on their own unless something was done rather soon. That +was the reason for the relatively short respite which was made a +condition by the Führer. He feared that if more time were allowed, +matters would drag out and danger of war not decrease but rather +increase.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that, despite this information given to Ambassador +Henderson, the answer of the British Government called +this proposal unreasonable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I know of the British reaction from several +documents that I saw later. The first reaction came during my discussion +with Henderson on 30 August.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that on 30 August you received a confidential +communication regarding Poland’s total mobilization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. On the 30th Hitler awaited +word from the Polish negotiator. This, however, did not come, but, I +believe, on the evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had +ordered, although not announced, general mobilization. I believe it +was not announced until the next morning. This, of course, further +aggravated the situation enormously. +<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that the British Government then practically +withdrew their offer to mediate by suggesting that Germany +take immediate and direct steps to prepare negotiations between +Germany and Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: You mean on the 30th?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, on the 30th.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is so. As I said before, we had been +waiting on the 30th, but the Polish negotiator had not arrived. In +the meantime, Hitler had prepared the proposals which he wanted +to hand to a Polish negotiator who, as he had expressly promised Sir +Nevile Henderson, would be able to negotiate with Germany on the +basis of complete equality. Not until shortly before midnight, or at +least in the late evening, a call came through saying, that the British +Ambassador wanted to transmit a communication from his government. +This meeting, I believe, was then postponed once more; at +any rate at midnight on 30 August the well-known conversation +between Henderson and me took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You heard yesterday Minister Schmidt’s description +of this meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description +of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to add the following about +this conversation. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us +were nervous, that is true. The British Ambassador was nervous +and so was I. I should like to and must mention here the fact that +the British Ambassador had had on the day before a minor scene +with the Führer which might have ended seriously. I succeeded in +changing the subject. Therefore, there was also a certain tension +between the British Ambassador and myself. However, I intentionally +received the British Ambassador composedly and calmly, +and accepted his communication. I hoped that this communication +would, in the last moment, contain his announcement of a Polish +negotiator.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson +told me:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>1. That his government could not recommend this mode of procedure, +despite the tense situation, which had been aggravated still +more by the Polish total mobilization; rather the British Government +recommended that the German Government use diplomatic channels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>2. That, if the German Government would submit the same proposals +to the British Government, the British Government would be +ready to exert their influence in Warsaw in order to find a solution, +as far as these suggestions appeared to be reasonable. In view of the +whole situation this was a very difficult answer because, as I said, +the situation was extremely tense and the Führer had been waiting +<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span> +since the day before for a Polish emissary. I, in turn, feared also +that the guns would go off by themselves unless a solution or something +else came quickly, as I have said. I then read to Henderson +the proposals given to me by the Führer. I should like to state here +once more under oath that the Führer had expressly forbidden me +to let these proposals out of my hands. He told me that I might +communicate to the British Ambassador only the substance of them, +if I thought it advisable. I did a little more than that; I read all +the proposals, from the beginning to the end, to the British Ambassador. +I did this because I still hoped that the British Government +wanted to exert their influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. +But here too I must state frankly that from my talk with the British +Ambassador on 30 August, from his whole attitude, which Minister +Schmidt also described to a certain extent yesterday, as well as from +the substance of the communication of the British Government, I +got the impression that England at this moment was not quite prepared +to live up to the situation and, let us say, to do her utmost to +bring about a peaceful solution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What did the German Government do after the +contents of the note were made known to Ambassador Henderson?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: After my conversation with the British +Ambassador I reported to the Führer. I told him it had been a +serious conversation. I told him also that in pursuance of his instructions +I had not handed the memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson +despite the latter’s request. But I had the impression that the +situation was serious and I was convinced that the British guarantee +to Poland was in force. That had been my very definite impression +from this conversation. Then, in the course of the 31st the Führer +waited the whole day to see whether or not some sort of Polish +negotiator would come or whether a new communication would +come from the British Government. We have heard here about Reich +Marshal Göring’s intervention, how he informed Mr. Dahlerus of the +contents of this note in every detail. There can thus be no doubt +that during the course of that night, at the latest in the morning of +the 31st the precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the +hands of both the London Government and the Warsaw Government. +On the 31st the Führer waited the whole day and I am convinced, +and I want to state it very clearly here, that he hoped that +something would be done by England. Then in the course of the +31st the Polish Ambassador came to see me. But it is known that +he had no authority to do anything, to enter into negotiations or +even to receive proposals of any sort. I do not know whether the +Führer would have authorized me on the 31st to hand proposals of +this sort to him, but I think it is possible. But the Polish Ambassador +was not authorized to receive them, as he expressly told me. +<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span> +I might point out briefly that regarding the attitude in Warsaw the +witness Dahlerus has already given additional testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It is correct that England did not forward the German +proposals to Warsaw until the evening of 31 August?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that the German proposals which had +been submitted by you on the preceding evening of the 30th to Ambassador +Sir Nevile Henderson were not forwarded to Warsaw until +the evening of 31 August?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: You mean from London?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: From London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I cannot tell you precisely, but that +can undoubtedly be verified from official documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What considerations then led to the final decision to +take military action against Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you the details of this. I know +only that the Führer—that the proposals which I had read to the +British Ambassador in the night of the 30th were published by +broadcast, as I believe, on the evening of the 31st. The reaction of +the Warsaw radio, I remember this reaction exactly, was unfortunately +such as to sound like a veritable battlecry in answer to the +German proposals which, as I heard, had been characterized by +Henderson as reasonable. I believe they were characterized by the +Polish radio as an insolence, and the Germans were spoken of as +Huns or the like. I still remember that. At any rate, shortly after +the announcement of these proposals a very sharp negative answer +came from Warsaw. I assume that it was the answer which persuaded +the Führer in the night of the 31st to issue the order to march. I, +for my part, can say only that I went to the Reich Chancellery, and +the Führer told me that he had given the order and that nothing +else could be done now, or something to this effect, and that things +were now in motion. Thereupon I said to the Führer merely, “I wish +you good luck.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might also mention that the outbreak of these hostilities was +the end of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about +friendship with England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Mussolini make another proposal of mediation +and how did this proposal turn out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. On 3 September, in the +morning, such a proposal of mediation arrived in Berlin stating that +Mussolini was still in a position to bring the Polish question in +some way before the forum of a conference, and that he would do so +if the German Government agreed rapidly. It was said at the same +<span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span> +time that the French Government had already approved this proposal. +Germany also immediately agreed. But a few days later—I cannot +now state the time precisely—it was reported that, in a speech I +believe, by the British Foreign Minister Halifax in the House of +Commons or in some other British declaration, this proposal had +been turned down by London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Do you know whether France also turned down this +proposal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that we received along +with the proposal, I believe through the Italian Government, the information +that the French Government either was in favor of the +suggestion or had already accepted it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you see any possibilities for peace after the conclusion +of the Polish campaign and were they pursued?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign +I had some lengthy conversations with Adolf Hitler. The situation +was then such that beyond a doubt there was a certain lack of enthusiasm +for this whole war on the part of the French. During these +weeks military people occasionally used the expression “potato war in +the West.” Hitler, as far as I can judge from everything that he +told me, was not interested in bringing the war in the West to a +decision, and I believe this was true of all of us members of the +Government. I should like to remind you of the speech made by +Reich Marshal Göring to this effect at that time. Hitler then made +a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else, perhaps in +the Reichstag, I believe in the Reichstag, in which he twice told England +and France in unmistakable language that he was still ready +to open negotiations at any time. We tried to find out also very +cautiously by listening to diplomatic circles what the mood was in +the enemy capitals. But the public replies to Adolf Hitler’s speeches +clearly demonstrated that there could be no thought of peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What did you do from then on to prevent the war +from becoming more extended?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was, I should like to say, my most ardent +endeavor after the end of the Polish campaign to attempt to localize +the war, that is, to prevent the war from spreading in Europe. +However, I soon was to find out that once a war has broken out, +politics are not always the only or rather not at all, the decisive factor +in such matters, and that in such cases the so-called timetables of +general staffs start to function. Everybody wants to outdo everybody +else. Our diplomatic efforts were undoubtedly everywhere, in +Scandinavia as well as in the Balkans and elsewhere, against an extension +of the war. Nevertheless, the war did take that course. I +should like to state that according to my conversations with Adolf +<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span> +Hitler, and I am also convinced that the German military men were +of the same opinion, Hitler wished in no way to extend the war +anywhere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that you received information which +pointed to the intention of the Western Powers to invade the Ruhr?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. We received numerous +reports all the time. Our intelligence service was such that we had +a great many channels doing intelligence work. All of these channels +led to the Führer. The Foreign Office had relatively little intelligence +service, but relied rather on official diplomatic channels. But we +too received reports and news at that time which undoubtedly +allowed inferences to be drawn. We in the Foreign Office also received +reports implying that the Western Powers had the intention +of advancing into the Ruhr area at the first appropriate opportunity. +The situation in the West was such that the West Wall was a very +strong military barrier against France and this naturally gave rise +to the idea that such an attack might come through neutral territory, +such as Belgium and Holland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will you take, Dr. Horn?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half, Your Lordship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great +patience to a very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this +exaggerated going into detail does not do the defendant’s case any +good in my opinion. We will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-FIFTH DAY</span><br/> Saturday, 30 March 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Dönitz +is absent from Court this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On 16 February 1923 a conference of ambassadors +transferred to Lithuania the sovereignty over the territory of Memel, +which had already been annexed in 1923 by a surprise attack by +Lithuanian troops. What caused Hitler to issue these directives for +the reintegration of the Memel territory in 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The small territory of Memel, being the +land mentioned in our National anthem, was always very dear to +the hearts of the entire German people. The military facts are well +known. It was placed under the control of the Allied Powers after +the World War I and was later seized and occupied by Lithuanian +soldiers by a <span class='it'>coup de main</span>. The country itself is ancient German +territory, and it was natural that it should wish to become a part +of Germany once more. As early as 1938, the Führer referred to +this problem in my presence as one which would have to be solved +sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were begun with +the Lithuanian Government. These negotiations resulted in a meeting +between Urbisk, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, and myself, and +an agreement was signed, by means of which the Memel territory +was once more to become part of the Reich. That was in March +1939. I do not need to describe the sufferings which this region +has had to endure in the past years. At any rate it was quite in +accordance with the principle of the self-determination of peoples, +that the will of the people of Memel was granted in 1939, and +all that the agreement did, was to restore a perfectly natural state +of affairs and one which would have had in any case to be +established sooner or later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: It was followed half a year later by the war with +Poland. What, in your opinion, were the decisive causes which +brought about this war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I gave evidence in this matter yesterday. +The decisive factor was the English guarantee extended to Poland. +I do not need to elaborate this point. This guarantee, combined +<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span> +with the Polish mentality, made it impossible for us to negotiate +with the Poles or to come to an understanding with them. As for +the actual outbreak of war, the following reasons for it can +be given:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>1. There is no doubt...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I generalized this morning +and I repeat my assertion of yesterday that I am most reluctant +to interfere here with this examination. But as the witness has +said himself, we did go all through this yesterday, we have heard +this whole story already in the occasion of yesterday afternoon’s +session. My point is that the witness himself, before going into +his answer, stated that he had already given the causes for the +war, yesterday afternoon, and I quite agree. I think it is entirely +unnecessary for him to go over it again today. I might add +parenthetically that we had some great doubt about the relevancy +or the materiality of it even on yesterday’s occasion, but surely +we do not have to hear him again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I would like to say that the former German Minister +for Foreign Affairs, who is accused of being co-responsible for +a war of aggression, might perhaps say a few words about the +decisive causes, which according to him led to this war. The +defendant, of course, should not repeat what he said yesterday. +I want him to give only some details on points to which he referred +in only a general way yesterday, and it will not take up very +much of the Tribunal’s time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that +he does not go over the identical ground that he went over +yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Please tell us very briefly the facts that determined +your attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There are just a few brief facts that I +would like to mention, and they concern only the events of these +last 2 days:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, there is no doubt that on 30 and 31 August, England +was well aware of the extreme tension of the situation. This +fact was communicated to Hitler in a letter, and Hitler said that +the decision must be made and a way of solving the problem +found, with all possible speed. This was Chamberlain’s letter +to Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly: England knew that the proposals made by Germany +were reasonable, for we know that England was in possession of +these proposals in the night of 30 to 31 August. Ambassador +Henderson himself declared that these proposals were reasonable. +<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thirdly: It would have been possible, therefore, on 30 or +31 August, to give a hint to Warsaw and tell the Poles to begin +some sort of negotiations with us. This could have been done +in three different ways: Polish negotiator could have flown to +Berlin, which would have been, as the Führer said, a matter of +an hour to an hour and a half; or, a meeting could have been +arranged between the foreign ministers or the heads of the states +to take place on the frontiers; or else, Ambassador Lipski could +simply have been instructed at least to receive the German proposals. +If these instructions had been given, the crisis would +have been averted and diplomatic negotiations could have been +initiated. England herself, had she wished to do so, could have +sent her ambassador to represent her at the negotiations, which +action, after what had gone before, would undoubtedly have been +regarded very favorably by Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This, however, did not take place, and, as I gather from documents +which I saw for the first time here, nothing was done during +this period to alleviate this very tense situation. Chauvinism is +natural to the Poles; and we know from Ambassador Henderson’s +own words and from the testimony of Mr. Dahlerus that Ambassador +Lipski used very strong language illustrative of Polish +mentality. Because Poland was very well aware that she would, +in all circumstances, have the assistance of England and France, +she assumed an attitude which made war inevitable to all intents +and purposes. I believe that these facts really are of some importance +for the historical view of that entire period. I would like +to add that I personally regretted this turn of events. All my +work of 25 years was destroyed by this war; and up to the last +minute I made every possible effort to avert this war. I believe +that even Ambassador Henderson’s documents prove that I did +make these attempts. I told Adolf Hitler that it was Chamberlain’s +most ardent desire to have good relations with Germany and to +reach an agreement with her; and I even sent a special messenger +to the Embassy to see Henderson, to tell him how earnestly the +Führer desired this, and to do everything in his power to make +this desire of Adolf Hitler’s clear to his government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Denmark and Norway were occupied in April 1940. +You had concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark on 31 May +1939 and on the basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution +of perfidious diplomacy. When and in what way did you +receive knowledge of the imminent occupation of Denmark and +Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It had always been the Führer’s wish and +mine to keep Scandinavia neutral. In accordance with Adolf Hitler’s +policy, I did my best to prevent the war from spreading. +<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>One day in April 1940 Hitler summoned me to the Chancellery. +He told me that he had received reports stating that the British +were on the point of occupying Norway, or of landing troops there. +He had therefore decided to occupy Norway and Denmark on the +morning of the day after next. That was the first I heard of it. +I was amazed; and the Führer then showed me the documentary +evidence which he had received through his intelligence service. +He ordered me to prepare notes at once, informing the Norwegian +and the Danish governments that German troops were about to +march in. I reminded the Führer that we had a non-aggression pact +with Denmark and that Norway was a neutral country, and told +him that reports received from our Legation at Oslo did not +indicate any landing. When the documents were shown to me, +however, I realized how grave the situation was and that these +reports had to be taken seriously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next day along with my assistants, I prepared diplomatic +notes to be sent by plane to Oslo and Copenhagen on 8 April. On +that day we worked day and night in order to finish these notes. +The Führer had given orders that these notes were to arrive shortly +before the German occupation. The order was executed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The occupation of Denmark was completed without trouble, as +far as I know. I believe that hardly a shot was fired. As soon as +we had occupied the country, we negotiated with the Danish Government, +under Stauning, and made agreements so that everything +should go on without disturbances and as far as possible in a +friendly atmosphere. Denmark’s integrity was fully guaranteed, +and matters went on, even in the later stages, in a comparatively +quiet and orderly way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The situation was rather different in Norway. Resistance had +developed. We tried to keep the King of Norway in the country +and to induce him to stay there. We negotiated with him but we +had no success. He went north, I believe, to Narvik; and so there +was no longer any possibility of negotiating with Norway. Norway +was occupied, as you know, and a civil administration established. +After this date, Norway was no longer any concern of the Foreign +Office; but one thing I should like to add: that the Führer told +me repeatedly that the measures he had taken were extremely +necessary, and that documents found after the landing of British +troops in Norway, and published at a later date, showed that the +occupation of these countries and the landing in Norway had +doubtlessly been planned for a long time by England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Frequent allusions have been made in the course of this Trial +to the great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish peoples. I +personally am of the opinion that whatever one may think of the +<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span> +German occupation, for all intents and purposes it prevented Scandinavia +from becoming a theater of war, and I believe, that in that +way the Norwegian and Danish peoples were spared untold +suffering. If war had broken out between Germany and the +Scandinavian countries, these people would have been exposed to +much greater suffering and privation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did you have anything to do with Quisling before +the occupation of Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must explain that the name of Quisling +became known only at a much later date. Before the occupation +of Norway his name meant nothing to me. It is true that Herr +Rosenberg contacted me with a view to assisting pro-German +Scandinavians within the frame of the former Nordic Movement +(Nordische Bewegung) and that was a perfectly natural thing +to do. At that period, we also provided funds for newspapers, +propaganda, and also for political activities in Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At these discussions, I remember this distinctly, no mention was +ever made of any seizing of political power through certain circles +in Norway, or of military operations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What influence did the Foreign Office have in +Denmark after the occupation of the country?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation of Denmark the +Foreign Office was represented by a minister at the Danish Court. +Later, because of certain events—I believe it would take too long +to enumerate them—the Danish Government resigned and a Reich +Plenipotentiary was appointed. There was also a Military Commander +in Denmark and later on a Higher SS and Police Leader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The activities of the minister of the Danish Court were those of +an ordinary and very influential minister, who tried to straighten +out all the difficulties which might naturally arise during an occupation; +and later on the function of the Reich Plenipotentiary, +according to my instructions, was to treat Denmark, not as an +enemy of Germany, but as a friend. This was always a guiding +principle in Denmark and even at a much later period, when more +serious difficulties arose as a result of the intensified warfare, there +was really complete quiet and calm in Denmark throughout the long +years of war and we were very well satisfied with conditions there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Later, because of the activities of enemy agents against our +measures, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, things took a more rigorous turn; the Reich +Plenipotentiary always had instructions from me not to aggravate +things but to straighten them out and to work on the continuation +of good relations between the Danes and the Germans. His task +was not always an easy one; but on the whole, I believe, he did +his work satisfactorily. +<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Since when and how did you receive reports about +the intention of the Franco-British General Staff to include Belgium +and Holland in their theater of operations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Great importance has obviously been +attached to this question during the proceedings here as well. The +situation was as follows: In 1937, Germany declared that she had +made an agreement with Belgium in which Germany undertook to +respect Belgium’s strict neutrality on condition that Belgium on her +part would maintain her neutrality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the Polish campaign the Führer told me on several +occasions that, according to his intelligence reports, the enemy +intended to cross Dutch and Belgian territory to attack the Ruhr. +We also sometimes received reports of this kind; these were of a +less concrete nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the Ruhr +district, which was Germany’s most vital area, was a possibility that +had to be reckoned with at all times. I had a good many discussions +with the Führer about that time, regarding the importance of +Belgian neutrality for the world in general; but I knew, too, that +we were involved in a struggle, a hard struggle of larger dimensions +where completely different standards would have to be applied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of events, in the spring of 1940, our intelligence +reports about an attack of this kind became more and more concrete, +and I may mention that documents belonging to the French +General Staff, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, which were found later and published by +the German Foreign Office, proved conclusively that the reports +which Germany had received were absolutely true and that an +attack on the Ruhr area had actually been repeatedly considered +by the enemies of Germany, that is, by those who were her enemies +at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection I would like to call attention to a document +concerning a meeting between Prime Minister Chamberlain and +M. Daladier in Paris, at which Mr. Chamberlain suggested an attack +for the destruction of the vitally important industrial areas of the +Ruhr through the so-called “chimneys” of Holland and Belgium. +I believe this document is here and has been granted to the Defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The situation before the offensive in the West on which the +Führer had decided was therefore such that an attack by the enemy +through these great areas had to be expected at any time. For this +reason he decided to attack across this area, across these two neutral +territories, and I believe that after the attack—the military authorities +will confirm this—further documents were found and facts +established, which as far as I remember, showed that the closest +co-operation had existed between the Belgian and I believe also the +Dutch General Staffs, and the British and French General Staffs. +<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Of course it is always a very grave matter in such a war to +violate the neutrality of a country, and you must not think that +we dismissed it, so to speak, with a wave of the hand. It cost me +many a sleepless night and I would like to remind you that the +same questions arose on the other side and other statesmen also +discussed them at the time. I remind you of a statement to the +effect that “one got tired of thinking of the rights of neutrals”; and +this assertion was made by the eminent British statesman, Winston +Churchill.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What caused Germany to violate the integrity of +Luxembourg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Luxembourg was in much the same situation +as Belgium and Holland. It is a very small country, and +obviously in a war on the scale of this one the armies cannot +suddenly bypass one particular country. But I would like to point +out just one thing in connection with Luxembourg: The summer +before, that is during the summer of 1939, we had started negotiations +with France and Luxembourg with a view to making perfectly +definite pacts of neutrality to be established by treaties. At first, +the negotiations seemed to be going very well; but they were +suddenly broken off by both France and Luxembourg. At the time +we did not understand the reason for this, but I know that when +I reported it to the Führer, it made him a little distrustful as to +the motives that may have been of importance on the other side. +We never knew the exact reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How far was the German Foreign Office able to +exert its influence in France after the partial occupation of the +country?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation or partial occupation +of France, although we were not yet at peace with France and there +was therefore really no reason to resume diplomatic relations, as +only an armistice had been declared, the Führer, at my request, +appointed an ambassador to the Vichy Government. I was especially +anxious for this to be done because it had always been my aim +to come to a closer co-operation with France. I would like to +emphasize the fact that I resumed my efforts in this direction immediately +after the victory and the armistice. I have—the Führer +readily agreed to this and also initiated the so-called Montoire +Policy at my request, by meeting Marshal Pétain at Montoire after +a meeting with General Franco. I was present at this meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe I may say in the interests of historical truth that Adolf +Hitler’s treatment of the head of the defeated French nation is +probably unexampled and must be described as chivalrous. There +cannot be many parallel cases in history. Adolf Hitler immediately +made proposals to Marshal Pétain for a closer collaboration between +<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span> +Germany and France, but Marshal Pétain, even at the very first +meeting, adopted an attitude of marked reserve towards the victor, +so that, to my great personal regret this first meeting came to an end +somewhat more quickly than I had really hoped it would. In spite +of this, we continued to try to carry out a systematic policy of conciliation +and even of close collaboration with France. Our lack of +success was probably due to the natural attitude of France and the +will of influential circles. Germany did not fail to make every effort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What influence did you yourself, and the German +Foreign Office have on conditions in Belgium after the occupation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We had no influence whatsoever on conditions +in Belgium or in Holland. The Führer set up military and +civilian administrations, and the Foreign Office had no further connection +with them, beyond being represented by a liaison officer +who, in practice, had nothing or almost nothing to do. I would +like to add that it was rather different in France, inasmuch as we +were naturally in a position to exercise a certain amount of +influence on the Vichy Government through our ambassador. I did +so, for instance, in matters of finance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We have heard here in court a good deal about the activities of +Herr Hemmen. I should just like to say that, no matter how his +powers may have been defined, I appointed him for the express +purpose of preventing inflation and the collapse of the French currency. +That was the special mission entrusted to Hemmen. Even +if France was no longer willing to co-operate politically with +Germany, she was undoubtedly of economic importance to us; and +I wanted to keep her on a sound basis and to preserve her system +of finance. That was the real reason for Herr Hemmen’s mission.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What plans did Hitler have with regard to his +foreign policy after the conclusion of the campaign in the West?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the campaign in +the West, I discussed future developments with the Führer at his +headquarters. I asked him what his further intentions were with +regard to England. The Führer and I proposed at the time, +whether we had not better make another attempt with England. +The Führer seemed to have had the same idea and was delighted +with my proposal for making a fresh peace offer or attempting to +make peace with England. I asked the Führer whether I should +draft such a treaty for this case. The Führer spontaneously replied: +“No, that will not be necessary, I will do that myself, that is, there +is no need to do it at all.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He said, word for word: “If England is ready for peace, there +are only four points to be settled. Above all, after Dunkirk, I do +not want England in any circumstances to suffer a loss of prestige, +<span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span> +so under no circumstances do I want a peace which would +involve that.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to the contents of such a treaty, he enumerated +four points:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>1. Germany is ready to recognize in all respects the existence +of the British Empire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>2. England must, therefore, acknowledge Germany to be the +greatest continental power, if only because of the size of her +population.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>3. He said, “I want England to return the German colonies. +I would be satisfied with one or two of them, because of the raw +materials.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>4. He said that he wanted a permanent alliance with England +for life and death.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that at the end of 1939, you heard from +Hitler that conferences had taken place between the Greek and +French General Staffs and that French officers had been sent +to Greece?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. It came within the +scope of the Führer’s policy for preventing the war from spreading, +as entrusted to me, that I should keep a sharp watch on these things +and, of course, especially on the Balkans; Adolf Hitler wished in +all circumstances to keep the Balkans out of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As for Greece the situation was as follows: Greece had accepted +a British guarantee. Also, there were close links between Yugoslavia +and England and, especially, France. Through the Führer’s intelligence +service and through military channels we repeatedly heard +about staff conferences between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, +which were supposed to be taking place. About that time I summoned +the Greek Minister on several occasions and drew his attention +to these things. I asked him to be very careful, and told him +that Germany had no intention of taking any steps against the +Greek people, who had always been very much liked in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, further intelligence reports came in to the effect that +Britain had been given permission to establish naval bases in +Greece. I believe—and all this led up to the intervention of Italy, +which we did not desire at all—I believe Reich Marshal Göring has +already discussed this topic. It was impossible to prevent this intervention, +for when we arrived in Florence—I was with Adolf Hitler +at the time—for his conference with Mussolini, it was too late +and Mussolini said: “We are on the march.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Führer was very much upset and depressed when he heard +this news. We then had to do everything in our power so that the +war between Greece and Italy might at least be prevented from +<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span> +spreading. Yugoslav policy was naturally the decisive factor here. +I tried in every possible way to establish closer links with Yugoslavia +and to win her over to the Tripartite Pact which had already +been concluded then. It was difficult at first, but with the help of +the Regent Prince Paul and the Zvetkovitch Government, we finally +succeeded in inducing Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact. We +knew very well, however, that there was strong opposition in +Belgrade to the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact and +to any kind of closer connection with Germany. In Vienna at the +time the Führer said that the signing of the Tripartite Pact seemed +like a funeral to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All the same, we were very much surprised when—I think it +was 2 or 3 days after the conclusion of this pact—the government +was overthrown by General Simovic’s coup and a new government +was set up which certainly could not be described as friendly to +Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Reports came from Belgrade concerning close collaboration with +the British General Staff. I believe American observers in this field +are informed on the point, and during the last few months I have +heard from English sources that British elements had played a part +in this coup. That was quite natural, for we were at war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All these events caused the Führer to intervene in the Balkans, +first of all, to help Italy, whom the courageous resistance of the +Greeks had forced into a very difficult position in Albania; and +secondly, to prevent a possible attack from the north on the part +of Yugoslavia, which might have made the Italian situation still +more serious or even brought about a crushing defeat for our +Italian ally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Those were the military and strategic factors which induced the +Führer to intervene and to conduct the campaign against Greece and +Yugoslavia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: If I understood you correctly, Greece put bases on her +territory at the disposal of the British Navy before the Italian attack +in October 1940, in spite of the fact that she had declared her neutrality. +Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was the substance of the military +reports which I received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In September 1939, General Gamelin, then French +Commander-in-Chief, approved the project for an Allied landing at +Salonika. When did Germany receive knowledge of this intention?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We first learned the exact details from the +files of the French General Staff on the outbreak of war. But I +know that from the very beginning all the reports which the Führer +received from the various intelligence branches of the Reich caused +<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span> +him to fear the possibility that a new front might be built up at +any moment in Salonika as had happened in the first World War, +and that would mean a considerable dispersal of the German forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In September 1939 you made a second trip to Moscow. +What was the reason for this visit and what was discussed there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: My second visit to Moscow was made necessary +by the ending of the Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward +the end of September, and this time I received an especially cordial +reception. The situation then was such that we had to create clear +conditions in the Polish territory. Soviet troops had occupied the +eastern regions of Poland, and we had occupied the western parts +up to the line of demarcation previously agreed upon. Now we had +to fix a definite line of demarcation. We were also anxious to +strengthen our ties with the Soviet Union and to establish cordial +relations with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>An agreement was reached in Moscow, fixing a definite line in +Poland, and an economic treaty to put economic relations on an +entirely new basis was envisaged. A comprehensive treaty regulating +the exchange of raw materials was envisaged and later on +concluded. At the same time this pact was politically amplified into +a treaty of friendship, as is well known. One question remained, +about the territory of Lithuania. For the sake of establishing particularly +trustful relations between Moscow and Berlin, the Führer +renounced influence over Lithuania and gave Russia predominance +in Lithuania by this second treaty, so that there was now a clear +understanding between Germany and Soviet Russia with respect to +territorial claims as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that on 15 June 1940, after the delivery +of an ultimatum, the Russians occupied the whole of Lithuania, +including the part which was still German, without notifying the +Reich government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There was no special agreement concerning +this, but it is well known that these areas were actually occupied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What further Russian measures caused Hitler anxiety +as to Russia’s attitude and intentions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Various things made the Führer a little +sceptical about the Russian attitude. One was the occupation of the +Baltic States, which I have just mentioned. Another was the occupation +of Bessarabia and North Bukovina after the French campaign +and of which we were simply informed without any previous consultation. +The King of Romania asked us for advice at that time. +The Führer, out of loyalty to the Soviet pact, advised the King of +Romania to accept the Russian demands and to evacuate Bessarabia. +<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span> +In addition, the war with Finland in 1940 caused a certain uneasiness +in Germany, among the German people who had strong sympathies +for the Finns. The Führer felt himself bound to take this +into account to some extent. There were two other points to consider. +One was that the Führer received a report on certain communist +propaganda in German factories which alleged that the +Russian trade delegation was the center of this propaganda. Above +all, we heard of military preparations being made by Russia. I know +after the French campaign he spoke to me about this matter on +several occasions and said that approximately 20 German divisions +had been concentrated near the East Prussian border; and that +very large forces—I happen to remember the number, I think about +30 army corps—were said to be concentrated in Bessarabia. The +Führer was perturbed by these reports and asked me to watch the +situation closely. He even said that in all probability the 1939 Pact +had been concluded for the sole purpose of being able to dictate +economic and political conditions to us. In any case, he now proposed +to take countermeasures. I pointed out the danger of preventive +wars to the Führer, but the Führer said that German-Italian +interests must come first in all circumstances, if necessary. I said +I hoped that matters would not go so far and that, at all +events, we should make every effort through diplomatic channels +to avoid this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In November, from 12 to 14 November 1940 to be +exact, the Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On +whose initiative did this visit take place and what was the subject +under discussion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The conferences with Molotov at Berlin +concerned the following subjects: I might interpolate that when we +were trying to effect a settlement with Russia through diplomatic +channels, I wrote a letter to Marshal Stalin, with the Führer’s +permission, in the late autumn of 1940 and invited Mr. Molotov +to come to Berlin. This invitation was accepted, and Russo-German +relations were discussed in their entirety during a conversation +between the Führer and Mr. Molotov. I was present at this discussion. +Mr. Molotov first discussed with the Führer Russo-German +relations in general and then went on to mention Finland and the +Balkans. He said that Russia had vital interests in Finland. He said +that when the delimitation of zones of influence had been settled, +it had been agreed that Finland should be included in the Russian +sphere of influence. The Führer replied that Germany also had +extensive interests in Finland, especially with regard to nickel, and +furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the entire German +people sympathized with the Finns. He would therefore ask +Mr. Molotov to compromise on this question. This topic was brought +up on several occasions. +<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to the Balkans, Mr. Molotov said that he wanted a +non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and generally closer ties with +Bulgaria. He also thought of establishing bases there. The Führer +replied, or rather asked, whether Bulgaria had approached Molotov +in the matter, but that apparently was not the case. The Führer +then said that he could not express any opinion on this question +until he had discussed it with Mussolini, who was his ally and who +was naturally interested in the Balkans too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Various other points were also discussed, but no final settlement +was reached at this discussion. The discussion rather proceeded on +lines which seemed to me not those best calculated to lead to a +bridging of all contrasts. As soon as the meeting was over, I requested +the Führer to authorize me to take up again the discussions with +Mr. Molotov and asked him if he would consent to my discussing +with Mr. Molotov the possibility of Russia’s joining the Tripartite +Pact. That was one of our aims at the time. The Führer agreed to +this and I had another long discussion with the Russian Foreign +Commissar. In this conversation the same topics were discussed. +Mr. Molotov alluded to Russia’s vital interest in Finland; he also +referred to Russia’s deep interest in Bulgaria, the kinship between +the Russian and the Bulgarian people, and her interest in other +Balkan countries. It was finally agreed that on his return to Moscow +he should speak to Stalin and try to arrive at some solution of +the question. I proposed that they join the Tripartite Pact and +further proposed that I should discuss with the Führer the various +points which had been raised. Perhaps we could still find a way +out. The general result of this conversation was that Molotov went +back to Moscow with the intention of clearing up through the +embassies the differences still existing between us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, surely, as these negotiations did not +eventuate in any agreement, they are very remote from anything +we are considering. You are not suggesting that any agreements +were come to, are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No. I wanted to prove only that Germany made +efforts to prevent the conflict with Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict with +Russia in any of these negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No. It is evident from all the efforts made by Germany, +and from Ribbentrop’s testimony, that they wanted to eliminate +as far as possible any differences which might lead to a conflict +between Germany and Russia. As regards a deliberate—the Prosecution +assert that the pact with Russia was made with the intention of +violating it and attacking Russia, that it was intended to attack +Russia all along. I want to prove with this evidence that this was +not the case. +<span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me to be very remote, indeed. It +only goes to show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations +with Russia which had no result. That is all. You may go on, +Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In one of your previous answers you spoke of troop +concentrations on the East Prussian border mentioning 20 German +divisions. I assume that that was just a <span class='it'>lapsus linguae</span> on your part.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I meant to say Russian divisions. The +Führer, I know, mentioned this many times. He said, I believe, +that we had only one division in the whole of East Prussia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was not the occupation of Balkan territory by the +Russians the reason for your discussion with Molotov?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question. +Please repeat it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Was not the Russian occupation of territory in the +Balkans and also in the Baltic States the reason for inviting Molotov +to Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In the Balkans, no; for there were no Russian +occupation zones there. But it did apply to Bessarabia, which +is not a Balkan country in the strictest sense of the term. It was +the occupation of Bessarabia, which took place with surprising +speed, and that of Northern Bukovina, which had not been agreed +to fall within the Russian sphere of influence in the discussions at +Moscow—and which was, as the Führer said at the time, really an +old Austrian crown land—and the occupation of the Baltic territories. +It is true that this caused the Führer a certain amount of +anxiety.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that in the summer of 1940 you and +Hitler were informed that a Franco-British military commission was +in Moscow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes—no. What was the date, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in +continually, but I cannot say now how far that was correct for the +summer of 1940. When I arrived in Moscow in 1939, I found French +and English military commissions there, with instructions from the +British and French governments to conclude a military alliance +between Russia, England, and France. This was part of the policy +which the Führer described as “British encirclement policy” in his +speech to the Reichstag, I think on 28 May, and which Mr. Churchill +in 1936 in the embassy had made quite evident to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that at these conferences between... +<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard +to follow this. I wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer +to 1940? I wanted to get it clear whether it was 1940 or 1939. It +makes a big difference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? 1940, +I believe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was going to reply to that. I have already +said that I am not quite sure about 1940; I said only that these +reports existed. I know, however, that this mission was there +in 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: During Molotov’s visit to Berlin in the year 1940, +was any allusion made to the fact that Russia was not satisfied with +the last Russo-Finnish peace treaty and that she intended to annex +the whole of Finland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was not as definite as that, but it was +clear from her attitude that Russia considered Finland as her sphere +of influence. What measures Russia intended to take there is not +in my power to say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: On 5 April 1941 a Russian-Yugoslav Non-aggression +and Friendship Pact was concluded. What was the effect of this +conclusion upon Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This seemed to the Führer to confirm the +fact that Russia had deviated from the 1939 policy. He considered +it an affront, to use his own words, for he said that he had concluded +a pact with the other government and Russia only a short +time afterwards had concluded a pact with the government which +was definitely hostile to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler thereupon forbade you to take +any further diplomatic steps in connection with Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. I told the Führer at the +time that we must now make even more determined efforts to come +to an understanding about Russia’s attitude. He said that would be +useless and he did not think it would change the Russian attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What were the causes which led to the outbreak of +the conflict with Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must say this here: In the winter of +1940-41 the Führer was confronted with the following situation. +I think it is most important to make this clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>England was not prepared to make peace. The attitude of the +United States of America and of Russia was therefore of decisive +importance to the Führer. He told me the following about this—I +had a very lengthy discussion with him on the subject and asked +him to give me clearly defined diplomatic directives. He said that +<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span> +Japan’s attitude was not absolutely secure for Germany; although +we had concluded the Tripartite Pact, there were very strong oppositional +elements at work in Japan and we could not know what +position Japan would take; Italy had proved to be a very weak ally +in the Greek campaign. Germany might, therefore, have to stand +entirely alone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After that, he spoke of the American attitude. He said that he +had always wanted to have good relations with the United States, +but that in spite of extreme reserve the United States had grown +steadily more hostile to Germany. The Tripartite Pact had been +concluded with a view to keeping the United States out of the war, +as it was our wish and our belief that in that way those circles in +the United States which were working for peace and for good relations +with Germany could be strengthened. We were not successful +in this, however, as the attitude of the United States was not favorable +to Germany after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The +Führer’s basic idea, and mine, namely, that if the United States did +enter the war in Europe, they would have to reckon with a war on +two fronts and therefore would prefer not to intervene, was not +realized.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now the further question of Russia’s attitude came up and in +this connection the Führer made the following statement: We have +a friendship pact with Russia. But Russia has assumed the attitude +which we have just been discussing and which causes me a certain +amount of concern. We do not know, therefore, what to expect from +that side. More and more troop movements were reported; he had +himself taken military countermeasures, the exact nature of which +was, and still is, unknown to me. However, his great anxiety was +that Russia on the one hand and the United States and Britain on +the other, might proceed against Germany. On the one hand, therefore, +he had to reckon with an attack by Russia and on the other +hand with a joint attack by the United States and England, that is +to say with large-scale landings in the West. All these considerations +finally caused the Führer to take preventive measures, to +start a preventive war against Russia on his own initiative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What actual political reasons were there for the +Tripartite Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Tripartite Pact was concluded, I believe, +in September 1940. The situation was as I have just described +it, that is to say, the Führer was alarmed that the United States +might sooner or later enter the war. For this reason I wanted to do all +I could, in the field of diplomacy, to strengthen Germany’s position. +I thought we had Italy as an ally, but Italy showed herself to be +a weak ally. +<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>As we could not win France over to our side, the only friend +apart from the Balkan States was Japan. In the summer of 1940 +we therefore tried to achieve closer collaboration with Japan. Japan +was trying to do the same with us and that led to the signing of +the pact. The aim, or substance, of this pact was a political, military, +and economic alliance. There is no doubt, however, that it was +intended as a defensive alliance; and we considered it as such from +the start. By that I mean that it was intended in the first place to +keep the United States out of the war; and I hoped that a combination +of this kind might enable us to make peace with England +after all. The pact itself was not based on any plan for aggression +or world domination, as has often been asserted. That is not true; +its purpose was, as I have just said, to arrive at a combination which +would enable Germany to introduce a new order in Europe and +would also allow Japan to reach a solution acceptable to her in East +Asia, especially in regard to the Chinese problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was what I had in mind when I negotiated and signed the +pact. The situation was not unfavorable; the pact might possibly +keep the United States neutral and isolate England so that we might +all the same arrive at a compromise peace, a possibility of which +we never lost sight during the whole course of the war, and for +which we worked steadily.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What effect, according to the embassy reports which +reached you, did the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement +have on the United States?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that the occupation of +Austria and the Munich Agreement produced a much more unfavorable +feeling towards Germany in the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In November 1938 the American Ambassador at +Berlin was recalled to Washington to report to his government, and +the normal diplomatic relations with Germany were thus broken off. +According to your observations, what were the reasons for this +measure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We never really found out the details, and +we very much regretted it, as it forced us to recall our own Ambassador +in Washington, at least to call him back to make a report. It +is, however, evident that this measure was determined by the whole +attitude of the United States. Many incidents took place about that +time which gradually convinced the Führer that sooner or later they +would bring the United States into the war against us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Permit me to mention a few examples. President Roosevelt’s +attitude was defined for the first time in the “quarantine speech” +which he made in 1937. The press then started an energetic campaign. +After the ambassador was recalled the situation grew more +<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span> +critical and the effect began to make itself felt in every sphere of +German-American relations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that many documents dealing with the subject have +been published in the meantime and that a number of these have +been submitted by the Defense, dealing, for instance, with the attitude +adopted by certain United States diplomats at the time of the +Polish crisis; the cash-and-carry clause was then introduced which +could benefit only Germany’s enemies; the ceding of destroyers to +England; the so-called Lend-Lease Bill later on; and in other fields +the further advance of the United States towards Europe: The occupation +of Greenland, Iceland, on the African Continent, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; +the aid given to Soviet Russia after the outbreak of this war. All +these measures strengthened the Führer’s conviction that sooner or +later he would certainly have to reckon with a war against America. +There is no doubt that the Führer did not, in the first instance, +want such a war; and I may say that I myself, as I think you will see +from many of the documents submitted by the Prosecution, again +and again did everything I could, in the diplomatic field, to keep +the United States out of this war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In the summer of 1941 President Roosevelt gave his +so-called “firing order” to the American Fleet in order to protect +transports carrying armaments to England. How did Hitler and +German diplomacy react to this order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was a very regrettable event for us. I +am not competent to deal with technical details but I remember +exactly that Hitler was greatly excited about this order. I believe +it was in a speech at some meeting—probably at Munich, but I do +not remember exactly—that he replied to this speech and issued a +warning in answer to the announcement. I happen to remember the +form which his reply took, because at the time I thought it rather +odd. He said that America had given the order to fire on German +ships. “I gave no order to fire but I ordered that the fire be +returned”; I believe that is the way he expressed it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Documentary evidence of these events reached us in the diplomatic +service, but the Navy is better informed on the subject than +I am. After that, I believe, there were protests and publications +about the measures which made the German attitude plain; I cannot +give you exact details of these protests without referring to the +documents themselves.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Did Japan notify Germany in advance of her attack +on Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, she did not. At the time I tried to +induce Japan to attack Singapore, because it was impossible to make +peace with England and I did not know what military measures +<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span> +we could take to achieve this end. In any case, the Führer directed +me to do everything I could in the diplomatic field to weaken England’s +position and thus achieve peace. We believed that this could +best be done through an attack by Japan on England’s strong position +in East Asia. For that reason I tried to induce Japan, at that +time, to attack Singapore.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I also tried to +make Japan attack Russia, for I thought that in this way the war +could be ended most speedily. Japan, however, did not do that. +She did then—she did neither of the things we wanted her to do, +but instead, she did a third. She attacked the United States at Pearl +Harbor. This attack came as a complete surprise to us. We had +considered the possibility of Japan’s attacking Singapore, that is +England, or perhaps Hong Kong, but we never considered an attack +on the United States as being to our advantage. We knew that in +the case of an attack on England, there was a possibility that the +United States might intervene; that was a question which, naturally, +we had often considered. We hoped very much, however, that this +would not happen and that America would not intervene. The first +news I received of the attack on Pearl Harbor was through the +Berlin press, and then from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. I +should like to say under oath that all other reports, versions, or +documentary evidence are entirely false. I would like to go even +further to state that the attack came as a surprise even to the +Japanese Ambassador—at least he told me that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Does Your Lordship wish for a recess now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going +to take?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Not much more, Your Honor. I should say 15 or +20 minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for 10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: What considerations caused Hitler and you to enter +the war against the United States on the side of Japan?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: When the news of Pearl Harbor came, the +Führer had to make a decision. The text of the Tripartite Pact +bound us to assist Japan only in case of an attack against Japan +herself. I went to see the Führer, explained the legal aspect of the +situation and told him that, although we welcomed a new ally against +England, it meant we had a new opponent to deal with as well, or +would have one to deal with if we declared war on the United +States. +<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Führer then decided that the United States had already +fired upon our ships and thereby had practically created a state of +war; that it was therefore only a question of form, or, at least, that +this official state of war might supervene at any moment, as a +result of an incident; and that in the long run it was impossible +that this state of affairs in the Atlantic continue without a German-American +war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He then instructed me to draft a note—which he subsequently +altered—and to hand the American Ambassador his papers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How did the Foreign Office co-operate with Germany’s +allies during the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We naturally had close co-operation with +Italy. By that I mean that in the further course of war, we were +forced to all intents and purposes to take charge of all military +operations there ourselves, or, at least, to take joint charge of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Co-operation with Japan was very difficult, for the simple reason +that we could communicate with the Japanese Government only by +air. We had contact with them from time to time through U-boats, +but there was no co-ordinated military or political plan of campaign. +I believe that on this point General Marshall’s view is correct, +namely, that there was no close strategic co-operation or planning +of any kind; and, really, there was not any.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: How was co-operation with Italy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, we naturally had very +close co-operation with Italy, but difficulties arose through the many +heterogeneous influences at work; and Italy proved herself, right +from the start, to be a very weak ally in every respect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Why, in the course of the Russian campaign, did you +suggest to Hitler the conclusion of separate peace agreements?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: A certain atmosphere of confidence between +the Soviet Government and ourselves had been created at Moscow, +between Stalin, Molotov and myself, and also extending to the +Führer. For instance, the Führer told me that he had confidence +in Stalin, whom he considered one of the really great men of history, +and whose creation of the Red Army he thought a tremendous +achievement; but that one could never tell what might happen. The +power of the Soviets had grown and developed enormously. It was +very difficult to know how to deal with Russia and make an agreement +with her again. I myself always tried, through diplomatic and +other channels, to maintain contact to a certain extent, because I +still believed and hoped that some sort of peace could be made which +would relieve Germany in the East and allow her to concentrate her +forces in the West and even lead, perhaps, to a general peace. With +this in view, I proposed to the Führer, for the first time, in the +<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span> +winter of 1942, it was before Stalingrad, that an agreement should +be reached with Russia. I did that after the Anglo-American landing +in Africa which caused me great misgivings. Adolf Hitler—I met +him in the train at Bamberg—most emphatically rejected the idea +of any such peace or peace feelers, because he thought that if it +became known, it would be liable to create a spirit of defeatism, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I had suggested to him at the time that we should negotiate +peace with Russia on a very moderate basis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, in 1943, I again advised the Führer in a lengthy, +written exposition, to seek such a peace. I think it was after the +collapse of Italy. The Führer was at that time open to consider such +a peace; and he drafted a possible mutual line of demarcation which +might be adopted, and said that he would let me know definitely on +the following day. Next day, however, I did not receive any authorization +or directive from him. I think that the Führer probably felt +that it was impossible to heal the breach between National Socialism +and communism and that such a peace would be no more than an +armistice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I made one or two further attempts but the Führer held the view +that a decisive military success must be achieved first, and only after +that could we start negotiations, otherwise the negotiations would +be useless.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I were asked to express an opinion as to whether such negotiations +would have been likely to succeed, I would say that I think +it very doubtful. I believe that, considering the strong stand taken +by our opponents, especially England, even since the beginning of +the war, there was never any real chance of Germany’s attaining +peace; and that holds good for both the East and the West. And I +am convinced that with the formulation at Casablanca of the demand +for unconditional surrender, the possibility ceased entirely to exist. +I base my opinion not on purely abstract considerations, but on continuous +feelers, made through indirect channels, often unidentifiable +as such, by the other side, and which expressed the opinion of +important personalities with a guiding influence on policy in those +countries. They were determined to fight it out to the bitter end. +I think the Führer was right when he said that such negotiations +would serve no purpose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: To come to a different subject, the witness Lahousen +has testified here that in September 1939 a conversation took place +in Hitler’s private train at which you were also present, and which +dealt with the instigation of a rebellion in the Polish Ukraine. What +led to this conversation and what part did you play in the discussion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that in the course of the Polish +campaign Admiral Canaris, who was at the time Chief of the Wehrmacht +Counterintelligence Service, came to see me, as he sometimes +<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span> +did when he was making a short personal visit. I was in my compartment +on the Führer’s train at the time. I do not remember that +the witness Lahousen was present; I had the impression when I saw +Herr Lahousen here that I had never seen him before. Canaris came +to me from time to time to tell me about his activities in the Intelligence +and other fields. He did so on this occasion; and I believe it +was he who told me that he had set all his agents to fomenting a +revolt among the Ukrainian and other minorities in the rear of the +Polish Army. He certainly received no instructions or directives +from me, as was alleged here—and cannot have received any, for +these two reasons:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>1. The German Foreign Minister was never in a position to give +any directives to a military authority.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>2. At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the German Foreign +Office was not at all concerned with the question of the Ukraine, +and similar questions—or at any rate I myself was not. I was not +even sufficiently well acquainted with the details to be able to give +directives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a circular issued by +the Foreign Office...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something more about this? The +witness Lahousen has alleged that I said that houses were to be +burned down or villages were to be burned down and the Jews were +to be killed. I would like to state categorically that I never said +such a thing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Canaris was with me in my car at that time, and it is possible, +although I do not remember it exactly, that I may have seen him +going out later on. Apparently he received instructions which originated +with the Führer as to the attitude he was to take in Poland +with regard to the Ukrainian and other questions. There is no sense +in the statement ascribed to me, because especially in the Ukraine—the +Ukrainian villages—those were Ukrainians living in them, and +they were not our enemies but our friends; it would have been +completely senseless for me to say that these villages should be +burned down. Secondly, as regards killing the Jews, I can only say +that this would have been entirely contrary to my inner conviction +and that the killing of the Jews never entered the mind of anybody +at that time. I may say, in short, that all this is absolutely untrue. +I have never given instructions of this kind, nor could I have done +so, nor even a general indication on those lines. May I add that +I remember that Herr Lahousen himself was not quite convinced +that I had made this statement; at least, that was my impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Have you anything to say about the Foreign Office +circular submitted by the Prosecution and bearing the title: “The +Jewish question as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938”? +<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I saw this circular here for the first time. +Here are the facts: There was a section in the Foreign Office which +was concerned with Party matters and questions of ideology. That +department undoubtedly co-operated with the competent departments +of the Party. That was not the Foreign Office itself. I saw +the circular here. It seems to me that it is on the same lines as +most of the circulars issued at the time for the information and +training of officials, and so on. It even might possibly have gone +through my office, but I think that the fact that it was signed by +a section chief and not by myself or by the state secretary, should +prove that I did not consider the circular very important even if +I did see it. Even if it did go through my office or pass me in some +other way, I certainly did not read it because in principle I did not +read such long documents, but asked my assistants to give me a short +summary of the contents. I may add that I received hundreds of +letters in the course of the day’s work, some of which were read to +me, and also circulars and decrees which I signed, and many of +which I did not acquaint myself with. I wish to state, however, that +if one of my officials signed the circular it goes without saying that +I assume full responsibility for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The Prosecution have several times spoken of the +Geneva Convention. Your name was frequently mentioned in this +connection also. What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe, and many people will and could +confirm it, that from the beginning of the war the Foreign Office +and I have always supported the Geneva Convention in every way. +I should like to add that the military authorities always showed +much understanding for these things—at least, for the affairs I had +to deal with. If, later on, this no longer held good in every respect, +it was due to the rigors of war, and possibly to the harshness of +the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the terror-fliers I must state that in 1943 and 1944 the +English and American air raids gradually became a terrible threat +to Germany. I saw this for the first time in Hamburg, and I remember +this event because I was with the Führer at the time and I +described to him the terrifying impression I had received. I do not +believe that anyone who has not experienced such a raid and its +results can imagine what it means. It is evident that we Germans, +and especially Adolf Hitler, continually sought means to master +this menace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must also mention the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would +like to ask the Tribunal’s permission to name a witness, the former +Danish Minister Richard, who was there during the attack and +described it to me 2 days later. It was, therefore, self-evident that +<span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span> +the problem of terror-fliers had to be solved somehow by the Führer. +This was in contrast to our view insofar as we wanted to find a +solution which would not infringe upon the Geneva Convention, or +at least a solution which could be publicly proclaimed to our enemies. +My department was not directly concerned with the question, for +we had nothing to do with defense problems which were taken care +of by the military authorities, the police and those responsible for +home policy. But we were indirectly concerned where the matter +was affected by the Geneva Convention, and my point of view, +which I frequently expressed, was that if any steps were taken an +official proclamation should be published, giving a definition of a +terror-flier, and stating that these terror-fliers convicted or airmen +suspected of an attack upon the civilian population would be tried by +courts-martial. Geneva would then be officially notified of this measure +or preparatory measure and then the enemy would be informed +through the protecting powers. Fliers found guilty of deliberate terrorist +raids by the courts-martial would be sentenced; if not, they would +revert to the normal status of prisoners of war. But this was never +carried out in practice. It was not a suggestion by me but an idea which +I expressed to Hitler in the course of conversations on one or two +occasions and which was not put into practice because, in practice, +it was impossible to find a definition for these raids. I believe some +mention was also made of a conference supposed to have taken place +in Klessheim during which I was said to have proposed or supported +farther-reaching measures. I remember quite clearly that this conference +did not take place. I do not believe, or at least, I do not +remember, that I ever discussed this question at that time with +Himmler, with whom I was not at that time on good terms, or +Göring, whom I did not see very often. I believe that it is possible +that the subject was brought up in a conversation during an official +visit to Klessheim, as often happened, with the Führer, but that +I do not know any more, I do know one thing that if allusion is +made to a more thorough-going proposal emanating from me it can +refer only to the following: At the time we were anxious to arrive +at a clear definition of these attacks by terror-fliers and in the course +of discussion various suggestions were made for the definition of +certain categories of attacks, such as machine-gunning from the air, +as terror attacks. It is possible that this note, or whatever it was, +came into being in this way: That the person in question knew my +views, that is, the person trying to find a practical solution—if one +was arrived at—to agree officially with the Geneva Convention or +could, at least, have been officially discussed with Geneva.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Another document has also been submitted in this connection. +I believe it was a suggestion for an expert opinion on this question +by the Foreign Office. I do not remember exactly how this expert +opinion came to be given, whether it was done on my orders or +<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span> +whether it was the result of a discussion with the Wehrmacht authorities +concerned, who wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign +Office. All I know is that the Wehrmacht always attached great +importance to an exact knowledge of our opinion with regard to the +Geneva Convention. I remember that expert opinion, however, and +that I have seen it. I am now said to have approved it. It would +take too long to go into details, but that is not correct. I remember +that I submitted that expert opinion to the Führer as being a very +important matter which I could not deal with alone. I think that +the Führer—or I remember rather exactly, that the Führer dismissed +it as nonsense at the time, so this expert opinion was not +well received by the Führer. In the further course of events all we +heard, because we were only concerned indirectly, was that no order +of any sort was issued by the Führer or any Wehrmacht authority, +because the Wehrmacht shared our very views on this subject. +Admittedly, I do not know that in detail; but I can say with absolute +certainty that since this question of defense against terror-fliers was +under consideration, and afterwards, not a single case of lynching +came to my ears. I did not hear that this had happened until I +was here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The other day witness Dahlerus was brought here. +How long have you known Dahlerus?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the +first time. Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once +from a distance or possibly in the Reich Chancellery during one of +his apparently frequent visits to the Führer. But I do not remember +him, and when I saw him here I had the impression that I had never +seen him before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Were you in a position to exercise influence regarding +planes for visitors to the Reich Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I had no such influence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: One more question on a different subject. What real +estate was at your disposal in your official capacity as Foreign +Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The other day the British Prosecutor declared +that, to begin with, I had one house and later on I had six. +I want to clear this matter up for the Court. After losing my entire +fortune in America, I became quite wealthy again through my own +work. As such, and in other ways, too, I had certain possibilities +and I also had funds through relatives, through my wife. I built a +house in Berlin-Dahlem in 1922-23 and bought several lots there. +We lived there for many years. Furthermore, in 1934—I want to +emphasize the fact that this had nothing to do with my political +activities, because at the time I had only just started them—I bought +<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span> +a small house and estate called Sonnenburg, near Berlin, with some +funds which my wife inherited, I think, and from funds of my own.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The other—or I should say rather that since that time I have not +acquired a square yard of property in Germany or anywhere else. +The other houses mentioned by the British Prosecutor, that is, the +so-called Schloss Fuschl, this became known because various foreign +statesmen were received there during the war. That is not +really a castle but a tower, an old hunting tower of the Archbishops +of Salzburg. The Führer had put it at my disposal to have a roof +over my head when I was at Obersalzberg, because he did not want +me to stay in the hotel, which was always very crowded, and I had +to bring my staff with me. Fuschl was never my personal property, +but was a so-called Foreign Office establishment, which belonged +exclusively to the state and was kept up by the state. I knew the +former owners of this castle or tower only by name and, therefore, +I cannot give any information about them. I only heard that this +building was confiscated by the Reich Government, along with other +property belonging to political opponents in Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second house mentioned here was, I think, a house in Slovakia. +There was also a question of a third house in Sudetenland, +which was alleged to be the property of a Count Czernin. I believe +I can explain this also. Here are the facts: The Führer had given +me permission to arrange hunting parties to which I could invite +foreign statesmen for the purpose of more informal talks. I was +also a hunter, so the Foreign Office, that is to say the Reich Government, +had leased ground from some of the farmers in Sudetenland +for hunting purposes, along with a suitably impressive house. I +believe they were rented for only a couple of years; they were not +even purchased. The same thing was done in the case of a hunting +ground in Slovakia. I do not think that this was our property at +all. The Slovak Government placed it at our disposal for a few days +every year, to shoot deer. It was a hunting lodge in which I once +or twice spent 2 or 3 days, but it has nothing to do with my own +property.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Another place was mentioned, a house called Tanneck. I may +mention that I have never even seen this house, situated, I believe, +in the Rhineland. According to the description which I have received, +it is a small house occupied by a man responsible for looking after +several horses. I had formerly served in the cavalry and was interested +in horses which had been purchased in France by the State, +from the well-known racing stable owner, the Aga Khan in Normandy, +as they would otherwise have been ruined. I should like to +emphasize the fact that full compensation—I always paid particular +attention to this—was paid for the horses, as I think the Aga Khan +will gladly confirm. They were brought to Germany with the +<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span> +Führer’s full consent, although he was not greatly interested in +horses; but he understood my point of view. These horses were +later to be put in the stud farm Grabitz, which belonged to the Reich +Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal permits, I would like to say that, as far as my +personal affairs are concerned, my Defense Counsel will present the +necessary testimony. I gave instructions at that time that I did not +want to have a single Reichsmark more at the end of my term of +office than I had at the beginning, with the exception of two gifts +which I received from the Führer, but most of which, or at least +part of which, I believe, has since been spent by the State for my +official expenses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: One last question: During your activities, in regard +to foreign policy, did you see any possibility of realizing prospects +of revision which had been conceded to Germany but which had not +materialized?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was precisely the great problem out +of which, in the final analysis, this war developed. As Adolf Hitler +often told me, he wanted to build up an ideal social state in Europe +after the solution of the problems which he had recognized as vital. +He wanted to erect buildings, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; that was his aim. Now, the +realization of these aims defined as vital by the Führer was greatly +hampered by the petrified political system, which had been established +in Europe and the world in general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We, the Führer, and then I myself on his order—so I believe I +can be the chief witness—always tried to solve these problems +through diplomatic and peaceful channels. I brooded many nights +over the League of Nations—day and night over Paragraph 19 of +the Covenant of the League of Nations, but the difficulty was that +the Führer was not in a position, or was convinced that it was +simply impossible to obtain results through negotiation—at least, +without having strong armed forces to back him up. The mistake +was, I believe, that, although Paragraph 19 was a very good paragraph +of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and one which we +all would have been very willing to sign and follow or one which +we did sign and would have followed, no means of putting it into +practice existed. That gradually created a situation in which the +powers, and that is quite natural, who wanted to retain this state +of petrifaction, as I might call it, or <span class='it'>status quo</span>, opposed any steps +taken by Germany, which of course, caused reaction on the part of +the Führer, until finally it reached the point, the very tragic point, +where this great war began over a question like Danzig and the +Corridor, which could have been solved comparatively easy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have no more questions. +<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not think it would be possible +to go any further with the examination of the witness today, but +the Tribunal would welcome your assistance and the assistance of +the Prosecution with reference to your documents, if you could tell +us what the position is with reference to your documents, and if the +Prosecution could tell us how far they have been able to see these +documents since they have been translated and how far they have +been able to make up their minds as to what documents they wish +to object to and what documents they are prepared to admit as +being offered in evidence before us. Could you tell us what the +position is with reference to these documents; how many of your +documents have been translated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me +this morning that the English Document Book will be ready on +Monday and that I can discuss with him the question of what +documents will be admitted. He also told me that the British Prosecution +would arrange everything with the other delegations of the +Prosecution, so that on Tuesday I should be in a position to submit +the remaining documents and, I believe, this could be done in 2 or +3 hours. I want to submit these documents in groups and do not +wish to read too much from them, but only explain to the Tribunal +my reason for asking them to take judicial notice of these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You said, did you not, it would take you no +longer than 2 or 3 hours to explain the documents after you had +come to the arrangement with the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And have you any other witnesses to call +besides the defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: No. I would like only to submit an affidavit by a +witness requested by me, Counsellor of Legation Gottfriedsen, +dealing with the personal financial circumstances of the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop, former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Gottfriedsen +was the Foreign Office official whose task was to look after the +official income of the Foreign Minister and who is also very well +acquainted with his private financial affairs. He can give information +about the personal and official estates belonging to the Foreign +Minister and the Foreign Ministry. I have embodied this information +in the form of a few questions in an affidavit. If the Prosecution +have no objection to this affidavit, I could dispense with the +calling of the witness, Gottfriedsen. However, if the Prosecution +want him to appear, then I would question him on the contents of +the affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have no other witnesses for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. +When all my documents will have been presented, the case for the +Defense will be concluded. +<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view +on this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British +Prosecution is concerned, we have now had six document books, +I think, taking us up to Number 214, roughly two-thirds of the +documents which Dr. Horn wishes to tender, and we have been +able to go through up to Number 191. I made out a list—I could +hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn another one—of those +documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I should +think we object to something like 70 or 80, between the Numbers +45 and 191, maybe a little more. The Soviet Delegation are, I think, +in a position to tender their objections, which are practically entirely +in accord with ours, though they were prepared separately. M. Champetier +de Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he +wishes to make objections. I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more +or less leaving this point to me and will act in accordance with the +British Delegation’s view on the point. So that is the position. It +probably would be convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of +objections which I have up to date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, +what the position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the +documents. You remember that the Tribunal did make an order +that the Prosecution should object to documents, if possible, before +they were translated, so as to avoid unnecessary translations, and in +the event of any disagreement between the Prosecution and the +Defense any matter should be referred to the Tribunal. It was +thought that there were a great number of documents on which +agreement could be achieved in that way, and the labor and time +taken up in translating would be obviated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have +been in over these documents, is that we did our best to try to +formulate our view on the index, but it is a very difficult matter +to form a view when you get a short description of only a line and +a half about a document. But it might be that that would be the +most practical way of doing it, despite its difficulty. If the Prosecution +were given an index with as good a description as possible +of the document, the Prosecution then formulated their objections +on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding differences +before the documents were translated, I should think—I am afraid +I can put it only tentatively—it would be worth a trial. Otherwise, +you would get a terrible blockage in the Translation Division of the +Tribunal by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in +this case, to which ultimately we are going to make full and +numerous objections, but that holds up the translation of all the +documents belonging to the subsequent proceedings. So I should be +<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span> +prepared—and I think my colleagues would support me—in making +a trial, if the Tribunal thought it could be done, to hand in an +objection on a list of documents and see if we could in that way +arrive at the results which would obviate the necessity of translating +them all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, +supposing the defendants’ counsel were to give them the entire +documents in German with also a full index in English, and then +the Prosecution, or some member of the Prosecution who is familiar +with German, could go through the documents in German and the +Prosecution can then make up their minds in that way? Would that +be an assistance to the Prosecution? They would have not only the +index to inform them as to what was the nature of the documents, +but they would have the documents in German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that would be a great +help, especially if he underlined the more material passages.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendants’ +counsel, some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to +what were the necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, +My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the +immediate future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants’ +counsel may wish to ask questions of the Defendant Ribbentrop +and then the Prosecution may wish to cross-examine him, and +that, I suppose, might possibly take all Monday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that is highly probable, +My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Under those circumstances, if the scheme +which Dr. Horn has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily +be any delay at all, because by Tuesday morning his documents +would have been all examined by the Prosecution and the +objections to them would have been put in, and he could then +go through, as he says, in 2 or 3 hours, the documents which +remain for the consideration of the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what +the position is with reference to the next defendant. It may be +that on Tuesday after the midday adjournment the case of Defendant +Keitel would come on. Now, are his documents in order? +As far as I remember, most of his documents are documents which +have already been put in evidence. +<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A great many.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. +The documents have been presented and affidavits were already +presented to the Prosecution last week. I am waiting only for the +Prosecution to decide as to the relevancy of those documents +which the defendant has submitted as his own statements and +which are to be submitted in order to shorten the examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the chance of +going through them myself but, as a matter of principle, we have +always been quite prepared that a statement should be read so +long as the witness is there to be cross-examined. If the Tribunal +has no objection, there will be none from the Prosecution on that +procedure.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all +to that method of presenting written documents, provided the +Prosecution does not object to them, and, therefore, no cross-examination +is necessary. Could Dr. Nelte tell us whether the +documents which he wishes to present, insofar as they have not +already been put in evidence, have been translated yet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: They all were sent to the translation office and +the last two documents were sent 3 days ago. I assume, therefore, +that the delegations of the Prosecution have, in the meantime, +received the translations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you received them, Sir David?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not +received them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Perhaps they have not been distributed yet. Several +or about two-thirds of the documents were translated into French +and English about two weeks ago and are ready. I subsequently +also sent these documents to the Russian Delegation so that they +could be translated into Russian.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General +Mitchell, that the documents are translated. They have not yet been +distributed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then there ought to be no cause for delay +in connection with the Defendant Keitel’s case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No. +<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the Defendant +Kaltenbrunner, who is the next one? Dr. Kauffmann, are +your documents yet translated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have only a very few affidavits +and there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of +the Prosecution in due time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite +ready to go on then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, after Keitel, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel, very well. Sir David, then +you will present to us the objections which you are making to +Dr. Horn’s documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his +objections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall hand them in as +far as I have gone, if I may, at once.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as +he has any.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-SIXTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 1 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the defendants’ counsel any +questions they want to put to the defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, Your Honor. Witness, the preamble to the secret +pact concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August +1939 is worded more or less as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, +the following is agreed upon in case of a conflict...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you recall whether the preamble had approximately that +wording?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact wording, but it is +approximately correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the chief of the legal department of +the Foreign Office, Ambassador Dr. Gaus, participated as legal +adviser in the negotiations in Moscow on 23 August 1939 and drafted +the treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Ambassador Gaus participated partly in the +negotiations and drafted the agreements with me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I shall now read an extract from the statement by +Ambassador Gaus and ask you a few questions in connection with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to +read?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I shall read from Paragraph 3 of the statement made +by Dr. Gaus and in connection with it ask a few questions of the +witness, because some points concerning this pact do not seem to +have been sufficiently clarified as yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relation +these questions have with the Defendant Hess, who is defended by +Dr. Seidl, or with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to discuss this +affidavit, as I attach no importance whatsoever to it. I wish only to +draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigating +the problems connected with the policy of the Allied +<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span> +nations, but are investigating the charges against the major German +war criminals; and such questions on the part of the Defense Counsel +is an attempt to divert the attention of the Tribunal from the issues +we are investigating. I therefore think it proper that questions of +this kind should be rejected as not relevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Gaus stated, under Paragraph 3 of his affidavit:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The plane of the Reich Foreign Minister whom I had to accompany +as legal adviser in the intended negotiations arrived +in Moscow at noon on 23 August 1939. On the afternoon of the +same day the first conversation between Herr Von Ribbentrop +and Mr. Stalin took place at which, on the German side, +besides the Reich Foreign Minister, only Embassy Counsellor +Hilger, as interpreter, and perhaps also Ambassador Count +Schulenburg, but not myself, were present.</p> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister returned very satisfied from +this long conference and indicated that it was as good as +certain that it would result in the conclusion of the agreements +desired on the part of Germany. The continuation of +the conference, at which the documents to be signed were to +be discussed and completed, was scheduled for later in the +evening. At this second conference I participated personally +and so did Ambassador Count Schulenburg and Embassy +Counsellor Hilger. On the Russian side the negotiations were +conducted by Messrs. Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter +was Mr. Pavlov. An agreement on the text of the Soviet-German +Non-aggression Pact was reached quickly and without +difficulties.</p> + +<p>“Herr Von Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble +to the agreement which I had drafted a rather far-reaching +phrase concerning the formation of friendly German-Soviet +relations to which Mr. Stalin objected with the remark that +the Soviet Government could not suddenly present to the +public German-Soviet assurances of friendship after they had +been covered with pails of manure by the Nazi Government +for 6 years. Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was +deleted or rather changed.</p> + +<p>“Besides the Non-aggression Pact there were negotiations for +quite some time on a separate secret document, which according +to my recollection was called a ‘secret agreement’ or +‘secret additional agreement’ and the terms of which were +aimed at a demarcation of the mutual spheres of interest in +the European territories situated between the two countries. +<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span> +Whether the expression ‘spheres of interest’ or other such +expressions were used therein, I do not recall. In the document, +Germany declared herself politically disinterested in Latvia, +Estonia and Finland but considered Lithuania to be part of +her sphere of influence.</p> + +<p>“Regarding the political disinterest of Germany in the two +Baltic countries mentioned, controversy arose when the Reich +Foreign Minister, in accordance with his instructions, wanted +to have a certain part of the Baltic territory exempted from +this political disinterest; this, however, was rejected on the +part of the Soviets, especially on account of the ice-free ports +in this territory.</p> + +<p>“Because of this point, which apparently had already been +discussed in Ribbentrop’s first conversation, the Foreign +Minister had put in a call to Hitler which came through only +during the second discussion, and during which, in direct conversation +with Hitler, he was authorized to accept the Soviet +standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish +territory. I cannot remember whether it was drafted on a +map which was to be attached to the document or only described +in the document. Moreover, an agreement was reached +in regard to Poland, stating approximately that the two powers +would act in mutual agreement in the final settlement of +questions concerning this country. It could, however, be possible +that this last agreement regarding Poland was reached +only when the change of the secret agreement mentioned later +in Paragraph 5 was made.</p> + +<p>“Regarding the Balkan States, it was confirmed that Germany +had only economic interests there. The Non-aggression Pact +and the secret agreement were signed rather late that same +evening.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, in the affidavit of Gaus, a pact is mentioned whereby +the two powers agree to act in mutual agreement with regard to the +final settlement of the questions concerning Poland. Had such an +agreement already been reached on 23 August 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. At that time the serious +German-Polish crisis was acute, and it goes without saying that this +question was thoroughly discussed. I should like to emphasize that +there was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin’s or Hitler’s mind +that, if the negotiations with Poland came to naught, the territories +that had been taken from the two great powers by force of arms +could also be retaken by force of arms. In keeping with this understanding, +the eastern territories were occupied by Soviet troops and +the western territories by German troops after victory. There is no +doubt that Stalin can never accuse Germany of an aggression or +<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span> +of an aggressive war for her action in Poland. If it is considered +an aggression, then both sides are guilty of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement +described merely in writing or was it drawn on a map attached to +the agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The line of demarcation was roughly drawn +on a map. It ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Narew, and San. +These rivers I remember. That was the line of demarcation that was +to be adhered to in case of an armed conflict with Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of that agreement, not +Germany but Soviet Russia received the greater part of Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the exact proportions, but, +at any rate, the agreement was that the territories east of these +rivers were to go to Soviet Russia and the territories west of these +rivers were to be occupied by German troops, while the organization +of this territory as intended by Germany was still an open question +and had not yet been discussed by Hitler and myself. Then, later +the Government General was formed when the regions lost by +Germany after World War I were incorporated into Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Now, something else. You stated last Friday that +you wanted Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That failed because of Russian demands. +The Russian demands concerned—I should perhaps say first that I +had agreed with M. Molotov in Berlin to conduct further negotiations +through diplomatic channels. I wanted to influence the Führer +regarding the demands already made by Molotov in Berlin in order +that some sort of an agreement or compromise might be arrived at.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Schulenburg sent us a report from Moscow with the +Russian demands. In this report was, first of all, the renewed +demand for Finland. To this the Führer, as is well known, told +Molotov that he did not wish that after the winter campaign of 1940 +another war should break out in the North. Now the demand for +Finland was raised again, and we assumed that it would mean the +occupation of Finland. It was difficult since it was a demand which +the Führer had already turned down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Another demand of the Russians was that of the Balkans and +Bulgaria. Russia, as is well known, wanted bases there and wished +to enter into close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, +with whom we got in touch, did not want this. Moreover, this +Russian penetration of the Balkans was for both the Führer and +Mussolini a difficult question because of our economic interests +there: grain, oil, and so on. But above all it was the will of the +Bulgarian Government themselves, which was against this penetration. +<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, thirdly, there was the demand of the Russians for outlets +to the sea and military bases on the Dardanelles; and then the +request which Molotov had already expressed to me in Berlin, to +secure somehow at least an interest in the outlets of the Baltic Sea. +M. Molotov himself told me at that time that Russia naturally was +also very much interested in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time I discussed these demands and requests fully with +the Führer. The Führer said we would have to get in touch with +Mussolini, who was very much interested in some of these demands. +This took place, but neither the demands for the Balkans nor the +demands for the Dardanelles met with the approval from Mussolini. +As far as Bulgaria is concerned I have already stated that she did +not want it either; and with regard to Finland, neither Finland nor +the Führer wanted to accede to the demands of the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Negotiations were then carried on for many months. I recall that +upon receipt of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had +another long conversation with the Führer. I had an idea that, if we +could bring about a compromise between the Russian demands and +the wishes of the various parties concerned, a coalition could be +formed which would be so strong that it would eventually induce +England to remain at peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your +question that this is supposed to be an answer to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In essence he has already answered the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question +you should stop him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well. I now come to another question: What +was Adolf Hitler’s opinion regarding the military strength of Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler once said to me—he expressed +himself thus—and this was when he became worried about what was +taking place in Russia in the way of preparations against Germany: +“We do not know of course what is concealed behind this gate, if +some day we should really be forced to kick it open.” From this +and other statements which the Führer made at this time I concluded +that, on the basis of reports about Russia, he suffered great +anxiety about the strength and the possible display of might by the +Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: My next question: What circumstances induced Hitler +to anticipate the threatening danger of an offensive by the Soviet +Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This was as follows...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been dealt with extensively and +exhaustively by the Defendant Göring? You are here as counsel for +Hess. +<span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the opinion that this has been +dealt with exhaustively, I shall withdraw the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were +putting Gaus’ affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention +that he should say that the affidavit was true; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t put to him Paragraph 4 of the +affidavit at all, did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I read only Paragraph 3 of the affidavit. I did not +read Paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 in order to save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, “yes,” that +you did not put it. Should you not put the end of Paragraph 4 to +him, which reads in this way:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a +manner that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with +Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided upon +but only as an imminent possibility. No statements which +could have included the approval or encouragement for such a +conflict were made by the Soviet statesmen on this point. +Rather the Soviet representatives limited themselves in this +respect simply to taking cognizance of the explanations of the +German representatives.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following to this. When I +went to Moscow no final decision had been reached by the Führer...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, couldn’t you answer the question +directly? I asked you whether the statement in the affidavit was +correct or not. You can explain afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Not quite correct, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is not correct insofar as at that time the +decision to attack Poland had in no way been made by the Führer. +There is, however, no doubt that it became perfectly clear during +the discussions in Moscow that there was at any time the possibility +of such a conflict, if the last effort at negotiations failed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and +what I have just read to you? What I read to you was this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a +manner that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland +<span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span> +appear not as a matter already finally decided upon but only +as an imminent possibility.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I should have thought your explanation was exactly the same as +that. That’s all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something briefly in +this connection? This witness Gaus was present only at the second +conference. He was, however, not present at the long conference +which took place previously between the witness Ribbentrop on the +one hand and Molotov and Stalin on the other hand. At these conferences +only Embassy Counsellor Hilger was present and I ask the +Tribunal to call witness Hilger, who has, in view of the importance +of this point, already been granted me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any +application in writing for calling any witness that you like; and +also the Tribunal wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to +have the witness Gaus here for a cross-examination they may do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Then I should like to put in as Hess Exhibit Number +16 (Document Number Hess-16) the sworn affidavit of Ambassador +Gaus.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, as far as I understand, +there is some slight danger of the witness Gaus being removed from +Nuremberg. I would like to state at this time that we would like +to have him retained here for long enough time for possible cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to ask +questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of +1940, when the idea of a war with Russia was discussed by Hitler, +he went to Fuschl in order to talk to you about this question. He +believed that you too had misgivings about it. Do you recall that +Keitel at the end of August or at the beginning of September was +in Fuschl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He did visit me at +that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you recall that Keitel at that time stated to you +his opinion about the probably imminent war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He spoke of that at +the time. I believe he said that the Führer had discussed it with +him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What I am driving at is this: Keitel states that he +spoke with you about a memorandum he intended to submit to Hitler +<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span> +which referred to the considerations which were to be taken into +account in case of war with Soviet Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. Field Marshal Keitel told +me at that time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, +and he expressed his misgivings concerning a possible conflict +between the Soviet Union and Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Field Marshal +Keitel was opposed to the war at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I had absolutely that +impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked +you to support his point of view with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, and I told him at that +time that I would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he ought +to do the same.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Another question, regarding the escape of the French +General Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General +Giraud escaped from Königstein, asked you to take steps with the +French Government to bring about the voluntary return of General +Giraud?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. At that time he asked +me whether it would not be possible, by way of negotiations with +the French Government, to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment +in some way or other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did a meeting then take place with General Giraud +in occupied France through the intervention of Ambassador Abetz?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, such a meeting took place. I believe +Ambassador Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the +company of M. Laval. The Ambassador did everything he could in +order to induce the General to return, but finally did not succeed. +The General was promised safe conduct for this meeting and upon +its conclusion the General and Laval left.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has submitted an order, the subject +of which was the branding of Soviet prisoners of war. The Defendant +Keitel is held responsible for this order. He states that he spoke +with you about this question at headquarters located at the time in +Vinnitza; that he had to do it because all questions pertaining to +prisoners of war also concerned the department for international +law of the Foreign Office. Do you recall that in this connection +Keitel asked you whether there were any objections from the point +of view of international law to this branding which Hitler wished.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: I heard about the +intention of marking prisoners of war and went to headquarters to +<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span> +speak with Keitel about this matter because it was my opinion that +the marking of prisoners in such a way was out of the question. +Keitel shared my opinion; and, so far as I recall, I believe he gave +later orders that this intended form of marking was not to be used.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I have no further question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant +Dönitz): Witness, when did you make the acquaintance of +Admiral Dönitz?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I made his acquaintance after he was +appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz +before or after this time exert or try to exert any influence on +German foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have never heard that Admiral Dönitz +tried to exert any influence on German foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall Marshal +Antonescu’s visit to the Führer headquarters on 27 February 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do recall the visit but not the date. +Marshal Antonescu used to visit the Führer frequently. I should say +every six months or so; I believe you said at the beginning of 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, on 27 February 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I think it is correct that he visited the +Führer at the beginning of 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall whether +Antonescu, at that time, attended the discussion of the military +situation, as guest?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am quite certain, because this was usually +the case when Antonescu came to see the Führer. The Führer always +explained the military situation to him, that is, he invited him to the +so-called noon discussion of the military situation. I do not recall +exactly now, but there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu +attended the discussion of the military situation in February.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Besides the military discussions +were there also political discussions with Antonescu?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, every visit with Marshal Antonescu +began by the Führer’s withdrawing either with the Marshal alone +or sometimes also with me, but mostly with the Marshal alone, +because he was the chief of state; a long detailed political discussion +would ensue, to which I was generally called in later. +<span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz take +part in these political discussions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Certainly not, because the Führer seldom +invited military leaders to these political discussions with Marshal +Antonescu. Later however, he did occasionally, but I do not recall +that Admiral Dönitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, +the Prosecution have submitted a document concerning a discussion +between you and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka +on 29 March 1941. The document carries the Document Number +1877-PS, and is Exhibit Number USA-152. A part of this document +was read into the record by the Prosecution, and on Page 1007 of +the German transcript (Volume III, Page 379) can be found among +other things, the following passage which concerns Grossadmiral +Raeder:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Next, the RAM (Foreign Minister) turned again to the Singapore +question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese +of possible attacks by submarines based in the Philippines, +and of the intervention of the English Mediterranean and +Home Fleets, he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral +Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy +during this year would have its hands so full in English home +waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to +send even a single ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder +had described the United States submarines as so poor that +Japan need not bother about them at all.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, as the Defendant Raeder clearly remembers, you, as +Foreign Minister, never spoke with him about strategic matters +regarding Japan or even about the worth or worthlessness of +American submarines. I should be obliged to you if you could +clarify this point, whether there might be some confusion as to the +person involved in this discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is altogether possible. I do not recall +that I ever spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese +strategy. The fact was that we had only very loose connections with +Japan on these questions. If at that time I said to Matsuoka what is +written there, it is quite possible that I quoted the Führer that he +had said it to me. Naturally I could not have said it on my own +initiative, because I did not know about it. I know that the Führer +spoke to me frequently about such points particularly with regard +to Japan. It is possible therefore that this did not originate with +<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span> +Admiral Raeder but the Führer. I do not know who made this note. +Is it a...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The document is entitled, “Notes on the conference +between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign +Minister, Matsuoka...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that here. It is possible that +the Führer said that to me. In fact, I consider that probable. It is +possible that some mistake was made in the note; that I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Witness, did you inform the Defendant Raeder of +such political discussions as you had with Matsuoka or Oshima?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever speak with Grossadmiral Raeder +about other political questions or have him present at political +negotiations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not our practice. Generally, +the Führer kept military and political matters strictly separate, so +that I, as Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss +military or strategic matters at my office; but when questions of +foreign policy were to be discussed, this took place at the Führer +headquarters, but as I have seen from documents which I read for +the first time here, matters were kept separate even there. In other +words, if such discussions took place at all, a fact which I cannot +recall at the moment, it could have been only at the Führer headquarters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the State Secretary of the Foreign +Office, Steengracht, who was heard here as a witness, answered in +the negative my question as to whether the high military leaders +were regularly informed by him about current political matters. +Now I ask whether you, as Foreign Minister, informed high military +leaders about political matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must answer this question in the same +way as I answered the previous one. That was not our practice. All +political and military matters were dealt with exclusively by the +Führer. The Führer told me what I had to do in the diplomatic and +political field, and he told the military men what they had to do +militarily. I was occasionally, but very seldom, informed about +military matters by the Führer, and whatever the military men had +to know about political matters they never learned from me; but if +they learned at all, it was from the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. +<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, did you have +an order or an instruction according to which you were to inform +the SA leaders of the development and treatment of foreign political +matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The SA? No. There was no such order, and +I had no such instructions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Did the SA leadership have any influence on +foreign policy at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: And now I should like to ask a question for my +colleague Dr. Sauter who is ill: Were you in 1943 witness to a conversation +between Hitler and Himmler, in which the question was +discussed as to whether Von Schirach, who was then Reichsleiter, +should be summoned before the Volksgericht (People’s Court)?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: What consequences would such a trial before the +Volksgericht have had for Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not +know the details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my +presence, made the suggestion to the Führer that Schirach should +be brought and tried before the Volksgericht for some reason or +other. I do not know the details. I was not interested in them. I +said to the Führer that this, in my opinion, would make a very bad +impression from the point of view of foreign policy and I know that +Himmler received no answer from the Führer; at any rate, he did +not give the order. What consequences that would have had I cannot +say, but when such a suggestion came from Himmler, the consequences +were very serious.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation +and how did you react to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated +that I told the Führer as well as Himmler that it would make a very +bad impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of +the defendants’ counsel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to +advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar +with the League of Nations declaration of 1927?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember the League +of Nations declaration of 1927? +<span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many +declarations. Please tell me which one you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one +about aggressive war in 1927, didn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but +it is clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an +aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the +League of Nations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and +the preamble of the declaration was:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve +as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence +an international crime...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Were you familiar with that when you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important +matter to be familiar with if you were going to advise Hitler, who +was then Chancellor, on foreign policy, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, +and corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent +events have proved that the League of Nations was not in +a position to save Germany from chaos.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as +your own view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the +expression of opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as +your own view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, +but on the other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be +given help in some way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from +that, if you were not familiar in detail with that resolution, were +you familiar in detail with the Kellogg-Briand Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view +expressed in the preamble and in the pact that there should be a +renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how +you carried that out. Let’s take the first example. Are you telling +<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span> +this Tribunal that as far as you know, no pressure or threats were +made to Herr Von Schuschnigg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler +at the Obersalzberg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question +first, and then you can give your explanation. Are you saying that +no pressure or threats were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th +of February? Answer that “yes” or “no”, and we will go into the +explanation later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating +personality of the Führer and the arguments that he presented +made such an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to +Hitler’s proposals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s just look into that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation +at that time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with +Adolf Hitler, in which his reaction to the first conference became +very clear to me. This reaction was one of being deeply impressed by +Hitler’s personality and by the arguments which Hitler submitted to +him. Schuschnigg told me in this conversation, which was extremely +cordial, that he too—and I believe these were his words—regarded +it as a historical mission to bring the two peoples closer together.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present at the Berghof—I +don’t say in the room, but in the building or about? Were +there present Hitler, yourself, the Defendant Von Papen, the Defendant +Keitel, General Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, +I think that Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about +2 hours before lunch in the morning, isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, +they had a long conversation, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von +Schuschnigg was allowed to have a short conversation with his own +Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg +and Guido Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant +Von Papen, isn’t that right? +<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember that? Just +think again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean—then I believe I did not +understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After +a conversation that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and +Schmidt came before you and the Defendant Von Papen and they +had a conversation with you, which I will put to you in a moment. +Now, isn’t it right that you and Von Papen saw Von Schuschnigg +and Guido Schmidt?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that +is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember exhibiting +to Von Schuschnigg a typewritten draft containing the demands +made on Von Schuschnigg? Now, just think.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had +dictated a memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to +Schuschnigg. I am not sure of the details now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that +memorandum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain +my ignorance about the entire conference I would like to state that +at this time I was not at all informed about the Austrian problem +because Hitler had handled these matters personally and I had +become Foreign Minister only a few days before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, +at an occasion which you have described to him as a historic +meeting, presumably you can give the Tribunal at any rate an +outline of what the memorandum contained. What were the points +in the memorandum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember +that in detail. This meeting was one between the Führer and +Schuschnigg, and everything that was done and agreed upon there +was either dictated by the Führer himself or was suggested to the +Führer by someone else. I did not know the details. I only knew +that it was primarily a question of bringing about better relations +between Germany and Austria. Since many National Socialists had +been arrested in Austria the relations between the two countries had +been greatly troubled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, +it will bring it back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization +of the Austrian Cabinet, including: +<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry +of Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of +Nazis convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights +for Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the +Fatherland Front?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that +may be about correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague +notion and knowledge I had about Austrian affairs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg +that Hitler had informed you that these demands which you were +offering were the final demands of the Führer and that Hitler was +not prepared to discuss them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that +I told Von Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment +I do not remember.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, “You must accept +the whole of these demands?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. +I exerted no pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember +that this conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour +and a half was confined to generalities and to personal matters and +that I gained from this conversation a very favorable impression of +Schuschnigg’s personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff +later on. I put no pressure on Schuschnigg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I +am suggesting to you that at this conversation you were trying to +get Schuschnigg to sign the document containing these terms which +you agree that you may have had. I want you to remember the +answer and remind you of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Don’t you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant +Von Papen and saying, “Now, you told me that I would not +be confronted with any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden,” and +Herr Von Papen apologizing and saying, “That is so. I did not know +you were going to be confronted with these demands.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Don’t you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That cannot +be quite right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you +remember Von Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler +again and Guido Schmidt remaining with you to make some +alterations in the document which you were putting? +<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; +it is conceivable, I do not remember the details, though.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this +second conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he +must comply with these demands within 3 days?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time +today. I did not know that. I was not present at the second conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before +you say you have heard that for the first time today, because in a +moment I will show you some documents. Are you sure you did not +hear that Hitler told Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, +or Hitler would order the march into Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will +agree that that would be the heaviest military and political pressure? +There could be no other heavier pressure than suggesting a march +into Austria, could there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed +between the two countries at that time, that, of course, would have +been a pressure. But one thing must be taken for granted; and that +is, that under no circumstances would it have been possible in the +long run to find any solution between the two countries if there +were no closer contact, and from the beginning—I should like to +state this here—it was always my view that the two countries should +form some sort of close alliance, and I visualized a customs and +currency union...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve given that view about +three times. Let us come back to this interview which I am putting +back to you, that took place on the 12th of February. Don’t you +know that Schuschnigg said: “I am only the Bundeskanzler. I have +to refer to President Miklas, and I can sign this protocol only subject +to reference to President Miklas.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in +detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Hitler +opening the door and calling Keitel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed +to have happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I +heard about it here for the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don’t you? +<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for +the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Keitel’s +going in to speak to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear +about that. I do not know, I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg +signed this document on the condition that within 3 days these +demands would be fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into +Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if +the witness had the German Document Book in front of him. I +tried to get most of the pages agreeing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good +time to break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at +the Defendant Jodl’s diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it +is the Ribbentrop Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, +Document Number 1780-PS. The entry is as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In the afternoon General K.”—that is Keitel—“asks Admiral +C.”—that is Admiral Canaris—“and myself to come to his +apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the +effect that military pressure by shamming military action +should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive +maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone +for approval.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had got +hold of some rumors or gossip that were going around the Berghof. +That rumor or gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, +General Keitel, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about any +military measures, therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value +of this entry. The Führer did not inform me about any military +measures regarding Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal +you were there, that you were taking part, handling the document, +and that Hitler never said a word to you about what he was arranging +with the Defendant Keitel, who was also there? +<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next +entry for the 14th of February:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris +went to Munich to the Counterintelligence Office (Abwehrstelle +VII) and initiated the different measures. The effect was +quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that +Germany is undertaking serious military preparation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about +either these military measures or the effect on Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military +measures, but I consider it quite possible that the Führer, in order +to put more stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in +this field...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment!</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: ...and that may have contributed in the +end to the solution of the problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just +why I am putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as +Foreign Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a +foreign minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which +General Jodl was remarking, that “the effect was quick and strong.”—the +impression was “created that Germany is undertaking serious +military preparations.” Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, +that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that I did +not know anything about military measures and, if I had known, I +would not have the slightest reason not to say here that it was not +so. It is a fact, however, that in the days before and after the +conversations between the Führer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy +taking over the Foreign Office that I treated the Austrian problem, +at that time, merely as a secondary matter in foreign policy. I did +not play a leading role in the handling of the Austrian problem...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, +that you were engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was +perfectly clear—my question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that +you did not know anything about the effect in Austria—you, as +Foreign Minister of the Reich? Now answer the question. Did you +or did you not know of the effect in Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, +and I did not observe it in detail either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, that is your story and you +want that to be taken as a criterion, a touchstone of whether or not +<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span> +you are telling the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, +say that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures +taken by Keitel on the Führer’s orders? Is that your final +answer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: To that I can tell you again quite precisely, +I learned from the Führer when I went to London a little later, and +that is absolutely the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian +affair, that matters in Austria were working out more or less as +agreed upon in the conversations in Berchtesgaden. I did not make +any particular observations in detail at that time, so far as I +remember. It is possible that this or that detail slipped my memory +in the meantime, for many years have passed since then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next two entries +in Jodl’s diary:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“15 February. In the evening, an official announcement about +the positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was +issued.”</p> + +<p>“16 February. Changes in the Austrian Government and the +general political amnesty.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember my putting to you what Herr Von Schuschnigg +signed, and the condition was made that the matters would come +into effect within 3 days; within 3 days there was a conference about +the effects and the changes were announced in Austria in accordance +with the note that you had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that +that is clear, isn’t it—3 days—you still say...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Of these 3 days, as I have told you already, +I know nothing; but it was a matter of course that this meeting +would have some results in the way of appeasing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You call it “appeasing”? Is +that your considered view to the Tribunal, that assuming that the +Defendant Jodl is telling the truth or assuming that the Defendant +Keitel said that to him, as General Jodl was saying, that these +military preparations should be put in hand, isn’t that the most +severe political and military pressure that could be put on the +chancellor of another state?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: If one considers the problem from a higher +viewpoint, no; I have a different opinion. Here was a problem +which might possibly have led to war, to a European war; and I +believe, and I also said that later to Lord Halifax in London, that +it was better to solve this problem than to allow it to become a +permanent sore spot on the body of Europe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to put words in +your mouth. Do you mean by the last answer, that it was better +<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span> +that political and military pressure should be put on Schuschnigg, +so long as the problem was solved? Is that your view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not get that question. May I ask you +to repeat it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question was: Is it your view +that it was better that political and military pressure should be put +on Herr Von Schuschnigg if by that means the problem was solved?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: If by that means, a worse complication, that +is to say a war was actually avoided, I consider that was the +better way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me, why did you and +your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, at any rate, I believe +Schuschnigg—I do not know the details—must at that time have +done something which was against the State or the interests of the +State. But if you say “prison”, I know only from my own recollection +that the Führer said and emphasized several times that +Schuschnigg should be treated particularly well and decently and +that he was not in a prison but lodged in a house and also, I believe, +that his wife was with him. I cannot, however, say more on the +subject from my own experience and from my own observation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean “prison.” I will substitute +for it “Buchenwald” and “Dachau”. He was at both Buchenwald +and Dachau. Do you think he was enjoying himself there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I only heard here that Herr Schuschnigg +was in a concentration camp; I did not know before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just make a change, just try to +answer my question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg +in prison for 7 years?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything on that point. I can +only say and repeat, that, according to what I heard at that time, +he was not in prison but confined in a villa and had all the comforts +possible. That is what I heard to that time and I was glad +about it because, as I have said already, I liked him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one thing he did not +have, Witness, he did not have the opportunity of giving his account +as to what had happened at Berchtesgaden or of his side of the +Anschluss to anyone for these 7 years, did he? That is quite obvious +with all you say, that he was very comfortable at Buchenwald and +Dachau, wherever he was, but comfortable or not, he didn’t get the +chance of putting his side of the happenings to the world, did he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I could not judge. +<span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You couldn’t judge? You know +perfectly well, don’t you, that Herr Von Schuschnigg was not allowed +to publish his account of anything while he was under restraint for +these 7 years? Don’t you know that quite well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That may be assumed...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It may have been in the interests of the +State, however.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is your view of it. +We will pass to another subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in +the dealing with Czechoslovakia. Will you agree with me, that in +March of 1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you, through your ambassador +in Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten +Deutsche Party under Konrad Henlein?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am sorry but that is not correct. May I +explain...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you explain, I think you +might save time if you look at the document book on Page 20 in +your book, it is Page 31 in the English book, and listen while I refer +you to a letter from your ambassador.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Which number, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 20. It is a letter from your +ambassador in Prague to the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant’s document +book, it is the Prosecution’s book. I will see, hereafter, that +it is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant</span>]: Now, this letter from your ambassador +to the Foreign Office...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know about that letter. May I...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me refer you to Paragraph +1. I refer you also to Paragraph 3, so you need not be worried +that I shall miss it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 1:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The line of German Foreign policy, as transmitted by the +German Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and +tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My”—that is, your +ambassador—“directives are to be complied with implicitly.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 2:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly +with my approval. The editorial staff of <span class='it'>Zeit</span> is to be improved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 3:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which, +in the end, might lead to political complications, and adopts +the line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. +The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation +and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.” +(Document Number 3060-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Having read that, don’t you agree with me—what I put to you +a moment ago—that the activities of the Sudeten German Party +were to take place according to the directives?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I state an opinion on that now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like the answer to that +question first, and I am sure the Tribunal will let you make an +explanation. It is perfectly easy to answer that question “yes” or +“no”. Isn’t it right that that letter shows that the Sudeten German +Party was acting under your directives; isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to explain. This letter in itself +is a crowning proof of the fact that things were quite to the contrary. +Between the Sudeten German Party and many agencies in +the Reich, connections had been established; this was quite natural, +because there was a very strong movement among the Sudeten Germans +which was striving for closer connection with the Reich, especially +after Adolf Hitler had come to power. These tendencies were +beginning to impair the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia +and this very letter bears proof of the fact that I attempted +gradually to put these uncontrolled connections, which existed +between the Sudeten Germans and the Reich, in some way under +control.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking +you, Witness. What I put to you, and I put it to you three times, +I think, quite clearly: Does this letter show that that Party, the +Sudeten German Party, was from that time acting under your directions? +Are you still denying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I deny that emphatically. The case is +just the opposite. This letter indicates an attempt to direct the +German-Czech relations, which had become very difficult due to the +natural desire of the Sudeten Germans to establish closer relations +with the German people, into right and sensible channels, which +however, shortly after this letter, unfortunately failed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you deny what I have +put to you, what is meant when your ambassador writes to the Foreign +Office and says that the line of German policy, as transmitted +<span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span> +by the German Legation, is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics +of the Sudeten German Party? What does that mean if it +doesn’t mean what you have said—that the Party was acting under +your direction? What else can it mean if it doesn’t mean that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It means exactly what I have said, that the +legation should try to induce the leadership of the Sudeten Germans +to adopt a sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which +were existent should not lead to difficulties in German-Czech relations. +That was at that time the purport of the conversation with +the legation in Prague and that is quite clearly expressed by this +letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what this sensible +program which you were suggesting was. The next day, on the +17th of March, Konrad Henlein writes to you and suggests a personal +talk; and if you will turn over to Page 26 of the German +document book—Page 33 of the English—you will find the note of +the personal talk which you had at the Foreign Office on the +29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other +gentlemen whose names are not so well known. (Document Number +2788-PS, Exhibit Number USA-95) I only want you to look at four +sentences in that, after the first one: “The Reichsminister started +out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference, which had +been scheduled, strictly a secret.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And then you refer to the meeting that the Führer had had with +Konrad Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that +in mind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will look down the page, after the “1” and “2”, there +is a paragraph which begins “The Foreign Minister”, and the second +sentence is:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its +final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It +appears dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with promises +of the Czechoslovakian Government, which, on the one hand, +would give the impression abroad that a solution has been +found and, on the other hand, would only partially satisfy +the Sudeten Germans.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, if you will look one sentence further on, after some uncomplimentary +remarks about Beneš, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The aim of the negotiations to be carried on by the Sudeten +German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government would +finally be to avoid entry into the government”—observe the +next words—“by the extension and gradual specification of +the demands to be made.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And then you make the position of the Reich Cabinet clear: +<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Cabinet”—the next sentence but one—“itself +must refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or +towards London and Paris as the advocate”—note the next +words—“or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The policy which I suggest to you was now to direct the activities +of the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with +the Czechoslovak Government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak +Government, and the Reich Cabinet in its turn would avoid +acting as mediator in the matter; in other words, Witness, that you, +through your influence on the Sudeten Germans, were taking every +step and doing your utmost to see that no agreement could be +reached on the difficulties or the minority problem. Isn’t that right? +Isn’t that what you were telling them at that interview?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give your explanation. What +would you say these words meant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I summoned Konrad Henlein at that time, +and believe it was the only time, or perhaps I saw him once more; +unfortunately, only once or twice, in order to enjoin him, too, to +work for a peaceful development of the Sudeten German problem. +The demands of the Sudeten Germans were already far-reaching at +that time. They wanted to return to the Reich. That was more or +less tacit or was expressed. It seemed to me a solution which was +dangerous and which had to be stopped in some way or another +because otherwise it might lead to a war. Henlein finally came to +see me then, but I wish to point out in advance that it was the +only time, I believe, that I discussed the matter thoroughly with +Henlein, and soon afterwards I lost control of the matter. The +entire Sudeten German problem, that is, what is contained in this +letter and about which there can be no doubt, is:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Firstly, that I wanted to bring the efforts of the Sudeten Germans +to a peaceful development so that we could support it diplomatically +also, which seemed to me absolutely justified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And secondly, that in this way we should avoid the sudden +development of a situation which, by acts of terror or other wild +incidents, would lead to a German-Czech and European crisis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Those were at that time the reasons why I summoned Henlein.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, as to the various sentences which the Prosecutor has read, +it is clear that the Sudeten German Party had at that time very +far-reaching demands. Naturally, they wanted Adolf Hitler to send +an ultimatum to Prague saying “You must do that, and that is final,” +and that is what they would have preferred.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We did not want that, of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful +development and solution of these things. Therefore, I discussed +<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span> +with Henlein at that time the way in which the Sudeten German +Party was to proceed in order to put through their demands gradually. +The demands which I had in mind at that time were demands +for a far-reaching cultural autonomy, and possibly autonomy in +other fields too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you were thinking of cultural +and social autonomy, why were you telling these gentlemen not to +come to an agreement with the Prague Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I could not specify that now. That may +have been for tactical considerations. I assume that Konrad Henlein +made such a suggestion and that I agreed with it. Naturally I did +not know the problem too well in detail and this note must be—I +presume that what happened was that Henlein himself merely +explained his program—the details are not contained here—and +that I agreed to it more or less. Therefore, I assume that at that +time it seemed perhaps advisable to Henlein for tactical reasons not +to enter into the government and assume responsibilities at that +moment, but rather to try first to proceed with the matter in a +different way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the 29th of March, and +you have told the Tribunal a moment ago about your anxiety for +peace. You very soon knew that there wasn’t going to be any question +of relying on peaceful measures, didn’t you? Can you remember? +Just try and apply yourself to it, because you have obviously +been applying your mind to this. Can you remember when Hitler +disclosed to you that he was making the military preparations for +occupying Czechoslovakia that autumn?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler spoke very little to me about +military matters. I do not remember such a disclosure, but I know +of course that the Führer was determined to solve this problem at +a fixed time; and according to the experiences which Germany had +had in past years, it was for him a matter of course that to do +this he was obliged, I might say, to take some sort of military +measures in order to put more pressure on his demands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me help you about that. +Turn on to Page 31 of your document book. It is Page 37 of +the English Document Book. (Document Number 2360-PS, Exhibit +GB-134)</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Page 31?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 31 of your document book, +yes. It is a quotation from Hitler’s speech in January 1939, but it +happens to make clear this point. You see he says—have you got +it, Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it. +<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “On the basis of this unbearable +provocation, which was still further emphasized by +truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans +there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten German question +in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1. The order for the preparation of military steps against +this State”—that is Czechoslovakia—“to be completed by +2 October.</p> + +<p>“2. I ordered the intensive and speedy completion of our line +of fortifications in the West.” (Document Number 2360-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to remind you of that, because there was a meeting on +the 28th of May, and that is Hitler’s own account of it. Put in +another way, he said, “It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia +should disappear from the map.” And then he made clear the other +thing about the defensive front in the West.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have here, I believe, seen the document +about it. I do not recall the meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if—I think Captain Fritz +Wiedemann was still adjutant of the Führer at that time; it was +before he went abroad—he says you were there, would you deny it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that, but I believe that is an +error by Herr Wiedemann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you think you weren’t there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am inclined to believe that it is an error. +At any rate I do not remember that meeting. I could not say for +sure. Generally I was not drawn into military affairs, but in this +case I cannot say for sure. But I knew that it was common talk +that the Führer, in the course of the year 1938, became more and +more determined to assure the rights, as he put it, of the Sudeten +Germans; I knew that he had made certain military preparations +for that purpose, but I did not know in what form and to what +extent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just to put your point of view +fairly—I don’t want to put anything more into it—you knew that +military preparations were being made, but you did not know the +details of what we know now as “Fall Grün.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know any details; I never +heard about them, but I knew that during the last weeks and +months of the crisis...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to this question. I believe I +may, in order to save time, just point out that the entire Sudeten +German policy was sanctioned by the four great powers, England, +<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span> +France, Italy, and Germany, and by the Munich Agreement which +determined this policy. Therefore, I do not see that in this respect +there can be a violation of International Law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is perfectly +proper.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, at the time you knew +enough to discuss the possible course of the possible war with the +foreign personalities. Would you look on to Page 34, that is Page 40 +of the English book. These are the notes of a discussion with the +Italian Ambassador. I do not know which of your officials it took +place with, but I want you to look at where it says in a handwritten +note “only for the Reichsminister.”</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed +unmistakably to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs. +Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might +go on leave for perhaps 2 months, but certainly not later +than...” (Document Number 2800-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>If you look at the date you will see it is the 18th of July, and +2 months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. +Then if you will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed +by yourself, on the 27th of August:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Attolico paid me a visit. He had received another written +instruction from Mussolini, asking that Germany communicate +in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia. +Mussolini asked for such notification, as Attolico assured me, +in order: ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures +on the French frontier.’</p> + +<p>“Note: I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former +<span class='it'>démarche</span>, that I could not give him any date, that, however, +in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed +of any decision.” (Document Number 2792-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>So that it is quite clear, isn’t it, that you knew that the general +German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under +way but the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive +of Hitler, that it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That +was the position in July and August, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In August, 27 August, there was, of course, +already a sort of crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia about +that problem; and it is quite clear that during that time there was +some alarm as to the final outcome. And apparently, according to +this document, I said to the Italian Ambassador that in case crisis +developed into a military action, Mussolini would, of course, be +notified in advance. +<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Mussolini would be ready +to make a demonstration on the French frontier in order to help +forward your military plans; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is in this document, but I do not know +anything about it. Perhaps Attolico said that; if it says so here he +must have said it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over to about the +same time, Pages 36 to 38, Pages 41 to 43 of the English book. I do +not want to take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of +the meeting which you had with the Hungarian Ministers Imredy +and Kanya. And I should be very glad if, in the interest of time, +you would try to answer the general question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Weren’t you trying in your discussions with Imredy and Kanya +to get the Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia, should +war eventuate?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am not very familiar with the contents of +this document. May I read it first, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just read to you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I may perhaps be able to answer it from +recollection. I do not know exactly what the document says, but my +recollection is, that at that time a crisis was impending. It is quite +natural, if an armed conflict about the Sudeten German problem was +within the realm of possibility, that Germany should then establish +some sort of contact with neighboring states. That is a matter of +course, but I believe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you went a little beyond +contacting them, didn’t you? The document says at the end of the +sixth paragraph, “Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires +revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.” (Document +Number 2796-PS)</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to +the Hungarians is: “If you want the revision of your boundaries, you +have to come into the war with us.” It is quite clear, isn’t it, Witness, +that is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is exactly in line with what I just +said. I do not know if that expression was used, but, at any rate, it +is clear that at that time, I remember, I told these gentlemen that +the possibility of a conflict was present and that in such a case it +would be advisable if we reached an agreement regarding our +interests. I would like to mention that Hungary, during all the +preceding years, considered it one of the hardest conditions of the +peace treaty that these territories in the north had been separated +from her and naturally she was very much interested in the +agreement. +<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were very much interested +in offering them revision. Just look at the last two paragraphs. It is +headed “The 25th.” It should be Page 38 of your document book. It +begins—the very end of this statement:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness for participation +in case of a German-Czech conflict, Von Kanya mentioned +several days ago that his country would need a period of one +or two years in order to develop adequately the armed +strength of Hungary. During today’s conversation, Von Kanya +corrected this remark and said that Hungary’s military +situation was much better; his country would be ready, as far +as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by +1 October of this year.” (Document Number 2797-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That +your position was perfectly clear. First of all, you get the Sudeten +Germans under your control. Then you learned from Hitler that +there were military preparations. Then you get the Italians in line. +Then you get the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone +ready for aggression against Czechoslovakia. That is what I am +putting to you. I want you to be quite clear about it, to be under no +misapprehension. Now, look, what...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I answer to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, if you like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I said once before that the Sudeten German +Party was unfortunately not under my control. Moreover, it is and +was my view that it was the fundamental right of the Sudeten Germans, +according to the law of the sovereign rights of peoples which +had been proclaimed in 1919, to decide themselves where they +wanted to belong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When Adolf Hitler came, this pressure to join the Reich became +very strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, +either by diplomatic means or, if it had to be, by other means. That +was obvious, and became more so to me. At any rate, I personally +did everything to try to solve the problem diplomatically. On the +other hand, however, in order to bring about a situation such as +eventually led to Munich, I naturally tried my utmost to surround +Germany with friends in order to make our position as strong as +possible in the face of such a problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did +you not, that the Fall Grün and Hitler’s military plans envisaged the +conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. As far as the +Sudeten-German problem is concerned, the British Government +themselves concluded the agreement at Munich by which the entire +<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span> +problem was solved in the way I always strove to achieve it by +German diplomacy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue +politics with you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the +Fall Grün and Hitler’s plans on this matter had been known to His +Majesty’s Government only since the end of the war, when it came +into our possession as a captured document. What I asked you was—you +say that as the Foreign Minister of the Reich, you did not know +of these military plans, that the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia +was envisaged? You say that? You want the Tribunal to believe that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grün +and the conception of Fall Grün here for the first time in the documents. +I did not know that term before, nor was I interested. That +the Führer envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, +clear to me later in the course of the subsequent developments and +by the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to +that in a moment. I just want you to look at the final act of +preparation which you were doing, and I am suggesting for this clear +aggression; if you will look at Page 45 in the book in front of you, +you will see a note from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, +to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to +start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (Document +Number 2858-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That was your office’s further act, wasn’t it, in order to make +things difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting +your friends to induce—to use your own word—the Slovaks to start +an advance for autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office +was doing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the +Foreign Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the +contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram +because Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he +should put the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. +How that came about, I could not say in detail today. I would like +to emphasize again that Conrad Henlein’s activity—I say, unfortunately, +and I said so before—was far beyond my control. I saw +Henlein only once or twice during that entire time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you +through all the details. You understand what I’m suggesting to you, +that your office was now taking one of its last steps, because this +was in the middle of the crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to +weaken the Czech Government by inducing demands of autonomy +<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span> +from the Slovaks. You said that you were only passing on Henlein’s +wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I shall not trouble you further. +Besides, you suggested—I come on to what took place in the spring +and ask you one or two questions about that. In the spring Hitler +was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without—I was going to +say swallowing, but I want to choose my language carefully—to +obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich and to +make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look +on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in +secret code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact; to the +Embassy in Prague.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt +today, in case you should get any written communications +from President Hacha, please do not make any written or +verbal comments or take any other action but pass them on +here by ciphered telegrams. Moreover, I must ask you and +the other members of the legation to make a point of not +being available during the next few days if the Czech Government +wants to communicate with you.” (Document Number +2815-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry +out these ordinary functions and form a channel of communication +with the Czech Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember very +well. That had the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of +Czechoslovakia, Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have +been the same day, approached the envoy in Prague, saying that +President Hacha wished to speak to the Führer. I had reported that +to the Führer, and the Führer had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian +Prime Minister or the Czechoslovakian President. The +Führer said, at the same time, that he wished to conduct these +negotiations himself and that he did not wish anybody else, even the +legation, to interfere in any way. That, according to my recollection, +was the reason for this telegram. No one was to undertake anything +in Prague; whatever was done would be done by the Führer +personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending +crisis between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of +President Hacha or his desire to see the Führer can be explained as +being the result of this situation in general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to +remind you what you and the Führer were doing on that day. You +will find that if you look at Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. +<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span> +You were having a conference, you and the Führer, with Meissner +and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich and Keppler; and you were +having the conference with the Slovaks, with M. Tiso. Do you +remember that conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a +general question and perhaps without putting the details to you. +What Hitler and you were doing at that conference was saying this +to the Slovaks: “If you do not declare your independence of Prague, +we shall leave you to the tender mercies of Hungary.” Isn’t that in +a sentence a fair summary of what Hitler and you were saying at +that conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I +would like to add a further statement to that. The situation at the +time was as follows, and one has to look at it from a political point +of view: The Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted +to regain the territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and +today form a part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of +Czechoslovakia. There were, therefore, constantly great differences +between Pressburg (Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also +between Prague and Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict +could be expected at any time; at least half a dozen times we were +given to understand by the Hungarian Government that this could +not go on forever; that they must have their revision in one way or +the other. The situation was such that for quite some time very +strong movements for independence existed among the Slovaks. We +were approached on this matter quite frequently, at first by Tuka +and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the situation +was that the Führer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of the +Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later President +of the State, and told him that now, of course—I believe he told him +during this conversation—that he was not interested in the question +for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then the +Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible. +There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by +Hungary. It is, however, correct...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious +the Slovaks seemed to be for independence and what action Hitler +and yourself were taking to secure it; if you try to find it, it will +probably be at Page 67; it is at the end of a paragraph beginning, +“Now he has permitted Minister Tiso to come here...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported +as saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he +had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his +<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span> +decision. It was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at +that time that, if Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he +would support this endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand +by his words so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she +wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve +the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia +to the mercy of the events for which he was no longer responsible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to +say and you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, +Exhibit USA-117):</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the +view that in this case a decision was a question of hours and +not of days. He showed Hitler a message he had just received +which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak +frontier. The Führer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso +and expressed his hope that Slovakia would soon come to +a clear decision.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the +strongest possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve +connections with Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to +meet your pressure on Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure +was not used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary—and +my remark refers to the possibility of warlike developments with +the Hungarians—but wishes for independence had for a long time +been conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible +that, at the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because +after all it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the +Führer, which must have been obvious by then, to solve the question +of Bohemia and Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest +of the Führer to do his part to bring about the independence of +Slovakia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last +question before I come to the interview with President Hacha. +Don’t you remember that 2 days before Herr Bürckel—that is in my +recollection—Herr Bürckel and another Austrian National Socialist, +the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a number of German officers, at +about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, went into +a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the <span class='it'>soi-disant</span> Slovak +Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia? +Don’t you know that? It was reported by our consul.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that +something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it +<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span> +was. I believe that it was directed by the Führer. I had, I believe, +less to do with that. I no longer recall that exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had +better adjourn until 2.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the +interview between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, +were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler’s saying +at that interview that he had given the order for German troops to +march into Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o’clock in the morning the +German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know +that Hitler told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia +and Moravia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying +what I put to you, that he had given the order for German troops to +march into Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant +Göring, as he told the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would +order the German Air Forces to bomb Prague?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, +because at that discussion I was not...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a +detailed statement; I am asking you if you remember what I should +suppose was a rather remarkable statement, that the Defendant +Göring said to President Hacha that he would order the German Air +Force to bomb Prague if Czech resistance was not called off. Do you +remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole +interview, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will +give me a chance I shall explain how it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question +at the moment. You say you do not remember that. At any +rate, if the Defendant Göring said that he said it, would you accept +that it happened?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: If Göring says so, then it must, of course, +be true. I have merely stated that I was not present during that +conference between President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal +Göring. +<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying +that within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any more?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a +very long conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying +that at 6 o’clock the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed +to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was +said. However, I do not remember the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will +you agree with me that the most intolerable pressure was put on +President Hacha?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. +However, to that I must add that President Hacha, on his +part, had come to Berlin in order to find a solution, together with +Hitler. He was surprised that troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. +That I know, and I remember it exactly. But he agreed +to it eventually and then contacted his government and his chief of +staff, so that there would be no hostile reception for the German +troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the Czech Foreign +Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that +agreement was obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the +German Army and Air Force?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Führer told President +Hacha that the German Army would march in, that naturally, +this instrument was written under that impression. That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think you could +answer one of my question directly? I will ask it again. Will you +agree with me that that document was obtained by the most intolerable +pressure and threat of aggression? That is a simple question. +Do you agree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you +put on the head of a country except to threaten him that your army +would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would +bomb his capital?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you +not consider it war that the Army would march in with a proportion +of a division over a battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb +Prague? +<span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Führer that +he would place the fate of his country in the Führer’s hands, and +the Führer had...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. +My question is a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer +to it. You have told us that that agreement was obtained after these +threats were made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a +moment ago.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement +was obtained by threat of war. Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably +lighter than the threats under which Germany stood for years +through the Versailles Treaty and its sanctions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is +comparatively, will you now answer my question? Do you agree +that that agreement was obtained by threat of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is +under the pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about +that. However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the +Führer explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do +this, and eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his +government and his general staff and heard their opinion. However, +it is absolutely correct that the Führer was resolved to solve this +question under any circumstances. The reason was, that the Führer +was of the opinion that in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there +was a conspiracy against the German Reich; Reich Marshal Göring +had already stated that Russian commissions were said to have been +at Czech airdromes. Consequently the Führer acted as he did because +he believed that it was necessary in the highest interest and for the +protection of the German Reich. I might draw a comparison: For +instance, President Roosevelt declared an interest in the Western +Hemisphere; England has extended her interest over the entire +globe. I think, that the interest which the Führer showed in the +remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable for a +great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At +any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were +occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a +single drop of blood being shed because you had threatened to march +in overwhelming strength and to bomb Prague if they didn’t agree, +isn’t that so? +<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with +superiority, but because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans +could march in unimpeded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the +agreement was obtained, however, by your threatening to march +in and threatening to bomb Prague, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was +not so, but that the Führer had talked to President Hacha about it +and told him that he would march in. The conversation between +President Hacha and Göring is not known to me. President Hacha +signed the agreement after he had consulted his government and his +general staff in Prague by telephone. There is no doubt that the +personality of the Führer, his reasoning, and finally the announced +entry of the German troops induced President Hacha to sign the +agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember—would +you mind standing up, General, for a second? [<span class='it'>A Czechoslovakian +Army officer arose.</span>] Don’t you remember that General Ecer asked +you some questions once, this general from Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you +thought that this action on the 15th of March was contrary to the +declaration of Hitler given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler +saw in the occupation a vital necessity for Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the +first point; I will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In +the Munich Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing +like that is contained. It was not intended as a violation of that +agreement. In the second place, I think I stated that Hitler believed +he had to act that way in the interest of his country.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us +one or two general things about your views with regard to Great +Britain. Is it correct that when you went to London as Ambassador +of the Reich you thought there was very little chance of an agreement, +in fact that it was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an +understanding with Great Britain?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Führer to send me to +London personally...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am +asking you: Is it right that when you went to London as Ambassador +you thought there was very little chance of an understanding with +England, in fact, that the chance was a hundred-to-one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good. +<span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your +own words...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These +are your own words, aren’t they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? +Do you remember saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, +but I want to add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very +small; and I also told him that I would try everything to bring about +an Anglo-German understanding in spite of the odds.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did +you believe that war was inevitable? When you left England, when +you ceased being ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was +inevitable, but that, considering the developments which were taking +place in England, a possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about +this. Did you say that you didn’t think war was unavoidable when +you left England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable +nor that it was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with +the development of the policy towards Germany which was taking +place in England, an armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the +document book; English book, 170.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second +paragraph? It reads like this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister), had been more than +skeptical even on his arrival in London and had considered +the chances for an understanding as a hundred-to-one. The +warmongers’ clique in England had won the upper hand. +When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable.” +(Document Number 1834-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; +at any rate, that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is +quite possible that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in +<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span> +consultation with the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune +to express it that way. At any rate, that is not the important point; +the important thing is that as I remember, when I left England a +certainty and inevitability of war did not exist. Whether in later +years I said this or that has no bearing on what I said when I left +London. I do not think that there is the least bit of evidence for +that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the war against England and +therefore used forceful language.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said “no,” just look at +Document Number TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions +that are to be drawn. You will see it at the end under Number 5, +“Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us...” It is about the end +of the third page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“5) Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us:</p> + +<p>“1) Outwardly further understanding with England while +protecting the interest of our friends;</p> + +<p>“2) Formation, under great secrecy but with all persistence, +of a coalition against England, that is, in practice a tightening +of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over +of all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or +indirectly; close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats +of the three great powers towards this purpose.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And the last sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Every day on which—no matter what tactical interludes of +rapprochement towards us are attempted—our political considerations +are not guided fundamentally by the thought of +England as our most dangerous adversary, would be a gain +for our enemies.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not +advised the Führer that there should be outward friendly relations +and in actuality a coalition against her?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document +that is at all. May I see it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the +2d of January 1938. It is your own report to the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is +the conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an +agreement or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time +was clearly this, that England was resisting the German wishes for +a revision which the Führer had declared vital and that only +through a strong diplomatic coalition did it seem possible to induce +England, by diplomatic and not by bellicose means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what +was untrue? +<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know +whether the details have been recorded accurately. It is a long +record; I do not know where it comes from.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the +meeting, from captured German documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are +said in diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At +any rate, the truth is that when I left London there was no certainty +that the war was inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical +when I left London and did not know in what direction things +would be drifting, particularly on account of the very strong pro-war +party in England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more +slowly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, +was it not your view that the German policy should be pretended +friendliness toward England and actual formation of a coalition +against her?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was +clear to me, when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of +the German desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally +England who opposed them. I had tried for years, by order +of the Führer, to achieve these things by means of a friendly understanding +with England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my +question: Did you advise the Führer that the proper policy was +pretended friendliness with England and in actuality the formation +of a coalition against her? Did you or did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it +to agree to these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the +situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why +you told the Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler +in the sense in which I put to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding +with England and formation under great secrecy of a coalition +against her. I put that to you twice and you denied it, I want to +know why you did deny it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was +resisting the German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted +<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span> +to realize these aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends +and bring England with the help of those friends to the conference +table so that England would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic +means. That was my task at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your +attention to the relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity +of answering a question generally, and I hope in that way we +may save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches +of all German statesmen were full of the most profound affection +and respect for Poland? Do you agree with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what +is shown in the Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? +I will give you the page number, Page 107 of your document book. +I want you to look at it. I think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, +“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia...”; and +you may take it from me that the method of approach was putting +forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the return of all +Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and objectively. That +is what preceded it. I want you to look at that paragraph.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did +not hear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, “This method of +approach towards Czechoslovakia...” it begins. The fourth on +my copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, +I have it.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “This method of approach +towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended also because of +our relationship with Poland. The turning away of Germany +from the boundary question of the southeast and her change-over +to those of the east and northeast must inevitably put +the Poles on the alert. After the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian +question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will +be the next in turn; but the later this assumption becomes a +factor in international politics, the better.” (Document Number +TC-76)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign +policy at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not +know what kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared +<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span> +by some official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical +treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the +State Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. +Whether it reached me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is +possible that such thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. +That is quite possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, +would you look at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from +Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said +Reichstag; I meant Sportpalast.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the +Führer is quoted as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to +Marshal Pilsudski:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting +pacification. We realize that here are two peoples who must +live together and neither of whom can do away with the other. +A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the +sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found. It has +been found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly, +things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and +small groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the +decisive fact is that the two Governments and all reasonable +and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the +two countries possess the firm will and determination to improve +their relations. This is a real work of peace, of more +value than all of the idle talk at the League of Nations Palace +in Geneva.” (Document Number TC-73, Number 42)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the +Führer’s view at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the +questions of the treatment of minorities in Poland were very +unimportant; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were +a latent and even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and +the purpose of that particular kind of statement by the Führer was +to overcome it. I am so familiar with the problem of the minorities +in Poland because I watched it for personal reasons for many years. +From the time I took over the Foreign Ministry, there were again +and again the greatest difficulties which, however, were always +settled on our part in the most generous way. +<span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed +with me that the speeches at that time—and you say quite honestly—were +full of praise and affection for the Poles; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could +bring the German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory +and sensible solution. That had been our policy since 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after +Munich you first raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, +I think, in October, around 21 October.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had +replied on the 31st; it may have reached you a day later through +M. Lipski, suggesting the making of a bilateral agreement between +Germany and Poland, but saying the return of Danzig to the Reich +would lead to a conflict. I put it quite generally. I just wanted to +remind you of the tenor of the reply. Do you remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not +quite like that. The Führer had charged me—it was on 28 October, +to be exact—to request Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. +His order was given because the Führer in particular, perhaps as a +sequel to the speech in the Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, +wanted to bring about a clarification of the relations with all his +neighbors. He wanted that now particularly with respect to Poland. +He instructed me, therefore, to discuss with Ambassador Lipski the +question of Danzig and the question of a connection between the +Reich and East Prussia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these +wishes in a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very +reserved; he stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem +but that he would discuss the question with his government. I asked +him to do so soon and inform me of the outcome. That was the +beginning of the negotiations with Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn—I do +not want to stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter—if +you will turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck’s +conversation with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your +attention to the last paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that +the Danzig question was a very difficult problem:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this +problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite +new, some new formula, for which he used the term ‘Körperschaft,’ +which on the one hand would safeguard the interest of +the German population and on the other hand the Polish +interest. In addition the Chancellor declared that the Minister +<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span> +could be quite at ease; there would be no <span class='it'>fait accompli</span> in +Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the +situation of the Polish Government.” (Document TC-73, Number +48)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you see that, before I ask you the question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of +your own conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, +at the beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will +see that, after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, +“In answer, Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany +was not seeking any violent solution.” (Document TC-73, +Number 49). That was almost word for word what Hitler had said +the day before; do you see that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. +(Document Number C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant +Keitel’s orders to—or rather, to put it exactly—the Defendant +Keitel’s transmission of the Führer’s order with regard to Danzig. +It is dated 24 November. That was some 6 weeks before, and it is +supplementary to an order of 21 October, and you see what it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions +of 21 October, preparations are also to be made to enable +the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops +by surprise. (‘4. Occupation of Danzig’).</p> + +<p>“The preparations will be made on the following basis. The +condition is a <span class='it'>coup de main</span> occupation of Danzig, exploiting +a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.” +(Document Number C-137)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you know of these instructions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first +time that I have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add +something?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler +must have known of the order, mustn’t he? It is an order of the +Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume—that +is what I wanted to add—that the British Prosecution are aware +that political matters and military matters are in this case two +completely different conceptions. There is no doubt that the Führer, +in view of the permanent difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor, +had given military orders of some kind—just in case—and I can +<span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span> +well imagine that it is one of these orders. I see it today for the first +time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known +of the orders, Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of +January that Germany was not seeking a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span> or a violent +solution? If you had known of that order would you still have +said it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering +it an order of the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled +to do, then I would still continue to have the same opinion. I think +it is part of the General Staff’s duty to take into consideration all +possible eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final +analysis that has nothing to do with politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to +have a cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be +occupied by German troops by surprise when you are telling the +Poles that you won’t have a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span>? That is your idea of how +matters should be carried on? If it is I will leave it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the +Führer was alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest +a sudden Polish attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I +am not a military man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations +for all such problems and possibilities. But, of course, I +cannot judge the details of these orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that +Hitler was determined to attack Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action +against Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in +August 1939. That, of course, he had made certain military preparations +in advance to meet any eventuality becomes clear from this +order regarding Danzig. But I definitely did not learn about this +order, and I do not recollect now in detail whether I received at +that time any military communication. I do remember that I knew +virtually nothing about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that +you did not know in May that Hitler’s real view was that Danzig +was not the subject of the dispute at all, but that his real object was +the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The +Führer talked sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did +not know that he had the intention to attack Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, +or it may be 118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the +<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span> +minutes of the conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new +Reich Chancellery.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. I want you to look at it. It +may be on Page 118, and it begins with the following words:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a question +of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of securing our +food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food +supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. +Added to the natural fertility, the German, through cultivation, +will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other +possibility for Europe.” (Document Number L-79)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that +view to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should +like to say first that it looks as though I was not present during this +conference. That was a military conference, and the Führer used +to hold these military conferences quite separately from the political +conferences. The Führer did now and then mention that we had to +have Lebensraum; but I knew nothing, and he never told me anything +at that time, that is in May 1939, of an intention to attack +Poland. Yes, I think this was kept back deliberately, as had been +done in other cases, because he always wanted his diplomats to stand +wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution and to bring it about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler +was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that +Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted +was Lebensraum; is that your story?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately +because...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very +short paragraph a little further on where he says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with +no alternative but to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. +We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. +There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign +Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do +you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just +read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing +Poland, that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and +<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span> +your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that +Hitler never mentioned that to his Foreign Minister, who would +have the practical conduct of foreign policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, +according to my recollection, only much later, in the summer of +1939. At that time he did say that he was resolved—and he said +literally—to solve the problem one way or another.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn’t +know in May that Hitler wanted war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know in May that +Hitler wanted war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document +that he did want war, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention +of an action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used +strong language to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he +had the firm intention of attacking a certain country in some way, +but whether he actually would have carried it out later politically is +an entirely different question. I know that he repeatedly told me +that one had to talk with military men as if war was about to break +out here or there on the next day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about +another point. You said on Friday that you had never expressed the +view that Great Britain would stay out of war and would fail to +honor her guarantee to Poland. Do you remember saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you +to look at one or two other documents. Do you remember on the +29th of April 1939 receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the +Foreign Minister at 3:30 in the afternoon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of +your meeting signed by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say +this to the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm conviction +that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French +or English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with +Poland were gloomy at the moment.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider +that impossible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you got a copy...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. +This will become Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail +what I said at that time, but it may be possible that there was an +effort at that time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably +concerned about the Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But +I hardly believe that I said anything like this. However, it is certain +that the Führer knew, and I had told the Führer that England would +march to the aid of Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful +would you look at Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit +GB-290. Apparently you saw these gentlemen again 2 days later. +Just look at the last sentence of that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) pointed out again that Poland +presented no military problem for us. In case of a military +clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is quite straight speaking, isn’t it, “The British would coldly +leave the Poles in the lurch”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the +report of the 1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is +signed by a gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above +his signature. The words I am asking you about are, “In case of a +military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, +if I may ask?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It +begins:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude +towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish +attitude had aroused great bitterness.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said something +like that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to +alarm the Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear +that that is nothing but diplomatic talk. +<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think there is any +requirement to tell the truth in a political conversation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to +bring about a situation which made it possible to solve this and the +Polish question in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians +today, and this applies to the Italians also, that England would assist +Poland and that a great war would result, then this would create a +diplomatic situation which would make it impossible to solve the +problem at all. There is no doubt that during the entire time I had +to use very strong language, just as the Führer had always ordered, +for if his own Foreign Minister had hinted at other possibilities, it +would naturally have been very difficult, and I venture to say, it +would have meant that this would, in any case, have led to war. But +we wanted to create a strong German position so that we could solve +this problem peacefully. I may add that the Hungarians were somewhat +worried with regard to the German policy, and that the Führer +had told me from the start to use particularly clear and strong +language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also quite +frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you +were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to +this Tribunal. That is what it comes to shortly, isn’t it? That is +what you want us to understand—that you were telling lies to the +Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is +what you want us to understand isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies +in this case, Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and +if we wanted to create a strong position, then of course we could +not go beating about the bush. Consider what the impression would +have been if the German Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the +slightest German step the whole world would attack Germany! The +Führer used frequently such strong language and expected me to do +the same. I want to emphasize again that often I had to use such +language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that there was no misunderstanding. +If the Führer was determined on the solution of a +problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the risk of war +if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a firm stand, +for had we failed to do that, war would have been inevitable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have +in mind what Count Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the +11th or 12th of August, just before your meeting at, I think it was +at Salzburg, with you and Hitler. You remember that according to +Count Ciano’s diary he said that he asked you, “What do you want, +the Corridor or Danzig?” and that you looked at him and said, “Not +any more; we want war.” Do you remember that? +<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count +Ciano at that time, this is on the same line, “the Führer is determined +to solve the Polish problem one way or another.” This was +what the Führer had instructed me to say. That I am supposed to +have said “we want war” is absurd for the simple reason that, it is +clear to every diplomat, those things are just not said, not even to +the very best and most trusted ally, but most certainly not to Count +Ciano.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at +a report of the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini +and Count Ciano not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that +is, about 9 months later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, +which will become Exhibit GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think +it is Page 18 or 19...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation +between you and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March +1940. It begins by saying:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister recalled that he actually had +stated in Salzburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that +England and France would assist Poland without further +questions, but that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility +of intervention by the Western Powers. He was glad +now about the course of events, because, first of all, it had +always been clear that the clash would have to come sooner +or later and that it was inevitable.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish +the conflict in the lifetime of the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is +that it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you +are these words:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He was glad now about the course of events, because, first of +all, it had always been clear that the clash would have to +come sooner or later and that it was inevitable.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And if you will look at where it says “secondly”...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting +to you is that that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, +and that you were very glad that the war had come, because you +thought this was an appropriate time for it to happen. +<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says +here also “that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of +intervention by the Western Powers.” It says so here quite clearly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I +am putting to you. I pass from that point about British intervention. +I say, “he was glad now about the course of events,” and if you will +look down at the paragraph where it says “secondly,” so that you +will have it in mind, the third line says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general +conscription it was clear that the ratio of war strength would +not develop in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The +word “secondly” is underlined, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Secondly, at the moment when +England introduced general conscription...” It is about 10 lines +further on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try +to prove with that; I do not quite understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next +sentence before you answer my question.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This, along with the other things, was decisive for the +Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question, even under the +danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The deciding +fact was, however, that a great power could not take certain +things lying down.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>What I am saying...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the +time and the view that you declared afterwards as being your view, +that you were determined that you would solve the Polish question +even if it meant war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying +that you wanted war. That is what I am putting to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano +at the time at Berchtesgaden that the Führer was determined to +solve the problem one way or another. It was necessary to put it in +that way because the Führer was convinced that whatever became +known to Rome would go to London and Paris at once. He wanted +therefore to have clear language used so that Italy would be on our +side diplomatically. If the Führer or myself had said that the Führer +was not so determined to solve that problem, then it would have +<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span> +been without doubt passed on immediately. But since the Führer +was determined to solve the problem, if necessary by war if it could +not be solved any other way, this would have meant war, which +explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had to adopt +at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is +contradictory to what is being said here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last +week in August and take that again very shortly, because there is +a lot of ground to cover.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the +Führer called off the attack which was designed for the morning of +the 26th. You remember that? I just want you to have the dates +in mind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day +Dahlerus gave his evidence, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the +date, that on the evening of the 24th the Defendant Göring asked +Herr Dahlerus to go to London the next morning to carry forward +a preliminary outline of what the Führer was going to say to Sir +Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you remember that was his +evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I +suppose they are correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, +and the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving +them as I have looked them up. That was the night of the 24th; +Dahlerus left on the morning of the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the +25th—you said about noon, I am not quarreling with you for a +matter of minutes—midday on the 25th the Führer saw Sir Nevile +Henderson...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a +<span class='it'>note verbale</span>, that is, an inquiry in general terms.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At +noon he had only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister +Schmidt take the <span class='it'>note verbale</span> to him, I think that is the way it was, +with a special message in which I asked him again to impress upon +his Government how serious the Führer was about this message or +offer. I think that is contained in the <span class='it'>British Blue Book</span>. +<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the +actual note, Herr Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation +which he had with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the +attack on the morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done +until you had had the message from Signor Mussolini at about +3 o’clock, and the news that the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was +going to be signed that evening about 4 o’clock. That is what you +have said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the +time that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when +the words were spoken by the Führer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it +was the German intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and +what I suggest is that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the +words which were spoken to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply +designed in order to trouble the British Government, in the hope +that it might have some effect on them withdrawing from their aid +to Poland; isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with +the message of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding +the meeting between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say +that I read the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler +in the morning, I think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had +arrived at a sort of deadlock. I talked to the Führer afterwards, +about whether or not another attempt should be made in order to +arrive at some kind of a solution with England. Subsequently, +towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2 o’clock, the Führer met Sir +Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him he should take a +plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British Government +as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem he +intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He +gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the <span class='it'>note +verbale</span>; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson +flew to London. While the Führer was having that conversation, +military measures were under way. I learned of that during the +day, because Mussolini’s refusal had arrived, I believe, not at +3 o’clock, but earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then +at 4 or 5 in the afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British +agreement. I went to the Führer immediately and suggested +to him to withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short +deliberation. There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military +<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span> +measures had been taken. Just how far they went I regret not +to be able to say. But when the Führer sent that offer, that <span class='it'>note +verbale</span> to England I was convinced and under the impression that +if England would respond to it in some way, it would not come to +an armed conflict, and that in this case the military measures which, +I believe, were automatically put in effect, would somehow have +been stopped later on. But I cannot say anything about that in detail. +I recollect only one thing, and that is that when I received the <span class='it'>note +verbale</span> from the Führer, which I think was in the afternoon or in +the evening, these measures had already either been stopped or +were, at any rate, in the process of being stopped. I cannot give it +to you in chronological order at the moment. For that I have to have +the pertinent documents which, unfortunately, are not at my disposal +here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the Führer to England +was made in order to try once again to come to a solution of the +Polish problem. When I saw the <span class='it'>note verbale</span> I even asked him, +“How about the Polish solution?” and I still recollect that he said, +“We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond to +it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been +stopped when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly +after.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at +the meeting of the Führer and his generals on the 22d of August, +but you must have heard many times the account of it read out +since this Trial started. You remember the Führer is reported, +according to minutes, to have said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I shall use propagandistic reasons for starting the war; never +mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be +asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting +and making the war, not the right is what matters but victory.” +(Document Number 1014-PS).</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said +anything like that to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking +you is, has Hitler said anything similar to that to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not +present; I think I was on my way to Moscow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That +is why I put it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to +you? You say “no.” Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that? +<span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not +said it to you, I am not going to pursue it, because we must not +waste too much time on each of these details. I want you to come +to the 29th of August when you saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and +while accepting, with some reservations, the idea of direct negotiation +with Poland, you said that it must be a condition of that +negotiation that the Poles should send a plenipotentiary by the next +day, by the 30th. You remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, +but I do want to keep it short on this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say “no”. May I make +a statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only +preliminary. I thought it was common ground that you saw Sir +Nevile on the 29th, that you put a number of terms. One of the +terms was that a Polish plenipotentiary should be present by the +30th. If you don’t agree with that, please tell me if I am wrong, +because it is my recollection of all documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told +us that your reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile +was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And +I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary +had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a +copy of the terms. That’s right, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were +given, that were read out by you, were not ready on the 29th, +because in your communication demanding a plenipotentiary you +said if he came on the 30th you would have the terms ready by that +time. So may I take it that these terms were drawn up by Hitler +with the help of the Foreign Office between the 29th and the 30th?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there +were 16 points, if I remember rightly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after +the treatment of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles +would be willing to send a fly into the spider’s parlor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for +it. I think that a hint from the British Government would have +sufficed to bring that envoy to Berlin. +<span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And what you hoped was to put +the Poles in this dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a +propagandistic cause for the war, to use Hitler’s phrase—or else you +would be able, by putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to +do exactly what you had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and +Hacha, and get a surrender from the Poles. Wasn’t that what was +in your mind?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, +that on the 29th the Führer told the British Ambassador that he +would draft these conditions or this agreement and by the time of +the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also +available to the British Government—or he hoped that this would +be possible, I think that is what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took +note of that, and I must repeat that the Führer, after the British +reply had been received on the 28th, once more, and in spite of the +extremely tense situation between Poland and Germany, agreed to +that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in these crucial days of +the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following: The Führer had drafted +these conditions, England knew that the possibility of arriving at a +solution existed. All during the 30th of August we heard nothing +from England, at least nothing definite. Only at midnight, I think, +did the British Ambassador report for this discussion. In the meantime, +I must mention that at 7 o’clock in the evening news of the +general mobilization in Poland had been received, which excited the +Führer extremely. Through that, the situation had become extraordinarily +acute. I still remember exactly the situation at the Chancellery +where almost hourly reports were received about incidents, +streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere heavily +charged with electricity. The Führer waited all through the 30th; +no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that conversation +took place. The course of that conversation has already +been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter +Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had +read the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that +England perhaps might do something yet. The Führer had told Sir +Nevile Henderson that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on +equal terms. Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting +somewhere at an appointed place, or, that someone would come to +Berlin, or that the Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the +necessary authority. Those were the possibilities. I would even like +to go further. It was merely necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, +until late that night, or the next morning when the march began, +for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to have authority at least to +receive in his hands the German proposals. Had this been done, the +diplomatic negotiations would in any case have been under way and +thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for the time being. +<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have +been no objections. I believe the Führer would have welcomed, if +the British Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, +I have also mentioned this here before, was called +reasonable by Sir Nevile Henderson personally. One hint from +the British Government during the 30th or 31st, and negotiations +would have been in course on the basis of these reasonable proposals +of the Führer, termed reasonable even by the British themselves. +It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles, and I believe +that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which were +absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, +which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution, +perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that +they think that your answers and your explanations are too long, +too argumentative, and too repetitive, and they are upon matters +which have been gone over and over again before the Tribunal, +so they would therefore ask you to try to keep your answers as +short as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, +Witness, on Friday, that you didn’t know about the connection +between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring +and summer of 1939? It was well before the war, in the spring +and summer, before June of 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg +had friends in Norway and that the name of Quisling was +mentioned, but this name meant nothing to me at that time. On +the request of the Führer, at that time I gave Rosenberg certain +amounts of money for his friends in Norway, for newspapers, +propaganda, and similar purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know, as I understand +your testimony, that some of Quisling’s men had been in +a schooling camp in Germany in August of 1939, before the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of +it here through a document. But I do not recall having known +anything about it. At any rate, if I knew anything about it, I +did not know any of the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans +living in Norway had been used to enlarge and extend the +<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span> +staff of the various German official agencies, the legation and the +consulates, soon after the beginning of the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, +at all. At that time I probably never did learn correctly about +that, if that was the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the quotation from the +<span class='it'>Yearbook of the NSDAP</span>. All I want to know at the moment is +whether or not you knew about that. If you say you did not...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing +about it, I’m afraid...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in +December 1939, that Quisling had two interviews with Hitler +on the 16th and 18th of December?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was +the date, may I ask?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, +through the Defendant Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, +according to my recollection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first +matter that you knew about in regard to Norway was, first, +when you got the letter from Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from +Keitel. I believe this is a misunderstanding.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a +mistake of mine. I am sorry. Do you remember a letter from +Keitel, where he says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been, +by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High +Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the +Wehrmacht had therefore ample time to deal with all +questions connected with the carrying out of this operation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>So really, Witness—I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter—you +are really not a very good person to ask about the earlier +preparations with regard to Norway, because you weren’t in on +these earlier discussions with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. +Is that right? If so, I will leave the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. +But I should like to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this +letter—why, I do not know—only some days later. The first intimation +of the intention to occupy Norway, due to the anticipated +landing of the British, I received about 36 hours ahead of time +<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span> +from the Führer. The letter was probably longer under way +than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, +because there is a good deal to cover, and I will take you straight +to the question of the Low Countries. You have heard me read, +and probably other people read, more than once, the statement +of Hitler’s on the 22d of August 1939:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and +Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as +well as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available +means. England and France will not violate the neutrality +of these countries.” (Document Number 798-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren’t +there, and I ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very +early date, on the 7th of October 1939, an army group order was +given that Army Group B is to make all preparations, according +to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian +territory if the political situation so demands. Did you know of +that order on the 7th of October?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did +not know it before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the +9th of October Hitler issued a directive:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“A longer delay would not only result in the abandonment +of Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality in favor +of the Western Powers, but would also serve to strengthen +the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, +and would lessen the confidence of neutral states in final +German victory. Preparations should be made for offensive +action on the northern flank of the Western Front, crossing +the area of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack +must be carried out as soon and as forcibly as possible.” +(Document Number C-62)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of +October?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were +concerned you are telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, +the many assurances, in August and October, without telling his +Foreign Minister that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given +the directive for the attack on the Low Countries, that he did not +<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span> +tell you about his order or his directive for his attack on the Low +Countries? Are you sure of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should +recall it. I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an +offensive should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, +had occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the +state of your knowledge, we will pass on to something about which +you did know a little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of +Hitler and yourself with Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of +August 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, +about it, here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just +to look at that document, and it is on Page 181. I want you to +follow while I read one passage, which should be about 182. It +is on my second page and it is a paragraph which begins, “As +Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of +conflict...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that “As +Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on +my Page 2. It may be further on in yours.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. “As Poland makes it +clear...” It is two paragraphs on from a single line that says +at the point “Count Ciano showed signs of...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have found it, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next +sentence: “Generally speaking...” This is the next sentence but one:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals +one after the other. This could be done fairly easily +if one Axis partner protected the rear of the other, who was +just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and <span class='it'>vice +versa</span>. For Italy, Yugoslavia was to be considered such an +uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, +(the Führer) had suggested, particularly in consideration of +Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards +the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection +<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span> +with the Axis, and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of +Nations. Prince Paul had agreed to the latter. Recently the +Prince Regent had been in London and sought reassurance +of the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that +had happened in the case of Gafencu, who had also been very +reasonable during his visit to Germany, and had denied +any interest in the aims of the Western democracies.” (Document +Number 1871-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that was Hitler’s formulation of his policy, and may I take +it that that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, +to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include +among these pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that +way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation +was this at that time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to +keep Italy on our side. Italy was always a very unreliable partner. +For that reason the Führer spoke at that time in a way designed +to tell Italy, so to speak, that, if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, +he would support Italy. It can be understood only from +the situation which was this: Germany, with Italy’s assistance, +had already peacefully carried out some of her revisions in Europe, +except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which Mussolini supported +Hitler. I remember the situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. +But it is not an explanation of the words I put to you which is +the important thing. “It would be best to liquidate uncertain +neutrals one after the other.” Are you denying that that was your +policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken +so literally, for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is +different in other countries—many things are said sometimes...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s +view, hadn’t it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest +possible opportunity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document +2818-PS. My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember +this is the secret additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance +Pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and +appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of +May 1939. Do you see? +<span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: What page?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look +at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini +begin? Under the Pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number 1 says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The war between the plutocratic and, therefore, selfishly +conservative nations and the densely populated and poor +nations is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this +situation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is +hoping that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what +should happen if the war comes; he says that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war +of exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst +premise, which contains 100 percent probability. The Axis will +get nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption +is hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis +diminish considerably the vicissitude and the danger of a war +of exhaustion. For this purpose one must take the whole +Danube and Balkan area immediately after the very first +hours of the war. One will not be satisfied with declarations +of neutrality but must occupy the territories and use them for +the procurement of necessary food and industrial war supplies.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Do you see that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you agree that it was +Mussolini’s view that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest +possible moment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I +see here for the first time. I did not know them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the +remarks of Hitler which you have seen considerably more than once. +You remember, after the Simovic <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> on the 26th of March, +there was a meeting, a conference with Hitler, where he announced +his policy:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible +loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations +in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a +state. With regard to foreign policy neither will diplomatic +inquiries be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of +the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted in any +case in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will +<span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span> +start as soon as the means and troops available for it are +ready.” (Document Number 1746-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember Hitler’s saying that on the 27th of March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps +see the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember it? It has +been read many times in this court, Hitler’s statement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual +words, but in general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that was the +sense of it, and I read his words. Now, that was the policy...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by “the +sense of it.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’ll put it to you now. What +I mean is this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without +asking them for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any +kind. You decided to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. +Isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to +be permitted to explain the actual state of the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of +these points which I have specifically read and mentioned to you. +“No diplomatic inquiries will be made.” Why did you decide, or +why did Hitler decide, and you help, to attack Yugoslavia without +making any diplomatic inquiries, without giving the new government +any chance to give you assurances? Why did you do it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Because the new government had been +formed mainly by England, as one of the British interrogation +officers himself, in the course of the preliminary hearings, admitted +to me. Therefore it was perfectly clear to the Führer, when the +Simovic Putsch was carried out, that the enemies of Germany at +that time stood behind Simovic’s government and that it mobilized +the army—this information had been received—in order to attack +the Italian army from the rear. It was not my policy, for I was +called into the conference of which you are speaking only later, I +believe, and at that time Hitler categorically announced his position +without being contradicted by anyone. I ask you to question the +military men about that. I was present, and had a serious encounter +with the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it right to attack +this country without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, +to cause military destruction, to use Hitler’s words, “with unmerciful +harshness” and to destroy the capital of Belgrade by waves of +<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span> +bomber attacks? Did you think that was right? I ask you a simple +question: Did you think it was right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot answer this question either with +“yes” or “no,” as you want it, without giving an explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you need not answer it. +If you cannot answer that question “yes” or “no,” you need not +answer it at all. And you come on to the next point, which is +the question of Russia. Now, as far as I could understand your +statement, you said that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet +Union after Mr. Molotov’s visit to Berlin on, I think, the 12th of +November of 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not say that, because I did not +know it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as I understood it, one of +the reasons which you were giving as a justification for the attack +on the Soviet Union was what was said by Mr. Molotov during his +visit of November 1940. Isn’t that what you said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was one of the reasons that caused +the Führer concern. I did not know anything about an attack at +that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the Defendant +Jodl says that even during the Western campaign, that is, May and +June 1940, Hitler had told him that he had made a fundamental +decision to take steps against this danger, that is, the Soviet Union, +“the moment our military position made it at all possible.” Did you +know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I learned that first now here in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Document L-172, USA-34, +Jodl’s lecture. And did you know that on the 14th of August +1940 General Thoma was informed during a conference with Göring +that the Führer desired punctual deliveries to the Russians only +until the spring of 1941; that “later on we would have no further +interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.” Did you +know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that in +November of 1940, General Thoma and State Secretaries Körner, +Neumann, Becker, and General Von Hannecken were informed by +Göring of the action planned in the East? Did you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know now, don’t you, that +a long time before any of the matters raised in Molotov’s visit +<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span> +came up for discussion, Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet +Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that at all. I knew +that Hitler had apprehensions but I knew nothing about an attack. +I was not informed about military preparations, because these +matters were always dealt with separately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even on 18 December, when +Hitler issued the directive Number 21 on “Barbarossa,” he told +you nothing about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, because just in December, as I happen +to remember exactly, I had another long talk with the Führer in +order to obtain his consent to win the Soviet Union as a partner to +the Three-Power Pact, and to make it a four-power pact. Hitler +was not altogether enthusiastic about this idea, as I noticed; but +he told me, “We have already made this and that together; perhaps +we will succeed with this too.” These were his words. That was +in December. I believe there is also an affidavit about that from +a witness, which the Defense is going to present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you understand what you +are saying? This is after the Defendant Göring had announced it +to General Thoma and these under-secretaries, after the directive +had actually gone out for Barbarossa, that Hitler let you suggest +that you should try to get the Soviet Union to join the Tripartite +Pact, without ever telling you that he had his orders out for +the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you really expect anyone to +believe that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was, do you really +expect anyone to believe that after it had been announced time +and again that the Reich was going to attack the Soviet Union, +and after the actual directive had gone out for the attack, that +Hitler let you tell him that you were thinking of asking them to +join the Tripartite Pact? Is that your evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is exactly the way it was. I suggested +this to Hitler again in December, and received his consent +for further negotiations. I knew nothing in December of an aggressive +war against the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it was quite clear that, +as far as your department was concerned, you were getting the +most favorable reports about the Soviet Union and about the +unlikeliness of the Soviet Union making any incursion into political +affairs inimical to Germany? Is that right, so far as your reports +from your own ambassador and your own people in Russia were +concerned? +<span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Reports of this sort came from the embassy +in Moscow. I submitted them repeatedly, or rather always, to the +Führer but his answer was that the diplomats and military attachés +in Moscow were the worst informed men in the world. That was +his answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was your honest view, +based on your own information, that there was no danger from +Russia, that Russia was keeping honestly to the agreement that +she had made with you. That was your honest view, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. I said those were +the reports from the diplomats, which we received from Moscow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you believe them? Didn’t +you believe your own staff yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was very skeptical myself as to whether +these reports were reliable, because the Führer, who received +reports, had reports of an altogether different nature and the +political attitude also pointed in a different direction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, in the spring of +1941, your office joined in the preparations for the attack on the +Soviet Union, did it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know precisely when, but in the +spring things came to a head and there must have been conferences +between some offices that dealt with the possibility of a conflict +with the Soviet Union. However, I do not recall details about +that any more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Again, I do not want +to occupy too much time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in +April of 1941 you were co-operating with Rosenberg’s office in +preparing for the taking over of Eastern territories, and, on the 18th +of May, you issued a memorandum with regard to the preparation +of the naval campaign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: So far as the preparations with Rosenberg +are concerned, that is in error. I spoke, according to my recollection, +about this matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. +So far as that Navy memorandum is concerned, I saw that document +here; I had not known of it previously. I believe it is an expert +opinion on international law about matters which might arise in +connection with a war in the Baltic Sea. Such expert opinion was +doubtless submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It says, “The Foreign Office has +prepared, for use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration +of operational zones.” Don’t you remember anything about that? +<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that did not reach me at +all at that time. That was acted upon by another office. Of course +I am responsible for everything that happens in my ministry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Ambassador Ritter the +liaison officer between your office and the Wehrmacht?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, again, I want you to help +me about one or two other matters. You have told us that you +negotiated the Anti-Comintern Pact back in 1936; and, of course, +at that time the Anti-Comintern Pact—and I think you said so +yourself—was directed against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it was more an ideological pact, +which, of course, had certain political implications. That is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was extended by the +Tripartite Pact of the 27th of September 1940? That was an extension +of the first pact, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It had in itself nothing to do with the +first pact, because this one was a purely political, economic, and +military pact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the fact is—and I +think I can take this quite shortly—that you were urging Japan +to enter the war quite early in March of 1941, weren’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack +on England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, +because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war +with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in +the Japanese. That is your point, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other +than what other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of +Great Britain have done in America, and later in Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points +to you on that actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, +didn’t it, that if Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility +that the United States might be brought in very shortly after? +And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan +produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United +States, you would be prepared to fight the United States too. That +is right isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did +everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America +out of the war. I believe also that that is proved by many documents +that I have seen here for the first time. +<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I +would like you to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page +204 of the English document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it +here already.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before +Pearl Harbor, on the 29th of November; and according to the +Japanese Ambassador, you are saying this to him—if you look at +Paragraph 1:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order +in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never +has been, and probably never will be, a time when closer +co-operation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If +Japan hesitates at this time and Germany goes ahead and +establishes her European New Order, all the military might +of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against +Japan. As the Führer Hitler said today, there are fundamental +differences in the very right to exist between Germany and +Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to +the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United +States negotiations being concluded successfully, +because of the fact that the United States is putting up a +stiff front.</p> + +<p>“ ‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a +decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident +that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and +Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for +Japan herself.’ ” (Document D-656)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you still say, in view of that document and that statement +that you made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying +to prevent war with the United States? I suggest to you that you +were doing everything to encourage Japan to go to war with the +United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; +that is not true. I do not know this document, nor do +I know where it comes from. At any rate, under no circumstances +did I express it that way; and I regret that all the other documents +which prove that I tried again and again to keep the United +States out of the war, have not yet been read here. I have seen +this document here and I have been pondering all the time as +to how this passage would have gotten into the document. All +the other documents, I believe a dozen or a dozen and a half, +which have been presented here prove clearly my wish to keep +America out of the war. I can prove that for years I had made +<span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span> +efforts in all fields, despite the intransigent attitude of the United +States, not to undertake anything against America. I can explain +this only as follows: The Japanese Ambassador earnestly desired +that his country should take some action and I know he sent +many telegrams to Tokio in order to get Japan to participate +in the war, particularly against Singapore. I can only presume +that this is perhaps, if I may say so, an incorrect interpretation +of this conference. I ask you to give the Defense an opportunity +to submit all the other documents up to this date, which will +prove the exact opposite of what is laid down in this one paragraph.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is the official report +to the Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he +is wrong when he says that you told him—he gives your exact +words—that you were comforted that it would not only be in the +interest of Germany and Japan jointly but would bring about +favorable results for Japan herself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, just look at the next document, if you deny that one, on +Page 356. This is another report of the Japanese Ambassador and +he said, the day after Pearl Harbor:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At 1 o’clock... I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and +told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue +formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop +replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at +general headquarters, discussing how the formalities of +declaring war could be carried out, so as to make a good +impression on the German people, and that he would transmit +your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to +have it carried out properly.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Now, look at the last three lines:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the +8th, Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack +American ships whenever and wherever they might meet +them.” (Document Number D-657)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That was 3 days before the declaration of war. You say that +that report of the Japanese Ambassador is also wrong?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that it is an error.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is wrong about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe it is an error. That was after +the attack on Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Exactly, the day after Pearl +Harbor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was an order of Adolf Hitler’s to +attack America who, as everyone knows, had been attacking our +ships for months. This is an altogether different affair. +<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you say “attacking German +ships,” do you mean defending themselves against German submarines?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, so far as I know, some months earlier, +I cannot tell you the exact date; but it was a long time before +Pearl Harbor, we had delivered an official protest to the United +States, in which we pointed out, in the case of the two ships +<span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kerne</span>, that these two boats had pursued German submarines +and had thrown depth charges at them. I believe the +Secretary of the Navy Knox admitted this openly in a press conference. +I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech in +Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American +vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you +is this: Did you approve of the policy of ordering the entire German +Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they +might meet them 3 days before war was declared? Did you approve +of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that now, +because I do not remember it and do not even know the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about +another point. Do you remember that the...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It would have been understandable, that I +must add.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given your answer. +Do you remember, in June 1944, that there was a conference about +which we have heard evidence, regarding the shooting of what is +known as “terror-fliers”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, just listen to this question and try to answer it directly, +if you would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you +wished to include among terror-fliers every type of terror attack +on the German civilian population, that is, including bombing +attacks on cities? Is it right that you wished to include the airmen +engaged in attacks on German cities as terror-fliers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not true like that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at Page 391. This +is a report signed by General Warlimont on the conference on +the 6th of June, and in the fourth line—well, let me read it. +It says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief +of the Operations Staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the +6th that a conference on this question had been held shortly +before, between the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign +<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span> +Minister, and Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion +made by Ribbentrop, who wished to include every +type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that +is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed at the above +conference that only attacks carried out with aircraft armament +should be considered as criminal actions in that sense.” +(Document Number 135-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said that +you wished to include every type of attack?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yesterday I answered this question at +length. I do not know whether I should refer to this point again. +I dealt with this point, I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, +I can repeat it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I do not want you to +repeat it. I want you to answer my question. Do you say that +Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said at this conference that you +wished to include those who were engaged in bombing of cities?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is not so. First of all, so far as I +remember, this conference never took place; and, secondly, I stated +my attitude perfectly clearly yesterday, how I wished to treat +terror-fliers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, answer my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true as you have stated it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Then answer this question. +Did you approve that those you called “terror-fliers” were to be left +to be lynched by the population or handed over to the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not my attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look on +Page 393, Page 214 of the English? This, as you know, is a memorandum +from the Foreign Office; and it is stated on Page 396 +that General Warlimont states that Ambassador Ritter has advised +us by telephone that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved +this draft (Document 740-PS). The draft deals with the two actions +in Paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the draft says, “The German +authorities are not directly responsible, since death occurred before +a German official intervened” (Document 728-PS).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching +of fliers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not my view. I explained that +yesterday quite exhaustively and stated what my attitude was +toward this document. This document is an expert opinion of the +Foreign Office, which was submitted to me. I do not know how +it originated, upon my order or upon a statement of the military +<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span> +authorities. I did not approve this expert opinion as it is submitted +to me here, but I did send it to the Führer and asked him +to decide about it. The Führer then called this document “nonsense,” +I believe, and therewith this expert opinion of the Foreign +Office was rejected and did not come into effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, +you say that when Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised +the Wehrmacht by telephone on 29 June that you approved the +draft, that either Warlimont is not speaking the truth or Ritter +is not speaking the truth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can +be seen from another document which I have also seen here that +this document was sent to the Führer and that I said there that +the Führer must approve it. I did see also another document regarding +it. That is also my recollection of the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to +the Führer’s view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have +a look at Document 3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an +account of a meeting that you and Hitler had with Oshima on +the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12. Do you +remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima that the +Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot, that +the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did +you agree with that view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that +is in this document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said +here is in the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, +Lines 9 to 12.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only +say that this attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was +brought about by the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked +you whether you agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now +to deal with another point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, +regarding this point because it is of decisive importance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned +Counsel after you have answered my question on this. I want you +now to direct your attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have +heard me asking a number of witnesses a certain number of +<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span> +questions about it. These were the 50 British airmen who were +murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you know that? Do +you know what I am talking about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, +Mr. Eden, made a strong statement in the House of Commons, +saying that these men had been murdered and that Great +Britain would exact justice upon the murderers? Do you remember +that, in June of 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made +by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that +the Reich Government issued a statement saying that, in a communication +by the Reich Government conveyed to the British via +Switzerland, this unqualifiable charge of the British Foreign Minister +had been sharply refuted, that being issued in July 1944? Do you +remember that being issued?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember +only the following: That at that time we received evidence of what +had happened and that it was communicated to us in a note from +the protecting powers. That is all I know about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask +you: Did you know at the time that this statement was issued—did +you know that these officers had been murdered in cold blood?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men +had been shot while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, +we did have the impression that everything was not in order, +I know that. I remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. +Who told you the lie that these men had been shot trying to +escape? Who informed you of that lie?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time +we received the documentation from the competent authorities +and a memorandum was forwarded to the Swiss Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your +documentation which contained that lie? Did you get it from +Himmler or Göring?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that +you had a good idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to +tell us a word about your connection with the SS. You are not +suggesting, are you, at this stage that you were merely an honorary +member of the SS? It has been suggested by your counsel, and I am +sure it must have been on some misunderstanding of information, +that you were merely an honorary member of the SS. That is not +the case, is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly +how it was: I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did +not serve in the SS, but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister +it was customary to have a rank of some sort and I had received the +rank of SS Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is +entirely untrue, that you joined the SS by application before you +became ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged +to the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, +because Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it +to you; you applied to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. +Did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; +but the fact was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey +greatcoat and thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not +remember when that was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador +I received a higher rank, as Foreign Minister I received a still +higher one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in May 1933, after you made +application, you joined the SS in the not too high rank of Standartenführer, +didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that could be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you became an Oberführer +only on the 20th of April 1935, a Brigadeführer on 18 June 1935, and +Gruppenführer on the 13th of September 1936—that was after you +became an ambassador—and Obergruppenführer on the 20th of April +1940. Before you were made an ambassador you had been in the SS +for 3 years and you had received promotion in the ordinary way, +when you did your work with the SS, isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Without ever taking any steps or doing +anything myself in the SS, yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look. It is Document +D-744(a), Exhibit GB-294. The correspondence is 744(b). You may +<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span> +take it; you need not go through it in detail. That is your application, +with all the particulars. I just want to ask you one or two +things about it. You asked to join, did you not, the “Totenkopf,” +the Death’s-Head Division of the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that cannot be true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember getting a +special Death’s-Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? +Don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember. I never belonged +to a Death’s-Head Division. You were just talking about a Death’s-Head +Division, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A Death’s-Head Division.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. If it says so here, it is +not true. But I think that I at one time received a so-called dagger, +like all SS Führer. That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the ring, too. Here is a +letter dated the 5th of November 1935, to the Personnel Office of +the Reichsführer SS: “In reply to your question I have to inform +you that Brigadeführer Von Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17. Heil Hitler,” +(signed) (Adjutant) “Thorner.” Do you remember getting that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that everyone received such a ring +but I do not remember precisely. No doubt it is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took, didn’t you, continuous +interest in the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I +think your correspondence with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 +or 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, that is certainly +correct. Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all +fields. That is quite clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had, and especially in the +field of concentration camps, hadn’t you? Are you saying that you +did not know that concentration camps were being carried on in +an enormous scale?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look around for +the moment. [<span class='it'>A map behind the witness box was uncovered.</span>] That +is an enlargement of the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution +and these red spots are concentration camps. Now, I would just like +you to look at it. We will see now one of the reasons for the location +of your various residences. There, one north of Berlin, Sonnenburg. +Do you see roughly where that is on that map? +<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Sonnenburg is 1 hour’s auto ride from +Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: North of Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, east of Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another house. You +are quite near it yourself, your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is +quite near the border; just over the border, and very near it, the +group of camps which existed around Mauthausen. Do you see them, +just above your right hand? Do you see the group of camps, the +Mauthausen group?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to state on my oath that I +heard the name of “Mauthausen” for the first time in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another of the places. +You say you did not go there very often, but you used to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I can make this much more brief +for you. I can say that I heard of only two concentration camps +until I came here—no it was three: Dachau, Oranienburg, and +Theresienstadt. All the other names I heard here for the first time. +The Theresienstadt camp was an old people’s home for Jews, and +I believe was visited a few times by the International Red Cross. +I never heard previously of all the other camps. I wish to make +that quite clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that near Mauthausen +there were 33 camps at various places, within a comparatively +short distance, and 45 camps as to which the commandant did +not give the names because there were so many of them, and in +the 33 camps there were over 100,000 internees? Are you telling +the Tribunal that in all your journeys to Fuschl you never heard +of the camps at Mauthausen, where 100,000 people were shut up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me, and I +can produce dozens of witnesses who can testify to that. Dozens.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not care how many witnesses +you produce. I ask you to look at that map again. You were +a responsible minister in the Government of that country from the +4th of February 1938 till the defeat of Germany in May 1945, a +period of 7 and a quarter years. Are you telling the Tribunal that +anyone could be a responsible minister in that country where these +hundreds of concentration camps existed and not know anything +about them except two?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It may be amazing but it is 100 percent true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that it is not +only amazing, but that it is so incredible that it must be false. How +could you be ignorant of these camps? Did you never see Himmler? +<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I never saw him about these things. +Never. These things were kept absolutely secret and we heard here, +for the very first time, what went on in them. Nobody knew anything +about them. That may sound astounding but I am positively +convinced that the gentlemen in the dock also knew nothing about +all that was going on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear from them in their +turn. Did you know that at Auschwitz alone...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I heard the name Auschwitz here for the +first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the German official of +Auschwitz has sworn an affidavit that 4 million people were put +to death in the camp. Are you telling the Tribunal that that happened +without your knowing anything about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me. I can +state that here on my oath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, there is one other +subject, which I would like you to deal with; and here, fortunately, +I am in the position of assisting your memory with some documents. +It is a question of the partisans. I want you to look at a few +documents, three documents, with regard to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship +will allow me 5 minutes. That is what I have been trying to do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Do you agree that you were in +favor of the harshest treatment of people in the occupied countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand. Could you repeat +the question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question is, would it be a +fair way of expressing your point of view to say that you were in +favor of the harshest treatment of—I will put it first of all—of +partisans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I ever expressed +myself about the treatment of partisans. I do not recall having +done so. In any case, I was against it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, look at Document +D-735, which will be Exhibit GB-295. That is a discussion between +you and Count Ciano in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and +Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s headquarters after breakfast on +the 19th of December 1942. Now, if you will look at Page 2, you +will see that there is a passage where Field Marshal Keitel told the +Italian gentlemen that: +<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and +Italian troops working in co-operation; and this while it was +still winter, in view of the strong British influence in this +area. The Führer explained that the Serbian conspirators +were to be burned out, and that no soft methods were to be +used in doing this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that +every village in which partisans were found had to be burned +down. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that +Roatta must not leave the third zone, but must on the contrary +advance, and this in the closest collaboration with +the German troops. In this connection Field Marshal Keitel +requested the Italian gentlemen not to regard the utilization +of Croatian troops to help in this cleaning-up operation as a +favoring of the Croatians. The Reich Foreign Minister stated +in this connection that the Poglavnik to whom he had spoken +very clearly, was 100 percent ready to come to an agreement +with Italy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators +should be burned out”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did that represent your view, +that “the Serbian conspirators should be burned out”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know that expression. At any rate +it is certain that they should have been locked up.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What it means is that their villages +should be razed to the ground by fire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Where did I say that? I do not believe I +said that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the Führer’s point of +view. Was it your point of view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Führer took a very harsh attitude on +these questions, and I know that occasionally harsh orders had to +be issued also from other offices, including the military. It was a +struggle for life and death. One should not forget that it was war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you denying...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, I do not see where I said anything +about partisans, that is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that is not your point +of view? Is that what you are saying? That is not your point of +view? Are you saying that it is not your point of view as to the +way to treat them? Do not look at the next document. Tell me, is +that your point of view? +<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question that you want +me to answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you say that you were not +in favor of harsh treatment of partisans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I am of the opinion that the partisans who +attack the troops in the rear should be treated harshly. Yes, I am +of that opinion, I believe everyone in the Army is of that opinion, +and every politician.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including women and children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, by no means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at that, if you deny +this attitude to women and children. Look at the document, Number +D-741.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that will be Document D-741; this will be GB-296.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Will you look at the end of that. +That is a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin +on 21 February 1943. The last paragraph says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the +conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in +Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was appreciated +on the German side that Roatta wished to spare Italian +blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, trying to +drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. These partisan +gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women, and +children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of +German and Italian men, women, and children.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you still say that you did not want harsh treatment of women +and children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: What page is that on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is on Pages 10 to 13. It is the +last paragraph of my translation.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, +women and children, as their further existence imperiled the +lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: If I did say that at any time, it must have +been under great excitement. In any case, it does not correspond to +my opinion which I have proved by my other acts during the war. +I cannot say anything else at the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just show you one of +your other acts, which will be the final one, if the Tribunal will +bear with me. It is Document D-740, which will be GB-297. This +is a memorandum of the conversation between the Reich Foreign +<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span> +Minister and Secretary of State Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors +Von Mackensen and Alfieri at Klessheim castle on the +afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will look at the beginning, +I think you were discussing some strike in Italy. You say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had +perhaps been instigated by British agents was energetically +contested by Bastianini. There were Italian communists who +were still in Italy and who received their orders from Moscow. +The Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only +merciless action would remedy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to discuss Italy +but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown +that one would not get anywhere with soft methods or in the +endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister +then explained his views by a comparison between Denmark +and Norway. In Norway brutal measures had been taken +which had evoked lively protests, particularly in Sweden.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then you go on, and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot find it; what page is it on, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The paragraph begins: “The +Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike has perhaps +been instigated by British agents...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see what I have put +to you. You say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Only merciless action would be any good. In Norway brutal +measures had been taken.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And at the beginning of the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the +Greeks should sense a change for the better. He was of the +opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be deported +from Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should +be shown in an iron manner who was master in the country. +Hard methods of this kind were necessary if one was waging +a war against Stalin, which was not a gentleman’s war but +a brutal war of extermination.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then, with regard to France, after some statement about the +French you say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once +again stressed the necessity of taking severe measures.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And in the third line of the next paragraph: +<span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied +territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order +that the American armament potential might be equaled.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you +wanted the most severe measures taken in occupied territories in +order to mobilize labor to increase the Reich war potential?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I can say the following in regard to this +document. I know that at that time...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, you can say that, but you +can answer my question first. Do these views express your view +that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...severe measures should be +taken with foreign labor and with people in occupied territories. +Does that document express your view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it does not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you say it? Why +did you say these things?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Because at that time, on the commission +of the Führer, I had to keep the Italians’ noses to the grindstone, +since there was complete chaos in some of the areas and the Italians +always attempted to cause complete confusion in the rear areas of +the German Army by some of the measures they took there. That is +why I occasionally had to speak very harshly with the Italians. I +recall that very distinctly. At that time the Italians were fighting +together with the Chetniks partly against German troops; it was +complete chaos there and for this reason I often used rather earnest +and harsh language with the diplomats—perhaps an exaggerated +language. But things actually looked quite different afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was not a bit exaggeration, +was it, in both Norway and Greece? You were taking the most +brutal measures against the occupied countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. We had absolutely nothing +to say in Norway; we always tried to do things differently. And in +Denmark we did everything to reduce these harsh measures, which +were in part necessary, because of the paratroopers and so forth, +and tried not to have them carried out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think it can be proved, from a number of other documents, +that I and the Foreign Office always worked toward compromise in +the various occupied countries. I do not believe that it is quite fair +and correct to take only one or two such statements from the +innumerable documents where occasionally I did use harsh words. +It is certain that in the course of 6 years of war harsh language +<span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span> +must be used from time to time. I may remind you that foreign +statesmen also used harsh language regarding the treatment of Germany. +But I am sure they did not mean it that way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me this: Every time today +when you have been confronted with a document which attributes +to you some harsh language or the opposite of what you have said +here you say that on that occasion you were telling a diplomatic +lie. Is that what it comes to? Thank you very much.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all these documents +in evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 2 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-SEVENTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 2 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will +have noticed that I did not deal with the question of Jews. That will +now be taken up by my learned friend, M. Faure, of the French +Delegation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words on an +important question? A map was discussed here yesterday, the map +which is now visible in court. From that map the Prosecution conclude +that a large number of concentration camps were distributed +all over Germany. The defendants are contradicting this statement +as energetically as possible. In the treatment of my case, the case +of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, I hope to adduce evidence to the +effect that only a very few of the red spots on this map are accurate. +I wish to make this statement here and now, in order that the impression +does not arise over again, in the subsequent cases, that this +map is a correct one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of +what has already been put in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty to adduce proof to +the contrary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for +you to say so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the +Prosecution at an earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity +to answer it, but not to answer it at this moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were +the chief of the diplomatic personnel, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: The personnel followed your instructions, did they +not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You declared yesterday that you were responsible for +the acts of your subordinates?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Would you tell me if Dr. Best, Plenipotentiary for +Denmark, was a member of your Ministry?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Dr. Best told you, did he not, that Hitler had given +an order to assassinate Danes when there were acts of sabotage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: According to the documents that have been produced +before the Tribunal, Dr. Best saw you on 30 December 1943 and told +you that Hitler had given the order to assassinate Danes when there +were acts of sabotage in Denmark; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was to be done against saboteurs. +Hitler had ordered it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: The order, according to the terms employed by +Dr. Best in the document, was to “execute persons, terrorists or non-terrorists, +without trial.” Can that not be considered as assassination?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: From the beginning I strongly opposed +these measures, and so did Dr. Best. We went so far as to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Defendant, I am not trying to say that you were +pleased with this state of affairs. I am merely asking you if you +were informed thereof. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the Führer wanted that. I do not know +the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: But I am not asking for details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: And what was ordered afterwards I do not +know because, so far as I am aware, it did not go through us, but +through another department.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I note that you actually were informed of the +Führer’s order given that day to permit assassination. You therefore +considered it normal to belong to a government, the head of which +was a murderer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, the exact opposite is true here, the +exact opposite...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: All right, all right, just answer, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: ...for I told him that I had taken my stand +and that I held divergent views. The Führer was most dissatisfied +with Dr. Best and had the matter handled through other channels, +since Dr. Best was against it and so was I.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I am merely asking you to answer my question +very briefly. You can give details through your counsel later. +<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to Denmark, there was action against the Jews in +that country in order to deport them. Did you have anything to do +with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about matters +relating to the Jews in Denmark, since I know nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Did you never hear anything about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that I discussed the fact with +Best, that this question was of no significance in Denmark. He was +therefore not proposing to do anything in particular about the Jewish +question there, and I declared myself in complete agreement with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document 2375-PS. This +document has not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. I would like +to submit it under French Exhibit Number RF-1503. I would like to +read with you the second paragraph of this document. It is an affidavit +from Mildner, a colonel of the police in Denmark.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As commander, I was subordinate to the Reich Plenipotentiary, +Dr. Best. Since I was opposed to the persecution of the +Jews, on principle and for practical reasons, I asked Dr. Best +to give me the reasons for the measures that were ordered.</p> + +<p>“Dr. Best declared to me that the Reich Foreign Minister, +Ribbentrop, obviously knew Hitler’s intention to exterminate +the Jews in Europe. He had furnished Hitler with a report +about the Jewish problem in Denmark and proposed to deport +the Jews from Denmark.</p> + +<p>“Dr. Best declared furthermore that Ribbentrop was afraid +of being held responsible in case the Jews remained in +Denmark.</p> + +<p>“Dr. Best was now compelled to carry out the measures that +were proposed to Hitler by Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p>“From the discussion with Dr. Best I gathered that he must +have had a discussion or a telephone conversation with +Ribbentrop.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You read that, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: What is written in this document is pure +fantasy. It is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Very well; I ask then that you be shown Document +3688-PS, which I wish to deposit under the French Exhibit Number +RF-1502. It is a note of 24 September 1942, signed by Luther, and +addressed to his collaborators. I should like to read with you the +first two paragraphs of that document.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today +by telephone to expedite as much as possible the evacuation +of the Jews from different countries in Europe, since it is +<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span> +certain that the Jews stir up feelings against us everywhere +and must be held responsible for acts of sabotage and outrages.</p> + +<p>“After a short report on the evacuation of Jews at present in +process in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and the occupied territories, +the Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered us now +to approach the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Danish Governments +with the aim of getting the evacuation started in these +countries.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I suggest that this second document confirms the first as regards +your participation in the deportation of Jews in Denmark. Do you +agree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was the Führer’s plan, at the time, to +deport the Jews from Europe to North Africa, and Madagascar was +also mentioned in this connection. He ordered me to approach various +governments with a view to encouraging the emigration of the Jews, +if possible, and to remove all Jews from important government posts. +I issued instructions to the Foreign Office accordingly, and, if I +remember rightly, certain governments were approached several +times to that effect. It was the question of the Jewish emigration +to certain parts of North Africa; that is true. May I return to this +affidavit? This sworn affidavit is pure fantasy of Colonel Mildner’s +and is absolutely untrue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: But, in any case, you admit...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Dr. Best once discussed the Jewish question +with me, and he said that as far as Denmark was concerned, the +question was of no particular importance, since there were not +many Jews left there. I explained to him that he would have to let +matters take their own course there. That is the truth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You admit, nevertheless, that this document signed +by Luther is correct, and that you did give the order to evacuate +the Jews of Denmark? It is in the letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, not in Denmark. I do not even know +this document of Luther’s. This is the first time I have seen it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Please, simply answer my questions; otherwise we +shall waste a lot of time. In your opinion, both these documents are +incorrect, you said so; let us pass on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The German Embassy in Paris...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say so. That is incorrect. I +said that I did not know Luther’s document. It is, however, true +that the Führer gave me instructions to tell the Foreign Office to +approach certain foreign governments with a view to solving the +Jewish problem by removing the Jews from government positions +and, wherever possible, to favor Jewish emigration. +<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: The German Embassy in Paris was under your orders, +was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The German Embassy in Paris, that is, the +Ambassador to the Vichy Government, naturally received orders +from me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: French Document RF-1061 has already been read to +the Tribunal and in this document you defined the functions of Ambassador +Abetz. It is 3614-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this document, which has already been read to you twice here, +I would remind you that you commissioned Abetz to put in a safe +place the public and private art treasures, particularly those belonging +to Jews, on the basis of special instructions mentioned here. +Abetz executed this mission by pillaging art collections in France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I would ask that you be shown Document 3766-PS, +which has not yet been produced, and to which I should like to give +the French Exhibit Number RF-1505. I will go over merely a few +lines of this document with you. It is a report from the military +administration, which was distributed in 700 copies. It is entitled: +“Report on the Removal of French Works of Art by the German +Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If you will look at Page 3, you will see that the title in the +margin is very significant: “German-Embassy: Attempt to remove +paintings from the Louvre.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Page 4, I will read the first sentence at the top of the page...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: When may I refer to the individual points? +Not at all, or here and now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: When I ask you a question you will answer. I am +reading a passage to you:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Ambassador Abetz, disregarding the prohibition pronounced +by the military administration, undertook to send to Germany +a series of works of art from the Louvre which had been +placed in safety.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you informed of this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I declare that this is absolutely untrue. +Not a single work of art was taken out of the Louvre by Ambassador +Abetz. That would have been contrary to the express orders of the +Führer, who had strictly forbidden it. The report is incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I mention that on one occasion the French Government +wanted to present me with a work of art from the Louvre, a painting +by Boucher. I returned this picture to the Louvre. I do not +possess anything, and the Foreign Office never even saw a single +work of art, from the Louvre. +<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You state that this report is incorrect?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is this report you are putting to him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: It is Document 3766-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but what is this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: It is a report from the German military administration, +which is in the American documents in the PS series. The +Tribunal received a general affidavit referring thereto.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Captured documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes, captured documents. I indicate to the Tribunal +that this captured report contains numerous other passages relating +to the actions of Abetz, but as the defendant declares that the report +is inexact as regards one of its passages, I shall not continue reading +the document, in order to save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In addition...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: But this is not a captured document, not a +report.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Please answer my questions. We are not going to +carry on this controversy. Your counsel can interrogate you later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I must ask your permission to inquire into the nature +of the documents submitted to the defendant. If it is stated that +it is a captured report and then that it is not a captured report, the +matters should be put right, here and immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I have already indicated that this document belongs +to the PS series of captured documents. The Tribunal has a large +number of such documents and I do not think that their authenticity +will be disputed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I would now like to ask you the +following question:...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to ask further questions upon +this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: No, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Apart from the questions of art +treasures, Abetz also dealt with the question of the treatment of +Jews in general, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Abetz had no order. As far as I know he +also had nothing to do with the Jewish question. This question was +handled by other departments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Is it not true that in October 1940 Abetz communicated +with you with a view to settling the situation of Jews of +German or Austrian descent who were residing in France?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; it did not interest me. +<span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I would like to show you Document EC-265, which +I wish to submit as French Document RF-1504. It is a telegram +from Abetz dated 1 October 1940. I will read merely the first and +last sentences:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territory +of France requires, besides other measures, a regulation as +soon as possible of the citizenship status of the Reich German +Jews who were living here at the beginning of the war...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And the last sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The measures proposed above are to be considered as merely +the first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I +reserve the right to make other proposals.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I have time to read the telegram first?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a little too fast.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: So far as I can see, this telegram apparently +deals with the fact that Austrian and German Jews are to be repatriated +to Austria and Germany from France. I do not know that. +This is the first time I have seen this telegram, and I can give no +information about it. It probably represents one of the routine +measures dealt with by the Foreign Office in the course of the +day’s work, but which were not submitted to me; and apart from +that, these matters were individually dealt with by other departments, +not by us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: If you will look on the left-hand side of the telegram, +you will see the distribution list. There were 19, including you, +were there not? You were Number 2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to inform the French prosecutor +that every day four, five, six, or eight hundred such documents +and telegrams reached my office, of which only 1 or 2 percent +were submitted to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Apart from the question...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: In any case I know nothing about this +telegram.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Apart from the question of Jews of Austrian and +German origin, your colleagues and subordinates in the Embassy +also dealt with the question of the French Jews. Now, before asking +you this question, I should like to read out to you two sentences from +a document which was submitted to the Tribunal as French Document +Number RF-1207. It is a report from Dannecker, who was +responsible for solving the Jewish problem in France. Dannecker +concluded his report as follows: +<span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In this connection, I cannot speak of this matter without +mentioning the genuinely friendly support which our work +received from the German Ambassador Abetz, his representative, +the envoy Schleier, and SS Sturmbannführer and +Counsellor of Legation Dr. Zeitschel. I should like to add +that the Embassy in Paris has, on its own initiative, placed +quite large sums at the disposal of the branch in charge of the +Jewish question, for the financing of the Anti-Jewish Institute, +and that it will continue to do so in future.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Therefore, according to these documents, Abetz, Schleier, and +Zeitschel worked together.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Faure, we do not know where you are +reading from.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Mr. President, this document was not given to you +in this folder because it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. +I merely wished to read two sentences from it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: It is evident therefore, from this document, that three +officials of the German Embassy, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel, +collaborated with Dannecker in the settlement of Jewish affairs. +That is shown by the document, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Am I supposed to answer that? Is it a +question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: It is a question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: To that question I must answer “naturally.” +They certainly collaborated to some extent in the Jewish question +in France; that is perfectly clear. But I can also add that the French +Prosecution surely is informed that Ambassador Abetz was not only +instructed by me, but also acted on his own initiative in always +attempting to reach some kind of conciliatory settlement of this +question. It goes without saying that the Embassy was involved, +one way or the other, in this sphere of action. And it also goes +without saying that I must assume responsibility for anything done +by the gentlemen in the Embassy, and I should like to repeat that +my instructions as well as the activities of Ambassador Abetz were +always in the opposite direction. It is quite clear that the basic +anti-Semitic tendency and policy of the German Government spread +over all the departments and naturally, in any sphere—I mean, +every Government office somehow or other came into contact with +these matters. Our task in the Foreign Office—which could be +proved in thousands of cases if the documents would be submitted—was +to act as an intermediary in this sphere. I might say, we often +had to do things in accordance with this anti-Semitic policy, but +<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span> +we always endeavored to prevent these measures and to reach some +kind of conciliatory settlement. In fact, the German Embassy was +not responsible for any anti-Semitic measures of any description +in France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I would like to draw your attention to another document, +Number RF-1210, a French document which is a second report +from Dannecker of 22 February 1942, Page 3 of the document, +Page 2 of the German text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say here and now that I +do not even know who Dannecker is. Perhaps you can give me some +information on that subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I informed you that Dannecker was the person +responsible for Jewish affairs in France. As a matter of fact, these +documents were submitted a long time ago to the Tribunal and +communicated to the Defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At Page 3 of the document, which is Page 2 of the German, there +is a paragraph entitled, “Actions,” from which I read one sentence: +“Up to the present, three large-scale operations have been undertaken +against the Jews in Paris.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will look at the last page of the document, the last +paragraph but one, we read as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Since the middle of 1941 there has been a conference every +Tuesday in which the following services participate:... I, II, +and III, military commands, administrative, police, and economic +sections; IV, German Embassy, Paris; V, Einsatzstab +Westen of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.</p> + +<p>“The result of the conference is that—with very few exceptions +naturally called for by outsiders—the anti-Jewish policy +is being brought into one common line in the occupied +territory.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This document clearly shows, does it not, that your collaborators +were in agreement with the anti-Jewish policy in the occupied +territories and that this policy included the arrest of Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to this statement? According +to my information, in this case, as so often happened in such cases, +the German ambassadors could have served as the branch offices. +They might have joined in with a view to guiding matters into +peaceful channels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown French Document RF-1220, +which is a letter from the German Embassy of 27 June 1942, +addressed to the head of the Security Police and the SD in France. +Before asking you a question I would like to read with you the first +two paragraphs of this letter: +<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Following my interview with Hauptsturmführer Dannecker +on the date of 27 June, during which he indicated that he +required that 50,000 Jews from the unoccupied zone be +deported to the East as soon as possible, and that on the +basis of notes sent by the Commissioner General for Jewish +Questions, Darquier de Pellepoix, under any circumstances +something had to be done for this, I reported the matter +to Ambassador Abetz and Minister Rahn immediately after +the discussion. The latter is to confer with President Laval +this afternoon, and he has promised me that he will speak +to him at once about the handing over of these 50,000 Jews; +also he will insist that Darquier de Pellepoix be given +complete freedom of action according to the laws already +promulgated, and that the credits which have been promised +to him be handed to him immediately.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I should like to ask you a question. I ask you to answer +as briefly as possible: Were you aware of this <span class='it'>démarche</span> for the +handing over of these 50,000 Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not; I heard about it here for the +first time, when this document was, I believe, read out once before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: If your collaborators Abetz, Rahn, and Zeitschel took +such action on this subject without informing you, was it not because +they thought they were acting in accordance with your general +directives?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so; they worked very +independently in Paris, but I should like to repeat once again that +I am assuming responsibility for everything that these gentlemen +have done. I make a point of emphasizing this fact. I did not, +however, know anything about the proposed measure against the +50,000 Jews. And I do not even know whether it was ever put into +effect, and in what manner these gentlemen had implicated themselves +in the matter. The letter does not make it clear. I know +only one thing, and that is that my general instructions were to +tread cautiously in such matters and, if possible, to bridge difficulties +according to my own basic concepts and not to do anything +to force matters but, on the contrary, to smooth them over. I can +say no more on the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: During the interrogation of your witness Steengracht, +the British Prosecution produced a document, 3319-PS, under the +British Exhibit Number GB-287. I should like to refer to this document +for one question only.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this document there is an account of a meeting, or a congress, +at which were present all the reporters on Jewish questions from +the various diplomatic missions in Europe. This congress was held +<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span> +on 3 and 4 April 1944 in Krummhübel. It was organized by Schleier. +This was read the other day. You knew about this congress, I +suppose?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, this is the first time I have heard about +it. What congress was that? I have never heard that such a congress +ever took place. What kind of congress was it supposed to be?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: This document has already been submitted; it was a +congress held...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I know only about one congress which I +asked the Führer not to hold. That I do know. But I know nothing +at all about a congress which did take place. Please give more +detailed information on the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: The document was handed over to the Tribunal, and +I would like to ask you one question. You testified that you were +unaware of this meeting at which 31 persons, most of whom +belonged to the diplomatic service, were present. I will inform you +that during this meeting Embassy Counsellor Von Thadden made +a declaration which was reported in the following terms:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist solution +of Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be rejected +and why the Jews must be expatriated into the Eastern +territories.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I suggest that this declaration made by an embassy counsellor +in the presence of 31 people belonging to your service voiced your +own attitude on these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but I do not know in the very least +what you mean. May I, to begin with, please have some information +on the matter with which we are dealing? I do not understand it at +all. I have told you once before that I know nothing about any +congress except the one which I countermanded. That was an international +congress which was to have been held. I know nothing of +a congress of diplomats. Would you kindly place the document in +question at my disposal in order that I may make my reply?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I do not intend to show you this document. I read +one sentence contained in this document, and I am merely asking +you if this phrase represents your opinion or not. Answer “yes” +or “no”.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Then I must request you to repeat the +sentence. I wish to confirm again, however, that no congress took +place; it is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to that question, if the +opportunity is not afforded the defendant to give a truthful answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question was proper. +<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I ask you whether this sentence which I have read +out to you corresponded to your opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the sentence. I +did not understand it correctly.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>M. FAURE: “The speaker explained the reasons why the +Zionist solution of Palestine and similar alternative solutions +must be rejected and why the Jews must be expatriated to the +Eastern territories.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Was that your thesis?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Was your attention drawn to the fact that the Italian +authorities in France protected the Jews against persecution by +Germans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect that there was something +of the kind but I no longer remember exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Did you approach the Italian Government on this +subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that on one occasion I spoke +either to Mussolini or to Count Ciano about certain acts of sabotage, +espionage, or something of that kind which had occurred in France +and against which one would have to be on the alert, and in this +connection, I believe, the Jewish problem was also discussed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document D-734, which I +would like to submit as French Exhibit Number RF-1501. This note +is headed:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Account of a conference between the Reich Foreign Minister +and the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia in the presence of Ambassadors +Von Mackensen and Alfieri and the State Secretary +Bastianini on the 25th of February 1943.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>I would like to read with you the second paragraph on this page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the Jewish +question. The Duce was aware that Germany had taken a +radical position with regard to the treatment of the Jews. As +a result of the development of the war in Russia she had come +to an even greater clarification of this question. All Jews had +been transported from Germany and from the territories occupied +by her to reservations in the East. He, the Reich +Foreign Minister, knew that this measure was described as +cruel, particularly by enemies, but it was necessary in order +to be able to carry the war through to a successful conclusion.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>I shall not read the following paragraph, but the fourth: +<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“France also had taken measures against the Jews which were +extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here, +too, final solution would be the deportation of the Jews to the +East. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, knew that in Italian +military circles, and occasionally among German military +people too, the Jewish problem was not sufficiently appreciated. +It was only in this way that he could understand an +order of the <span class='it'>Comando Supremo</span> which, in the Italian occupation +zone of France had canceled measures taken against +the Jews by the French authorities acting under German +influence. The Duce contested the accuracy of this report and +traced it back to the French tactics of causing dissension +between Germany and Italy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I shall ask you a question: A short while ago you told us +that you wanted to make all the Jews emigrate to Madagascar. Is +Madagascar in the Eastern reservations mentioned in the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: About what? I have not understood.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You were talking in this document of deporting Jews +to the reservations in the Eastern territories, and a short while ago +you spoke to us of settling the Jews in Madagascar. Is Madagascar +meant here?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was the Führer’s plan. This document +refers to the fact that a large-scale espionage system had +been discovered, I believe, in France. The Führer sent me while +I was on a journey to Italy and told me to speak to Mussolini and +see to it that in cases of Jews involved in these acts of sabotage and +espionage, the Italian Government or the Italian Army did not intervene +to prevent this measure. Also I should like to state definitely +that I knew, and it was also the Führer’s plan, that the European +Jews were to be resettled on a large-scale either in Madagascar, +North Africa, or in reservations in the East. This was generally +known in Germany. That is all that we are concerned with here, +and I also knew that some very unpleasant things had occurred at +that time and that the Führer was convinced that all of them could +be attributed to Jewish organizations in the south of France, I +believe. I now recollect very well that at the time I discussed the +matter with Mussolini and begged him to adopt suitable measures +since these Jews were furnishing all the information to the English +and American Intelligence Services. At least that was the information +which the Führer was constantly receiving.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You said, did you not, that all Jews were to be deported +to the Eastern reservations? Is that correct? Please reply +“yes” or “no”.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Whether I was in favor of it? +<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Germany deported all the Jews from German territory +and territories occupied by her to Eastern reservations. That +is true, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the contents of the document +in detail. I do not know what I myself said in detail. But at any +rate I knew that the Führer had ordered that the Jews of the +occupied territories in Europe were to be transported to reservations +in the East and resettled there. That I did know. The carrying out +of these measures, however, was not my task as Minister for Foreign +Affairs of the Foreign Office, but I did know that it was the Führer’s +wish. In this connection, I remember that I received an order from +him to discuss the matter with the Italian Government so that they +too would introduce corresponding measures regarding the Jewish +problem. That applied to other countries as well, where we had to +send telegrams quite frequently, so that these countries should solve +the Jewish question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you read to the witness the +second paragraph beginning: “Further, the Reich Foreign Minister +dealt with the Jewish question...”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, the second paragraph. That is the +paragraph which I have just been reading.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you read the third one, but I did not +know you read the second one too. You read the second one too, did +you? Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes, I read it as well, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The document is a new document, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, it is a document which I would +like to submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1501. It belongs to the +“D” series; it is D-734 of the British document books.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the defendant said whether he admits +that it is a substantially accurate account of the conversation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I can no longer say for certain, Mr. President; +what I did say at the time, I know only, and gather, from this +document, from these words, that the Jews were spreading news +from British and American sources. I can remember that at that +time a large espionage and sabotage organization was in existence, +and that this organization was causing a great deal of trouble in +France, and that the Führer ordered me to discuss the matter with +Mussolini since the Italians were opposing certain measures we had +introduced in France. I spoke to Mussolini and told him that the +Führer was of the opinion that, where this question was concerned, +we should have to come to a definite understanding. +<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, Defendant, you have already told us +that. The question that I asked was whether you agreed that it was +a substantially accurate account of the conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that in certain points the report +is incorrect, but fundamentally the position was as I have just +explained it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Now, you also spoke about this question with Horthy, +did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I had to confer several times with the +Hungarian Government so as to persuade them to do something +about the Jewish problem. The Führer was extremely insistent on +this point. I therefore discussed the question repeatedly with the +Hungarian Ambassador and the question was primarily to centralize +the Jews somehow or other in some part of Budapest, I think it was +slightly outside Budapest or in—as a matter of fact, I do not know +Budapest very well—in any case, it was somewhere in Budapest +itself. That was the first point. And the second point dealt with the +removal of the Jews from influential Government posts, since it had +been proved that Jewish influence in these departments was sufficiently +authoritative to bring Hungary to a separate peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: The document relating to your conversation or one +of the conversations which you had with Horthy has already been +produced. It was that of 17 April 1943. It is Document D-736, which +was submitted as GB-283.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the interrogation of your witness, Schmidt, the British +prosecutor asked this witness if he admitted having compiled this +account, and this was confirmed by Schmidt. This note bears the +following remark at the bottom of the first paragraph: “The Foreign +Minister declared that the Jews were either to be exterminated or +sent to concentration camps. There was no other solution.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You did say that, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I definitely did not say it in those words. +But I would like to reply as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was apparently an account prepared by “Minister” Schmidt, as +was his habit, some days after a long discussion between the Führer +and Horthy. I have already said that the Führer had repeatedly +charged me to talk to Horthy, to the Hungarian Government, to the +Ambassador, in order to reach a solution of the Jewish question. +At the time when Horthy visited the Führer the Führer emphasized +the question to him in a very irritable manner, and I remember +perfectly that subsequent to this discussion I talked the matter over +with “Minister” Schmidt, saying that I, strictly speaking, had not +quite understood the Führer. +<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The remark mentioned was definitely not made in this way. M. +Horthy had apparently said that he could not, after all, beat the +Jews to death. It is possible, since there would have been no +question of that in any case, that in this connection I did endeavor +to persuade Horthy to do something or other at once about the +Jewish question in Budapest, namely, that he should undertake now +the centralization which the Führer had already wished to carry +out for a long time. My objection or my interpolation may have +referred to this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must add that the situation, at that time, was as follows: We had +been receiving repeated indications from Himmler, to the effect that +Himmler wished to handle the Jewish situation in Hungary himself. +I did not want this, since, one way or another, it would probably +have created political difficulties abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Consequently, acting on the wish of the Führer, who was extremely +obstinate on this subject, I, as is known, repeatedly attempted +to smooth matters over and, at the same time, pin the Hungarians +down to do something about it in any case. Therefore, if, from a long +conversation, some remark has been extracted and summarized in +brief, and contains some such statement, it certainly does not mean +that I wished the Jews to be beaten to death. It was 100 percent +contrary to my personal convictions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I do not understand whether you answered my +question or not. I will have to ask you again. Is the report correct, +or is it not correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, in this form it cannot be correct. These +are notes. I personally have never seen these notes before; otherwise +I should have said at once that this is nonsense and liable to misconstruction. +I did not see these notes before; I saw them for the +first time in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I can say only one thing which may possibly have occurred. I +might have said...well yes, “the Jews cannot be exterminated or +beaten to death, so, please do something in order that the Führer +will be satisfied at long last, and centralize the Jews.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was our aim, at that time at any rate. We did not want to +render the situation more acute, but we were trying to do something +in Hungary so that no other department could take the matter in +hand, thereby creating political difficulties abroad for the Foreign +Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You knew at that time that many Jews had been +deported. That may be gathered from your explanations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, please. Are you passing +from this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I was continuing to speak of it in more general terms. +<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are passing from it, did you say?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, the Tribunal would like to +know whether you did say to the Regent Horthy that Jews ought +to be taken to concentration camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I consider it possible that such may have +been the case, for we had, at that time, received an order that a +concentration camp was to be installed near Budapest or else that +the Jews should be centralized there, and the Führer had instructed +me a long time before to discuss with the Hungarians a possible +solution of the Jewish question. This solution should consist of two +points. One was the removal of the Jews from important government +positions and two, since there were so many Jews in Budapest, +to centralize the Jews in certain quarters of Budapest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I understand your suggestion to be that this +document is inaccurate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it is not accurate. The way I should +like to put it, Mr. President, is that when reading the document, it +would appear from this document that I considered it possible or +desirable to beat the Jews to death. That is perfectly untrue but +what I did say here and what I emphasized later on could be understood +to mean only that I wished something to be done in Hungary +to solve the Jewish problem, so that other departments should not +interfere in the matter. For the Führer often spoke to me about it, +very seriously indeed, saying that the Jewish problem in Hungary +must be solved now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that, I think, already. What +I wanted to ask you was this: Are you suggesting that Schmidt, who +drew up this memorandum, invented the last few sentences, beginning +with the words:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If the Jews there did not want to work they would be shot. +If they could not work they would have to perish. They had +to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli with which a healthy +body may become infected. This was not cruel if one remembered +that innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or deer, +have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why +should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be shown +more leniency? Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews +perished. One of the most famous examples of this was the +downfall of a people who once were so proud, the Persians, +who now lead a pitiful existence as Armenians.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you suggesting that Schmidt invented those sentences or +imagined them? +<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Mr. President, I should like to add that I +myself was very grieved by these words of the Führer, and I did not +quite understand them. But perhaps this attitude can be understood +only if we remember that the Führer believed that the Jews had +caused this war, and that he had gradually developed a very fanatical +hatred for them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I remember too that later on, after this conference, I discussed +with the interpreter Schmidt and the two gentlemen the fact that +this was the first time the Führer had used expressions in connection +with the Jewish problem which I could no longer understand. These +words were certainly not invented by Schmidt. The Führer did +express himself in some such way at that time. That is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: It appears from his document that you thought there +were concentration camps in Hungary and yet you said yesterday +that you did not know there were any in Germany. Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know that there were any concentration +camps in Hungary, but I did say that the Führer had +instructed me to ask Horthy to ask the Hungarian Government to +concentrate the Jews in Budapest, in certain parts of the city of +Budapest. As to concentration camps in Germany, I already spoke +yesterday about my knowledge of that subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: You admitted that you knew Hitler’s policy to deport +all Jews and you admitted that insofar as you were competent as +Minister for Foreign Affairs, you assisted this policy, did you not? +That is right, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: As his faithful follower I adhered to the +Führer’s orders even in this field, but I always did my utmost to +alleviate the situation as far as possible. This can be stated and +proved by many witnesses. Even in 1943 I submitted a comprehensive +memorandum to the Führer in which I urged him to alter the +Jewish policy completely. I could also quote many other examples.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: If I understand your testimony rightly, you were +morally opposed to this persecution of Jews, but you did help to +carry them out, is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I repeatedly said at the very beginning of +my examination, that in that sense I have never been anti-Semitic. +But I was a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Apart from the Jewish question, you dealt with +arrests of French people, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The arrests of Frenchmen...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Yes. Did you or did you not give orders to arrest +Frenchmen? +<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that this was so. Quite +possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: Can you be more precise on that subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I cannot, for the moment, remember +any details. In any case I know that Frenchmen were arrested. Just +how far this depended on us, at that time, I do not know. It was, I +think, in 1944, shortly before the invasion that the Führer issued an +order to the effect that a large number of important French members +of the resistance movement were to be arrested on the spot, and +I believe that we were advised accordingly. It is also possible that +we co-operated in this action to a certain extent, but I cannot +remember any details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was a question of arresting those elements who would kindle +the flame of the Resistance Movement in the event of an invasion, +and would attack the German armies in the rear. But I cannot give +you any more particulars now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown a document which will be +submitted as Exhibit Number RF-1506 (Document Number RF-1506). +It is an affidavit by Dr. H. Knochen. I shall read some passages from +this document.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At the end of 1943—it must have been in December—there +was a conference at the Foreign Office on arrests to be made +in France. As I was in Berlin, I was also summoned to it. +Present at this conference were: The Foreign Minister Von +Ribbentrop; the State Secretary Von Steengracht; Ambassador +Abetz; another member of the Foreign Office, whose name I +do not know; the Chief of the SIPO and the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner; +the Higher SS and Police Leader in France, Oberg; +and representing the Military Commander-in-Chief was his +Chief of Staff Colonel Kossmann, if my memory serves me +right.</p> + +<p>“The Minister stated the following: The Führer expects in +France more attention to be paid in the future than hitherto. +The enemy force must not be allowed to increase. Therefore +all German services will have to carry out their duties more +meticulously.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I omit the next paragraph. Then we read the following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He sees arising danger, in the event of invasion, of those +prominent Frenchmen who do not wish to collaborate with +Germany, and who are secretly active against her. They might +constitute a danger to the troops. These dangerous elements +should be sought out in business circles, university centers, +in certain military and political circles, and all classes of +society connected with them. He believes that it will be +<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span> +necessary to strike an immediate blow against these people. +He suggests that they number easily 2,000 people or more. At +a moment when it is necessary to defend Europe against her +enemy, there is no reason why we should shrink from taking +preventive measures of this kind in France. As to the practical +means of putting this into effect, the Minister stated, +Ambassador Abetz will have to take up this matter immediately +and draw up a list in collaboration with the German +services in order to take account of all the questions that arise +out of this matter.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I end the quotation here. Do you admit the accuracy of this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I distinctly remember that discussion. +This was a Führer order to the effect that immediate action be +taken—I have just spoken about this—in view of the pending +invasion, to arrest all potentially dangerous elements who could fan +the flame of resistance in the rear of the German armies. I considered +this a perfectly comprehensible measure which any Government, +with the welfare of the troops at heart, would have made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then held this conference. The Führer expected a far greater +wave of arrests, but only a comparatively small number, I believe, +were arrested then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Subsequently we had comparatively little to do with the actual +arrests; they were carried out by the police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But it is perfectly clear that this conference did take place at the +time indicated and that we did what had to be done at the moment, +as proposed, namely, the arrest of those elements which might have +been dangerous in case of an invasion. That is quite true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. FAURE: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that I want to say. One +of them relates to the Prosecution and one of them relates to the +Defense. It is desired that the Prosecution should furnish documents +to the interpreters when they are going to use documents in +the course of examination or cross-examination. Documents need +not necessarily be in the language which the interpreter is going +to use, but there must be some document in some language, one of +the languages, placed before the interpreters in order to assist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The other point is that I am told that the defendants’ counsel are +not getting their documents ready for the Translation Division in +<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span> +anything like the 2 weeks beforehand which was specified by the +Tribunal. The Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be +furnished to the Tribunal or the Translation Division 2 weeks ahead, +if possible. Those words “if possible” are being treated too lightly +and the documents, I am told, are sometimes coming in as late as +48 hours before the case of the particular defendant is to be taken. +That is not sufficient and it will lead to delay. That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the +cross-examination of this defendant by the French Prosecution, +reference was made to Document 3766-PS and I understood Dr. Horn +to say that that document was not a captured document. That was +my understanding of his statement. I am not altogether sure that +that was what he said when he approached the microphone. So that +the record will be perfectly clear, I now wish to inform the Tribunal +that it is a captured document and I do not know upon what basis +Dr. Horn made that assertion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have not, so far, had any opportunity—it +has been stated that we are dealing with a captured +document, and I have had no opportunity of checking the matter +beforehand. It said on the top of this document that it was a USA +exhibit, Document Number 3766-PS, and I had no opportunity of +checking this on its arrival. I have therefore requested that this fact +be kindly established by the French Prosecution. That was my sole +objection. I did not deny that it was a captured document; I was +merely unable to prove it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask +questions of the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that +you are not going over ground which has already been gone over.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Most certainly not, Sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You speak English pretty well, +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I spoke it well in the past and I think I +speak it passably well today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Almost as well as you speak German?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I would not say that, but in the past +I spoke it nearly as well as German, although I have naturally forgotten +a great deal in the course of the years and now it is more +difficult for me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you know what is meant by a “yes man” in +English?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: A “yes man”—<span class='it'>per se</span>. A man who says +“yes” even when he himself—it is somewhat difficult to define. +<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span> +In any case, I do not know what you mean by it in English. In +German I should define him as a man who obeys orders and is +obedient and loyal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you were a “yes man” +for Hitler, isn’t that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I was always loyal to Hitler, carried through +his orders, differed frequently in opinion from him, had serious +disputes with him, repeatedly tendered my resignation, but when +Hitler gave an order, I always carried out his instructions in accordance +with the principles of our authoritarian state.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, you were interrogated frequently by me, were +you not, before this Trial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, once or twice, I believe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read to you certain questions +and answers which were given in the course of these interrogations, +and simply ask you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made +the answers that I read to you. That question can be answered +“yes” or “no”; do you understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. AMEN: “I have been a loyal man to the Führer to his +last days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal +man to his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree +with everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very +divergent views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would +keep faith in him. I gave him my word of honor that I would +not get him into any difficulties.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that according to my recollection is +correct. I did not see the document and I did not sign anything, +but as far as I can remember, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, what did you mean by saying that you would +not get him into any difficulties?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany +and the only man who could win this war for Germany, and +therefore I did not want to create any difficulties for him, and +remained faithful to him until the end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, what you really meant was that you were +never going to cross him, and you promised him that in 1941, isn’t +that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I would never cause him any difficulties, +yes, I did say that. He often found me a rather difficult subordinate, +and that is when I told him that I would not cause him any difficulties. +<span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In 1941 you told him that no matter whether you +differed with his opinion in the future, you would never press the +point, isn’t that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>] “Yes” or “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite that, but...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, approximately that, is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it cannot be put that way. I only meant, +if I may explain it this way, that I would never cause him any difficulties; +if a serious divergence of opinion should ever arise, I would +just withhold my own view. That was what I meant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, you gave him your word of honor to that +effect, isn’t that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And at that time you had talked about resigning, +isn’t that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is also true, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And that made the Führer lose his temper and +become ill, correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. “Ill” is not the correct expression, but +he became very excited at that time. I should prefer not to mention +the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn’t that +correct, and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these +questions and do what he told you to do? Right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not wish to say anything more about +the personal reasons, nor do I believe that these are matters which +could be of any interest here. Those would be personal matters +between the Führer and myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I am not interested in that. I am interested +only in ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear +under oath, that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would +never express or press any divergent views to anything which he +desired. Is that not correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, no! That is absolutely untrue, the interpretation +is false. I told the Führer that I would never create any +difficulties for him. After 1941 I had many divergencies with him, +and even at that time I always voiced my own opinions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, Ribbentrop, whatever divergent views you +had you were never able to put any of them into effect after 1941, +were you? “Yes” or “no?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. Please +repeat it. +<span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I say, no matter how divergent your views were, +or what views you expressed to the Führer on any of these questions +after 1941, your suggestions being contrary to the Führer’s +were never put into effect. Isn’t that correct? You always eventually +did what the Führer told you to do and what he wished, +regardless of your own views.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: You are putting two questions to me. To +the first I must reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted +suggestions from me. Question Number 2, however, is correct. I can +answer it by saying that if Hitler at any time expressed an opinion +to me and issued an order, I carried the order through as was +natural in our country.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In other words, eventually you always said “yes”, +isn’t that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I carried out his order, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you some more of your +testimony:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He”—referring to the Führer—“considered me his closest +collaborator. We had a very serious conversation then, and +when I wanted to go away, I promised it to him and I have +kept it to the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, +I can assure you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry +that I gave it. Perhaps it would have been better if I had +not given it. It put me from then on in the position that +I could not talk to Hitler, in very serious and important +moments of this war, in the way in which I would have liked +to, and in which, perhaps, I might have been able to talk to +him after this conversation in 1941.</p> + +<p>“I must explain all this to you. If you do not know the background +of these things you might think perhaps that as Foreign +Minister during these last years I would like to say more +about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more +information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to +this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it. +But I reserve the right to prove to posterity that I kept my +promise and also the right to show the role which I have +played in the whole of this drama.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you or did you not make those statements under oath to me?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: They are...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: “Yes” or “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Here again we have two questions. To +question Number 1, I would say that I know nothing at all. To +the second question, I answer “no.” I certainly never testified under +oath to that. I was put on oath only twice, but that is not relevant +<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span> +here. The statement is not verbatim and must have been wrongly +translated. It is correct that I said that I was loyal to the Führer +and that I further said that I had many arguments with him, that +we were not always of the same opinion, and that is the essence +of my statement. That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I asked you only one question, and I ask you again +to answer it “yes” or “no.” Did you or did you not make those +statements in the exact language that I just read them to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer +that, because he said it is not verbatim.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But it is verbatim.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is +not verbatim.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, very good, Your Lordship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In any event, you can see that you +stated the substance of what I just read to you; correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, Ribbentrop, you testified and +gave this particular testimony in English, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have often spoken English at interrogations, +that is quite true, but whether it was precisely this statement +which was made in English, I do not know. In any case, I repeat, +these statements on both points are to be understood that way; that +is how they were meant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And when you gave your testimony in English, that +was at your own request, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: At whose request?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. I believe it just happened +that way; I cannot remember. I believe I spoke English +mostly, and German a few times. Most of the time, however, I +spoke English.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you a little more of your +testimony and ask you the same question, which I hope you will +answer “yes” or “no,” namely: Did you give this testimony in the +course of the interrogation:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: ‘Do you feel that you have an obligation to the +German people to set forth historically not only the good +things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?’</p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘That is a terribly difficult question to answer.’</p> + +<p>“Question: ‘Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel +towards the Führer?’ +<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span></p> + +<p>“Answer: ‘I do not want to stand before the German people +as being disloyal to the Führer.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you make those statements?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, though I can +no longer remember very exactly. But that is quite possible. So +much has been said in the course of the last few months, and then +too, from a physical point of view, I have, as you know, not +been quite up to the mark, so that I just cannot remember every +single word.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: All right. Now see if you recall having made these +statements:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I always told the Führer openly my view if he wanted to +hear it, but I kept myself entirely back from all decisions, but +if the Führer once had decided, I, according to my attitude +toward the Führer, blindly carried out his orders and acted +in the sense of his decision. In a few decisive foreign political +points, I tried to give my opinion more forcefully. This +was in the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, +because I considered this absolutely important and necessary, +but from 1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult +to bring an opinion through with the Führer.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you recall having made those statements? “Yes,” or “no,” +please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is more or less true. Yes, I practically +remember it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already +heard a very long cross-examination of the defendant, and they +think that this is not adding very much to what they have already +heard. The defendant has given very similar evidence already.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. I will pass to another subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have testified that there was +a sharp line of demarcation between the political and the military +situations. Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Between—I did not understand that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You have testified that there was always a sharp +line of demarcation between the political and the military elements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. The Führer always differentiated +rather strongly between these two elements; that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And that information belonging to the military was +kept exclusively for the military and not made available to your +office, for example? Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I heard little of military matters and plans; +yes, that is correct. +<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And that the contrary was also true, that the information +which you obtained was not made available to the military; +is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That I am in no position to judge, but I +would assume so, since I do not know what information the military +received from the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, you told us that the Führer’s entire plan was +to keep those political and military channels separate each from the +other. Correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, in general he kept them very severely +apart. I have already said so several times. That is why I have +only just now had cognizance of many military documents for the +first time. That was perfectly in keeping with the Führer’s decrees +on secrecy, that no one department should know more than was +absolutely essential.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact that was not true at all; +was it, Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have already given you my answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact you had secret agents out who +were working jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the +Army, and for the Navy; isn’t that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You are quite sure of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I am certain of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you are swearing to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: You mean agents who did something, who...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who were out obtaining information for your office, +for the Army, and for the Navy at the same, jointly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that highly improbable. It is, of +course, possible that somehow or other, some man may have worked +for different departments, but this was definitely not done on an +organized scale. The organization—we maintained a very small +intelligence service abroad—and the intelligence services of the +other departments of the Reich generally worked, as far as I was +informed, completely apart from ours. It is possible that here and +there some person or other would work for other, for different +departments. That is quite conceivable. For instance, some person +or other in our legations, as was customary at the English, American, +Russian, and other legations, who had dug themselves in as consular +assistants or some other kind of assistants, and carried out +intelligence work for some organization or other. +<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: So you want to change the answer you made a +moment ago; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not wish to change it at all. Fundamentally, +as an organized routine matter, I never introduced any of +the secret agents who worked for the different departments abroad. +It is, however, conceivable that the department of the Foreign Office +dealing with such matters may have appointed somebody. It was, +however, a fairly insignificant affair. Today I say “unfortunately.” +It is quite possible that other agents from this department, working +for other departments, for Counterintelligence or the SD, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, +were correlated. Later on we even—I should like to add the following: +I had pronounced differences of opinion with Himmler, over +the intelligence services abroad, and it was only through the good +offices of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner that I obtained an agreement +to the effect that certain items of information would be placed +at my disposal. But later this agreement was not honored. I think +it was practically ineffective, because it was already too late. That, +I believe, was in 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? +Will you first tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Albrecht Haushofer was a former collaborator +of mine and was a man who, yes, who dealt with German +minority questions. Could I perhaps read the letter first? Is it a +letter from Haushofer? It is not signed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, it is. Have you finished reading?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite, not yet. Shall I read the +others too, or only the first letter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: We shall get to the other letters in a moment. I +am trying to make this as short as we possibly can. Does that letter +refresh your recollection that Haushofer was out in the Orient +investigating various matters and making reports to you as early +as 1937?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: At the moment I cannot recall that Haushofer +was in Tokio but it is conceivable, it is possible that such was +the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, the letter is addressed to you and it encloses +a report, does it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Isn’t this a letter from Count Dürckheim? +Isn’t there some misunderstanding? But if you say this was written +by Haushofer, then it is conceivable that he was in Tokio; it is possible. +I am not acquainted with the details. I sent Count Dürckheim +to Tokio at that time but it is possible that Haushofer was there too. +To be candid, I have, at present, forgotten all about it. +<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just seen that this letter is not +fully dated and is unsigned but I hear from Colonel Amen it was +allegedly written in 1937. In 1937 Ribbentrop was not yet Foreign +Minister. He was appointed Foreign Minister only on 4 February +1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: It has the date on it—3 October—and it was captured +with Haushofer’s documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: But I consider it quite probable that this +letter is from Haushofer, although, to be quite candid, I no longer +remember exactly that he had been to Tokio in 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, now...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: He was a collaborator who worked with us +in the early years but later dealt more with German minority questions, +so that I lost track of him in recent years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I will just pass along through this document. You +will find the next document is dated 15 April 1937, requesting +reimbursement and funds for this trip.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And then passing to the next document, you will +find a letter to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, saying:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I am using the courier to send you also personally a short +report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It contains +as briefly as possible a summary of what I could observe +and hear over here in 4 weeks.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you see that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see the letter. Yes, yes!</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Then you will pass on to the next letter, dated +1 September 1937, addressed to yourself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Enclosing a report covering the first 4 weeks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it before me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, we will pass the report over just for the +moment and you will come to a letter dated 17 December 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is +very far from the matters which they have really got to consider.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. If seems to me that this indicates +very clearly that copies of the same report which is included here +were being sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy—that +went to Raeder—and one to the Army and to Ribbentrop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness’ first answer +was that they did not have joint agents but he subsequently qualified +that and said they might sometimes have had joint agents. +<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: That is right, Sir. If you think he has conceded +that point...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to put this in as Exhibit USA-790.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we +are not, in this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a +free collaborator of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the +question of the German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio +at that time, and he doubtless was there, although it has slipped my +memory, then I must have told him to speak to several persons over +there and report to me. He apparently, as I have only just gathered +from this letter, either because he liked to be busy or for some other +reason unknown to me, or because he knew the other gentlemen, +placed these reports at the disposal of these other gentlemen, on +his own initiative. But he certainly was no agent sent out by +different departments. I think the only person who knew him well +was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he knew nobody at all. I fear +I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he was a private tourist, +who submitted his impressions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you +were not very close to Himmler; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with +Himmler were good during the first few years, but I regret to say +that in the latter years I was not on good terms with him. I +naturally—it was not very noticeable to the outside world—but I do +not wish to discuss this matter in detail. Many things have already +been said about it and there were serious and violent divergencies, +due to many reasons...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what +years did you get along closely with him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler +and myself arose, I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties +in Romania. These divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally +to all outward appearances we had to work together as before, +and we often exchanged letters on our respective birthdays and +on other occasions. But later on relations were not very good. +The final break came in 1941. Formerly I had been on good +terms with him and also shared his opinion for the creation of +a leadership class, at which he was aiming.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with +Himmler in 1940 and 1941?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: How many? +<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Fifty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have +been the case. Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. +But after 1941 relations between us were more strained, and later +they were not very good. Others, I believe, have already testified +to that effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, +except...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments +between Ribbentrop or something other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to +go into?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as +many appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has +discussed with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the +entire matters which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has +told the Tribunal that he had never heard anything about concentration +camps from Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at +no time did Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 +meetings, I do not know, we may have met frequently, despite +everything, but I cannot remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or +ten, I do not know. I do not believe it to be of vital importance +since it is not a decisive factor. Of course we had to work together +in various fields and this collaboration was mostly very difficult.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments +which you had with him also, were there not? Just take a look +at this sheet of entries from Himmler’s appointment book and +tell me whether that conforms to your...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want +this matter gone into any further.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments +as distinguished from social. There are no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions +of the Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German +foreign policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive +questions and request you to answer these questions laconically in +terms of “yes” or “no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act +of German aggression? Please answer this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment +of a purpose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences +at least, after saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else +but “yes” and “no”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You +have replied far too extensively. I would like you to summarize +your replies, precisely by saying “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must +ask you to forgive me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I understand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act +of aggression, that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the +mutual purpose of both nations involved. They had always wished +to be together and the government before Adolf Hitler had already +striven for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or +“no.” Do you consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German +aggression? Do you consider...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical +answer to that; that it was not an aggression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses +are not to be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must +answer “yes” or “no” first, and then make a short explanation if +they want to. But, anyhow, with reference to this question, he has +answered it categorically.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the +seizure of Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but +a union in accordance with the right of self-determination of +nations, as laid down in 1919 by the President of the United States, +Wilson. The annexation of the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an +agreement of four great powers in Munich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my +question. I asked you whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, +of the whole of Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by +Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by +Germany. I consider, according to the words of the Führer, and +<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span> +I believe he was right, that it was a necessity resulting from +Germany’s geographical position. This position meant that the +remaining part of Czechoslovakia, the part which still existed, could +always be used as a kind of aircraft-carrier for attacks against +Germany. The Führer therefore considered himself obliged to +occupy the territory of Bohemia and Moravia, in order to protect +the German Reich against air attack—the air journey from Prague +to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer told me at the time +that in view of the fact that United States had declared the entire +Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of interest, that Russia +was a powerful country with gigantic territories, and that England +embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly justified in +considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an +act of aggression by Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on +Poland was rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. +It might have been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German +demands, and I think the Führer would have trodden this +path of peace, had the other powers taken this path with him. As +matters stood, the situation had become so tense that Germany +could no longer accept it as it was, and as a great power Germany +could not tolerate Polish provocations any further. That is how this +war arose. I am convinced that primarily the Führer was never +interested in conquering Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an +act of aggression by Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is +called, was, according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a +purely preventive measure adopted against imminent landings of +British fighting forces. How authentic our information was is proved +by the fact that only a few days later English and German troops +were engaged in battle in Norway. That means that it was proved +that these English troops had been ready for a long time for fighting +in Norway, and it came out from the documents discovered later +on and published at the time, and from orders issued, that the +English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down to the +smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing +Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater +of war. I do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can +be considered as an act of aggression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on +Norway as an act of aggression on the part of Germany either?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. +I was talking about Norway and Denmark, a combined action. +<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a +simultaneous action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, +Holland, and Luxembourg as an act of aggression on the part of +Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again +say “no,” but I would like to add an explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give +shorter replies because you explain the basic questions far too +extensively. You deny that this was an act of aggression on the +part of Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand +that we are dealing with very important questions, which are not +easily explained in a sentence, especially since we did not have the +opportunity to explain the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been +answering questions of this nature for 3 days running.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish +campaign military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. +The Führer did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, +and France, it was France who declared war on Germany and not +we who declared war on France. We therefore had to prepare for +an attack from this direction as well. The Führer told me at the +time that such an attack on the Ruhr area was to be expected, and +documents discovered at a later date have proved to the world at +large beyond a shadow of doubt that this information was perfectly +authentic. The Führer therefore decided to adopt preventive +measures in this case as well and not to wait for an attack on the +heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the timetable of the +German General Staff was put into practice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an +act of aggression on the part of Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by +Germany has already been discussed. I do not believe I need give +any further details on this point. That is here...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give +detailed replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece +as an act of aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” +or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures +adopted in Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting +bases, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention +of Adolf Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive +action in this sense. It was quite clear that British troops were +<span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span> +about to land in Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and +the Peloponnesos, and that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the +enemies of Germany, in agreement with the enemies of Germany, +as I mentioned yesterday, had been encouraged with the intent of +launching an attack against Germany from that country. The documents +of the French General Staff discovered later in France showed +only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been planned...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken +about that in much detail. You explained it yesterday at great +length. Now will you please answer “yes” or “no” to my last +question: Do you, or do you not consider the attack on the Soviet +Union as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of +the word, but...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word +it was not an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word +was it an aggression?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? +I must be allowed to say something.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very +complicated concept, which even today the world at large cannot +readily define. That is a point I should like to emphasize first. We +are here dealing, undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with +a war of prevention. That is quite certain, for attack we did. There +is no denying it. I had hoped that matters with the Soviet Union +could have been settled differently, diplomatically, and I did +everything I could in this direction. But the information received +and all the political acts of the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until +the outbreak of war, persuaded the Führer, as he repeatedly told +me, that sooner or later the so-called East-West pincers would be +applied to Germany, that is, that in the East, Russia with her +immense war potential, and in the West, England and the United +States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the purpose of +making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry that +this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close +collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and +Moscow. This I do not know; I personally received no such news. +But the reports and information which I received from the Führer +were of an extremely concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, +one day, Germany, faced with this political situation, would be +threatened with catastrophe and he wished to prevent the collapse of +Germany and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe. +<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated +that, in the pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential +to solve a number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. +Now this testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted +just now that all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany +were justified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only +that we were not dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, +and explained how this war came to pass and how it developed. I +also explained how I had always done everything in my power to +prevent the war at its outbreak during the Polish crisis. Beyond the +precincts of this Tribunal, history will prove the truth of my words +and show how I always endeavored to localize the war and prevent +it from spreading. That, I believe, will also be established. Therefore, +in conclusion I should like to say once more that the outbreak +of war was caused by circumstances which, at long last, were no +longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he did, and +when the war spread ever further all his decisions were principally +prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he acted +solely in the highest interests of his people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the +following questions:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, +Number 311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of +Hitler entitled the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that +document not so very long ago. I am not going to quote from it, +since you doubtlessly remember it, as you wrote it a very short time +ago.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document +that is. May I look at it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your +own defense counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the +Tribunal by your attorney. On Page 5 there...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of +this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal +as 111, without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the +Defense submitted as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation +here, which came to us together with a German document +book. I presume that the document book has been submitted to the +Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. +It is not 111; it is Ribbentrop-111. +<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book +Number 9.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation +of Hitler, you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, +under an influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s +plans were extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German +hegemony in Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document +you wrote yourself, Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for +Defendant Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document +is quite irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the +Defendant Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not +know when it was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it +is irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant +did not have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation +to Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw +the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the +document quite irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented +by the defense counsel in the Document Book. It was written by +the Defendant Ribbentrop in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors +considered it admissible since this document, this appreciation, +presented by the Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in +asking a large number of questions. But if the Tribunal considers +that it really is quite irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain +from quoting it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling +on the admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have +seen them this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I should like to put a few questions +with regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should +<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span> +like you to acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document +is entitled “Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” +I invite your attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of +the document. It states: “The Führer has, in connection with the +partition of Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page +it is?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the +partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer +has issued the following instructions:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being +prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will +be carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you found the place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the +words: “The Führer...” Do you have it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the +record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition +of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” +That is how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage +are you quoting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be +carried out according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” +And then reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster +General of the OKH.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not +mentioned here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps +this would be a good time to adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, have you acquainted +yourself with the contents of the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with the entire +document or with Paragraph 4 only?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I have read Paragraph 1 of which you +spoke previously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Did you find the passage referring to the +plenary powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the +partition of the territory of Yugoslavia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it says in my document that the surrender +of the territory occupied by the Italians is to be prepared by +a letter from the Führer to the Duce and put into effect on further +instructions from the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. That is precisely the passage +which I had in view, that is, Section 2 of this document, which is +headed “The Delimitation of the Frontiers.” It is stated there—Section +2, Page 2 of the Document—it is stated:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not in the +foregoing Section I, this is done in agreement with the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have only one question to ask in this connection. +May I assume that this document defines the part played by +the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the partition of Yugoslav territory? +Is this correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: That appears from the fact that the Foreign +Office was to take part in fixing the other frontiers, in addition +to those defined here, the main lines of which were probably, already, +fairly clear. That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This is quite evident. I should like to put two +more questions to you concerning Yugoslavia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 4 June 1941—this no longer refers to the previous document—a +conference was held in the German Legation, presided over by +the German Minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche, at which it was +decided forcibly to evacuate the Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and +the Serbs from Croatia into Serbia. This decision results from a +telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number 389, dated +31 May 1941. Do you know about these measures? +<span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I do not know them, +but perhaps I may read through them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that resettlement was undertaken +there but I do not know the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It goes without saying that it must be very +difficult for you to remember all the details at the present time. +But you do remember that such deportations did actually take place +and precisely in accordance with the directives of the Ministry for +Foreign Affairs?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. It states here that the Führer had +approved a resettlement program, but I do not know the details. At +any rate, we undoubtedly had something to do with it, for this +meeting definitely took place in the Foreign Office; that is certain. +Unfortunately I cannot add any details since I am not informed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. There is one more question +in this connection. This was a compulsory resettlement of the +population?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; I cannot say. No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know? All right. And now the last +question in connection with Yugoslavia: After Germany’s attack on +Yugoslavia about 200 employees of the Yugoslav Foreign Office +attempted to leave for Switzerland. They were arrested; and then, +in spite of protests addressed to your Ministry, they were forcibly +taken to Belgrade whence many of them were sent to concentration +camps and there died. Why did you not take the measures which +you were obliged to take after such a glaring breach of diplomatic +immunity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that at the moment I cannot +recollect it at all; but, as far as I know, instructions have always +followed the principle that diplomats must be treated as diplomats +and sent back to their own countries. If it did not happen in this +case, I do not know why it was not done. However you yourself say +that they were sent to Belgrade. That, at any rate, is certainly in +accordance with my instructions. Why or whether they were later +interned in Belgrade, I must say I do not know. I do not think we +had anything to do with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know that they were interned in +concentration camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Now for a further series of +questions. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the +Sudetenland of 21 November 1938? Can you remember? +<span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know to which order you are +referring. May I look through it? I see that I am one of those +who signed it. This is the law regarding the reincorporation of the +Sudetenland into the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you actually signed this +decree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No doubt. If it says so here, then it must +certainly have been so. At the moment, of course, I do not remember +it exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is evident. Who, beside Hitler, signed +the decree regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of +16 March 1939, which by its very nature destroyed any remaining +vestige of the sovereignty of the Czechoslovakian Republic?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I was one of those who signed +that one, too. At least so I assume. Yes, I see that I signed it; +here it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all these documents +speak for themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature +upon these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I only want to +remind the defendant. Since he appears to forget I simply present +the documents to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You also signed the decree of 12 October +1939 regarding the occupation of the Polish territories. Do +you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: 12 October ’39? No, I do not remember it. +I signed a great many things during those years but I cannot +remember them in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This is the decree dated 12 October.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his +signature, why should you waste time in putting these documents +to him? His signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. +This is a mere waste of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Then I have only one more +question in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Your signature also appears on the +decree of 18 May 1940, regarding the annexation by Germany of the +Belgian territories, Eupen and Malmédy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I put these questions so that I may conclude with the following +question. Am I right in stating that each time the Hitler Government +was attempting to lend the appearance of legality to their +<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span> +territorial annexation by a decree, this decree invariably bore the +signature of the Reich Minister Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I believe not. If any territorial changes +were undertaken, it was the Führer who ordered them; and, as is +probably evident from these documents, the various ministers who +were in any way concerned then countersigned the Führer’s order +or the laws decreed by the Führer, and, of course, I probably +countersigned most of these orders myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now, I should like you to +acquaint yourself with the document already submitted in evidence +to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document Number +USSR-120). It is your agreement with Himmler for the organization +of intelligence work. It is an extensive document and I should like +you to acquaint yourself with Subparagraph 6 of this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I beg your pardon. This is a different document. +This concerns the intelligence service. You spoke of slave +labor, but this concerns the intelligence service.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This has been incorrectly translated to you. I +was not speaking about slave labor; I was speaking about intelligence +work. Please refer to Subparagraph 6 of this document. It +is an extensive document and the time of the Tribunal should not +be taken up unduly. It is stated here, and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance +to the Secret intelligence service. The Minister of Foreign +Affairs, as far as this is compatible with the requirements +of foreign policy, will install certain members of the intelligence +service in the diplomatic missions.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>I want to omit one long paragraph and will read the final paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The responsible member of the intelligence service must keep +the head of the mission informed on all important aspects of +secret intelligence service activities in the country in question.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>You did sign such an agreement? Is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: We are therefore forced to the conclusion that +the foreign organization of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs +was actually engaged in espionage work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, you cannot really say that, for the following +reasons:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I mentioned once before this morning in the course of the examination +that there were differences of opinion between Himmler and +myself in regard to the intelligence service abroad. Thanks to the +<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span> +efforts of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, that agreement was eventually +signed. We planned to co-operate, and I do not deny that we +intended to work intelligence service personnel into the Foreign +Office organization. This, however, was not put into practice. The +agreement could not become effective because it was concluded so +late that the end of the war intervened. I think the date of the conclusion +of this agreement, which is lacking in this copy, must have +been 1944 or even 1945. Thus, there was no actual co-operation. +Such co-operation was, however, planned; and I was particularly +interested in it. There had been all sorts of differences and I wanted +to end them and put matters on a more uniform basis. That was +the reason. In any case, I think that is part of the procedure which +all countries had to employ abroad. I do not think it is anything +unusual.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking you your opinion. I was only +interested in this document; it is true that you did sign such an +agreement. You replied in the affirmative. I am not asking you +further questions about this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I replied in the affirmative—yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I wanted to know this only. I have another +document from this series. Do you remember a letter of the Defendant +Kaltenbrunner in which he asked for one million Tomans for +bribery in Iran?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: One million...? What is that? I did not +hear it; please repeat it. I did not hear the word very well...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: One million Tomans. Tomans are Iranian currency. +I should like you to acquaint yourself with this document; it +is a short one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: May I see it, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect the matter, and I think +certain funds were placed at their disposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: The money was placed at Kaltenbrunner’s +disposal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the details, but I believe I +did give instructions to the Foreign Office at the time that financial +support should be given in this matter. That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It was precisely that point which interested +me. The document speaks for itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now proceed to the following series of questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You have testified that in August or September 1940 in the Schloss +Fuschl, you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum on +<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span> +the possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Consequently, +nearly one year prior to that attack on the Soviet Union, +you were already informed of the plans for this attack, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. The Defendant Keitel +was with me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he told +me that the Führer had certain misgivings regarding Russia and +could not leave the possibility of an armed conflict out of his calculations. +He said that, for his part, he had prepared a memorandum +which he proposed to discuss with the Führer. He had doubts +as to the wisdom of any conflict of that kind in the East, and he +asked me at the time if I would also use my influence with the +Führer in that direction. I agreed to do so. But an attack or plans +for an attack were not discussed; I might say that all this was a discussion +more from a General Staff point of view. He made no mention +to me of anything more concrete.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to detain the attention of the +Tribunal on this question, because it has already been sufficiently +investigated. But I want to ask you in this connection the following +question: You replied to Keitel during this conversation that you +would express your opinion regarding the war with the U.S.S.R. to +Hitler. Did you have a conversation with Hitler on that subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I discussed the subject several times with +Hitler, and on this occasion I spoke of the danger of preventive wars +to him. Hitler told me of his misgivings, which I have already mentioned +here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, you have testified in that sense. Tell me, +did you know that the so-called “Green File” of the Defendant +Göring, containing directives for the plunder and exploitation of +the temporarily occupied territories of the Soviet Union was prepared +a long time prior to the attack on the Soviet Union? Did +you know this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. I heard the term +“Green File” here for the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: All right—you did not know the name. And +when did you learn about the contents? The contents of this file?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Neither the file nor the name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know. All right. You knew that +already before the war directives were drafted for the extermination +of the peaceful Soviet population?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you know about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I heard nothing at all about such plans.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And the directives? +<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding the preparation of such plans...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And regarding the directives concerning jurisdiction +in the Barbarossa region? You evidently did know about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding what? I did not understand that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Regarding jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region. +It is a supplement to Plan Barbarossa.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I have never occupied +myself personally with that subject. It might be possible that some +department in my office did have a hand in it somewhere; but +as far as I remember I, myself, was never concerned with the +subject of jurisdiction; for after the outbreak of the conflict with +the Soviet Union the Foreign Office had nothing more to do with +these territories.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram +which you addressed on 10 July 1941, at 1451 hours, to the +German Ambassador in Tokio. We are submitting this document, +Number 2896-PS, to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-446. +You must remember this telegram.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: To whom is it addressed? It does not +say here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: To the German Ambassador in Tokio. Do you +remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Oh, Tokio, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You apparently remember it. I must ask you +to pay attention to the words on Page 4 at the end of this document. +They are underlined in pencil for the sake of convenience. Have +you found the passage? I shall read only that part into the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Which part are you referring to? The +last page?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It is on Page 4. It is underlined.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have found it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read this passage into the record.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I request you to use every means in your power to influence +Matsuoka, in the way I have indicated, so that Japan will +declare war on Russia as soon as possible; for the sooner this +happens, the better it will be. It must still be our natural aim +to shake hands with Japan on the Trans-Siberian railway +before the winter. With the collapse of Russia the position +of the countries participating in the Three Power Pact will +be so strong that the collapse of England or the complete +annihilation of the British Isles will be only a question of +time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you found this passage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have the passage; yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What is it? Is it one of your efforts to localize +the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand that last question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I say, is this one of your efforts to localize +the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: The war against Russia had started, and +I tried at the time—the Führer held the same view—to get Japan +into the war against Russia in order to end the war with Russia as +soon as possible. That was the meaning of that telegram.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This was not only the policy of the Führer; +it was also your policy as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask. You state +that you never heard a thing about the cruelties perpetrated in the +concentration camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: During the war you, as Minister of Foreign +Affairs, studied the foreign press and the foreign newspapers. Did +you know what the foreign press was saying?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is true only up to a certain point. +I had so much to read and so much work to do every day that, on +principle, I received only the foreign political news selected for me +from the foreign press. Thus, during the whole of the war I never +had any news from abroad about the concentration camps, until one +day your armies, that is, the Soviet Russian armies, captured the +camp at Maidanek in Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On that occasion news came from our embassies and I asked for +press news, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, to be submitted to me. How I took these news +releases to the Führer and what resulted from that has already been +discussed here. Before that I knew nothing about any atrocities or +any measures taken in the concentration camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about the notes of the Minister +for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, concerning the +atrocities committed by the German fascists in the temporarily +occupied territories of the Soviet Union, the deportation into slavery +of the people of the Soviet, the pillaging?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I think that note reached me somehow +through diplomatic channels. I am not quite sure how; it may have +come through news agencies. However, I do remember that at the +<span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span> +time—I believe there were even several notes—at any rate I remember +one of these notes which I submitted to the Führer. But since +the beginning of the Russo-German war we could not carry out any +action in these territories, and we had no influence there. Therefore, +I am not informed about details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I was primarily interested in one fundamental +fact, namely, that you were aware of the notes from the Minister +for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Tell me, please, do you +know that millions of citizens were driven into slavery to Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know! And that those citizens +were used as slaves in Germany—you were not aware of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: No. According to what I heard, all these +foreign workers are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. +I think it is possible, of course, that other things might have +happened, too; but on the whole, I believe that a good deal was +done to treat these workers well. I know that on occasion departments +of the Foreign Office co-operated in these matters with a +view to preventing those possible things. Generally speaking, however, +we had no influence in that sphere, as we were excluded from +Eastern questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Why were you informed that foreign laborers +were treated well and why were you not informed that they were +being treated as slaves?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think that this is correct. We in +the Foreign Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite +a number of other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, from France for them. We advised on questions concerning +their welfare. And I know that the German Labor Front +did everything in its power, at least with regard to the sector which +we could view to some extent, to treat the workers well, to preserve +their willingness to work, and to make their leisure pleasant. I +know, at least, that those of its efforts in which we co-operated were +on these lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I now present a penultimate group of +questions in connection with the activities of the “Ribbentrop Battalion.” +I must now request you to read the testimony of SS Obersturmbannführer +Norman Paul Förster. This document is submitted +as Exhibit Number USSR-445 (Document Number USSR-445). Please +pay particular attention to Page 3 of Förster’s testimony. This passage +is underlined. It is stated there:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“When in that same month, August 1941, I reported to the +address given to me in Berlin, I learned that I had been transferred +to Special Command SS of the Ministry of Foreign +<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span> +Affairs. A member of the Foreign Ministry, Baron von Kunsberg, +was at the head of the SS Special Command... In this +command there were about 80 to 100 men altogether and 300 +or 400 men were added later. The special command was later +rechristened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Battalion ‘z.b.V.’ +(for special employment).</p> + +<p>“I was received by Baron von Kunsberg in a building belonging +to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Sonderkommando +was quartered. He explained to me that the Sonderkommando +was created on instructions from the Reich Minister +of Foreign Affairs Von Ribbentrop. According to Von Ribbentrop’s +instructions, our Sonderkommando was to move forward +with the front-line troops in occupied territory in order +to protect the cultural treasures—museums, archives, scientific +institutions, art galleries, and so forth—from ruin and destruction +by the German soldiers, to confiscate them and transport +them to Germany.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Here I omit a few lines and then:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“On the evening of 5 August 1941, in the presence of Nietsch, +Paulsen, Krallat, Remerssen, Lieben, and others, Von Kunsberg +informed us of Von Ribbentrop’s verbal order according +to which all scientific institutions, libraries, palaces, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, +in Russia were to be thoroughly ‘combed out’ and everything +of definite value was to be carried off.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you find that passage in the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. Shall I answer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you first of all to reply to my +question, reading as follows: You know that such a battalion of the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs existed, and that in accordance with +your directives, it was especially concerned—as is stated in this document—with +the preservation of cultural treasures? Please reply to +this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite incorrect as it appears in this +document. I cannot acknowledge it in any way and I must object +to it. The following is correct:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This Herr Von Kunsberg is a man who was appointed, with a +few assistants, long before the Russian campaign with the idea even +at that time of confiscating in France documents, important documents, +which might be found there and which might be of importance +or value to us. Any order which—at the same time, I may say, +he had orders to see to it that there should be no unnecessary +destruction of art treasures, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. In no circumstances did he +receive from me orders to transport these things to Germany or to +<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span> +steal any of them. I do not know how this statement came to be +made; but in this form it is certainly not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You have protested against a great many of +the documents here. That does not mean that they are incorrect. I +am not going to quote from this testimony any further. I shall now +refer to a document; it is a letter from the Defendant Göring +addressed to the Defendant Rosenberg. It has already been submitted +to the Tribunal under Document Number 1985-PS. I shall +here quote Paragraph 2 of the document. It has already been submitted, +so I shall read this letter addressed by Göring to Rosenberg +into the record. He writes:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“After all the fuss and bother I very much welcomed the fact +that an office was finally set up to collect these things, +although I must point out that still other offices refer here to +authority received from the Führer, especially the Reich +Minister of Foreign Affairs, who sent a circular to all the +organizations several months ago, stating amongst other +things, that he had been given authority in the occupied +territories for the preservation of cultural treasures.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>We can assume that the Defendant Göring is better acquainted +with the circumstances anent the preservation of art treasures. +Don’t you remember those things at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know how this letter from Reich +Marshal Göring came to be written. I do not know, but if there is +any mention in it of authorities or anything of that kind, that could +only refer to the fact that these art treasures were secured in these +territories. I have already stated here that during the war neither +I myself nor the Foreign Office confiscated or claimed any art treasures +whatsoever, whether for my personal use or for our use. It is +possible that these art treasures were temporarily placed in safekeeping. +Certainly none of them passed into our possession. Therefore +it might be a misunderstanding in this letter because I remember +clearly that at that time we were dealing with the safekeeping +of art treasures. In France, for instance, at that time robberies were +beginning to be committed in private houses and art galleries, <span class='it'>et +cetera</span>; and I still remember asking the Wehrmacht to provide guards +to keep a watch on these art treasures, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. At any rate we +in the Foreign Office never saw any of these works of art ourselves.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I think we had better not go too deeply into +details. I should like to ask another question in this connection. +Don’t you think that the term “safekeeping of art treasures in the +occupied territories” actually concealed the looting of art treasures?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly never intended that; and I +have never given any order to that effect. I should like to state +<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span> +that here, emphatically. Perhaps I may add that when I heard that +Kunsberg had suddenly assembled such a large staff, I immediately +ordered the dissolution of his entire battalion—it was not a battalion; +that is badly expressed—at any rate, its immediate dissolution; +and I think I even remember dismissing him from the Foreign +Office, because he did not do what I wanted. I think he was +removed from his office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am closing my interrogation. You +were Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fascist Germans from 4 February +1938. Your appointment to this post coincided with the initial +period, when Hitler had launched on a series of acts involving a +foreign policy which in the end led to the World War. The question +arises: Why did Hitler appoint you his Minister of Foreign Affairs +just before embarking on a wide program of aggression? Don’t you +consider that he thought you were the most suitable man for the +purpose, a man with whom he could never have any differences of +opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about Adolf +Hitler’s thoughts. He did not tell me about them. He knew that +I was his faithful assistant, that I shared his view that we must +have a strong Germany, and that I had to get these things done +through diplomatic and peaceful channels. I cannot say more. What +ideas he may have had, I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Here is my last question. How can you explain +the fact that even now, when the entire panorama of the bloody +crimes of the Hitler regime has been unfolded before your eyes, +when you fully realize the complete crash of that Hitlerite policy +which has brought you to the dock—how can we explain that you +are still defending this regime; and, furthermore, that you are still +praising Hitler and that you are still declaring that the leading +criminal clique consisted of a group of idealists? How can you +explain that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That seems to be a number of questions in +one, and I do not think it is a proper question to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I thought that this was only one question +which summarizes everything.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Will you answer please, Defendant +Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I told you, General Rudenko, that the Tribunal +does not think it a proper question to put.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant, +Mr. President. +<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Horn, I understand that you are going to deal with your +documents now, are you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I see the time; we might perhaps adjourn for +10 minutes now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to announce that the +Tribunal will not sit on Good Friday or the Saturday afterwards +nor on Easter Monday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the +United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking for all +the four prosecutors, to put the Prosecution’s comments on the +document books which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has put in. +I am speaking for all the four prosecutors, with one exception, that +the French Chief Prosecutor wishes to speak on two particular +groups of documents which are of special interest to the French +Delegation. I think, if it is convenient to the Tribunal, I might +put the whole of the Prosecution’s position before Dr. Horn puts his +answer if that is agreeable to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree, Dr. Horn, that he might put +his view first? Is it agreeable to you that Mr. Barrington should put +the position first?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: There are, in all, nine books in the +English version; and the last two have been received only today, +so, as they contain perhaps about 350 documents, I regret that I +have not been able to agree in the list with Dr. Horn, himself, +although I have acquainted him with the comments that the Prosecution +proposes to make.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first two books, comprising Documents 1 to 44, have already +been read in open court on the 27th of March by Dr. Horn, and I +take it that Your Lordship does not want them gone into again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: So that leaves simply Books 3 to 9, +and I have made out a working note of which I have copies. I do +not know whether the members of the Tribunal have them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh, yes; Your Lordship will see that +on the left column are the documents which the Prosecution would +<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span> +object to, and in the middle column are those that they would +allow, and there are remarks on the right-hand side.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Although this does not show it, I have, for convenience, divided +these documents up into nine groups; and so I think I need not go +through all the documents in detail unless there is any particular +question on any one of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Before saying what the groups are, perhaps I might make two +general remarks, that the Prosecution takes the position that the +<span class='it'>German White Books</span>, which figure very largely in this list—<span class='it'>White +Books</span> issued by the government of the Nazi conspirators,—cannot +be regarded as evidence of facts, stated therein; and secondly, that +there are among these documents a considerable number which are +only discussions of subjects in a very vague and tentative stage, and +a great many of them, in the Prosecution’s view, are cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, of the first of the nine groups, I have broken them down +to Czechoslovakia; and if you will look at the note that I have +handed up, that consists of the first few documents down to 45. I +beg your Lordship’s pardon. That is wrong. From after 45, there +are six PS documents which are already exhibits and there are 46 +and 47 and over the page there are 7 more on Czechoslovakia, and the +Prosecution’s position on those is that six PS documents are allowed +and 46 and 47; but, over the page, 66, 67, and 69 are objected to +purely on the ground that they are cumulative—cumulative, I think +of Number 68.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which volume are they in, 66 and 69?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: In Volume 3, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: As they have already been translated does +it make much difference if there are objections that they are cumulative?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, there is not any difference, My +Lord, at all, except if they are going to be read into the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: They have all been translated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: They have all been translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And in the other languages, too?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand so, My Lord, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: So they need not be read into the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the rule, isn’t it, that if they have +been translated into the four languages, they need not be read into +the record?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: That would apply to all the documents +in all these nine books now because they all have been translated. +<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would; but there may be other objections +to the documents besides their being cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: There will be, according to the Prosecution’s +submission, a very large number that are cumulative <span class='it'>in toto</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There will be a very large number?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the point was that, being translated, +they are there already.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is the only point the Prosecution +has against those. The thing is, My Lord, the Prosecution say they +are cumulative. Of course, Dr. Horn might not say so and perhaps +he would welcome a ruling as to whether they should be used or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No. What I was suggesting to you was that +if the only objection to them was that they were cumulative they +may just as well go in, be put in evidence, because they have already +been translated—it saves time—as to have them all argued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord, unless Dr. Horn wishes +to read any of these documents and refer to them specifically.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you mean that he might read them all +and then...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know what Your Lordship is +going to allow him to do. I understood perhaps he would read some +of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Presumably, if he reads many that are cumulative, +we shall stop him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will pass on to the second group, +which are Numbers 48 to 62 inclusive, and those are on the subject +of Allied rearmament and alleged warlike intentions before the +outbreak of war. Number 54 appears to be missing from my book, +and I do not know whether it was intentionally left out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution would object to all those on the ground that +they are irrelevant. They are in Book 3, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 59 is different, isn’t it? 59 is dealing with +a speech by Sir Malcolm MacDonald about the colonies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. That is not exactly rearmament, +but of course it is on the same theme in a way, that it is a provocation +to war. It is certainly in rather a different category from +the others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: The third group deals with Poland, +and that is a very large group because it includes all the negotiations +before the outbreak of the war, and the numbers involved in +that group are 74 to 214.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think it would perhaps be convenient to break that group down +into two phases. The first one would be the questions of the minorities +and Danzig and the Corridor and the incidents connected with +them, and the second phase—slightly overlapping in time, but +roughly it follows after the other one—would be the diplomatic +events involving countries other than Poland, that is to say, very +approximately from the 15th of March 1939 onwards. The first phase +of that group would be Numbers 74 to 181, and the second phase +182 to 214.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, in regard to the first phase, there are two points. The +Prosecution says that these are, with very few exceptions, irrelevant +because they treat of incidents and the problems arising out of these +minority questions, and the Prosecution says those are irrelevant +for two reasons. One of the documents among them consists of an +exchange of notes between the German and Polish governments on +the 28th of April 1939. That is TC-72, Number 14, in Book 5. And +that exchange of notes consists of a confirmation that both parties +unconditionally renounce the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg +Pact. That had been done previously on the 26th of January 1934, +as appears in another document here. It is on Page 2 of my note, +TC-21.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of TC-72?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: TC-72, Number 14, was the 28th of +April 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: And on the footing that the two countries +unconditionally renounced, the use of force on the basis of the +Kellogg Pact, added to the fact that the Defendant Ribbentrop has +himself said that during 1938 Germany was on very good terms +with Poland. And also there was a declaration made by Germany +and Poland on the 5th of November 1937 about minorities—that is +Number 123 in this list of documents; it occurs at the top of Page 4 +in the note. In view of these things, the Prosecution says that the +accounts of these and reports of these incidents and minority +problems are irrelevant and very old history.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think perhaps I might...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have them all cumulative or +irrelevant starting with 76. You mean the cumulative? +<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I am afraid to say, Your Honor, +this was originally got out purely as a working note, and that is +rather an error. It should be irrelevant on account of TC-21.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I was going to say that +perhaps I might anticipate an objection that Dr. Horn has been good +enough to tell me that he will make to this, that yesterday he +contended that certain incidents before Munich had been condoned +by the Munich Agreement, and that the argument I have just put +up is on the same lines as that which the Tribunal turned down +yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But, of course, there is this difference, that the Munich Agreement +was negotiated in ignorance of the Fall Grün and that, from +the point of view of condoning previous incidents, it is not on the +same footing as an agreement negotiated in full knowledge of the +circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>So, My Lord, taking Group 3, Poland and the first phase of it, +the Prosecution would suggest—looking at the middle column on +Page 2—allowing Number 75, which is the Polish Treaty of 1919, +and TC-21, which I have already mentioned, which reaffirmed the +Kellogg Pact, and Number 123 and TC-72, Number 14 and 16, which +I have already mentioned. The remainder, perhaps, might all be +said to be irrelevant; but it would be reasonable, perhaps, to allow +Numbers 117, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159, 160, 163, and TC-72, Number 18. +These were largely discussions between ambassadors and heads of +state, which may have rather more importance than the other documents +in this particular group.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As a matter of fact, My Lord, I think they are all in anyhow, +those that I have just mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That goes up to 182. Starting now at 182, and the first five, 182 +to 186...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to 155 which is the calling +out of Polish reserves, 155 to 158?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, the objection to that +was simply based on the fact that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think they are all mentioned in the conversation +which is 159, and that is probably the reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. I am obliged, Your Lordship. I +think that it is so, but I do not think the objection to them could +be very strong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 182 to 186, My Lord, they are +reports by the German chargés d’affaires in various capitals, and +the Prosecution say that those would not be proper evidence. +<span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are just accounts of the +German chargés d’affaires’ observations and conclusions of fact, for +the most part by them, transmitted to their Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you mean they are irrelevant +on the ground of hearsay?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg your pardon.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Because they are hearsay they +should not be admitted; is that what you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, of course, partly +hearsay. They are also vague, and again, they are transmitted with +an object in view. At least that has been the submission of the +Prosecution, that they are transmitted to color the picture from the +German point of view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Would you admit these if they +were made by chargés d’affaires of other states?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: If they were made by chargés d’affaires +of other states?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they would be admissible if they +were put in as government reports by Allied nations under the +Charter; but they are not really admissible if they are German +documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry; I do not know what +you mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Article 21 of the Charter...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry. Perhaps I do not +make myself clear. I do not quite understand why these are different +from any other official reports made by chargés d’affaires of any +country. Is it because they are German reports?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Because they are German reports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see. In other words, you +think German reports should be excluded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think under the Charter they should +be excluded, except, of course, if they are used by the Prosecution +as admissions against the German Government itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We are going to hear you in a moment, +Dr. Horn. Anyhow, Mr. Barrington, your objection to 182 to 214 is +that it is self-serving evidence and therefore not admissible; is +that it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is right, My Lord. +<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other objection to them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, as I said, conclusions +of fact drawn by an observer in a foreign country. They tend to +get rather vague.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That might apply to a great deal of the +evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 187 to 192 and TC-77 there is +no objection to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 193 and 194 are German Foreign Office memoranda and +they are mere discussions, internal to the German Foreign Office. +193 is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, +and it deals with a visit to him of the French Ambassador. And +Number 194 is similar, a visit of the British Ambassador. Number +195, that is Sir Nevile Henderson’s White Paper, <span class='it'>Failure of a +Mission</span>, and there are a number of extracts from that; it is a book +and there are a number of extracts from that in the document book +and it is contended that they are cumulative of evidence which has +already been given and that in particular most of them are really +provocative. That applies particularly to the first extract.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by provocative?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Your Lordship will see that in the +first extract there are some rather strongly worded opinions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which book are they in?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: They are in Book 6, My Lord. There +are some rather strongly worded opinions about the position of +Soviet Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Number 196 and 197 are German +memoranda and reports for Foreign Office use, and they cover the +same category as 193 and 194. One of them is internal to the Foreign +Office and the other from the German chargé d’affaires in Washington.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Numbers 198 to 203 are all right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 204 is objected to as not being evidence; it is a memorandum +of the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign +Office in Berlin, and it merely talks of a report in the <span class='it'>Berliner +Börsenzeitung</span>. It is merely secondhand evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 205 and 206 are not objected to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next one, TC-72, Number 74, is not objected to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 207 is the same document as the previous one. It is a +mere repetition.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Number 208, My Lord, consists of a collection of extracts +from the <span class='it'>British Blue Book</span>, and I am afraid I have not had time to +<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span> +check up which of them are actually in evidence already. But it is +clear that the majority of them are obviously relevant, but it is +suggested that those in the left-hand column do include unnecessary +detail in view of the rest of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 209, there is no objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 210 is a conversation between the Defendant Ribbentrop +and Sir Nevile Henderson on the 30th of August 1939, and that of +course has been the subject of evidence already and is perhaps in +any event cumulative for that reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 211(a) and 211(b) are just repetitions of documents +quoted from the <span class='it'>British Blue Book</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 212 is a Polish wireless broadcast, and Number 213 is a +German communiqué to the German public, and it is contended that +those have no evidential value.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 214 is an extract from a book which the Tribunal has +already refused to the defendants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, the next page of the note, My Lord, deals with my next +group, which is Norway and Denmark.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Group 4, is it? Group 4, is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is Group 4, My Lord, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>215(a) and 215(b) deal with the case of Iceland and Greenland. +They are not very long documents; they are just considered to be +irrelevant. Objection to them could not be very strong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is no objection to 216(a) and 216(b), which are already in +evidence, I think; and D-629 is also already in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 217 is simply an interview which the Defendant Ribbentrop +gave to the press, which the Prosecution says is not proper +evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 004-PS is already in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 218 and 219, I think, are also in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 220 again is objected to as it is simply an interview with +the press.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to those two Ribbentrop +communications to the press?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is self-created evidence, My Lord. He +has presumably given that evidence already. He had not given it +at the same time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What he said 6 years ago might be relevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if Your Lordship thinks so; but +the point I was making is simply that it is self-created evidence and +created at the time with a view to create an impression. It is +propaganda. +<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may say that, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: Then, My Lord, the next group is the +Low Countries. That group really began at 218, of course, and it +goes on to 240...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this another group? Communiqué of the +5th group?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the fifth group, My Lord, yes. +That goes on from 218 to 245, and I shall not deal in detail with that +because the French Chief Prosecutor is going to speak about that. +And the same with the next group, Number 6, which is the Balkans. +The French Chief Prosecutor will deal with that, Documents 246 to 278.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next group, Number 7, is Russia, that is, Documents 280 to +295, with the exception, I think of 285(a), which seems to have got +there by mistake; it appears to refer to the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 279—I cannot identify from the English translation +what it is at all. Perhaps Your Lordship will be good enough to +make an amendment against Numbers 232 and 283; they should be +put into the middle column, there being no objection to them. But +there is an objection to all the other Russian documents. Your +Lordship will see, beginning at the bottom of the group, 291 to 295, +they all concern the Anticomintern Pact. Working up the page +again from the bottom, 290, 1 to 5, are extracts from the book which +the Tribunal has already refused. And, of the documents above that, +280 is Hitler’s speech about Russia in October 1939. And 281 is a +repetition of a document we have already had, Number 274, which +is the Three Power Pact. That will be dealt with.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that that is a textual reproduction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think I am right in saying that it is +actually a textual reproduction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But why is there an objection if +it is simply a textual reproduction? The Prosecution has been given +textual reproduction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is no objection at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean it is not in the right +column?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I was putting in the Allied column only +the ones which could make up a complete set according to the +Prosecution’s views.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that true of 284 also, the Soviet-German +pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know whether that has come +before... +<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why do you object to that then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: By “Pact,” is it the German Pact of the 28th +of September 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the 28th of September 1939. I +am told that there is no objection to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 285 is again simply a German report which draws conclusions +of facts, and the Prosecution says that has no proper evidential +value. It is a very long report by the German Foreign Office +concerning the agitation in Europe against the German Reich by the +Soviet Union, and it is full of conclusions of fact and opinions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is after the date of the beginning of war +against Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is after the beginning of that war, +My Lord, yes. Number 286 and 287, those are objected to as being +without value as evidence. They come from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 288 is said to be a captured Soviet document; but it has +deteriorated generally in the English version, had no date and no +signature, and it seems of very doubtful value.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 289 is a report from the Yugoslav military attaché in +Moscow, which is also thought to be irrelevant by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Group Number 8, My Lord, is the group concerning the +United States of America, Documents 299 to 310, and including +285(a). The first ten documents, Your Lordship will see, are reports +from, we would say they come from a very indirect source, the +process report by the Polish Ambassador on the political situation +in the United States in 1939. The next one seems to come from +Portugal, the next from the Polish Ambassador again, the next two +also from the Polish Ambassador. Then the next one, Number 300, +is President Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech in 1937, which seems too +far back to be of any proper relevance. Number 301 is a German +summary of events in the United States, which we say is irrelevant +for the reasons I have stated: That they are German summaries, +rather more unreliable than irrelevant. Number 302 again is the +Polish Ambassador’s report. Number 303 is a statement by President +Roosevelt in 1936, and Number 304 is President Roosevelt’s message +to Congress on the 4th of January 1939. I do not think there is +anything very objectionable about that. To numbers 305 to 308, +there is no objection; 309—in my copy there are two different versions +of 309. The first one is a German summary of the facts without +any dates and with no sources indicated. It seems to be of no proper +value as evidence, and the second one, 309 and 309(a), are declarations +of the Pan-American Conference and the German note in +reply to it. I do not think the Prosecution can take a very strong +objection to that, but it does not seem to be very closely in point. +<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>TC-72, Number 127, and TC-72, Number 124, are both appeals of +President Roosevelt to Hitler and are not objected to. 310 is another +German summary of facts without any sources indicated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The ninth group is simply a miscellaneous group; and, if My +Lordship will turn back to the first page of my note, it is the first +8 documents on that page, down to Number 45. They are all allowed. +There is no objection to them, except Number 12, which is the +announcement of the Reichstag election results. It does not seem to +matter one way or the other whether that is in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 45 is Lord Rothermere’s book of predictions and prophecies, +<span class='it'>Warnings and Prophecies</span>. I think the Prosecution contends +that it is not relevant evidence in this case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on Page 2, Numbers 70 to 73. +Number 71 is the German-Lithuanian treaty about Memel, and there +is no objection. Number 70 is thought to be rather irrelevant. Numbers +72 and 73 are objected to because they deal with the Fourteen +Points of President Wilson.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on the last page of one of +my notes right down at the bottom, Number 296, and that is a speech +by Hitler on the Rhineland. You have all the evidence that has +been given. It appears to be rather cumulative, if it is not in +already. I have not actually checked whether it is in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 298 on the top of the next page is, in fact, superfluous. +It is the same as Number 274. And down at the bottom of the last +page, My Lord, 311, is a paper written by the Defendant Ribbentrop +on the Führer’s personality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That has already been ruled out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR BARRINGTON: That, I think, has been ruled out this +morning by Your Lordship. Number 312 is an affidavit of Frau Von +Ribbentrop. Number 313 is an affidavit of Dr. Gottfriedsen. I understand +from Dr. Horn that, although he had been allowed Dr. Gottfriedsen +as a witness, he thinks it will save time if he reads the +affidavit or a part of it. Perhaps, if Your Lordship will allow the +Prosecution to make what comments they think fit when he comes +to do that, it would be the best way of treating it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is all—all my points, My Lord. There are just the Low +Countries and the Balkans.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, it is true that Mr. Barrington +has spoken for all of us; and I do not intend to go over any +of these documents, except this, because I fear there is some question +in the minds of the members of the Tribunal about our objection +running from 76 through 116, 118 to 122, and 114 to 148, the Polish +documents. We also say, of course, with Major Barrington that they +are cumulative, but it seems to me there is a much more basic +<span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span> +objection. Perhaps they all have to do with the alleged incidents +inside Poland and they were published in these <span class='it'>White Papers</span>. These +incidents involved the mistreatment of Polish citizens inside Poland, +who were perhaps of German extraction. Well, it is our view that +such documents are irrelevant here because that is no defense at all +to the charges; and we cannot permit, we say, a nation to defend +itself or these defendants to defend themselves on charges such as +have been preferred here, by proving that citizens of another state, +although they may have been of German extraction or any other +extraction, were mistreated inside that state. Beginning with 76 +running through to 116, 118 through 122, 114 through 148, and 151 +through 152—it is 124 through 148 rather than 114 through 148, +124 through 148. The last are 151 and 152.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for +the French Republic): I will ask the Tribunal’s permission to make +two short remarks about documents which are part of the fifth and +sixth group, and which concern entirely French documents taken +from the <span class='it'>German White Book</span>. It is, as a matter of fact only for this +reason, that the French Prosecution has any knowledge of them, for, +contrary to what the Tribunal believes, the French Prosecution has +not yet received a translation of the documents submitted by Dr. +Horn. The first group, Number 5, Documents 221 to 245; these are +General Staff documents; and it appears that from them Dr. Horn +wishes to draw the conclusion that England and France violated the +neutrality of Belgium. If we ask the Tribunal to reject the 25 documents, +it is only because we see a grave risk of the Tribunal’s losing +time in useless discussions. Far from having any reason to fear +discussion, we feel that on the contrary France and Britain would +both be found to have respected scrupulously the two pacts which +they had signed: The first being to respect the neutrality of Belgium, +and the second being to respect the pact by which they had +guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What is the precise issue here, Gentlemen? Only to find out +whether Germany, France, or England violated the neutrality of +Belgium. The Defendant Ribbentrop has been asked this by his +counsel, and has answered it in the clearest possible manner, during +Saturday’s session, in a statement which the Tribunal is certain to +remember. The Defendant Ribbentrop said, “Of course it is always +very hard in a war like this to violate the neutrality of a country; +and you must not think that we enjoyed doing things like that.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That, Gentlemen, is a formal admission that Germany violated +the neutrality of Belgium. Why should we waste time in discussing +the relevance of these 25 documents now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I go on to the second group, Group Number 6. These are General +Staff documents, which Germany claims to have seized; and they +<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span> +concern events in the Balkans in 1939 and 1940. The French Prosecution +asks you to reject the 22 documents submitted by Dr. Horn +for the two reasons following: They have absolutely no claim to be +considered authentic, and they are not relevant. They have absolutely +no claim to be considered authentic—they are all extracts from +the <span class='it'>White Book</span>; and the Tribunal knows the Prosecution’s views on +this point. Moreover, the great majority of these documents are +extracts from documents originating with the Allied general staffs. +No originals have been produced; and the supposed copies are not +even submitted in their entirety. In the second place, they are not +relevant, for they all concern plans studied by the general staffs in +the last months of 1939 and the early part of 1940. These plans for +French or British intervention in Yugoslavia and Greece naturally +presupposed the consent of the governments concerned as an indispensable +condition. The plans were never carried through. They +were definitely abandoned after the Armistice of June 1940. The +documents date from 1939 and 1940; and the Tribunal will remember +that the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece occurred on +6 April 1941 at a time when the Hitler Government no longer had +any reason to fear plans made in 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These documents, which have no claim to be considered authentic, +are also in no way relevant to the present discussion; and for that +reason the French Prosecution asks the Tribunal to reject them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn. Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks +that you may possibly, in view of the evidence which the Defendant +Ribbentrop has given, find it possible to withdraw some of these +documents, in view of the time that has been taken up. I mean the +Defendant Ribbentrop has dealt with the subject very fully; and it +may be, therefore, that you will be able to withdraw some of these +documents in order to save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I will withdraw all the documents +which are cumulative. I should like first...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you let us know now what it is you wish +to withdraw...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>To begin with may I state my position on a few basic questions? +That is the probative value of the <span class='it'>White Books</span> and the ambassadors’ +reports. I would like to point out that these documents had a decisive +influence on political opinion. That applies to the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop as well as Hitler. And in addition, I would like to +point out that the Prosecution have relied largely on reports of this +kind. I should like, therefore, to ask for equal rights for the Defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I would like to say a few words about the documents of +the French General Staff which were found in the town of La +<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span> +Charité during the French campaign. If the High Tribunal shares +the doubts and misgivings expressed by the representative of the +French Prosecution, I ask permission to question the Commander of +Army Group 10, Field Marshal Leeb, as to the fact that these General +Staff documents were found in the town of La Charité.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Polish documents to which I have referred were found in +the Polish Foreign Ministry at Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief at +that time, Field Marshal or Generaloberst Blaskowitz, can testify to +that effect. And in this connection I would also name Generaloberst +Blaskowitz as a witness, if the Tribunal has any misgivings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Moreover, I can summarize the opinion of the Defense by saying +that I believe that objections can be raised against a document only +if its inaccuracy is obvious from the contents or if it can be shown +to be a forgery. I ask the Tribunal to admit all the other documents +contained in the <span class='it'>White Books</span> or the ambassadors’ reports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the documents on Polish minority questions I would like to +point out that Prime Minister Chamberlain himself described the +minority question as being the decisive question between Germany +and Poland. Since these negotiations, of which the main subject, +besides Danzig and the Corridor, was the minority question, led to +war, the minority question is therefore one of the causes of the +war. Therefore I ask that the documents on this point, which prove +continuous violation of the minority pacts on the part of Poland +be admitted in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If the High Tribunal agree, I will now begin to submit the documents +to the Tribunal for judicial notice or to read certain essential +passages; and I would like to tell the Tribunal now which documents +I will dispense with.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if I might just +state my position—not as regards the case of Ribbentrop, with whom +I am not concerned; my colleague, Dr. Horn, is dealing with him—but +simply on principle, not exclusively from the Defense point of +view, but quite objectively and basically in regard to the various +problems which the Tribunal must consider before making their +decision as to the admissibility of any piece of evidence—either in +the form of a question put to a witness or a document to be submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not asking for permission to talk for the sake of talking, +but because I believe that by doing so I can shorten the later stages +of the proceedings; because I hope that the Tribunal will be in +agreement with the main points of my statements and that therefore +it will be unnecessary for the Defense to make these statements at +a later stage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have naturally to leave it entirely to the Tribunal whether +they consider it now the appropriate time or whether I shall do +<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span> +it only after my colleague Horn has finished with his documentary +evidence. At any case I should like to make the statements before +the Tribunal have ruled upon the applications of the Prosecution +and of Dr. Horn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask Your Lordship whether the Tribunal will +allow me now to make clear, as shortly as possible, the position I +take up in principle on the questions which I consider of vital +importance for the decision. May I do this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe, without wishing to criticize the juridical +value of the statements which we have heard here, that there has +been some confusion of ideas. We must keep the distinction quite +clear in our minds: 1. Is an item of evidence—and that applies to +witnesses as well as documents—relevant? 2. Is an item of evidence +useful as such? 3. Is an item of evidence cumulative and therefore +to be rejected?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal rule that something offered in evidence is not +relevant, not useful, or cumulative, then it must refuse the application +for it at this stage of the proceedings. On the other hand, +the question of the credibility of something offered in evidence—that +is, whether the answer of a witness is to be believed or not, whether +the contents of a document may be considered credible, whether +expositions set forth in a <span class='it'>White Book</span>, for instance, are to be believed +or not believed—that, in my opinion, is a question which can be +decided only when the evidence in question has been brought into +the proceedings and the Tribunal have taken judicial notice of it +and are able, when freely evaluating the evidence—a course which +is open to the Tribunal—to pass judgment on its credibility or +otherwise. For that reason I think that at the present moment there +seems to be no reason for saying, for instance that this document +cannot be used at all because it is part of a <span class='it'>White Book</span> published +by the German Government. No one will deny that a <span class='it'>White Book</span>, +that is, a publication, an official publication, issued by any government, +can as such be useful and relevant evidence. Whether the +passage read and introduced into the proceedings is such that the +Tribunal can give it credence is a question that can be decided after +the evidence in connection with the <span class='it'>White Book</span> has been introduced +into the proceedings, and the Tribunal have taken official notice +of the passage in question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I turn to the question of relevancy and effectiveness. The +representative of the British Prosecution has stated here that the +reports sent by the German ambassadors to their Foreign Minister +are, <span class='it'>per se</span>, not useful. At least, that is the way I understood him. +They will be admitted only if the Prosecution wishes to use them. +<span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span> +In other words, they are to be admitted only if the Prosecution, +wishes to use them to the detriment of the defendants. I do not +think that this point of view can be maintained. The representative +of the British Delegation cited Article 21 of the Charter in this +connection. Article 21 of the Charter has nothing whatsoever to do +with this question. Article 21 of the Charter merely states, so far +as I remember it—I do not have the Charter on hand but I believe +I know the contents of it very well—that documents referring to +the investigation by the governments of the victorious powers of +war crimes committed in their own countries do not have to be read, +but may merely be submitted to the Tribunal for judicial notice. +This question however has nothing whatsoever to do with the question +of the usefulness or relevancy of a report submitted at any time +by a German ambassador to his Foreign Office. Whether this report +has been admitted, or is to be admitted, can be decided according +to whether the Tribunal consider as relevant the subject which +it concerns and which it is to prove—if the fact which is to be +proved by it is considered relevant by the Tribunal and is adequately +established by one or both parties. Then, in my opinion, this ambassador’s +report should be admitted; and after its admission the +Tribunal can, by freely weighing the evidence, consider the value +of the evidence, that is, its credibility, and moreover its objective +as well as its subjective credibility. So much for the clear-cut +differentiation of the concepts of relevancy and usefulness and for +the concept of the value of evidence, that is, the objective and +subjective credibility of evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, with regard to the question of whether evidence is cumulative. +It is certain that every jurist in this courtroom agrees that +cumulative evidence should not be admitted; but the question of +whether evidence is cumulative may in no circumstances be judged +formally, so to speak, mechanically. I can well imagine that a +question with the same wording as one that has already been +put, need not necessarily be cumulative, for reasons which I will +enumerate in a moment and that a question which in form does not +resemble one already put, may nevertheless be cumulative because +it requires an answer from the witness regarding the same evidence, +but expressed in different words. The fact that a question may be +identical in wording with one which has already been put does not +necessarily mean that it is cumulative as shown by the old proverb +<span class='it'>Si duo faciunt idem non est idem</span>. If, for instance, I ask a witness +who bears the stamp of a fanatical adherent of the Nazi regime for +his subjective impression of something and then put the same question +on the same impression to a witness who is known to be a +fanatical opponent of the Nazi regime, then these two questions +are certainly not cumulative, for it is of paramount importance, if +<span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span> +the Tribunal is to be in a position to form an opinion and make a +decision, to find out whether an impression is registered in the same +way by two worlds, so to speak—by two diametrically opposed +persons. Therefore one has to take the witness into consideration +in judging whether a question is cumulative or not. A further +example of the fact that a question which is exactly similar to one +previously put need not be cumulative would be, for instance, if I +put the question to the defendant and then to a witness who is not +interested. In saying this I wish in no way to disparage the evidence +given by the defendant under oath. That is far from being my +intention. In principle, the testimony of both the witnesses is alike. +There is, however, a great difference. In order not to take too long +I will cite only one example—whether when investigating some +phase of the defendant’s inner life about which he himself is +best informed, I question a witness who had an impression of this +incident concerning the defendant, or whether I question the defendant +himself for whom this inner impression is a part of the +psychological background of his deed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to stop at this point, in order not to take up +too much of the Tribunal’s time with theoretical expositions. My +intention in making this statement was only to request the high +Tribunal in making their decision, I repeat in regard to relevancy +and usefulness, to make a clear distinction in the question of the value +to be attached to subjective evidence, which should be decided after +its admission, and to ask the Tribunal, when considering whether +evidence is cumulative, not to be guided solely by the outward form +of the question or the document but to investigate whether it +would not be in the interest of truth and give a deeper insight +into the case to put the same question to different people, or to +have the same question confirmed, or not confirmed, by written +statements by different people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My conscience is uneasy about this academic exposition, but I +hope that the clarification which I have tried to make and in which +I may perhaps have succeeded to some extent, may help to shorten +somewhat later stages of the proceedings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long +you think you are going to be over these documents, because we +are getting further and further behind. And how long do you +anticipate you will be? Have you made up your mind yet what +documents you are prepared to withdraw, if any?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should need about two more hours—that +is without objections on the part of the Prosecution, and I +believe that in that time I can finish my entire presentation +including the reading of the most important passages, which are +<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span> +limited to a very few documents. Therefore, without objections +about two hours.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have heard the Prosecution’s objections. +We have heard them. We will consider them, and we will consider +any answer that you make to them; but we do not desire at this +stage, when we have all these other defendants’ cases to be heard, +that you should go into these documents in detail now and read +them, and we hope that you will not think it necessary to read +from these documents after you have answered the objections of +the Prosecution to certain of the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I have the intention...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you the idea that you had finished your +argument in answer to the Prosecution’s objections or not? Did you +intend to deal further with the admissibility of any of these particular +documents or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In accordance with the wishes expressed by the +Tribunal I intend to submit these documents in groups, with a brief +connecting text and in each group where the Prosecution has made +objections to add a few remarks on the points raised. I do not +intend to do any more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you see, the position is this. The +Prosecution have objected to certain documents on certain grounds, +and we want to give you a full opportunity to answer those objections. +When you have your full answer to those objections, we think +it will be appropriate we should adjourn and decide upon those +objections and upon your arguments. Do you see? That we should +rule that, after you have given your answer to the objections, we +should adjourn and decide which of the documents we rule to be +admissible in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: If the Tribunal intends to give its ruling after I +have taken my position on the objections of the Prosecution, then +I ask that I be given an opportunity now, for, to begin with, I +would like...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Horn. Because you see, +it is 5 o’clock, and we shall not be able to conclude it tonight.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Horn, if you could conclude your arguments in answer to +the questions of principle which have been raised by the Prosecution +now, we think it would be the most convenient course if you could +do it in a fairly short time. I mean, you have heard what the Prosecution +say about these various groups, and it would be more convenient, +we think, if you could answer that in the space of a quarter +of an hour now. +<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: First of all, I would like to refer to documents +numbered 48 to 61. In regard to these I can take only the following +position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Number 48 to 61. Perhaps I may again use these +pages of the Prosecution, with their objections, as a basis. Documents +48 to 61 were rejected as irrelevant, but these documents deal +with rearmament and preparation for war by the opposite side. I +can arrive at the basic motives animating Hitler and Ribbentrop +only by contrasting the German evidence with the evidence given +by the other side. I cannot judge of the illegality of an action unless +I know all the facts. To know all the facts, I have to know the +attitude taken by the other side. Therefore, I consider these documents +highly relevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The next group of decisive importance consists of +the documents dealing with the Polish minority problem. The representative +of the Prosecution has said that by the German-Polish +agreement of 5 November 1937, the minority problem was sanctioned +by both countries. That is, all violations of international law in +regard to minority questions would be considered a closed chapter +if they had occurred before that year. This view is certainly not +correct, because one agreement cannot sanction the violation of a +prior agreement. Moreover, during the negotiations for the 1934 +pact between Germany and Poland it was expressly agreed, as I +can prove by means of these documents that, after a general political +agreement had been made, the minority question as well as that of +Danzig and of the Corridor should be settled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These questions were expressly held in abeyance pending a +further settlement by agreement, and as no such settlement of the +two questions was made, the documents dealing with the violations +by the Poles of international law with regard to minority pacts +cannot be rejected on account of this agreement. For this agreement, +as I should like to emphasize once more, particularly deals with a +further agreement for the settlement of this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second objection for this group is the fact that the minority +problem on the whole is called irrelevant. Previously I stated briefly +that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain himself realized the +need for regulating this problem. I will submit this document too; +it is Document Number 200 in my document book. All the political +circles concerned thought that the solution must be found for this +question and therefore considered it relevant. I ask the Tribunal +therefore to admit the documents referring to it. These documents +cannot be rejected in part as cumulative, as was done here, for on +<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span> +the strength of these documents, I wish to prove that these minority +pacts have been repeatedly violated since 1919, and I submit documents +from the international tribunal of The Hague and the League +of Nations at Geneva, showing that these violations took place +during a period of over 20 years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I accept the objections made by the Soviet Delegation to Documents +286 to 289, and I withdraw Documents 286 to 289.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since the Tribunal recently objected to the book <span class='it'>America in the +Battle of the Continents</span>, I also withdraw documents presented under +Number 290, 1 to 5. I have also referred to that book under several +other numbers, and I withdraw also all those numbers which refer +to the book, <span class='it'>America in the Battle of the Continents</span>. As for the +ambassadors’ reports, I again refer to my statement and the basic +statements made here a moment ago by my colleague, Dr. Dix. I +am convinced that, on principle, and on the strength of the legal +arguments adduced and also in view of the fact that the Prosecution +have used such reports extensively, the Defense should also be +granted the right of referring to these reports, especially as they +formed the foundation on which German political opinion was based.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I shall not be able to dispense with the files of the French +General Staff either, for the reasons I have stated. It has been said +that Documents 221 to 269 are irrelevant. They are not irrelevant, +because we had neutrality pacts with those countries, and in the +neutrality pacts it was agreed that Germany would respect their +neutrality as long as the other side also respected it. As it would +now be possible here to prove that the other side did not respect +this neutrality, the proof of whether a war of aggression against +these countries by Germany...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The point that M. Champetier de Ribes was +making was that France was out of the war by 1940. Therefore +documents which were drawn up by the French General Staff in +1940 had no relevance in 1941. Isn’t that so? That is the point that +he was making.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: You mean the French Prosecutor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the French Prosecutor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes. However, the fact that breaches of neutrality +were committed by France and were known to the German Government +at the time alters the legal situation completely. You cannot +say that Germany waged an aggressive war against these countries +when we knew through our intelligence service that our opponents +intended to occupy these countries, and did in fact do so, by sending +out General Staff officers. Thus it was the other side which was +guilty of violation, and the files which have been found have only +<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span> +confirmed the intelligence reports submitted to us at the time; I say, +at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore, you cannot accuse Germany of violating the neutrality +pact in these cases. I would like to ask the Tribunal, therefore, to +admit those files as relevant for the reasons stated. With reference +to the other documents, I ask to be permitted to make my statement +when I submit the documents to the Tribunal in the presentation of +evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, we want to rule upon it +when we have heard your arguments; we do not want to have to +rule again over every document. We want you to take them in +groups, in the way the Prosecution has, so that we may make up +our minds and rule.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: These are the main objections which I have to make +to the arguments of the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal once more +to differentiate between considerations of principle raised by Dr. Dix, +and between the factual considerations raised by myself with regard +to the individual groups.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 3 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-EIGHTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 3 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has read and considered every +one of the documents produced by Dr. Horn on behalf of the Defendant +Ribbentrop and the Tribunal rules as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will refer only to the documents to which no objection was +taken, where the Tribunal rejects them; that is to say, documents +to which no objection is taken are allowed with the particular exceptions +which I make.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With reference to the documents to which objection was taken, +the Tribunal rejects Numbers 12, 45, 48 to 61 inclusive. It allows +Document 62. It rejects Documents 66, 67 and 69. It allows Document +70. It rejects Documents 72, 73, 74. It rejects Documents 76 +to 81 inclusive. It grants Document 82. It rejects Document 83. It +grants Documents 84 to 87 inclusive. It rejects Documents 88 to +116 inclusive. It rejects Documents 118 to 126 inclusive. It allows +Document 127. It rejects Documents 128 to 134 inclusive. It rejects +Documents 135 to 148 inclusive. It rejects Documents 151 and 152. +It allows Documents 155 and 156. It rejects Documents 157 and +158. It rejects Document 161. It allows Document 162. It allows +Document 164. It allows Documents 165 to 183 inclusive. It rejects +Document 184. It allows Documents 185 and 186. It rejects Document +191. It allows Documents 193 and 194. It rejects Document +195, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It grants Document 195, Paragraphs +5, 6, 7, 8, 9. It rejects Documents 196 and 197 and 198. It rejects +Document 204. It rejects Document 207. It grants the whole of +Document 208. It grants Document 210. It rejects Document 211 (a) +and (b) and Document 212. It grants Document 213. It rejects 214. +It rejects 215 (a) and (b). It grants Documents 217 and 220. It grants +Documents 221 to 245, except Document 238, and it also excludes all +comments contained in those documents. It rejects Documents 246 +to 269. It rejects 270 and 271. It rejects 275. It rejects 276. It grants +277 and 278. As to 279, the Tribunal would like Dr. Horn to inform +them what that document is because in the copy that they have got +it is unidentified. That is 279, Dr. Horn, in Book 8, I think.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The document contains the Non-aggression Treaty +between Germany and the Soviet Union, of 23 August 1939. It contains +the text of that treaty. +<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, then that will be allowed. 280 and +281 are granted. 282, 283, and 284 are granted. 285 is rejected. 286 +to 289 were withdrawn. 290 was withdrawn. 291 is granted. 292 is +rejected, 293 is rejected, 294 is rejected. 295 is rejected. 296 is +granted. 298 to 305, inclusive, are rejected. 306 is granted. 307 is +rejected. 308 is granted. 309 and 309 (a) are both rejected. 310 is +rejected. 311 had already been ruled out. 313 is granted. 314 is +rejected. 317 is granted. 318 is rejected. Well, 312 is granted; it +had not been objected to. I do not have a note of 315 and 316; are +they asked for?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: 315, Mr. President, is the reproduction of a PS number, +that is 1834-PS, and has already been submitted and therefore +need not be submitted again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does that apply also to 316, Dr. Horn?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: 316 also has a PS number and therefore need not be +resubmitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, that deals with all the numbers, +I think.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Mr. President, I will dispense with Number 312, and +ask instead for Number 317. This contains a notarized statement +under oath...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 317 is granted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn, will you deal with the ones +which we have left in, as far as you wish to deal with them. If +you wish to comment upon any of the ones that we have allowed, +you may do so now. We do not desire you to do so, but if you wish +to do so, you may.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship for permission to present +my arguments. I will present only very brief arguments at a time +to be determined by the High Tribunal, so that I can sort the +documents and need not take up your time unnecessarily? All the +documents are fastened together at present and it would take longer +if I were to present my case now than if I could present the sorted +documents. I therefore ask the Tribunal to set a time when I may +present these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The application is granted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes. I will then have concluded my case and will +need only a relatively short time to comment briefly on some but +not all of the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If Dr. Nelte is already to go on with the case +of the Defendant Keitel, the Tribunal suggests possibly you might be +able to deal shortly with your documents at 2 o’clock. +<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that be agreeable to Dr. Nelte?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: I will consult my colleague.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Nelte has just advised me that he will fetch his documents +and then he can proceed with the presentation of his case immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Dr. Nelte returned to the courtroom.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal is much obliged to +you for presenting your argument now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I will begin the presentation of the +case for Keitel by asking you to summon the defendant to the witness +stand, and I shall question him. The documents which I will +use in this interrogation were submitted with a list yesterday. I +hope that those documents are at your disposal so that you will be +able to follow my questions in a manner which is desirable in the +interest of a smoothly conducted interrogation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then you will call the Defendant Keitel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Keitel took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): Wilhelm Keitel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak +the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please describe your military career briefly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the year 1901, in the beginning of March, I became +an officer candidate in an artillery regiment of the Prussian Army. +At the beginning of the first World War, in 1914, I was the regimental +adjutant of my regiment. I was wounded in September +1914, and in the beginning of November I became chief of a battery +of my regiment. Since the spring of 1915 I served in various general +staff capacities, first with higher commands of the field army, later +as a general staff officer of a division. Towards the end I was the +first general staff officer of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Then I +joined the Reichswehr as a volunteer. Beginning with the year 1929 +I was Division Head (Abteilungsleiter) of the Army Organizational +Division in the Reichswehrministerium. After an interruption from +1933 to 1935 I became, on 1 October 1935, Chief of the Wehrmacht +<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span> +Department (Wehrmachtsamt) of the Reichskriegsminister, that is +Chief of Staff with the Minister of War. While on active service +I became Generalmajor. At that time I was chief of an infantry +brigade. On 4 February 1938 to my surprise I was appointed Chief +of Staff of the Führer, or Chief of the OKW—Oberkommando der +Wehrmacht. On 1 October 1939, I became General of the Infantry +and after the campaign in the West in 1940 I became Field Marshal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were you a member of the National Socialist German +Labor Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I was not a member. According to military law +I could not be or become a member.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But you received the Golden Party Badge. For +what reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct. Hitler presented this Golden Badge +of the Party to me in April 1939, at the same time that the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch, received it. +The Führer said it was to be in commemoration of the march into +Czechoslovakia. The Golden Badge had “16 and 17 March” engraved +on it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In the year 1944 the Military Service Law was +changed so that active soldiers could also become members of the +Party. What did you do at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct. In the late summer or autumn of 1944 +the Military Service Law was changed so that active soldiers could +also be Party members. At that time I was invited to submit personal +data for the Party in order to be listed as a member of the +Party. At the same time I was asked to send in a donation of money +to the Party. I submitted personal data to Party headquarters and +also sent in a donation, but as far as I know I never became a +member. I never received a membership card.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: To what extent did you participate at Party +functions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Owing to my position and to the fact that I accompanied +the Führer constantly, I participated at public functions of +the Party several times, for example, at the Party rallies in Nuremberg, +also each year when the Winter Relief Work campaign was +launched. Finally, according to orders, each year on the 9th of November, +I had to attend, together with a representative of the Party +a memorial service at the graves of the victims of 9 November 1923. +It took place symbolically in memory of the fight on 9 November, +between the Party and the Wehrmacht. I never participated in +internal conferences or meetings of the Party directorate. The +Führer had let me know that he did not want this. Thus, for +<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span> +example, every year on 9 November I was in Munich, but never +participated in the gatherings of the so-called Hoheitsträger (bearers +of power) of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What decorations did you receive during the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the war—it must have been in the winter of +1939-1940—I received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. I did +not receive any other German war decorations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you have any sons?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I had three sons, all of whom served at the front as +officers during this war. The youngest one died in battle in Russia +in 1941. The second was a major in Russia and has been missing +in action, and the eldest son, who was a major, is a prisoner of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, beginning with essential +matters, I would like to put the following basic questions to you: What +basic attitude did you, as a soldier, an officer, and a general, have +toward the problems with which you had to deal in your profession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say that I was a soldier by inclination and conviction. +For more than 44 years without interruption I served my +country and my people as a soldier, and I tried to do my best in +the service of my profession. I believed that I should do this as a +matter of duty, laboring unceasingly and giving myself completely +to those tasks which fell to me in my many and diverse positions. +I did this with the same devotion under the Kaiser, under President +Ebert, under Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, and under the Führer, +Adolf Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What is your attitude today?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As a German officer, I naturally consider it my duty +to answer for what I have done, even if it should have been wrong. +I am grateful that I am being given the opportunity to give an +account here and before the German people of what I was and my +participation in the events which have taken place. It will not +always be possible to separate clearly guilt and entanglement in +the threads of destiny. But I do consider one thing impossible, that +the men in the front lines and the leaders and the subleaders at +the front should be charged with the guilt, while the highest leaders +reject responsibility. That, in my opinion, is wrong, and I consider +it unworthy. I am convinced that the large mass of our brave soldiers +were really decent, and that wherever they overstepped the +bounds of acceptable behavior, our soldiers acted in good faith, +believing in military necessity, and the orders which they received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in presenting evidence regarding +violations of the laws of war, Crimes against Humanity, repeatedly +point to letters, orders, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, which bear your name. Many so-called +<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span> +Keitel orders and Keitel decrees, have been submitted here. +Now we have to examine whether and to what degree you and your +actions are guilty of and responsible for the results of these orders. +What do you wish to say to this general accusation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is correct that there are a large number of orders, +instructions, and directives with which my name is connected, and +it must also be admitted that such orders often contain deviations +from existing international law. On the other hand, there are a +group of directives and orders based not on military inspiration but +on an ideological foundation and point of view. In this connection +I am thinking of the group of directives which were issued before +the campaign against the Soviet Union and also which were issued +subsequently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What can you say in your defense in regard to those +orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say only that fundamentally I bear that responsibility +which arises from my position for all those things which +resulted from these orders and which are connected with my name +and my signature. Further, I bear the responsibility, insofar as it is +based on legal and moral principles, for those offices and divisions +of the OKW which were subordinate to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: From what may your official position and the scope +of your legal responsibility be inferred?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is contained in the Führer’s decree of 4 February +1938 which has been frequently cited.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am submitting this decree to you so that you can +have the text before you. In this Führer decree, Paragraph 1, you +will find:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“From now on I will directly and personally take over the +Supreme Command of the entire Wehrmacht.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What did that mean compared with the conditions that had +existed until then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Until that time we had a Commander-in-Chief of the +Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Von Blomberg. In addition there was +the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht who, according to the +constitution, was the head of the State—in this case, Hitler. With +the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Von +Blomberg, there was only one Supreme Commander and that was +Hitler himself. And from that time on he himself exercised command +of all three arms of the Wehrmacht: The Army, Navy, and +Air Force. It also says “from now on directly.” That should establish +unequivocally that any intermediary position with authority to +issue orders was no longer to exist, but that Hitler’s orders +<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span> +as Supreme Commander were issued directly to the three arms of +the Wehrmacht and their Commanders. It also says here “directly” +and “personally.” That, too, had its meaning, for the word “personally” +was to express the fact that there was and would be no, +I would say, “deputizing” of this authority.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I assume therefore that you never signed your +orders “acting for”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I do not remember a single instance in which I +signed “acting for.” According to our military principles, if the +question had arisen to appoint a deputy, it could have been only +one person, the Commander-in-Chief of the three arms of the Wehrmacht, +namely the one highest in rank.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In Paragraph 2 of the decree of 4 February 1938 +it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...the former Wehrmacht office in the Ministry of War, with +its functions is placed directly under my command as OKW +and as my military staff.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>What does this signify in regard to the staff which was thereby +formed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht had his +military staff in the Wehrmachtsamt, that is to say, the Wehrmachtsamt +in the Ministry of War. Hitler, as Supreme Commander, +took over the Wehrmachtsamt as his military staff. Thus, this staff +was to be his personal working staff. At the same time that the +post of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was eliminated, +that of Reich Minister of War was also removed. There was no +War Ministry and no Minister of War as heretofore. Thus one could +clearly see what Hitler wanted, namely, that between him and +the Wehrmacht divisions there was to be no one holding office with +any authority either in command channels or in ministerial functions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When this decree was issued you were installed as +holder of a new office with the title of “Chief OKW.” Will you +please clarify whether this term “Chief OKW” is correct; that is, +whether it really was what the title seems to indicate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I must add that I realize only now that this term in +its abbreviated form is not quite apt. To be exact one should have +said, “Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” and +not the abbreviation, “Chief OKW.” From the case presented by the +Prosecution I gathered that the idea of “Chief” was interpreted as +if that were a commander, chief of an office, with authority to issue +orders. And that, of course, is an erroneous conclusion. It was +neither a position of a chief in the sense of a commander, nor, as +might have been assumed or has been assumed, was it a position as +<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span> +chief of a general staff. That too, is incorrect. I was never Chief +of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. It was Hitler’s unmistakable +wish to concentrate in his own person all the authority, all the +power of command. That is not merely a retrospective statement. +He clearly expressed this desire to me on several occasions, partly +in connection with the fact that he told me repeatedly, “I could +never put this through with Blomberg.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I have here a statement made by Field Marshal Von +Brauchitsch and submitted by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Perhaps I might add something further. I was discussing +the fact that it was not a position of Chief of the General +Staff, since it was Hitler’s basic view that commanders-in-chief of +the Wehrmacht branches each had his own general staff, or operations +staff, and that he did not want the High Command of the +Wehrmacht, including the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, to take over +the functions of a general staff. Therefore, in practice the work was +done by the general staffs of the Wehrmacht branches, while the +Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW, which was purposely kept +small, was a working staff for Hitler, a staff for strategic planning +and for special missions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s statement in +his affidavit, of which I have already spoken, is correct? It says here:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“When Hitler had decided to use military pressure or military +power in attaining his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army, if he participated, received his instructions first +orally, as a rule, or by an appropriate order. Thereupon the +OKW worked out the operation and deployment plans. When +they had been submitted to Hitler and were approved by him, +a written order from the OKW to the branches of the Wehrmacht +followed.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, in principle it is correct insofar as the final formulation +of the order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army took the +form of a directive, as we called it, based on the general plans which +had already been submitted and approved. This work was done by +the Wehrmacht Operational Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab); thus +the Wehrmacht Operational Staff was not an office which became +independently active and did not handle matters concerning the +issuing of orders independently; rather the Wehrmacht Operational +Staff and I took part in the basic determination or approval of these +proposals and formulated them in the manner in which they were +then carried out by Hitler as Commander-in-Chief. To speak technically +we then passed these orders on. +<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then I have an affidavit by Generaloberst Halder +which deals with the same subject. You know this affidavit Number +1. I believe I can dispense with the reading of it and as evidence +refer only to Halder’s affidavit Number 1, which has been submitted +by the Prosecution (Document Number 3702-PS).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In addition the Prosecution submitted another treatise without +a special number. The title of the treatise is “Basis for the Organization +of the German Wehrmacht.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this the document which you say the Prosecution +offered in evidence but did not give a number to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, this document was given to us by the +Prosecution, I believe by the American Prosecution, on 26 November +1945. I do not know...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean it never was deposited in evidence +by the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I do not believe I can decide that. I assume that a +document which has been submitted to the Defense Counsel was +submitted to the High Tribunal at the same time, if not as evidence, +then at least for judicial notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? Is it an affidavit +or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It is not an affidavit; it is really a study by the +American Prosecution. And, I assume, it is a basis for the indictment +of the organization OKW, and so forth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, I do not have it in the document book, because +I assumed that was also at the disposal of the High Tribunal. Besides, +Mr. President, it is a short document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Mr. Dodd can tell us what it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If I could see it I might be able to be helpful. I am +not familiar with it. It is probably one of the documents which we +submitted to the Defense but which we did not actually introduce in +evidence, and that happened more than once, I think, in the early +days of the Trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I refer to a single short paragraph of this study +which I would like to read. Perhaps we can thus obviate submitting +the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the whole of the +affidavit? I do not mean at this moment, but are you proposing to +offer it? +<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I assume that the Prosecution have already submitted +it. I am only referring to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The whole affidavit? What is the number of it, +if it has been submitted?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: This affidavit also does not have a number. The +Prosecution...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It has not been submitted if it has not a +number on it then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is suggested to me that possibly the Halder affidavit was +offered and then rejected.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No. At that time a series of affidavits was submitted: +By Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, and many other generals who +are in Nuremberg. None of these affidavits had an exhibit number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This affidavit was put in by the United States as an +exhibit. I do not have the number handy, but I think it was submitted +at the time Colonel Telford Taylor submitted the case on +behalf of the Prosecution against the High Command and the OKW. +This Halder “affidavit,” the first document which Doctor Nelte +referred to, is not an affidavit. It was a paper submitted to the +Tribunal and to the Defense by Colonel Taylor. It set out some of +the basic principles of the organization of the High Command and +the OKW wholly before he presented his part of the case. It is +really just the work of our own staff here in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Nelte, as the document you are referring +to, not the Halder affidavit, appears to be a mere compilation, +the Tribunal thinks it should not go in as an exhibit, but you can +put a question to the witness upon it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the essay which you +have before you, the Prosecution asserted the following: After 1938 +there were four divisions: The OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht); +the OKH (High Command of the Army); the OKL (High +Command of the Air Force); the OKM (High Command of the Navy); +and each had its own general staff. What can you tell us about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say only that this is not correct, and also contradicts +the description which I have already given of the functions of +the High Commands of the Wehrmacht branches and of the OKW. +There were not four such departments. There were only three: The +High Command of the Army, the High Command of the Navy, and +the High Command of the Air Force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As I have just stated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht as +a personal, direct working staff, was in no way an independent +authority in that sense. The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht +branches were commanders, had the authority to issue orders and +<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span> +exercised this power over troops which were subordinate to them. +The OKW had neither the power to issue orders, nor subordinate +troops to which orders could have been issued. It is also not correct, +if I recall the speeches of the Prosecution, to use the expression +“Keitel was Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.” I am mentioning +it only to emphasize this point. Further, I would like, briefly, +to call attention to the diagram on the last page of the document +which has been shown to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: This sketch is the diagram which is called “The +Wehrmacht.” It is an exposition, a diagrammatic exposition of the +entire Wehrmacht and its branches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe I should point briefly to the fact that it is +this diagram which was the basis for this erroneous conception, +because in it the High Command of the Wehrmacht is designated as +a special office or office of command, and that is incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What tasks had you in this military sector as the +Chief of the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: First of all, it was an essential task to secure for the +Führer with and through the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, all the +documents and all the numerous informations and reports which he +desired. I dare say that the Wehrmacht Operational Staff had, in +this connection, the function to one might say arrange and establish +direct and close communication between Hitler and the general staffs +of the branches of the Wehrmacht. In addition to securing a countless +number of such documents which were demanded daily, there +was a second function, namely to be regularly present at all conferences +in which the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht +branches and the chiefs of their staffs participated as well as the +Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff. On those occasions as +soon as a series of oral orders was given, these orders, in compliance +with military principles, naturally had later to be confirmed in +writing. Only in this way could we prevent mistakes or misunderstandings +from arising, that is, by confirming these orders to those +who had already received them orally the orders were made clear. +That is the purpose and meaning of the order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How did you sign the orders and documents which +you drew up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is correct that this form of orders and directives were +almost exclusively signed by me. They were actually orders which +had already been given and which had already long since been +transmitted through military channels. As can be seen from the +bulk of the documents submitted here, this gave rise to the form +which I made a habit of using in which I always wrote at the +<span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span> +beginning or after a few preliminary words, “The Führer has therefore +ordered...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the large majority of cases this order was no longer a surprise +to the office which received it. It was nothing new but it was only +a confirmation. In a similar way I naturally had also a considerable +number of organizational and other directives and orders also in not +purely operational fields worked out under my supervision and +passed on. In this respect I should like to point out particularly that +in no case did I send out orders without having shown them again +to my supreme commander when making the daily reports, in order +to be certain that I had not misunderstood him in any form or +manner or that I was not issuing anything which—and this I would +like to emphasize—did not have his approval to the letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: There was another category of orders and directives...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I perhaps add a few words?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In order to clarify this: Among the documents submitted +here are those which Hitler personally signed and released +under the heading “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the +Wehrmacht.” There are some exceptions in which such directives +were signed by me “by order of,” I would like to explain this matter +also. In this case it is also true that if these directives, which for the +most part had been corrected several times by Hitler personally, +had to be issued urgently and the Supreme Commander was prevented +from signing himself, it was necessary for me to let the +signature go out in this form, never as “deputy” but always as “by +order of.” Otherwise, orders were issued as I have already stated, in +the form of directives which were signed by me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At the same time I should like to mention that even if we have +a series of documents here headed “Chief, Supreme Commander of +the Wehrmacht” or—some of them are different: “High Command of +the Wehrmacht”—if they are signed, “by order, Jodl,” I can say that +it can be proved almost automatically that I did not happen to be +there at the time; otherwise I would have signed it myself, knowing +that I was Chief of Staff who, in accordance with military regulations, +had to sign such documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The memorandum which you have before you contains +the following sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The OKW united in itself the activity of a staff and of a +ministry; the matters involved, which had previously been +taken care of by the Reich War Ministry, have probably also +been turned over to the OKW.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Please clarify the ministerial function of the OKW. +<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, this formulation as set down in this document is +not exactly incorrect, but it is on important points at least, open +to misunderstanding, for it was not at all true that all functions +which had been previously carried out by the War Minister were +turned over to the OKW. There were many functions and rights +which the War Minister, in his capacity as minister, and thus the +person responsible for them, could and did decide even for the +branches of the Wehrmacht and their commanders, which were never +transmitted to the Chief of the OKW, that is, to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The following things happened at that time: Everything in this +connection involving authority to issue orders or exercise supreme +command, and which the Führer did not wish to take over personally, +was transferred to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of +the Wehrmacht as far as supreme authority and authority to make +decisions were concerned. To touch on the subject briefly, I should +like to mention a few essential facts which I remember. For example, +the officers’ personnel records, decisions on complaints, documentary +material on budget questions, court jurisdiction and court authority, +which formerly belonged to the Minister of War, were transferred to +the commander-in-chief, as well as all questions concerning officials +and all questions of the rights of officials. I could mention still more, +but I merely wished to point out that even in cases where decisions +had to be made, as for example, removing an official or dismissing +an employee, the chief of the OKW did not decide. These powers +were delegated to the commanders-in-chief in addition to the powers +they held previously and which were transferred from the War +Minister’s jurisdiction. There were only certain reservations which +the Führer made for himself. Similarly some of the other fields of +the OKW were limited in their assignments in the course of the +following years through the dissolution of the Economic Armament +Office. The position of Armament Minister was created because of +the dissolution of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, that is, the Counterintelligence +Service, of which only the branch self-protection of the +troops was left with the Wehrmacht; everything else was transferred, +and so forth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My authority included the following: It was my duty in all cases +to get Hitler’s decision on all basic questions with which this ministerial +section was concerned. I was free from the necessity of doing +this only in current matters or if there was complete agreement +between the persons involved in a ministerial or administrative +question and the branches of the Wehrmacht in my department. In +such a case a decision by Hitler was not necessary. I must emphasize +again, in summary, that the OKW had no authority of its own, and +that one can say only that Hitler actually functioned as Supreme +<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span> +Commander of the Wehrmacht, just as the functions of the War +Minister were combined in his person so as to, to repeat that, to +eliminate an intermediary official at all costs. That is, there was to +be no intermediary between him and the commanders-in-chief of the +Wehrmacht branches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that +they would hear Dr. Horn at 2 o’clock, they would not wish to interrupt +the examination of the Defendant Keitel if you prefer to go +on with that now. It is a matter for you to consider whichever you +like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees that I continue the interrogation of +Keitel now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the +Tribunal I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred +to this morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as Exhibit USA-531 +(Document Number 3702-PS) on 4 January, by Colonel Taylor; and +the second Halder affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced +as Exhibit USA-533 (Document Number 3707-PS) on 5 January, by +Colonel Taylor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd was kind enough to put at +my disposal a number of copies of the pamphlet, “Principles of +Organization of the German Armed Forces” so that I can submit +them to the Tribunal. I do so now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You last explained that on 4 February +1938, part of the authority of the War Ministry was transferred to +branches of the Armed Forces, and part to the High Command of +the Wehrmacht. In the decree which has been mentioned it says, +concerning this matter:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The OKW at the same time is taking care of the affairs of +the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the OKW, on my orders +will exercise the authority which the Reich Minister of War +had heretofore.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Tell me briefly to which fields this applied. I myself will submit +to the Tribunal a diagram which has already been sent to the +Translation Division for translation. I do not know, however, if the +Tribunal already has the translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The ministerial functions actually transferred to the +OKW were executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most +important now, indicating their functions:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, a few words about the Wehrmacht Operations Staff +(Wehrmachtführungsstab) which, being an office of the OKW, was +subordinated to it in the same way as the other offices of the OKW +were, but which was on a higher level than the other offices. As +the name implies, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was an organ +<span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span> +of the Führer’s High Command with which he frequently—I might +say, mostly—collaborated personally. It had no ministerial powers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there was the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines +Wehrmachtsamt) which took care mainly of ministerial and administrative +questions. One could almost call it a war ministry on a small +scale.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the office of Counterintelligence Service (Amt Ausland Abwehr), +which was to a large extent ministerial but to some degree an +aid in operational questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the Economic Armament Office, in regard to which I must +point out that in the year 1940 this office was dissolved and only a +small Defense Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) remained, which +was mainly concerned with questions of supply of all consumer +goods needed by the Armed Forces, such as fuel, coal, gasoline, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and which I need not mention further.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then an important field of activity: Replacements Administration +for the entire Armed Forces, or abbreviated, Recruiting, a central +office which was designed mostly to take care of personnel questions +within the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the Legal Administration, the Budget Department, and a +number of other offices which it is not necessary to enumerate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In these offices the ministerial functions of the OKW were +carried out. I would like...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed +the distinction which the defendant has made between the General +Staff for the High Commands and the position of the OKW; but is it +necessary for the Tribunal to go into all these details?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I had finished dealing with this section.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you +have just put before the Tribunal, this diagram, are you desiring to +make an exhibit of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I would like to submit it in evidence. You will also +be given a translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You +must number all your exhibits.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please number it, Keitel-1(a).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We prepared it and the technical division of the +Prosecution has reproduced it. The Prosecution also are in possession +of the diagram. +<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the defendant to confirm that +it is correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Field Marshal, would you please look at this diagram +and confirm whether it is correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I recognize the diagram...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution have not received +this diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before +making conclusions, to acquaint themselves with this diagram.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: They can be obtained and distributed right away. +Then I would like the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the +diagrams have been submitted in sufficient numbers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain +the minor changes which occurred from the time of the creation of +the OKW up to the time which I have mentioned, changes brought +about by the reorganization of the armament ministries, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, +but it shows the manner in which it actually worked during the last +years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In order to terminate this group of questions I +would like to say the following: Is it correct that according to this, +all the Keitel orders, Keitel decrees, which have been submitted by +the Prosecution, were in reality Führer orders, that is to say, orders +which were the expression of Hitler’s will, based on his instructions +and commands?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that is the correct definition of the summary of the +testimony I have given. I would like to state again in summarizing +that, as I have stated from the beginning, I assume and have +assumed responsibility for these orders insofar as they are connected +with my name, for the position was this: I, of course, knew the contents +of these orders which I executed. I recognize my signature, of +course, in the documents which have been submitted to me and +therefore I accept the documents as authentic. I may add that +insofar as I had military or other objections to the orders, I naturally +expressed them very forcibly and that I endeavored to prevent +orders being given which I considered controversial. But I must state +in all truth that if the decision had been finally made by Hitler, I +then issued these orders and transmitted them, I might almost say, +without checking them in any way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter upon the next phase +of my questions I should like to state the following:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have deduced Keitel’s participation in the many +crimes which have been described here from various facts, facts +<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span> +which cannot always be connected with each other and made to +agree. The Prosecution have stated that he was a powerful and +important staff officer. That is set out in the Indictment. Then the +Prosecution stated that he was a tool without a will of his own and +that the relation between himself and Hitler was an intimate one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You will understand that if the defendant wants to clarify or to +protest against these things he must explain the relation between +himself and Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the defendant has been +doing. He has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you +want to elucidate it further you must ask him further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I only wanted to let him speak about the private +relation to Hitler. So far we have been concerned only with the +official relation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Would you please tell us something +about the co-operation between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as +brief as possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the +same time give us a correct picture.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The co-operation can be characterized only as one +between a high military superior and his subordinate. In other +words, the same relations as I have always had in my military +career with the senior officers of whose staff I was a member. The +relation between Hitler and myself never departed from this strictly +military and soldierly relationship. Of course, it was my right and +my duty to express my opinions. How difficult that was can be +judged only by someone who knows that Hitler, after a few words, +was wont to take over the entire discussion and to exhaust the +subject entirely from his point of view. It was then very difficult, +of course, to come back to the subject again. I may say that due to +my various positions in high staff offices I was quite used to dealing +with the superior commanders, if I may use that expression. +However, I was quite unaccustomed to the conditions which I encountered +here. They surprised me, and not infrequently they +reduced me to a state of real uncertainty. That can be understood if +one knows that Hitler, in soldiering or military questions, if I were +to express myself very cautiously, was a man with far-reaching +plans for reform with which I, with my 37 years of service as a +soldier of the old school, was confronted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was it the same during the war or do you refer to +the time before the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the war these controversies were moderated by +the events, so that actuality was strongly influenced by the urgency +of the situation. Therefore, these things did not appear in that form. +<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span> +On the other hand, the position then was that Hitler in his discussions +about the situation had a comparatively large circle of about +twenty people assembled around him, and speaking in military +terms, unsparingly made his accusations—objections and criticism—directed, +as a rule, at people who were not present. I took the part +of the absent person as a matter of principle, because he could not +defend himself. The result was that the accusations and criticism +were then aimed at me, and my training as a soldier finally forced +me to control myself, because it is unseemly to answer back or to +oppose or to attempt to contradict a superior before very young +subordinates, such as those who were present. Opposition to a +superior or to personalities, no matter what their rank, was +unbearable to the Führer. One could then attempt to speak to him +about these things only in private.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Had you the feeling that you had Hitler’s confidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I could not say yes. I must frankly admit that Hitler’s +confidence in me was not without reservations, and today I know +only too well that there were many things concerning which he had +never spoken frankly to me and about which he never took me into +his confidence. It was a fact that Hitler was very suspicious of the +old or elderly generals. For him they were products of an old and +antiquated school and in this sense he was to us old soldiers a man +who brought new revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and +wished to incorporate them into Wehrmacht training. This frequently +led to serious crises. I believe I do not have to elaborate on +that. The real evil, however, was that this lack of confidence led +him to believe that I was in conspiracy with the Army generals +behind his back and that I supported them against him. Perhaps +that was a result of my habit of defending them because they could +not defend themselves. At various instances that led to extremely +acute and serious crises.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Much will depend upon stating how your co-operation +with Hitler has to be valued, particularly to what extent +you could be considered his collaborator or adviser. Will you tell +me whether Hitler discussed his plans with you in the manner which +is customary in close collaboration?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In general I must deny that. It was not in any way in +keeping with Hitler’s peculiar disposition and personality to have +advisers of that kind, that is, if you call an adviser someone who +gives advice in the sense of presenting, let us say, a great number of +military elements from long experience as an officer, but not in the +sense of an adviser to help to formulate a decision, such far-reaching +decisions which are doubtlessly meant here. On principle, such a +decision was preceded by weeks or months of careful consideration. +<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span> +During that time one had to assist by procuring documents, but +concerning the main point, the decision itself, he did not brook any +influence. Therefore, strange as it may sound, the final answer +always was: “This is my decision and it is unalterable.” That was +the announcement of his decision.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But if various departments were competent for these +decisions, were there no general conferences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I cannot recall that any one of the really important +decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated as the result +of joint counsel for instance between the politicians, the soldiers or +other ministers, because it was Adolf Hitler’s own way to speak, +privately as a rule, to each department and each department chief, +to learn from him what he wanted to know, and then to find out +some element that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. +Things were not at all as would appear from the documents here of +minutes of conferences of generals, of meetings and similar things +with a list of those present. Never did such a meeting have the +character of a deliberation. There could be no question of that. +Rather, the Führer had a certain idea, and if for various reasons he +thought that we opposed that idea even inwardly, he used that as a +reason to clarify his thoughts before a large circle without any +discussion. In other words, in these assemblies, which the documents +here speak of as conferences, there was never any deliberation. +I must add that even the external form which these things took was +such that, following the military example, the senior commander +convened a certain number of generals, everyone was seated, the +Führer arrived, spoke and went out. No one in such a situation +could have found an opening to say anything. To use just one word +for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an +order but not a conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: To come to a different subject, the Prosecution have +asserted that you had been a member of the Reich Government. +What do you have to say about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I never belonged to the Reich Government and I was +also never a member of the Cabinet. I must also state that I never +became a minister, but as is stated in the decree of 1938, “he has the +rank of a Reich minister,” not “he is Reich minister.” The expression +“minister” is, of course, simply intended to indicate the rank of +minister and there was a good reason for that. I need point out only +what I said this morning: It was not intended that there should be +anyone holding an office with the authority of a minister between +Hitler and the Wehrmacht, and the branches of the Wehrmacht. I +must clarify the question which has been frequently raised by the +Prosecution that “He had the rank of a minister,” by saying that, +<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span> +before the decree was issued, I asked whether I was to deal with the +State secretaries or with the ministers, and Hitler said, “If on my +orders you deal with other ministers of the Reich, then, of course, +you can do so only with the rank of a minister, not on the level of +a state secretary.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the explanation of the expression in the decree “He has +the rank of a Reich minister.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you, in the headquarters have any conferences +with other important and competent personalities, such as Ribbentrop, +Rosenberg, Speer, Sauckel, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Ministers or special plenipotentiaries visited headquarters +according to a plan which very seldom led to the simultaneous +presence of several of them. Generally, it was carefully +arranged so that a special time was set aside for each one. As a rule, +I was of course informed that “the Foreign Minister is here” or +“Minister Speer is here” or the “Plenipotentiary General for +Allocation of Labor Sauckel is here.” However, I was called in +only in regard to purely military questions which the Führer +discussed with these gentlemen in private and I could give instances +of this. However, as has already been mentioned recently, during +the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it would be false +to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters formed +a small or select cabinet. Hitler dealt with each of these officials +and functionaries separately, gave him his orders, and dismissed +him. It sometimes happened that on the way home, these gentlemen +visited me, mostly to ask me about small questions and small favors +which I could do for them or with instructions to inform me about +a decision or with the order to forward a decision to those military +offices which had to be notified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In concluding, I would like to know whether the +expression “intimate” which is contained in the Indictment, is correct +in order to describe the relations between you and Hitler, privately +or officially?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I found the word “intimate” in the Indictment and I +asked myself the question, “Where does this conception originate?” +To be quite frank, I have but one answer for it, that is that no one +ever heard a single word from me about the actual and constant +difficulties that I had. I deliberately kept quiet about them. Intimate +relations are, according to my definition of “intimate”—I do not +know if in the English translation “intimate” expresses the same +thing which we call “intim”—relations where there is confidence +and frank discussion and these did not exist. I have already +characterized it. Intimacy was not Hitler’s attitude towards the +generals, to whose senior generation I also belonged. Apart from the +<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span> +very formal intercourse which sometimes lasted for weeks and in +which even the external forms were hardly observed—I do not want +to discuss this in detail here—the relation never reached a point +where it could be classified as that of a close adviser or a close +collaborator as I conceived it in my Army staff positions. I must say +that for my part I have been faithful and loyal and I always fulfilled +my duties in that manner. However, I must also say that a sincere +and personal relation based upon mutual understanding and confidence +never existed. It has always been correct, but it was military +and official, and never went beyond that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: By the decree of 4 February 1938 a Secret Cabinet +Council was established. According to the contents of that decree, +you are supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet Council. In +order to save time, I merely wish to ask you: Do you confirm from +your own knowledge the statement made by Reich Marshal Göring, +that the Secret Cabinet Council was established only for appearances +and that a Secret Cabinet Council was never constituted and that it +never had a session?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can answer only, “Yes, never.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I come now to the question of the Reich Defense +Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat). In the session of 23 November, the +prosecutor submitted in evidence, as proof of the rearmament and +the active participation of the Wehrmacht in the planning of war of +aggression, among others:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document EC-177, which was designated as “Meeting of the +Reich Defense Council of 22 May 1933.” I must say that I have taken +the translation from the minutes and I am not sure whether the +expression “Reichsverteidigungsrat” was translated correctly. In the +minutes it states that it is a meeting of the working committee. For +your information may I say that the Reichsverteidigungsrat was +supposed to be a sort of ministerial body and that in addition, there +was a working committee.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A second document, EC-405, was submitted concerning a meeting +of the same body on 7 March 1934; and a third document, 2261-PS, +dealing with the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and the simultaneous +appointment of Dr. Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for War +Economy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Beyond doubt, you have been active in questions of national +defense. These documents are also submitted as evidence against +you. I ask you, therefore, to state whether these meetings in which +you participated and which you conducted, were concerned with +preparations for war and rearmament.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: From the very beginning, as long as we were working +on these things and by means of a committee of experts from which +<span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span> +everything else evolved, I personally participated in these matters, +and I may call myself the founder of that committee of ministerial +experts which was set up to co-operate with the War Ministry. As +Chief of the Organizational Department of the Army, in the winter +of 1929 and 1930, that is, 3 years before Hitler came to power, I +formed and personally assembled that committee after the Chancellor—I +believe it was Brüning—and the Prussian and Reich +Minister of the Interior Severing had consented to it. I would like +to add that a representative of Minister Severing was always present +to make sure that nothing took place which would have been in +violation of the Treaty of Versailles. This work was very difficult, +because no Reich minister and no department head was officially +obliged to carry out the wishes of the National Ministry of Defense, +this was purely voluntary. Consequently, the work went along +haltingly and slowly. In this committee of experts which met perhaps +two or three times a year, we dealt with, if I may put it +briefly, what assistance the Civilian Department could render, in +order to set free the small army of 100,000 soldiers for purely +military tasks, naturally limiting ourselves to the defense of our +frontiers, as stated in the Treaty of Versailles: “The Defense of the +Frontiers”; I could perhaps still repeat our discussion from memory, +since, with the exception of the period from 1933 to 1935, I conducted +every one of these meetings myself, that is as leader of the discussion, +not as chairman. I can, however, refer you now to the +<span class='it'>Mobilization Handbook for Civil Authorities</span>, which was the outcome +of this work and about which I shall speak later. It may be possible +to submit it here. We were concerned only with questions of defense, +such as the protection of our frontiers, and, in order to make myself +clear, I should like to mention some of them. The Wehrmacht was +to be free to protect railway property, post office property, repeater +stations, radio stations, and to man the frontiers with security units +for which the Customs Services were to be responsible. Cable and +sea communications with East Prussia were also to be improved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will not bore you with all this. They were all defensive +measures with a view to freeing the few soldiers for purely military +functions, because for purposes of actual military operations I need +not tell you what we could have done with an army of only 100,000 +men. Any questions which went beyond this were never dealt with +in that committee. The manner in which we worked was this: I +asked the experts to submit their wishes to the heads of departments +or state secretaries and then to try to persuade the heads of +departments to take over the tasks from us, so that we could say +that was being done by others and we need not bother about it. I +can guarantee that operational questions, strategic questions, armament +questions, questions of supply of war equipment, were never +discussed in this committee. They were only organizational questions +<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span> +of the taking over of functions which generally should be performed +by a soldier, but which we wanted to transfer to the civil authorities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, as to the meeting of 22 May 1933, which has been discussed +several times, it was already stated in the heading of the minutes +which we have before us: “Competency—heretofore the Reichswehrminister, +now the Reich Defense Council”—I have just explained that. +Hitherto Reichswehrminister, over the committee, voluntary participation +of the ministers of other departments, now obligatory activity +of the heads of departments, that is, the group of ministers who +received the title of “Defense Council.” I will express that even +more clearly, so that it cannot be misunderstood. Every member of +the committee represented a ministry. The minister to whom the +committee member was responsible, along with his colleagues, +formed the Reich Defense Council, as envisaged by us then. They +were the Council and we were the Committee. Therefore, “heretofore +the Reichswehrminister”—now, one could say, as I have just expressed +it, the other ministers were obliged to do that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In Paragraph 3 the working plans were particularly mentioned. +These working plans, in a word, are the forerunner of the <span class='it'>Mobilization +Book</span>, which is the final stage; whereas the working plans of +about 1933 were the intermediary stage. Then as regards the concluding +words at the meeting of 22 May 1933, which have been given +special prominence here by the Prosecution, and which deal with the +need for secrecy—the passage where I said, according to the minutes, +that nothing which could lead to objections at the Disarmament +Conference should be left lying in the desks of the ministries—that +is correct. I did say that, and I have said it because the experts told +me that, with the exception of a small wooden box or a drawer in +a desk which could not be locked, they had no place in which to keep +anything, and because Von Blomberg, Reich War Minister at that +time, who had been in Geneva at the Disarmament Conference for +almost two years, gave me the definite order before this meeting, to +point out these things, because in Geneva one was surrounded by an +extremely large number of agents who were only waiting to be able +to present proof that, in spite of the disarmament negotiations, there +were things going on which could be interpreted as violations of the +Versailles Treaty. That is what I had to say about the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I have given to you now the <span class='it'>Mobilization Book for +the Civil Administration</span>. It is Document 1639-PS. It has been submitted +in order to prove that aggressive wars were being planned. +Would you explain to us the purpose of this book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have already stated that at an earlier stage, that is, +during the years 1932-33, the individual ministries had so-called +working plans, indicating what they were to do if something +happened which necessitated their participation in defending the +<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span> +country. In the course of years, naturally, a number of new tasks +were added and that finally led to this <span class='it'>Mobilization Book</span> for the +civil authorities and civil administration, the study of which would +certainly show nothing which might have anything to do with strategic, +operational, or other preparations for war. On the other hand, +I am not in a position to prove that everything contained in this +book could never have been useful in military operations which +could develop from an aggressive war plan. Many measures, one +could almost say most measures, in the event of mobilization would +not indicate on the surface whether it is a measure for defense or a +measure which is necessary or indispensable for aggressive action. +That cannot be determined. But I believe I can say, because I, +myself, have been engaged so deeply in this work, perhaps more +than in any other, that there was no reason at all to burden the +civilian experts—they were high government counsellors—with +strategic or operational planning. I do not believe that it is necessary +to prove that such work is not within their scope. I have looked +through and studied this mobilization book here. I do not wish to +bore you by citing points which are of a purely defensive nature. +I could name them: barriers, reinforcement of the frontier defenses, +demolitions, cutting of railroads and similar things, all this is in +the book. One of the most important chapters, which, if I remember +correctly, we discussed during four or five of these sessions, was the +question of evacuation, that is, evacuating territories close to the +border of valuable war material and personnel, so that, in case of +war with the neighbor, they should not fall into the hands of the +enemy. This problem of evacuation was one of the most difficult, +because the extent to which one can evacuate, that is, what things +can be evacuated, is perhaps one of the most difficult decisions +to make.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to say one more thing about the Reich Defense Committee, +supplementing the ideas which I expressed before. Until the +year 1938, no meeting or session of the Reich Defense Council was +ever held, that is, the ministers who were the superiors of the +committee members never met, not even once. I would have known +about it, although at the cabinet meeting, I believe as early as March +1933, we passed a resolution to make these ministers responsible for +a Reich Defense Council which should deal with these tasks, and to +oblige them to take over these tasks as their necessary contribution +to the defense of the Reich, and, of course, to finance them. That +was the main purpose, otherwise the Reich Defense Council never met.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Actually, the minutes which have been presented, for +the period of ’33 to ’38, are of the meetings of the working committee. +But you know that about eight days ago two documents +were submitted which appeared to be the minutes of the meetings of +<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span> +the Reich Defense Council. One session or assembly is supposed to +have taken place in November 1938, and the second one in March +1939. Unfortunately these documents have not been submitted to +me, but I have looked at them and you have also seen them. Can +you explain to us how these minutes, that is, these meetings came +about and what they mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I merely wish to add a few supplementary words to +the statement which Reich Marshal Göring has already made. In +December 1938, there was passed the Reich Defense Law, which had +been drawn up in 1935, a shelved law, that is, a law which had not +been made public and which required modification, the reason being +that the Reich Defense Law of ’35 was devised by the Reich War +Minister, Commander-in-Chief Von Blomberg, who no longer held +office. I was with Reich Marshal Göring at that time to discuss this +with him and to find a new basis for this law, which until then had +not been published. This law of the autumn of 1938 had a number +of supplementary clauses as compared to the old one, and perhaps +I will be able to give details later. Among other things, according +to this law also, Reich Marshal Göring was the delegate of the +Führer, a function formerly held by the Reich War Minister and +which I could not exercise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This conference in November 1938, to recall it briefly, had been +convened by Reich Marshal Göring in order to present this law +which had not been published, and which was not to be published, +to a large circle of members of the ministries. There were about +seventy or more persons present to whom the Reich Marshal explained +the purpose and the essence of this law in the form of a +speech. There was no discussion, apart from that speech, and there +was certainly no question of a meeting of the Reich Defense Council +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You also recently showed me the second document of a meeting +of the Reich Defense Council as it is called and as also appears in +the heading of the minutes of the summer 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, March 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That has been mentioned here, and I believe it was the +second meeting of the Reich Defense Council. I can explain that. +This is how it was: I called a meeting of the committee and, of +course, furnished Reich Marshal Göring with the agenda and the +names of the people who were to be present. Reich Marshal Göring +informed me that he would come himself and that since he wished +to discuss other questions, he would accordingly enlarge the attendance. +This conference, therefore, had an agenda which I had +planned for the committee, and concrete questions were also brought +up for debate. It is, however, remarkable that according to the list +<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span> +of those present, that is, according to the numbers, the members of +the Reich Defense Council were represented by only a very small +number, almost not at all, although there were about forty or fifty +people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was a body of 12 +people, and it needs no further explanation that, from the form in +which these two conferences took place, one could not say that this +was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Council based upon a +clearly defined agenda, but rather that there were two meetings, the +motive and extent of which I have described here.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you might +get on a little more quickly with the defendant. The Tribunal recall +that you asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit +of the defendant’s evidence, and there is in your document book an +affidavit. You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at +very much greater length than you would have gone into them if +you read the affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal +more shortly with the evidence in future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I made every effort to be as brief and +concise as possible in my questions, but testimony is, of course, +always subjective. The defendant is unfortunately the one who is +mentioned most frequently in this Trial and naturally he is interested +in clarifying those matters which he considers essential in +order to present his case clearly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I do not think it is necessary +to discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed +their wish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your +request, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Field Marshal Keitel, you have just given us an explanation of +the Reich Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee. You +probably realize that we are not and should not be so much concerned +with whether decisions are made by a Reich Defense Council +or a Reich Defense Committee. We are interested in what actually +took place and whether or not these things justify the imputations +of the Prosecution. In this respect I ask you to tell me if those +things which you discussed and planned on the Reich Defense Committee +justify the suspicion that you were considering aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I realize fully that we are not concerned with the +formality of whether it was the Council or the Committee, since the +Council was a board of ministers while the Committee was a board +<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span> +of minor experts. We are concerned with what actually did take +place and what was done. With the exception that in the year 1934 +and until the autumn of 1935 I was not present at these discussions, +and therefore cannot vouch for every word which was spoken at that +time, I must state that nothing about the planning of wars, the +preparing for wars, the operational, strategical, or armed preparedness +for war, was ever discussed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has labeled you as a member of the +Three Man College, from which they have deduced that you had +special powers to act within the German Reich Government. I am +submitting to you Document 2194-PS. In this document in the Reich +Defense Law of 1938, Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, you will find the +source of this term which in itself is not official.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Reich Defense Law of 1938 provided for a plenipotentiary +general for administration in order to restrict the size of +the body. The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office +and further, according to Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, the Supreme +Command of the Army was to have priority influence in regard to +the State Railways and the State Postal Services, for in the event of +mobilization, transports must run and the services for the transmission +of news must be available, as is the case in all countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Three Man College is a concept which I have never heard of +until just now. It probably refers to the Plenipotentiary General for +Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and the +Chief of the OKW. It referred to these three. There is no doubt +about it, because, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they were +already supposed to have a number of decrees ready in the drawers +which were to be published when this law was made public, and +each one of the three had to make the necessary preparations in his +own sphere. From the right to assume these functions by reason of +these authorities the Three Man College concept originated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution then contended that according to +Document 2852-PS you were a member of the Council of Ministers +for Defense of the Reich. Did you become a minister through this +membership in the Reich Defense Council?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I might perhaps say a few words to begin with about +the Council of Ministers, insofar as the Reich Defense Law, the Reich +Defense Committee and the Reich Defense Council, disappeared as +a result of the law regarding the Council of Ministers for Defense +of the Reich, that is, they were never made public and never put +into effect. The Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich was +newly created on 1 September 1939 and this made all these preparations +on paper in the Reich Defense Council, Reich Defense Committee +and the law null and void and put in its place a new thing, +<span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span> +an institution. This institution, the Council of Ministers for Defense +of the Reich, was now the small war cabinet, which, if I may say so, +should previously have been the Reich Defense Council with their +limited number of members. Thus, a new basis was established, +and new decrees which were necessary were put into effect by the +Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, after it had been +created and officially confirmed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I was called into this Council of Ministers or rather I received a +chair in this Council of Ministers. I prefer not to give the reasons, +because they were entirely private. It was a compensation for +opposition against these things—I never became active in this +Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, but I was a member; +it was not necessary to be active since in the purely military sphere, +that is, things with which the Wehrmacht immediately was concerned, +the Führer personally, without the Council of Ministers, +issued the necessary decrees with his own signature and the detour +via the Council of Ministers in Berlin was not necessary; and in my +opinion I must deny that I became a minister by this appointment. +The authority to exercise the functions of a minister was in no way +given. I was only the representative of the Wehrmacht in this +Council of Ministers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: However, your name is indisputably at the bottom +of many laws and decrees which were issued. How do you explain +the signature on these laws?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I did sign a series of decrees issued by the Council +of Ministers because they were submitted to me by the Secretariat, +that is, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, with +a request for my signature. When I questioned the necessity for +doing this, I received a formal answer from Lammers to the effect +that other Reich departments might see that the Wehrmacht was not +excluded from these decrees or laws. That is why my signature is +included. It means that the Wehrmacht must also obey these decrees +and laws. That is why I had no misgivings in signing my name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution further accuse you of having been +a political general. Undoubtedly you appeared at various special +functions. Will you please answer this accusation and tell us how +it came about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can readily understand the fact that functions of a +ministerial nature which necessarily brought me frequently into +contact with ministers of the Reich—in the course of a war everything +is tied up with the Wehrmacht in some way or other—would +seem to indicate that I had exercised a political function in these +matters. The same conclusion can be drawn from other events. That +is, my presence at State visits and similar functions as indicated by +<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span> +many documents might suggest that I was exercising political +functions or in some way had been called to exercise such functions. +Neither is true; neither in regard to internal German ministerial +functions nor in regard to matters connected with foreign policy. +There were naturally a great many things to be settled with the +ministries, the technical ministries. The Wehrmacht had to participate +and had a voice in almost all the decrees which were issued +by the civilian ministries. This work was naturally done in Berlin. +The fact that I had to remain with the Führer at his headquarters +kept me away; and this meant that my offices, the offices of the +OKW, had to settle these questions with the Reich departments and +their experts rather independently on the whole. Thus it happened, +naturally, that decrees of this kind were drawn up requiring my +comments and the Führer’s consent, which was obtained through me +and that in this connection I was the person who co-ordinated the +various wishes and views of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht +branches and reduced them to a common Wehrmacht denominator, +so to speak. Through these activities I was naturally drawn into the +general apparatus of this work, but I do not believe that this would +justify the application of the term “political general” to the Führer’s +Military Chief of Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What can you tell us with regard to foreign policy +and the meetings at which foreign policy was discussed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Concerning the sphere of foreign policy, I would merely +like to emphasize what the former Reich Foreign Minister has +already said about collaboration with the leaders of the Wehrmacht. +If at all, two of the leading partners marched their own roads, then +it was the foreign policy on one side and the Wehrmacht on the +other, especially under the influence of the Führer himself, who did +not desire collaboration and opposed the mutual exchange of ideas. +He kept us in avowedly separate camps, and wished to work with +each one separately. I must emphasize that most strongly. To conclude, +this applied to all other departments who came to headquarters, +that is, everything was discussed with them alone, and +they also left the headquarters alone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There were contacts with the Foreign Office, as State Secretary +Von Steengracht has stated, with regard to all questions of international +law or, in connection therewith, with questions affecting +the prisoners of war, questions of communication with the protecting +powers, and questions which Von Steengracht may have had in mind +when he said, “With the Wehrmacht the whole field of an attaché’s +work,” since all reports sent by military attachés in neutral and +friendly countries to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht +branches went through Foreign Office channels. They all arrived +there and we received them from there. It was quite natural that +<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span> +during the war any news of special interest might call for special +contacts in that we often had to complain that the reports did not +reach us in time from the Foreign Office, and that our Ministry +wanted to have them sent direct and not by a roundabout way. +Otherwise, however, I must emphasize that there was no collaboration +in any other field nor, I might say, any community of work +in the field of strategics with the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: About ten days ago Document D-665 was submitted +by the Prosecution. This document is headed “The Führer’s Ideas +Regarding the Waffen-SS” dated 6 August 1940. In this document +there is a passage by the OKW which states the following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Chief of the OKW has decided in this connection that +it can be only desirable for the ideas of the Führer to be +given the utmost publicity.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I read this document at the time it was submitted, +and I remembered it. To explain the origin of this document I must +say briefly: After the war in France Hitler planned to give an independent +status to the SS units, the Waffen-SS units, or form them +into complete military bodies of troops. Until that time they had +been parts of infantry troops attached to different Army formations. +Now these groups were to be made into independent and fully-equipped +units and would thus become independent formations. This +created extreme unrest in the Army, and caused acute dissatisfaction +among the generals. It was said to denote competition to the Army +and the breaking of the promise made to the army that “there is +only one bearer of arms in Germany, and that is the Wehrmacht.” +They asked: “Where would this lead to?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army asked Hitler’s +chief adjutant for information about this revolting affair and General +Schmundt, with Hitler’s approval, then wrote the passage mentioned +in this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I went to the Führer personally about this question to tell him +plainly that the Army considered it an insult. He decided to handle +the matter through his chief adjutant, as it had nothing to do with +the High Command of the Wehrmacht. This announcement was then +made by the Army itself in order to calm the excited minds. My +personal comment that there was no objection to the widest publicity +in this case either was given to satisfy General Von Brauchitsch, +who expressly requested to be allowed to distribute it to every unit, +in order to reassure the Army that the troops in question were police +troops who under all circumstances had to have experience of active +service, as otherwise they would be denied any recognition at home +as troops. That is how that came about, and if I am asked today +<span class='pageno' title='497' id='Page_497'></span> +about my views on this matter I may say briefly: I also thought at +the time that there ought to be a limit to these things; I believe +10 percent was the figure mentioned. With the development of +events in connection with the setting up of new formations after +1942, these troops lost their original character of an elite selected on +physical and racial grounds. There was no mistaking the fact that +considerable pressure was exercised; and I myself was very much +afraid that some day this instrument of the Waffen-SS, which had +swelled to a force more than 20 divisions strong, would grow into +a new Army with a different ideology. We had very grave misgivings +in this respect, especially as what we now saw before us was +no longer an elite in any sense of the term, and since we even saw +commissioned and noncommissioned officers and men transferred +from these troops to the Wehrmacht. It was no longer the pick of +volunteers. I do not think there is anything further to add.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have submitted Document L-211 +to me. It is headed “War Operations as an Organizational Problem,” +and contains the comments of the OKW on the memorandum of the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army regarding the organization of the +leadership of the Wehrmacht. This document was submitted to prove +that the OKW and you, as Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, +held views which favored aggression and had expressed them +in this study.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I assume that you remember this study. What have you to say +about the accusation which is based on this study?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This study was submitted to me during my preliminary +interrogation and thus I was reminded of its existence. In this connection +I must also give a brief description of the background. It is +not an exaggeration to say that in the early twenties, that is, shortly +after the end of World War I, there was a great deal of literature +produced, I believe, in all countries which had taken part in the +war, on the most efficient organization and co-ordination at the +highest level in the Armed Forces (Kriegsspitzengliederung). I +myself wrote on the subject and I know the opinions held in the +United States, England, and France. At that time everybody was +occupied with the question of that organization, and Von Blomberg +said he was in favor of the eighth solution—seven had already been +discarded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection a struggle developed, led by the High Command +of the Army and the General Staff of the Army, who constantly +opposed the idea of a combined supreme operational command +of the Wehrmacht, and demanded that the supreme authority should +be in the hands of the Army General Staff, as it was before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When the High Command of the Wehrmacht was created and +Blomberg had gone, the Army thought the moment opportune to +<span class='pageno' title='498' id='Page_498'></span> +return with renewed vigor to the attack. The result was a memorandum +from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, written by +General Beck, and the answer to this is the study mentioned here. +As I collaborated in the drafting of this answer, I can vouch for the +two men responsible for it, namely, Generaloberst Jodl and myself, +who were the only two who worked on it. I can state that at that +time we were not motivated by any acute problem or by any preliminary +general staff work in preparation for war, but only by the +fact, as I might put it, that of all the many memoranda and investigations +into the most expedient method, the one drawn up by us +appeared to be the most practical.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, does not the document speak for +itself? He says he collaborated in it, but that it was not concerned +with war, so that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks +for itself then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But surely he may clarify some of the ideas contained +in this document. Moreover, Mr. President, in regard to this +question I took the liberty of submitting the affidavit in Document +Book Number 2: “High Command of the Wehrmacht and General +Staff” which is signed by the Defendant Keitel as well as by Herr +Jodl. It has been submitted to you as Number 2 of Document Book 2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of 8 March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: 29 March, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, in the second part.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But what page?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The pages have not been numbered consecutively, it +has a table of contents, and under that you will find it as Number 2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting them from L-211 now? Are +you finished with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated +in the study, which is L-211, and that it was not concerned with war. +You might leave it at that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, in this Trial it matters to +hear what the defendants have to say about those documents which +allegedly accuse them. The explanation of Document L-211 which +the Defendant Keitel wishes to make is contained in the affidavit +which I submitted in Document Book Number 2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in +the affidavit then he should not have been asked about it; the affidavit +should have been read. +<span class='pageno' title='499' id='Page_499'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The difference between the length of his verbal +statement and the length of the affidavit is indicated by the relation +of 1 to 10. He gave only a brief summary of the answer he wished +to make. The affidavit is longer, and therefore I thought I could +dispense with reading the affidavit if he would give us a brief +summary of the chief points with which we are concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word +summary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I now come to the question of rearmament, and the +various cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I would like to +ask you about the accusation of the Prosecution that you participated +in the planning and preparation of wars of aggression. So that we +can understand each other, and that you can give your answers +correctly, we must be quite clear as to what is meant by war of +aggression. Will you tell us your views on that subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As a soldier, I must say that the term “War of Aggression” +as used here is meaningless as far as I am concerned; we +learned how to conduct actions of attack, actions of defense, and +actions of retreat. However, according to my own personal feelings +as a military man, the concept “war of aggression” is a purely political +concept and not a military one. I mean that if the Wehrmacht +and the soldier are a tool of the politicians, they are not qualified +in my opinion to decide or to judge whether these military operations +did or did not constitute a war of aggression. I think I can +summarize my views by saying that military offices should not have +authority to decide this question and are not in a position to do so; +and that these decisions are not the task of the soldier, but solely +that of the statesman.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then you mean to say, and this applies also to all +commanders and offices involved, that the question of whether or +not a war is a war of aggression, or whether it has to be conducted +for the defense of a country, in other words, whether a war is a just +war or not, was not in the field of your professional deliberations +and decisions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No; that is what I wish to express, since...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What you are giving is an explanation. But you +are not only a soldier, you are also an individual with a life of your +own. When facts brought to your notice in your professional capacity +seemed to reveal that a projected operation was unjust, did you not +give it consideration? +<span class='pageno' title='500' id='Page_500'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe I can truthfully say that throughout the whole +of my military career I was brought up, so to speak, in the old traditional +concept that one never discussed this question. Naturally, one +has one’s own opinion and a life of one’s own, but in the exercise of +one’s professional functions as a soldier and an officer, one has given +this life away, yielded it up. Therefore I could not say either at that +time or later that I had misgivings about questions of a purely +political discretion, for I took the stand that a soldier has a right to +have confidence in his state leadership, and accordingly he is obliged +to do his duty and to obey.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now let us take up the questions individually. Did +you know Hitler’s plans first in regard to rearmament, and later in +regard to any aggression, as the Prosecution calls it? I am thinking +chiefly of the period from February 1933 to 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It was clear to me that when Hitler became Chancellor, +we soldiers would undoubtedly have a different position in the Reich +under new leadership, and that the military factor would certainly +be viewed differently from what had been the case before. Therefore +we quite honestly and openly welcomed the fact that at the +head of the Reich Government there was a man who was determined +to bring about an era which would lead us out of the deplorable +conditions then prevailing. This much I must confess, that I welcomed +the plan and intention to rearm as far as was possible at +that time, as well as the ideas which tended in that direction. In +any event, as early as 1933, in the late summer, I resigned from +my activities in the War Ministry. I spent two years on active +service and returned only at the time when the military sovereignty +had been won back and we were rearming openly. Therefore, during +my absence I did not follow these matters. At any rate, in the +period from 1935 to 1938, during which I was Chief under Blomberg, +I naturally saw and witnessed everything that took place in connection +with rearmament and everything that was done in this field +by the War Ministry to help the Wehrmacht branches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland +in the demilitarized zone, the re-establishment of military sovereignty, +the introduction of conscription, the building up of the Air +Force and the increase in the number of Wehrmacht contingents +violated the Versailles Treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The wording of the Versailles Treaty, as long as it was +considered binding upon us, did not, of course, permit these things. +The Treaty of Versailles, may I say, was studied very closely by us +in order to find loopholes which allowed us, without violating the +treaty, to take measures which would not make us guilty of breaking +the treaty. That was the daily task of the Reich Defense Committee. +<span class='pageno' title='501' id='Page_501'></span> +From 1935 on, conditions were entirely different, and after my +return as Chief, under Blomberg, I must state frankly that I no +longer had any misgivings as to whether the Treaty of Versailles +was violated or not because what was done, was done openly. We +announced that we would raise 36 divisions. Discussions were held +quite openly, and I could see nothing in which we soldiers could, in +any way, see a violation of the treaty. It was clear to all of us, and +it was our will to do everything to free ourselves of the territorial +and military fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. I must say honestly +that any soldier or officer who did not feel similarly about these +things would in my estimation have been worthless. It was taken +as a matter of course if one was a soldier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: During this Trial, an order, C-194, which bears your +signature, was submitted. It concerns aerial reconnaissance and +movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland. +This order leads to the inference that you participated in the +occupation of the Rhineland. In what capacity did you sign this +order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The order shows already the future introductory +phrasing: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Minister +Von Blomberg, upon report, has ordered...” I transmitted in this +form an instruction which General Von Blomberg had given me, to +the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and I recall that it concerned +the introduction of control measures during the days when +the three battalions were marching into the demilitarized zone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you, up to the time of your appointment as +Chief of the OKW, learn from Hitler himself or from other sources, +that there were plans in existence which, contrary to Hitler’s avowed +peace assurances could be put into effect only by force, that is, +through a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During this period of time until the first practical +measures were taken in the case of Austria, I cannot remember +having had any knowledge of a program, or the establishment of a +program or far-reaching plan, or one covering a period of years. I +must say also that we were so occupied with the reorganization of +this small army of seven divisions into an expanded force of twice +or three times its original size, apart from the creation of a large +air force which had no equipment at all, that in those years a visit +to our office would have shown that we were completely occupied +with purely organizational problems, and from the way Hitler +worked, as described by me today, it is quite obvious that we saw +nothing of these things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you have any personal connection with Hitler +before 4 February 1938? +<span class='pageno' title='502' id='Page_502'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the years from 1935 to 1938, as chief under Blomberg, +I saw the Führer three times. He never spoke one word to me and +so he did not know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could +have been only through Herr Von Blomberg. I had absolutely no +contact with the Führer either personally or through other people +who were prominent in the Party or in politics. My first conversation +with him was in the last days of January before I was appointed +to this office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything of the meeting or discussion +with Hitler in November 1937? I am referring to a conference in +which Hitler, as it is alleged, made public his last will.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I already stated under oath at the preliminary interrogation +that I did not know about this, and that I saw a document +or the minutes or a record of this meeting at this Trial for the first +time. I believe it is the Hossbach document and I do not remember +that Von Blomberg gave me any directions to take preparatory steps +after this conference. That is not the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know of any of Hitler’s intentions regarding +territorial questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I must answer that in the affirmative. I learned +of them, and I also knew from public political discussions that he +proposed to settle in some form, gradually, sooner or later, a series +of territorial problems which were the result of the Treaty of Versailles. +That is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And what did you think about the realization of +these territorial aims, I mean the manner in which they were to be +solved?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: At that time I saw these things and judged them only +according to what we were capable of in military terms. I can only +say, when I left the troops in 1935, none of these 24 divisions which +were to be established existed. I did not view all this from the +standpoint of political aims, but with the sober consideration: Can +we accomplish anything by attack and the conduct of war if we have +no military means at our disposal? Consequently for me everything +in this connection revolved around the programs of rearmament, +which were to be completed in 1943-1945, and for the Navy in 1945. +Therefore, we had 10 years in which to build up a concentrated +Wehrmacht. Hence, I did not consider these problems acute even +when they came to my attention in a political way, for I thought it +impossible to realize these plans except by negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How do you explain the general directives of June +1937 for preparation for mobilization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This document is actually an instruction for mobilization +kept in general terms and was in line with our traditional +<span class='pageno' title='503' id='Page_503'></span> +General Staff policy before the war and before the World War, the +World War I, that on principle something of the kind must be prepared +beforehand. In my opinion, this had nothing to do with any +of Hitler’s political plans, for at that time I was already Chief of +Staff under Blomberg, and General Jodl was at that time the Chief +of the National Defense Division. Perhaps it sounds somewhat +arrogant for me to say that we were very much satisfied that we +were at last beginning to tell the Wehrmacht each year what it had +to do intellectually and theoretically. In the former General Staff +training which I received before the World War, the chief aim of +these instructions was that the General Staff tours for the purpose +of study should afford an opportunity for the theoretical elaboration +of all problems. Such was the former training of the Great General +Staff. I no longer know whether in this connection Blomberg himself +originally thought out these salient ideas of possible complications or +possible military contingencies, or whether he was perhaps influenced +by the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is certain that Hitler never saw this. It was the inside work +of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But in it you find a reference to a “Case Otto,” and +you know that that was the affair with Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Of course I remember the Case Otto, which indicated +by its name that it concerns Otto von Hapsburg. There must have +been—were of course—certain reports about an attempted restoration, +and in that case an intervention, eventually an armed one, +was to take place. The Führer, Adolf Hitler, wished to prevent a +restoration of the monarchy in Austria. Later this came up again +in connection with the Anschluss. I believe that I can omit that now +and perhaps explain later. In any event, we believed that on the +basis of the deliberations by the Army some sort of preparations +were being made which would bring into being Case Otto, because +the code word was “Case Otto comes into force.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You mean to say that no concrete orders were given +in regard to Case Otto on the basis of this general directive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: You mean the Anschluss at the beginning of February?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I beg your pardon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can state here only what I experienced when Hitler +sent me to the Army. I went into General Beck’s office and said: +“The Führer demands that you report to him immediately and inform +him about the preparations which have already been made +for a possible invasion of Austria”, and General Beck then said, “We +have prepared nothing; nothing has been done, nothing at all.” +<span class='pageno' title='504' id='Page_504'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution contends that you participated in +planning the action against Austria as it was put into effect in +March of 1938. I have here the directive regarding Case Otto, C-102.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Can you still affirm that the whole matter was improvised?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I remember that this order was not issued to the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army and to the other Commanders-in-Chief +until the whole project was under way. Nothing had been +prepared. It was all improvised and this was to be the documentary +registration of facts which were being put into practice. The commands +were given verbally and individually regarding what was to +be done and what actually was done on the morning of 12 March, +when Austria was invaded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I must now return to the events preceding the case +of Austria. You know that in General Jodl’s diary it is stated: +“Schuschnigg signs under strongest political and military pressure.” +In what manner did you participate in this conference at the Obersalzberg +which took place with Schuschnigg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I add to my previous answer that we can see from +this that the invasion took place on the morning of 12 March and +the order was issued late in the evening of 11 March. Therefore this +document could not have had any real influence on this affair. Such +an order cannot be worked out between 10 in the evening and 6 in +the morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I can say the following in regard to my participation at Obersalzberg +on 10 or 11 February:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was the first official action in which I took part. In the evening +of 4 February Hitler left Berlin. He summoned me to be at Obersalzberg +on 10 February. There, on that day the meeting with the +Austrian Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, which has been frequently +discussed here, took place. Shortly after I arrived—I had no idea +why I had been summoned—General Von Reichenau arrived from +Munich, and General of the Air Force, Sperrle; so that we three +Generals were present when at about 10:30 Herr Schuschnigg arrived +with Herr Von Papen. Since I had never attended a conference or +a political action or any meeting of that nature, I did not know what +I was there for. I must tell you this frankly, otherwise you will not +understand it. In the course of the day the reason for the presence +of the three representatives of the Wehrmacht naturally became +clear to me. In certain respects they represented a military, at least +a military demonstration—I may safely call it that. In the preliminary +interrogation and also in later discussions I was asked the +significance of the fact that in the afternoon my name was suddenly +called through the house and I was to visit the Führer. I went to +him in his room. Perhaps it sounds strange for me to say that when +<span class='pageno' title='505' id='Page_505'></span> +I entered the room I thought that he would give me a directive but +the words were “Nothing at all.” He used the words, “Please sit +down.” Then he said, “Yes, the Federal Chancellor wishes to have +a short conference with his Foreign Minister Schmidt; otherwise I +have nothing at all.” I can only assure you that not one word was +said to me about a political action apart from the fact that Herr +Schuschnigg did not leave until the evening and that further conferences +took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We Generals sat in the anteroom, and when in the evening, shortly +before my departure, I received the direction to launch reports that +we were taking certain measures for mobilization, of which you +have been informed here through a document, then it became quite +clear to me that this day had served to bring the discussions to a +head by the introduction of military representatives, and the directive +to spread reports was to keep up the pressure, as has been +shown here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Upon my return to my apartment in Berlin, in the presence of +Goebbels and Canaris, we discussed the reports which were to be +sent out and which Canaris then broadcast in Munich. Finally, in +order to conclude this matter, it might be interesting to point out +that the Chief of Intelligence in the Austrian Federal Ministry, +Lahousen, who has been present here in court, told Jodl and me +when later on he came into the service of the Wehrmacht: “We were +not taken in by this bluff.” And I indubitably gave Jodl a basis for +his entry in the diary, even though it is somewhat drastically worded, +for I was naturally impressed by this first experience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What is your position on the measures against +Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Nothing further need be said concerning the further +developments of the affair. It has already been presented here in +detail. On the day of the invasion by the troops I flew with +Hitler to the front. We drove along the highways through Braunau, +Linz. We stayed overnight and proceeded to Vienna. And to put it +modestly, it is true that in every village we were received most +enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal Army marched side by +side with the German soldiers through the streets over which we +drove. Not a shot was fired. On the other side the only formation +which had a certain military significance was an armored unit on +the road from Passau to Vienna which arrived in Vienna with very +few vehicles. This division was on the spot for the parade the next +day. That is a very sober picture of what I saw.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now we come to the question of Czechoslovakia. +When did Hitler for the first time discuss with you the question of +Czechoslovakia and his intentions in that respect? +<span class='pageno' title='506' id='Page_506'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe 6 to 8 weeks after the march into Austria, +that is, after the Anschluss toward the end of April. The Anschluss +was about the middle of March and also took the form of a sudden +summons, one evening, to the Reich Chancellery where the Führer +then explained matters to me. This resulted in the well-known +directive in the Case Green. The history of this case is well known +by the Schmundt Files all of which I identified in the preliminary +interrogation. At that time he gave me first directives in a rather +hasty manner. It was not possible for me to ask any questions, as +he wished to leave Berlin immediately. These were the bases for +the questions regarding the conditions under which a warlike action +against Czechoslovakia could or would arise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Hitler wanted to +attack Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In any event the instructions which he gave me that +evening were to the effect that preparations for a military action +with all the preliminary work, which was the responsibility of the +General Staff, were to be made. He expressed himself very precisely +although he explained explicitly that the date was quite open and +said that for the time being it was not his intention. These were the +words: “...for the time being it is not my intention.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In this connection was a difference made between +the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not believe that we discussed it at all that evening +during that short conference. The Führer did not discuss with me +the political aspects; he merely assigned me to the consideration of +the necessary military measures. He did not say whether he would +be content with the Sudetenland or whether we were to break +through the Czechoslovakian line of fortification. That was not the +problem at that time. But in any event—if they had to be settled +by going to war—then the war had to be prepared; if it came to +a conflict with the Czech Army, that is, a real war it would have +to be prepared.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You know that the record of the Hitler-General +Keitel Conference on 21 April, of which there are two versions, +speaks of a lightning action being necessary in case of an incident. +In the first one after the word “incident” it reads: “for example, the +assassination of the German Minister” following a demonstration +hostile to Germany. In the second one, after the word “incident” +it reads only “for example, action in case of an incident.” Will you +please explain to what this note, which is not a record in the proper +sense of the word, can be attributed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I saw the Schmundt notes for the first time here. We +did not receive it at that time as a document to work with. It is not +<span class='pageno' title='507' id='Page_507'></span> +a record. These are notes made subsequently by an adjutant. I do +not want to doubt their correctness or accuracy, for memory would +not permit me to recall today the exact words which were used. +However this question, which is considered significant here, the +assassination of the German Minister in Prague, is a situation which +I have never heard of, if only for the reason that no one ever said +such a thing. It was said it might happen that the Minister is +assassinated whereupon I asked which minister, or something similar. +Then, as I recall it, Hitler said that the war of 1914 also started with +an assassination at Sarajevo, and that such incidents could happen. +I did not in any way get the impression at that time that a war was +to be created through a provocation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You will have to tell me some more on that point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='508' id='Page_508'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>NINETY-NINTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 4 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yesterday we discussed last the meeting on 21 April +of you, Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I am again having Document +388-PS brought to you and ask you to answer when I ask you. Was +this not a conference of the kind which you said yesterday in principle +did not take place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: To a certain extent it is true that I was called in +and to my complete surprise was presented with ideas concerning +preparation for war against Czechoslovakia. This took place within +a very short time, before one of Hitler’s departures for Berchtesgaden. +I do not recall saying one word during these short instructions, +but I asked only one question, and then with these extremely +surprising directives I went home.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What happened then, so far as you were concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: My reflections during the first hour after that were +that this could not be carried out in view of the military strength +which I knew we then possessed. I then comforted myself with the +thought that the conversation premised that nothing had been +planned within a measurable lapse of time. The following day I +discussed the matter with the Chief of the Operations Staff, General +Jodl. I never received any minutes of this discussion, nor any +record. The outcome of our deliberations was “to leave things alone +because there was plenty of time, and because any such action was +out of the question for military reasons.” I also explained to Jodl +that the introductory words had been: “It is not my intention to +undertake military action against Czechoslovakia within a measurable +lapse of time.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, in the next weeks, we started theoretical deliberations; this, +however, without taking into consultation the branches of the Wehrmacht +because I considered myself not authorized to do so. In the +following period it is to be noted, as can be seen from the Schmundt +File, that the adjutants, the military adjutants, continuously asked +innumerable detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, +and so on. These questions were answered by the Wehrmacht +Operations Staff to the best of their knowledge. +<span class='pageno' title='509' id='Page_509'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I believe we can shorten this considerably, Herr +Marshal, however important your explanations are. The decisive +point now is—if you would take the document in front of you and +compare the draft which you finally made on pressure from Obersalzberg +and tell me what happened after that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. About four weeks after I had been given this +job, I sent to Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory +measures. In reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come +to Berlin to speak with the commander-in-chief. He came to Berlin +at the end of May, and I was present at the conference with Generaloberst +Von Brauchitsch. In this conference the basic plan was +changed altogether, namely, to the effect that Hitler expressed the +intention to take military action against Czechoslovakia in the very +near future. As reason why he changed his mind he gave the fact +that Czechoslovakia—I believe it was on the 20th or 21st of May—had +ordered general mobilization, and Hitler at that time declared +this could have been directed only against us. Military preparations +had not been made by Germany. This was the reason for the complete +change of his intentions, which he communicated orally to the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he ordered him to begin +preparations at once. This explains the changes in the basic orders—that +is to say, the directive which was now being issued had as its +basic idea: “It is my irrevocable decision to take military action +against Czechoslovakia in the near future.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: War against Czechoslovakia was avoided as a result +of the Munich Agreement. What was your opinion and that of the +generals about this agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: We were extraordinarily happy that it had not come +to a military operation, because throughout the time of preparation +we had always been of the opinion that our means of attack against +the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From +a purely military point of view we lacked the means for an attack +which involved the piercing of the frontier fortifications. Consequently +we were extremely satisfied that a peaceful political solution +had been reached.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What effect did this agreement have on the +generals regarding Hitler’s prestige?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe I may say that as a result this greatly +increased Hitler’s prestige among the generals. We recognized that +on the one hand military means and military preparations had not +been neglected and on the other hand a solution had been found +which we had not expected and for which we were extremely +thankful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it not amazing that 3 weeks after the Munich +Agreement that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the +<span class='pageno' title='510' id='Page_510'></span> +generals, Hitler gave instructions for the occupation of the +remainder of Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe that recently Reich Marshal Göring enlarged +on this question in the course of his examination. It was my impression, +as I remember it, that Hitler told me at that time that he did +not believe that Czechoslovakia would overcome the loss of the +Sudeten-German territories with their strong fortifications; and, +moreover, he was concerned about the close relations then existing +between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and thought that +Czechoslovakia could and perhaps would become a military and +strategic menace. These were the military reasons which were +given to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was it not pointed out to Hitler by anyone that a +solution by force of the problem regarding the remainder of Czechoslovakia +involved a great danger, namely, that the other powers, +that is England, France, would be offended?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich +between the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Führer. +However, I regarded this question as far as its further treatment +was concerned as a political one, and consequently I did not raise +any objections, if I may so express myself, especially as a considerable +reduction in the military preparations decided on before +the Munich meeting was ordered. Whenever the political question +was raised, the Führer refused to discuss it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In connection with this question of Czechoslovakia, +I should like to mention Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, who was +characterized by the Prosecution as the liaison man with Henlein. +Was the Wehrmacht or the OKW engaged in this matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Köchling’s job remained unknown to me; it was I who +named Köchling. Hitler asked me if an officer was available for +a special mission, and if so he should report to me. After I dispatched +Lieutenant Colonel Köchling from Berlin I neither saw nor +spoke to him again. I do know, however, that, as I heard later, he +was with Henlein as a sort of military adviser.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has pointed out that you were +present at the visit of Minister President Tiso in March 1939, as +well as at the visit of President Hacha, and from this it was deduced +that you participated in the political discussions which then took +place. What role did you play on these occasions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is true, I believe in every case, that on the occasion +of such state visits and visits of foreign statesmen I was present +in the Reich Chancellery or at the reception. I never took part in +the actual discussions of political questions. I was present at the +reception and felt that I should be present to be introduced as a +<span class='pageno' title='511' id='Page_511'></span> +high ranking representative of the Wehrmacht. But in each individual +case that I can recall I was dismissed with thanks or waited +in the antechamber in case I should be needed. I can positively say +that I did not say one single word either to Tiso or to President +Hacha on that night, nor did I take part in Hitler’s direct discussions +with these men. May I add that just on the night of President +Hacha’s visit I had to be present in the Reich Chancellery, because +during that night the High Command of the Army had to be +instructed as to how the entry which had been prepared was to +take place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In this connection I wish to establish only this, +since I assume that this question has been clarified by Reich Marshal +Göring’s testimony. You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible +bombing of Prague in the event that he should not be willing +to sign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the case of Poland. Here too the +Prosecution accuses you of having participated in the planning and +preparation for military action against Poland and of having assisted +in the execution of this action. Would you state in brief your basic +attitude towards these Eastern problems?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The question concerning the problem of Danzig and +the Corridor were known to me. I also knew that political discussions +and negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. +The case of the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had +to be and was prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these +problems.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since I myself was not concerned with political matters, I personally +was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before +Munich, military preparations, that is, military pressure if I may +call it such, would play the same kind of role as in my opinion +it had played at Munich. I did not believe that the matter would +be brought to an end without military preparations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Could not this question have been solved by direct +preceding negotiations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is hard for me to say, although I know that +several discussions took place concerning the Danzig question as +well as concerning a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a +remark that impressed me at the time, when Hitler once said he +deplored Marshal Pilsudski’s death, because he believed he had +reached or could have reached an agreement with this statesman. +This statement was once made to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated that already in the +autumn of 1938 Hitler was working on the question of a war against +Poland. Did you participate in this in 1938? +<span class='pageno' title='512' id='Page_512'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. This I cannot recall. I should like to believe that, +to my recollection, at that time there were even signs that this was +not the case. At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive +tour of inspection of the eastern fortifications. We covered the entire +front from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe marshland as far +as Breslau in order to inspect the various frontier fortifications +against Poland. The question of fortifications in East Prussia was +thoroughly discussed at that time. When I consider this in this +connection today, I can only assume that for him these discussions +were possibly connected with the Danzig and Corridor problem +and he simply wanted to find out whether these eastern fortifications +had sufficient defensive strength, should the Danzig and Corridor +question eventually lead to war with Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When were the preparations made for the occupation +of Danzig?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 +orders were issued that Danzig be occupied at a favorable moment +by a <span class='it'>coup de main</span> from East Prussia. That is all I know about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was the possibility of war against Poland discussed +in this connection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that was apparently connected with the examination +of the possibilities to defend the border, but I do not recall +any, nor was there any kind of preparation, any military preparations, +at that time, apart from a surprise attack from East Prussia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: If I remember rightly you once told me, when we +discussed this question, that Danzig was to be occupied only if this +would not result in a war with Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that is so. This statement was made time and +again, that this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was +to be carried out only if it was certain that it would not lead to +war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When did this view change?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe Poland’s refusal to discuss any kind of solution +of the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further +deliberations and steps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution is in possession of the directive of +3 April 1939...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I might perhaps add that generally after Munich the +situation also in regard to the Eastern problem was viewed differently, +perhaps, or as I believe, from this point of view: The problem +of Czechoslovakia has been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This +will perhaps also be possible with regard to the other German +problems in the East. I also believe I remember Hitler saying that +<span class='pageno' title='513' id='Page_513'></span> +he did not think the Western Powers, particularly England, would +be interested in Germany’s Eastern problem and would sooner act +as mediators than raise any objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That is Document C-120, the “Fall Weiss”. According +to this, the directive was issued on 3 April 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Let us take the document first. In the first sentence it +is already stated that this document was to replace the regular +annual instructions of the Wehrmacht regarding possible preparations +for mobilization, a further elaboration of subjects known to +us from the instructions which had been issued in 1937-38 and which +were issued every year. But in fact, at that time or shortly before, +Hitler had, in my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army to make strategic and operative preparations +for an attack on, for a war with Poland. I then issued these first +considerations, as can be seen from this document, that is, the +Führer had already ordered the following: Everything should be +worked out by the OKH of the Army by 1 September 1939, and that +after this a timetable should be drawn up. This document was +signed by me at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was your attitude and that of the other +generals towards this war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I must say that at this time, as in the case of the +preparations against Czechoslovakia, both the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army and the generals to whom I spoke, and also I, myself, +were opposed to the idea of waging a war against Poland. We did +not want this war, but, of course, we immediately began to carry +out the given orders, at least as far as the elaboration by the General +Staff was concerned. Our reason was that to our knowledge the +military means which were at our disposal at that time, that is to +say, the divisions, their equipment, their armament, let alone their +absolutely inadequate supply of munition kept reminding us as +soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you mean to say that in your considerations +only military viewpoints defined your attitude?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I must admit that. I did not concern myself with +the political problems but only with the question: Can we or can +we not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I want to establish only this. Now, on 23 May 1939, +there was a conference at which Hitler addressed the generals. You +know this address? What was the reason for and the contents of +this address?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I saw the minutes of it for the first time in the course +of my interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that +time. The purpose of this address was to show the generals that +<span class='pageno' title='514' id='Page_514'></span> +their misgivings were unfounded, to remove their misgivings, and +finally to point out that the conditions were not yet given and that +political negotiations about these matters still could and perhaps +would change the situation. It was however simply to give encouragement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were you at that time of the opinion that war +would actually break out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, at that time—and this was perhaps rather naïve—I +believed that war would not break out, that in view of the +military preparations ordered, negotiations would take place again +and a solution would be found. In our military considerations a +strictly military point of view was always dominant. We generals +believed that France—to a lesser extent England—in view of her +mutual-assistance pact with Poland would intervene and that we +did not at all have the defensive means for this. For this very reason +I personally was always convinced that there would be no war +because we could not wage a war against Poland if France attacked +us in the West.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now then, what was your opinion of the situation +after the speech of 22 August 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This speech was made at the end of August and was +addressed to the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the commanders-in-chief +of the troops preparing in the East. When Hitler, +towards the end of this speech, declared that a pact had been concluded +with the Soviet Union, I was firmly convinced that there +would be no war because I believed that these conditions constituted +a basis for negotiation and that Poland would not expose herself +to it. I also believed that now a basis for negotiations had been +found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy of which I read +here for the first time from notes, that all preparations had been +made, and that it was intended to put them into execution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know that England actually attempted to +act as intermediary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I knew nothing of these matters. The first thing +which was very surprising to me was that on one of those days +which have been discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th +or 25th, only a few days after the conference at Obersalzberg, I +was suddenly called to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery and he said +to me only, “Stop everything at once, get Brauchitsch immediately. +I need time for negotiations.” I believe that after these few words +I was dismissed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What followed thereupon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army and passed on the order, and Brauchitsch was called to the +<span class='pageno' title='515' id='Page_515'></span> +Führer. Everything was stopped and all decisions on possible military +action were suspended, first without any time limit, on the following +day for a certain limited period, I believe it was 5 days according +to the calculations we can make today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know of the so-called minimum demands +on Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe that I saw them in the Reich Chancellery, +that Hitler himself showed them to me, so that I knew about them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: As you saw them, I would like to ask whether +you considered these demands to be serious?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: At that time I was always only a few minutes in +the Reich Chancellery and as a soldier I naturally believed that +these were meant perfectly honestly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was there any talk at that time of border incidents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. This question of border incidents was also extensively +discussed with me here in my interrogations. In this situation +and in the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in +those days there was no talk at all on this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am now having Document 795-PS brought to you, +notes which deal with the Polish uniforms for Heydrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I add...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: ...namely, that on 30 August, I believe, the day for +the attack, which took place on 1 September, was again postponed +for 24 hours. For this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called +to the Reich Chancellery and to my recollection the reason given +was that a Polish Government plenipotentiary was expected. +Everything was to be postponed for 24 hours. Then no further +changes of the military instructions occurred.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents +or for some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me, I know +it; it is a subsequent note made by Admiral Canaris of a conversation +he had with me. He told me at that time that he was +to make available a few Polish uniforms. This had been communicated +to him by the Führer through the adjutant. I asked: “For +what purpose?” We both agreed that this was intended for some +illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at that time that +I did not believe in such things at all and that he had better keep +his hands off. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau which +was also to be taken by a <span class='it'>coup de main</span> by the Wehrmacht. That +is all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the +issue by saying that he had no Polish uniforms. He could simply +say he had none and the matter would be settled. +<span class='pageno' title='516' id='Page_516'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected +with the subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. +Do you know anything of this incident?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for +the first time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never +found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew +nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard +the testimonies given here before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall +having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know of the efforts of America and Italy +after 1 September 1939 to end the war in one way or another?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that +took place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August +or the beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about +the visits of a Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London’s intervention. +I remember only that, while in the Reich Chancellery +for a short time, I met Hitler, who said to me: “Do not disturb +me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier.” This must have been +in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, +any of the other generals ever knew anything about the matters +I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken after +1 September. Nothing at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What did you say to Canaris and Lahousen in the +Führer’s train on 14 September, that is, shortly before the attack +on Warsaw, with regard to the so-called political “house cleaning”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have been interrogated here about this point, but I +did not recall this visit at all. But from Lahousen’s testimony it +appeared—he said, as I remember—that I had repeated what Hitler +had said and had passed on these orders, as he put it. I know that +the Commander-in-Chief of the Army who then directed the military +operations in Poland had at the daily conferences already complained +about interference by the police in occupied Polish territory. +I can only say that I apparently repeated what had been said about +these things in my presence between Hitler and Brauchitsch. I +can make no statements regarding details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might add that to my recollection the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army at that time complained several times that as long as he +had the executive power in the occupied territories he would under +no circumstances tolerate other agencies in this area and that at +his request he was relieved of his responsibility for Poland in +October. I therefore believe that the statements the witness made +from memory or on the strength of notes are not quite correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of Norway. Did +you know that in October 1939 Germany had given a declaration +of neutrality to Denmark and Norway? +<span class='pageno' title='517' id='Page_517'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I knew that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were you and the OKW taken into consultation +about declarations of neutrality in this or other cases?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were you informed of them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, we were not informed either. These were discussions +referring to foreign policy, of which we soldiers were not +informed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You mean you were not informed officially. But +you as a person who also reads newspapers knew of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Good. Before our discussion about the problem +of aggressive war I asked you a question which, in order to save +time, I would not like to repeat. However, it seems to me that the +question I put to you in order to get your opinion on aggressive +war must be asked again in this connection because an attack on +a neutral country, a country which had been given a guarantee +was bound to cause particular scruples on the part of people who +have to do with these things, with the waging of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore, I put this question to you again in this case and +ask you to describe what your attitude and the soldiers’ attitude +was to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In this connection, I must say we were already at war. +There was a state of war with England and France. It would not +be right for me to say that I interfered in the least with these +matters, but I regarded them rather as political matters, and, as a +soldier, I held the opinion that preparations for military actions +against Norway and Denmark did not yet mean their outbreak and +that these preparations would very obviously take months if such +an action was executed at all and that in the meantime the situation +could change. It was this train of thought which caused me not +to take any steps in regard to the impossibility to consider and to +prepare strategically this intervention in Norway and Denmark; +therefore, I left these things, I must say, to those who were concerned +with political matters. I cannot put it any other way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When did the preparations for this action start?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I think the first deliberations took place already in +October 1939; on the other hand, the first directives were issued +only in January, that is to say, several months later. In connection +with the discussions before this Tribunal and with the information +given by Reich Marshal Göring in his statements, I also remember +that one day I was ordered to call Grand Admiral Raeder to the +Führer. He wanted to discuss with him questions regarding sea +<span class='pageno' title='518' id='Page_518'></span> +warfare in the Bay of Heligoland and in the Atlantic Ocean and +the dangers we would encounter in waging war in this area.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Hitler ordered me to call together a special staff which +was to study all these problems from the viewpoint of sea, air, and +land warfare. I remembered this also upon seeing the documents +produced here. This special staff dispensed with my personal +assistance. Hitler said at the time that he himself would furnish +tasks for this staff. These were, I believe, the military considerations +in the months from 1939 to the beginning of 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In this connection I should only like to know +further whether you had any conversation with Quisling at this +stage of preliminary measures?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I saw Quisling neither before nor after the Norway +campaign; I saw him for the first time approximately one or two +years later. We had no contact, not even any kind of transmission +of information. I already stated in a preliminary interrogation that +by order of Hitler I sent an officer, I believe it was Colonel Pieckenbrock, +to Copenhagen for conferences with Norwegians. I did not +know Quisling.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: As to the war in the West, there is once more in +the foreground the question of violation of neutrality in the case +of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. Did you know that these +three countries had been given assurances regarding the inviolability +of their neutrality?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I knew and also was told that at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I do not want to ask the same questions as in the +case of Norway and Denmark, but, in this connection, however, +I should like to ask: Did you consider these assurances by Hitler +to be honest?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: When I remember the situation as it was then, I did +at that time believe, when I learned of these things, that there was +no intention of bringing any other state into the war. At any rate, +I had no reason, no justification, to assume the opposite, namely +that this was intended as a deception.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did +you still believe that there was any possibility of terminating or +localizing the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I did believe this. My view was strengthened +by the Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which allusions +were made which convinced me that political discussions about this +question were going on, above all, with England, and because +Hitler had told me time and again, whenever these questions were +brought up, “The West is actually not interested in these Eastern +<span class='pageno' title='519' id='Page_519'></span> +problems of Germany.” This was the phrase he always used to +calm people, namely that the Western Powers were not interested +in these problems.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, seen from a purely military point of view, it must +be added that we soldiers had, of course, always expected an attack +by the Western Powers, that is to say, by France, during the Polish +campaign, and were very surprised that in the West, apart from +some skirmishes between the Maginot Line and the West Wall, +nothing had actually happened, though we had—this I know for +certain—along the whole Western Front from the Dutch border to +Basel only five divisions, apart from the small forces manning the +fortifications of the West Wall. Thus, from a purely military operative +point of view, a French attack during the Polish campaign +would have encountered only a German military screen, not a real +defense. Since nothing of this sort happened, we soldiers thought +of course that the Western Powers had no serious intentions, because +they did not take advantage of the extremely favorable situation +for military operations and did not undertake anything, at least not +anything serious, against us during the 3 to 4 weeks when all the +German fighting formations were employed in the East. This also +strengthened our views as to what the attitude of the Western +Powers would probably be in the future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What plans did Hitler have for the West?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the last phase of the Polish campaign, he had +already transferred all unnecessary forces to the West, in consideration +of the fact that at any time something else might happen +there. However, during the last days of the Polish campaign, he +had already told me that he intended to throw his forces as swiftly +as possible from the East to the West and if possible, attack in the +West in the winter of 1939-1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did these plans include attacks on and marching +through Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Not in the beginning, but first, if we can express it +from the military point of view, the deployment in the West was +to be a protective measure, that is, a thorough strengthening of the +frontiers, of course preferably to take place where there was nothing +except border posts. Accordingly, already at the end of September +and the beginning of October, a transportation of the army from the +East to the West did take place, as a security measure without, however, +any fixed center of gravity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What did the military leaders know about Belgium +and Holland’s attitude?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This naturally changed several times in the course of +the winter. At that time, in the autumn of 1939—I can speak only +<span class='pageno' title='520' id='Page_520'></span> +for myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter—I was +convinced that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any +circumstances and would do anything she could to preserve her +neutrality. On the other hand, we received, through the close connections +between the Belgian and Italian royal houses, a number of +reports that sounded very threatening. I had no way of finding out +whether they were true, but we learned of them, and they indicated +that strong pressure was exerted on Belgium to give up her neutrality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As for Holland, we knew at that time only that there were General +Staff relations between her and England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But then of course, in the months from October 1939 to May 1940 +the situation changed considerably and the tension varied greatly. +From the purely military point of view, we knew one thing: That +all the French swift units, that is motorized units, were concentrated +on the Belgian-French border, and from a military point of view, +we interpreted this measure as meaning that at least preparations +were being made for crossing through Belgium at any time with the +swift units and advancing up to the borders of the Ruhr district.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe I should omit details, here, because they are not important +for the further developments, they are of a purely operative +and strategic nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were there differences of opinion between the generals +and Hitler with reference to the attack in the West which had +to take place through this neutral territory?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe I must say that this at that time was one of +the most serious crises in the whole war, namely, the opinions held +by a number of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army, Brauchitsch, and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personally +belong to that group, which wanted at all costs to attempt +to prevent an attack in the West which Hitler intended for that +winter. There were various reasons for this: The difficulty of transporting +the Eastern Army to the West; then the point of view—and +this I must state—the fact that we believed at that time, perhaps +more from the political point of view, that if we did not attack, the +possibility of a peaceful solution might still exist and might still be +realizable. Thus we considered it possible that between then and +the spring many political changes could take place. Secondly, as +soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter war, in +view of the short days and long nights, which are always a great +hindrance to all military operations. To Hitler’s objection that the +French swift forces might march through Belgium at any time and +then stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were +superior in such a situation in a war of movement, we were a match +<span class='pageno' title='521' id='Page_521'></span> +for it; that was our view. I may add that this situation led to a +very serious crisis between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army and also me, because I had this trend of thought which +Hitler vigorously rejected because it was, as he declared, strategically +wrong. In our talks he accused me in the sharpest manner +of conspiring against him with the generals of the Army and +strengthening them in their opposition to his views. I must state +here that I then asked to be relieved immediately of my post and +given another, because I felt that under these circumstances the confidence +between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed, +and I was greatly offended. I may add that relations with the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army also suffered greatly from this. But +the idea of my discharge or employment elsewhere was sharply +rejected, I would not be entitled to it. It has already been discussed +here; I need not go into it any further. But this breach of confidence +was not to be mended, not even in the future. In the case +of Norway, there had already been a similar conflict because I had +left the house. General Jodl’s diary refers to it as a “serious crisis.” +I shall not go into this in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the reason for Hitler’s speech to the Commanders-in-Chief +on 23 November 1939, in the Reich Chancellery?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say that this was very closely connected with the +crisis between Hitler and the generals. He called a meeting of the +generals at that time to present and substantiate his views, and we +knew it was his intention to bring about a change of attitude on the +part of the generals. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual +persons were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. +The reasons given by those who had spoken against this attack in +the West were repeated. Moreover, he now wanted to make an +irrevocable statement of his will to carry out this attack in the West +that very winter, because this, in his view, was the only strategic +solution, as every delay was to the enemy’s advantage. In other +words, at that time, he no longer counted on any other solution than +resort to force of arms.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When, then, was the decision made to advance +through Belgium and Holland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The preparations for such a march through and attack +on Belgium and Holland had already been made, but Hitler withheld +the decision as to whether such a big attack or violation of the +neutrality of these countries was actually to be carried out, and +kept it open until the spring of 1940, obviously for all sorts of political +reasons, and perhaps also with the idea that the problem would +automatically be solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or if the +mobile French troops entered, or something like that. I can only +<span class='pageno' title='522' id='Page_522'></span> +state that the decision for the carrying out of this plan was withheld +until the very last moment and the order was given only immediately +before it was to be executed. I believe that there was also +one other factor in this, which I have already mentioned, namely +the relationship between the royal houses of Italy and Belgium. +Hitler always surrounded his decisions with secrecy for he was +obviously afraid that they might become known through this +relationship.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when +you refer to Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it +by its proper name, you, and the defendants, and other witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to make +a slight correction in the statement which he made earlier upon my +question regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish +campaign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I said earlier that in the West during the war against +Poland, there were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. +I had confused that with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately +20 divisions, including the reserves in the Rhineland and in +the West district behind the lines. Therefore, the statement I made +was made inadvertently and was a mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, +with reference also to the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, +have accused you of having co-operated in the preparation, +planning, and above all in the carrying out of those wars. What is +your attitude toward this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: We were drawn into the war against Greece and +against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 to our complete surprise +and without having made any plans. Let me take Greece first: I +accompanied Hitler during his journey through France for the meetings +with Marshal Pétain and with Franco on the Spanish border, +and during that journey we received our first news regarding the +intention of Italy to attack Greece. The journey to Florence was +immediately decided upon, and upon arrival in Florence, we received +Mussolini’s communication, which has already been mentioned by +Reich Marshal Göring, namely, that the attack against Greece had +already begun.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I can only say from my own personal knowledge that Hitler was +extremely angry about this development and the dragging of the +Balkans into the war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally +<span class='pageno' title='523' id='Page_523'></span> +prevented a break with Mussolini. I never knew of any intentions +to wage war against Greece.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into +that war or how did that come about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: At first the necessity did not exist, but during the first +months, October-November, of that campaign of the Italians, it +already became clear that the Italian position in this war had +become extremely precarious. Therefore, as early as November or +December, there were calls on the part of Mussolini for help, calls +to assist him in some form or other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Moreover, seen from the military point of view, it was clear of +course that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of +Italy in the Balkans would have had considerable and very serious +consequences. Therefore, by improvised means, assistance was rendered. +I think a mountain division was to be brought in, but it was +technically impossible, since there were no transportation facilities. +Then another solution was attempted by means of air transport and +the like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: At the time when improvisations ceased, we come, +however, to the plan presented by the Prosecution and called “Marita.” +When was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The war in Greece and Albania had begun to reach a +certain standstill because of winter conditions. During that time, +plans were conceived in order to avoid a catastrophe for Italy, to +bring in against Greece certain forces from the North for an attack +to relieve pressure, for such I must call it. That would, and did of +course, take several months.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I just explain that at that time the idea of a march through +Yugoslavia, or even the suggestion that forces should be brought in +through Yugoslavia was definitely turned down by Hitler, although +the Army particularly had proposed that possibility as the most suitable +way of bringing in troops.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Regarding the “Operation Marita,” perhaps not much more can +be said than to mention the march through Bulgaria, which had +been prepared and discussed diplomatically with Bulgaria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I would like to ask just one more question on that +subject. The Prosecution have stated that even before the overthrow +of the Yugoslav Government, that is to say, at the end of March +1941, negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality +of an attack on Yugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, +or were you consulted?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I have no recollection at all of any military +discussion on the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the +eventuality of a military action in the case of Yugoslavia. That is +<span class='pageno' title='524' id='Page_524'></span> +completely unknown to me. On the contrary, everything that +happened later on—a few words about Yugoslavia will have to be +said later—was completely improvised. Nothing had been prepared, +at any rate not with the knowledge of the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But it is known to you, is it not, that military discussions +with Hungary had taken place during that period? I +assume that you merely want to say that they did not refer to +Yugoslavia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Of course, it was known to me that several discussions +had taken place with the Hungarian General Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You said you wanted to say something else about +the case of Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Göring has made statements +upon that subject here. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, +I have no further questions with regard to that subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I should merely like to confirm once more that the +decision to proceed against Yugoslavia with military means meant +completely upsetting all military advances and arrangements made +up to that time. Marita had to be completely readjusted. Also new +forces had to be brought through Hungary from the North. All +that was completely improvised.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to Fall Barbarossa. The Soviet Prosecution, +particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of +the Armed Forces and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer +of 1940, had dealt with the plan of an attack against the Soviet +Union. When did Hitler for the first time talk to you about the +possibility of a conflict, of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of +August 1940, on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at +Berchtesgaden, or rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the +first time that the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet +Union was discussed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What were the reasons which Hitler gave at that +time which might possibly lead to a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Göring has +said on this subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>According to our notions, there were considerable troop concentrations +in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Foreign Minister, too, +had mentioned figures which I cannot recall, and there was the +anxiety which had been repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time +that developments might result in the Romanian theater which +would endanger our source of petroleum, the fuel supply for the +conduct of the war, which for the most part came from Romania. +Apart from that, I think he talked about strong or manifest troop +concentrations in the Baltic provinces. +<span class='pageno' title='525' id='Page_525'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were any directives given by you at that time or +by those branches of the Wehrmacht which were affected?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly +to increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against +Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the possibility +of transferring troops from the West, from France, as quickly +as possible to the Southeast areas or to East Prussia. Certain +return transports of troops from the Eastern military districts had +already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions +were given at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How was the line of demarcation occupied?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There were continual reports from that border or +demarcation line on frontier incidents, shootings, and particularly +about frequent crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, +which led to the due exchange of notes. But at any rate there were +continual small frontier fights and shootings, particularly in the +South, and we received information through our frontier troops that +continual or at certain times new Russian troop units appeared +opposite them. I think that was all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you know how many divisions of the German +Wehrmacht were stationed there at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the Western campaign there were—I do not +think I am wrong this time—seven divisions, seven divisions from +East Prussia to the Carpathians, two of which, during the Western +campaign, had even been transported to the West but later on were +transported back again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution submitted that at the end of July +1940 Generaloberst Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall +to several officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to study +the Russian problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport +problems. Since you said a little earlier that not until August +did you hear for the first time from Hitler what the situation was, +I am now asking you whether you were informed about these conferences +of Generaloberst Jodl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I did not hear until I came here, that such a conference +took place in Berchtesgaden at the end of July or beginning +of August. This was due to the fact that I was absent from +Berchtesgaden. I did not know of this conference, and I think +General Jodl probably forgot to tell me about it at the time. I did +not know about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What were your personal views at that time regarding +the problem which arose out of the conference with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: When I became conscious of the fact that the matter +had been given really serious thought I was very surprised, and I +<span class='pageno' title='526' id='Page_526'></span> +considered it most unfortunate. I seriously considered what could +be done to influence Hitler by using military considerations. At +that time, as has been briefly discussed here by the Foreign Minister, +I wrote a personal memorandum containing my thoughts on +the subject, I should like to say, independently of the experts working +in the General Staff and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and +wanted to present this memorandum to Hitler. I decided on that +method because, as a rule, one could never get beyond the second +sentence of a discussion with Hitler. He took the word out of +one’s mouth and afterwards one never was able to say what one +wanted to say. And in this connection I should like to say right +now that I had the idea—it was the first and only time—of visiting +the Foreign Minister personally, in order to ask him to support me +from the political angle regarding that question. That is the visit +to Fuschl, which has already been discussed here and which the +Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination +the other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then you confirm what Herr Von Ribbentrop has +said, so that there is no need for me to repeat it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I confirm that I went to Fuschl. I had the memorandum +with me. It had been written by hand, since I did not want +anybody else to get hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the +fact that he wanted to try to exercise influence on Hitler to the +same end. He promised me that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. Some time later at the Berghof, after a report +of the situation had been given, I handed him that memorandum +when we were alone. I think he told me at the time that he was +going to study it. He took it, and did not give me a chance to make +any explanations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Considering its importance did you later on find an +opportunity to refer to it again?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. At first nothing at all happened, so that after +some time I reminded him of it and asked him to discuss the problem +with me. This he did, and the matter was dealt with very +briefly by his saying that the military and strategic considerations +put forward by me were in no way convincing. He, Hitler, considered +these ideas erroneous, and turned them down. In that connection +I can perhaps mention very briefly that I was again very +much upset and there was another crisis when I asked to be relieved +of my post, and that another man be put in my office and that I +be sent to the front. That once more led to a sharp controversy as +has already been described by the Reich Marshal when he said that +Hitler took the attitude that he would not tolerate that a general +<span class='pageno' title='527' id='Page_527'></span> +whose views he did not agree with should ask to be relieved of his +post because of this disagreement. I think he said that he had every +right to turn down such suggestions and ideas if he considered them +wrong. I had not the right to take any action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did he return that memorandum to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I do not think I got it back. I have always assumed +that it was found among the captured Schmundt files, which apparently +is not the case. I did not get it back; he kept it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Tribunal in +this connection any further. I will leave it to you as to whether +you wish to disclose the contents of that memorandum. I am not +so much concerned with the military presentation—one can imagine +what it was—but the question is: Did you refer to the Non-Aggression +Pact of 1939 in that memorandum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, but I must say that the main part of my memorandum +was devoted to military studies, military studies regarding +the amount of forces, the requirements of effectives, and the dispersal +of forces in France and Norway at the time, and the Luftwaffe +in Italy, and our being tied down in the West. In that memorandum +I most certainly pointed to the fact that this Non-Aggression +Pact existed. But all the rest were military considerations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Were any military orders given at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. No orders were given at that time except, I think, +for the improvement of lines of communications from the West to +the East to permit speeding up troop transports, particularly to the +Southeastern sector, in other words, north of the Carpathians and +in the East Prussian sector. Apart from that no orders of any kind +were given at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Had the discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov +already taken place at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. On the contrary, at that time, in October the idea +of a discussion with the Russians was still pending. Hitler also told +me that at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection +that until such a discussion had taken place he would not give any +orders, since it had been proved to him by General Jodl that in any +case it was technically impossible to transfer strong troop units into +the threatened sectors in the East which I have mentioned. Accordingly, +nothing was done. The visit or rather discussion with the +Russian delegation was prepared, in which connection I would like +to say that I made the suggestion at that time that Hitler should +talk personally with M. Stalin. That was the only thing I did in +the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: During that conference were military matters discussed? +<span class='pageno' title='528' id='Page_528'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not take any part in the discussions with +M. Molotov, although in this instance too I was present at the +reception and at certain social meetings. I remember that on two +occasions I sat next to Molotov at the table. I did not hear any +political discussion, nor did I have any political discussions with +my table companion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What did Hitler say after these discussions had +come to an end?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: After the departure of Molotov he really said very +little. He more or less said that he was disappointed in the discussion. +I think he mentioned briefly that problems regarding the +Baltic Sea and the Black Sea areas had been discussed in a general +way and that he had not been able to take any positive or desired +stand. He said he did not go into details. I asked him about military +things which had a certain significance at the time—the strong +forces, for instance, in the Bessarabian sector. I think Hitler evaded +the answer and said that this was obviously connected with all +these matters and that he had not gone into it too deeply, or something +similar, I cannot remember exactly. At any rate, there was +nothing new in it for us and nothing final.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: After that conference were any military orders +given?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I think not even then, but Hitler told us at the time +that he wished to wait for the reaction to these discussions in the +Eastern area after the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain +orders had been given to the ambassador, too, in that respect, however +not directly after the Molotov visit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: May I ask you to give the date when the first +definite instructions were given?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can only reconstruct it retrospectively, on the strength +of the instruction Barbarossa which has been shown to me here and +which came out in December. I believe it must have been during +the first half of December that the orders were issued, the well-known +order Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at +the beginning of December, namely, the orders to work out the +strategic plan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you know about the conference which took +place at Zossen in December and which has been mentioned by +the Prosecution here? Perhaps I may remind you that the Finnish +General Heinrichs was present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about the conference in Zossen, and +I think General Buschenhagen was also there, according to the statements +he has made here. I did not know anything about the Finnish +General Heinrichs’ presence in Zossen and have heard about it for +<span class='pageno' title='529' id='Page_529'></span> +the first time here. The only way I can explain this is that the +General Staff of the Army wanted to get information or other things +and that for that purpose they discussed that with the persons concerned. +I did not meet General Heinrichs until May 1941. At that +time I had a conference with him and General Jodl at Salzburg. +Before that I had never seen him and I had never talked to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is there any significance in the fact that Directive +Number 21 says that Hitler would order the actual deployment +of the troops 8 weeks before the operational plan would become +effective?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, there was considerable significance attached to +that. I have been interrogated about that by the Soviet Delegation +here. The reason was that according to the calculations of the +Army, it would take about eight weeks to get these troops, which +were to be transported by rail, into position; that is to say, if troops +from Reich territory were to be placed in position on an operative +starting line. Hitler emphasized when the repeated revisions of the +plan were made that he wanted to have complete control of such +deployment. In other words, troop movements without his approval +were not to be made. That was the purpose of this instruction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When did it become clear to you that Hitler was +determined to attack the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As far as I can recollect, it was at the beginning of +March. The idea was that the attack might be made approximately +in the middle of May. Therefore the decision regarding the transport +of troops by rail had to be made in the middle of March. For +that reason, during the first half of March a meeting of generals +was called, that is to say, a briefing of the generals at Hitler’s headquarters +and the explanations given by him at that time had clearly +the purpose of telling the generals that he was determined to carry +out the deployment although an order had not yet been given. He +gave a whole series of ideas and issued certain instructions on things +which are contained in these directives here for the special parts +of Fall Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS, and these are the +directives which were eventually also signed by me. He then gave +us the directive for these guiding principles and ideas, so that the +generals were already informed about the contents, which in turn +caused me to confirm it in writing in this form, for there was +nothing new in it for any one who had taken part in the discussions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It appears to me, however, that what Hitler told +the generals in his address was something new; and it also seems +to me that you who were concerned with these matters, that is to +say, who had to work them out, understood or had to understand +that now a completely abnormal method of warfare was about to +<span class='pageno' title='530' id='Page_530'></span> +begin, at least when seen from your traditional point of view as +a soldier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct. Views were expressed there regarding +the administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be +conquered or occupied. There was the completely new idea of +setting up Reich commissioners and civilian administrations. There +was the definite decision to charge the Delegate for the Four Year +Plan with the supreme direction in the economic field; and what +was for me the most important point, and what affected me most +was the fact that besides the right of the military commander to +exercise the executive power of the occupation force, a policy was +to be followed here in which it was clearly expressed that Reichsführer +SS Himmler was to be given extensive plenipotentiary +powers concerning all police actions in these territories which later +on became known. I firmly opposed that, since to me it seemed +impossible that there should be two authorities placed side by side. +In the directives here it says: “The authority of the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army is not affected by this.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was a complete illusion and self-deception. Quite the opposite +happened. As long as it was compatible with my functions, I +fought against this. I think I ought to say that I have no witness +to that other than General Jodl, who shared these experiences with +me. Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, +more or less, and gave them the meaning he wanted. That is +how these directives came about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That I had no power to order the things which are contained in +these directives is clear from the fact that it says that the Reich +Marshal receives this task...the Reichsführer SS receives that task, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I had no authority whatever to give orders to them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted +to launch an attack on the Soviet Union, one would previously have +to take diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an +ultimatum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Oh, yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of +1940-1941, whenever there were discussions regarding the strength +of the Russian forces on the demarcation line, that is, in December-January, +I asked Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to +bring about a cleaning-up of the situation, if I may express it so. +I can add now that the first time he said nothing at all, and the +second time he refused, maintaining that it was useless, since he +would only receive the answer that this was an internal affair and +that it was none of our business, or something like that. At any +rate, he refused. I tried again, at a later stage, that is to say I +voiced the request that an ultimatum should be presented before +<span class='pageno' title='531' id='Page_531'></span> +we entered upon an action, so that in some form the basis would +be created for a preventive war, as we called it, for an attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You say “preventive war.” When the final decisions +were made, what was the military situation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army +judged the situation, by a study or memorandum. I believe it is +Document 872-PS, dated the end of January or the beginning of +February, a report made by the Chief of the General Staff of the +Army to Hitler on the state of operative and strategic preparations. +And in this document I found the information we then had on the +strength of the Red Army and other existing information known to +us, which is dealt with fully in this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, I have to say too that the intelligence service +of the OKW, Admiral Canaris, placed at my disposal or at the +Army’s disposal very little material because the Russian area was +closely sealed against German intelligence. In other words, there +were gaps up to a certain point. Only the things contained in +Document 872-PS were known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so +as to justify your decision?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, there were—Halder reported that there were +150 divisions of the Soviet Union deployed along the line of demarcation. +Then there were aerial photographs of a large number of +airdromes. In short, there was a degree of preparedness on the part +of Soviet Russia, which could at any time lead to military action. +Only the actual fighting later made it clear just how far the enemy +had been prepared. I must say, that we fully realized all these +things only during the actual attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You were present during Hitler’s last speech to the +commanders in the East, made on 14 June 1941, in the Reich +Chancellery, were you not? I ask you, without going over old +ground, to state briefly what Hitler said on that occasion, and what +effect it had on the generals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t there a document in connection with +this? It must all be in the document. Isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask one question on that subject and +then submit the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not +read the document at all, but will merely quote the short summaries +which are at the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree +to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant +what was in the document. +<span class='pageno' title='532' id='Page_532'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The document contains, if I may indicate it briefly, +the following: The developments, and the ever increasing influence +of organizations alien to the Wehrmacht on the course of the war. +It is the proof that the Wehrmacht, during this war, which must be +called a degenerate war, tried, as far as possible, to keep within the +limits of international law and that when the...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question +is, that is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: My question to Field Marshal Keitel was to tell me +about the speech on the 14th of June 1941, and what Hitler ordered +the generals to do and what the effect on them was. With that, I +intended to conclude the preparations for the Russian campaign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, +but I don’t see how he can tell what the effect was upon the +other generals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: He can only assume of course, but he can say +whether the others reacted in one way or another. One can talk +and one can take an opposing stand. I merely wanted to know +whether this happened or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened +that day at the conference; if you want to know what happened +at the conference, why don’t you ask him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please, tell us about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: After short reports regarding the operational orders to +the individual commanders, there followed a recapitulation, which +I must describe as a purely political speech. The main theme was +that this was the decisive battle between two ideologies, and that +this fact made it impossible—that the leadership in this war, the +practices which we knew as soldiers, and which we considered to +be the only correct ones under international law, had to be measured +by completely different standards. The war could not be carried +on by these means. This was an entirely new kind of war, +based on completely different arguments and principles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With these explanations, the various orders were then given to +do away with the legal system in territories which were not pacified, +to combat resistance with brutal means, to consider every local +resistance movement as the expression of the deep rift between the +two ideologies. These were decidedly quite new and very impressive +ideas, but also thoughts which affected us deeply.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you, or did any other generals raise objections +to or oppose these explanations, directives, and orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I personally made no remonstrances, apart from +those which I had already advanced and the objections I had already +<span class='pageno' title='533' id='Page_533'></span> +expressed before. However, I have never known which generals, +if any of the generals, addressed the Führer. At any rate, they did +not do so after that discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come +to decide whether you will accept the affidavits of the Defendant +Keitel contained in my Document Book Number 2 under the Numbers +3 and 5, as exhibits. Perhaps the Prosecution can express an +opinion on this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Up to now we have merely discussed the history before the +actual Russian war. Insofar as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW +is concerned, I should like to shorten the examination by submitting +these two affidavits. The affidavit Number 3 is an exposé of the +conditions governing the authority for issuing orders in the East. +The extent of the territory and the numerous organizations led to +an extremely complicated procedure for giving orders. To enable +you to ascertain whether the Defendant Keitel, or the OKW, or +some other department might be responsible, the conditions governing +the authority to issue orders in the East have been presented +in detail. I believe it would save a great deal of time if you would +accept this document as an exhibit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dodd and I have +no objection to this procedure used by the Defense and we believe +that it might probably help the Tribunal to have in front of them +the printed accounts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize +these affidavits?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I intend merely to submit it to you after I have +asked the defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been +written and signed by him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had +these affidavits for some time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The same applies, if I understand Sir David correctly, +to affidavit Number 5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if +you gave these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit +numbers and gave us also their dates so that we can identify them. +Can you give us the dates of the affidavits?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter in the +secretary’s office during the recess?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn’t +it? The other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the +<span class='pageno' title='534' id='Page_534'></span> +recess and give them numbers. You can give them numbers at +the recess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is nearly 1 o’clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. +You can give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual cases which I hope, +however, to conclude in the course of the afternoon. Mr. President, +I am sorry but I must discuss the prisoner-of-war affairs and several +individual matters. I think I still need this afternoon for myself. +I believe that if I bear in mind the interests of the Defendant Keitel, +I am limiting myself a good deal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him +now or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I think—I do not know how the President feels +about it—it would be convenient if we had a recess now so that in +the meantime I can put the affidavits in order. I have not yet +finished the discussion of this subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='535' id='Page_535'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this +morning, the first document, Number 3 of Document Book Number 2, +entitled “The Command Relationships in the East,” will be given the +number 10 of the Keitel Documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14 March 1946?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes, 14 March 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The document that I have got is headed the +23 February 1946, and at the end, the 14 March 1946. Is that the one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later +attested. There is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that +is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It is the document of 14 March 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The affidavit is dated 14 March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I give it Number Keitel-10. The second document, +which is fifth in the document book, is dated at the head 18 March +1946 and has at the end the defendant’s attestation as of 29 March +1946. This document has received the number Keitel-12. Permit me +to read a summary of a few points on Pages 11 and 12 of the German +copy. This, as it appears to me, is of very great importance +for this Trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Document Number 12.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The question in this document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I do not think the interpreters +have found the document yet, have they? It comes just after a +certificate, by Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway +through the book, and, although the pages are not numbered consecutively, +it appears to have the figure 51 on it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, “In summing up...” +Those are the last three pages of this document:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In summing up it must be established that:</p> + +<p>“1. In addition to the Wehrmacht as the legal protector of the +Reich internally and externally (as in every State)”—I interpolate, +‘in the SS organizations’—“a particular, completely +<span class='pageno' title='536' id='Page_536'></span> +independent power factor arose and was legalized, which +politically, biologically, in police and administration matters +actually drew the powers of the State to itself.</p> + +<p>“2. Even at the beginning of military complications and conflicts +the SS came to be the actual forerunner and standard +bearer of a policy of conquest and power.</p> + +<p>“3. After the commencement of the military actions the Reichsführer +SS devised methods which always appeared appropriate, +which were concealed at first, or were hardly apparent, +at least from the outside, and which enabled him in reality to +build up his power under the guise of protecting the annexed +or occupied territories from political opponents.</p> + +<p>“4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning +with the organization of political unrest, that is, of so-called +liberation actions and ‘incidents,’ the road leads straight +through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into +the Russian territory.</p> + +<p>“5. With the directives for the Barbarossa Plan for the administration +and utilization of the conquered Eastern territories, +the Wehrmacht was, against its intention and without +knowledge of the conditions, drawn further and further into +the subsequent developments and activities.</p> + +<p>“6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the +effects of Himmler’s full powers, and had no idea of the +possible effect of these powers.</p> + +<p>“I assume without further discussion that the same holds true +for the OKH, which according to the order of the Führer made +the agreements with Himmler’s officials and gave orders to +the subordinate army commanders.</p> + +<p>“7. In reality, it was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Army +who had the executive power assigned to him and the power +to decree and to maintain law in the occupied territories, but +Himmler and Heydrich decided on their own authority the +fate of the people and prisoners, including prisoners of war in +whose camps they exercised the executive power.</p> + +<p>“8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German +officers, which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors +who bore responsibility, led to an attitude,—regrettable +in retrospect,—which caused them to shrink from rebelling +against these orders and these methods even when they recognized +their illegality and inwardly refuted them.</p> + +<p>“9. The Führer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental +Order Number 1 in an irresponsible way with respect +to us. This Order Number 1 read, more or less: +<span class='pageno' title='537' id='Page_537'></span></p> + +<p>“ ‘1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not +belong to his own range of assignments.</p> + +<p>“ ‘2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfill the tasks +assigned to him.</p> + +<p>“ ‘3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary +for the performance of the duties assigned to him.</p> + +<p>“ ‘4. No one shall transmit to subordinate offices, to any greater +extent or any earlier than is unavoidable for the achievement +of the purpose, orders which are to be kept secret.’</p> + +<p>“10. If the entire consequences which arose from granting +Himmler authority in the East had been foreseen, in this case +the leading generals would have been the first to raise an +unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction.</p> + +<p>“As these atrocities developed, one from the other, step by +step, and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, +destiny took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, Defendant Keitel, did you yourself write this statement, +that is, dictate it as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar +with its contents and did you swear to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant</span>]: We had stopped at Document C-50, +which deals with the abolition of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa +area. I do not know whether you still want to express your +opinion on it, or whether that is now superfluous after what has just +been read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I should like to say to this only that these documents, +C-50 and 884-PS, beginning at Page 4, are the record of the directives +that were given in that General Staff meeting on 14 June. In +line with military regulations and customs they were given the form +of written orders and then sent to the subordinate offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I have a few more short questions regarding the war +against America. The Prosecution assert that Japan was influenced +by Germany to wage war against America and have, in the course +of their presentation, accused you of participation and co-operation +in this plan. Would you like to make some statement regarding this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Document C-75 is a directive by the Supreme Command +of the Wehrmacht which deals with co-operation with Japan. +Of course, I participated in the drawing-up of this order and signed +it by order. The other document, Number 1881-PS, regarding a conference +between the Führer and Matsuoka, I do not know, and I did +not know anything about it. I can say only the following for us +soldiers: +<span class='pageno' title='538' id='Page_538'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of all this time, until the Japanese entry into the +war against America, there were two points of view that were the +general directives or principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One +was to prevent America from entering the war under any circumstances; +consequently to renounce military operations in the seas, as +far as the Navy was concerned. The other, the thought that guided +us soldiers, was the hope that Japan would enter the war against +Russia; and I recall that around November and the beginning of +December 1941, when the advance of the German armies west of +Moscow was halted and I visited the front with Hitler, I was asked +several times by the generals, “When is Japan going to enter the +war?” The reasons for their asking this were that again and again +Russian Far East divisions were being thrown into the fight via +Moscow, that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far East. That +was about 18 to 20 divisions, but I could not say for certain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I was present in Berlin during Matsuoka’s visit, and I saw him +also at a social gathering, but I did not have any conversation with +him. All the deductions that might be made from Directive 24, C-75, +and which I have learned about from the preliminary examination +during my interrogation, are without any foundation for us soldiers, +and there is no justification for anyone’s believing that we were +guided by thoughts of bringing about a war between Japan and +America, or of undertaking anything to that end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In conclusion, I can say only that this order was necessary +because the branches of the Wehrmacht offered resistance to giving +Japan certain things, military secrets in armament production, +unless she were in the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, +a letter from Major Von Falkenstein to the Luftwaffe +Operations Staff. Reich Marshal Göring testified to this in his interrogation. +I only wanted to ask you if you knew of this letter, or if +you have anything to add to Reich Marshal Göring’s testimony?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have nothing to add, for I never saw this letter by +Von Falkenstein until I saw it here during my interrogation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual facts with which +you and the OKW are charged by the Prosecution. Because of the +vast number of points brought up by the Prosecution I can naturally +choose only individual groups and those with the most serious +charges, in order to elucidate whether and to what extent you were +involved and what your attitude was to the ensuing results. In most +cases it is a question of orders from Hitler, but in your statement on +the actual happenings you have admitted to a certain participation +in these things and knowledge of them. Therefore, we must discuss +these points. One of the most important is that of hostages. In this +<span class='pageno' title='539' id='Page_539'></span> +connection I want to show you Document C-128. These are orders +for operations in the West. Let me ask you, however, first of all, +what is the basis for the taking of hostages as it was usually carried +out by the Wehrmacht?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: These are the printed regulations “Secret G-2” (Army +Service Regulation G-2) and headed, according to the order: “Service +Instructions for Army Units.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn to Document Book +Number 1, Number 7 on Page 65 of my document book. I ask you to +establish that this is a copy from the afore-mentioned Army Regulations, +Section 9, which deals with the question of hostages. This +is Document K-7, and it reads as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Hostages may be taken only by order of a regimental commander, +an independent battalion commander or a commander +of equal rank. With regard to accommodation and feeding, it is +to be noted that, though they should be kept under strictest +guard, they are not convicts. Furthermore, only senior officers +holding at least the position of a division commander can +decide on the fate of hostages.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is, if you want to call it so, the Hostage Law of the German +Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I might say in this connection that in Document C-128, +which is the preparatory operational order of the Army for the +battle in the West, this is mentioned specially under the heading: +“3a. Security measures against the population of occupied territory. +A) Hostages.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as Keitel-7?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask to have these printed Army Instructions put in +evidence as Exhibit Keitel-7 (Document Number Keitel-7).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say what you are putting +it in as each time, because if you simply say “7” it will lead to +confusion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Keitel-7.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant</span>]: Was Document C-128 the order of +the High Command of the Army on the occasion of the march into +France?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now I have here another document, Document +Number 1585-PS, which contains an opinion expressed by the OKW. +It is a letter to the Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief +of the Luftwaffe; and in this letter, I assume, are contained the convictions +held by the office of which you were head. +<span class='pageno' title='540' id='Page_540'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What do you say today in connection with this letter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say only that it is precisely the same standpoint +that I represent today, because there is here, with reference to the +above-mentioned order, the following paragraph, beginning with the +words, “For the protection against any misuse...” and so on. Then +the order is quoted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: This is in reference to Regulation G-2, and further, +that the “decision regarding the fate of hostages...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It says, “According to which the decision on the fate of +hostages is reserved to senior officers holding at least the position +of a division commander.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it correct when I say that this letter was drawn +up by the Legal Department of the OKW after examination of the +situation as regards international law and its implications?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, it is to be seen from the document itself that this +point of view was taken into consideration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you issue any general orders on this question +of hostages in your capacity as chief of OKW, apart from those we +have had up to now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, the OKW participated only in helping to draw up +this order. No other basic orders or directions were issued on this +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you nevertheless in individual cases have +anything to do with this question of hostages? You and the OKW +are charged by the Prosecution with having expressed yourselves in +some way or having taken some kind of attitude when inquiries +were made by Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I show you Document 1594-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This document, 1594-PS, is a communication from Von +Falkenhausen, the Military Commander of Belgium, and is directed +to the OKH, General Staff, Quartermaster General, and, further, to +the Commander-in-Chief and Military Commander in France and +for the information of the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands +and Luftgau Belgium.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not know this document nor could I know it, for it is +directed to the Army. The assumption expressed by the French +Prosecutor that I received a letter from Falkenhausen is not true. +I do not know this letter and it was not sent to me. Official communication +between the military commanders in France and Belgium +took place only between the OKH and these two military +commanders subordinate to it. These commanders were not subordinate +either to the OKW or to me. +<span class='pageno' title='541' id='Page_541'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution has submitted Document +Number UK-25 and has asserted that this document was the basis +for the hostage legislation in France, that there is, in other words, +a basic connection between the order you signed on 16 September +1941 and the treatment of hostages in France. I will show you these +documents, 1587-PS and 1588-PS, in addition to UK-25 and request +you to comment on them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I must first answer the question as to whether I had +any discussion on individual matters with military commanders +regarding the question of hostages. Did you not ask me that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: With regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, with regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen. It is +possible, and I do recall one such case, Stülpnagel called me up from +Paris on such a matter because he had received an order from the +Army to shoot a certain number of hostages for an attack on members +of the German Wehrmacht. He wanted to have this order +certified by me. That happened and I believe it is confirmed by a +telegram, which has been shown to me here. It is also confirmed that +at that time I had a meeting with Stülpnagel in Berlin. Otherwise, +the relations between myself and these two military commanders +were limited to quite exceptional matters, in which they believed +that with my help they might obtain certain support with regard to +things that were very unpleasant for them, for example, in such +questions as labor allocation, that is, workers from Belgium or +France destined for Germany, where also, in one case, conflicts arose +between the military commanders and their police authorities. In +these cases I was called up directly in order to mediate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Permit me, please, to look at the documents first.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You must begin with UK-25, 16 September 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all +these documents in their heads by reference to their numbers, and +we do not have the documents before us. We do not know what +documents you are dealing with here. It is quite impossible for us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, I took the liberty of +submitting to the Tribunal before the beginning of the sessions a list +of documents. I am sorry if that was not done. I could not submit +the documents themselves. You will always find a number to the +left of this list.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is +1587-PS, which is not the one that you are referring to, apparently, +and it is described as a report to the Supreme Command of the +Army. That does not give us much indication of what it is about. +<span class='pageno' title='542' id='Page_542'></span> +The next one is 1594-PS, a letter to OKH. That again does not give +us much indication of what it is about, except that they have something +to do with the hostage question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the Defendant +Keitel is about to answer. Do you not also have the order +bearing Document Number C-128?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is directions for the +operation in the West.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And UK-25?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And 1588-PS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have got them all. The only thing that I +was pointing out to you was that the description of them is inadequate +to explain to us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps +by a word or two you can indicate to us when you come to the +document what it is about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, about which the Defendant Keitel +is about to testify, is an order of 16 September 1941, signed by him, +regarding “Communist Uprisings in the Occupied Territories.” It +contains, among other things, the sentence, “The Führer has now +ordered that most severe measures should be taken everywhere in +order to crush this movement as soon as possible.” The French +Prosecution asserted that, on the basis of this order, hostage legislation +was promulgated in France, which is contained in Document +1588-PS. If you have Document 1588-PS, you will find on the third +page a regular code regarding the taking and treatment of hostages.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The defendant is to state whether such a causal relation did exist, +and to what extent the OKW and he himself were at all competent +in these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Document UK-25, the Führer Order of the 16 September +1941, as has just been stated, is concerned with communist uprisings +in occupied territories, and the fact that this is a Führer order has +already been mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so +far as its contents are concerned, referred solely to the Eastern +regions, particularly to the Balkan countries. I believe that I can +prove this by the fact that there is attached to this document a distribution +list, that is, a list of addresses beginning, “Wehrmacht Commander +Southeast for Serbia, Southern Greece, and Crete.” This +was, of course, transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders +and also to the OKH with the possibility of its being passed on to +subordinate officers. I believe that this document, which, for the +sake of saving time, I need not read here, has several indications +that the assumption on the part of the French Prosecution that this +<span class='pageno' title='543' id='Page_543'></span> +is the basis for the hostage law to be found in Document Number +1588-PS is false, and that there is no causal nexus between the two. +It is true that the date of this hostage law is also September—the +number is hard to read—but, as far as its contents are concerned, +these two matters are, in my opinion, not connected. Moreover, the +two military commanders in France and Belgium never received this +order from the OKW, but they may have received it through the +OKH, a matter which I cannot check because I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Regarding this order of 16 September 1941, I should like to say +that its great severity can be traced back to the personal influence +of the Führer. The fact that it is concerned with the Eastern region +is already to be seen from the contents and from the introduction +and does not need to be substantiated any further. It is correct that +this order of 16 September 1941 is signed by me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the second individual fact, “Nacht +und Nebel.” The Prosecution charges you of having participated in +the Nacht und Nebel decree of 12 December 1941, Document Number L-90...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I say one more thing regarding the other question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please, if it appears to be necessary. In the communication +of 2 February 1942 we find the words, “In the annex are +transmitted: 1) A decree of the Führer of 7 December 1941...” +You wanted to say something more; if it is important, please. Do +you have Document Number L-90?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: L-90, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the cause for this order, so terrible in its +consequences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I must state that it is perfectly clear to me that the +connection of my name with this so-called “Nacht und Nebel” order +is a serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the +documents that it is a Führer order. Consequently I should like to +state how this order came about. Since the beginning of the Eastern +campaign and in the late autumn of 1941 until the spring of 1942, +the resistance movements, sabotage and everything connected with +it increased enormously in all the occupied territories. From the +military angle it meant that the security troops were tied down, +having to be kept on the spot by the unrest. That is how I saw it +from the military point of view at that time. And day by day, +through the daily reports we could picture the sequence of events +in the individual occupation sectors. It was impossible to handle +this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be informed of each +individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if such matters +were concealed from him in the reports by military authorities. He +got to know about them all the same. +<span class='pageno' title='544' id='Page_544'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection, he said to me that it was very displeasing to +him and very unfavorable to establishing peace that, owing to this, +death sentences by court-martial against saboteurs and their accomplices +were increasing; that he did not wish this to occur, since from +his point of view it made appeasement and relations with the population +only more difficult. He said at that time that a state of +peace could be achieved only if this were reduced and if, instead of +death sentences—to shorten it—in case a death sentence could not +be expected and carried out in the shortest time possible, as stated +here in the decree, the suspect or guilty persons concerned—if one +may use the word “guilty”—should be deported to Germany without +the knowledge of their families and be interned or imprisoned, +instead of lengthy court-martial proceedings with many witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I expressed the greatest misgivings in this matter and know +very well that I said at that time that I feared results exactly +opposite to those apparently hoped for. I then had serious discussions +with the legal adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, +because there was an elimination of ordinary legal procedures. I +tried again to prevent this order from being issued or to have it +modified. My efforts were in vain. The threat was made to me that +the Minister of Justice would be commissioned to issue a corresponding +decree, should the Wehrmacht not be able to do so. Now +may I refer to details only insofar as these ways were provided in +this order, L-90, of preventing arbitrary application, and these were +primarily as follows:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The general principles of the order provided expressly that such +deportation or abduction into Reich territory should take place only +after regular court-martial proceedings, and that in every case the +officer in charge of jurisdiction, that is, the divisional commander +must deal with the matter together with his legal adviser, in the +legal way, on the basis of preliminary proceedings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must say that I believed then that every arbitrary and excessive +application of these principles was avoided by this provision. You +will perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, “It is the +will of the Führer after long consideration...” put in for that +purpose, were not said without reason and not without the hope that +the addressed military commander would also recognize from this +that this was a method of which we did not approve and did not +consider to be right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Finally we introduced a reviewing procedure into the order so +that through the higher channels of appeal, that is, the Military +Commander in France and the Supreme Command or Commander +of the Army, it would be possible to try the case legally by appeal +proceedings if the verdict seemed open to question, at least, within +the meaning of the decree. I learned here for the first time of the +<span class='pageno' title='545' id='Page_545'></span> +full and monstrous tragedy, namely, that this order, which was intended +only for the Wehrmacht and for the sole purpose of determining +whether an offender who faced a sentence in jail could be +made to disappear by means of this Nacht und Nebel procedure, was +obviously applied universally by the police, as testified by witnesses +whom I have heard here, and according to the Indictment which I +also heard, and so the horrible fact of the existence of whole camps +full of people deported through the Nacht und Nebel procedure has +been proved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In my opinion, the Wehrmacht, at least I and the military commanders +of the occupied territories who were connected with this +order, did not know of this. At any rate it was never reported to +me. Therefore this order, which in itself was undoubtedly very +dangerous and disregarded certain requirements of law such as we +understood it, was able to develop into that formidable affair of +which the Prosecution have spoken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The intention was to take those who were to be deported from +their home country to Germany, because Hitler was of the opinion +that penal servitude in wartime would not be considered by the +persons concerned as dishonorable in cases where it was a question +of actions by so-called patriots. It would be regarded as a short +detention which would end when the war was over.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These reflections have already been made in part in the note. +If you have any further questions, please put them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The order for the carrying out of this Nacht und +Nebel decree states that the Gestapo was to effect the transportation +to Germany. You stated that the people who came to Germany were +to be turned over to the Minister of Justice, that is, to normal police +custody. You will understand that, by the connection with the Gestapo, +certain suspicions are raised that it was known from the start +what happened to these people. Can you say anything in elucidation +of that matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. The order that was given at that time was that +these people should be turned over to the German authorities of +justice. This letter signed “by order” and then the signature, was +issued 8 weeks later than the decree itself by the Amt Ausland +Abwehr as I can see from my official correspondence. It indicates +the conferences, that is, the agreements, which had to be reached +at that time, regarding the method by which these people were to be +taken from their native countries to Germany. They were apparently +conducted by this Amt Abwehr, which evidently ordered police +detachments as escorts. That can be seen from it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might mention in this connection—I must have seen it—that it +did not seem objectionable at that time, because I could have, and +<span class='pageno' title='546' id='Page_546'></span> +I had, no reason to assume that these people were being turned +over to the Gestapo, frankly speaking, to be liquidated, but that the +Gestapo was simply being used as the medium in charge of the +transportation to Germany. I should like to emphasize that particularly, +so that there can be no doubt that it was not our idea to do +away with the people as was later done in that Nacht und Nebel +camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of parachutists, +sabotage troops, and Commando operations. The French Prosecution +treat in detail the origin and effect of the two Führer Orders of +18 October 1942 regarding the treatment of Commandos.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Does the Tribunal have a copy of this Führer Order? It is 498...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got a copy of the order. You +mean 553-PS or 498?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The second is Document Number 553-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have not got that either, “Combating of +Individual Parachutists, Decree of 4. 8. 42.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? What you +just said did not come through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 553-PS, “Combating of Individual Parachutists, +Decree of 4. 8. 42.” That is what we have, nothing else. You +also have 498...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Document Number 553-PS is a memorandum signed +by Keitel. The French Prosecution has assumed correctly that there +is some connection between the Document 553-PS and the Führer +Order of 18 October 1942. The defendant is to testify what were the +reasons that lay behind this Führer Order and this notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: First of all, Document 553-PS, the note: This memorandum +was issued by me in August 1942. As I have already described +in connection with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, sabotage acts, the +dropping of agents by parachute, the parachuting of arms, ammunition, +explosives, radio sets and small groups of saboteurs +reached greater and greater proportions. They were dropped at +night from aircraft in thinly populated regions. This activity covered +the whole area governed by Germany at that time. It extended from +the west over to Czechoslovakia and Poland, and from the East as +far as the Berlin area. Of course, a large number of the people +involved in these actions were captured and much of the material +was taken. This memorandum was to rally all offices, outside the +Wehrmacht, as well, police and civilian authorities, to the service +against this new method of conducting the war, which was, to our +way of thinking, illegal, a sort of “war in the dark behind the lines.” +Even today, after reading this document through again—it has +<span class='pageno' title='547' id='Page_547'></span> +already been given to me here—I consider this memorandum unobjectionable. +It expressly provides that members of enemy forces, +that is members of any enemy force, if captured by the police, +should be taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after being identified. +I know that in the French sector the French police did their +full share in arresting these troops and putting them in safe charge. +They collaborated in preventing these acts of sabotage. It will +perhaps make clear how extensive these activities were if I mention +that on certain days there were as many as 100 railways blown +up in this way. That is in the memorandum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, as to the Führer orders of 18 October 1942, which have +been mentioned very often here and which I may describe as the +further development of the regulations mentioned in this memorandum: +As to these methods, this way of conducting illegal warfare +kept on increasing, and individual parachutists grew into small +Commando units which landed from heavy aircraft or by parachute +and were systematically employed, not to create disturbances or +destruction in general, but to attack specific, vital, and important +military objectives. In Norway, for instance, I recall that they had +the task of blowing up the only aluminum works. It may sound +strange, but during this period half to three-quarters of an hour +of the daily discussion on the situation was devoted to the problem +of how to handle these incidents. These incidents in all sectors +caused the Führer to demand other methods, vigorous measures, to +combat this activity, which he characterized as “terrorism” and said +that the only method that could be used to combat it was severe +countermeasures. I recall that in reply to our objections as soldiers +the following words were spoken: “As long as the paratrooper or +saboteur runs the danger only of being taken captive, he incurs no +risk; in normal circumstances he risks nothing; we must take action +against this.” These were the reasons behind his thoughts. I was +asked several times to express myself on this subject and to present +a draft. General Jodl will also recall this. We did not know what +we, as soldiers, were to do. We could make no suggestion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I may sum up briefly, we heard Hitler’s bursts of temper on +this subject almost every day, but we did nothing, not knowing +what we could do. Hitler declared that this was against the Hague +Convention and illegal, that it was a method of waging war not +foreseen in the Hague Convention and which could not be foreseen. +He said that this was a new war with which we had to contend, +in which new methods were needed. Then, to make it short, as I +have already testified in the preliminary investigation, these orders—this +order itself and the well-known instructions that those who +did not carry out the first order should be punished—were issued +in a concise form and signed by Hitler. They were then distributed, +<span class='pageno' title='548' id='Page_548'></span> +I believe, by the Chief of the Operations Staff, Jodl. I might add +that many times the commanders who received these orders asked +questions about how they were to be applied, particularly in connection +with the threat that they would be punished if they did +not carry them out. The only reply we could make was, “You +know what is in the orders,” for we were not in a position to change +these signed orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused you personally of +having issued the order to kill the English saboteurs captured in the +Commando operations at Stavanger. In this connection I submit to +you Documents 498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS. [<span class='it'>The documents were +submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This, Mr. President, was a Commando mission in the vicinity of +Stavanger. The troops who fell into German hands had to be killed, +according to the Führer decree. There was a remote possibility of +interrogating these persons, if that was demanded by military +necessity. In this case the Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General +Von Falkenhorst, dealt with the matter. He turned to the OKW, +as he has already testified in the minutes of an interrogation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Would you make any statement in +this connection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I was interrogated on this subject, and in the course +of the interrogation I was confronted with General Von Falkenhorst. +As I recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions +regarding the carrying out of this order. I did not know of it. Even +the event itself was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it +again only after I had seen the documents. During the interrogation, +I told the interrogator that I had no authority to change that order, +that I could refer any one concerned only to the order, as such. +As regards my confrontation with General Von Falkenhorst, I should +like to say only what is stated here in the minutes, “He obviously +shelved the answers and altered his earlier statements, but did not +deny them. Keitel did not deny having had this talk with me but +denied that the subject of it was what I said.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I can only say that this is a summary +of the interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst, a document which +was submitted by the Prosecution without having a document +number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Have you finished your statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I believe that suffices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this +document, did they? They have not offered it in evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I believe they did. +<span class='pageno' title='549' id='Page_549'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the Defendant +Keitel in one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn’t that right? +That does not mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation +itself, you see, need not be put in evidence. You must put +it in now if you want it to go in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document +was put in by the Prosecution here as proof of the assertion +that the Defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. +I received the document here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, +but I cannot think of any document having been put in here that +has not had an exhibit number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many +of these interrogations did not have document numbers; but, of +course, if they were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain +exhibit numbers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for +Counsel for the Prosecution to verify whether it was read in +evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be +a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at +a quarter to 5. They will then sit again in this Court in closed +session, and they desire that both Counsel for the Prosecution and +Counsel for the Defense should be present then, as they wish to +discuss with those counsels on both sides the best way of avoiding +translating unnecessary documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents +put in, and a great burden has fallen upon the Translation +Division. That is the problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss +in closed session with Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for +the Defense; They will, therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session +where there is room for all the Defense Counsel. That is at 5 o’clock.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief +West, in June 1944, regarding the treatment of sabotage troops +behind the invasion front? A new situation had been created by the +invasion and, therefore, by the problem of the Commandos. +<span class='pageno' title='550' id='Page_550'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been +submitted to me here, and there were several documents. It is true +that the Commander-in-Chief West, after the landing of Anglo-American +forces in Northern France, considered that a new situation +had arisen with reference to this Führer Order of 18 October 1942 +directed against the parachute Commandos.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The inquiry was, as usual, reported, and General Jodl and I +represented the view of the Commander-in-Chief West, namely, that +this order was not applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that +point of view and gave certain directives in reply, which, according +to the document, had at least two editions; after one had been +cancelled as useless, the Document 551-PS remained as the final +version as approved by the Führer during that report.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I remember all this so accurately because, on the occasion of presenting +that reply during the discussion of the situation, this handwritten +appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the +application in the Italian theatre, too. With that appendix, this +version, which was approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent +out to the Commander-in-Chief West.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In this connection, was the question discussed as to +how the active support of such acts of sabotage by the population +could be judged from the point of view of international law?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with +the order of 18 October 1942, and the well-known memorandum +previously discussed. I am of the opinion that, giving any assistance +to agents or other enemy organs in such sabotage acts, is a violation +of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. If the population takes part +in, aids, or supports such action, or covers the perpetrators—hides +them or helps them in any way or in any form—that, in my opinion, is +clearly expressed in the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, namely +that the population must not commit such actions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have submitted a letter of +30 July 1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned +with the treatment of members of foreign military missions caught +together with partisans. Do you know this order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes I do. Yes, I have already been interrogated on this +Document 537-PS during the preliminary investigation, and I made +the statement which I will repeat here: It had been reported that, +attached to the staffs of these partisans, particularly those of the +leaders of the Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there were military +missions which, we believed, were certainly individual agents or +teams for maintaining liaison with the states with which we were at +war. It had been reported to me, and I had been asked what should +be done if such a mission, as it was called, were captured. When +<span class='pageno' title='551' id='Page_551'></span> +this was reported to the Führer he decided to reject the suggestions +of the military authority concerned, namely, to treat them as +prisoners of war, since, according to the directive of 18 October 1942, +they were to be considered as saboteurs and treated as such. This +document is, therefore, the transmission of this order which bears +my signature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The problem of terror-fliers and lynch law has been +mentioned during the examination of Reich Marshal Göring. I shall +confine myself to a few questions which concern you personally in +connection with that problem. Do you know what we are concerned +with in the conception of terror-fliers and their treatment? What +was your attitude toward this question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The fact that, starting from a certain date in the +summer of 1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft against the +population as has already been mentioned here, increased considerably, +with 30 to 40 dead on certain days, caused Hitler to demand +categorically an adequate ruling on this question. We soldiers were +of the opinion that existing regulations were sufficient, and that new +regulations were unnecessary. The question of lynch law was +dragged into the problem and the question of what was meant by +the term terror-flier. These two groups of questions resulted in the +very large quantity of documents which you all know, and which +contain the text of the discussion on these subjects.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details +which have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, +I am interested in the words which you have written +across this document. Please, will you explain those?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested, +following the lines of the warning issued when German +prisoners of war taken at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning +should be issued here, too, in the form of a similar official note, +saying that we should make reprisals unless the enemy commanders +stopped the practice of their own accord. That was turned down as +not being a suitable course of action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And now let us turn to the documents, which are important +to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Document 735-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and +myself. That is the record of a report written by me in the margin +which runs as follows: “Courts-martial will not work”; at least that +was the content. That was written at the time because the question +of sentence by courts-martial came up for discussion since this very +document laid down in detail for the first time what a terror-flier +was, and because it stated that terror attacks were always attacks +<span class='pageno' title='552' id='Page_552'></span> +carried out from low-flying aircraft with machine guns. I was led +to think that crews attacking in low-level flights could not, generally +speaking, in 99 out of 100 cases be captured alive, if they crashed; +for there is no possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a +low-level attack. Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. +Furthermore, I considered, apart from the fact that one could not +conduct proceedings against such a flier, one would, secondly, not +be able to conclude a satisfactory trial or a satisfactory investigation +if an attack had been carried out from a considerable height, +because no court, in my opinion, would be able to prove that such +a man had had the intention of attacking those targets which +possibly were hit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Finally, there was one last thought, which was that, in accordance +with the rules, court-martial sentences against prisoners of war had +to be communicated to the enemy state through the protecting +power, and 3 months’ grace had to be given during which the home +state could object to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the +question that, through those channels the deterrent results desired +could be achieved within a brief period. That was really what I +meant. I also wrote another note, and this refers to lynch law. It +states: “If you allow lynching at all, then you can hardly lay down +rules for it.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there +is no possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method +could be regulated or considered justified by mob justice, and I am +still of the opinion that rules cannot be laid down, if such proceedings +are tolerated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: But what was your attitude regarding the question +of lynch law?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It was my point of view that it was a method completely +impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by +the Reich Marshal in which proceedings against a soldier who had +stopped such action were suppressed. I know of no case where +soldiers, with reference to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards +a prisoner of war in any way other than that laid down in the +general regulations. That is unknown to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should also like to state, and this has not been mentioned yet, +that I had a discussion with Reich Marshal Göring at the Berghof +about the whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed +with me: We soldiers must reject lynch law under any circumstances. +I requested him in this awkward position in which we found +ourselves to approach Hitler once more personally, to persuade him +not to compel us to give an order in these matters or to draft an +order. That was the situation. +<span class='pageno' title='553' id='Page_553'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We are now turning to questions relating to prisoners +of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I just say finally that an order from the OKW +was never submitted and never issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare +in which all nations and all people are so passionately interested +as the prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the Prosecution +have stressed particularly those cases which were considered +to be violations of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva +Convention, or to international law in general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since the OKW, and you as its Chief, were responsible for +prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the +following questions to you: What had been done in Germany to +make all departments and offices of the Wehrmacht acquainted with +international agreements which referred to prisoners of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There was a special military manual on that subject, +which I think is available, and which contained all the clauses in +the existing international agreements and the provisions for carrying +them out. That is, I think, Directive Number 38, which applied to +the Army and the Navy, and also to the Luftwaffe as a military +manual. That was the basis, the basic order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How was that put into practice? Were people who +were concerned with such questions in practice instructed, or was it +sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Every department right down to the smallest unit had +these directives, and every soldier up to a certain point was instructed +on them. Apart from that, no further explanations and +regulations were issued at the beginning of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am thinking of the courses of instruction instituted +in Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know that they took +place in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is known to me that such matters were the subject +of courses of instructions suitable for those people who were actually +in contact with prisoner-of-war matters. They took the form of +training courses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a +leaflet in his pay book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. That has already been confirmed by General +Milch the other day, who had it with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When were the first instructions regarding prisoners +of war given in our case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after +the beginning of the Polish campaign in the East, since every—I +<span class='pageno' title='554' id='Page_554'></span> +should like to say—preparatory measure for reception of prisoners +of war had been rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards +things had to be improvised at very short notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was ordered?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It was ordered that the three branches of the Wehrmacht, +the Navy, Army and Luftwaffe—the latter had to do with +it only to a limited extent—but particularly the Army should make +appropriate preparations for camps, guards, and whatever was +necessary for the establishment and the organization of such things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Please tell us what the functions of the OKW were +regarding the treatment and care of prisoners of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The principal instruction was treatment according to +Directive KGV-38 (Prisoner of War Regulation 38) based on international +agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything +which the people concerned should know. Apart from that, no +additional instructions were issued at that time, but the above +directive was applied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I should like to know first of all how far the OKW +had jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing +department which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and +directives concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, +by means of inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions +were carried out. In other words, it was the head office which issued +directives and was entitled to make inspections, but was not in +command of the camps themselves.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Should one not add the contact with the Foreign +Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the +entire Wehrmacht, and therefore of the Navy and Luftwaffe too, +was to communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign +Office and also to communicate with the International Red Cross +and all agencies interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had +forgotten that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Therefore the OKW was, generally speaking, the +legislator and the control organ.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What did the branches of the Wehrmacht have to do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Navy and the Luftwaffe had camps under their +command, which were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to +their own arms; and so did the Army. But owing to the large +numbers belonging to the Army, the deputy commanding generals +<span class='pageno' title='555' id='Page_555'></span> +of the home front, that is, the commanders of the Wehrkreise were +the commanding authorities who in their area were in charge of +the camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who +was at the head of such a camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the Wehrkreis command, there was a commander +or a general responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war +in the Wehrkreis concerned, and the camp itself was under the +charge of a camp commandant who had a small staff of officers, +among them an intelligence officer and similar personnel who were +necessary for such matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Who was the superior officer of the general for +prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The commander of the Wehrkreis was the superior +officer of the commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in-Chief +of the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in +turn under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='556' id='Page_556'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDREDTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 5 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The last question I asked you yesterday concerned +the channel through which orders were transmitted in matters +concerning prisoners of war. You said that orders went from the +camp commander to the army district commander and then by +the commander of the reserve army to the OKH, the High Command +of the Army. I should now like to have you tell me who +was responsible if something happened in a PW camp which violated +the Geneva Convention or was a breach of generally recognized +international law. Was that your business? Was the OKW responsible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The OKW was responsible in the case of incidents +which violated general orders, that is, basic instructions issued by +the OKW, or in the case of failure to exercise the right to inspect. +In such circumstances I would say that the OKW was responsible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How did the OKW exercise its right to inspect +camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: At first, in the early days of the war, through an +inspector of the Prisoners of War Organization (the KGW), who +was at the same time the office or departmental chief of the +department KGW in the General Office of the Armed Forces. In +a certain sense, he exercised a double function. Later on, after +1942 I believe, it was done by appointing an inspector general who +had nothing to do with the correspondence or official work on the +ministerial side.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the control by the protecting powers +and the International Red Cross?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: If a protecting power wished to send a delegation to +inspect camps, that was arranged by the department or the inspector +for the prisoner-of-war matters, and he accompanied the delegation. +Perhaps I ought to say that, as far as the French were concerned, +Ambassador Scapini carried out that function personally and that +a protecting power did not exist in this form.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Could the representatives of the protecting powers +and the Red Cross talk freely to the prisoners of war or only in +the presence of officers of the German Armed Forces? +<span class='pageno' title='557' id='Page_557'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know whether the procedure adopted in +camps was always in accordance with the basic instructions, which +were to render possible a direct exchange of views between prisoners +of war and visitors from their own countries. As a general rule, +it was allowed and made possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you as the chief of the OKW concern yourself +personally with the general instructions on prisoner-of-war matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I did concern myself with the general instructions. +Apart from that, my being tied to the Führer and to headquarters +naturally made it impossible for me to be in continuous +contact with my offices. There were, however, the KGW branch +office and the inspector, as well as the Chief of the General Armed +Forces Office who was, in any case, responsible to me and dealt +with these matters. These three departments had to deal with the +routine work; and I, myself, was called on when decisions had to +be made and when the Führer interfered in person, as he frequently +did, and gave orders of his own.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: According to the documents presented here in +Court, Soviet prisoners of war seem to have received different +treatment from the other prisoners. What can you say on that +subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is true that in this connection there was a difference +in treatment due to the view, frequently stated by the Führer, that +the Soviet Union on their part had not observed or ratified the +Geneva Convention. It was also due to the part played by “ideological +conceptions regarding the conduct of the war.” The Führer +emphasized that we had a free hand in this field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am now going to show you Document EC-388, +Exhibit USSR-356. It is dated 15 September 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence +Department of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, +dated 8 September 1941, regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian +prisoners of war. Part 3 is a memorandum on the guarding of +Soviet prisoners of war, and the last document is a copy of the +decree by the Council of People’s Commissars regarding the +prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these +directives were not issued until September, which can be attributed +to the fact that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that +Russian prisoners of war were not to be brought back to Reich +territory. This order was later on rescinded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text +of which I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions +have their origin in the idea that this was a battle of +<span class='pageno' title='558' id='Page_558'></span> +nationalities, for the initial phrase reads, “Bolshevism is the deadly +enemy of National Socialist Germany.” That, in my opinion, immediately +shows the basis on which these instructions were made +and the motives and ideas from which they sprang. It is a fact +that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not consider this a battle +between two states to be waged in accordance with the rules of +international law but as a conflict between two ideologies. There +are also several statements in the document regarding selection +from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may +express it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of +those who, on account of their political activities and their fanaticism, +had to be isolated as representing a particularly dangerous +threat to National Socialism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already +been presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is +a letter from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, +Admiral Canaris, reminding one of the general order which I have +just mentioned and adding a series of remarks in which he formulates +and emphasizes his doubts about the decree and his +objections to it. About the memorandum which is attached I need +not say any more. It is an extract, and also the orders which the +Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1 July, for the treatment +of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for the treatment +of German prisoners of war. I received this on 15 September, +whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier; +and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared +his objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked +him to cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on +the subject. The Führer said that we could not expect that German +prisoners of war would be treated according to the Geneva Convention +or international law on the other side. We had no way +of investigating it and he saw no reason to alter the directives +he had issued on that account. He refused point-blank, so I returned +the file with my marginal notes to Admiral Canaris. The order +remained in force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet +prisoners of war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued +or was it handled differently in practice?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the +reports which have been put before me, the practice was, if I may +say so, very much better and more favorable than the very severe +instructions first issued when it had been agreed that the prisoners +of war were to be transported to Germany. At any rate, I have +seen numerous reports stating that labor conditions, particularly in +agriculture, but also in war economy, and in particular in the +<span class='pageno' title='559' id='Page_559'></span> +general institution of war economy such as railways, the building +of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might have +been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I refer on this occasion to +Document Number 6 in the document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Document Number 6, in Document Book Number 1—in +my document book, Number 6—“Conditions of employment for +workers from the East, as well as Soviet Russian prisoners of +war.” In this document book I have included from the book +I am submitting only those passages which concern the conditions +of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am submitting +this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal +to admit it in evidence without my having to read from it. These +instructions refer expressly to the points which indicate that at +a later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be treated +in accordance with the Geneva Convention as laid down by the +OKW, author of the decree.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I continue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You do not wish to read +from it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, I do not want to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please, will you explain to me just +what relations existed between the police, or rather Himmler, on +the one hand and the Prisoners of War Organization, the KGW, +on the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I say, first of all, that there was constant friction +between Himmler and the corresponding police services and the +departments of the Wehrmacht which worked in this sphere and +that this friction never stopped. It was apparent right from the +first that Himmler at least desired to have the lead in his own +hands, and he never ceased trying to obtain influence of one kind +or another over prisoner-of-war affairs. The natural circumstances +of escapes, recapture by police, searches and inquiries, the complaints +about insufficient guarding of prisoners, the insufficient +security measures in the camps, the lack of guards and their +inefficiency—all these things suited him; and he exploited them in +talks with Hitler, when he continually accused the Wehrmacht +behind its back, if I may use the expression, of every possible +shortcoming and failure to carry out their duty. As a result of +this Hitler was continually intervening, and in most cases I did not +know the reason. He took up the charges and intervened constantly +in affairs so that the Wehrmacht departments were kept in what +I might term a state of perpetual unrest. In this connection, since +<span class='pageno' title='560' id='Page_560'></span> +I could not investigate matters myself, I was forced to give instructions +to my departments in the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the underlying cause and the real purpose +which Himmler attempted to achieve?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: He wanted not only to gain influence but also, as far +as possible, to have prisoner-of-war affairs under himself as Chief +of Police in Germany so that he would reign supreme in these +matters, if I may say so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did not the question of procuring labor enter into it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I +shall have to refer to that later but I can say now that one observation +at least was made which could not be misinterpreted: The +searches and inquiries, made at certain intervals in Germany for +escaped persons, made it clear that the majority of these prisoners +of war did not go back to the camps from which they had escaped +so that obviously they had been retained by police departments and +probably used for labor under the jurisdiction of Himmler. Naturally, +the number of escapes increased every year and became more and +more extensive. For that, of course, there are quite plausible +reasons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The prisoner-of-war system, of course, is pretty +closely connected with the labor problem. Which departments +were responsible for the employment of prisoners of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The departments which dealt with this were the State +Labor Offices in the so-called Reich Labor Allocation Service, which +had originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was +later on transferred to the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of +Labor. In practice it worked like this: The State Labor Offices +applied for workers to the Army district commands which had +jurisdiction over the camps. These workers were supplied as far +as was possible under the existing general directives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What did the OKW have to do with the allocation +of labor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In general, of course, they had to supervise it, so that +allocation was regulated according to the general basic orders. It +was not possible, of course, and the inspector was not in a position +to check on how each individual was employed; after all, the army +district commanders and their generals for the KGW were responsible +for that and were the appropriate persons. The actual fight, +as I might call it, for prisoner-of-war labor did not really start +until 1942. Until then, such workers had been employed mainly +in agriculture and the German railway system and a number of +general institutions, but not in industry. This applies especially +<span class='pageno' title='561' id='Page_561'></span> +to Soviet prisoners of war who were, in the main, agricultural +workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the actual cause for these labor requirements?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the winter of 1941-42 the problem of replacing +soldiers who had dropped out arose, particularly in the eastern +theater of war. Considerable numbers of soldiers fit for active +service were needed for the front and the armed services. I +remember the figures. The army alone needed replacements numbering +from 2 to 2.5 million men every year. Assuming that about +1 million of these would come from normal recruiting and about +half a million from rehabilitated men, that is, from sick and +wounded men who had recovered, that still left 1.5 million to be +replaced every year. These could be withdrawn from the war +economy and placed at the disposal of the services, the Armed +Forces. From this fact resulted the close correlation between the +drawing off of these men from the war economy and their replacement +by new workers. This manpower had to be taken from the +prisoners of war on the one hand and Plenipotentiary Sauckel, +whose functions may be summarized as the task of procuring labor, +on the other hand. This connection kept bringing me into these +matters, too, since I was responsible for the replacements for all the +Wehrmacht—Army, Navy, and Air Force—in other words, for the +recruiting system. That is why I was present at discussions between +Sauckel and the Führer regarding replacements and how +these replacements were to be found.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What can you tell me about the allocation of +prisoners of war in industry and in the armament industry?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Up to 1942 or thereabouts we had not used prisoners +of war in any industry even indirectly connected with armaments. +This was due to an express prohibition issued by Hitler, which was +made by him because he feared attempts at sabotaging machines, +production equipment, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. He regarded things of that kind +as probable and dangerous. Not until necessity compelled us to +use every worker in some capacity in the home factories did we +abandon this principle. It was no longer discussed; and naturally +prisoners of war came to be used after that in the general war +production, while my view which I, that is the OKW, expressed in +my general orders, was that their use in armament factories was +forbidden; I thought that it was not permissible to employ prisoners +of war in factories which were exclusively making armaments, by +which I mean war equipment, weapons, and munitions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that an order +issued by the Führer at a later date decreed further relaxation of +<span class='pageno' title='562' id='Page_562'></span> +the limitations of the existing orders. I think the Prosecution stated +that Minister Speer is supposed to have spoken of so many thousands +of prisoners of war employed in the war economy. I may say, +however, that many jobs had to be done in the armament industry +which had nothing to do with the actual production of arms and +ammunition.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently stated that +prisoners of war were detained by the police and even placed in +concentration camps. Can you give an explanation about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I think the explanation of that is that the selection +process already mentioned took place in the camps. Furthermore +there are documents to show that prisoners of war in whose case +the disciplinary powers of the commander were not sufficient were +singled out and handed over to the Secret State Police. Finally, +I have already mentioned the subject of prisoners who escaped and +were recaptured, a considerable number of whom, if not the +majority, did not return to their camps. Instructions on the part +of the OKW or the Chief of Prisoners of War Organization ordering +the surrender of these prisoners to concentration camps are not +known to me and have never been issued. But the fact that, when +they were handed over to the police, they frequently did end up +in the concentration camps has been made known here in various +ways, by documents and witnesses. That is my explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have presented a document +which bears the Number 1650-PS. This is an order, or, rather, an +alleged order, from the OKW ordering that escaped prisoners of +war who are not employed are to be surrendered to the Security +Service. After what you have just told us, you will have to give +an explanation of that. I am showing you, in addition, Document +1514-PS, an order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI (Area Command), +from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted +by the OKW in connection with the surrender of prisoners of war +to the Secret State Police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: First of all, I want to discuss Document 1650-PS. To +begin with, I have to state that I did not know of that order, that +it was never in my hands, and that so far I have not been able to +find out how it came to be issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Wouldn’t you like to say, first of all, that the document +as such is not a document of the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am coming to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am afraid you must start with that in order to +clear up the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The document starts like a document which has been +confiscated in a police department. It starts with the words, “The +<span class='pageno' title='563' id='Page_563'></span> +OKW has ordered as follows:”; after that come the Numbers 1, 2, +3 and then it goes on to say, “In this connection I order...”, and +that is the Supreme Police Chief of the Reich Security Head +Office; it is signed by Müller, not Kaltenbrunner but Müller. I have +certainly not signed this order OKW 1 to 3, and I have not seen it; +there is no doubt about that. The fact that technical expressions, +“Stage 3 b” <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, are used proves that in itself. These are terms +used by the police and they are unknown to me. I must say, therefore, +that I am not sure how this document was drafted. I cannot +explain it. There are assumptions and possibilities, and I should +like to mention them briefly because I have given a great deal +of thought to the matter. First, I do not believe that any department +of the OKW, that is, the Chief of Prisoners of War Organization +or the Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office, could have +issued this order independently without instructions to do so. I +consider that quite impossible, as it was completely contrary to the +general tendency. I have no recollection that I have ever received +any instructions of this kind from Hitler or that I have passed +any such instruction on to anybody else. I conclude that even if +this may look like an excuse, there were, of course, other channels +which the Führer used without regard to competency. And, if I +must supply an explanation, such orders could have been given +through an adjutant without my knowledge. I emphasize that this +is a supposition and that it cannot absolve me from blame.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is only one thing that I would like to say, and that is +with reference to the Document 1514-PS. This is a captured order +from the Wehrkreiskommando VI, at Münster, dated 27 July 1944, +in other words, the summer of 1944. It deals with escaped prisoners +of war and how they are to be dealt with. It says “Reference,” and +then it quotes seven different orders from the year 1942 up to the +beginning of July 1944. This order deals with the question of +escaped prisoners of war and ought to have been incorporated in +this document, if the military office of Wehrkreis VI had had such +an OKW order. That fact is remarkable, and it led me to the +conclusion that there never was a written order and that the +military authorities in question never received such an order at +all. I cannot say more about it since I cannot prove it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You know that the Prosecution have submitted an +order, according to which Soviet Russian prisoners of war were +to be marked by means of tattooing, so that they could be identified. +Would you please make a statement on that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The facts are as follows: During the summer of 1942, +the Führer called the Quartermaster General of the Army to headquarters +for a report lasting several hours, at which the Führer +asked him to report on conditions in the Eastern rear army +<span class='pageno' title='564' id='Page_564'></span> +territory. I was suddenly called in and told that the Quartermaster +General was saying that thousands of Russian prisoners of war +were escaping every month, that they disappeared among the population, +immediately discarded their uniforms, and procured civilian +clothes, and could no longer be identified. I was ordered to make +investigations and to devise some means of identification which +would enable them to be identified even after they had put on +civilian clothing. Thereupon I sent instructions to Berlin, saying +that such an order should be prepared but that investigations should +first be made by the international law department of the Foreign +Office to find out whether such an order could be given at all; and, +secondly, whether it could be carried out technically.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to say that we were thinking of tattoo marks +of the kind found on many seamen and bricklayers in Germany. +But I heard no more about it. One day I met the Foreign Minister +at headquarters and talked to him about the question. Foreign +Minister Von Ribbentrop knew about the inquiry submitted to the +Foreign Office and considered the measure extremely questionable. +That was the first news I had about the subject. I gave immediate +instructions, whether personally or through the adjutant I cannot +remember, that the order was not to go out. I had neither seen +a draft nor had I signed anything. At any rate I gave an +unmistakable order: “The order is in no circumstances to be issued.” +I received no further detailed information at the time. I heard +nothing more about it and I was convinced that the order had not +been issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When I was interrogated, I made a statement on those lines. I +have now been told by my Defense Counsel that the woman secretary +of the Chief of the Prisoners of War Organization has +volunteered to testify that the order was rescinded and was not +to be issued and, further, that she had received those instructions +personally. She said in her statement, however, that this did not +happen until several days after the order had actually gone out +and that that was the only possible explanation of how that order +came to be found in the police office as still valid.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I shall submit the affidavit of the +witness which has been received at the appropriate time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] We now turn to the case of Sagan. +The Prosecution originally accused you of giving the order for +the killing of 50 Royal Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag +Luft III at Sagan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am no longer clear as to whether the Prosecution still maintain +this grave accusation since Reich Marshal Göring and the witness +Westhoff have been interrogated, the latter outside these proceedings. +I have the report of Westhoff’s interrogation before me and +<span class='pageno' title='565' id='Page_565'></span> +I have also submitted it to you. I should like to ask you now to +amplify the statement which the witness Westhoff made during the +preliminary proceedings and which he will make shortly in this +court, and to say what you yourself know about this extremely +grave incident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The facts are that one morning it was reported to +me that the escape had taken place. At the same time I received +the information that about 15 of the escaped officers had been +apprehended in the vicinity of the camp. I did not intend to report +the case at the noon conference on the military situation held at +Berchtesgaden, or rather, at the Berghof, as it was highly unpleasant, +being the third mass escape in a very short period. As +it had happened only 10 or 12 hours before, I hoped that in the +course of the day the majority of them would be caught and that +in this way the matter might be settled satisfactorily.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>While I was making my report Himmler appeared. I think that +it was towards the end of my report that he announced the incident +in my presence, as he had already started the usual general search +for the escaped prisoners. There was an extremely heated discussion, +a serious clash between Hitler and myself, since he immediately +made the most outrageous accusations against me on account +of this incident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Things are sometimes incorrectly represented in Westhoff’s +account, and that is why I am making a detailed statement. During +this clash the Führer stated in great excitement, “These prisoners are +not to be sent back to the Armed Forces; they are to stay with the +Police.” I immediately objected sharply. I said that this procedure +was impossible. The general excitement led Hitler to declare again +and with considerable emphasis, “I am ordering you to retain them, +Himmler; you are not to give them up.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I put up a fight for the men who had already come back and +who should, according to the original order, be brought out again +and handed over to the police. I succeeded in doing it; but I could +not do anything more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After that very grave clash...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Will you tell me, please who was present during +that scene?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As far as I remember, Colonel General Jodl was certainly +present, at least for part of the time, and heard some of it, +though perhaps not every word, since he was in the adjoining room +at first. At any rate, Jodl and I returned to our quarters together. +We discussed the case and talked about the extremely unpleasant +consequences which the whole matter would have. On returning +<span class='pageno' title='566' id='Page_566'></span> +to my quarters I immediately ordered General Von Graevenitz to +report to me the following morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection I must explain that Reich Marshal Göring was +not present. If I was a little uncertain about that during my interrogation +it was because I was told that witnesses had already stated +that Göring was present. But right from the beginning I thought +it improbable and doubtful. It is also incorrect, therefore, that +Göring raised any accusations against me at the time. There had +not been a conference in Berlin either. These are mistakes which +I think I can explain by saying that Graevenitz, who came with +Westhoff and saw me for the first time, was present during the +report and witnessed a scene of a kind unusual in military life, +because of the violence of my remarks in connection with the +incident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you want me to say anything more about the discussion with +Graevenitz?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The only thing which interests me in this connection +is, whether you repeated to Graevenitz the order previously +given by Hitler in such a way that both Graevenitz and Westhoff +who was also present, might get the impression that you yourself +had issued the order for the shooting of the escaped officers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to the record of Westhoff’s interrogation, +which I have seen, I can explain it, I think, as follows: first of all, +I made serious accusations. I myself was extraordinarily excited, +for I must say that even the order that the prisoners were to be +retained by the police caused me extreme anxiety regarding their +fate. I frankly admit that the possibility of their being shot while +trying to escape remained in my subconscious mind. I certainly +spoke in extreme agitation at the time and did not weigh my words +carefully. And I certainly repeated Hitler’s words, which were, “We +must make an example,” since I was afraid of some further serious +encroachments upon the Prisoners of War Organization in other +ways, apart from this single case of the prisoners not being returned +to the Wehrmacht. On reading the interrogation report I saw the +statement by Graevenitz, or rather, Westhoff, to the effect that I +had said, “They will be shot, and most of them must be dead +already.” I probably said something like, “You will see what a +disaster this is; perhaps many of them have been shot already.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I did not know, however, that they had already been shot; and +I must confess that in my presence Hitler never said a word about +anybody being shot. He only said, “Himmler, you will keep them; +you will not hand them over.” I did not find out until several days +later that they had been shot. I saw among other papers also an +official report from the British Government stating that not until +<span class='pageno' title='567' id='Page_567'></span> +the 31st—the escape took place on the 25th—that not until the 31st +were they actually shot.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore Westhoff is also wrong in thinking that orders had +already been issued saying that an announcement was to be made +in the camp stating that certain people had been shot or would not +return and that lists of names were to be posted. That order did +not come until later, and I remember it; I remember it because of +the following incident:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A few days afterwards, I think on or about the 31st, before the +situation report, one of the adjutants told me that a report had +been received that some had been shot. I requested a discussion +alone with Hitler and told him that I had heard that people had +been shot by the police. All he said was that he had received it +too—naturally, since it was his report. In extreme disgust I told +him my opinion of it. At that time he told me that it was to be +published in the camp as a warning to the others. Only upon this +the announcement in the camp was ordered. In any case, Westhoff’s +recollection of some of the facts, which he has sworn to, is not +quite accurate, even if such expressions as those used by him and +explained by me here may have occurred. We shall hear his own +account of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did Hitler ever tell you that he had ordered those +men to be shot?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, he never told me that. I never heard it from him. +I heard it very much later, as far as I can remember, from Reich +Marshal Göring, with whom the whole incident was, of course, the +subject of discussions and conversations, especially as an Air Force +camp was involved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I should like to say in conclusion: Are you stating +under oath, here, that you yourself neither ordered these Royal Air +Force officers to be shot, nor did you receive and pass on such an +order, nor did you yourself learn who gave the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct. I neither received that order nor did +I know or hear of it; nor did I pass on such an order. I can repeat +this herewith under oath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We now turn to deportations. What the Prosecution +refer to as deportation of workers is the removal of bodily fit citizens +of the occupied territories to Germany or other occupied territories +for the purpose of using them for “slave labor” on defense +work or other tasks connected with warfare. That is the accusation +which I have read to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have repeatedly coupled your name with these +accusations and have said that you, that is, the OKW, had co-operated +in supplying workers for the German war economy. You +<span class='pageno' title='568' id='Page_568'></span> +know that in fact the Defendant Sauckel was the Plenipotentiary +in that field. I should like to ask you whether workers had been +taken from the occupied territories and brought to Germany before +Plenipotentiary Sauckel was appointed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As far as I know, workers came from occupied territories, +especially those in the West: Belgium, Holland—I do not +know about Holland, but certainly France—to Germany. According +to what I heard, I understood at the time that it was done by +recruiting volunteers. I think I remember that General Von Stülpnagel, +the military commander of Paris, told me in Berlin once +during a meeting that more than 200,000 had volunteered, but I +cannot remember exactly when that was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Was the OKW the competent authority on these +matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, the OKW had nothing to do with it. These questions +were handled through the usual channels, the OKH, the Military +Commanders in France and in Belgium and Northern France +with the competent central authorities of the Reich at home, the +OKW never had anything to do with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What about civilian administration in occupied +territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In occupied territories with civilian administration, the +Wehrmacht was excluded from any executive powers in the administration, +so that in these territories the Wehrmacht and its services +had certainly nothing to do with it. Only in those territories which +were still operational areas for the Army were executive powers +given to military troops, high commanders, army commanders, <span class='it'>et +cetera</span>. The OKW did not come into the official procedure here +either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: According to an interrogation report submitted here +the Defendant Sauckel said that you, that is, the OKW, were responsible +for giving instructions to the military commanders in the +occupied territories and that he, Sauckel, was to have their support +in his recruiting campaigns for getting the quotas. What can you +say about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The view held by Plenipotentiary Sauckel can obviously +be explained by the fact that he knew neither the official service +channels nor the functions of the Wehrmacht, that he saw me at +one or two discussions on the furnishing of manpower, and, thirdly, +that he sometimes came to see me when he had made his report and +received his orders alone. He had probably been given orders to +do so, in Hitler’s usual way: Go and see the Chief of the OKW; he +will do the rest. The OKW had no occasion to do anything. The +OKW had no right to give orders, but in Sauckel’s case I did take +<span class='pageno' title='569' id='Page_569'></span> +over the job of informing the OKH or the technical departments +in the General Quartermaster’s office. I have never issued orders +or instructions of my own to the military commanders or other +services in occupied territories. It was not one of the functions +of the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted here according to +which Generals Stapf and Nagel had agreed to ask you to exercise +pressure or coercion during the recruiting campaigns in the East. +That, at any rate, is the assertion by the Prosecution. Do you know +of this happening?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I remembered it when the document was presented. +It was obviously an attempt on the part of Stapf, who had worked +with me in the Army for many years, to get the Führer’s support +or assistance through my mediation. Stapf, who was the director +of the Economic Staff East at the time, and General Nagel, who was +also mentioned in this connection and who was in charge of the +Economic Inspectorate Department in the East, had obviously tried +to involve me in the matter. According to the document, some +pressure had to be applied from higher quarters; but I took no +steps at all as I had nothing to do with these things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am now going to deal with the question of the +pillage of art treasures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we might adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have accused you, among +other things, of issuing directives regarding the safeguarding and +confiscation of objects of art, libraries, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Were any military +orders, directives, or instructions laid down before the campaign +in the West or in the East, with regard to objects of art, libraries, +and their treatment in occupied territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, as far as I know, there was nothing at all about +these matters, although thorough provision had been made for +everything else which might happen in the course of a war. I am +not aware of any orders which were given with that in mind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am going to show you three documents submitted +by the French Prosecution, which mention you in connection with +Rosenberg’s special staff, which has already been mentioned here +on various occasions. These are Documents 137-PS, 138-PS, and +140-PS. These are documents from the Chief of the OKW to the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army in France and in the Netherlands. +<span class='pageno' title='570' id='Page_570'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The first two documents, 137-PS and 138-PS, came +from headquarters. They were dictated in part by myself and sent +to offices of the Army. One says “To the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army,” the other one “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army +in Occupied France” and to the “Commander of the Wehrmacht in +the Netherlands.” They originated partly in answers to queries +from various military offices which considered themselves responsible +for the safekeeping or guarding of whatever was in the occupied +territories, and also from offices which obviously were going +to collect, inspect, to register, or otherwise investigate these art +treasures, libraries, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and to confiscate them. In one case +I was called up on the phone by the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army, I think, who protested against this, at other times by Reichsleiter +Rosenberg. The Führer directed me to instruct military services +to acquiesce in this and to state their agreements, as they were +directives which he had issued and approved himself. The way in +which the documents are drawn up shows, in itself, that they did +not emanate from an OKW office. My adjutant signed them; but +I myself dictated them on the Führer’s orders and sent them out. +These queries may have been made just because no provision had +been made and no orders given. I did not know what was to be +done with these art treasures, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; but I naturally took the +view that the object was to safeguard them. No mention was +made of transport, or confiscation, or expropriation; and the question +did not occur to me; I merely gave these instructions in quite +a brief form and did not bother any further about the matter. I +took them to be precautionary measures and they did not seem to +me to be unjustified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then you mean the OKW had no jurisdiction over +these affairs?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It was a question of merely transmitting letters to +the military authorities to make known Hitler’s wishes to assist +Rosenberg in his task?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I should like to put a personal question to you in +this connection. Have you ever appropriated to yourself any of the +art treasures from public or private ownership in the occupied countries, +or did any office whatever assign any work of art to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I never had anything to do with these things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: We now come to the so-called economic exploitation +of occupied territories. You are accused of participating, in your +official position as Chief of the OKW, in the economic exploitation +<span class='pageno' title='571' id='Page_571'></span> +of the occupied Eastern countries and the Western occupied countries. +This question has already been discussed in Reich Marshal +Göring’s examination, so I can treat it relatively briefly. It is, however, +necessary for you to clarify the extent to which the OKW, and +yourself in particular, were connected with these matters, for both +the OKW and yourself are mentioned in this connection, as well as +the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt (Economic Armament Office), which was +a branch of the OKW. General Thomas of that office prepared a +compilation which was produced by the Prosecution. What can +you say about this question, if I have Document 1157-PS and +USSR-80 shown to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: 1157-PS deals with “Plan Barbarossa Oldenburg.” I +would like to say this:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office), which even then +was no longer known as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt carried out +under its chief, General Thomas, certain organizational preparations, +first for the campaign in the West and later for campaign Barbarossa +in the East. They were made by the military economic +organization at home, in the Reich, which had teams attached to +all Wehrkreiskommandos. As a result, advisers and some personnel +with experience in problems of war economy supplies and a few +small detachments called Feldwirtschaftskommandos (Field Economic +Detachments) were assigned to the Army Commands +(the A.O.K’s).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The personnel attached to the Quartermaster Staffs at the A.O.K. +were responsible for securing, or causing to be secured, supplies, +fuel, and food stuffs found in occupied or conquered territories, as +well as other articles suitable for the immediate requirements of +the troops. They should then co-operate with the Senior Quartermaster, +who looks after my army supplies, and the intendant in +charge of the transport of supplies, in making them available for +the fighting troops. Information obtained regarding war economy +in the important areas of France and Belgium, as far as such information +could be obtained, was kept for later use. The East, as I +believe Reich Marshal Göring has already explained at length, was +organized on quite a different basis with a view not only to supplying +the troops, but also to exploiting the conquered territories. An +organization serving this aim was built up, called Wirtschaftsorganisation +Ost-Oldenburg (Economic Organization East-Oldenburg). +Its connection with the OKW lay in the fact that the +necessary preparations for organizing and developing panels of +experts and technical branch offices had to be discussed with the +Ministry of Economics, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministry of +Food and Agriculture. That was Wirtschaftsorganisation Oldenburg. +The OKW and its Chief, that is myself, had no power to give orders +<span class='pageno' title='572' id='Page_572'></span> +or instructions affecting its activities. The organization was created +and placed at the disposal of those responsible for putting it in +action, giving it instructions and working with it. If General Thomas +wrote in his book, which was produced here as a document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: 2353-PS (Exhibit Number USA-35), Page 386. Perhaps +you will just read that, so that you can give us a summary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. This is an excerpt from the book of General +Thomas, where he describes in detail his own functions and those +of the organization which he directed in the OKW, from its origin +until far into the war. He says here:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The functions exercised by the Economic Armament Office +(Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) while the Eastern campaign was +going on consisted mainly in the organizational management +of the economic machinery set in motion and in advising +the Operational Staff for War Economy East.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You need read only Paragraph 4 for your summary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Operational Staff for Military Economy East, +attached to the Four Year Plan as Barbarossa-Oldenburg, was +responsible for the entire economic direction of the whole of the +Eastern area. It was responsible, for the technical instructions of +the State Secretaries in the Operational Staff for Military Economy, +for the organization of Thomas’ Economic Armament Office, and +for applying all measures to be taken by the Operational Staff for +Military Economy East under the direction and command of the +Reich Marshal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: How were conditions in the West?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I described very briefly the small group of experts +attached to the High Command quartermaster departments in the +West. Later on, as I have already stated, at the beginning of June, +the entire economic direction was transferred to the Four Year Plan +and the plenipotentiaries for the Four Year Plan, as far as anything +passed beyond current supplies intended to cover daily requirements, +fuel, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. This was done by a special decree, which +has already been mentioned by the Reich Marshal and which had +been issued by the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That was laid down by General Thomas on Page +304 in Document 2353-PS, which we have already mentioned. There +is no need for me to read this; and I request the Tribunal to allow +me to present the defendant’s affidavit in Document Book Number 2 +for the Military Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as Document +Keitel-11 in evidence, so that no further questions on the +subject may be necessary. I assume that the Prosecution will agree +to this procedure. +<span class='pageno' title='573' id='Page_573'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number is it in Book 2?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Number 4 in this Document Book Number 2. It is +Page 27 and following, in Document Book 2, submitted to the Court. +The document is dated 29 March 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What date did you say it is?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The 29th of March 1946. I do not think there is any +date in the document book. I will present the original, which I +have here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How is it described in the document itself? +We have a document dated 4 March 1946, “The Economic Armament +Office of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.” Is +that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The document was written on 4 March 1946, but +the affidavit was added on 29 March 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But that appears to have been 8 March? Is +it that document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt in the OKW. It is +possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That’s here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In any case, there is no doubt about the identity +of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now I come to a topic which is +presented again and again before the high Tribunal and which is +very difficult because the reason for these questions is not properly +understood.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The charge has been made against you that in your capacity as +a member of the government, as the Prosecution contend, you knew, +or must have known of the happenings in the concentration camps. +I am therefore compelled to ask you what you know about the +existence of the concentration camps, how much you knew and +what you had to do with them. Did you know of their existence? +Did you know that concentration camps existed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I knew already before the war that concentration +camps existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; +and I supposed and assumed that there were other concentration +camps besides the two I knew. I had no further particulars about +the existence of concentration camps. As far as internees in such +camps were concerned, I knew that they included habitual criminals +and political opponents. As Reich Marshal Göring has said, +that was the basis of the institution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything about the treatment of +internees? +<span class='pageno' title='574' id='Page_574'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I heard nothing precise about it. I assumed that +it was a severe form of detention, or one which brought severe +measures in its train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew +nothing about the conditions found there, especially ill-treatment +of internees, tortures, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration +camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Grossadmiral +Raeder. With the help of Canaris and at the request of +Grossadmiral Raeder, I tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the +concentration camps. The attempt was unsuccessful. I made a +second attempt at the request of a family in my home village, +in a case where a peasant was in a concentration camp for political +reasons; and in this case I succeeded. The individual involved +was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I had a talk with +this man; and when I asked him what things were like there, he +gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been all +right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: When you talked to this man did you have the +impression that anything had happened to him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Undoubtedly he did not give that impression. I did +not see him directly after his release. I saw him later when I was +at home. The reason that I talked to him was because he came to +thank me. He said nothing about being badly treated or anything +like that at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It has been stated here that now and again these +concentration camps were visited by members of the Wehrmacht, +by officers—and high ranking officers, too. How do you explain that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler’s +invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him +to pay a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would +like to show it to me. I know also that large and small groups of +officers and commissions were shown through the camps. I think +I need scarcely say how these visits were handled as regards the +things that were shown to them. To supplement my statement I +would like to say it was not uncommon to hear such remarks as +“You’ll end up in a concentration camp!” or “All sorts of things +go on there.” I do know, however, that whenever anyone came to +me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they +knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: +“I really do not know; I just heard it.” So that whatever one might +think, one never got at the facts and never could get at them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You heard that medical experiments were made on +these internees, and that this was done by agreement with higher +quarters. I ask you whether you had knowledge of that, either personally +or from the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. +<span class='pageno' title='575' id='Page_575'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about the medical experiments +on internees, which have been described here in detail, either +officially or otherwise. Nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I turn now to a group of questions relating to the +Prosecution’s assertion that you intended to have General Weygand +and General Giraud assassinated or, at least, were participating in +plans to that end. You know that witness Lahousen, on 30 November +1945 stated that Admiral Canaris had been pressed by you for +some time, November-December 1940, to do away with the Chief +of the French General Staff, General Weygand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Lahousen added that Canaris told his departmental heads that +after a talk with you. Did you discuss the case of General Weygand +with Canaris?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is probably correct, for there were reports at the +time that General Weygand was traveling in North Africa, visiting +the troops, and inspecting the colonial troops. I consider it quite +natural that I told Canaris, who was the Chief of Counterintelligence, +that it should be possible to determine the object of General +Weygand’s journey, the places at which he stopped in North Africa, +and whether any military significance could be attached to this +visit, as regards putting colonial troops into action or the introduction +of other measures concerning them in North Africa. He is +sure to have received instructions to try to get information through +his Intelligence Department as to what was taking place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I assume, also to keep an eye on him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send +members of its staff to North Africa?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed +via Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence +links with Morocco by way of Spain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was +officially possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there +were Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in +France. We had several Army departments there in connection +with checking up the armaments of the North African troops.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in +wishing General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the +policy Germany wished to carry through? What was the reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand +might be, shall we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection +with Marshal Pétain, which was started about the end of September +<span class='pageno' title='576' id='Page_576'></span> +and the beginning of October of that year, and the well-known +collaboration policy which reached its height in the winter of +1940-41, it was absurd even to think of doing away with the Marshal’s +Chief of Staff. An action of this kind would not have fitted +into the general policy followed in dealing with the situation in +North Africa. We released a large number of officers in the regular +French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in the +winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were +generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, +as we knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in +North Africa for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the +disposal of the Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of +utilizing him in the colonial service. There had not been the +slightest motive for wishing General Weygand ill or to think of +anything of the sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with +the French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations +in Africa and the strengthening of West Africa?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice +Delegation there ought to be a large number of documents asking +for all sorts of concessions in connection with North Africa and +more especially Central and West Africa, owing to the fact that +during the winter of 1940-41 riots had taken place in French Central +Africa against which the French Government wanted to take measures. +I believe that in the spring of 1941 a conference lasting +several days took place in Paris with the French General Staff, in +order to prepare measures in which the German Wehrmacht, which +already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian area, would +participate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this +conversation with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can +you suggest anything which might have caused this misunderstanding?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive +details given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later +meeting, “What about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen +used; and he might have drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in +that sense of the word, as he represented it, he kept on saying “in +that sense of the word,” and when asked what that meant, he said, +“To kill him.” It is due only to that, it can be due only to that. +I must say that Canaris was frequently alone with me. Often he +brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we discussed +<span class='pageno' title='577' id='Page_577'></span> +matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank with +me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been +discussions about it, but he never said anything like that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea +of putting Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an +act of high political significance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf +Hitler and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the +greatest imaginable political significance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it +would have meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Certainly one would have had to expect that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Only with regard to the great importance of General +Weygand’s personality?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Can you give any other explanation, or any proof +that the designs attributed to you, but thanks be to God were never +put into practice, had no foundation in fact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Although it was at a much later date that General +Weygand was taken to Germany, on the occupation of the hitherto +unoccupied zone of Southern France, I was told by the Führer +himself that he had given orders only for the general to be interned +in his own home, without being inconvenienced by guards—an +honorable arrest and not the treatment accorded to an ordinary +prisoner of war. Of course, that was in 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Therefore, you finally and repeatedly deny under +oath that you gave any order or expressed yourself in any way +which might lead your hearers to conclude that you intended or +wished General Weygand to be put out of the way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I can expressly reaffirm that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen also spoke of Giraud and +described the case much in the same way as that of Weygand. In +neither case was he in a position to say from his own first-hand +knowledge that you had given such an order, but he reported what +Canaris had told him and illustrated his testimony by means of +later inquiries. I ask you to tell us what you know about the case +of Giraud, which created a sensation at the time and also here, and +to say what part you took in discussions regarding Giraud.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Giraud’s successful escape from the Fortress of Königstein +near Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was +severely reprimanded about the guard of this general’s camp, a +military fortress. The escape was successful despite all attempts +<span class='pageno' title='578' id='Page_578'></span> +to recapture the general, by police or military action, on his way +back to France. Canaris had instructions from me to keep a particularly +sharp watch on all the places at which he might cross the +frontier into France or Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture +him. The police were also put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after +his escape it was made known that the general had arrived safely +back in France. If I issued any orders during this search I probably +used the words I gave in the preliminary interrogations, +namely, “We must get the general back, dead or alive.” I possibly +did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and +Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to +captivity of his own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or +impossible, as the general had declared himself willing to go to +the occupied zone to discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that +the general might possibly do it on account of the concessions +hitherto made to Marshal Pétain regarding personal wishes in connection +with the release of French generals from captivity. The +meeting with General Giraud took place in occupied territory, at +the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where the question of +his return was discussed. The Military Commander informed me +by telephone of the general’s presence in occupied territory, in the +hotel where the German officers were billeted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The commanding general suggested that if the general would +not return voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend +him if he were authorized to do so. I at once refused this +categorically for I considered it a breach of faith. The general had +come trusting to receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow +into military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me +that the general’s family was residing in territory occupied by +German troops; and it was almost certain that the general would +try to see his family, even if only after a certain period of time +and when the incident had been allowed to drop. He suggested to +me to make preparations for the recapture of the general if he +made a visit of this kind in occupied territory. Canaris said that +he himself would initiate these preparations through his Counterintelligence +office in Paris and through his other offices. Nothing +happened for some time; and it was surely quite natural for me +to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with Canaris or if +Lahousen was with him, “What has become of the Giraud affair?” +or, in the same way, “How is the Giraud case getting on?” The +words used by Mr. Lahousen were, “It is very difficult; but we shall +do everything we can.” That was his answer. Canaris made no +<span class='pageno' title='579' id='Page_579'></span> +reply. That strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it +did not occur to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Third phase: At a later stage—Shall I continue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Fourth phase.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler saying to me: +“This is all nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence +is not capable of this and cannot handle this matter. I will +turn it over to Himmler and Counterintelligence had better keep +out of this, for they will never get hold of the general again.” +Admiral Canaris said at the time that he was counting on having +the necessary security measures taken by the French secret state +police in case General Giraud went to the occupied zone; and a +fight might result, as the general was notoriously a spirited soldier, +a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff by means +of a rope—that is how he escaped from Königstein.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Fifth phase: According to Lahousen’s explanation in Berlin, +Canaris’ desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, +which Lahousen said was done as a result of representations from +the departmental heads, was because I asked again how matters +stood with Giraud and he wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. +Canaris came to me and asked if he could pass it on to the +Reich Security Main Office or to the police. I said yes, because the +Führer had already told me repeatedly that he wanted to hand it +over to Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when +Himmler came to see me and confirmed that he had received orders +from Hitler to have Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively +and that I was to stop Canaris from taking any action in the case. +He had been told that Canaris was working along parallel lines. +I immediately agreed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at +length. I had asked about “Gustav” and similar questions. I wanted +to direct Canaris immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, +as Hitler had confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according +to Lahousen’s detailed reports, that excuses were sought, <span class='it'>et +cetera</span>, that the matter was thought to be very mysterious, that is, +Gustav as an abbreviation for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy +rather than fact. I had Canaris summoned to me at once, for he +was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had done nothing at all, right +from the start. He was thus in a highly uncomfortable position +with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he came I said +only, “You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep +clear of it.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then came the next phase: The general’s escape without difficulty +to North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported—if +<span class='pageno' title='580' id='Page_580'></span> +I remember correctly—before the invasion of North Africa by the +Anglo-American troops. That ended the business. No action was +ever taken by the Counterintelligence whom I had charged to +watch him, or by the police; and I never even used the words to +do away with the general. Never!</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, +but it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North +Africa to Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, +with a liaison officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and +asked if the general could return to France and what would happen +to him on landing in France. The question was turned over to me. +Generaloberst Jodl is my witness that these things actually happened. +The chief of the Counterintelligence Office involved in this +matter was with me. The answer was: “Exactly the same treatment +as General Weygand who is already in Germany. There is +no doubt that the Führer will agree.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But +these things actually happened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few +questions for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in +a later phase, the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences +or losses of a rather serious nature. When you were searching for +Giraud did you cause any trouble to his family, who were living +in occupied France? Did you give any directives which would confine +or inconvenience the family in any way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the +family’s residence in order to receive information of any visit which +he might have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken +against the family. It would have been foolish in this case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Foolish of you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: To make matters quite clear: You had no knowledge +of anything having happened later on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, none at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only +ask you, in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you +did not, at any time, give an order or a directive which might be +interpreted to mean that General Giraud was to be killed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase +“We must have him back, dead or alive” may be considered of +weight in this respect. I never gave orders that the general was +to be killed or done away with, or anything of the kind. Never. +<span class='pageno' title='581' id='Page_581'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the +Defendant Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence +the affidavit, that last one, Number 6 in Document Book +Number 2. I would like to submit that affidavit in evidence. It is +on Page 51 and following and is Document K...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you put that in as K-12 yesterday?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, +where is it and what is the date of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated +9 March 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst +Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit +or to show it to him for confirmation when he is called to the +witness stand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter +of the so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred +to yesterday by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper +was never offered in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. +It was referred to by M. Dubost—I mean, it was not referred to by +him, but it was included in his brief. I did not refer to it, and I +did not offer it in evidence. That is how it came into the hands of +Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence +now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your +former statement by answering the question put by your counsel +with a statement that Reich Marshal Göring was not present at +the conference in which Hitler gave orders for the airmen who had +escaped from the Sagan Camp should be held by the police and +since you further said that a conference with Reich Marshal Göring +in Berlin did not take place, I have only the following questions +on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did you receive a +letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the +<span class='pageno' title='582' id='Page_582'></span> +Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over +their prison camps to the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview +with Hitler I declined the offer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant +Dr. Frank was a lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, +who was then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted +to rejoin the Wehrmacht?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved +of his office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the +Führer who merely made a movement with his hands and said +“Out of the question.” I informed Frank of that decision through +the liaison officer who was temporarily with him at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will +not take me very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o’clock, so +it might be better to adjourn now. I would then put my question +to the witness after the recess.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o’clock.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='583' id='Page_583'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent +and an expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the +armament expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is +certainly not in a position to remember these figures just at the +moment. Professor Kraus, my colleague, therefore, during my absence, +was kind enough to mark these figures down and to check +them in co-operation with the witness. The written deposition +was signed by the witness at that time, in order to avoid any +misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these figures, I +now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this +deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of +this deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit +to the Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four +delegations of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels +of the Defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Dönitz, and the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Witness, would you please look at +the first column only, which bears the heading “Total Expenditures.” +The second and the third columns show which of those sums were +raised through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were +raised from other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should +like to have certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, +because they were the results of Schacht’s calculations and the +witness here can therefore give no information about them. May +I ask you concerning these armament expenditures of the Reich, +beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the fiscal year running from +1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein are: 5,000 millions for +1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions for 1937, 11,000 millions +for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are these figures correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. +May I add that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an +opportunity to speak to the Reich Finance Minister about these +figures and to co-ordinate our opinions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the +Reich on 1 April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there +existed: 24 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized +division, 1 mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition +10 infantry divisions and 1 armored division were being formed? +I wish to add, that of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed +on 1 April 1938; and only 7 to 8 were in the process of being +formed and expected to be complete by 1 October 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore +confirmed them in this affidavit. +<span class='pageno' title='584' id='Page_584'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to +put two more questions to the witness which have not been discussed +with him so that I do not know whether he remembers the +figures in question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in +the proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and +Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler’s march +into Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning +the armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In +the preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and +I believe the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, +going by military units, that is, divisions...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, +in the spring of 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to +say at that time, as far as figures are concerned, there were fewer +divisions than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of +1938 the number of formations, that is, divisions, was probably +equal. In the spring of 1939, when we marched in, the strength +which was used then was less than that which stood ready in the +fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they are important to this Tribunal, +you could get rather from General Jodl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia +had at her disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document +in evidence when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that +what you intend to do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be +included in my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now, +because I have to take it up again when Schacht will be examined +and you will find it then in the document book. However, I would +like to suggest that the copy which I have given to the witness +should become a part of the record, because my questions have +referred to this document. For this reason it might be useful to +make this copy a part of the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record +it had better be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1? +<span class='pageno' title='585' id='Page_585'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for +Defendant Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): +Witness, on 4 January 1944, a conference allegedly took place +between the Führer and Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. +Were you present at this conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could +not fill, to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those +who asked for it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his +reasons for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the +areas from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; +the strong activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great +obstacles in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the +action, and similar reasons. I do not remember any details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you +the leader of the German delegation which signed the capitulation +with which the war in Europe was terminated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that +take place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night +from 8 to 9 May 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full +powers which would authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They +had been signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of +State and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a +few words that he had authorized and ordered me to conduct the +negotiations and to sign the capitulation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers +examined and acknowledged by the Allies?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to +present the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several +hours later they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of +the Red Army who said that I had to show them again when signing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again? +<span class='pageno' title='586' id='Page_586'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of +capitulation and handed them over to become part of the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant +Jodl): Witness, during your testimony you have explained the +organization of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. This +organization was based on a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor +of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW was designated +as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed +Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the +Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is +that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was +the Chief of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the +departmental chiefs of the Armed Forces High Command as I have +already stated, although the first among equals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral +co-ordinated offices?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion +between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February +1938. Do you remember that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to +this conversation has been submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl +present at this conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived +from the conference which I described before and which I held with +him and Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain +military preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg +conference; it is therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as +a result of the description made to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the +German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten +question, the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you +ever give an order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) +under Canaris, to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or +on the border?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, +not by myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field +Marshal, the then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left +this position and was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief +of an artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, +at that time Colonel Warlimont. +<span class='pageno' title='587' id='Page_587'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say +Jodl was not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the +Armed Forces and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont +was not his representative but successor in Jodl’s position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the +occasion of that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—Warlimont +was present as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl +to do with that conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer +and commander in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the +Armed Forces Operations Staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 +to 1938. My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that +position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once +his command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander +of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get +such a command?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army and I remember that during the summer of +1939, I wrote him that his wish to become the commander of a +mountain division in Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—would +come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was +it up to the OKH?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army and he had made the decision.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself +notified Jodl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make +him very happy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond +regularly with Jodl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to +him during that year. +<span class='pageno' title='588' id='Page_588'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the +OKW. He knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of +the future so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, +a rather important position. He goes on active service, as you say. +One should think that then he would not only receive a private letter +once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to +my personal opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active +service is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any +longer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything +which would make us happy. It could be that somebody received the +official order for instance, to keep this gentleman informed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it +happened, but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried +to do it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and +Brünn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in +order to get information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I +believe it is very unlikely because if such were the case he would +have visited me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, +that when he came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the +war, in response to a telegram, he first had to be informed as to +what was going on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him +and myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, +perhaps, the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery +after the Simovic Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of +the wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody +at that conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested +that instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to +march to the borders of a state whose attitude was completely +uncertain and then clarify the situation by an ultimatum?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent +conditions in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, +<span class='pageno' title='589' id='Page_589'></span> +brought that point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send +an ultimatum; that is about the way it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the +East in October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to +Army Group North; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane +to Army Group North in order to get information for the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander +of Army Group North?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, he was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries +which he had at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to +Von Leeb where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the +question of the population of Leningrad, played an important role, +which worried him very much at that time because there were +certain indications that the population was streaming out of the city +and infiltrating into his area. I remember that at that time he asked +me to make the suggestion to the Führer that, as he could not take +over and feed 1 million civilians within the area of his army group, +a sluice, so to speak, should be made towards the east, that is, the +Russian zone, so that the population could flow out in that direction. +I reported that to the Führer at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other +direction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests. +According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population +to get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since +it has been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the +Führer and Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated +18 October 1942, that is Document Number 498-PS which has been +submitted here. It had been announced publicly beforehand that an +order of that kind would be issued. Do you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the +daily communiqués of the Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communiqué +of 7 October 1942, which, below the usual report, states +with reference to what has happened, “The High Command of the +Armed Forces therefore considers itself obliged to issue the following +<span class='pageno' title='590' id='Page_590'></span> +orders.” The first item is of no interest here, and then, at the second +item appears the following sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the +British and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers, +but rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German +troops and will be killed in combat without mercy wherever +they appear.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated +and corrected it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the +point which was last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order +about Commandos, Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this +order on Commandos, under Number VI, Hitler threatened that all +commanders would be court-martialed if they did not carry out this +order. Do you know what considerations prompted Hitler to include +this particular passage in the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that +the purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order +should actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by +the generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave +order; and for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the +threat of punishment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions +concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General +Staff and the OKW. What do you understand to be the German +General Staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who +are especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long +time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff +of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically +and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking +the Court to declare as criminal; and therefore, I do not see what +relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are +you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands +by the General Staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended +to connect this question with another one; and, by the answer +to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged +group, a group has been accused under a wrong name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong +name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has +<span class='pageno' title='591' id='Page_591'></span> +already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you +put your second question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are +considered collectively to form one group which is designated as +General Staff and OKW, do you consider this designation to be +correct or misleading?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation +is misleading, because to us the General Staff always means +a body of assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army +groups and the commanding generals represent the leadership corps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed +sufficiently in this Trial. I want to know only the following from +you: Was the relation of these echelons to each other that of military +superiors and subordinates or did there exist an additional organization +involving these ranks which went beyond purely professional +military duties?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff +officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their +uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves +had no relation to each other through any interoffice channels or +through any other organizations of any kind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst +Halder was put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence +of that affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General +Staff and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the statement +in that sentence correct or incorrect?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say +that those few officers who had General Staff positions were the +ones who did the real work in the General Staff of the Army, while +the rest of the far more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH +had nothing to do with these matters. That is what I think he +wanted to say, a small group which was concerned with these +problems.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler +ever consulted a military leader on a political matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, that did not happen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the +conferences with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you +tell me anything about protests made, with or without success, by +any commanders who had come from the front and who happened +to be present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were +silent listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards, +according to circumstances, such commanders used to make +<span class='pageno' title='592' id='Page_592'></span> +a special report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there +was also an opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by +Kesselring, to discuss these things personally and to advance +opinions. But otherwise nobody had anything to say in these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when +particularly emphatic objections were raised, by any commander, to +Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have +been.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which +Hitler had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do +not know of any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases +which played a role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals +in the West, before the beginning of the war, and I understood +your question to mean whether I knew of any cases beyond that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more +that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the +limit of anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the +General Staff of the Army?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a +prejudice against the General Staff and thought the General Staff +was arrogant. I believe that is sufficient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than +once.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this +witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this +particular witness has not been asked about these points.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked +about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this +point and would have crossed off this question already if one of my +colleagues had put it before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>To the defendant.</span>] Would Hitler, in case an application for resignation +was tendered by one or more front commanders have been +willing to take back an order which he had once given...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has +come and given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, +certainly many of them. +<span class='pageno' title='593' id='Page_593'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the +question I have put now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been +examined in this Court have told us it was impossible to resign. +That is what you are asking about, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if +I can assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted +to prove, as true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether +they accept its truth or not, is a different question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something +also to this question. I do not believe that it can be considered +cumulative, since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, +Dr. Dix, the same question when put to two different witnesses is +in each case a different question, because the subjective answer of +the individual witness to this particular point is desired. But I will +forego that question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Witness, to what extent was the +headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and +also I believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security +measures had been taken with every kind of safety device such as +fences, obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against +any surprise attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and +several areas which were fenced in separately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders +of the army groups and armies in the East did not have +any authority outside their area of operation. Was there a tendency +to keep that operational area as small as possible, or as large as +possible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large +areas of operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom +of movement in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer +was the first who, by drastic means, caused the limitation of these +zones to make them as small as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from administrative +measures and get them out of the extended space they +<span class='pageno' title='594' id='Page_594'></span> +had sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into +narrowly limited areas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, +units of the Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for +operational, that is, for combat purposes. I am particularly interested +in getting that point clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails +some confusion. Did the forces of the SD have anything to do with +the units of the Waffen-SS which were subordinated to army units +for the purpose of operational assignments?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions +were incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do +with anything else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an +SS man for any offense?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander +would have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort +for disciplinary measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer +Himmler, and not the commander of the army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of +the SD have to report to the commanders of the armies upon what +they did on Himmler’s orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail +by the witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections +which existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen +and commands. I was not involved and took no part in it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen +of the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, +were obliged to report to the military commanders in whose +rear areas they operated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which +were in force in this respect; I have not seen them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military +commanders at any time were informed of the intention of Hitler or +Himmler to kill the Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since +I personally was not informed either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the +subject of the prisoners of war. It had already become known +during the war that the conditions relating to the food supply of +Soviet Russian prisoners of war during the first period of the eastern +campaign were miserable. What was the reason for these conditions +which prevailed during that first period? +<span class='pageno' title='595' id='Page_595'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army said during the situation report conferences. +As I recall, he repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of +large masses which required extraordinary efforts of organization to +provide food supply, housing, and security.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt +actually chaotic during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a +particular reason which existed, and in order to refresh your +memory, Witness, I would like to mention the following:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the +future prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning +that these prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite +of these preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was +stopped by a sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer +of these Russian prisoners into the homeland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a +certain period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian +prisoners of war into the Reich was prohibited and only after that +the transfer into the home camps was made possible in order to +utilize the manpower.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during +this first period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal +of the troops?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. +Only the OKH, which had the exclusive responsibility, would +know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the +position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. +When was that position set up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe in 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that +position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same +as the position of a commander of a division?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the +commander of a brigade or a division, a section chief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in +the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way +of estimate I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, +<span class='pageno' title='596' id='Page_596'></span> +two, three or four sections. Therefore there would have been about +30 or 35 section chiefs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff was one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had +among the department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who +combined several small sections. That was about his position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with +that position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work +of that part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was +attached to the Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that +work in accordance with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of +the Armed Forces Operations Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly +high degree, as is maintained by the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this +capacity, but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of +high ranking and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned +with these things, as Halder has pointed out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, +the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations +Staff, not equal in importance to the other positions which are +included in this group or alleged group of the General Staff and +the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed +Forces Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those +who had to deal with operational and strategical questions, but +subordinate to General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in +the Arbeitsstab.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question +which I have put to you was not completely answered. I have asked +you whether the importance of that position was equal to or even +approached equality with that of the other offices which are included +in the group of the general staff and the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General +Staff and the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme +commanders, and the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did +not belong to those.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have +said in your Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning +<span class='pageno' title='597' id='Page_597'></span> +of the war, became the champions and standard bearers of a policy +of conquest and force. In order to exclude any misunderstandings, +I should like to clarify the following: What did you mean by SS in +this case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my +counsel was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you +read the latter you would find for yourself the answer to your +question. To state it in a more precise way: It concerned the Reich +SS Leadership under Himmler and under those functionaries within +his sphere of command, police and SS, who appeared and were +active in the occupied territories. The concept of the so-called +general SS in the homeland had nothing to do with that. I hope +that makes it clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): +Witness, the Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant +Bormann also with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. +In that connection, I would like to put a few questions to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm +as it was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused +to give the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, +and any information on the Volkssturm.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed +of the purpose of the Volkssturm?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend +their own homesteads.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the +Wehrmacht, the Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive +purpose?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered +the Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them +or sent them home.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted +to say that that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann’s +brain or did it originate with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar +things, but military authorities had nothing to do with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters +to the Führer besides the odd things about the Volkssturm? +<span class='pageno' title='598' id='Page_598'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of +things; I can conclude that only from what I was told, and assume +that it originated with Bormann. I do not know it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, +after his return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the +changed foreign political situation—the guarantee pact between +England and Poland had been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the +military measures which had been set in motion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given +to me by Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and +his foreign minister. I was not present at that conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other +ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the +strategic plans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the +Armed Forces Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do +it and that we never did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed +about such questions, that information could have come only +from Hitler himself. I doubt that he made an exception here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April +1940, concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway +which you sent to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter +you informed the Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation +and requested him to take the necessary political steps. Had you +already instructed Von Ribbentrop before that date about the intended +occupation of Norway and Denmark?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that, according +to the way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter was an +unusual method of giving information about this, by the Führer’s +order, to the Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about these +things. I was ordered to write it to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General +Lahousen, I want to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish +campaign, was there a directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate +the Jews in the Polish Ukraine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that +during the occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the +problem of the Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also +put a question once to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that +that area was well suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know +or remember anything else. +<span class='pageno' title='599' id='Page_599'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any +plan to instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the +Poles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard +such things said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember +anything about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you +were Chief of the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, +that is, Prisoners of War Organization. Did you ever issue orders +or have orders issued on the basis of which members of the SA or +units of the SA were detailed to guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war +camps, or were to be used for that purpose?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been +issued by the OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you +that any such guard duty was performed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that +some units of the army in some particular place may have used SA +men temporarily to assist in guard duty, which I would not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for +10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow +morning at 10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary +applications for witnesses and documents, and after that at a quarter +to 1 it will adjourn into a closed session.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me +exactly when you received your first commission as an officer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: On 18 August 1902.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting +as a simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private +first class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost +6 years regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery +commander, and then after the spring of 1915 I served on the +general staff. +<span class='pageno' title='600' id='Page_600'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct translation. +Did you pass the Staff College or any other college, that +is to say, did you receive preliminary training?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated +in so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant +and in the summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General +Staff and returned to my regiment later when the war broke out +in 1914.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did +Hitler possess?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself +that after the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a +Bavarian infantry regiment. During the war he was a private, +then private first class and maybe corporal during the last period.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you, +with your thorough military training and great experience, could +have had an opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, +in solving questions of a strategic and military nature, as well +as other matters pertaining to the Armed Forces?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree +which is almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional +officer, Hitler had studied general staff publications, military +literature, essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he +had a knowledge in the military fields which can only be called +amazing. May I give an example of that which can be confirmed +by the other officers of the Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed +concerning organization, armament, leadership, and equipment of +all armies, and what is more remarkable, of all navies of the globe, +that it was impossible to prove any error on his part; and I have +to add that also during the war, while I was at his headquarters +and in his close proximity, Hitler studied at night all the big +general staff books by Moltke, Schlieffen, and Clausewitz and from +them acquired his vast knowledge by himself. Therefore we had +the impression: Only a genius can do that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your +military training and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a +number of highly important matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I +heard a lot from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question +of my counsel that even in the simple, every-day questions +concerning organization and equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must +admit openly that I was the pupil and not the master.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your +co-operation with Hitler began? +<span class='pageno' title='601' id='Page_601'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that +position, 4 February 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with +Hitler during the entire period of preparation for and realization of +aggressive warfare?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations +as to how, after I entered my new position in the beginning +of February, events followed in quick succession, often in a very +surprising manner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders +of the OKW and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three +commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and +among these the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich +Marshal Göring, was also Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I +received, as I said yesterday, the rank but not the authority and +title of a minister.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military collaborators +of the OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with +Hitler and the other Reich Ministers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, +there was the method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich +Chancellor and the Ministers immediately involved, and, finally +of the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. This did not hold good for +the military sector, for according to the traditions of the German +Army and the Wehrmacht the signatures were given by the principal +experts who had worked on the matter, by the Chief of Staff, +or by whoever had given or at least drafted the order, and an initial +was added on the margin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such +decrees together with other Ministers of the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also +gave the reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was +not Reich Minister and did not receive the function of a minister +in office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of +the War Ministry from February 1938 on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of +February, it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg. +Beginning with 4 February there was neither a Minister for +War nor a War Ministry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what +government organization had replaced the War Ministry and exercised +its function, since I knew that this Ministry did not exist. +<span class='pageno' title='602' id='Page_602'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff +of the War Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and +distributed it, as I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred +all command functions to the commanders-in-chief of the +branches of the Wehrmacht. But this was not an order of mine but +an order of Hitler’s.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to +the Tribunal it would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating, +and supreme military authority of the Reich and that +it was directly under Hitler’s control. Would this conclusion be +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the +drafting of military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically +to the plans for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, +Belgium, Holland, France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet +Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, +saying that the operational and strategic planning, after an order +had been given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to +Hitler by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; +that is to say, for the Army, by the High Command of +the Army and the General Staff of the Army, and then further +decisions were made with respect to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to +ask you the following question: Do you admit that a directive issued +under your signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, +is <span class='it'>per se</span> a document of great political and international importance, +providing for the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree +by the Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested +and concerned. I did not have any personal or political +influence whatsoever in these questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a +complete explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and +what their significance is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about +it, and I shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. +I should now like to determine with greater precision your own +position in the question of Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, +with the direct participation of the OKW, organized acts of provocation +in order to find a reason for aggression against Yugoslavia +and a justification for this aggression in the eyes of the world? +<span class='pageno' title='603' id='Page_603'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel +of other defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate +in any preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish +either that any military offices should ever participate in the +discussion, preparation, deliberation, or the execution of incidents. +I use “incident” here in the sense of provocation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take +to insure the arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which +Free Corps you refer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office +did any gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. +I have no knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was +not given, or at any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot +remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order +issued to occupy Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German +troops, on 14 March 1939, in the afternoon, while President Hacha +was still on the way to Berlin for negotiations with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by +the Führer. There had been preparations to occupy by a <span class='it'>coup de +main</span> that area where the well-known big and modern steel works +were located near Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name +now—before the date of the march into Czechoslovakia as originally +set. As a justification for that decision, Hitler had told me that +it was done in order to prevent the Poles from making a surprise +attack from the north, and thereby perhaps taking possession of +the most modern rolling mill in the world. This he gave as a +reason, and the operation, that is, the occupation, actually took +place in the late hours of 14 March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President +Hacha was on the way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery!</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to +the facts. It is true that the occupation was carried out on that +evening. I have given the reasons, and President Hacha learned +about it only after he arrived in Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in +connection with the aggression against the Soviet Union. You testified +to the Tribunal yesterday on the subject. You explained your +<span class='pageno' title='604' id='Page_604'></span> +position, with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union. But you +informed the Tribunal that the orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa +were given at the beginning of December 1940. Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific +order by the High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the +drawing up of this plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. +I explained yesterday, however, that some order had been issued, +probably in September, concerning transport and railway facilities +and similar matters. I cannot recall whether I signed that order, +but yesterday I mentioned such a preparatory order to improve +transport conditions from the West to the East.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In September?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I +cannot commit myself as to the exact time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained +at a later stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during +the course of his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the +following briefly: Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack +the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which +is mentioned in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring +to, you mean the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not +present at this obviously very casual and brief conversation and +did not hear it. My recollections concerning that period also justify +my belief that I was not present, because I was on the move almost +every day by airplane and was not present at the discussions of +the situation at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with +Ribbentrop take place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; +I believe, it was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give +the exact date any more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that +I did not return to Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote +the memorandum which I mentioned yesterday at a later date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first +heard about Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the +conversation with Ribbentrop?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden +for about two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, +<span class='pageno' title='605' id='Page_605'></span> +I returned to headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one +of the subsequent days, probably during the middle of August, I +heard for the first time ideas of that kind from Hitler. That was +the basis for my deliberation and my memorandum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly +in asking whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the +summer of 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble +about that. Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence +of the witness Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, +on 11 February of this year. Paulus, as you will remember, +informed the Tribunal that when he entered the OKH on 3 September +1940, he found among other plans an unfinished preliminary +operational draft of a plan for attacking the Soviet Union, known +under the name of Barbarossa. Do you remember that part of +Paulus’ testimony?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was +a study or a draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document +on the occasion of his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff +of the Army. This is not known to me, and it could not be known +to me because the documents, files, and other reports of the General +Staff of the Army were never at my disposal; and I never had an +opportunity to look at them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that +the OKH, in September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection +with Plan Barbarossa?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, +then I could not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether +it actually was true. I can neither deny nor affirm it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that +you were opposed to the war with the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with +the suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the +Soviet Union. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan +and not to wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the +content of my memorandum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would +like to ask you now about a conference, evidently known to you, +which was held 3 weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet +<span class='pageno' title='606' id='Page_606'></span> +Union, the conference of 16 July 1941. Do you remember that conference, +which dealt with the tasks for the conduct of the war +against the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. +I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to +you at this particular minute. You may remember that I submitted +it to the Defendant Göring, when the question of the dismemberment +and of the annexation of the Soviet Union arose. Do you +remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked +on top “BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified +it as a memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified +that I was called in only during the second part of the conference +and that I had not been present during the first part of it. I also +testified that it was not the minutes but a free summary made by +Reichsleiter Bormann, dictated by him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on +16 July, the question was already being advanced about the annexation +by Germany of the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of +the Volga, the Ukraine, Bielorussia and other territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the +conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on +where questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain personalities +who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have +seen the document here for the first time and did not know of it +before; and did not attend the first half of the conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently: +What were the final aims pursued by Hitler and his +entourage at that time, against the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given +me, I saw the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that +he was convinced that a war would break out some way or other +within the next years between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism +and the German Reich of National Socialism. The reasons +which were given to me were something like this: If I believe or +rather if I am convinced that such a conflict between these two +nations will take place, then it would be better now than later. +That is how I can put it. But I do not remember, at least not at +the moment, the questions which are in this document about the +dismemberment of several areas. Perhaps they were constructions +of fantasy. +<span class='pageno' title='607' id='Page_607'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that +you did not know of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the +territories of the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true +that I believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents +of the Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer connection +from the point of view of food supply or economy, but concrete +plans for conquest are not known to me and if they were ever +touched upon I never considered them to be serious problems. That +is the way I looked at it at that time. I must not explain how I +see it today, but only how I saw it at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July +Hitler announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to +the ground?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have +read that document here again. That it is contained in the document +I cannot remember now. But I have had this document here in +my hands; I have read it in the presence of the American Prosecutor; +and if it is stated therein, then the question of whether or +not I have heard it depends entirely on the moment at which I was +called to that conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document now, +because it has already been submitted several times. But in the +minutes previously quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them +himself, it is said, “The Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. +The Führer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then cede +it to the Finns.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from +what moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said +before that moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if +I am given the document or if one reads the record of my preliminary +interrogation. That is what I told the interrogating officer +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of +the conference of 16 July immediately. While the passages required +are being found, I shall ask you a few more questions, and by that +time the passages will have been found.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know +about it from other documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian Delegation +and the general who is present here in this courtroom. He +has called my attention to a document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation, +that is quite right. +<span class='pageno' title='608' id='Page_608'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from +an admiral, as well as a second document which contained a short +directive, I believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I +have been interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can +state only that neither through artillery operations during the siege, +nor by operations of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction +be compared with that of other places we know about. It did not +materialize, we did not carry it out. It never came to a systematic +shelling of Leningrad, as far as I know. Consequently, only that +can be stated which I said at that time under oath to the gentlemen +of the Soviet Delegation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad +never shelled?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area, +but it never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes +of destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come +to an attack on Leningrad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask +you a few supplementary questions. [<span class='it'>The document was submitted +to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment +after this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator +at the time that I just heard the discussion about the appointment +of Gauleiter Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks +I did not hear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those +minutes of the report on the conference of 16 July that deal with +Leningrad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the +minutes of the meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they +had finished talking about Leningrad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about +the qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable +for an administrative office. These were the first words which I +heard. A debate was going on about that subject just when I entered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of +Leningrad to the ground.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you +mean the order of the Navy, the order which was found with the +Navy? +<span class='pageno' title='609' id='Page_609'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that there were two decrees, one +issued by the naval command and the other by the OKW, signed by +Jodl? You do know that, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I have seen both these decrees here. They were +submitted by the Russian Delegation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And you know that the decree signed by the +Defendant Jodl also refers to the destruction of the city of Moscow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That I do not remember exactly, any more since only +Leningrad was referred to at that time, when I glanced at it. But +if it is stated there, I will not doubt it at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you: Did the OKW issue decrees +for the purpose of having them obeyed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The order or communication of the Navy is first of all +no OKW order and how it originated is not known to me. The short +order of the OKW, signed “By order of Jodl,” was not drafted in +my presence, as I already stated yesterday. I would have signed +it but I was absent and therefore do not know either to which reasons +or discussions this order was due.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You have not replied to my question. I am +asking you: The directives issued by the OKW were given out to +be obeyed? Can you reply to me briefly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This is a directive but not an order, because an order +can be given only by the office of the local command of the army. +It was therefore a directive, an aim, an intention.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And are directives from the OKW not meant +to be carried out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Certainly they are meant to be carried out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: As to your statement that no one shelled +Leningrad, it does not even call for further denial, since it is a +well-known fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I at least say that I did not issue that order. That +is why I do not know anything about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that before the beginning of the +war against the Soviet Union the Defendant Göring issued a so-called +Green Folder containing directives on the economic matters +in the territories of the U.S.S.R. intended for occupation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, that is known to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you affirm that in your directive of 16 June +1941 you instructed all the German troops to obey these directives +implicitly? +<span class='pageno' title='610' id='Page_610'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, there is a directive which makes known to all +units of the Army the organizations which are assigned for important +tasks and what their responsibilities are, and that all the military +commands of the Army must act in compliance therewith. That +I passed on; it was not my order, I passed it on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Was it your own order or were you merely +obeying the Führer’s instructions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I merely passed on the orders received from the Führer, +and I could not give any orders at all to Reich Marshal Göring in +that respect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You did not issue an order to Field Marshal +Göring, but addressed your order to the troops?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I could not give him any orders either; I could only +communicate the will of the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army, and he had to pass it on to his army groups.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You did not disagree with this will of the +Führer’s?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not raise any objection, since this did not concern +a duty of the OKW. I followed the order and passed it on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that this order gave you instructions +for the immediate and complete economic exploitation of the +occupied regions of the Soviet Union in the interest of German war +economy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not give such an order containing the aims and +tasks which were to be carried out by the organization Economic +Staff Oldenburg, since I had nothing to do with that. I only passed on +the contents of the Green Folder—it is known what this name stands +for—to the High Command of the Army for appropriate action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that the directives contained in +Göring’s Green Folder were aimed at the plunder of the material +wealth of the Soviet Union and all her citizens?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. In my opinion nothing was said about destruction +in the Green Folder. Instead of destruction one ought to say, to +make good use of surplus, especially in the field of the food supply +and the utilization of raw materials for the entire war economy of +Germany, but not the destruction of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Please repeat what you have said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I said that in the Green Folder there were principles +for the utilization of present and future reserves which were considered +surplus, but never for their destruction. To let the Soviet +population starve at the same time, on account of this, that was not +the case. I have seen these things on the spot and therefore I am +qualified to speak about them. +<span class='pageno' title='611' id='Page_611'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not consider that plunder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The quibble about words, whether booty, or exploitation +of reserves found during the war, or looting, or the like, is +a matter of concepts which I believe need not be defined here. +Everyone uses his own expressions in this respect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, do not let us argue about it. I have +one last question to ask you with regard to the attack on the Soviet +Union: Do you agree that the methods of warfare adopted by the +German Army in the East stood in striking contrast with the simplest +concept of military honor of an army and the exigencies +of war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I cannot admit that in this form. I would rather +say, the fact that the brutalizing—I have used this term before—that +the brutalizing of the war against the Soviet Union and what +occurred in the East, is not to be attributed to instigation by the +German Army but to circumstances which I have stated in an +affidavit submitted by my counsel to the Tribunal. I would furthermore +like to ask the Russian Prosecutor to read it so that he can +see my opinion about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. To conclude the question of aggression +and to pass to the question of atrocities, I have to ask you the +following question, and I trust you will impart to the Tribunal the +information you possess in your capacity as Hitler’s closest adviser +on the conduct of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My question is the following: What tasks did the High Command +of the Armed Forces entrust to the German Army in case Germany +fought to the finish a victorious war against the Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know what you mean by that. Which demands +were put to the military leadership in case the war would be a +success? May I ask you to put this question differently. I did not +understand it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have in mind tasks for the further conduct +of the war after a successful conclusion of the Eastern campaign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There could have occurred what actually did occur later, +that is, the landing of the British and American forces in France, +in Denmark, or in Germany, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. There were various possibilities +of warfare which might occur and which could not be anticipated +at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking this question in general. You +are evidently acquainted with a document entitled, <span class='it'>Manual of Naval +Warfare</span>, which had already been drafted on 8 August 1941 and +contained plans for the subsequent conduct of the war after the +conclusion of the Eastern campaign. I refer here to the drafting of +<span class='pageno' title='612' id='Page_612'></span> +plans for an attack on Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Do you know this +document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It has not been submitted to me so far. It is a surprise +at the moment, and I cannot recall it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This document, Your Honors, is Number S-57; it was submitted +to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336. I shall show it to +you in a minute. Please hand this document to the defendant. [<span class='it'>The +document was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I see this document for the first time, at any rate here +during the proceedings. It begins with the sentence, “A draft of +directives concerning further plans after the end of the Eastern +campaign was submitted to the Naval Operations Staff.” This order +or directive of the Navy I have never seen nor could I have seen +it. It is a draft of directives which could come only from the High +Command of the Wehrmacht. In the Armed Forces Operations Staff +there were officers from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, +and it is quite possible that ideas which took the shape of drafts +of directives were made known at the time to the officers of the +Wehrmacht Operations Staff. I cannot remember any such draft of +directives of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, but perhaps Generaloberst +Jodl may possibly be in a position to give information about +that. I cannot remember it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember it? I shall not examine +you about it closely but you see that the document plans the seizure +of Gibraltar with the active participation of Spain. In addition it +provides for an attack on Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and so forth. And +you say that you know nothing of this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I shall be glad to give information about that. An +attack to seize Gibraltar, the entrance to the Mediterranean straits, +had already been planned for the preceding winter but had not been +carried out, that is, during the winter of 1939-40. It was nothing +new and the other topics which have been mentioned were those +which developed ideas based on the situation existing north of the +Caucasus as a result of the operations. I do not at all mean to say +that these ideas were not given any thought, but I do not remember +it and I did not read every document or paper of the Wehrmacht +Operations Staff when it was in the drafting stage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: If you consider as mere scraps of paper documents +concerning the seizure of foreign countries, then what documents +do you consider as important?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can state only the following, which is true and sincere. +In wartime one makes many plans and considers various +<span class='pageno' title='613' id='Page_613'></span> +possibilities which are not and cannot be carried out in the face +of the hard facts of reality; and therefore it is not permissible to +regard such papers afterwards from an historical point of view, as +representing throughout the will and intention of the operational +and strategic war leadership.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I agree with you that from an historical point +of view this document is at present of no importance whatsoever. +But taken in conjunction with the plan of the German General Staff +at a time when this Staff thought it was going to defeat the Soviet +Union, the document does acquire a very different meaning. However, +I shall not examine you any further about this document, for +the time being.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now pass on to the subject of atrocities and of your attitude +towards these crimes. Your counsel, Dr. Nelte, has already handed +you the principal documents of the Prosecution on the subject of +atrocities. I do not therefore intend either to submit them again +or to enter into any detailed argument on the subject. I shall +merely examine you on the basic principles of these documents +which were submitted by your counsel when he interrogated you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I shall first of all refer to a document entitled, “Directive on +the Introduction of Military Jurisdiction in Region Barbarossa and +on the Adoption of Special Military Measures.” Do you remember +that document? It was drawn up on 13 May 1941 more than a +month before the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. Do +you remember that in that document, drawn up before the war, +instructions were given that suspect elements should immediately +be brought before an officer and that he would decide whether they +were to be shot? Do you remember that directive? Did you sign +the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I have never denied that. But I have given the +necessary explanations as to how the document came into being +and who was its originator.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Document C-50, dated 13 May 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: [<span class='it'>To the defendant</span>]: Although you declare that +you have already elucidated the matter to your counsel, I am nevertheless +obliged to put this question to you in a slightly different +form: Did you consider that an officer had a right to shoot people +without trial or investigation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the German Army there have always been courts-martial +for our own soldiers as well as for our enemies, which could +always be set up, consisting of one officer and one or two soldiers +<span class='pageno' title='614' id='Page_614'></span> +all three of whom would act as judges. That is what we call a +court-martial (Standgericht); the only requisite is always that an +officer must preside at this court. But as a matter of principle I +have to repeat the statement which I have made yesterday...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: One moment! Please reply to this question. +Did not this document do away with judicial proceedings in the +case of so-called suspects, at the same time leaving to an officer of +the German Army the right to shoot them? Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: In the case of German soldiers it was correct and was +permitted. There is a military tribunal with judicial officers and +there is a court-martial which consists of soldiers. These have the +right to pass and to execute an appropriate sentence against any +soldier of the German Army in court-martial proceedings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The +question is, what right does this document give, not what the orders +in the German Army are.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Can you reply to the following question? Did +this document do away with judicial proceedings and did it give +the German officer the right to shoot suspects, as stated herein?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was an order which was given to me by Hitler. +He had given me that order and I put my name under it. What +that means, I explained in detail yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You, a Field Marshal, signed that decree. You +considered that the decree was irregular; you understood what the +consequences of that decree were likely to be. Then why did you +sign it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot say any more than that I put my name to +it and I thereby, personally, assumed in my position a degree of +responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And one more question. This decree was dated +13 May 1941, almost a month before the outbreak of war. So you +had planned the murder of human beings beforehand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That I do not understand. It is correct that this order +was issued about 4 weeks before the beginning of the campaign +Barbarossa, and another 4 weeks earlier it had been communicated +to the generals in a statement by Hitler. They knew that weeks +before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know how this decree was actually +applied?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have also told my opinion to the interrogating General +of the Soviet Army in the preliminary interrogations; whether +generals discussed this order with me has not been mentioned, but +I wish to point out that it says specifically here that the higher +<span class='pageno' title='615' id='Page_615'></span> +commanders have the right to suspend this order concerning court +jurisdiction as soon as their area is pacified. I have given the same +answer to every general who has asked me about the reasons for +this order and its effect. I said that it provides that they were +allowed to suspend this order as soon as they considered their area +to be pacified. That is an individual subjective question for the +discretion of the commanders and it is provided therein.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And now for the final question in connection +with this order or directive. This order actually assured German +soldiers and officers impunity for arbitrary actions and actions of +lawlessness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Within certain limits, within certain limits! The limit +was strictly defined in the oral order to the generals, namely, application +of severest disciplinary measures among their own troops.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I think, Defendant Keitel, that you have seen +these “certain limits” in the documents submitted to the Tribunal +and in the documentary films.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I shall now ask you the following question: On 12 May 1941 the +question of the treatment of captured Russian political commissars +and military prisoners was under consideration. Do you remember +that document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: At the moment I cannot recall which one you mean. +It is not clear to me what you are referring to at the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I refer to the document dated 12 May 1941, +which established that the political leaders of the Red Army should +not be recognized as prisoners of war but should be destroyed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have seen only notes on it. I do not recall the document +at present but I know the facts. I cannot recall the document +at the moment. May I see it please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. [<span class='it'>The document was handed to +the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Number 884-PS. It is a document dated 12 May +1941 and entitled: “Treatment of Political and Military Russian +Functionaries.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It is not an order but a memorandum on a report by +the Department of National Defense, with the remark that decisions +by the Führer are still required. The memorandum probably refers +to a suggested order, I remember this now; I saw it at the time and +the result of the report is not mentioned but merely a suggestion +which was put down for the ruling. As far as I know, the ruling +was taken on those lines then communicated to the High Command +of the Army as having been approved by the Führer or having been +<span class='pageno' title='616' id='Page_616'></span> +attended to, or discussed, or agreed upon, directly between the +Führer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean when you speak of “regulation”? +We have learned so many expressions from German Army +terminology, such as “regulation,” “special treatment,” “execution,” +but they all, translated into vulgar parlance, mean one thing, and +one thing only—murder. What are you thinking of when you say +“regulation”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not say “regulation.” I do not know which word +was understood to mean regulation. I said that, in the sense of that +memorandum, according to my recollection, directives had been +issued by Hitler to the Army at that time, that is, an approval to +the suggestion which has been made in the memorandum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In that case you do not deny that as far back +as May, more than a month before the outbreak of war, the document +had already been drafted which provided for the annihilation +of Russian political commissars and military personnel? You do not +deny this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, that I do not deny. That was the result of the +directives which had been communicated and which had been +worked out here in writing by the generals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 6 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='617' id='Page_617'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST DAY</span><br/> Saturday, 6 April 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I am asking you about the +directive concerning the so-called communist insurrectionary movement +in the occupied territories. Yesterday your counsel showed +you this directive. It is an order of 16 September 1941, Number R-98. +I shall remind you of one passage from this order. It states:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In order to nip in the bud any conspiracy, the strongest +measures should be taken at the first sign of trouble in order +to maintain the authority of the occupying power and to +prevent the conspiracy from spreading...”;</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>and furthermore:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...one must bear in mind that in the countries affected +human life has absolutely no value and that a deterrent effect +can be achieved only through the application of extraordinarily +harsh measures.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You remember this basic idea of the order, that human life absolutely +does not amount to anything. Do you remember this +statement, the basic statement of the order, that “human life has +absolutely no value”? Do you remember this sentence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You signed the order containing this statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider that necessity demanded this +extremely evil order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I explained some of the reasons for this order yesterday +and I pointed out that these instructions were addressed in the +first place to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht offices in the +Southeast; that is, the Balkan regions, where extensive partisan +warfare and a war between the leaders had assumed enormous proportions, +and secondly, because the same phenomena had been observed +and established on the same or similar scale in certain +defined areas of the occupied Soviet territory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Does this mean that you consider this order +to have been entirely correct? +<span class='pageno' title='618' id='Page_618'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have already explained in detail, in replying to questions, +my fundamental standpoint with regard to all orders concerning +the treatment of the population. I signed the order and by +doing so I assumed responsibility within the scope of my official +jurisdiction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you are not +answering the question. The question was perfectly capable of an +answer “yes” or “no” and an explanation afterwards. It is not an +answer to the question to say that you have already explained to +your counsel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more, do you consider this +order, this particular order—and I emphasize, in which it is stated +that “human life has absolutely no value”—do you consider this +order correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It does not contain these words; but I knew from years +of experience that in the Southeastern territories and in certain +parts of the Soviet territory, human life was not respected to the +same degree.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You say that these words do not exist in the +order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: To my knowledge those exact words do not appear; +but it says that human life has very little value in these territories. +I remember something like that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: According to your recollection now, you remember +that you were interrogated by General Alexandrov on +9 November 1945. To a question in regard to the meaning of this +sentence you replied: “I must admit that this sentence is authentic, +although the Führer himself inserted this sentence in the order.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember your explanation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is correct. That is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I can produce this order for you. I did not +produce it because you were familiarizing yourself with it yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not read through all the points yesterday. I +merely admitted its actual existence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal if you got a translation +of the document. When you are cross-examining upon a document +and as to the actual words of it, it is very inconvenient for us +not to have the document before us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I shall at once present this +order to the defendant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Handing the document to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document 389-PS? +<span class='pageno' title='619' id='Page_619'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, this is Document 389-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you are citing a document it would be +a good thing if you would cite the number rather slowly because +very often the translation does not come through accurately to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: All right, I shall observe this in the future, +Mr. President. I numbered this document R-98, but it has a double +number, R-98 and 389-PS. I cited Subparagraph 3 b) of this order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Defendant Keitel, have you familiarized yourself with the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. The text in the German language says that “in +the countries affected human life frequently has no value...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And further?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, “...and a deterrent effect can be obtained only +by extreme harshness. To atone for the life of a German soldier...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Quite clear. And in this same order, in this +same Subparagraph “b,” it is stated that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To atone for the life of one German soldier, 50 to 100 Communists +must, as a rule, be sentenced to death. The method +of execution should strengthen the measure of determent.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The German text is slightly different. It says: “In such +cases in general, the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists may +be considered adequate.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the German wording.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: For one German soldier?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I know that and I see it here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is what I was asking you about. So now +I ask you once more...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Do you want an explanation of that or am I not to say +any more?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I shall now interrogate you on this matter. I +ask you whether, when signing this order you thereby expressed +your personal opinion on these cruel measures? In other words, were +you in agreement with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I signed the order but the figures contained in it are +alterations made personally by Hitler himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And what figures did you present to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The figures in the original were 5 to 10.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, the divergence between you +and Hitler consisted merely in the figures and not in the spirit of +the document? +<span class='pageno' title='620' id='Page_620'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: The idea was that the only way of deterring them was +to demand several sacrifices for the life of one soldier, as is stated +here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was not an answer to the question. The +question was whether the only difference between you and Hitler on +this document was a question of figures. That admits of the answer, +“yes” or “no.” Was the only difference between you and Hitler a +question of figures?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Then I must say that with reference to the underlying +principle there was a difference of opinion, the final results of which +I no longer feel myself in a position to justify, since I added my +signature on behalf of my department. There was a fundamental +difference of opinion on the entire question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Let us continue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to remind you of one more order. It is the order +dated 16 December 1942, referring to the so-called “Fight against +the Partisans.” This document was submitted to the Tribunal as +Exhibit Number USSR-16; I shall not examine you in detail with +regard to this order. It was presented to you yesterday by your +defense counsel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not remember that at the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Not the one that was presented yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: All right. If you do not remember I can hand +you this document in order to refresh your memory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number of this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This is the document submitted by the Soviet +Prosecution as Exhibit Number USSR-16 (Document Number +USSR-16).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I just took down that it was USA-516, but I +suppose I was wrong in hearing. It is USSR-16, is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, USSR-16.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: [<span class='it'>Handing the document to the defendant.</span>] I +shall interrogate you, Defendant Keitel, only on one question in +connection with this order. In Subparagraph 1 of this order, Paragraph +3, it is stated, and I would draw your attention to the following +sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The troops are therefore authorized and ordered in this +struggle to take any measures without restriction even against +women and children, if that is necessary to achieve success.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you found this passage? +<span class='pageno' title='621' id='Page_621'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the order calling for the +application of any kind of measures you like without restriction, also +against women and children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: “To employ without restriction any means, even against +women and children, if it is necessary.” I have found that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is exactly what I am asking you about. +I ask you, Defendant Keitel, Field Marshal of the former German +Army, do you consider that this order is a just one, that measures +may be employed at will against women and children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Measures, insofar as it means that women and children +were also to be removed from territories where there was partisan +warfare, never atrocities or the murder of women or children. Never!</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: To remove—a German term—means to kill?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No. I do not think it would ever have been necessary +to tell German soldiers that they could not and must not kill women +and children.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You did not answer my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you consider this order a just one in regard to measures +against women and children or do you consider it unjust? Answer +“yes” or “no.” Is it just or unjust? Explain the matter later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I considered these measures to be right and as such I +admit them; but not measures to kill. That was a crime.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: “Any kind of measures” includes murder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, but not of women and children.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but it says here “Any kind of measures +against women and children.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, it does not say “any measures.” It says “...and +not to shrink from taking measures against women and children.” +That is what it says.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>No German soldier or German officer ever thought of killing +women and children.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And in reality...?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot say in every individual case, since I do not +know and I could not be everywhere and since I received no reports +about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: But there were millions of such cases?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have no knowledge of that and I do not believe that +it happened in millions of cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not believe it? +<span class='pageno' title='622' id='Page_622'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now +refer to one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet +prisoners of war. I do not intend to examine you in regard to the +branding of Soviet prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently +well known to the Tribunal. I want to examine you in +regard to one document, the report of Admiral Canaris, which was +presented to you yesterday. You remember yesterday your counsel +submitted to you the Canaris report; it is dated 15 September 1941 +and registered under Document Number EC-338. As you will +remember, even a German officer drew attention to the exceptional +arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with the Soviet +prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass +murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of +definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the +statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to +yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference +to myself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, +Keitel, personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris +in his report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done +away with where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you +in agreement with it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately +submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account +of the enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was +dated the beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On +the whole I shared the objections raised by Canaris, but I must +supplement that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now +present you with the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing +your decision.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document +containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record +in court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to +the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes. +<span class='pageno' title='623' id='Page_623'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. +This is Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. +The following are the contents of your decision:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“These objections arise from the military conception of chivalrous +warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of an +ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I sanction +them.” Signed: “Keitel.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is this your resolution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the +Führer for decision. I wrote it then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said +so; it is said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I +read it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. +I will now draw your attention to another passage of this +document. I draw your attention to Page 2. Please observe that +the text of Canaris’ report mentions the following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are +politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to +their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando) +belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance +with directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments +and whose execution cannot be checked by the latter.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written +in the margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard +were “Canaris writes.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact +that your decision “Highly expedient” appears in the margin, +opposite that paragraph, and written by your own hand. Have +you found this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the +army offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and +knew nothing about them. It states that they are not known to +the Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the +Security Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians +and prisoners of war? You consider that expedient?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these +Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I +meant. That appears here and I underlined “unknown.” +<span class='pageno' title='624' id='Page_624'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as +Field Marshal and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly +referred to yourself as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty +decision of September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the +murder of the unarmed soldiers whom you had captured? Is +that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility +within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would +like to ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the +Tribunal, about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in +accordance with the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of +an officer” to promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of +war and on peaceful citizens?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September +are concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of +war whom we found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we +found them murdered by the hundreds.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow +the path to which you resorted once before, and revive the question +of the alleged butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I +agreed yesterday that as far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning +of the war, you had signed a directive on the shooting of +political and military workers in the Red Army. I have some...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they +did not contain the word “murder.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since +this means arguing against documents; and documents speak for +themselves.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal +that the generals of the German Army were only blindly +carrying out Hitler’s orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised +objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in +my presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological +war and ordered them to be put into practice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their +own initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation +of the laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved +by Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders +altering, modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as +<span class='pageno' title='625' id='Page_625'></span> +regards jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because +they also discussed it with me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about +modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, +ever promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and +customs of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you +are referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I +know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have +in mind is General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the +conduct of troops in the East.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet +Prosecution as Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number +USSR-12). The passages to which I refer are underlined in this +document, and I shall read into the record one quotation from this +order governing the conduct of troops in the East:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken +humanity...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a +preliminary interrogation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and +approved by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the +army commanders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first +time. To my knowledge I never saw the order either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider +such orders as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of +Soviet prisoners of war and of the civilian population be of any +possible interest to the Chief of the OKW, since their lives were +of no value whatsoever?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front +and had no official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief +of the Army was the only one who had.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When +testifying before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your +accomplices, the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty +of Versailles, and I am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade +and the Crimea part of Germany before the Treaty of Versailles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law +had been amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. +<span class='pageno' title='626' id='Page_626'></span> +You accepted this offer, presented your personal credentials to the +leadership of the Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, +did not your acceptance to join the membership of the Nazi Party +signify that you were in agreement with the program, objectives, +and methods of the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden +Party Badge for three or four years, I thought that this request +for my personal particulars was only a formal registration; and I +paid the required Party membership subscription. I did both these +things and have admitted doing them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was +ever made, you already, <span class='it'>de facto</span>, considered yourself a member of +the Nazi Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as +a political soldier or politician.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been +said here, that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called +you but on account of your own convictions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient +soldier of my Führer. And I do not think that there are generals +in Russia who do not give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on +the 2d of October 1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining +your position? It was after your interrogations, and in your own +time you wrote a letter explaining your point of view. Do you +remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer +remember the contents. It referred to the interrogations, however.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given +a further opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put +to me took me by surprise and I was often unable to remember +the answers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one +passage and ask you whether it correctly expresses your view:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to +fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often +acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against +my own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned +by Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete +self-abnegation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that? +<span class='pageno' title='627' id='Page_627'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to +tell the Tribunal, what were the worst matters in your view in +which you often acted against the inner voice of your conscience? +Just tell us some of the worst matters in which you acted against +the inner voice of your conscience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but +the decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my +conscience and my convictions were those which were contrary to +the training which I had undergone during my 37 years as an +officer in the German Army. That was a blow at my most intimate +personal principles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, +Defendant. Can you tell the Tribunal the three worst things you +had to do which were against the inner voice of your conscience? +What do you pick out as the three worst things you had to do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for +the conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary +to the acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly +concerns the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. +officers, the question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, +that of the terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel +Decree and the actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and +about which I did not know. Those were the worst struggles which +I had with myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und +Nebel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer +are in the British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and +Alfred Jodl, and it occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Defendant, I will give you the +German document book. It is 279 of the British document book, +and 289...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Number 731?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know +which volume it is; Part 2, I think it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from +the start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty +is not pronounced and not carried out within a week,</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany +secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the +offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these +measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused; +<span class='pageno' title='628' id='Page_628'></span></p> + +<p>(b) the fact that no information may be given as to their +whereabouts or their fate.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and +brutal, were they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally +thought that to deport individuals secretly was very much more +cruel than to impose a sentence of death. I have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 +of yours—281 of the English Book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering +letter:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of +offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even +penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness. +Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved +either by capital punishment or by measures which keep the +culprit’s relatives and the population generally uncertain as +to his fate.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer +which you are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were +they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I add something?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I +drew your attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s +long considered will,” which were intended to convey to the generals +who were receiving these orders what was written between the lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that +that was by no means the end of this series of orders, was it? This +order was unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving +its purpose, was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in +that form was unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop +what it was designed to stop? Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, it did not cease.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make +a still more severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My +Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-298.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] It says: +<span class='pageno' title='629' id='Page_629'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the +occupied territories, committed more and more by bands +under unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest +countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity +of the war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us +from the rear at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve +no consideration.</p> + +<p>“I therefore order:</p> + +<p>“All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in +the occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the +SS, or the Police, or against installations used by them, are to +be combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and +sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to +fight down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those +who are apprehended later are to be handed over to +the nearest local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices, +especially women, who take no active part in the +fighting, are to be employed on labor. Children are to be +spared.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, would you look at Paragraph II:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive instructions. +He is entitled to make alterations and additions as +far as required by the exigencies of war operations.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? +It must have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: +“Women are to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” +So it says in the original version which I have before me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant +that they were not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make +alterations and additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, +attempt to mitigate the severity of that order in any way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional +orders to mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would +have issued anything without first presenting it to the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did +issue. Would you look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit +GB-299?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the +Senior Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that +decree; and would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5: +<span class='pageno' title='630' id='Page_630'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p> “All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of +terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German +civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the +security or readiness for action of the occupying power are to +be suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences +already pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits +are to be handed over with a report on the proceedings to the +nearest local Security Police and SD office. In the case of +death sentences which have already become final, the regulations +now in force will continue to apply.</p> + +<p>“Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil +the security or readiness for action of the occupying power do +not justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German +civilians in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders +of the occupied territories to draw up new regulations +in agreement with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing +them over to the SD for forced labor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were +not making it any easier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose +out of the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later +on the same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, +and signed them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you +called terrorism and sabotage. Let us look at what happened to +people who were guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage. +Look at Document D-763. That will be GB-300. “Non-German +civilians...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the +occupied territories who endanger the security or tactical +preparedness of the occupying power otherwise than through +acts of terrorism and sabotage, are to be handed over to the +SD. Section I, Number 3...”—that is the part that says +women will be employed on labor and children will be +spared—“of the Führer’s order also applies to them.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone +who was handed over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, +certainly be put into a concentration camp, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated +on labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me +from what I have learned that they frequently ended in the concentration +camp. However, it was always described to us, to me, as +<span class='pageno' title='631' id='Page_631'></span> +a labor camp. That was the description, “labor camps of the Secret +State Police.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will +agree that that is a most severe course to take with people who have +been guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin +and development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will +merely answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe +measure. The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as +is known, during the interminable daily situation reports on the +incidents in all the occupied territories, I received from the Führer +instructions and orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form +similar to this document; and I think I have already described in +detail the way in which I discussed these things with him and how +I worked, that on principle I never issued or signed anything which +did not agree in principle with his wishes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you +for only 3 weeks, was it not, because on 4 September, which is +barely 3 weeks later, you issued another order, Document D-766, +Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was issued, as it shows, as an agreement +with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the Reich Minister of Justice and +Dr. Lammers. Now look at I:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been +sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the +security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the +sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the +occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be +handed over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest +local Security Police and SD office. An exception is made +only in the case of those sentenced to death for whom the +execution of the penalty has been ordered.</p> + +<p>“II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the +occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the +directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such +acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given +a distinguishing mark.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by +that order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that +it was made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied +territories, due to lack of troops to keep order. +<span class='pageno' title='632' id='Page_632'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You +called a conference to consider this matter. That is shown in Document +D-765, and I also show you D-767, the report of the conference. +You need not worry about 765, which just says that there is to be a +conference, but in Document D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, +there is a report of the conference. The second paragraph says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the +immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German +civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now +listen to this: “No answer was given to the +question raised during the discussion as to why they must be +surrendered to the SD at the present moment, in spite of the +considerable amount of administrative work involved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had +been sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it +now, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did +not trouble you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you +earlier, that the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as +a result of the terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht +Legal Department had presented these things for discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate +persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to +the tender mercies of the SD?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. +I did not attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the +note since, as a matter of principle, I always marked every document +which had been presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted +with the figures quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; +I am not acquainted with them and I do not remember them, unless +another order was...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which +you have read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer +in the affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my +question. You cannot give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht +and these other offices were sending the 24,000 people, who had been +sentenced by ordinary courts, over to the SD? You cannot give us +any reason for that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is +a misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does +not mean the same thing. +<span class='pageno' title='633' id='Page_633'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this +Trial too long to think that handing people over to the SD means +police custody. It means a concentration camp and a gas chamber +usually, does it not? That is what it meant in fact, whether you +knew it or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration +camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot +say that it was not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers +to the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming +to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] If you will notice that, Defendant, +two paragraphs below the one I put to you it states:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the +minor matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they +are to be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local +authorities.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this +business, was it not, Defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously +mentioned at that conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, +I want you to realize how we have been going. We started +with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, which disappeared, and we went +on to the Terror and Sabotage Decree. We then proceeded to acts +which were less than terror and sabotage, but were criminal acts +under the rules of the occupying power.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply +refused to work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is +Exhibit GB-304. That is a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, +who was in the Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces +in the Netherlands, through his Chief of Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now listen to this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at +standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to +resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means +of transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are +no longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the +Führer’s decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and +<span class='pageno' title='634' id='Page_634'></span> +Sabotage Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary +executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which +we have already seen—“troops may use weapons only +against persons who commit acts of violence as terrorists or +saboteurs, whereas persons who endanger the security or tactical +preparedness of the occupying power in any other way +than by terrorism or acts of sabotage, are to be handed over +to the SD.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then General Christiansen comes in with this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore +ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police +forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also, +with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not +terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but +who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is +requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as +the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively +against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger +the conduct of operations.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even +without trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal +and cruel a measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? +Do you agree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that +cruel measure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but +perhaps the answer is there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document +D-770, which is, I think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will +notice on the distribution list that that goes to the Commander of +the Armed Forces in the Netherlands, and further to the signal +which we have just been looking at. Now, you say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German +civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear +in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no consideration. +This must be our guiding principle in the interpretation +and application of the Führer’s decree itself and the Chief of +the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944.</p> + +<p>“If the military situation and the state of communications +make it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective +measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. +There is, naturally”—and I ask you to note the word +<span class='pageno' title='635' id='Page_635'></span> +“naturally”—“no objection to passing and executing death +sentences by summary court-martial under such circumstances.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an +independent command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an +independent command, apart from your division? I think that was +the last independent command you had. You have not had an independent +command yourself, have you? Don’t I make myself clear?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been +a commander or chief of an army or army group yourself, if I +remember rightly, or of an area, have you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I have not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in +General Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct +encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these +railway men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective +measures ruthlessly and independently.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. +It is not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction +of summary court-martial was provided.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, +Defendant. I suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence +states: “If handing over to the SD is impossible, owing to the +military situation and the state of communications, other effective +measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word +“naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so +far as I can make out, have been inserted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, +no objections to passing and executing death sentences by +summary court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of +course, there is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling +him, in addition to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly +and independently. If General Christiansen had shot these +railway men out of hand, after getting that letter from you, neither +you nor any other superior could have blamed him for it, could you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to +carry out summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no +<span class='pageno' title='636' id='Page_636'></span> +objections to the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial +under such circumstances.” That is how I meant it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by +“effective measures to be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What +did you mean by that, if it was only an ordinary summary court +procedure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by +means of the same. That is what the last sentence means. It is +already unusual to appoint a summary court-martial in such cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use +a military summary court to shoot railway men who will not work +is going rather far even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, +isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that +when you make all these additions, taking you through the chain of +additions that you make to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel +Order, of which you disapproved, do you say that you went to +Hitler for every one of these executive orders and answers that +you made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these +orders. I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these +orders without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly +point out that that was so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept +into the translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as +summary court. I do not believe that the words “summary court” +reflect accurately what we understand in the German language by +“Standgericht.” I do not know just what you understand in the +English or American language by “summary court,” but I can +imagine that this means some summary procedure.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the +Defendant that it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one +officer and two soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the +Defendant will correct me. Is that right, Defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial +procedure) briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial +was that it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal +expert to be present, although it was desirable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, +the Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the +German which is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is +that true? +<span class='pageno' title='637' id='Page_637'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told +that the translation is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated +by “naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment +might be produced in this connection since in British and American +law a summary court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am +told that a summary court...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that +question. The question I asked you was whether there was any +German word which is translated into English by the word “naturally.” +Is that not a clear question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, +of course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in +using the word “naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” +instead of at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude +that it means, “there are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich +keine Einwendungen),” whereas the German text says, “Against the +passing and executing of death sentences by summary court procedure +there are—under such circumstances, of course—no objections +(Gegen die Verhängung und Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im +standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen unter solchen Verhältnissen +selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” +There is a word in the German which is translated “naturally.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such +circumstances” are separated in the English version, while in the +German version they belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under +such circumstances.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another +point. You told us yesterday that with regard to forced labor you +were concerned in it because there was a shortage of manpower and +you had to take men out of industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office +was concerned with using military forces in order to try and +round-up people for forced labor, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The +Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put +the document to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and +see if you agree. I think it saves time in the end. If you look at +Document 3819-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the +English version. It is the report of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July +1944. You have to look on through the document after the letters +<span class='pageno' title='638' id='Page_638'></span> +from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant Speer, the account +of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the German version. +It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with a speech +from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von +Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of +the head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently +issued Führer order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if +you have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative +of the Chief of the OKW...”</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the +Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently +issued Führer order, according to which all German forces +had to participate in the task of raising manpower. Wherever +the Wehrmacht was stationed, if it was not employed exclusively +in pressing military duties (as, for example, in the construction +of coastal defenses), it would be available, but it +could not be assigned expressly for the purpose of the GBA. +General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:</p> + +<p>“a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take +over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan +areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his +presence in these areas is to be recruited by force.</p> + +<p>“b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account +of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the +population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with +the assistance of the Wehrmacht.</p> + +<p>“c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be +rounded up with special vigor with the assistance of the +Wehrmacht.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you +still say that the Wehrmacht...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received +an order mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would +like to say that I know of no such demand and I have not found any +confirmation of it. The conference as such is unknown to me and so +are the proposals you mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General +Warlimont is suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the +rounding-up of forced labor, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not +know that such an order was given. According to the record, this is +a proposal made by General Warlimont, yes. +<span class='pageno' title='639' id='Page_639'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you +should read the three lines after the passage you have read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks +and expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success +could be achieved by this means.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter +Sauckel be asked at a given time whether and to what extent +troops of the Armed Forces did actually participate in such matters. +It is not known to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel +will be asked a number of questions in due time. At the moment I +am asking you. You say that you do not know anything about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this +connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions +took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few +questions about the murder of various prisoners of war. I want to +get it quite clear. Did you mean yesterday to justify the order for +the shooting of Commandos, dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish +to say that it was right and justified, or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I +thought that we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft +or submit such a written order. We did not do it because we could +not justify it or give reasons for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to +you is this: Did you approve and think right the order that was +made that Commandos should be shot?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment +threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the +order without personal orders from Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order +was right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it +right, but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand +against it in any way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had +contained provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for +sabotage purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that +provision of parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t +you remember in the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put +it to you if you like, but I would so much prefer that you try to +<span class='pageno' title='640' id='Page_640'></span> +remember it yourself. Don’t you remember that your own orders +contained a provision for parachutists being dropped for sabotage +purposes in Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is +Page 21 and 22 of the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Which document book, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first +document book, and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, +which is Document 388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere +about Page 15 or 16 or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes +and then it is divided into items.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“For the success of this operation, co-operation with the Sudeten +German frontier population, with deserters from the +Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, +and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for +the Branches of the Armed Forces...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It +states:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier +population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, +with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the +sabotage service can be of importance.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to +work on frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army +authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command +were insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members +of the German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at +the end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be +people who are going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any +use, must they not? They do sabotage, don’t they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and +parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer +<span class='pageno' title='641' id='Page_641'></span> +their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are +thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, +but I want to have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which +this order of the Führer was announced. You will find the order—the +Tribunal will find it on Page 64—but what I want him to look +at if he would be so kind, is Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, +of your book. The second sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the +Commanders” about this order. That is on Page 25, and Defendant +Jodl says: “This order is for the commanders only and must not +under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because +you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the order, that you +had this secrecy provision put on it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the +connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, +dated 19 October. Now have you got it, the second sentence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the +18th. “This order is for commanders only and must not under any +circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because you were +ashamed of the order, that it was put like that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl +should be asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have +already stated the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for +this secrecy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask +you to put this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I +have already stated my own views and those of General Jodl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at +the way that even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you +look—I guess it is Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler +wherein he says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed +Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a +sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and +exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you +collectively, Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. +You were doing your best to keep quiet about this, about anything +being known about this order, weren’t you? +<span class='pageno' title='642' id='Page_642'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every +case we subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, +the Wehrmacht report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the +Wehrmacht report we stated that such and such an incident had +occurred, followed by such and such consequences. That is my +recollection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask +you to look at one document further on, because in that regard, +you remember, after the Soviet Union tried certain people at +Kharkov, when you were trying to get up some counterpropaganda—now, +look at this document, about these executions, it is Page 308, +Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I am going to ask +you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum and +the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth +memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks +on the Battleship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>.” Do you see that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship +<span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>, oh, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, +now:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had +come to Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an +attack on the Battleship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> in Drontheim Fjord, by means +of a two-man torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, +which were attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy +sea. From among the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and +four Norwegians, a party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians +were challenged on the Swedish border; however, +only the British seaman in civilian clothes, Robert Paul +Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London, could be arrested +and the others escaped into Sweden.</p> + +<p>“Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used +to carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle +duster.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And now the next page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Violence representing a breach of international law could +not be proved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your +attention?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see +that it has been reported by the department.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us +that you have been a soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your +military position. What, in the name of all military tradition, has +<span class='pageno' title='643' id='Page_643'></span> +that boy done wrong by coming from a two-man torpedo to make +an attack on a battleship; what had he done wrong?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried +out by soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed +forces, it is an attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship +by means of sabotage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if +you were prepared to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack +against a battleship, what is wrong with a sailor doing that? I +want to understand what is in your mind. What do you, as a +man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do you see +wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a battleship? +Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial +bomb if it is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a +perfectly permissible attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see +that incident I will not go through putting the others in, as they +are all just the same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde +to attack German ships.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, +standing in the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did +you tolerate all these young men being murdered, one after the +other without making any protests?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making +any further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement +now. I know that these incidents occurred and I know the +consequences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you +to understand this. As far as I know, in the German military code, +as in every military code, there is no obligation on the part of a +soldier to obey an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows +is contrary to the laws of war and law. It is the same in your +army, and our army, and I think in every army, isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October +1942. I was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at +the attack on the battleship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. I knew only that the order +was issued, together with all the threats of punishment which made +it so difficult for the commanders to alter or deviate from the +order on their own initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself +whether I considered this order to be right or to serve any useful +purpose and I have given you a definite answer: that I could not +have prevented the action taken at the mouth of the Gironde or +in the case of <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> if I had wanted to. +<span class='pageno' title='644' id='Page_644'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my difficulty. I have +given you only two cases; there are plenty more. There are others +which occurred in Italy which we have heard. The point I am +putting to you is this: You were the representative; that you have +told us a hundred times, of the military tradition. You had behind +you an officers corps with all its...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, Sir David, I must deny that. I was not responsible +either for the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force. I was +not a commander; I was a Chief of Staff and I had no authority +to intervene in the execution of orders in the various branches +of the Armed Forces, each of which had its own Commander-in-Chief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard about your staff +rank, but I want to make this point perfectly clear. You were a +Field Marshal, Kesselring was a Field Marshal, Milch was a Field +Marshal, all, I gather, with military training behind them and all +having their influence if not their command, among the Armed +Forces of Germany. How was it that there was not one man of +your rank, of your military tradition, with the courage to stand +up and oppose cold-blooded murder? That is what I want to know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did not do it; I made no further objection to these +things. I can say no more and I cannot speak for others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us pass if you can +say no more than that. I want to see what you did with regard +to our French allies because I have been asked to deal with some +matters for the French Delegation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You remember that on the Eastern Front you captured some +Frenchmen who were fighting with the Russians. Do you remember +making an order about that? You captured some De Gaullists, as +you called them, that is Free French people who were fighting +for the Russians. Do you remember your action with regard to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I recollect the transmission of a Führer order in regard +to the surrender of these Frenchmen to their lawful government, +which was recognized by us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not, of course, the part +of the order I want to put to you.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases +with regard to relatives of Frenchmen fighting for the Russians. +If the investigation reveals that relatives have given +assistance to facilitate escape from France, then severe +measures are to be taken.</p> + +<p>“OKW/Wi. Rü is to make the necessary preparations with the +respective military commander or the Higher SS and Police +Leader in France.—Signed—Keitel.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='645' id='Page_645'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Can you imagine anything more dreadful than taking severe +measures against the mother of a young man who has helped him +to go and fight with the allies of his country? Can you imagine +anything more despicable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can think of many things since I have lost sons of +my own in the war. I am not the inventor of this idea; it did not +originate with me; I only transmitted it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate the difference, +Defendant, between the point which you made and the point which +I make. Losing sons in a war is a terrible tragedy. Taking severe +measures against a mother of a boy who wants to go and fight for +his country’s allies, I am suggesting to you, is despicable. The one +is a tragedy; the other is the height of brutality. Do you not agree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I can only say that it does not state the consequences +of the investigations and findings. I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is all the answer +you can make I will ask you to look at something else.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: No, I should like to add that I regret that any families +were held responsible for the misdeeds of their sons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will not waste the time +by taking up the word “misdeed.” If you think that is a misdeed +it is not worth our discussing it further. I just want to protest +against your word.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, let us see; that was not an isolated case. Just look at Page +110 (a) of the document book which you have, Page 122. This is +an order quite early on 1 October 1941.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Attacks committed on members of the Armed Forces lately +in the occupied territories give reason to point out that it is +advisable that military commanders always have at their +disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, +namely:</p> + +<p>“(1) Nationalists,</p> + +<p>“(2) Democratic-bourgeois, and</p> + +<p>“(3) Communists.</p> + +<p>“It is important that these should include well-known leading +personalities, or members of their families whose names are +to be made public.</p> + +<p>“Hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit are to +be shot in case of attacks.</p> + +<p>“It is asked that commanders be instructed accordingly.—Signed—Keitel.” +(Document 1590-PS).</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Why were you so particular that, if you happened to arrest +a democratic-bourgeois, your commanders should have a sufficient +<span class='pageno' title='646' id='Page_646'></span> +bag of democratic-bourgeois to shoot as hostages? I thought you +were not a politician.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I was not at all particular and the idea did not +originate with me; but it is in accordance with the instructions, +the official regulations, regarding hostages which I discussed yesterday +or on the day before and which state that those held as +hostages must come from the circles responsible for the attacks. +That is the explanation, or confirmation, of that as far as my +memory goes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with that as a +course of action, that if you found a member of a democratic-bourgeois +family who had been taking part in, say, sabotage or +resistance, that you should shoot a number of democratic-bourgeois +on his behalf? Did you approve of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I have already explained how orders for shooting +hostages, which were also given, were to be applied and how they +were to be carried out in the case of those deserving of death and +who had already been sentenced.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you a perfectly +simple question, Defendant. Did you or did you not approve of a +number of democratic-bourgeois to be taken as hostages for one +democratic-bourgeois who happened to be...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It does not say so in the document; it says only that +hostages must be taken; but it says nothing about shooting them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you mind looking at it +since you corrected me so emphatically? Depending upon the +membership of the culprit, that is, whether he is a nationalist, or +a democratic-bourgeois or Communist, “hostages of the corresponding +group are to be shot in case of attacks.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: If that is in the document then I must have signed +it that way. The document referring to the conference with the +commanders shows clearly how it was carried out in practice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now answer my question. Did +you approve of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I personally had different views on the hostage system, +but I signed it, because I had been ordered to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you had a different +view. Will you just look at a letter from Herr Terboven, who was +in charge in Norway, Document 870-PS, and it is Page 85, 71 (a), +RF-281. This is a report from Terboven for the information of +the Führer and I want you to look at Paragraph 2, “Counter-measures”, +Subparagraph 4. Do you see it? Have you got it, Defendant? +I am sorry, I did give you the number; probably you did +<span class='pageno' title='647' id='Page_647'></span> +not hear it, 71 (a), Page 71 (a) of the document book. So sorry I +did not make it clear. My Lord, I am told that this has been put +in by the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-281. I gave it a GB +number, as I recall.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: RF-281.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Do you find Section 2, Paragraph 4? +That is:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Now I have just received a teleprint from Field Marshal +Keitel, asking for a regulation to be issued, making members +of the personnel, and, if necessary their relatives, collectively +responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their establishments +(joint responsibility of relatives). This demand serves +a purpose and promises success only if I am actually allowed +to perform executions by firing squads. If this is not possible, +such a decree would have exactly the opposite effect.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Opposite the word “if I am actually allowed to perform executions +by firing squads” there is the pencil note from you, “Yes, +that is best.” So that is a third example where I suggest that you, +yourself, are approving and encouraging the shooting of next of +kin for the act of some member of their family. What do you say +to that, your own pencil mark?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I did make that marginal note. An order given in +this matter was different. A reply was given which was different. +I wrote that note.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to know. +Why did you write this remark, “Yes, that is best,” approving of a +firing squad for relatives of people who had committed some occupation +offense in Norway? Why did you think it was best that +there should be a firing squad for the relations? Why?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: It was not done and no order to that effect was given. +A different order was given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking, +and I shall give you one more chance of answering it. Why did +you put your pencil on that document, “Yes, that is best”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KEITEL: I am no longer in a position to explain that today, in +view of the fact that I see hundreds of documents daily. I wrote +it and I admit it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, unless it means +something entirely different from what you have written, it meant +that you approved it yourself and thought the best course was that +the relations should be shot by a firing squad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think Your Lordship said that you wished to adjourn. +<span class='pageno' title='648' id='Page_648'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not finished, My Lord. +I have a few matters for Monday morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the defendant can return to the dock, +and we will proceed with the other applications.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sir David, shall we deal with these applications in the same +way as we have done before?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The first one +that I have is an application on behalf of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner +for a witness called Hoess, who was former Commander +of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. My Lord, there is no objection +on the part of the Prosecution to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: So that is the application which has to be +made by a great number of the defendants’ counsel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes, Your Lordship is +quite right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, as Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, +the Prosecution feel that he could contribute to the information of +the Tribunal, if no objection is forthcoming.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I see that you are among the +counsel who applied for him. Is there anything you wish to add +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I have nothing to add to my written application.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Then the Tribunal will consider +this, you see, after you have dealt with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next one is +Dr. Naville. Dr. Naville was allowed as witness to the Defendant +Göring, provided he can be located. He has been located in Switzerland +and I understand he has informed the Tribunal that he sees +no use in his coming here as a witness for Göring, and he is now +asked for by Dr. Nelte, Counsel for Keitel, to prove that prisoners +of war had been treated according to the rules of the Geneva +Convention, Dr. Naville having been a representative of the Red +Cross. Dr. Nelte, I am told, will be satisfied with an interrogatory, +and the Prosecution have no objection to an interrogatory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That is correct; I agree, providing that I am allowed +to put my questions to Dr. Naville in writing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But may I add something here, not to this application to present +evidence, but with reference to another application, which I already +submitted to the Prosecution through the Translation Division +<span class='pageno' title='649' id='Page_649'></span> +yesterday or the day before. My application, to admit Hitler’s stenographers +as witnesses was rejected by the Tribunal as irrelevant. +I have now received a letter and an affidavit from one of these +stenographers, and in that affidavit I find a passage which refers +to Keitel’s attitude towards Hitler at interviews and conferences +with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Public opinion has criticized the defendants as being in the habit +of quoting dead men whenever they want to say anything in their +favor; and similar statements have been made in this Court. The +Defendant Keitel requests that the part of the affidavit which I +have already submitted and which I intend to submit, be admitted +as an affidavit so that the witness can still be rejected and yet it +will be possible for me to submit that passage of the affidavit +with the agreement of the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Dr. Nelte, My Lord, will +submit the passage, we will consider it, but I have not had the +chance of doing it up until now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you will carry out that course and +if you want, there is no objection to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, you will let me have +it, a copy of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application +is on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach, a request to submit +an affidavit of Dr. Hans Carossa. The gist of the affidavit is that +the defendant tried to keep himself independent of Party directives +in matters of literature and art and that, while Gauleiter in Vienna, +he repeatedly intervened on behalf of Jews and concentration +camp inmates. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to +an affidavit being filed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Funk +for interrogatories to be submitted to Mr. Messersmith, dealing +with Funk’s relation to the Party and his work in the Reich Ministry +of Propaganda. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection, but +remind the Tribunal that the Defendant Funk has already, on +the 15th of March, asked permission to submit another affidavit +to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. The +Prosecution did not raise any objections, but the Tribunal has not, +as far as we know, granted that yet. So I wanted the Tribunal to +know there was a previous request...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatory +on the 15th of March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Interrogatories. +<span class='pageno' title='650' id='Page_650'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories? Surely we must have dealt +with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is the information that +my office had. They have not seen the...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I see.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In case the Tribunal had not +dealt with it, we want to point out that there is one outstanding. +We have no objection to either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the Defendant Rosenberg requests Hitler’s decree to +Rosenberg of June 1943. There is no objection on the part of the +Prosecution. I am told that we can not trace any previous application +but the position at the moment is that we haven’t any +objection to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, My Lord, the next is Von Neurath, an application for a +questionnaire for Professor Kossuth, long a resident of Prague. +Really they ask for interrogatories. My Lord, there is no objection +to interrogatories.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, My Lord, there is an application in reverse, if I may put +it so, from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht, the downgrading +of Herr Huelse, who was drafted as a witness, to an +affidavit. My Lord, we have no objection to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This is the witness Huelse. He was granted to me as +a witness. In order to shorten and simplify the proceedings, I have +decided to forfeit the right to hear the witness because there was +an affidavit. I have received the affidavit. While my application to +dispense with the witness was pending, however, the witness +arrived in Nuremberg. He is here now, and I think therefore, +that it will be best for him to stay and for me to be allowed to +examine him by confronting him with his own affidavit, asking him +to confirm it, and then put some additional questions to him. I +think that would be much more practical than having the witness +here to no purpose, sending him back again and retaining only +the affidavit. My purpose, in any case, was partly to avoid the +complications connected with getting him here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you withdraw the application +to have the affidavit...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness Huelse a prisoner or not, or +an internee?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: He is a free witness. He is not in detention and he +is free to move about Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can he remain here until the Defendant +Schacht’s case comes on? +<span class='pageno' title='651' id='Page_651'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I hope so. He has told me that he can stay and that +he is willing to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have no objection. +The Tribunal has already granted him as a witness. If Dr. Dix +wants him as a witness, of course we have no objection to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next one is an application on behalf of the Defendant +Streicher, for an affidavit from a Dr. Herold. To put it quite shortly, +the Prosecution suggest that it should be interrogatories rather than +an affidavit and on that basis we would make no objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, there is only one thing I have to say. I had a most +useful discussion with Dr. Dix last night, following out the +Tribunal’s suggestion of going through the documents. Dr. Dix was +most helpful in explaining the purpose of his documents and what +they were. I do suggest that if any of the Defense Counsel when +they are explaining the documents would also care to explain the +purport of their witnesses—I do not want to embarrass them in +any way—but if they would voluntarily explain the purport of +witnesses, either to Mr. Dodd or myself, we might be able to save +them a great deal of time, by indicating whether the evidence +of that witness would be agreed to or might be the subject of +objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I only throw it out now, as we are going to meet over the documents, +and if they would extend it to witnesses, I am sure we could +achieve a most profitable co-operation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are suggesting, Sir David, are you, that +they should explain to you the nature of the evidence which the +witness was going to give?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And if the Prosecution were not going to +dispute it, that it might be incorporated in an affidavit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that we could probably +dispense with the witness, and probably incorporate that in an +affidavit. Of course, I have been told the general purport of the +witness, because I attended on the application, but if they could +elaborate on it a little more as it often happens when they see the +witness and let me know what the scope of the witness’ testimony +would be, I could probably concede, either in whole or in part, and +save them a lot of work and the Tribunal a lot of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal would like to +know whether the defendants’ counsel think that is a possible +course, whether it might lead to some shortening of the defense. +Could Dr. Dix possibly tell us whether he thinks it would be +possible? +<span class='pageno' title='652' id='Page_652'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Of course, I cannot make any statement on the views +of my colleagues, since I cannot read their minds. All I can say +at the moment is that I will recommend to my colleagues, as +unusually helpful and practical, the kind of conversation which +I had the honor of having with Sir David yesterday. Personally, +I think that my colleagues too will agree to this procedure unless +there is any particular objection to it, which is, of course, always +possible. I cannot say any more at the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You understand what Sir David was suggesting, +that such a conversation should apply not only to documents +but also to witnesses and if you could indicate rather more +fully than you do in your applications what the subject of their +evidence was going to be, possibly the Prosecution might be able +to say in those circumstances that upon those matters they should +not propose to dispute the evidence and therefore it might be +incorporated in an affidavit?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship +allows me to interject, if they care to bring a statement on a +particular witness’ testimony, the Prosecution would, I am sure, in +many particulars be prepared to say, “Well, you produce that statement +on that point and we will admit it, without any formality.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Dr. Dix, you and the other counsel +for the defendants could consider that matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have understood it to be exactly as Your Lordship +has just stated it. I discussed both the witnesses and the documents +with Sir David and that was very helpful; and in that sense I +will...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If that is all we need do at the moment, +then...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 8 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious +printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for +periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; +however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus +“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes +French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: +hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb +tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the +tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations +between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as +possible to the original document presentation and layout.</p> + +<p class='line'> </p> + +<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals +Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 10</span>, +by Various.]</p> + +<div style='margin-top:1.5em;margin-bottom:1em;'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG BOOK OF TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 10 ***</div> + +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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