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If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Tactics, Volume I (of 2) - Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry - -Author: William Balck - -Translator: Walter Krueger - -Release Date: March 26, 2021 [eBook #64927] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Harry Lamé and the Online Distributed Proofreading - Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from - images generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICS, VOLUME I (OF 2) *** - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - Text printed in italics has been transcribed _between underscores_, - bold face text =between equal signs=. Text printed in a different - (sans-serif) type has been indicated ~by tildes~. Small capitals have - been replaced with ALL CAPITALS. - - Footnotes [513]-[516] were not present in the source document text; - please see the Transcriber’s Notes at the end of this text for more - details. - - More Transcriber’s Notes may be found at the end of this text. - - - - - TACTICS - - BY - - ~BALCK - Colonel, German Army.~ - - - VOLUME I. - - INTRODUCTION AND FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY. - - - TRANSLATED BY - ~WALTER KRUEGER, - First Lieutenant 23rd Infantry, U. S. Army, - Instructor Army Service Schools.~ - - - Fourth completely revised edition. - With numerous plates in the text. - - - U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION, - FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS. - 1911 - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1911, - BY WALTER KRUEGER. - - - =PRESS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO., - LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.= - - - - -TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE. - - -The translation of this book was undertaken at the instance of Major -John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of it in the -course in tactics in the Army Service Schools. - -It is an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical -principles in the various armies, discussed in the light of the -tactical views and methods prevailing in Germany, and amplified by -numerous examples from military history. - -The professional value of this book to all officers of our Regular Army -and Militia who are endeavoring to gain a working knowledge of tactics, -is so obvious that any comment would be superfluous. - - Army Service Schools, - Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, - December, 1910. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its first edition -in 1896, and for which the preparatory work reached back more than -a decade, now appears in its fourth edition in a completely changed -form. The lessons gained in war and improvements in weapons have -corrected many earlier views. While the Boer war confused the views -on infantry combat and brought forth more lessons in a negative than -in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese war has had a great educating -influence, in that it corroborated the soundness of the lessons -gained in the Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those -lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. The fundamental -principles upon which success depends have remained the same. - -For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s wishes for -a new edition. It would not have been difficult to publish long ago -a new edition, based upon the many lessons of war communicated to me -by members of foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But, -after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more inclined -to avail myself once more of the opportunity of gaining practical -experience by service with troops. Pure theoretical reflection is only -too apt to depart from the requirements of practice and to overlook -the friction appearing everywhere. The battalion commander, more than -any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor of his -officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. Moreover, the proximity -of the maneuver ground to my present station gave me an opportunity -of observing the field training of a large number of battalions -and regiments of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with -brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several trips abroad -and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, furnished valuable -suggestions. I postponed issuing the new edition until the publication -of the new Russian and Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our -own excellent regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from -the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was further able -to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian (1905), Belgian (1906), -U. S. (1904), British (1905), and Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations. -This enumeration alone justifies the statement, “completely revised,” -appearing on the title page. - -I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign experiences in -detail. The words of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton of the -British Army, to whose writings I owe a great deal, deserve special -attention in studying the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is -a blessing that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably it -is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is finally incapable -of assimilating the lessons gained by other armies. Military attachés -may discover the most important points in the training and employment -of foreign armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but their -comrades will pay no more attention to them than did Napoleon III. -to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army before the outbreak of the -Franco-German war.” - -The treatment of the subject matter has remained the same throughout; -it represents, as in the first edition, the principle that tactical -lessons must be deduced from human nature, from the effect of weapons, -and from experience in war, proper regard being had for national -characteristics and historical transmission. _Tactics is psychology._ -My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, upon the -works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General Rohne. The publications -of Historical Section I of the Great General Staff and the splendid -works of the late Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited -from military history. An almost too copious literature is already -available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs (_Einzelschriften_) -of the Great General Staff, and of Streffleur, especially “_Urteile und -Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_,” published by the latter, afford a rich -field for research. - -It is not difficult to cite examples from military history in support -of any tactical procedure, but such examples require a very careful -sifting before they can be recommended as worthy models for our action -in front of the enemy. - -The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal shock action -from the experience gained by them in their combats in Upper Italy in -1859, and the British were not very far removed from completely denying -the feasibility of making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the -desire to avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity -of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians finally had to -learn again the same bitter lessons as at Plevna. - -Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears in Athens a -translation in Modern Greek from the pen of Captain Strategos of the -Greek General Staff, well known to many German officers from his War -Academy days. - -It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the same kind reception -at home and abroad that was given its three predecessors. For all -communications, suggestions or corrections, directed either to me or to -my publisher, I will be sincerely grateful. - - THE AUTHOR. - - POSEN, March, 1908. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - =INTRODUCTION.= - PAGE - - =1. War= 1 - Eternal peace 1 - War the _ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2 - Courts of arbitration 3 - - =2. Strategy and Tactics= 4 - Definition of strategy and tactics 4 - Relation of strategy to tactics 6 - - =3. The Method of Instruction= 7 - Value of examples 8 - Applicatory method 10 - Advantages and disadvantages 10 - Arrangement of the subject matter 12 - - =4. Drill Regulations= 13 - Instructions for campaign 15 - Regulations and the science of combat 15 - - - =THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.= - - - =I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT= 19 - - =1. The Importance and Employment of Infantry= 19 - Relative strength as compared to other arms 19 - Élite infantry. Guards 21 - Jägers and riflemen 22 - Mountain infantry 23 - Machine guns 24 - Mounted infantry 25 - Patrols and scouting detachments 27 - Cyclists 28 - Snowshoe runners 30 - - =2. The Tactical Unit= 32 - - =3. Organization= 34 - The company 34 - Peace and war strength 35 - The battalion 36 - The regiment 37 - The brigade 37 - - =4. Intrenching Tool Equipment= 38 - - =5. The Load of the Infantryman= 39 - Comparison of the loads carried by infantrymen in various - armies 40 - - - =II. THE FORMATIONS= 41 - - =1. The Issue of Orders= 41 - Trumpet signals 41 - - =2. The Purpose of Formations. Comparison Between Line and - Column= 42 - Assembly and route formations 42 - Maneuver and combat formations 43 - Napoleonic columns 44 - Comparison between line and column 44 - The origin of column tactics 44 - - =3. The Company= 46 - (_a_) Formation of the company 46 - Number of ranks 46 - Interval and distance 47 - Front and facing distance 48 - (_b_) Division of the company into three or four platoons 48 - Losses among officers 50 - - =4. Length of Pace and Marching= 53 - Comparison (table) 54 - Double time 55 - - =5. Movements of the Company in Line= 56 - - =6. The Columns of the Company. Movements in Column. Formation - of Line= 56 - Column of twos 56 - Column of squads 57 - Route column 57 - Column of fours 58 - Double column of squads 59 - Comparison of column of fours with column of squads 59 - The importance of the squad 59 - The employment of the column of squads 59 - Company column 60 - Column of platoons 61 - Column of sections 61 - Guidon flags 63 - Posts of platoon commanders 63 - Movements in column 64 - Suggestions made by Colonel Fumet, French Army 65 - - =7. The Battalion= 67 - Normal formation of the German battalion 67 - The color 68 - Formations in various armies 69 - The value of double column 71 - The battalion in route column 72 - - =8. The Regiment and the Brigade= 73 - Formation in line or in echelon 73 - - =9. Extended Order= 75 - Thin and dense skirmish lines 75 - (_a_) The formation of the skirmish line 78 - (_b_) Movements in skirmish line 81 - Advance by rushes 82 - Time required for making a rush. Strength of the force making - the rush 83 - Rising 84 - Short or long rushes 85 - Advance by crawling 86 - Lessons of the Boer War 88 - Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War 89 - Provisions of the various regulations relative to the advance - by rushes 90 - Fire while in motion 92 - Examples of the employment of fire while in motion 93 - Examples of the employment of rushes 93 - (_c_) Reinforcing the firing line 96 - (_d_) Closing up. Assembling. Re-forming 97 - - =10. Supports= 98 - Duties 98 - Distance 99 - Commander 100 - Movements 100 - Formation 100 - Supports in rear of the firing line or not? 101 - - =11. Comparison Between Close and Extended Order= 102 - Necessity of drill 104 - Combat drill 105 - Training 105 - Training of leaders 109 - - - =III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES= 111 - - =A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY= 111 - - =1. The Field Gun= 111 - Percussion shrapnel 111 - Time shrapnel 112 - Shell 115 - The French _obus allongé_ 115 - - =2. The Light Field Howitzer= 116 - - =3. The Heavy Field Howitzer= 118 - - =4. Expedients for Minimizing the Effect of Fire= 118 - (_a_) Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the - hostile fire 119 - (_b_) Minimizing the effect of fire 120 - - =5. The Results Obtained by Artillery Against Various Targets= 122 - French data 123 - - =6. The Effect of Shrapnel Bullets on Animate Targets= 125 - - =B. INFANTRY FIRE= 126 - - =1. The Effect of a Single Projectile on Animate Targets= 126 - Explosive effect 127 - Tumbling bullets 127 - - =2. The Effect of “S” Bullets on Materials= 131 - - - =IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE= 132 - Stunning and exhaustive effect 132 - The engagement at Modder River, Nov. 28, 1899 132 - - =1. Fire Discipline= 133 - The employment of the bayonet; bayonet fencing 134 - - =2. Fire Control and Fire Direction= 134 - Squad leaders 135 - Company commanders 136 - Uncontrolled fire 136 - Russian experiences in the Far East 137 - - =3. Selection of the Line to be Occupied= 138 - - =4. The Strength of the Firing Line= 139 - - =5. Ascertaining Ranges= 140 - Influence of the knowledge of the range upon the efficacy of - the fire 140 - Ascertaining ranges by pacing or galloping 141 - Influence of the terrain upon the length of pace 141 - Errors of estimation 142 - Provisions of various regulations 143 - Memorizing distinguishing marks on the enemy 144 - Scaling the range from maps 144 - Obtaining the range from other troops 145 - Trial volleys fired for the purpose of obtaining proper sight - elevation 145 - Range finding instruments 146 - - =6. Selection of a Target and Time for Opening Fire= 147 - Short or long range fire 147 - Limit of long range fire 147 - The moral effect of withholding the fire 151 - Marshal Bugeaud’s narrative 151 - Provisions of various regulations 153 - General rules for opening fire in attack and defense 154 - - =7. Pauses in the Fire= 155 - - =8. Kinds of Fire= 157 - Volley fire and fire at will; bursts of fire (_rafales_) 158 - The rate of fire 160 - The influence of the rate of fire upon the efficacy of fire 161 - The volley 163 - Bursts of fire (_rafales_) 164 - - =9. Rear Sight Elevations and Points of Aim= 165 - - =10. Commands= 166 - - =11. The Observation of the Fire= 167 - - =12. The Effect of Fire= 167 - Comparison between losses produced by infantry and artillery - fire 167 - (_a_) Influence of training 168 - (_b_) Influence of the error in estimating the range 170 - (_c_) Fire effect as regards time. Number of rounds to be - expended 172 - (_d_) Additional influences affecting the accuracy of fire 173 - Wolozkoi’s theory of the effect of the constant cone of - misses 173 - (_e_) Influence of rifle-rests in firing 178 - (_f_) Influence of the ground 179 - Danger space and beaten zone 179 - Firing upon hill positions 183 - Indirect rifle fire 184 - Ricochets 185 - - =13. Losses In Action= 185 - Losses in the various formations 186 - Losses among officers 189 - - =14. The Moral Effect of Fire= 191 - The impressions produced upon General Bonnal by the battle - of Wörth 191 - Surrenders of British troops in South Africa 192 - Limit of endurance in battle 193 - The “void of the battlefield” 194 - Mixing of organizations 195 - Fighting power of improvised units 197 - Overcoming crises in action 198 - - - =V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION= 201 - - =1. Normal Procedure= 201 - The normal attack 202 - Drill attack 204 - - =2. Concentration, Development, and Deployment for Action= 205 - Development for action 207 - Deployment for action 209 - - =3. The Battalion, the Regiment, and the Brigade= 210 - The battalion 210 - The regiment 214 - The brigade 216 - Base units 218 - Examples of changes of front 220 - - =4. Distribution in Depth and Frontage of Combat Formations= 222 - Dangers of distribution in depth 222 - Plevna and Wafangu 222, 223 - Distribution in depth necessary during the preparatory stage 224 - Contrast between distribution in depth and frontage 225 - Dangers of over-extension (Spicheren) 225, 226 - Influence of fire effect and morale upon frontage 227, 228 - Influence of the task assigned a force 231 - Delaying actions. Night attacks. Defense 232, 233 - Approximate figures for the extent of front that may be - covered 233 - Frontage of the several units 235, 236 - The Boer War 238 - The Russo-Japanese War 239 - Table of troops per km. of front 240 - Recapitulation of the most important points governing - frontage 241 - Provisions of various regulations 241 - - =5. Combat Orders= 243 - Combat tasks 243 - Division of work in staffs 245 - - =6. Communication on the Battlefield= 246 - Signal and wig-wag flags 246 - Signal arrangements in the Austrian, French and British - armies 248 - - =7. Local Reconnaissance of the Infantry= 248 - Reconnaissance in force 251 - The object of local reconnaissance 251 - Scouting detachments 252 - - =8. The Importance of the Terrain= 254 - The attack over an open plain 255 - The French group attack 256 - Combat sections 257 - - - =VI. MACHINE GUNS= 259 - - =1. Development of the Arm= 259 - Mounting and method of transportation 261, 262 - - =2. The Power of Machine Guns= 262 - Kinds of fire 263 - Combat value of machine guns and infantry 267 - - =3. Infantry Versus Machine Guns= 268 - Conduct of troops when exposed to machine gun fire 268, 269 - - =4. Machine Guns in Germany= 270 - Organization 270 - Formations 273, 274 - Machine gun companies 275 - - =5. Going Into Position= 276 - - =6. The Fire Fight= 283 - Machine guns in the engagement at the Waterberg 283 - - =7. Machine Guns in Other Countries= 284 - Switzerland 284 - Austria 286 - England 289 - Japan and France 290 - Russia 290 - Machine guns at Liao Yang, 1904 291 - - =8. The Employment of Machine Gun Batteries= 293 - Rencontre and attack 295 - Rear guards 295 - Defense 295 - Coöperation with cavalry 296 - Machine guns versus artillery 297 - English views 297 - Swiss views 299 - - - =VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY= 301 - Deployment for firing 303 - Moral effect of a charge 306 - Aiming positions 307 - Time for opening fire 308 - Selection of sight elevation 310 - Kind of fire 310 - Distribution of fire 311 - Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard 311 - Advance against cavalry 313 - Infantry versus dismounted cavalry 313 - Provisions of various regulations 314 - - - =VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY= 316 - - =1. The Passage of Infantry Through Artillery Lines= 316 - - =2. The Advance Under Artillery Fire= 318 - Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile - fire 318 - Fire for effect 320 - Formations used by infantry when under artillery fire Russo- - Japanese War 322 - Lessons of war 321, 323 - - =3. Firing on Hostile Artillery in Position= 324 - Cover afforded by steel shields 324 - - - =IX. THE ATTACK= 329 - Attack and defense compared 329 - - =1. The Surprise= 330 - Examples of surprises 331 - - =2. The Rencontre= 333 - Conduct of the advance guard 334 - Issue of orders 336 - Conduct of the main body 338 - Provisions of various regulations 339 - Examples 339 - - - =X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE= 340 - - =1. Lessons of War= 340 - Boer War 340 - The infantry attack in the Russo-Japanese War 340 - Russian infantry 340 - Japanese infantry 341 - Examples 343, 344 - - =2. The Conditions Upon which Success Depends= 345 - - =3. Preparation of the Attack= 346 - Reconnaissance. Preparatory position 346 - - =4. The Coöperation of Infantry and Artillery in Battle= 351 - Preparation of the assault 352 - - =5. The Point of Attack= 355 - - =6. Envelopment= 356 - Holding attack 357 - Launching the enveloping force 359 - Separation of holding and flank attacks 361 - Provisions of various regulations 362 - - =7. Removal of Packs= 363 - - =8. The Employment of Machine Guns= 365 - - =9. The Conduct of the Attack= 365 - The advance of the firing line 365 - Distances 368 - The fire fight 369 - The superiority of fire 370 - Fixing bayonets 372 - - =10. The Assault= 373 - The decision to assault 373 - The decision to assault emanating from the firing line 375 - Fire support during the assault 379 - Bayonet fights 382 - Wounds produced by cutting weapons 384 - Assaulting distances 385 - Conduct after a successful attack 385 - Conduct after an unsuccessful attack 386 - - =11. The Use of the Spade in Attack= 387 - Sand bags 390 - Results of Russian experiments 390 - Provisions of various regulations 392 - General rules governing the use of the spade in attack 393 - - =12. The Employment of Reserves= 394 - Launching or withholding reserves 395 - - =13. The Conduct of the Leaders in Action= 399 - - =14. United Action Versus Tactical Missions= 401 - The attack on the “Tannenwäldchen” at Colombey Aug. 14, - 1870 402, 403 - The attack on Grugies (St. Quentin) 403 - The dangers of assigning tasks 405 - - - =XI. THE DEFENSE= 408 - - =1. The Passive Defense= 409 - - =2. The Defense Seeking a Decision= 409 - Troops required to occupy the position 410 - Division of the position into sections 411 - Advanced positions 413 - - =3. Fortifying the Position= 415 - Battalion groups 417 - Observation of the foreground 420 - Clearing the foreground 421 - Dummy intrenchments and masks 421 - Cover trenches and communicating trenches 421 - Obstacles 422 - Russian views 422 - - =4. The Conduct of the Defense= 423 - Protection of the flanks 425 - Employment of machine guns 425 - Occupation of the position 426 - - =5. The Counter-Attack= 428 - Position of the general reserve 429 - The moment for making the counter-attack 432 - The counter-attack after the position is carried 433 - The counter-attack in conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 - Frontal counter-attack 436 - Provisions of various regulations 438 - - - =XII. THE RETREAT= 440 - Breaking off an action 441 - Rallying positions 442 - - - =XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS= 445 - The delaying action and the holding attack 445 - - =XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS= 448 - The Austrian Drill Regulations of 1903 448 - The Italian Drill Regulations of 1903 and 1906 451 - The French Drill Regulations of 1904 453 - The British Drill Regulations of 1905 459 - The Japanese Drill Regulations of 1907 463 - The Russian Drill Regulations of 1907 466 - The Swiss Drill Regulations of 1908 466 - - - =XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION= 468 - - =1. Historical Sketch= 468 - Table showing ammunition supply of the various armies of the - world 475 - - =2. Regulations Governing the Supply of Ammunition in Armies= 476 - Germany 476 - Austria 479 - Russia 480 - France 480 - England 482 - Italy 483 - - =3. What Deductions May Be Made From the Regulations of the - Various Armies= 483 - - - =INDEX= 487 - - - =INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY= 527 - - - - -ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION. - - - C. D. R. = Cavalry Drill Regulations. - F. A. D. R. = Field Artillery Drill Regulations. - F. A. F. R. = Field Artillery Firing Regulations. - F. S. R. = Field Service Regulations. - Gen. St. W. (_Generalstabswerk_) = German General Staff account of the - Franco-German War (unless otherwise indicated). - I. D. R. = Infantry Drill Regulations. - I. F. R. = Infantry Firing Regulations. - - g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains. - kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs. - kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram through a - meter against the force of gravity. - m. = meter = 39.37 in. - km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or ⁵⁄₈ mile. - x = pace. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -1. WAR. - -Clausewitz, in his work _On War_, defines war as “a continuation of -state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force -the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable -of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged -honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the -injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of -the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is -no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts -to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to -abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to -abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of -dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual -that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the -national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with -one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880, -to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; -for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man -develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to -duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would -stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in -1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt -to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period -of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only -the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those -ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish -and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all -desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher -moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain -conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and -enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the -business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise -providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that -war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and -that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism. -* * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits -it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached -to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent -the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the -state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at -stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues, -the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace -nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions -are united in the one thought--the fatherland; they are animated by -that common sentiment of devotion unto death--patriotism--which, once -experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows -the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in -those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A -great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That -is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a -nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and -resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and, -so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the -_ultima ratio_.” - - [1] _Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland_, in _Historische - und politische Aufsätze_, New edition, II. - - [2] _Das grosze Jahr_, in _Hammerschläge und Historien_. - -Since war is the _ultima ratio_ of state policy, and as a sovereign -state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs -and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of -arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a -decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if -the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is -embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able -to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the -possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never -decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the -possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3] - - [3] The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for - a settlement of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was - to be enforced by summary proceedings when necessary. The war of - 1866 proved that the paragraphs of the constitution mentioned, of - necessity had to fail the moment the vital interests of two powerful - states came into conflict. See VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Geschichte des - Krieges von 1866_, I, p. 115. - -The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration -are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh -facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed--as are many proposals -for disarmament--calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans. - -If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the -question of right between two states at once becomes a question of -might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account -nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have -the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by -fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to -dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power -of public opinion and with the influence of representative government, -has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets, -like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer possible. As a -result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes -part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits -interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt -crushing of the opponent. - - [4] “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for - an industrious jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.” - FREDERICK II. - - “Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in - which lies our last hope.” MACHIAVELLI, _Il Principe_. - -This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the -hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he -will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of -1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary -to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state -is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the -enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order -to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations -will also have to be taken into account in answering this question. -From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will -always be the complete overthrow of the enemy. - - -2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS. - -Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope -of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this -direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and -strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each -other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy. - -Von Bülow, the author of _The Spirit of Modern Warfare_ (1798)[5], -calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s -sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science -of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz -calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of -the war (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres -d’opérations_”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces -in battle (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de -bataille_”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the -study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles -calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”. -Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “_l’art de -guerre_” instead of the term “_strategy_”. None of these definitions -are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, -the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor -Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the -science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the -object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in -battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define -strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems -of each: “_Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser -d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer -lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le -tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les -disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, -d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le -but proposé._”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the application -of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it -is sufficient to define strategy as the _science of the conduct of -war_, tactics as the _science of troop-leading_. Strategy brings about -the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out, -in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. -Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric -advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a -complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The -German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based -on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of -retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank. -The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the -enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered -with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following -up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the -leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here -that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein -he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their -influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as -the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all -control over them has entirely ceased.” - - [5] _Geist des neueren Kriegssystems._ - - [6] “The art of directing armies In the theater of operations.” - - [7] “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.” - - [8] “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the - regulation of their activity with reference to battle, has been - included in the term ‘tactics’, while the term strategy is synonymous - with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters as fall into the domain - of tactics.” BLUME, _Strategie_, p. 33. - - “Tactics teaches _how_, and strategy _why_, one should fight.” - General V. SCHERFF. - - Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of - armies, while the manner of execution belongs to tactics. - - [9] “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a - comprehensive glance the entire probable theater of war, establish - the lines of operations and direct the masses on the decisive points. - - “It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of - march of the troops, to form them for battle at the various points - determined by strategy, to begin the action, to sustain it, and to - maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” THIERS. - - [10] V. MOLTKE, _Tactical Problems, No. 58_ (1878) p. 133. - -Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy -a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the -two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to -tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule, -take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to -neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz -not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of -terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper -importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces. Should the -demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield, -the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s -foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces. -Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the -direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in -this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of -tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and -their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools -for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other -hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory -and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy -are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves -to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal MOLTKE.[11] - - [11] The view that the direction of attack should be governed by - the possibility of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by - General v. Scherff, who says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced - by the question ‘will the attack here or there be tactically - easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it there be - strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course - with reference to measures on the battlefield.” - - -3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION. - -While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the -higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from -which to gather knowledge.[12] - - [12] See lecture by Prince HOHENLOHE: _Kriegserfahrung und - Kriegsgeschichte_, Neisse, 1879. - - “Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only - true philosophy. Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the - great captains; it is the only means of learning the art of war.” - NAPOLEON I., on April 17th, 1821. - - “Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the - memory, provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment - should pass upon.” FREDERICK THE GREAT. - -In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal -experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of -our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables -us to appreciate those controlling factors which, in map problems, -do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear -only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from -the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost -invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is -not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a -given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, -of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “_Les -Autrichiens_,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “_ont fait la guerre sans la -comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont -étudiée._” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever -theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, -on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows -us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a -position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us -in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated, -instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military -history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and -their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what -the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of -the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences, -doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It -describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military -common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance -the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare -also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military -experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual, -prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic -enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot -suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military -history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect -tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war -the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned -by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The -experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with -caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion -to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has -the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently -acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter -into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept -his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very -difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described -if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means, -as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We -maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a -single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere -allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial -reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author -cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact -that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In -consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a -hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which -would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce, -from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he -publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have -convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the -employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for -thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that -the more recent military history is the most natural source from which -to select examples, inasmuch as recent history alone is sufficiently -known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in -this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper -analysis of these proofs must be left to the student. - - [13] _Principes de la Guerre_, 1903. - - “The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding - it; the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied - it.” - - [14] From _Meinungen und Mahnungen_, Vienna, 1894. - - [15] _On War_, II, Chapter 6, p. 111. - - See also CLAUSEWITZ’ remarks on “_Criticism_,” II, Chapter 5. - -The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the -system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois, -considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which -it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory -system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, -although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, -and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the -same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, -although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected -form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary -manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17] -The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the -individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal -intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a -thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who -has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce -imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from -objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under -the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be -taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing -appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but -the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative -of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the -conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory -which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is -especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines -the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or -inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson -in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical -operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the -means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand -the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with -which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation, -arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be -able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not -lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and -of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of -theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by -the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this -direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to -the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods -must, therefore, supplement each other. - - [16] See KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5. - - [17] VON BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, p. 17. - - [18] “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately - a great number of officers, imagining that they are solving the - question, at once cry out: ‘Everything depends on circumstances; - according to the wind must the sails be set.’ But if you do not know - beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a wind, how can you - set the sail according to the wind?” BUGEAUD, _Aperçus sur quelques - détails de guerre_. - -If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character -is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of -unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also -the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to -its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this -character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to -military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength -of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure -of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to -the influences of certain situations such as would be encountered in -war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time -of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however, -very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal -conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This -should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of -these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of -peace. - -After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the -purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it -may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office -of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is -still necessary--the study of military history. From this fountain -of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their -material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to -guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as -different from reality as day is from night.”[19] - - [19] F. C. V. H. (_Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General_ CONRAD V. - HÖTZENDORF, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). _Zum - Studium der Taktik_, p. 2. - -Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics -may be divided into two parts: - -1. =Formal tactics=, or that contained in drill regulations. This -portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when -assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations -governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard -to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the -terrain. - -2. =Applied tactics=[20] deals with the combined action of the several -arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account -influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field -warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly speaking, be included under -this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21] -pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and -technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the -same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them -lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation -of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a -clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible. -(Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur). - - [20] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, Chapter - 23. “The higher, Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of - battles--subordinate, or minor tactics, is the manner of fighting, or - the battle-tactics of an arm considered in its details.” - - [21] MAJOR GUNDELACH, _Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg_, - Berlin, 1908. - - -4. DRILL REGULATIONS. - -Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and -lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition -which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of -the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his -peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the -psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and -as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, -however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, -necessitate new tactics. - -It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken -place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but -that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This -doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to -the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome -the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be -remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history -of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive -example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.” - - [22] MAHAN, _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, pp. 9 and 10. - -It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no -matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been -originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short -time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes -are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be -interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing -our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr. -On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements -if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In -his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article -which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not -why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ -It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the -regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in -action.” - -It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby -relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which -knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face -of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the -Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical -formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer -weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer? - -The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the -troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken -infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets -quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and -create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German -war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay -this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these -auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The -initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the -frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even -the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set -forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the -faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain. - - [23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue - “Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained - according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange - theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences - gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in - 1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this - experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870, - the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double - column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had - already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See MOLTKE, - _Feldzug von 1859_, p. 65. - -Further development and justification of the principles of the drill -regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain -assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations -should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook -of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is -necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles. - -“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very -different subjects. The regulations are law, authority--no doubt can -be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the -character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time. -They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly -changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed -be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter -the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction, -which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other -authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of -the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which -is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into -consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and -changing anew.”[24] - - [24] KEIM, _Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre_, p. 1. - -A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own -drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate -and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different -powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of -experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the -effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless -measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most -important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon -with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great -exertions and great mental agitation. _A doctrine of tactics which does -not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless -pedantry._ - - - - -THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY. - - -I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT. - - -1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY. - -In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and -importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms, -infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared -with the other arms. - - In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was - as 1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In - the Swedish army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient. - During the era of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion - between the two principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the - Napoleonic wars as 1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4 - per 1,000 men. In the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the - disadvantage of infantry. At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the - relative proportions of the three arms in the German IInd Army were - as follows: cavalry to infantry as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men. - The proportion between the two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps - of the German army, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as - 1:18.8; on the first day of the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6; - at the opening of the campaign there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at - the close of the campaign 5.8 guns per 1,000 men. This was still more - marked in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps, which, on October 31st, had - 5.8 guns and on December 9th even 11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present - Germany has approximately 6, and France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry. - -The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark -on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat -formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,” -and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and -trained more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French -army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions, -but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of -regiments of _gardes mobiles_ and volunteers. - -Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat -with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in -extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable, -and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it -surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will -power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the -other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through -exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25] - - [25] Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71: - - Infantry: 69.8; Field Officers: 13.26; Captains: 10.19; - Lieutenants: 3.85% - Artillery: 57.7; „ „ 4.04; „ 4.84; - Lieutenants: 4.52„ - Cavalry: 37.5; „ „ 5.61; „ 2.29; - Lieutenants: 3.24„ - -The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it -can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of -cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone -therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for -reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry -is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions -only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way. - -The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry -encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the -limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery -when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages. - -The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made -in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line) -and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty -and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive -method of recruiting by means of bounties made it necessary to avoid -using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the -expensive personnel for decisive shock action _en masse_. Skirmishing -was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In -Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the -close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed -to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of -infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the -originator of an _élite_ infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he -created one _voltigeur_ and one _grenadier_ company in each battalion. -While battalion tactics predominated, _i.e._, until the close of the -campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At -the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion -a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited -at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material -and received special training in extended order fighting. Following -the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third -rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a -third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the -sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the -most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866 -there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter -platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual _élite_ force assembled -in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the -troops, however. - -The system of column tactics, which required that every company should -be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment -of _élite_ companies. The Prussian _élite_, consisting of the platoons -formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the -employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The -experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the -extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment -of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an -action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments -and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire -action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even -after its leader has fallen. - -Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the -entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges -and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person, -and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty. - -The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are -not, strictly speaking, _corps d’élite_, for they are not selected -from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard -receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps -of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous -results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves -constantly under the eye of the emperor. - -Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their -use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for -existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare -(_Chasseurs alpins_, _Alpini_)[26], or where they are intended to serve -as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions -are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are -retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of -organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an -attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent -marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever -possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding -important points, and for combat and service of security on difficult -terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it -was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; -that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that -infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished -as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for -special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the -campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, -gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where, -contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of -the infantry.[27] - - [26] See _Über Gebirgstruppen_, VI, p. 273, and also - _Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen_, 1907, May - to July. - - V. GRAEVENITZ, _Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1903. - - [27] The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th - Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the - Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the - defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz). - The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role, - frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions - (3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to - escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at - Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at - Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for - the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were - thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged - with those of the infantry. - - For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted - on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd - Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the - front of the entire division. - - V. MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von - 1866_. - - KUNZ, _Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege - 1870/71_. On page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are - recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions - on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege - positions in front of Paris). - -Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops, -requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical -qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor -every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although -the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently -contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by -peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not -suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare, -a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time -ensuring the comfort of the men while at rest, is necessary. The -lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short -exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present -the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special -mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger, -Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The -Italian _Alpini_ (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to -which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have -in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected -corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results. -The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is -worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops -garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups, -each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer -company, and machine guns. - -As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to -direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means -of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the -visual signals employed by the navy. - -The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the -transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with -its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on -closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is -delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand, -that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance, -which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops, -and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller -independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the -enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine -guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage -of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the enemy and -also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army. - -In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the -additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and -of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the -requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point -of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire -of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The -principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however, -that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while -in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the -mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was -not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide -turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the -purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended -their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied -that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care -of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses -which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised -bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical -employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted -infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character -and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones. -Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by -mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on -that of the Boers. - -In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks -which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an -improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations; -if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons -became cavalry: for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl -and cannot endure. - -The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the -following principles for its employment: - - In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be - lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On - account of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater - distances, and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning - movements than infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in - the following cases: - - (a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front - of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse - batteries assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the - fire of the cavalry. It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as - possible, tactically important positions. It is to find positions - from which it can bring fire, preferably flanking fire, to bear on - the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat begins. It - is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed nucleus - in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable the - cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves - exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are - charged. - - (b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light - mobile reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a - moment’s notice from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending - assistance, or for influencing the action at particular points - and for which other troops are not available on account of the - extraordinary extension of modern lines of battle. - - (c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile - column in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in - performing this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in - the service of reconnaissance and patrolling. - - The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry - organizations: - - In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted - infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and - every brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each - battalion of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon, - consisting of two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40 - men, and 54 horses). Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of - mounted infantry is: 28 officers, 630 men, and 676 horses. - -The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where climatic -conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in -cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert -a potent influence on the actions of an opponent. As shown by our -experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry -is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to -prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country -return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal -actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the -employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough -horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be -of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry -and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands -for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the -cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling -its own fighting efficiency. - -For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are -used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against -the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by -advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance, -secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent -of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm -foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a -large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. -To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is -always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its -best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes -for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without -a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little -importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, -when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver, -when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men -prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly -appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during -critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his -courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look -toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of -non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive -his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to -despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it -will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise -a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From -the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely -different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to -a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and -tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their -own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in -the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle. -It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the -mobility which infantry lacks. - -If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take -the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain -with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other -soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle -that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be -utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service -and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in -addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the -divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the -formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division -has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be -withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist -detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would -lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an -organization. If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments -could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the -army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts -and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in -the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to -the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material -necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted -to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great -mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else, -the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their -dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road -space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos -take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the -terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only -by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment -cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to -push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary. - - [28] Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and 200, GERMAN - F. S. R. - - [29] By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry freedom of - action; by advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the - purpose of re-establishing contact with the enemy, of forestalling - him in occupying important points, or of outflanking him: finally, by - coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in covering a retreat, - in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work. - - [30] According to the _Italian Regulations of 1904_, the rate of - march of cyclists is as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate, - 10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., accelerated rate of march, up to 20 - km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 km., without long rests. For - riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required. - - In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the - formation of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each - _Bersaglieri_ Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be - employed in supporting a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished - a good deal in surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England - the development of cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers - and their exercises have demonstrated that such units are capable of - expanding in a brief space of time. - - In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered - valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division - (1905). Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming - cyclist battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are - advocates of their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the - brutal German battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves - which he would form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry. - -According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the -cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of -moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist -companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding -an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to -serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for -reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their -flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with -other arms. - -In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is -had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe -or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and -Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in -Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is, -however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of -the German mountains. - - [31] One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is - without doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment - of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers (Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In - June, 1905, this detachment, consisting of 4 officers, 15 men and - 4 guides, all with field equipment, marched around the base of the - “Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. 2,500 m.), - Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the - Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey - which, even in mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced - tourists. In several of these detachments experiments were made with - white covers for uniform and equipment, which enabled individual men - and patrols to approach unseen to within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent. - -Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with -snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is -retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of -security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of -maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased -when valleys or abrupt declivities intervene between the forces. The -only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one -can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without -difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the -marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty -which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy -points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings -with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able -to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of -snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting -links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to -move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they -easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as -the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact -with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command -and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking. - -The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each -ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must -be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled -in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is -increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small -detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is -patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute -for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed -of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This -permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be -employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing -to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary -to acquire proficiency in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be -easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse, -while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground. -When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they -are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in -France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training -school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences -gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for -training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a -body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a -climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included). - - [32] During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a - distance of 67 km. in 2³⁄₄ hours. - - -2. THE TACTICAL UNIT. - -By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of -troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing -a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are -personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be -small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single -leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit -to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a -troop[33] (_Eskadron_) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces. -The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be -decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in -action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase -in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in -such extension would make the supervision of the unit too difficult -for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a -troop (_Eskadron_) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately -150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer -of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one -establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and -horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established. - - [33] _Eskadron_ has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The - German _Eskadron_ consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139 - horses. It is the smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry - and is divided into four Züge (platoons). _Translator._ - - [34] GENERAL MARMONT, in his _Esprit des Institutions Militaires_, - p. 41, states that experience has shown that the most suitable - strength for a troop is 48 files, divided into four platoons; but, he - recommends that platoons should consist of 16-18 files in order to - maintain this strength throughout a campaign. - - [35] _Vorwerke._ - -While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of -a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is -no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the -movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case -of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an -independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses -the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision, -to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat, -and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining -serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action. - -To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of -little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs -a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or -cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39] -(company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry -out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible -leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle, -its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division at -least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting -units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry -regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a -compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component -parts independently for combined action against some point.” General -von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of -troops (_Truppenkörper_) is applied to an organization having the -necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which -is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as -can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who -knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the -troop (_Eskadron_), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies -the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to -the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm, -supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders -or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three -arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action, -he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are -“battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and -which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one -themselves. - - [36] _Von der Kriegführung_, p. 49. - - [37] _Truppeneinheit._ - - [38] _Kampfgruppen._ - - [39] _Kampfeinheit._ - - [40] _Gefechtseinheit._ - - [41] _Schlachteneinheiten._ - - [42] _Entwickelung der Taktik_, III, p. 125. - - [43] _Grundeinheiten._ - - -3. ORGANIZATION. - -The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong -in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength -of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation -based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can -still be obtained. In armies in which companies are composed of more -than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a -margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200 -rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching, -detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which -frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it -appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned, -as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no -longer be considered basic units. - - ===========+=========+===================================++ - | | || - | | || - | | || - | | || - | | (a) PEACE STRENGTH. || - |Company. +-----+--+------+------+------+-----++ - | | | | | |Offi- | || - | | |N.| | |cers’ |Hosp.|| - | |Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Ser- |Corps|| - | |cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|vants.|Men. || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum | 4 |15| 4 | 128 | ... | ... || - |Maximum | 5 |17| 4 | 142 | ... | ... || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum | 4 |11| 2 | 76 | 4 | ... || - |Maximum | 4 |14| 2 | 109 | 4 | ... || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,| | | | | | || - |Bersa- | | | | | | || - |glieri | 3 |13| ... | 87 | ... | ... || - | | | | |Musicians (trum- || - | | | | |peters only) and || - | | | | |sappers armed with|| - | | | | |rifle. || - |Alpini | 4 |19| ... | 121| ... | ... || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary | 3 |15| 2 | 108| ... | ... || - |Maximum | 3 |15| 2 | 158| ... | ... || - |Chasseurs| 3 |21| 2 | 125| ... | ... || - | | | | | and| | || - | | ...|..| ...| 150| ... | ... || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- | | | | | | || - |mately | 3 | 7| ...| 96 | 4 | ... || - | | | | | | [44] | || - -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ - - ===========+=========++=========================================++ - | || || - | || || - | || || - | || || - | || (b) WAR STRENGTH. || - |Company. ++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ - | || | | | | |Lit- | || - | || |N.| | |Train |ter |Hosp.|| - | ||Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Sol- |Bear-|Corps|| - | ||cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|diers.|ers. |Men. || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ - ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 5 |20| 4 | 226 | 4 | 4 | 1 || - |Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ - ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || 4 |19| 4 | 195 | ... | 4 | ... || - |Maximum || ... |..| ... | 4 Pio- |4 Officers’|| - | || | | | neers. | servants. || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ - ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | | | | | || - |Bersa- || | | | | | | || - |glieri || 5 |16| ... | 180 | ... | ... | ... || - | ||Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers || - | || armed with rifle. || - |Alpini || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++ - ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 4 |28| 4 | 218 | ... | 2 | 1 || - |Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || - |Chasseurs|| ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || - | || | | | | | | || - | || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++ - ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | | | non-combatants. || - |mately || 4 |22| ... | 200 | ... | 20 |... || - | || | | | | | | || - -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++ - - ===========+=========++=============== - | ||Difference - | ||between - | ||minimum peace - | ||strength and - | ||war strength. - |Company. ++-----+--+------ - | || | | - | || |N.| - | ||Offi-|C.|Pri- - | ||cers.|O.|vates. - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 1 | 5| 103 - |Maximum || ... | | ... - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || ... | 5| 132 - |Maximum || 4 Officers’ - | || servants. - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | - |Bersa- || | | - |glieri || 2 | 3| 93 - | ||Musicians (trum- - | ||peters only) and - | ||sappers armed - | ||with rifle. - |Alpini || ... |..| ... - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 1 |18| 110 - |Maximum || ... | | ... - |Chasseurs|| ... | | ... - | || | | - | || ... | | ... - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | - |mately || 1 |15| 104 - | || | | - -----------+---------++-----+--+------ - - [44] In addition, five non-combatants. - - After the heavy losses at =St. Privat=, two companies were combined - into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard - Corps. The administration of the consolidated companies had to - remain distinct on account of the preparation of casualty lists, - recommendations for promotion and decorations. On the day of the - battle of =Orleans=, the strength of the German battalions varied - from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army Corps to 747 men in the 40th - Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after the battle of =Le Mans=, - the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even reduced to 280 - men. - -The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat -by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the -rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the -battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French -Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies, -because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in -mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units -than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain. - - As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action - developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was - transformed into combined action of the four companies, the strength - of the company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of - companies in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the - Great was divided for administrative purposes into five companies - and for tactical purposes into eight _pelotons_. The battalion of - the first empire consisted of six _Füsilier_ and two _Voltigeur_ - companies, and the Austrian battalion, until the reorganization after - 1866, consisted of six companies of which each two formed a division. - Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated in the infantry of - all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German - states), but early in the seventies most of the states adopted the - four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line - and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia - had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment - of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the - exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the - British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however, - be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of - their small size. - -In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset -which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The -battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the -regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, -and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion -is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, -the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess -the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during -each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do -indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time -of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades -of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly -organized reserve available. - -“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its -training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into -three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently -fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. -R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German -General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, -whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units -throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently -broken up. - -This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment -brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade -commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, -there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only -by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from -each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of -bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which -may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or -more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the -brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be -maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units -must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force -which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of -infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders -are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for -relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of -peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, -moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. -The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have -induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each -of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of -three brigades of four battalions each. - - -4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45] - - [45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped - with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68 - small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters. - -Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption -of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in -importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern -infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of -its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. -There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and -subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not -be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in -view requires it. - -What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, -Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but -experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that -for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., -and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching -under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be -impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According -to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with -spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large -number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with -explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges. - -The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in -each battalion: - - +=========+================================+=================+======= - | FOR EARTH WORK. | FOR TIMBER WORK.| - ----------+-----------------+--------------+---------+-------+------- - | Small | Large | Small | Large | - | Intrenching | Intrenching | Intrenching | - | Tools. | Tools. | Tools. | - ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------ - |Spades.|Mattocks.|Spades.|Picks.|Hatchets.| Axes. |Total. - ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------ - Germany | 400 | 40 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 8 | 513 - Austria | 400 | 64 | 8 | 16 | ... | 8[46]| ... - Italy[47] | 32 | 8 | 36 | 18 | ... | 62 | ... - France[48]| 448 | 128 | ... | ... | ... |... | ... - ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------- - - [46] Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and - carpenter tools in addition to their rifles. These men are formed - into a pioneer platoon of 64 men in each regiment. - - [47] The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and - 12-15 mattocks per company, is contemplated. - - [48] The following demolition tools are available in each - battalion: 64 picks, 64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur - sections carry in addition a mattock or a pick apiece, and each - ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a fascine knife, or a saw. - The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed at the - present moment. - - -5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN. - -The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of -the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the -“Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load -of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new -experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows: - - Clothing 5.397 kg. - Equipment[49] 3,964 „ - Baggage[50] 5.600 „ - Arms and ammunition 8.507 „ - Rations (including breakfast). 3.238 „ - ---------- - Total 26.706 kg. - -To this must be added intrenching tools: - - Small spade and scabbard 0.89 kg. - Hatchet 1.08 „ - Mattock 1.48 „ - Load with spade 27.596 „ - - [49] Tent equipment 1.620 kg. - - [50] Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269 - g. ration on his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two - parts, one containing cocoa paste, the other concentrated extract of - beef (Pemmican). - -COMPARISON.[51] - - ===========+==========+=======+========+=======+=======+=========== - | | | |Weight| | Weight - | | | | of | Weight| of - | Without | With |Clothing.|knap- | of | ammu- - | spades. |spades.| |sacks.|rifles.|nition.[52] - -----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+----------- - Germany |26.706 | 27.596| 5.397 |20.919| 4.707 | 4.714 kg. - Austria[53]|26.615 | 26.443| 4.428 |22.187| 4.200 | 4.080 „ - Russia |28.216 | 29.206| 4.000 |22.622| 4.576 | 3.426 „ - France |26.125 | | 6.222 |19.903| 5.049 | 3.675 „ - Italy |29.135[54]| | 5.993 |23.143| 4.505 | 4.320 „ - Japan |26.365 | | 3.475 |22.890| 4.435 | 3.600 „ - -----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+----------- - - [51] According to _Journal of Military Scientific Societies_, 1906. - - [52] Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds - per man. - - [53] Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front - rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front - rank). - - [54] Alpini carry 32.096 kg. - - -II. THE FORMATIONS. - - -1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS. - -Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not -suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the -intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient -free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are -given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the -telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and -the following signals: _To advance_, the leader raises the arm; to -indicate that the command is _to follow him_, he extends his raised arm -in the direction of march; _to halt_, he lowers the arm; _to deploy_, -both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if -necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently -indicated with one extended arm; _to assemble_ his men, the leader -describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also -be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed -upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of -troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. -(Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a -change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must -be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by -troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service -calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying -those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except -“charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden. - - During the engagement of =Trautenau= (27th June, 1866), the trumpet - signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian - battalions to withdraw.[55] See also the effect of the signal - “assemble” after the taking of =Problus=.[56] Notice the effect of - the signal “form square” during the assault on the =Forest of Bor= - (=Königgrätz=).[57] - - [55] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85. - - [56] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16_, p. 230. - - [57] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57_, p. 47. HÖNIG, - _Untersuchungen über die Taktik der Zukunft_, 4th Edition, p. 61. - - On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded - by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry - Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army - corps. Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a - trumpeter, surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the - alarm signal.[58] - - [58] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66_, pp. 48/49. - - The village of =Diletz= (action at =Gitschin=, 1866) was to be - evacuated at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade - withdraw.” The signal was, however, understood and carried out - by only three battalions; two battalions, which were at the time - engaged, did not hear it at all and maintained their position until - they were taken in reverse by hostile fire and forced to withdraw.[59] - - [59] _Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps_, p. 130. - - In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th - Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at =Vionville=, the signal - “assemble” was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further - mischief being averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who - prevented trumpeters from blowing the call and ordered them to blow - “commence firing” instead.[60] - - [60] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52_, p. 59. - - -2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN. - -The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior -to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the -entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing -troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an -action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of -hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly, -comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road -being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted -messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit -a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce -their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation -existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may -be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of -comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what -extent the depth of the columns should be decreased. - -The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across -country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to -cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to -avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and -direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction. -These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a -deployment into line necessary. - -Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all -weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not -satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes -every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire -and compels the most extensive deployment. - -Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question -belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at -Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six -battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply -demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to -the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an -equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops, -formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable -for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62] -On the other hand, in the battles of the Empire we find columns -formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from -participation in the action, but which were designed to break through -the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps -was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a -single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions -respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack -formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were -deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column -and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their -vulnerability and their fire and shock power. - - [61] FRIEDERICH, _Herbstfeldzug, 1813_, I, p. 305. - - [62] RENARD, _Considérations sur la tactique de l’infanterie en - Europe_, Paris, 1857. - - RÜSTOW, _Geschichte der Infanterie_, II, p. 316. - -The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than -the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of -the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock -power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the -influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line. - -The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The -characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of -the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present -danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the -bold, the column that of the weak. - - The column[63] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early - as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application - until the wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used - because the raw levies lacked the training necessary for making - movements in line. Whenever a line formation was used, battalions, - owing to the scarcity of efficient officers, resolved themselves - into disorderly skirmish lines which were exceedingly difficult to - control. The adoption of the column was, therefore, the result of - practical experience, but as a formation it could be justified on - the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development - for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages - of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the - placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in - line. This formation was employed for the first time in the attack - made by a demi-brigade during the battle on the =Tagliamento= (1797), - and subsequently it was used at =Marengo= (attack made by Desaix’s - Division). - - [63] The development of the French column tactics is splendidly - portrayed by KUHL in his work _Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796_, p. - 46, et seq. - -[Illustration] - - During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had - a marked _penchant_ for this formation, until it sank more and more - into insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at =Waterloo=, - and Macdonald at =Wagram=). Formations suggesting the above are found - even in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter - platoons of the companies at first in rear of the wings of the - deployed battalion, and later in rear of the outer flank platoons of - the companies). - -[Illustration] - -On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles, -especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a -line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets -which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On -ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground -rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to -greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64] - - [64] At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for - each meter of the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of - the range, so that the second and third platoons of a company in - column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between platoons) would offer a - target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (¹⁄₅ the height of a - man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (¹⁄₄ the height of a man) at 1200 m. - - -3. THE COMPANY. - - -(a) Formation of the Company. - -(Par. 83 German I. D. R.). - -In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height -from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the -entire company is divided into three platoons (_Züge_). When a platoon -consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections -(_Halbzüge_). - -In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in -two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right -to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets -the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section -(_Korporalschaft_) under a non-commissioned officer. During the -campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange -companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the -same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of -course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men -according to height from right to left flank, but it would without -doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the -formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85, -German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each -platoon are posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the -rear rank of the company. - - [65] The number of ranks is intimately related to the rate of - fire of the infantry weapon. During the days of slow loading, the - necessity of keeping at least a part of the rifles at all times ready - for firing led the Imperialists in the Thirty Years’ war (loading - was executed by 90 motions) to form their musketeers into sixteen - ranks, while Gustavus Adolphus was able to form his infantry into - six ranks owing to the greater loading facility of their rifles. - In the Seven Years’ war the Prussian infantry was formed in three, - that of the Austrians in four ranks, the fourth rank serving as a - reserve. The first rank fired kneeling. The British infantry was the - first to adopt the two rank formation for fire action, forming into - four ranks for shock action and frequently for warding off cavalry - attacks. Emperor Napoleon considered a third rank useless for fire - and shock action and initiated the double rank formation on the eve - of the battle of Leipzig. In 1888 the Prussian infantry--the last to - do so--gave up the three rank formation which had long since lost its - importance in battle and which was retained side by side with the - double rank formation for purposes of parade only. - -[Illustration: Germany.] - -The _non-commissioned officers_ are posted in the front rank, on the -flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and -Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the -line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In -France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front -rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has -a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment -occupies a space about 75 cm. square. - - The German Infantry Drill Regulations define interval (_intervalle_) - as the space between two elements on the same line, and distance as - the space between two elements in the direction of depth. An interval - is measured from the left flank of the element on the right to the - right flank of the element on the left (or vice versa); and distance - in the company and in the battalion is measured from the rear of the - element in front to the head of the element in rear (or vice versa). - If the distance between two elements is equal to their front, the - column is called an “open column”, otherwise it is called a “close - column.” - -FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE. - - ===========+=========================+================================ - | FRONT. | FACING DISTANCE. - | (Per man.) | (Distance between ranks.) - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Germany |About 0.80 m. Loose elbow|0.80 m. from back of front rank - |contact. |man to breast of rear rank man. - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Austria |About 0.75 m. Files are |120 cm. from heels of front rank - |separated by an interval |man to those of rear rank man - |of the width of a hand. |(according to German method of - | |measuring, about 0.88 m.). - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Italy |0.70 m. |0.75 m. from breast of front - | |rank man to breast of rear rank - | |man(according to German method - | |of measuring, 0.45 m.) on the - | |march, 1.20 m. (according to - | |German method of measuring, - | |0.90). - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - France |0.70 m. including 0.15 m.|1 m. from back or knapsack of - |interval between files. |front rank man to breast of rear - | |rank man. - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Russia |0.70 m. Files are |Rear rank man is an arm’s length - |separated by an interval |from back of knapsack of front - |of the width of a hand. |rank man = 60-70 cm. - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - England |About 0.80 m. |1.50 m. from heel of front rank - | |man to heel of rear rank man - | |(according to German method of - | |measuring, about 1.20 m.). - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Switzerland|About 0.75 m. |0.80 m. from back of front rank - | |man to breast of rear rank man. - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Belgium |About 0.80 m. |1 m. from heel of front rank man - | |to heel of rear rank man - | |(according to German method of - | |measuring, about 0.70 m.). - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - Japan |About 0.85 m. |0.75 m. from back (or knapsack) - | |of front rank man to breast of - | |rear rank man. - -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- - - -(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons. - -In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered as distinct -bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical strength. They are -placed side by side and constitute the company in line. In Germany -and Russia the company is at each formation divided into platoons of -approximately equal strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and -Italy, it is contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn -when once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements are -executed, after preparatory commands given by the company commanders, -by commands of execution or signals given by platoon commanders. The -execution of movements is retarded by this procedure and the movement -itself becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of -commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous, -especially in the weak platoons at peace strength. - -[Illustration: France.] - - Column of platoons from line (par. 121 German I. D. R.: “Form column - of platoons”) is formed in Austria as follows (Austrian I. D. R. par. - 360): At the preparatory command, “Column,” given by the company - commander, the leaders of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th platoons command - at once, as in forming column of fours to the front, “Fours right - (left), column right (left).” At the command “march,” the platoons - step off, each turning in column to the rear, and are conducted to - their new positions, halted, and dressed to the right (left). - -The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, and Belgium -excepted, are divided into four platoons; each two platoons may in -addition be combined into a half-company. The German, Japanese, and -Belgian companies are divided into three platoons. “The platoon is not -an independent subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists -of a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes a -force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer commanding -the platoon makes it what it should be. The strength of the platoon is -therefore solely dependent upon the number of officers available.” (VON -SCHERFF). - -The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization of the company -is that fewer platoon commanders are required, which fact is well -worthy of attention in the mobilization of units of both Line and -Reserve, especially in view of the extraordinarily heavy casualties -among the troop leaders in the course of a campaign.[66] - - [66] See also _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88. - - It is only necessary to recall the situation of the Guard Corps and - of the IIIrd Army Corps after the battles around =Metz=, and the - condition of the German troops during the advance to =Le Mans=. On - January 7th, 1871, there were 36 officers with the 57th Infantry, of - which 16 led platoons of the 36 platoons in the first line, and 8 - lieutenants commanded companies. On mobilizing, 25 lieutenants were - assigned as platoon commanders and six as company commanders in the - 57th Infantry.[67] - - [67] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, I, p. 25. For additional facts in - regard to the dwindling of the number of officers consult _Die - sieben Tage von Le Mans_, by V. D. GOLTZ; also _Supplement to - Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1873, p. 368; also VON KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug - an der Loire_, p. 43. - - The eight infantry regiments and the Jäger-Battalion of the Xth Army - Corps had, at this time, instead of the required 506 officers, only - 286, of which number 174 were for duty. The 22nd Infantry Division - had only 108 officers left; companies and even half-battalions were - led into action by very young officers of the Reserve, and, on many - occasions, even by vice 1st sergeants. - - On the morning of August 17th, 1870, the 40th Füsilier Regiment - had two field officers and four captains present for duty. Two - captains, two first lieutenants and eight second lieutenants - (four of these belonging to the Reserve), led companies; only two - lieutenants of the Reserve, one cadet, and four vice 1st sergeants - remained available for duty as platoon commanders. The regiment - participated in the battle of =Gravelotte= with this small number - of officers.[68] The 6th Grenadier Regiment, which, in July, 1870, - had marched out with four field officers, seven captains, six first, - 14 second lieutenants, and four cadets, all on the active list, - lost so many officers at =Wörth= and =Sedan= that a field officer - of the 46th Infantry had to take command of the regiment; three - first lieutenants of battalions; and four second lieutenants, two - officers of the Reserve, and six vice 1st sergeants of the companies. - The 12 companies had available five vice 1st sergeants as platoon - commanders. The 1st Battalion of the 58th Infantry had only seven - officers left (including its commander and the adjutant) after its - losses at =Weiszenburg=.[69] - - [68] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 162. - - [69] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 58_, p. 56. - - The 7th Grenadier Regiment lost 40 officers at =Weiszenburg= and - =Wörth=. On August 7th, three captains commanded the battalions and - three officers of the 5th Jäger-Battalion were detailed to command - companies in it.[70] At =Gravelotte= the Füsilier-Battalion of the - 1st, the Ist Battalion of the 2nd, and the IInd Battalion of the - 3rd Regiment of the Guard lost all of their officers. The French - organizations, having more officers and less men than we, were by no - means so badly off in 1870-71. Upon mobilizing in 1870, the German - army had 13.7 officers to every 1,000 men, the French army, 32.2 - officers. - - [70] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 122. - -On the other hand, it should be remembered that in armies consisting -of militia it is considerably more difficult to command a platoon of -60-70 men than to command one of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably -connected with the four-platoon company is the small size of the -platoons during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance most -regulations permit the three-platoon formation when the company is -small, because platoons consisting of less than ten files are of no -instructional value. An advantage of the three-platoon company is -the simplicity and rapidity with which changes from one formation to -another may be effected. - -The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for movements on the -battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 rifles, a target about -25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The four-unit column of platoons is -better suited for movements. With a front of 17 m., its depth is only -15 m., when the distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces -(Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See p. 62). - -For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following would be the -forms: - -[Illustration] - -The other advantages praised by advocates of the four-unit company are: - -1. That a smaller platoon is more suitable for field service--that a -picket is perhaps only in the rarest cases to be made 60 men strong. - -2. That a small platoon makes a better and more comprehensive -employment of the company in action possible, as the company commander -has an opportunity to use ¹⁄₄, ¹⁄₂, or ³⁄₄ of his company according to -the requirements of the situation, while the three-unit company affords -less favorable combinations, permitting only an employment of ¹⁄₃ or -²⁄₃ of its strength. - -These advantages can also be obtained in the German company by the -employment of sections (¹⁄₆, ¹⁄₃, ¹⁄₂, ²⁄₃, ⁵⁄₆) so that the objections -to the three-unit company would appear to be groundless. - -The platoons (in Italy called _plotone_, in France, _section_) are -subdivided into sections (_demi-sections_, _Halbzüge_), in Austria -into two skirmish groups (_Schwärme_) of 4-7 files each, and, when -consisting of 16 files, into four skirmish groups (in Italy this is -also done, the groups being called _squadriglio_). In Germany the -platoons are divided into groups or squads of four files each, and -in Russia the platoons are divided into sections of 8-15 files each -and these again into groups or squads of 4-6 men each. If the squad -is to have any importance at all in action, it must have a leader, -and it might easily happen that a mobilized company lacks the number -of leaders necessary to provide one for each group. The withdrawal -from the line of a number of good shots for duty as squad leaders is -compensated for, in our opinion, by the more thorough supervision over -the men. This consideration has, however, apparently caused other -states (Austria and France) not to count on the activity of the squad -leaders in a fire action to the same extent as is the case in Germany. - - -4. LENGTH OF PACE AND MARCHING. - -An extended, swinging step, without haste and without unduly taxing -the lungs, is advantageous in all movements. When accustomed to this -pace on the drill ground, the men will march with practically the -same step on varied ground, and this appears more desirable than to -shorten the step, while at the same time increasing the distance to be -covered in a given time. The length of the pace depends largely upon -the height of the individual, but even small men can maintain a step -of 0.80 m. without undue exertion.[71] In Switzerland the cadence has -been fixed at 116-120 steps per minute “with a view of suiting the -peculiarities and the varying degree of mobility which characterize -the inhabitants of the different cantons.”(!) For purely practical -reasons it is advisable to fix upon some even number of paces in order -that the cadence may be tested with the watch. (Austria excepted). The -longest pace in conjunction with the highest cadence (_Bersaglieri_, -whose march is almost a double time, excepted) is found in England -and Switzerland. Such a performance could not be kept up by a fully -equipped man without impairing health. - - [71] When the leg is extended at an angle of 57 degrees the length - of pace would be as follows: - - Height of man. Length of leg. Length of foot. Length of pace. - 1.6 m. 0.8 m. 0.24 m. = 0.75 m. - 1.675 „ 0.857 „ 0.253 „ = 0.776 „ - 1.70 „ 0.87 „ 0.26 „ = 0.80 „ - 1.75 „ 0.88 „ 0.26 „ = 0.82 „ - - ===========+====================++====================++ - | QUICK TIME. || ACCELERATED TIME. || - +------+-------------++------+-------------++ - | | PER MINUTE. || | PER MINUTE. || - | +------+------++ +------+------++ - |Length|Number| ||Length|Number| || - | of | of | || of | of | || - | pace.|paces.| || pace.|paces.| || - | m. | | m. || m. | | m. || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - Germany | 0.80 | 114 | 91.2 || 0.80 | 120 | 96.00|| - | | | || | | || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - Austria | 0.75 | 115 | 86.25|| 0.75 | 125 | 93.75|| - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - Italy, Line| | | || | | || - and Alpini | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| ... | ... | ... || - Bersaglieri| 0.86 | 140 |120. || ... | ... | || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - France | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| 0.80 | 124 | 99.00|| - | | | || | | || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - | 0.71 | 118 | 84- || 0.71 | | || - Russia | | | || | 122 |119. || - | 0.89 | 122 |109 || 0.89 | | || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - Japan | 0.75 | 114 | 85.5 || ... | ... | ... || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - England | 0.84 | 128 |107.5 || 0.91 | 128 |116.5 || - -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ - | | 116- | 92.8-|| | 120- | 96- || - Switzerland| 0.80 | | || 0.80 | | || - | | 120 | 96.00|| | 140 |112 || - ===========+======+======+======++======+======+======++ - - ===========++===================== - || DOUBLE TIME. - ++--------+------------ - || | PER MINUTE. - || +------+----- - || Length |Number| - || of | of | - || pace. |paces.| - || m. | | m. - -----------++--------+------+----- - Germany ||0.75- | 170- |127- - ||0.90 | 180 |162 - -----------++--------+------+----- - Austria ||0.90 | 160 |144 - -----------++--------+------+----- - Italy, Line|| | | - and Alpini ||0.90 | 170 |153 - Bersaglieri||1.00 | 180 |180 - -----------++--------+------+----- - France ||0.30[72]| 180 |136 - || | | - -----------++--------+------+----- - || | 170- |181- - Russia ||1.066 | | - || | 181 |192 - -----------++--------+------+----- - Japan ||0.85 | 170 |144 - -----------++--------+------+----- - England ||1.02 | 180 |183.6 - -----------++--------+------+----- - || | | - Switzerland||0.90 | 160 |144 - || | | - ===========++========+======+===== - - [72] The following, taken from _La marche du fantassin_ (_Journal - des sciences militaires, 1897_), is here inserted for comparison. - - _French Drill Reg. of 1791_ (in force until 1862): - _Pas ordinaire_ 100 paces at 0.65 m. = 65 m. per minute - _Frederick The Great’s - Infantry_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „ - - _Prussian Drill Reg. of 1812_: - _Ordinary pace_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „ - _Accelerated pace_ 108 „ „ 0.70 m. = 75.6 m. „ „ - In general, double time is considered of little value. In Austria -double time is to be maintained for periods of two minutes, quick -time of five minutes duration alternating, up to sixteen minutes, -_i.e._, until a distance of 1,726 m. has been covered. In Germany, -an alternating quick and double time march in heavy marching order -is prescribed. A different practice prevails in Italy. According -to the Italian Regulations all troops are to be trained to march -in double time without rest and without knapsacks for 2 kilometers -(with knapsacks, 1 km.); _Bersaglieri_ without knapsacks, 3 km. (with -knapsacks, 1¹⁄₂ km.), also without rest (_i.e._, 13 and 16.8 minutes -respectively). When we consider that in double time with the necessary -alternating step, 2,000 m. can be covered in 17 minutes, and in -accelerated step, in 19-20 minutes, the time gained is unimportant when -compared to the fatigue of the men and the exertion of the lungs, which -interferes with deliberate, accurate firing. During an Austrian firing -test the number of hits fell from 76.5%, attained while advancing in -quick time, to 51% after a period of double time. - -The run, without keeping step (_Marsch! Marsch!_) is employed in -rapidly crossing short, fire-swept spaces, in changing quickly from one -formation to another, and in the charge. - - -5. MOVEMENTS OF THE COMPANY IN LINE. - -The commander of the center platoon is the guide. - -A change of direction is effected by inclining toward the new direction -(at the command: “Half right, march!” when the angular change of -direction is less than 45 degrees), by indicating a new point to march -on, or by executing a turn. - - -6. THE COLUMNS OF THE COMPANY; MOVEMENTS IN COLUMN; FORMATION OF LINE. - - -Column of Twos.[73] - - [73] _Reihenkolonne._ - -Column of twos is formed by facing in the indicated direction. Marching -at attention the depth of an organization in column of twos is equal -to its front when in line. The column of twos is used in marching by -the flank for short distances only, as the march at attention in this -formation unduly fatigues the men. In addition, this formation may be -used, in exceptional cases, on narrow roads; but the column becomes -considerably elongated (as much as 165%), when marching at route step. -Line is formed from column of twos either by facing, or by executing -front into line. - - -Column of Squads. - -This is an open column formed (the company being in line at a halt or -in motion) by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees. It may also -be formed from line at a halt by the squad on the designated flank -moving straight to the front, the others executing a turn of 90 degrees -toward the proper flank, then following the leading squad.[74] Column -of squads may also be formed by executing “Squads right (left), column -right (left).” Line is formed by each squad executing a turn of 90 -degrees or by executing front into line (without regard to the original -front). - - [74] “Right forward, fours right.” _Translator._ - -[Illustration: Column of Squads.] - -[Illustration: Route Column.] - -Route column is formed from column of squads by the squads in each -section closing to facing distance, the file closers, musicians, -and hospital corps men forming ranks of four men, in the gaps thus -created. (Par. 91 German I. D. R.) With the exception of Russia, which -employs a section column, of Switzerland, which uses a column of -squads, and of France, which has adopted a wheel by fours like that of -the cavalry, all other armies employ the _column of fours_[75] as their -march formation. - - [75] _Doppelreihenkolonne_. - -Column of fours is, as a rule, formed as follows: - -The even numbered men place themselves on the right or left of the odd -numbered men by making an appropriate turn, thus forming a column of -fours whose length is equal to the front of the company in line. In the -plate below let the Roman numerals represent front rank men, the Arabic -numerals rear rank men, and the horizontal line the original front -occupied; column of fours will then be formed to the right, in the -different states, as shown: - -[Illustration: Austria. - -Russia, England, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan. - -Italy. Netherlands.] - -For the purpose of increasing the front of the column, the double -column of squads, having a width of 8 files, may be employed. This -is formed in practice by placing the columns of two organizations -(companies or battalions) side by side. In large bodies of troops, -the depth of a column is reduced in this manner by one-half. A column -of fours formed by closing on the center instead of by wheeling to a -flank, is employed in Italy and Russia for the purpose of reducing the -front of an organization. - - -Comparison of Column of Fours with Column of Squads. - -The column of fours has the advantage over our column of squads in that -it can be more quickly and easily formed; that the front rank men must -make a turn, while, at the same time, observing the march direction, -can scarcely be considered a disadvantage. - -The column of fours and the column of squads have the same depth. The -Austrians consider movements made in column of fours on the battlefield -more clumsy and fatiguing than when made in column of squads, because -checks are transmitted to the whole column of fours owing to its -rigidity, while in column of squads the march is easier, more rapid -and more orderly. The squad organization, moreover, facilitates the -employment of small parties in the service of security and increases -the importance of the squad leader in fire action. For the last named -reason we should not like to dispense with the column of squads. - - -The Employment of the Column of Squads. - -The route column is suitable for movements under frontal artillery -fire, as the cone of dispersion of bursting time shrapnel combines -small lateral spread with great effect in the direction of depth, -and as it is very difficult for the opponent to observe whether a -shot falls short or goes over, unless it strikes just in front of the -column. When artillery can bring a flanking fire to bear on the column -it becomes necessary to neutralize this by placing the platoons side -by side so as not to present an easily observed target to the enemy. - -Movements by the flank and changes of front are easily made in column -of squads, and after some practice the deployment into line of -skirmishers from this formation offers no difficulties. This column -is best adapted for movements over varied ground. In column of squads -difficult terrain can be crossed and advantage can be taken of the -most insignificant cover. In addition, it is difficult for an enemy -to observe a force moving in column of squads along the edge of woods -and rows of trees, and such a column entails the least expenditure of -energy on the part of the men. The leaders must insist, however, that -the men cover in file, and that elongation of the column does not take -place. The column of squads or the route column is therefore to be -employed on the battlefield as long as possible. - -A column of squads or route column may be shortened by placing the -platoons, each in column of twos or squads, side by side. By this means -the =Company Column= (_Kompagniekolonne_) is formed. - -[Illustration] - -The normal interval between platoons in this formation, measured from -the leading guide of one platoon to the leading guide of the next in -line, is nine paces. This interval may be increased as required by the -nature of the ground and the intended deployment for action (deployment -on a broader front). Movements in company column are facilitated by -the fact that platoon commanders are posted four paces in front of -the center of their respective platoons. The leading squad follows -the platoon leader, the guide of that squad moving directly in that -officer’s tracks. Thus, small, unimportant deviations, unavoidable on -varied ground, can easily be adjusted, while too definite rules would -tend to restrict the mobility of the platoon commanders in front of -their platoons. The principal thing is that the platoon follow its -leader who guides it without command. - -The musicians distribute themselves in rear of the platoons in -readiness for their subsequent duty in action--that of maintaining -communication between the several parts of the company. The intervals -of nine paces between platoons are not rigid, but rather the reverse. -The flexibility of the formation considerably facilitates movements in -difficult country. This “meandering” of the company over the terrain -requires special training. The old, historic company column, in which -the platoons were formed in line one in rear of the other at a distance -of nine paces (Russia 5 paces = 3.55 m., Austria, Italy, France, 6 -paces = 4.50 m., and Japan, 8 paces = 6 m.), their commanders on their -respective right flanks, is now called the - - -Column of Platoons. - -Austria, France, and Italy have retained the old designation. - -The front of the column of platoons may be decreased by forming column -of sections. The column of sections is suitable as a route formation on -broad roads; the transition from column of sections to column of squads -is not difficult, and for the purpose of passing through occasional -narrow stretches of road, the files on the flanks may be removed. In -most cases it is, however, more desirable to place several columns -abreast than to employ column of sections, because deployment is -facilitated in the former case. - - -Company in Column of Platoons. - -[Illustration: Germany.] - -[Illustration: Russia.] - - =Russia.= The four squad leaders of each platoon are posted on the - flanks of the rear rank and in the center of each rank. The ranking - non-commissioned officer of each platoon stands on the left flank of - the front rank of his platoon. The 1st sergeant, the guidon bearer, - and one trumpeter, and behind them two drummers, are posted in rear - of the company. - -[Illustration: Austria.] - - The staves of the guidon flags (_Jalonneurflaggen_) are inserted into - the rifle barrel of a soldier (in case of a battalion into the rifle - barrel of a N. C. O.) and serve to indicate battalions and companies. - - According to the color scheme used in Russia: red = 1, blue = 2, - white = 3, green = 4. “R” indicates the number of the regiment in - the division, “B” the number of battalion, and “K” the number of the - company. A red flag is carried by the 1st Company, and a red flag - with one green horizontal and one blue vertical stripe is carried by - the 8th Company of the 1st Regiment of an infantry division. In Japan - and England so-called storm-flags (small national flags) have been - adopted to facilitate mutual recognition of friendly troops. - -[Illustration] - - -Posts of Platoon Commanders. - -In Switzerland, in Russia, and in Germany, the post of platoon -commanders is on the flanks of their respective platoons when the -company is in column of platoons. In England and Austria platoon -commanders are posted in rear of their platoons, with the exception of -the commander of the leading platoon, who is posted beside his guide. -In all other states platoon commanders are posted in front of their -platoons. Officers are posted in front of their platoons so as to -facilitate observation on their part, and so that their platoons can -follow them. This position becomes a necessity when the regulations -require that all movements of the company be executed at commands given -by platoon commanders. When they are posted in front of their platoons, -they cannot supervise their men unless they turn around to do so. - -The column of platoons is a close column from which line cannot be -formed directly. It has not been found necessary in Germany to provide -an open column permitting prompt deployment toward a flank. The column -of platoons unites the company on the smallest space and facilitates -supervision, but in companies at full war strength it is not well -adapted for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of -cover, on account of the size of the platoons (40 files each). In -platoons at war strength the men look more toward the point upon which -they are to march than upon the enemy, and the deployment of the rear -platoons offers difficulties which occur principally when a deployment -in an oblique direction or one by the whole company becomes necessary. - -The column of platoons is formed by the flank platoons placing -themselves in rear of the center platoon. Line is again formed by rear -platoons moving to right and left and abreast of the leading platoon. - -The German company column is much more flexible, and the advantage -of a prompt deployment for action, made possible by the fact that -all platoon commanders and the heads of platoons are in the lead and -therefore can see the objective, should not be underestimated. The -company column is formed from line by the center platoon forming column -of squads to the front (or rear), the flank platoons, each in column -of squads, closing on the center platoon, heads of the three columns -on the same line. Company column is formed as follows from column of -platoons: the leading platoon executes squads right (left), column left -(right), the two rear platoons execute squads right (left), and are -led to a position abreast of the leading platoon. Company column from -column of squads is formed by rear platoons moving to the right and -left respectively, and abreast of the leading platoon. - -When line is to be formed from company column, the flank platoons -have to incline to the right and left respectively in order to gain -sufficient interval. - - -Movements in Column. - -For marching short distances to a flank, column of twos may be -employed; for longer distances, column of squads (or fours); and the -march direction may be changed by inclining in the proper direction. - - * * * * * - -Since March 1904, experiments, which deserve to be mentioned here, -have been made in France under the direction of Colonel Fumet, having -for their object the simplification of the drill regulations. In the -experiments a four-rank formation is being considered. In this proposed -scheme the platoon is formed so as to place the four single-rank squads -(_escouades_) in rear of each other at the very close facing distance -of 0.50 m., the leaders of the _escouades_ taking post on the right -flank, a first class private being posted on each flank and in the -center of each _escouade_. - -[Illustration: Forming Double Rank from the Four-Rank Formation and the -Reverse Movement.] - -[Illustration: Deployment of a Half-Platoon formed in Four Ranks into -Two Half-Platoons formed in Double Rank.] - -[Illustration: The Platoon (_section_) in Line.] - -[Illustration: Deployment of a Half-Platoon Into Line of Skirmishers.] - -[Illustration: The Company.] - -The platoon at war strength (50 men) has a front of 8-10 m. and a -depth of 3 m. The movements are very simple. Route column is formed by -simply facing to flank, without first dividing the platoon into squads. -Double rank line may be formed from column of fours, by executing -right and left front into line. The double rank line may be deployed -into half-platoons. Furthermore, a single rank line may be formed by -the men of the rear rank stepping up into the front rank. One drawback -of this scheme is, that, in forming route column, facing distance of -0.80 m. between ranks is to be gradually gained after stepping off. -The deployment of half-platoons into line of skirmishers offers no -difficulties. It is otherwise, however, when the platoon is formed in -four ranks and marching in platoon front, for then line of skirmishers -can be formed only by deploying each rank in turn. The depth of the -column may be decreased by placing platoons (formed in column of twos -or fours) abreast, this expedient affording a suitable route formation -on broad roads. The company is formed by placing the platoons on a -line and abreast of each other at intervals of 2 m. In the battalion, -column of platoons and “mass” are the only formations considered. In -the “mass” formation the companies, each in line, are in rear of each -other. - - -7. THE BATTALION. - -The movements of the battalion have been considerably simplified -in all armies. Battalion drill is, however, necessary, since, as -shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the morning of August 18th, -1870, simultaneous movements of large masses across country will be -unavoidable in future wars on account of the great size of modern -armies.[76] - - [76] Additional examples: Advance of the 6th Infantry Division on - Vionville. _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 556. The flank march made by the 3rd - and 4th Bavarian Brigades from La Maladerie toward Schloss Goury (5 - km. battle of Loigny). HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 22. - - Advance of the 33rd Infantry Brigade from Champdoux against Loigny - (_ibid._, IV, p. 80). - - Advance of the 22nd Infantry Division from Lumeau on Poupry, 4.5 - km. (_ibid._, IV, p. 139). - - Advance of the French to the battle on December 1st, 1870 (_ibid._, - III, p. 164). - - -Normal Formation of the German Battalion. - -The four columns of platoons, or the company columns of a battalion, -may be placed, as dictated by space or purpose, abreast of each other -as a =broad column= (_Breitkolonne_), or in rear of each other as a -=deep column= (_Tiefkolonne_). The numerical order of companies is -immaterial. - -[Illustration: Deep Column.] - -[Illustration: Broad Column.] - -[Illustration] - -The deep column is employed for assembling troops if the terrain -necessitates a formation on a narrow front. If sufficient distance is -allowed between companies, line may be formed to a flank, but this -increases the depth of the column to such an extent that movements -at attention are impossible. The deep column may be used as a route -formation in addition to the column of squads. During the change from -route formation to that of action, the deep column formation may be -retained so long as the depth of the whole column does not have to be -further reduced. When necessary, the deep column may be replaced by a -formation in which the four companies, each in route column, are placed -abreast of each other. - -The broad column finds proper employment, aside from parades, in cases -where the terrain or the contemplated deployment requires more front -than depth. It is also advisable to assemble the widely scattered -troops in a broad column after an action. The broad column does -not lend itself, however, to the execution of changes of front by -battalion; but should such changes of front become necessary, they are -always to be executed by company. - -The color is posted between the right and left center companies, in -broad column, and on the right flank of the third company, in deep -column. In action the color remains with the company with which it -happens to be at the moment.[77] Should this company also join the -firing line, the color accompanies it; but under all circumstances one -squad must remain with the color. (Par. 236 German I. D. R.). It has -been contended that this is a disadvantage, as the enemy can direct -his fire on the color and the men in its vicinity. If the colors, upon -which the soldiers have been sworn, are taken into the field, it is -always better to endure the unavoidable losses incidental to carrying -them, and even to expose them to capture, than to send them back to -a safe place under escort.[78] At the Albrechtshaus farm (Wörth) -the colors served as rallying points around which the disordered -skirmishers rapidly assembled.[79] - - [77] In Japan the color joins the battalion commander. British - troops leave their colors in their garrisons. In Russia and France - the color is carried only by one battalion of each regiment. - - [78] See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 180, - battle of Wörth. A platoon of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 47th - Infantry was sent to the rear with the color, and a squad of the - Füsilier-Battalion of the 46th Infantry finally had six colors - to guard. In the 88th Infantry, out of a total of 48 sections, 9 - sections remained in rear as a guard for 2 colors, but finally 6 of - these sections crossed the Sauer. - - [79] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp. 77, 152. - -The figures given on pages 72 and 73 of the German Infantry Drill -Regulations illustrate formations with organizations at peace strength. -The approximate dimensions of broad and deep columns at war strength -are as follows: - -[Illustration] - - =Russia.= Numerous formations are prescribed. In addition to route - column, columns with half company front and with company front are - prescribed. Reserve columns are mentioned. These, according to the - number of companies on the same line, are called single platoon - column (deep column), two platoon column (double column), or four - platoon column. - - =Austria.= _The mass_, in which the companies of the battalion are - on the same line, each company in company column[80] with intervals - of three paces between companies, is employed for assembling the - battalion in a restricted space in a position in readiness when out - of range of hostile fire, or for assembling the battalion under - cover. The _line of columns_, in which the companies, each in column - or some other suitable formation, are formed abreast of each other at - deploying intervals plus three paces, is also used. - - [80] In the Austrian company column (_Kompagniekolonne_), the - platoons, each in line, are formed one in rear of the other. This - formation was formerly called company column (_Kompagniekolonne_) - by the Germans also, but at present they designate it by the term - “column of platoons” (_Zugkolonne_). _Translator._ - - _The line._ In this formation the companies, each in line, are placed - abreast of each other at intervals of three paces. - - _The column._ In this formation the companies are placed in rear of - each other, each either in line or in column, with distances of nine - paces between companies. The companies are numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd, - 4th, etc., from head to rear, if in column, and from right to left, - if in line. - - =Italy.= The formations are like those of Austria, but the double - column has been retained. - - =Japan.= The only formations prescribed are the broad and deep column. - - =France.= The companies are formed in column or in _ligne de sections - par quatre_, intervals and distances being 10 paces. Distances and - intervals may be increased when required. The _battalion in line_ in - which the companies are formed in line in numerical order, abreast of - each other at intervals of six paces, is only retained as a parade - formation. - - _Line of company columns_ (_ligne de colonnes_). Companies abreast - with intervals of six paces. - - _Deep column_ (_colonne de bataillon_). The companies in normal - formation in rear of each other at distances of 10 paces. - - _Double column_ (_colonne double_). Intervals and distances 10 paces. - - The formation in which the companies are abreast of each other, each - in column of fours at deploying intervals, is employed in marching - across country and also under artillery fire. Only the regiment - carries a color, the battalion a guidon (_fanion_). - -[Illustration: =Deep Column= - -(_colonne de bataillon_). - -The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (_ligne de -sections par quatre_).] - -[Illustration: =Double Column= - -(_colonne double_).] - -[Illustration: =Deep Column= - -(_colonne de bataillon_).] - -[Illustration: =Line of Company Columns= - -(_ligne de colonnes_).] - -[Illustration: =Double Column= - -(_colonne double_). - -The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (_ligne de -sections par quatre_).] - - =England.= Columns are formed, in view of the (8) weak companies in - a battalion, with company or half-company front at full or reduced - distances (_quarter column_). In actions with savages echelon - formations and the square are also employed. - - =Switzerland.= The company is divided into four platoons. The line is - used as an assembly formation and for purposes of parade. The company - column, corresponding to the German formation of the same name, is - used for movements on the battlefield. In both line and company - column the platoons are posted abreast, at intervals of three paces. - Finally the route column is used. This is formed either by wheeling - by squads, or by platoons executing column right (left). On the - battlefield the platoon may be deployed and formed in several lines. - - In the battalion, company columns in line of columns, or route - columns in the battalion column, are posted abreast at intervals of - 10 paces. Line and double column are abolished. - -Opinions are divided as to the value of the double column. Formerly, -when the double column was still the column of attack from which -deployment for fire action had to be made, a discussion of its merits -was of special importance. While Austria abandoned the double column -formation in 1881 and Germany in 1905, Switzerland replaced it by a -column having a front of two platoons (_Plotonkolonne_), and Russia -readopted it again recently. All other states utilize it as of equal -value with the deep column in making movements beyond range of -artillery fire and as an assembly formation in addition to the deep -column. The change from double column to any company column formation -is easier than a like change from the Swiss “Ploton column” (double -column of platoons), which has the same front, since in the double -column two companies can be deployed at the same time toward both -flanks. - -The deep column appears to be better adapted for making movements and -for advancing under cover, and, on account of its narrow front, a force -in this formation is better able to adapt itself to the forms of the -ground in hilly or close country than a body of troops in double column -of twice the width of front. - - -The Battalion in Route Column. - -(Par. 316 German F. S. R.). - -The companies are formed in route column and follow each other at -distances of 8 m. Mounted officers, musicians,[81] led horses and -vehicles are to be included in actual depths of columns given and not -in the distances. A permanent extension of distances for the purpose of -restricting checks of the march to a single organization is as little -permissible as the permanent elimination or reduction of distances; -distances may be dispensed with temporarily only. The reduction of the -depth of a column, obtained by eliminating distances between elements -entirely, is so small that the rapidity of deployment gained does not, -by any means, compensate for the increased exertion of the troops.[82] - - [81] A trumpeter marches in rear of the battalion for the purpose - of blowing “Give way,” when necessary to open one side of the road. - At this signal all the troops close in toward the flank of the guide. - - [82] The depth of a brigade of six battalions on the march is - about 2500 m. By eliminating distances between elements a space of - only 100 m. is gained, while by marching in a front of six files, - approximately 750 m. is gained. The march of the 10th Infantry - Division from Weiszenburg to Preuschdorf, on August 5th, 1870, proved - exceedingly fatiguing. The distances between organizations had been - eliminated pursuant to orders. “Some of the rearmost elements had to - double time uphill to keep up whenever the head of the column went - down hill. Great fatigue and many cases of overexertion were the - result.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 37_, p. 124. - -During the march the company commander goes wherever his presence may -be necessary for the proper supervision of his company. Neither are -platoon commanders tied to a fixed place; one officer is, however, -required to march in rear of the company. The company ammunition -wagons follow in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in -rear of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train marches -separately. - -The depth of the battalion on the march, without field train, is 400 -m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m. - - =Austria.= Column of fours. Depth of a battalion on the march, - including combat train, 670 paces (502 m.). The distance between - companies is nine paces (6.7 m.). - - =France.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The - depth of each rank is reckoned at 1.40 m. on the march (in Germany - 1.10 m.), and that of every 100 men at 50 m. Depth of a battalion, - including combat train, on the march is 450 m. - - =Russia.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.1 m.). The - battalion without combat train has a depth of 350 paces (249 m.). The - combat train follows in rear of the regiment. - - A German regiment of four battalions with combat train has a depth of - 1,650 m. on the march; a Russian regiment, a depth of 1,725 paces (@ - 71 cm.)=1,215 m. (elongation on the march not considered). - - =Italy.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The - battalion has a depth of 422 m. on the march. - - -8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE. - -For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and of the brigade -see page 37 _supra_. All movements must be executed in an orderly -manner by regiment and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up -tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at -the same time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base -battalion may be designated. - -When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, disposition, -intervals and distances of the tactical units depend upon the terrain -and the intentions of the commander. Frequently the tactical units -(battalions and regiments) are assembled in separate groups. - -When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do not dictate -otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep column, are -posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals and distances, -rear battalions covering those in front or the gaps between them. An -appropriate formation will frequently be that in which route columns -are placed abreast and on the same line. - -In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed -abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other, -_i.e._, in line or in echelon. When the regiments are formed side by -side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded -by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better -control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first -line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization. -This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may, -however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the -orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the -reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can -influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for -the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each -echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres, -because troops are thrown into action directly from route column. -The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first -line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of -different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is -proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently -abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a -flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84] -When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for -troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by -side. - - [83] For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade - in action, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_ - (August and September numbers 1877) entitled: _Die Infanterie Brigade - in ihrer Entwickelung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the - employment of regiments in line or in echelon, see Memoir by General - von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in the campaign of 1866. - MOLTKE, _Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq. - - [84] The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._ I, - p. 310, et seq. The formation, side by side, of the six battalions - of the IIIrd Army Corps in the attack on the hill at Forbach - (Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and would have disrupted - all organizations. - -The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route -column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a -flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the -decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset, -invite a more rapid extension of front. - - -9. EXTENDED ORDER. - -Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can -be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and -to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The -deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish -the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of -the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers -are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which -sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in -open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The -strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is -sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, -and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or -the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of -skirmishers needed (_i.e._, the denser the firing line).[85] If the -enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (_i.e._, -a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be -required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion. - - [85] The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship, - and further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at - close quarters, found thin firing lines sufficient. - -Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in -action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to -the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. -R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer -too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. -Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very thin -firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines -which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire. -Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s -expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with -volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves -too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their -fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by -a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, -and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily -to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind -than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several -successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each -case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close -proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish -lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once -upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing -lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.). - -This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war -and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin -skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be -pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to -make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. -The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire -with a dense skirmish line.[87] - - [86] Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on - February 18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in - two lines of equal strength and separated by a distance of 300 m., - the remainder following at 400 m. Three battalions of the Highland - Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 m. See my lecture: _Lehren - des Burenkrieges_. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, pp. 43 - and 67. - - For the Japanese procedure see V. LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der - Japaner_, pp. 44 and 66. BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Sechs Monate - beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. 217. - - [87] In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment - against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, BRONSART VON - SCHELLENDORFF (_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 225), says: “Some - 500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of - the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for - about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and - fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with - the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150 - m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until - this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups - of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the - advanced line.” - -It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, -when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their -strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same. - -RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES. - - FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION. - ============+===========+=======+======+====+=======+========+======= - | | | | | Hits. | Figures| - | Range & | | | +---+---+ hit. | - Target. | Elevation:|No. of |No. of|Time| | +---+----+Figures - | m. |rifles.|shots.|min.| | % | | % |missed. - ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+------- - 180 head | 680 | 166 | 1268 | 5 | 54| 4 | 49| 27 | 131 - targets |Elevation | | | | | | | | - placed at |used: first| | | | | | | | - intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | | - 1-2 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | | - ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+------- - 90 head | 680 | 166 | 850 | 5 | 35| 4 | 27| 30 | 63 - targets |Elevation | | | | | | | | - placed at |used: first| | | | | | | | - intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | | - 3-4 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | | - ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+------- - -The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed -by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the -gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy -of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines -considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is -the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly -distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with -hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures -hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, -however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the -weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more -perceptible in the smaller force. - - -(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line. - -Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at -the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). -The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, -either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. -R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered. -Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework -of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely. -When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish -intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those -of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers -under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons -designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment -being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France, -the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line -may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an -advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished -in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is -continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of -skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is -first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. -(Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground, -deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to -allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The -number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation. -When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult -for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an -appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into -decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires -complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 -German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger -force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at -once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the -firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this -case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy). - -Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands -facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders -are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to -maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear -of their platoons (_i.e._, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the -only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear. -In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated -to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of -supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to -prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care. - -The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader -of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the -musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line -of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon; -but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility -if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he -expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he -wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the -company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.). -The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any -targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so, -communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not -be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and -observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.). - -Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other -troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should -always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to -the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose -connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other -hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed -flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a -report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be -made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon -and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should -keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be -employed advantageously in such cases. - - The =Austrian= deployment is similar to the German, the intervals - between skirmishers being about two paces. In =Italy= the skirmishers - are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (_catena ordinaria_), but this - interval may be increased by order up to three paces (_catena rada_). - The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to - facilitate volley fire by squad. The =French= deployment is similar - to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in - which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In - =England= skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during - the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought, - one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle - per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In =Russia= and - =Japan= the intervals are as ordered. In =Switzerland= skirmishers - are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be - covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the - rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance - of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or - single men, is authorized. - - -(b) Movements in Skirmish Line. - -Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all -movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up, -should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A -careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted -upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized -by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious -advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction. -Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with -the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long -skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the -_base_, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders -maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on -line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of -the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free -to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the -march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by -designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank, -within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes -of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a -temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by -degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.). - -In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible -only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire -from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing -without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer -appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the -more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, -the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole -bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an =advance -by rushes=, since the whole distance separating the advancing line -from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be -employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an -advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a -certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position -occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely -and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken -up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it -depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire. - - [88] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77. - -The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without -firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire -will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the -defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes -of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at -each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance -impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further -advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious -infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire -of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases -only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear -desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will -still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire -of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant -losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a -force with the determination to advance. - - -Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush. - -The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds -preparation for making a rush. - - To cover 80 m., requires 26-30 seconds; - „ „ 40 „ „ 17-20 „ - „ „ 25 „ „ 10-15 „ - -While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in -readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order -to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is -absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the -troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire -at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target -offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very -soon cease of their own accord. - -The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive -role here. - -The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with -the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of -being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence -and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is -difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines -necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in -addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be -employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of -fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with -the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon. - - The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke - auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles - him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have - someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which - he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed - upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that - here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees - the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will, - as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful - attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and - patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those - who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they - are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This - would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice, - if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty - voluntarily.” - -The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and -rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best -be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The -formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the -soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during -his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with -him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by -advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward -through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means -of carrying a skirmish line forward. - -The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush -forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by -increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded -by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only; -for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments -cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously -fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In -oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere -with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on -the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. -The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile -skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When -the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate -to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of -artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have -to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under -cover by the hail of shot. - -The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to -which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining -ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy -and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from -cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither -consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to -close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the -offensive.” (HÖNIG). The powers of endurance of the men, the character -of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded -by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If -the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to -let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and -the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw -themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an -advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and -nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to -pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of -special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of -peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier -for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the -field. - -The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the -enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition -to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with -startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time, -but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time -the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already -have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves -down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then -endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling. - -The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first. -The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting -stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for -some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring -units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible. - -The greater the superiority of our fire, _i.e._, the marksmanship which -compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the -rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other. - -Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the -platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to -rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and -because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try -to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers -have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush, -but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because -of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the -fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best -intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time -of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not -endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations. - -When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question -presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth -the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance -by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to =crawl -forward=? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface -of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance -made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing -grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the -direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would -also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have -crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit -crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following -results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: -A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes; -crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an -extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and -the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89] -The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward -once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the -man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure -was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to -execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with -or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will -frequently be able to advance only by crawling. - - [89] During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the - fighting line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced - by troops crawling up into the line, and carried forward to within - 450 m. of the enemy’s position. An isolated assault was subsequently - repulsed by the Boers. - - Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, head - resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of - the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and - straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the - body slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and - the head also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head - is raised only when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is - placed against the shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring, - the man offers a larger target, and, in addition, is not immediately - ready for firing. - - In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of - his position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire, - slowly but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling - line is said to have produced an especially disquieting and - paralyzing impression on the immovable defender, who was tied to his - position, because of his inability to inflict perceptible losses - on these small, prone targets, and because, moreover, he himself - was continually under a galling fire. As no assault was made, no - opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against - targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however, - insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As - to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to - resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order - to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew - more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every - energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of - surrender.[90] - - [90] Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900. - _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1905, pp. 145 and 149. - - One who fought on the Boer side writes as follows: “After we had - crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within - about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving - over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little - credence in these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a - bad experience, we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as - we saw that most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away - their weapons, we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up - with them, I noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like - children. Later, when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of - their troops to some English officers, they stated that it was due to - the uncanny manner of our advance. - - “These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger - approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off - effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops; - for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the - plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had - had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly - exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to - unnerve their troops.”[91] - - [91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_, - in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59. - -=Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, -according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 -to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was -exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward -under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary -to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the -increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92] - - [92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69. - -One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the -British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. -This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed -fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long -lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, -on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * -Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s -attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this -is possible only when the advancing units are small.” - -The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those -published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 -m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy -lasts. - - -Russo-Japanese War. - -In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and -very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army -as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the -following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure -of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the -engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning -with 1,000 m. - -From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, -beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the -length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one -rush as the enemy withdrew from his position. - - 1st rush 132 m., about 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle - 2nd „ 58 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ - 3rd „ 63 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ - 4th „ 61 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ - 5th „ 75 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ - 6th „ 151 „ „ 5 „ „ „ „ „ - 7th „ 400 „ - ----------------------------------------------- - 940 m., about 95 rounds of ammunition per rifle - -If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it -follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes. - - -Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes. - - =Germany.= (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by rushes, - the following commands are given: (Such) =Platoon (section, squad) - Rush!... Rise!... March! March!= At the command =Rush!= the - skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, and - prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left - hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body - as possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After - a brief pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon - commander jumps up and at the same time commands: =Rise!... March! - March!= At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The - length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D. - R.). While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short - rushes, which are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing, - should also be practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers - rise promptly and simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly. - The rush is terminated by the command “_Position_”; the sight - setting is changed when necessary and fire opened without further - preliminaries. Frequently the new firing position may be indicated - before the rush is made. - - =Austria.= Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of the - rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical - situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They - serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.” - - =France.= Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover - (_par bonds successifs_). - - =England.= (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations - prescribed rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their - length was actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first - engagements of the South African war, in cases where the fire of the - enemy was not especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently - published, state: “Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100 - yards (_i.e._, 70-90 m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length. - At decisive ranges, _i.e._, under 540 m., they should be short enough - to afford the enemy no opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on - the skirmishers. When cover is available the advance is made from - cover to cover.” At another place the regulations state: “On open - ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising - simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short - rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy - unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The - rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The - shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have to be, - and the shorter the length of the rushes.” - - All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as - possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible, - advance beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When - an advance by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or - crawl forward. - - =Italy.= Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with - companies, are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits. - When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the - organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by - entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the - main line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run, or if - cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again - at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons - open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the - advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable - to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good - position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy. - - =Japan.= Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum - length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by units - smaller than a platoon. - - =Russia.= Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections, - and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When - sections advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the - section which is to advance first, and also the order in which the - others are to follow. The Russian regulations are the only ones which - prescribe a “movement to the rear by rushes,” at a run. - -Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over -plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes -will be impossible. Whether =fire while in motion= ought to be -employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition -for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued -or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken -enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the -attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against -advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% -hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire -effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to -collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to -the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently -employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding -each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not -in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, -the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to -rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being -more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under -fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently -result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender -has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is -prescribed). - - During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force - advancing from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal - number of rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following - results were obtained: - - Regulation attack: Fire while in motion: - Time 26 min. 28 seconds 18 min. 40 seconds - Fire pauses 12 „ 18 „ 7 „ 40 „ - - Attacker against the defender: - Percentage of hits 7 16.7 - Defender against the attacker: - Percentage of hits 9.2 33. - - Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from - 1,400 to 100 paces: - - Attacker 22.7 20. - Defender 32.2 51.2 - -There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. -All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short -rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept -well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy. -Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by -flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the -advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery -fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when -the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our -shrapnel. - - -Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion. - - The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=.[93] - - [93] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50_, p. 212. - - This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which - lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by - Prussian artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry. - - The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.[94] - - [94] Springer, VI, p. 204. - - The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was - successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were - taken. With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced - against front and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed. - - The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against the - VIth Army Corps in =l’Hay= and =Chevilly=: “The defender’s coolness - and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the - attack, and finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady - volleys delivered by him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”[95] - - [95] V. SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, 1, p. - 71. - - -Examples of the Employment of Rushes. - - 1. Attack on =Le Bourget=, on October 30th, 1870.[96] - - [96] HOHENLOHE, _Briefe über Infanterie_, p. 80. - - KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 10, p. 43. - - Two battalions of the _Kaiser Franz_ Guard Grenadier Regiment had - to advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le - Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high - potato crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two - companies entirely deployed in the first line, and the battalion - reserves in rear of the center of the line with files at extended - intervals. The second line was formed similarly. The two companies - in the firing line advanced at first without firing, by rushes of - about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each moving forward - beyond the point where the other had halted. When effective range - was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other moved - forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a similar - manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while lying - down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the - village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn - to the interior of the village. - - The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were - insignificant. - - The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St. - Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack. - - 2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878. - - The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions - (_Drushines_) of Bulgarians, and the _Ugla_, _Vladimir_, and _Kasan_ - Regiments, was to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle - battalions armed with Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion - of the _Ugla_ Regiment armed with captured Turkish rifles. The only - artillery available consisted of a mountain battery, while the Turks - were able to bring twenty guns into action. - - The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian - firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when - the losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, _without - firing_, from 750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes - were made by the entire firing line; the supports, with files at - extended intervals, did not follow until the firing line had thrown - itself down. - - After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from - the reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one - battalion, each battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance - between lines (total depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900 - m. on, the advance was made by rushes, the entire force inclining - to the right front. While covered by the fire of the skirmishers of - the firing line in front, the length of the rushes was 100-150 m. - At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading line, extending the line of - the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able to open fire and, after - about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent that the Turks - were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, which was - successful. - - Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11 - officers and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269 - men; the original strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure - of ammunition: 11th Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle. - - The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s - fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The - Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the - assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated - to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of - one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between - lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between - files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of - ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[97] - - [97] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, III, pp. 168-186. - -In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate -engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward” -had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of -small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only -20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward -individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.) - - The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at - =Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite - the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc. - - In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of - =Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges - south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west - and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how - rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a - few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated - by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just - before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant - fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course - absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by - groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one - in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down - again.”[98] - - [98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127. - - The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900), - on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes, - then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally - working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching - the last firing position from which the final assault could be - made.[99] - - [99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139. - _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539. - - -(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line. - -If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy -losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it -finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it -must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This -may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined -intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred, -by putting men in the intervals (_i.e._, increasing the density of the -line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical -units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever -practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it, -although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and -gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical -because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated -officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line -(replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is -unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be -trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is -not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is -possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even -during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that -the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to -150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the -firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish -line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes, -or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even -by crawling. - - =Austria.= Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of - prolonging it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used. - When prolonging the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the - firing line. During an attack efforts should, however, be made to - advance beyond the firing line--“to overreach it.” The other method, - that of filling up the line, is in attack, as a rule, to be used for - the purpose of carrying the line forward, the rush to be made as soon - as the reinforcement reaches the firing line. Signals are prescribed - for prolonging the line without advancing beyond it, for reinforcing - that line and advancing beyond it, and for filling it up and carrying - it forward in a rush. - - -(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming. - -(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.). - -The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in -action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their -leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which -have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common -leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in -motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should -be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and -causes dangerous gaps along the entire front. - -If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the -situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order -formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his -unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander -of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held -well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that -effect. - -The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy. - -The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall -in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.). - - -10. SUPPORTS. - -(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.). - -The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the -first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the -decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question, -be in the first line. - -Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a -less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from -the enemy. - -It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to -cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and, -in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line -can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack, -and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to -influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the -impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by -sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage. -The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all -probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization -as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in -rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it -will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both -flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile -fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the -power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them -from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself. -The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly -illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front -of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the -firing line forward failed, and the necessary impetus for the decisive -advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing -line.[100] - - [100] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 200. - -In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the -skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions. -(Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked, -as they increase the volume of fire. - -Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon -the terrain. - -When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased in the course -of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should -be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to -participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an -action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the -leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available. - -When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase -distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming -under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line -should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an -attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent, -by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the -defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the -purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short -distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched) -at the points where they are to be employed. - -During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of -hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not -simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same -shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more -than 300 m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the -combat approaches. - -In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon -cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would -be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the -less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner -in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the -advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In -this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain -permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly -careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it -is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line. - -The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and -successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce -it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split -up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to -reunite it at the first opportunity. - -The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing -line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts -for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously -with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the -fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as -the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose, -the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw -itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably -weaker.”[101] - - [101] _Report of Lieutenant Borsov_, in KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, - _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, III, p. 183. - -The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column -of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time -or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the -direction of advance. Columns having a narrow front, so long as they -are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range -infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is -advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader -must get his command again entirely under control. - - -Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not? - -Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into -firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often -placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly -enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these -were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage -during the first deployment before the situation is clear. - -The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports: - -1. _The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as -a rule, being able to participate in the action._ This argument is not -well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is -equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw -themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief -that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that -they followed the firing line too closely. - -Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the -firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small -angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports -are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated. - -2. _The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will -not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will -fail to seize the right moment for advancing._ (This can perhaps never -be avoided). - -3. _Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units, -makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire._ These -criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case -impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the -business of platoon commanders. - -The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of -targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small -size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can -be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of -sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to -be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force, -need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following -the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The -drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company -were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action. - - -11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER. - -In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be -led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The -position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of -him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid -of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry -fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the -enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile -fire compels the most extended deployment.[102] - - [102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ - close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken - enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations. - Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle - of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment, - formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of - the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered - in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of - about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression - produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and - deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion - had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by - the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. - 35_, p. 23. - - In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not - at all exceptional. - - On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry, - advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in - half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12 - officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and - wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery - and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments - of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II, - p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152. - - The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the - 29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of - the opponent. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29_, p. 499. - -In =extended order= the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he -is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he -expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, -judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling -his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, -as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the -skirmisher. - -The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the -noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially -in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly -trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, -as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the -demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out -of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this -initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by -restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier. - -In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any -direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as -long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in -order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must -be assembled in close order without regard to the previously existing -organization. - -In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other -arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103] -as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the -troops show a disposition to get out of hand. - - [103] The British _Infantry Training_ contains special regulations - governing “savage warfare,” in which close order battalion formations - are explicitly given the preference (order in echelon, square). - -In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross -difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents -of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In -extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power -most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible -targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the _skirmish line_ is the -principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is -initiated and carried through to the end. - -Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the -simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian -battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they -were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is -pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian -infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which -they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness. -No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing -its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate -object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in -magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive -discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part -whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was -drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear -tactics in the camp at Boulogne and during the brief pauses between -campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved -equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an -important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to -overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with -this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein -during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his -command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement -until order had been completely restored. - - [104] Compare herewith _Der 18. August_, p. 463, in regard to the - importance of discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat. - -General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct -methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To -quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly -be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.” -Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended -order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises -the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not -soldiers, _i.e._, _men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of -death_. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this -term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments -which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use -correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category -belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any -position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece, -prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the -ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect, -crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these -things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not -permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of -combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending -any other meaning. - -“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher -load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of -aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the -rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the -mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to -exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his -superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no -longer able to follow their example. - -“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere; -the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed -with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops -the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance -in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of -his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill -in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of -training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very -considerably. - -“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop -the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member -of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened -mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill. -His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the -assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no -soldier.”[105] - - [105] V. D. GOLTZ, _Zur Gefechtsausbildung_, p. 26. - -The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this -drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral -powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill -troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and -the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness -guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the -elements.”[106] - - [106] _Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations_. - - “However, when necessity demands the creation of new - organizations--whether militia, volunteers, or _gardes mobiles_,--it - is a great mistake to expect everything from moral factors; even - though hatred of the enemy, enthusiasm for the fatherland, the - republic or for glory, rise to the highest pitch. ‘Victory or - death’ is the watchword when marching out--but neither is quickly - attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting - marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon the - intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the - sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be - annihilated at once by a rapid assault--not at all; the advance is - made very slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to - evaporate during the many hours in which death is constantly faced.” - LAYMAN. - -For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of -duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual -to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will -suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to -yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything -else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until -the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by -the side of enthusiasm. - -“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work _Drill or -Training_, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops, -and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket -has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined -through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the -outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are -beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive -appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it -down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are -needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain -are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of -self-sacrifice is the important factor.” - -It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the -brochure _Drill or Training_, written by Archduke John, to _Drill -and Training_. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and -a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter -time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that -the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are -unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced -sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments -inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can -only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the -present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp -word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of -troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger. - -The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted -minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in -so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s -fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier -and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of -Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation -to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for -linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war -and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s -Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits, -numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by -leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the -decisive factors for success. - -The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to -leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the -victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the -gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced -by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of -the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most -destructive hostile fire. - -Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training -of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing, -cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless -offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, _trained to rely upon -themselves_, and _skirmishers having initiative_.” (Par. 2 German I. -D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and -continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D. -R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into -a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158 -German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing -self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251 -German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the -offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, _forward, -at the enemy, no matter what the cost_.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.). -“The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass -all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par. -327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers -not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of -penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those -who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an -abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the -previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.” -(Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to -shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the -fight _regardless of consequences_ even when the outcome of the battle -is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.). - -If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by -discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense -of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not -appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised -form; it makes itself felt rather in the shape of tactical scruples, -whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates -to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the -force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the -fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an -officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the -start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it -may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate -leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the -seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees -in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops -have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to -colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications -of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably -accompanied by great losses. - - [107] In this connection and in regard to the British losses in - South Africa, see my lecture: _Die Lehren des Burenkrieges_ (1904), - p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and - Spionskop is interesting. See _The Times History of the War in South - Africa_, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318. - - - - -III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES. - - -A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY. - - -1. THE FIELD GUN. - -The field artillery of all the states that need be considered is armed -with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and capable under peace -conditions of firing as many as twenty shots per minute. Its caliber -varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. (Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia, -7.62, and England, 8.38 cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The -German gun fires shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and -the French 7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the -same weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 and -the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through the action of -combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to 5000, in France and Russia -to 5500 m.). The projectiles have a maximum range of 8000 m., when -percussion fuze is used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which -bursts approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is set -at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with a light -field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. -(time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. -(time fuze ranging from 500 to 5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field -howitzers (cal. 14.91 cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of -6870 m.) in the heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5 -cm. Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another long -piece of 12 cm. caliber. - -=Percussion shrapnel= is used for defense at short range, and in fire -for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range and the nature of -the ground. It is effective against troops lodged in tall timber. -Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently cause the premature burst of -the projectiles.[108] - - [108] Engagement of Azay (6th January, 1871). _Geschichte des - Regiments Nr. 20_. HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, I, pp. 16 and - 49. _Taktik_, VI, p. 42. - -Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately in -front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, depending upon the range). -However, even in this case, the bullets often pass over low targets, -such as skirmishers lying down, and low parapets afford sufficient -protection. An adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is -directed on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields, -terrain covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the ground, -or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the angle of fall -is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece at ranges of 3300 m. and -over) half of the bullets penetrate the ground, the remainder ricochet -and pass on at a greatly reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary -effect of shrapnel is insignificant owing to the smallness of the -bursting charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the -projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.[109] - - [109] Consult _Taktik_, VI, p. 45, in regard to the incendiary - effect of projectiles. - -[Illustration: Percussion Shrapnel.] - -=Time shrapnel= (used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is fairly independent -of the terrain, the burst being easily observed since the bullets are -embedded in a “smoke-producing composition.” The extreme range at which -this projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing -the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, both of -which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, model ’96, may be -effectively employed up to a range of 4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire -is so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short time. -(Par. 630 German F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account -of its certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits -the trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This fuze -also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly advancing -targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short range. The French -Regulations give the width of the beaten zone of a single shrapnel -as 20, that of two from the same piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of -the beaten zone is 300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the -German shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel -(model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines following -250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base charge shrapnel -these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. from the first line. The -German shrapnel gives very good results when set to burst 30 to 150 m. -in front of the target, the height of burst being regulated accordingly -(approximately ¹⁄₃ of the whole number of hundreds of meters of the -range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect may, however, -be expected even when the fuze is set to burst the projectile 300 m. in -front of the target. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.). - -Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down from 1000 to -3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and against standing skirmishers -at the same ranges when burst 56 to 45 m. short. The two tables given -below, borrowed from the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery -tactics,[110] give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel, -and of the effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the -target: - - ======================+======================================= - |When firing at the targets named (1 - |skirmisher per m.) with time shrapnel, - TARGETS. |mod. ’96, set to burst 50 m. short, the - |following _hits per shrapnel_ may be - |expected after the adjustment has been - |effected: - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - | 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m. - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - Skirmishers standing | 18.4 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 10.4 - Skirmishers kneeling | 10.6 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 5.8 - Skirmishers lying down| 6.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.5 - Head targets | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - - ======================+======================================= - |When firing at the targets named - TARGETS. |(skirmish line with 1 skirmisher per - |m.), under service conditions, with time - |shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to burst 50-100 - |m. short, the following hits per minute - |may be expected on an average: - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - | 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m. - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - Skirmishers standing | 364 | 202 | 109 | 46 | 14 - Skirmishers kneeling | 210 | 117 | 63 | 27 | 8 - Skirmishers lying down| 126 | 70 | 38 | 16 | 5 - Head targets | 70 | 39 | 21 | 9 | 3 - ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- - - [110] ROHNE, _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, Berlin, 2nd Edition, - p. 9. - -More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel -bursting within 100 m. are disabled. The penetration of shrapnel -bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike -bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for -action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than -100 m. The effect of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with -shields is insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile -employed by artillery against animate objects, provided these are not -located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, or under -bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against such cover on -account of the flatness of the trajectory and the sensitiveness of the -fuze. - -Shrapnel is to be supplemented by =shell= filled with explosive charge, -model ’88, which has a great explosive effect at extreme ranges and in -tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 German F. A. F. R., in regard to action -against shielded batteries). - - Percussion shell, on account of its very sensitive fuze, bursts on - penetrating the shield, while percussion shrapnel goes entirely - through the shield and bursts about ¹⁄₂ m. in rear of it. - -[Illustration: Percussion Shell, Model ’96.] - -Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under light splinter -proofs may be reached with time shell burst directly over or close -in front of them. The depth of the beaten zone of this projectile is -small, seldom exceeding 50 m., even when the fire is directed against -targets in the open. About 75% of all the fragments are capable of -inflicting disabling wounds when the interval of burst is short. The -peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful -adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French _obus allongé_, -a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; angle of the cone -of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed only for the destruction -of material objects.[111] - - [111] When firing on animate objects, the beaten zone of this - projectile does not exceed a space 50 m. wide and 20 m. deep, but the - concussion of the explosion will undoubtedly be felt at a greater - distance. The explosive effect of the projectile is equivalent to - that of 30 kg. of powder. The explosion of the projectile produces a - cone-shaped crater having a diameter of 2 and a depth of 0.50 m. Ten - melinite shells per running meter are required to destroy a parapet 3 - m. thick and 2.30 m. high. - -The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts only after -it has pierced thin walls or shields. - -[Illustration: Time Shell, Model ’96.] - - -2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER. - -The realization that the power of resistance of a defender lodged in -deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of guns having a flat -trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun capable of high angle fire, -which had been eliminated from the field artillery upon the advent of -rifled cannon.[112] - - [112] After March, 1859, the artillery of a mobilized Prussian - army corps consisted of three horse batteries, each armed with six - 6-pounder guns and two 7-pounder howitzers; six foot batteries, each - armed with eight 12-pounder guns; and three foot batteries, each - armed with eight 7-pounder howitzers. Thus the artillery of an army - corps numbered 30 howitzers and 66 guns. - -For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light field howitzer, -model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (500 jacketed bullets, @ -10 g.; time fuze graduated from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 -kg. (0.37 kg. explosive charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500 -to 5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to utilize -to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the projectile before -it bursts. - -A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a greater number -of hits, when the point of burst is favorably situated, than one fired -from a field gun. However, the projectiles fired from the latter have a -deeper beaten zone on account of the flatter trajectory of the piece, -and a greater penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity. -The German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the effect -of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the principal -ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to 150 m.) from the -target. The effect of shrapnel from the field gun and from the light -field howitzer is considered adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when -bursts are regulated to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in -front of the target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field -gun is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a result -of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst). -But in this connection it is to be borne in mind that the effect of -single shots only is here considered. The shrapnel fire of the field -gun is considerably superior to that of the howitzer. This is due to -the fact that the howitzer fires more slowly than the field gun and -must expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same results. -If, in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries -approximately 2¹⁄₂ times as many shrapnel as the light field howitzer -battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will be 2¹⁄₂ times -as effective, against targets in the open, as that of the latter. - -The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself when it -becomes necessary to destroy material objects. - -The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is employed -against troops immediately behind cover. The shell is burst immediately -in front of, over, or in rear of the target, which is thus struck by -splinters from above. The more nearly perpendicular the splinters -strike the target, and the greater their number and weight, the greater -will be the effect produced. The angle of the cone of dispersion is -about 200 degrees; with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing -15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges beyond -2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of penetrating the -splinter proof cover usually employed in the field. At ranges under -2100 m. its angle of fall is too small to make an adequate effect -certain. - -[Illustration: Time Shell, Model ’98.] - - -3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER. - -The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 kg., containing an -explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with a percussion fuze either -with or without delay action. This shell is designed to penetrate the -roofs of splinter proofs. An earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary -to afford protection against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm. -shell produces a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter, -_i.e._, 2 cu. m. (in made ground this crater is three times this size). -The heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded -batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, is -capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action. - - -4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF FIRE. - -Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable when firing -lines are to be reinforced and when troops intended for the decisive -attack are to be pushed closer to the enemy. Formations calculated to -minimize the effect of the hostile fire must be taken up in time, -since it is not always possible to make use of cover. The efficacy -of the fire depends upon the accurate determination of the range and -height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful observation -of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).[113] The effect of this fire -is considerably increased when the opponent’s infantry, against whom -the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable formations (particularly -broad line formations). Infantry has frequently found it advantageous -to advance in small detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals -in extended order. - - [113] The color of uniforms exerts considerable influence on - observation. According to experiments made in France, colors rank - as follows as regards visibility: white (invisible at night), light - blue, alizarine red, green, dark brown, gray, or yellowish brown. - _Schweizer Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie_, 1896, I, p. 39. The - following colors protect against heat, in the order named (in reverse - order against cold): white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, - black. The position of gray in the list depends upon the amount of - white or black mixed with it. - - -(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the Hostile Fire. - -A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds with percussion -fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to 750 m. The time required for -securing adjustment at the longer ranges is as follows: - - At 800-1500 m., on low infantry targets, 1.5 min., 6-9 rounds with - perc. fuze; - At 1700-2250 m., on low infantry targets, 3.7 min., 11 rounds with - perc. fuze; - At 2000-3000 m., on artillery targets, 4.6 min., 11 rounds with - perc. fuze; - -Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are very unfavorable -targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for a battery commander -to determine the relative position of bursts on the flank of a column -with respect to the leading element thereof. Such shots are frequently -considered as over. Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to -designate a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery -to secure adjustment. - -Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous objects, -as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.[114] Intrenchments -that have just been thrown up should be made to look as nearly as -possible like the surrounding country by covering them with snow, sod, -or brush. It is made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure -adjustment, if our infantry changes position to the front or to a -flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes. - - [114] The cutting down of a poplar at Königgrätz decreased the - effect of the Austrian artillery fire, which, previous to this, had - caused rather serious losses. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 2_, p. - 36. A similar effect was produced by tearing down a house at Lovtcha. - KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen - Krieg_, I, p. 59. - -It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire upon masks, -but difficult to determine the distance between mask and target. It is -an advantage when masks are situated obliquely to a position. As masks -(rows of trees) may cause the premature burst of projectiles having -percussion fuzes, they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they -are to =screen=.[115] When so situated they frequently afford better -protection than actual intrenchments. - - [115] Fight of some Prussian batteries against a French battery - masked by chaussee trees at Weiszenburg. See HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche - Artillerie_, I, pp. 13 and 49. The 4th Light and the 4th Heavy - Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery (German) were able to - maintain their position east of Mars-la-Tour, under the fire of - superior hostile artillery, because they were screened by the trees - and the embankment of the chaussee thirty paces in their front. - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschrift_, 25, p. 18. - - The sustained bombardment of Schlosz Ladonchamps (situated on - the Moselle flats north of Metz) with 12 cm. guns, which fired 200 - shots per day from Oct. 9th to 10th, and 100 per day from Oct. 11th - to 16th, 1870, was unsuccessful, because the percussion shells - were ineffective. This will not be changed in the future by the - adoption of high-explosive shells. According to DICK DE LONLAY, - the garrison of the castle and its park lost only 5-10 men per day - during this time. The defensibility of the castle was not impaired, - although projectiles finally fell into the building itself during - the sustained bombardment. According to the same author (IV, p. 556) - 1,022 shells fell into the park and castle of Ladonchamps on October - 7th, but only ten men were placed out of action. - - -(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire. - -Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as for example -lines and columns, and positions in which a flank is refused, should be -avoided. It is a good plan to increase the number of targets and to -employ narrow columns (column of twos) that are not too deep. Supports -must be far enough in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being -struck by one and the same shrapnel. - -Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese war, platoons -or sections in columns of squads or twos,[116] separated by a maximum -interval of 50 paces, were indeed found more suitable under fire than -line formations, but the losses were nevertheless very serious except -where cover screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them -actual protection. - - [116] The advance against Beaumont and the height of Chancy during - the battle of Beaumont. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp. 124 and - 238. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 93_, II, p. 97. At Gravelotte - this formation was employed with advantage by the _Königin_ Regiment - during its advance on Amanweiler, and later in the campaign during - the assault on Le Bourget. _Geschichte des Regiments Königin_, pp. 9 - and 132. - -During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns of twos was -found advantageous on several occasions.[117] This formation has the -following disadvantages, however: it is very susceptible to flanking -fire; the influence of the officers is principally restricted to -the leading elements; intervals are easily lost and on that account -it becomes more difficult to form line. It would seem to be better, -therefore, to advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of -squads, or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos -or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between squads are -easily lost, however, and the company then becomes a dense skirmish -line of from four to six ranks. To echelon the platoons slightly has -very little value on account of the depth of the beaten zone of modern -shrapnel. - - [117] This formation is also well adapted for passing through - woods. _Taktik_, VI, p. 108. - -In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese war, both -belligerents finally made use of thin successive skirmish lines for -advancing; these lines followed each other at 200-300 m. and united -again on reaching cover. - - -5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS. - -_Germany._ According to computations made by Lieutenant-General -Rohne,[118] the following hits may be expected from every time -shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average of 50 m. short of the -targets named: - - =====+=========+=========+======+================= - Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched - m. | | | |Skirmishers.[119] - -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- - 500| 18.4 | 10.6 | 6.4 | 3.5 - 1000| 14.2 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 2.4 - 2000| 12. | 6.9 | 4.1 | 2.3 - 3000| 11. | 6.3 | 3.8 | 2.1 - 4000| 10. | 5.8 | 3.5 | 1.9 - -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- - - [118] _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, p. 9 _et seq._ - - [119] One skirmish figure per meter. - -The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing 50 shots at -500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at 3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m., -is as follows: - - =====+=========+=========+======+================= - Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched - m. | | | |Skirmishers.[120] - -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- - 500| 364 | 210 | 126 | 70 - 1000| 202 | 117 | 70 | 39 - 2000| 109 | 63 | 38 | 21 - 3000| 46 | 27 | 16 | 9 - 4000| 14 | 8 | 5 | 3 - -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- - - [120] One skirmish figure per meter. - -_France._[121] According to the French Field Artillery Regulations -(footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel covers effectively -a front of 25 m., and a battery of four pieces, a front of 100 m. This -intensity of fire, which is obtained when each piece fires one shot -with proper corrector and range settings (the battery four shots) -Aubrat calls “_Density 4_.” When _rafale_ fire (two shots per piece) -is employed against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting, -density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., the deflection -of the pieces must be changed between successive shots (_tir avec -fauchage_). To obtain density 8 against a front of 150 m., each -piece must fire three shots, as prescribed in the regulations. When -progressive fire (_tir progressif_) is employed, four different ranges -are given, of which only one can be considered effective. When not -sweeping, in this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining -a density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, to one -round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, against a front -of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires one salvo against a target -having a front of 50 m., density 8 is obtained; by firing two salvos, -density 16 is obtained. - - [121] The following is taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S essay - on the work of Squadron Commander AUBRAT, _Les exercices de service - en campagne_. The essay mentioned appeared in the December, 1907, - number of _Artilleristische Monatsschriften_. - -The _Commission d’études pratiques du tir_ has made a thorough -investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel fire. The following -table gives a general idea of the effect to be expected when firing -against service targets (_i.e._, the percentage of figures one may -expect to hit when employing fire of varying density): - - ==============================================+======================= - | DENSITY. - TARGETS. +-----+-----+-----+----- - | 4 | 8 | 16 | 32 - ----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+----- - | % | % | % | % - Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or | | | | - a single rank line | 25 | 40 | 65 |---- - | | | | - Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire | | | | - but protected by shields of the French type. | | | | - Space between shields and ground not closed | 7.5| 15 | 25 | 40 - | | | | - Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun | | | | - crews protected by shields. Space between | | | | - shields and ground not closed | ----| 7.5 | 15 | 25 - | | | | - Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, | | | | - but not firing; gun crews protected by | | | | - shields. Space between shields and ground | | | | - closed so that bullets cannot pass through | ----| 0-2 | ----|---- - ----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+----- - -A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15% -irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (_tir progressif_; -32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the -open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62 -skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men -have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced -by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the -one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when -standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one -_tir progressif_, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect -could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a _rafale_ of eight -rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire. - - -6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122] - - [122] BIRCHER, Colonel and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army - Corps, _Die Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse_, Aarau, 1899. KÜTTNER, - _Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege - 1900_. Tübingen, 1900. HILDEBRAND, _Die Verwundungen durch die - modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen_. I (1905). BOHNE, _Über die Wirkung des - Schrapnelschusses_, in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 74, 1902. - -The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused -by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the -bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular -at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit; -bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the -introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles -of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded. - -The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the -striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their -density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration. -The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the -velocity, and, naturally, the effect. - -Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put -animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8 -kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an -average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is -deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of -12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120 -m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and -bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range -from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30 -German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a -greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles. - -It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords protection -against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against -half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops -shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration -of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they -strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity -for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less -than 100 m. - - -B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123] - - [123] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_. - Colonel MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, Austrian Army, _Modernes Schieszwesen_, - 1901. - -The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm -employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The -adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the -recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing -a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections -made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism, -danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced -against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition -to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect -of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover, -the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial -velocity of the projectile possible. - -The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view, -viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective -hit in itself. - - -1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124] - - [124] See _Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte_, 1905, p. 475, - and 1906, p. 412, which contain complete references to military - literature. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 1, 1906. - -During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following -small arms and projectiles: - - ======+=========+=======+=====+=====================+========= - | Rifle. | Model | Cal.| PROJECTILE. |Initial - | |(year).| |Description. |Weight.|Velocity. - | | | mm. | | g. | m. - ------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+--------- - Japan |{Arisaka | ’97 | 6.5 |Hardened lead| 10.5 | 715 - |{Murata | ’94 | 8.0 |core with | 15.42 | 564 - | | | |copper-nickel| | - Russia| ---- | ’91 | 7.62|jacket. | 13.7 | 615 - ------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+--------- - -The ballistic qualities of the _Arisaka_ rifle were superior to those -of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about -equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in -every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect -produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges -(within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by -the _Arisaka_ rifle.[125] - - [125] “The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces - and consequently destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The - projectile communicates a portion of its energy to the molecules - struck, and these in turn transfer that energy to adjoining ones. - The greater the velocity of the projectile at the moment of impact, - the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in organs - filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with - the greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the - past has never been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the - impression that the projectile has exploded in the body. In order to - produce this effect a velocity of about 350 to 400 m. is required, - which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles of older pattern, - and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle. - Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it - shatters it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to - a considerable extent, all because the bone is filled with a liquid - substance.” ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 69. - -At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless -produced by tumbling bullets.[126] - - [126] See also _Ricochets_, p. 185 infra. - -Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters -varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle, -even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different -density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon -a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet -will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a -series of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second -board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles -which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change -their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on -which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing -the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made -by explosive bullets. - -The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two -men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the _Lebel_ rifle on corpses, -it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100 -m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and -through 2 bodies at 1200 m. - -In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a -basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal -region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh -wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole -made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is -insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles -remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past. - -The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by -projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly -perforated. - -Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs, -chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127] - - [127] “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been - shot in the chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest - railway station, a distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well - except for a slight difficulty in breathing. A lance corporal of - the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having received a similar - wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on a - two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an - extent, however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a - distance of 30 km.” Dr. SELDOWITSCHI in _Wratsch_. - -According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in -joints healed without suppuration, the joint and its mobility being -saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was, -as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest -wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few _versts_ to the -dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing. -As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more -serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but -even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so -serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds, -in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were -treated with fair success. - -The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated -that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so -serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these -campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable -from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the -certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of -action. - -Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time -he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for -the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names -of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December -11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100, -seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty -after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of -154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their -organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could -be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber _Arisaka_ -rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those -caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for -example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The -following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian -rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by a scab; after -three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded -were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of -the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for -duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without -splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return -to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When -bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded. - -The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable -from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the -adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and -the “D” bullet in France).[128] - - [128] - - Rifle Rifle - mod. ’88. mod. ’98; Lebel rifle; - “S” bullet. “D” bullet. - Caliber 7.9 mm. 7.9 mm. 8. mm. - Weight of bullet 14.7 g. 10. g. 13.2 g. - Initial velocity 640. m. 860. m. 730. m. - Remaining velocity at 800 m. 270. m. 362. m. 377. m. - Maximum ordinate of trajectory - at 700 m. 3.80 m. 1.85 m. 2.10 m. - - _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, No. 53; _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907. II, - p. 281. - -A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious -wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not -inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone -his recovery indefinitely. - -=The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.= - - ======================+==================================== - | THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN - Of the Total Number +--------+---------+-------------- - of Men Hit | Fatally|Instantly|Incapacitated - in Each Case. |injured.|disabled.|for some time. - | % | % | % - ----------------------+--------+---------+-------------- - Flesh wounds 800 m | ---- | 36.4 | 27.3 - ----------+ | | - produced at 1350 m | ---- | 43.8 | 37.3 - ----------------------+--------+---------+-------------- - Bones struck 800 m | 20.3 | 79.2 | 75.0 - ----------+ | | - at 1350 m | 11.1 | 88.9 | 88.9 - ----------------------|--------+---------+-------------- - Average | 7.97 | 62.07 | 57.12 - ----------------------+--------+---------+-------------- - - -2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS. - -The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet -(rifle model ’98) at the ranges given: - - 60 cm at 100 m. - 80 cm at 400 m. - 35 cm at 800 m. - 10 cm at 1800 m. - -In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm. -According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m., -while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less -thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen -snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m. -thick, were not pierced even at 250 m. - - - - -IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE. - - -Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on -the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume -them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is -suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and -terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect. - -On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and -destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged -period over an extended front. In this case the material losses -suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the -conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the -victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies -and consequently of his determination to fight. - - At =Modder River= (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the - British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire - until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[129] - - [129] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Die Gefechte in Natal und der - Kap-Kolonie_, 1899. - - The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted - in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and - moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually - destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and - continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively - easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack - made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at =Modder - River=: “All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to - be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a - blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft - of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally - certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot.” In regard - to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: “Meantime - the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a - little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to - advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour - fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade, - surprised at =Magersfontain=, fared still worse. The fight growing - out of the surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at - which this action was fought, the Boer method of fire (_i.e._, to - fire only when an enemy raised himself to get better aim, and then to - employ only an effective concentrated fire) necessarily produced a - depressing effect.” - -In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that -the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good -marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire -control and fire direction. - - -1. FIRE DISCIPLINE. - -Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction. -It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as -well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the -handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be -maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by -the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action. - -=Fire discipline= requires: - -Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be -returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful -observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the -ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase -of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and -a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of -ammunition. - -The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by -machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed -to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases -suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters -nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the -Russo-Japanese war demonstrate that determined troops will hold a -position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge, -or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples: -Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on -March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18. - -Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance, -irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be -crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important -means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of -developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing -advance.”[130] - - [130] _Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations._ - -Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good -individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and -firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in -which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire. - - -2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION. - -The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring -about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly -concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the -only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against -whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain -such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges, -the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction -than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate -rear sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of -dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting -the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the -standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase. - - [131] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 3rd Edition, - p. 85. “The importance of the line shot (_i.e._, a hit on the - vertical stripe through the center of the German bull’s-eye target) - in the marksmanship training of the soldier should by no means be - underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true value. The line - shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the latter - forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting - (_i.e._, hitting the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target) - becomes a moral factor of the highest value in field firing. It - cannot be denied, however, that the importance of the line shot, as - such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to transfer - the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely - failed.” Captain KRAUSE, _Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der - Infanterie_, Berlin, 1904, p. 1. - -Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon -commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire -control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the -designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of -fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the -observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be -distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that -are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution -of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual -leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses -in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon. -(Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the -correct _comprehension of the target_, the _distribution of fire_, -the _rate of fire_, and the _employment of the terrain to the best -advantage_, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of -thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably -results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The -platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man -of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad -leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the -proper influence on their skirmishers.[133] - - [132] The _Belgian Firing Regulations_ require that the officer - directing and controlling the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The - time necessary to produce a certain effect with a given number of - rifles; 2. The number of rounds necessary to produce a certain effect - in a given period of time; 3. Whether a given target justifies the - expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or the efficacy of - the fire. The requirements of the _Italian Firing Regulations_ are - similar. - - [133] Austria: The position of the platoon leader is not so - definitely fixed as in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad - leaders participate in the firing. In skirmish line fire control - and fire direction are to remain as long as possible in the hands - of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged with - concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the - proper time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing - the ammunition. At long ranges he designates the companies that are - to fire, and also the position from which fire is to be opened. - -The squad leaders are charged with _constantly supervising_ the setting -of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of -fire; and the expenditure of ammunition. - -_The squad leaders participate in the firing only_ when their duties -as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged -engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These -remarks apply also to the range finders. - -In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing -when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of -thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset -by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required -in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no -position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure -of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable -to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction -and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading -the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly -supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire. - -“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and -designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces -the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the -fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his -platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate -the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain -target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of -the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.). - -In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will -frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the -leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the -combat. To provide for such contingencies, the skirmishers must be -taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they -may fire (_not that they must fire_) at all targets within 600 m.; that -between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets -only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire -at all. - - In the pamphlet entitled, _Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese - War_, p. 11, et seq., Captain SOLOVIEV, 34th East Siberian Rifle - Regiment, 1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost - ungovernable tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown - themselves down, to open fire without orders; paying attention - neither to the target designated, nor to setting their sights. - - “This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning - the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * * - It is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men - have not been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of - hostile projectiles, and the thunder of our own artillery make such a - deafening roar that one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long - firing lines make it extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders; - even squad commanders can not make themselves understood. Volley - firing must therefore be dispensed with. - - “Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers, - can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal. - With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this - direction; it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole - length of the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight. - - “The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in - proportion to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of - the enemy, especially on the defensive. The men get more and more - restless, their nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer - and greater. In such a moment the leader must make every effort to - keep his men in hand, and prevent the firing from degenerating into a - wild blazing away at nothing. This is always a sign that the leader - has lost control of his troops. - - “The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the - nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed - to active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire - discipline ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the - fire the necessary efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle, - the more embittered the fight, the greater the losses, the more - fatigue and nervous strain gain the upper hand, the greater and - more important the role which the officer has to play. The success - of the 200 men under his command depends entirely upon the company - commander. The war in the Far East might well be called the war - of company commanders. The soldiers watch their leader constantly - and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his bearing, his - determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge the - situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the - conduct of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to - great heights, but it may also sink very low. To show depression or - faint-heartedness is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once - communicated to the men, the leader loses control of his command, and - the mischief is done. - - “In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander - and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as great a - role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of peace - become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become - second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war. - - “I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute - shout, in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously - quieting effect upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here - and there, a remark concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have - the sights not been set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at - once that it is done.’ Because the commander is angry, and notices - neglect, everything goes well, so the men reason, and no danger need - be apprehended. The men quiet down, forget the whistling of the - bullets, set their sights carefully, point their pieces properly, and - aim again.” - - -3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED. - -While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum -benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the -determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to -a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon -whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying -action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the -first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with. - -Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with -constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide -entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To -rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear -subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in -the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable -for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a -much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing -line cannot see the target during an attack, the platoon commander -should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther -to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I. -D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be -the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the -heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the -foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height -to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to -select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in -which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be -avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying -in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience, -while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined -targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single -officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent -of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force; -too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the -losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the -difficulties of fire control and fire direction. - - -4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE. - -This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing -line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection -against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is -to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned -to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we -have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority. -On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack -develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for -holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor -to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the -lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing -is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The -French attempt to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the -number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire -to be used. - -In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use -“Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country). -The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar -provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of -the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the -latter. - - [134] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1, - 2; p. 136, par. 6; p. 155, par. 1. See p. 154, infra. - - -5. ASCERTAINING RANGES. - -(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.). - -Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect -knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the -trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of -the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire, -at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten -zone approximately 100 m. deep--good aim, proper elevation, and careful -firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest -portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire. - -The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which -100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5 -mm. rifle: - - =====================+======================+======================= - | MEASURED RANGE. | ESTIMATED RANGE. - +----------+-----------+----------+------------ - | Slow fire| Rapid fire| Slow fire|Rapid fire - | [135] | [135] | [135] | [135] - |Percentage|Percentage |Percentage|Percentage - | of hits. | of hits. | of hits. | of hits. - ---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------ - At 500 m. | 21.5 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 11.3 - At 1000 m. | 11.1 | 8.1 | 6.5 | 5.3 - At 1500 m. | 5. | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2 - Average results at-- | | | | - Ranges under 1000 m. | 18.2 | 13.6 | 12.1 | 9.3 - Ranges over 1000 m. | 7.1 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 - ---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------ - - [135] Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute. - -Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence -upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the -skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected, -the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone -of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire -decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their -coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171, -infra). - - [136] ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der - Infanterie_, p. 13. - -The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned: - -(_a_) Pacing and galloping; - -(_b_) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with -known distances; by estimating part of the distance); - -(_c_) Firing trial volleys (ranging); - -(_d_) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it -directly from infantry or artillery already engaged; - -(_e_) Measuring the range directly on the ground. - - Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate - results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man - takes per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of - pace depends upon the character and slope of the ground.[137] In - pacing over varied ground, a man follows the slope line while the - projectile follows an airline. Therefore it would seem that pacing is - only practicable at short ranges when the enemy is not near. The same - is true of galloping over the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump - at a gallop is on an average 3 m.). - - [137] Professor RZIHA ascertained the following diminution of the - length of a pace at different degrees of slope: - - _Descending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 - Length of pace in cm. 77 70 62 56 50 45 30 - Number of paces per 100 m. 129 143 161 179 200 222 333 - - _Ascending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 - Length of pace in cm. 77 74 72 70 67 60 50 - Number of paces per 100 m. 120 135 138 143 148 166 200 - - According to Major CZERNY, Austrian Army (_Treffwahrscheinlichkeit_, - in _Streffleur_, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent - of the range. - -In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts approximately -to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by -taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing -combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear -sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of -the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced -by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.). -Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in -bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the -man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when -the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling -ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the -other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in -a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when -the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and -against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss -Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are -usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great. - - [138] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige - Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition, p. 12. - - The following statement is taken from a report made at the British - Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of - estimates under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were - obtained: - - --------Error-------- Greater - Correct ±50 yards ±100 yards errors - Officers of the Regular Army 15 49 20 14% - Officers of Militia and - Volunteers 20 44 22 20% - - France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of - instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and - non-commissioned officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%. - -In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually -short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the majority of -soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain -point. - - [139] The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment - on August 18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height - northwest of Amanweiler: “The companies, who supposed the enemy to - be much nearer” (the actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced, - cheering, and were received with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire - (from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad line.” HESSERT. - - Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn - fields: “The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish - works were reached was underestimated. One company cheered when - at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces from the hostile works: - the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward at a run.” - KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen - Krieg_. - - =Germany.= All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to - 800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range - finders) are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid - ranges, and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I. - F. R.). - - “Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more - than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the - range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly. - The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as - follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example: - 350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.; - over 1000 m., 300 m.” - - =Italy.= Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating - the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges - up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable - privates participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted - by an officer in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book. - The following is the classification: - - Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and - never 100 m. - - Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and in - exceptional cases 150 m. - - Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 and - never 200 m. - - Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m. - - The =Russians= estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer - ranges are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the - first year of their service all the men are drilled in estimating - ranges from 400 to 800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected - men from each company up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers - and men) are to make at least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190 - Russian I. F. R.). The result is considered good when the error in - the estimate does not exceed the figure given below at the ranges - named: - - Range in paces. Error in paces. Percentage of error. - 400 to 1000 paces 50 or 12.5 to 5 % - 1000 „ 2000 „ 100 „ 10 „ 5 „ - 2000 „ 3000 „ 200 „ 10 „ 6.6„ - - The Russian range finding instrument (_Souchier_) is used by - officers and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in - determining ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent. - - In =Switzerland= recruits are trained to estimate distances up to - 600 m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned - officers estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500 - m. Three weeks after the recruits join, those of the most skilled - in estimating distances--about an eighth of the total number--are - selected to undergo further instruction. For this purpose they are - placed under the orders of an officer charged with this instruction, - who trains them for at least three hours, every other day, in - estimating distances on varied ground. The better half of these men, - regardless of the company to which they may belong, receive further - instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain are to be had with - these men and not only extended marches but even railway journeys not - exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose. - - In =Austria= the men are required to estimate distances up to 800 - paces (600 m.),_i.e._, up to the range within which they might - frequently have to choose their target independently. Only officers, - non-commissioned officers, and specially skilled men are required to - estimate ranges up to 2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty - determinations at short, mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range - finder,” is not to exceed 12 per cent. The _Roksandic_ range finding - apparatus is said to give errors not exceeding 2-3 per cent when - skillfully used. - -To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at -a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual -service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs. -Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action, -and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various -rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s -skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that -the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the -target makes upon him. (England and Austria). - -It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly -from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the -scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field, -that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of -dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not -likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers -to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate -maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges -are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a map. Moreover, -artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may -be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a -horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of -a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing -uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle. - -An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary, -as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and -illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range -of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight -corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long -ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of -temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by -18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on -account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the -selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately -1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their -rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by -18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m. - - [140] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, - p. 51, and also par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature - and of the altitude of the battlefield was strikingly illustrated in - the Boer war. - -These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the -range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the -proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190 -and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland: -fire at will, one round). - -To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable -only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target -itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the -bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and, -finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these -preliminary conditions will rarely be fulfilled, it will only in -exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this -method. - - When this method is employed, volleys are fired either by sections or - by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target. - For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below - the proper one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of - the target can be expected with certainty. This procedure is then - repeated, as often as necessary, with correspondingly raised or - lowered rear sight leaves, until the correct elevation is obtained. - -This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one -of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is -advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by -artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe -the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to -adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled -shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141] - - [141] The 32 mm. _Nordenfeld_ machine gun fires a shell weighing - 400 g. - -The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at -both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (_Hahn_) -has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.). -This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to -1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers -standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently -accurate when the error amounts to - - 2-3% up to a range of 1000 m. - 3¹⁄₂-5% „ „ „ „ 2000 „ - 3-3¹⁄₂% „ „ „ „ 1500 „ - -On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before -and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the -range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity, -before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more -restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the -fire fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for -the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to -Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See -p. 137 supra). - - -6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE. - -In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the -fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within -effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to -be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of -ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view -of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target -once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object -of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience -teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own -troops, while it raises that of the enemy. - -In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal -determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous, -generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the -most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets -which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the -greatest number of effective hits. - -Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising -target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since -the troops following it in close order will in any event come within -range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available, -the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results. - -Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be -opened at long or at short ranges. - -Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against -low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges over 1200 m. a -decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount -of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect -even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges). - -When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective -against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the -highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets -are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off -the target. - -The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in -defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the -danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance, -very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful -here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was -armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply -the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only -up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing -long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the -expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish -ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly -trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away -without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the -advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire -is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the -enemy--we want to annihilate him. - -Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges -on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire -effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose -of annihilating the enemy. - -Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye, -present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should -not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by -utilizing every expedient (rushes with breathing spells, and cover) -until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear -that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without -orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others -continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the -attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of -mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142] - - [142] At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the - Highland Brigade advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of - the hostile position. This advance, to be sure, was made under cover - of the fire of the right wing of the 9th Brigade, which had made a - lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position. - -Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the -rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any -question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views -are expressed in the German regulations. - -Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long -ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in -many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack -failed. - - “Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately - a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by - Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center - group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the - Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on - the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted - 400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They - succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce - them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s - attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon - as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry - it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered - heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in - complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line - (8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward - some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body, - which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m. - of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight - and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up - troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy - of imitation. - - The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in - this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated, - which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at - long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within - decisive range of the position of their opponents. - -The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an -excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the -long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m. -(Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at -Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even -through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be -compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during -their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders -at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile -position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under -fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143] - - [143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141. - -Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the -latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct -rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper -in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions, -for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is -absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages -above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the -defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of -forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has -systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of -his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its -ranks by suddenly opening fire? - -The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when -sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and -when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short -range without firing. “Infantry should never attempt to take the -place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that -arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit -of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should -in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not -suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from -accomplishing his object. - -At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when -directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that -it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to -25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing -skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range, -3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F. -R.). - -If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using -cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his -attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are -necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the -defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking -force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s -chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as -soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the -position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he -be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the -defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short -ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which -make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the -defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target -for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently -betrays his position prematurely by opening fire. - -The _moral effect_ of withholding the fire (_fire surprise_) is very -great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if suddenly -directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still -in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s -position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th -Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899) -or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops -should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to -the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th -Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are, -however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the -defender. - - [144] Marshal BUGEAUD gives a very graphic description of the moral - effect of fire in his _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_, - based upon his experiences in the fights with the British in the - Peninsula: “The men began to get excited when still 1,000 m. from - the enemy; they talked to each other; the march became more and more - hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the columns. The - British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor was not - without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the - men shouting: ‘_Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!_’ Shakos - were raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double - time; the ranks became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here - and there; and a few shots were fired from the column. The British - continued to stand immovable, and seemed to pay no attention to us - even when only 300 paces separated the two forces. - - “The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to - deal with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld - by the enemy would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled; - the moral power which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises - over confusion, which seeks to drown itself in noise, made itself - felt in our ranks. At this moment, when the highest tension had been - reached, the British line raised its rifles--an indescribable feeling - rooted many of our men to the spot--and began to fire. The volleys, - coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we - wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three - overpowering cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to - the bayonet attack, and everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly - flight.” - - [145] The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. HÖNIG, - _Volkskrieg_, pp. 157 to 212. - - [146] Dec. 15th, 1870. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 246. - KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug gegen den Loir_, p. 81. - -Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the -French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at -ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the -Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by -rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached. -The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an -annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at -extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at Beaune la Rolande; in -the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka -Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni -Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range -zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until -they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the -Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148] - - [147] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, pp. 53, 93 - and 143. The village was situated in a valley and had only a limited - field of fire. - - [148] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp. - 86 and 113. As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power - of the needle gun (_Zündnadelgewehr_) at point blank range (280 m.) - corresponds to the effect of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to - 900 m. At Nachod the regiments named below suffered in two hours the - losses given: - - Loss, men; - Strength; prisoners - Regiment. men. included. Prisoners. Percentage. - 20th Infantry 2,500 722 165 28.8% - 60th Infantry 2,500 685 185 27.4% - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - =Austria.= “_In attack, everything must be done to get as close as - possible to the enemy before fire is opened._” In each fire position - the fire should be delivered with steadiness and without haste. - - In _defense_, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets - appear within effective range. Sometimes--especially in minor - operations--it may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and - then open fire on him suddenly. - - A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are - situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of - ammunition which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises - that of the enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to - consider whether a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long - range fire should, in any case, be used only when the size of the - target makes an adequate fire effect probable, and when the range is - known, or can be ascertained with accuracy. In long range fire the - use of small units, each expending a large amount of ammunition, is - as a rule to be recommended. The _distribution_ and _concentration_ - of fire should be regulated by the officer charged with fire - direction. - - “_Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an - enemy in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively - small forces, shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective - manner._” (Fire surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but - especially when the enemy has used up all, or nearly all, of his - reserves, comparatively small detachments, skillfully led, can - contribute materially to success, or even bring about the decision, - if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear and open - fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should - be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are - present.[149] - - [149] In minor operations this would be a proper place for the - employment of large scouting detachments, the importance of which - decreases with the size of the contending forces. Such tasks can, - however, be just as well performed by a well-trained body of infantry. - - =France.= In _attack_, fire is opened as late as possible, at any - rate not until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the - forward movement. Fire is the only means which makes a further - advance possible. - - In _defense_, long range fire may be used under certain - circumstances. “Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range - take the attacker by surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many - men.” - - =England= (1905). _Attack._ Infantry is to advance as close as - possible to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be - endured. Fire is decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and - infantry should support each other. Attention is called to the - support afforded advancing skirmishers by the fire of infantry units - and machine guns held in rear. The British are thus the first to - prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing Regulations require that - “fire of position” be practiced by company at a range of 900 m. The - company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) while movable - disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire is to increase - in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level ground - or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire - of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable - occasionally. Aside from its employment in “fire of position,” - long range fire is to be used in attack in the following cases: In - enveloping movements for the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line; - when favorable targets present themselves; in containing actions or - in feints; in concentrated collective fire; and finally in pursuit. - _Defense_: Fire is to be opened at 1000 m. on skirmishers, but it - may be advantageous to withhold it until the hostile line comes - within short range. This will give good results when the enemy is in - ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the attack is made by - poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire tires the eye - and the hand. - - =Italy.= In _attack_, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit - of short range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to - open fire before this with a part of the advancing force is only - permissible when necessary to carry the line forward. _Defense._ As - soon as the defender has a chance of obtaining some fire effect, - he should open fire to prevent the attacking infantry from getting - within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) and at mid ranges - (up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. The battalion - commander determines when fire is to be opened. - -From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when -infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following =General -Rules=:-- - -It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional -cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures -the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning, -is of greater importance. - - -(a) IN ATTACK. - -The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an -adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender -may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only -when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be -reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a -pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of -annoying the enemy. - - -(b) IN DEFENSE.[150] - - [150] In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire - on favorable targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m. - -Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is -available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive -actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no -artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as -targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the -sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery -is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when -it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in -unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be -sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range. - - -7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151] - - [151] A Russian company commander contributes the following in - _Mitteilungen der Infanterie Schieszschulen_: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904, - the fire in one of the trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout - the entire day. The men were finally completely exhausted; their - shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be given some rest, - and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, only to - die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective, - as they were completely exhausted and used up.” - - =Swiss.= Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense - to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then - to remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A - prompt resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be - assured.” - - =France.= “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and - takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant - resumes his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense - formations on open ground.” - -The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction with -reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the -fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at -present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing -spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and -allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of -such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant -readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement -the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If -the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be -resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker -(like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will -in many cases--especially at the beginning of a campaign--be deceived -into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now -advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise -him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire -are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable -the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable -of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease -firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender -should _change his rear sight elevations_ if the attacker advances by -rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to -present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after -a rush, and to utilize this interruption for changing the rear sight -elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the -rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing -an effective fire to bear upon the enemy. - - [152] Compare HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher - Strategie_, p. 145, relative to the various opinions entertained in - the staffs of Generals v. Göben and Steinmetz in regard to the pause - in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. _Der 18. August_, pp. - 269, 271 and 352. - - -8. KINDS OF FIRE. - -In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of -the _volley_ was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop -the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in -other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern -combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was -used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to -clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared. - -In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost -exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops -held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views -are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a -volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained. -The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but -were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations -recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much -because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but -out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an -admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It -was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause -waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence -of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional -regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may be employed by -section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one -shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges. - - [153] At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders - ordered their men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing - from cover to cover (“_Boer Attack_”) to discontinue that fire, and - to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently avoided presenting - large targets to the British volley fire. - -_Germany._ _Volleys_ (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed -by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line -(par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the -organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be -used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective -fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of -trial volleys only in exceptional cases. - -“_The highest attainable rate of fire_--the word rapid fire has -been elided--is to be used in attack during the preparation for the -assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a -cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate -collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208 -German I. F. R.). - -_Fire at will_ is used both in extended and close order. - - =Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).= “_Il - n’y a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté._” - NAPOLEON.[154] - - [154] “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when - engaged with the enemy.” NAPOLEON. - - “It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history - of effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the - so-called volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In - a few instances the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually - their effect was insignificant.” V. BOGUSLAWSKI. - - “Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction - of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order - to fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes - a certain amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if - allowed to continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later - perhaps into disorderly flight. - - “The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged--some - men even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an - example likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the - point of getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections - drowned the voice of the commander. In such situations only personal - experience and resourcefulness can tell a company commander what - to do. We recommend a course which has always been attended with - success in practice. Let the officer commanding a section jump upon - the parapet and from there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if - the enemy’s fire permits, and his own heart is stout enough, let him - order the next volley from his position on the parapet. When once the - force is again under control, the volleys will be as good as if the - enemy were not so close.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER _Kritische Rückblicke - auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, II, pp. 304 and 310. - - In his _Comments on Drill Regulations_ (16th Nov., 1840) Prince - WILLIAM, subsequently Emperor WILLIAM I. of Germany, says: - - “I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion - that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this - fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after - volley firing, even though not ordered, _because in my opinion it - is impossible to combat human nature_, which finds more security in - rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....” - - _Russian experiences in Manchuria._ “At first _volleys_ by formed - bodies of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used. - In the latter, the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to - bring their pieces down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible - to see the enemy--who was advancing by rushes--to change their rear - sight elevations at the whistle signal of their commander.... When at - a distance from the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless - volleys. When the enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The - Russians used only fire at will at ranges under 800 paces. This - enabled the men to fire on individual hostile skirmishers and to - place the boldest out of action.” SOLOVIEV. - - =Austria.= _Volleys_ are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close - order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon - targets which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably - be visible for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind - of fire used, the rate of fire being increased or decreased by the - men according to the existing situation. When necessary, the leaders - should regulate the fire; but this should only be done in exceptional - cases as the men are apt to increase rather than diminish the rate of - fire (“Rapid fire”). - - The _maximum rate of fire_ is to be employed: “In _attack_, for - the purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in - _defense_, for the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It - is moreover to be used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a - defeated enemy as long as he is within effective range; and, finally, - in fire surprises, repulse of cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with - the enemy.” - - =France.= The French _Lebel_ rifle has a cylindrical magazine - situated under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges - which have to be loaded singly. As a rule, _fire with counted - cartridges_ is employed (_feu à cartouches comptées_) for the purpose - of obtaining a “burst of fire” (_rafale_). The _rafale_ consists of - firmly controlled, concentrated, collective fire. Fire at will (_feu - à volonté_) is also used, eight rounds per minute being fired at the - short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be increased up - to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the magazine - (_feu à répétition_). One minute is required to fill the magazine. - Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes - necessary to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are - directed to fire. - - =England and Switzerland.= The only fire employed is fire at will. - The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the - target and the range. - - =Italy.= Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks). - - =Japan and Russia.= (See p. 157, supra). - - -The Rate of Fire. - -As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz., -_slow fire_, _accelerated fire_, and _rapid fire_. The command “fire -more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing -(or increasing) the rate of fire. - -The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of -the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and -the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will -reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (_i.e._, whether the rifle -is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of -fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able -to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing. - -Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with -which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire -effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. _The desire of -the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time -of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire._ As the rate of -fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, -it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally -corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover, -as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also -exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the case -may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about -a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition -to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is -invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case, -however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not -necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely -due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be -condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the -product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude -good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load -and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the -same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching. - -“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save -ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition. -Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and -lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155] - - [155] _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition. - -A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of -ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were -delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable, -however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate -for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break -forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or -necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will -present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual -shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the -impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing. -Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results: - - Ranges up to 400 m. 5 rounds per minute; - „ from 400- 700 „ 4-5 „ „ „ - „ „ 700-1000 „ 3-4 „ „ „ - „ „ 1000-1300 „ 2-3 „ „ „ - „ „ 1300-1500 „ 1-4 „ „ „ - „ over 1500 „ 1 „ „ „ - -Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire -entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness. -Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity -of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is -calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is -lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to -prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected -rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most -of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,” -which is only calculated to produce confusion. - - [156] At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a - long advance at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile - battalion. The men became excited, raised the leaves of their rear - sights, and opened rapid fire, which had no effect whatever, as the - range was only 200 paces. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 27_, p. 95. - -The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in -regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157] - - [157] Consult also _Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule - seit dem Jahre 1900_, Vienna, 1905. ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die - Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 132. - -1. _When the appropriate elevation is used_, two-thirds of the -percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per -minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per -minute. - -2. _When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m._, -rapid fire produces almost the _same percentage_ of hits as ordinary -fire at will. - -3. _When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m._, rapid fire -produces almost _twice as great a percentage_ of hits as fire at will. - -From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not -used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than -ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods -of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at -will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will -be higher. - -Of all the different kinds of fire, the _volley_ is best adapted to -meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating -the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of -value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in -preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They -should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or -spread out when exposed to fire at will. - -As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces, -the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys. -The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire -unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between -preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon -the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and -the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position -it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution -should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or -kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to -eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack -coolness--mental as well as physical--which is indispensable in every -volley. - -The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very -considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a -deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of -the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire -at will, which they will do when their officers are either killed or -wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158] - - [158] During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of - the 10th Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for - the purpose of firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good - one, however, and the men at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant - C---- jumped in front of the men to stop the firing, but was shot in - the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire continued along the entire - line.” _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12_, p. 454. - - During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always - opened the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had - occurred among the officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the - steady volley fire soon degenerated into wild, hurried fire at will, - which produced no effect whatever. - -If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without -any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many -leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to -handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate -movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory -stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not -themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions -many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. -The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight -elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be -remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point -produces the same results. - -The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep -the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to -direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target -according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire -with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This -was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the -sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but -the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while in -Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the -purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in -hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are -regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very -moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual -soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the -three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire -is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely -hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable -targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure -of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for -rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well -directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to -the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild, -uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when -the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might -sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the -enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is -thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may -be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall, -for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the -controversy with one well-aimed blow.” - - [159] Temporarily adopted in Germany also. - - [160] Par. 194.1 of the _French Infantry Drill Regulations_ of - Dec. 3rd, 1904, states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent - by the fire is much more considerable when the fire is concentrated - and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” Par. 194.4 states: “The - efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is augmented when the - enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The fire is, as - a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent; - and, in exceptional cases, by volleys.” - - -9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM. - -In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight -elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the -range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on -this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general -rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in -which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 -m.[161] - - [161] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 93, et seq. - - In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author - recommends the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the - longer ranges, the employment of combined sights, in which the - elevations differ from each other by 200 m. In peace time the use - of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in which rear sight - elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to - increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable - conditions found on the target range are lacking. - -“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper -sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when -the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the -range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short -ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It -should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, -the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.” -(Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point -is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at -the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve -as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium -and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges -it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When -the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to -distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection -of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the -discretion of the individual skirmishers. - - -10. COMMANDS. - -In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the -regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks -devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the -skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range; -the third directs him to open fire. - - -11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE. - -The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of -the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed -strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially -difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike -in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate -leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often -more confusing than valuable. - - -12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE. - -COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE. - -In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71 -the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of -Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses: - - ===========+===========================+======================== - | PERCENTAGES. | WOUNDS. - +----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- - | Small | Art’y |Cutting |Serious.|Slight.| Very - |arms fire.| fire. |weapons.| | |slight. - -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- - Guard Div. | 88.42 | 11.50 | 0.08 | 32.17 | 62.49 | 5.34 - 2d Div. | 89.43 | 7.91 | 2.30 | 44.05 | 54.89 | 1.06 - 12th Div. | 80.52 | 14.48 | 2.09 | 39.12 | 46.36 | 14.52 - -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- - Average | 86.12 | 11.30 | 2.09 | 38.45 | 54.58 | 6.97 - -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- - -The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including -killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a -relative value. The following figures express the average losses of -Russians and Japanese: - - Losses through rifle fire 85.9% - Losses through artillery fire 11.4% - Losses through cutting weapons 3.2% - -Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose -of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly -delivered, for annihilating him. - -While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon -the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the -number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison -by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in -deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like -targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per -minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which -is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken. - - [162] In this connection the following works have been consulted: - _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th - Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General ROHNE, and _Schieszlehre - für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition (1906), by the same author; - also _Militär-Wochenblatt_ No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute - trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the - conditions of firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by - Lieutenant-General Rohne, they serve as an excellent standard of - comparison, and, when their relative value is considered, as a basis - for tactical deductions. - - -(a) Influence of Training. - -Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing -at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman, -firing at will, may (not _must_) expect a hit from each round fired, -at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350 -m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within -600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of -the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such -an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate -them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce -an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over, -the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here -skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of -the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of -the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne -computed (_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 84) that when firing -rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, -the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of -hits given at the ranges indicated: - - =======+======================================== - | NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY - +---------------+------------+----------- - Range.|Excellent shots| Fair shots | Poor shots - | Out of 100 rounds fired. - -------+---------------+------------+----------- - 1000 m.| 27. | 17.6 | 8.9 - 1500 m.| 14.2 | 9.7 | 4.8 - -------+---------------+------------+----------- - -This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the -excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The -figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that -even poor shots may obtain better results in this case. - -From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately -ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle -and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only -when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. -too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental. -In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is -to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree -of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general -way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship -is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not -necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more -value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range. - - -(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range. - -At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of -the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in -estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss -Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 -m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average -is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range -finding instruments see p. 146, supra. - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration] - -In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a -target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under-- - -“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used; - -“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to -his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that -the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für -die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 102). - - ======+================+===============+=============== - Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots. - +-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------- - m. | a | b | a | b | a | b - ------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------- - 400 | 65.1 | 58.5 | 50.4 | 47.8 | 26.6 | 26.4 - 600 | 46.6 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 26.6 | 16.9 | 15.8 - 800 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 23.3 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 9.7 - 1000 | 27. | 7.5 | 17.6 | 7. | 8.9 | 5.9 - 1200 | 20.5 | 4. | 13.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 3.5 - 1400 | 16.1 | 2.4 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 2.2 - 1600 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 1.4 - ------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------- - -The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error, -the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the -marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than -marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m. - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.” - - ======+================+===============+=============== - Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots. - m. | | | - ------+----------------+---------------+--------------- - 400 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 0.4 - 600 | 13.7 | 6.3 | 1.1 - 800 | 19.8 | 9.4 | 2.1 - 1000 | 19.5 | 10.6 | 3.0 - 1200 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 3.3 - 1400 | 13.3 | 8.4 | 3.2 - 1600 | 11. | 7.2 | 2. - ------+----------------+---------------+--------------- - - -(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended. - -The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a -limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should -therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to -bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The -leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the -ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain -amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only -where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has -been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish -the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since -ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that -of the enemy. - -When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed -in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only, -the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following -table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force -out of action:[163] - - At a range of 300 m. 3 rounds, - „ „ „ „ 400 „ 5 „ - „ „ „ „ 500 „ 6 „ - „ „ „ „ 600 „ 7.5 „ - „ „ „ „ 700 „ 10 „ - „ „ „ „ 800 „ 13 „ - „ „ „ „ 900 „ 16 „ - „ „ „ „ 1000 „ 25 „ - „ „ „ „ 1100 „ 45 „ - „ „ „ „ 1200 „ 50 „ - „ „ „ „ 1300 „ 57 „ - „ „ „ „ 1400 „ 63 „ - „ „ „ „ 1500 „ 72 „ - „ „ „ „ 1600 „ 80 „ - - [163] According to ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd - Edition, p. 214. - -In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of -7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were -used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds -indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers, -visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The -efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following -data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 -skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3% -hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading -fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%, -and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%. - - -(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire. - -Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the -trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire -effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement -of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the -sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon -with the =effect of misses= on the field of battle more than with the -really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable -number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian -Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement -for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon -the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely -upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at -the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that -accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, -according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his -piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a -rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme -angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a -mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the -resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone -increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It -follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles -than in those of older pattern. - - [164] _Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht_, 1883. - -He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the -skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he -has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be -none other than that in which the piece is horizontal. - -Although the theory of the =Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses=, is not -tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact -core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions -indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of -fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain -value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles, -especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and -moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At -the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed -fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, -100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40% -core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of -the bullets. - -According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes -a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming -position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25 -minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement -on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal -angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and -this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and -the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude -of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect. -Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues, -the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of -that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will -think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the -individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according -to the magnitude of the danger. - -“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, -and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may -be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur -in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular -case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as -prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction -of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable. - -“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better -discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an -action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain -extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the -efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and -the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which -Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions. - -“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to -keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire -their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges -would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined -of the two opponents to advance to the assault. - -“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (_i.e._, the delivery of fire -at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in -consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s -fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close -to his position--by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165] - - [165] F. C. v. II. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 97. - -Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed -by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4 -degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire -correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper -trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these -figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% -of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the _Chassepot_ rifle; -at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 -mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are -applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire, -while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim. - - During the =Franco-German war= the German troops learned by - experience that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on - the attacker at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did - not increase as the skirmishers came closer to his position; that, - on the contrary, the intensity of the hostile fire effect fell off - noticeably at ranges below 600 m. - - During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against =St. Privat=, - the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges - from 1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges - from 500-600 m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain - stationary on the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the - enveloping movement made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500 - m. corresponds approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees - for the _Chassepot_ rifle. The 20th Infantry Division was molested - by rifle fire from =St. Privat=, during its march from =St. Ail= to - =St. Privat= (the range in this case was 2200 m., which corresponds - to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 minutes for the _Chassepot_ - rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, against whom this fire - was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from the French position. - - In the =Russo-Turkish war= of 1877-78, the same thing occurred. - Infantry projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were - still 2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of - departure of 14 degrees 30 minutes). - - Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond - (5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle - fire were very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from - the hostile position, on the other hand, the losses were remarkably - small, sometimes even ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their - heads under cover altogether. - - A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement - at =Slivnica= on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from - the enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the - reserves, stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray - shots.” - -It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence -of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision -by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the -firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness -in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war -one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it -tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable -rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. -This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in -giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every -effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s -fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse -the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head -cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation -of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance. -To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be -built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at -a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition -replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to -resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage -of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the -feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece -without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a -state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.” - -A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will -still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles -with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its -officers are equal to their task. - - -(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing. - -Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher -fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of -the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian -regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients, -to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden -in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges -has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire -delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel -of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand -supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and -when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest, -high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is -also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads -over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as -corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at -short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace -performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses -do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the -ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained -stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese -found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile -fire had no effect. - - [166] According to the _Swiss Firing Regulations_ the change in - height in the point of the target struck amounts to ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of the - range. - - [167] The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of - subsequent reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on - Spionskop from 3 A. M. until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men - in 18¹⁄₂ hours (one officer to every 18.5 men), _i.e._, 28.2%. See p. - 189 infra. - - -(f) Influence of the Ground.[168] - - [168] MONDEIL, _De la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ - de bataille_, Paris, 1900. - -So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level -ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the -inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls. -Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of -the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of -sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169] - - [169] Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S definitions are given below in - explanation of certain technical terms: - - “_Danger Space_” is the distance measured along the line of sight - within which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the - target nor falls below the target. - - “_Beaten Zone_” is the distance measured along the surface of the - ground within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of - the target. - - Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not - been correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space. - In pointing at the bottom line of the target, the aiming position - (_i.e._, the height at which the piece is held) does not affect - the danger space. When pointing at the center of the target the - danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations and - tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low - targets, as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target. - “The evil effects of errors in estimating the range decrease as the - ‘danger space’ increases, which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon - the ballistic properties of the rifle, upon the range, and the height - of the target. The danger on the ground in rear of the target fired - upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements and ammunition - over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition - depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.” - - The importance of this circumstance is frequently so magnified in - the French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For - example, they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a - height can be covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the - ascent to a plateau by evacuating the military crest and occupying - the reverse slope, keeping the slope facing the enemy under a grazing - fire with the tail ends of the trajectories. - -Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane -pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the -beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D, -it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and -the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached -when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the -projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. -If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be -C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the -angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground. - -[Illustration] - - [170] The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula - deduced by Lieutenant-General ROHNE in his work _Schieszlehre für - Infanterie_, p. 127: - - Let α = angle of fall; - γ = angle of slope (rising or falling); - β = beaten zone on level ground; - - then - α - ----- β = beaten zone on falling ground; - α - γ - - α - ----- β = beaten zone on rising ground. - α + γ - -From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the -appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken -advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops -will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target -on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more -or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will -in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since -each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of -projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect -to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of -considerable depth on the march. - - The following data in regard to the increase (diminution) - of the depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of - Lieutenant-General ROHNE on _Das gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen - der Infanterie_, p. 44: - - ======+===============+================ - Range.| Rising Slope. | Falling Slope. - m. | 1° | 2° | 1° | 2° - ------+-------+-------+-------+-------- - 800 | ¹⁄₂ | ¹⁄₃ | ∞ | ∞ - 1000 | ²⁄₃ | ³⁄₄ | 2 | ∞ - 1200 | ³⁄₄ | ³⁄₅ | ³⁄₂ | 3 - 1400 | ⁴⁄₅ | ⁴⁄₆ | ⁴⁄₃ | 2 - ------+-------+-------+-------+-------- - -[Illustration] - - The above figure, taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S work, - _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 128, shows the influence of - the ground on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a - target, 100, 200 m. etc., in rear of which are other targets of the - same dimensions but situated either on level ground, on a 2-degree - rising slope, or a 1-degree falling slope. On a rising slope of 2 - degrees the depth of the beaten zone is decreased by half, and on a - downward slope of 1 degree increased by half. - - “The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great - importance to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’ - shots for the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in - battle will approximate theirs more nearly than any other. From this - we may deduce that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing - line, less distance will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire - directed at the firing line than on level ground; and that, if the - ground in rear of the firing line slopes downward, the distances must - be increased unless the slope is so great or the hostile trajectories - so flat that bullets pass over the crest, forming a ‘defiladed - space,’ into which no projectiles strike.” - - On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (_i.e._, on the - slope of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground, - the slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on - ground falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope - of hills and on plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses. - - Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of - the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800 - m.) a defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring - supports nearer to the firing line than would be practicable on level - ground. If we assume that each graduation of the rear sight over 600 - m. commands a space 100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we - obtain the following depths of the beaten zones at a range of 1500 - m., with rifle model ’98 (angle of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes): - - Ground rising 1 in 10 = 6° = 50 m. - „ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 64 m. - „ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 81 m. - Ground falling 1 in 10 = 6° = 360 m. - „ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 180 m. - „ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 113 m. - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration] - - The figures on pages 181 and 182 show to what extent the ground is - capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French - assert that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles - in the defense of the park wall at =Villiers=. It was, at any rate, - only an accident that the masses of troops on the west side of the - gently sloping Mamelon de Villiers suffered heavy losses on November - 30th, 1870. - - General PAQUIÉ of the French Army[171] lays down the following rule: - “When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle - of fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth - of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₄ times greater than on level ground. - When the angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of - fall of the mean trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the - beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₂ times greater than on level ground. When the - lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a - hill at the height of a man, and when the reverse slope of that hill - is equal to ¹⁄₁₀₀ of the range, the depth of the beaten zone will be - five times as great as on level ground.” - - [171] See also _Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques - du camp de Châlons_. _Journal des sciences militaires_, Sept., - Oct., Nov., 1808--_Le Joindre Général. Petit Guide pour les tirs - collectifs_, 1904. - - These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to - increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain, - and train the eye in judging such situations. - - The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing - on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy - in shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective--as shown in the - action against the French IInd Corps at =Point du Jour= and by the - experiences of the Russians at =Plevna= and =Gorni Dubniac=. This - condition becomes aggravated the smaller the angles of fall of the - projectiles, and the higher the target is situated relative to the - firing position of the attacking party. - - Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the - greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top - of the height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as - the position is approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a - _Main Firing Position_. (See Figure, p. 182. Fire effect from A and - from B). For the purpose of determining the favorable range, “D,” - corresponding to a certain height (of the enemy’s position) “H,” - Lieutenant-General ROHNE has deduced the following formula for rifle - model ’88:[172] - - D = 15.H + 500. - - [172] Capitaine CUGNAC, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work - of Captain KNOBLOCH, _Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen - Höhenstellungen_, _Swiss Monthly Journal_, 1907. - - The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at - present crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35 - m.) could be effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons - at 1025 m.; a further advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle - model ’98 the formula might be stated: 20. H + 600. - - It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible - to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender - must take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope - facing the enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to) - without being himself exposed to view, is of still less value for - use in the field. According to General Warnet of the French Army, if - “p” is the degree of slope expressed in centimeters, the defender - should choose between two points which lie between (p + 5) 1000 - and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the - defender should take up his position either 600 or 300 m. in rear of - the main crest. In such a position the defender will, it is true, be - protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but can only - very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration - of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an - opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under - fire. Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the - numerous tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here, - to show the strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic - principle may develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely - forgotten that in war only that which is simple succeeds. - - “Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible - from the firing position. In this connection, the following is - taken from the report of Captain KNOBLOCH, Austrian Army,[173] on - _Schieszaufgaben unter feldmäszigen Verhältnissen_: - - [173] _Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des - Gefechtswertes unserer Infanterie_, Vienna, 1904. _Feldmäsziges - Schieszen der Infanterie aus versteckten Stellungen._ _Organ der - militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine_, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1906. _Resultate - der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer._ _Mitteilungen - über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens_, No. 12 of 1905. - _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155. - - “Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are - used. These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with - it. It goes without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these - conditions will rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not - be selected at random at some particular elevation, because the angle - between target and aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear - sight leaf, might possibly lead to a negative sight setting. - - “In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of - appropriate height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect; - but the aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite - the fact that the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as - trees, woods, factory chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could - be found on the terrain itself. This largely determines the value of - indirect rifle fire in the field.” - - This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover, - its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that - we could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison. - Indirect rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do - damage to the enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon. - -It remains to mention briefly the effect of =ricochets= which, as -a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is -short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard -ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not -ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows -run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets -almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D” -projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter -their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably -increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range -of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which -they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their -range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the -skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the -consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions -this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing -at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a -man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from -the skirmisher who did the firing. - - [174] According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble - even when only grazing small twigs. - - -13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175] - - [175] See _Taktik_, V, p. 76 _et seq._ - -An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone -of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy -is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead -to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops -impossible. - -Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy -when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is -a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to -close order formation must be utilized. - -Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental -shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might -therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no -flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the -following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the -formations indicated. - -[Illustration: - - Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected. - Horizontal axis: Range in meters. - - Dash-dot curve: Company Column.[176] - Dotted curve: Line of platoons.[177] - Solid curve: Line of skirmishers. - Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace - intervals.] - - [176] In Germany called “Column of Platoons.” - - [177] In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals. - -According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of -Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained -by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at -intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation -is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at -ranges under 1300 m. - -According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following -percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing -old model steel jacketed bullets: - - ==========================================+=================== - | At a range of - +----+----+----+---- - |1200|1400|1600|1800 - | m. | m. | m. | m. - ------------------------------------------+----+----+----+---- - Platoon (one rank) | 4.4| 3.4| 2.2| 1.4 - Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals | 1.2|----|----|---- - Platoon in column of fours | 6.6| 3.8| 2.2| 1.3 - Platoon in column of twos | 5.6| 3.2| 1.9| 1.1 - Company column (German column of platoons)|22.0|18.0|14.0|10.0 - ------------------------------------------+----+----+----+---- - - [178] _Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, p. 15. - -Lieutenant-General ROHNE, in his work, _Schieszlehre für die -Infanterie_, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability -of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire -only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the -appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against-- - - ========+=====+=========+============= - |Line.|Column of|Infantry in - | |platoons.|route column. - --------+-----+---------+------------- - Standing| 116 | 160 | 98 - Prone | 20 | 65 | 72 - --------+-----+---------+------------- - -And against a company deployed in line of platoons: - - =========+================+==================+=================== - |3 platoons, each| 3 platoons, each |6 sections, each in - |in route column.|in column of twos.| column of twos. - ---------+----------------+------------------+------------------- - Standing | 57 | 39 | 29 - Prone | 28 | 25 | 14 - ---------+----------------+------------------+------------------- - -The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus -seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line -lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under -purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable -formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In -this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing -on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single -projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire -the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability, -the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons, -since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally. - -The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from -10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses -in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an -organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency. -Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as, -for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and -which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will -be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without -going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179] - - [179] It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses - spoil troops and their leaders in this respect. - - At the battle of =Gravelotte=, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200 - sabres, and 732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated - on the German side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the - decisive action. The losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as - follows: 899 officers and 19,260 men; according to arms: infantry, - 10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, 5.74%. On the decisive flank, - the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of almost 30%. On this - flank, the Rifles of the Guard (_Gardeschützen_) lost 44%, the 1st - Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their enlisted - strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 men. - - Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the - 18th Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless - they may amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in - single bodies of troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire. - - At =Magersfontain=, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of - their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the - officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion - of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth - Highlanders, 23.9%. At =Colenso= (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost - 6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin - Fusiliers, 23.9%. - -=Spionskop= (Jan. 24th, 1900): - - Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18¹⁄₂ hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2% - Supports 1,600 „ „ 10¹⁄₂ „ 8 „ 95 „ = 6.4% - Reserves 1,500 „ „ 4¹⁄₂ „ 15 „ 170 „ = 12.3% - Staffs ---- ---- 5 „ --- ---- - ---------------------------------------------------- - 5,794 men 68 officers, 986 men = 17.5% - - This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing - the fire were shot down. - - Attacking troops 1 officer for every 18 men - Supports 1 „ „ „ 12 „ - Reserves 1 „ „ „ 11 „ - -------------------------- - 1 officer for every 14 men - - For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the - Prussian Grenadier Battalion “_von Wedel_,” consisting of 12 officers - and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour - during the battle of =Soor= (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered - by the Grenadier Battalion “_von Münchow_” at =Kesselsdorf= are - possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named - battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.[180] - - [180] _Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and - 47. - - At =Kolin=, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” lost 652 men, - and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, _i.e._, - considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the - battle, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” numbered only 24 - men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233, - 296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was - undoubtedly very great.[181] At =Kolin=, the infantry lost in all - 12,307 men out of 19,000, _i.e._, 65%. - - [181] _Ibid._, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20. - -The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means -due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders -in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead -their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more -necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous -systems of the men, and the poorer the troops. According to past -experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the -early stages of a war.[182] - - [182] See _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358. - - The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are - given, in round figures, in the following table: - - At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men; - „ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; - „ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; - „ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ; - „ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ; - „ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ; - „ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; - „ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; - „ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ; - - Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses - among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight - of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with - the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost - all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company - commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company - officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in - field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29% - in company officers.” - - [183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre - M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115. - - On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its - officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about - three-quarters of an hour. - - On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its - officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._, - 64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%, - that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the - _Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action. - - After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the - East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing - line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are - not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle - Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th - only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd - Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one - battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a - private. - - -14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE. - -The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of -the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and -as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable -increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such -a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more -than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire. - -“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain themselves -owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses -which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination -to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of -impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually, -the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed -either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely -replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised; -exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought -of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were -awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could -have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most -surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184] - - [184] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 150. - -In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General -von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited -or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain -firm will power.” - -General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of -Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying, -facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The -shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the -shells bursting in the midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division -in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men. -Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale -faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire -to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were -congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to -joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their -lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number -were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of -wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the -Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos -drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy -was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into -line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had -reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling -commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly -under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They -blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the -foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to -the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against -trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover -by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in -greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the -enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down -by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to -400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly -discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke -enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This -excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the -troops again under control. - -The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of -the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions existing in the -theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language. -During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments -of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with -sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men -considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a -difficult situation. - -On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for -great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult -to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were -undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact -that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to -isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the -operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where -water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit -of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would -have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at -Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable; -not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment, -which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble -resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen, -who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the -commander of the British force did not really know just what action to -take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand -must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded -in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before -permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds. - - [185] In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found - all but three of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st, - 1900, justified. In the three cases in which the verdict was adverse - only a few men had surrendered. Within a period of eight months - the British lost a total of 1680 officers and 2124 men killed and - wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 officers and - 4984 men. - -It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are -able to endure. After the Franco-German War it was believed that -troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to -one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be -reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect -of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss -7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; -and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and -deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg -(loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack. -The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and -the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult -situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of -enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel -has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The -steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct -of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. -The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this -militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death. -The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous -system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm -of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the -human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by -officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller -than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the -nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the -battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “_void -of the battlefield_”[187] has become especially pronounced since the -introduction of smokeless powder. “_The invisibility of the enemy -directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy -and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined -to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to -hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days -at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 -m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral -depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.” -(General NÉGRIER.)[188] - - [186] See SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei_. After the - author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote: - “And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a - certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers - will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will - reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in - regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is - carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about _Courage_, - _ibid._, p. 206. - - [187] This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not - new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his _Vertrauten Briefen_ - (Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the “void of the - battlefield” in the fights around Metz. BONNAL, _L’art nouveau en - Tactique_, p. 90. - - [188] _Revue des deux mondes_, for June, 1902. - -The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by-- - - 1. Derangement of tactical units; - - 2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and - - 3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses. - - According to the _History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment_ (p. 113) - immediately after the battle of =St. Privat=, most of the companies - numbered only 30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although, - allowing for losses, there should have been 1922 men. The three - companies of the 39th Füsilier Regiment which had fought in the - =Stiring Wald= at =Spicheren=, numbered only 6 officers and 150 - men at the close of the fight in the evening,[189] which means - that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle - of =Colombey=, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment - was assembled, three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men, - respectively. This battalion had lost about 300 men.[190] - - [189] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 366. - - [190] _Geschichte des Regiments_, p. 347. - - The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account - (_Gt. St. W._) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different - infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying - a front of 1200 paces, in the following order: - - 7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. } - -------, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, } - Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. } - - { 10. 11. 12. 1. 1. 9.10. 4.3. Cos. - { ------------, ----, ----, -----, -----, - { 13. 13. 73. 15. 73. Inf. - - At =Wörth= 17 different regiments were represented on a front of 5700 - paces. - - “The assault on =Elsaszhausen= (=Wörth=), after preliminary forest - fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some - cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was - the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear - of it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army - Corps) which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves. - Even the battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical - entities.”[191] - - [191] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 268. - - At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into - formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers, - easily succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units - disintegrated rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.[192] - - [192] For details see KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XVI, - pp. 122, 124, 177, 231-234. - - In the =Giefert Wald= (=Spicheren=) out of 32 companies (4 - brigades) only four companies fought together as a battalion. In - the little =Wenzelberg Wood= (at =Nachod=) there were engaged 7¹⁄₂ - Austrian battalions (belonging to four different regiments) and 2 - Jäger-Battalions, all of these troops belonging to three different - brigades.[193] No attempt was made to lead these troops as one body. - - [193] _Austrian Gen. St. W._, 1866, III, p. 81. - - In the oak wood at =Dubno= (=Skalitz=), there were engaged 12¹⁄₂ - and 8¹⁄₂ battalions belonging to four different regiments and to - two different army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up - of the order of battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades, - regiments and battalions. In consequence of this, control was lost to - a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, and the result achieved - was mainly due to the skill and intelligence of the subordinate - leaders--especially that of the commanders of battalions and half - battalions.”[194] - - [194] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, II, p. 48. - - “The wooded region in rear of =St. Hubert= was thickly infested with - stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to - be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets, - some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present - except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers - riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved - only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of - the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the - valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of =St. Hubert= had increased - to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the - result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196] - - [195] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 139. - - [196] _Ibid._, p. 167. - - “At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps - occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east - of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the - enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious - mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197] - - [197] _Ibid._, p. 224. - - “At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the - 46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up - with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments - of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the - capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal - but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a - battalion.”[198] - - [198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249. - - “In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became - disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around - in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and - sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the - _Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left - flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire - became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to - rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying - along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers - of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish - line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200] - - [199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72. - - [200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72. - - This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers - left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=. - - The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third - battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly - continued the advance in complete disorder. - - “Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a - reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of - the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging - to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of - the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the - companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the - greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201] - - [201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154. - - “Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments, - attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way; - 400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the - organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in - Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men - had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single - company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had - disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become - separated from their units.”[202] - - [202] _Ibid._, I, pp. 236 and 238. - - “Prince IMERETINSKI succeeded in forming stragglers into the - following improvised units: - - 3 provisional companies of the _Libau_ Regiment. - 2 „ „ „ „ _Susdal_ „ - 2¹⁄₂ „ „ „ „ _Vladimir_ „ - 1 detachment of 100 men of the _Reval_ Regiment. - - “These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance - and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203] - - [203] _Ibid._, I, p. 243. - - “These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of - Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians - succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in - companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally - belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the - afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was - made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new - organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204] - - [204] _Ibid._, I, p. 258. - -The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are, -above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the -deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear -of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing -the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide -of disorder as made by the author of _Summer Nights Dream_ (1888) -(platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing -toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The -disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion. -It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with -illusory ideas. - -It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any -officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization; -and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are -requisite for tactical training--a large number of officers being told -to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur -in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of -an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a -prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful -engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a -reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire -from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can -well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed -of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own -officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic. - - The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion, - 4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at - =Colombey= (14th August, 1870) under French shell and _Chassepot_ - fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two - shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20 - men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew - shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company - executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another - and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed - at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although - not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with - suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did - everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned - officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its - movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the - perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men, - repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At - that moment the battalion commander--he was called the ‘marble - statue’ on account of his coolness--galloped up on his bay, shouting: - ‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’ - Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the - words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled - again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color - company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on - the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they - executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and - soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and - 4th Companies.” - - The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them - its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession - within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company - lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205] - - [205] RETZLAFF, _Aus meinem Tagebuch_. - -Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example -of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are -of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the -individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common -sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers -into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the -premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual. - - [206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are: - - The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against - Italian infantry. _Oesterreichs Kämpfe_, II, p. 74. - - The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870. - - HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, pp. 170, - 184, 193 and 215. - - _Sedan_, _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1243. - - _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the - capture of Servigny). - - LEHAUCOURT, _Campagne de la Loire_, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes - Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans). - - - - -V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION. - - -1. NORMAL PROCEDURE. - -The characteristic tendency of modern times is the liberation of the -individual from antiquated ideas and from the restraint exercised -by ostensibly reactionary governmental power. The key-note of this -tendency, which places individualism above collectivism, is absolute -independence of the individual in municipal and national affairs, in -science and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent -by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be assured by -the sum-total of a number of negative or positive individual efforts, -but only by the simultaneous launching of masses controlled by a -single will. Within these limits the independence of the individual is -permissible, for a commander does not exact apathetic obedience, but, -on the contrary, intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and -this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules. - -Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the German Drill -Regulations leave the leader free to dispose of his troops according to -the purpose of the combat and the nature of the ground. In this he is -assisted by the initiative and independent action of his subordinate -leaders. Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite -however, in armies in which the tactical training of commanders and -subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared that the latter -will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where such normal formations -are prescribed, it is assumed that hard and fast rules are requisite -for training; that the average officer cannot be expected to estimate -a situation correctly and arrive at proper decisions; and that the -majority of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are -to render any service at all. - -Drill regulations should facilitate quick mutual understanding between -leader and organization and lay down general principles for ordinary -situations, for combat tasks, and for formations, but should not, by -their rules, direct the actions of a leader from the very beginning -into definite grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure, -there is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and that -the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail in war at the -very moment when its presence is most vitally necessary.[207] - - [207] “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of - drill and who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the - lame man deprived of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived - of his spectacles.” VON SEIDLITZ. - -“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the ground, -therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what might happen in each -particular case.” (FREDERICK THE GREAT). Whether or not a particular -normal procedure is appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but -solely upon the tactical situation.[208] - - [208] It is only in cases where precisely identical situations - may be presumed to exist that there can be any question of a normal - procedure. The last stages of the infantry attack in fortress - warfare present features of this nature and on that account a normal - procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of the European - armies. - -While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general -manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to -details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe -it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are -advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most -suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of -investigating this point would probably have the strange result that -each representative would concede that what the others desire is -practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself -capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that -all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations -entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been -foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many -details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which -cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises -in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future. -Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they -have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their -regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to -strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on -tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help -yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of -doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, -because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own -initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same -proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded -universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of -our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future -war may correct their provisions.[210] - - [209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc. - p. 42 - - _British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is - apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations, - the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to - lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal - attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make - themselves felt through losses and failures.” - - [210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin, - 1906). - -The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in -the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down -a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer -will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind -some sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion -of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If such combat -regulations are called “drill attack” (_Schulangriff_), many of the -objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such -definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse -between leader and troops. - - “Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (_On - War_, II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should - not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as - good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most - suitable.... By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill, - precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their - part will make the whole machine run easier.... - - “The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends - to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances - imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and - thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals - (Prince Louis at =Saalfeld=; Tauenzien on the =Dornberg= at =Jena=; - Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of =Kapellendorf=) without - exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great’s system - of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten - into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the - most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has - ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they - involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never before or since - overtaken any army on the battlefield.” - - General von Boguslawski[211] demands that the conduct of the attack - be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in - action. He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even - the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present - time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse - the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by - no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the - terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into - offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it - should be flexible.” - - [211] _Taktische Darlegungen_, p. 51. - - Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal - attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the - basis of troop training--a solid foundation for further development. - In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be - done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack. - The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as - long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such, - however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these - normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training - and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from - the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This, - briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform procedure, which - not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is - absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher - leader.” - - General von Scherff states:[212] - - “It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of - responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:-- - - “1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for - battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning - appropriate missions; - - “2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of - a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient - provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization - is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally, - - “3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed - by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the - drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component - parts.” - - [212] _Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff_, Berlin, - 1902. - - -2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[213] - - [213] _Aufmarsch_, _Entfaltung_, _Entwicklung_. - -Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German -war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from -the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious -systematic =concentration=[214] was invariably employed before -entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies -and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route -column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for -going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly -formation.[215] - - [214] “By _concentration_ is meant the passage from route column to - a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of - decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German - I. D. R.) - - [215] Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of - Gravelotte, see _Taktik_, III, p. 305. - - The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the - Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The - army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again - formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V. - LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain - the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations. - -Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing, -the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth -of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been -done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper -distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only -when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the -former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper -however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in -several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for -decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections). - -The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in -close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in -route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go -around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However, -even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable -targets to hostile machine guns and artillery. - - [216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307. - - The British were surprised in close order formations at - =Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order - to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from - the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements - directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was - done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation - was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no - obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who - stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four - battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a - depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being - 300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight - companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals - between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces. - The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in - other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared. - -[Illustration: =The Formation of a Brigade of Four Battalions of the -6th Infantry Division= - -during the advance on =Poplar Grove= on March 7th, 1900. Front about -800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.] - -When an engagement is expected, the different elements, each in route -column, are directed upon their several objectives, i.e., the column -is _developed for action_. This is done because it is necessary to -gain a start over the enemy in deployment and advantageous to move -in route column. Thus a =development for action= (_Entfaltung_)[217] -is nothing but an extension of front accomplished by breaking up the -original route column into a number of separate columns. The latter -march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route column. -Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate extension is not -anticipated. During the development for action, preparations should be -made providing for the necessary depth of the combat formation. - - [217] The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of - front, “development for action” (_Entfaltung_, pars. 315 and 466), - and “distribution in depth” (_Gliedern_, pars. 287-291 and 427). The - term “to form for attack” (_Auseinanderziehen_, par. 241), means that - troops are given a combat formation both as regards frontage and - depth. - -When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the concentration into -an assembly formation should be avoided, since it generally entails a -loss of time and energy, and the development for action chosen instead. -(Par. 315 German I. D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage -of affording a higher degree of readiness for action without letting -the troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from route -column but also from assembly formation.[218] - - [218] See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov - on September 2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in _Angriffsverfahren der - Japaner_, by von Lüttwitz. - -The development for action should begin as soon as there is danger of -getting under effective artillery fire. The length of time required for -going into action may be reduced by shortening the route column (by -concentrating the troops into deep column); by forming several route -columns abreast, unless column of sections has already been formed; by -clearing the roads of troops; by marching across country; by indicating -beforehand on which side of the infantry the artillery is to be -brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. R.); and, finally, by directing -the heads of the various elements upon their respective objectives. -(Development for action). - - In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not - so clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in - rencontres is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it - becomes apparent, during the preparatory stage of the action, that - the enemy has a visible start in deployment.” When time is not - pressing, the regulations prescribe a concentration for action and, - simultaneously therewith, such a grouping of the principal units (if - possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile guns, and - well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only straight to - the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the zone of - hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is - discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place, - in order to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for - artillery, it will be necessary to leave the road and to advance - across country. This will, as a rule, result in widening the front - of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of - placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made, - so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for - reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close - country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially - called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in - defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by - a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions. - -The =deployment for action= (_Entwicklung_) consists of forming the -troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers. -As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may -be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation. - -It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action -ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of -skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment. -There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the -rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line -proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to -defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case -the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much -as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German -I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I. -D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good -plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: “First -direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable -formation.” - - An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching - of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at - =Vionville=) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated - (6th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) is of special interest. The - concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at =Waterloo=, and - of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at =Nehweiler= (=Wörth=), - almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At =Nachod=, - the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration, - lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops - from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced - by parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This - reinforcement, while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient. - - During its march to the battlefield of =Gravelotte=, the 3rd Infantry - Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then - it formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of - Rezonville, and from there moved on in echelon formation. The - concentration of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870 - (=Spicheren=), was still less justifiable. About noon, when the head - of the brigade reached the exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl, - it received orders to cross the Saar. Upon receiving this order, the - five battalions present concentrated, unfurled their flags and then - marched across country to the railroad bridge of Mattstall. In order - to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed again. The delays - which occurred here led the parts of the force which had crossed - first, to throw themselves into the fight.[219] - - [219] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77_, p. 51. - - -3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE BRIGADE. - -When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken up into -companies either by directing the latter upon their respective -objectives, or by forming for attack by command. - -When forming for attack by command, the front, the base company, -intervals, distances, and the relation of the companies to each other -must be indicated. The intervals should be sufficiently large to permit -the companies to move unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities -of marching will not be communicated from one to the other. - -A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon will suffice -for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies at war strength -would be 150 paces, and between companies at peace strength 100 paces. -Intervals may be increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable -the troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same holds true -for distances. For rules in regard to the distance between the second -and first line, see p. 121, supra. When a battalion has formed line -of companies at long range from the enemy for the purpose of reducing -the effect of the hostile fire, distances should be diminished to -facilitate the transmission of orders. - -When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend upon the -purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, some of the -Japanese battalions, stationed at points where the decision was not -sought, were each assigned a front of 800 m. In these cases the four -companies of each battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at -large intervals. - -[Illustration] - -It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment for particular -situations. In each case the formation of the battalion depends upon -the situation, the purpose of the combat, and the nature of the ground, -the battalion commander having the option of going into action in one, -two, or three lines. - -Moreover, the formation depends upon whether-- - -1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger force; and -whether one or both of its flanks are resting on impassable obstacles; - -2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; whether it -is to attack or to stand on the defensive; - -3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire or is to take -advantage of the preparation effected by other troops; and, finally, - -4. Whether or not it has to fight at night. - -=A battalion acting alone=, whose flanks are not resting on natural -obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies successively into -action so as to retain complete organizations for other purposes. It -will seldom be proper for the battalion to form for attack in the -regular manner. When this can be done the battalion should form in -three lines in conformity with its task of initiating, carrying out, -and deciding the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced -by the second company as soon as the situation has become sufficiently -clear. More frequently, the battalion commander will send only a single -company into action, retaining the others for the time being under -cover. - -[Illustration] - -The =advance guard battalion= of a regiment will, as a rule, be -compelled to develop considerable fire in a _rencontre_ (par. 357 -German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance of the enemy, -and for this purpose it will frequently place two companies into -action at once. But since the battalion commander cannot count upon -reinforcements and, moreover, as he does not know on which flank the -combat is subsequently going to develop, he will provisionally retain -the other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them in rear -of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above figure). - -[Illustration] - -In a =containing action= one should endeavor to employ few rifles -but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, and keep supports and -reserves far in rear so as to minimize the losses. If the force is to -deploy first of all only for fire action, but is later to participate -in the decisive attack, it will be advisable to place two companies in -the first line, one in the second, and one in the third. The companies -in the second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile -fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching one -and then the other company, to exercise an influence on the course of -the action during a longer period than would otherwise be possible. -(See “b”). - -[Illustration] - -=When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force=, and when -both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports for feeding -the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) and can cover a greater -front. A reserve may either be entirely dispensed with, or made very -weak. - -When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened flank -should be protected by echeloning the supports and the reserve in -rear of it. In this position, these echelons are not so apt to be -bullet-stops as when they are placed in rear of the center. Besides, -they can more easily execute enveloping movements and can take a -hostile flank attack in flank. When both flanks are in the air, only -the most essential precautions should be taken on the one flank, while -on the other everything available is united for the decisive attack. - -In =defense=, three companies can sometimes be taken into the first -line for the purpose of developing a strong fire, while the fourth -company is held in rear of a threatened flank or in rear of the center. -(See “d”). When it is desired to employ the reserve offensively, only -one or two companies are placed in the first line, the others being -held in reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive. -Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve. - -[Illustration] - -When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to make an immediate -attack which has been prepared by the fire of other troops, all its -companies may be taken at once into the first line. In this case -the battalion may be formed for attack with its companies at close -intervals. This might also be a suitable combat formation for night -operations. All these formations are subject to change however, as soon -as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary. - -The general principles stated for a battalion are also applicable to a -=regiment=. The regiment may either be directly formed for attack, or -the heads of the battalions may be deflected toward the points where -the deployment is to take place. An interval of 300-400 m. between -heads of battalions is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent -deployment. The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the -purpose of the combat. - -The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion commanders, but -leaves the latter entire freedom of action in regard to the formation -to be taken up and the manner of deploying. He should interfere with -companies only in exceptional cases. Such interference is justified -only when the conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity -of action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe the proper -channels in communicating an order. - -[Illustration: Methods of Forming a Battalion for Attack.] - -[Illustration] - -In developing the =brigade=[220] for action, the depth of column -begins to exert an influence. Every concentration of the brigade -retards its entry into action. If the longest distance to be covered -in developing the brigade is assigned to the leading element of the -column, the march into action will be accelerated. - - [220] For historical references in regard to the importance in - action of the brigade, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für - Armee und Marine_ (August-September number of 1877) entitled, _Die - Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In - regard to the employment of the regiments in line or in echelon, see - MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_. - MOLTKE’S _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq. - -[Illustration] - -When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is to prolong the -flank of the fighting line, its entry into action might be hastened, -perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue the march in the -original direction while the leading regiment takes the longer route. -The rear regiment would then be abreast of the leading one after about -15 minutes. If the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating -lines, the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes, -have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of skirmishers. - -When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each regiment is assigned -a separate task (attack of a point, or defense of a section). If the -tasks assigned are definite and harmonize with each other, mutual -coöperation will be assured. The brigade commander ordinarily sends his -orders to the regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste, -correction of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he should -inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade consisting of -two regiments, its commander, in order to be able to influence the -action, will be compelled to retain at least one battalion as a reserve. - -Brigades of three regiments[221] (each of three battalions) have an -advantage in this respect. But if such an increase in infantry units -were contemplated, it would be better, for reasons that will be given -later on,[222] to form the additional troops into a third division in -each army corps. - - [221] The British division consists of twelve battalions formed - into three brigades. - - In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly - marked. The division consists of three brigades, each brigade - of three regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. The - battalions have a strength of only 400 men. - - [222] _Taktik_ (_Kriegsgliederung_), III, p. 31, et seq. - - -Base Units. - -The possibility of regulating the movements of a body of troops by -means of a base unit, depends upon a number of preliminary conditions -which will seldom be fulfilled in war: - -1. _The leader of the base unit would have to remain unharmed to the -very last._ If he were disabled the command of the unit would devolve -upon the next in rank who would perhaps not join it in every case. - -2. _The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus necessary for -a further advance, would have to maintain the direction after the -original base unit had ceased to exist on account of the mixing of -organizations._ - -3. _The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties during -its advance than the other units of the force._ If the base unit were -to encounter greater difficulties than the other units, this might -serve as an excuse for reducing the rate of advance. In attack, the -organization nearest the enemy, in other words, the one that is led -better and more energetically than the others, is quite naturally -charged with maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization -will be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements in -rear. - -The designation of a base unit[223] or unit of direction on the -battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the initiative of -the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. A base unit is only -profitable in night operations, in crossing unfavorable ground (woods), -and in bringing the fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile -fire. “With the entry into action, the importance of the base company -gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. (Par. -242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, it is better to indicate -either the objective on which the troops are to march, or the flank -toward which they are to maintain connection. - - [223] “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have - to regulate their movements without thereby being curbed in their - endeavor to advance (base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.) - - In France units of direction are prescribed (_la direction est - confidée aux unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles - du terrain_), but their duties are not given in detail. Units of - direction are also prescribed in Austria. - -A _change of direction_ of march is executed by wheeling or turning -with the subordinate units toward the new front. (Par. 185 German -I. D. R.). A _change of front_ is effected in the same manner. With -long lines, echeloning and movements by the flank will result, which -can only be rectified gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When -skirmishers have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a -deployment in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion -of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the desired -direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to withdraw, at -the same time, those parts of the former skirmish line which are no -longer necessary. - - -Examples of Changes of Front. - - 1. Engagement at =Helmstedt=, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry - had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the - Ütting Hill.[224] - - [224] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 54. - - 2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the - =Niederwald= after crossing the Sauer (battle of =Wörth=).[225] - - [225] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262. - - 3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of - =Loigny-Poupry= (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example - of the conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon - the advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held =Lumeau=. The - 33rd Brigade, its battalions in double column, was concentrated south - of =Champdoux=. The division commander retained two battalions as a - reserve and ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter - wheel to the right and to form his command for attack in the general - direction of Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on - the Bavarians defending =Schlosz Goury=. The attack was directed - against the French Division Jauréguiberry, which was attacking - Schlosz Goury. This division first came under fire at 3-400 m. and - then approached to within about 150 m. of the defenders’ position; - strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but otherwise - nothing was done to protect the right. - - By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade - would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury, - and, as Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a - fan-shaped extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation, - would have been unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies - at his disposal and decided to advance in a southerly direction - until his second line overlapped the most advanced hostile line, so - that the attack as planned would have struck simultaneously both - the first and second lines of the enemy. The slight loss of time - involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could carry out - his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the - enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade - formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200 - m. from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the - brigade after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right. - -[Illustration] - - As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of - the 76th Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd - Companies of the same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th - and 8th Companies of the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The - center half-battalion, (2nd and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry), - the unit of direction, was ordered to march on the church spire of - Loigny. All the units of the force, with the exception of the IInd - Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of skirmishers. The - 1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, 75th Infantry, - covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the eleven - companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line - (approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the - second. - - The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy - quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The - attack came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were - taken in flank, and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to - oppose the onslaught of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense, - unwieldy masses of the French were more and more crowded together by - the uninterrupted advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives - to the German marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by - the artillery in position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the - brigade to Ecuillon. - - The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The - right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry, - which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to - march on the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing - penetrated into Loigny.[226] - - [226] See HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 80; also KUNZ, _Loigny_, p. - 105. - - 4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against the - =Forbach Hill= (=Spicheren=).[227] - - [227] _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 356. - - -4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF COMBAT FORMATIONS.[228] - - [228] See _Taktik_, V, _Gefechtslehre_, p. 38. - -The infantry combat is decided by the combined action of long firing -lines. Retained forces, not launched against the enemy for the purpose -of crushing him, exert no influence whatever on the decision, since -they only increase losses without contributing to the fire effect. In -the battles of the past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of -the combat (unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing -the flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the short -range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in readiness so close -to the firing line that they could assault _en masse_ at once and -without any diminution of their strength. The deciding factor, which -rested in retained reserves during the Napoleonic era, lies at present -in the firing line.[229] - - [229] The French still entertain a contrary opinion. - -=Distribution in depth= _is, therefore, only a means to an end; an -expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a -constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault; -to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory -is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting -forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but -it must extend its front during the fight._ To launch an insufficient -number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually is a -fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a superior force -continually with an inferior one, without being able to take advantage -of the superiority which we may actually possess. - - The Russian attacks in the battles around =Plevna= are very - instructive in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the =Grivica= - intrenchments were attacked by two columns consisting of nine - battalions. The Ist and IInd Battalions of the 121st Infantry - succeeded in reaching the trench, but then the attack failed. The - IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result Thereupon the - IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were launched, but - these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of the - trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner, - likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by - the entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.[230] - - [230] _Russisch-Türkischer Krieg_ (_Gen. St. W._), German - Translation, III, pp. 254 and 264. - - On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th - Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the - 64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the - 31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned - force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army - Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In - spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure - of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was - insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were - again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions - instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and - one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6 - battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they - likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only - when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions - lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in - reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous - employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the - Russian infantry.[231] - - [231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211. - - The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who - advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak - garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the - isolated attacking groups which followed each other. - - The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient - fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the - battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu= - (15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced - with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the - first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three - battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development - of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The - 2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and - 1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to - pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese. - - [232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56. - -Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory stage of the -fight, as it enables the commander to meet unexpected developments in -the situation. Moreover, it is justifiable so long as the information -in regard to the strength and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. -When reconnaissance work is not thoroughly performed, the force may -be obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally -chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and movements -by the flank can only be made when the front is narrow. Moreover, -after a force is once deployed within the zone of hostile fire, it is -committed to the direction chosen and can only move straight to the -front. Considerable changes of front can only be executed by the lines -in rear. The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and -to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. As the -losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a force can cover a -broader front and keep its supports in closer proximity to the firing -line in the former than in the latter case, especially if it was able -to strengthen its position. The reserve, however, should be kept at a -greater distance from the firing line than in attack, in order that it -may retain complete freedom of movement--in covering the retreat, or in -making a counter-attack--and may not be involved in the fire fight. - -The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, give the -impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which the attacking line -can rally, and cover the re-forming of the troops after a successful -attack. The several echelons of the attack formation, except the small -fractions immediately supporting the firing line[233] and covering -its flanks, should have become merged with that line by the time the -decisive moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes up an -unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an advantage; on -the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys in force, exposes -himself to grave danger. _The troops should be sent into action in a -deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear -until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be -thrown in for the assault._ - - [233] The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the - line is clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth. - KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172. - -=Distribution in depth and frontage= are interdependent; the greater -the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In -every deployment for action the following question awaits solution -by the troop leader: “How deep ought the formation to be and how -great an extension of front is allowable.” The result of the combat -depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad -combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and -flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are -not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of -leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness -of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution -in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the -force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action -with another part of the force in accordance with this information; -and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that -decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the -leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it -gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to -repulse them--something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any -rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in -the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into -play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element -of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take -advantage. - -Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth -is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the -opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too -broad a front. - - At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order - for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the - =Roten Berg= of the =Spicheren Heights=,[234] it being assumed that - only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade - of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the - action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m. - from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd - Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right - flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th - Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered - a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg - was undoubtedly difficult,[235] this wide extension, which made all - leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the - first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions - against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The - brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th - Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the - battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably - increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following - troops were in the first line on the right wing:[236] - - I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and ¹⁄₂3. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos. - -------- ------------ -------------------- -------------- - 53. Inf. ~=74. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ 77. Inf. - - 10. 11. and 12. Cos. ¹⁄₂3. Co. - -------------------- ------------ - ~=39. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ - - [234] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310. - - [235] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 318. - - [236] The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade. - The 4th Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the - crow flies, from the left flank of its battalion. - - The following troops were in the second line: - - Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos.[237] II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn. - ------------ ------------------- ------------------------ - 53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf. - - [237] These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the - other companies of their battalion. - - This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might - have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar - situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the - Giefert Wald--39²⁄₃ companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th - and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600 - m. It is true, the peculiar situation existing on the German side, - operated against a simultaneous employment of the several bodies and - a mixing of units was unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have - been possible to prevent such a complete dissolution of all units, - by François’ Brigade taking up a more suitable formation before - the action commenced. The mistake made here was repeated over and - over again in the other preliminary combats of the campaign, and - invariably led to the same result.[238] - - [238] Consult _Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei - Wörth_, KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 10, et seq. - - The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at - =Magersfontain= and =Paardeberg= may be traced to the lack of - sufficient reinforcements. At Magersfontain, the four battalions - of the Highland Brigade were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at - Paardeberg on a front of 4000 m. - -In deciding how many men are required to occupy or attack a position, -the principal point to be considered is the effect of fire. The -modern long range magazine rifle will, no doubt, enable us to defend -a position with a smaller force than was possible in the past with -the older less improved weapons. However, combats last longer -nowadays, and the shock action of Frederick the Great’s tactics is -no longer practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and -the tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer -occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole force engaged -are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable conditions, certain -organizations may suffer losses quite as great as those incurred in -the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.[239] Instead of the -sanguinary hand-to-hand fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged -fire fight carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly -fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as -possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. This -fire fight is frequently decided by psychological factors and without -the troops suffering material losses. - - [239] At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of - 93.1%, and twelve other French regiments suffered a loss of over 50%. - To be sure, the losses sustained during the retreat are included - in this total. At Albuera (16th May, 1811), the 57th Regiment - (British) and the Füsilier Brigade lost 70%; in four hours the army - of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which originally - numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained. - -“The duration of the combat under modern conditions,” writes General -Négrier,[240] “leads to a considerable mental exhaustion of the troops -which is apparent in nervous lassitude. This explains the impotency -of leader and troops the day after a defeat and even after a victory. -This lassitude is still greater on the day of the battle. While it -is true that this has always been the case, the nervous exhaustion -has grown in an inconceivable manner, its intensity increasing at -the same rate as the invisibility of the opponent. _The invisibility -of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources -of his energy and courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy is -inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression -to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole -days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than -800 m. from the enemy, was not caused by their losses, but by the -moral depression produced within the effective zone of rifle fire. -Another factor, which governs the modern combat at short ranges, the -_impossibility of the commander making his influence felt in lines -which are seriously engaged_, is of still greater importance. _The -influence of the officers who lead these lines is also limited. They -are scarcely able to direct the three or four men nearest them._ The -combat depends upon the individual fighters, and there never has been -a time when the personal efficiency of the individual soldier has -had a greater significance.” We should not forget that this change -occurred during a period in which we no longer fight our battles with -professional soldiers of long service, but, on the contrary, with peace -cadres of our conscript armies raised to war strength by Reservists. - - [240] _Revue des deux mondes_, June number, 1902. - -Another factor to be considered is the fighting quality of the -opponent. In an action against an enemy who is a match for us, the -necessity for distribution in depth is, of course, greater than when -fighting against poor troops. - - General v. Werder could with impunity oppose the newly raised levies - of the French Republic on the =Lisaine= with 1.12 men per meter of - front. The victory was won by this very extraordinary extension of - front, which, if employed in the face of the Imperial army, would - have led to defeat.[241] - - [241] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, p. 11. - -_Considerations of importance in deciding upon the extent of front to -be covered by a force, similar conditions on both sides being presumed, -are_-- - -1. _Whether it is compelled to fight an independent action alone_; - -2. _Whether it is fighting, from the preparatory to the decisive stage -of the combat, as part of a larger body, with at least one, or perhaps -both flanks secured_; - -3. _Whether it has been selected to make the decisive attack against an -enemy already shaken by other troops_. - -In the last mentioned case a sudden effect, a short, powerful blow, -is required, and the maximum frontage of all the units employed on -the same line is admissible. But even a force advancing to the final -assault can by no means dispense with distribution in depth; supports -and reserves are needed to carry forward the firing line when it has -been checked, to cover its flanks, and to carry on the pursuit (second -line). - -The frontage of an organization whose flanks are secure and which -is acting as a part of a larger force, depends upon other troops; -considerable extension of front is admissible provided the firing line -is constantly maintained at a strength which will enable it to gain a -superiority of fire over the enemy. “While an organization which has -only one flank protected, is less restricted as regards frontage, it -will have to provide for distribution in depth on the exposed flank. -In this case, it is a good plan to move the units held in rear toward -the particular flank (echeloning). Interval and distance increase with -the size of this echelon.” (Par. 290 German I. D. R.). The German -Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 397) further emphasize the fact that, -when well-trained infantry employs its rifles to good advantage in -defense, it is very strong in front; that it can hold a position with -a comparatively small force; and that, in this case, it has only one -weak spot, the flank, which it must seek to protect by distribution -in depth. This view is fully borne out by the recent events in South -Africa and in Manchuria. Under favorable conditions (deliberate -defense), a battalion fighting as part of a larger force may put all -of its companies into the first line, a front of 200 m. being assigned -to each. The battalion can thus defend a front of 800 m. The only -restriction is the requirement that the battalion commander must be -able, at all times, to direct the course of the combat. - -An organization acting alone which has to fight an action independently -from beginning to end under varying conditions, cannot employ all of -its available strength in the first line at one time. A distribution -into three parts, viz., firing line, supports, and reserve, is -therefore required. During the preparatory stage, the firing line -should be as weak as possible, while, for sustaining and deciding the -action, the reserve should be as strong as possible. As a rule, this -distribution will not come into existence until the combat has begun; -it must disappear again, during the subsequent course of the fight, -through reinforcement of the troops that initiated the action, thus -resulting in an increase of the combat front. - -While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density along the -entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to the fact that -one will endeavor to increase the distribution in depth only at the -point where the decision is sought (offensive wings), while one will -seek to obtain results by a generous expenditure of ammunition at -points where the enemy is only to be contained. When a broad front has -to be held with a weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in -groups. Of the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that -the skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages of a -piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). Frequently, -however, after an action is over, the assault that penetrated a line is -called the main attack, and the one that failed, a demonstration. An -organization fighting alone will generally begin an action by deploying -on a narrow front; it will protect its flanks by distribution in depth; -and, finally, mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make -the assault. The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack -in defense cannot be strong enough. - -Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon the frontage is -the task which a force is to perform, _i.e._, whether it is to make an -attack or to stand on the defensive; whether it is to fight a delaying -action or is to withdraw. The object of distribution in depth is to -keep the firing line constantly at the same strength; this requires -stronger reinforcements in attack (owing to the greater losses), than -in defense, and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front. - -The number of troops which will be required to hold a given piece of -ground must be determined separately in each case. The strength of the -fighting line depends upon the effect of the hostile fire. Military -history tells us how many troops the leader sent into action in order -to gain the victory, but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of -troops that might have sufficed in the particular case. - -In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading battalion -may be fully engaged by the time the next one arrives on the -battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation may require the -employment of longer firing lines than would be deemed proper for the -size of the command when making a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German -I. D. R.). The assailant should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who -is likewise advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to -that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s debouchment -from a defile. - - At =Nachod=, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies - in reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon. - - The conduct of the advance guard of the 8th Infantry Division - at =Beaumont= is worthy of imitation. In this case, the support - battalion was deployed and the artillery went into position; strong - detachments were retained in rear of the left wing until the main - body had arrived. Likewise, a proper relation existed between - frontage (4 battalions on a front of 1400 m.) and distribution in - depth. According to the General Staff Account of the Franco-German - war (II, p. 1045), the distribution was as follows: - - _First line_: 4th Jäger-Battalion, which was subsequently reinforced - by the IInd Battalion, 96th Infantry and the Ist and IInd Battalions, - 86th Infantry. - - _Support for the Artillery_: Füsilier Battalion, 96th Infantry. - - _Reserve_: IIIrd Battalion, 86th Infantry. - - We have already mentioned the deployment of the advance guard at - =Spicheren= (p. 226 supra). In that instance the whole force was - thrown in at once, whereas at =Beaumont= the deployment of the - different units was coördinated and proceeded systematically. An - advance guard should be able to repulse an attack and then assume the - offensive without outside assistance. An example which is not worthy - of imitation is the engagement of the 29th Infantry Brigade at the - =Hallue=. The brigade began the fight, without being compelled to do - so, and deployed its 4530 men on a front of 5000 m. The 30th Infantry - Brigade (4070 men) then entered the fight and deployed on a front - of 3000 m. in prolongation of the line of the 29th Brigade. If the - French had made a decisive attack at this point, the 15th Infantry - Division would not have been able to repulse it. - -Distribution in depth, for the purpose of warding off an enveloping -movement and for making a counter-attack, is more necessary in defense -than in attack; besides, a greater front may be covered in the former -case on account of the smaller losses. The following factors in part -determine the extent of front to be occupied and the number of troops -required to defend it: (1) the strength, natural or artificial, of the -position; (2) obstacles in its front; (3) salient angles which can be -easily enveloped; (4) the intentions of the commander (_i.e._, whether -he contemplates fighting a purely defensive combat or one including -offensive action). - -=Delaying actions= are usually fought at long and medium ranges as -purely passive defensive combats and no provision is made for replacing -casualties, the object of the fight being to avoid a decision. Few -men should, therefore, be placed in the firing line, but these should -be supplied with abundant ammunition. However, as the force desires -to avoid a decisive engagement by withdrawing, distribution in depth -should be provided to protect the flanks and to facilitate breaking off -the action. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). This requires that distances be -great. - -=Night attacks=, on account of the element of surprise involved, do not -require great distribution in depth; as a rule, the fight is decided -in a very short time by the collision of the opposing forces. However, -measures must be taken to protect the flanks, to ensure victory, and to -give the first line the impetus necessary to carry it forward in case -it is checked. - - The British attack on the Egyptian position at =Tel el Kebir= (1882) - was made by only 11,000 men on a front of about 6 km. After a short - fight the works were taken. - -An attempt will now be made to give some approximate figures for the -extent of front that may be occupied in various situations. - -Assuming one rifle for every three meters of front occupied, the -following might suffice for temporarily defending a line 1000 m. long: - - Firing line 300 rifles - Supports (one platoon in rear of each wing) 120 „ - Reserve (two companies) 400 „ - ---------- - Total 820 rifles - -Thus 0.8 men per meter would be sufficient. This is borne out by the -Boer War. With a good field of fire, even a thin firing line, provided -with plenty of ammunition, is capable of bringing any attack to a -standstill, at least for the time being. - -=A defense seeking a decision= requires fighting at short ranges; the -firing line must be kept constantly at the same strength; losses of -about one-fifth (killed, wounded, and missing) must be reckoned with; -and, finally, a reserve, consisting of about a third of the effective -strength of the force, is required for making the counter-attack. -The firing line is, from the outset, made as dense as possible, and -echelons posted on the flanks must oppose any advance against the -flanks. - -The following would thus suffice for defending a front of 1000 m.: - - Firing line 1000 men - Replacement of casualties 200 „ - Flank protection (2 companies) 400 „ - Reserve 800 „ - -------- - Total 2400 men - -Hence, 2.4 rifles per meter of front would be available for defense. - -The defense is decided by a successful counter-attack made by the -reserve, whereas the attack requires an additional force to cover and -assure the assembling and re-forming of the troops. The greater force -is naturally required by the attacker, who must be stronger than the -defender at the moment when the assault is made. The following would be -required for making an attack on a front of 1000 m.: - - Firing line 1200 rifles - Replacement of casualties (¹⁄₂) 600 „ - Flank protection 400 „ - Reserve 2000 „ - ----------- - Total 4200 rifles - -This would be equivalent to 4.2 rifles per meter of front. - -These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of course, and -should be considered minima. - - The number of troops required for attack or defense must be - determined separately for each individual case. At =Lovtcha=, 25 - battalions, 92 guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large - a force for attacking 8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At =Gorni - Dubniac=, 3 infantry divisions of the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked - 6 weak Turkish battalions having only 4 guns. After the first two - unsuccessful assaults on =Plevna=, the Russians overestimated the - strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated at 80,000 - men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, 90,000 men and - 400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 Turks and 60 - guns. - -From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the =maximum -frontage= is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure, -occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is -to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops. -On the other hand, the =maximum distribution in depth= is necessary -for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between -these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore -impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an -attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 373) -accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack at 150 m. and that -of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 m. It is impossible to give a -definite ratio of effective strength to combat frontage. Thus, while -in attack a company puts into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of -its front, the brigade employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units -a proportionally greater number. The necessity for distribution in -depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units -composing it. - -In a company, for example, a platoon is sufficient to fulfill, within -certain limits, all the functions of a reserve, while in a larger force -the duties of a reserve are so complex that each task (protecting -the flanks, reinforcing the firing line, giving the impetus for the -assault, and covering the assembling and re-forming of the attacking -force) must be assigned to a separate unit. Moreover, the duration of -a combat, and, in conjunction therewith, the necessity of reinforcing -the firing line and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the -force. During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined -to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity for -reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why 5 to 6 men -will not suffice, during the course of a combat, for a front wherein -only one man can use his rifle. From the foregoing it follows that the -frontage does not increase in proportion to the number of men. Thus, -an army corps would not occupy a front four times that of a brigade, -or twice that of a division. This is best illustrated by doubling or -trebling a plane area when both length and breadth have to be equally -increased.[242] - - [242] See _Taktik_, V, p. 46, et seq. - -The maximum frontage to be covered in attack by the firing line of -a =company= is fixed at 150 m., in order that the density and fire -power of that line may be constantly maintained during a prolonged and -costly action. During shorter (_i.e._, rear guard actions), or less -costly actions (defense), it is, however, permissible to exceed this -limit. The regulations by no means insist upon a literal interpretation -of this paragraph, since they mention the deployment of the entire -company, when it would certainly occupy a front of about 200 m. There -is no disguising the fact, however, that, when extended on a front of -200 m., it is out of the question for the company commander to lead his -men. - -The regulations do not fix the combat frontage of a =battalion=, as it -depends upon the tactical situation, and the battalion commander is -at liberty to place one, two, three, or four companies into the first -line. The frontage of a battalion would thus be 300 meters when making -an independent attack, and not exceeding 600 meters when fighting a -purely defensive action as part of a larger force, in other words, a -mean frontage of 400 meters. - -This is also true of the =regiment=. The combat frontage of a regiment -acting alone, will, at the start, seldom exceed that of two battalions -deployed abreast. From this we obtain a frontage of 600-800 m. for the -regiment when it is acting independently, and a frontage of about 1200 -m. when it is fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger -force. - -Military history tells us that an army corps consisting of 25 -battalions, acting as a part of a larger force in a deliberately -planned attack, occupies an average front of 2.5 to 5 km. According -to this, the frontage of a brigade would amount to about 800-1000 m., -_i.e._, to 6-7.5 rifles per meter of front. - - This limit was frequently exceeded during the =Franco-German war= - according to the circumstances under which the brigade went into - action and the commander’s estimate of the situation. If the brigades - had to cover the concentration of the columns in rear, and if the - battalions came into action successively, both brigade and battalion - frontages were frequently very great. The endeavor to close with the - enemy as soon as possible and the desire to bring a large number of - rifles into action, led to enormously increased frontages at the - expense of depth. The brigades which arrived later, entered the line - where other brigades were already engaged, and the result was a - dissolution and admixture of all tactical organizations. - - At =Colombey=, the 25th Brigade covered a front of nearly 3 km. with - 28 companies, only four or five companies remaining in close order. - Connecting with this brigade on the north, 22 companies, belonging to - two different divisions of the 1st Army Corps, covered a front of 4 - km., supported by three or four companies in close order. With such - an overextension of front the offensive or defensive power of a force - is, of course, crippled. - - During the battle of =Amiens=, the 3rd Prussian Brigade advanced in - three columns against the heights north of the Luce. On the left, six - companies of the 4th Infantry advanced from Domart, in the center, - four companies from Hangard, and on the right, two companies from - Demnin. A battery and a troop (_Eskadron_) were attached to each - column, and the right column was followed by the 44th Infantry. - - The French advanced troops were pushed back without special - difficulty, but at the northern edge of the timber, the - brigade now found itself opposite the French main position - Cachy--Villers-Bretonneux. The attack on this position began at once, - and in a short time the 4th Infantry and two batteries were in action - on the line East corner of the Bois de Hangard--Gentelles (5 km. - long). At the same time, the 44th Infantry with one battery deployed - on a front of about 2000 m. to the right of this line. The right wing - of the 44th Infantry subsequently advanced to attack the trenches - southeast of Villers-Bretonneux and captured them. The enveloped - French left wing withdrew to the village named, and rallied on strong - reserves. - - This was the situation when the fight came to a standstill toward 1 - o’clock P. M. The brigade fought in a thin line over a mile (four - English miles) long. The reserve only consisted of three companies - of the 4th Infantry, at Gentelles, and four companies of the 44th - Infantry, in rear of the right flank. - - A defeat was averted only by the timely interference of other - troops, especially of strong artillery (76 Prussian guns against 24 - French).[243] - - [243] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 47, et seq. - -The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to make it easier -for battalion and regimental commanders to designate combat sections; -the higher leaders reckon with regimental and brigade fronts. In war, -however, the numerical strength varies constantly, and it is therefore -advisable not to reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number -of rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned in drill -regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent of front to -be covered by organizations which act as part of a larger force in an -attack seeking a decision. The extent of front to be covered in other -situations, under favorable or unfavorable attack conditions, requires -in each case a separate estimate. - -In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions of front, -which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to avoid the costly frontal -attack. - -At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British division under -Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of 12 km.; and during the -attack on Pieters Hill, on February 27th, 1900, the troops under -General Buller (30,000 men) extended over a front of 11 km. - -At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of 17 km. -(0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed 25,000 rifles, 5000 -troopers, and 116 guns on a front of 32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In -the engagement at Diamond Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under -Lord Roberts (40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties -could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had given up all -thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February 18th, 1900, the 6th -Division and the Brigade of Highlanders succeeded in getting close to -the enemy, but there the attack failed on account of the lack of an -impetus from the rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages -were greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason for this -overextension lies in the fact that a numerically inferior assailant -was desirous of vanquishing the defender, and in order to accomplish -this purpose, he was obliged to make an extensive use of the spade and -to put all rifles into the first line. - - ===================+=======+=======+======+==========+========== - | | | |Per 10,000| - | Jap. | Russ. |Front-|men.[244] | Per m. - | | | age. |Jap.|Russ.|Jap.|Russ. - -------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+----- - | | | km. | m. | men. - Liao Yang (West and| | | | | | | - South front) |106,700|150,000| 26 |2600| 1750|3.9 | 5.9 - | | | | | | | - Shaho |148,000|257,000| 48 |3330| 1980|3. | 5. - | | | | | | | - Mukden (exclusive | | | | | | | - of Yalu Army) |247,000|336,000| 96 |3960| 2970|2.6 | 3.4 - -------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+----- - - [244] According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the _Journal - of the Officers’ Association_, Tokio. - -The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small -reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be -increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the -attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no -means a disadvantage.[245] - - [245] At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km. - between the Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by - only one infantry regiment of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry - regiments, and one battalion of artillery. However, the Russians were - fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The insignificant - danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised by - the French regulations. - -During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the -necessary reinforcements. - -~INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.~[246] - - [246] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteristische Reflexionen_. - - ========+======+=======+=============+==================+================ - Rifle. |Year |Battle.|Belligerents.|Per km. of the |Remarks. - | | | |combat frontage. | - | | | +-----+------+-----+ - |of | | |Bat- |Esca- |Field| - |the | | |tal- |drons |guns.| - |Cam- | | |ions |@ 150 | | - |paign.| | |@ 900|troop-| | - | | | |ri- |ers. | | - | | | |fles.| | | - --------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - Muzzle | 1815 |Water- |French | 12 | 19 |46 |After Napoleon’s - loaders.| |loo +-------------+-----+------+-----+concentration - | | |British | 10 | 15 |25 |for battle - | | | | | | |toward noon. - +------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - | 1859 |Sol- |French and | 7 | 5 |19 |After the victo- - | |ferino |Sardinians | | | |rious advance of - | | +-------------+-----+------+-----+the Austrian - | | |Austrians | 7 | 2.5 |21 |VIIIth Corps to - | | | | | | |S. Martino. - +------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - | 1866 |Cus- |Austrians | 8 | 2. |17 | - | |tozza | | | | | - --------+ +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - Breech | |König- |Prussians | 9.5| 10 |39 |Situation at - loaders | |grätz +-------------+-----+------+-----+noon. - large | | |Austrians | 10 | 8.5 |43 | - caliber.| | |& Saxons | | | | - +------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - | 1870 |Wörth |Germans | 9 | 5 |37 | - | +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+ - | |Grave- |Germans | 11.5| 9 |46 | - | |lotte +-------------+-----+------+-----+ - | |St. |French | 8 | 6.5 |32 | - | |Privat | | | | | - --------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - Mag. | 1899 |Colen- |British | 1.5| | 4 |Including 1¹⁄₂ - rifles | |so 1st | | | | |heavy guns. - of | |battle,| | | | | - small | |Dec. | | | | | - caliber.| |15th | | | | | - +------+-------+ +-----+------+-----+---------------- - | 1900 |Colen- | | 2.5| 1.5 | 7.5 |Including 1¹⁄₂ - | |so, 2d | | | | |heavy guns. - | |battle,| | | | | - | |Febru- | | | | | - | |ary | | | | | - | |27th | | | | | - --------+---+--+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - 7.6 mm. | M | 1|Febru- |Russians | 1 | 0.4 | *5 |Total extension - against | u | 9|ary | | | | |from the Liao to - 6.5 mm. | k | 0|20th | | | | |Tung-wha-sien. - Mag. | d | 5| | | | | |*Incl. 1 heavy - rifles. | e | .| | | | | |gun. - | n | | | +-----+------+-----+---------------- - | | | | | 3 | 0.7 | *5.5|Excl. East and - | | | | | | | |West Det. *Incl. - | | | | | | | |3 heavy guns. - | | | +-------------+-----+------+-----+---------------- - | | | |Japanese | 3.5| 0.8 |*15.5|Exclusive of the - | | | | | | | |approaching Vth - | | | | | | | |army. *Incl. 2 - | | | | | | | |heavy guns. - | | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+---------- - | | |March |West |Rus- | 5 | 0.8 |†18 |†Ex- |Excl. of - | | |3d |front.|sians | | | |clu- |Trans- - | | | | | | | | |sive |Baikal - | | | | | | | | |of |Cossack - | | | | | | | | |heavy|Div. - | | | | +------+-----+------+-----+guns.| - | | | | |Japan-| 3.5| 1 |†11.6| |Excl. of - | | | | |ese | | | | |2d Cav. - | | | | | | | | | |Brigade. - | | | +------+------+-----+------+-----+ | - | | | |South |Rus- | 1.7| .5 | †6 | | - | | | |front.|sians | | | | | - | | | | +------+-----+------+-----+ | - | | | | |Japan-| 2.2| .3 | †5.6| | - | | | | |ese | | | | | - | | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+ | - | | |March |West |Rus- | 4.6| 0.7 |†15.6| |Excl. of - | | |7th |front.|sians | | | | |Trans- - | | | | | | | | | |Baikal - | | | | | | | | | |Cossack - | | | | | | | | | |Div. - | | | | +------+--- -+------+-----+ | - | | | | |Japan-| 4 | 0.6 |†10.5| |Excl. of - | | | | |ese | | | | |Cav. Div. - --------+---+--+-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+---------- - -Let us now recapitulate the most important points which have a bearing -on combat frontage: - -1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely fixed, as it -depends upon the situation and the purpose of an action. - -2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an extended front -to be obstinately defended with a weak force. - -3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the size of the -force. - -4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) fighting as part -of a larger force is justified in deploying on a wider front than when -acting alone. - -The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the -force and with the number of units composing it Only the result can -decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage was justified in a given -case. A commander will endeavor to hold certain parts of the line with -a weak force, posted in groups, while, at the decisive point, he will -throw in every available man in order to gain the victory. - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - =Austria-Hungary.= Frontage depends upon the tactical situation and - the terrain. The frontage of a company acting as part of a larger - force in attack is fixed at about 130-150 paces (97-112 m.). “In - other situations, a greater frontage is, as a rule, permissible.” - The battalion acting as part of a larger force in attack, “is, as - a rule, not to cover a frontage exceeding its own front when in - line”--in peace exercises, 300-400 paces (225-300 m.). With companies - of 200 men, 2 rifles, and in the battalion 2.6 rifles are reckoned - per meter of front. “The increased fighting power of infantry, due - to better fire effect, in general permits a greater frontage to be - covered. This will often be taken advantage of, in order to make - as many troops as possible available for the decisive stage of the - combat. But this frontage should not be so great, that the requisite - power of resistance is weakened, or that tactical coöperation or the - attainment of the object of the combat are impaired.” Further than - this nothing is prescribed. - - =France.= Nothing definite is prescribed. The combat is carried on by - groups separated by intervals. - - “When _an organisation is acting as part of a larger force_ and has - to advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective, - its commander may from the outset push a strong force into action, - retaining a reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks - of this force is in the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in - rear of the flank which may be threatened. When _an organisation is - acting alone_, and when both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is - pushed forward and a reserve is retained....” - - The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be held, - especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions - are those dictated by necessity--always to assure effective control - by the leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical - units. - - This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which no - longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle. - - =Belgium.= The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger - force in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased. - - =Japan.= The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical - with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a - company is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding - that of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does - not exceed 1500 m. at the initial deployment. - - =Russia.= The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is - governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective - strength, and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No - figures are given for the larger units. - - =England.= While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin - firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite - extreme after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the - first line may employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (_i.e._, 90 - m.), distributed as firing line, supports, and battalion reserve; - the latter may consist either of one company or of parts of several. - Entire companies are deployed only in exceptional cases, for - instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult to bring - up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses - likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses will - be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the - firing line and the supports combined. In accordance with these - general principles, a battalion may deploy for attack on a front - not exceeding 800 yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed). - A brigade consisting of four battalions will thus be able to cover - either a front of 1400 or one of 2100 m., depending upon the number - of battalions put into the line. - - =Italy.= Only general principles are prescribed. “Skill in judging - the proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of - peace by exercises on varied ground and under different situations, - especially when organizations approximately at war strength are used.” - - -5. COMBAT ORDERS.[247] - - [247] V. KIESLING, _Gefechtsbefehle_, Berlin, 1907. - -Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct the course -of an action by despatching adjutants from time to time. This must -be borne in mind when issuing a combat order. Such an order can only -regulate the launching of the troops into action and prescribe a task -as a guide for their subsequent conduct. Since leaders change during -the course of the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the -component parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose of -the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander expects -of them; it is not sufficient to order them to occupy a certain -point--they must be told whether or not they are to defend it. An order -which directs troops “to oppose” the enemy, conveys an extremely vague -meaning; it should specify instead whether they are “to attack” the -enemy, or whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate -leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, forces -the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends to attack, or -to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight a delaying action, -or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even the lowest grades must be -informed of this decision of the commander. The troops will perform -anything that is demanded of them in definite terms. On the other hand, -the commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an order -and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative when an order -is not received or the situation changes. - -Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German I. D. R.) -and definite combat tasks, each complete in itself (par. 293 German -I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical units to be employed in the -first line (battalions in case of a regiment; regiments, as a rule, -in case of a division). In attack, the order indicates the front upon -which each one of the larger units is to deploy and what portion of the -hostile position it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent -of the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the limits of -which the particular unit must make the most of the accidents of the -ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, unity of action is ensured -by the mutual coöperation of the tactical units fighting abreast of -each other (par. 475 German I. D. R.), and by the designation of a -unit upon which the others regulate their movements, without, however, -thereby being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of -combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander “can shift -the decisive point of the action to any place desired, reinforce where -he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, -finally, bring about the decision.” - -The first orders--those for putting the troops in motion in the desired -direction--are usually verbal; more detailed orders, which are the rule -from the brigade on up, are issued subsequently. (Par. 274 German I. -D. R.). In most cases, the commander knows quite well what he wants, -but only the effort required in expressing in writing what he desires -to say, enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary -clearness. Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order -and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation; -the superior remembers only what he desired to say at the particular -moment, but not the language in which the order was couched. Written -orders minimize the possibility of a misunderstanding. They have the -further advantage that the recipient has in his possession a document -to which he can always refer in case of doubt. - -Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, for protecting -flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, since these matters -are attended to as a matter of course, every leader being held -responsible for making proper dispositions, within the limits of his -command, for the performance of these duties. The higher the rank -of the commander, the farther he should stay away from the scene of -battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the course of -the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them, -or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander -selects a position too close to the point where the first line is -engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows -himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range -of vision.[248] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position, -has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication -with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his -subordinates. - - [248] This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise - of Kuropatkin. The latter led in person too much and was completely - lost in the details of minor troop-leading. - -At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned -among the different members of the staff. - -The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy -and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with -the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal -flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme -described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is -furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring -troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders. - -The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of -facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is -very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this -is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will, -however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the -day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed. - - In =France= this is regulated by _Agents de liaison_. These are to - keep the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the - action of subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders. - “The importance of permanent communication between leader and - subordinate increases with the distances separating troops in action; - the leader’s influence on the course of the combat can be ensured - only by these _agents_. - - As a general rule, one mounted officer from every infantry unit, - from the battalion up, reports to the next higher commander for the - purpose of maintaining communication. This officer may detail a - cyclist or trooper to accompany him. He is to be prepared to give all - necessary information in regard to his unit, and to keep in touch - with the general situation in order to inform his immediate superior - in regard to it. He communicates with his own unit either by sending - orderlies with messages, or by carrying the orders of the commander - in person.” - - -6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD. - -Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the battlefield -only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; even intrenched -connecting posts communicating with one another by means of shouts -or signals do not absolutely ensure communication in a protracted -engagement. Heliographs or signal lamps are valuable only during the -approach to the battlefield and in large battles.[249] The same is -true of the field telegraph, by means of which, for example, division -headquarters may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. In -an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,[250] and -signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone and telegraph -has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at headquarters, since the -coming and going of messengers is eliminated; on the other hand, the -commander is at once informed of every reverse (which may perhaps be -only temporary) and will not always be able to resist the temptation of -leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese made a -very extensive use of the various means of communication, but neglected -to guard against an interruption of their lines of information by -installing signal flag stations. This cannot be dispensed with. In the -Japanese army visual signals[251] were not used, and in the Russian -army they were not adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of -communication did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both -armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, as -now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose of -establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.[252] - - [249] See _Taktik_, III, p. 116, et seq. - - VON LÖBELL’S _Jahresberichte_ 1906, p. 390: _Employment of - Heliographs and Signal Lamps in Southwest Africa_. - - [250] Wig-wag signals have been abolished and Morse signals - prescribed in their stead by Cabinet Orders dated January 16th, 1908. - - [251] Sir IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, pp. - 173-174, 196, 241 and 323. - - [252] The station apparatus furnished by the firm of “Zwietusch” of - Charlottenburg, weighs 5.5 kg. with its battery. - - In defensive positions, which are held for a prolonged period, - it is, of course, practicable to establish telephonic connection - with the most advanced line. This was, for example, the case in the - Japanese 10th Division on the morning of March 3rd, 1905 (Mukden). - On this occasion the division commander in rear was informed by - telephone of the presence of wire entanglements in front of the - Russian position, and permission was asked and granted to postpone - the attack. - -Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used in -Germany.[253] The signal motions are made in an upright position, -the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being used. This -method of signaling permits communication to be kept up within a radius -of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used at night and in combined land and -naval operations. The wig-wag signals are easily learned and entirely -sufficient for communicating over distances within 3 km.; they also -permit information to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are -employed for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals -possess the additional advantage that they can be made by a man while -in a prone position.[254] Wig-wag signals are a very effective means of -communication and will rarely fail.[255] - - [253] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, June number, 1906, and - March number, 1907. - - [254] Signals with wig-wag flags can be made by a man lying flat - on his belly or on his back; this is, however, frequently impossible - with outstretched arms and the sender must be content to make the - signals by grasping the staves of the two flags in the middle, then - placing them in appropriate position relative to each other (for - example in making the letters, d, e, k, l, p, u). - - [255] The signals prescribed in par. 11 German I. D. R. are very - effective if made with wig-wag flags; if made with signal flags they - require constant observation, without, however, precluding mistakes. - For example, when given with signal flags, the signal “halt” - “h, - h, h,” (.... .... ....) is frequently confused with the signal “the - assault is about to begin” (... ... ...). This mistake is not so apt - to occur when wig-wag flags are used. - - When General Stakelberg, after his right flank had been turned at - Wafangu, sent orders to withdraw to General Gerngross, the commander - on the left flank, it took the officer who carried the order through - this mountainous country, nearly an hour to cover the 5 km. which - separated the two commanders. An order sent by means of wig-wag flags - could have reached the leader in question within a few minutes. - -A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his -subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him -to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The -permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace, -and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities -of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy -for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does -not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his -wishes.[256] - - [256] Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army - with the deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. KUNZ, - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience - of the commander-in-chief was natural perhaps, but, due to his - interference, the enveloping movement skillfully initiated by General - v. d. Tann, could not be executed. - - =Austria-Hungary.= “Infantry telegraph detachments” are assigned - to every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.[257] - These detachments are charged with the duty of keeping up the - visual signal and telegraph service in field and mountain warfare. - The Morse alphabet is used in visual signaling and in telegraphic - communication. In this the Austrian regulations differ from the - German. The infantry telegraph detachment attached to an infantry - division is divided into three sections, and is equipped with - telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each section - consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped with - 24 km. of wire. - - [257] _Streffleur_, 1905, April-May number. - - =France.= Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some of - the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of - visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are - expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire). - - =England.= Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment. - Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals. - - -7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY. - -(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.). - -It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic -reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in -Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less -good and often deficient, so that in consequence thereof surprises -were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line -when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed -aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom -of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened, -cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the -infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but -this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered -that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything -of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very -things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional -cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to -it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry -reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry -patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of -providing for its own reconnaissance. - -The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact -that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted -officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except -for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for -carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the -reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the -slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and, -as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any -value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in -that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being -observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was -in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed, -and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order -formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses. - - In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed - in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers - (=Magersfontain=, =Colenso=), which induced it to deploy all of its - lines on a wide front at an early moment. - - The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance, - whereas the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so - that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders. - “Local reconnaissance was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These - carefully approached our positions in small groups. One man of each - group laid his rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches, - raised his head and observed, while three or four of his companions, - whom he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches. - Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the ground for - protection. This mode of procedure continued for seven hours.” - - The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely - deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that - neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the - Japanese 2nd Division at =Fuchau= and =Kapukai= on March 10th, 1905. - This division advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified - Russian position, was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had - to fight under unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy - losses, from early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation - compelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of the - Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during the battle of =Liao Yang= (2nd - Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater importance - and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle at =Sykwantun= - caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave the position - assigned him on the heights of the =Yentai= mines and to march toward - the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over covered - terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and rear - by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),[258] and thrown back in utter - rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had - been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of - the Japanese. - - [258] For details of the attack made by Sasaki’s Brigade, see - GERTSCH, _Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege_, I, sketch 14. - -The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect a force from -surprise. This may be accomplished by sending out combat patrols, and -by company commanders riding ahead in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.). -The latter are likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to -selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance -the better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to the -best advantage. - -The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when we have to -reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to screen his force.[259] - - [259] The attacker’s reconnaissance must be prevented as long as - possible. Frequently patrols in the foreground will suffice for this - purpose. (Par. 406 German I. D. R.) - -Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance nor create -the necessary opening through which the leaders can reconnoiter in -person. Stronger forces are requisite, and “reconnaissance companies” -may have to be sent out toward the enemy to serve as a support for the -patrols, to reinforce them when necessary, and to constitute natural -collecting stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the -result of these endeavors to obtain information,[260] for the defender -will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an -attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in this -case, since the information obtained in regard to the position and -strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. 134 German F. S. -R.). - - [260] See _Taktik_, IV. p. 214, et seq. The results of the - reconnaissance in force made at Neuville aux Bois were very - unsatisfactory. - -In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining information -by means of detachments of all arms which also prevent hostile -reconnaissance. In minor operations the French send out infantry -detachments, which, from secure hiding places, pick off observers, -screen the position of their own force, and prevent the enemy from -using covered avenues of approach. However, these very patrol combats -may cause the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to -the hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined -that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the -details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance. -Then the commander will wish to know whether or not an immediate attack -is feasible, or whether it is advisable to wait until nightfall for -bringing up the infantry. The local reconnaissance determines where -the flanks of the enemy are located; whether the position in front is -the hostile main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy -has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is -posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement -has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[261] -to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the -position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with -or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary -to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[262] In moving to new -firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and -dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a -flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for -permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific -orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may -seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze--Rezonville (battle of -Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the -troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take -advantage of the information gained by those troops.[263] - - [261] See _Taktik_, V, p. 243, et seq. - - [262] HOPPENSTEDT (_Schlacht der Zukunft_, pp. 134 and 140) draws a - graphic picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality. - - The procedure outlined by that author (_Ibid._, p. 122) for - indicating, by means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile - fire, seems practicable. He states: “Holding his flag upright, the - member of the patrol proceeds steadily on his way to Weyer. Now he - has arrived at the point where the road bends slightly toward the - south; his flag descends,” etc. - - [263] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 128, et seq., - p. 243. - - The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the - successful “fire surprises” carried out by the Boers at Modder River - on November 28th, 1899, and at Colenso, against Hart’s Brigade - advancing in dense masses, on December 15th, 1899. - -The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should -not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but -that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To -the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking -off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been -incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. -For such tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”[264] after the -Russian pattern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness -in difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank -and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided with -ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can hamper the -reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of their own force, -ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and -finally, having made a skillful lodgment, they can become very annoying -to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room -for such employment is lacking. To form picked men into special -organizations, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The -constant transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during -the second part of the South African war was fatal to the British -infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its good -men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned officers. While -everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an -organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure -become apparent, however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the -absence of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents -the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate -the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat -situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness -going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. -Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned -officers and brave privates, whose example will revive his courage.” -(Par. 268 German I. D. R.). - - [264] V. TETTAU, _Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee_, Berlin, - 1901. - - HOPPENSTEDT, _Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos_, 1907. - -If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a -mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an -entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know -his men only imperfectly. - - Before the 95th Infantry (French) made its attack on the brewery - of =l’Amitié= (south of =Noisseville=), on August 31st, 1870, a - reconnoitering detachment had ascertained the strength of the - position and the manner in which it was held by the defender.[265] - - [265] _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 192. - - =Examples of the successful employment of flanking fire by small - forces:= - - The flanking fire, delivered from the =Bois des Ognons= by about - 30 men of the 12th Company, 72nd Infantry, compelled the French to - withdraw their left flank. (Combat on the Gorze--Rezonville road, - 16th August, 1870).[266] - - [266] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 146. - - At =Gravelotte-St. Privat=, flanking fire is said to have caused the - withdrawal of nine French battalions which had until then delivered - an effective fire upon the Prussian Guard Artillery.[267] - - [267] _Ibid._, 10, p. 24, and 12, p. 24, et seq. - - -8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN. - -The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting unobstructed -view, while the attack requires stretches of ground hidden from the -observation of the enemy and sheltered from his fire, in order that -the troops may be deployed for action at the decisive ranges. A piece -of ground will rarely possess all these advantages, but, nevertheless, -well-trained infantry will be able to defend successfully a piece -of ground that has a poor field of fire, and infantry which is -energetically and skillfully led will be able to cross even an open -plain. - -At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor to -keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely be able to take -advantage of available cover, but at a halt and while firing they -will be able to do so. Their taking advantage of the ground should -not lead to a diminution of the energy of the advance, and should -not cause parts of the force to fall behind.[268] “The terrain -exerts considerable influence on the formation of troops. Open -country requires that distances be increased so that the losses may -be minimized, while close country permits distances to be reduced. -The commander should take particular care not to let this advantage -escape him, since it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the -first line promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on -covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.). - - [268] This is equally true of ground that is difficult to march - over; the troops must cross it. The evasion of difficult portions of - terrain usually leads to disorder and a dispersion of the troops. - For the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade at Wörth, see KUNZ, - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 101. (Thick underbrush in - the woods on the Fuchshübel.) - -An attack over a plain devoid of cover “should be avoided as far as -possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered -to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point -where an approach under cover is practicable. If suitable terrain is -lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over -the open plain.” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). In contrast with the -continuous skirmish lines of the past, which are still favored by the -Austrians, the German regulations permit a gap to be left in the line -where an open plain devoid of cover exists, without thereby implying -that it cannot be crossed. The French regulations (par. 257), contrary -to the German, contemplate that “only weak detachments be left in the -open, fire swept spaces,” and that the troops intended for the fire -fight be pushed forward under available cover, separate groups being -thus formed.[269] - - [269] This should be an important hint for the opponent. The lines - of approach may perhaps be sheltered with reference to a certain - point, but there will always be portions of the enemy’s line from - which a fire may be directed upon these avenues of approach and the - troops marching thereon. - -“This mode of fighting in groups does away with the continuous firing -lines of the past which no longer fulfill the requirements of modern -battle. - -“The rearmost fractions of the force endeavor to avoid open spaces, -or such as are swept by hostile fire, by moving, sometimes in a close -order formation and again widely extended, toward the lines of cover, -without regard to the direction in which the enemy may happen to be. -The unit that finds the advance easiest takes the lead, and all the -others, supported by the fire of their immediate neighbors, endeavor to -follow it. - -“Depending upon the character of the terrain and available cover, the -forces deployed for the fire fight will, therefore, advance in a -rather dense formation in the areas favorable for such a procedure, -while weak forces only will be found on open and fire swept ground. The -advance is regulated by designating the objective of the attack and by -stipulating the necessity of mutual coöperation.” - -This French group attack owes its existence to the silently accepted -fact that an open plain cannot be crossed when swept by unsubdued -hostile fire; it reckons with an unfavorable terrain such as an -attacker will only find in exceptional cases. We by no means fail to -recognize the fact that individual portions of the attacker’s force, -when favored by the terrain, will be able to advance more quickly than -others, and that other portions may even be compelled to discontinue -their advance for a time; but it seems a precarious proceeding to lay -down this result of the hostile fire effect as a guide in the training -of troops. The group tactics of the Boers stood the test only on the -defensive; they could not prevent individual groups from being attacked -by far superior forces. In an attack, the units favored by the terrain -will constitute the framework upon which the units which are compelled -to advance more slowly, will form. There is, however, danger that these -leading groups will succumb to the superior fire of a defender who is -deployed on a broader front. Although this may not happen, the spirit -of the regulations tempts leaders to drive everything forward, to rush -ahead with isolated parts of the force. An additional drawback of these -systematic group tactics lies in the difficulty of deploying the troops -moving in the narrow avenue of approach. If the French infantry really -desires to avoid the plain and wants to stick principally to cover, -who will guarantee that the great freedom allowed it, will not cause -it to crowd together under cover, lose the direction to its objective, -and become completely mixed up?[270] This danger is the more imminent -since no importance is attached to a more definite limitation of the -frontage to be covered, while wide extension is, on the contrary, -actually preached. The fear of losses will gain the upper hand and -the attack will lose its energy. “It is easy to teach troops to be -over-cautious, but it is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops -against the enemy.” (Sir IAN HAMILTON). - - [270] The plentiful cover along the ravine of the Mance brook was - by no means an actual advantage for the Ist Army. The 18th of August - presents the strange phenomenon of the success of the attack on St. - Privat, made over terrain devoid of cover, and the failure of the - attack on the French IInd Corps, made over the most favorable terrain - imaginable. - - Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the - advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past =Vionville= on =Flavigny= - and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire - directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and - left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction - designated by the regimental commander.[271] One company of the IInd - Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march - direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault - made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to - the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd - Battalion.--“A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed - from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against - the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of - the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the - 35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry) - were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move - in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The - direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies - (the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry).”[272] - - [271] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 560. - - [272] V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A) - showing lines of advance of the companies. - -While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate -the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the -march direction be maintained and that cover be utilized only within -the assigned “combat section”; they leave it to subordinate commanders -to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground. -“Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an -attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible, -or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance -over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an -approach under cover is practicable. _If suitable terrain is lacking -to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open -plain._” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). For purposes of instruction, it -is entirely correct to require “that even on terrain devoid of cover, -well-trained infantry should not open fire until the medium ranges are -reached.” (Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile -fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, should not -impair the energy of the advance and cause portions of the attacking -force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating it. On the other hand, we -should not be afraid to leave gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy -would, in any case, not be able to use them for his own advance. - -Thus we have here the German united attack, on the one hand, and -the French group attack, on the other. Since group tactics no -doubt diminish losses, they should be used in delaying actions, in -holding attacks, and in defense; they should unquestionably not be -employed when a concerted, rapid movement of skirmishers to the front -becomes necessary. How should the Vth Corps at Wörth and the Guard -at St. Privat, for instance, have attacked, according to the French -regulations? - - - - -VI. MACHINE GUNS.[273] - - [273] _Exerzierreglement und Schieszvorschrift für die - Maschinengewehrabteilungen_, 1904. - - Captain BRAUN, _Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung_, - Berlin, 1905. - - -1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARM. - -The effect of canister had decreased considerably with the introduction -of rifled guns, and this was the more noticeable, because, -simultaneously therewith, the accuracy and rate of fire of the infantry -rifle was greatly increased. The attempts to re-invest the artillery -with its one-time superiority were directed in two channels: one aimed -at perfecting shrapnel, which had been rather neglected up to this -time (England, Prussia, Austria), while the other resurrected the -mediaeval idea of the “barrel-organ gun,” with a view of assembling a -number of rifle barrels and of combining thereby the accuracy of the -small arm with the moral effect of canister. Thus, among others, the -4-10 barreled _Gatling_ gun was invented in America in 1861, it being -the oldest representative of this type of weapon. In order to obtain -a weapon matching the Prussian _needle_ gun, Bavaria adopted the 4 -barreled _Feldl_ gun and France the 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_.[274] -The name _canon à balles_, which was given the gun, sufficed to -indicate the manner in which it was intended to be used. As these guns -frequently failed in action, offered the same target and required the -same equipment and approximately the same road space as field guns, -the states who had first adopted them, finally decided to dispense -with them on European theaters of war. The further development of -machine guns was not especially accelerated by the fact that the French -_mitrailleuses_ had not fulfilled the expectations entertained for -them during the Franco-German war, isolated cases excepted,[275] and -that they were quickly silenced by the German artillery, which was -equipped only with percussion shell, as soon as their position was -ascertained. Thus, these guns seemed useful only in colonial wars and -on board war ships for warding off torpedo boats. Although they took up -very little room when in position, they were not considered useful for -flank defense in fortresses, on account of the frequent breakdowns. In -addition to their height, other defects developed; for example, they -could obtain only a very insignificant rate of fire, betrayed their -position by the powder smoke, and lacked the means for ascertaining -ranges. - - [274] The 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_, cal. 13 mm., fired volleys at - the rate of 125 rounds per minute. Its fire was considered equivalent - to that of 50 needle guns; its weight was 1,485 kg., each of its - four horses pulling 371 kg.; its maximum range was 3,000 m. Its most - favorable, practical range 500-1,500 m.--A glaring defect of the - gun was that fire pauses occurred whenever cartridges were fed into - the slot and that the lateral spread of its cone of dispersion was - extremely small. - - [275] Battle of Gravelotte. _Gen. St. W._, pp. 705-712, 723 and - 781. The employment of three Gatling guns in rear of the park wall - of Yoré, during the defense of the plateau of Auvours. (_Revue - d’artillerie_, 1900, p. 297; _Gen. St. W._, IV, p. 817). - -The situation changed entirely when a practicable, smokeless powder -was invented, and Hiram Maxim, an American, succeeded in utilizing the -energy of the recoil (a factor neglected up to that time, although -annoying to the marksman) for opening the breech, inserting a fresh -cartridge into the chamber, closing the breech, and automatically -firing the piece.[276] Through this invention it became possible to -fire a maximum of 900 and an average of 500 rounds per minute, from a -single barrel moving laterally back and forth. The desire to obtain a -still greater rate of fire was checked effectively, because of the fact -that with such an increase the danger of jamming increased and the use -of infantry ammunition was precluded. The water in the jacket continues -to be a decided drawback to this type of gun, for it is not always -easily procured, impairs the mechanism by freezing, makes it difficult -to change barrels, and constitutes a considerable weight. If cooling -the barrel by means of water were to be dispensed with, the accuracy of -the piece would rapidly diminish, and, after 1000 rounds of continuous -fire, bullets would tumble even at short ranges. At the present time -water is still the most effective means of cooling the barrel.[277] - - [276] Of the other types the following may here be mentioned: - _Hotchkiss_ (France), insufficient cooling of the barrel by air; - _Schwarzlose_ (Austria), machine gun model 7, a very simple weapon - which has only a single spring. - - [277] In the _Colt_ Machine Gun, which is not water-cooled, after - 500 rounds had been fired, a cartridge inserted into the piece - exploded in seven seconds, and cartridges placed in the chamber a - quarter of an hour later exploded in 20 seconds. - -Machine guns fire ordinary small arms ammunition carried in loops on a -canvass belt (weighing 1 kg. when empty), which is generally capable -of holding 250 rounds of 8 mm. cartridges weighing 8.315 kg. These -belts are very carefully manufactured, the material being shrunk, so -as to prevent their shrinking when in use. Two men can refill an empty -belt with 8 mm. cartridges in seven minutes, according to Swedish -experiments, while a belt filling machine can refill one in a still -shorter time. The rate of fire of machine guns is approximately 500 -rounds per minute. They are variously mounted,[278] according to -circumstances, on sleds (in which the gun rests on a frame similar -to that of a wheelbarrow), on tripods, or, for mountain warfare, on -basket frames. Although the greatest readiness for firing was obtained -with guns mounted on cavalry carriages (two-wheeled carts, similar to -limbers, and equipped with shafts), which also permitted the greatest -amount of ammunition to be carried along, these guns offered such a -high target that their use, in an infantry action, was entirely out of -the question, leading only to their being quickly silenced. Another -defect was that the guns were unable to follow immediately upon the -heels of the organization to which they were attached. Guns mounted -on light tripods possess the least readiness for firing, as the gun -must be dismounted during each change of position; but tripods are -indispensable in mountain warfare. In India a tripod frame on wheels -is employed. The basket frame, which is very light and is carried on -the back of a soldier, affords nothing but a rest for the gun. This -type of mount has the disadvantage of necessitating, in reality, -freehand firing when the barrel is supported near the muzzle; that -the operator, when firing continuously, becomes greatly fatigued, -and that the accuracy suffers in consequence thereof. The advantages -of the tripod and the wheeled carriage have been skillfully combined -in the carriage adopted in Germany. In this the gun rests on a sled; -this is in turn supported by the carriage proper, which is wheeled. -In exceptional cases the gun may be fired from the carriage, but -ordinarily it is fired from the sled, which is detached from the -carriage for that purpose. This sled permits the gun to be laid at any -desired height and enables it to follow the infantry anywhere during an -action.[279] - - [278] - - British cavalry machine gun with mount 152.3 kg. - Machine gun with tripod } 16.5 + 18 = 34.5 „ - Machine gun with basket frame } latest model 35.0 „ - Machine gun with sled } 16.5 + 24 = 40.5 „ - - [279] The following complement per gun is considered necessary: - - Germany 14¹⁄₂ men 9 horses. - Switzerland 8¹⁄₂ men 12 horses. - - In the Russo-Japanese war the machine gun detachments of the Russian - cavalry were equipped with _Rexer_ guns which can scarcely be - considered machine guns owing to their slow rate of fire and extreme - heating of the barrel. - -Machine guns can be transported upon larger vehicles capable of -being unlimbered; they can also be carried on pack horses or other -pack animals, and for short distances by men. Although pack animal -transportation enables the guns to follow the troops anywhere, the -amount of ammunition that can be carried along is limited, and the -opening of fire is retarded, since gun and tripod must first be -assembled; the opening of fire may even be delayed when a pack animal -falls; ammunition cannot be carried on the gun; and the animals get -sore backs even if pack saddles are carefully adjusted. - - -2. THE POWER OF MACHINE GUNS. - -The machine gun is noted for its adaptability to any terrain, and the -constancy of its high rate of fire as compared with that of a body of -infantry, which decreases with the range, the diminishing visibility -of the target, and prolonged fire. On the other hand, a single jamming -can make a machine gun valueless, at least for the time being. For -this reason, the Germans employ machine guns only in platoons, as a -rule, and the Swiss let both guns of a platoon fire simultaneously -only in exceptional cases. Theoretically, the maximum rate of fire of -600 rounds per minute will rarely be attained; and 200-300 rounds per -minute will usually suffice against prone targets. In Germany volley -and continuous fire are employed; fire by a single piece is used only -to ward off patrols when the machine guns do not want to betray their -position.[280] - - [280] The following kinds of fire are used in the countries named - below: - - Austria: Single shots; volleys (20-25 rounds); fire by a single - piece. - - Switzerland: Fire by a single piece; volleys (20-30 rounds); rapid - fire (volleys of 100 rounds); and fire at will (both pieces of a - platoon simultaneously employing rapid fire). The last-named is - only employed in exceptional cases, for example, when the danger is - imminent and when favorable opportunities offer. - -A volley consists of about 25 rounds and is followed by a pause for -observing the effect of the fire. It is employed in adjusting the fire -upon difficult targets in rolling country. Fire for effect consists, -as a general rule, of “continuous fire,” and is interrupted only when -the tactical situation requires it. The water in the jacket should be -renewed and oiling attended to during the pauses in the fire, whether -these grow out of the tactical situation, or are made necessary by -technical considerations. - -The fire is either directed upon a point (concentrated fire), the -elevation and direction of the piece being fixed, or it is distributed -over the entire target or over a designated part of the same (sweeping, -and progressive fire).[281] - - [281] For example, when sweeping the crest of the parapet of a line - of trenches, or the edge of a wood, both hands move the gun slowly - and evenly from side to side. When searching an area in the direction - of depth and obliquely (progressive fire with sweeping), the left - hand gives the gun the proper horizontal direction, while the right - manipulates the slow motion elevating gear. When firing on rapidly - moving targets--for example skirmish lines advancing by rushes--or - targets advancing over rolling country, both the traversing and - elevating movements may be unclamped. The rapidity with which the gun - is moved, when sweeping or searching, depends upon the range and the - kind of target on which the fire is directed. As a rule, the piece - is moved slowly and steadily. The accuracy of the fire is impaired - when the gun is moved too rapidly. When the fire is well observed, - it might be advantageous, in exceptional cases, when firing against - either stationary or moving targets, to direct the gun, without - aiming, after the bullets have been seen to hit their mark, by - properly manipulating the elevating and traversing apparatus while - the firing is in progress. - -The ballistic properties of the gun are the same as those of the -infantry rifle.[282] - - [282] The destructive power of the projectiles fired from a machine - gun, as they strike within a small space, is, of course, much greater - than that of the scattered projectiles of a body of infantry. Trees - having a circumference of 30 cm. are felled by machine gun fire in - about 15 seconds at a range of 450 m. - -In the machine gun an important factor in the dispersion of infantry -fire--flinching and errors in aiming--is eliminated, while the heating -of its barrel and the vibrations of its carriage in continuous fire do -not produce a corresponding increase in dispersion. On this account -the cone of dispersion of the machine gun is more compact than that -of the infantry rifle and its accuracy at long ranges is therefore -considerably greater than that of the latter.[283] Firing tests -indicate that the accuracy of machine gun fire diminishes only very -slightly with increasing range, provided the appropriate elevation is -used.[284] - - [283] According to Austrian experiments the depth of the beaten - zone of a machine gun is only ¹⁄₃ to ¹⁄₂ that produced by the fire of - a platoon of infantry. - - [284] The following average results were obtained in experiments - made at the Musketry School, while firing on infantry targets - advancing alternately at quick and double time: - - At ranges from 2000-1600 m. 1.72% hits - „ „ „ 1500-1200 m. 2.53% „ - - Firing against disappearing head targets placed at intervals of - 0.60-0.70 m.: - - At 600-800 m. 1.89% hits „ 800-1100 m. 1.69% „ - - In firing first with an elevation of 1800, then with one of 1750 m. - (the range being 2000-1600 m. and 254 rounds being expended per gun), - on 50 advancing, kneeling targets, placed at intervals of 1 m. 3.10% - hits were obtained and 52% figures were placed out of action in 1¹⁄₂ - minutes. - - In firing at the same targets for 2¹⁄₃ minutes, with an elevation of - 1900 m. (304 rounds expended), the result dropped to 0.3% hits and - 8.3% figures placed out of action. - -In war the influence of the compact cone of dispersion will be still -more potent, for we will then have to reckon with a single, specially -selected machine gun marksman who is well protected, while the -excitement of battle will produce a far different impression upon an -organization composed of men differing materially from each other. The -compactness of the cone of dispersion of the machine gun requires -that the appropriate elevation be used if the fire is to be effective -against well concealed prone skirmishers. This can be accomplished only -in part by employing range finders. Since the probable error of these -instruments is ±5% of the range, this determination is so inaccurate -for machine gun fire that nothing remains but to increase the -dispersion artificially. When it is impossible to observe the strike of -the bullets, the dispersion may be artificially increased by employing -combined sights, two in a single platoon and three in a machine gun -battery (company), and above all by sweeping. The employment of -combined sights would appear to be too rigid a method; sweeping fire is -at any rate better.[285] - - [285] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre_, 2nd Ed. p. 185, et - seq. - -From general ballistic data, Lieutenant-General ROHNE[286] computes -that the following results would be obtained by a machine gun and a -detachment of skirmishers when firing with the appropriate elevation at -a broad target 1 m. high:-- - - Machine Detachment - gun of skirmishers - At 500 m. 32.4 16.8% hits - „ 1000 „ 15.3 8.1% „ - „ 1500 „ 10.2 5.1% „ - „ 2000 „ 6.4 3.2% „ - - [286] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1901, IV, p. 268. - -This nearly double superiority is reversed, however, when the -appropriate elevation is not used: - - ======+======================================================== - |Firing on a target 1 m. high, the following percentages - | of hits may be expected when the error in estimating - | the range is-- - Range.| 50 m. | 100 m. | 150 m. | 200 m. - +-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------ - |Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir- - | guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish- - m. | | ers.| | ers.| | ers.| | ers. - ------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------ - 500 | 27.5 | 16.0| 19.0 | 13.8| 7.0 | 11.7| 1.3 | 7.3 - 1000 | 9.2 | 6.8| 2.0 | 4.8| 0.2 | 2.7| -- | 1.0 - 1500 | 3.6 | 3.9| 0.2 | 1.8| -- | 0.5| -- | 0.1 - 2000 | 1.7 | 2.2| -- | 0.8| -- | 0.2| -- | -- - ------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------ - -From this it follows that the good qualities of the machine gun can be -utilized to the fullest advantage only when the appropriate elevation -is used. When this is not accurately known, the fire effect of the -machine gun drops down to zero more quickly than that of a skirmish -line. Where local conditions are at all favorable, the determination of -the appropriate elevation is facilitated by observing the strike of the -projectiles in “volley fire.” - - According to British firing tests, at ranges from 500-1000 yards an - error of estimation of 100 yards, reduces the effect of the fire - 50 per cent. According to firing tests 75% of all shots fired by a - machine gun and body of infantry are distributed as follows: - - =====+==================+==================+==================== - | Machine gun. | Detachment of |Errors of estimation - | | infantry. | permissible for the - At |Depth of 75% strip|Depth of 75% strip| machine gun. - m. | m. | m. | m. - -----+------------------+------------------+-------------------- - 450 | 112 | 192 | 54 = 12 % - 900 | 63 | 108 | 31 = 3.5% - 1350 | 54 | 90 | 27 = 2 % - 1800 | 67 | 140 | 31 = 1.8% - -----+------------------+------------------+-------------------- - -It is clearly apparent that the permissible error of the range finder -is smaller than the depth of the vertical dispersion strip covered by -75% of the bullets. - -The difficulty of hitting a target lodged in some feature of the -terrain requires that the machine gun be used first of all against -large targets that are visible for a short time only. When the -appropriate elevation is used, a decisive effect may be confidently -counted on within a short space of time; when an inappropriate -elevation is used and the fire is not properly observed, only -accidental hits can, as a rule, be expected, even when the fire -is directed on tall, dense targets. When the fire is directed on -skirmishers lying down, the effect produced is not commensurate with -the amount of ammunition expended, and a slight error in the elevation -used may nullify the effect entirely. A straight line of trenches, -which is plainly visible, is, on the other hand, an eminently favorable -target. The heating of the barrel, and the difficulty of replenishing -ammunition and renewing the water in the jacket, tend to work against a -participation of machine guns in a protracted fire fight. The machine -gun is not at all suited for carrying on a prolonged fire action. - -It is very difficult to determine the relative combat value of a body -of infantry as compared with that of a machine gun. One will not be far -wrong in placing this value between 50 and 60 men. - -In experimental field firing at the Swiss Infantry Musketry School, it -was demonstrated that 30-40 skirmishers almost in every case rapidly -gained the upper hand over a machine gun in the open, at 900 m., but -that the infantrymen had small chances of success when the position of -the machine gun could not be accurately determined. In Switzerland a -machine gun is considered equivalent to 50 infantrymen. Skirmishers are -the most difficult target for machine guns to fight, and, at the same -time, they are the most dangerous. When the fire is well observed, a -good effect can, indeed, still be counted on, when the fire is directed -at prone skirmishers at ranges up to 1000 m., but this is not true when -the fire cannot be observed; in the last mentioned case, no effect -worth mentioning is produced. - - =Austria.= In a field firing test (which was repeated four times) - between a machine gun (gun pointer covered by a shield) and 30 - infantrymen, the following results were obtained at 600 m. in 1¹⁄₂ - minutes: - - Infantrymen 120 rounds 10 hits (9%) - Machine gun 215 „ 14 „ (7%)[287] - - [287] Firing tests of the Army Musketry School at Bruck, a.d. - Leitha, 1905. _Streffleur_, Apl. 1906, p. 524. - - =England.= At the Infantry School at Hythe, in a firing test at 300 - yards, lasting 5 minutes--perhaps the longest period during which - continuous fire is possible--the power of a Maxim gun was found to - be equivalent to 60 rifles. In field firing this comparative power - dropped down to 25-35 rifles. In this connection, it should be - borne in mind that moral influences do not make themselves felt in - firing under peace conditions, and that, on the other hand, a single - favorable hit can place the machine gun out of action for a long - period, while the skirmishers can keep up the fire. - - -3. INFANTRY VERSUS MACHINE GUNS. - -It will rarely be possible to concentrate upon a machine gun battery -of six guns a fire equivalent to its own. Because of the small -target offered by machine guns, it is necessary for a firing line to -concentrate its fire upon one machine gun at a time, thus gradually -silencing the battery in detail. This procedure is feasible because -it is very difficult for the machine guns to reach with their fire -all parts of a well concealed skirmish line. The normal relation, -unfavorable for the infantry, changes in its favor, however, as machine -guns cannot keep up a high rate of fire for a prolonged period, even -when nothing is considered but ammunition supply; as serious breaks are -especially apt to occur when the gun is worked to its maximum capacity; -and as the ammunition expended in one minute (3600 rounds) cannot -produce an effect unless not only the correct range but also the proper -elevation is accurately known. - -The fight against machine guns may be advantageously conducted -according to the following principles:[288] - -1. Infantry skirmishers should conceal themselves so well that it will -be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them. Color of -immediate vicinity (shade) and background should be considered; platoon -and other leaders must not stand upright; objects that are clearly -visible should be avoided. - -2. It should be made difficult for the hostile machine guns to observe -their fire (ricochets) and to measure the range. (No prominent features -that would facilitate such measurements should be located near the -infantry position). - -3. The firing line, as far as this is possible, should not be -continuous; the several parts of the line should be posted in echelon. - -4. Kinds of fire: Lively fire at will should be used. - -5. Expenditure of ammunition: At least 600 rounds should be expended -against each machine gun. - -6. At the outset a single company should concentrate its fire upon a -single machine gun, picking out the one that is most clearly visible. -Machine guns on the flanks are not good targets, as a strong wind may -deflect the fire directed upon them. - - [288] Switzerland: Machine guns, “on account of their small gun - squads, are more sensitive to losses than artillery. They cannot - adjust their fire so easily as artillery, but, when once on the - target, the effect of their fire is great. - - “The principles governing the combat against artillery are - applicable, in general, to the fight against machine guns. It may be - assumed that at medium ranges, one platoon of infantry will suffice - for silencing one machine gun, provided the platoon of infantry - fights the action under favorable conditions. At short ranges, a few - good marksmen suffice for silencing a machine gun. For this reason - selected men are sent forward, when the situation permits, to sneak - up to the machine guns and to pick off the men serving them.” - -The following rules, governing the conduct of infantry when exposed to -machine gun fire, may be deduced from the above: - -Even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid -of cover, when exposed within a range of 1500 m. to the unsubdued fire -of machine guns; nothing remains but for them to lie down, and to gain -ground to the front in groups, or one by one. - -The same is true of route columns. They can only deploy to the right -and left front at double time, and take cover. - -The most unsuitable formation under machine gun fire is the column of -platoons, whether lying down or in motion.[289] - - [289] Within ³⁄₄ to 1 minute a column of platoons (lying down) - sustained an average of 4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at - 900-1100 m. with 42 and 32%, respectively, figures placed out of - action. - -If the column of platoons is reached by effective machine gun fire, -when lying down, line must be formed. The men must not rise, however, -to execute this movement, but the platoons should crawl forward into -line. For the men to rise would mean annihilation. - -The low target offered by machine guns makes them a difficult target -for field artillery to hit, in spite of the accuracy with which the -latter can adjust its fire. - - -4. MACHINE GUNS IN GERMANY. - -The German machine gun (drawn by 4 horses driven from the saddle) is -mounted upon a sled which forms the firing frame. On the march, this -sled is placed on a wheeled carriage, from which it must first be -detached (10-15 seconds) before the gun is used; in exceptional cases, -the gun can be fired from the wheeled carriage. - -The gun commander is mounted. Two of the gunners are seated on the axle -chest of the carriage, their carbines buckled to the gun carriage; two -are seated on the limber chest, their carbines slung over their backs. -When surprised by a direct attack, all the men that can be spared form -as skirmishers in the intervals between the guns of the machine gun -battery. The machine gun can be served by a single man. The water in -the jacket need not necessarily be renewed when the gun is fired for a -short time only. - -The machine guns can be used on any terrain passable for infantry. When -detached from the wheeled carriage they can even surmount considerable -obstacles. In action, they present no larger target than skirmishers -fighting under similar conditions, and are capable of offering more -resistance than infantry. - -The sled can be carried or drawn by the men for short distances. The -ammunition, placed in belts holding 250 rounds each, and packed in six -boxes, is similarly drawn on an ammunition sled. If the conditions -permit, the guns may be drawn by horses. - -The “fighting battery” consists of six guns, formed into three -platoons, and an ammunition platoon (three ammunition wagons and one -store wagon); the combat train consists of officers’ and other led -horses. The field train consists of one baggage wagon, one ration -(commissary) wagon, one forage wagon, and a second store wagon. - -[Illustration: Machine Guns in Germany. - -Lead Team Hitched to Gun. - -Carrying the Machine Guns.] - -The movements and gaits of a machine gun battery are the same as those -of a field battery: the order in line, at close or extended intervals, -in which the guns are abreast, the intervals between them, measured -from center to center, being 5 and 17 paces, respectively. The order in -line, at extended intervals, is used in moving to the front or rear; -the order in line, at close intervals, for assembly, for movements in -that formation, for parking, and for parade. The section column[290] is -the principal maneuver formation on the battlefield; it is employed as -an assembly formation on a road, and as route column. (Par. 320 German -F. S. R.). In section column the guns follow each other at a distance -of four paces. In addition to this column, a column of platoons is -used, in which the platoons follow each other at a distance of 22 -paces. (This may be reduced to 6 paces). - - [290] The guns are placed in rear of each other, the ammunition - wagons and other vehicles bring up the rear. _Translator_. - -A machine gun battery has available 87,300 rounds of ammunition (10,500 -rounds with each gun and 8100 rounds in each ammunition wagon, or a -total of 14,550 rounds per gun), which may be drawn forward to the -firing position upon sleds, in boxes holding 250 rounds each. The -ammunition wagons are refilled from the ammunition wagons of the light -ammunition columns of the cavalry division and from the wagons of the -infantry ammunition columns marked with a red stripe, which carry -ammunition for machine gun units. A reserve machine gun is carried with -the ammunition column. - -The machine gun battery combines high infantry fire power -(approximately equivalent to that of the skirmishers of a German -cavalry regiment, armed with carbines, or to that of 4-6 platoons of -infantry)[291] with instant readiness for firing, and a mobility which -enables it to follow the mounted arms anywhere. The chance of producing -a sudden fire effect within a short space of time must be especially -utilized, and, therefore, an endeavor should be made to put entire -machine gun batteries into the first line. The employment of single -guns is precluded owing to the danger of breakdowns, and the employment -of platoons is especially proper on the defensive as well as in action -at short range. - - [291] A German cavalry regiment at peace strength numbers from 552 - to 576 sabers: a platoon of infantry (on a peace footing) numbers - from 48 to 53 men. - - In making a comparison between a cavalry regiment and a machine gun - battery, it must be borne in mind that horse holders are deducted - from the strength given for a cavalry regiment. _Translator_. - -[Illustration: Order in Line - -(extended intervals).] - -[Illustration: Column of Platoons - -(closed up).] - -[Illustration: Section Column. - -(Route Column).] - -[Illustration: Explanation of Symbols used:] - -[Illustration: Order in Line - -(close intervals).] - -The duties of machine guns naturally grow out of their tactical -advantages. Their fire power should be saved for decisive moments, when -the development of strong fire power at short ranges is requisite, and -when the available time and the situation do not permit of pushing -infantry into action. The machine gun batteries, which constitute -an independent arm, and which are assigned to cavalry and infantry -divisions, are best adapted for these duties. - -The heavy matériel and the teams designed for rapid movements make the -machine gun battery less suited for employment in infantry combat, -where such a high degree of mobility is not so necessary. In the -battle on the Shaho an employment of machine guns by platoons in -the first line, came about quite naturally. The guns prepared the -assault, reinforced weak points, and supported the advance. In Germany, -provisional machine gun companies consisting of six two-horse machine -guns, driven from the carriage (these guns cannot be fired from their -carriages), have been adopted for this purpose. These machine gun -companies are principally an auxiliary weapon of the infantry, and, -distributed by platoons to the battalions, or sent into action as a -single unit by the regimental commander, they serve the purpose of -augmenting the fire of the infantry. - -Movements at increased gaits are possible in exceptional cases only; -as a rule, the guns follow the infantry at a walk, and in combats -terminating in a defeat, it may frequently be impossible to keep them -from falling into the hands of the enemy. The permanent assignment of -machine guns to battalions does not seem to be advisable. - - -5. GOING INTO POSITION. - -The principles which govern the reconnaissance and occupation of a -position by field artillery are applicable also to machine guns. -The tactical situation determines whether the guns should move -into position under cover or in the open. As a rule, the interval -between two adjacent machine guns in line is 17 paces; but the proper -utilization of favorable cover does not preclude posting the guns close -together. It may likewise be advantageous to post the guns in echelon -on the flanks. - -In action the carriages remain, as a rule, in the nearest cover in -rear of the line. The advance from this point is effected by the men -carrying or dragging the detached guns and ammunition sleds; under -certain circumstances, it may also be advisable to have the guns -or ammunition sleds drawn forward by single horses (mounts of gun -commanders). On level ground the ammunition platoon and the wheeled -carriages of the machine guns take post in rear of and as close as -possible to the guns. Whether the two groups are combined, or whether -the machine gun carriages should occupy the nearest, and the ammunition -wagons the more distant cover, depends upon the available cover. The -commander of the machine gun carriages sends full ammunition sleds -to the firing line at an early moment and has empty boxes and belts -brought back. - -[Illustration: A Machine Gun Platoon Crawling Into Position.] - -[Illustration: Range Finder. A Machine Gun Platoon in Position.] - -[Illustration: A Machine Gun Platoon Intrenched.] - - -6. THE FIRE FIGHT. - - The machine gun. squad consists of one gun commander and four - gunners, numbers 1-4; number 2 is the gun pointer. The gun commander - sees that the gun is set up for the prone, sitting, or kneeling fire - position, according to the terrain, supervises the service of the - gun, which can be served in any position of the body, and removes all - obstructions that interfere with its effective use. The gun pointer - handles the gun, _i.e._, he loads it, sets the sight, aims and fires - it. No. 3, who lies to the right of the gun pointer, assists the - latter in these duties, places a box of ammunition on the right of - the gun, and feeds the ammunition belt into the slot. When necessary, - he takes the place of the gun pointer. No. 1 lies in rear of the gun - pointer, keeps his eye on the battery and platoon commanders, and - transmits their orders to the gun commander and gun pointer. No. 4 - has charge of the replenishment of ammunition; he takes cover or lies - down 20 paces in rear of, or on a flank of the gun. - - The range finders, without special orders to that effect, measure - the range to targets as they appear, or to fixed points, and call - it out to the battery commander. The battery commander designates - the target, the range, and the kind of fire to be used. The platoon - commanders assign a section of the target to each of their guns, - designate the elevation that is to be used, and supervise the service - of the guns; they are especially held responsible that the fire - is directed upon the proper target. Platoon commanders constantly - observe through their field glasses the strike of the bullets and - the enemy. The commander of the gun carriages is charged with their - supervision; he constantly sends forward ammunition, and, when - necessary, men and matériel, into the firing position. When the - detached guns change position, he follows the movement under cover - with the gun carriages, bringing them as close to the firing position - as possible. - - After machine gun batteries had been employed at maneuvers as an - auxiliary arm of the cavalry, they did especially good work in the - fights in Southwest Africa,[292] where they were not opposed by - artillery. - - [292] _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1904, Nos. 136, 139 and 140. - - Through their ability to follow a skirmish line into the densest - thickets, they were a valuable support to the infantry in the close - country in which the African fights took place, where artillery of - necessity had to fail owing to absence of a clear field of view. It - was demonstrated, however, that the machine gun squads became so - engrossed in the work of serving their guns that supporting troops - had to guard them against surprise. - - In the engagement at the =Waterberg=, the machine guns did splendid - work in meeting, with an effective volley fire, the sudden, energetic - attacks made by the Hereros against the flank and rear of the - Germans. In two critical moments, during the attack against the left - flank of the advance guard, and during the attack made with a yell - against the right and rear of headquarters, it was principally due - to the machine guns that the enemy, who had come within short range, - was repulsed. Participants of this fight believed that the Hereros - did not dare to make a real attack when machine guns went into action - against them. It had been impossible to avoid using single machine - guns. Just as the enemy was making an attack upon the 11th Company, - machine gun No. 3 (2nd Machine Gun Battery), which had done splendid - work, broke down. This was the only case of jamming that occurred. - Although exposed to a galling hostile fire, the gun commander managed - to change barrels in 30 seconds, and then to resume the firing. The - 2nd Machine Gun Battery expended 20,775 rounds of ammunition; the - expenditure of the different guns varied between 7350 and 120 rounds, - according to the part taken by them in the action. The ammunition - supply was certain and steady; no shortage of ammunition, not even a - temporary one, occurred anywhere. - - -7. MACHINE GUNS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. - - =Switzerland.= In 1892 Switzerland began to organize four mounted - Maxim machine gun companies, which were assigned to the weak - cavalry brigades (consisting of six troops[293]) on account of the - defensive role of the Swiss cavalry and the lack of batteries of - horse artillery. Three machine gun companies were assigned to the - fortifications on the St. Gotthard and one to St. Moritz for the - purpose of augmenting the fire of the advanced positions belonging to - those fortifications, and to cover the approaches thereto. - - [293] Eskadrons. - - A Maxim machine gun company consists of 6 officers, 105 - non-commissioned officers and privates, 99 horses (24 pack horses - and 24 draft horses), 8 guns mounted on tripods, and 7 vehicles (two - of these are two-horse supply and baggage wagons, one four-horse - field forge with field kitchen, 4 two-horse ammunition wagons, each - carrying 15,520 rounds of ammunition). The guns and the ammunition - are carried on pack animals. A packed gun horse carries a load of 108 - kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats. An ammunition horse carries a load - of 123 kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats and 8 ammunition boxes (each - holding 250 rounds, or a total of 2000 rounds weighing 90.5 kg.). A - machine gun company of eight guns is divided into four platoons, each - consisting of two guns and four ammunition horses, and the combat - train, consisting of four ammunition wagons and the field kitchen. - Every gun is commanded by a “gun chief,” and two of the five men - belonging to the gun squad are horse holders. After the command - “halt” has been given, 1-1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to get the gun - ready for firing. The company carries 5940 rounds of ammunition for - each gun. - -[Illustration: Switzerland. - -Machine Gun and Ammunition Horse. - -Gun Commander and Gun Ready to Fire.] - - Route column from line is formed by the guns moving successively - in the proper direction, the two ammunition pack animals following - directly in rear of the gun to which they belong. The company takes - up a road space of 150 m. For movements off the road the company may - move in “mass,” or with the platoons in “combat formation.” When - in “mass” the platoons, each in route column, are abreast, with - intervals of 10-20 paces between them. When the platoons are in - “combat formation,” the two guns of each are placed abreast at equal - intervals. - -[Illustration: Platoon In Route Column.] - - The three machine gun companies assigned to the line of - fortifications consist of two to three platoons, each of four guns. - A platoon consists of 2 officers and 60 non-commissioned officers - and privates. The men are armed with rifles and equipped with alpine - sticks. “Gun carriers” (_Waffenwarte_) carry the gun basket, which - weighs 33 kg. The weight of the water in the jacket is only 1 kg. - “Ammunition carriers” (_Munitionswarte_) carry the ammunition in - specially constructed frames, each man carrying 500 rounds. - - Kinds of fire: “_Fire by a single gun_” is employed at the opening of - an action to drive away patrols and reconnoitering officers, when it - is not desired to betray the presence of machine guns to the enemy. - - “_Volley fire_” is the usual fire employed by machine guns and - corresponds to the volley fire of infantry. After the target and the - elevation have been designated, the platoon commander directs that - fire he opened by calling the name of the gun pointer who is to fire. - A pause is made after every series of 20-30 shots, which is used to - make necessary corrections. - - As soon as the proper elevation has been determined, “_rapid fire_” - is opened. In this the _guns of a platoon fire alternately_. The fire - is delivered in series of 100 rounds, and the time during which one - of the guns is not firing is utilized by the non-commissioned officer - with it to examine and oil the mechanism. - - The “_fire at will_” (continuous fire) of the machine guns - corresponds to the magazine fire of the infantry. _All the guns fire - simultaneously_ series of 50 to 100 rounds, interrupting the fire for - a moment at the end of each series for the purpose of examining and - oiling the mechanism; then they resume the fire with a new series of - 50 to 100 rounds. On account of the great expenditure of ammunition - entailed, and also in order to prevent the premature deterioration - of the matériel, fire at will is used in exceptional cases only, for - example, when danger is imminent, or when favorable opportunities - offer. - - “_Progressive fire_” may be employed against narrow, deep targets, - when the range could not be accurately determined. It may also be - employed for searching an area 100-200 m. deep. - - =Austria= has begun to organize _cavalry and mountain machine gun - batteries_ consisting of four guns each. The machine gun Model 7 - (_Schwarzlose_), with pack animal equipment, has been adopted. The - gun horse carries 500, and each of the two ammunition horses, 1500 - rounds of ammunition. During mobilization two ammunition horses - are to be added for each gun. Mountain machine gun batteries are - similarly organized; each ammunition horse carries 2000 rounds of - ammunition. On the gun itself, and on the gun frame, 44 belts, each - holding 250 rounds, or a total of 11,000 rounds, are carried.[294] - - [294] The Schwarzlose machine gun weighs 18 kg. exclusive of frame - and the water in the jacket. (The Maxim weighs 28 kg.). - - The formations employed by the cavalry machine gun batteries are the - order in line (at close intervals), the combat order, and the route - column. - - The mountain machine gun batteries, carrying guns and ammunition - upon pack horses, are equipped with tripod and basket mounts. These - machine gun batteries combine the system of mounting and carrying - employed by the Swiss cavalry and mountain machine gun companies. - Three pack animals are employed to transport each gun with its - ammunition. The gun squad consists of three men. Officers and - non-commissioned officers are mounted; the other men of the battery - are not. Unpacking the guns, posting them, and getting them in - readiness for firing, is managed in a similar manner as in the Swiss - machine gun companies. - - The gun adopted for _infantry machine gun batteries_ is the light and - simple Schwarzlose machine gun, Model 7. - - Springs Parts of breech Screws & Pins Weights - Maxim 14 35 52 27.5 kg. - Schwarzlose 1 11 13 17.5 „ - - Tripod mounts and pack animal transportation are necessary in view - of Austrian theaters of war. The batteries consist of four machine - guns. - - “The great length of modern battle fronts, and the gaps and local - combats along the latter, would seem to make a distribution of - machine guns along the entire front desirable. Attention is thereby - directed to organizing the machine guns to be employed with the - infantry as ‘Regimental Machine Guns.’ Such an organization would - best ensure the training of this new arm for the infantry combat and - the prompt attainment of an understanding of its employment. - - “In the cavalry, the difficulties of organizing, training, and - employing machine guns are considerably greater than in the infantry. - These difficulties are best overcome by organizing the machine guns - assigned to cavalry into independent batteries, and placing them at - the disposal of the higher cavalry commanders. - - “In determining upon the size of the machine gun batteries attached - to infantry, an attempt should be made to combine minimum size with - adequate fire effect and maximum mobility. Two machine guns would - seem to be almost the maximum number that should be posted at one - point in an infantry action. From a tactical point of view, it is, - moreover, undesirable to post a greater number at one point, because - gun shields, steam, etc. would frequently form too prominent a - target, for the hostile artillery to forego firing on it promptly and - with telling effect. - - “In connection with the desire for more than two machine guns in each - infantry and Jäger organization--about two guns per battalion--the - tremendous increase in ammunition trains should be considered. It - would also be well to bear in mind that we have, as a matter of fact, - not even become accustomed to the numerous ammunition columns of our - rapid fire artillery. - - “In the cavalry, the necessity of dividing a machine gun battery - for the purpose of assigning the parts thereof to brigades, and - of assigning machine guns to reconnaissance and other independent - detachments, must be reckoned with. When we bear in mind that single - machine guns are to be used only in exceptional cases, the machine - gun battery intended for the cavalry cannot well be made smaller than - four guns.”[295] - - [295] _Streffleur_, January, 1908, p. 114, et seq. - - =England.= During the =Boer war= 1-2 machine guns mounted on a high - carriage were assigned to each of the British battalions. These guns - were unsuited to employment in an infantry combat and were quickly - silenced. The campaign demonstrated that these guns could frequently - not be used, and that they stood idle in rear of the line. They were - not combined into detachments for the purpose of supporting the - attack, as should have been done, until the engagement at =Pieters - Hill= (27th Febr., 1900). On account of the long range at which these - guns came into action, the effect of their fire was indeed very - small, but, nevertheless, its moral effect impaired the steadiness - of the Boer aim. Since the great fire power of these guns can be - brought into play only when several of them are employed together, - it is not a good plan to assign single guns to cavalry regiments for - the purpose of supporting the dismounted line in action. Only the - commander of the entire force, and not each battalion commander, - is able to judge where the employment of machine guns would be - advantageous. The proposal to assign machine guns to the artillery - was not followed, as it was justly feared that the machine guns would - then be assigned tasks to which they were not adapted. - - At the present time, each battalion has a machine gun platoon - consisting of two guns. Both guns with their tripods, and a portion - of the ammunition, are transported on one wagon drawn by two horses. - They are in addition equipped with a two-horse ammunition cart. The - complement consists of 1 non-commissioned officer, 15 privates, 1 - saddle horse, and 4 draft horses. - - Each battalion of mounted infantry has a machine gun platoon which is - similarly organized. Each of the four vehicles of this platoon is, - however, drawn by four horses. In addition, this platoon is equipped - with six machine gun pack saddles for transporting the guns on pack - animals. The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 first sergeant, 23 - privates, 16 saddle horses, and 16 draft animals. - - The machine gun platoon of a cavalry regiment consists of only - one gun, which is carried on a four-horse wagon, and a four-horse - ammunition wagon. The platoon is equipped with three pack saddles. - The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 13 - privates, 11 saddle horses, and 8 draft horses. - - The following ammunition is carried by the British machine gun - platoons: - - ======================+========+==========+==========+======== - | | In the | In the | - |With the|ammunition| Division | Total - | organ- | column |ammunition| No. - |ization.| of the | column. |rounds. - | |F. A. Bns.| | - ----------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------- - Infantry M. G. P. | 11,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 31,500 - Mtd. Infantry M. G. P.| 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500 - Cavalry M. G. P | 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500 - ----------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------- - - =Japan= and =France= seem to have decided to follow the British in - assigning machine gun platoons to regiments. In =Japan=, soon after - the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, the Guard, the 1st, 2nd, - 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, and the two independent cavalry brigades, - had machine gun batteries consisting of 6 guns each. During the - winter 1904-5, 320 machine guns were gradually placed in position, - singly and by platoons, in the fortifications on the Shaho. - - =Russia.= At the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, a machine gun - company was assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 5th East Siberian Rifle - Brigades. This company consisted of 5 officers, 85 combatants, 13 - non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 29 draft horses, and eight guns. - The latter were mounted on high carriages, and were protected by - steel shields. Of the ammunition, 1350 rounds, in belts holding 450 - rounds each, were carried on each gun carriage, and 4500 rounds - on each of the six two-wheeled ammunition carts. The field train - consisted of nine one-horse carts. The loss of the machine gun - company at the =Yalu= was probably due to the fact that the guns, - mounted on high carriages, were quickly deprived of their mobility - in their second position, after they had, from their first position, - effectively flanked the advance of the Japanese infantry. Immediately - after this first lesson, the high wheeled carriage was apparently - abolished, and the tripod adopted. On September 26th, 1904, the - machine gun companies were reorganized. There were (old) wheeled, - and (newly-organized) so-called “mountain machine gun companies,” - the latter having pack animal transportation. These companies were - assigned to infantry and Rifle divisions and were designated by the - numbers of their divisions. - - On December 12th, 1906, the machine gun organization was again - changed, because it was asserted that the assignment of machine gun - companies to divisions hampered the division commander; that the - employment of 8 guns at one point was injudicious; and that so large - a machine gun battery actually induced a scattering of the guns. - Infantry, Reserve, and Rifle regiments are each assigned a machine - gun organization consisting of 4 guns, mounted on tripods, equipped - with 6 mm. steel shields, with pack animal transportation. - - Complement: 3 officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 46 privates, - 7 non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 21 pack and draft horses (8 of - these for carrying ammunition), 4 ammunition carts, and 5 train - wagons. The personnel is drawn from a regiment in which the men to be - detailed for machine gun duty are trained. - - According to an officer who commanded a machine gun company in the - battle of =Liao Yang=[296], his company went into position on August - 30th, on the right flank of its division behind an earth embankment - at the south edge of the village of Gutsealing, and 300 m. from the - railroad running in a southwesterly direction. This position was - taken up with the object of preventing the envelopment of the right - flank of the division. Sufficient time was available for cutting - down the kaoliang crop for 650 m. Beyond this range the kaoliang - fields continued for several hundred meters. Directly in front of - the position of the company there was a hill, upon which several - mounted men showed themselves toward 10 A. M. As soon as fire was - opened on them, they threw themselves down in a field covered - with tall kaoliang. When these mounted men had reached a fairly - open space, about 900 m. from the machine gun company, they could - be clearly seen. In rear of them was observed a mountain battery - of artillery, which endeavored to go into position on the hill - mentioned, apparently with a view of directing a flanking fire on - the Russian skirmishers farther to the front than the machine guns. - Fire was opened at once, without first bracketing the target, the - first gun firing at 1200 paces (about 850 m.), and each succeeding - gun increasing the range by 25 paces, thus covering with fire a space - 150 m. deep. Immediately after fire was opened on it, the mountain - battery attempted to escape to the right, but succumbed to the fire - of the machine guns. The latter had fired about 1¹⁄₂ minutes, and had - expended 6000 rounds of ammunition. About noon, hostile (Japanese) - skirmishers attempted to cross the railroad embankment, one by one, - apparently with a view of flanking the machine guns. The latter - opened fire on the Japanese, combined sights, and, for a short - period, rapid fire with sweeping being resorted to. The movement - made by the Japanese was discontinued; an advance made by groups - against the front of the machine guns got only as far as the edge of - the cleared kaoliang field. In the open, the skirmishers were unable - to advance a single step; every attempt, on their part, to rise, - was prevented. Whether it would have been possible to advance by - crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, can, of course, not be - determined now. - - [296] _Russian Invalid_, October 1904. - - At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and - annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire. - At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from - the machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness, - however, in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered. - When their fire became more and more galling, the machine gun - commander decided to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15 - men (Reservists and horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to - drive them out. The undertaking was successful. It was found that - this continuous annoying fire had been kept up by only 1 officer and - 24 men. - - At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a - signal detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry, - directed on this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after - two machine guns, one using an elevation of 1025, the other one of - 1075 m., had fired on that point for a short time, the Japanese - disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns succeeded in repulsing an - enveloping movement made against their right flank. This movement was - betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang stalks. Toward 7 P. M., - the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the machine guns, which - suffered considerable losses, although the personnel was protected by - an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. This fire did not - cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was evacuated - by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night found the - machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company had - lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition, - or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority - of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish - line can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter. - - In the defensive position on the =Shaho= and at =Mukden=, machine - guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets - and under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel - ANISINOW, good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050 - m., against closed bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry - (_Eskadrons_) up to 1400 m.; against batteries of artillery, halted - in the open, staffs, and columns, the fire was sufficiently effective - up to 1960 m. - - -8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN BATTERIES. - -Machine guns will never be able to replace artillery at long ranges; on -the other hand, they will often find an opportunity to support other -arms with their fire at medium and short ranges. - -It has been asserted that machine guns do not always follow the -movements of the firing lines in action, that the commander of a -force is not always able to find a good position for them; and the -question raised whether the space taken up by the machine guns and -their ammunition wagons in a column could not be more profitably filled -by companies of infantry or by a portion of an ammunition column of -corresponding length. To be sure, machine guns are a special arm; the -justification of their existence lies in the combination of constant -readiness for firing with highly developed mobility, so that, held back -under direct control of the commander of a force, they give him the -means wherewith to produce within a short time a sudden effect, in the -nature of a surprise. This is the very purpose for which machine guns -were created. They are not intended for prolonged fire action, not for -accompanying an infantry skirmish line in an advance by rushes, and, -least of all, for fighting well covered firing lines. In addition, the -fact that machine guns make it possible to concentrate fire quickly on -any space, whereby the moral effect is considerably increased, ought -not to be underestimated. It would seem to be advisable to employ -machine guns in conjunction with infantry when it is impossible to -develop a powerful fire on account of the conformation of the ground, -but when such fire is desirable for commanding approaches or defiles; -further, when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example, -in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be pushed far -to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, which can then be -held by a few men during the pauses in the fight.[297] Although machine -gun fire may perhaps be relatively less accurate than that of a body of -infantry, the value of pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy -within a brief space of time should not be underestimated.[298] - - [297] At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was - not easy for a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the - shaft of a search light; few men possessed the requisite eyesight to - make this possible. It would no doubt be practicable, however, to - attach such men to the machine guns posted in a defensive position. A - considerable increase in fire effect could thus be obtained. - - [298] Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing - from 1200-1100 paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1¹⁄₂, and - machine gun fire, in 3% hits. The three kinds of fire, when directed - against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, in one minute, in 13, 18, and - 10% hits, respectively. - -Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are employed as -a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend upon whether -it is contemplated to employ them in a purely defensive way for the -purpose of reinforcing the several weak points, or offensively in fire -surprises or in covering the flanks. The distribution by platoons -has the undeniable disadvantage that single guns will frequently -not find an opportunity to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition -supply is increased; and that the combined employment of the several -platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. On -the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons each, an -employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution by platoons is -permissible in a passive defense, the employment of the guns by battery -(company) against the flanks of the attacker permits the mobility and -fire power of the arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a -distribution of machine guns by platoons--if we except colonial and -mountain warfare--is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless -frittering away of fighting units.[299] - - [299] Lieutenant ULRICH (retired), who participated in the fighting - in Manchuria, voices the same opinion in _Jahrbücher_, March number, - p. 285: - - “The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of - strong machine gun units is one of the most important requirements of - modern battle.” - -Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers into play to the -best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, when, from their -position as far forward as possible in the column, they are pushed to -the front to occupy important points and to compel the enemy to deploy -his infantry. The commander should, however, endeavor to withdraw the -machine guns from the fight as soon as his own infantry has deployed, -in order to avoid involving the guns in a protracted fire fight -necessitating an expenditure of a great amount of ammunition and in -which the accuracy of their fire would gradually suffer.[300] The -proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment as a separate -arm, whether they are posted so as to flank an enemy, or are kept -at the disposal of the commander as an ever ready reserve, which -is pushed forward to keep the point to be attacked under fire, to -meet a counter-attack, or--and to this use they are best adapted--to -participate in the pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear -guard actions, since they are able to remain in position longer, for -example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are paralyzed by the -thought of getting away from the enemy in time. Machine guns are much -more independent than infantry on account of their ability to withdraw -at an increased gait. On account of their greater staying power and -the greater intensity of their fire, they increase the delay which -the enemy suffers, as well as the start gained by their own force; -they moreover enable their own force to get away from the enemy and to -escape pursuit. - - [300] This applies particularly to machine guns which have air - cooled barrels. After four minutes of continuous fire, part of - the projectiles, and after seven minutes all of the projectiles - fired from a Hotchkiss machine gun go over the target (platoon). - _Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift_, January number, 1907. - -In employing machine guns in defense, it must be borne in mind that the -guns are not adapted to carry on protracted fire actions; and that the -advantage of the mobility of machine gun batteries cannot be properly -utilized if they have been assigned, from the outset, a definite -section to defend. As a rule, it will be advisable, in defense, to keep -the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them later, -as necessity requires, even by platoons, to reinforce the defensive -line at threatened points, or, by battery (company), to prevent an -envelopment, or to participate in offensive movements. This does not -preclude the employment of machine guns during the preparatory stage -of the engagement, for example, to command important approaches. When -a covered withdrawal of the guns is assured, it will also be possible -to post machine gun batteries in such a manner in front of, or to a -flank of the main defensive position, that they can suddenly sweep -with their fire the ground on which the opponent will probably place -his artillery. Flanking machine gun fire can sometimes be employed for -sweeping dead angles. - -The provisions of the Austrian machine gun regulations correspond in -the main to those of the German Army. In Austria special stress is -laid upon the use of machine guns with cavalry, while in Germany they -are in addition a mobile reserve. Machine gun batteries accomplish the -principal objects which cavalry expects to attain by the assignment -of infantry,[301] viz., relief from fighting on foot, great fire -power, and mobility. Even in reconnaissance duty, machine guns will -be employed to break down the resistance of the enemy in occupied -localities and to augment the resistance of their own force in such -places. During an advance, machine guns should go into position at an -early moment in order to cover as effectively as possible the approach -and the deployment for attack. It is advisable to post the guns of -a machine gun battery together, so as not to have numerous lines of -fire interfere with the movements of the cavalry; this is especially -emphasized by the Austrian regulations. Machine gun batteries, like -horse batteries (artillery), remain with the cavalry divisions during a -battle. - - [301] In regard to the employment of machine guns in the maneuvers - of 1905, see _Streffleur_, 1906, May number. - -German machine guns are especially adapted for resisting cavalry, while -guns transported upon pack animals are entirely helpless on the march -and when going into position, and require the support of the other -arms. German machine guns, whether on their wheeled carriages or on -their sleds, are capable of warding off cavalry. The fire of the guns -should be distributed over the entire front of the mounted attacking -line. Special attention should be paid to lines following the first -attacking line, to the flanks of the guns themselves, and to covering -the carriages when they are not with the guns. Machine guns are able to -advance on open ground without regard to cavalry, so long as the latter -is not supported by artillery or infantry, or is not so superior in -force that it can attack simultaneously from several directions, or in -several lines. - -In action against artillery it should be borne in mind that artillery -possesses an unquestioned superiority of fire at the longer ranges; at -ranges at which machine guns are able to fire at all, they must seek to -find protection under cover, or by distributing the guns. Artillery is -very susceptible to flanking fire. When that arm is to be engaged, the -machine gun sleds should be brought as close as possible to the hostile -batteries. In this case it is, moreover, advisable to have large -intervals between the machine gun platoons. The great mobility of the -machine gun battery, when limbered, will sometimes enable it to take up -a position from which it can flank the enemy. In distributing machine -gun fire it would be well always to assign the same task to two guns. -It is not a good plan to have all the machine guns sweep the entire -front of a firing battery (artillery). - - The opinions in regard to machine gun employment in field - warfare--mountain and fortress warfare are not considered - here--differ considerably. In =England= machine guns are attached to - battalions, and Japan of late leans toward this mode of employment. - In =Switzerland= machine guns serve in addition as a substitute for - horse batteries, which their army lacks. - - The =English= view is obviously affected by their experience in - colonial wars. - - The following are given as the duties of machine guns _in attack_: - - 1. The machine gun is above all to be employed at long ranges. In - open country it will seldom be possible for the gun to reach a - position in the first line, where, moreover, the gun would offer too - good a target. Covered terrain should be taken advantage of to get - the gun close to the enemy. The advance of infantry may be supported - at long ranges by machine gun fire (fire of position). - - 2. The delivery of volley fire against any point of the hostile - position. - - 3. The warding off of counter-attacks or attacks made by cavalry. - - 4. The utilization of flanking positions. - - 5. The support of cavalry during delaying actions (ammunition being - in this case a substitute for men) although the fire effect against - low targets is very small. - - 6. The holding of captured positions. - - _In defense_ the isolated employment of machine guns at a distance - from the organization is prohibited and their use against extended - skirmish lines cautioned against. Machine guns are well adapted for - protecting flanks and can be kept back as a reserve to prevent the - advance of hostile reinforcements, to support counter-attacks, to - direct fire against deep and dense targets, and, finally, to support - the firing line in action at short range. - - _In defense_ the principal duties of machine guns will consist of-- - - 1. Sweeping obstacles and commanding terrain which is specially - favorable for the attack; flanking of salients. - - 2. Reinforcing weak points. - - 3. Firing on advancing hostile reinforcements. - - The cavalry regulations, contrary to those of the infantry, also - permit a massed employment of machine guns when ordered by brigade or - division commanders. - - “As a rule, it will not be advisable to open fire on isolated mounted - men or small groups of approximately platoon strength, as this would - betray the position prematurely. In action, machine guns may be - employed in conjunction with dismounted skirmishers for the purpose - of forming a supporting point for movements, a rallying position, or - for protecting a flank. Finally, during an attack, machine guns may - support the fire of the horse battery, on the outer flank of which - they go into position, to serve as support, or to facilitate by their - fire a withdrawal.” - - These official regulations are not entirely in accord with the views - entertained in the army. The combined use of the machine guns of - a brigade, such as quite naturally resulted in the engagement at - =Pieters Hill=, is advocated by many. At the longer ranges, machine - gun companies are to fire on favorable targets, discontinuing their - fire when their object has been accomplished. In addition they are to - cover the advance or withdrawal of the infantry; to fire on certain - points of the hostile position; to act against the enemy’s flanks in - pursuit; and, in defense, posted in pairs, they are to flank salient - angles and make it difficult for the enemy to approach the obstacles. - - In =Switzerland= machine guns are considered an auxiliary arm. “Our - field army should be capable of accepting and sustaining battle in - the mountains and on highland plateaus without necessitating the - creation of numerous special detachments for that purpose. Machine - gun companies should be a tool which can be used in the mountains and - on highland plateaus, and which can be turned over for use to any - organization.” - - The platoon is the firing unit; the company commander posts his - platoons at large intervals and regulates their mutual coöperation. - Fire, suddenly delivered from various points, frequently rather - far distant from each other, is considered to have a particularly - demoralizing effect; the scattered posting of the platoons makes it - difficult for the enemy to combat effectively the individual platoons - which are skillfully concealed on the terrain. “The indefinable, - uncanny and confusing aspect of their appearance enhances the effect - of the fire surprise.” The defensive character is here especially - clearly marked, for cavalry which counts in the first place on the - offensive will prefer a combined employment of machine guns, so as - not to be hampered in its movements by the various lines of fire. On - the march, machine guns are posted as far forward as possible in the - column; single platoons may also be attached to troops (_Eskadrons_) - of advance guard cavalry, and, in exceptional cases only, to troops - (_Eskadrons_) of reconnoitering cavalry. Machine guns, supported by - weak cavalry detachments, may be pushed forward to occupy defiles; - moreover, the machine gun company assigned to a cavalry brigade may - be sent into action either as a whole unit, or it may be divided from - the start or during the course of the fight. This machine gun company - may also be attached to regiments, troops (_Eskadrons_) or platoons - of cavalry charged with special missions, in which case it is, as a - rule, broken up into platoons. The premature detaching of machine gun - units is especially cautioned against. “The mobility of the machine - gun unit is such that it is not at all dangerous to hold them back - until the last moment before sending them to the actually threatened - point.” - - The regulations deem a special support necessary for the machine - gun batteries when they are sent on independent missions. Single - guns are not to be so used. Machine guns, distributed by platoons, - invest cavalry dismounted for fire action with a special power - of resistance. It will frequently be advantageous to occupy the - enemy in front with weakly supported machine gun batteries, while - maneuvering with the main body of the mounted force so as to gain the - enemy’s weak point, and attacking him there with fire or a charge. - In a cavalry fight Maxim machine gun marksmen, by timely, hold, - and energetic action, will very often be able to create favorable - conditions for their own troops, facilitate the selection of a point - of attack, and retard and interfere with the hostile deployment. - - The following statements taken from the regulations for the _Service - and Training of_ =Swiss= _cavalry_ (1904) are of interest: - - “Machine guns invest pursuing cavalry with tremendous power.--Their - violent fire, suddenly breaking forth, especially when quickly - delivered at the flanks of the retreating mass, must have an - annihilating effect and convert the retreat into a rout. - - “In a retreat, Maxim gun marksmen with their guns can quickly occupy - rallying positions (when possible, flanking), which, thanks to their - mobility, they are capable of holding longer than other arms. Thereby - they facilitate for the other troops the critical breaking off of the - engagement. - - “The retreat will proceed with greater steadiness and time will be - gained for organizing resistance and for making that resistance more - obstinate. - - “When, during the crisis of battle, every available man joins in the - fight, machine guns may take a hand in it, even when the terrain is - unfavorable for the employment of cavalry, by gaining the flanks at a - rapid gait, turning and firing upon the hostile flank or the hostile - masses launched for the counter-attack. - - “It would be incorrect, however, at such a moment, simply to throw - the machine guns into the fighting line or to a flank. By doing this - the mobility of the guns would not be utilized, and they would lose - their character of a mounted arm. - - “The assignment of machine guns to cavalry augments the fighting - power and independence of the latter and increases to the utmost its - desire to go ahead, its enterprise and bold initiative. With the aid - of machine guns, our militia cavalry, even when opposed by better - drilled cavalry, can go into battle calmly on our terrain, with the - firm conviction of defeating it. - - “But a cavalry leader should never shrink from sacrificing his - machine guns when the object to be attained requires it, and when no - other means remain to save the force. _These weapons should never be - more to him than a welcome and powerful aid toward the fulfillment of - his mission. Cavalry which degenerates into a mere support for its - machine guns has ceased to be cavalry._” - - - - -VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[302] - -(Par. 451 German I. D. R.). - - [302] _Taktik_, II, p. 137: _Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf - Infanterie_. For examples from military history consult the splendid - works of Major KUNZ, especially _Die deutsche Reiterei_, and - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5. - - -The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to -use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man -even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of -mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly -in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which -retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by -cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while -cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge, -on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its -irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as -there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry -allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier -being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is -energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would -look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge -during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on -the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of -infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous -losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility -is disproportionately greater.” (_Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June -15th, 1882_). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the -greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed -in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation -made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any -rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at -full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between -files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such -charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry -accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in -action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on -the battlefield. - - [303] _Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf_, I, p. 55. - - The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the - Austrian army at =Custozza= with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans, - may be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry - was not accustomed to field service and lacked training. This small - force of cavalry broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade - (Italian) and struck the route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing - it into complete panic, so that of five battalions only one remained - intact. The three platoons of cavalry, which numbered about 100 - sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 horses killed and wounded. - The charge made by three troops (_Eskadrons_) of the Dragoons of the - Guard at =Mars-la-Tour=, to facilitate the retreat of the defeated - 38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th Hussars at - =Sapignies= were likewise successful. - -Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for warding off -cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry charge passes suffer -losses that scarcely deserve mention. The fight is not hopeless even -when the hostile troopers halt within the ranks of the infantry. When -cavalry has charged through a skirmish line, the latter should be -careful not to face about to fire at the troopers,[304] as that would -give a second cavalry line an opportunity to approach and strike it -unawares. - - [304] “The French firing lines through which the cavalry had - charged (evening attack made by Rauch’s Brigade in the direction - of Rezonville on August 16th, 1870) fired after the Hussars, while - the French Infantry units in rear fired in the opposite direction. - The result was a frightful cross-fire, which, while undoubtedly - disastrous for the Hussars, certainly must have worked havoc among - the French.” KUNZ, _Reiterei_, p. 153. - -The supports in rear of the first line form the objective of the -cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. These supports -must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless of the skirmishers -in front. - -The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when that line is -not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened wing should never -be bent forward since that interferes with the fire of adjacent units. -The task of repulsing an attack directed against a flank had best be -left to the supports in rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill -Regulations (par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk -of the supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing -line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank would -be insignificant; and that at any rate a _new_ firing line could not be -formed within a short time; and, therefore, that a charge against its -flank would be advantageous. This statement should be a warning for us -always to retain echelons or machine guns in rear of the flanks. The -most critical situation for infantry is that in which it is charged by -cavalry while retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports -available to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be -left to each individual to save himself as best he can. - - During the battle of =Scheinovo=, three companies of the 11th Russian - Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under - the pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to - charge their left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the - 4th Company, which was most seriously threatened, halted and formed - square as if on the parade ground. During this maneuver, all the - officers and many non-commissioned officers were either killed or - wounded. The heavy losses of the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be - ascribed to this halt under the most violent fire of the enemy.[305] - - [305] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 166. - -When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, however, the hostile -infantry and artillery will have to stop firing, and it may then be -possible to rally or re-form the defeated force, provided the men will -heed their leaders. - -Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front or flank for -the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to fire in close -order only when not themselves subjected to hostile fire. The front and -flanks of a body of infantry in proper formation are equally strong, -but, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that a deployment -toward a flank, for the purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt -to impair the steadiness of the men.[306] - - [306] General VON SCHERFF (_Kriegslehren_, II, p. 263) believes - that a frontal charge made by cavalry of sufficient strength has - better chances of succeeding than a charge in deep formation against - a flank. In a frontal charge, the suddenly appearing cavalry is - exposed “only to the fire at will of individual skirmishers whose - continuous front masks the fire of units in rear.” In the other case - (charge against a flank) the cavalry receives not only the fire of - the closed bodies first encountered, but also that of the supports - firing through the gaps between these groups. The frontal attacks - executed with superb gallantry by the French cavalry at Sedan rather - prove the opposite. - -If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, such as -ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the hostile cavalry. -It is not necessary, however, for the infantry to occupy the obstacle -itself; in fact, it is better to take up a position some distance -away. The shortness of our rifles obliges us to form the firing unit -at right angles to the line of advance of the approaching cavalry, -and to avoid aiming obliquely. The provision contained in a number of -drill regulations, including the French, that the bodies in close order -(supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable, -as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as the French -infantry did in repulsing the charge made by Bredow’s Brigade and -the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). The deployment from “broad” -and “deep” column to meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be -ordered directly by company commanders on the caution of the battalion -commander, the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided -upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for firing and to -protect the flanks by means of echelons. - - In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the - commanders of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading - companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for - example, the following scheme would be appropriate: - - _The 1st Company_ forms left front into line so that its front is at - right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry; - - _The 2nd Company_ forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the - first company; - - _The 3rd Company_ forms right front into line, and prolongs the line - of the first company; - - _The 4th Company_ also forms right front into line, or is held in - readiness as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the - approaching cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight - platoons. - -[Illustration] - -It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge directed -against the flank of a marching column (form line by wheeling by -squads). When the cavalry charge is directed against the head or -the tail of a column, as recommended by the German Cavalry Drill -Regulations (par. 350), there will not be time enough, as a rule, for -the entire company or battalion to form line. It will suffice to let -the leading elements form line, the rear elements moving out of the -column and forming in rear of the flanks as supports. - -Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation taken up; in -fact the latter is of importance only when it increases the feeling of -security. The morale of an organization is of more importance than the -formation taken up. A proud confidence in victory and morale are the -only factors which decide success, and the training of infantry should -be such as to develop these qualities. - -Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a success if it -causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to take up formations -which interfere with the highest development of its fire, or which -offer favorable targets to the hostile infantry and artillery. This -is especially the case where infantry is in the act of beginning an -assault, when the slightest hesitation may jeopardize success. If -cavalry actually begins to charge at this moment, only the bodies -immediately threatened halt at the signal “attention,”[307] and face -the cavalry; the remainder continue the march. - - [307] The German army is the only one that employs an appropriate - signal for this purpose. The attack made by the 28th Infantry Brigade - against the wood of Bor at Königgrätz is very instructive in this - connection. HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 56. At the signal, - “cavalry,” the threatened portions of the brigade halted and formed - square. Fortunately the Saxons had already begun to retire from the - edge of the wood. A stray hostile troop (_Eskadron_) had caused all - the trouble. - -The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces such a -tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately threatened, -that they either watch the attack passively, or else too many of them -take a hand in repulsing it. This moment, in which the attention of -the troops is so completely riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized -for the purpose of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a -withdrawal.[308] It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s -self the success which the French army could have gained at Waterloo if -infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s cavalry squadrons. -In the battle of Vionville the German infantry fired at the most -incredible angles at the charging French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s -Brigade was making its charge during the same battle, part of the -infantry of the 6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers, -to follow with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking -place on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct, -as natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by -such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of executing -a movement or holding him with our own fire. It also seems absolutely -necessary to support with rifle fire the charge made by one’s own -cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the hostile infantry from firing -undisturbed on our troopers. - - [308] “Every leader should carefully watch the progress of a - cavalry charge, and, as soon as he observes that friendly cavalry has - succeeded in penetrating the hostile line or that the enemy is shaken - and directs all of his fire against the charging cavalry, he should - immediately advance to the attack and be upon the enemy with the - bayonet before the latter recovers his senses. Such an attack will - not have been made in vain, even if the cavalry has been repulsed.” - General GURKO’S comments on the maneuvers of 1893. - - Prince FREDERICK CHARLES, in his _Winke für die Offiziere der unter - Meinen Befehlen ins Feld rückenden Truppen_ (1870), also demands that - the infantry should quickly follow up cavalry attacks. - -There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout should be -kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry drill regulations -recognize that a charge has greater chances of succeeding when it is -made in deep formation, in successive lines, or simultaneously from -several directions. The fire of the infantry is distributed, and, -unless a good lookout is kept, a part of the cavalry, scarcely or not -at all molested by fire, may perhaps succeed in driving the attack -home. This will be the case when infantry allows itself to be enticed -into developing a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is -made, while the main attack comes from another, or from several other -directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ more rifles -in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, while the mere -threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly led infantry to develop an -excessive volume of fire. - -On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at a -considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed to -effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. The men -lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by the hostile -troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping on them, besides -which, the danger space is greater than when the men fire standing. In -rolling or close country, where cavalry cannot be seen by men lying -down, the aiming position kneeling or standing should properly be -assumed. The losses inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured. -Horses and riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright -human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling or -prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the charge. What is -of greater importance, however, is that men standing upright can more -easily execute a change of front, fire on passing cavalry, and use -their bayonets in case the cavalry actually penetrates their line. The -British and Italian regulations very properly prescribe that the front -rank of a body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases. - -As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the -steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be -advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short -range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is -not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in -the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging -cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge -in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first -volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be -still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were -absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is -necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does -not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to -reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to -carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction -in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit -is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on -charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short -ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks -of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its -fire until the cavalry has come within short range. - - [309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted - charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and - coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All - precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate - itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon - cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister V. WÄLDSTATTEN. - - [310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at - 140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. _Geschichte des Regiments - Nr. 46_, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the - 87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. _Gen. St. W._, II, p. - 1217. - - [311] The _France Militaire_ contains the following statement - in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the - French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907: - “Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber - bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when - a vital organ had been hit. _At Casablanca, horses that had been - hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while._ This - is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as - out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This - is entirely incorrect. _Many wounded horses carry their riders into - the melée and do not die until the day after the fight._ This was - observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side. - - “Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of - penetrating the hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first - place, they would have to be hit, and that, in itself, is not such - an easy matter. This is still more difficult for the infantry, if it - knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate the dash of - our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in our - peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time - of peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are - training our cavalry for panic in time of war.” - - At =Garcia Hernandez= (1812), a French square was broken by a - wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This - is, however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two - ranks. Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line--whether - or not the horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such - an event in exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are - generally insignificant. - - The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it - attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its - fire. During the retreat after the battle of =Jena=, on October 28th, - 1806, the Grenadier Battalion _Prinz August_, threatened by hostile - cavalry, did not feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and - attempted to cross the Ucker farther down. In the expectation that - a cavalry charge would be made, square was formed and the officers - were told not to fire until the cavalry had approached to within 20 - paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry--the brigade which had crossed - at Golmitz as well as the remainder of Beaumont’s Division, under - its commander, in all nine regiments--approached. The first charge - was made by nine troops (_Eskadrons_) under the division commander. - They approached at a gallop. When the expected fire did not come, the - dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that finally they were - going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the command “Fire” was - given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers fell, the rest - galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent charges were - repulsed in a similar manner.”[312] - - [312] VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Der Krieg von 1806-7_, II, p. 279. The - charge of the 5th Lancers at Beaumont forms a counterpart of the - above. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 18. - -We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the strength of the -infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and whether the latter charges -from several directions or in several successive lines. A small force -of infantry, especially when it may anticipate attacks from several -directions, must open fire sooner than a strong infantry force which -has to contend with an attack coming from one direction only. In the -first mentioned case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by -one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals. - -It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not directly -threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry charge made on -another unit; then it is advisable to open fire at an early moment -in order to break the momentum of the charge at long range. (11th -Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan). - -This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should be used. -The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, although this -has been done on the drill ground by well trained soldiers without -impairing the continuity or accuracy of the fire. According to the -table of ordinates of the trajectory (par. 23 German I. F. R.), a -bullet fired when the sight is set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the -feet of the horse, does not rise above the height of a mounted trooper -throughout that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the -target however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement -of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain covered with grass -or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the target and aim above that -line. It is better, therefore, to aim at the breast of the horse, with -sights set at 600 m., and to fire as soon as the target gets within 800 -m. On account of the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is -not advisable to change sights. - -It is a good plan to fire one volley first and then to employ fire at -will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting the onrushing mass -of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the opinion of the leader, -the first shot may be fired. But this waiting is of great importance -to prevent the fire from becoming wild and ineffective. Since the -elimination of powder smoke, there is no reason why other volleys -should be fired after the first, for in the excitement of the fight -the volley cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find -the rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack of -a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a unit to be kept -better in hand, may be an important factor under certain circumstances -however. The volley should, as a rule, be used by supports that are not -exposed to fire. (8th Company of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st -and 2nd Companies of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers -at Sedan). - -Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion -of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the center while -charging, no special importance need be attached to the distribution of -the fire. - -As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry -consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per minute), should be -a match for 1-3 troops (_Eskadrons_), and a company of infantry, under -favorable conditions, may be able to deal with a cavalry brigade.[313] -Cavalry can become dangerous for infantry only when the infantry is -surprised, finds no opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and -morale, or attempts to reach cover by running. - - [313] A German cavalry brigade consists of eight troops - (_Eskadrons_). _Translator_. - - -The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville. - - At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies - of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny - towards the Metz--Mars-la-Tour _chaussee_. As French infantry was - not on the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and - the Guard Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former - regiment went to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been - assigned to it. - - The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m. - distance between them, with two troops (_Eskadrons_) in each line, a - fifth troop (_Eskadron_) following as a reserve. Although hampered - in its movements and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage - wagons and other camp litter that covered the ground, the regiment - nevertheless made the charge with superb gallantry. - - The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry, - under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their - leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view - at a distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was - received with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop - (_Eskadron_) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians, - but a part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to - the left. It is said, that of the leaders only one officer and one - non-commissioned officer remained in the saddle, and that only - twenty cuirassiers were rallied after the charge. The left troop - (_Eskadron_) missed its objective completely. The Prussian rear rank - faced about and fired on some French troopers who attempted to make - an attack from the rear and who now also received fire from other - units of Prussian infantry. - - During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines - had become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke - in two, the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian - infantry and suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which - did not stop the movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German - accounts, to be sure, do not mention that the second line could - not be seen on account of the powder smoke, and that the fire was - discontinued to let the smoke clear away. When the French line was - 100 m. away it received the command _chargez_ and the Prussian - infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which shattered the attack, - the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about 10 paces in - front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired - and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just as - little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the - Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd - Infantry and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry, - deployed in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts - of this battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped - by the fire of this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers - was prevented by Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French - regiment, which had begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22 - officers, 208 men (36.2% of its strength), and 243 horses. According - to Dick de Lonlay,[314] after this charge, the regiment was able to - form only 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) of 62 troopers each, instead of 5 - troops (_Eskadrons_) of 115 troopers each, which would mean a loss - of 248 men. The first line had suffered the heaviest losses; in - the 4th troop (_Eskadron_), which had lost all of its officers and - non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left. - - [314] _Français et Allemands_, III, p. 84. KUNZ, - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 11. The French _Gen. St. W._, - II, pp. 301-309, gives the losses as 18 officers, 170 men, and 208 - horses. - -A charge has a better chance of succeeding if it is prepared by -artillery fire. - - During the attack made by two troops (_Eskadrons_) of Landwehr - Hussars against the 1st Battalion _Gyulai_ at =Tobitschau=, an - Austrian square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated - it. During the attack of Bredow’s Brigade at =Vionville=, the - artillery was able to send its last shells against the enemy - immediately past the right flank of the cavalry brigade. - -The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in all armies, -compels us to consider the case when infantry must advance over open -ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special units must then be -designated, who, by means of long range fire, repulse the cavalry or -keep it at a distance. At Minden (1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry -succeeded in driving the hostile cavalry from the field, and at -Vauxchamps and Etoges (14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry -succeeded in breaking through the French cavalry. It will be easy to -do the same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not very -superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, machine guns, or -artillery. - -Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to bring long -range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them by a flank -attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long and medium ranges -is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, and besides, the better -marksmanship of the infantry is bound to make itself felt at short -ranges. When the infantry has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.) -of the dismounted cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will -still be able to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it -to do so (par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can be -effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in the fight. - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - =England.= The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost - universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are - immediately threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be - fixed. An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered - when infantry has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced - to retire; and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by - dust, fog, or heavy rain. - - =Austria.= _Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from - cavalry charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of - mind, and morale, and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at - short range._ - - When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should be - ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the - purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and - for better utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly - made from a short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow - formation than to deploy hastily, provided the fire is delivered with - steadiness. As cavalry frequently attacks only for the purpose of - forcing the infantry to discontinue its advance, or to induce it to - take up a close order formation, all units not immediately threatened - by the attack should continue their movement or remain in their - positions. - - When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which make - it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions, - companies, or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly - meet the cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support - each other in warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place - themselves within the protected area thus formed. - - The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly - utilizing cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary, - fix bayonets. Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as - seems necessary for warding off the attack; the other parts continue - to carry out the task assigned them. The commander retains a part of - his force in readiness for warding off unexpected attacks. - - “When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, the - men should assume the position offering the smallest target. - - “If a platoon is _directly attacked_ by cavalry, it will only in rare - cases be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.); - _frequently it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come - up close_. When the platoon participates in warding off a cavalry - attack made against another unit, it may open fire at longer ranges. - - “Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off - cavalry.” - - =France.= Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be, - has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in - superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand, - and makes good use of its fire. - - When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old. - Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations - of combat, especially during critical moments. - - If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies - by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its - task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack. - - Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet - a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even - the boldest cavalry. - - When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for - the infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the - purpose of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts. - - =Russia.= Nothing prescribed. - - =Japan.= Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced to - discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose - of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial - defeat. Only those fractions that are absolutely necessary for - repulsing the cavalry should take up the fight against it. - - - - -VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY. - - -1. THE PASSAGE OF INFANTRY THROUGH ARTILLERY LINES. - -The artillery of a mobilized German army corps with its twenty-four -batteries takes up approximately 2500 m. of the front of about 4000 -m. available for the corps. When the ground is unfavorable, the front -available for the other arms may be still further reduced. All remedies -suggested for reducing the frontage required by artillery offer no real -solution of the difficulty; in fact, they have resulting drawbacks, -such as the reduction to ten paces of the interval between guns, and -the posting of artillery in two lines, one in rear of the other. On -account of these drawbacks, a commander will avail himself of these -remedies only in case of the most urgent necessity. The question as -to how infantry can best pass through these long artillery lines is -therefore of especial interest. While artillery will generally seek -commanding positions and avoid covered terrain, infantry will make use -of depressions and cover as the natural routes of advance for passing -by batteries in action and for deploying subsequently in front of them. -In this case the solution of the problem is simple. The difficulties -are disproportionately greater when terrain impassable for artillery -is lacking. Nothing could be more desirable for hostile artillery -which has adjusted its fire upon our batteries, than for the intervals -between our guns to become suddenly filled with infantry, whereupon -our artillery, until now under fire, would have to cease firing so -as not to endanger our infantry. This pause in the fire will be more -noticeable, when our artillery has not yet succeeded in gaining a -superiority of fire over the hostile guns; and its length will depend -upon the depth of the infantry formation. In this case the infantry -cannot avoid heavy losses as it must cross the fire-swept space in rear -of the guns, and soon thereafter must enter the zone of the opponent’s -actual “fire for effect,” besides losing for the time being the support -of its own artillery fire. It is obvious that for infantry to advance -in deployed lines through artillery in action, condemns the latter -to long silence, and even exposes it to the danger of being placed -altogether out of action. Infantry can pass through artillery lines at -certain points only, its passage being subject to an agreement between -the infantry and artillery commanders. It is advisable to have those -batteries cease firing whose fire has the least influence on the course -of the artillery combat. It is, however, of the utmost importance -that the fire of all hostile batteries which possibly could fire on -our infantry, be kept down by the increased fire of our artillery. In -this manner, we may perhaps be able to draw the fire of the hostile -artillery away from those points at which our infantry is to pass -through our artillery line. This is especially important. It will also -be advantageous to designate successively, different points in the -artillery line for the passage of infantry. This should be done for two -reasons: first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance -the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may not be -presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged period; second, -in order that movements by the flank on the part of the infantry may -be obviated. The column of squads would be a suitable formation in -which two battalions of infantry could simultaneously pass through the -line of guns approximately within the space occupied by one battery. -These battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line -toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume firing only -when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. in front of them. The -artillery will be able to resume its fire earlier when it is posted in -rear of a crest, and for this reason such points should be selected for -the passage of infantry. - - -2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.[315] - - [315] A lecture delivered by Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH, R.A., at - the Royal Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled, - _Infantry Formations in the Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of - View_, contains some interesting information. The lecture mentioned - appeared in _The Journal of the Royal Artillery_ for February, 1909. - _Translator_. - -In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance for -considerable distances under artillery fire without being able to -take advantage of cover. It should guard against being surprised by -artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation. - -In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s adjustment -and observation of fire should be avoided. (See p. 119 supra). To this -end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily long near objects that -are clearly visible at a great distance. If it is noticed that the -enemy is beginning to adjust his fire on some prominent feature of -the terrain, that point should be passed as quickly as possible; the -same is true of a plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns, -separated by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are -advantageous. This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously -striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the enemy to judge -the relative position of the smoke from the burst of his shrapnel with -respect to the target. This increases the difficulties of the enemy’s -observation of fire, as it is not easy for him to determine whether his -shots go over or fall short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m. -deep, as used in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses, -owing to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles. - -The narrowest possible front should be presented to the enemy when -within his zone of fire. - -It is moreover desirable to make the further observation of fire -difficult for the hostile artillery, and to diminish the effect of his -projectiles at the target (see p. 120 supra) by taking up suitable -formations. Broad, shallow formations were suitable against the shell -fire of the past. However, they had the great drawback of considerably -facilitating the observation of shots falling short or going over, as -the smoke from the burst hid the target in the first case, and as -the target appeared silhouetted against the smoke from the burst in -the second. The cone of dispersion of the modern base charge shrapnel -combines comparatively small lateral spread with great effect in depth. -The effect of a well-placed shrapnel may be confined to one target, and -that of projectiles bursting in the intervals reduced by taking up a -formation in which narrow columns (columns of squads) are separated by -wide intervals (up to 50 m.). - -[Illustration] - -The range is determined or verified by bracketing; that is, by -enclosing the target between shots which, fired at a known difference -of range, strike respectively, short of and beyond the target. In -France this is done either by battery salvo or by piece. In the former -case, the French distribute the fire equally over the entire space -which they wish to cover with fire; hence, they do not direct it upon -the individual columns, especially when they employ indirect laying, -their favorite mode of procedure. It is in this kind of fire especially -that narrow columns, separated by wide intervals, are a great -advantage, because it is pure accident if a projectile falls so that -its burst can be observed. Moreover, when the columns are not abreast -of each other, the observations of bursts may be contradictory. Thus, -in one salvo, “over” and “short” bursts may be obtained, especially -if several bursts could not be reliably observed, and the salvo will -have to be repeated. When a projectile bursts “short,” immediately -in front of the 1st company, for example, it may be assumed that the -next projectile will be fired at a range increased by 100-200 m. The -1st company should therefore move to the front at double time, the 2nd -and 3rd likewise, while the 4th executes platoons front into line and -takes to cover in anticipation of an “over” shot. The “over” meant -for the 1st company will then be the signal for the 4th company to -rush forward. _The following general rule may be given: A projectile -bursting “over” or just “short” of the target requires that the force -fired upon move quickly; a projectile bursting far “short” of the -target requires that cover be taken._ The platoon and squad leaders of -the attacking force should not betray its presence by standing upright; -the force should disappear absolutely without leaving a trace. - -A force cannot, in the long run, prevent artillery from effecting an -adjustment of fire upon it; all it can do is to postpone the beginning -of the fire for effect. - -Fire for effect is of three kinds: - -1. “Progressive fire” (_tir progressif_).[316] In this fire, after -establishing a bracket (as a rule, one of 200 m.), every piece fires -two rounds at each of four ranges, viz., at a range 100 m. less than -the short limit of the bracket, at both ranges of the bracket, and at a -range 100 m. greater than the long limit of the bracket. For example, -if a bracket has been established for the target at 3000 and 3200 m., -the battery would fire at 2900, 3000, 3200, and 3300 m. - - [316] Called “Zone Fire” in our field artillery. _Translator_. - -2. “Sweeping” (_fauchage_) is employed when it is desired to cover -a broader zone. In this every gun fires three rounds at each of the -ranges designated. The first round is fired with the line of sight -directed on the right portion of the target (or on the aiming point). -Before firing each of the succeeding rounds, the direction of the piece -is changed to the left by three turns of the traversing handwheel. At -the next range this process is reversed, the direction of the piece -being changed to the right by three turns of the traversing handwheel -after each round. At 2500 m., for example, a battery can cover, in this -manner, a space twice the width of its own front. - -3. “Fire at successive ranges” (searching fire). In this fire salvos -or volleys are delivered at the target at a number of ranges to be -designated by the battery commander.[317] - - [317] The Belgian Drill Regulations (1907) give the following - details in regard to the fire effect of a French four gun battery: In - “progressive fire” (_tir progressif_), 32 rounds cover a space 100 - m. wide and 400 m. deep (1 fragment covers 6 sq. m.). When direct - laying is employed, one fragment covers 2 sq. m. In “progressive fire - with sweeping” (_tir progressif avec fauchage_), 48 shrapnel cover a - space 200 m. wide and 400 m. deep, each fragment covering 8 sq. m. - Depending upon the range, 1¹⁄₂ to 5 minutes are required to secure - adjustment. (See p. 119 supra). - -During the Russo-Japanese war, all close order formations proved -unsuitable under artillery fire, except when the terrain afforded -cover. The Japanese infantry recognized very soon that the best -protection against artillery fire lay in constant motion (irregular -rushes made by small units) and in wide extension. The following -procedure, employed at Yoshirei on July 31st, 1904, seems worthy of -imitation:[318] The several platoons of the companies followed each -other in deployed lines at distances of 200-300 m. When they had to -cross open ground in order to reach a designated line, the platoons -sought to advance by squads, whose men were deployed at intervals of -5-10 paces and who moved at a rapid gait interrupted by breathing -spells. The men invariably assembled when cover was reached. The losses -were insignificant. The Russians also made use of a similar procedure -after their first disastrous experiences. In many instances the -platoons ran forward in single rank. “Change of gait and direction, as -well as the use of loose irregular skirmish lines make it difficult for -the artillery to hit anything.” (Par. 450 German I. D. R.). - - [318] SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 337. - - -Formations used by Infantry during the Russo-Japanese War when under -Artillery Fire. - -[Illustration: a. - -A platoon in route column forms four columns of files.] - -[Illustration: b. - -A company in column of platoons, each in line of skirmishers with the -men 2-4 m. apart. - -(It would be better to use sections instead of platoons).] - -[Illustration: c. - -The ranks of the sections in each platoon of the company following each -other at a distance of 100 m. - -This formation was taken up from company column (German).] - -These formations made it possible to advance at a walk to within 3000 -m. of a hostile position; beyond that an advance by rushes had to -be resorted to, in which the attacking force avoided showing itself -simultaneously in long lines. The simplest scheme might be to move -forward in column of sections, each section in skirmish line. Formation -“a” is well adapted for quickly crossing fire swept places, and when -there is hope of re-forming the column subsequently. Formation “c” -is suitable for quickly deploying from company column. However, the -last-named formation no longer guarantees a proper leading of the -company, and quite naturally does not absolutely prevent losses. After -the Japanese 5th Brigade (Nambu) had taken possession of Yuhuntun[319] -and the three houses during the night of March 6/7, 1905, the following -dispositions for attack were made by the Russians about noon on the -7th: On the right, the 5th and 10th Rifle Regiments, in five lines, -each consisting of one battalion (total depth of the formation 600 m.); -in the center, the 123rd Infantry (Koslov) of which the companies of -three battalions were deployed in single rank lines, each consisting -of one company, with the men at intervals of from 3 to 5 paces, the -companies in rear of each other at distances of 100 paces; the IVth -Battalion, similarly formed, was posted in echelon to the left rear. -The 124th Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment, -advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, was fired -on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving from 4000 to 2000 m. -The regiment lost about 600 men. This loss is insignificant when the -size of the target (about 600 m. wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered. -The Japanese did not care to become involved in a serious infantry -action and therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better -to advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded no -cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient time, they crossed -such plains singly, one by one, and then assembled under cover for the -attack. - - [319] V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der - Mandschurei_, II, p. 334. - - SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken_, p. 310. - - Col. CSICSERICS V. BACSANY, _Unser neues Feldgeschütz_, 1907, pp. - 17 and 21. - - -3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION - -was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire on -artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small that the -expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.[320] The gap between the -steel shields of the French field gun is not large enough to exert a -noticeable influence. Steel shields, 3 mm. thick, afford protection -against steel jacketed bullets fired at or beyond 300 m.; against -“S” and “D” projectiles they afford protection, it is said, beyond -500 m. only. Machine guns directing continuous fire on a point may -obtain better results. According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate -can be pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel -projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of which is -precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional density, and -difficulty of manufacture).[321] For this reason, it is better to leave -the task of destroying shielded batteries, even when they are in the -open, to one’s own artillery, than to attack them with infantry. The -fire effect of the infantry is not noticeably increased when delivered -obliquely against the front of the battery. (Par. 184 German I. D. R.). -In Germany the gun commander and cannoneer No. 3, who is posted at the -trail, are then especially endangered; but in order to flank the guns -effectively and to reach in rear of the shields with its fire, the -infantry must move to a flank a distance at least equal to ¹⁄₃ of the -range, and even then the fire effect is very small. The effect may even -be entirely nullified when the flanking fire is delivered from the side -on which the caisson bodies are posted. In this case it suffices to -push forward the caisson body to protect the personnel. It is a good -plan for infantry to direct its fire on the limbers and the reserve. -And again, infantry should not let any opportunity pass to fire on -artillery in motion or in the act of limbering or unlimbering within -effective range. Guns moved by hand into positions from which direct -laying can be employed for the purpose of warding off the infantry -attack, offer particularly favorable targets. Infantry that is to -capture artillery must approach its objective by means of irregular -rushes made by small groups, and increase its fire to the utmost -intensity when the limbers are brought up to the guns. The effect of -artillery fire is small under 200 m., in the absence of canister.[322] - - [320] Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated - that infantry was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries - so as to render them immobile; it could only interfere with the - _personnel_, but could not demolish the batteries. - - [321] _Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und - Geniewesens_, 1907, No. 5. - - [322] The capture of the Smolenski Artillery Battalion on October - 14th, 1904 (Shaho). _Artilleristische Monatshefte_ for March, 1908. - -[Illustration: Germany. - -Field Howitzer. - -Field Gun.] - -[Illustration: France.] - -The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. Hubert, during -the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult it is to unlimber -on open ground when under effective infantry and artillery fire; but, -if five limbers with their teams had not stampeded, perhaps it might -have been possible after a while, for the battery to reopen fire. -Hasse’s Battery, also at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving -in a short time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to -continue its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of the -guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover of a garden wall -at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there under enfilading infantry -fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s Battery lost 17 men and 37 -horses; Hasse’s Battery, 38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15 -men and 40 horses.[323] - - [323] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, III, p. 227. - -Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range will always -produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s Battery, and in -the two British batteries of Colonel Long at Colenso.[324] These two -batteries did not cease firing because they had suffered too heavily, -but only because they had expended all their limber ammunition and the -caissons were unable to come up. It was impossible for these batteries -to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to -destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great -quantities of ammunition were expended. - - [324] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 43. - -At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division -suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections were up and -the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun -squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P. -M., _i.e._, within half an hour.” Immediately after the French attack -had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the -advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery) -could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and -34 horses.[325] This example proves again that when artillery has once -managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated -by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than -temporary position in the first line. - - [325] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, 8, pp. 44 and 210. - - HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 40. - -The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance from -hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry screen, even -if only a weak one. In the days when batteries had no shields, this -screen enabled artillery to devote its entire attention to the -principal target without regard to hostile infantry. At the present -time, especially in positions in rear of a crest and in long artillery -lines, the principal object of such a screen is to prevent hostile -patrols from molesting the artillery. Small detachments posted at wide -intervals are sufficient for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now -as in the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to daring, -sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. (Par. -448 German I. D. R.). - - At the battle of =Vionville=,[326] about 5 P. M., four horse and - seven field batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near - =Flavigny= with ten French batteries. After this artillery duel had - lasted half an hour, French Guard Infantry advanced to the attack. - This was repulsed by artillery fire at a range of 800 m., but the - fire of the artillery was diverted from its proper objective by the - advance of this infantry. Similarly, at =St. Privat=, two batteries - of the Guard Artillery had to direct their fire on French skirmishers. - - [326] _Gen St. W._, I, p. 557. - - - - -IX. THE ATTACK. - - -The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack can annihilate -him. The decision as to whether the force is to attack or stand on -the defensive depends upon the tactical situation and the will of the -commander, and not upon numerical superiority, of which one is not -aware, as a rule, until after the battle.[327] Determined attacks, -again and again repeated, in spite of all failures, are the surest -means of gaining victory and of preventing the enemy from becoming -aware of his superiority. Only pressing reasons (marked hostile -superiority, necessity for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or -the failure of an attack), and never favorable terrain conditions, -should determine a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the -eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. A -commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the purpose of -letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him in turn, reaps only -the disadvantages and never the advantages of both the offensive and -the defensive. - - [327] See _Taktik_, V, p. 121, et seq. - -The attack may take various forms, depending upon whether the -dispositions have to be made under hostile fire (surprise and -rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced the initiative and -awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or in a position prepared -for defense (deliberately planned attack). In the last case the -attack requires more careful preparation and in many instances even -necessitates the employment of special auxiliaries (such as guns -capable of high angle fire, and engineer trains). However, the advance -of a strong firing line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and -the uninterrupted fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all -attacks. - -Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and the rencontre -there is an attack formation more closely resembling the rencontre in -character, which may be called the _abridged attack_.[328] This attack -formation is used in forestalling the enemy in occupying important -points, in preventing enveloping movements, in carrying out flank -attacks, in surprising the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise, -in relieving the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover -appropriate where the conformation of the ground or the time of day -prohibit a use of the rifle. - - [328] _Abgekürzter Angriff_. - - The first stages of the fight of the 6th Infantry Division at - =Vionville= are of this character. The fire fight was relegated to - the background in view of the constant movement to the front. The - situation prohibited our properly taking advantage of our superior - marksmanship.--The attack on the railroad cut of =Nuits=, during the - late afternoon of December 18th, 1870, progressed similarly.[329] - - [329] KUNZ, _Gefecht von Nuits_, p. 19, et seq. - - -1. THE SURPRISE.[330] - - [330] See _Taktik_, V, p. 190. - -Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it -will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from -a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly -opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of -the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by -surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation -and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the -opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming to a decision. - -Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as possible, -a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to let the -troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. A bold -decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such a critical -situation.[331] It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and open -fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire is still -less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound to lead to a -complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a defeat can only be -averted, in such a case, by assuming the offensive and thus repulsing -the enemy. The decision for attacking directly from route column -(or, when the enemy is still at a distance, at least for deploying -toward the front) is the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares -an ambuscade for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in -numbers, morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he does -not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm the enemy with -fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An impetuous advance may -perhaps intimidate him, and our losses will be less, at any rate, than -if we turn our backs on him and await our fate in what is at best but -a poor position, as it is taken up, as a rule, during the first moment -of panic. However, even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot -avert disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at least -save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the rencontre on the -battlefield. - - [331] “No matter how unexpectedly the enemy may appear, you should - never forget that he may be annihilated either with the bayonet or - with fire. The choice between the two is not a difficult one, and the - formation to be adopted is of secondary importance. When the enemy - is at close quarters, always use the bayonet; if he is still at a - distance, fire on him, and then use the bayonet.” DRAGOMIROV. - - -Examples of Surprises. - - The surprise at =Baalon= on September 17th, 1870.[332] The surprise - at =Vouziers= on December 15th, 1870.[333] The conduct of the French - infantry when surprised in its camp at =Beaumont=. - - [332] CARDINAL VON WIDDERN, _Krieg an den rückwärtigen - Verbindungen_, I, p. 149. - - [333] _Ibid._, II, p. 125. - - During the battle of =Noisseville= there occurred an unusually - instructive episode, the disastrous results of which could have been - easily avoided if the mounted officers on duty with the force had - been sent out to reconnoiter. Six companies of the 44th Infantry - (Prussian) were advancing from =Flanville= against =Montoy=. On - the French side, the 62nd Infantry was likewise advancing against - Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when the 44th Infantry (Prussian) - very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. The French regimental - commander decided to attack at once. “The Prussian detachments - advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west slope of - the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly - encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was - immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns - in close order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians - was attacked from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from - the park through the west entrance of the village. The Prussian - skirmish lines were repulsed in an instant, and thrown into complete - confusion. The hostile fire had an annihilating effect on account of - the short range, and the situation was at once completely reversed. - The Prussians sought in vain to gain a firm foothold in the eastern - outskirts of the village of Montoy. Their losses were heavy. The four - companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) of the 44th Infantry numbered - in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 officers and 480 men, - of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) were taken - prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th and - 12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective - strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%.”[334] - - [334] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 32, et seq. - - This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th - Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position - to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence, - the French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from - Flanville, which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering - some losses. - -When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, the advantage -rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and advances to the charge -first. This onslaught with cold steel should become second nature -to the troops. In traversing close country, a force should be in a -formation that enables it to develop an adequate fire and to make a -charge in compact formation. A line formation is entirely unsuitable, -as a rule, on account of the difficulties of the terrain to be -overcome, and in a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control -the men. - -For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[335] -company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons -advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads -in columns of files. If the platoons or sections were to advance in -single file, the columns would be too long, and it would be next to -impossible to maintain the intervals. The six or eight small columns -of files of a platoon are, on the other hand, close enough together to -keep each other in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed -for firing and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily -than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can exercise -better control over the men than in skirmish line, which invariably -bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, while connection -is not maintained at all at other points and march direction and -cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the Bois de Givodeau during the -battle of Beaumont).[336] - - [335] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 117, et seq. - - [336] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 125, with sketch. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, - _Beaumont_, p. 112, et seq. - - Examples: The conduct of the infantry of the IXth Army Corps in - passing through the Niederwald of Wörth, may serve as a model. KUNZ, - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 108, et seq. - - Engagement of La Landrière on January 11th, 1871. _Geschichte des - Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 292. - - _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 109. - - -2. THE RENCONTRE.[337] - -(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.). - - [337] See also _Taktik_, V, p. 192, et seq. - -“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in war. During -marches in campaign the opponents will frequently not gain detailed -information of each other until they come into actual contact. Thus -the rencontre develops out of a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352 -German I. D. R.). - -Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision occurs -frequently at a point not intended by either; as every minute brings -the heads of the two columns closer together no time is to be lost. -The commander who desires to wait until he can come to a decision -consonant with the results of the reconnaissance will arrive too late. -The tactical situation in its entirety determines whether or not an -attack should be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting -moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be -any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment -from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but -because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line. -The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to -regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose -of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a -rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander -who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in -throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which -would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed, -may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the -attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part -of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a -definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered -terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while -in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose -that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards -terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon -the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack -alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the -action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that -the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced -troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). _The rencontre increases -the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the -troops._ - - * * * * * - -The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is -most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is -to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable -conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground -be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while -moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold -important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of -the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the -advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying -on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if -they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the -advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should -quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he -should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the -point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances -the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear -so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable -terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the -commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and -then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main -body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior -numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much -easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to -answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard -will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in -regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his -columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer -to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell, -until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment -has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand -caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat -frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has -been most successful in making preparations for going into action by -developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is -artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division -encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this -does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically -concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss -of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. _The general -situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the -commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the -opposing forces._ - -_Issue of orders._ See _Taktik_, V, p. 197. - -The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the -commander (_i.e._, whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for -attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the -location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should -be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently -cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered -at once. - - [338] Par. 350 German I. D. R. - -The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment -over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank, -by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to -the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance -to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of -deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short -range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the -troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its -fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once -move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions -received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel -the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every -fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against -its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will -instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is -unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable -to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs -should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse -state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements. -But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the -troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile -dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile -position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field -glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can -never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack -home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When -opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably -be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From -here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in -addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in -some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating -losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation. -One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the -training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not -give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the -ground gained, and persevere.[340] - - [339] This induces the British _Infantry Training_ to prescribe - that in a rencontre a concentration for attack should invariably be - ordered. - - [340] Military history furnishes a multitude of examples of - the fact that a force can persevere in spite of the most galling - fire (St. Privat. Gorni Dubniac). A reverse does not occur, as a - rule, until the advent of unforeseen circumstances. The Brigade of - Highlanders held out for hours at Magersfontain, and an insignificant - change of front on the right flank subsequently caused the whole line - to retire. See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 74. - -When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity of -occupying important supporting points and of gaining ground for the -concentration for action, requires a broad front to be covered. (Par. -357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, which will arrive soon thereafter, -will then bring relief to the infantry in critical situations. - -In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight is at a -standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may notice that, -although it is impossible to push the attack home without further -reinforcements, the space in which the concentration for action is to -take place, is secured against a hostile attack, or that the enemy has -been deprived of the initiative and has been thrown on the defensive. -This is the moment in which the commander regains the initiative -and in which, by means of an _attack order_, he can dispose of the -troops of the main body as he sees fit. _The “rencontre” differs -from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the latter, the -concentration for action can proceed smoothly as desired by the -commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, for the time being, -dictates the course of action. Therefore the commander should make -efforts to free himself from this restraint, i.e., he should endeavor -to launch his troops in a manner not influenced by the dispositions of -the enemy._ - -The degree of control which a commander retains over the course of the -combat depends upon the promptness with which he gains a general idea -of the situation. For this, if for no other reason, he should be as -near the head of the column as possible while on the march. The troops -sent first into action, supported by the artillery, must put every -available man into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the -enemy and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an entity. -In any case, the battalions of the main body should not be successively -thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, for the purpose of -overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving the advance guard from -a dilemma. The machine gun batteries, whose employment was particularly -important during the preparatory stage of the fight, should be -withdrawn as early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in -the hands of the commander. - -In bringing the main body into action, deployments by the flank should -be avoided. The deployment should be initiated by subordinate units -(in an infantry division, by regiments) moving out of the route column -and toward the objective points determined by the purpose of the -combat.[341] - - [341] General VON SCHLICHTING holds a different view in his work - _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, I, p. 106. “In a rencontre, - the piece on the board of the battlefield can be moved only when the - next one is clear of the march column and ready for action. Further - action is then not only permissible but imperative.” - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - In all the regulations, those of Germany excepted, the rencontre is - treated with marked reserve. - - =Austria.= “When a collision occurs with an opponent who is likewise - in the act of advancing--_rencontre_--the different parts of the - force and their subdivisions must make strenuous efforts to advance - in the designated direction. In a rencontre, it will be proper to - concentrate the main forces, prior to making the attack, only in case - it becomes apparent during the preparatory stage of the action that - the enemy has gained a visible start in deployment. The endeavor - to forestall the enemy, and the necessity of promptly reinforcing - the troops already engaged, will often curtail or preclude the - preparatory concentration of the main body in a rencontre, and force - the commander to permit at least parts of his approaching troops to - go directly into action.” If conditions are eminently favorable for - the enemy at the point where the collision occurs, it may sometimes - be more desirable to stand provisionally on the defensive with the - advance guard until other troops come up. - - “Under such circumstances, it may even be advisable to withdraw the - troops covering the march; but in that event, the relation of the - force to neighboring columns should be considered.” - - =France.= The commander should decide promptly whether to attack, to - stand on the defensive, or to avoid an engagement for the time being. - The regulations do not provide for employing the troops directly - from route column. The advance guard is frequently thrown on its own - resources; it is often forced to fight on a very broad front, and - to place all of its troops into action at the very beginning of an - engagement for the purpose of seizing and holding supporting points - necessary for the subsequent deployment. - - -Examples. - - 1. The deployment for action of the 5th Infantry Division from the - defile of Gorze, against the French Division Vergé, at the battle of - =Vionville= (16th August, 1870), is especially instructive.[342] - - [342] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 549. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, - p. 50. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 32, et seq. - _Taktik_, V, p. 210. - - 2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at =La Thibaudine= - (=Beaumont=). The French concentration for action had progressed - farther than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry - was insufficient.[343] - - [343] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 90. - - 3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at =Trautenau=.[344] Likewise the - fight of the Vth Army Corps at =Nachod= on June 27th, 1866. - - [344] _Taktik_, V, p. 206. STROBL, _Trautenau_, p. 8, et seq. - KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, p. 16. - - - - -X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE. - - -1. LESSONS OF WAR. - - During the =Boer War= (1899-1902), the British infantry always - attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated - fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British, - their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be - traced to the following causes:-- - - 1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be - surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of - the Guards at =Modder River=). In many instances, the British forces - were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s - Brigade at =Colenso=). - - 2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted - against each other. (=Modder River=, =Magersfontain=, =Colenso=). - - 3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire - surprises carried out by small detachments. - - 4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry. - - 5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions). - The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted - action was a rare exception. - - 6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of - an organization that had already been shaken never did occur. - - 7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At - =Magersfontain= only 8¹⁄₂ battalions out of 13, and at =Colenso= - only 6 battalions out of 16¹⁄₂, had been seriously engaged. When - =Spionskop= was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged. - The attacks were begun, but not pushed home. - - -The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War. - - The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[345] (Russian I. D. R. - of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep - formations. The bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the - result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the - consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire, - were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the - endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible, - led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary - conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of - the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive - stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of - creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably - with this splendid offensive spirit. - - [345] “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive - spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting.” COUNT MARENZI. - - The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit - of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy - tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and - initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night - combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was - carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who - left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold - and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected - nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the - Japanese combats were-- - - 1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness; - - 2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of - infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole - front; - - 3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point - where the decisive attack was not to take place;[346] - - [346] The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden. - - 4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack; - - 5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense; - - 6. The absence of pursuit. - - The fights at =Wafangu=,[347] as well as the attack made by the Guard - and the 12th Division at the =Yalu=[348] proceeded entirely according - to German pattern. - - [347] _Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg_, - Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank - by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive. - - [348] _Ibid._, I, p. 79, et seq. _Kriegsgeschichtliche - Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also VON LÜTTWITZ, - _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 2. - - A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the - Russian artillery--whose ballistic properties were superior to those - of its antagonist--brought a greater number of guns into the field, - and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically - inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[349] - - [349] The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing - forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese - confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps - 10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more - than the Japanese. - - The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the - government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[350] - The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to - maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing - remained for the Japanese--unless they wished to renounce the - offensive entirely--but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in - front. Since the advantages of the attack--superior numbers and the - freedom of choosing the point of attack--were thus dissipated, the - victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As - the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased - more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but - to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness - as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available - precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development - of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward - resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the - purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of - their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese - were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance - of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the - offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although - their movements were retarded thereby. - - [350] C. H. _Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und - neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur_, 1907, October number. - - The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced - by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly - country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and - long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged - to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth - Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell - to their lot. - - Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard - to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[351] Units were - pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each; - and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain - touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if - for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and - in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of - developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to - mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist - army had a special _penchant_ for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[352] - usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances, - begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed - home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but - assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined - to intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify - quickly a captured position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will - find the best lessons applicable to our conditions. - - [351] _Streffleur_, 1907, January number. - - [352] This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See VON LÜTTWITZ, - _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made - “as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance - was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill - Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On - the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length - of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m. - - -Examples. - - 1. The engagement of the Guard Division at =Yangtsuling= on July - 31st, 1904.[353] - - [353] GERTSCH, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A - Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 313. _Urteile und Beobachtungen - von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 57. - - 2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry - Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against =Temple Hill= (=Terrayama=), - which was held by 4-6 companies.[354] - - [354] BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. - 132.--VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 23. - - Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and - supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500 - m., the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried. - - The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated - fire. - - 3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, 1904, - against a height south of =Huaku= (battle on the =Shaho=).[355] - - [355] _Ibid._, p. 24. - - 4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) under - General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against the - heights south of =Shotasko= (battle on the =Shaho=). - -_Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade._ - - Frontage about 2000 m. - - 4. Infantry: 29. Infantry: - - 5. and 6. 4. and 2. 12. and 11. Cos. 10. and 2. Cos. - --------- --------- ----------- ---------- - 7. and 8. 1. and 3. Cos. 9. and 3. Cos. - - Brigade Reserve: - - 9. and 10. Cos. 11. and 12._ Cos. - --------------- ----------------- - 4. Infantry. 29. Infantry. - - Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed: - - 1. and 4. Cos. II. Bn. - -------------- and ------------- - 29. Infantry. 29. Infantry. - - First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval - between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces. - - The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and - the distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men - that could not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then - followed independently. At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at - will, which lasted for two minutes, and then advanced by rushes - by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the - battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were - absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve - approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between - reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The - last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s position, - and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only - to 235 men.[356] - - [356] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24. SIR IAN - HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, II. Consult the same work - on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the - Chosenrei Pass. - - * * * * * - - In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain - devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced. - The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing - lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very - gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion - 800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[357] This caused the attack to - falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the - hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to - intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another. - - [357] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 47. - - -Examples. - - 1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, 1904, - at =Shiliho= (battle on the =Shaho=).[358] - - [358] _Ibid._, p. 26. - - 2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to - 9th, north of =Madiapu= (battle of =Mukden=). This division required - three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting - distance of the enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was - constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that - under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[359] - - [359] _Ibid._, p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry - Division, in _Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 121. - - 3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904 - (battle of =Mukden=).[360] - - [360] BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, pp. - 217, et seq., 225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand - bags, consult _ibid._, pp. 236 and 292. - - Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons - of the =Russo-Japanese war=, make the following deductions: - “* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance - by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been - done up to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover, - the advantages of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of - the action, and the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and - long range fire on such lines in which it is desirable to advance, - without halting on the way, to within 1000 yards of the enemy. The - necessity of gaining a superiority of fire before advancing to the - assault, and the necessity of an increased supply of ammunition, are - confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated that the bayonet of the - infantryman is still capable of playing an important role in battle.” - - -2. THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SUCCESS DEPENDS. - -The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat -is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that _esprit_ -and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than -any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called -upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over -open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said -Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations -that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under -cover. _But every superior commander ought to consider what such an -operation portends._” Heavy losses are unavoidable in a destructive -fire fight lasting for hours.[361] The attack will not succeed so long -as the enemy commands the plain with his fire. The commander of the -attacking force must find ways and means to wrest this command from the -enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated that -an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly prepared by infantry -and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate forces, and is pushed -with determination close to the enemy; and that such an attack is, in -fact, superior to the defensive. The success of an attack on a position -prepared for defense might depend upon the following preliminary -conditions: - -(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining the most -favorable direction for the attack. - -(b) Occupation of the foreground of the hostile position. When the -foreground is entirely open, an advance must be made under cover of -darkness up to the medium ranges. - -(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest coöperation of -infantry and artillery. - -(d) Timely determination of the point at which the decisive attack is -to be made. - -(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, so as to -allow of delaying the opening of fire until the force is as close as -possible to the enemy. - -(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment of -a strong force for the purpose of bringing about a superiority of -infantry fire. The organization detailed to make the attack must have -its entire effective strength available for accomplishing its proper -task, and not be compelled to detach parts for guarding its flanks. - -(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the part of the -attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any idea of assuming the -offensive, at least for the time being, the attacker should not allow -the advantage to escape him of choosing time and direction of the -attack. - - [361] General VON SCHLICHTING, in his work _Taktische und - strategische Grundsätze_, maintains the opinion--in contrast to - General VON SCHERFF--that open terrain commanded by hostile fire is - impassable for infantry. At any rate, military history has yet to - furnish proof of this. - - -3. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK. - - -Reconnaissance. Preparatory Position. - -“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces the -initiative for the time being. The attacker will then have time to -reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh all the circumstances -that favor the attack. He should not limit himself to reconnaissance -by the cavalry and to observation through field glasses. Mounted -officers’ and infantry officers’ patrols should supplement this -reconnaissance, and complete the information gained as the enemy is -approached.” (Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.). - -The local reconnaissance (see p. 248 supra) should be conducted with -all possible care; timely directions should be given in regard to -it during the approach to the battlefield;[362] the activity of the -reconnoitering bodies should continually increase as the enemy is -approached; and the work itself should be divided in a systematic -manner. Excessive thoroughness may retard reconnaissance work to -such an extent, on short winter days especially, that success may be -jeopardized. (Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of action -will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It would be wholly -wrong to postpone the decision for making the attack until something -definite is known of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. -These matters are almost never cleared up until after the battle. The -decision as to whether or not an attack should be made is determined -primarily by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). The -latter may force a commander to advance promptly without permitting -him to await the results of the reconnaissance. The character of the -terrain and the preparation the enemy is known to have made, determine -whether the commander ought to attack at once, whether he ought to -utilize the cover of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops, -or whether he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his -position. - - [362] According to experience the reconnaissance work generally - flags during a halt, although that is the very time when an increased - activity is desirable. The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on - August 18th, 1870, from the arrival at Caulre until the advance guard - opened the fight, is particularly instructive. _Der 18. August_, pp. - 124, et seq. and 215. - -The information required as a basis for this decision will, as a rule, -not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the objections -arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot be avoided, if -it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight into the enemy’s -situation. It cannot be expected that the defender will passively -permit the assailant to gain an insight into his dispositions. A -feint will accomplish nothing; the enemy must be seriously engaged, -so that he will show his hand.[363] Yet in spite of these combats, -misapprehensions are not precluded. - - [363] It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on - October 10th, 1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army - before it had completed its concentration for battle. The advance - guards of the Reserve Division and of the 5th Division encountered - advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth Army Corps), and at - Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, however, not - recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been - encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the - night 10/11th October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the - 11th. 9th Supplement to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, p. 327. - -It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor to -gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find themselves -suddenly within short range of the enemy. In such a situation, the -detachment should maintain its position, as its fire will frequently -facilitate the approach of the other attacking troops. Almost every one -of the more serious engagements furnishes examples illustrating this -feature.[364] - - [364] The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the - “three houses” (Yuhuntun near Mukden). _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907, - p. 78. The perseverance of the troops in the Palungshan works, - captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being enveloped on both flanks. - (Port Arthur). _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, 4, pp. 81 and 91. - The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard - Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). _Urteile und - Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 60. - -In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being driven back, if -for no other reason, it is advisable to place in readiness an adequate -force of artillery. As the artillery is protected by shields, it can -take up the fight even against superior artillery with better chances -of succeeding than in the past. - -If the commander has decided to attack and has determined against -what part of the hostile position the main attack is to be made, the -foreground of the hostile position is at once occupied, and the enemy’s -advanced troops forced back, so as to prevent the defender from gaining -an insight into the dispositions of the assailant. - -The assailant should launch as few troops as possible for initiating -the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely in a fire fight with -the infantry of the hostile main position, even if the terrain would -permit a covered approach to short range. If the advanced troops allow -themselves to be enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the -danger of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole -force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for the main -attack.[365] - - [365] “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain - permits to the enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose - of opening fire.” - -Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue precipitation -in issuing orders may place advanced troops in such an unfavorable -situation. If the defender allows himself to be tricked into assuming -the offensive for the purpose of driving off harassing detachments, so -much the better for the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then -find an opportunity to fire on the enemy.[366] - - [366] The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of - French infantry during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der - 18. August_, pp. 174 and 179. - - =Austria.= “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will - have to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line - may be formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will - nevertheless still abstain from advancing into the zone of effective - fire.” The Austrians usually employ strong covering bodies. The - Germans desire to ensure simultaneous action on the part of all the - troops in opening the combat. - - At =Spicheren= the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under - the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only - occupied by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders - to General von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of - Frossard’s Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which - the artillery was posted.[367] - - [367] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310. - - At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the Vth - Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer with - four battalions at =Wörth= and =Spachbach= (1500 m. apart) and to - occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac - Mahon was in position.[368] - - [368] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 320. - -The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the advance guard, -into a preparatory position, is made in such a manner that units are -opposite their objectives when the subsequent forward movement against -the enemy is begun.[369] This frequently requires a rearrangement of -the forces so that even an assailant who is numerically inferior may -be superior at the decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the -front and flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the -economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to failure, and -is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly superior in numbers -or morale. - - [369] The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near - Ste. Marie aux Chênes, against St. Privat. _Der 18. August_ p. 408. - -A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on the course -of the combat and makes it difficult to change the direction of the -attack. Route columns, taking advantage of all available cover, will, -therefore, be retained as long as possible, and only subordinate units -permitted to march directly toward their proper objectives, until the -hostile fire compels a more extended deployment (development). The -preparatory position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front -of the hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to -accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and to shield -it from the observation and the fire of the enemy. - -In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have to be placed -in a preparatory position when three kilometers or more from the enemy, -even when the latter’s artillery will in all probability be neutralized -by our own. - -“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various units into the -preparatory position, it is advisable, especially in close country, -to have them move from one covered position to another. If this is -done, units whose march was favored by the nature of the ground, will -not arrive prematurely within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while -others who had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are -still a considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his -dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance from -one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German I. D. R.). - -Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position carefully -prepared for defense will consume several days, the assailant placing -his artillery in position on the first day and reconnoitering under -cover of infantry, which is pushed to the front.[370] The troops of -the first line are pushed forward far enough before daylight so that -they can intrench under cover of darkness and open fire at dawn. -This will be more difficult to accomplish when covering troops or -advanced positions are located in front of the hostile position. If the -assailant has succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops -back upon the main position, an advance to within effective range may -be made during the night in order that the fire fight may be opened on -the succeeding day. Although the chance of taking the enemy by surprise -is eliminated in such a case, the advantage of having diminished the -distance that will have to be crossed under fire remains.[371] - - [370] The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail - in _Taktik_, V, p. 237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest - cooperation of field artillery, foot artillery, infantry and pioneers. - - [371] The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an - interesting example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this - instance, was made during the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy. - -It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, which must -be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the leading line. These -rear echelons must either be intrenched or at least sheltered by masks. -General actions should be avoided at night. - - -4. THE COÖPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN BATTLE. - -Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), the -infantry has to advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. In -doing this the infantry must either pass by or through the artillery -which is already engaged.[372] - - [372] See p. 316, et seq. - -During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in spite of the -mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced the artillery of both -belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse slope of heights. When this -was neglected and when batteries went into position in the open, within -effective range, they were quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel -caused both sides to advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order -formations at an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively. -This alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished -a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident that the first -few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred coincidentally with -the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, which was superior both -as regards numbers and power. The new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in -contrast with the previous edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the -infantry attack should not be postponed until a superiority of fire -has been gained. Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from -the modern armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile -positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at Plevna -and the British in South Africa). - -“_The principal duty of field artillery is to support the infantry -in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably connected -with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, always fight the -targets that are most dangerous for its infantry._” (Par. 364 German F. -A. D. R.). - -The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe that the guns -should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry (par. 375), and -that single batteries should accompany the infantry attack to within -close range of the enemy (par. 471). When an assault is to be made, the -infantry expects the artillery to direct its fire against the point of -attack until immediately before the assault begins. - -“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with the support -of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable protection, even at -the short ranges. _At the decisive moment the artillery should not -shrink even from the heaviest infantry fire._” (Par. 369 German F. A. -D. R.). - -“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery to -consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively -supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is chosen as -an objective will depend upon the situation. As a rule, the hostile -artillery will be the proper objective for our artillery during the -preparatory stage of the action. As the distance between the opposing -infantry forces decreases, it will become more and more necessary for -the artillery to devote itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432 -German F. A. D. R.). - -If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote itself -for some time to the most important target without regard to the -hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely occupying the latter’s -attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. R.). To silence artillery in a -concealed position requires curved fire and a good deal of ammunition; -but, on the other hand, artillery so posted cannot fire upon advancing -skirmishers.[373] Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant -should force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose -itself to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. D. -R.). - - [373] This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted - quickly enough, and that it is difficult to follow moving targets. - Besides, when the targets are small and numerous, they are difficult - to hit. - -The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of both sides -will engage each other’s attention with only a small part of their -guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile infantry. It is -obvious that the infantry will very soon demand of its artillery in -definite terms that it should first annihilate the hostile artillery -before the infantry can think of continuing the attack. - -The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the fusion of -activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely new departure. -The commencement of the infantry attack is accordingly no longer -dependent upon the result of the artillery combat; on the contrary, -both combats are of equal importance and proceed along parallel lines; -the only danger is that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the -front before a superiority of fire has been gained. - - Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned - by the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched - artillery can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional - circumstances, as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as - soon as the hostile fire becomes too hot, and resume its fire again - when that of the enemy abates. The infantry attack should therefore - be launched without awaiting the result of the artillery combat, but - the infantry must insist upon the artillery completely engaging the - attention of the hostile guns during the advance. Another reason for - not awaiting the outcome of the artillery combat, lies in the great - frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful attack made by a division - will then frequently cause the neighboring unit to make an immediate - attack.” - - =Austria= (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the - necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long - as the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved - a noticeable success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile - artillery, the infantry attack remains a difficult undertaking.” - - =France.= The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action: - The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as - quickly as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely - necessary. The commander should give the order for the attack only - when the preparation is considered sufficient. - - =England.= The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing - infantry forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so - as to compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile - batteries have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances - to the attack, the fire is directed upon the point of attack in order - to prepare and to cover the assault.” - - =Italy.= The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm - for infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from - the start by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery - or infantry, the attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to - draw its fire upon themselves, in order to facilitate the deployment - of their own infantry. If, on the other hand, the hostile artillery - remains concealed for the purpose of saving its fire for the infantry - when the latter offers a favorable target upon arriving within - effective range, then it would seem advisable for the artillery of - the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only with - enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s - artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the - defender’s artillery is compelled to come into action in order to - support its own infantry against the advance of the attacker’s - infantry.” - -The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry and -artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing at all times -with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting guidons),[374] -since the elimination of powder smoke and the adoption of neutral -tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance that, while we have -a signal for increasing the range of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have -none for indicating that the fire is to be concentrated upon certain -points. “Uninterrupted communication with the fighting line in front -must be provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal -or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are primarily -to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the enemy, in order -that the artillery may keep up its fire as long as possible.” (Par. 376 -German F. A. D. R.). In England, it has been suggested to indicate the -point upon which fire is to be concentrated, by the colored ball of -smoke of a special projectile. It requires strict attention on the part -of the infantry to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery. -Every opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced -under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. This -is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is to be blinded by -a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of the artillery will either -cause the most advanced line to make a rush, or the troops of the rear -line to come up to the firing line in order to reinforce it or to carry -it forward as much as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable -shield for the infantry (_véritable bouclier de l’infanterie_).” -LANGLOIS. - - [374] During the attack on the Waterberg, on August 11th, 1904, the - various units were ordered to carry, on their outer flanks, flags - attached to long poles. These flags were white in Estorffs, red in - v.d. Heyde’s, blue in Müller’s, and green in Deimling’s detachment. - - -5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.[375] - - [375] See _Taktik_, V, p. 138. - -The reconnoitering troops are charged with the duty of ascertaining -the parts of the hostile position which can be approached under cover, -which are weaker than the others (frequently true of the flanks),[376] -or which can be enfiladed. The attack will usually be directed -against the weakest point in the hostile position, or that on which -the greatest volume of fire can be concentrated from enfilading or -commanding positions. At all other points of the battlefield, the -assailant will endeavor to deceive the opponent, with weak forces, as -to his true intentions, but, at the decisive point, he should launch -superior numbers. The French regulations contend that such weak points -will only become apparent during the course of the fight, and therefore -separate the troops into a preparatory and a decisive combat group. - - [376] Example: The right flank of the French position at Wörth, and - at Roncourt (St. Privat). - -The desire to strike the weakest point in the enemy’s line causes -the decisive blow to be directed against a flank, and the numerical -superiority requisite for gaining the superiority of fire, leads to - - -6. ENVELOPMENT. - -(Pars. 392-396 German I. D. R.). - -The desire of the attacker to put a superior number of rifles into the -fight, in order to gain a superiority of fire more quickly, naturally -leads to an extension of the firing line and to an overlapping of the -defender’s line. The advantage of overlapping the enemy’s line lies in -the fact that part of the line attacked is exposed to both frontal and -oblique fire. The effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending -the wing of the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line -succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only the -hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment is -brought about with the result that the lines of fire of the assailant -cross each other within the hostile position. If the defender refuses a -wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. This will cause such heavy -losses that the defender will begin to succumb first at the salient -point of his line. A further advantage is gained by a pressure on the -enemy’s line of retreat. - -[Illustration] - -Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;[377] they may -perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate him. - - [377] It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks - made by the Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made - by the 72nd, 40th and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height - of Maison Blanche south of Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. KUNZ, - _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-10, p. 128. - -For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether the -commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile flank; -individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, regiments, -finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear of the front of the -enemy should not lead the enveloping force to attempt to execute -another enveloping movement when it encounters a newly formed front. -Surprise is, to a certain extent, essential to the success of a flank -attack.[378] The troops holding the enemy in front [secondary attack] -must, therefore, hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance -about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that he -will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. If -this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham from -reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing force with -more troops than are absolutely necessary. In this connection, compare -the conduct of the 1st Army at Königgrätz and of the Prussian Vth Army -Corps at Wörth with the vacillating action of the Russian IIIrd and -Ist Armies at Sandepu.[379] So long as the enemy is not firmly held -in front, he will be able to evade an envelopment by withdrawing. The -combats of the Boers in the Orange Free State furnish numerous examples -of this fact. The Austrian regulations have very properly coined the -term “attack on two fronts”, which better indicates the task of both -parts of an attacking force. - - [378] The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). V. - LETTOW-VORBECK, II, p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of - Forbach at Spicheren by six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. _Gen. - St. W._, I. p. 356. The assault and capture of the Mont de Brune - (Beaumont) by 6¹⁄₂ Prussian companies, which were followed by 4²⁄₃ - companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 battalions and 3 - batteries; 6 guns were captured. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp. - 132 and 227. - - [379] _Taktik_. V. p. 42. - -Whether the decisive blow is directed against the front or a flank, -depends upon the result of the fire. The advantages offered by an -enveloping movement must not lead to holding the enemy once and for -all in front, while the main attack is directed against his flank. A -frontal attack made in conjunction with a threatening demonstration -against the hostile flank frequently offers far greater prospects -of success.[380] If a superiority is to be employed to advantage, -an envelopment must be made; all objections advanced against the -“enveloping craze” are disposed of by this statement.[381] “A condition -precedent to an envelopment is that the enemy be held in front. For -this purpose a determined demonstration is most effective.” (Par. 392 -German I. D. R.). - - [380] The attack on Flanville, on September 1st, 1870, is an - instructive example. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 87. _Gen. St. W._, II. - p. 1407. - - [381] V. D. GOLTZ, _Das Volk in Waffen_, pp. 328 and 332. BLUME, - _Strategie_, p. 170. MECKEL, _Truppenführung_, p. 221. - -The risks involved in an envelopment must not be -overlooked--overextension and dispersion of the troops;[382] the -possibility that the troops fighting in front and those fighting on the -flank, separated from each other, may be defeated in detail, whether -this be brought about by the defender assuming the offensive, or by -the force holding the enemy in front allowing itself to be enticed -into making a premature advance and suffering a defeat before the -envelopment has a chance to become effective. - - [382] The attack made by François’ Brigade during the battle of - Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 318. Between 12 and 1 o’clock, this - brigade covered a front of 4000 m. See p. 262, supra. - -“The envelopment is effected in the simplest manner if the forces -designated for this task, when still at a distance from the enemy, are -given a march direction that will bring them against the hostile flank. - -“When initiated during the development for action or when carried out -by retained reserves, the envelopment is much more difficult.” (Par. -393 German I. D. R.). - -In the last-mentioned case it may happen that the force detailed to -make the flank attack strikes the enemy’s front instead of his flank. -The same is true of attempts to envelop with parts of the infantry of -the first line that are already deployed, perhaps already engaged, -when the terrain is not specially favorable for such a movement. Such -movements may, in special cases, be carried out at night. (Enveloping -movements of the divisions of the Japanese IIIrd Army at Mukden). As a -rule, this brings about only an overlapping and flanking of the parts -of the hostile position next adjacent to the wing making the movement, -but does not produce a concentric effect on the hostile flank. Yet, -even weak detachments that reach positions from which they are able to -enfilade the enemy, facilitate the advance to the front. - -In starting an enveloping movement when at a considerable distance -from the enemy, the force which is to make it, is directed upon a -point located in rear of the hostile position, approximately where -his reserves are presumed to be. If then the fighting line is further -extended toward the outer flank, the assailant avoids facing the -hostile front directly, and will almost invariably have a start over -the defender in extending the threatened wing. The troops still in the -act of withdrawing from the route column naturally take charge of the -protection of the flanks.[383] - - [383] Compare the deployment for action of the 1st Guard Division - at Königgrätz with that of the 4th Japanese Division at Wafangu. In - the last-mentioned case, the leading (10th) brigade was launched - in a very skillful flank attack; the second brigade took charge of - protecting the flank. - -If a flank march in front of the enemy should become necessary, it can -be undertaken with sufficient safety only when proper preparations -have been made--distribution in depth, shortening of route columns, -due regard being had to protection of the front and flanks--to permit -a deployment of the force at the right moment and in a suitable -formation toward the hostile side.[384] Within effective range of the -enemy, such a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover -is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force the -troops making the flank march to face to the front.[385] - - [384] V. SCHLICHTING. _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, - I, p. 90, et seq. The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions - against the Hill of Forbach (Spicheren) is especially instructive - in this connection. The attacking force was threatened by hostile - troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment caused the - attacking force to face toward the front of the French position. - As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in - order to be pushed into the fight again at another place. GERNIER, - _Einmarschkämpfe_, p. 184. - - [385] Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at - Villermain-Cravant, on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a - violent snow storm and thick weather made it possible for this force - to disengage itself from the enemy and to join the 1st Bavarian Army - Corps at Cravant. - - The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French - position on the =Hallue=[386]: The 30th Brigade used the road leading - along the hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its - movement. The leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry, - on debouching from Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying - flanking fire and endeavored to advance in the face of it, while the - brigade commander, energetically carrying out the orders given him, - led the 68th Infantry toward Frechencourt, thus forestalling several - French battalions that were hurrying up from the east. The village - was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry, but a frontal offensive - movement against the hostile main position could not be carried out - from here either, in spite of the inferiority of the French troops. - - [386] V. MALACHOWSKI, _Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht_, p. - 24, et seq. KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the - conduct of the 15th Infantry Division, which was to hold the enemy in - front and which advanced prematurely before the enveloping movement - of the 16th Division had become effective, consult p. 282 supra, and - _Taktik_, V. p. 163. - -Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at once without -being first placed in a preparatory position[387] or whether it should -first be concentrated, depends upon the situation of the troops engaged -in front with the enemy (the necessity of relieving the pressure on -the Ist Army engaged in front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon -the counter-measures taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters -a newly formed front, it would be a mistake for him to attack -successively with the different units. - - [387] According to the opinion of General V. SCHLICHTING, a - preparatory position should be taken up. _Taktische und strategische - Grundsätze_, III, pp. 133 and 154, et seq. See _Taktik_, V, p. 174. - -Whether the troops holding the enemy in front participate in the -assault during an enveloping movement, depends upon circumstances. They -may frequently better ensure the success of the attack by delivering an -enfilading fire than by advancing. The commander should, at any rate, -not lose sight of this advantage. If both groups (the enveloping and -the holding group) advance to the decisive attack, they should do so -simultaneously. The group holding the enemy in front must resist the -temptation of moving to the front before the envelopment can become -effective.[388] - - [388] Consult _Der 18. August_, pp. 377, 561 and 590. In regard to - the attack made by the Guard and the Saxons and the premature attack - made by the Guard at St Privat. - - The attack on =Ste. Marie aux Chênes=, on August 18th, 1870,[389] and - that made by the 37th Infantry Brigade on =Ladon=[390] are models - worthy of imitation. “The brigade commander personally directed - Lieutenant-Colonel v. Hagen (commanding the troops holding the enemy - in front) to have the signal ‘forward double time’ sounded as soon - as he could see the skirmishers of the 78th Infantry coming over the - heights to the right front.” - - [389] The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard received orders “to - form for attack against St. Privat, but not to attack that village - before the expected arrival of the Saxon Corps.” _Der 18. August_, - pp. 167 and 288. - - [390] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, III, pp. 58 and 49. - - At =Gorni Dubniac=, on October 30th, 1877, the scheme of designating - the moment for attack by means of artillery salvos, failed. During - the attack on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, the simultaneous - advance of Prince Mirski’s troops was regulated by the clock. - -If the attacker desires to deliver an effective blow against the -enemy’s flank, _a considerable interval must be left between the troops -charged with the holding attack_ [secondary attack] _and those detailed -to make the flank attack_, when the envelopment is initiated. (Par. 393 -German I. D. R.). The width of this gap is increased to a seemingly -dangerous degree by the range of modern weapons, but real danger is not -to be apprehended as a counter-attack of the defender exposes both of -his flanks to an enveloping attack. If the enveloping group continues -to advance, that advance in itself will very soon set a limit to the -enemy’s counter-attack. The seemingly dangerous gap in the line, at -the commencement of an action, is closed more and more as the enemy is -approached. Nevertheless, this gap may induce a cautious leader to draw -the enveloping group closer to the frontal group, thereby impairing -the effectiveness of the envelopment. The flanking groups accomplish -the best results, but in following up tactical objectives, they should -never lose sight of the annihilation of the enemy. The difficulty of -coördinating the action of the separated parts of the line is greater -than the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack against -the frontal group. As a rule, the entry of the enveloping group into -action will be the signal for a general attack. The effectiveness of -the enveloping attack is proportional to the energy with which it is -made, but the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack -increases in the same ratio. - -[Illustration] - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - =Austria.= When possible, the reserve is to be designated to make the - enveloping movement. (Par. 407 Austrian I. D. R.). When practicable, - a part of the reserve is employed from the start for the envelopment, - and, under certain circumstances, also for the purpose of gaining - positions from which an enfilade fire can be delivered, and for - supporting the advance of the frontal attack. The group holding - the enemy in front may at first fight a purely defensive action to - prevent a hostile counter-attack, to screen our own dispositions, and - finally, by means of a fire fight at effective ranges, to hold the - hostile troops in their position. - - =France.= The envelopment is occasionally mentioned in the - regulations (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). The Field - Service Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose different stages - may vary in length depending upon the intentions of the commander, - state, however, that the attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of - the enemy, with superior forces, for the purpose of annihilating him.” - - =England.= The importance of flank attacks, even those in which - the defender is subdued by the flanking fire of mounted troops, is - specially mentioned, but, in this connection, it is emphasized that - it is immaterial whether the attack is finally directed against - the front or a flank of the enemy. The holding attack is to be - carried out with energy in front to prevent the enemy from drawing - reinforcements to other points. - - =Italy.= While the regulations of 1891 still unqualifiedly - acknowledged that any frontal attack might succeed, the regulations - of 1903 called attention to the importance of the envelopment, - without denying “that the frontal attack might be the decisive one.” - Surprise is an advantageous factor for success, and for this reason, - even covering troops, for example, may have to be dispensed with on - the march. - - If a force desires to take the enemy by surprise, it must carefully - take advantage of the ground. The surprise may be made more complete, - if the accompanying frontal attack is energetically pushed. On the - other hand, considerations for the troops in the holding attack, set - a limit to the extension of the flanking movement. The fire power of - the troops in the holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops - themselves defeated by a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of - the general advance arrives. They must pay the strictest attention to - the course of events on the opponent’s side; if the enemy retires, or - shifts parts of his force in order to meet a flank attack, the troops - in the holding attack must act with energy. If such signs are not - apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, be proper only when the - pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt on the enemy’s line. - This is the only way in which “simultaneous action by both attacks - may be ensured, and this is of decisive importance to the successful - issue of the combat.” - - -7. REMOVAL OF PACKS. - -It is advisable for infantry to remove packs for an attack; such -tremendous physical exertions await the troops that everything ought -to be done to reduce the load carried by the individual man.[391] “As -soon as it becomes doubtful whether the troops will be able to perform -the task assigned them in action without such relief, all independent -commanders, and, in organizations larger than a regiment, commanders -of regiments and of higher units, have authority to order the men to -remove their packs. In issuing such an order they should bear in mind -the disadvantages which may result from leaving the packs behind. When -knapsacks are removed, the ammunition and iron rations should be taken -from them. Overcoats, cooking utensils, canteens, bread bags, and -intrenching tools remain on the men.” (Par. 301 German I. D. R.). - - [391] Examples from military history in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, - 1902, No. 32. - -According to the French Manual of Field Engineering, the skirmishers, -especially when intrenching, may utilize the knapsack as cover. - -In a defeat knapsacks will frequently be lost. Thus the Russians, -after the second battle of Plevna, and Frossard’s Corps, after the -battle of Spicheren, lost their knapsacks with camp equipment and iron -rations, and, in consequence thereof, suffered great hardships during -the succeeding days. On the other hand, during their retreat, the -43rd, 44th and 45th Infantry Regiments of the Ist Army Corps managed -to recover without trouble the packs which they had removed before -entering the battle of Trautenau. - - The infantry of the Xth Army Corps had left its knapsacks behind - on August 8th, 1870, and did not get them again until the early - part of September. The knapsacks were not hauled on wagons after - the organizations, but were left at the railroad station of St. - Ingbert. On August 6th, 1870, the Würtemberg Field Brigade had left - its knapsacks in a bivouac near Reimersweiler at the risk of never - seeing them again. Among other reasons, General v. d. Tann considered - it impossible for the 2nd Bavarian Division to advance beyond Wörth, - because the organizations might perhaps thereby have been separated - for several days from their baggage, which they had left behind - between Preuschdorf and Görsdorf. - -When knapsacks are removed, a detachment will have to be left behind -to guard them, otherwise they may be robbed of their contents.[392] -The troops always consider the trip to the rear to get the baggage -a special hardship; wagons will very rarely be available for this -purpose, as after great battles all the wagons in the entire -neighborhood will be requisitioned for transporting the wounded, and as -supply wagons will, as a rule, not be at hand. - - [392] This was neglected by the 20th and 35th Infantries, on August - 16th, 1870. - - -8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS. - -In an attack upon a defensive position which is held in force, machine -gun batteries will generally be held in rear for the time being. They -form a mobile reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief, who may -employ it for quickly reinforcing threatened points, for exerting a -pressure upon the wings and flanks of the enemy, and for preparing the -assault. Machine gun companies, either broken up into platoons or not, -as the case may be, endeavor to reach positions from which they can -facilitate the advance of their infantry. - -It is especially advantageous if the fire that is directed upon the -point where the hostile position is to be penetrated, comes from a -position permitting a good view, or from an oblique direction, because -the fire will not have to be discontinued even when the infantry -continues its advance or moves to the assault. If such a position, -permitting the greatest fire effect, is reached (at about 800 m. or -less from the hostile position) any further advance of the machine guns -is faulty, because it interrupts the fire and necessitates fresh laying -and adjustment. - -Upon the victorious termination of a fight, the machine guns should -participate in the first stages of the pursuit by making an extended -use of their fire. They hurry forward into the captured position, as -soon as it is apparent that the victory has been gained, in order to -support the infantry in holding the position, to cover the infantry -while it is re-forming, and to reduce the last vestige of the enemy’s -resistance. If the attack fails the machine guns cover the retiring -troops. - - -9. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK. - -In an infantry attack, the art of minor troop leading consists of -pushing a firing line, superior to the enemy, to the strip of ground -from which the power of our rifle can be utilized to the best advantage -for vanquishing the enemy; secondly, of bringing up supports, without -exposing them to unnecessary losses, so that they will be promptly -available in case of need. The preparations which the enemy has -made for attaining the maximum fire power (by intrenching, placing -ammunition in readiness, and by ascertaining ranges) must be offset -by employing a superior number of rifles. The commander who brings a -greater number of rifles into action than his opponent, may count on -gaining a superiority of fire quickly and with certainty. - -The task of higher troop leading consists of simultaneously launching -the troops against the common objective. - -The effect of modern projectiles requires that, on open ground, the -first deployment be made when 4000-5000 m. from the enemy. The best -scheme would be to advance, without halting, to within decisive short -range of the defender, and then to open fire, but, as previously -stated, the defender should endeavor to prevent the assailant from ever -reaching these ranges. This design of the defender must be frustrated; -if artillery is unable to accomplish this, machine guns or a part of -the infantry must enter the fight; but all parts of the force not -required for this fire fight at medium ranges should continue their -movement without interruption. - -The most difficult task that infantry may be called upon to perform -consists of advancing over an open plain, in the face of unsubdued -artillery, when the situation does not permit night or the effect of an -envelopment to be awaited. - -The first deployment as skirmishers is made for the purpose of -protecting the advancing troops against surprise. Frequently, a squad -or a section per company will suffice for this purpose, but these units -should cover the entire front available for the organization to which -they belong. A uniform and simultaneous advance along the whole line -is impossible however, on account of the diversity of the ground at -various points. When cover is available, skirmish lines may be formed -quickly and pushed forward as entities, but when cover is lacking, -firing lines may have to be deployed slowly and piecemeal. The unit -that has pushed farthest to the front must facilitate with its fire the -advance of those who have encountered greater obstacles in advancing. - -Long, dense firing lines and the supports following them are exposed -to such heavy losses in open country, even at long ranges, that their -advance will soon hesitate. Moreover, the defender will only fire -on targets whose size and density promise a great number of hits. -Therefore, the assailant should endeavor to lead his infantry forward -in loose, disconnected skirmish lines, which are difficult for the -enemy to hit. As a rule, the assailant should not open fire until -after he has been reinforced and has sufficient fire power available. -(Par. 334 German I. D. R.). The situation in which these thin firing -lines are placed is by no means a favorable one, as the defender will -concentrate his fire on the points where the assailant seems to be -filling up his line “for the purpose of overwhelming the defender -permanently by a superiority of fire.” (Par. 413 German I. D. R.). The -skirmishers will then quite naturally open fire for the purpose of -interfering with the cool delivery of the defender’s fire. - -Such a piecemeal, almost independent advance, during which the effect -of the accustomed word of command is considerably reduced and control -and supervision of the individual skirmisher is impossible, presupposes -that the troops are well-drilled, individually trained, and, above all, -intelligent. Attention must also be called to the fact that the firing -line can offer but a weak resistance to an enemy advancing unexpectedly -in force. But, in spite of these drawbacks, this mode of advance -has its advantages for crossing a plain devoid of cover. It permits -favorable fire positions to be reached with greater safety, especially -if these positions can be picked out with the aid of field glasses, -than would be the case if dense skirmish lines were led forward -simultaneously. - -The advance of the infantry under hostile fire, over open ground, may -accordingly be conducted-- - -1. At a walk, by long rushes made by strong units (by platoons at -least), supported by powerful artillery fire or by the fire of a -machine gun battery or a detachment of skirmishers posted in a -favorable position; - -2. By shorter rushes made by smaller units (“proper only when -conditions demand it”); - -3. By crawling, or, in exceptional cases (for example in passing -through fields of standing grain), by employing - -4. Fire while in motion. - -The fire fight at long ranges and near the extreme limit of mid ranges -is only a means for the purpose of reaching the decisive battle ranges, -and of interfering with the undisturbed delivery of the enemy’s fire. -Fire must be opened at as late a moment as possible. Our firing line -should in any case be strong enough, upon entering the zone of mid -ranges, to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire. Experience has shown -that an assailant who opens fire at “long” ranges rarely reaches short -ranges. (See p. 149 supra). - -The distances at which the echelons in rear follow the firing line -should be less (as laid down in the Italian and Russian regulations) -than the distance which separates the firing line of the attacker from -that of the defender. The distances may be increased without danger at -this stage of the combat, as the decision is not imminent, but on the -flanks the supports will have to be brought up closer in order that an -unexpected flank attack may be effectively opposed. All parts of the -attacking force move--as long as possible at a walk--straight to the -front. Subordinate leaders, taking advantage of all available cover, -should endeavor to lead the supports skillfully after the firing line. -This requires that the ground to be crossed be reconnoitered. As a -rule, a movement by the flank upon leaving cover is costlier than an -advance by squads or sections over open ground. Long lines make it -easier for the hostile artillery to adjust and observe its fire, while, -when a greater number of targets of smaller frontage is exposed, this -is made more difficult. For this reason, supports are not led forward -as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, under -certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller units. The -units following in rear remain as long as possible in close order -formations, preferably in route columns. “Man is by nature exceedingly -timid. Soldiers, even those drawn from the educated classes, who were -fully aware of the supreme importance of gaining the victory, broke -down on coming under fire. In close order the moral encouragement due -to the proximity of superiors and comrades kept up their courage.” -(Hessert).[393] Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to -be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which deploy and -follow each other at considerable distances.[394] - - [393] “We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal, - and, in doing so, to ignore the psychological element of combat.” - Major-General Stieler. - - [394] The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian - reserves at Plevna (11th September, 1877), and during the attack made - by the Guard on Gorni Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the - part of the reserves. - -As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders must decide -whether or not it ought to be returned; but the closer one can get to -the enemy without firing a shot, the better. According to the German -F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, uninterrupted forward movement of -skirmish lines in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is -possible only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, even -skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. from the enemy. - -Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, which, -in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, and which, -subsequently, is to produce a superiority of fire. As taught by -experience, this cannot be accomplished from a single position, if the -enemy is efficient. - - A so-called “main firing position”, which was to be located 400-600 - m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the - purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making - use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious - infantry attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first - firing position and the assaulting position, was not appreciated. - - =Austria.= (Par. 589 I. D. R.). “When conditions are very favorable, - it might be possible to choose the firing position in which the - decisive fire fight is to be begun, so close to the enemy that the - decision can be gained from it.” - -The fire fight must be taken up by enough troops to make it -impossible for the defender, who holds his position strongly, to gain -a superiority of fire over some parts of the attacking force. The -supports will now move closer to the firing line, in order to fill -every gap in that line and to meet every attempt of the defender to -gain the upper hand. The echelons of the second line which have not as -yet been absorbed by the firing line, move up in a similar manner. If -the hostile fire abates, parts of the firing line should endeavor to -get closer to the enemy; they are followed by the next adjoining units. -At this stage of the action the attacker will have to give up, to some -extent, his distribution in depth. - -Superiority of fire is an essential condition to victory. It is -attained by better marksmanship, fire control and fire direction, by -taking advantage of cover, and by concentrating a powerful fire against -the decisive point. When the attacker’s troops are not well trained, -a greater number of rifles and more ammunition will be required to -gain this superiority. Accordingly, the attacker will either make an -envelopment or employ fire of position. The attacker possesses a great -advantage, in that he does not need to gain a superiority of fire -along the whole front, but only at a single point. It suffices for -him to contain weak portions of the hostile front with suitable, well -concealed combat groups capable of quickly developing a powerful fire, -while he masses the bulk of his forces against the decisive point. The -defender, who never knows where the decisive blow is going to fall, -ought not to allow himself to be enticed into occupying portions of his -line more weakly than the rest. - -The attainment of the superiority of fire requires time, and, in -addition, coolness and patience on the part of the leaders. All the -ammunition that is expended in gaining this superiority is later -compensated for by fewer losses. The heavy losses sustained by the -Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870, -may be traced directly to the fact that the leaders did not know how to -wait. - -Superiority of fire[395] is absolutely essential to the success of the -attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead to such -heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach the enemy’s -position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.[396] - - [395] For the situation of the British Guard at Modder River - (28th November, 1890), see p. 182 supra. The Guards were closely - hugging the ground at a distance of 800 m. from the enemy. After - 29 ammunition carriers had been shot at the very beginning of the - engagement, all attempts to carry orders or ammunition to the firing - line were abandoned. No attempts were made to relieve the pressure by - means of the fire of sharpshooters, by bringing up reinforcements, or - by gaining ground by crawling. - - [396] “Battles are won by the superiority of fire.” FREDERICK THE - GREAT in his _Military Testament_, 1768. - -During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, the attacker -will have succeeded in working forward little by little until he is -close to the enemy’s position. His superiority will now make itself -felt; the fire from the part of the hostile line that is to be -penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, single groups, then -several, and finally, whole units of the enemy’s line will commence to -crumble away. The attacker should wait until this effect is produced -before he begins the assault; if he does not do this, the attack is -sure to fail. - -_Austria._ (Par. 590 I. D. R.). “The close approach of a long firing -line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a -proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, -under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for -the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a -premature assault may still result in disaster. _As long as the conduct -of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is -crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight -for the superiority of fire._” - -Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from easy to -recognize when the defender of a position has been sufficiently subdued -by fire to make an assault feasible, and when the proper moment has -arrived for launching the reserves. It is only necessary to recall the -premature advance of the artillery and cavalry over the ravine of the -Mance brook, on August 18th, 1870. - -The cessation of the defender’s fire, in itself, is not a sure -sign that his firing line is shaken, as the attacker is unable to -distinguish between a fire pause ordered by the commander on the -defensive and the forced discontinuance of the fight. Sure indications -are not available until men actually leave the defender’s fighting line -here and there, and attempts of the leaders to hold the wavering ones -are clearly apparent. - -At this moment, a leader who has resolved to assault, should order -bayonets fixed. - - * * * * * - -The temporary interruption of the fire occasioned by fixing bayonets is -of no importance, as the superiority of fire has already been gained. -If bayonets are prematurely ordered to be fixed, the accuracy of the -fire will soon be impaired, as the firing of rifles, weighted down -by the attached bayonets, increases the fatigue of the men. When the -troops are excited, the downward deflection of the bullets caused by -fixing the bayonet can, however, only produce a good effect. It is -best to fix bayonets at the signal “Fix bayonet”. In the excitement -prevailing at the moment, it will be impossible to execute the order -with any uniformity, but it is a good plan, in time of peace, to -require one man of each file to fire while the other one fixes his -bayonet. The approaching reserves fix bayonets while on the march. - - -10. THE ASSAULT. - -“The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the domain of -tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and under what conditions -the assault should be made in war, cannot be formulated. At any rate, -fire tactics are not only an essential factor but also the crowning -act of combat; the assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern -combats show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in -consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are exposed -to the annihilating effect of fire. This lesson was thoroughly learned -by the Austrians in 1866, and by the Russians in front of Plevna. Of -what avail were ‘self-sacrifice’, the ‘unconquerable determination to -gain the victory’, the ‘desire for hand to hand conflict’, and all -the other terms that are employed to prove that the moral factors are -the decisive ones in war? That they are the decisive factors needs -no proof whatever; it follows, as a matter of course, from uniform -training, uniform leadership, and uniform arms. But tactics fit for -use in war, are to furnish, above all else, ways and means, showing -how and by what methods the fighting energy of troops may be preserved -most effectively, and thus contribute directly toward preventing the -premature deterioration of the morale of the troops.”[397] - - [397] Colonel KEIM in _von Löbells Jahresberichte_, 1899, II, p. - 561. - -“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault with fixed -bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A premature advance to the -assault, with all the peculiar features attending it, produces an -aversion against the attack, an undue extension of battle lines, and -makes it impossible for reinforcements to come up, except under cover -of darkness. - -The decision for making the assault emanates either from the -subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the commander of the -whole force. The latter may give the impulse for the assault by -launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly the safer procedure. “When -the decision to assault emanates from the commanders in rear, notice -thereof is given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be -repeated by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At this -signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. The parts of -the firing line which are still in rear, move forward, as quickly as -possible, to a position close to the enemy. All reinforcements in rear -hasten straight to the front. As soon as the leading line is to form -for the assault, all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double -time’, all the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force -throw themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. It -should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports -to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s -position. When immediately in front of the enemy, the men should charge -bayonet and, with a cheer, penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348 -German I. D. R.). - -It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive when the -proper moment for making the assault has arrived, as he is compelled -to remain so far in rear of the fighting line, especially where large -forces are concerned, that he can only follow the general course of -the attack. The first indication which he receives as to whether the -enemy’s fire power has been broken all along the line, is the advance -of his own firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in -time when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, and -it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with sufficient -promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to good account.[398] - - [398] “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the - closing of a telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of - constructive theory, which seeks, by this means, to increase the - energy of the first line, but only succeeds in massing too many men - in front of the enemy, a better condition than which the enemy could - not desire.” VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p. - 230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the - Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. F. HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden - Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 145. _Der 18. August_, p. 271. - -The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take the initiative -in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, especially -if the enemy evacuates the position, that the firing line, quickly -taking advantage of this moment, pass over to the bayonet attack. If -the firing line were to wait until the reserves are up, valuable time -would be lost, under certain circumstances; the enemy might recover -from his temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive -reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the attacker -would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the position unmolested, -retire in good order, and perhaps take up a new position, or at least -evade quickly the pursuing fire of the assailant. The firing line -would be the first, in such a case, to perceive when and where the -resistance of the enemy abates; it should therefore make the most of -this knowledge and throw itself upon the part of the defender’s force -that is in the act of withdrawing. - -When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing line, there -is danger that instead of a general attack only a local one will -result. It is impossible to conceive that the whole firing line will -simultaneously consider that the moment for the assault has arrived; -in general, only a part of that line at a time will come to this -conclusion. Such local attacks are hazardous, however, and have some -chance of succeeding only in covered terrain. A local assault made -by a single battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a -considerable portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash -itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly charging -unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile line at some one -point, the defender will at once attack it in vastly superior force -and compel it to retire with heavy loss. Furthermore, the failure is -usually not confined to the one unit. The troops on the right and left -of it, although they are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not -yet shaken him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the -assault, as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule, -when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series -of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good -troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of -definitely gained superiority finally arrives. - - The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[399] very aptly - describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of - the tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the - prolonged fight at close range; the time was now ripe for the - decision and the German corps commanders issued orders for the - assault. Before this order reached the leading line, however, the - German general officers on the spot had decided, at about 7:30 P. - M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, as they - considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the signal given by - them, and in many instances of their own accord, the Prussian and - Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, on - the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended by - the enemy.” (=St. Privat=). Consult, _Der 18. August_, pp. 525 and - 571. - - [399] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 800. - - “When the XIth Army Corps issued from the =Niederwald= (near - =Wörth=), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the - direction of =Elsaszhausen= that the troops had to choose between - either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been - gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open - to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in - confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only - three formed and fresh battalions were available.”--“General von Bose - now ordered a general attack. At the signal ‘the whole force will - advance’, the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud - cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”[400] - - [400] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267. - - The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been - gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become - unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any - numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative - of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely - defensive action. - -It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the initiative -of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the entire force. In -some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, if disaster is to be -avoided. When a portion of the firing line advances, however, and the -tactical situation in any way permits, neighboring units should at once -conform to the movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in -this case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without regard -to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being repulsed. -(Par. 345, German I. D. R.). - -This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters of the -assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” in this -assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault by the entire -line. This might obviously cause the troops to advance prematurely -to the assault, a danger which might be brought about by the junior -platoon commander. No one but the supreme commander, therefore, has -the right to order this signal to be sounded when he wishes a general -assault to be made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill -Regulations (par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides -to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of signals -(s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain the skirmishers -by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general assault all along the -line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. If a unit moves to the assault -contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander, he should possess -enough nerve to look on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much -better for him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the -failure of the general attack by a premature advance. - -“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously as -possible, this is not to be understood as meaning that all the units -should penetrate the hostile position at one and the same time. Such -simultaneous action is immaterial, and might, indeed, cause parts of -the line who had a chance of successfully carrying out the assault, -to hesitate because others are still in rear. The power of the attack -would accordingly be impaired. All units that have once started must -continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German I. D. R.). - -It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended for the -holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. If they can -bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of attack from an -oblique direction and thereby ensure the success of the attack, they -should make the most of this advantage. (Par. 340 German I. D. R.). - -When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, as laid down in -the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers throw themselves -down for the purpose of firing. The supports in the act of moving up -continue their march. If the enemy faces about, all the troops press -after him. - - The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack: - - “If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens - to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been - assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically, - while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their - fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion - in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to - discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover.... - The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without - hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement - has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall - cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that - of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, - until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive - to be assumed.” - -The German Infantry Drill Regulations contain no further rules for the -conduct of the assault. If the physical and moral power of the enemy is -so broken by the preceding fire fight that he commences to evacuate his -position, it is quite immaterial what sort of an assault is made; the -men simply fire and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case -the assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight. - -A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically led, will -not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his position by fire alone; -to compel him to evacuate his position will at the very least require -that an assault be threatened. - -Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the effect of the -fire fight alone was so great that the assault would strike nothing -but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended position. The assault -was to commence after the enemy had ceased firing and had sought -protection in his trenches. The following statement is made by one who -fought on the Boer side: - - “The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived - within 300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a - brief period of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the - assault simultaneously in one long line. This assault, made without - fire support, was repulsed without trouble by the Boer fire. On - several occasions, short lines of our opponent had begun to advance, - but these were in every instance forced to throw themselves down - after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon the whole British line, - in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, began to advance. One - could clearly hear the British leaders call to their men to cease - firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the cheer - ‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the whole - hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me like a - grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder and - the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently - happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same - moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but - was soon better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling, - ‘Steady boys, steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and - more men fell in the British line, and, when it had arrived within - 100 or 80 paces of our position, its energy had spent itself. A - part of the men threw themselves down behind boulders and fired, - while the majority rushed back to the shelter of some bushes; but - even there it was for the most part impossible to hold them. An - assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, even if he is - numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire a number - of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position - the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one - will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under - hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves - without shelter to the hostile fire.”[401] - - [401] Supplement 8 to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1901. - - The same lesson was learned long ago at =Gorni Dubniac= and at - =Plevna=. - -It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of such an -assault. This should be furnished in the first place by the artillery. -In furnishing this support, artillery can employ time fire only until -the infantry arrives within 300 m. of the enemy, while percussion fire -may be continued until the infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy. -During the attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said -to have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if two -or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. The -following statement appears in a British memorial on the lessons of -the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced by artillery fire, -which forced the defenders to take to cover and did not even permit -them to raise their heads above the parapet, was so highly esteemed -by the Japanese infantry that it requested the batteries to continue -firing, without regard to the losses thereby inflicted in its own -ranks, until it had taken the position or unfurled small national flags -as an indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According -to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted in -their infantry by their own guns were insignificant in comparison to -the losses which the defender could inflict by delivering his fire -undisturbed at a range of a few hundred meters, when not kept down by -the attacking artillery.” According to the Austrian regulations, one -unit is to remain halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the -point of attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision -involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to retain -a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, instead of -launching his whole force in the assault. - -When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the artillery will -perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry has reached -a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, when the guns -will have to cease firing, and when even the infantry units which -have been left behind to support the attack, will no longer be able -to direct their fire upon the enemy on account of the wide frontage -of the assaulting force. The defender’s troops would have to be poor -indeed, if they would not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has -practically ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose -of emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even though the -fire be unaimed. - -If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, while the -attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be compelled to keep -under cover. _This can only be accomplished by employing fire while in -motion._ - -This fire is practicable because the defender, who has been overwhelmed -in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his works; it is advantageous, -as it is only to compel the enemy to keep under cover. It would -unquestionably be a mistake, and not justifiable in any case, to employ -fire while in motion, when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the -enemy is not completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover, -ready to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault -with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing the -defender from bringing up his reserves. - - The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton, - perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good - fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close - up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations - are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the - assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing - this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from - the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw - themselves down instead of continuing the advance. And, if the men - have once thrown themselves down during the assault, they will rise - only for the purpose of retreating.”[402] - - [402] In _Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff_, p. 63, - Colonel VON DER GOLTZ makes the following statement in regard to an - experiment: “As the line gradually drew closer to the defender’s - position, the desire of the individual men to get into the hostile - position as quickly as possible, became more and more apparent; the - prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling position, - finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while - in motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized - by the regulations and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its - employment in this case may be traced to the very proper desire of - not allowing the enemy, who has been held down this long, to raise - himself above his parapet. This fire while in motion should not be - confused with the fire while in motion formerly employed by long - skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. The - latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already - overwhelmed, but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an - unshaken opponent.” - - =Russia.= The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.) - that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point - at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and - the men form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a - run or by crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is - begun at a greater distance than 35 m. from the hostile position, - fire while in motion is employed, “in order that the enemy may not - regain his senses and may be prevented from rising above his parapet.” - -During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable terrain -(Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate fights for the -possession of fortifications (the Grivica Work at Plevna, Scheinovo), -bayonet combats are unavoidable, provided both forces are equally -determined. During the fight for the possession of Servigny, on the -evening of August 31st, 1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred -in the narrow village streets.[403] The Russo-Japanese war also proved -beyond the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain their -positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.[404] - - [403] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 51. See p. 134 supra. Fieldmarshal - MOLTKE makes the following observations in regard to the bayonet - fights of the campaign of 1859: “General Niel credits his victory at - Solferino to the use of the bayonet. The question as to how often the - advance to hand to hand conflict is carried out, may be left open. As - a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed that the enemy - will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in regard - to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If - the bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the - campaign of 1859, were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if - the simple prosaic truth could be ascertained, by far the greater - number of these reports would be corrected in so far as to state that - the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided the actual - collision.” - - [404] Examples: The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, In - _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, VON LÜTTWITZ.--The capture of - works No. 17 and No. 18 by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905 - (Mukden).--Description by an eyewitness of a bayonet fight. Sir IAN - HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, p. 252.--A bayonet fight - occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th Rifle Regiment - broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the Yalu, - (see _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 131), and in - Bernaul’s Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July - 24th, 1904. - -The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the line; -frequently isolated groups and then entire units will leave his -line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes effective. -Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable privates will endeavor -to keep the weak-kneed from running away.[405] - - [405] At Villepion, Captain von Hoffmann made a wavering section - hold its position by springing toward them, revolver in hand, and - yelling: “I’ll shoot the first man who gets up! my revolver will - hit too, whether Chassepot bullets will hit you is a question.” - _Geschichte des Bayerischen Leibregiments_. - -If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but -a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the -decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have -remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker -must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance -of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in -close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.[406] - - [406] One must read KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp. - 80, 116, 123 and 156, in order to appreciate what an electrifying - influence the beating of drums may have even on retreating lines. - - “The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when - undertaken in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by - cheers and beating drums.” BOGUSLAWSKI. - - “Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von - Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his men - rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”--“The mere launching of - the attack from the direction of =Point du Jour= sufficed to induce - the well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel - pits, likewise to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.” - HÖNIG. - -In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the -conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent; -that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal of his own. -The soldier should not be taught to shrink from the bayonet attack, but -to seek it. If the infantry is deprived of the _arme blanche_, if the -impossibility of bayonet fighting is preached, and the soldier is never -given an opportunity in time of peace of defending himself, man to man, -with his weapon in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed, -which is unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most -essential quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position. - -“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness of the -bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be found who are equally -capable of making use of it. Indeed, the bayonet cannot be abolished -for the reason, if for no other, that it is the sole and exclusive -embodiment of that will power which alone, both in war and in every-day -life, attains its object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the -attainment of the object. - -“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle -on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be -able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were -to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of -fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled -with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with -the bayonet. With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good -substitute for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only -of troops who do not fear annihilation, _i.e._, troops trained to use -the bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. If -this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure waste -of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with the enemy, if -necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into the air. - -“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the enemy -from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally prefer this -mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very little risk of getting -hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an aversion for exposing himself to -danger, _i.e._, he will shrink from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach -too much importance to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained -soldier, who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who -is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight. -Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, but -does not improve his morale.” DRAGOMIROV. - -Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced by cutting -weapons: - - Campaign of 1859 1.67% - Campaign of 1864 4.0 % - Campaign of 1866 (Prussians) 5.4 % - St. Privat (Germans) 1.0 % - Russo-Turkish war 0.9 % - -In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about 150 m. During -the Franco-German war, the assault against Elsaszhausen (battle of -Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.[407] and that against St. Hubert -at 100-200 m. from the enemy.[408] The 107th Infantry, after charging -over a distance of more than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held -by the French north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the -northern outskirts of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be -covered.[409] In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the -center column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a wild, -headlong assault against its outskirts.”[410] The Japanese frequently -had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, but there were also -instances where their assaulting troops had only to cover a few meters -(1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.). - - [407] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267. - - [408] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 127. - - [409] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 804. - - [410] KUNZ, _Le Bourget_, p. 21. - -=If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position=, he will be -at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be in confusion -and exhausted, and a large number of officers will be gone. If the -defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, takes advantage of this moment, -he may be able to turn the tide of the battle. The inclination of -the men to pursue the enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and -making the most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in -all battles. The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his -victorious infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue -the enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or quickly -assembled detachments should advance on the flanks in pursuit of the -enemy. There is a wide difference between a wild, headlong rush after -the enemy and a systematic pursuit. Infantry that rushes headlong to -the front after penetrating a position must be brought back at any -cost, unless it can enter a second position simultaneously with the -enemy.[411] - - [411] The conduct of the 47th Infantry Brigade after the capture - of Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der 18. August_, p. 184. The second line - of the position at Düppel was carried by the pursuing victors at the - first rush. _Gen. St. W._, 1864, II, p. 539. - -In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker should -re-form his troops without regard to their original arrangement (if -the enemy gives him time enough, the original organizations should -be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish ammunition, and remove -the prisoners. It is a mistake to mass more rifles in the captured -position than can be employed to advantage, as the enemy will in all -probability direct a heavy fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been -decided, the echelons in rear should be halted, so that they can be -employed as occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often -have to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German I. D. R.). -Preparations should be made to the end that hostile counter-attacks -may be at once repulsed. These rules are particularly important when -the position that has been carried is not the main position but only -an advanced post.[412] These measures must be taken independently -by all leaders who participated in the assault, without waiting for -orders from superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as -possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while the enemy -is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with his re-forming, -to prevent his taking up route column, and to overrun his rallying -positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted of a whole series of such -pursuing actions. The arrival of night should by no means be used as an -excuse for discontinuing the pursuit, for night above all else is the -mightiest ally of a bold victor.[413] - - [412] See _Taktik_, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken - after the capture of St. Privat. _Der 18. August_, p. 533. The - situation in Fröschweiler; KUNZ. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, - 17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the signals, ‘the whole force - assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded everywhere. How - little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the conduct - of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. _Ibid._, pp. 87-90. The - 10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear - to a bivouac which they had left in the morning. - - [413] See _Taktik_, V. p. 436. - -=If the attack fails=, it will be the duty of the commander to arrest -the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the rear under hostile -fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt these men while they -are exposed to the most effective fire of the enemy. Only when the -nearest cover is reached can there be any question of halting. (Par. -327 German I. D. R.). When cover is not available near at hand, the -exhaustion of the troops will soon stop the flight, or the leaders -may be able to face them again to the front, as soon as the hostile -fire abates. However, the retreating troops will have placed quite a -distance between themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and -the latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to take -full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless the -attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No matter where -the retreating troops come to a halt and face to the front, there they -must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, intrench. - - The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of - =St. Privat=,[414] and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at - =Magersfontain=, immediately in front of the Boer position, on - December 11th, 1899, is worthy of imitation. - - [414] The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill - is variously given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of - the 1st Guard Regiment) and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See - _History of the 3rd Guard Regiment_, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of - the _1st Guard Regiment_, p. 165; that of the _2nd Guard Regiment_, - p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who still remained, - the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and - self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” _Gen. - St. W._, II, p. 872. - - The assault on =Gorni Dubniac= came to a standstill at very short - range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov - Regiments maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian - skirmishers 320 m., from the trench.[415] - - [415] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 126. - - -11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK. - -(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.). - -In every attack there are situations in which it may be advantageous to -use intrenching tools-- - -1. In fortifying rallying positions. - -The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very cautious, fortified the -initial positions from which their attacks were made, in order that -they might have rallying positions in case of defeat.[416] - - [416] On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army) - had pushed back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a - position 2700 m. from the new Russian position at Yushuling. From - this position the 12th Division advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian - attack had not taken place. The extended fortifications facing the - Russian Shaho position were made with the same end in view. The war - in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army possessed - sufficient freedom of action. See p. 341, et seq., supra. - -2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover of darkness to -within effective range of the enemy for the purpose of opening fire at -daybreak. In this case, the advancing force is, as a rule, instructed -to advance until it comes under hostile fire and then to intrench.[417] - - [417] During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the - Canadians were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches - located 500 m. from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down - and to intrench as soon as they were fired upon. This was done - when the force was 100 m. from the enemy. _Kriegsgeschichtliche - Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 60. - - The Japanese 45th Infantry, in its advance under cover of darkness - against Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000 - m., whereupon the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the - hostile fire abated, the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy - resumed his fire, it intrenched. A third advance brought the regiment - within 500 m. of the defender’s position and it was able to make the - assault during the forenoon of October 12th, 1904. - -3. In intrenching an echelon posted to cover advancing infantry. - -4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of intrenching tools in -quickly putting captured positions in a state of defense, so often felt -during the Franco-German war and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been -removed by the introduction of portable tools.[418] The necessity of -quickly preparing captured positions for defense presented itself in a -number of instances. - - [418] Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later - the French in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion, - on December 1st, 1870 (HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, III, p. 257; KUNZ, - _Loigny_, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, 1871 (_Geschichte des - Regiments Nr. 20_. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the second - ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877 - (KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October - 11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were - repulsed from the captured position, which had been prepared for - defense. The fights for the possession of the village of Linchinpu - (on the right bank of the Shaho, north of the railway), captured - on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the position had to be - prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (VON TETTAU, - _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei_, II, p. - 136). - -5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack when further -advance is impossible, that is, in situations such as confronted the -infantry of the Guard on August 18th when its first attack came to a -standstill. During the attack on Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish -war, the Russian Guard intrenched when a further advance became -impossible. During the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days -later, specific orders were issued for the troops to intrench when -1000-2000 m. from the Turkish works.[419] - - [419] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 166. - -As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish war, general -instructions were issued to the Russian infantry on the subject of -intrenching in attack. According to these instructions, the spade was -to be used in attack in the following cases: In fortifying a captured -position, as a protection against a possible offensive return of the -defender; in holding supporting points necessary to a continuation of -the attack; and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense. -The order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases, -by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to be observed: -“Every man equipped with a spade and who is not sheltered by some -feature of the terrain, places his rifle on the ground and, lying on -his left side, begins to excavate a hole parallel to his body. This -hole should be as long as the distance from his left elbow to his knee, -as wide as the length of the spade-handle, and as deep as the width of -the blade of the spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front -of his head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. When -this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated hole, and, -lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When he has obtained -sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other man of the file, who -proceeds in a similar fashion.” - -The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority, found it -necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, and therefore -made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, or utilized sand -bags,[420] which were carried along. In this manner, they laboriously -worked their way to within assaulting distance of the enemy. In many -instances, this necessitated whole days of fighting when an envelopment -was impossible. Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen -or when the sod was not thick. - - [420] See p. 344 supra. Frequently the bags, which could be tied - with a string, were filled near the place where they were to be used. - The advance was considerably retarded by carrying along sand bags. - During the attack on Yuputz, on March 1st, 1905, by the 8th Infantry - Division of the IInd Army, the first sand bag cover was constructed - 700 m. and the last 250 m. from the village. - - _Results of Russian experiments._ The sand bag employed was made - of coarse linen of grayish green color and when filled and tied, - was approximately 50 cm. long (width of a man’s shoulders), 30-35 - cm. wide, and 30-35 cm. high. The filled sand bag weighed 14-20 - kg., depending upon the filling material (sand or broken stone). - When filled with sand or broken stone, the sand bag stopped all - projectiles, while, when filled with earth, even two bags placed in - rear of each other did not afford sufficient protection. The sand - bags were scarcely discernible with the naked eye at 400 m. They were - not an easy target to hit, and, even at 300 m., it was difficult to - aim at them. - - The men had a distinct aversion against constructing shelter trenches - while lying down. During the war they could be made to intrench only - by great exertions on the part of the officers. The reason for this - is obvious; digging with the small spade while in a prone position - is uncomfortable. The skirmisher considers it much more profitable - to fire than to puzzle out how he can best stir up the soil with the - small spade while in a prone position. Moreover, he knows that at any - moment he may have to make a rush to the front. - - The beautiful idea that these trenches were to be used and widened - by the reserves, was usually not carried out. The reserves preferred - to make longer rushes and to take advantage of folds of the ground - rather than occupy themselves with intrenching under hostile fire. - - At ranges from 2000-1000 m., single men made short rushes, only 30-40 - m. long, as the filled sand bag constituted a considerable load. - Before a man ran forward, he slung his rifle, grasped the sand bag - with one hand at the tied end, with the other at a loop specially - provided for that purpose; then he jumped up, ran forward 30-40 m., - as rapidly as he could in a crouching position, placed the sand bag - on the ground, and threw himself down behind it. Under effective - hostile fire, at 1000-550 m. (during our peace maneuvers at 420-280 - m.), the men then crawl forward, utilizing the sand bag as cover. - The men would rather crawl a greater distance with the sand bag than - intrench while lying down. - - From the position of the enemy, the skirmishers lying behind grayish - green sand bags could not be recognized with the naked eye at - 2000-1000 m. It is reported that both officers and men were at first - very much disinclined toward making these experiments, but that they - changed their views after one or two exercises, and the principal - apprehension, that of increasing the weight of the field equipment, - disappeared because of the undeniable advantages of the sand bag. - -Such cover constructed by the assailant has no greater value than -natural cover found on the ground over which the attack is made; it -affords protection during halts and induces retreating skirmishers to -face to the front again at an earlier moment than would otherwise be -the case. - -“It should not be forgotten, however, that time gained is of greater -benefit to the defender than to the assailant. Moreover, the great -difficulty of inducing a firing line which has made a lodgment under -hostile fire, to advance from its laboriously constructed cover, -admonishes us to be cautious in employing the spade during an attack. -The construction of cover ought never to impair the desire for making -an impetuous attack, or destroy the offensive spirit.” (Par. 313 German -I. D. R.). - -When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it must detach -half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot be offset by an -increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, range finders, and -musicians, take part in the fight, as the men offer a taller target -while intrenching, and as the newly turned earth facilitates the -enemy’s aim. A superiority of fire that has been gained may thereby be -lost. However, when the defender’s troops have been so shaken that the -assailant can detach half of his rifles with impunity, the latter need -not remain lying on the ground, but can advance, in most cases, closer -to the enemy’s position. The use of the spade is, therefore, proper -only when ground that has been gained is to be held, and when the -enemy’s fire permits intrenching. - - =Russia.= In instructions issued by General Kuropatkin, the following - statement in regard to the Japanese infantry appears: “It advances in - widely deployed lines. The firing line advances by short, alternating - rushes, the men then throwing themselves down and intrenching. In - spite of our extraordinarily violent fire, the firing line continues - to advance by alternate rushes, leaves its half completed shelter - trenches and begins to dig new ones. The supports then advance by - alternate rushes, occupy the first line of trenches and complete - them. When the firing line advances from the second line of trenches, - they are occupied by the supports, while the reserves move up into - the first line of trenches. In this manner, the advance is continued - by successive rushes. From this, it is apparent that the infantryman - in the firing line must act on his own initiative in selecting a - point for intrenching.” - - =Japan.= In a number of cases, the Japanese conducted an attack in - the manner described. At Liao Yang, on September 1st, 1904, shelter - trenches were dug at 750 and at 530 m. from the Russian position. - The advance beyond this was so managed that the men intrenched after - every rush, finally arriving, in the course of the day, within 300 - m. of the enemy. An assault made from this position on the afternoon - of the 2nd was repulsed. The whole Japanese line again faced to the - front on arriving in the shelter trenches which they had dug 300 m. - from the hostile position. The Japanese now perfected their weak - intrenchments and were even able to repulse two counter-attacks - made by the Russians. This was certainly an exceptional case, and, - besides, it involved an attack on a fortified position. - - The German Manual of Field Engineering (No. 46) recommends that the - man, when lying on his left side, construct in the first place a - parapet 30 cm. high, as head cover and rifle rest. This produces pits - 50 cm. wide, 60 cm. long, and 40 cm. deep, usually deeper in front - than in rear, which makes aiming uncomfortable. - - =France.= According to the _Instruction pratique sur les travaux de - campagne_ (24th October, 1906), the men are to improve available - cover; where natural cover is wanting, artificial cover is to - be constructed when the hostile fire compels a halt or the men - are forced to halt to regain their breath. At short ranges, the - skirmishers dig individual pits. It is desirable for the soldier to - use his knapsack as cover while working, and to leave it in position - later also, to get better head cover. - - =England.= Although the troops are not equipped with portable - intrenching tools, it is prescribed that captured positions be - fortified; in open country, when the hostile fire is too hot, this is - to be done at night. - - The suggestion of creating cover for skirmishers by using the - pits produced by short shell salvos, is a singular one. Detailed - experiments have been made in =Austria=.[421] In instructions issued - by the commander of the XIth Corps, it was recommended that, when - exposed to moderate hostile fire, the soldier should hug the ground - as closely as possible while at work. The intrenching proceeded - most rapidly when the soldier first excavated the ground in front - and threw it forward. But in order to do this, the man has to push - himself backward during the work and must throw the earth some - distance. The parapet is low, but affords sufficient protection. - - [421] _Streffleur_, 1906, III, p. 387. - -[Illustration] - - The task is greater when the soldier lies first on his left, then on - his right side, removes earth from a borrow pit at his right and then - from one on his left, and piles it up in front. As the skirmisher - lies on the natural surface of the ground during this operation, he - naturally constructs a higher parapet. - -The following general rules governing the use of the spade in attack -may be laid down: - -1. An invariable use of the spade in attack must be unhesitatingly -condemned. The best means of gaining the superiority of fire, and the -best protection against hostile fire, is our own fire. - -2. It must not be left to the soldier’s discretion, as to whether or -not he shall intrench. The order for intrenching should in every case -emanate from the supreme commander. - -3. As a rule, the spade should be used in those phases of combat that -partake more of a defensive character, in particular-- - -(a) To protect artillery and prepare rallying positions during the -preparatory stage of the action; - -(b) To shelter troops detailed to contain the enemy while enveloping -movements are in progress; - -(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile fire by their -own delivered from enfilading or commanding positions; - -(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point that has just -been gained, whether this has been captured from the enemy or whether -the attack has come to a standstill at that point and a pause in the -fighting occurs. - -4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to trench is -advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack is a purely -frontal one and is made over ground devoid of cover. - - -12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.[422] - -(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.). - - [422] _Taktik_, V. p. 334, et seq. - -The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. It would seem -desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of approach, or the position -one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous -line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the -earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of -fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in -the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of -the enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven -from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be -given by fresh troops; and the success gained by the firing line must -be clinched by a retained assaulting force. The necessity of having -a formed body of troops available, until the fight is in full swing, -to meet unforeseen contingencies, further requires that a reserve -be provided. Organizations should not be broken up any more than is -absolutely necessary. The number of troops which the commander will -retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of information -he has in regard to the situation. During an attack the reserve is -frequently not designated until a preparatory position is taken up. In -attack about ¹⁄₄-¹⁄₃, and in defense ¹⁄₆-¹⁄₂ of the whole force is put -in the reserve, depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a -purely defensive one or the decision is sought. - -The reserve enables the commander to “shift the center of gravity of -the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce his line where he -considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally, -to bring about the decision.” (Par. 294 German I. D. R.). As the combat -progresses, the commander must decide whether the situation is such -as to compel him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,[423] or -whether it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose -of gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the attack -fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting in all the -reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a mistake not to employ -the reserve, to keep it in readiness to cover a possible retreat, if -its intervention can yet bring about a favorable termination of the -combat. - - [423] See deliberations of General v. d. Tann at Coulmiers. HELVIG, - _Das erste bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 203. - - The employment of the reserves by the Russians at =Plevna=, on - September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine - battalions and was too weak to make an impression at one point; - fifteen battalions were detailed to cover the lines of communication - and the artillery (which was not at all in danger). Forty battalions - that did not enter the fight were scattered all over the battlefield, - no one being able to account for their presence.[424] When Skobeleff - had effected a lodgment in the Turkish position, every available - man should have been sent to this point. Although there were 9 - battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) available, only - the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in - previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that - more for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of - the success that had been gained. - - [424] In the Franco-German war, the same thing happened on the - German side. _Der 18. August_, p. 221. - - In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all - their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch - numerous detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely - ignoring existing organizations (this had, indeed, also the - advantage that a suitable leader could be found for carrying a - special mission into execution), and to form strong reserves by - details from any and all imaginable units. These reserves were - frequently not used at all.[425] - - [425] On July 31st, 1904, when, in pursuance of orders from General - Headquarters, a regiment and a battery was to be despatched to - Mistshenko’s Cavalry Division, 15 km. away, a provisional regiment - of two battalions was formed, without apparent reason, for the - purpose from the 139th and 140th Infantry Regiments. In regard to the - inclination of the Russians to form detachments, see LÖFFLER, I, pp. - 11, 27, 53 and 54. - - On March 5th, 1905, the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps - (Zerpitzki) had available one brigade of his 31st Division, one - regiment of his 9th Division, one regiment of the VIIIth Corps, three - Rifle regiments of the mixed Rifle Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and - one regiment of the Vth Siberian Army Corps.[426] - - [426] See V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der - Mandschurei_, II, p. 483. - - On October 15th, in the battle on the =Shaho=, the general reserve - of the army consisted of 32 battalions belonging to five different - divisions and five different army corps. In his order for the battle, - Kuropatkin laid particular stress on the necessity of forming - reserves (Army Orders dated August 15th, 1904): “Keeping back more - than half of the force in reserve is the best guarantee for success.” - On December 27th, 1904, he made a similar statement. - -The reserves are created to be used; every available man must -participate in the decisive stage of the combat. If the enemy yields -before the reserve is launched, so much the better; if he does not give -way, all the troops that are at hand must be put in. The main thing is -to gain the victory; scruples may be indulged in afterwards. A defeated -commander who leaves the battlefield with troops that are still -partially intact, has not made the most of the means at his disposal -for combat, provided the situation was such that the launching of the -reserves could have secured the victory. As shown by Hastenbeck (1757), -by Idstedt (1850), and by Bapaume, at the moment of the crisis there is -no sharp dividing line between victory and defeat, and the reserves may -decide the fate of the day. The decision of Archduke Albrecht, during -the battle of Custozza (1866), to push his last reserves into the fight -was worthy of a great commander. - - In contrast with this, =Russia= (1904): “In employing the general - reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than - the troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to - support this or that section, _but he should in no case use up his - whole reserve before the decision has occurred_.” The failures of - the British in the South African war may likewise be traced in part - to a faulty use of the reserves. Thus, we read in the regulations of - 1896: “The reserve should occupy a favorable defensive position in - order to check the enemy in case of defeat; if the attack succeeds, - the reserve should move up into the position and take charge of the - pursuit.” - -“Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, after having -made the most inconceivable exertions to swim across a broad, deep -river, shrinks from the last spurt and drowns, although he need only -stretch out his arm to reach the opposite shore.” (DRAGOMIROV). - -In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that the whole -available force must be launched at the decisive moment at the decisive -point, and that the commander ought not to detach portions of the force -intended for the decisive blow for tasks of secondary importance. - - The launching of L’Estocq’s Corps at =Preussisch-Eylau=, is still a - model worthy of imitation.[427] - - [427] LETTOW-VORBECK, _Feldzug von 1806 und 1807_, IV, p. 107. - - In the battle of =Vionville=, three battalions and four batteries - were detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived - during the afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in - the action of the 5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed - necessary on the right flank. When the head of the division reached - Tronville, the question was discussed, as to whether it was desirable - first to concentrate the division for action, or to throw the leading - battalions into the Tronville forest, where portions of Lehman’s - Brigade were still holding their ground. As an advance of the French - out of the woods would have endangered the left flank of the Prussian - artillery line, three battalions were at once thrown into the forest, - while the six remaining battalions were kept in reserve for the time - being. Subsequently, three more battalions were sent forward to - reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest - - “What a decisive blow the 20th Division could have struck, if it had - been employed in one body!” (V. LIEBERT).[428] - - [428] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 595. _Kriegsgeschichtliche - Einzelschriften_, 18, p. 580.--V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, - p. 146.--Essay by V. LIEBERT published in Supplement of the - _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895. From the description contained in - the 4th Supplement of the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895, p. 177. It - appears, at any rate, that the support given by the 39th Half-Brigade - was not absolutely necessary. On the right flank as well, a united - employment of the force for the attack of Hill 970 ought to have - been possible; as it was, regiments were cut up in making isolated - assaults, which had no effect whatever on the outcome of the general - action. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq. - -The decision is usually brought about by pressure on a flank, but it -might become necessary to accomplish this result by launching large -masses against some point of the hostile front.[429] - - [429] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteriemassen im Angriff_. - Colonel CSICSERICS VON BACSANY of the Austrian Army, in a brilliant - study entitled _Die Schlacht_ (Vienna, 1908), argues that with the - increased combat frontage of armies, local successes have no longer - the same Influence on the outcome of the battle as of old. Compare, - for example, the envelopment of the Russian left flank at Liao Yang, - and the penetration of the line at Yuhuntun (Mukden), with the effect - produced by the capture of Chlum and St. Privat on the outcome of the - battles of Königgrätz and Gravelotte, respectively. - -The difficulties of accomplishing this are best illustrated by the -situation of the IIIrd Army Corps on the afternoon of August 18th, -1870, when Prince Frederick Charles yielded to the entreaties of -General von Alvensleben and permitted him to advance south of the -Bois de la Cusse.[430] Similar situations resulted in the case of the -Austrian 1st and VIth Army Corps at Königgrätz, the French IIIrd and -IVth Army Corps, on a front of 2.75 km., with the Guards in rear, -between Noisseville and Failly, and, finally, the advance of the -1st East Siberian Rifle Division at Wafangu. The French regulations -likewise contemplate a decisive attack made by large masses on a narrow -front. If these troops which are to clinch the success gained by the -fighting line, are deployed on the front laid down in regulations, they -will be unable to use their weapons. It isn’t mechanical shock action, -but fire effect that decides the battle. In such a mass of troops, only -fractional parts will be able to fire, the major portion is crowded -together and becomes a dense, defenseless target, exposed to all the -psychological impressions produced by crowding human beings into a -narrow space.[431] - - [430] _Der 18. August_, pp. 484 and 558, sketches 34 and 35. - - [431] The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors - in colonial wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that, - for our purposes, deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat - of the two French brigades at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at - Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). LEHAUCOURT, _Les Expéditions de Tonkin_. - The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st March. 1896). - -A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of 1500 m., _i.e._, -put only about ¹⁄₄ of its men in the first line; but no objection can -be made if the brigade, in moving to the final decisive assault, at -once advances on a front of 2500-3000 m. - - -13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION. - -The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the -commander to control and direct all ranks in action by words of command -diminishes. In action, therefore, those means must be adopted that will -facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires first of all the -choice of an appropriate position for the leader. - -The beginning of an action should find the leader as far forward as -possible; during the advance to the battlefield, with the advance -guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for neither messages nor reports, -nor a map can adequately take the place of personal inspection of the -situation of the enemy, of neighboring units, and of the ground. So -placed, he can best direct the first deployment, upon which the future -course of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making -prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops from making -detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude -arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit. - -During the action, the superior commander can influence the course -of the fight, his personal example excepted, only by employing his -reserves. His place is, therefore, near the reserves, at a point that -can be readily found, and never in the firing line. - -A company commander should remain where he believes he can best control -his company, as a rule, perhaps in the firing line. He provides for the -supply and distribution of ammunition that is brought up from the rear, -and regulates the coöperation of the platoons. (Pars. 216, 457 and 458 -German I. D. R.). - -A battalion commander should only in very exceptional cases take post -in the firing line; he should nearly always remain with parts of the -force that are held back for the time being, but, in any case, where -he can effectively supervise his battalion. The choice of a regimental -commander’s position is influenced by the same considerations; when his -regiment is acting as part of a brigade, he must select his position so -as to facilitate the transmission of orders from brigade headquarters. -The brigade commander will, as a rule, remain near his reserves, at a -point from which he can best overlook the deployment of his brigade. - -On account of the fact that extended order fighting predominates, -leaders of all grades must be particularly careful to maintain -connection between the several parts of their command, with each other, -and with adjoining units, and to preserve their influence over their -firing lines. Superior commanders should, in addition, see that their -troops do not get out of hand, and all subordinate leaders, after -carrying out a task assigned them, should endeavor promptly to rejoin -their proper commands, or place themselves at the disposal of the -commander of troops still engaged with the enemy. - -These requirements will be fulfilled, if superior commanders order -nothing that they should not and cannot order, and if the officers -charged with the execution of the orders coöperate to attain the -desired end, and do not abuse the freedom of action allowed them. - -While subordinate leaders, up to and including company commanders, -are mainly occupied with fire control and fire direction, and should -influence the men by their personal example, superior commanders have -other tasks, which they must not neglect for the purpose of interfering -in the sphere of action of their subordinates. They can influence the -fire action only by sending the necessary forces to those portions -of the firing line whose fire they wish to augment. An interference -on their part with the action of subordinates is permissible only in -case of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes, which would cause the -combat to take a course other than that intended. The larger the unit -commanded by an officer, the greater the latitude that must be allowed -him. The leaders should concentrate their attention upon the general -execution of their special tasks as part of the whole scheme, rather -than upon supervision of details. It is by no means essential for all -parts of the force to employ identical means to attain one and the same -object. Every leader should bear in mind that _omission or neglect are -greater crimes than a mistake made in the choice of means_. - -The initiative of leaders of all grades is the foundation of great -victories in war, but this initiative must neither jeopardize unity of -action nor direct the course of events into channels not intended by -the commander.[432] - - [432] See _Taktik_, III, p. 174, and V, p. 57, et seq. - -The best safeguard against the results of an act of unjustifiable -initiative is to ask oneself: “What orders would my superior have to -give me, if he were in my place and knew what I know?” - - -14. UNITED ACTION VERSUS TACTICAL MISSIONS. - - Although no one disputes that victory depends upon a superiority of - fire at the decisive point, yet there is a great diversity of opinion - as to how this superiority is to be attained. - - General Bronsart von Schellendorff states:[433] “Every battle seeks - to bring about a decisive victory, but this is, after all, invariably - the sum of local victories. Successful battle-tactics consist of - correctly estimating the tactical value of these local successes - and of contriving to gain a victory at the decisive point; in other - words, to manage so that the sum-total of positive factors will be - greater than that of the negative factors.” - - [433] _Betrachtungen über die zeitgemäsze Fechtweise der - Infanterie_, 1891, p. 36. - - In the opinion of the advocates of this course,[434] unity of action - is attainable by practice and study, but not by set formations. If - unity of action could be ensured in all bodies of troops by means - of study and practice, there would seem to be no reason why the - regulations should lay down still more definite rules to govern the - manner in which an attack should be conducted. The matter is not - so simple, however. Bearing in mind the great latitude that the - regulations allow each individual in choosing the formation which he - deems proper in a given case, it is obvious that many very different - procedures may result. This in itself is no drawback, and to a - certain extent this condition must exist, as the task in hand, the - nature of the country, and the existing situation vary. But, if a - given problem can be correctly solved in several ways, it will also - admit of a decidedly incorrect solution; and it is the more likely - to be solved incorrectly, the less study and practice is indulged in - by a large part of the corps of officers, and the less this class of - officers finds in existing regulations as a guide to conduct. When, - in spite of undeniable progress, we see dispersed attacks and an - unquestionably incorrect conduct in every maneuver, and this with a - corps of officers nearly all of whom are professional soldiers, who - have had the advantage of study and practice, what may we expect - in war, where the corps of officers will be very largely composed - of officers of the Reserve and Landwehr, who have but very limited - opportunities for study and practice, but who, after the very first - battle, may have to command companies. - - [434] General VON SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische - Grundsätze der Gegenwart_. See also the essay in the July number of - _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1898. - - General von Scherff,[435] the chief advocate of “united action,” is - opposed to the “combat with units of command” (_Kommandoeinheiten_) - briefly sketched above. He makes a distinction between battle-tactics - and the tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of - the local successes can by no means gain the victory; that can only - be done by the united launching of adequate forces at the decisive - point. “No weapon in the world will ever alter the fact that five - battalions united in one body have a greater inherent fighting - power than five separate battalions--not to mention twenty separate - companies--always provided that a united body of troops is also - launched as one body.” - - [435] _Kriegslehren in Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen der - Neuzeit_, I-IV, _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, 1898. - - -Examples Illustrating the Necessity of a United Attack. - - 1. The 26th Infantry Brigade was alarmed and put in march toward the - battlefield to support the advance guard brigade of the VIIth Army - Corps, engaged at =Colombey=. The commander of the 26th Infantry - Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It - was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the - 25th Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and - Colligny, and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The - troops already engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and - physical energy was exhausted. It is only too patent that the first - battalion (1st Battalion, 13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was - thrown into the fight to afford at least temporary relief, but this - insufficient reinforcement was involved in the general failure. After - about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade (the IIIrd Battallion, - 73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) was concentrating - for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united attack, - only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This - battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the “Tannenwäldchen” at the - “Todten-Allee”, but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall - back with considerable losses, prevented the further advance of the - IInd Battallion of the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier - Battalion of the 13th Infantry, on the bank of the Vallières brook. - “Although the General Staff account of the war is silent on this - subject, we are justified in assuming that only the presence of the - brigade commander, who had learned a lesson from the second local - assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry from - making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the organizations, - the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, proceeded - more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing on - the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a - second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the - IInd Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time. - The result was that the enemy was completely routed.”[436] - - [436] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 470. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p. - 41, et seq. - - 2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated - attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three - different brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a - higher commander been present, a united attack launched by him would - undoubtedly have been successful.[437] - - [437] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 631. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. - 271. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq. - - 3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb - of =St. Martin=, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th - Infantry Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a - large body of massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry - Division, in particular the attack made on =Grugies= (battle of =St. - Quentin=) is the antithesis of the above-mentioned attack. Although - the situation did not necessitate the simultaneous launching of the - available forces, the brigade attacked in driblets. The attack made - by these fractions, launched one after another, was not able to - bring about a decision. In the first place, at about 11 A. M., three - companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th Infantry), soon afterwards - supported by the 8th Company of the 29th Infantry, and the 8th - Company of the 69th Infantry, attacked the French position at the - railway embankment and cut. The Prussian troops fought with great - gallantry, the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry making - four attacks, and the other two companies, three. Although these - five companies succeeded in gaining temporary successes, they lacked - a common commander, and were supported from the rear only when they - were thrown back after fighting for three-quarters of an hour. - - About noon, the four companies of the Ist Battalion, 29th Infantry, - were brought up, but did not engage until the first line had been - forced back and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry, - at any rate, were out of action for the time being. Incidentally, - it may be mentioned that the Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry - attacked in three groups, the strongest of which consisted of 2-l/2 - companies, the weakest of only half a company. Only the strongest - of these groups scored a success, and the Ist Battalion of the 29th - Infantry was completely routed after a bloody fight. The 9th and 10th - Companies, 29th Infantry, did not arrive on the battlefield until - after the companies of the Ist Battalion of this regiment, whose - heroic fight cannot be sufficiently praised, had ceased to exist as - tactical units. - - At 12:30 P. M., the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 70th Infantry - were brought up and threw back the French, but were in their turn - defeated. At this moment the 10th and 11th Companies of the 40th - Infantry arrived; these companies were also able to advance, but - their success was a temporary one only. - - At 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion of the 40th Infantry appeared, - threw the French back, but was soon attacked by superior forces and - suffered the same fate as its predecessors. - - At 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion of the 70th Infantry and the - 9th and 12th Companies of the 40th Infantry were brought forward, but - only the former engaged seriously at once--again without success. - A little while later, the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, - advanced energetically. At about 3:30 P. M., the French made a very - strong counter-attack; all that had been gained seemed about to - be lost again, when the decision was finally brought about by the - vigorous action of the 41st Infantry and a charge made by Reserve - Dragoons. - - The capture of Grugies, of the sugar mill, and, a little later, of - Gauchy, now followed. - - The resistance of the French was broken. General von Barnekow - had thus, apparently, gained his object; but at what a price? In - this engagement, the launching of troops in driblets may be very - accurately followed: - - 1. At 11 A. M., five companies were launched in two separate groups - (5th, 6th, and 7th Companies, 69th Infantry--8th Company, 29th - Infantry and 8th Company, 69th Infantry); - - 2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry) - were also launched in separate groups; - - 3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th - Companies, 29th Infantry); - - 4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and 4th - Companies, 70th Infantry); - - 5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were - pushed in; - - 6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought - up; - - 7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the - 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced. - - Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually - drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different - detachments, from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division - at Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on - the battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was - exhausted.[438] - - [438] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, II, pp. 135 and 212. - - Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary - one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally - forced them to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of - partial successes, which became reverses, however, in a very short - time. - - _Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required - beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved - the weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster, - without turning the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only - be brought about by simultaneously launching masses._ - - “The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer - practicable under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the - opposite extreme of extended order, company column tactics, with - which all were sufficiently familiar, since it had been carefully - practiced in minor field exercises in time of peace.” (The attack - made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against =Schlosz Aubigny=, August - 14th, 1870[439]) - - [439] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 466; VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p. - 16; VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p. 18. This - example is the more instructive, as both advocates of these opposing - views show how, in their opinion, the attack should have been made. - The same attack is, moreover, treated in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, - 1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title _Selbständigkeit und - Auftragsverfahren_. - - There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the - continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not - be able to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate - leaders restoring this unity, and “that, in the end, no higher - commander will any longer have the assurance that his wishes will - be carried out.” The battles around Metz during August, 1870, show - a tendency on the part of the infantry to leave behind, in reserve - and in rallying positions, parts of the troops launched to perform a - certain combat task, “to detach parts to maintain communication (very - often not at all endangered) with neighboring detachments”, and to - despatch others to a distance to cover a flank, or to make a wide - turning movement for the purpose of enveloping the enemy’s flank. - - To prevent a battle from degenerating into a number of disconnected, - local combats, and to ensure that the enemy will be actually - subjected to the fire of as many rifles as the supreme commander - intended, General von Scherff proposes that the battle formation, - consisting of several echelons separated by fixed distances, be taken - up outside of the zone of hostile fire, and that these echelons - then advance simultaneously and as uninterruptedly as possible upon - the enemy. In this movement the terrain is to be taken advantage of - only so far as the orders permit. In view of the flat trajectory of - the modern rifle, he concedes that fire while in motion, formerly - considered permissible by him at long and medium ranges, may be - replaced by an advance by rushes of the firing line, alternating - with firing in a prone position, the ammunition to be expended at - each halt being fixed by the officer charged with fire direction. - He moreover considers it necessary to have a main firing position, - located approximately at the outer limit of short ranges, for the - purpose of gaining the superiority of fire. Base units must be - designated in order to prevent weak detachments from encountering the - enemy single-handed. Moreover, he intends to keep the advance going - by increasing the fire, and by detailed and definite orders providing - for the constant reinforcement of the firing line by men of the - steadily following supports and reserves. Further, since according to - his proposal, a halt by the rear echelons of an attack that has once - been launched, is excluded on principle, it follows of necessity, - that, for the fire effect of the firing line at the really decisive - ranges, there can remain only a very brief period of time, measurable - in minutes, which is amply sufficient, in his opinion, for the object - to be accomplished. - - It is charged that General von Scherff’s proposal[440] (see p. 205 - supra) favors a set scheme for conducting every fight. This is not - true; there is quite a difference between “more definitely regulating - the conduct of an attack”, aimed at by the author of _Kriegslehren_, - and the formulation of a normal procedure. - - [440] The 10th Supplement of the _Internationale Revue_ 1900, gives - General von Scherff’s ideas on the infantry attack. See also his - _Reglementarische Studien_, p. 58, and _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, p. - 102. _Vergleichender Rückblick auf die neueste Tagesliteratur über - den Infanterieangriff_, 1906. - - “Where a number of individuals are to coöperate for the purpose of - performing a certain task, the nature of the case requires that - each one be able to picture to himself beforehand the nature of the - task, so that his share in it will appear clear and definite. Each - one must know what he is to do, when and where he should engage, - what his role is to be, etc. etc., or the result will be hopeless - confusion.”--“The drill regulations must supply this picture and the - drill-ground is the place where its general forms should be impressed - upon every individual participating in the performance of a task.” - Experience has taught us that this image of the drill-ground becomes - distorted in war through influences which have almost never permitted - it to appear on the battlefield in its true form. The initiative of - subordinate leaders should overcome the obstacles which stand in the - way of a realization of this ideal image. - - =The system of tactical missions= reckons with the sum-total of local - successes, assigns tasks to the different units of command, and - leaves to the latter the choice of the means, without restricting - their independence. The course of the combat can be influenced only - by the action of retained forces, and it is sought to produce united - action by acquainting all leaders with the object of the combat, they - in turn endeavoring to attain this object even though they do so in - different ways. - - =The system of united action= seeks to ensure victory by - simultaneously placing in readiness all the forces intended for - the general combat, by an orderly concentration for action, and by - launching the troops at one and the same time, without, however, - requiring all parts of the force to employ the same formations. This - system dictates to the leader the number of troops he should launch. - Since in action everything is ordered as necessity therefor arises, - the result is that the leader loses sight of the general action in - view of the great number of separate orders that must be issued. - - In the system of tactical missions, there is danger of arbitrary - action on the part of subordinates, and of dispersion; moreover, - it is not always easy to deploy strong firing lines, and there is - an increased tendency to overestimate the value of cover and, in - consequence, to overstep the assigned frontage. - - The system of united action is open to the objection that initiative - of the individual disappears and that the rules laid down in drill - regulations degenerate into a pattern devoid of all spirit. - - In =Austria= (1906), Captain Wachtel[441] suggests that, when a - decision is not sought, an attack in groups be made, and that, when a - decision is sought, a united attack be made. In =Switzerland=, Major - Sonderegger[442] advocates a procedure based on that of General von - Scherff. - - [441] _Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff_. - - [442] _Der ungebremste Infanterieangriff_, 1906. - - The initiative of the individual should carry the troops over - difficulties occasioned by the terrain or the enemy. Such checks - occur most frequently from the time a force enters the zone of - effective hostile fire until the assault has been decided upon. In - the author’s opinion, the individualized attack is a concession made, - at the expense of united action, for the purpose of making the attack - succeed at all. - - - - -XI. THE DEFENSE.[443] - - [443] _Taktik_, V, p. 308. HOPPENSTEDT, _Taktisches Handbuch für - den Infanterieoffizier_, p. 30. - - -The invariable guiding principle in defense is to make the most -profitable use of fire. This principle governs in the selection of a -position and in strengthening it artificially. - -The defender’s object may be-- - -1. =Temporary occupation= of a piece of ground; - -2. =Purely passive defense=, outpost, rear guard, and delaying actions; - -3. =Offensive-defensive action=, _i.e._, to bring about a decision by -combining the offensive with the defensive. - -In fortress warfare, situations may arise which may make it necessary -to hold a piece of ground obstinately, without it being possible to -assume the offensive. In the French, Russian, and Italian regulations, -only the offensive-defensive is considered. The Italians see in the -defensive nothing but a preparation for the offensive; the Russians -seek to shake the enemy with fire in defense, so that they can -subsequently assume the offensive. - -The defensive is dependent upon the terrain, and is subject to the -condition that the locality where the tactical situation requires -a stand to be made offers a position favorable for employing fire -to good advantage, and that the opponent actually attacks where the -defender expects him. The employment of the defensive is restricted -by its dependence on the ground and on the measures of the enemy. Its -employment may frequently be explained by the fact that one of the -contending parties allows itself to be checked to such an extent by the -initiative of the other that it can only offer a passive resistance. -Such passive resistance may here and there score a success by chance -(Plevna, St. Privat), but, as a rule, only the assailant reaps a -benefit from such situations. - - -1. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE - -seeks to avoid a decision, and must therefore endeavor, by opening fire -at an early moment, to prevent the enemy from reaching short ranges. -(See p. 147 supra). It is not absolutely necessary to have a clear -field of fire or strong reserves, but the latter, kept a considerable -distance in rear, must be strong enough to enable the force to -disengage itself from the enemy. - -Since only a temporary resistance is to be made, it is permissible for -the force to cover a greater front. The defender should endeavor to -compensate for his numerical inferiority by expending a large amount of -ammunition and by employing machine guns. It is an advantage to have -obstacles in front of the position and cover in rear of it, because the -former retard the enemy’s advance and the latter shelters the troops -from his fire in case of a retreat. - - -2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION.[444] - - [444] During the attack on the large work at Gorni Dubniac, the - Finnland Regiment was unable to advance from its last position, only - 70-100 paces distant from the enemy, over the foreground swept by - grazing fire. Several attempted assaults were repulsed. - -Decisive results can only be obtained at short and medium ranges. Long -range fire may, indeed, inflict losses on the enemy and delay his -advance, but it cannot repulse him. (See p. 148 supra). - -It is not sufficient merely to ward off the attack with fire; the -offensive must be assumed. When this is not done, the assailant can -repair his losses and try another attack. When the defender has -repulsed the enemy, he should follow up this success with an attack. -However, as he will rarely be able to do this with the force at his -disposal, fresh troops will be required. (Beaune la Rolande, Lisaine). -The change from the tactical defensive to the offensive offers the same -difficulties as the corresponding strategical move; but, in the former -case, there is present, in addition, the element of danger and the -difficulty of perceiving the right moment.[445] - - [445] _Taktik_, V, p. 320. Compare this with Benedeck’s hesitation - at Königgrätz. - -A position is of value only when it compels the enemy to attack, -directs his movements into definite channels, and induces him to make -wide turning movements, which cause him to lose time and produce -favorable conditions for the assumption of the offensive on the part -of the defender. Every position that enables the defender to use all -his weapons, and does not deter the enemy from making an attack, is -suitable for this purpose. - -“By placing our troops in an unassailable position, we actually refuse -battle and force the enemy to seek the decision in another manner. -* * * A defensive position approaches its ideal to the extent that -its strength is hidden and opportunity is offered of surprising the -enemy by our tactical combinations. One should endeavor to conceal -the advantages which one intends to derive from the formation of the -ground, just as one hides from the enemy the bulk of one’s troops and -their actual position. This is, indeed, only practicable to a certain -extent, and requires perhaps a peculiar and little used method of -treatment.”[446] - - [446] CLAUSEWITZ, _On War_, VI, 12 (_Militär-Klassiker_, p. - 364). The Boers were masters of the art of concealing defensive - positions. At Colenso, on the Modder River, and at Magersfontain, - their positions were located in places where neither the British - artillerists nor the reconnoitering detachments suspected them to be. - -Modern firearms make the defense so strong in front that it suffices to -hold this part of the position with a weak force supplied with plenty -of ammunition, and provided with weak supports, at a few points, to -replace losses. As these supports have a definite task to perform, they -are posted as near the first line as the available cover permits, in -order to cut down the distance to be traversed by them under fire. -When practicable, they are intrenched within the firing line itself. As -it is advisable to supply these troops with a great deal of ammunition, -some of the ammunition wagons belonging to the battalions held in -reserve may be turned over to them. The general reserve intended for -offensive action should be kept far in rear of the line. When kept too -close to the first line, the defender will be unable to move it to any -point desired, after the direction of the attack becomes apparent. -The defender should examine his position from the point of view of -the attacker, and ask himself, “_With how weak a force may I occupy -the position and still obtain the frontal strength described in the -regulations, and how strong can I make the general reserve so as to -bring about a decision?_” - -At some parts of the position, an attack will have good prospects of -succeeding, at others it would encounter difficulties, and, finally, -at others it could not possibly succeed. While many troops are needed -in the first-mentioned portions (sections), comparatively few troops -will suffice to hold those sections which are less favorable for -the attacker (on account of their free field of fire, obstacles, -and the absence of artillery positions in which the attacker can -place his guns). This leads to a division of the defensive position -into sections, each forming a separate unit of command (battalion -or company) and, when necessary, detailing its own reserve (section -reserve). When the frontage of the sections, as determined by the -above-mentioned examination of the position, is considerable, or when -obstacles lie within the position, a further subdivision may become -necessary. This does not imply that the position must be held in -equal strength all along the line; portions of the line that are very -difficult to attack need only be kept under observation. Gaps in the -defensive line are, as a rule, of very little value to the assailant, -as the defender will frequently be able to sweep the space in front of -them from a flank. “In order to keep all parts of the foreground under -observation, and to prevent portions of the hostile force from escaping -the defender’s fire, a division of the foreground corresponding to the -division into sections must be made when necessary.” (Par. 403 German -I. D. R.). - -Weak points, _i.e._, points against which the assailant can suddenly -mass superior forces at short range, or in the defense of which a -coöperation of infantry and artillery is impossible, must be specially -strengthened: by obstacles; provision for flanking the hostile advance; -and preparation of supporting points in rear of the position. In -addition, such weak points must be occupied with a strong garrison, by -employing two firing lines, one above the other; reserves; and machine -guns. - -Enclosed farm yards (Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870), and small -patches of timber, are best not occupied at all; they are far more -valuable as sham defenses in that they draw the fire of the assailant. -At any rate, it is a question whether, at the last moment, when the -hostile assault must be warded off, it will be possible to occupy such -points. - -As a general rule, only a single defensive position, consisting of an -infantry and an artillery line, is selected. - - The Russians invariably posted strong advanced detachments in front - of their main defensive positions. As a result, the most serious - fights usually occurred in the positions taken up by these advanced - troops.[447] At =Haicheng=, for example, a strong main position had - been prepared, in which a stand was to be made. In spite of this, - the IInd Siberian Corps was left in a strongly fortified advanced - position west of =Simutcheng=. This corps, in its turn, fortified two - lines of advanced positions far in its front. - - [447] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 109. See - _Taktik_, V, p. 305, in regard to the numerous positions in the - valley of the Shaho. - - “Thus, on July 31, 1904, only seven battalions of this corps finally - fought at =Daputsi= and =Liadapu=. When they were thrown back by - superior forces, the mistake was made of bringing up fresh troops - to regain the position captured by the enemy. These troops arrived - too late and had to make a difficult attack on the Japanese, who - had already occupied the captured position. Naturally their frontal - attack accomplished nothing. - - “The force thus suffered a defeat needlessly, and, although the - defensive had been decided upon, a lot of men were sacrificed in an - attempt to retake an advanced position that had been captured by the - enemy. The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when - its line of retreat was endangered by Mistshenko’s being forced back. - The Russians likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when - news was received that strong hostile forces were advancing against - the left flank of the position.”[448] - - [448] See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 41/42, p. 49. - -As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy =advanced positions=,[449] -_i.e._, positions lying within effective range of the main position. -Supporting points immediately in front of the main position, projecting -from it like caponiers, and flanking the ground over which the -assailant will have to make his attack, must not be confounded with -these advanced positions. St. Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on -the battlefield of Gravelotte are good examples of both classes of -positions. In order to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it -advantageous to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying -still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing this, -favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful leadership -are essential. - - [449] _Taktik_, V, p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to - the contemplated construction of advanced positions in front of - the Shaho position, as the Russians desired to gain time for the - offensive movement to be made by their left wing. The uncertainty - and hesitation produced by the constant changes in orders, and the - excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which allowed - themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal. - - In =France= and =Russia= much is expected of advanced positions. - In =England= particular importance is attached to them when they - draw the enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a - counter-attack. The British consider that supporting points lying in - front of the position had best be left unoccupied, unless they can be - supported by artillery fire from the main position. - - “Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will - frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible - to gain an approximate idea of the enemy’s strength only by a fight. - For this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of - Belfort, in January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is - to deceive the enemy as to the defender’s strength, and to compel - him to deploy, will have a greater justification now than at that - time. Nowadays, such detachments may cover a considerable front - without danger, especially when they are plentifully supplied with - ammunition. This will make it still more easy to deceive the enemy, - and a skillful defender will know how to make the most of it.”[450] - - [450] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_, II, p. 237. - -Advanced positions[451] are apt to mask the fire from the main -position, and fights for their possession may easily lead to the defeat -of the troops holding them. The danger of the fight taking place and -being decided in the advanced position must be reckoned with. (Battles -of Ligny and on the Hallue). On the other hand, it may be advantageous -to employ scouting detachments, cyclists, and machine guns, and to -construct dummy intrenchments in front of the main position. (Par. 407 -German I. D. R.). The French, more than anyone else, are convinced of -the advantages to be derived from an employment of advanced positions -(for example in deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main -position). In a deliberately planned concentration and advance into -action, such positions are, however, so effectively enveloped that -they do not come into play at all and fall an easy prey to the enemy. -However, we do not wish to deny their occasional usefulness in -cases where it is necessary to gain time for concentration and for -strengthening the main position. In fights for their possession, an -idea may frequently be gained of the intentions and dispositions of the -assailant. Moreover, they offer opportunities for surprising the enemy -with fire, and induce him to make premature attacks and to mass his -troops in the ones he has captured. - - [451] Par. 21 German _Manual of Field Engineering_: “Their use is - principally restricted to special cases in fortress warfare.” - -Next to a free field of fire (clearing the foreground, and ascertaining -ranges), the determining factors in selecting a position are elbow room -in and in rear of the position, supporting points for the flanks, and -cover. The natural cover available on the ground is made use of as best -suits the purpose of the action. - -The line in which the artillery intends to fight the decisive action -constitutes the “framework” of the position. Although artillery will -rarely be able to perform all its tasks in a single position, its first -position is selected with due regard to the position of the hostile -artillery. The most important position is that from which the hostile -infantry attack is to be repulsed. This should be selected far enough -in front of the artillery to enable the latter to fire over it, and to -deprive the assailant’s artillery of the opportunity of hitting the -defender’s infantry and artillery at one and the same time. (Par. 401 -German I. D. R.). A distance of 600 m. between infantry and artillery -is considered sufficient for this purpose. In view of the protection -afforded by gun shields against infantry fire, it is scarcely necessary -to post skirmish lines in advance of the artillery. But, where the -infantry line is not continuous in front of the artillery, troops -should be posted, so as to protect the artillery personnel from -being annoyed by hostile patrols. It will seldom be possible for a -commander to do justice to the requirements of both arms; in every -compromise, one or the other arm is only too apt to be placed at a -disadvantage. The needs of the infantry, whose choice of a position is -more restricted, take precedence. While infantry can govern its action -by that of the artillery during the preparatory stage of an attack, -this is impossible in defense, as the infantry is obliged to carry the -fight through to its logical conclusion in the position in which it is -begun.[452] - - [452] As the artillery is less restricted in the choice of - positions, and as the final outcome of the fight depends, after all, - on the outcome of the infantry action, the demands of the infantry, - contrary to par. 292 German I. D. R., must be considered in the first - place. - - -3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.[453] - - [453] Germany: _Manual of Field Engineering_, 1905. France: - _Instruction pratique sur les travaux de campagne_ (December 24th, - 1906). England: _Manual of Military Engineering_, 1905. Russia: - _Mitteilungen vom Ingenieur Comité_, No. 41 (1906). The Austrian and - Italian regulations are undergoing revision. - -The apprehensions formerly entertained in regard to prematurely -fortifying a position, and which are still shared by the French -regulations, are no longer to be found in the new regulations. The -construction of field fortifications requires time, if they are to be -of value, and if they are to give leaders and troops the assurance -that they can be defended by the minimum number of men.[454] Even -intrenchments that have been constructed in vain will frequently prove -useful in deceiving the enemy. In many cases, it will be necessary to -be prepared to meet a hostile attack made from several directions. This -contingency should be taken into account by at least preparing for the -work beforehand. - - [454] At 10 A. M., on August 18th, 1870. General Canrobert received - orders to place St. Privat in a state of defense. At 11 A. M., the - first reports of the approach of the Prussian Guard were received, - and at 4 P. M., Ste. Marie aux Chênes was in German hands. Hence, - only five hours were available for these preparations for defense. - -“If the situation turns out to be different than was expected, the -intrenchments already constructed should not influence the decisions -of the commander. On the other hand, the consideration that the works -might be built unnecessarily must not cause their construction to be -omitted altogether.” (Par. 311 German I. D. R.). - - In the preface to the French regulations, it is emphasized that - intrenching a position ought neither to impair the spirit of the - offensive nor hamper the movement to the front. “Intrenchments are - a means to an end, but not the end itself. They should only be used - when no violence is done thereby to the tactical situation, and one - should never hesitate, for a single moment, to abandon them, if the - situation requires, or to construct others, at another place, if it - becomes necessary.” The men should therefore be trained in handling - the portable intrenching tools, until they can use them skillfully in - any position of the body. - - “The use of intrenchments may also be abused. To remain inertly - in a place is just as fatal as to advance without making use of - cover. When temporary halts are made, the commander for the time - being, often placed in that position by chance (_chef du moment, - chef d’unité ou chef de groupe éventuel_), indicates whether or not - intrenchments are to be constructed.” - - Battle intrenchments are to protect the soldier against hostile - fire, without hampering him in using his rifle. “They are one of - the factors which ensure economy in men, in that they save a body - of troops from suffering unnecessary losses. But their importance - always recedes before the general requirements of an action, and they - should never in any way interfere with the advance of troops; on the - contrary, intrenchments are to make it possible to bring troops - within effective range of the enemy, without impairing their physical - condition or their morale.” - -Intrenchments enable a commander to save troops, which he can use -offensively at the decisive point. They do not fulfill the object -for which they were intended, when they make it easier for the enemy -to pick out the position. “Works which cannot be perceived from the -foreground even through powerful field glasses, afford the most -effective protection against artillery fire.” Trenches should therefore -be deep, have a low parapet, and be properly masked. - -The commander indicates when work is to begin. Every unit must intrench -the portion of the defensive line which it is to defend; working -parties, specially detailed from troops not intended for the immediate -defense of the position, can be counted on only when extensive works -are to be constructed. - -Continuous lines of trenches are seldom built; it suffices to construct -a line of works with intervals, _i.e._, battalion groups, the intervals -being simply held by a weak force. - -These battalion groups (par. 24 German Manual of Field Engineering) -are constructed without regard to any fixed form, as the tactical -employment of the companies requires. They consist of firing trenches -(flanks refused and echelons in rear of the wings), provided with -splinter proofs, and adequate cover trenches, so that all the men, if -possible, will be sheltered from artillery fire. - -The aim is, first of all, to construct inconspicuous standing firing -trenches. These should have low parapets and be provided with numerous -traverses to restrict the effect of high explosive shell. In order -that these traverses may not betray the location of the position, they -should not rise above the parapet.[455] - - [455] These traverses afford very little shelter against enfilading - fire; it is advisable to keep sand bags in readiness as a protection - in case such fire is received. - -Deep, narrow trenches afford the best protection against artillery -fire (the trench should be about 0.60 m. wide at the bottom). Narrow -trenches are especially difficult to pick out from a balloon. In -constructing trenches having no parapet at all, special precautions -must be taken in order that their location may not be betrayed by the -scattered earth or by their rear wall, which will be visible when they -are located on the slope facing the enemy. When the trenches are to -be held for some time, provision must be made for the construction -of splinter proofs,[456] other overhead cover, and loopholes of -observation. - - [456] These lie about 0.50 m. below the natural surface of the - ground and accommodate 5-6 men: they are separated from each other by - an earth wall 1 m. thick. - -Numerous light splinter proofs are generally to be preferred to a -few larger and stronger ones, as they afford sufficient protection -against shrapnel bullets and fragments. They may be protected against -direct hits from field guns, or other guns having a flat trajectory, -by sloping their roofs to the rear at an angle as nearly as possible -coincident with the angle of fall of those projectiles. - -Since field intrenchments are incapable of furnishing protection -against direct hits from guns having a curved trajectory, this object -must be attained by skillfully distributing splinter proofs along the -front. These should be inconspicuous and should not take up too much -room. The comfort of the troops in the trenches should also be provided -for by constructing kitchens, latrines, drainage ditches, and dressing -stations. - -In addition, field magazines for storing ammunition should be built, -and alarm arrangements made. Moreover, covered communication should be -provided along the line and to the rear. The front and gaps in the line -may be very effectively flanked by fire from skillfully constructed -refused wings. - -In constructing a battalion group of intrenchments, provision will have -to be made, in addition, for the following: - -[Illustration: Intrenchments for a Battalion.] - -[Illustration: Firing Trench with Cover Trench.] - -[Illustration: Firing Trench with Splinter Proofs.] - -[Illustration: Profiles.] - -[Illustration: Firing Trench in ordinary soil.] - -[Illustration: Splinter Proof.] - -[Illustration: Communicating Trench.] - -[Illustration: Communicating Trench without Parapet.] - -[Illustration: Machine Gun Pit.] - -1. =Observation of the foreground=, “for the purpose of reconnaissance -and security, as well as for noting the effect of one’s own fire.” In -order that observers may not betray the location of the position, it -is recommended that they be posted at inconspicuous points affording -a sufficiently extended view, and screened from the observation of -the enemy. When they have to be posted in the defensive line, the -terreplein is either lowered in places, so that they can just look over -the parapet, or special observation stations are constructed. Provision -must be made for communication between the several parts of the line -and with the next higher headquarters. - -2. =Clearing the foreground.= As a rule, it will be practicable to -employ for this work troops not needed in digging trenches. As time -is lacking in field warfare for extensive work, such as cutting down -embankments and removing dead angles, one will have to be content with -trampling down or burning standing grain, removing objects which the -enemy might use as aiming points, and cutting clearings through woods. -It is not advisable to demolish stone walls and houses, as the debris -is difficult to remove and affords cover to the enemy. - -3. =Dummy intrenchments and masks.=[457] These are to deceive the -assailant as to the position and extent of the defensive works. -They should not be located in the same fire swept zone as the -defensive works themselves, and at a distance should look like real -fortifications. Masks are to screen defensive works or troops, without -restricting the fire of the latter. Natural features are best suited -for this purpose, but may be replaced or supplemented by artificial -masks. - - [457] _Taktik_, V, p. 291. At Magersfontain, the Boers constructed - dummy trenches on the crest, while the trenches actually held by them - were located at the foot of the slope. The result is well known. - -In many cases, it will suffice to place a few skirmishers behind a -parapet that has been hastily thrown up with a plow. - -4. =Cover trenches and communicating trenches.= These constitute a -considerable portion of the defensive works. Communicating trenches -may be either covered ways or zigzags, and connect the cover trenches -with the firing trenches. Sortie steps should be provided in order to -facilitate a prompt advance from the trenches. In many cases, it is -impossible to avoid placing firing and cover trenches so close to each -other that the enemy’s shells can strike both simultaneously. - -5. =Obstacles.= These need only be constructed when two forces confront -each other for a protracted period. The purpose of obstacles is to hold -the enemy where he will be exposed to the most deadly fire; retard his -advance; compel him to confine his movements to certain avenues of -approach (this is especially valuable in night combats); and eliminate -dead angles in front of the position. The presence of extensive -obstacles forces the enemy to advance systematically. As a rule, they -can only be removed by pioneers. They should not be located too near -the position, as they are apt to be damaged by artillery fire directed -at the position, and interfere with the defender’s fire. When they -are too far in front of the position, the defender will not be able -to guard them and prevent their destruction. In general, they should -not be more than 200 m. from the position. It is better to construct -several lines of small obstacles than a single line of large ones. The -requirement that obstacles must not interfere with the defender’s fire, -must not afford the enemy an opportunity to approach under cover, and -must remain intact under hostile artillery fire, is best met by marshy -ground and by wire entanglements. Obstacles should be provided with a -slight glacis in order to prevent artillery fire from destroying them -prematurely. When wire entanglements are too high, they are easily seen -at a distance, and, although they are little damaged by artillery fire, -the attacker can make preparations to remove them. - - -Russian Views. - - A defensive position consists of an advanced position, a fighting - line with firing trenches and batteries, supporting points in rear, - and, finally, a fourth line, which serves as a rallying position. - The key to a position, which lay formerly in the line of supporting - points, lies at present in the firing trenches in which supporting - points must be provided. (Colonel Golenkin advocates the use of - semi-circular works as supporting points, and Lieutenant-Colonel - Mordovin large closed works). “These semi-circular works are in - a sense the anchors by means of which the firing line clings to - the position which it has occupied.” It does not matter if the - enemy penetrates the first line and captures one or two of these - supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and - the second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat - indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated - into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able - to sustain the counter-attack made by the defender’s reserves, and - its temporary success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this - may be accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely - essential. Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number - than is employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose. - According to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are - essential in order to check an enemy who has penetrated the first - line, and to facilitate the defender’s final retreat in case of - necessity. - - Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions - for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks, - and, finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either - to serve “reconnaissance purposes,” by forcing the enemy to an early - deployment, or to do duty as “caponiers” from which a flanking fire - may be brought to bear on the foreground. - - Advanced positions, doing duty as “caponiers,” are invariably to - consist of closed works, those serving “reconnaissance purposes” of - open works. The latter are to be defended “to the last ditch,” and - are not to be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or - less, but the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a - bayonet fight. - - In contrast with this distribution in depth--2 km., in the model - given--Lieutenant-Colonel Jabel, whose views are based on the same - experiences, advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He - states: “The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks, - as well as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery - fire in particular, produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that - the decisive action could be fought only in a single line. With its - capture, further fighting had only small prospects of success * * *” - “When firing trenches have been constructed at the points where the - best effect can be obtained from long and short range fire, they - should not be evacuated prematurely, but held, in order to make the - most of this fire effect, until the enemy arrives close enough to use - his bayonets. If the troops holding the trenches retire immediately - before the bayonet fight, their retreat invariably becomes a rout, - and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, after leaving - their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open to the - hostile fire.” - - -4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE. - -In his _Tactical Handbook_, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a method, -well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of artillery fire -on a defensive position. He believes that dummy intrenchments, not -too conspicuously located, partially, but not skillfully masked and -occupied, will deceive the attacker’s artillery for some time, at any -rate, until the advanced troops of the attacker induce the defenders to -man their parapet and expose themselves to shrapnel fire. The “defense -should be conducted in such a manner that the garrison of the main -position will not need to expose itself to the enemy’s artillery fire -as soon as his advanced troops appear.” Major Hoppenstedt believes that -this can be attained, in hill positions, by conducting the fire fight, -at long and medium ranges, from positions in rear, the defender moving -up into the main position, specially prepared for this purpose, when -the attacker disappears in the defiladed spaces in front of it. The -objection to this method is that it necessitates too large a force to -hold the position. - - “In a protracted, obstinate fight, the defender’s trenches, - exposed to the combined hostile infantry and artillery fire, will - finally become filled with dead and wounded, and it will rarely - be practicable to remove them. The arrival of reinforcements will - increase the confusion and the losses, and the fighting energy of the - troops will decrease with tremendous rapidity. This is one of the - greatest disadvantages of the defense as compared with the attack and - its constantly moving lines. - - “In such cases, which will be typical at points where the attacker - intends to penetrate the line, it may be a real act of salvation for - the defender’s firing line to rush to the front. - - “In fighting at short ranges, especially just before the assailant - makes his assault, such a rush to the front on the part of the - defender’s line, may be a good move for another reason. As is well - known, the attacker’s artillery must change targets when its infantry - arrives within a certain distance of the defender’s position. The - Germans (par. 446 I. D. R.) fix this point at 300 m. from the enemy, - and the French, whose guns have a flatter trajectory, fix it at 500 - m. In attacking a hill position, when the fire is well observed, the - distance of this point from the position will be considerably greater. - - “But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be, - skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point - fixed by the regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid - interfering with the fire of its artillery. Under such circumstances, - it may be a skillful move for a defender who is still full of fight, - to decrease the distance which separates him from the hostile - infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may escape from the hostile - artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures his vision. If he - finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, for he will - then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.” - -The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger of a sudden -attack being directed against a flank. The assailant will endeavor to -avoid making an attack against the front of a position prepared for -defense, when such an attack has small chances of succeeding, and seek -the decision by attacking a flank, where conditions are, to a certain -extent at least, equalized. The danger of a flank attack increases -with the length of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move -to prolong the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat) -for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power of extension -is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and the wing attacked will -then be so weak and attenuated that it will not be capable of offering -serious resistance. - -To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise promises little -success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will make itself felt, -first of all, at the salient thus formed (see p. 357 supra), and his -convergent artillery and infantry fire, which may even enfilade parts -of the line, will paralyze all tactical movements of the defender at -this point. - -By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only postpone -the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope with an -envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different manner. - -The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping force by -posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring about a decision -by employing the reserve offensively. However, for carrying out these -measures, more time is required than for merely refusing a flank. Time -may be gained by making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with -strong detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the -flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could think of -attacking the main position. - - * * * * * - -In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne in mind that -they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire fights, and that the -mobility of the machine gun batteries cannot be utilized when, from the -very start, they are assigned a section to defend. - -In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the machine -guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, when necessary, -to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, to prevent -envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to participate in an offensive -movement. - -This does not preclude their coming into action at the very opening of -an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary to command important -avenues of approach. - -When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be possible to -post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in front or on a flank of -the main position, that they can bring a sudden fire to bear on the -area in which the opponent will in all probability post his artillery. - -Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep defiladed spaces in -front of the defensive line. - - * * * * * - -If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation of the -position should not be longer deferred. It is always risky to occupy -the position in the face of hostile batteries, especially as the fire -of the defender’s guns is masked by the skirmishers moving forward. If -the defender can manage to give the attacker the impression that the -position is still unoccupied, perhaps thereby inducing him to advance -less cautiously, and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral -effect far exceeding the material success may be counted upon.[458] -The firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will -have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the troops should -not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively insignificant in -defense, and as it is important to develop a heavy fire so as to make -it difficult for the enemy to gain the fire superiority. The principles -governing the moment for opening fire have already been discussed (pp. -147 and 154 supra). - - [458] Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899. - Engagement at Colenso, on December 15th, 1899. - -The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority of fire. -This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire from a large -number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s force in motion. The -defender should make the most of the advantage which his preparedness -gives him. The attacker’s firing line with its supports forms the -target. A departure from this rule is in order, in the case of a French -assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the reserves -and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable for the -defender to discontinue his fire and to take cover when the assailant -lies down and fires; but, while under cover, everything should be -prepared for resuming the fire when the enemy rises to continue his -advance (p. 156 supra). - -If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from reaching the -extreme limit of short ranges, the commander must decide whether to -continue the fight until a decision is reached, or whether to break off -the action. - -When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, it will be too -late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain in rear of the -position is especially favorable, or other troops can take a hand in -the fight to cover the withdrawal. The onrushing assailant is received -with accelerated fire; the defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk -a fight at close quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is -already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.” - -While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for the defender to -step upon the rear wall of the trench so that the latter would become -an obstacle for the attacker. But this scheme can only be employed when -the troops are completely in hand. - -While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost intensity by -the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the general reserve, -which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to bring about the decision -by advancing to attack. On arriving close enough to assault, the attack -reaches its most critical stage, and even a counter-attack made by a -comparatively small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense. - - -5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.[459] - - [459] See F.C. V. H. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 418 et seq. - -In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well -posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the -force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong -defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at -another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813, -and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in -Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June, -1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because -Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the -position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality). -Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the -act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming -the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative -strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may -still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack -can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major -portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position -and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success. - - [460] Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. 1805 (_Schlachterfolg_, p. 28); - Salamanca, 1812. - -The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense, -but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action -is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the -assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter -case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile -forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the -commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the -enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461] - - [461] The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of - Noisseville. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 41. - -Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make -itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it. -As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should -launch his reserves for the counter-attack. - -The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole -force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in -numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack -remains almost always the only remedy. - -“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can -best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile -attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of -the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as -a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both -flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves -in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment, -while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other -for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general -reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off -a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German -I. D. R.). - -The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the -position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet -cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire -directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually -involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the -measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him -to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines -the position of the general reserve. - -Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position -of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken -to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to -its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to -advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can -be made rapidly and with uniformity. - -Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to direct his -attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should -be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the -troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile -fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making -a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of -the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone -of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This -interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the -counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when -the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender. -This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the -position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition, -the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the -assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is -posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should -be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing -line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is -posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped -together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action -(refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a -flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the -assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position, -and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a -flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it -will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity -of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope -of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may -frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant -to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the -position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so -doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in -rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must -similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to -protect themselves against a flank attack. - -[Illustration] - -It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve. -This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of -resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any -case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough -to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying -the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of -ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance -must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in -order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The -question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how -strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each -particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to -produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force, -as it could then be checked by weak detachments. - -While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either-- - -1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy -during its forward movement; or - -2. Take up the attack formation from the start. - -The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small, -of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes -to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions. - -The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the -counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation -is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes -in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation -seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction--straight -to the front. - -It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should -be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no -special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general -reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to -throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the -counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is -under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is -made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of -the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed, -exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to -take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions -may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be -checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their -fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always -repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps -still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never -produce decisive results. - -A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the -position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such -supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact -that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion, -will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable -number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such -an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing -is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. -Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of -such _retours offensifs_, this may be explained by the fact that the -counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is -but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against -him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to -re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to -make a counter-attack. - - Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into =Servigny= - under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town - systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out - again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[462] - - [462] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 52. _Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. - 181. - - The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle - of =Wörth= (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade) - pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery - fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French - counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of - the =Niederwald=, was discontinued at a timely moment.[463] The - well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at - =Wörth=, after the capture of =Elsaszhausen=, was successful and is - especially instructive.[464] The attack made by General de Sonis for - the purpose of retaking =Loigny= was undertaken too late and with - inadequate forces.[465] The same is true of the counter-attack made - by the 3rd Bavarian Division on =Zella= (4th July, 1866). - - [463] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, pp. 75 and 159. - - [464] _Ibid._, XVI, p. 187, et seq. - - [465] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 124. - -The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be -successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet -it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined -with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy -to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they -should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at -close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain -reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last -moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time -when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.” - -The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the -right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how -long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance, -no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the -counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the -reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually -up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires -wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the -situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching -the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the -result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him -from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger -the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the -more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will -not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and -accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive -action. - -We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack -should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as -well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank -of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does -not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. -A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the -start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not -supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the -defeat of the defender’s entire force. - - A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of the - 3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries - which had gone into action near =Goury= (battle of =Loigny=). The - Ist and IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions, - 12th Infantry, and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and - when the batteries finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing - back the French battalions immediately opposing it. The twenty-one - companies now made the mistake of attacking =Ecuillon=, which they - occupied. The attacking force had traversed about 2000 m., and as - there were no reserves and flank echelons, the Bavarians were obliged - to give way before an assault made by seven fresh battalions against - their unprotected left flank. The mistake of pushing forward too far, - and the lack of supports in rear of the exposed flank, was bound to - exact a penalty, as soon as the French were in a position to advance - on their own account.[466] - - [466] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 43. - - A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near - =Tsinortun=. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division - advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of - enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The - commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve - (apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a - counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian - counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which - followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire. - The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the - 140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the - Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest - as regards the Japanese method of attack.[467] - - [467] LÖFFLER, _Allgemeine Lage_, I, pp. 68 and 69. V. HOEN, _Der - russisch-japanische Krieg_, in _Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen - Vereins_, p. 166. NIESSEL, _Enseignements tactiques_, p. 158. - -So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against -the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who -has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a -counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral -factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in -rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot -quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468] - - [468] Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s - flank: Battle of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack - made by 21 companies of the 4th Brigade at Goury (HÖNIG, - _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 55), and that made by the Ist Battalion, - 10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry, - at Goury (_ibid._, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’ - Brigade (_ibid._, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made - by the garrison of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General - Sonis: the brilliant flank attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th - Infantry, during the battle of Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (KUNZ, - _Orleans_, p. 148); and the counter-attack made by General Bataille - on the Stiring Wald during the battle of Spicheren. The last-named - counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception and - execution. (_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, pp. 93 and 96). - -Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, _i.e._, one made straight -to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to -the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of -success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where -the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the -defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the -attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes -apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of -movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually -preceded by wavering.[469] - - [469] “The defender will only be able to make a frontal - counter-attack from his position when he has repulsed the assault and - has made the most of fire action, or when it is important to drive - away the enemy who has been brought to a standstill in front of the - defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may lead to the loss - of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.). - -The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during -the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel -says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring -up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the -utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves -itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix -bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of -retreat.” - - [470] _Lehre von der Truppenführung_. - - This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of - =Elsaszhausen= against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps - appearing at the northern edge of the =Niederwald=. The success they - met with at the start induced the French to continue their advance, - and when a reverse occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen - was taken by the Hessians without difficulty.[471] - - [471] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 121, et seq. - -Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line -of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently -successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the -attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry. -Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the -support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads. -However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool, -meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short -ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of -his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the -result.[472] - - [472] The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples - of this. (_Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, pp. 75 and 234). - In both cases the defender’s frontal counter-attack forced the - assailant to face about; but at Soor a second line of infantry, and - at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally turned the - scale in favor of the assailant. - -Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender -still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept -in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the -decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force, -and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a -frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with -altogether. - - Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully - by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century. - (In these counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then - advanced to the assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made - during the battles of =Vimiero=, =Maida=, =Busaco=, and especially - =Waterloo=.[473] - - [473] At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and - the British Guards repulsed the French attack. VON OLLECH, _Feldzug - von 1815_, pp. 230 and 247. See also note p. 151 supra. - - At =Beaumont=, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the - French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to - waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance - caused the French to retire.[474] - - [474] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 53. - - In the battles of the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, frontal - counter-attacks were successfully made in several instances. - - In the engagement at =Kazeljevo= (5th September, 1877), the frontal - counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far - inferior, saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were - obstructed by their trains, which had gone astray.[475] - - [475] SPRINGER, _Der russisch-türkische Krieg_, III, p. 171. - - The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of - =Gorni Bugarov= (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment, - which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments, - occupied a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans, - on the road leading from =Orchanie= to =Sofia=. The Russians allowed - the Turks to approach to very short range before they opened fire, - which was immediately followed by a counter-attack all along the - line. This seems to have been the result of the initiative of the - several battalion commanders. The Turks (15 battalions) faced about - and retired on Sofia. The Russian infantry was led back to its first - position.[476] - - [476] _Ibid._, VII, p. 134. - - On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment - of the Russian Guard at =Tashkessen= was repulsed by the frontal - counter-attack made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.[477] - - [477] BAKER-PASHA, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 57. - -During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very -frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were -invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the -latter found cover in previously constructed trenches. - - -Provisions of Various Regulations. - - =Austria-Hungary.= If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander - should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general reserve - for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case, - the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the - opponent advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy - and carry out the counter-attack with determination by directing a - powerful fire against the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement - on one flank is absolutely essential to the execution of the - counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided; the - enemy is to be annihilated by fire. - - When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general - reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing - the troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops - making an enveloping attack on the position. - - =France.= The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack - (_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A - counter-attack is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates - into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast - herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an - offensive return. - - A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon - as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful - and suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the - first line, will, at the very least, check the enemy until the - fighting line has had time to recover. - - Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but - to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon - him, then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press - on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected - and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank - by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure - has frequently been successful. “If the attacker presses forward - too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position, - fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from - view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged - increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic - counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels - him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until - he has had time to recover.” - - “The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must - prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy - must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the - counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless - of the cost When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the - commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should - be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the - enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the - commander must order the offensive to be assumed.” - - =England.= The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison - of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the - general reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive - counter-attack. The moment when the attacker has used up his - reserves and is about to assault is generally considered as the most - propitious for making the counter-attack. - - =Japan.= The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans. - “The better the position, the location and construction of the - intrenchments, and the distribution of troops, the greater the - number of men that can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the - stronger the general reserve available for an offensive movement. By - this means the chances of victory are increased. * * * Frequently - there is danger that the defender will be committed to purely passive - defense, and that freedom of action will be lost. Therefore, when the - proper moment arrives, the decisive counter-attack should be made.” - - - - -XII. THE RETREAT. - -(Par. 426 German I. D. R.). - - -A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; only the -presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting line should -induce a commander to come to the weighty decision of reaching -it by running. (Russia). On account of the great range of modern -weapons, defeated troops, on open ground, cannot escape from fire -by running.[478] No rules can be laid down in regulations as to the -conduct of a retreat after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is -no longer possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops -in position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire in -a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,[479] and cannot -re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at least abates. (Par. -428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which is moved to the rear at a timely -moment, and all available cavalry should cover the retreat of the -infantry, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from making the most of -its opportunities for effective action. - - [478] Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be - underestimated. See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. - 49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to the panic created in a skirmish - line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett (Wörth). This skirmish - line was running to the rear toward a rallying position and the panic - was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! March! March!” - The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of a mounted - field officer. Major v. Below. - - [479] The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and - roughly handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to - its left rear through the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused - the two regiments to change places. (The attack made by the 38th - Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 25, - p. 35. - -To order a retreat at the right moment requires military instinct; -rules cannot be laid down in regard to it. - -“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are either withdrawn by -order or defeated, can no longer choose their line of retreat. If the -enemy pursues, they must retire perpendicularly to their former front, -without changing formation, and need a force on which they can rally -in order to prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that -a systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force still has -some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, for a force -intended for decisive action to retain a reserve for covering the -retreat instead of employing it for the purpose of gaining the victory.” - -To break off the action by systematically relieving the troops engaged -with the enemy,[480] is only possible if the force still has reserves -available, if cavalry and artillery are in a position to take a hand in -the fight, or if the troops that have been withdrawn are sheltered from -the enemy’s fire by features of the ground--all of which depends in -many cases on chance. - - [480] _Taktik_, V, p. 344. - -It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense than in -attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches closer with -every moment. This brings up the question, as to whether it would not -be better for the defender to hold out until darkness sets in than -expose his troops to the incalculable results of a retreat under fire. -When the assailant has once entered the zone of short ranges, the -defender will no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the -defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should be begun -at the point where the enemy is not pressing his attack, or where he -has been unable to gain a superiority of fire. When a withdrawal is -made, the whole local front should retire at once and simultaneously; -it would be a mistake to reduce gradually the strength of the units -engaged, for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to -annihilate completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot maintain -its position, a platoon certainly could not do so. - -[Illustration] - -As soon as the commander decides to break off the action, the reserve, -if one is still available, should be sent to the rear to take up a -rallying position, which should be so situated that it can make its -influence felt as soon as the main position is evacuated. As every -defeated force, or one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to -the rear, the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding -it to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a flank -of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position can be -advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, but this will only -be practicable in minor engagements. The distance of the rallying -position from the main defensive position should be such as to compel -the enemy to advance again under fire, and prevent his carrying both -the main defensive position and the rallying position at one rush. On -the other hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear -that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they enter its -effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying position are -also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good plan for them to engage -the enemy from the start at too short a range. “It is most desirable -when artillery and machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this -purpose, while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The -mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 German I. D. -R.). - -The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all -dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without -precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite -to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line -should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve -is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying -position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first -rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is -not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line -should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can -still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit -of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as -soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order -to retard the enemy’s advance. - -The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy’s advance -long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form, -so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been -accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless -there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state -of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary, -but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable -position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally -necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible. - -“The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to -a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to -be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the -different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured -himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in -order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[481] The -rest is the business of subordinate leaders.” (Par. 432 German I. D. -R.). The latter remain with their organizations for the purpose of -maintaining order and cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants -and officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear -ahead of the troops.[482] - - [481] This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of - other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all - blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. V. SCHLICHTING, I, - p. 115. See _Taktik_, V, p. 350. - - [482] For the conduct of a retreat, see _Taktik_, V, p. 373, et seq. - - - - -XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS. - - -THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING ATTACK. - -Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the defender, -and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by force of arms, it is -obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” or “held” only when he permits -this to be done. It is difficult to conduct a delaying action or a -holding attack, because our training, which is based on offensive -action, causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage. -In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding attacks, the -offensive intention predominates. The latter may consist of merely -threatening the enemy with an attack, or of seriously engaging him. -(Par. 392 German I. D. R.). Both the delaying action and the holding -attack aim at deceiving the enemy.[483] Accordingly, the characteristic -features of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of -ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few rifles, -in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of our force. In -both combats, troops require considerable distribution in depth. The -object of a delaying action is to gain time until the troops in rear -can deploy, neighboring columns can come up, or a turning movement -can become effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a -delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so that -they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is still more -necessary in a holding attack,[484] in order that the troops may be -able to repulse a counter-attack made by the enemy, or, by attacking -him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. A force fighting a delaying -action should keep its supports far to the rear, while a force charged -with holding the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly -employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an influence -on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). Since a -delaying action is to be fought at long ranges, a field of fire is -only required at those ranges; defiladed spaces in the foreground may -frequently be a positive advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so -long as it is necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding -attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; the violent -fire breaking forth from time to time must teach the defender that a -force is lying in waiting opposite him, ready to rush forward at a -moment’s notice. - - [483] This is still more pronounced In demonstrations. (_Taktik_, - V, p. 11). “Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions, - but they may consist of offensive action. The regulations do not lay - down specific rules either for them or for other more rare methods - of combat; accordingly, their conduct will vary with the situation.” - (Par. 420, German I. D. R.). - - [484] _Taktik_, V, p. 161. - -The object of threatening with an attack may frequently be accomplished -by engaging the enemy with several detachments which are separated -by intervals. (Par. 288 German I. D. R.). The negative object of -preventing the enemy from withdrawing may be accomplished with a -weak force; the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up -his reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive -point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A determined -commander will not allow himself to be held by demonstrations. The -manner in which the Vth Army Corps forced the French to bring up their -reserves into the first line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation. - -The size of the group charged with holding the enemy depends upon the -extent of front to be covered and the probable duration of the combat. -The conduct of such a force will vary considerably, depending upon the -distance to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When -the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the enemy -energetically. - - =England.= The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the - direction in which the main attack will be made, and, when the - crisis of the action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from - those parts of his front which are only threatened and opposing the - decisive attack with nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops - making the holding attack should act vigorously, as soon as the - attack develops, and be in readiness to transform their demonstration - instantly into a real attack. - - - - -XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS. - - -THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.[485] - - [485] The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry - Drill Regulations are skillfully compared by Major-General - REGENSPURSKY V. REGENY, Austrian Army, in an article entitled _Die - taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements für die k. k. Fusztruppen - vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem deutschen Reglement 1906_. - (_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8). - - -ATTACK. - - Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense - are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been - revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his - main body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body - farther to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive. - The =attack on a position prepared for defense=, even after the - attacker’s artillery has succeeded in paving the way for its - infantry, consists of a laborious advance from one firing position - to another. The question as to whether an attack is feasible without - the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect that it - will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has - sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations - divide the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance - to the decisive firing position (the main firing position), and the - decisive action. - - The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views - considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here - merely be made to point out several differences. The combat formation - necessary for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during - the preparatory stage, so that, when the forward movement commences, - the troops need only move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a - division, by appropriately combining “tactical units”, echelons are - formed, whose strength depends upon the purpose of the combat, the - information of the enemy, and the relation of the division to other - bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). Rules for the employment - of thin or dense firing lines are not given. “The attacker should - advance impetuously to the point where he can employ his rifles - effectively,” (Par. 582). - - “In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective - range of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par. - 323). When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open - fire independently, if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it - finds a good opportunity for firing which the company commander has - overlooked. (Par. 338). Unless the battalion commander has reserved - to himself the right of designating the moment for opening fire, the - company commanders direct when fire shall be opened, and conduct the - fire fight at mid and short ranges. At long ranges, the battalion - commander designates the companies that are to fire. - - =Kinds of fire.= Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a - rule, volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but - may also be used in skirmish line to test the range. According to - par. 331, the rate of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and - 686, fire surprises are authorized. - - When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to =advance by - rushes=. These are to be made by alternate units moving forward, - supported by the fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in - exceptional cases to be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The - length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and - the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of - the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing - position.” (Par. 313). - - Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by - =crawling=. This is considered especially useful in rectifying - alignments. (Par. 196). - - For =envelopment=, see p. 362 supra. - - For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 393 supra. - - =Assault.= “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who - occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s - superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances, - furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of - penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature - assault may still result in disaster. - - “As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear - indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for - the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of - fire. In doing this, the commander should not hesitate to put in - his last man if necessary. The assault--in case the enemy still - offers resistance--should not be made until the attack has been - pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, and the power of - resistance of the enemy is palpably broken. - - “It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act - of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation - strained to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no - longer any chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment, - honor and salvation lie wholly in moving to the front. - - “When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be - carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical - stage of the action, may nullify the previous success, and must - therefore be quickly overcome by the reserves, if any are still - available, taking a hand in the fight.” (Pars. 590-592). - - The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from - the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the - units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops - are to conform to the movement of that line. The following provision, - which applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German - regulations, viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s - force should, whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it - upon any hostile reserves that may appear.” - - -DEFENSE. - - The regulations governing the =defense seeking a decision= differ - but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work - of preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the - direction in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known. - The assailant is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining - information of the position and the measures taken for strengthening - it. This is to be accomplished by pushing small detachments to the - front to hamper the enemy’s advance. - - In the past, =advanced positions= were decidedly opposed by the - Austrians, but at present their use is recommended in cases where - time is to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where - fire from such positions would inflict considerable losses on the - enemy. However, the regulations seek to obviate the danger of the - principal fight taking place in the advanced position instead of in - the main position, by adding: “But such a measure should not cause - the commander to swerve from the firm determination to carry out his - original intention.” - - The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it - possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while - the remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the - actual decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist - every temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than - for carrying out the =counter-attack=, which should be ordered when - the assailant is under the most effective fire of the position. The - general reserve should then be quickly deployed and should make its - attack with determination, by directing a violent fire against the - flank of the enemy. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided. - The garrison is only charged with the task of annihilating the enemy - with its fire, which should be increased to the utmost intensity. - - -THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.[486] - - [486] Major-General MIKULICZ RADECKI, Austrian Army, _Das neue - Exerzierreglement der italienischen Infanterie_, Vienna, 1906. V. - GRÄVENITZ, _Die neueren taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische - Heer_, in _Vierteljahrsheft_, 1905, I, p. 90, et seq. _Der - Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene_, in _Streffleur_, - 1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special - pamphlet form). - - P. RATH, _Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur_, in _Militärische - Welt_, 1907, January-February number. - - -ATTACK. - - The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in - Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many - defiles, causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.[487] - The regulations emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of - infantry and artillery. - - [487] Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against - the hostile forces which it encounters in its march, whether its - action be to determine, as quickly as possible, the strength of the - opponent and to save its main body from an unnecessary delay, or - whether it be to deceive the opponent as to the location of its own - forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a surprise. (Par. - 37). - - Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up - in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken - up until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the - leading element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed - formation. To neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible - as the action progresses, the firing line is formed into groups - separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, although this increases the - casualties. These intervals may be increased, when required, to 10 - paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing line are usually - at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to advance - until increased casualties force it to open fire. - - =Kinds of fire.= Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used - when the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The - battalion commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as - soon as it is certain that a good effect can be produced. When two - targets appear, the fire is to be directed upon the one promising the - best results (_i.e._, not necessarily the one that is tactically most - important). “In order that the intensity of the fire may correspond - to the requirements of the tactical situation existing at the moment, - officers, by reason of their tactical training, should be able to - state approximately how many rounds are necessary to produce the - desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character of the - target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as - the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From - these estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in - order to bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.” - - The =advance by rushes= may be made either at a walk or at a run, but - the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted. - The following points are considered especially important: The time - for making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by - a whole unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon - various circumstances, which the leader, alter due consideration - of the terrain and the hostile fire, as well as of the physical - condition and morale of his men, is to judge in each particular case. - In doing this, he is to bear in mind that the rush must be made as - unobserved by the enemy as possible, so that the latter cannot direct - his lire upon the advancing unit. - - The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line - which are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority - of fire over the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units - which could only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and - useless losses, are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed - ahead, support these with their fire, and then advance in turn under - cover of the fire of the others. - - As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are - to be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The - length of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run, - depends upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire - is to be opened at once. - - When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the - organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by - entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the - firing line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run. - or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open - fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading - echelons open fire at once from their new positions, so as to - facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances - make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have - reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon - the enemy. - - At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile - fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups - consisting of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining - flanks of neighboring units cease firing, so as not to injure the men - of the advancing unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead, - while squad leaders see that all of the men move forward. - - Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the - firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are - to carry that line forward, to come up in that formation. - - The =assault= is to be made either in close or extended order to the - tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers. - - The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained - by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the - participation of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat. - When engaged with an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position, - only a part of the leading line is to be launched against certain - sections (_tratti_) of the defensive position, while other parts, by - means of rapid fire, prevent the enemy from supporting the threatened - sections. In conjunction with this frequently emphasized scheme of - penetrating several specially important sections of the hostile - position, the regulations express the view--by no means generally - considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously chosen - points will force the enemy to retreat. - - The assault is, as a rule, to be made by order of the commander of - the whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault - is suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (_attenti_), and - at the command “to the assault” (_per l’assalto_), the men throw - themselves with loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets - and the beating of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already - gotten so close to the enemy that further waiting would be useless, - it advances to the assault, after getting permission therefor, or, - otherwise, on its own responsibility. All the rest of the troops are - to join in this movement. - - -DEFENSE. - - So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy - will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as - possible. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack=. - Long range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open - terrain devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened - until the enemy arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened, - all the supports are to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is - undertaken by the first line only in exceptional cases. - - -THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904. - - -ATTACK. - - Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference - for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might - produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination - towards shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term - “shock troops” has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The - forward movement alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is - the element that executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army - as a probable opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance - with mixed detachments. The regulations do not touch upon the tactics - of the rencontre, and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the - advance guard than the German regulations.[488] The advance guard - is to occupy supporting points, under cover of which the main body - can deploy, and to complete the reconnaissance by its fight. The - necessity of infantry detachments completing the reconnaissance made - by the cavalry is particularly emphasized. - - [488] See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R. - - Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in the - manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The danger - of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German - regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The - French regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat - elements, and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain - devoid of cover is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French - attack does not lie in the firing line--the fight for the superiority - of fire is not mentioned--but in maneuvering troops cautiously led - after the firing line. The defender is to be engaged all along the - line and, when the weak points of his position are recognized, the - commander-in-chief is to give the order for the assault. - - This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the - French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A - brigade is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st - regiment in the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third - battalion (_troupe d’entrainement_); the 2nd regiment follows at a - like distance as a reserve. - - The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the - infantry preparation (_préparation_), the decisive action (_l’action - décisive_), and the completion (_l’achèvement_). - - =The artillery in the preparatory action.= The artillery is to - endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible, - without, however, expending more ammunition than is absolutely - necessary.... The commander is not to give the order for the attack - until the preparation is considered sufficient. - - The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful - manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered - and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached - to every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner - in which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely - separated parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong - hostile firing line, and may be defeated in detail. - - The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations - issued in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix, - formerly commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice - President of the Supreme War Council. - - =Assembly.= The division is assembled in division square (_carré de - division_), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the - regiments in line of double columns or in line of company columns, - abreast or in echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which - successive lines are pushed forward without any attempt to envelop - (in other words a pure frontal attack), the division is concentrated - with the brigades abreast, their regiments in echelon. If a flank - attack is to be made, in which the leading brigade must be protected - by an echelon and a reserve ready for any eventuality, the division - is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, their regiments - abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a road in - rear of the _carré_. The pioneer company is divided into four parts, - corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled troops, - for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during the - forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled - force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and - cavalry. - - =Preparations for the advance in mass formation.= During the - concentration, mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of - the terrain which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed - division, and later these officers act as guides. - - -Preparatory attack formation. - - =A. Pure frontal attack.= The leading regiment in each brigade is to - have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to - be echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions - are to be protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of - cavalry. The second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in - rear of the inner flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional - cavalry is to be held in rear of the division, in readiness to - advance to the right or the left. - - =B. Flank attack.= The two regiments of the leading brigade are to - furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third - regiment is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the - fourth regiment is to form the general reserve. The cavalry is to - reconnoiter on the outer flank. In this case, as well as in a pure - frontal attack, the artillery is to take up a position from which it - can support the attack. Drummers, trumpeters, and bands, are to march - with the general reserve. The regulations state that it is absolutely - essential for infantry units to be sheltered from hostile observation - during their forward movement, and that they must remain under - control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops are not to - deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According - to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at 5000 - m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move by a - flank, but only straight to the front. - - The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause - lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when - necessary, from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast - rules or normal formations are prescribed for this advance. - - The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot. - When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as - the only means of making a further advance possible. - - =Kinds of fire.= Fire at will (_feu à volonté_), principally used at - short ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire - with counted cartridges (_feu à cartouches comptées_), the number - being given (this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (_feu - à répétition_); and the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley - fire has been again prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (_rafales_) are - typical of French fire tactics. (See p. 164 supra). - - After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but - the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made. - - The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry - combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They - emphasize that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by - means of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At - the point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile - troops as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight, - while the troops in the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance - impetuously. - - A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features - all along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated - by the regulations, are very apt to fail prematurely. This is - particularly likely to happen because some of the troops will fall - behind, while others are able to push ahead more rapidly. These - attacks are to destroy the power of resistance of the enemy and to - exhaust him physically. The leading units are to cover with their - fire the advance of those who are less favored by the terrain.[489] - During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill at a - range of 600 to 800 m. - - [489] According to DENCAUSSE, in _Journal des Sciences Militaires_, - 1906, and November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor - to approach within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing - a shot. - - The supports (_renforts_) follow in a similar manner, ready to move - up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or - independently in case the situation requires it. Their entry into - action is in a general way determined by the commander of the whole - force. They are to augment the fire power of the firing line or - to carry it forward. The efforts of all are to be directed toward - constantly keeping up the advance. - - At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports, - will be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points, - and to effect a lodgment on the ground captured. At other points - the attacking group will be too weak to push the attack home. In - such a case, the troops are to effect a lodgment on the terrain - (_s’accrochent sur le sol_) in rear of the nearest cover, as close - as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain themselves - there until artillery or neighboring troops can support them. The - fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that an - attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these - usually protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a - decisive attack at some points. The infantry should endeavor to - compensate for its numerical inferiority by skillfully utilizing the - ground and intrenchments, by great activity, and, above all else, by - invincible pertinacity. The supporting point will thus become the - center of the fight of a separate combat group.” - - The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize - fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the - artillery and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat, - the commander must decide where the retained troops should be - launched for the assault. The selection of a point of attack is - essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of - character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be - regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close - order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting - troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best - advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are - to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation - in order to give to that line, as _troupes d’assaut_, the impetus for - the assault. - - According to Thomas de Colligny,[490] formerly general staff officer - of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an - assault should form in four lines, each consisting of one company; - the distance between lines being 150 m., and the front covered - likewise 150 m. Each of the three leading lines should be formed - in line of platoons in columns of route at deploying intervals - sufficient to allow single rank line to be formed, and the fourth - line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals between platoons. - When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding one is to carry - it forward. If the French believe such close order formations to be - indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more extensive use of - cover. - - [490] _Conseils à mon bataillon_, p. 107. - - Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General - Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One - regiment, on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (_avant ligne_), - in rear of that, the assaulting troops (_troupes d’assaut_). First - line: one regiment, its twelve company columns abreast; second line: - one regiment, its three battalions in double column at extended - intervals, 300 m. in rear of the first line; third line: the fourth - regiment, its battalions in route column abreast of each other, 300 - m. in rear of the second line. While, during our peace maneuvers, we - continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line in the expectation that - his supports and reserve will in the end enter our zone of fire, it - might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, to direct - our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible. - - =Envelopment.= This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations - (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service - Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in - length depending upon the intentions of the commander, state that the - attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior - forces for the purpose of annihilating him.” - - For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 392 supra. - - -DEFENSE. - - The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced - positions, and advanced posts[491] (intended to prevent hostile - reconnaissance), and numerous counter-attacks. - - [491] These frequently consist of detachments of all arms - (_détachements de couverture ou de contact_). General BONNAL. - (_Deutsche Revue_, December number, 1907) says: “The French - regulation--in contrast to the German--provide in defense for - detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the purpose - of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him - on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have - their advantages and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the - opinion that in sending out advanced detachments one must exercise - great care in order that these may not be defeated in detail, for - this is invariably detrimental to the whole force.” - - For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its - supports, and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended - for offensive action. In addition to calling attention to the - necessity of overwhelming with fire the hostile troops advancing over - open ground, the regulations recommend that the fire be withheld - occasionally and that the enemy be allowed to run into the greatly - accelerated fire which is unexpectedly directed upon him. The fire is - to be discontinued as soon as the enemy takes to cover, and is to be - increased to the utmost intensity when he moves in dense formation - over open ground. The supports are to be used to augment the fire - power of the firing line. - - =Counter-attack.= General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is - met by the offensive return (_retour offensif_), the flank attack - by the counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander - should ride ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what - counter-measures he should take. The artillery can render the most - effective assistance by registering its fire upon the points at which - the enemy will probably advance, and by preventing him from leaving - his position. If the attack is successful, the local reserve advances - beyond the firing line, which has entered the hostile position, and - fires upon the retreating enemy. The general reserve now becomes the - local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms and becomes the - general reserve.” - - The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack - (_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A - =counter-attack= is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates - into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast - herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an - =offensive return=. (For details see p. 439 supra). - - Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but - to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon - him. then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on, - in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and - reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by - fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has - frequently been successful. - - “The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must - prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy - must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the - counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless - of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the - commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should - be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the - enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the - commander must order the offensive to be assumed.” - - -THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.[492] - - [492] _Infantry Training._ _Combined - Training_.--_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1906, III, _The Development of the - Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War_. - - -ATTACK. - - The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive - battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment - made in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his - main position, and paves the way for a further advance; every advance - must be thoroughly prepared and systematically carried out.” - - In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions - is used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the - protection of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a - “preparatory formation”, the battalions in one or more lines of - “quarter columns” (column of companies). As soon as the commander - has decided which flank of the enemy he will envelop, against which - portion of the enemy’s line he will launch his decisive attack, - he assembles his subordinate commanders to receive the orders. - According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible to issue - orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as a - general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented - by verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention - to the peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile - counter-attack is possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade - commander designates the position to be taken up by the machine - guns, and gives directions to them in regard to supporting the - advance by long range fire. A base battalion is to be designated. - When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack is assigned - to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion is - led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given - a compass direction. Every leader is to provide independently for - reconnaissance and for communication by signal flags and also by - telephone; a mounted signal corps man accompanies the brigade - commander. - - Every unit is formed in three lines for attack. - - The =first line=, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports, - is made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than - one-fourth of the whole force. - - The =second line=, the reserves of the firing line, is under the - orders of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce - the firing line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The - second line is to fill up the firing line to the maximum density, - _i.e._, to one man per yard of front (0.9 m.). - - The =third line=, the general reserve, is to assure the success of - the attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than - one-fourth of the whole force.[493] “The general reserve is directly - under the orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables - him to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward - off counter-attacks. If the attack succeeds, the general reserve - pushes forward rapidly to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails, - it serves as a rallying force, but before the commander decides - to leave behind even a part of it, he should consider whether, by - launching all the troops at his disposal, he could break down the - resistance of the defender. The commander can only exercise an - influence on the course of the action by means of a reserve. If he - keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power - to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore - the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to - meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the - additional strength required to drive the attack home.” - - [493] According to the old regulations, a part of the general - reserve had to remain in rear in rallying positions. (See p. 397 - supra). - - In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under - the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault, - it is advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying - position. Even a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least - half a company at his disposal. The British were not without reason - censured because their flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa - on account of the lack of energy of the frontal groups, and their - new regulations accordingly contain detailed rules for the conduct - of the “holding attack”. The troops holding the enemy in front are - to threaten him for the time being. This is to be accomplished by - wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by occasional bursts of - lire (_rafales_), by employing machine guns, by retaining supports - far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing to - decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main - attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order - to deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be - launched and that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See p. - 447 supra). - - Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no - longer given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more - front than when acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive - attack, a battalion in the first line may put 125 rifles on every 100 - yards (90 m.) of front; these are distributed between firing line, - supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist of one or - more companies. Entire companies are only deployed in exceptional - cases, for example on open ground, where it is difficult to bring - up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses to - be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, in all - probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line - plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a - front not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A - brigade of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m., - depending upon the number of battalions engaged. - - When the force arrives within 4 or 5 km. of the enemy, the battalions - are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first - line is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn - protected by scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther, - they lie down and await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter - advances under cover of the supporting fire of infantry, machine - guns, and artillery. Fire of position is considered necessary. Fire - at will is from now on used. This is to vary in intensity according - to the character of the target, and the range. It is to increase to - special violence when the attacking infantry advances over level - ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be discontinued when - the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line is to advance - as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive losses. - Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, but - small losses are to be borne. - - After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with - more rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by - controlled fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according - to the regulations, at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of - effective fire, all the troops are to deploy. In consequence of - this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work forward independently, are - scattered all over the terrain over which the attack is being made. - At the initial deployment, the interval between skirmishers is to - be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where the decision - is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or three - yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2¹⁄₂-3¹⁄₂ paces). Another paragraph - of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one - rifle per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those - entertained by them immediately after the South African war, have - undergone a noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of - a firing line; dense firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are - at present deemed essential to a decisive fight, while the fire of - widely extended lines is considered ineffective. The intervals may - vary considerably, but the regulations state that it should be borne - in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight are increased and - the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; moreover, - that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated, - an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity of - moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the - men be trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a - difficult situation, and to do everything in their power to carry - out the original intentions of the commander. - - =Rushes= over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92 - m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an - example given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards - (22 m.) long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is - to be continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no - opportunity to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are - to be made from one covering feature to another. - - “On open ground and within effective range, long lines of - skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even - when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may - take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire - is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the - enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing unit - will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.” - - The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as - possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to - advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads - are unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly. - - The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the - strength of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of - platoons at full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer - comparatively small losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200 - m.). The troops are to deploy before reaching effective ranges - (1200-600 m.), as they will otherwise suffer serious losses. At - decisive ranges the firing line is to be filled up to its maximum - density. - - The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the - =assault=; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops - is considered particularly important. The order for the assault is - to be given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of - conducting it is left to company commanders. - - When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are - to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting - distance, where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single - field guns are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a - brief but violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn. - - -DEFENSE. - - In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports, - and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons - for the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The - object of =advanced positions= is to mislead, deceive, and check - the enemy. They are to be evacuated before the troops in them - become seriously engaged. It is not considered necessary for the - =main position= to consist of a continuous line of trenches; every - platoon and even every squad may have its own trench. The principal - requirements are good field of fire and mutual support by oblique or - enfilade fire. - - The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the - field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state - that, under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad - front, but that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong - garrison is required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as - dummy intrenchments, are not to be constructed so as to stand out - against the horizon. The importance of masking firing trenches, and - of constructing overhead cover is emphasized; special cover trenches - for the supports may be constructed in rear of the crest. - - Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also - considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short - range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the - assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his - attack with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing - tires the eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a - =counter-attack= made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks - by section reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the - British to make the section reserves very strong has been frequently - observed. The final stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s - day, of a counter-attack all along the line. As soon as the opponent - has arrived within assaulting distance, the troops holding the - position are to fix bayonets and, after delivering magazine fire, are - to make a short frontal counter-attack. - - -THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907. - - -ATTACK. - - The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but take - their peculiar theater of war into consideration. - - =Kinds of fire.= Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used. - - =Rushes= are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the - regulations admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making - rushes that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m., - their value will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise - to avoid sending forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that - the advance may not be too much retarded and the difficulties of - leading increased. - - The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be - possible “to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this - account, the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the - assault with cold steel. They further state that, when the enemy can - be kept down by artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will - be easy; that, as it is difficult to obtain a timely effect from - artillery fire directed upon an enemy who takes advantage of cover or - who occupies a fortified position, the infantry cannot wait for the - successful termination of the artillery combat, but, on the contrary, - should advance while that combat is in progress, for only by so doing - can it count upon the effective coöperation of its artillery. But, - nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, even if - it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the artillery. - - The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position - prepared for defense. - - =Rencontre.= The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the - advance guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time, - deliberate attack; that the commander should promptly decide what - to do, even if the situation is not entirely clear; and that, when - practicable, the main body should be launched as an entity. A fight - against a superior enemy is only to be avoided, for the time being, - in case the latter has gained a start in deployment. - - =Attack on a position prepared for defense.= The commander frames - his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance, - and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory - position, where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable, - combat sections to the different units. In order that they may - utilize the covering features of the ground to the best advantage, - the different units are to avoid advancing abreast. On account of - the difficulties attending an advance over ground swept by hostile - fire, it is considered desirable for the troops to take advantage - of the cover afforded by darkness. In order that, in such a case, - serious lateral displacements of the troops may be avoided, the - fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to endeavor to - drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main position. - The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to be - made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense, - there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by - intrenching successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances - permit, an attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to - the enemy’s position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is - to be designated during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and - detailed preparations are to be made for the advance. As soon as the - troops arrive during the night in the selected position, they are to - construct cover quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard - that intrenching tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is - to be had to the sand bags that are carried along. The men engaged in - digging trenches are at all times to be ready for action. - - The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an - assaulting position should make the =assault= immediately at dawn or - should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and - that, if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend - on the suddenness and rapidity with which it is carried out. The - reconnaissance of the position and the work of removing obstacles is - to be completed, if possible, during the night, so that avenues of - approach will be open for the assaulting troops. - - If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and - if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the - night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at - night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it - will depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly, - directly from the last firing position, or whether it is carried - out upon the completion of works of approach. When necessary the - assaulting bodies are to carry along hand grenades and demolition - tools, the latter being selected in conformity with the results of - the reconnaissance. - - The regulations state that to have captured a position does not - suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the - victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile - position are to continue the advance until they again find a field - of fire, whereupon they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The - troops which do not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly, - secure the captured position, take requisite measures for security, - and make preparations to meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are - not to be assembled in large bodies at points exposed to hostile - artillery fire. As soon as the enemy has gotten out of range, all the - troops are promptly to resume the forward movement, and are to pursue - him vigorously so far as due regard for cohesion and order permits. - - =Intrenching tools= are to be used in attacks on fortified positions, - and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy. - - -DEFENSE. - - In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide - for economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and - a general reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect - the flanks. Dummy intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make - it difficult for the enemy to gain information of the defensive - position. The Japanese views in regard to =advanced positions= are - not so pronounced as the German, for, while their regulations mention - the combat of the outposts pushed forward from the position, the - danger of advanced positions is not especially emphasized. - - The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has - fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position - with the bayonet. - - Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position - from that of the artillery. If information is received that the - attacker has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting - position, small detachments are to advance and prevent him from - strengthening his position. - - -THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907. - - The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training - and combat. - - -THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908. - - -ATTACK. - - There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German - regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the - combat and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander - in deciding whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The - regulations state that decisive results are only offered by the - attack; that considerations of a presumable hostile superiority and - other apparently unfavorable conditions should not diminish the - energy of the attack; and that the decision to launch the troops - should never be made dependent upon the receipt of reports in regard - to the enemy. - - The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation - or the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The - regulations state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon - superiority of fire and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous - advance and an unswerving determination to win are of just as much - importance. The conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon - whether it is made in a rencontre or on a position prepared for - defense. - - The views entertained in regard to the =rencontre= coincide with - the German views. The regulations say that the result of the - reconnaissance should not be awaited, because success depends largely - upon prompt action. The commander may launch parts of his main body - in succession, as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating - in close country, when it is necessary to gain ground quickly on - debouching from a defile, or when the enemy makes an impetuous - advance. The commander is to direct all his efforts toward throwing - the enemy upon the defensive, and then to launch the main body as an - entity. - - The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only - discuss the =attack on a fortified position=; various modifications - of the attack, depending upon the preparations made by the enemy, - are authorized. Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by - darkness, and an extensive use is to be made of =intrenching tools=. - The regulations state that an assault by day only has a chance of - succeeding when the defender is completely subdued, and when only - insignificant obstacles and defenses are encountered. When this is - not the case, the day is to be used for making preparations for the - attack, and the night for executing it. - - -DEFENSE. - - The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the - deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating - an assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of - gaining time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the - direction in which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt, - or when the commander intends to assail the enemy while the latter - is in the act of deploying. In the =defense seeking a decision=, - advanced positions are not to be used, because it is believed that - the employment of detachments of troops in front of the defensive - position will weaken the latter, and a hostile enveloping attack will - soon force the advanced troops to fall back upon the main position. - The regulations point out that if the advanced troops are supported - by fire from the main position, the latter will be prematurely - disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced troops is, - however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive the - enemy, or to support the cavalry. - - The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be - constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to - fire are not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter. - - - - -XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.[494] - - [494] Lieutenant-Colonel KOVARIK, _Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren - Systems für den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf_, Berlin, 1903. - - -1. HISTORICAL SKETCH. - -The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital importance to -the infantry. To solve it correctly means to assure the success of the -infantry in fire action. The first question that needs consideration -is, whether the experiences of past wars show that the ammunition at -present carried by the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances, -even when ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time -because all the roads are choked with troops. - - For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the - =Franco-German war=, in which breechloaders were used for the - first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80 - cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20 - additional rounds per man.[495] - - [495] Historical data given by D. GÜNTHER in _Die Entwickelung der - Feuertaktik der Infanterie_, 1902. - - When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any - campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could - ever have taken place. In the =Franco-German war=, the expenditure - of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000 - rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44 - per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about - 58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of - ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon - discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking, - the only information available being the record of the number of - rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to - the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with - them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each - man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how - much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no - record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount - of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known, - that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place, - an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs. - This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition - column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in - unbroken packages on the battlefield of =Hühnerwasser=. - - A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops, - on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes - filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at - =Sedan=),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the - rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on - January 19th, 1871, in the battle at =Mont Valérien=, and in the 38th - Brigade, at the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=).[497] - - [496] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1175. - - [497] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, II, p. 259. - - The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard - to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements. - Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule, - cannot lay claim to trustworthiness. - - The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war - was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the - Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery. - Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing. - - “In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of - the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more - rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the - difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently - increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these - circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops - fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was - no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened - that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack - of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred - at the battle of =Mars-la-Tour= in the infantry of the IIIrd Army - Corps.”[498] - - [498] _Gen. St. W._, V, p. 1460. - - On August 16th, at the battle of =Vionville=, the Prussian IIIrd Army - Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486 - cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet, - in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the - battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded, - each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200 - rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the - afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred. - - [499] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 32. - - The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition - during the battle of =Vionville= are taken from _Kriegsgeschichtliche - Beispiele_, 8 and 9, by Major KUNZ: - - IInd Bn. Leib Regt. 12,749 rounds for 850 rifles, or 15 per rifle. - Ist Bn. 40th Inf. 35,000 „ „ 450 „ „ 78 „ „ - IInd Bn. 40th Inf. 6,650 „ „ 350 „ „ 19 „ „ - IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf. 4,520 „ „ 300 „ „ 15 „ „ - - A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the - Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in - front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient - ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to - inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd - Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after - they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two - hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses: - Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500] - - [500] For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at - Beaumont, see HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 184. - - The defense of the stone wall at =Buzanval= by the 50th Infantry - (German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate - defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy - at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent, - nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire - discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine - hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v. - Boguslawski says: - - “The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately - determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note - showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not - fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far - the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the - 6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no - record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle. - To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of - ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180 - men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges. - He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition - originally supplied him. - - “Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into - billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume - that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten - rounds per hour.” - - In the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=, some of the companies of the - 56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In - the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able - to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons - near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such - assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by - the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the - battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was - distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging - to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but, - in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition - carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at - the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought - almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men--about - 80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously - directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the - fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition - to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well - disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition - promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing - it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In - consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery, - men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or - less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was - almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men--80 rounds - per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened - packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position - occupied by the 38th Brigade. - - The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition - expended at =St. Privat= by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August - 19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820, - and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition - supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken - into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be - considered excessive.[501] - - [501] _Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz_, p. 250. - - At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard - managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition, - without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which - were left intact.[502] - - [502] _Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons_, p. 121. - - The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably - greater in all the battles. At =Champigny=, every French infantry - soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove - sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the - Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st - was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27 - rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition - was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division, - against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim - that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In - the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general - of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503] - Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz - on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of - Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of - ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed - information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the - 25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead - of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and - 3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men--9% hits). The statement made - in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French - soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot - be substantiated by French records. - - [503] HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 159. - - [504] PAQUIÉ, _Le tir en terrain varié_, p. 39. - - The expenditure of ammunition in the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, - amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side. - The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure - of ammunition are available. In the engagement at =Aiaslar=, on - August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at - =Karahassankioi=, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man. - On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122 - rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the - Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in - his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional - rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by - the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an - organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available, - and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds. - - In front of =Plevna=, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in - six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition - carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on =Plevna=, they - expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505] - In the engagement at =Lovtcha=, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired - during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that - his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the - ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to - which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up - the necessary ammunition.[506] - - [505] Details given in the German translation of the Russian _Gen. - St. W._ (Vienna), III, pp. 330-331. - - [506] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 88. - - On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack - on the =Omar Bey Tabia=, expended the following ammunition: - - 63rd Infantry[507] 55,296 rounds, or 21 per rifle - 119th „ [507] 99,744 „ „ 43 „ „ - 64th „ 24,650 „ „ 10 „ „ - 115th „ 45,360 „ „ 24 „ „ - - [507] These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1¹⁄₂ hours. - - In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition - than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short - at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the - Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations, - after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as - apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead - and wounded. - - During the assault on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, each man of - the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an - average of 2 rounds per man, per minute. - - The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles - than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at =Gorni Dubniac=, each - man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact, - that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed - 3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while - the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280 - men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100 - rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside - a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at =Tashkessen= - (31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend - Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle - Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour). - - [508] Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack - mules carrying 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from - 100 to 120 rounds on his person. - - [509] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den - Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 170. - - [510] BAKER, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 160. - - There is very little information available in regard to the - expenditure of ammunition during the =Russo-Japanese war=. The - Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8 - one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and - the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds - each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210 - rounds per man. In the engagement at =Hamatan= (=Yalu=), several - Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of - rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd - and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without - difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a - thoroughly reliable report published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of - September 24th, 1905: - - During the battle of =Liao Yang=, which lasted six days, the 138th - Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On - September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other - words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other - regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition - was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to - withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day - and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October - 13th to 18th, at =Linshinpu=, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800 - rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting - within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at - 15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian - position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and - 250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle - of =Liao Yang= (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended - 416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions), - 250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less - than 160 rounds per rifle. - - [511] _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei._ - - The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in - addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of - ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which - were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The - Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man - should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going - into action. In the engagement at =Kinchau= (26th November, 1904), - the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143 - rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512] - - [512] _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, I. p. 224. - -Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 rounds of -ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, cases may arise -where troops could fire a greater number of rounds to good advantage. -This must be taken into account when determining the number of rounds -with which the infantryman should be supplied--on his person and in the -ammunition wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the supply can -be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition columns after a -battle, so long as it is still possible to assign a separate road to -each army corps. When this is no longer practicable, the ammunition -columns will encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in supplying -the infantry with ammunition. - - -AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD. - - ========++=======+=====+=======+============+======+=======++ - ~Coun- || Year | Cal-| Weight| System |Weight| Weight|| - try.~ || of |iber.|of car-| of loading | of | of || - || con- | |tridge.| | clip.| clip || - || struc-| | | | |filled.|| - || tion. | | | | | || - || | mm. | g. | | g. | g. || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~GER- || 1905 | 7.9 | 27.19 |Mag. in rear| 7 | 126 || - MANY~ || S. | | |of barrel, | | || - || | | |loaded with | | || - || | | |clip holding| | || - || | | |5 car- | | || - || | | |tridges. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~AUS- || 1895 | 8. | 28.35 |Mag. in rear|Frame | 158.25|| - TRIA~ || | | |of barrel, | 16.5 | || - || | | |loaded with | | || - || | | |frame | | || - || | | |holding 5 | | || - || | | |cartridges. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~ITALY~ || 1891 | 6.5 | 22. |Mag. in rear| 12 | 138 || - ||Car- | | |of barrel, | | || - ||can- | | |loaded with | | || - ||Mann- | | |frame | | || - ||licher.| | |holding 6 | | || - || | | |cartridges. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~ENG- || 1908 | 7.71| 27.5 |Mag. in rear| Clip | 150 || - LAND~ ||Lee- | | |of barrel, | 12.5 | || - ||En- | | |loaded with | | || - ||field. | | |clip holding| | || - || | | |5 car- | | || - || | | |tridges. | | || - || | | |[514] | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~FRANCE~|| 1886- | 8. | 29. |Mag. under | -- | -- || - || 98, | | |barrel, car-| | || - ||1905 D | | |tridges | | || - ||Lebel. | | |loaded | | || - || | | |singly. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~RUSSIA~|| 1891 | 7.62| 25.812|Mag. in rear| 9.6 | 137 || - [516] ||(Three | | |of barrel, | | || - ||line | | |loaded with | | || - ||rifle).| | |clip holding| | || - || | | |5 car- | | || - || | | |tridges. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - ~JAPAN~ || 1897 | 6.50| 22.4 |Mag. in rear| 8.5 | 120 || - [516] ||Arisaka| | |of barrel, | | || - ||(Meidji| | |loaded with | | || - || 80). | | |clip holding| | || - || | | |5 car- | | || - || | | |tridges. | | || - --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ - - ========++==================++===========++=================++ - ~Coun- || Number of rounds || Ammunition|| Number of rounds|| - try.~ || carried by a man.|| wagons. || carried by ammu-|| - || || || nition wagons. || - || || || No. || - || Weight|| || per rifle.|| - || No. kg. || ||No. [513]|| - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~GER- || 150 | ||4 Company || 14,400 | 77 || - MANY~ ||N. C. O. 45| ||ammunition || | || - ||Trum- |4.5 ||wagons. || | || - ||peter 90| || || | || - ||Drummer 30| || || | || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~AUS- || 120 | ||4 Company || 9,450 | 47.2|| - TRIA~ ||N. C. O. 40| 4.31||ammunition || | || - || | ||wagons. || | || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~ITALY~ || 162 | ||Infantry of the line, | || - ||Sergt. and |3.736||in field train | 24 || - ||Trum- | ||Alpini, on pack animals | || - ||peter 126| ||and on carts |244 || - ||Inf. | || | || - ||Pioneers 108| || | || - --------++------------+-----++------------------------+-----++ - ~ENG- || 115 |3.48 ||8 Pack animals |250 || - LAND~ || | ||8 Ammunition wagons | || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~FRANCE~|| 120 | ||4 Company || 16,384 | 82 || - ||N. C. O. 56|3.48 ||ammunition || or | || - || | ||wagons. || 19,000 | || - || | || || [515] | || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~RUSSIA~|| 120 |3.33 ||24 am. ||In each of | || - [516] || | ||carts: ||the 8 1- | || - || | ||Ist ||horse carts| || - || | ||echelon, 8 || 6000 |=36 || - || | ||1-horse ||In each of | || - || | ||carts ||the 16 2- | || - || | ||IInd ||horse carts| || - || | ||echelon, 16|| 14,400 |=30 || - || | ||2-horse || | -- || - || | ||carts || | 66 || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - ~JAPAN~ || 120 |2.9 ||Each com- || 16,000 | 80 || - [516] || | ||pany has || | || - || | ||one cart. || | || - --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ - - ========++===============++=============+=========== - ~Coun- ||Reserve supply.|| Supply | Supply - try.~ || || available | available - || || in a | in an - || || division. |army corps. - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - ~GER- ||Each of the 34 || 150 | 150 - MANY~ ||am. wagons of || 77 | 77 - ||the 4 inf. am. || --- | 144 - ||columns of an || 227 | --- - ||army corps, || | 361 - ||carries 23,000 || | - ||rounds or 144 || | - ||per rifle. || | - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - ~AUS- ||Each division ||16 battalions|3 divisions - TRIA~ ||has one div. ||of 800 rifles| 224 - ||am. park of 30 ||each. | 18 - ||am. wagons, || 120 | --- - ||which carry || 47.2 |about 242 - ||769,500 rounds || 57 | - ||or 57 per || ----- | - ||rifle. || 224. | - ||The corps am. || | - ||park same || | - ||strength as a || | - ||div. park. || | - --------++---------------++------+------+----------- - ~ITALY~ ||In the 3rd sec-||Line: | Alpi-|Inf. of the - ||tion of the am.|| | ni: |line: - ||column, 40 || 162 | 162 | 162 - ||rounds per || 24 | 244 | 24 - ||rifle; || 40 | 90 | 40 - ||In the Arty. || --- | --- | 45 - ||park of the || 226 | 496 | --- - ||army corps, 45 || | | 271 - ||rounds per || | | - ||rifle; || | | - ||In the Alpini || | | - ||am. column, 90 || | | - ||rounds per || | | - ||rifle. || | | - --------++---------------++------+------+----------- - ~ENG- ||In the division|| 115 |400 rounds - LAND~ ||am. column, 125|| 250 |per 1,000 - ||rounds per || 125 |rifles. - ||rifle. || --- | - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - ~FRANCE~||In the corps || 120 | 110 - ||am. park: || 82 | --- - ||Ist || --- | 312 - ||echelon 44.2|| 202 | - ||IInd || | - ||echelon 66.2|| | - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - ~RUSSIA~||In the light || 120 | 267 - [516] ||Arty. park 81|| 66 | 164 - ||In the reserve || 81 | --- - ||park 164|| --- | 431 - || ---|| 267 | - || 245|| | - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - ~JAPAN~ || -- || -- | -- - [516] || || | - --------++---------------++-------------+----------- - - By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the - number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles - specified: - - { Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket 85 rounds - Paper Shells { Prussian rifled infantry musket (new model) 55 „ - { Prussian needle gun M/41-69 78 „ - { French chassepot rifle M/66 90 „ - - { Infantry rifle M/71 69 „ - Metal Shells { Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81 98 „ - { Rifle, M/98 with loading clips 103 „ - - The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier: - - =Germany=: =45= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, - and =60= in the knapsack; - - =Austria=: =20= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, - and =60= in the knapsack; - - =Russia=: =30= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to - the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve - cartridge box attached to the knapsack; - - =France=: =120= rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and - one behind; - - =England=: In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding - =15= rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder - belt holding =50= rounds); - - =Japan=: =30= rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and - =60= rounds in the cartridge box behind. - - -2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES. - - -GERMANY. - -(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.) - -On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition wagons -of the battalions, as this renders supervision easier, and enables -the battalion commander to regulate the replenishment of ammunition. -Companies acting alone, as well as those forming the support of an -advance guard, are followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not -seem desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or of a -brigade on account of the distance separating the different battalions. -During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition should be taken -out of the knapsacks, and the contents of the ammunition wagons -distributed among the men. The men carry this extra ammunition in their -haversacks and in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc. - - The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of - track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the - ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to - carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned - within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors - in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments - (to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of - cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15 - cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25 - kg. - - As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man, - according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1 - non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the - ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take - post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the - other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the - bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of - two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a - bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four - minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the - left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the - third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can - carry 21.8 kg. - -Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition wagon. -These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued too soon, this additional -burden causes considerable inconvenience, and consequently reduces -the marching power of the men. The leader must also decide what shall -be done with the ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely, -and the troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition -wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the mounted -wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. When refilled, -they rejoin their proper organizations. If requested, ammunition must -be issued to any body of troops. - -On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have been emptied, -follow the movements of the several companies and take up a position -under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster, as close as possible to the -firing line--never more than 800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases, -this must be done without regard to losses. The firing line is supplied -with ammunition, when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward. -When the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact is -communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the signal “m”. -This signal, when made to the front by the troops in rear, signifies, -“ammunition is coming up at once.” - -In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to the firing line -by individual men, the latter should invariably be detailed from troops -in rear which have not as yet been engaged. These men must endeavor to -reach the firing line by rushes or by crawling, and must then remain -with that line. - -It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the ammunition -taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly replaced. The higher -commanders would do well to provide a reserve supply of ammunition, -until the arrival of the ammunition columns, by assembling the -ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.). -It will also be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons -of the troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all -probability, expend a large amount of ammunition. - -The ammunition should be removed from the dead and wounded. If this is -done by the men of an advancing skirmish line, there is danger that the -forward movement will be retarded, and that some of the men will take -advantage of this opportunity to make themselves “scarce.” Officers -and men should endeavor to replenish ammunition at every opportunity, -without awaiting specific orders to that effect, and, in general, see -that not only the prescribed number of rounds, but, on the contrary, as -much ammunition as possible is on hand in the organization. - -When the force is to stand on the defensive, especially if the position -to be occupied has been prepared for defense, ammunition should -be deposited all along the firing line. (Cartridge boxes or other -utensils may be used as receptacles). It is advisable to use first the -cartridges carried in caps, haversacks, coat and trousers’ pockets. The -contents of the right cartridge box are saved for decisive moments when -great rapidity of fire is essential. In replenishing ammunition, the -right cartridge box is filled first, then the left, and the surplus is -accommodated in haversack, coat and trousers’ pockets. - - -AUSTRIA. - -(Par. 70 Regulations of 1903). - - The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention. - If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional - rounds before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each - non-commissioned officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition - wagon, so that the latter is about half emptied.[517] This brings - the total amount carried by each soldier up to 140 rounds, and - increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and that of the - non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into action, - the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion - reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the - attention of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion - reserve has been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons - accompany the regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the - wagons maintain intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are - either placed under the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the - senior supply officer present with them, as may be directed by the - battalion commander. - - [517] The company ammunition wagon carries 9,450 rounds of - ammunition, packed in seven compartments. It consists of a body and a - limber, has a width of track of 1.13 m., and is supplied with eight - sacks which serve to carry ammunition to the troops. During the day - its position is indicated by a red flag, and at night by a green - lantern. - - In attack, it will, as a rule, only be possible to replenish - ammunition until troops get within about 1,000 paces (750 m.) of the - enemy. From this point on, however, it will be extremely difficult to - supply ammunition. Every lull in the fight must be taken advantage - of to replenish ammunition. The firing line receives a fresh supply - of ammunition through reinforcements or through small detachments - under non-commissioned officers sent forward from the reserves. These - detachments, after distributing the ammunition they have brought - up, remain with the firing line. The companies engaged in the fire - fight later take advantage of every opportunity to replenish and to - redistribute ammunition. - - In defense, all the ammunition wagons may be emptied before the - action begins, and sent to the rear to be refilled. The ammunition - should be deposited in the vicinity of the firing line. The - subsequent replenishment of the supply should be managed as in an - attack. If ammunition is very urgently needed by the firing line, - and when no other remedy suggests itself, a part of the ammunition - of the reserves may be turned over to the firing line. Special - detachments should be detailed to remove the ammunition from the - dead and wounded. Wounded men who are able to walk to the dressing - station, turn over their ammunition to their comrades. - - If another organization requests to be furnished ammunition, the - entire amount required, or a part thereof, depending upon the urgency - of the case and the amount available, should be turned over to it. - - -RUSSIA.[518] - - [518] In each battalion, the ammunition wagon of the 2nd company - carries 108 explosive cartridges, weighing 200 g. each, and that of - the 3rd company carries 48 fuzes. - - The ammunition carried in the cartridge boxes of the men may prove - insufficient during an action. On open ground the ammunition - wagons, assembled by regiment, accompany the regimental reserve, - and in covered terrain, they are assembled by battalion, and follow - the battalion reserve. When practicable, their position is to be - indicated during the day by red flags placed on their flank, and at - night by green lanterns. In defense, an adequate supply of ammunition - should be deposited in rear of the firing line, or should be at - once distributed among the men. In attack, the ammunition supply of - the firing line and of the supports is to be replenished when they - enter ranges under 700 m. The best means of preventing shortage of - ammunition is to husband it at long ranges. Ammunition wagons are not - to be emptied and their contents distributed before an action begins; - on the contrary, the ammunition is to be issued during the fight, one - wagon after another being emptied. Ammunition may be sent forward - from the reserve to the firing line, the men who carry it remaining - with that line. On the other hand--and this seems to be the method - most frequently employed--men from the firing line may be sent to - the rear for ammunition. The men of the reserves at once turn over - one-half of their cartridges to these men, who are then assembled and - sent forward under the command of a non-commissioned officer. The - ammunition is carried forward in sacks--so-called “bashlicks.” - - -FRANCE. - - Each company has one ammunition wagon, which is a part of the combat - train (_train de combat_), and carries 16,384 Lebel cartridges, and - 36 intrenching tools. It can carry 19,000 rounds of the new “D” - ammunition,[519] So long as any ammunition remains in the ammunition - wagons, they remain under all circumstances with their battalion. - They are assembled in battalion groups on the left flank of their - battalion. When the battalion is broken up for advance, flank, - rear guard, or outpost work, they remain with the main body of the - battalion. When the companies are separated for a protracted period, - the battalion commander decides whether or not the ammunition - wagons should accompany their respective companies. The ammunition - in the wagons is, as a general rule, to be distributed before the - commencement of an action. If this is impossible when the force - is taken by surprise, the commander of the group of ammunition - wagons must bring them up as close as possible under cover, and - the battalion commander must supervise the distribution of the - ammunition. In quarters and on the march, the ammunition is to be - replenished by taking the ammunition from the sick, from the men - detailed away, or from the supply carried by the baggage wagon.[520] - The ammunition in the baggage wagon is only to be used when all these - other sources are exhausted. When an encounter with the enemy may - be expected, and only a short march is anticipated, the ammunition - carried in the baggage wagons may be distributed before starting. - - [519] The company ammunition wagon Model 1893 weighs 287 kg. - when empty, and 770 kg. when filled. It carries 14,400 rounds of - ammunition (net capacity 48%) or 66 rounds per rifle. - - [520] The baggage wagon weighs 450 kg. when empty, and 1054 kg. - when loaded. It carries 36 intrenching tools, and a tool chest. Its - net capacity is 45%. Forty knapsacks may be transported on this wagon - in lieu of the ammunition. - - Any further replenishment of ammunition is to be ordered by the - division commander. The empty company ammunition wagons are assembled - in regimental groups and follow at least 1,000 m. in rear of the - regimental reserve. At each halt, the wagon train is to prepare for - defense. The regimental commander is to regulate the distribution of - the ammunition sent forward by the ammunition columns. - - When this distribution cannot be made for some reason or other, the - wagons, assembled in groups of four, follow their battalions. It is - the duty of the battalion commander to keep the firing line supplied - with ammunition. The contents of the company ammunition wagons are - not to be replenished from the ammunition columns during an action. - The ammunition is to be removed from the dead and wounded. - - The source of the ammunition supply is the corps ammunition park, - which is divided into three echelons, as follows: - - 1st echelon consists of two infantry ammunition columns and marches - at the head of the combat train of the troops engaged; - - IInd echelon consists of three infantry ammunition columns; - - IIIrd echelon carries artillery ammunition only. - - Two infantry ammunition columns of the 1st echelon, which, as a - rule, constitutes the “ammunition supply center” at the commencement - of an action, march at the head of the combat train (_train de - combat_). A half-filled infantry ammunition column must at all times - be available at this “ammunition supply center.” Ammunition wagons - of the infantry ammunition column are sent forward at the request - of the division commander to the position taken up by the company - ammunition wagons. The latter are generally posted not more than - 1,000 m. in the rear of the fighting line, and parts of each infantry - ammunition column (usually one ammunition wagon for each battalion) - are posted by an officer not more than 1,500 m. in rear of these. - The empty company ammunition wagons are not refilled, the ammunition - being sent forward directly from the ammunition columns. As soon as - the infantry ammunition columns are informed which organizations they - are to supply, they send out non-commissioned officers to locate the - ammunition wagons of those organizations and establish communication - with them. The commander of the ammunition column directs where empty - ammunition wagons are to assemble. In emergencies, wagons of the - infantry ammunition column may also drive close up to the fighting - line. In this case, empty wagons assemble near the groups of company - ammunition wagons, and from there they are sent back in trains to the - ammunition column to which they belong. - - Every opportunity, such as a lull in the fight, or an abatement of - the hostile fire, etc., must be utilized to distribute the ammunition - of the company wagons or of the ammunition column. - - It is prohibited to send wagons or men to the rear for the purpose of - bringing up ammunition on the battlefield. All men sent forward with - ammunition should remain in the firing line. - - -ENGLAND. - - The British infantryman is usually provided with 115, and each - machine gun with 3,500 rounds of ammunition. Each battalion is, in - addition, provided with 8 pack animals, each carrying two ammunition - chests containing 4,400 cartridges (77 kg.), and with 8 ammunition - wagons. - - On the march, the pack animals and half of the ammunition wagons - follow immediately in rear of the battalion. The (16) remaining - wagons form a reserve ammunition column at the disposal of the - brigade commander, and march at the tail of the brigade. When an - engagement is anticipated, 50 additional rounds (1.3 kg.) may be - issued to each man before leaving camp. During an action, one pack - animal and two ammunition wagons follow each half-battalion. Empty - company ammunition wagons are refilled from the brigade reserve - ammunition column. When the wagons of the latter are empty, they are - replaced by filled wagons from the ammunition column. The teams are - not transferred with the wagons, but remain with the organization to - which they belong. - - Ammunition wagons are expected to approach to within about 900 - m. of the firing line, and pack animals to within 450 m. One - non-commissioned officer and two or three privates are to be detailed - from each company to bring up ammunition. Each man is to carry a sack - containing 600 cartridges (16 kg.). That this method of supplying - ammunition is practicable under fire is shown by the distinguished - conduct lists for =Paardeberg=, where men were praised or decorated - for endurance and fearlessness in bringing up ammunition. (See p. 371 - supra). The men who bring up ammunition may be kept in the firing - line when the ground is devoid of cover. - - The division ammunition columns, although they carry both infantry - and artillery ammunition, constitute an integral part of the - artillery battalions. - - -ITALY. - - When an encounter with the enemy is anticipated, the ammunition - wagons are to be emptied, the men detailed to carry ammunition are - to remove their packs, and each one of them is to carry ammunition - weighing about 7.5 kg. - - The packs are to be removed only in case of urgent necessity. - When this is ordered, however, the soldier first removes all the - cartridges and the emergency ration from his pack. The ammunition - knapsacks, which are always to be taken along, are, however, carried - in turn by all the soldiers of the company. - - The advancing units that are in need of ammunition, may demand it - from troops ordered to remain behind. They take along their own - ammunition carriers. The latter, assembled in a squad, distribute the - ammunition along the firing line, and remain with that line. In the - first lull that occurs, they assemble again as a squad and take part - as such in the action. - - The empty ammunition knapsacks belonging to organizations in reserve - are to be refilled as rapidly as possible from the ammunition wagons - sent forward from the ammunition park to the fighting line. - - The ammunition of the dead and wounded is to be removed ind - distributed among the remaining men. During pauses in the fire, the - ammunition is to be equalized in all organizations engaged in the - fire fight. - - The ammunition wagons of the echelons in rear are to approach the - fighting line as far as the available cover permits. Their position - is to be indicated by flags. The ammunition carriers are to come to - these wagons to refill the empty ammunition knapsacks. - - -3. WHAT DEDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THE REGULATIONS OF THE VARIOUS -ARMIES. - -1. The contents of the ammunition wagons should be distributed at the -commencement of an action. This should not be done too early as the -packing and unpacking of ammunition takes time, and as the soldier -will not march so well when loaded down at the wrong time with 60 to -75 additional cartridges (1.8 to 2.4 kg.), unequally distributed in -haversack and pockets. It is also a good plan to issue as many rounds -of ammunition to the non-commissioned officers as to the men. During a -fight this ammunition can then be distributed to the men. - -2. As soon as the ammunition wagons have been refilled from the -ammunition columns, which have been brought up, they should at once -endeavor to rejoin their battalions and should then follow as close -as possible in rear of the latter. The expenditure of ammunition -will never be equally distributed along the line; therefore, if the -battalion commander retains all four ammunition wagons directly under -his own orders, he will be better able to equalize the supply of -ammunition than would be the case if each ammunition wagon, as soon as -it is refilled, were to follow its own company, which, in many cases, -it will scarcely find again. - -3. It is the duty of the commander to assign a few ammunition wagons -belonging to organizations held in reserve to bodies of troops which -will in all probability need a greater quantity of ammunition. - -4. The organization must be in possession of an adequate supply of -ammunition on entering the zone of effective fire, i.e., at a distance -of 600 m. from the enemy. The sending of individual men to the rear -for the purpose of bringing up ammunition will only be practicable -in rare cases. As a rule, the violence of the hostile fire will make -this impossible. Only the best men can be sent back. It is asking too -much to expect them to cross twice the zone swept by hostile fire. -Moreover, the best men are needed in the firing line to encourage -the weaker element, and to replace disabled squad leaders. Under no -circumstances should the firing line be withdrawn to get ammunition -from the ammunition wagons, as an attack made unexpectedly by the enemy -might find the position unoccupied and thus cause its loss.[521] It is -a general principle that ammunition must be sent forward from the rear. - - [521] Examples: The loss of the park at Coulmiers (HELVIG, _Das 1. - bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 202). The engagement at Daix on January - 21st, 1871 (_Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 61_, p. 174). KUNZ, - _Loigny-Poupry_, p. 77. - -5. The ammunition can be removed from the dead and wounded only -in defense, or in attack when the forward movement has come to a -standstill. In an advance, it cannot be done without retarding the -movement and without affording individual men an excuse to remain -behind. - -6. The bringing up of ammunition by individual men, left to their -own devises, is not to be recommended, as it facilitates “shirking”; -moreover, if one of the men is disabled, the ammunition he carries -will never reach the firing line. Ammunition should either be sent -to the firing line with each support, or it should be carried by -detachments sent forward in thin skirmish lines under the command of -non-commissioned officers. These detachments should remain with the -firing line. - -7. Whether or not signals for informing the troops in rear of a -shortage of ammunition in the firing line will fulfill the expectations -entertained for them, can only be determined by the test of war. - - - - -INDEX. - - - A. - - ACCELERATED FIRE, effect of 162 - - ACCELERATED TIME, in various armies (tables) 54 - - ACCURACY, effect of, in collective fire 169 - - ACTION - Breaking off an 441 - Conduct and duties of the leaders in 399 - Containing 445 - Delaying 445 - - ADJUSTMENT, artillery fire 319 - - ADVANCE - Crawling--see Crawling - Fire while in motion 92, 93 - Firing line in attack 366 - Formations suitable for, through timber 332 - Impulse from the rear 95 - Infantry under artillery fire 321 - Rushes--see Rushes - Skirmish line 76 - - ADVANCE BY CRAWLING--see Crawling - - ADVANCE BY RUSHES--see Rushes - - ADVANCE GUARD. - Battalion, formation for attack 212 - Conduct in a rencontre 334 - Conduct of, France 454 - Italy 451 - - ADVANCED POSITIONS 413 - Austria 450 - Danger of fight being decided in 414 - England 462 - Examples of 412 - Example of attack on 348 - Japan 465 - Russia 413 - - ADVANCED TROOPS 349 - - AGENTS DE LIAISON 245 - - AIM, points of 165 - - AIMING POSITION, warding off cavalry 307 - - ALPINI 22, 24 - - ALTITUDE, effect of, on ranges 145 - - AMMUNITION - Expenditure and supply of 468 - Franco-German War 468 - Russo-Japanese War 473 - Russo-Turkish War 472 - Expenditure of, during advance by rushes 90 - How carried by soldier in various armies 476 - Knapsacks 483 - Machine guns 261 - Austria 288 - England 290 - Switzerland 284 - Germany 273 - Rate of fire versus waste of 161 - Shortage of, examples 469 - Supply and distribution in action 400 - Supply, Austria 475, 479 - Deductions from various regulations 483 - Defense 400 - England 475, 482 - France 475, 480 - Germany 475, 476 - Italy 475, 483 - Japan 475 - Russia 475, 480 - Various armies (table) 475 - Wagon--see Ammunition Wagons, - Weight of, in various armies (table) 40 - - AMMUNITION CARTS--see Ammunition Wagons - - AMMUNITION KNAPSACKS 483 - - AMMUNITION WAGONS 72 - Austria 479 - England 482 - France 480 - Germany 477 - Italy 483 - Russia 480 - - APPLICATORY METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 10, 11 - - APPLIED TACTICS 12, 13 - - ARBITRATION, Courts of 3 - - ARMY CORPS, frontage in attack 236 - - ARTILLERY, - Adjustment of fire 319 - Cavalry charge supported by 313 - Combat of infantry against 316 - Combat of machine guns against 297 - Combination fuses 113 - Coöperation with infantry 351, 354 - Effect of fire (France) 123, 124, 321 - Field guns, in various armies 111 - Fire at successive ranges 321 - Fire diverted by advancing infantry 327 - Fire effect of French 4-gun battery 321 - Fire effect of (French data) 123, 124 - Fire for effect 320 - Howitzer, heavy field 118 - Light field 116 - Infantry screen 327 - Line, distance from infantry line in defense 415 - Losses, Franco-German War 20 - Percentage of 188 - Under infantry fire 326, 327 - Percussion shell (Model 96) 115 - Percussion shrapnel 111 - Positions in defense 414 - Preparatory action (France) in attack 454 - Progressive fire 320 - Searching fire 321 - Shields, protection afforded by 324 - Shrapnel 112, 113 - Effect of (table) 114, 122 - Sweeping fire 321 - Time required for adjusting the fire 119 - Time shell (Model 96) 116 - (Model 98) 118 - Time shrapnel 112, 113 - Unlimbering under infantry fire 326 - Zone fire 320 - - ASSAULT 373 - Austria 449 - Conduct of the 374 - Decision to make an 373 - England 462 - Examples 376 - Fire support 379 - Fire while in motion 381 - France 457 - Guidons 355 - Italy 452 - Japan 464 - Moment for making the 374 - Pursuit after successful 385 - Successful, conduct after 385 - Trumpet signal, fix bayonet 377 - Unsuccessful, conduct after 386 - - ASSAULTING DISTANCE 385, 424 - - ASSEMBLY FORMATIONS 42 - France (_carré de division_) 454 - - ATTACK 329 - Abridged 330 - Advance of the firing line 366 - Advance guard, conduct of the--in a rencontre 334 - Advanced troops 349 - Assault 352, 373, 374, 399 - Assaulting distance 385, 424 - Austria 448 - Brigade, frontage of a, in 399 - Column 44, 45 - Comparison with defense 329 - Conditions upon which success depends 345 - Conduct of the 365 - Coöperation of infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354 - Decision to assault 373 - Deliberately planned, comparison with rencontre 334, 338 - Deployment, initial 366 - Distances 368 - Of supports from firing line 99 - Duration of the 351 - England 459 - Envelopment 356 - Examples - Boer War 340 - Russo-Japanese War 340, 345 - Fire fight 368 - Fixing bayonets 372 - Formation for, of a battalion 211, 212, 213 - France 453 - Advance in mass formation 455 - Group attack 255 - Preparatory attack formation 455 - Frontage 234 - Army corps 236 - Battalion 236 - Brigade 235, 236, 399 - Company 96, 235, 236 - Gaps in the line 239 - General rules for use of intrenching tools 393 - Higher troop leading, duties 366 - Holding 357, 445 - Intrenching tools, use of 387 - Infantry against dismounted cavalry 313 - Italy 451 - Japan 463 - I. Army 342 - Influences determining tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 - Launching the enveloping force 359 - Lessons of the Boer War 340 - Russo-Japanese War 340 - Local reconnaissance in 347 - Machine guns in 365 - Methods of forming a battalion for (plates) 215, 216 - Minor troop leading, duties 365 - Moment for making the assault 374 - Normal attack 203, 204, 205 - Number of men required 234 - On an enemy deployed for defense 340 - Orders, issue of, in rencontre 36 - Over plain devoid of cover 255 - Point of 355 - Position of commander in 399 - Preparation by infantry and artillery (France) 454 - Preparation of the 346 - Preparatory position, advance into 350 - Provisions of various regulations in re use of spade in 392 - Pure frontal 357 - Range finding instruments, employment in 146 - Reconnaissance 346 - In force 347 - Rencontre 333 - Compared with deliberately planned attack 338 - Conduct of main body in a 336 - Reserve, strength of 395 - Reserves, employment of 394 - Rules for the advance under fire 367 - Sand bag cover 344, 390 - Secondary 357 - Separation of holding and flank attacks 361 - Signal (fix bayonet) 377 - Spade, use of, in 387, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466 - Successful, conduct after 385 - Superiority of fire, necessity of 370, 371 - Supports, advance of 368 - Distance from firing line 99 - Surprise 330 - Switzerland 466 - Time for opening fire, general rules 155 - Troop leading, duties of 365, 366 - United, examples illustrating necessity of a 402 - Unsuccessful, conduct after 386 - - ATTACK ON A POSITION PREPARED FOR DEFENSE - Austria 448 - Japan 464 - Switzerland 466 - - AUSTRIA - Advanced positions 450 - Advanced troops 349 - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 479 - Assault 449 - Attack 448 - Attack on a position prepared for defense 448 - Battalion, formations of the 69, 72 - Column of platoons, how formed 49 - (plate) 62 - Company, strength of (table) 35 - Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 - Counter-attack 438, 450 - Crawling 449 - Defense 450 - Seeking a decision 450 - Development for action 208 - Envelopment 362, 449 - Fire control and fire discipline 135 - Fire, kinds of 159 - Time for opening 153 - While in motion, experiments with 92 - Firing line, method of reinforcing the 96 - Position, choice of 370 - Frontage 241 - Front and facing distance 48 - Infantry combat 448-450 - Infantry versus cavalry 314 - Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 - Kinds of fire 449 - Load carried by a soldier 40 - Machine gun 288 - Ammunition supply 288 - And infantry, relative fire effect of 267 - Fire, kinds of 263 - Formations 288 - Organization 288 - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Ranges, ascertaining 144 - Reinforcing the firing line, method of 96 - Rencontre 339, 448 - Rushes 90, 449 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Superiority of fire 371 - Supply of ammunition 475, 479 - Telegraph detachments 248 - Use of spade in attack 392, 449 - - - B. - - BASE UNIT 218 - Advantages and disadvantages 218, 219 - Of combat, designation of 244 - - BATTALION - Acting alone, formation for attack 212 - Advance guard, formation for attack 212 - Attack formation, France 457 - Austrian, formation of the 69, 72 - Broad column (with plates) 67, 68 - Commander, duties in action 400 - Post in action 400 - Deep column (with plates) 67, 68 - Depth on the march 72 - English, formation of the 71 - Formation, in a containing action 213 - Forming for attack 211 - French, formation of the (with plates) 70 - Frontage in attack and defense 236 - German, formation of the 67, 68 - Group intrenchments 417 - Historical development 36 - Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 - Intrenchments for a 419, 421 - Italian, formation of the 70 - Japanese, formation of the 70 - Method of forming for attack (plates) 215, 216 - Movements of the 67 - Normal formation 67 - Organization of the 36, 37 - Part of a larger force, formation in attack 213 - In defense 213 - Route column, formation 72 - Provisions of various regulations 73 - Russian, formations of the 69 - Swiss, formations of the 71 - - BATTALION COMMANDER - Duties in action 400 - Post in action 400 - - BATTLE UNIT 34 - - BAYONET FENCING 134 - - BAYONET FIGHTS 382 - - BEATEN ZONE 179 - Definition 179 - Depth at various angles of slope--General Paquié’s rule for - determining 183 - Formulae for computing depth of 180 - Increase and diminution of (table) 181 - - BELGIUM - Fire control and fire direction 135 - Frontage 242 - Front and facing distance 48 - - BREAKING OFF AN ACTION 441 - - BRIGADE 37 - Attack formation of a French 454 - Cavalry, strength of 311 - Combat formation 74 - Development for action (with plate) 216, 217 - Formations 73, 74 - Frontage in attack 235, 236, 399 - Importance 37, 38 - Movements 73, 74 - Three-unit organization 218 - - BROAD COLUMN (with plate) 67 - - - C. - - CADENCE 53, 54 - - CAVALRY - Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311 - Charge supported by artillery 313 - Charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313 - Combat of infantry against 301 - Provisions of various regulations 314, 315 - Combat of machine guns against 296 - Dismounted, infantry attack against 313 - Losses - Charge of French cavalry at Vionville 312 - Franco-German War 20 - Percentage of 188 - Massed employment 313 - Moral effect of a charge 306 - Regiment, strength of German 273 - Relative strength as compared to infantry 311 - - CHANGE OF DIRECTION, how executed 219 - - CHANGE OF FRONT - Examples of 220, 221 - How executed 219 - - CHASSEURS ALPINS 22 - - CLEARING THE FOREGROUND 421 - - CLOSE COLUMN, definition 47 - - CLOSE ORDER - Battalion 67 - Brigade 73 - Company 56 - Compared with extended order 102 - Regiment 73 - - CLOSE ORDER FORMATIONS, - Effect of fire on 102, 103 - Value of 103, 104 - - COLLECTIVE FIRE 169 - - COLOR, position of the 68 - - COLT MACHINE GUN 261 - - COLUMN - Attack in 44, 45 - Battalion in route 72 - Broad (with plate) 67 - Close, definition of 47 - Comparison with line 42-45 - Deep (with plates) 67, 68 - Dimensions of broad and deep (plate) 69 - Double 71 - French double (plate) 70 - Open, definition of 47 - Route (machine gun battery) 273, 274 - Section (machine gun battery) 273, 274 - - COLUMN OF FOURS 58 - How formed (plate) 58 - And squads compared 59 - - COLUMN OF PLATOONS 61 - How formed 49 - Machine gun battery 273, 274 - (plate) 62 - Vulnerability of 186, 187 - - COLUMN OF SQUADS 57 - Employment of 59 - (plates) 57 - - COLUMN OF TWOS 56 - - COLUMNS, line of company, France (plate) 70 - - COMBAT - Conduct and duties of the leaders 399 - Drill, importance of 105 - Duration of 178 - Frontage--see Frontage. - Infantry 448-467 - Austria 448-450 - France 453-459 - Italy 451-453 - Japan 463-465 - Japanese, Characteristics of 341 - Russia 466 - Switzerland 466-467 - Versus artillery 316 - Versus cavalry 301 - Versus machine guns 268 - Machine Guns 296, 297 - Versus artillery 297 - Versus cavalry 296 - Orders 243, 244 - Necessity for written 244 - Patrols 80, 250 - Sections 257 - Assignment of 243 - Division of a position into 411 - Tasks, assignment of 243 - Train (machine guns) 270 - Unit 34 - - COMBAT DRILL, importance of 105 - - COMBAT FRONTAGE--see Frontage - - COMBAT ORDERS 243 - Items that should not appear in 244 - Written, necessity for 244 - - COMBAT PATROLS 250 - - COMBAT SECTIONS 257 - Division of a position into 411 - - COMBAT TRAIN, machine gun 270 - - COMBAT UNIT 34 - - COMBINED SIGHTS, use of 166 - - COMMANDER - Battalion, post of, in action 400 - Company, post of, in action 400 - Conduct in action 399 - Interference with subordinates 401 - Post of, in action 399 - Post of, in rencontre 398 - Regimental, post of, in action 400 - Selection of a position during combat 244 - - COMMANDS 41 - Fire 166 - - COMMUNICATING TRENCHES 421 - - COMMUNICATION - With neighboring troops and next higher headquarters 245 - On the battlefield 246 - - COMPANY 34 - Ammunition wagons 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483 - Austrian, in column of platoons (plate) 62 - Columns of the 56 - Commander, duties in action 400 - Post in action 400 - Dimensions of the 3 and 4 platoon company (plate) 52 - Division into platoons, sections, squads 46-53 - 3 or 4 platoons 48, 53 - Formation of the 46, 47 - French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 - In line (plate) 49 - Frontage in attack 235 - Attack and defense 96 - Defense and rear guard actions 236 - German, - In column of platoons (plate) 62 - In column of squads (plate) 57 - In company column (plate) 60 - In line (plate) 47 - In route column (plate) 57 - Movements in line and column 56 - Non-commissioned officers, posts of, in various armies 47 - Organization of the 34, 35 - Range finders, post of 46, 47 - Russian, in column of platoons (plate) 62 - Strength of the 24, 35 - In the various armies (table) 35 - - COMPANY AMMUNITION WAGONS 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483 - - COMPANY COLUMN (with plates) 60 - Value of 186, 187 - - COMPANY COMMANDER, - Duties in action 400 - Post in action 400 - - CONCENTRATED FIRE, machine guns 263 - - CONCENTRATION - For action 205 - French, into _carré de division_, in attack 454 - - CONE OF DISPERSION, machine gun fire 264 - - CONE OF MISSES, Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant 173 - - CONTAINING ACTIONS 445 - Delaying action and holding attack compared 445 - - COÖPERATION - Formation of a battalion in 213 - Infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354 - Difficulties of 354 - Provisions of various regulations 354 - - COUNTER-ATTACK 378, 428, 453 - After position is carried 433 - Austria 410 - Decision brought about by the 234 - England 463 - Examples of 433, 435, 436, 437, 438 - France 439, 458 - Frontal 436 - In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 - Moment for making 432, 434 - Moral effect of 436 - Provisions of various regulations 438, 439 - - COURTS OF ARBITRATION 3 - - COVER - Sand bag 344, 390 - Trenches 421 - Use of 256 - By firing line 138 - - COVER TRENCHES 421 - - CRAWLING 86 - Austria 49 - How executed 87, 88 - - CUTTING WEAPONS, wounds produced by (%) 384 - - CYCLISTS 28, 29, 30, 414 - Depth of detachment of 29 - Rate of march of 29 - Use of, on battlefield 246 - - - D. - - “D” BULLET - Data regarding 130 - Effect on steel shields 324 - - DANGER, effect of 195 - - DANGER SPACE, definition 179 - - DEEP COLUMN (with plates) 67, 68 - French (with plates) 70 - - DEFENSE 408 - Advanced positions 413 - Ammunition supply 410 - Austria 450 - Battalion group intrenchments 417 - Clearing the foreground 421 - Combat sections, division of the position into 411 - Communicating trenches 419, 420, 421 - Company, frontage of 96 - Comparison with attack 329 - Conduct of the 423 - Counter-attack 234, 428 - After position is carried 433 - Frontal 436 - Moment for making 432, 434 - Cover trenches 419-421 - Distance of general reserve from defensive line 430 - Distribution in depth in 232 - Dummy intrenchments 421 - England 462 - Field magazines 418 - Fire fight 427 - Firing trenches 417 - Flanks, protection of the 425 - Formation of a battalion 213, 214 - Fortifying the position 415 - Framework of the position 414 - France 458 - Frontage in 232, 233 - Frontage of a battalion 236 - Company 96, 236 - Frontal counter-attack 436 - Gaps in the line 411 - General reserve, location of the 411 - Position of the 429 - Strength of the 431 - Interval between general reserve and defensive line 430 - Intrenching, time essential for 416 - Intrenchments, purpose of 416, 417 - Italy 453 - Japan 465 - Long range fire, use of 150 - Machine guns 295, 425 - Masks 421 - Number of men required in temporary 233 - Observation of the foreground 420 - Obstacles, construction of 421 - Occupation of the position 426 - Offensive, - Assumption of the 428 - --defensive 408 - Necessity of assuming the 409 - Passive 409 - Position, - Advanced 413 - Determining factors in selecting a 414 - Division of the, into sections 411 - Fortifying the 415 - Framework of the 414 - Requirements of a 410 - Purely passive 408 - Range finding instruments, employment of 146 - Refusing a flank 425 - Reserve, strength of 395 - Russia 422 - Section reserves 411 - Sections, division of the position into 411 - Seeking a decision 233, 234, 409, 450, 467 - Splinter proofs 418, 419, 420 - Superiority of fire 427 - Supports 410 - Switzerland 467 - Temporary, - Frontage in 233 - Number of men required in 233 - Occupation of a position 408 - Terrain, character of, required by 254 - Time for opening fire, in (general rules) 155 - Traverses 417 - Trenches (dimensions) 418, 420 - Troops required to occupy the position 410, 411 - Weak points, strengthening of 412 - - DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION 409 - Austria 450 - Frontage 233, 234 - Number of men required 234 - Switzerland 467 - - DELAYING ACTION 445 - Compared with holding attack 445 - Distribution in depth in 232 - Frontage in 232 - - DEMOLITION TOOLS 39 - - DEPLOYMENT 78, 80, 209 - For action 209 - France, from 4-rank formation (with plate) 65, 66 - Initial, in attack 366 - Provisions of various regulations 80 - - DEPTH - Battalion on the march 72 - Cyclist detachment 29 - Distribution in 222-225, 235, 237, 241, 242 - - DEVELOPMENT FOR ACTION 207 - Brigade 216, 217 - - DISARMAMENT, proposals for 3 - - DISCIPLINE and the moral factors 107, 108 - - DISPERSION 33 - - DISTANCE, - Definition of 47 - Assaulting 385, 424 - Attack 368 - Between elements in the battalion 72, 73 - Facing, in various armies (table) 48 - General reserve from defensive line 430 - Support from firing line in attack 99 - - DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH 222 - Maximum, when necessary 235 - Necessity for 224 - Necessity for, increase with size of force 241 - Provisions of various regulations 241, 242 - Relation to frontage 225 - Examples 223, 237 - - DIVISION, attack formation, France 457 - - DOUBLE COLUMN, France (with plates) 70 - - DOUBLE TIME 55 - In various armies (table) 54 - - DRILL AND TRAINING 105, 106 - - DRILL ATTACK 204 - - DRILL, importance of combat 105 - - DRILL REGULATIONS 13-16 - Provisions of various--see under name of country - - DUMMY INTRENCHMENTS 421, 423 - - - E. - - ECHELON FORMATION 73, 74 - - EFFECT OF FIRE 167 - As regards time 172 - At medium ranges 151 - Influence of the elevation selected 162 - On artillery when unlimbering 326 - On close order formations 102, 103 - On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 - Standard of measurement of the 168 - - EFFICACY OF FIRE 140 - Against hill positions 183 - Dependent upon accuracy 156 - Influence of the ground on 179 - Influence of training 168 - - ELEVATIONS, rear sight 165, 310 - - ÉLITE TROOPS 21, 22 - - ENGLAND - Advanced positions 413, 462 - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 482 - Assault 462 - Attack 459 - Battalion, formations of the 71 - Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 - Counter-attack 439, 463 - Defense 462 - Envelopment 362 - Fire fight in attack 461 - Fire of position 154 - Fire, time for opening 154 - Kinds of 160 - Frontage 242 - In attack 460 - Front and facing distance 48 - Frontal counter-attack 463 - Group intrenchments 462 - Holding attack 447 - Infantry combat 459-463 - Versus cavalry 314 - Intrenching in attack 392 - Local counter-attack 463 - Machine guns 289 - Ammunition supply 290 - And infantry, relative fire effect 266, 267 - Organization 290 - Views on 297 - Mounted infantry 26 - Normal attack 203 - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Rallying position 460 - Reserves, use of, prior to Boer War 397 - Rushes 91, 462 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Supply of ammunition 475, 482 - Telephone detachments 248 - Use of spade in attack 392 - - ENVELOPMENT 356 - Austria 362, 449 - Dangers involved 358 - England 363 - Examples of 357-361 - France 362, 457 - Italy 363 - Provisions of various regulations 362, 363 - - ESKADRONS - Number in German brigade 311 - Strength of 32 - - ESTIMATING DISTANCES--see Range - - EQUIPMENT 38-40 - Intrenching tool 38-40 - Tent, weight of 40 - Weight of, in various armies (table) 40 - - EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION 468 - Examples from military history 468-474 - Franco-German War 468 - Russo-Japanese War 473 - Russo-Turkish War 472 - - EXPLOSIVES 39, 480 - - EXTENDED ORDER 75 - Compared with close order 102 - Movements in 81 - - - F. - - FACING DISTANCE, in various armies (table) 48 - - FIELD ARTILLERY--see Artillery - - FIELD GUN 111 - - FIELD MAGAZINES 418 - - FIELD TRAIN 72 - Machine guns 270 - - FIGHTING UNIT 33 - - FILE CLOSERS, position of 46, 47 - - FIRE - Accelerated, effect of 162 - Beaten zone, definition 179 - Collective, effect of accuracy in 169 - Combined sights 166 - Commands for firing 166 - Constant cone of misses, Wolozkoi’s theory of the 173 - Continuous, fatigue produced by 155 - Control 134 - Curve of hits obtained by various marksmen 170 - Danger space, definition 179 - Direction 134 - Discipline 133 - Distribution of, against charging cavalry 311 - Effect 167 - As regards time 172 - At medium ranges 151 - Influence of the elevation selected on 162 - On artillery when unlimbering 326 - On close order formations 102, 103 - On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 - Efficacy of 140 - Against hill positions 183 - Dependent upon accuracy 156 - Influence of the ground on 179 - Influence of training on 168 - Elevations and points of aim 165 - To be used in warding off cavalry charges 310 - Employment of infantry 132 - Expedients for minimizing the effect of hostile 118 - Flanking 254 - Formula for determining favorable range for firing against hill - positions 183 - Hits obtained by various marksmen (table) 171 - Hostile, expedients for minimizing effect of 118 - Formations suitable under 120, 121 - Hurried, effect of 162 - Increasing difficulties in adjusting hostile artillery fire 119 - Indirect 184 - Infantry 126 - Against charging cavalry 308 - And machine gun, relative value of 265-267 - Employment of 132 - Influences affecting accuracy of 173 - Influence of the ground on efficacy of 179 - Kinds of 157 - Austria 449 - France 455 - Italy 451 - Japan 463 - Provisions of various regulations 158-160 - Russo-Japanese War 157 - To be used in warding off a cavalry charge 310 - Long range 148, 150-153, 176 - Losses produced by long range fire 176 - Machine gun--see Machine Guns - Marksmanship, effect of, in collective 169 - Misses - Effect of 173 - Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of 173 - Moral effect of 191, 227 - On charging cavalry 309 - Number of rounds to be expended to accomplish a certain result 172 - Oblique, effect of, against shielded batteries 324 - Observation of 167 - Pauses in 155 - Preparation 149 - Provisions of various regulations in re kinds of 158 - Time for opening 153 - Rafale 164 - Rate of 160 - At various ranges 162 - Versus waste of ammunition 161 - Ricochets, effect of 185 - Rifle-rests, influence of 178 - Superiority of, in defense 427 - Time for opening 147 - General rules 155 - On charging cavalry 308 - Provisions of various regulations 153 - Training, influence of, on efficacy of 168 - Trial volleys 164 - Volley, value of 157, 163 - With counted cartridges 164 - Withholding the 151 - Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of misses 173 - - FIRE AT SUCCESSIVE RANGES 321 - - FIRE EFFECT 167 - As regards time 172 - At medium ranges 151 - Influence of the elevation selected, on 162 - On artillery when unlimbering 326 - On close order formations 102, 103 - On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 - Standard of measurement of the 168 - - FIRE FIGHT - Attack 368, 369, 461 - Defense 427 - Machine guns 283 - Superiority of fire in attack 370-371 - - FIRE FOR EFFECT 320 - - FIRE OF POSITION 140 - Infantry 85 - Machine guns 85 - - FIRE WHILE IN MOTION 92, 381 - Austrian experiments with 92 - Examples of employment of 93 - Losses when using 92 - - FIRING LINE - Advance in attack 366 - Assembling the 97 - Closing in 97 - Dense 75 - Prolonging the 96 - Re-forming the 97 - Reinforcing the, method of 96 - Selection of line to be occupied by 138 - Strength and density 75 - Strength of the 139 - Use of cover by the 138 - - FIRING TRENCHES 417, 419, 420 - - FIXING BAYONETS 372 - Signal for, in assault 377 - - FLAGS, Guidon 62, 63 - - FLANK ATTACK - Separation from holding attack 361 - France 455 - - FLANKS, protection of the, in defense 425 - - FOREGROUND, division into sections 411 - - FORMAL TACTICS 12 - - FORMATIONS 42 - Advance through woods 332 - Assembly 42, 454 - Austria 49, 52, 58, 62, 69, 72 - Battalion 67-73 - Battle 43 - Belgium 58 - Brigade 73-74 - England 58, 71 - France 49, 65, 66, 70, 73, 454 - Germany 47, 52, 57, 60, 62, 67, 68, 72 - Infantry under artillery fire 318, 321-324 - Influence of various rifles on density of 240 - Italy 58, 70, 73 - Japan 58, 70 - Line and column, comparison of 43 - Machine guns 273, 274 - Austria 288 - Germany 273, 274 - Switzerland 287 - Netherlands 58 - Provisions of various regulations 69-71 - Purpose of 42 - Regiment 73, 74 - Route 42 - Russia 58, 62, 69, 73 - Sweden 58 - Switzerland 71 - Tactical, importance of 108 - Troops in rear of firing line 186 - Vulnerability of various 181, 186, 187 - Warding off a cavalry charge 302 - - FORTIFYING THE POSITION 415 - Russia 422 - - FORTRESS WARFARE 13 - - FOURS, column of 58 - Compared with column of squads 59 - How formed 58 - - FRAMEWORK OF A POSITION 414 - - FRANCE - Advance guard, conduct of the 454 - Advance in mass formation in attack 455 - Advanced positions 413 - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 480 - Artillery fire, effect of 123, 124 - Assembly (_carré de division_) 454 - Assault 457 - Attack 453 - Artillery in the preparatory action 454 - Formation - Battalion 457 - Brigade 454 - Division 457 - Infantry preparation 454 - Battalion, formation of the (with plate) 70 - Company (plate) 49 - Strength of (table) 35 - _Contre attaque_ 439 - Coöperation of infantry and artillery 334 - Counter-attack 378, 439, 458 - In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 - Defense 458 - Envelopment 363, 457 - Fire, kinds of 159, 455 - Fire pauses 156 - Fire, time for opening 154 - Flank attack 455 - Frontage 241, 242 - Front and facing distance 48 - Group attack 255 - Group combat 241, 242 - Infantry combat 453-459 - Infantry versus cavalry 315 - Intrenching in attack 457 - Intrenching, tool equipment (table) 39 - Intrenchments 416 - Kinds of fire 159, 455 - Line of company columns 70 - Load carried by soldier 40 - Machine guns 290 - Offensive return 458 - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Platoon in 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 - Preparatory attack formation 455 - Pure frontal attack 455 - Rafale fire 164 - Rencontre 339 - _Retour offensif_ 439 - Rushes 90, 91 - Signal detachments 248 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Supply of ammunition 475, 480 - Supports, conduct in attack 456 - Units of direction 219 - Use of spade in attack 392, 457 - Vulnerability of various formations 187 - - FRONTAGE - Army corps in attack 236 - Attack 234 - England 460 - Austria 241 - Battalion in attack and defense 236 - Belgium 242 - Brigade in attack 235, 399 - Combat formations 222 - Company in attack 235, 236 - Attack and defense 96 - Defense 236 - Rear guard action 236 - Considerations governing in attack 229 - Defense, factors governing in 232 - Seeking a decision 233, 234 - Temporary 233 - England 242, 460 - Examples 223, 237 - France 241 - Gaps in the line 239, 411 - Italy 242 - Japan 242 - Maximum, when justifiable 235 - Overextension of 238 - Provisions of various regulations 241, 242 - Regiment 236 - Relation to distribution in depth 225 - Resumé of most important points governing 241 - Russia 242 - Russo-Japanese War 239 - Various battles 240 - - FRONTAL COUNTER-ATTACK 436 - England 463 - Examples of 437, 438 - - FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE in various countries (table) 48 - - - G. - - GAPS IN THE ATTACKING LINE 239 - - GAPS IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE 411 - - GATLING GUN 259 - - GENERAL RESERVE - Distance from defensive line 430 - Interval from flank of defensive line 430 - Position of the, in defense 411, 429 - Strength in defense 431 - - GERMANY - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 476 - Battalion, formations of the 67, 68 - Broad column (plate) 67 - Cavalry brigade, number of _Eskadrons_ in 311 - Column of platoons (plate) 62 - Column of squads and route column (plate) 57 - Company (plate) 47 - Strength of (table) 35 - Company column (plate) 60 - Concentration, defense 205 - Deep column (plate) 67, 68 - Development for action, defense 207 - Distribution in depth, defense 207 - _Eskadron_, strength of 32 - Fire, kinds of 158 - Front and facing distance 48 - Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 - Load carried by soldier 40 - Machine guns--see Machine Guns - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Ranges, ascertaining 143 - Rushes 90 - Supply of ammunition 475, 476 - “To form for attack,” definition 207 - - GROUND, influence of the 179 - - GROUP INTRENCHMENTS 417 - England 462 - Switzerland 467 - - GUARDS 22 - - GUIDON FLAGS 62, 63 - Examples of the use of 355 - - - H. - - HATCHET, weight of the 40 - - HEADQUARTERS, distribution of work at 245 - - HELIOGRAPH, use of, on the battlefield 246 - - HISTORY--see Military History - - HITS - Number of, obtained by various marksmen (table) 169 - Curves of hits (plate) 170 - Percentage of, standard of measurement of effect of fire 168 - - HOLDING ATTACK 357 - Compared with delaying action 445 - Separation from flank attack 361 - Strength of 446 - - HOTCHKISS MACHINE GUN 260 - - HOWITZER - Heavy field 118 - Light field 116 - - - I. - - INDIVIDUALISM, influence of, on tactics 201 - - INDIRECT FIRE 184 - - INFANTRY FIRE--see Fire - - INFLUENCE OF THE GROUND 179 - - INFANTRY - Advance under artillery fire 318 - Advance under fire, rules for 367 - Attack - In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340-345 - On dismounted cavalry 313 - Combat - According to various drill regulations 448-467 - Against artillery 316 - Cavalry 301 - Provisions of various regulations 314-315 - Machine guns, general principles 268 - In Russo-Japanese War 341 - Value of, as compared with machine guns 267 - Conduct under machine gun fire 269 - Coöperation with artillery 351, 354 - Cyclists 28, 29, 30 - Deployment 201 - For firing on charging cavalry 303 - Élite 21 - Equipment, weight of (table) in various armies 40 - Fire, effect of, against shielded batteries 324, 325 - Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265 - Fire of position 85 - Firing on artillery in position 324 - Formations for advancing under artillery fire 318, 321, 324 - Importance and employment of 19-32 - Japanese, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 - Load carried 39 - Local reconnaissance of the 248 - Losses in Franco-German War 20 - Percentage of 188 - Manner of fighting 19, 20 - Method of warding off a cavalry charge 304 - Mounted infantry 25, 26, 27 - Passage through artillery lines 316 - Proportion to other arms 19 - Relative strength as compared to cavalry 311 - Russian, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 340 - Screen for artillery 327 - Tactical unit 32-34 - Tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 - Time for opening fire on charging cavalry 308 - - INFANTRY COMBAT - Austria 448-450 - England 459-463 - France 453-459 - Italy 451-453 - Japan 463-465 - Russia 466 - Switzerland 466-467 - - INFANTRY SCREEN 327 - - INFORMATION OFFICERS 245 - - INSTRUCTION - Method of 7-13 - Applicatory (or inductive) 10, 11 - Deductive 11 - Maneuvers 8, 12 - Map problems 8, 11 - Military history, study of 7, 8 - - INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGNS 15 - - INTERVAL - Between general reserve and flank of defensive line 430 - Definition 47 - - INTRENCHING IN ATTACK - Austria 392, 449 - England 392 - France 392, 457 - Germany 392 - Japan 392, 465 - Russia 392 - Switzerland 466 - - INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT 38-40 - In various armies (table) 39 - - INTRENCHING TOOLS - General rules for use in attack 393 - Use of in attack 387 - Provisions of various regulations 392, 393 - - INTRENCHMENTS - Battalion groups of 417 - Communicating trenches 419, 421 - Cover trenches 419, 421 - Dimensions 418, 420 - Dummy 421, 423 - Field magazines 418 - Firing trenches 417, 419, 420 - Foreground, clearing the 421 - Observation of the 420 - Masks 421 - Narrow trenches 418 - Obstacles, construction of 421 - Purpose 416 - Splinter proofs 418, 420 - Traverses 417 - - IRON RATION, weight of 40 - - ITALY - Advance guard, conduct of the 451 - Ammunition knapsacks 483 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 483 - Assault 452 - Attack 451 - Battalion, formations of the 70 - Company, strength of (table) 35 - Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 - Counter-attack 453 - Cyclists, rate of march of 29 - Defense 453 - Envelopment 362 - Fire, kinds of 160 - Time for opening 154 - Frontage 242 - Front and facing distance 48 - Infantry combat 451-453 - Intrenching tool equipment 39 - Kinds of fire 451 - Load carried by soldier 40 - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Ranges, ascertaining 143 - Rushes 91, 452 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Supply of ammunition 475, 483 - Vulnerability of various formations 186 - - - J. - - JAPAN - Advance in skirmish line 76, 77 - Advanced positions 465 - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Assault 464 - Attack 463 - On a position prepared for defense 464 - In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341, 342 - Battalion, formations of the 70 - Combat, characteristics of 341 - Counter-attack 439 - Defense 465 - Fire, kinds of 160 - Frontage 242 - Front and facing distance 48 - Infantry - Combat 463-465 - Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341 - Versus cavalry 315 - Intrenching in attack 392, 465 - Kinds of fire 463 - Load carried by soldier 40 - Machine guns 290 - Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 - Pursuit 465 - Rencontre 464 - Rushes 91, 463 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Use of spade in attack 392, 466 - - JÄGER 21-23 - - - K. - - KAISERJÄGER 24 - - KINDS OF FIRE--see Fire - - KNAPSACKS - Ammunition 483 - Loss of 364 - Weight of, in various armies (table) 40 - - - L. - - LEADERS - Conduct in action 399 - Duties in action 399, 400, 401 - Posts in action 399 - - LEADING--see Troop Leading - - LESSONS OF THE BOER WAR, in re - Attack 340 - Rushes 88, 89 - - LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, in re - Attack 340 - Fire control and fire direction 137 - Formations under artillery fire 321-324 - Rushes 89, 90 - - LINE - Comparison with column 42-45 - Vulnerability of the 187 - - LINE FORMATION 73, 74 - - LINE OF COMPANY COLUMNS, French (with plate) 70 - - LINE OF PLATOONS, vulnerability of 186 - - LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE--see Reconnaissance - - LONG RANGE FIRE 148, 150-153, 176 - - LOSSES - Artillery under infantry fire 326, 327 - British, in Boer War 193 - Examples 20, 36, 45, 50, 51, 153, 167, 168, 176, 178, 188, - 189, 190, 193, 227, 312, 324 - Franco-German War (by arm) 20 - French Cuirassiers in charge at Vionville 312 - In action 185 - Infantry under artillery fire 324 - Percentage of 186, 188, 189, 227 - Produced by - Long range fire 176 - Artillery and infantry fire, comparison 167, 168 - Officers and men, comparison 189, 190 - Skirmish line 81 - When using fire while in motion 92 - - - M. - - MACHINE GUNS 259 - Ammunition 261 - Supply - Austria 288 - Battery 273 - England 290 - Germany 273 - Russia 291 - Switzerland 284 - Transportation of 270 - Assignment to cavalry 296 - Attack, employment in 365 - Austria 288 - Basket mount 261 - Battery (Germany) - Ammunition supply 273 - Column of platoons 273, 274 - Combat train 276 - Employment of 293 - Field train 270 - Fighting 270 - Formations 273, 274 - Movements and gaits 273 - Order in line 273, 274 - Organization 270 - Relative combat value 273 - Route column 273, 274 - Section column 273, 274 - Belts, ammunition 261 - Cavalry 261 - Colt 261 - Column of platoons 273, 274 - Combat - Against artillery 297 - Cavalry 296 - Of infantry against, general principles 268 - Train 270 - Value as compared with skirmishers 267 - Companies - Germany 275 - Russia 290 - Switzerland 284 - Cone of dispersion 264 - Crawling into position (illustration) 277 - Defense 414 - Employment in 425 - Development, historical 259 - Employment of 263 - English views on employment of 297 - Examples of employment of 283 - Feldl gun 219 - Field train 270 - Fighting battery 270 - Fire 263 - Austria 263 - Comparison with infantry fire 265-267 - Concentrated 263 - Cone of dispersion 264 - Effect of 264, 294 - Germany 263 - Kinds of 263, 287-288 - Progressive 263 - Rate of 261 - Sweeping 263 - Switzerland 263, 287 - Formations - Austria 288 - Germany 273, 274 - Switzerland 287 - Fire effect 264, 294 - As compared with a body of skirmishers 265 - Fire fight 283 - Fire of position 85 - France 290 - Gatling 259 - Germany 270 - Going into position 276 - Historical development 259 - Hotchkiss 260 - In position (illustration) 279 - Intrenched (illustration) 281 - Japan 290 - Kinds of fire - Austria 263, 288 - Germany 263 - Switzerland 263, 287, 288 - Mitrailleuse 259 - Mountain batteries 288 - Mounting, method of 261, 284 - Organization - Austria 288 - England 290 - Germany 270, 271, 275 - Russia 291 - Switzerland 284 - Order in line 273-274 - Progressive fire 263 - Russia 290 - Schwarzlose 260 - Searching fire 263 - Section column 273, 274 - Sled mount 261 - Sweeping fire 263 - Swiss views on employment of 299 - Tripod mount 261 - Various countries 284-293 - Weights of various, with mounts 261 - - MAGAZINES--see Field Magazines - - MAIN BODY, conduct in a rencontre 336 - - MAIN FIRING POSITION 369 - - MANEUVERS 8, 12 - - MAP PROBLEMS 8, 11 - - MARCH, rate of, cyclists 29 - - MARCHING, length of pace and 53 - - MARKSMANSHIP, value of 169 - - MASKS 421 - Influence of 120 - - MATTOCK, weight of 40 - - METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, effect of, on range 145 - - METHOD OF INSTRUCTION--see Instruction - - MILITARY HISTORY, EXAMPLES FROM - Abridged attack 330 - Advance, impulse from the rear 95 - Advanced positions 412 - Attack on 348 - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 89, 90, 468, 474 - Artillery fire diverted from proper objective by advancing - infantry 327 - Artillery supporting a cavalry charge 313 - Under infantry fire 326-327 - Assault 376, 409 - Assaulting guidons, use of 355 - Attack 340-345 - Formation of a brigade 207 - Battalions, strength of 36 - Cavalry charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313 - Changes of front 320, 321 - Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311 - Close order formation, effect of fire on 102, 103 - Column as attack formation 44, 45 - Combats, duration of 178 - Companies, consolidation of 36 - Concentration for action 205, 209, 210 - Counter-attack - After position is carried 433 - Against a hostile flank 435, 436 - Cover, - Construction of, in attack 344 - Use of 257 - Defensive position, location of 410 - Deployment 206 - Of reserves 369 - Distribution in depth and frontage 222, 223, 226 - Dummy trenches 421 - Effect of danger 195-200 - Fire on charging cavalry 308 - Envelopment 357, 358, 359, 360, 361 - Expenditure and supply of ammunition 468-474 - Fatigue produced by continuous fire 155 - Fire, - Effect of 132 - Kinds of, used in Russo-Japanese War 157, 159 - Russo-Turkish War 158, 159 - Withholding the 151, 152 - Fire control and fire direction, difficulties of 137 - Fire effect on close order formations 102, 103 - Fire pauses 156 - Fire preparation 149 - Fire support during an assault 380 - Fire while in motion 93 - Flank attack 357 - Flanking fire 354 - Formations suitable under fire 121 - Under artillery fire 321, 322, 323, 324 - Frontage 231, 232 - And distribution in depth 237 - In Russo-Japanese War 239 - Of battalions at Mukden 211 - Overextension of 238 - Frontal counter attacks 437, 438 - Gaps in the line 239 - Improvised units, use of 197 - Influence of various rifles on density of battle formations 24 - Length of rushes and expenditure of ammunition 89-90 - Lessons of the Boer War, in re attack 340 - Russo-Japanese War, in re attack 340 - Local reconnaissance 250, 253 - Long range fire 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 - In defense 155 - Losses 36, 50, 51, 153, 332 - Percentage of 188, 189, 227 - Produced by infantry and artillery fire 167 - Long range fire 176 - Relative, officers to men 189, 190 - Under artillery fire 324 - Machine guns, employment of 260, 275, 283, 289, 290 - Masks, effect of 120 - Mistakes caused by trumpet signals 42 - Mixing of organizations 195, 226 - Moral effect of a cavalry charge 306 - Fire 426 - Gen. Bennal’s impressions at Wörth 191 - On charging cavalry 309 - Number of troops required for attack and defense 234 - Passage through timber 333 - Ranges, underestimation of 142 - Removal of packs 364 - Rencontre 339 - Reserves, employment of 340, 395, 396, 397 - Rushes, employment of 93, 94, 95 - Length of 89, 90 - Sand bags, use of, in attack 344, 390 - Study of 7-8 - Surprise 208, 250, 252, 331, 340 - Surrender of British troops in Boer War 192 - Telephone communication at Mukden 247 - Temperature, effect of 145 - Trumpet signals, mistakes caused by 42 - United attack, necessity of 402 - Use of spade in attack 387, 388 - Value of 8, 9, 10 - Void of the battlefield 194 - Volleys, use of 164 - Woods, passage through 333 - Wounds - Produced by cutting weapons 384 - Character of 128, 129 - - MINOR TACTICS 12 - - MISSES, effect of; Wolozkoi’s theory 173 - - MITRAILLEUSE 259 - - MIXING OF ORGANIZATIONS 195, 226 - How prevented 96, 97 - - MORAL EFFECT - Cavalry charge 306 - Counter-attack 436 - Fire 191, 227 - On charging cavalry 309 - - MORAL FACTORS and discipline 107, 108 - - MOUNTAIN TROOPS 23 - - MOUNTAIN WARFARE 23 - - MOUNTED INFANTRY 25, 26, 27 - - MOUNTED MESSENGERS, use on battlefield 246 - - MUSICIANS - Duties in skirmish line 79 - Posts in skirmish line 79 - - - N. - - NEEDLE GUN, compared with rifle, model 98, as regards flatness of - trajectory 153 - - NETHERLANDS, column of fours 58 - - NIGHT ATTACKS, distribution in depth 233 - - NIGHT OPERATIONS, close order formations, importance of 104 - - NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, posts of, in various armies 47 - - NORMAL ATTACK 203 - v. Boguslawski’s views 204 - Clausewitz’s views 204 - v. Scherff’s views 205 - - NORMAL FORMATIONS, necessity for, in some countries 201 - - - O. - - OBSERVATION OF THE FOREGROUND 420 - Compared with deliberately planned attack 334, 338 - - OBSERVATION STATIONS 421 - - OBSTACLES 422 - - OBUS ALLONGÉ 115 - - OFFENSIVE - Assumption of the 428 - In defense 409 - Spirit of the 109, 110 - - OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE 408 - - OFFENSIVE RETURN (France) 439, 458 - - OFFICERS - Demeanor, influence of 84 - Losses among 50, 51 - Franco-German War (by arm) 20 - Relative to men 189, 190 - - OPEN COLUMN, depth of 47 - - ORDER IN LINE, machine gun batteries 273, 274 - - ORDERS 41 - Combat 243, 244 - Contents of 41 - Issue of 41 - In a rencontre 336 - - ORGANIZATION 34 - Battalion 36, 37 - Brigade 37, 38 - Company 34, 35 - In various armies (table) 35 - Machine guns, - Austria 288 - England 290 - France 290 - Germany 270 - Japan 290 - Russia 290 - Switzerland 284 - Mounted infantry (England) 26 - Regiment 37 - - ORGANIZATIONS - Mixing of 195, 226 - How prevented 96, 97 - Use of improvised 197 - - - P. - - PACE - Diminution of length of, on various slopes 141 - Length of, and marching 53 - In various armies (table) 54 - - PACES, number of, per minute 54 - - PACKS, removal of 363, 364 - - PANIC 27, 107, 441 - - PASSIVE DEFENSE 408, 409 - - PATROLS 27 - Combat 80 - - PEACE, eternal 1 - - PENETRATION, “S” bullet 131 - - PLATOON - Column of twos, vulnerability of 187 - Commander, post in close order 63 - Skirmish line 79 - French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 - Infantry, strength of the German 273 - One-rank, vulnerability of the 187 - - PLATOONS - Column of (with plate) 61, 62 - How formed 49 - Machine gun battery 273, 274 - Division of the company into 46 - Three or four platoons 48 - - POSITION - Advance into a preparatory 350 - Advanced 413 - Battalion groups of intrenchments 417 - Communicating trenches 421 - Cover trenches 421 - Determining factors in selecting a 414 - Dummy intrenchments 421 - Foreground, clearing the 421 - Division into sections 411 - Observation of the 420 - Fortifying the 415 - Framework of the 414 - Gaps in the defensive 411 - Intrenchments 418-422 - Masks 421 - Obstacles, construction of 421 - Occupation of the 426 - Rallying 442 - Requisites of a defensive 410 - Russian views in re defensive 422 - Sections, divisions into 411 - Temporary occupation 408 - - POSTS - Battalion commander in action 400 - Commander in a rencontre 338 - Company commander in action 400 - Musicians in skirmish line 79, 80 - Non-commissioned officers in close order 47 - Platoon commanders in close order 63 - Skirmish line 79 - Range finders in close order 46, 47 - Skirmish line 79, 80 - Squad leaders in close order 46, 47 - Skirmish line 79 - Regimental commander in action 400 - - PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT 352 - - PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 346 - By artillery, provisions of various regulations 354 - - PREPARATORY POSITION 350 - - PROGRESSIVE FIRE - Artillery 320 - Machine guns 263 - - PURE FRONTAL ATTACK 357 - France 455 - - PURSUIT 385 - Japan 465 - - - Q. - - QUICK TIME, in various armies (table) 54 - - - R. - - RAFALE 158, 164 - - RALLYING POSITION 442 - England 460 - Occupation of the 443 - - RANGE - Altitude, effect of, on the 145 - Ascertaining the 140 - Pacing and galloping 141 - Provisions of various regulations 143 - Ascertaining the 140 - Range finding instruments 146 - Trial volleys 145 - Error of estimation 141 - Formulae for determining favorable range for firing against hill - positions 183 - Influence of error in estimating the 170 - Knowledge of the 140 - Meteorological conditions, effect of 145 - Range finding instruments, permissible error 146 - Trial volleys 145 - - RANGE FINDERS - Classification 143 - Duties in machine gun detachments 283 - Post in close order 46, 47 - Skirmish line 79, 80 - - RANGE FINDING INSTRUMENTS - Errors permissible 146 - Principle of construction 146 - - RANGING--see Range - - RANKS, influence of rate of fire upon the number of 46 - - RATIONS, weight of 40 - - REAR GUARD ACTION, frontage of a company in 236 - - RECONNAISSANCE - Companies 251 - Detachments of all arms 251 - In attack 346 - In force 251, 347 - Local, in attack 347 - Object of 250 - Of the infantry 248 - Patrols and scouting detachments 27 - - REGIMENT 37 - Cavalry, strength of German 273 - Combat frontage 236 - Formation for attack 214 - Formations 73, 74 - Importance 37 - Organization 37 - - REGIMENTAL COMMANDER - Duties in action 400 - Post in action 400 - - REGULATIONS--see Drill Regulations - - REMOVAL OF PACKS 363, 364 - - RENCONTRE 333 - Advance guard, conduct of the 334 - Austria 448 - Commander, position of 338 - Conduct of main body 336 - Examples of 339 - Japan 464 - Machine guns, examples of, in a 295, 338 - Main body, launching of the 338 - Orders, issue of 336 - Provisions of various regulations 339 - Use of echelon formation in 74 - Switzerland 466 - - REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, influence of, on war 3 - - RESERVE - Employment of, in attack 394 - Examples of employment of 340, 395, 396, 397 - General, distance from defensive line 430 - Interval from flank of defensive line 430 - Position in defense 429 - Strength of, in defense 431 - In retreat 442 - Launching or withholding the 396 - Section 411 - Size of, in various units 235 - Strength of the (in attack and defense) 395 - - RETREAT - Direction of 440, 442 - Rallying position 442 - Reserve 442 - - RICOCHETS, effect of 185 - - RIFLE--see Rifles - - RIFLEMEN 22 - - RIFLE-RESTS, influence of 178 - - RIFLES - Automatic 126 - Influence of various, on density of battle formations (table) 240 - Used in Russo-Japanese War 127 - Weight of, in various armies (table) 40 - - ROAD SPACE--see Depth - - ROUTE COLUMN (with plate) 57 - Battalion in 72 - Machine gun battery 273, 274 - - RUSHES - Advance by 82 - Austria 449 - England 462 - Examples of the employment of 93, 94, 95 - Gait to be employed in 82, 86 - How made in various armies 90, 91 - Italy 452 - Japan 91, 463 - Length of 83 - Lessons of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars 88, 89, 90 - Long or short 85, 86 - Preparation for 83 - Provisions of various regulations 90-91 - Russia 91 - Short or long 85, 86 - Strength of the rushing unit 83 - Time required for 83 - - RUSSIA - Advanced positions 413 - Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 - Ammunition supply 475 - Regulations in re 480 - Assault 381 - Battalion, formations of the 69, 73 - Column of platoons (plate) 62 - Company, strength of (table) 35 - Defensive position, views on 422 - Fire, kinds of 160 - Frontage 242 - Front and facing distance 48 - Infantry - Combat 466 - Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340 - Versus cavalry 315 - Intrenching tool equipment of Russian companies 38 - Load carried by soldier 40 - Machine guns 290 - Pace, length and number per minute 54 - Ranges, ascertaining 143 - Rushes 91 - Sandbag cover, results of experiments 390 - Skirmish line, formation of 80 - Supply of ammunition 475, 480 - Use of general reserve 397 - Spade in attack 392 - - - S. - - “S” BULLET - Effect on corpses 130 - Materials 131 - Steel shields 324 - - SAND BAGS 344, 390 - Results of Russian experiments 390 - - SCHWARZLOSE MACHINE GUN 260 - - SCOUTING DETACHMENTS 27, 28, 414 - Use of, in reconnaissance 252 - - SEARCHING FIRE - Artillery 321 - Machine guns 263 - - SECONDARY ATTACK 357 - - SECTIONS - Assignment of combat 243 - Defensive position, division into combat 411 - Division of the platoon into 46 - - SECTION COLUMN, machine gun battery 273, 274 - - SHARPSHOOTER PLATOONS 21 - - SHELL - Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117 - Percussion (Model 96) 115 - Time (Model 96) 116 - (Model 98) 118 - - SHIELDS - Protection afforded by 324 - - SHRAPNEL - Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117 - Effect (tables) 114, 122 - On animate targets 125 - Incendiary effect 112 - Percussion 111, 112 - Time 112 - - SIGNAL LAMPS, use of, on battlefield 246 - - SIGNALS 41 - Advance 41 - Assemble 41 - Attention 41 - Charge 41 - Deploy 41 - Employment of, by combat patrols 80 - Fix bayonet 41, 377 - Halt 41 - Misunderstanding of 42 - Trumpet 41 - - SITUATION, estimate of the 11 - - SKI DETACHMENTS 30, 31, 32 - - SKI RUNNERS 30, 31, 32 - - SKIRMISH LINES - Boer advance in thin 75 - Cover, use of 256 - Efficacy of fire against thin and dense (table) 77 - Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265 - Formation of 78 - In various armies 80 - Gaits of 81 - Japanese advance in thin 76, 77 - Losses 81 - Movements in 81, 82 - Thin and dense 76, 77 - Vulnerability of 186, 187 - - SNOW SHOE MARCHING 30, 31 - - SPADE - Use of, in attack 387, 388, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466 - Small, weight of 40 - - SPLINTER PROOFS 418, 420 - - SQUAD LEADERS - Posts in close order 46, 47 - Skirmish line 79 - - SQUADS - Column of, compared with column of fours 59 - (Plate) 57 - Division of the company into 46 - Machine gun, composition and duties of members of (Germany) 283 - - STAFFS, division of work in 245 - - STRATEGY - Definitions of 4, 5, 6 - Relation of tactics to 6, 7 - - SUPERIORITY OF FIRE 370, 371, 427 - - SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION - Austria 475, 479 - Deductions from various regulations 483 - England 475, 482 - France 475, 480 - Germany 475, 476 - Italy 475, 483 - Japan 475 - Russia 475, 480 - Various armies (table) 475 - - SUPPORTS 98, 99 - Advance of 100 - In attack 368 - Advantages of 102 - Arguments against 101, 102 - Commander, duties of 100 - Conduct, French regulations 455 - Defense 410 - Deployment in attack 369 - Distance from firing line 98, 99 - Duties 98 - Formations 100 - Movements 100 - Necessity 98 - Purpose 98 - - SURPRISE 330 - Examples of 331 - - SURRENDER, British troops in Boer War 192 - - SWEDEN, column of fours 58 - - SWEEPING FIRE - Artillery 321 - Machine guns 263 - - - T. - - TACTICAL FORMATIONS, Importance of 108 - - TACTICAL MISSIONS, compared with united action 401 - - TACTICAL UNIT 32, 33, 34 - - TACTICS - Applied 12, 13 - Changes in 13, 14 - Definitions of 4, 5, 6 - Formal 12 - Grand 12 - Japanese infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341 - Minor 12 - Relation of strategy to 6-7 - Russian infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340 - - TARGET, selection of a 147 - - TASKS - Assignment of 218 - Dangers of assigning 405 - - TELEGRAPH, FIELD, use of, on battlefield 246 - - TELEPHONE, FIELD, use of, in infantry combat 246 - - TEMPORARY OCCUPATION of a position 408 - - TERRAIN, importance of 254 - - TIMBER, advance through 332 - - TRAINING and drill 105, 106 - Influence of, on efficacy of fire 168 - - TRAVERSES 417 - - TRENCHES 416-420 - Dimensions 418 - - TROOP LEADING - Duties of higher 366 - Minor 365 - - TROOP UNIT 34 - - TRUMPET SIGNALS 41 - - TWOS, column of 56 - - - U. - - UNIFORM, color of, influence on visibility 119 - - UNITED ACTION - Compared with tactical missions 401 - Dangers of 405 - - UNITED STATES, three-unit organization 38, 218 - - UNIVERSAL SERVICE, influence of, on war 4 - - USE OF SPADE IN ATTACK 387 - Austria 449 - France 457 - Japan 465 - Provisions of various regulations 392 - Switzerland 466 - - - V. - - VOID OF THE BATTLEFIELD 194 - - VOLLEY - Value of the 157, 163 - Trial 145 - - VULNERABILITY of various formations 186, 187 - - - W. - - WAR 2, 3, 4 - Importance and necessity of 2 - Influence of representative government in reducing number of - wars 3 - Influence of universal service on 4 - Lessons of, in re attack 340 - Rushes 88, 89 - Purpose of 4 - _Ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2, 3 - - WEAPONS, changes and improvements in 13 - - WIGWAG FLAGS, use of, in infantry action 246 - - WIRE CUTTERS 39 - - WITHDRAWAL 441 - Conduct of a 441 - - WOLOZKOI’S THEORY of the constant cone of misses 173 - - WOODS, advance through 332 - - WOUNDS - Produced by cutting weapons, (%) 384 - Infantry and artillery fire, comparison 167 - Jacketed bullets 129 - Shrapnel bullets 125 - Small arms in Russo-Japanese War, character of 127, 128 - - - Z. - - ZONE FIRE, artillery 320 - - - - -INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY. - - - A. - - =~Aiaslar~=, August 25, 1877. PAGE - Ammunition, expenditure of 472 - - =~Albuera~=, 1811. - Losses 227 - - =~Amiens~=, November 27, 1870. - Frontage 237 - - =~Austerlitz.~= - Attacking column, formation 44 - - =~Azay~=, January 6, 1871. - Masks, effect of 112 - - - B. - - =~Baalon~=, September 17, 1870. - Surprise 331 - - =~Beaumont~=, August 30, 1870. - Advance guard, deployment of 231, 232 - Artillery, losses of the 327 - Cavalry charge 309 - Deployment of an advance guard 231, 232 - Distribution in depth 231, 232 - Flank attack 357 - Frontage 231, 232 - Frontal counter-attack 437 - Ineffective rapid fire at short ranges 162 - Line of platoons in columns of twos 121 - Losses, artillery under infantry fire 327 - Rencontre 339 - Surprise 331 - Woods, passage through 333 - - =~Beaune la Bolande~=, November 28, 1870. - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 470 - Shortage of 469 - Short range fire 153 - Withholding the fire 152 - - =~Belmont~=, November 22, 1899. - Night march 351 - - =~Boer War~=--see South African War (1899-1902). - - =~Busaco.~= - Frontal counter-attack 437 - - =~Buzanval~=, January 19, 1871. - Ammunition, expenditure of 470 - - - C. - - =~Casablanca~=, 1907. - Effect of infantry fire on charging cavalry 308 - - =~Chagey~=, January 11, 1871. - Short range fire 153 - - =~Champigny~=, November 30, 1870. - Ammunition, expenditure and supply 471 - Influence of the ground on efficacy of fire 183 - Jägers, employment of 23 - - =~Chevilly~=, November 30, 1870. - Fire while in motion 93 - - =~Chlum~= (Königgrätz), 1866. - Flank attack 357 - - =~Colenso~=, December 15, 1899. - Artillery under infantry fire 326 - Boer position, location of 410 - Density of battle line 240 - Insufficient reconnaissance 340 - Losses 189 - Officers 190 - Moral effect of fire 152, 426 - Pure frontal attack 340 - Reconnaissance, lack of local 249 - Reserves, use of 340 - Surprise 340 - Withholding the fire, moral effect 152 - - =~Colombey~=, August 14, 1870. - Attack on Aubigny 405 - On the “Tannenwäldchen” 403 - Frontage 237 - Losses 195 - Mixing of organizations 195 - Moral effect of fire 199 - - =~Coulmiers~=, November 9, 1870. - Ammunition supply 484 - Reserve, employment of the 395 - - =~Coulomiers~=, December 15, 1870. - Withholding the fire 152 - - =~Custozza~=, 1866. - Battle lines, density of 240 - Cavalry charge 302 - Moral effect of a 200 - Reserves, employment of 396 - - - D. - - =~Daix~=, November 26, 1870. - Ammunition, supply of 484 - - =~Datshishiao~=, July 24, 1904. - Bayonet fight 382 - - =~Diamond Hill~=, 1900. - Frontage 238 - - =~Doornkop~=, May 29, 1900. - Opening fire 150 - - - E. - - =~Etoges~=, 1814. - Infantry versus cavalry 313 - - - F. - - =~Franco-German War~= (1870-71). - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 468 - Close order formations, impossibility of employing, in first - line 102 - Fire, efficacy of 176 - Frontages 237 - Losses among officers, percentage of (by arm) 20 - Officers, number of, per 1000 men 51 - Proportion of the various arms 19 - - =~Fuchau~=, 1905. - Local reconnaissance 250 - - - G. - - =~Garcia Hernandez~=, 1812. - Cavalry charge 309 - - =~Gitschin~=, 1866. - Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42 - - =~Gorni Bugarov~=, January 1, 1878. - Frontal counter-attack 438 - Short range fire 153 - - =~Gorni Dubniac~=, October 24, 1877. - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 - Assault, inability to 409 - Fire, ineffectiveness of uphill 183 - Intrenching in attack 389 - Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 223 - Perseverance under fire 387 - Reserves, deployment of 369 - Rushes, advance by 95 - Signal for attack, failure of 361 - Strength, relative, of opposing forces 234 - - =~Gravelotte~= (St. Privat). - Advance to the battlefield 67 - Ammunition, expenditure 471 - Artillery under infantry fire 326 - Assault 376 - Assaulting distance 385 - Attack made by the III. Army Corps 398 - Battle lines, density of 240 - Close order formations under fire 103 - Columns of twos, line of 121 - Companies, consolidation of 36 - Concentration for action 210 - Density of battle lines 240 - Enfilade fire 254 - Envelopment 361 - Fire, - Artillery under infantry 326 - Close order formation under 103 - Columns of twos, line of, under 121 - Enfilade 254 - Long range 152 - Pause 156 - Perseverance under 108, 387 - Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183 - Flanking fire 254 - Infantry fire, artillery under 326 - Intrenchments, construction of 388 - Losses, aggregate and detail 188 - At various ranges 176 - Franz regiment 195 - Officers 33, 51, 190 - Lull in the fight at Point du Jour 156 - March formations 67 - Mitrailleuses, employment of 260 - Mixing of organizations 196 - Officers, losses among 33, 51, 190 - Organizations, mixing of 196 - Ranges, underestimation of 142 - Reconnaissance, relaxing in the 347 - Reserves 398 - Stragglers 196 - Uphill fire against trenches, ineffectiveness of 183 - - - H. - - =~Haicheng~=, 1904. - Advanced positions, several lines of 412 - - =~Hallue~=, December 23, 1870. - Envelopment 6 - Attempted, by first line 360 - Frontage 232 - - =~l’Hay~=, September 30, 1870. - Fire while in motion 93 - - =~Helmstedt~=, July 25, 1866. - Change of front 220 - - =~Hühnerwasser~=, 1866. - Ammunition found on the battlefield 469 - - - K. - - =~Karahassankioi~=, August 23, 1877. - Ammunition, expenditure of 472 - - =~Katzbach~=, August 26, 1813. - Attack in line 108 - - =~Kazeljevo.~= - Frontal counter-attack 438 - - =~Kesselsdorf~=, 1745. - Frontal counter-attack 437 - Losses 189 - - =~Kinchau~=, November 26, 1904. - Ammunition, expenditure of 474 - Assaulting distance 385 - - =~Kolin~=, 1757. - Losses 189 - - =~Königgrätz~=, July 3, 1866. - Adjustment of fire facilitated by a poplar 120 - Advance to the battlefield 205 - Battle lines, density of 240 - Cavalry charge, moral effect of a 306 - Flank attack 357, 359 - Jägers, employment of 23 - Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42 - - - L. - - =~Ladon~=, November 26, 1870. - Envelopment 361 - - =~Ladonchamps~= (near Metz). - Artillery fire, ineffectiveness of 120 - - =~Ladysmith~=, 1900. - Supports 98 - - =~Le Bourget~=, October 30, 1870. - Assaulting distance 385 - Columns of twos, line of 121 - Rushes 93, 94 - - =~Le Mans.~= - Battalions, strength of 36 - Gatling guns 260 - Officers, number present for duty 50 - - =~Liao Yang~=, 1904. - Ammunition, expenditure of 473, 474 - Battle lines, density of 239 - Fire 155 - Frontage 239 - Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 392 - Machine guns 291 - Strength of opposing forces 341 - Surprise 208, 250 - - =~Linshinpu~=, 1904. - Ammunition, expenditure of 473 - - =~Lisaine.~= - Frontage 228 - - =~Loigny~=, December 2, 1870. - Advance to the battlefield 67 - Counter-attack 433, 435, 436 - Intrenching tools, lack of 388 - Wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade 220 - - =~Lovtcha~=, September 1, 1877. - Ammunition, expenditure of 472 - Mixing of organizations 197 - Registration mark for artillery fire 120 - Rushes 95 - Strength of opposing forces 234 - - - M. - - =~Magersfontain~=, December 11, 1899. - Boer position, location of 410 - Convalescence of wounded 129 - Dummy trenches 421 - Fire surprise 133 - Frontage 227, 238 - Lack of reinforcements 227 - Losses 189 - Officers 190 - Perseverance under fire 137, 387 - Pure frontal attack 340 - Reconnaissance, lack of local 249 - Reinforcements, lack of 227 - Reserves, employment of 340 - Withholding the fire, moral effect of 152 - - =~Maida.~= - Frontal counter-attack 437 - - =~Marengo~=, 1800. - Attacking column, formation of 45 - - =~Mars-la-Tour~=--see Vionville. - - =~Minden~=, 1757. - Infantry versus cavalry 313 - - =~Modder River~=, November 28, 1899. - Boer position, location of 410 - Fire fight 132, 371 - Moral effect of fire 426 - Opening fire at long range 150 - Perseverance under fire 132 - Pure frontal attack 340 - Reconnaissance, lack of 252, 340 - Surprise 252, 340 - - =~Montoy~= (Noisseville). - Surprise 332 - - =~Mont Valérien~=, January 19, 1871. - Ammunition, shortage of 469 - - =~Mukden~=, 1905. - Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77 - Assault with cold steel 134 - Attack, mode of Japanese 343, 344 - Battle lines, density of 239, 240 - Bayonet fights 382 - Construction of cover in attack 344 - Frontage 239 - Gaps in the attacking line 239 - Machine guns 292 - Perseverance under fire 348 - Reserves 395, 396 - Sand bags, use of, in attack 344 - Skirmish lines, thin 76, 77 - Strength of opposing forces 341 - Telephone communication 247 - - - N. - - =~Nachod~=, 1866. - Bayonet attack 153 - Concentration 209 - Frontage 231 - Losses 153 - Mixing of organizations 196 - Rencontre 339 - - =~Nicholson’s Neck~=, October 24, 1899. - Crawling 87, 88 - Volleys, ineffectiveness of 157 - - =~Noisseville.~= - Bayonet fight 382 - Counter-attack 429, 433 - Flank attack 358 - Intrenching tools, lack of 388 - Losses 332 - Reconnaissance 253 - Surprise 331 - - =~Nuits~=, December 18, 1870. - Abridged attack 330 - - - O. - - =~Oerrshikiatsy~= (Shaho), 1904. - Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388 - - =~Orleans~=, December 3, 1870. - Counter-attack 436 - Strength of German battalions 36 - - - P. - - =~Paardeberg~=, February 18, 1900. - Advance without firing 149 - Convalescence of wounded 129 - Crawling 87 - Distribution in depth, lack of 238 - Frontage 76, 227 - Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388 - Opening fire at long range 150 - Reinforcements, lack of 227 - Skirmish lines, thin 76 - - =~Pieters Hill~=, February 27, 1900. - Fire support 380 - Frontage 238 - Machine guns 289, 298 - - =~Plevna~=, 1877. - Ammunition, expenditure of 472 - Attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223 - Bayonet fights 382 - Combat impressions 191 - Fire, opening 152 - Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183 - While in motion 93 - Improvised units 197, 198 - Intrenching tools, use of 388 - Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223 - Knapsacks, loss of 364 - Losses among officers 190 - At various ranges 152, 177 - Mixing of organizations 197 - Officers, losses among 190 - Opening fire at long range 152 - Ranges, underestimation of 142 - Reserves, deployment of 369 - Employment of 395 - Rushes 95 - Strength of opposing forces 234 - Underestimation of ranges 142 - Volleys 158 - - =~Podol~=, June 26, 1866. - Jägers 23 - - =~Poplar Grove~=, March 7, 1900. - Advance in attack formation 206 - Attack formation of a brigade 207 - Frontage 238 - - - R. - - =~Russo-Japanese War.~= - Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77 - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 - Formations under artillery fire 321, 322 - Frontage 238 - Infantry attack 137, 340 - Local reconnaissance 250 - Machine guns 290 - Rushes 89 - Strength of opposing forces 341 - Wounds, character of 128 - - =~Russo-Turkish War~=, 1877-78. - Ammunition, expenditure of 472 - Attacks 222, 223 - Frontal counter-attacks 438 - Losses 176 - - - S. - - =~St. Privat~=--see Gravelotte. - - =~St. Quentin~=, January 19, 1871. - Attack on Grugies, isolated 403 - Bayonet attack 103 - - =~Sandepu~=, 1904. - Losses among officers 190 - - =~Sapignies.~= - Cavalry charge 302 - - =~Scheinovo~=, January 9, 1878. - Ammunition, expenditure of 94, 95, 473 - Cavalry charge 303 - Losses 94, 95 - Rushes 94, 95 - Simultaneous attack 361 - - =~Sedan.~= - Ammunition, expenditure of 469 - Cavalry charge 308, 310, 311 - Losses among officers 51 - Mixing of organizations 197 - Packs, removal of 469 - - =~Shaho~=, 1904. - Advanced positions 348 - Artillery, capture of 326 - Attack formation of a brigade 343 - Battle lines, density of 239 - Frontage 239 - Infantry attack 343 - Intrenching tools, use of 388 - Machine guns 292 - Reserves 396 - - =~Shiliho~=, 1905. - Attack 344 - Rushes 90 - - =~Shipka Pass~=, 1877. - Short range fire 153 - - =~Skalitz~=, 1812. - Jägers 23 - Mixing of organizations 196 - - =~Slivnica~=, November 17 and 19, 1885. - Losses at long ranges 177 - - =~Solferino~=, 1859. - Bayonet fight 382 - Battle lines, density of 240 - - =~Soor~=, 1745. - Losses 189 - Frontal counter-attack 437 - - =~Soor~=, 1866. - Jägers 23 - - =~South African War~= (1899-1902). - Assaults 379 - Crawling 87, 88 - Front, overextension of 238 - Lessons gained from the 88, 340 - Machine guns 289 - Mounted infantry 25 - Rushes 88 - Skirmish lines, thin 75 - Surrenders 192 - Wounds, character of 129 - - =~Spicheren.~= - Advance in assembly formation 210 - Ammunition, expenditure of 469 - Attack, orders for 349 - Change of front 220 - Concentration 210 - Counter-attack 436 - Envelopment 357, 358, 360 - Formation in echelon and in line 74, 226 - Front, change of 220 - Frontage 226 - Knapsacks, loss of 364 - Losses 195 - Mixing of organizations 196, 226 - Orders for attack 349 - Stragglers 195 - - =~Spionskop~=, 1900. - Crawling 88 - Losses at short ranges, insignificant 178, 189 - Reserves 340 - - - T. - - =~Tagliamento~=, 1797. - Attack formations 45 - - =~Tashkessen~=, January 1, 1878. - Ammunition, expenditure of 473 - Frontal counter-attack 438 - - =~Tel el Kebir~=, 1882. - Night attack 233 - - =~Terrayama~= (Temple Hill), October 11, 1904. - Attack 343 - Bayonet fight 382 - Intrenching tools, use of 388 - - =~Tobitschau~=, 1866. - Cavalry charge 313 - - =~Towan~=, 1904. - Perseverance under fire 348 - - =~Trautenau~=, 1866. - Bayonet attack 153 - Jägers 23 - Packs, removal of 364 - Rencontre 339 - Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42 - - =~Tsinortun~=, August 26, 1904. - Counter-attack 435 - - =~Tugela~= (Pieters Hill), 1900. - Rushes 95 - - =~Tuminling Pass~=, 1904. - Losses, officers 190 - - - V. - - =~Vauxchamps~=, February 14, 1814. - Infantry versus cavalry 313 - - =~Villepion~=, December 1, 1870. - Holding wavering troops 382 - Intrenching tools, use of 388 - - =~Villermain-Cravant~=, 1870. - Flank march along hostile front 360 - - =~Villiers~=, October 30, 1870. - Influence of the ground on the efficacy of fire 183 - - =~Vimiero.~= - Frontal counter-attack 437 - - =~Vionville.~= - Abridged attack 330 - Advance in broad formations 67 - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 469, 470 - Artillery fire diverted by infantry 327 - Cavalry charge 302, 304, 311, 313 - Moral effect of 302 - Preparation by artillery fire 313 - Close order formations, losses in 102, 103 - Concentration 209 - Cover, use of 257 - Direction of retreat 440 - Flanking fire 254 - Losses in close order formations 102, 103 - Officers 190 - Masks 120 - Moral effect of a cavalry charge 302, 303 - Packs, removal of 364 - Rencontre 339 - Reserves, employment of 397 - Retreat 440 - Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42 - United attack, necessity of a 403 - Volley fire, ineffectiveness of 164 - - =~Vouziers~=, December 15, 1870. - Surprise 331 - - - W. - - =~Wafangu~=, June 15, 1904. - Attack 341 - Communication 247 - Distribution in depth, excessive 223 - Envelopment 341, 359 - - =~Wagram~=, 1809. - Attacking column, formation of 44, 45 - - =~Waterberg~=, 1904. - Assaulting guidons 355 - Machine guns, employment of 283 - - =~Waterloo~=, 1815. - Attacking column, formation of 44, 45 - Battle lines, density of 240 - Concentration 209 - Frontal counter-attack 437 - - =~Weiszenburg~=, August 2, 1870. - Losses among officers 51, 190 - Masks 120 - - =~Wörth~=, August 6, 1870. - Assault 376 - Assaulting distance 385 - Attack, orders to 349 - Battle lines, density of 240 - Cavalry charge 310, 311 - Change of front 220 - Colors 69 - Concentration 209 - Counter-attack 433 - Distance, elimination of, during advance 72 - Distribution in depth 224 - Fire while in motion 93 - Interference by the commander-in-chief 248 - Losses 227 - Officers 51 - Relative, officers and men 190 - Mixing of organizations 196 - Moral effect of fire 191 - Officers, losses among 51 - Orders to attack 349 - Packs, removal of 364 - Panic 440 - Passage through woods 333 - Reserve, employment of the 395 - Stragglers 196 - Supports 224 - Uphill fire 183 - Woods, passage through 254 - - - Y. - - =~Yalu~=, 1904. - Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 - Attack 341 - Bayonet fight 382 - Losses, officers 190 - Machine guns 291 - - =~Yangtsuling~=, 1904. - Attack 343 - - =~Yoshirei~=, July 31, 1904. - Formations under artillery fire 321, 323 - - =~Yuhuntun~=, 1905. - Perseverance under fire 348 - - =~Yuputz~=, March 1, 1905. - Sand bags, use of 390 - - =~Yushuling~=, 1904. - Intrenching tools, use of 388 - - - Z. - - =~Zella.~= - Counter-attack 433 - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - - Depending on the hard- and software used to read this text, not all - elements may display as intended. - - The language used in this text is that of the printed book, including - the use of inconsistent, erroneous, unusual or archaic spelling, - hyphenation, capitalisation, punctuation, etc., except as indicated - under Changes below. This applies to proper and geographical names - and non-English words and phrases as well; accents and diacriticals - have not been added or corrected unless mentioned below. - - The use of physical units has not been corrected; for example, the - author regularly uses m for speed, kgm for energy, etc. - - In addition to the abbreviations given on page xxi, the book - regularly uses differently abbreviated or shortened titles (sometimes - single words) or translations of references; this has not been - standardised. - - Page ix, Table of Contents: the differences between the Table of - Contents and the headings in the text have not been rectified. Apart - from (minor) differences in wording, not all headings in the text - occur in the Table of Contents, and not all entries in the Table of - Contents occur as headings in the text. Any auto-generated Table of - Contents may therefore differ from the one on page ix ff. - - Page 71, “in double column of twice the width of front”: the source - document was unclear at this point, the text might also have read “in - double column or twice the width of front”. - - Page 183, 187: (Général) Le Joindre is the author of the publication, - but his name is presented here as part of the title. - - Page 195, troop diagram: due to width restrictions, the diagram had - to be split into two rows (as it was in the printed book). - - Page 475: The table appears to contain totals that do not agree with - the data provided. Since it is not clear where the error was made, - these calculations have been left as they were: row Germany, last - column; row Austria, last column but one; row France, last column. - - The table contains footnote markers, but there are no corresponding - footnotes on this or the following pages. In an earlier edition of - the book, the footnotes (using the numbering from the table in this - text) were as follows: - - [513] The strength of a company is assumed as 200 men (England - excepted). - [514] 10 Cartridges packed in a box. - [515] New “D” ammunition. - [516] During the Russo-Japanese war. - - - Changes made - - Some minor obvious typographical and punctuation errors have been - corrected silently; some tables have been split or re-arranged for - better readability. - - Footnotes and illustrations have been moved outside text paragraphs. - - Spaced and non-spaced and italicised or regular “i.e.” - and “Ibid./ibid.” have been standardised to “_i.e._” and - “_Ibid._”/“_ibid._” “Minarelli Fitzgerald” has been standardised to - “Minarelli-Fitzgerald”. - - Page 8: “sans le comprendre” and “sans le faire” changed to “sans la - comprendre” and “sans la faire”. - - Various pages: “Wald und Ortsgefecht” and “Gruppen und - Einheitsangriff” have been changed to “Wald- und Ortsgefecht“ and - “Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff”. - - Page 11, footnote [18]: opening quote marks inserted before When one - attempts .... - - Page 93: closing quote marks inserted after ... (300-400 paces). - - Page 143, footnote [139]: closing quote mark deleted at end of - footnote. - - Page 162: “_... seit dem Jahre_, 1900,” changed to “_ ... seit dem - Jahre 1900_,” - - Page 180: B′, C′ and D′ in the text have been changed to B, C and D - cf. the illustration. Footnote [170]: angles have been transcribed α, - β and γ for consistency with the illustration and the text. - - Page 195: Negrier changed to Négrier; footnote anchor [191] inserted. - - Page 229: closing quote mark inserted after ... the size of this - echelon. - - Page 253: “Patrouillen und Radfahrkommandos” changed to “Patrouillen- - und Radfahr-Kommandos”. - - Page 257: “and that cover to be utilized only” changed to “and that - cover be utilized only”. - - Page 265, table: the column header “Machine gun” has been considered - to be a heading a single column only. - - Page 304, footnote [306]: closing quote mark inserted after ... of - units in rear. - - Page 324: “Csicseries v. Bacsany” changed to “Csicserics v. Bacsany”; - “Feldgeschüts” changed to “Feldgeschütz”. - - Page 354: closing quote mark inserted after ... the advance of the - attacker’s infantry. - - Page 355: “veritable bouclier” changed to “véritable bouclier”. - - Page 395: “Helwig” changed to “Helvig”. - - Page 399: footnote [430]: “_pp._ 484 and 558” changed to “pp. 484 and - 558”; footnote [431]: “Les Expéditions de Tonkins” changed to “Les - Expéditions de Tonkin”. - - Page 429: closing quote mark inserted after ... or for making a - counter-attack. - - Page 458, footnote [491]: “détachments de couverture” changed to - “détachements de couverture”. - - Indexes: some entries moved to their proper alphabetical order. - - Page 513: page number 363 changed to 263 (entry Machine guns, Kinds - of fire, Switzerland). - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICS, VOLUME I (OF 2) *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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margin-bottom: .25em; text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em; font-weight: bold;} - ul.index li.newletter .pagenum - {font-size: .7em;} - .underl - {text-decoration: underline;} - - </style> - </head> -<body> - -<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Tactics, Volume I (of 2), by William Balck</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<table style='min-width:0; padding:0; margin-left:0; border-collapse:collapse'> - <tr><td>Title:</td><td>Tactics, Volume I (of 2)</td></tr> - <tr><td></td><td>Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry</td></tr> -</table> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: William Balck</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Walter Krueger</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March 26, 2021 [eBook #64927]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Brian Coe, Harry Lamé and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICS, VOLUME I (OF 2) ***</div> - -<div class="tnbox"> - -<p class="noindent">Please see the <a href="#TN">Transcriber’s Notes</a> at the end of this text.</p> - -<p class="noindent blankbefore75">The cover image has been created for this text and is placed in the public domain.</p> - -</div><!--tnbox--> - -<div class="scr"> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Cover image" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -</div><!--scr--> - -<div class="titlepage"> - -<h1 title="TACTICS Volume I--Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry">TACTICS</h1> - -<p class="center highline4 fsize80">BY</p> - -<p class="center sstype"><span class="fsize150 gesp4">BALCK</span><br /> -<span class="fsize70">Colonel, German Army.</span></p> - -<p class="center highline3 blankbefore3">VOLUME I.<br /> -INTRODUCTION AND FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.</p> - -<p class="center blankbefore3"><span class="fsize80"><b>TRANSLATED BY</b></span><br /> -<span class="sstype"><span class="fsize110">WALTER KRUEGER,</span><br /> -<span class="fsize70">First Lieutenant 23rd Infantry, U. S. Army,<br /> -Instructor Army Service Schools.</span></span></p> - -<p class="center highline15 blankbefore3"><b>Fourth completely revised edition.<br /> -With numerous plates in the text.</b></p> - -<p class="center highline15 blankbefore4"><span class="fsize90">U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap fsize70">Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.<br /> -1911</span></p> - -</div><!--titlepage--> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<hr class="copyright top" /> - -<p class="center highline15"><span class="smcap">Copyright, 1911,<br /> -By Walter Krueger.</span></p> - -<hr class="copyright bot" /> - -<div class="leftcenter"> - -<p class="center fsize80"><b>PRESS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO.,<br /> -LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.</b></p> - -</div><!--leftcenter--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Pageiii">[iii]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak">TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<p>The translation of this book was undertaken at the -instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, who -desired to make use of it in the course in tactics in the -Army Service Schools.</p> - -<p>It is an epitome of the interpretation and application -of tactical principles in the various armies, discussed in -the light of the tactical views and methods prevailing in -Germany, and amplified by numerous examples from military -history.</p> - -<p>The professional value of this book to all officers of -our Regular Army and Militia who are endeavoring to -gain a working knowledge of tactics, is so obvious that -any comment would be superfluous.</p> - -<p class="highline15 blankbefore2"><span class="padl4">Army Service Schools,</span><br /> -<span class="padl14">Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,</span><br /> -<span class="padl24">December, 1910.</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Pageiv">[iv-<br />v]<a id="Pagev"></a></span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak">PREFACE.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<p>The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its -first edition in 1896, and for which the preparatory work -reached back more than a decade, now appears in its -fourth edition in a completely changed form. The lessons -gained in war and improvements in weapons have corrected -many earlier views. While the Boer war confused -the views on infantry combat and brought forth more -lessons in a negative than in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese -war has had a great educating influence, in that -it corroborated the soundness of the lessons gained in the -Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those -lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. -The fundamental principles upon which success depends -have remained the same.</p> - -<p>For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s -wishes for a new edition. It would not have been -difficult to publish long ago a new edition, based upon the -many lessons of war communicated to me by members of -foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But, -after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more -inclined to avail myself once more of the opportunity of -gaining practical experience by service with troops. Pure -theoretical reflection is only too apt to depart from the requirements -of practice and to overlook the friction appearing -everywhere. The battalion commander, more than -any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor -of his officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. -Moreover, the proximity of the maneuver ground to my -present station gave me an opportunity of observing the<span class="pagenum" id="Pagevi">[vi]</span> -field training of a large number of battalions and regiments -of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with -brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several -trips abroad and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, -furnished valuable suggestions. I postponed issuing the -new edition until the publication of the new Russian and -Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our own excellent -regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from -the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was -further able to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian -(1905), Belgian (1906), U. S. (1904), British (1905), and -Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations. This enumeration alone -justifies the statement, “completely revised,” appearing on -the title page.</p> - -<p>I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign -experiences in detail. The words of Lieutenant-General -Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Army, to whose writings -I owe a great deal, deserve special attention in studying -the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is a blessing -that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably -it is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is -finally incapable of assimilating the lessons gained by -other armies. Military attachés may discover the most -important points in the training and employment of foreign -armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but -their comrades will pay no more attention to them than -did Napoleon III. to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army -before the outbreak of the Franco-German war.”</p> - -<p>The treatment of the subject matter has remained the -same throughout; it represents, as in the first edition, the -principle that tactical lessons must be deduced from human -nature, from the effect of weapons, and from experience -in war, proper regard being had for national characteristics -and historical transmission. <i>Tactics is psychology.</i> -My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, -upon the works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General<span class="pagenum" id="Pagevii">[vii]</span> -Rohne. The publications of Historical Section I of the -Great General Staff and the splendid works of the late -Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited from -military history. An almost too copious literature is -already available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs -(<cite>Einzelschriften</cite>) of the Great General Staff, and of -Streffleur, especially “<i>Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern</i>,” -published by the latter, afford a rich field for -research.</p> - -<p>It is not difficult to cite examples from military history -in support of any tactical procedure, but such examples -require a very careful sifting before they can be recommended -as worthy models for our action in front of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal -shock action from the experience gained by them in their -combats in Upper Italy in 1859, and the British were not -very far removed from completely denying the feasibility of -making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the desire to -avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity -of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians -finally had to learn again the same bitter lessons as -at Plevna.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears -in Athens a translation in Modern Greek from the pen of -Captain Strategos of the Greek General Staff, well known -to many German officers from his War Academy days.</p> - -<p>It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the -same kind reception at home and abroad that was given -its three predecessors. For all communications, suggestions -or corrections, directed either to me or to my publisher, -I will be sincerely grateful.</p> - -<p class="right padr4 blankbefore1"><span class="smcap">The Author.</span></p> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Posen</span>, March, 1908.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Pageviii">[viii-<br />ix]<a id="Pageix"></a></span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak">CONTENTS.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<table class="toc" summary="ToC"> - -<tr> -<td colspan="5" class="maintitle"><b>INTRODUCTION.</b></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="4"> </td> -<td class="right fsize80">PAGE</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>War</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page1">1</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Eternal peace</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page1">1</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">War the <i>ultimo ratio</i> of state policy</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page2">2</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Courts of arbitration</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page3">3</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Strategy and Tactics</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page4">4</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Definition of strategy and tactics</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page4">4</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Relation of strategy to tactics</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page6">6</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Method of Instruction</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page7">7</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Value of examples</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page8">8</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Applicatory method</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page10">10</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Advantages and disadvantages</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page10">10</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Arrangement of the subject matter</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page12">12</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Drill Regulations</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page13">13</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Instructions for campaign</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page15">15</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Regulations and the science of combat</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page15">15</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="5" class="maintitle"><b>THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.</b></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>I.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page19">19</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Importance and Employment of Infantry</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page19">19</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Relative strength as compared to other arms</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page19">19</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Élite infantry. Guards</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page21">21</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Jägers and riflemen</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page22">22</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Mountain infantry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page23">23</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Machine guns</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page24">24</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Mounted infantry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page25">25</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Patrols and scouting detachments</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page27">27</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Cyclists</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page28">28</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Snowshoe runners</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page30">30</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Tactical Unit</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page32">32</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Organization</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page34">34</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The company</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page34">34</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Peace and war strength</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page35">35</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The battalion</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page36">36</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The regiment</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page37">37</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The brigade</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page37">37</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Intrenching Tool Equipment</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagex">[x]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page38">38</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Load of the Infantryman</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page39">39</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Comparison of the loads carried by infantrymen in various armies</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page40">40</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>II.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE FORMATIONS</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page41">41</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Issue of Orders</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page41">41</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Trumpet signals</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page41">41</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Purpose of Formations. Comparison Between Line and Column</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page42">42</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Assembly and route formations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page42">42</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Maneuver and combat formations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page43">43</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Napoleonic columns</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page44">44</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Comparison between line and column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page44">44</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The origin of column tactics</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page44">44</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Company</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page46">46</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>a</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Formation of the company</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page46">46</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="subsecname">Number of ranks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page46">46</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="subsecname">Interval and distance</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page47">47</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="subsecname">Front and facing distance</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page48">48</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>b</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Division of the company into three or four platoons</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page48">48</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Losses among officers</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page50">50</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Length of Pace and Marching</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page53">53</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Comparison (table)</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page54">54</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Double time</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page55">55</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Movements of the Company in Line</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page56">56</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Columns of the Company. Movements in Column. Formation of Line</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page56">56</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Column of twos</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page56">56</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Column of squads</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page57">57</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Route column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page57">57</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Column of fours</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page58">58</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Double column of squads</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page59">59</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Comparison of column of fours with column of squads</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page59">59</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The importance of the squad</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page59">59</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The employment of the column of squads</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page59">59</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Company column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page60">60</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Column of platoons</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page61">61</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Column of sections</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page61">61</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Guidon flags</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page63">63</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Posts of platoon commanders</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page63">63</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Movements in column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page64">64</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Suggestions made by Colonel Fumet, French Army</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page65">65</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>7.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Battalion</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexi">[xi]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page67">67</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Normal formation of the German battalion</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page67">67</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The color</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page68">68</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Formations in various armies</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page69">69</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The value of double column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page71">71</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The battalion in route column</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page72">72</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>8.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Regiment and the Brigade</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page73">73</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Formation in line or in echelon</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page73">73</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>9.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Extended Order</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page75">75</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Thin and dense skirmish lines</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page75">75</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>a</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">The formation of the skirmish line</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page78">78</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>b</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Movements in skirmish line</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page81">81</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Advance by rushes</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page82">82</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Time required for making a rush. Strength of the force making the rush</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page83">83</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Rising</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page84">84</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Short or long rushes</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page85">85</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Advance by crawling</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page86">86</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Lessons of the Boer War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page88">88</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page89">89</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of the various regulations relative to the advance by rushes</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page90">90</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Fire while in motion</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page92">92</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples of the employment of fire while in motion</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page93">93</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples of the employment of rushes</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page93">93</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>c</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Reinforcing the firing line</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page96">96</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>d</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Closing up. Assembling. Re-forming</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page97">97</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>10.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Supports</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page98">98</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Duties</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page98">98</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Distance</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page99">99</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Commander</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page100">100</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Movements</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page100">100</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Formation</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page100">100</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Supports in rear of the firing line or not?</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page101">101</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>11.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Comparison Between Close and Extended Order</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page102">102</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Necessity of drill</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page104">104</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Combat drill</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page105">105</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Training</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page105">105</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Training of leaders</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page109">109</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>III.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page111">111</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno letter"><b>A.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page111">111</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Field Gun</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page111">111</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Percussion shrapnel<span class="pagenum" id="Pagexii">[xii]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page111">111</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Time shrapnel</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page112">112</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Shell</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page115">115</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The French <i>obus allongé</i></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page115">115</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Light Field Howitzer</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page116">116</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Heavy Field Howitzer</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page118">118</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Expedients for Minimizing the Effect of Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page118">118</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>a</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page119">119</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>b</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Minimizing the effect of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page120">120</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Results Obtained by Artillery Against Various Targets</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page122">122</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">French data</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page123">123</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Effect of Shrapnel Bullets on Animate Targets</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page125">125</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno letter"><b>B.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>INFANTRY FIRE</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page126">126</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Effect of a Single Projectile on Animate Targets</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page126">126</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Explosive effect</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page127">127</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Tumbling bullets</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page127">127</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Effect of “S” Bullets on Materials</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page131">131</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>IV.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page132">132</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Stunning and exhaustive effect</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page132">132</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The engagement at Modder River, Nov. 28, 1899</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page132">132</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Fire Discipline</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page133">133</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The employment of the bayonet; bayonet fencing</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page134">134</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Fire Control and Fire Direction</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page134">134</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Squad leaders</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page135">135</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Company commanders</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page136">136</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Uncontrolled fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page136">136</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Russian experiences in the Far East</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page137">137</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Selection of the Line to be Occupied</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page138">138</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Strength of the Firing Line</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page139">139</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Ascertaining Ranges</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page140">140</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Influence of the knowledge of the range upon the efficacy of the fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page140">140</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Ascertaining ranges by pacing or galloping</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page141">141</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Influence of the terrain upon the length of pace</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page141">141</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Errors of estimation</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page142">142</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations<span class="pagenum" id="Pagexiii">[xiii]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page143">143</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Memorizing distinguishing marks on the enemy</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page144">144</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Scaling the range from maps</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page144">144</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Obtaining the range from other troops</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page145">145</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Trial volleys fired for the purpose of obtaining proper sight elevation</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page145">145</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Range finding instruments</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page146">146</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Selection of a Target and Time for Opening Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page147">147</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Short or long range fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page147">147</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Limit of long range fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page147">147</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The moral effect of withholding the fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page151">151</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Marshal Bugeaud’s narrative</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page151">151</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page153">153</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">General rules for opening fire in attack and defense</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page154">154</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>7.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Pauses in the Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page155">155</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>8.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Kinds of Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page157">157</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Volley fire and fire at will; bursts of fire (<i>rafales</i>)</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page158">158</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The rate of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page160">160</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The influence of the rate of fire upon the efficacy of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page161">161</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The volley</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page163">163</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Bursts of fire (<i>rafales</i>)</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page164">164</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>9.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Rear Sight Elevations and Points of Aim</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page165">165</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>10.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Commands</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page166">166</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>11.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Observation of the Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page167">167</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>12.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Effect of Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page167">167</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Comparison between losses produced by infantry and artillery fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page167">167</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>a</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Influence of training</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page168">168</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>b</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Influence of the error in estimating the range</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page170">170</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>c</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Fire effect as regards time. Number of rounds to be expended</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page172">172</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>d</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Additional influences affecting the accuracy of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page173">173</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="subsecname">Wolozkoi’s theory of the effect of the constant cone of misses</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page173">173</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>e</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Influence of rifle-rests in firing</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page178">178</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="subsecno">(<i>f</i>)</td> -<td class="subsecname">Influence of the ground</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page179">179</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Danger space and beaten zone</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page179">179</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Firing upon hill positions</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page183">183</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Indirect rifle fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page184">184</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Ricochets</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page185">185</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>13.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Losses In Action</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexiv">[xiv]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page185">185</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Losses in the various formations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page186">186</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Losses among officers</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page189">189</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>14.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Moral Effect of Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page191">191</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The impressions produced upon General Bonnal by the battle of Wörth</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page191">191</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Surrenders of British troops in South Africa</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page192">192</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Limit of endurance in battle</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page193">193</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The “void of the battlefield”</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page194">194</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Mixing of organizations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page195">195</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Fighting power of improvised units</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page197">197</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Overcoming crises in action</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page198">198</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>V.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page201">201</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Normal Procedure</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page201">201</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The normal attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page202">202</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Drill attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page204">204</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Concentration, Development, and Deployment for Action</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page205">205</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Development for action</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page207">207</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Deployment for action</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page209">209</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Battalion, the Regiment, and the Brigade</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page210">210</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The battalion</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page210">210</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The regiment</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page214">214</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The brigade</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page216">216</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Base units</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page218">218</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples of changes of front</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page220">220</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Distribution in Depth and Frontage of Combat Formations</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page222">222</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Dangers of distribution in depth</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page222">222</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Plevna and Wafangu</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page222">222</a>, <a href="#Page223">223</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Distribution in depth necessary during the preparatory stage</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page224">224</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Contrast between distribution in depth and frontage</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page225">225</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Dangers of over-extension (Spicheren)</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page225">225</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Influence of fire effect and morale upon frontage</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page227">227</a>, <a href="#Page228">228</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Influence of the task assigned a force</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page231">231</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Delaying actions. Night attacks. Defense</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page232">232</a>, <a href="#Page233">233</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Approximate figures for the extent of front that may be covered</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page233">233</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Frontage of the several units</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Boer War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page238">238</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Russo-Japanese War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page239">239</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Table of troops per km. of front</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page240">240</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Recapitulation of the most important points governing frontage<span class="pagenum" id="Pagexv">[xv]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page241">241</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page241">241</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Combat Orders</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page243">243</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Combat tasks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page243">243</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Division of work in staffs</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page245">245</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Communication on the Battlefield</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page246">246</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Signal and wig-wag flags</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page246">246</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Signal arrangements in the Austrian, French and British armies</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page248">248</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>7.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Local Reconnaissance of the Infantry</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page248">248</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Reconnaissance in force</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page251">251</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The object of local reconnaissance</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page251">251</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Scouting detachments</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page252">252</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>8.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Importance of the Terrain</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page254">254</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The attack over an open plain</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page255">255</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The French group attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page256">256</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Combat sections</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page257">257</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>VI.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>MACHINE GUNS</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page259">259</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Development of the Arm</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page259">259</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Mounting and method of transportation</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page261">261</a>, <a href="#Page262">262</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Power of Machine Guns</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page262">262</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Kinds of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page263">263</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Combat value of machine guns and infantry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page267">267</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Infantry Versus Machine Guns</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page268">268</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Conduct of troops when exposed to machine gun fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page268">268</a>, <a href="#Page269">269</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Machine Guns in Germany</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page270">270</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Organization</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page270">270</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Formations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Machine gun companies</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page275">275</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Going Into Position</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page276">276</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Fire Fight</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page283">283</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Machine guns in the engagement at the Waterberg</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page283">283</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>7.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Machine Guns in Other Countries</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page284">284</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Switzerland</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page284">284</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Austria</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page286">286</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">England</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page289">289</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Japan and France</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page290">290</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Russia</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page290">290</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Machine guns at Liao Yang, 1904</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page291">291</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>8.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Employment of Machine Gun Batteries</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexvi">[xvi]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page293">293</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Rencontre and attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page295">295</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Rear guards</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page295">295</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Defense</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page295">295</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Coöperation with cavalry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page296">296</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Machine guns versus artillery</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page297">297</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">English views</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page297">297</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Swiss views</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page299">299</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>VII.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page301">301</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Deployment for firing</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page303">303</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Moral effect of a charge</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page306">306</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Aiming positions</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page307">307</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Time for opening fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page308">308</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Selection of sight elevation</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page310">310</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Kind of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page310">310</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Distribution of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page311">311</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page311">311</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Advance against cavalry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page313">313</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Infantry versus dismounted cavalry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page313">313</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page314">314</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>VIII.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page316">316</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Passage of Infantry Through Artillery Lines</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page316">316</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Advance Under Artillery Fire</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page318">318</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page318">318</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Fire for effect</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page320">320</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Formations used by infantry when under artillery fire Russo-Japanese War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page322">322</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Lessons of war</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page321">321</a>, <a href="#Page323">323</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Firing on Hostile Artillery in Position</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page324">324</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Cover afforded by steel shields</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page324">324</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>IX.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE ATTACK</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page329">329</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Attack and defense compared</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page329">329</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Surprise</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page330">330</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples of surprises</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page331">331</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Rencontre</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page333">333</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Conduct of the advance guard</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page334">334</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Issue of orders</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page336">336</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Conduct of the main body</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page338">338</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page339">339</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page339">339</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>X.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexvii">[xvii]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page340">340</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Lessons of War</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page340">340</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Boer War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page340">340</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The infantry attack in the Russo-Japanese War</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page340">340</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Russian infantry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page340">340</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Japanese infantry</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page341">341</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Examples</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page343">343</a>, <a href="#Page344">344</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Conditions Upon which Success Depends</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page345">345</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Preparation of the Attack</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page346">346</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Reconnaissance. Preparatory position</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page346">346</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Coöperation of Infantry and Artillery in Battle</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page351">351</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Preparation of the assault</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page352">352</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Point of Attack</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page355">355</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>6.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Envelopment</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page356">356</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Holding attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page357">357</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Launching the enveloping force</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page359">359</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Separation of holding and flank attacks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page361">361</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page362">362</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>7.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Removal of Packs</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page363">363</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>8.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Employment of Machine Guns</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page365">365</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>9.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Conduct of the Attack</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page365">365</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The advance of the firing line</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page365">365</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Distances</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page368">368</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The fire fight</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page369">369</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The superiority of fire</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page370">370</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Fixing bayonets</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page372">372</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>10.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Assault</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page373">373</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The decision to assault</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page373">373</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The decision to assault emanating from the firing line</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page375">375</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Fire support during the assault</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page379">379</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Bayonet fights</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page382">382</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Wounds produced by cutting weapons</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page384">384</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Assaulting distances</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page385">385</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Conduct after a successful attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page385">385</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Conduct after an unsuccessful attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page386">386</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>11.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Use of the Spade in Attack</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page387">387</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Sand bags</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page390">390</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Results of Russian experiments</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page390">390</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page392">392</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">General rules governing the use of the spade in attack<span class="pagenum" id="Pagexviii">[xviii]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page393">393</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>12.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Employment of Reserves</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page394">394</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Launching or withholding reserves</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page395">395</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>13.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Conduct of the Leaders in Action</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page399">399</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>14.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>United Action Versus Tactical Missions</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page401">401</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The attack on the “Tannenwäldchen” at Colombey Aug. 14, 1870</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page402">402</a>, <a href="#Page403">403</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The attack on Grugies (St. Quentin)</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page403">403</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The dangers of assigning tasks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page405">405</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>XI.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE DEFENSE</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page408">408</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Passive Defense</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page409">409</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Defense Seeking a Decision</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page409">409</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Troops required to occupy the position</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page410">410</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Division of the position into sections</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page411">411</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Advanced positions</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page413">413</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Fortifying the Position</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page415">415</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Battalion groups</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page417">417</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Observation of the foreground</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page420">420</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Clearing the foreground</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page421">421</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Dummy intrenchments and masks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page421">421</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Cover trenches and communicating trenches</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page421">421</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Obstacles</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page422">422</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Russian views</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page422">422</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>4.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Conduct of the Defense</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page423">423</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Protection of the flanks</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page425">425</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Employment of machine guns</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page425">425</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Occupation of the position</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page426">426</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>5.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>The Counter-Attack</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page428">428</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Position of the general reserve</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page429">429</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The moment for making the counter-attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page432">432</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The counter-attack after the position is carried</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page433">433</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The counter-attack in conjunction with a movement to the rear</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page434">434</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Frontal counter-attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page436">436</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Provisions of various regulations</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page438">438</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>XII.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE RETREAT</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page440">440</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Breaking off an action</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page441">441</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Rallying positions</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page442">442</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>XIII.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>CONTAINING ACTIONS</b><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexix">[xix]</span></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page445">445</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The delaying action and the holding attack</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page445">445</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>XIV.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page448">448</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Austrian Drill Regulations of 1903</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page448">448</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Italian Drill Regulations of 1903 and 1906</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page451">451</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The French Drill Regulations of 1904</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page453">453</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The British Drill Regulations of 1905</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page459">459</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Japanese Drill Regulations of 1907</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page463">463</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Russian Drill Regulations of 1907</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page466">466</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">The Swiss Drill Regulations of 1908</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page466">466</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="chapno"><b>XV.</b></td> -<td colspan="3" class="chapname"><b>THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page468">468</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>1.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Historical Sketch</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page468">468</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Table showing ammunition supply of the various armies of the world</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page475">475</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>2.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>Regulations Governing the Supply of Ammunition in Armies</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page476">476</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Germany</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page476">476</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Austria</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page479">479</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Russia</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page480">480</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">France</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page480">480</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">England</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page482">482</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="subsecname">Italy</td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page483">483</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="secno"><b>3.</b></td> -<td colspan="2" class="secname"><b>What Deductions May Be Made From the Regulations of the Various Armies</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page483">483</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="4" class="chapname"><b>INDEX</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page487">487</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="4" class="chapname"><b>INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY</b></td> -<td class="pageno"><a href="#Page527">527</a></td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexx">[xx-<br />xxi]<a id="Pagexxi"></a></span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak">ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<table class="abbrs" summary="Abbreviations"> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">C. D. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Cavalry Drill Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">F. A. D. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Field Artillery Drill Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">F. A. F. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Field Artillery Firing Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">F. S. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Field Service Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="3" class="long">Gen. St. W. (<cite>Generalstabswerk</cite>) -= -German General Staff account of the Franco-German War (unless otherwise indicated).</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">I. D. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Infantry Drill Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="abbr">I. F. R.</td> -<td class="equals">=</td> -<td class="fullterm">Infantry Firing Regulations.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p class="noindent">g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains.<br /> -kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs.<br /> -kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram -through a meter against the force of gravity.<br /> -m. = meter = 39.37 in.<br /> -km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or <sup>5</sup>⁄<sub>8</sub> mile.<br /> -x = pace.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Pagexxii"><a id="Pagexxiii"></a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page1">[1]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2 class="text">INTRODUCTION.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page2">[2]</span></p> - -<h4>1. WAR.</h4> - -<p>Clausewitz, in his work <cite>On War</cite>, defines war as “a -continuation of state policy by other means; an act of violence -committed to force the opponent to comply with our will.” -The civil code is incapable of furnishing full satisfaction to -individuals in cases of outraged honor, and is obliged, under -certain circumstances, to allow the injured party to obtain -such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of the offender -or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is no -law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for -affronts to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as -impossible to abolish war in the world, in the family of -nations, as it would be to abolish dueling among the subjects -of a state. The total abolition of dueling would produce the -same results on the life of the individual that the cessation -of wars would produce on the development of the national -life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with one -another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, -1880, to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a -beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling -the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; -courage and unselfishness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice -even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in -materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in -1869.<a id="FNanchor1" href="#Footnote1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, -is apt to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted -period of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by -society causes not only the downfall of the state but destroys -at the same time all those ideals which make life worth living. -Narrow provincialism or selfish and worldly activity, looking -only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual, -undermines the foundations of a higher moral philosophy and -the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain conclusion that -the life object of the individual is acquisition and enjoyment; -that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the business -affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise -providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they -conclude that war, which interferes with man’s activities, -is the greatest evil, and that modern armies are only a sorry -remnant of mediaeval barbarism. * * * It proves a -positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits it to -a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached -to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, -the more violent the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds -in the service of the state. * * *” “The moment the -state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at stake,’ there is aroused -in a free people that highest of all virtues, the courage of -self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace nor be -developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions -are united in the one thought—the fatherland; they are animated -by that common sentiment of devotion unto death—patriotism—which, -once experienced, is never again forgotten, -and which ennobles and hallows the life of a whole generation. -* * *” The greatness of war lies in those very -phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A -great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.<a id="FNanchor2" href="#Footnote2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -“That is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, -a nation is not only permitted to force a way for -its righteous cause and resort to war, but it is its duty to do -so. War always has been, and, so long as men and nations -exist on the earth, it always will be, the <i>ultima ratio</i>.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote1" href="#FNanchor1" class="label">  [1]</a> -<cite>Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland</cite>, -in <cite>Historische und politische -Aufsätze</cite>, New edition, II.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote2" href="#FNanchor2" class="label">  [2]</a> <cite>Das grosze Jahr</cite>, in -<cite>Hammerschläge und Historien</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page3">[3]</span></p> - -<p>Since war is the <i>ultima ratio</i> of state policy, and as a -sovereign state must insist on absolute independence in determining -its affairs and its course of action, it follows that -the verdict of a court of arbitration, on the larger and more -serious questions, can have a decisive influence on the action -of the contending parties only if the arbitrator possesses the -power to enforce his decision, and is embued with a determination -to use that power. Thus the Pope was able to arbitrate -the question of right between Germany and Spain as to -the possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict -could never decide the question of might between Germany -and France as to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine.<a id="FNanchor3" href="#Footnote3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote3" href="#FNanchor3" class="label">  [3]</a> The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for a settlement -of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was to be enforced by -summary proceedings when necessary. The war of 1866 proved that the paragraphs -of the constitution mentioned, of necessity had to fail the moment the -vital interests of two powerful states came into conflict. See <span class="smcap">von Lettow-Vorbeck</span>, -<cite>Geschichte des Krieges von 1866</cite>, I, p. 115.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The utopian plans for a universal international court of -arbitration are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted -with the harsh facts of reality, if their ideas are -not, indeed—as are many proposals for disarmament—calculated -to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.</p> - -<p>If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, -then the question of right between two states at once becomes -a question of might. But the existence of a spirit of fair -play is taken into account nevertheless, for each party to the -controversy will seek to have the justice of its cause recognized. -The moral support engendered by fighting for a just -cause is so great that no state is willing to dispense with it.<a id="FNanchor4" href="#Footnote4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -This circumstance, coupled with the growing power of public -opinion and with the influence of representative government, -has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between -cabinets, like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer<span class="pagenum" id="Page4">[4]</span> -possible. As a result of the universal liability to service, -the whole nation takes part in a war; every class of society -suffers and has its pursuits interfered with; everything -presses to an early decision, to a prompt crushing of the -opponent.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote4" href="#FNanchor4" class="label">  [4]</a> “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for an industrious -jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.” <span class="smcap">Frederick II.</span></p> - -<p>“Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in which lies our -last hope.” <span class="smcap">Machiavelli</span>, <cite>Il Principe</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by -occupying the hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources -of supply, so that he will be convinced of the futility of -further resistance. (Campaigns of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71). -Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary to continue the -war until the power of resistance of the hostile state is completely -destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to -which the enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled -or broken, in order to compel peace, depends upon his -tenacity. Political considerations will also have to be taken -into account in answering this question. From the military -point of view, however, the purpose of every war will always -be the complete overthrow of the enemy.</p> - -<h4>2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.</h4> - -<p>Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing -the scope of each, have been vainly sought in the past. -That efforts in this direction have led to no results is only -natural, as tactics and strategy are complementary subjects -that often encroach upon each other, while grand tactics is -frequently identical with strategy.</p> - -<p>Von Bülow, the author of <cite>The Spirit of Modern Warfare</cite> -(1798)<a id="FNanchor5" href="#Footnote5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>, calls those movements strategical which are -made outside the enemy’s sphere of information. Von Willisen -considers strategy the science of communications, tactics -the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz calls strategy the -science of the use of battles for the purpose of the war<span class="pagenum" id="Page5">[5]</span> -(Jomini: “<i>l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres d’opérations</i>”)<a id="FNanchor6" href="#Footnote6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>, -tactics the science of the use of military forces in -battle (Jomini: “<i>l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de -bataille</i>”).<a id="FNanchor7" href="#Footnote7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a><a id="FNanchor8" href="#Footnote8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy -as the study of the conditions necessary for success in war. -Archduke Charles calls strategy the “science of war” and -tactics the “art of war”. Frederick the Great and Napoleon -always employed the term “<i>l’art de guerre</i>” instead of the -term “<i>strategy</i>”. None of these definitions are comprehensive -enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, the -supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor -Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy -is the science of utilizing military resources for the attainment -of the object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops -into and in battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead -of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with -explaining the problems of each: “<i>Le stratège doit concevoir -le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le -théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et -diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour -mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en -bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager -l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre -le but proposé.</i>”<a id="FNanchor9" href="#Footnote9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the<span class="pagenum" id="Page6">[6]</span> -application of common sense to the conduct of war.”<a id="FNanchor10" href="#Footnote10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> For -practical purposes it is sufficient to define strategy as the -<i>science of the conduct of war</i>, tactics as the <i>science of troop-leading</i>. -Strategy brings about the decision on the theater -of war, while the duty of carrying it out, in the manner -desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. -Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The -concentric advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in -1866 naturally led to a complete envelopment of the Austrians -on the field of Königgrätz. The German attack in the battle -on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based on the strategical -requirement of driving the French from their line of retreat -leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right -flank. The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, -which was holding the enemy in front, to envelop the left -wing of the French, interfered with the execution of the -correct strategical plan. Thus, in following up a success, -in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the leading -basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened -here that Moltke censured in his official report on the war -of 1866, wherein he stated: “The higher commanders have -not been able to make their influence felt down to the subordinate -grades. Frequently, as soon as the divisions and -brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all control -over them has entirely ceased.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote5" href="#FNanchor5" class="label">  [5]</a> <cite>Geist des neueren Kriegssystems.</cite></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote6" href="#FNanchor6" class="label">  [6]</a> “The art of directing armies in the theater of operations.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote7" href="#FNanchor7" class="label">  [7]</a> “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote8" href="#FNanchor8" class="label">  [8]</a> “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the regulation of -their activity with reference to battle, has been included in the term ‘tactics’, -while the term strategy is synonymous with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters -as fall into the domain of tactics.” <span class="smcap">Blume</span>, <cite>Strategie</cite>, p. 33.</p> - -<p>“Tactics teaches <i>how</i>, and strategy <i>why</i>, one should fight.” General <span class="smcap">v. -Scherff</span>.</p> - -<p>Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of armies, while -the manner of execution belongs to tactics.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote9" href="#FNanchor9" class="label">  [9]</a> “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a comprehensive -glance the entire probable theater of war, establish the lines of operations and -direct the masses on the decisive points.</p> - -<p>“It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of march of the -troops, to form them for battle at the various points determined by strategy, to -begin the action, to sustain it, and to maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” -<span class="smcap">Thiers.</span></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote10" href="#FNanchor10" class="label"> [10]</a> <span class="smcap">v. Moltke</span>, -<cite>Tactical Problems, No. 58</cite> (1878) p. 133.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics -to strategy a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions -of strategy; where the two come in conflict, where strategical -considerations are opposed to tactical interests, the strategical -considerations should, as a rule, take precedence. Tactics -must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to neutralize -existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz -not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages -of terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the -proper importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces.<span class="pagenum" id="Page7">[7]</span> -Should the demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics -on the battlefield, the latter must unquestionably take precedence, -since the general’s foremost thought must be the annihilation -of the hostile forces. Tactical considerations should -likewise govern in the selection of the direction of attack in -a battle, strategical reasons for striking in this or that direction -becoming effective only after the attainment of tactical -success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and -their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with -the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; -but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates -the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for -further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the -presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the -newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal <span class="smcap">Moltke</span>.<a id="FNanchor11" href="#Footnote11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote11" href="#FNanchor11" class="label"> [11]</a> The view that the direction of attack should be governed by the possibility -of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by General v. Scherff, who -says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced by the question ‘will the attack -here or there be tactically easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it -there be strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course with -reference to measures on the battlefield.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.</h4> - -<p>While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms -the basis of the higher art of war, military history is for us -the principal source from which to gather knowledge.<a id="FNanchor12" href="#Footnote12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote12" href="#FNanchor12" class="label"> [12]</a> -See lecture by Prince <span class="smcap">Hohenlohe</span>: <cite>Kriegserfahrung und Kriegsgeschichte</cite>, -Neisse, 1879.</p> - -<p>“Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only true philosophy. -Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the great captains; -it is the only means of learning the art of war.” <span class="smcap">Napoleon I.</span>, on April 17th, -1821.</p> - -<p>“Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the memory, -provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment should pass upon.” -<span class="smcap">Frederick the Great.</span></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack -personal experience in war, we can test the results of our -reflections and of our experience on the drillground. Military -history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling<span class="pagenum" id="Page8">[8]</span> -factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, -and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted -measure. One must learn the conduct of war from -the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and -is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, -of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained -too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the -Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the -British in South Africa. “<i>Les Autrichiens</i>,” says Colonel -Foch,<a id="FNanchor13" href="#Footnote13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> “<i>ont fait la guerre sans la comprendre, les Prussiens -l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont étudiée.</i>” “Military -history is neither a compilation of clever theories nor a book -designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, on the contrary, -a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows us to -view and grasp matters which we have never before been -in a position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to -confront us in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and -demand unpremeditated, instant and decisive action, entailing -heavy responsibilities. Military history, it is true, offers us, -in the first instance, only events and their outline, conditions -and phenomena, but it also presents, what the cleverest theory -is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of the disturbing -elements in war, an illustration of the influences, doubts, -embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. -It describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical -military common sense in surmounting these difficulties. -It prepares in advance the mental balance necessary at the -moment of action; it should prepare also for the unexpected. -It affords a substitute for lack of military experience, for the -accumulation of which the life of the individual, prior to the -moment of action, has been too short.”<a id="FNanchor14" href="#Footnote14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The pedantic enumeration -of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot<span class="pagenum" id="Page9">[9]</span> -suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from -military history in support of any opinion; frequently even -an incorrect tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. -For in war the action taken is as often wrong as -correct; the scales are turned by factors which in most cases -appear indistinctly or not at all. The experiences of military -history must, therefore, only be used with caution if tactical -lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion to -historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, -“has the further disadvantage that some readers are either -not sufficiently acquainted with these events, or remember -them too imperfectly to enter into the author’s ideas, so that -such students are compelled to accept his statements blindly -or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very difficult to -describe historical events as they ought to be described if -they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the -means, as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. -We maintain, however, that in establishing a new -or a doubtful view, a single event, thoroughly described, is -more instructive than a mere allusion to ten. The principal -evil resulting from a superficial reference to historical events -does not lie in the fact that the author cites them incorrectly -in support of his theory, but in the fact that he has never -become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In consequence -of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, -a hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, -which would never have appeared if the author had -been compelled to deduce, from a careful analysis of the connected -facts in the case, what he publishes and wishes to support -by historical proofs. If we have convinced ourselves -of the above outlined difficulties attending the employment of -historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for thoroughness -in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that -the more recent military history is the most natural source -from which to select examples, inasmuch as recent history<span class="pagenum" id="Page10">[10]</span> -alone is sufficiently known and analyzed.”<a id="FNanchor15" href="#Footnote15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The events from -military history mentioned in this work are cited simply as -proofs of certain phenomena; the proper analysis of these -proofs must be left to the student.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote13" href="#FNanchor13" class="label"> [13]</a> <cite>Principes de la -Guerre</cite>, 1903.</p> - -<p>“The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding it; -the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied it.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote14" href="#FNanchor14" class="label"> [14]</a> From <cite>Meinungen und Mahnungen</cite>, Vienna, 1894.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote15" href="#FNanchor15" class="label"> [15]</a> <cite>On War</cite>, II, Chapter 6, p. 111.</p> - -<p>See also <span class="smcap">Clausewitz’</span> remarks on “<cite>Criticism</cite>,” II, Chapter 5.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The applicatory method<a id="FNanchor16" href="#Footnote16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> is used frequently by preference -as the system of instruction, but its creator, General von -Verdy du Vernois, considers it merely a complement of the -deductive method, on which it is predicated and based. “The -weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies -in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written -by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and -that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in -the same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too -well known. For, although we ordinarily find principles -represented in a connected form, this method of instruction -can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection -with the details of the events described.”<a id="FNanchor17" href="#Footnote17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> The success of -the applicatory method depends largely upon the individuality -of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal intercourse -between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses -a thorough professional knowledge, who is master of -his subject, and who has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, -will be able to produce imaginary scenes which faithfully -represent reality and are free from objectionable features. -By constant practice with specific cases, under the -most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way -be taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired -in issuing appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger -of using nothing but the applicatory method must be noted. -The instructor, as representative of a definite theory, finds it -comparatively easy to select the conditions governing a specific -case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily<span class="pagenum" id="Page11">[11]</span> -appears to be the correct one. This is especially true -when the director of an applicatory problem determines the -action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, -or inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented -that the lesson in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose -and object of a tactical operation and allows of the -attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means necessary -to gain that object.<a id="FNanchor18" href="#Footnote18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> “He who is able to understand the -situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means -with which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental -operation, arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, -and will be able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, -provided he does not lose his head. If a clear comprehension -of the purpose in view and of the means for -carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of theory, the -estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by the -circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in -this direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically -belong to the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. -The two methods must, therefore, supplement each -other.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote16" href="#FNanchor16" class="label"> [16]</a> See <span class="smcap">Kühne</span>, -<cite>Kritische Wanderungen</cite>, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote17" href="#FNanchor17" class="label"> [17]</a> <span class="smcap">von Boguslawski</span>, -<cite>Entwickelung der Taktik</cite>, II, p. 17.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote18" href="#FNanchor18" class="label"> [18]</a> “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately a great number -of officers, imagining that they are solving the question, at once cry out: ‘Everything -depends on circumstances; according to the wind must the sails be set.’ -But if you do not know beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a -wind, how can you set the sail according to the wind?” <span class="smcap">Bugeaud</span>, -<cite>Aperçus sur -quelques détails de guerre</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of -character is required, providing the determination to execute, -in spite of unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized -as proper, and also the professional ability necessary to carry -out the determination to its logical conclusion. All that theory -can do toward forming this character is to emphasize its importance -and to refer students to military history. The applicatory -method, however, can develop strength of character -by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure -of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting -him to the influences of certain situations such as would<span class="pagenum" id="Page12">[12]</span> -be encountered in war (maneuvers). The means available -in tactical instruction in time of peace, for the development -of strength of character, are, however, very limited when -compared with the great demands made by the abnormal conditions -of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. -This should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate -the value of these means as well as the results to be obtained -from them in times of peace.</p> - -<p>After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating -the purpose and object of an operation, as well as the -means by which it may be attained, and applicatory practice -has performed its office of developing initiative and professional -skill, a third factor is still necessary—the study of military -history. From this fountain of knowledge both “theory” -and “applicatory method” must draw their material; to this -source they must again and again refer in order to guard -against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are -often as different from reality as day is from night.”<a id="FNanchor19" href="#Footnote19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote19" href="#FNanchor19" class="label"> [19]</a> <span class="smcap">F. C. v. H.</span> -(<i>Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General</i> <span class="smcap">Conrad v. Hötzendorf</span>, -Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). <cite>Zum Studium der Taktik</cite>, p. 2.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of -troops, tactics may be divided into two parts:</p> - -<p>1. <b>Formal tactics</b>, or that contained in drill regulations. -This portion of tactics furnishes the formations used -by troops when assembled, on the march, and in action, and -contains the regulations governing the conduct in battle of -troops acting alone without regard to the coöperation of -the other arms, and without reference to the terrain.</p> - -<p>2. <b>Applied tactics</b><a id="FNanchor20" href="#Footnote20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> deals with the combined action of -the several arms on the march, in camp, and in action, -taking into account influences of the terrain, seasons, and the -time of day in field warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly<span class="pagenum" id="Page13">[13]</span> -speaking, be included under this heading; that is to say, the -employment of tactical principles<a id="FNanchor21" href="#Footnote21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> pertaining to the mobile -arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and technical troops -on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the same in field -and fortress warfare; the only difference between them lies -in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation -of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history -shows that a clear distinction between field and fortress warfare -is impossible. (Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port -Arthur).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote20" href="#FNanchor20" class="label"> [20]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Boguslawski</span>, <cite>Entwickelung der Taktik</cite>, II, Chapter 23. “The higher, -Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of battles—subordinate, or minor -tactics, is the manner of fighting, or the battle-tactics of an arm considered in -its details.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote21" href="#FNanchor21" class="label"> [21]</a> -<span class="smcap">Major Gundelach</span>, <cite>Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg</cite>, Berlin, 1908.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>4. DRILL REGULATIONS.</h4> - -<p>Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical -views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the -tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment -of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented -by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, -is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, -inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is -the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, -appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, -therefore, necessitate new tactics.</p> - -<p>It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not -only taken place <i>after</i> changes in weapons, which necessarily -is the case, but that the interval between such changes has -been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that -an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or -two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the -inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can -be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”<a id="FNanchor22" href="#Footnote22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> -The history of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes<span class="pagenum" id="Page14">[14]</span> -more than one instructive example of the magnitude of such -“obstinate conservatism.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote22" href="#FNanchor22" class="label"> [22]</a> <span class="smcap">Mahan</span>, -<cite>The Influence of Sea Power upon History</cite>, pp. 9 and 10.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, -that, no matter with what far-sightedness such regulations -may have been originally compiled, they become antiquated -in a comparatively short time. Napoleon estimated this -period at ten years. Frequent changes are certainly not desirable, -if tactical development is not to be interfered with -and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing our -mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and -Landwehr. On the other hand, the regulations must keep -abreast of requirements if the conditions to which they owe -their existence have changed. In his “Military Fantasies” -the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article which -should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know -not why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ -It is just as necessary to teach that one must act -contrary to the regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops -as it will occur in action.”</p> - -<p>It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops -thereby relinquish a superiority previously possessed over -others, which knowledge they must later purchase, with -streams of blood, in the face of hostile bullets. Of what -avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the Russians in 1877, -were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical formations -that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer -weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?</p> - -<p>The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline -of the troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid -fire of unshaken infantry. The war experiences of our -regiments show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, -demolish superannuated formations and create new ones. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page15">[15]</span> -at what a sacrifice!<a id="FNanchor23" href="#Footnote23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> In the Franco-German war, superior -leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay this -price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks -these auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South -Africa. The initial failure of accustomed tactical formations -causes a dread of the frontal attack and finally leads some -tacticians to deny entirely even the feasibility of such an attack. -In peace training, therefore, set forms are of less importance; -stress should be laid on developing the faculty of -adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote23" href="#FNanchor23" class="label"> [23]</a> It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue “Instructions -for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained according to superannuated regulations, -for action on a strange theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate -the first experiences gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do -this in 1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this experience -for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870, the Füsilier -Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double column formed on the center, -although the campaign in Bohemia had already demonstrated that this formation -was out of date. See <span class="smcap">Moltke</span>, <cite>Feldzug von 1859</cite>, p. 65.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Further development and justification of the principles -of the drill regulations, and the modification of those principles -under certain assumptions, are reserved to the science -of tactics. Drill regulations should not be textbooks of tactics, -but, on the other hand, a textbook of tactics should deal -with formations only in so far as that is necessary to ensure -a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.</p> - -<p>“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain -sense very different subjects. The regulations are law, authority—no -doubt can be entertained on this point; but that -also invests them with the character of something fixed, at -least for a certain space of time. They cannot be kept up -to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly changing -and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would -indeed be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. -Here must enter the science of combat, which should be independent -in every direction, which should know no fixed -rules, and which should point to no other authority than that -of truth and reality. It is not the province of the science of<span class="pagenum" id="Page16">[16]</span> -combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which is in -keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into -consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing -and changing anew.”<a id="FNanchor24" href="#Footnote24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote24" href="#FNanchor24" class="label"> [24]</a> -<span class="smcap">Keim</span>, <cite>Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre</cite>, p. 1.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon -one’s own drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it -will investigate and compare the principles of the service -manuals of the different powers, and finally develop the -science still further by the aid of experience gained from -military history and the knowledge of the effect of weapons. -While these are the ever changing but nevertheless measurable -factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the -most important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader -must reckon with the action of men frequently exposed to the -influence of great exertions and great mental agitation. <i>A -doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate the -psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page17">[17]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2 class="text">THE -FORMAL TACTICS -OF -INFANTRY.</h2> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page18">[18-<br />19]<a id="Page19"></a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak">I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF -INFANTRY.</h4> - -<p>In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers -and importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction -of firearms, infantry has gradually increased in importance -and numbers as compared with the other arms.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was as -1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In the Swedish -army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient. During the era -of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion between the two -principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the Napoleonic wars as -1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4 per 1,000 men. In -the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the disadvantage of infantry. -At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the relative proportions of the -three arms in the German IInd Army were as follows: cavalry to infantry -as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men. The proportion between the -two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps of the German army, at the -outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as 1:18.8; on the first day of -the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6; at the opening of the campaign -there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at the close of the campaign 5.8 guns -per 1,000 men. This was still more marked in the Ist Bavarian Army -Corps, which, on October 31st, had 5.8 guns and on December 9th even -11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present Germany has approximately 6, and -France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing -mark on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according -to the combat formations of infantry, we may speak -of a period of “linear,” “column,” and “extended order” tactics. -Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and trained<span class="pagenum" id="Page20">[20]</span> -more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French -army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions, -but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a -large number of regiments of <i>gardes mobiles</i> and volunteers.</p> - -<p>Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as -for combat with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for -action in close as in extended order. It can fight on any -terrain which is at all passable, and is more independent of -weather and seasons than the other arms; it surpasses the -other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will -power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. -On the other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action -and through exertions on the march are greater than -those of the mounted arms.<a id="FNanchor25" href="#Footnote25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote25" href="#FNanchor25" class="label"> [25]</a> Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71:</p> - -<table class="sickness" summary="Sickness"> - -<tr> -<td class="left nopadl">Infantry:</td> -<td class="right">69.8;</td> -<td class="left">Field</td> -<td class="left">Officers:</td> -<td class="right">13.26;</td> -<td class="left">Captains:</td> -<td class="right">10.19;</td> -<td class="left">Lieutenants:</td> -<td class="right nopadr">3.85</td> -<td class="left nopadl">%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left nopadl">Artillery:</td> -<td class="right">57.7;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">4.04;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">4.84;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">4.52</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left nopadl">Cavalry:</td> -<td class="right">37.5;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">5.61;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">2.29;</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">3.24</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance -it can only by great exertions attain results which a -small force of cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. -Infantry acting alone therefore unquestionably requires -the assignment of mounted men for reconnaissance and messenger -duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry is like a -man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions -only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.</p> - -<p>The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt -when infantry encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, -owing to the limited range of its rifle. Infantry -cannot dispense with artillery when it has to attack localities -or fortified points in villages.</p> - -<p>The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction -made in the 18th Century between heavy infantry -(infantry of the line) and light infantry, the latter being employed -only in skirmish duty and in the service of security. -In the 18th Century the expensive method of recruiting by<span class="pagenum" id="Page21">[21]</span> -means of bounties made it necessary to avoid using troops -in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the expensive -personnel for decisive shock action <i>en masse</i>. Skirmishing -was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. -In Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased -to 24 at the close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, -on principle, opposed to the theory of light infantry. He demanded -but one species of infantry, “a good infantry.” In -spite of this, however, he became the originator of an <i>élite</i> -infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he created one -<i>voltigeur</i> and one <i>grenadier</i> company in each battalion. -While battalion tactics predominated, <i>i.e.</i>, until the close of -the campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in -most states. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia -still had in each battalion a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, -which, though not recruited at the expense of the -other companies, was formed of better material and received -special training in extended order fighting. Following the -example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the -third rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming -it into a third platoon in each company when in action. -This was called the sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed -of the best shots and the most skillful men of the company. -As late as the campaign of 1866 there were instances of the -employment of the combined sharpshooter platoons of a battalion. -Here we have an actual <i>élite</i> force assembled in provisional -organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the -troops, however.</p> - -<p>The system of column tactics, which required that every -company should be equally skilled in extended order fighting, -led to the abolishment of <i>élite</i> companies. The Prussian -<i>élite</i>, consisting of the platoons formed from the third rank, -although not always compatible with the employment of company -columns, was not abolished until 1876. The experience -of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page22">[22]</span> -extensive use of extended order formations, an independent -employment of single platoons was out of the question, as in -the course of an action the firing line absorbs not only entire -companies, but regiments and brigades; and, moreover, that -every platoon, as a unit for fire action, must possess those -elements which will carry it forward even after its leader -has fallen.</p> - -<p>Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers -from the entire army for use as a battle reserve. By -granting them privileges and by loading them with distinctions, -he attached them to his person, and they assumed the -character of household troops of a dynasty.</p> - -<p>The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. -They are not, strictly speaking, <i>corps d’élite</i>, for -they are not selected from the ranks of the army. While it -is true that the Prussian Guard receives a better class of recruits -and the composition of its corps of officers and the selection -of its commanders guarantee conspicuous results, its -principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves constantly -under the eye of the emperor.</p> - -<p>Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, -and their use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have -no tactical excuse for existing, except where they are specially -trained in mountain warfare (<i>Chasseurs alpins</i>, -<i>Alpini</i>)<a id="FNanchor26" href="#Footnote26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>, or -where they are intended to serve as a support for cavalry divisions. -(France). While Jäger-battalions are at present employed -like the rest of the infantry, they are retained by us -as such because of tradition and for reasons of organization -(they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an attempt -is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent -marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good -account whenever possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, -preferably for holding important points, and for combat<span class="pagenum" id="Page23">[23]</span> -and service of security on difficult terrain. Military experience -has shown, however, that in actual war it was seldom -possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; -that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, -and that infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder -with Jägers accomplished as good results as the latter. Since -the war of 1866 the demand for special employment of -Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the campaign of -1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, -gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment -only where, contrary to accepted notions, they fought side -by side with the rest of the infantry.<a id="FNanchor27" href="#Footnote27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote26" href="#FNanchor26" class="label"> [26]</a> See -<cite>Über Gebirgstruppen</cite>, VI, p. 273, and also <cite>Schweizerische -Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen</cite>, 1907, May to July.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">v. Graevenitz</span>, <cite>Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1903.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote27" href="#FNanchor27" class="label"> [27]</a> The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th Jäger-Battalion -at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the Guard at Lipa; or where during -an action a reverse threw us on the defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, -and also at Rosberitz). The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them -a special role, frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions -(3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to escort -baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at Soor; and the -1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at Schweinschädel); or they -distributed them along the whole front for the purpose of conducting extended -order fighting. When they were thus distributed among infantry organizations -their efforts merged with those of the infantry.</p> - -<p>For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted on both -flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd Jäger-Battalion was on this -day distributed by companies along the front of the entire division.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">v. Moltke</span>, <cite>Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866</cite>.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege 1870/71</cite>. On -page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are recorded (for instance: 5th -Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and -on January 19th, 1871, in siege positions in front of Paris).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to -troops, requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, -physical qualifications and special familiarity, that -neither every recruit nor every unit of the army will quite -fulfill all its demands, although the experience of Suworov, -during his campaign in the Alps, apparently contradicts this -statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by peace -training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not -suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain -warfare, a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and -at the same time ensuring the comfort of the men while at<span class="pagenum" id="Page24">[24]</span> -rest, is necessary. The lack of such mountain equipment is -keenly felt even during short exercises lasting only a few -days. Even Switzerland plans at present the formation of -three mountain brigades. Austria already has special mountain -brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger, -Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and -Dalmatia. The Italian <i>Alpini</i> (consisting of 22 battalions -in time of peace, to which militia companies are attached -on mobilization, and which have in addition a reserve of 22 -territorial companies) form a selected corps which is doubtless -capable of accomplishing excellent results. The Italians -propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is worthy -of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the -troops garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen -groups, each consisting of one battalion, one mountain -battery, one engineer company, and machine guns.</p> - -<p>As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted -officers to direct the firing line, it was natural to use the -more improved means of communication, the telephone and -telegraph, in addition to the visual signals employed by the -navy.</p> - -<p>The improvements made in weapons have had a further -influence on the transformation of the infantry. Even a -small force of infantry can with its magazine fire inflict annihilating -losses in a very short time on closed bodies offering -favorable targets, especially when this fire is delivered from -a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand, that -greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance, -which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers -with the troops, and, on the other hand, it necessitates the -employment of smaller independent detachments for our own -security and for harassing the enemy. Intimately connected -herewith is the introduction of machine guns, possessing -great mobility, which enables them to take advantage of -rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page25">[25]</span> -enemy and also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in -advance of the army.</p> - -<p>In England it was decided to form mounted infantry -charged with the additional duty of augmenting the fire of -a cavalry division, and of furnishing the commander-in-chief -with a reserve possessing the requisite mobility to permit its -being thrown to any threatened point of the long battle lines -of today. But of what importance is the fire of a single -battalion in the large armies of the present day? The principal -drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, -however, that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, -and that, while in motion, it really needs a supporting force. -In the Boer war the mounted infantry grew finally to a strength -of 50,000 men. As it was not confronted by cavalry, it -made good during the execution of wide turning movements, -which Lord Roberts employed with success for the purpose -of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended -their lines. In spite of these good services, it could -not be denied that mounted infantry had many faults. The -men knew nothing of the care of their mounts, as is evidenced -by the large percentage of horses which became unserviceable. -As mounted infantry units were improvised -bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and -tactical employment. After the war had lasted for some -time, the mounted infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten -their infantry character and deported themselves like -cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones. Thus, we find toward -the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by mounted -infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on -that of the Boers.</p> - -<p>In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all -those drawbacks which had been learned for centuries were -exemplified. As an improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs -the cohesion of organizations; if permanently organized, it -must become cavalry, just as the dragoons became cavalry:<span class="pagenum" id="Page26">[26]</span> -for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl and cannot -endure.</p> - -<p>The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry -lay down the following principles for its employment:</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be -lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On account -of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater distances, -and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning movements than -infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in the following cases:</p> - -<p>(a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front -of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse batteries -assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the fire of the cavalry. -It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as possible, tactically important -positions. It is to find positions from which it can bring fire, preferably -flanking fire, to bear on the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat -begins. It is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed -nucleus in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable -the cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves -exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are charged.</p> - -<p>(b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light mobile -reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a moment’s notice -from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending assistance, or for -influencing the action at particular points and for which other troops are -not available on account of the extraordinary extension of modern lines -of battle.</p> - -<p>(c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile column -in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in performing -this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in the service of -reconnaissance and patrolling.</p> - -<p>The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry -organizations:</p> - -<p>In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted -infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and every -brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each battalion -of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon, consisting of -two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40 men, and 54 horses). -Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of mounted infantry is: 28 -officers, 630 men, and 676 horses.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where -climatic conditions make long marches by European troops -impossible, or in cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at -distant points will exert a potent influence on the actions of<span class="pagenum" id="Page27">[27]</span> -an opponent. As shown by our experience in Southwest -Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry is colonial -(guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to prevent -the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country -return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the -principal actions. On European theaters of war, space is -lacking for the employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, -there are not enough horses. In organizing mounted -infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be of use only occasionally, -has been created at the expense of infantry and cavalry. -The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands for -local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening -the cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, -crippling its own fighting efficiency.</p> - -<p>For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting -detachments are used. Their usefulness in difficult country -and in enterprises against the enemy’s flank or rear cannot -be denied. In minor operations, by advancing on side roads, -they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance, secure the flanks -of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the -prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm foothold, -they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. -In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment -is lacking. To form special organizations of picked -men, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. An -organization cannot dispense with its best men in action; it -needs them as group leaders and as substitutes for disabled -non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without -a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization -is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become -apparent, however, when heavy losses deplete the ranks, -when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, -only the example of courageous men prevents the weak-kneed -from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate -the importance of psychological impressions during critical -combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his<span class="pagenum" id="Page28">[28]</span> -courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, -should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he -will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates -whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 -German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to despatch a -stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, -it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to -improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men -only imperfectly. From the standpoint of training, scouting -detachments have an entirely different value. They give -young infantry officers, who are tied to a command, an opportunity -to develop self-confidence, decision, and tactical -judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their own -responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed -in the young officers which will be of benefit to them -in a large battle. It is obvious that scouts should be assigned -bicycles to give them the mobility which infantry -lacks.</p> - -<p>If the roads are good, cyclists<a id="FNanchor28" href="#Footnote28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> will frequently be able to -take the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case -they remain with their organizations and perform the same -duties as the other soldiers. The employment of cyclists -is in accord with the principle that in war every resource the -country offers for warfare should be utilized. The advantage -of the use of cyclists for messenger service and their value to -the command generally is obvious; they are, in addition, -adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the divisional -cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves -to the formation of separate organizations for battle purposes -(each division has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked -men would thereby be withdrawn from the ranks of the -troops engaged. An improvised cyclist detachment would, in -addition, accomplish very little, as it would lack the thorough -peace training requisite for cohesive action as an organization.<span class="pagenum" id="Page29">[29]</span> -If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments -could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry<a id="FNanchor29" href="#Footnote29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> in advance of -the army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply -districts and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available -material in the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but -to proceed to the creation of cyclist companies in time of -peace. The material necessary for repairs and for ammunition -supply can only be entrusted to permanent organizations. -The advantages of cyclists are their great mobility,<a id="FNanchor30" href="#Footnote30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> their -prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else, the noiselessness -of their movements. Their weakness lies in their dependence -upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large -road space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in -column of twos take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and -in their dependence on the terrain. The last mentioned drawback -can be remedied apparently only by the adoption of a -folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment cannot be secured -on the machine, it is better in difficult country to push -the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when -necessary.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote28" href="#FNanchor28" class="label"> [28]</a> Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and -200, <span class="smcap">German F. S. R.</span></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote29" href="#FNanchor29" class="label"> [29]</a> By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry -freedom of action; by -advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the purpose of re-establishing -contact with the enemy, of forestalling him in occupying important points, or of -outflanking him: finally, by coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in -covering a retreat, in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote30" href="#FNanchor30" class="label"> [30]</a> According to the -<cite>Italian Regulations of 1904</cite>, the rate of march of cyclists is -as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate, 10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., -accelerated rate of march, up to 20 km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 -km., without long rests. For riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the formation -of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each <i>Bersaglieri</i> -Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be employed in supporting -a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished a good deal in -surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England the development of -cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers and their exercises have -demonstrated that such units are capable of expanding in a brief space -of time.</p> - -<p>In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered -valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division (1905). -Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming cyclist<span class="pagenum" id="Page30">[30]</span> -battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are advocates of -their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the brutal German -battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves which he would -form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September -10th, 1904, the cyclist company is to be looked upon as -infantry, which is capable of moving at great speed, but is -tied to the network of roads. The cyclist companies are -principally intended for defensive action, holding an important -point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to -serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted -for reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to -secure their flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly -in combination with other arms.</p> - -<p>In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be -used, recourse is had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) -or to the Norwegian snowshoe or ski (skee). In France, -Italy, Austria,<a id="FNanchor31" href="#Footnote31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland marching -on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in Germany the -troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is, however, -coming more and more into vogue among the rural -population of the German mountains.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote31" href="#FNanchor31" class="label"> [31]</a> One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is without -doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers -(Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In June, 1905, this detachment, consisting -of 4 officers, 15 men and 4 guides, all with field equipment, marched -around the base of the “Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. -2,500 m.), Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the -Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey which, even in -mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced tourists. In several of -these detachments experiments were made with white covers for uniform and -equipment, which enabled individual men and patrols to approach unseen to -within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not -equipped with snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the -fact that the march is retarded, but to the unusual difficulties -attending the service of security. Covering bodies are stalled. -Besides, the difficulties of maintaining communication with -neighboring detachments are increased when valleys or abrupt<span class="pagenum" id="Page31">[31]</span> -declivities intervene between the forces. The only -remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon -which one can move rapidly without regard to roads, -and up or down hill without difficulty. Patrols can be despatched -to adequate distances from the marching body on skis -alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty which cavalry -performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy -points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute -crossings with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments -alone are able to reconnoiter the condition of roads -and test the carrying power of snow in advance of a command, -and they alone can furnish the connecting links in an -extended outpost position, because they alone are able to -move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; -in action they easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his -weak points as well as the position of his reserves; and after -the fight they maintain contact with him as patrols. They -can hasten forward in advance of a command and prepare -cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.</p> - -<p>The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. -Each ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition -a distance of 1 m. must be left between men. Besides, -as the men are not all equally skilled in using skis, -the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is increased -considerably. This necessitates the employment of -small detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper -sphere of ski-runners is patrol duty. In winter campaigns -ski-runners are a necessary substitute for cavalry. In Scandinavia -reconnaissance detachments are composed of ski-runners -and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This -permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground -and may also be employed where the use of the much slower -sled is impracticable owing to the nature of the terrain. -Much practice is undoubtedly necessary to acquire proficiency<span class="pagenum" id="Page32">[32]</span> -in this sport<a id="FNanchor32" href="#Footnote32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>, for it surely cannot be easy to preserve an -upright position on skis behind a galloping horse, while at -the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground. -When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance -work, they are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The -snowshoe performances in France, since the establishment -by War Department order of a training school in Briançon, -are worthy of note. According to the experiences gained at -that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for training -men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, -1904, a body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of -80 km., including a climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ -rest included).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote32" href="#FNanchor32" class="label"> [32]</a> During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a distance of -67 km. in 2<sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> hours.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.</h4> - -<p>By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element -of a body of troops capable of sustaining an action independently, -of performing a simple combat task, and the elements -of which (man and horse) are personally known to -the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be small -enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a -single leader. This requirement limits the battle front of -the tactical unit to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately -to the front of a troop<a id="FNanchor33" href="#Footnote33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> (<i>Eskadron</i>) in line, or to -that of a battery of six pieces. The frontage of the tactical -unit of cavalry might with advantage be decreased, while -that of artillery, on account of its stability in action, might -be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase in the -quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved -in such extension would make the supervision of the unit too<span class="pagenum" id="Page33">[33]</span> -difficult for a single person. In nearly all large armies the -strength of a troop (<i>Eskadron</i>) of cavalry and of a field -battery is approximately 150 horses.<a id="FNanchor34" href="#Footnote34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> This corresponds approximately -to what the farmer of northern Germany considers -suitable to keep together in one establishment. If the -estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and horses, -subsidiary farms<a id="FNanchor35" href="#Footnote35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> are established.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote33" href="#FNanchor33" class="label"> [33]</a> <i>Eskadron</i> -has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The German <i>Eskadron</i> -consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139 horses. It is the -smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry and is divided into four -Züge (platoons). <i>Translator.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote34" href="#FNanchor34" class="label"> [34]</a> <span class="smcap">General Marmont</span>, -in his <cite>Esprit des Institutions Militaires</cite>, p. 41, states -that experience has shown that the most suitable strength for a troop is 48 -files, divided into four platoons; but, he recommends that platoons should consist -of 16-18 files in order to maintain this strength throughout a campaign.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote35" href="#FNanchor35" class="label"> [35]</a> <i>Vorwerke.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned -requirements of a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by -the battalion, but this is no longer the case. It is quite impossible -for one voice to control the movements of a battalion -in action; this is scarcely possible in case of a company. -On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an -independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion -possesses the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity -for subdivision, to sustain an action independently, to solve -minor problems of combat, and to remain a body full of -fighting efficiency even after sustaining serious losses such as -are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.</p> - -<p>To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical -unit” would be of little value. General von Scherff in a -logical manner<a id="FNanchor36" href="#Footnote36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> constructs a “troop -unit”<a id="FNanchor37" href="#Footnote37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> from “fighting -groups”<a id="FNanchor38" href="#Footnote38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> (squad of infantry or cavalry, or one gun), several -of which form a “fighting unit”<a id="FNanchor39" href="#Footnote39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> (company, troop or -battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry out a specific -task,” and placed under the command of a responsible -leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle, -its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division<span class="pagenum" id="Page34">[34]</span> -at least an evil.” The “combat unit”<a id="FNanchor40" href="#Footnote40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> consists of a -number of fighting units. “The commander of the combat -unit (infantry battalion, cavalry regiment, or artillery battalion) -should be able to lead it as a compact entity, and -should have the power of employing its component parts -independently for combined action against some point.” General -von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the -term body of troops (<i>Truppenkörper</i>) is applied to an organization -having the necessary means for feeding, clothing, -and equipping the men, and which is composed of a number -of “basic units.”<a id="FNanchor41" href="#Footnote41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> Such “basic units” as can be supervised, -handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who knows the -individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the troop -(<i>Eskadron</i>), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski<a id="FNanchor42" href="#Footnote42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> applies -the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the -company (troop) to the brigade, which act in accordance -with the tactics of their arm, supported by the other arms, -in the sphere assigned to them by orders or by circumstances. -Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three -arms, are capable of independent employment on the march -and in action, he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, -army corps are “battle units,”<a id="FNanchor43" href="#Footnote43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> with which the commander -reckons in battle, and which are strong enough to -meet an energetic attack or to execute one themselves.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote36" href="#FNanchor36" class="label"> [36]</a> <cite>Von der Kriegführung</cite>, p. 49.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote37" href="#FNanchor37" class="label"> [37]</a> <i>Truppeneinheit.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote38" href="#FNanchor38" class="label"> [38]</a> <i>Kampfgruppen.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote39" href="#FNanchor39" class="label"> [39]</a> <i>Kampfeinheit.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote40" href="#FNanchor40" class="label"> [40]</a> <i>Gefechtseinheit.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote41" href="#FNanchor41" class="label"> [41]</a> <i>Schlachteneinheiten.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote42" href="#FNanchor42" class="label"> [42]</a> <cite>Entwickelung der Taktik</cite>, III, p. 125.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote43" href="#FNanchor43" class="label"> [43]</a> <i>Grundeinheiten.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>3. ORGANIZATION.</h4> - -<p>The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to -250 men strong in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable -to exceed a strength of 150 men, as this is about -the greatest number in which a relation based upon personal -influence of the leader on his subordinates can still be obtained.<span class="pagenum" id="Page35">[35]</span> -In armies in which companies are composed of more -than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be -regarded as a margin of safety, intended to maintain the -company at a strength of 200 rifles after the first casualties -of a campaign, produced by marching, detached service and -battle losses. In view of the losses, which frequently increase -with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it appears -undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned, -as the companies would otherwise lose their independence -and could no longer be considered basic units.</p> - -<table class="organisation" summary="Organisation"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="3" class="br"> </th> -<th rowspan="3" class="br">Company.</th> -<th colspan="6" class="br">(<i>a</i>) PEACE STRENGTH.</th> -<th colspan="7" class="br">(<i>b</i>) WAR STRENGTH.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="3">Difference between<br />minimum peace<br />strength and<br />war strength.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Offi-<br />cers.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">N.<br />C.<br />O.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Musi-<br />cians.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Pri-<br />vates.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Offi-<br />cers’<br />Ser-<br />vants.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Hosp.<br />Corps<br />Men.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Offi-<br />cers.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">N.<br />C.<br />O.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Musi-<br />cians.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Pri-<br />vates.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Train<br />Sol-<br />diers.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Litter<br />Bear-<br />ers.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Hosp.<br />Corps<br />Men.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Offi-<br />cers.</th> -<th class="br">N.<br />C.<br />O.</th> -<th>Pri-<br />vates.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="country"><span class="sstype"><b>GERMANY</b></span></td> -<td class="company">Minimum</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">15</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">128</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">5</td> -<td class="number br">20</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">226</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">1</td> -<td class="number br">1</td> -<td class="number br">5</td> -<td class="number">103</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company">Maximum</td> -<td class="number br">5</td> -<td class="number br">17</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">142</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<td rowspan="2" class="country"><span class="sstype"><b>AUSTRIA</b></span></td> -<td class="company">Minimum</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">11</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">76</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">19</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">195</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">5</td> -<td class="number">132</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company">Maximum</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">14</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">109</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">4 Pio-<br />neers.</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">4 Officers’<br />servants.</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<td rowspan="3" class="country"><span class="sstype"><b>ITALY</b></span></td> -<td class="company">Infantry, Bersaglieri</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number br">13</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">87</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">5</td> -<td class="number br">16</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">180</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number">93</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td colspan="13" class="left">Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers armed with rifle.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company">Alpini</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">19</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">121</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<td rowspan="4" class="country"><span class="sstype"><b>FRANCE</b></span></td> -<td class="company">Ordinary</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number br">15</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">108</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">28</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">218</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">1</td> -<td class="number br">1</td> -<td class="number br">18</td> -<td class="number">110</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company">Maximum</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number br">15</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">158</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company">Chasseurs</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number br">21</td> -<td class="number br">2</td> -<td class="number br">125</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="company"> </td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">and<br />150</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<td rowspan="2" class="country"><span class="sstype"><b>RUSSIA</b></span></td> -<td class="company"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="center br">non-<br />combatants.</td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number br"> </td> -<td class="number"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="company">Approximately</td> -<td class="number br">3</td> -<td class="number br">7</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">96</td> -<td class="number br">4<a id="FNanchor44" href="#Footnote44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">4</td> -<td class="number br">22</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">200</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">20</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">1</td> -<td class="number br">15</td> -<td class="number">104</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote44" href="#FNanchor44" class="label"> [44]</a> In addition, five non-combatants.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page36">[36]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>After the heavy losses at <b>St. Privat</b>, two companies were combined -into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard Corps. -The administration of the consolidated companies had to remain distinct -on account of the preparation of casualty lists, recommendations for promotion -and decorations. On the day of the battle of <b>Orleans</b>, the strength -of the German battalions varied from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army -Corps to 747 men in the 40th Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after -the battle of <b>Le Mans</b>, the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even -reduced to 280 men.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The actual training of troops must be completed in -the company. Combat by an independent company is the exception; -combat by battalion the rule. By the consolidation -of four companies into one unit, the battalion, consisting of -800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French Chasseur battalions -are the only ones that consist of six companies, because their -proposed independent employment, for instance, in mountain -warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units -than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action -developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was transformed -into combined action of the four companies, the strength of the -company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of companies -in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the Great was -divided for administrative purposes into five companies and for tactical -purposes into eight <i>pelotons</i>. The battalion of the first empire consisted -of six <i>Füsilier</i> and two <i>Voltigeur</i> companies, and the Austrian battalion, -until the reorganization after 1866, consisted of six companies of which -each two formed a division. Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated -in the infantry of all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, -and the minor German states), but early in the seventies most of the -states adopted the four company battalion, Russia being the last to do -this (four line and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of -1812, Prussia had adopted the four company battalion. The independent -employment of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was -the exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the -British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however, be -said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of their -small size.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>In the four-company organization the battalion possesses -an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any -combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth<span class="pagenum" id="Page37">[37]</span> -of practical necessity; the regimental commander -cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an -intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion -is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, -the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions -do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental -staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of -the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate -command; they are, however, more expensive in time of -peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into -brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander -has a compactly organized reserve available.</p> - -<p>“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity -of its training, the <i>esprit de corps</i> of its officers, and its -division into three battalions—thereby facilitating subdivision—is -pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat -tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map -of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff -work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, -whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken -units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations -were frequently broken up.</p> - -<p>This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by -the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German -I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned -sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains -very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by -taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion -from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, -an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical -purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be -increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case -of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization -as a subdivision of the division cannot always be -maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal<span class="pagenum" id="Page38">[38]</span> -units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is -the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, -although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue -to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for -decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the -division commanders of a part of their work. In time of -peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment -and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments -and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion -organization have induced the United States to -form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions -(of 400 men each). An English division consists of three -brigades of four battalions each.</p> - -<h4 title="4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.">4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.<a id="FNanchor45" href="#Footnote45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote45" href="#FNanchor45" class="label"> [45]</a> In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped with 80 -small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68 small spades, -17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the -adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, -have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating -power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages -of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and -in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, -moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and -subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should -therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when -the tactical purpose in view requires it.</p> - -<p>What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment -of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still -undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform -tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, -one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his -rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire -all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable<span class="pagenum" id="Page39">[39]</span> -to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According -to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every -other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, -a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the -French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment -having 108 cartridges.</p> - -<p>The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment -available in each battalion:</p> - -<table class="trenchtool" summary="Tools"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="4" class="br">FOR EARTH WORK.</th> -<th colspan="3" class="br">FOR TIMBER WORK.</th> -<th> </th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="br">Small<br />Intrenching Tools.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="br">Large<br />Intrenching Tools.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Small</th> -<th class="br">Large</th> -<th rowspan="2"> </th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th colspan="3" class="br">Intrenching Tools.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">Spades.</th> -<th class="br">Mattocks.</th> -<th class="br">Spades.</th> -<th class="br">Picks.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Hatchets.</th> -<th class="br">Axes.</th> -<th>Total.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Germany</td> -<td class="number br">400</td> -<td class="number br"> 40</td> -<td class="number br">20</td> -<td class="number br">10</td> -<td class="right padr0">35</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="number br">8</td> -<td class="number">513</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Austria</td> -<td class="number br">400</td> -<td class="number br"> 64</td> -<td class="number br"> 8</td> -<td class="number br">16</td> -<td class="right padr0">8</td> -<td class="left padl0 br"><a id="FNanchor46" href="#Footnote46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Italy<a id="FNanchor47" href="#Footnote47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></td> -<td class="number br"> 32</td> -<td class="number br">  8</td> -<td class="number br">36</td> -<td class="number br">18</td> -<td class="right padr0">62</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">France<a id="FNanchor48" href="#Footnote48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></td> -<td class="number br">448</td> -<td class="number br">128</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="right padr0">...</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="number br">...</td> -<td class="number">...</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote46" href="#FNanchor46" class="label"> [46]</a> Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and carpenter tools -in addition to their rifles. These men are formed into a pioneer platoon of 64 -men in each regiment.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote47" href="#FNanchor47" class="label"> [47]</a> The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and 12-15 mattocks -per company, is contemplated.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote48" href="#FNanchor48" class="label"> [48]</a> The following demolition tools are available in each battalion: 64 picks, -64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur sections carry in addition a -mattock or a pick apiece, and each ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a -fascine knife, or a saw. The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed -at the present moment.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.</h4> - -<p>The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed -one-third of the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more -than 28 kg. According to the “Regulations for the Employment -of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load of a soldier -whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new -experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page40">[40]</span></p> - -<div class="loadsplit"> - -<div class="leftload"> - -<table class="manload" summary="Load"> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Clothing</td> -<td class="mass">5.397</td> -<td class="unit">kg.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Equipment<a id="FNanchor49" href="#Footnote49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></td> -<td class="mass">3,964</td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Baggage<a id="FNanchor50" href="#Footnote50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></td> -<td class="mass">5.600</td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Arms and ammunition</td> -<td class="mass">8.507</td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Rations (including breakfast).</td> -<td class="mass bb">3.238</td> -<td class="unit bb">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr"><span class="padl2">Total</span></td> -<td class="mass">26.706</td> -<td class="unit">kg.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--leftload--> - -<div class="rightload"> - -<p class="noindent">To this must be added intrenching -tools:</p> - -<table class="manload" summary="Load"> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Small spade and scabbard</td> -<td class="mass">0.89 </td> -<td class="unit">kg.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Hatchet</td> -<td class="mass">1.08 </td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Mattock</td> -<td class="mass">1.48 </td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Load with spade</td> -<td class="mass">27.596</td> -<td class="unit">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--rightload--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--loadsplit--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote49" href="#FNanchor49" class="label"> [49]</a> Tent equipment 1.620 kg.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote50" href="#FNanchor50" class="label"> [50]</a> Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269 g. ration on -his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two parts, one containing cocoa -paste, the other concentrated extract of beef (Pemmican).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p class="tabhead">COMPARISON.<a id="FNanchor51" href="#Footnote51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p> - -<table class="loadcomp" summary="Comparison"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Without<br />spades.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">With<br />spades.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Clothing.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Weight of<br />knap-<br />sacks.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Weight of<br />rifles.</th> -<th colspan="3">Weight of<br />ammuni-<br />tion.<a id="FNanchor52" href="#Footnote52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a></th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Germany</td> -<td class="kg">26.</td> -<td class="gr br">706</td> -<td class="kg">27.</td> -<td class="gr br">596</td> -<td class="kg">5.</td> -<td class="gr br">397</td> -<td class="kg">20.</td> -<td class="gr br">919</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">707</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr">714</td> -<td class="center padl1">kg.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Austria<a id="FNanchor53" href="#Footnote53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></td> -<td class="kg">26.</td> -<td class="gr br">615</td> -<td class="kg">26.</td> -<td class="gr br">443</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">428</td> -<td class="kg">22.</td> -<td class="gr br">187</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">200</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr">080</td> -<td class="center padl1">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Russia</td> -<td class="kg">28.</td> -<td class="gr br">216</td> -<td class="kg">29.</td> -<td class="gr br">206</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">000</td> -<td class="kg">22.</td> -<td class="gr br">622</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">576</td> -<td class="kg">3.</td> -<td class="gr">426</td> -<td class="center padl1">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">France</td> -<td class="kg">26.</td> -<td class="gr br">125</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">...</td> -<td class="kg">6.</td> -<td class="gr br">222</td> -<td class="kg">19.</td> -<td class="gr br">903</td> -<td class="kg">5.</td> -<td class="gr br">049</td> -<td class="kg">3.</td> -<td class="gr">675</td> -<td class="center padl1">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Italy</td> -<td class="kg">29.</td> -<td class="gr br">135<a id="FNanchor54" href="#Footnote54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">...</td> -<td class="kg">5.</td> -<td class="gr br">993</td> -<td class="kg">23.</td> -<td class="gr br">143</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">505</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr">320</td> -<td class="center padl1">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">Japan</td> -<td class="kg">26.</td> -<td class="gr br">365</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">...</td> -<td class="kg">3.</td> -<td class="gr br">475</td> -<td class="kg">22.</td> -<td class="gr br">890</td> -<td class="kg">4.</td> -<td class="gr br">435</td> -<td class="kg">3.</td> -<td class="gr">600</td> -<td class="center padl1">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote51" href="#FNanchor51" class="label"> [51]</a> -According to <cite>Journal of Military Scientific Societies</cite>, 1906.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote52" href="#FNanchor52" class="label"> [52]</a> Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds per -man.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote53" href="#FNanchor53" class="label"> [53]</a> Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front -rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front rank).</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote54" href="#FNanchor54" class="label"> [54]</a> Alpini carry 32.096 kg.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page41">[41]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">II. THE FORMATIONS.</h3> - -<h4>1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.</h4> - -<p>Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, -when these do not suffice, by orders. (Orders give information -of the situation and the intentions of the commander, -and assign tasks, but leave the recipient free to choose the -method of carrying them out). When commands are given -from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing -the telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, -signs, and the following signals: <i>To advance</i>, the leader raises -the arm; to indicate that the command is <i>to follow him</i>, -he extends his raised arm in the direction of march; <i>to halt</i>, -he lowers the arm; <i>to deploy</i>, both arms are raised laterally -to the height of the shoulders, and if necessary the direction -the skirmish line is to take is subsequently indicated -with one extended arm; <i>to assemble</i> his men, the leader describes -a circle above his head with one arm. These signals -may also be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional -signals should be agreed upon beforehand in each separate -case. If a signal is made to a body of troops in close order, -it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. (Par. 11 German -I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a change -of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, -must be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals -are only used by troops in garrison at drills, and in -barracks or billets as service calls. To prevent troops from -misunderstanding signals or from obeying those not intended -for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except “charge,” “fix -bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page42">[42]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the engagement of <b>Trautenau</b> (27th June, 1866), the trumpet -signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian battalions -to withdraw.<a id="FNanchor55" href="#Footnote55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> See also the effect of the signal “assemble” after the -taking of <b>Problus</b>.<a id="FNanchor56" href="#Footnote56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> Notice the effect of the signal “form square” during -the assault on the <b>Forest of Bor</b> (<b>Königgrätz</b>).<a id="FNanchor57" href="#Footnote57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote55" href="#FNanchor55" class="label"> [55]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kühne</span>, <cite>Kritische Wanderungen</cite>, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote56" href="#FNanchor56" class="label"> [56]</a> -<cite>Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16</cite>, p. 230.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote57" href="#FNanchor57" class="label"> [57]</a> -<cite>Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57</cite>, p. 47. -<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Untersuchungen -über die Taktik der Zukunft</cite>, 4th Edition, p. 61.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded -by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry -Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army corps. -Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a trumpeter, -surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the alarm signal.<a id="FNanchor58" href="#Footnote58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote58" href="#FNanchor58" class="label"> [58]</a> -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66</cite>, pp. 48/49.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The village of <b>Diletz</b> (action at <b>Gitschin</b>, 1866) was to be evacuated -at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade withdraw.” The -signal was, however, understood and carried out by only three battalions; -two battalions, which were at the time engaged, did not hear it at all -and maintained their position until they were taken in reverse by hostile -fire and forced to withdraw.<a id="FNanchor59" href="#Footnote59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote59" href="#FNanchor59" class="label"> [59]</a> -<cite>Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps</cite>, p. 130.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th Infantry -and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at <b>Vionville</b>, the signal “assemble” -was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further mischief being -averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who prevented trumpeters -from blowing the call and ordered them to blow “commence firing” -instead.<a id="FNanchor60" href="#Footnote60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote60" href="#FNanchor60" class="label"> [60]</a> -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52</cite>, p. 59.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON -BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.</h4> - -<p>The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, -usually prior to a movement, in a restricted space permitting -an easy survey of the entire body. Assembly formations -serve also the purpose of placing troops in readiness before -starting on a march, before beginning an action, and for -moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of hostile -fire (columns). Route formations should permit -an orderly, comfortable march of the troops, as much of the -available width of road being used as possible, a space being<span class="pagenum" id="Page43">[43]</span> -left for orderlies and mounted messengers, and for troops -which are drawn forward. In order to permit a prompt deployment -of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce their -depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The -situation existing at the moment will determine to what extent -allowances may be made for the comfort of the troops, -or how far considerations of comfort should be ignored in -view of readiness for action, and to what extent the depth -of the columns should be decreased.</p> - -<p>The formations for moving troops (to be employed in -marching across country and to be used on the battlefield) -should be such as to cause the least discomfort to the troops, -should make it possible to avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate -changes of front and direction of march, and permit -a prompt deployment in any direction. These formations -are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a deployment -into line necessary.</p> - -<p>Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment -of all weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). -This requirement is not satisfied by columns, but only by the -line. Modern fire effect excludes every employment of close -order formations under effective hostile fire and compels the -most extensive deployment.</p> - -<p>Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation -is a question belonging to a bygone age. The battles of -the British in Spain and at Waterloo, the engagement at -Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six battalions of Borke’s -Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,<a id="FNanchor61" href="#Footnote61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> amply demonstrate that -the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to the employment -of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with -an equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined -troops, formed in line that allows of the use of all -the rifles and is suitable for shock action as well, have always -carried off the victory.<a id="FNanchor62" href="#Footnote62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> -On the other hand, in the battles<span class="pagenum" id="Page44">[44]</span> -of the Empire we find columns formed, which of necessity -excluded a large part of the men from participation in -the action, but which were designed to break through the hostile -battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s -Corps was formed with eight deployed battalions in -rear of each other in a single column, supported on the -flanks by seven and eight battalions respectively, also in -column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack formations -in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division -were deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty -paces. Column and line must be examined with reference to -their mobility, their vulnerability and their fire and shock -power.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote61" href="#FNanchor61" class="label"> [61]</a> <span class="smcap">Friederich</span>, -<cite>Herbstfeldzug, 1813</cite>, I, p. 305.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote62" href="#FNanchor62" class="label"> [62]</a> <span class="smcap">Renard</span>, -<cite>Considérations sur la tactique de l’infanterie en Europe</cite>, Paris, -1857.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Rüstow</span>, <cite>Geschichte der Infanterie</cite>, II, p. 316.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The column possesses greater mobility and is better -adapted than the line for executing changes of front and -for taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground. -In a column steadiness and shock power (produced by the -crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the influence -exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.</p> - -<p>The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. -The characteristics of the line are great frontal -fire power, weakness of the flanks, difficulty of quickly -changing front, and the ever present danger of being pierced. -The line has been called the formation of the bold, the -column that of the weak.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The column<a id="FNanchor63" href="#Footnote63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> was proposed as a battle formation in France as early -as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application until the -wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used because the -raw levies lacked the training necessary for making movements in line. -Whenever a line formation was used, battalions, owing to the scarcity of -efficient officers, resolved themselves into disorderly skirmish lines which -were exceedingly difficult to control. The adoption of the column was, -therefore, the result of practical experience, but as a formation it could -be justified on the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development -for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages -of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page45">[45]</span> -placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in line. -This formation was employed for the first time in the attack made by a -demi-brigade during the battle on the <b>Tagliamento</b> (1797), and subsequently -it was used at <b>Marengo</b> (attack made by Desaix’s Division).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote63" href="#FNanchor63" class="label"> [63]</a> The development of the French column tactics is splendidly portrayed by -<span class="smcap">Kuhl</span> in his work <cite>Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796</cite>, p. 46, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo045a.png" alt="Line formation" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had a -marked <i>penchant</i> for this formation, until it sank more and more into -insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at <b>Waterloo</b>, and Macdonald -at <b>Wagram</b>). Formations suggesting the above are found even -in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter platoons of -the companies at first in rear of the wings of the deployed battalion, and -later in rear of the outer flank platoons of the companies).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo045b.png" alt="Battle formation" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry -projectiles, especially at short ranges, a column will -suffer greater losses than a line; at longer ranges the curvature -of the trajectory causes bullets which pass over the first -echelon to strike the second or third. On ground falling with -respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground rising with -respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to greater -losses when they come within the beaten zone.<a id="FNanchor64" href="#Footnote64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote64" href="#FNanchor64" class="label"> [64]</a> At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for each meter of -the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of the range, so that the second -and third platoons of a company in column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between -platoons) would offer a target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>5</sub> -the height of a man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> the height of a man) at -1200 m.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page46">[46]</span></p> - -<h4>3. THE COMPANY.</h4> - -<h5>(a) Formation of the Company.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).</span></h5> - -<p>In the company the files are placed in two ranks according -to height from right to left. Each four files form a -squad or group, and the entire company is divided into three -platoons (<i>Züge</i>). When a platoon consists of more than -three squads it is divided into two sections (<i>Halbzüge</i>).</p> - -<p>In the normal formation of the company, the three -platoons, each in two ranks,<a id="FNanchor65" href="#Footnote65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> are posted on a line in numerical -order from right to left. This formation facilitates firing -and in garrison meets the requirements of barrack life, each -two squads forming a section (<i>Korporalschaft</i>) under a non-commissioned -officer. During the campaign of 1866 Prince -Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange companies so -that friends and relatives could serve together in the same -squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, -of course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, -the men according to height from right to left flank, -but it would without doubt give a better account of itself in -action. For details of the formation of a company and division -into fractions see pars. 82-85, German I. D. R. The -squad leaders and the two range finders in each platoon are<span class="pagenum" id="Page47">[47]</span> -posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the rear -rank of the company.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote65" href="#FNanchor65" class="label"> [65]</a> The number of ranks is intimately related to the rate of fire of the infantry -weapon. During the days of slow loading, the necessity of keeping at least a -part of the rifles at all times ready for firing led the Imperialists in the Thirty -Years’ war (loading was executed by 90 motions) to form their musketeers into -sixteen ranks, while Gustavus Adolphus was able to form his infantry into six -ranks owing to the greater loading facility of their rifles. In the Seven Years’ -war the Prussian infantry was formed in three, that of the Austrians in four -ranks, the fourth rank serving as a reserve. The first rank fired kneeling. The -British infantry was the first to adopt the two rank formation for fire action, -forming into four ranks for shock action and frequently for warding off cavalry -attacks. Emperor Napoleon considered a third rank useless for fire and shock -action and initiated the double rank formation on the eve of the battle of -Leipzig. In 1888 the Prussian infantry—the last to do so—gave up the three -rank formation which had long since lost its importance in battle and which -was retained side by side with the double rank formation for purposes of parade -only.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption">Germany.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo047.png" alt="Line order" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The <i>non-commissioned officers</i> are posted in the front -rank, on the flanks and in the center of the platoons in -Russia, Austria, and Switzerland. In Germany and Italy -they are all posted in rear of the line as file closers, and it -is their duty to supervise the men. In France a part of the -non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, the -remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men -has a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with -field equipment occupies a space about 75 cm. square.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The German Infantry Drill Regulations define interval (<i>intervalle</i>) -as the space between two elements on the same line, and distance as the -space between two elements in the direction of depth. An interval is -measured from the left flank of the element on the right to the right -flank of the element on the left (or vice versa); and distance in the -company and in the battalion is measured from the rear of the element -in front to the head of the element in rear (or vice versa). If the -distance between two elements is equal to their front, the column is -called an “open column”, otherwise it is called a “close column.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page48">[48]</span></p> - -<p class="tabhead">FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.</p> - -<table class="distances" summary="Distances"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br"><span class="smcap">Front.</span><br />(Per man.)</th> -<th><span class="smcap">Facing Distance.</span><br />(Distance between ranks.)</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Germany</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.80 m. Loose elbow contact.</td> -<td class="descr">0.80 m. from back of front rank man to breast of rear rank man.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Austria</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.75 m. Files are separated by an interval of the width of a hand.</td> -<td class="descr">120 cm. from heels of front rank man to those of rear rank man (according to German method of -measuring, about 0.88 m.).</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Italy</td> -<td class="descr br">0.70 m.</td> -<td class="descr">0.75 m. from breast of front rank man to breast of rear rank man(according to German method of -measuring, 0.45 m.) on the march, 1.20 m. (according to German method of measuring, 0.90).</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">France</td> -<td class="descr br">0.70 m. including 0.15 m. interval between files.</td> -<td class="descr">1 m. from back or knapsack of front rank man to breast of rear rank man.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Russia</td> -<td class="descr br">0.70 m. Files are separated by an interval of the width of a hand.</td> -<td class="descr">Rear rank man is an arm’s length from back of knapsack of front rank man = 60-70 cm.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">England</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.80 m.</td> -<td class="descr">1.50 m. from heel of front rank man to heel of rear rank man (according to German -method of measuring, about 1.20 m.).</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Switzerland</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.75 m.</td> -<td class="descr">0.80 m. from back of front rank man to breast of rear rank man.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Belgium</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.80 m.</td> -<td class="descr">1 m. from heel of front rank man to heel of rear rank man (according to German method of measuring, about 0.70 m.).</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="country">Japan</td> -<td class="descr br">About 0.85 m.</td> -<td class="descr">0.75 m. from back (or knapsack) of front rank man to breast of rear rank man.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<h5><b>(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four -Platoons.</b></h5> - -<p>In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered -as distinct bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical -strength. They are placed side by side and constitute the -company in line. In Germany and Russia the company is at<span class="pagenum" id="Page49">[49]</span> -each formation divided into platoons of approximately equal -strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and Italy, it is -contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn when -once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements -are executed, after preparatory commands given by the -company commanders, by commands of execution or signals -given by platoon commanders. The execution of movements -is retarded by this procedure and the movement itself -becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of -commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous, -especially in the weak platoons at peace strength.</p> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption">France.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo049.png" alt="Battle line" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Column of platoons from line (par. 121 German I. D. R.: “Form -column of platoons”) is formed in Austria as follows (Austrian I. D. R. -par. 360): At the preparatory command, “Column,” given by the company -commander, the leaders of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th platoons command at -once, as in forming column of fours to the front, “Fours right (left), -column right (left).” At the command “march,” the platoons step off, -each turning in column to the rear, and are conducted to their new -positions, halted, and dressed to the right (left).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page50">[50]</span></p> - -<p>The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, -and Belgium excepted, are divided into four platoons; each -two platoons may in addition be combined into a half-company. -The German, Japanese, and Belgian companies are divided -into three platoons. “The platoon is not an independent -subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists of -a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes -a force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer -commanding the platoon makes it what it should be. -The strength of the platoon is therefore solely dependent -upon the number of officers available.” (<span class="smcap">von Scherff</span>).</p> - -<p>The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization -of the company is that fewer platoon commanders are required, -which fact is well worthy of attention in the mobilization -of units of both Line and Reserve, especially in view of -the extraordinarily heavy casualties among the troop leaders -in the course of a campaign.<a id="FNanchor66" href="#Footnote66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote66" href="#FNanchor66" class="label"> [66]</a> -See also <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, pp. 81, 88.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>It is only necessary to recall the situation of the Guard Corps and of -the IIIrd Army Corps after the battles around <b>Metz</b>, and the condition of -the German troops during the advance to <b>Le Mans</b>. On January 7th, 1871, -there were 36 officers with the 57th Infantry, of which 16 led platoons of -the 36 platoons in the first line, and 8 lieutenants commanded companies. -On mobilizing, 25 lieutenants were assigned as platoon commanders and -six as company commanders in the 57th Infantry.<a id="FNanchor67" href="#Footnote67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote67" href="#FNanchor67" class="label"> [67]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Gefechtsbilder</cite>, I, p. 25. For additional facts in regard to the -dwindling of the number of officers consult <cite>Die sieben Tage von Le Mans</cite>, by -<span class="smcap">V. D. Goltz</span>; also <cite>Supplement to -Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1873, p. 368; also <span class="smcap">von -Kortzfleisch</span>, <cite>Feldzug an der Loire</cite>, p. 43.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The eight infantry regiments and the Jäger-Battalion of the Xth -Army Corps had, at this time, instead of the required 506 officers, only -286, of which number 174 were for duty. The 22nd Infantry Division -had only 108 officers left; companies and even half-battalions were led -into action by very young officers of the Reserve, and, on many occasions, -even by vice 1st sergeants.</p> - -<p>On the morning of August 17th, 1870, the 40th Füsilier Regiment had -two field officers and four captains present for duty. Two captains, two -first lieutenants and eight second lieutenants (four of these belonging to -the Reserve), led companies; only two lieutenants of the Reserve, one cadet, -and four vice 1st sergeants remained available for duty as platoon commanders. -The regiment participated in the battle of <b>Gravelotte</b> with this<span class="pagenum" id="Page51">[51]</span> -small number of officers.<a id="FNanchor68" href="#Footnote68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> The 6th Grenadier Regiment, which, in July, -1870, had marched out with four field officers, seven captains, six first, 14 -second lieutenants, and four cadets, all on the active list, lost so many -officers at <b>Wörth</b> and <b>Sedan</b> that a field officer of the 46th Infantry had to -take command of the regiment; three first lieutenants of battalions; and four -second lieutenants, two officers of the Reserve, and six vice 1st sergeants of -the companies. The 12 companies had available five vice 1st sergeants as -platoon commanders. The 1st Battalion of the 58th Infantry had only seven -officers left (including its commander and the adjutant) after its losses at -<b>Weiszenburg</b>.<a id="FNanchor69" href="#Footnote69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote68" href="#FNanchor68" class="label"> [68]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8/9, p. 162.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote69" href="#FNanchor69" class="label"> [69]</a> -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 58</cite>, p. 56.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The 7th Grenadier Regiment lost 40 officers at <b>Weiszenburg</b> and -<b>Wörth</b>. On August 7th, three captains commanded the battalions and three -officers of the 5th Jäger-Battalion were detailed to command companies in -it.<a id="FNanchor70" href="#Footnote70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> At -<b>Gravelotte</b> the Füsilier-Battalion of the 1st, the Ist Battalion of -the 2nd, and the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the Guard lost all -of their officers. The French organizations, having more officers and less -men than we, were by no means so badly off in 1870-71. Upon mobilizing -in 1870, the German army had 13.7 officers to every 1,000 men, the French -army, 32.2 officers.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote70" href="#FNanchor70" class="label"> [70]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 14, p. 122.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>On the other hand, it should be remembered that in -armies consisting of militia it is considerably more difficult -to command a platoon of 60-70 men than to command one -of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably connected with -the four-platoon company is the small size of the platoons -during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance -most regulations permit the three-platoon formation when -the company is small, because platoons consisting of less than -ten files are of no instructional value. An advantage of the -three-platoon company is the simplicity and rapidity with -which changes from one formation to another may be effected.</p> - -<p>The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for -movements on the battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 -rifles, a target about 25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The -four-unit column of platoons is better suited for movements. -With a front of 17 m., its depth is only 15 m., when the<span class="pagenum" id="Page52">[52]</span> -distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces (Austria, -France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See <a href="#Page62">p. 62</a>).</p> - -<p>For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following -would be the forms:</p> - -<div class="container w35em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo052.png" alt="Platoon widths" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The other advantages praised by advocates of the four-unit -company are:</p> - -<p>1. That a smaller platoon is more suitable for field -service—that a picket is perhaps only in the rarest cases to be -made 60 men strong.</p> - -<p>2. That a small platoon makes a better and more comprehensive -employment of the company in action possible, as -the company commander has an opportunity to use <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub>, <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>, or -<sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> of his company according to the requirements of the situation, -while the three-unit company affords less favorable -combinations, permitting only an employment of <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> or <sup>2</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> -of its strength.</p> - -<p>These advantages can also be obtained in the German -company by the employment of sections (<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>6</sub>, -<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub>, <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>, <sup>2</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub>, -<sup>5</sup>⁄<sub>6</sub>) so that the objections to the three-unit company would -appear to be groundless.</p> - -<p>The platoons (in Italy called <i>plotone</i>, in France, <i>section</i>) -are subdivided into sections (<i>demi-sections</i>, <i>Halbzüge</i>), -in Austria into two skirmish groups (<i>Schwärme</i>) of 4-7 -files each, and, when consisting of 16 files, into four skirmish -groups (in Italy this is also done, the groups being called -<i>squadriglio</i>). In Germany the platoons are divided into<span class="pagenum" id="Page53">[53]</span> -groups or squads of four files each, and in Russia the platoons -are divided into sections of 8-15 files each and these again -into groups or squads of 4-6 men each. If the squad is -to have any importance at all in action, it must have a -leader, and it might easily happen that a mobilized company -lacks the number of leaders necessary to provide one for -each group. The withdrawal from the line of a number -of good shots for duty as squad leaders is compensated -for, in our opinion, by the more thorough supervision -over the men. This consideration has, however, apparently -caused other states (Austria and France) not to count -on the activity of the squad leaders in a fire action to the -same extent as is the case in Germany.</p> - -<h4>4. LENGTH OF PACE AND MARCHING.</h4> - -<p>An extended, swinging step, without haste and without -unduly taxing the lungs, is advantageous in all movements. -When accustomed to this pace on the drill ground, the men -will march with practically the same step on varied ground, -and this appears more desirable than to shorten the step, -while at the same time increasing the distance to be covered -in a given time. The length of the pace depends largely -upon the height of the individual, but even small men can -maintain a step of 0.80 m. without undue exertion.<a id="FNanchor71" href="#Footnote71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> In -Switzerland the cadence has been fixed at 116-120 steps per -minute “with a view of suiting the peculiarities and the varying -degree of mobility which characterize the inhabitants of -the different cantons.”(!) For purely practical reasons it is -advisable to fix upon some even number of paces in order<span class="pagenum" id="Page54">[54]</span> -that the cadence may be tested with the watch. (Austria -excepted). The longest pace in conjunction with the highest -cadence (<i>Bersaglieri</i>, whose march is almost a double time, -excepted) is found in England and Switzerland. Such a -performance could not be kept up by a fully equipped man -without impairing health.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote71" href="#FNanchor71" class="label"> [71]</a> When the leg is extended at an angle of 57 degrees the length of pace -would be as follows:</p> - -<table class="pacelength" summary="Pace lengths"> - -<tr> -<th colspan="2" class="padl1 padr1">Height<br />of man.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="padl1 padr1">Length<br />of leg.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="padl1 padr1">Length<br />of foot.</th> -<th> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="padl1 padr1">Length<br />of pace.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="data">1.6  </td> -<td class="units">m.</td> -<td class="data">0.8  </td> -<td class="units">m.</td> -<td class="data">0.24 </td> -<td class="units">m.</td> -<td>=</td> -<td class="data">0.75 </td> -<td class="units">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="data">1.675</td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.857</td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.253</td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td>=</td> -<td class="data">0.776</td> -<td class="units">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="data">1.70 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.87 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.26 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td>=</td> -<td class="data">0.80 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="data">1.75 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.88 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td class="data">0.26 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -<td>=</td> -<td class="data">0.82 </td> -<td class="units">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<table class="steps" summary="Steps"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th rowspan="4" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="5" class="br2">QUICK TIME.</th> -<th colspan="5" class="br2">ACCELERATED<br />TIME.</th> -<th colspan="6">DOUBLE TIME.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Length<br />of<br />pace.</th> -<th colspan="4" class="br2 bb">PER MINUTE.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Length<br />of<br />pace.</th> -<th colspan="4" class="br2 bb">PER MINUTE.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="br">Length<br />of<br />pace.</th> -<th colspan="4" class="bb">PER MINUTE.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Number<br />of<br />paces.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br2"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Number<br />of<br />paces.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br2"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Number<br />of<br />paces.</th> -<th colspan="2"> </th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br2">m.</th> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br2">m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="2">m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army">Germany</td> -<td class="c br">0.80</td> -<td class="r">114</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">91</td> -<td class="l br2">.2</td> -<td class="c br">0.80</td> -<td class="r">120</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">96</td> -<td class="l br2">.00</td> -<td class="r">0</td> -<td class="l br">.75-</td> -<td class="r">170</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">127</td> -<td class="l">-</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army"> </td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="br"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="br2"> </td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="br"> </td> -<td colspan="2" class="br2"> </td> -<td class="r">0</td> -<td class="l br">.90</td> -<td class="r">180</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">162</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army">Austria</td> -<td class="c br">0.75</td> -<td class="r">115</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">86</td> -<td class="l br2">.25</td> -<td class="c br">0.75</td> -<td class="r">125</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">93</td> -<td class="l br2">.75</td> -<td class="r">0.</td> -<td class="l br">90</td> -<td class="r">160</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">144</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army">Italy, Line<br /><span class="padl1">and</span> Alpini</td> -<td class="c d br">0.75</td> -<td class="r d">120</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r d">90</td> -<td class="l d br2">.00</td> -<td class="center d br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center d br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center d br2">...</td> -<td class="d r">0</td> -<td class="d l br">.90</td> -<td class="d r">170</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="d r">153</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army">Bersaglieri</td> -<td class="c br">0.86</td> -<td class="r">140</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">120</td> -<td class="l br2">.</td> -<td class="center br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="br2"> </td> -<td class="r">1</td> -<td class="l br">.00</td> -<td class="r">180</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">180</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army">France</td> -<td class="c br">0.75</td> -<td class="r">120</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">90</td> -<td class="l br2">.00</td> -<td class="c br">0.80</td> -<td class="r">124</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">99</td> -<td class="l br2">.00</td> -<td class="r">0</td> -<td class="l br">.30<a id="FNanchor72" href="#Footnote72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></td> -<td class="r">180</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">136</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="army m">Russia</td> -<td class="c br">0.71</td> -<td class="r">118</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">84</td> -<td class="left br2">-</td> -<td class="c br">0.71</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r m">122</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="br"> </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r m">119</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="l br2">.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r m">1</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="l br">.066</td> -<td class="r">170</td> -<td class="l br">-</td> -<td class="r">181</td> -<td class="l">-</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="c br">0.89</td> -<td class="r">122</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">109</td> -<td class="br2"> </td> -<td class="c br">0.89</td> -<td class="r">181</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">192</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army">Japan</td> -<td class="c br">0.75</td> -<td class="r">114</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">85</td> -<td class="l br2">.5</td> -<td class="center br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">...</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br2">...</td> -<td class="r">0</td> -<td class="l br">.85</td> -<td class="r">170</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">144</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="army">England</td> -<td class="c br">0.84</td> -<td class="r">128</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">107</td> -<td class="l br2">.5</td> -<td class="c br">0.91</td> -<td class="r">128</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">116</td> -<td class="l br2">.5</td> -<td class="r">1</td> -<td class="l br">.02</td> -<td class="r">180</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">183</td> -<td class="l">.6</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="army">Switzerland</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="c br">0.80</td> -<td class="r">116</td> -<td class="l br">-</td> -<td class="r">92</td> -<td class="l br2">.8-</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="c br">0.80</td> -<td class="r">120</td> -<td class="l br">-</td> -<td class="r">96</td> -<td class="l br2">-</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r">0</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="l br">.90</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r">160</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="br"> </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="r">144</td> -<td rowspan="2"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bbd"> -<td class="r">120</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">96</td> -<td class="l br2">.00</td> -<td class="r">140</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="r">112</td> -<td class="br2"> </td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote72" href="#FNanchor72" class="label"> [72]</a> The following, taken from -<cite>La marche du fantassin</cite> (<cite>Journal des -sciences militaires, 1897</cite>), is here inserted for comparison.</p> - -<table class="stepcomp" summary="Step comparison"> - -<tr> -<td colspan="11" class="left"><span class="padl4"><i>French Drill Reg. of 1791</i></span> (in force until 1862):</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left"><i>Pas ordinaire</i></td> -<td class="right">100</td> -<td class="center">paces</td> -<td class="center">at</td> -<td class="center">0.65</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="left">65</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">per</td> -<td class="center">minute</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left"><i>Frederick The Great’s Infantry</i></td> -<td class="right">75</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">0.70</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="left">52</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="11" class="left"><span class="padl4"><i>Prussian Drill Reg. of 1812:</i></span></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left"><i>Ordinary pace</i></td> -<td class="right">75</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">0.70</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="left">52</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left"><i>Accelerated pace</i></td> -<td class="right">108</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">0.70</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="left">75.6</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page55">[55]</span></p> - -<p>In general, double time is considered of little value. In -Austria double time is to be maintained for periods of two -minutes, quick time of five minutes duration alternating, up -to sixteen minutes, <i>i.e.</i>, until a distance of 1,726 m. has -been covered. In Germany, an alternating quick and double -time march in heavy marching order is prescribed. A -different practice prevails in Italy. According to the Italian -Regulations all troops are to be trained to march in -double time without rest and without knapsacks for 2 kilometers -(with knapsacks, 1 km.); <i>Bersaglieri</i> without knapsacks, -3 km. (with knapsacks, 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> km.), also without rest -(<i>i.e.</i>, 13 and 16.8 minutes respectively). When we consider -that in double time with the necessary alternating step, -2,000 m. can be covered in 17 minutes, and in accelerated -step, in 19-20 minutes, the time gained is unimportant when -compared to the fatigue of the men and the exertion of the -lungs, which interferes with deliberate, accurate firing. During -an Austrian firing test the number of hits fell from -76.5%, attained while advancing in quick time, to 51% after -a period of double time.</p> - -<p>The run, without keeping step (<i>Marsch! Marsch!</i>) is -employed in rapidly crossing short, fire-swept spaces, in -changing quickly from one formation to another, and in the -charge.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page56">[56]</span></p> - -<h4>5. MOVEMENTS OF THE COMPANY IN LINE.</h4> - -<p>The commander of the center platoon is the guide.</p> - -<p>A change of direction is effected by inclining toward -the new direction (at the command: “Half right, march!” -when the angular change of direction is less than 45 degrees), -by indicating a new point to march on, or by executing a -turn.</p> - -<h4>6. THE COLUMNS OF THE COMPANY; MOVEMENTS -IN COLUMN; FORMATION OF LINE.</h4> - -<h5>Column of Twos.<a id="FNanchor73" href="#Footnote73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote73" href="#FNanchor73" class="label"> [73]</a> <i>Reihenkolonne.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Column of twos is formed by facing in the indicated -direction. Marching at attention the depth of an organization -in column of twos is equal to its front when in line. -The column of twos is used in marching by the flank for -short distances only, as the march at attention in this formation -unduly fatigues the men. In addition, this formation -may be used, in exceptional cases, on narrow roads; but the -column becomes considerably elongated (as much as 165%), -when marching at route step. Line is formed from column -of twos either by facing, or by executing front into -line.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page57">[57]</span></p> - -<h5>Column of Squads.</h5> - -<p>This is an open column -formed (the company -being in line at -a halt or in motion) by -each squad executing -a turn of 90 degrees. -It may also be formed -from line at a halt by -the squad on the designated -flank moving -straight to the front, -the others executing -a turn of 90 degrees -toward the proper -flank, then following -the leading squad.<a id="FNanchor74" href="#Footnote74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> -Column of squads may -also be formed by executing -“Squads right -(left), column right -(left).” Line is formed -by each squad executing -a turn of 90 degrees -or by executing -front into line (without -regard to the -original front).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote74" href="#FNanchor74" class="label"> [74]</a> “Right forward, fours right.” -<i>Translator.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption">Column of Squads.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo057a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Route Column.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo057b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>Route column is -formed from column -of squads by the -squads in each section -closing to facing distance, -the file closers, -musicians, and hospital -corps men forming -ranks of four -men, in the gaps thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page58">[58]</span> -created. (Par. 91 German I. D. R.) With the exception -of Russia, which employs a section column, of Switzerland, -which uses a column of squads, and of France, which has -adopted a wheel by fours like that of the cavalry, all other -armies employ the <i>column of fours</i><a id="FNanchor75" href="#Footnote75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> as their march formation.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote75" href="#FNanchor75" class="label"> [75]</a> <i>Doppelreihenkolonne</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Column of fours is, as a rule, formed as follows:</p> - -<p>The even numbered men place themselves on the right -or left of the odd numbered men by making an appropriate -turn, thus forming a column of fours whose length is equal -to the front of the company in line. In the plate below -let the Roman numerals represent front rank men, the Arabic -numerals rear rank men, and the horizontal line the original -front occupied; column of fours will then be formed to the -right, in the different states, as shown:</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="split4060"> - -<div class="left4060"> -<p class="caption">Austria.</p> -</div> - -<div class="right4060"> -<p class="caption">Russia, England, Belgium, -Sweden, and Japan.</p> -</div> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split--> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo058a.png" alt="Column forming" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Italy. Netherlands.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo058b.png" alt="Column forming" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page59">[59]</span></p> - -<p>For the purpose of increasing the front of the column, -the double column of squads, having a width of 8 files, may -be employed. This is formed in practice by placing the -columns of two organizations (companies or battalions) side -by side. In large bodies of troops, the depth of a column -is reduced in this manner by one-half. A column of fours -formed by closing on the center instead of by wheeling to -a flank, is employed in Italy and Russia for the purpose of -reducing the front of an organization.</p> - -<h5>Comparison of Column of Fours with Column of Squads.</h5> - -<p>The column of fours has the advantage over our column -of squads in that it can be more quickly and easily formed; -that the front rank men must make a turn, while, at the -same time, observing the march direction, can scarcely be -considered a disadvantage.</p> - -<p>The column of fours and the column of squads have -the same depth. The Austrians consider movements made -in column of fours on the battlefield more clumsy and -fatiguing than when made in column of squads, because -checks are transmitted to the whole column of fours owing -to its rigidity, while in column of squads the march is easier, -more rapid and more orderly. The squad organization, moreover, -facilitates the employment of small parties in the service -of security and increases the importance of the squad leader -in fire action. For the last named reason we should not like -to dispense with the column of squads.</p> - -<h5>The Employment of the Column of Squads.</h5> - -<p>The route column is suitable for movements under -frontal artillery fire, as the cone of dispersion of bursting -time shrapnel combines small lateral spread with great effect -in the direction of depth, and as it is very difficult for the -opponent to observe whether a shot falls short or goes over, -unless it strikes just in front of the column. When artillery -can bring a flanking fire to bear on the column it becomes<span class="pagenum" id="Page60">[60]</span> -necessary to neutralize this by placing the platoons side by side -so as not to present an easily observed target to the enemy.</p> - -<p>Movements by the flank and changes of front are easily -made in column of squads, and after some practice the deployment -into line of skirmishers from this formation offers no -difficulties. This column is best adapted for movements over -varied ground. In column of squads difficult terrain can be -crossed and advantage can be taken of the most insignificant -cover. In addition, it is difficult for an enemy to observe a -force moving in column of squads along the edge of woods -and rows of trees, and such a column entails the least -expenditure of energy on the part of the men. The leaders -must insist, however, that the men cover in file, and that -elongation of the column does not take place. The column of -squads or the route column is therefore to be employed on -the battlefield as long as possible.</p> - -<p>A column of squads or route column may be shortened -by placing the platoons, each in column of twos or squads, -side by side. By this means the <b>Company Column</b> (<i>Kompagniekolonne</i>) -is formed.</p> - -<div class="container w20em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo060.png" alt="Company Column" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The normal interval between -platoons in this formation, measured -from the leading guide of one -platoon to the leading guide of the -next in line, is nine paces. This interval -may be increased as required -by the nature of the ground and -the intended deployment for action -(deployment on a broader front). -Movements in company column are -facilitated by the fact that platoon -commanders are posted four paces -in front of the center of their respective -platoons. The leading -squad follows the platoon leader, -the guide of that squad moving directly -in that officer’s tracks. Thus,<span class="pagenum" id="Page61">[61]</span> -small, unimportant deviations, unavoidable on varied ground, can -easily be adjusted, while too definite rules would tend to restrict -the mobility of the platoon commanders in front of their -platoons. The principal thing is that the platoon follow its -leader who guides it without command.</p> - -<p>The musicians distribute themselves in rear of the platoons -in readiness for their subsequent duty in action—that of -maintaining communication between the several parts of the -company. The intervals of nine paces between platoons are -not rigid, but rather the reverse. The flexibility of the formation -considerably facilitates movements in difficult country. -This “meandering” of the company over the terrain requires -special training. The old, historic company column, in which -the platoons were formed in line one in rear of the other -at a distance of nine paces (Russia 5 paces = 3.55 m., Austria, -Italy, France, 6 paces = 4.50 m., and Japan, 8 paces = 6 m.), -their commanders on their respective right flanks, is now -called the</p> - -<h5>Column of Platoons.</h5> - -<p>Austria, France, and Italy have retained the old designation.</p> - -<p>The front of the column of platoons may be decreased -by forming column of sections. The column of sections is -suitable as a route formation on broad roads; the transition -from column of sections to column of squads is not difficult, -and for the purpose of passing through occasional narrow -stretches of road, the files on the flanks may be removed. In -most cases it is, however, more desirable to place several -columns abreast than to employ column of sections, because -deployment is facilitated in the former case.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page62">[62]</span></p> - -<h5>Company in Column of Platoons.</h5> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="split6040"> - -<div class="left6040"> -<p class="caption">Germany.</p> -</div> - -<div class="right6040"> -<p class="caption">Russia.</p> -</div> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split--> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo062a.png" alt="Columns" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> The four squad leaders of each platoon are posted on the -flanks of the rear rank and in the center of each rank. The ranking non-commissioned -officer of each platoon stands on the left flank of the front -rank of his platoon. The 1st sergeant, the guidon bearer, and one trumpeter, -and behind them two drummers, are posted in rear of the company.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">Austria.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo062b.png" alt="Columns" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page63">[63]</span></p> - -<div class="figleft w10em"> -<img src="images/illo063.png" alt="Flag" /> -</div> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The staves of the guidon flags (<i>Jalonneurflaggen</i>) are inserted into -the rifle barrel of a soldier (in case of a battalion into the rifle barrel of -a N. C. O.) and serve to indicate battalions and companies.</p> - -<p>According to the color scheme used in Russia: red = 1, blue = 2, -white = 3, green = 4. “R” indicates the number of the regiment in the division, -“B” the number of battalion, and “K” the -number of the company. A red flag is carried by -the 1st Company, and a red flag with one green -horizontal and one blue vertical stripe is carried by -the 8th Company of the 1st Regiment of an infantry -division. In Japan and England so-called storm-flags -(small national flags) have been adopted to -facilitate mutual recognition of friendly troops.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>Posts of Platoon Commanders.</h5> - -<p>In Switzerland, in Russia, and in Germany, the post of -platoon commanders is on the flanks of their respective -platoons when the company is in column of platoons. In -England and Austria platoon commanders are posted in rear -of their platoons, with the exception of the commander of -the leading platoon, who is posted beside his guide. In all -other states platoon commanders are posted in front of their -platoons. Officers are posted in front of their platoons so -as to facilitate observation on their part, and so that their -platoons can follow them. This position becomes a necessity -when the regulations require that all movements of the company -be executed at commands given by platoon commanders. -When they are posted in front of their platoons, they cannot -supervise their men unless they turn around to do so.</p> - -<p>The column of platoons is a close column from which -line cannot be formed directly. It has not been found necessary -in Germany to provide an open column permitting -prompt deployment toward a flank. The column of platoons -unites the company on the smallest space and facilitates supervision, -but in companies at full war strength it is not well -adapted for executing changes of front and for taking advantage -of cover, on account of the size of the platoons (40<span class="pagenum" id="Page64">[64]</span> -files each). In platoons at war strength the men look more -toward the point upon which they are to march than upon -the enemy, and the deployment of the rear platoons offers -difficulties which occur principally when a deployment in an -oblique direction or one by the whole company becomes -necessary.</p> - -<p>The column of platoons is formed by the flank platoons -placing themselves in rear of the center platoon. Line is -again formed by rear platoons moving to right and left and -abreast of the leading platoon.</p> - -<p>The German company column is much more flexible, and -the advantage of a prompt deployment for action, made possible -by the fact that all platoon commanders and the heads -of platoons are in the lead and therefore can see the objective, -should not be underestimated. The company column is -formed from line by the center platoon forming column of -squads to the front (or rear), the flank platoons, each in -column of squads, closing on the center platoon, heads of the -three columns on the same line. Company column is formed -as follows from column of platoons: the leading platoon -executes squads right (left), column left (right), the two -rear platoons execute squads right (left), and are led to a -position abreast of the leading platoon. Company column -from column of squads is formed by rear platoons moving -to the right and left respectively, and abreast of the leading -platoon.</p> - -<p>When line is to be formed from company column, the -flank platoons have to incline to the right and left respectively -in order to gain sufficient interval.</p> - -<h5>Movements in Column.</h5> - -<p>For marching short distances to a flank, column of twos -may be employed; for longer distances, column of squads -(or fours); and the march direction may be changed by -inclining in the proper direction.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page65">[65]</span></p> - -<p>Since March 1904, experiments, which deserve to be -mentioned here, have been made in France under the direction -of Colonel Fumet, having for their object the simplification -of the drill regulations. In the experiments a four-rank formation -is being considered. In this proposed scheme the -platoon is formed so as to place the four single-rank squads -(<i>escouades</i>) in rear of each other at the very close facing -distance of 0.50 m., the leaders of the <i>escouades</i> taking post -on the right flank, a first class private being posted on each -flank and in the center of each <i>escouade</i>.</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">Forming Double Rank from the Four-Rank Formation -and the Reverse Movement.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo065a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w15em"> - -<p class="caption">Deployment of a Half-Platoon formed in Four Ranks -into Two Half-Platoons formed in Double Rank.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo065b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">The Platoon (<i>section</i>) in Line.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo065c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page66">[66]</span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">Deployment of a Half-Platoon Into Line of Skirmishers.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo066a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<p class="caption">The Company.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo066b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The platoon at war strength (50 men) has a front of 8-10 m. -and a depth of 3 m. The movements are very simple. -Route column is formed by simply facing to flank, without first -dividing the platoon into squads. Double rank line may be -formed from column of fours, by executing right and left -front into line. The double rank line may be deployed into -half-platoons. Furthermore, a single rank line may be formed -by the men of the rear rank stepping up into the front -rank. One drawback of this scheme is, that, in forming -route column, facing distance of 0.80 m. between ranks is to -be gradually gained after stepping off. The deployment of -half-platoons into line of skirmishers offers no difficulties. -It is otherwise, however, when the platoon is formed in four -ranks and marching in platoon front, for then line of skirmishers -can be formed only by deploying each rank in turn. -The depth of the column may be decreased by placing -platoons (formed in column of twos or fours) abreast, this -expedient affording a suitable route formation on broad -roads. The company is formed by placing the platoons on -a line and abreast of each other at intervals of 2 m. In the -battalion, column of platoons and “mass” are the only formations -considered. In the “mass” formation the companies, -each in line, are in rear of each other.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page67">[67]</span></p> - -<h4>7. THE BATTALION.</h4> - -<p>The movements of the battalion have been considerably -simplified in all armies. Battalion drill is, however, necessary, -since, as shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the -morning of August 18th, 1870, simultaneous movements of -large masses across country will be unavoidable in future -wars on account of the great size of modern armies.<a id="FNanchor76" href="#Footnote76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote76" href="#FNanchor76" class="label"> [76]</a> Additional examples: Advance of the 6th Infantry Division on Vionville. -<cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 556. The flank march made by the 3rd and 4th Bavarian -Brigades from La Maladerie toward Schloss Goury (5 km. battle of Loigny). -<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, IV, p. 22.</p> - -<p>Advance of the 33rd Infantry Brigade from Champdoux against Loigny -(<i>ibid.</i>, IV, p. 80).</p> - -<p>Advance of the 22nd Infantry Division from Lumeau on Poupry, 4.5 km. -(<i>ibid.</i>, IV, p. 139).</p> - -<p>Advance of the French to the battle on December 1st, 1870 (<i>ibid.</i>, III, p. -164).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Normal Formation of the German Battalion.</h5> - -<p>The four columns of platoons, or the company columns -of a battalion, may be placed, as dictated by space or purpose, -abreast of each other as a <b>broad column</b> (<i>Breitkolonne</i>), -or in rear of each other as a <b>deep column</b> (<i>Tiefkolonne</i>). -The numerical order of companies is immaterial.</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="split3070"> - -<div class="left3070"> -<p class="caption">Deep Column.</p> -</div> - -<div class="right3070"> -<p class="caption">Broad Column.</p> -</div> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split--> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo067.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page68">[68]</span></p> - -<div class="figright w5em"> -<img src="images/illo068.png" alt="Column" /> -</div> - -<p>The deep column is employed for assembling troops if -the terrain necessitates a formation on a narrow front. If -sufficient distance is allowed between companies, line may be -formed to a flank, but this increases the depth of the column -to such an extent that movements at attention are impossible. -The deep column may be used as a route formation in addition -to the column of squads. During the change from route -formation to that of action, the deep column formation may -be retained so long as the depth of the whole column does -not have to be further reduced. When necessary, the deep -column may be replaced by a formation in which the four -companies, each in route column, are placed abreast of each -other.</p> - -<p>The broad column finds proper employment, aside from -parades, in cases where the terrain or the contemplated -deployment requires more front than depth. It is also advisable -to assemble the widely scattered troops in a broad column -after an action. The broad column does not lend itself, -however, to the execution of changes of front by battalion; -but should such changes of front become necessary, -they are always to be executed by company.</p> - -<p>The color is posted between the right and -left center companies, in broad column, and on -the right flank of the third company, in deep -column. In action the color remains with the -company with which it happens to be at the moment.<a id="FNanchor77" href="#Footnote77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> -Should this company also join the firing -line, the color accompanies it; but under all circumstances -one squad must remain with the -color. (Par. 236 German I. D. R.). It has been -contended that this is a disadvantage, as the -enemy can direct his fire on the color and the -men in its vicinity. If the colors, upon which -the soldiers have been sworn, are taken into the -field, it is always better to endure the unavoidable -losses incidental to carrying them, and even to expose -them to capture, than to send them back to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page69">[69]</span> -safe place under escort.<a id="FNanchor78" href="#Footnote78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> At the Albrechtshaus farm -(Wörth) the colors served as rallying points around which the -disordered skirmishers rapidly assembled.<a id="FNanchor79" href="#Footnote79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote77" href="#FNanchor77" class="label"> [77]</a> -In Japan the color joins the battalion commander. British troops leave -their colors in their garrisons. In Russia and France the color is carried only -by one battalion of each regiment.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote78" href="#FNanchor78" class="label"> [78]</a> -See <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 14, p. 180, battle of Wörth. A -platoon of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 47th Infantry was sent to the rear -with the color, and a squad of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 46th Infantry finally -had six colors to guard. In the 88th Infantry, out of a total of 48 sections, -9 sections remained in rear as a guard for 2 colors, but finally 6 of these -sections crossed the Sauer.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote79" href="#FNanchor79" class="label"> [79]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 13, pp. 77, 152.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The figures given on pages 72 and 73 of the German -Infantry Drill Regulations illustrate formations with organizations -at peace strength. The approximate dimensions of -broad and deep columns at war strength are as follows:</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo069.png" alt="Columns" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> Numerous formations are prescribed. In addition to route -column, columns with half company front and with company front are -prescribed. Reserve columns are mentioned. These, according to the -number of companies on the same line, are called single platoon column -(deep column), two platoon column (double column), or four platoon -column.</p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> <i>The mass</i>, in which the companies of the battalion are on -the same line, each company in company column<a id="FNanchor80" href="#Footnote80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> with intervals of three -paces between companies, is employed for assembling the battalion in a -restricted space in a position in readiness when out of range of hostile fire, -or for assembling the battalion under cover. The <i>line of columns</i>, in -which the companies, each in column or some other suitable formation, are -formed abreast of each other at deploying intervals plus three paces, is -also used.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote80" href="#FNanchor80" class="label"> [80]</a> -In the Austrian company column (<i>Kompagniekolonne</i>), the platoons, each -in line, are formed one in rear of the other. This formation was formerly -called company column (<i>Kompagniekolonne</i>) by the Germans also, but at present -they designate it by the term “column of platoons” (<i>Zugkolonne</i>). <i>Translator.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><i>The line.</i> In this formation the companies, each in line, are placed -abreast of each other at intervals of three paces.</p> - -<p><i>The column.</i> In this formation the companies are placed in rear of -each other, each either in line or in column, with distances of nine paces<span class="pagenum" id="Page70">[70]</span> -between companies. The companies are numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc., -from head to rear, if in column, and from right to left, if in line.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> The formations are like those of Austria, but the double column -has been retained.</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> The only formations prescribed are the broad and deep -column.</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The companies are formed in column or in <i>ligne de sections -par quatre</i>, intervals and distances being 10 paces. Distances and -intervals may be increased when required. The <i>battalion in line</i> in which -the companies are formed in line in numerical order, abreast of each -other at intervals of six paces, is only retained as a parade formation.</p> - -<p><i>Line of company columns</i> (<i>ligne de colonnes</i>). Companies abreast -with intervals of six paces.</p> - -<p><i>Deep column</i> (<i>colonne de bataillon</i>). The companies in normal formation -in rear of each other at distances of 10 paces.</p> - -<p><i>Double column</i> (<i>colonne double</i>). Intervals and distances 10 paces.</p> - -<p>The formation in which the companies are abreast of each other, each -in column of fours at deploying intervals, is employed in marching across -country and also under artillery fire. Only the regiment carries a color, -the battalion a guidon (<i>fanion</i>).</p> - -<div class="split6733"> - -<div class="left6733"> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption">Deep Column<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(<i>colonne de bataillon</i>).</span></p> - -<p>The companies in line -of platoons in column of -fours (<i>ligne de sections -par quatre</i>).</p> - -<div class="figcenter max20m"> -<img src="images/illo070a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--left5050--> - -<div class="right5050"> - -<p class="caption blankbefore10">Double Column<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(<i>colonne double</i>).</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo070b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--right5050--> - -</div><!--split5050--> - -</div><!--left6733--> - -<div class="right6733"> - -<p class="caption">Deep Column<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(<i>colonne de bataillon</i>).</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo070c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--right6733--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split6733--> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> - -<p class="caption blankbefore10">Line of Company Columns<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(<i>ligne de colonnes</i>).</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo070d.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--left5050--> - -<div class="right5050"> - -<p class="caption">Double Column<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(<i>colonne double</i>).</span></p> - -<p>The companies in line of platoons -in column of fours (<i>ligne de sections -par quatre</i>).</p> - -<div class="container"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo070e.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--right5050--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split5050--> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page71">[71]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>England.</b> Columns are formed, in view of the (8) weak companies -in a battalion, with company or half-company front at full or reduced distances -(<i>quarter column</i>). In actions with savages echelon formations and -the square are also employed.</p> - -<p><b>Switzerland.</b> The company is divided into four platoons. The line -is used as an assembly formation and for purposes of parade. The company -column, corresponding to the German formation of the same name, -is used for movements on the battlefield. In both line and company column -the platoons are posted abreast, at intervals of three paces. Finally the -route column is used. This is formed either by wheeling by squads, or by -platoons executing column right (left). On the battlefield the platoon may -be deployed and formed in several lines.</p> - -<p>In the battalion, company columns in line of columns, or route columns -in the battalion column, are posted abreast at intervals of 10 paces. Line -and double column are abolished.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Opinions are divided as to the value of the double -column. Formerly, when the double column was still the -column of attack from which deployment for fire action had -to be made, a discussion of its merits was of special importance. -While Austria abandoned the double column formation -in 1881 and Germany in 1905, Switzerland replaced it -by a column having a front of two platoons (<i>Plotonkolonne</i>), -and Russia readopted it again recently. All other states -utilize it as of equal value with the deep column in making -movements beyond range of artillery fire and as an assembly -formation in addition to the deep column. The change -from double column to any company column formation is -easier than a like change from the Swiss “Ploton column” -(double column of platoons), which has the same front, -since in the double column two companies can be deployed -at the same time toward both flanks.</p> - -<p>The deep column appears to be better adapted for making -movements and for advancing under cover, and, on account -of its narrow front, a force in this formation is better -able to adapt itself to the forms of the ground in hilly or -close country than a body of troops in double column of -twice the width of front.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page72">[72]</span></p> - -<h5>The Battalion in Route Column.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Par. 316 German F. S. R.).</span></h5> - -<p>The companies are formed in route column and follow -each other at distances of 8 m. Mounted officers, musicians,<a id="FNanchor81" href="#Footnote81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> -led horses and vehicles are to be included in actual depths of -columns given and not in the distances. A permanent extension -of distances for the purpose of restricting checks of the -march to a single organization is as little permissible as the -permanent elimination or reduction of distances; distances -may be dispensed with temporarily only. The reduction of -the depth of a column, obtained by eliminating distances -between elements entirely, is so small that the rapidity of -deployment gained does not, by any means, compensate for -the increased exertion of the troops.<a id="FNanchor82" href="#Footnote82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote81" href="#FNanchor81" class="label"> [81]</a> A trumpeter marches in rear of the battalion for the purpose of blowing -“Give way,” when necessary to open one side of the road. At this signal all -the troops close in toward the flank of the guide.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote82" href="#FNanchor82" class="label"> [82]</a> The depth of a brigade of six battalions on the march is about 2500 m. -By eliminating distances between elements a space of only 100 m. is gained, -while by marching in a front of six files, approximately 750 m. is gained. The -march of the 10th Infantry Division from Weiszenburg to Preuschdorf, on -August 5th, 1870, proved exceedingly fatiguing. The distances between organizations -had been eliminated pursuant to orders. “Some of the rearmost elements -had to double time uphill to keep up whenever the head of the column -went down hill. Great fatigue and many cases of overexertion were the result.” -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 37</cite>, p. 124.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the march the company commander goes wherever -his presence may be necessary for the proper supervision -of his company. Neither are platoon commanders tied to a -fixed place; one officer is, however, required to march in rear -of the company. The company ammunition wagons follow -in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in rear -of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train -marches separately.</p> - -<p>The depth of the battalion on the march, without field -train, is 400 m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> Column of fours. Depth of a battalion on the march, including -combat train, 670 paces (502 m.). The distance between companies is -nine paces (6.7 m.).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page73">[73]</span></p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The -depth of each rank is reckoned at 1.40 m. on the march (in Germany 1.10 -m.), and that of every 100 men at 50 m. Depth of a battalion, including -combat train, on the march is 450 m.</p> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.1 m.). The -battalion without combat train has a depth of 350 paces (249 m.). The -combat train follows in rear of the regiment.</p> - -<p>A German regiment of four battalions with combat train has a depth -of 1,650 m. on the march; a Russian regiment, a depth of 1,725 paces (@ -71 cm.)=1,215 m. (elongation on the march not considered).</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The -battalion has a depth of 422 m. on the march.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE.</h4> - -<p>For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and -of the brigade see <a href="#Page37">page 37</a> <i>supra</i>. All movements must -be executed in an orderly manner by regiment and brigade, -in any formation, without breaking up tactical units, and the -entity of the whole body must be preserved at the same -time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base -battalion may be designated.</p> - -<p>When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, -disposition, intervals and distances of the tactical units -depend upon the terrain and the intentions of the commander. -Frequently the tactical units (battalions and regiments) -are assembled in separate groups.</p> - -<p>When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do -not dictate otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep -column, are posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals -and distances, rear battalions covering those in front or the -gaps between them. An appropriate formation will frequently -be that in which route columns are placed abreast and -on the same line.</p> - -<p>In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments -may be placed abreast of each other, on the same line, -or in rear of each other, <i>i.e.</i>, in line or in echelon. When<span class="pagenum" id="Page74">[74]</span> -the regiments are formed side by side, two adjacent independent -sections are created, each commanded by a regimental -commander; this insures better supervision, better -control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the -first line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same -organization. This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical -combinations. It may, however, be a disadvantage that the -first line is not subject to the orders of a single commander; -that it is difficult to employ the reserve battalions in one -body; and that the brigade commander can influence the -action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for the -purpose of forming a reserve.<a id="FNanchor83" href="#Footnote83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> The echelon formation, each -echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in -rencontres, because troops are thrown into action directly from -route column. The regimental commanders then become -leaders of echelons, the first line cannot be reinforced by its -own troops, and the organizations of different regiments -finally become mixed. The echelon formation is proper only -when the second line is intended to be used independently -abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, -on a flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank -attack.<a id="FNanchor84" href="#Footnote84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> When part of a larger force, the most suitable -combat formation for troops is usually the one in which the -regiments are formed side by side.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote83" href="#FNanchor83" class="label"> [83]</a> -For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade in action, see -essay published in <cite>Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine</cite> (August and September -numbers 1877) entitled: <cite>Die Infanterie Brigade in ihrer Entwickelung aus der -Brigade von 1812</cite>. In regard to the employment of regiments in line or in -echelon, see Memoir by General von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in -the campaign of 1866. <span class="smcap">Moltke</span>, <cite>Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze</cite>, p. 99, et seq.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote84" href="#FNanchor84" class="label"> [84]</a> -The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite> I, p. 310, et seq. -The formation, side by side, of the six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps in the -attack on the hill at Forbach (Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and -would have disrupted all organizations.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken -up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the -second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be -kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although<span class="pagenum" id="Page75">[75]</span> -the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid -extension of front.</p> - -<h4>9. EXTENDED ORDER.</h4> - -<p>Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. -The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to -occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance -upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing -line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the -attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding -the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are -pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force -which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few -hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable -to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing -line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon -marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the -terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the -more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of -skirmishers needed (<i>i.e.</i>, the denser the firing line).<a id="FNanchor85" href="#Footnote85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> If the -enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers -(<i>i.e.</i>, a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) -will be required, than if the action is to be carried to -a decisive conclusion.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote85" href="#FNanchor85" class="label"> [85]</a> The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship, and -further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at close quarters, -found thin firing lines sufficient.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least -time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led -forward as units up to the moment of opening fire. (Pars. -169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. R.). But on open terrain -such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a -loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. Nothing -remains then but to cover the available front with a very<span class="pagenum" id="Page76">[76]</span> -thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin -skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or -for opening fire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly -justify the opponent’s expenditure of ammunition, as he can -only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, -these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate -the approach of the following echelons by their fire. Besides, -it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a -considerable interval from his comrades in line during the -advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, -succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is -more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense -firing line. The advance in several successive, thin skirmish -lines is therefore only an expedient. In each case the leaders -will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity -of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish -lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering -at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before -opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. -(Par. 334 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both -in the Boer war and in the Russo-Japanese war,<a id="FNanchor86" href="#Footnote86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> but we -must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only maneuver -formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that -the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an -attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. -The Japanese also used this formation after they had once -opened fire with a dense skirmish line.<a id="FNanchor87" href="#Footnote87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote86" href="#FNanchor86" class="label"> [86]</a> -Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on February -18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in two lines of equal -strength and separated by a distance of 300 m., the remainder following at 400 -m. Three battalions of the Highland Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 -m. See my lecture: <cite>Lehren des Burenkrieges</cite>. -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, -33, pp. 43 and 67.</p> - -<p>For the Japanese procedure see <span class="smcap">v. Lüttwitz</span>, <cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, -pp. 44 and 66. <span class="smcap">Bronsart von Schellendorff</span>, <cite>Sechs Monate beim japanischen -Feldheer</cite>, p. 217.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote87" href="#FNanchor87" class="label"> [87]</a> -In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment against Husanta-Kantsy -at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, <span class="smcap">Bronsart von Schellendorff</span> -(<cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, p. 225), says: “Some 500-600 m. from the Russian -position, individual men sprang out of the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 -paces, rushed forward for about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw -themselves down and fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish -line, with the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150 -m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until this moment -had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups of 5-10 men for distances -of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the advanced line.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page77">[77]</span></p> - -<p>It might be well to mention here that thin and dense -skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men -in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied -by them is the same.</p> - -<p class="tabhead">RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE -SKIRMISH LINES.</p> - -<table class="firingtest" summary="Firing test"> - -<tr> -<th colspan="10" class="left fsize90">FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Target.</th> -<th class="br">Range &<br />Elevation:</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">No. of<br />rifles.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">No. of<br />shots.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Time<br />min.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Hits.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Figures<br />hit.</th> -<th rowspan="2">Figures<br />missed.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">%</th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">%</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="text">180 head targets placed at intervals of 1-2 paces.</td> -<td class="center br">680</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">166</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">1268</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">5</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">54</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">4</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">49</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">27</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data">131</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="text">Elevation used: first 600 then 700 m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="text">90 head targets placed at intervals of 3-4 paces.</td> -<td class="center br">680</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">166</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br"> 850</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">5</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">35</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">4</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">27</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data br">30</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="data"> 63</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="text">Elevation used: first 600 then 700 m.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, -as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence -thereof, by the gradually growing number of figures -hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance -strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy -an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The -explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly distributed -fire any specified front space is equally covered with -hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of -figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed<span class="pagenum" id="Page78">[78]</span> -or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still has -131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties -are therefore far more perceptible in the smaller -force.</p> - -<h5>(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.</h5> - -<p>Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the -men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. -142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may -be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either -with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German -I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically -ordered. Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads -and form the framework of the skirmish line. The men -follow their squad leaders absolutely. When the terrain requires -it, squad leaders may increase or diminish intervals -without command. In other armies (for instance, in those -of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers -under control as long as possible, has led to advancing -the platoons designated for the firing line at first in close -order, the deployment being made only when the state of -the action requires it. In France, the intervals between files -may be increased, or a single rank line may be formed -before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an -advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or -diminished in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. -The advance is continued until the command or signal -“Halt” is given. If line of skirmishers is to be formed -when marching to the rear, the command is first faced to -the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. -(Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied -ground, deployments will be made under cover whenever -possible in order to allow of an immediate advance in skirmish -line from that point. The number of platoons to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page79">[79]</span> -deployed depends upon the tactical situation. When three -deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult for the -company commander to control them; but this formation is -an appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters -immediately into decisive action, or in cases where the battalion -acting alone requires complete units in reserve for -additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 German I. D. R.). -When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger force, it is -a good plan to occupy all the available front space at once -with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the -firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less -in this case than when the men crowd together in groups. -(Italy).</p> - -<p>Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of -their commands facing the enemy while advancing; in moving -to the rear, squad leaders are posted on the side away -from the enemy, their duty being to maintain the march -direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear of their -platoons (<i>i.e.</i>, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is -the only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted -in the rear. In Austria one non-commissioned officer in -each platoon is designated to march in rear of the advancing -firing line for the purpose of supervising the skirmishers. -As this non-commissioned officer is to prevent straggling, he -should be selected with great care.</p> - -<p>The platoon commander indicates the march direction -to the leader of the base squad, and, accompanied by the -range finders and the musicians, moves to a point at least -ten paces in front of the line of his squad leaders, as a -rule, opposite the center of his platoon; but he is not restricted -to this position. He must possess mobility if he desires to -lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he expects to -avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he wishes -to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps -the company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221<span class="pagenum" id="Page80">[80]</span> -German I. D. R.). The range finders observe the battlefield, -estimate the range to any targets appearing in view, without -being specifically told to do so, communicate the range -found to the platoon commander (this should not be done by -shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and -observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected -by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a -prudent leader should always be sent out as combat patrols to -the flank, or better still, to the right or left front. The -patrol should under no circumstances lose connection with -the command which it is to protect, but, on the other hand, -should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed -flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol -itself. As a report from a combat patrol frequently arrives -too late, or cannot be made at all on account of hostile fire, -signals should be agreed upon and the leader of the squad -on the exposed flank of the line should keep the combat -patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be employed -advantageously in such cases.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The <b>Austrian</b> deployment is similar to the German, the intervals between -skirmishers being about two paces. In <b>Italy</b> the skirmishers are -posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (<i>catena ordinaria</i>), but this interval may be -increased by order up to three paces (<i>catena rada</i>). The interval between -squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to facilitate volley fire by squad. -The <b>French</b> deployment is similar to the German. An intermediate -extended order formation is that in which an advance is made in line, the -files at extended intervals. In <b>England</b> skirmishers are placed at intervals -of 5-15 paces during the initial deployment. At short ranges where the -decision is sought, one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the -rule, one rifle per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In <b>Russia</b> -and <b>Japan</b> the intervals are as ordered. In <b>Switzerland</b> skirmishers are -posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be covered the -intervals between squads are increased. The length of the rushes depends -on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance of the men. In exceptional -cases an advance by rushes, by squads or single men, is authorized.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page81">[81]</span></p> - -<h5>(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.</h5> - -<p>Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, -all movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be -taken up, should be made, as long as possible, in a free -swinging stride. A careful observation of alignment or of -intervals cannot be insisted upon. Cover found within the -allotted front should be utilized by ploying, but this must -neither interfere with the harmonious advance of the entire -force nor cause a loss of the march direction. Considerations -of cover for individual men should not interfere with -the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements -in long skirmish lines are best made by designating -a certain element as the <i>base</i>, whose leader is far in advance -of it; all neighboring leaders maintain their intervals from, -and endeavor to remain approximately on line with him. -This has the advantage of relieving the commander of the -whole line from looking after these details and leaves him -free to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor -changes of the march direction are executed by inclining -to the right or left or by designating a new objective. More -extended movements by the flank, within range of hostile -fire, are possible only under cover. Changes of direction are -executed like a gradual front into line, in which a temporary -echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted -by degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will -be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be -kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. -Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground -devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. -The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the -necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods -of time during which the skirmishers present their whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page82">[82]</span> -bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself<a id="FNanchor88" href="#Footnote88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> to an -<b>advance by rushes</b>, since the whole distance separating -the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one -rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when -it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line -quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, -or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, -to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely -and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes -should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing -by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the -hostile fire.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote88" href="#FNanchor88" class="label"> [88]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance -without firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which -his fire will begin to be effective against the well-covered -targets of the defender. The skirmishers advance in strong -detachments, by rushes of the greatest possible length, taking -short breathing spells at each halt. Very soon, however, the -hostile fire makes this advance impossible. A fire fight of -variable duration must first make a further advance possible -by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious infantry -engagement every step forward must be purchased by the -fire of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional -cases only, continue his advance in long lines, although -this must appear desirable to him, for almost invariably only -a part of his force will still be able to gain ground to the -front when supported by the fire of neighboring detachments. -Favorable local conditions, insignificant losses, and, above all, -the personality of the commander will embue a force with -the determination to advance.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page83">[83]</span></p> - -<h5>Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the -Force Making the Rush.</h5> - -<p>The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength -about 10-15 seconds preparation for making a rush.</p> - -<table class="rushes" summary="Sprints"> - -<tr> -<td class="left">To</td> -<td>cover</td> -<td>80</td> -<td>m.,</td> -<td>requires</td> -<td>26-30</td> -<td>seconds;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>40</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>17-20</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>25</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>10-15</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, -if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very -clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain -superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures -change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged -with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At -short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts -to advance by rushes with entire companies must -very soon cease of their own accord.</p> - -<p>The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy -play a decisive role here.</p> - -<p>The strength of the force making the rush is intimately -connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated -force would run the risk of being fired on by its own -neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral -courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult -to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines -necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, -and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines -should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses -a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has -been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest -fraction led by an officer, <i>i.e.</i>, with a platoon.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following appropriate statement appears in <cite>Taktische Rückblicke -auf 1866</cite>: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles -him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have someone<span class="pagenum" id="Page84">[84]</span> -assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which he finds himself, -is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed upon his officers. If the -officer’s quiet glance reminds him that here, as in peace time, the first -duty is obedience, and if he sees the officer subsequently advance fearlessly -and vigorously, he will, as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. -It is this faithful attachment to the person of his officer, rather than -ambition and patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. -Those who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they -are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This would -indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice, if its soldiers -would do nothing in action but their simple duty voluntarily.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to -rise and rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This -movement had best be executed with precision and energy -even during peace exercises. The formation and manner of -execution must become second nature to the soldier, like a -movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during -his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he -brings with him when called to the colors during mobilization. -The example set by advancing leaders and the arrival -of reinforcements, which move forward through the firing -line, have been found to be the most effective means of -carrying a skirmish line forward.</p> - -<p>The critical moment occurs when the men rise and -prepare to rush forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be -desirous to prevent, by increasing his fire, any attempt -to advance. The fire support afforded by neighboring detachments -would seem to have a conditional value only; for, -being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments -cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent -previously fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves -are not threatened. In oblique fire, the rifles, on -account of their short barrel, interfere with neighboring -ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on the flanks -to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. The -fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile -skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing<span class="pagenum" id="Page85">[85]</span> -unit. When the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine -guns should not hesitate to fire over the heads of their own -skirmishers. The coöperation of artillery will, in any case, -be of great value, and infantry will have to select those -moments for advancing when the defender is driven under -cover by the hail of shot.</p> - -<p>The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, -is an expedient to which the enemy compels us to -resort as the only means of gaining ground to the front. -The firm determination to close with the enemy and the ever-increasing -difficulty of inducing the men to advance from -cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes -are neither consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with -the desire to close with the enemy. “Many halts during an -advance are fatal to the offensive.” (<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>). The -powers of endurance of the men, the character of the -ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded -by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. -If the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it -is best to let them run forward so long as the physical powers -of the men and the hostile fire permit. The only danger is -that the men will throw themselves down prematurely, and -without orders. It is rather an advantage that during the -rapid advance, increasing both muscular and nervous activity, -the men do not think of danger and have no time to pay -attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, -worthy of special attention: If we train a soldier to make -long rushes in time of peace, he will be able to make them -in time of war, and it is easier for a leader to decrease than -to increase the length of rushes in the field.</p> - -<p>The short rushes are considered advantageous because -they take the enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he -is not in a condition to direct his fire on the advancing unit. -Rushes should be made with startling suddenness. They should<span class="pagenum" id="Page86">[86]</span> -not be made in step at double time, but, on the contrary, as -rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time the enemy directs -his fire on them, the skirmishers should already have thrown -themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves -down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and -should then endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.</p> - -<p>The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which -advanced first. The fire of this unit will at the start -be rather weak, getting stronger gradually. If this unit is -left in its advanced position for some time there is danger -of its being thrown back; all neighboring units must therefore -endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.</p> - -<p>The greater the superiority of our fire, <i>i.e.</i>, the marksmanship -which compels the enemy to keep under cover, the -greater the length of the rushes and the rapidity with which -they follow upon each other.</p> - -<p>Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because -the platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his -whole platoon to rise, since his influence extends only to the -men nearest him, and because the flank squads at first remain -behind and only gradually try to rejoin the leading skirmishers. -If only a part of the skirmishers have jumped up, it is -quite natural for them not to make a long rush, but to throw -themselves down before reaching the new position, because -of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades -and the fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, -in spite of the best intentions of the leader, the short rush -by small units occurs. In time of peace, however, we should -retain the long rush by platoons and not endeavor to give -human weaknesses the force of regulations.</p> - -<p>When once compelled to employ short rushes the following -question presents itself: Is the advantage of such a -small gain of ground worth the trouble of inducing the -soldier to rise for making an advance by rushes? Would it, -therefore, not be more profitable to <b>crawl forward</b>? A man<span class="pagenum" id="Page87">[87]</span> -crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface of approximately -the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance -made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of -standing grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of -maintaining the direction of march and reduction of the rate -of advance); it would also be difficult to get men to advance -to the charge after they have crawled along in this fashion -for some time. The supervision of a unit crawling forward -would also be exceedingly difficult. The following results -were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: -A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in -about 10 minutes; crawling tired the men, increased the -activity of the lungs to such an extent that deliberate aiming -and firing was out of the question and the motion produced -a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.<a id="FNanchor89" href="#Footnote89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> The Boers -occasionally used the following method: One man crept -forward once or twice his own length, raising his body -slightly, while the man next to him fired; then they exchanged -roles and this procedure was repeated uninterruptedly. -In any case, troops ought to be able to execute both -the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with or -without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line -will frequently be able to advance only by crawling.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote89" href="#FNanchor89" class="label"> [89]</a> During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the fighting -line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced by troops crawling up -into the line, and carried forward to within 450 m. of the enemy’s position. An -isolated assault was subsequently repulsed by the Boers.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, -head resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of -the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and -straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the body -slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and the head -also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head is raised only -when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is placed against the -shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring, the man offers a larger -target, and, in addition, is not immediately ready for firing.</p> - -<p>In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of his -position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire, slowly -but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling line is said<span class="pagenum" id="Page88">[88]</span> -to have produced an especially disquieting and paralyzing impression on -the immovable defender, who was tied to his position, because of his -inability to inflict perceptible losses on these small, prone targets, and -because, moreover, he himself was continually under a galling fire. As -no assault was made, no opportunity was offered the defender for using -his rifles against targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen -were, however, insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. -As to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to -resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order to escape -from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew more and more -acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every energetic decision, -one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of surrender.<a id="FNanchor90" href="#Footnote90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote90" href="#FNanchor90" class="label"> [90]</a> -Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900. <cite>Vierteljahrshefte</cite>, -1905, pp. 145 and 149.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>One who fought on the Boer side writes as follows: “After we -had crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within -about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving -over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little credence in -these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a bad experience, -we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as we saw that -most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away their weapons, -we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up with them, I -noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like children. Later, -when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of their troops to some -English officers, they stated that it was due to the uncanny manner of our -advance.</p> - -<p>“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger approaching -ever closer without their being able to ward it off effectively, caused great -depression and alarm among their troops; for the Boers, utilizing every -available rock in crawling over the plain, presented such an unfavorable -target that the British fire had had very little effect, while they themselves -had been constantly exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they -claimed, had contributed to unnerve their troops.”<a id="FNanchor91" href="#Footnote91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote91" href="#FNanchor91" class="label"> [91]</a> -<cite>Supplement No. 8 to <span>Militär-Wochenblatt</span></cite>, 1900. -<cite>Spionskop</cite>, in <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Einzelschriften</cite>, 34/35, p. 59.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5 class="inline">Lessons of the Boer War</h5> - -<p class="hinline nospace">: “The rushes * * * -were of variable length, according to the intensity of the -hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the -opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult -to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile -fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to<span class="pagenum" id="Page89">[89]</span> -push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the -increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”<a id="FNanchor92" href="#Footnote92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote92" href="#FNanchor92" class="label"> [92]</a> -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 33, p. 69.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in -regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose -gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching -enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men -who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became -generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, -on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. -* * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that -might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully -avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the -advancing units are small.”</p> - -<p>The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of -30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war -(1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue -only while the surprise of the enemy lasts.</p> - -<h5>Russo-Japanese War.</h5> - -<p>In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed -short, and very short, rushes by preference, while -other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long -rushes. From an English work we obtain the following -data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure -of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive -rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, -1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m.</p> - -<p>From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority -of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 -m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the -last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew -from his position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page90">[90]</span></p> - -<table class="rushes2" summary="Rushes"> - -<tr> -<td class="left">1st</td> -<td>rush</td> -<td>132</td> -<td>m.,</td> -<td>about</td> -<td>30</td> -<td>rounds</td> -<td>of</td> -<td>ammunition</td> -<td>per</td> -<td>rifle</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">2nd</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 58</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>15</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">3rd</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 63</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>15</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">4th</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 61</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>15</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">5th</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 75</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>15</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">6th</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>151</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 5</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">7th</td> -<td>„</td> -<td class="bb">400</td> -<td class="bb">„</td> -<td colspan="7" class="bb"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td>940</td> -<td>m.,</td> -<td>about</td> -<td>95</td> -<td>rounds</td> -<td>of</td> -<td>ammunition</td> -<td>per</td> -<td>rifle</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>If we assume that three shots per minute were fired -from each rifle, it follows that the attack consumed approximately -40-45 minutes.</p> - -<h5>Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the -Advance by Rushes.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Germany.</b> (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by -rushes, the following commands are given: (Such) <b>Platoon (section, -squad) Rush!... Rise!... March! March!</b> At the command -<b>Rush!</b> the skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, -and prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left -hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body as -possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After a brief -pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon commander -jumps up and at the same time commands: <b>Rise!... March! March!</b> -At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The -length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D. R.). -While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short rushes, which -are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing, should also be -practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers rise promptly and -simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly. The rush is terminated -by the command “<i>Position</i>”; the sight setting is changed when necessary -and fire opened without further preliminaries. Frequently the new firing -position may be indicated before the rush is made.</p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of -the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical situation, -as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They serve as -an expedient for reaching the next firing position.”</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover -(<i>par bonds successifs</i>).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page91">[91]</span></p> - -<p><b>England.</b> (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations prescribed -rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their length was -actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first engagements of the -South African war, in cases where the fire of the enemy was not -especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently published, state: -“Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100 yards (<i>i.e.</i>, 70-90 -m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length. At decisive ranges, -<i>i.e.</i>, under 540 m., they should be short enough to afford the enemy no -opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on the skirmishers. When cover -is available the advance is made from cover to cover.” At another place -the regulations state: “On open ground and within effective range, long -lines of skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even -when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may -take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is -avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy -lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have -to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”</p> - -<p>All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as -possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible, advance -beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When an advance -by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or crawl forward.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with companies, -are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits. When the intensity -of the hostile fire increases, or after the organizations have become mixed, -rushes can no longer be made by entire units but only by squads or like -fractions. These leave the main line and endeavor to reach the next cover -at a rapid run, or if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to -open fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading -echelons open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the -advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable to -delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good position and -are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum -length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by -units smaller than a platoon.</p> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections, -and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When sections -advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the section which is to -advance first, and also the order in which the others are to follow. The -Russian regulations are the only ones which prescribe a “movement to the -rear by rushes,” at a run.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when -advancing over plowed ground and through extensive grain -fields, an advance by rushes will be impossible. Whether<span class="pagenum" id="Page92">[92]</span> -<b>fire while in motion</b> ought to be employed in this case -should be determined. A preliminary condition for its employment -is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued -or that he has been forced under cover. To advance -against an unshaken enemy with fire while in motion must -lead to the annihilation of the attacking force. While the -defender scores only 12.8% hits against advancing skirmishers -at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% hits -against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy -in fire effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, -is bound to collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority -of fire prior to the advance. It is unfortunate that fire -while in motion is frequently employed when inappropriate -during drills. The danger of men wounding each other and -of the advance hesitating because the officers are not in front -of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, -the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the -men to rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of -stragglers being more easily detected, and of keeping the -entire hostile line under fire, cannot be denied. In war this -method of advance will frequently result without orders -while advancing to the charge after the defender has been -driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is prescribed).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force advancing -from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal number of -rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following results were obtained:</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<table class="rushes3" summary="Results"> - -<tr> -<td class="thinline w4m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w4m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w1m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w2m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w1m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w5m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w05m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w1m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w2m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w1m"> </td> -<td class="thinline w1m"> </td> -<td class="thinline"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th colspan="2"> </th> -<th colspan="5">Regulation attack:</th> -<th colspan="5">Fire while in motion:</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="padr4">Time</span></td> -<td class="right">26</td> -<td class="center">min.</td> -<td class="right padr0">28</td> -<td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="padr4">seconds</span></td> -<td class="right">18</td> -<td class="center">min.</td> -<td class="right padr0">40</td> -<td colspan="2" class="left">seconds</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="padr4">Fire pauses</span></td> -<td class="right">12</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padr0">18</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center"><span class="padr4">„</span></td> -<td class="right">7</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padr0">40</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="12" class="center">Attacker against the defender:</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="left">Percentage of hits</td> -<td class="right padr0">7</td> -<td colspan="4"> </td> -<td class="right padr0">16</td> -<td class="left padl0">.7</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="12" class="center">Defender against the attacker:</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="left">Percentage of hits</td> -<td class="right padr0">9</td> -<td class="left padl0">.2</td> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="right padr0">33</td> -<td class="left padl0">.</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="13" class="wrappable">Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from 1,400<br />to 100 paces:</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="left">Attacker</td> -<td class="right padr0">22</td> -<td class="left padl0">.7</td> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="right padr0">20</td> -<td class="left padl0">.</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="left">Defender</td> -<td class="right padr0">32</td> -<td class="left padl0">.2</td> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="right padr0">51</td> -<td class="left padl0">.2</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page93">[93]</span></p> - -<p>There is no model advance within the zone of effective -infantry fire. All expedients, whether they be sneaking or -crawling, long or short rushes, or fire while in motion, are of -equal value, if the force, kept well in hand by the leader, is -thereby brought closer to the enemy. Every opportunity to -gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by flanking fire -or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the advancing -force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery fire -should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing -when the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover -to escape our shrapnel.</p> - -<h5>Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at <b>Wörth</b>.<a id="FNanchor93" href="#Footnote93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote93" href="#FNanchor93" class="label"> [93]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Boguslawski</span>, <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50</cite>, p. 212.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which -lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by Prussian -artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry.</p> - -<p>The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.<a id="FNanchor94" href="#Footnote94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote94" href="#FNanchor94" class="label"> [94]</a> Springer, VI, p. 204.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was -successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were taken. -With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced against front -and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed.</p> - -<p>The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against -the VIth Army Corps in <b>l’Hay</b> and <b>Chevilly</b>: “The defender’s coolness -and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the attack, and -finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady volleys delivered by -him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”<a id="FNanchor95" href="#Footnote95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote95" href="#FNanchor95" class="label"> [95]</a> <span class="smcap">v. Schlichting</span>, -<cite>Taktische und strategische Grundsätze</cite>, 1, p. 71.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Examples of the Employment of Rushes.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. Attack on <b>Le Bourget</b>, on October 30th, 1870.<a id="FNanchor96" href="#Footnote96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote96" href="#FNanchor96" class="label"> [96]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hohenlohe</span>, <cite>Briefe über Infanterie</cite>, p. 80.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 10, p. 43.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Two battalions of the <i>Kaiser Franz</i> Guard Grenadier Regiment had to -advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le -Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high potato<span class="pagenum" id="Page94">[94]</span> -crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two companies entirely -deployed in the first line, and the battalion reserves in rear of the center -of the line with files at extended intervals. The second line was formed -similarly. The two companies in the firing line advanced at first without -firing, by rushes of about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each -moving forward beyond the point where the other had halted. When -effective range was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other -moved forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a -similar manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while -lying down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the -village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn to -the interior of the village.</p> - -<p>The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were -insignificant.</p> - -<p>The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St. -Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack.</p> - -<p>2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at <b>Scheinovo</b>, on January 9th, 1878.</p> - -<p>The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions (<i>Drushines</i>) -of Bulgarians, and the <i>Ugla</i>, -<i>Vladimir</i>, and <i>Kasan</i> Regiments, was -to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle battalions armed with -Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion of the <i>Ugla</i> Regiment armed -with captured Turkish rifles. The only artillery available consisted of -a mountain battery, while the Turks were able to bring twenty guns into -action.</p> - -<p>The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian -firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when the -losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, <i>without firing</i>, from -750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes were made by the -entire firing line; the supports, with files at extended intervals, did not -follow until the firing line had thrown itself down.</p> - -<p>After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from the -reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one battalion, each -battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance between lines (total -depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900 m. on, the advance was -made by rushes, the entire force inclining to the right front. While -covered by the fire of the skirmishers of the firing line in front, the length -of the rushes was 100-150 m. At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading -line, extending the line of the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able -to open fire and, after about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent -that the Turks were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, -which was successful.</p> - -<p>Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11 officers -and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269 men; the original -strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure of ammunition: 11th -Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page95">[95]</span></p> - -<p>The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s -fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The Kasan -Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the assault -on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated to such an -extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of one another, each -in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between lines; the intervals between -companies were 15 m., and those between files were extended. -Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of ammunition: 12 rounds -per rifle.<a id="FNanchor97" href="#Footnote97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote97" href="#FNanchor97" class="label"> [97]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, -<i>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen -Krieg</i>, III, pp. 168-186.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost -every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed -that “every step forward” had to be literally gained by the -impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments, -that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and -that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually. -(See <a href="#Page76">pp. 76</a> and <a href="#Page87">87</a> <i>supra</i>.)</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The frontal attacks made at <b>Wörth</b>, at the Roten Berg at <b>Spicheren</b>, -opposite <b>Flavigny</b>, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite the gravel pits of -<b>Point du Jour</b>, on August 18th, 1870, etc.</p> - -<p>In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of -<b>Lovtcha</b>, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges south of -<b>Plevna</b>, and the fight during the advance from the west and southwest -against the large work of <b>Gorni Dubniac</b>, show how rushes, repeatedly -attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a few paces. “On a signal -given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated by all the officers, the men -were to rush forward immediately. Just before the movement began, -the Turks opened the usual incessant fire, and the simultaneous advance -of so many squads was of course absolutely impossible. The rushes were, -therefore, always made by groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, -one in this company, one in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw -themselves down again.”<a id="FNanchor98" href="#Footnote98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote98" href="#FNanchor98" class="label"> [98]</a> -<span class="smcap">Pusyrewski</span>, -<cite>Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78</cite>, p. 127.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The attacks on <b>Railway Hill</b> and on <b>Hart’s Hill</b> (February 1900), -on the <b>Tugela</b>, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes, then -by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally working -itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching the last -firing position from which the final assault could be made.<a id="FNanchor99" href="#Footnote99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote99" href="#FNanchor99" class="label"> [99]</a> -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 34/35, pp. 129, 139. <cite>The Times History -of the War in South Africa</cite>, III, p. 539.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page96">[96]</span></p> - -<h5>(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.</h5> - -<p>If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained -after heavy losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, -or when it finally is to receive the impulse for making -a further advance, it must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 -and 341 German I. D. R.). This may be done by prolonging -the line (platoons abreast at well defined intervals), or, when -space is lacking and after losses have occurred, by putting -men in the intervals (<i>i.e.</i>, increasing the density of the line -and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical -units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. -Whenever practicable, the firing line should be reinforced -by prolonging it, although the other method, that of placing -men in the intervals and gaps of the firing line, is more frequently -used and more practical because the arrival of fresh -men and the replacement of incapacitated officers occasioned -thereby renews the strength of the firing line (replenishment -of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is unavoidable, -and on that account platoon and squad leaders -should be trained in time of peace to form new units at -once so that control is not lost. In order to prevent the mixing -of units, so far as this is possible, and to keep the firing -line filled up with skirmishers, even during an engagement entailing -heavy losses, it is indispensable that the fighting front -should be limited, that of a company in attack to 150, in defense -to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the -firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, -forms skirmish line at any rate before leaving the last cover -and advances by rushes, or, if directly in rear of the firing -line and under a heavy fire, even by crawling.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of prolonging -it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used. When prolonging -the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the firing line. During -an attack efforts should, however, be made to advance beyond the firing -line—“to overreach it.” The other method, that of filling up the line, is<span class="pagenum" id="Page97">[97]</span> -in attack, as a rule, to be used for the purpose of carrying the line forward, -the rush to be made as soon as the reinforcement reaches the firing -line. Signals are prescribed for prolonging the line without advancing -beyond it, for reinforcing that line and advancing beyond it, and for -filling it up and carrying it forward in a rush.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).</span></h5> - -<p>The most effective method of preventing a mixing of -organizations in action is for all units constantly to endeavor -to close in toward their leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties -have occurred. Squads which have sustained heavy -losses unite with adjoining ones under a common leader. -This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in -motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals -ordered should be maintained. Crowding of every description -increases losses and causes dangerous gaps along the -entire front.</p> - -<p>If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the -action and the situation make it no longer desirable to retain -an extended order formation, each leader, from the -squad leader upward, must assemble his unit at once and -place himself and it at the disposal of the commander of -the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly -and held well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific -orders to that effect.</p> - -<p>The troops must be assembled very quietly and always -facing the enemy.</p> - -<p>The original organizations are not re-formed until the -command “Fall in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page98">[98]</span></p> - -<h4>10. SUPPORTS.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<p>The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, -in the first place, a division into firing line and retained -fractions. At the decisive stage of a fight every available man -must, without question, be in the first line.</p> - -<p>Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot -be maintained at a less distance from the firing line than that -separating the latter from the enemy.</p> - -<p>It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the -firing line, to cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), -to act as a reserve, and, in case of necessity, as a rallying force -upon which the firing line can fall back. The presence of -supports increases confidence in attack, and the power of -resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to influence -the action, to give a firing line that has been checked -the impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the -action by sending reinforcements to points where he wishes -to gain an advantage. The support follows that part of the -firing line which, in all probability, will need its assistance; -if part of the same organization as the firing line, it follows -in rear of the center, otherwise in rear of a wing. In a company -advancing alone over covered terrain, it will sometimes -be necessary to place small supports in rear of both flanks. -Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile -fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by -platoons, but the power necessary for pushing home the attack -must be imparted to them from the rear; otherwise the -energy of the attack will spend itself. The necessity of -having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly illustrated -in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in -front of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all -attempts to push the firing line forward failed, and the necessary<span class="pagenum" id="Page99">[99]</span> -impetus for the decisive advance was not given until -fresh supports were fed into the firing line.<a id="FNanchor100" href="#Footnote100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote100" href="#FNanchor100" class="label">[100]</a> <cite>The Times History of the War in South Africa</cite>, III, p. 200.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of -the skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their -proper functions. (Switzerland and England). Such opportunities -should not be overlooked, as they increase the volume -of fire.</p> - -<p>Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the -action and upon the terrain.</p> - -<p>When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased -in the course of the action. When this is the case, the leaders -of all grades should be animated by but one desire, that -of being in front in order to participate in gaining the victory. -The duration of the crisis of an action is usually -brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the leader -must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.</p> - -<p>When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable -to increase distances in order to keep the echelons held back in -rear from coming under fire. In any case, the distance between -supports and firing line should be less than the distance -between firing line and enemy. In an attack, supports -should be close enough to the firing line to prevent, by timely -interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the -defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports -for the purpose of repulsing an assault, they will -usually be placed a short distance immediately in rear of or -within the firing line (intrenched) at the points where they -are to be employed.</p> - -<p>During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be -kept out of hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that -two echelons be not simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry -fire or by one and the same shrapnel. The distance -between echelons is therefore increased to more than 300<span class="pagenum" id="Page100">[100]</span> -m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the -combat approaches.</p> - -<p>In open country, supports held too close to the firing line -will soon cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their -losses would be so great that the boldest men would join the -firing line and the less courageous would hunt cover. Everything -depends upon the manner in which supports are led -forward, especially during that part of the advance immediately -preceding their junction with the firing line. In this -lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered -terrain permits distances to be reduced. The commander -should be particularly careful not to let this advantage escape -him, since on such terrain it is more frequently necessary -promptly to reinforce the firing line.</p> - -<p>The commander of the support must constantly observe -the movements and successes of the firing line in order that -he may be able to reinforce it in the most advantageous manner. -Whenever he is obliged to split up his command during -a movement to the front, he should endeavor to reunite -it at the first opportunity.</p> - -<p>The support should closely adapt its movements to those -of the firing line. When a part of the firing line makes a -rush, the support halts for the moment, and then runs forward -to the next cover, simultaneously with the next advancing -unit of the firing line, and covered by the fire of the -skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as -the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter -rose, the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the -firing line threw itself down and returned the fire, that of -the enemy became noticeably weaker.”<a id="FNanchor101" href="#Footnote101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote101" href="#FNanchor101" class="label">[101]</a> <cite>Report of Lieutenant Borsov</cite>, -in <span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke -auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg</cite>, III, p. 183.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The supports follow the firing line in single or double -rank, in column of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in -line of squads, in quick time or by rushes; it may also be -advisable to deviate temporarily from the direction of advance.<span class="pagenum" id="Page101">[101]</span> -Columns having a narrow front, so long as they -are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand -long range infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). -On coming to a halt, it is advisable to return to close order -formation; at any rate, the leader must get his command -again entirely under control.</p> - -<h5>Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?</h5> - -<p>Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion -was divided into firing line and companies of the second line. -The Japanese, also, often placed entire companies in the -firing line, which could not be quickly enough reinforced by -the companies of the second line, because these were held -too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage during -the first deployment before the situation is clear.</p> - -<p>The following arguments are advanced against the employment -of supports:</p> - -<p>1. <i>The supports following the firing line suffer losses, -without, as a rule, being able to participate in the action.</i> -This argument is not well founded, since the criticism made -with reference to supports is equally applicable to companies -in the second line. That supports threw themselves into the -firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief that they -were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that -they followed the firing line too closely.</p> - -<p>Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) -can reach the firing line quickly and can easily find cover -on account of the small angle of fall of modern bullets. -Besides, the knowledge that supports are immediately in rear, -the moral factor, should not be underestimated.</p> - -<p>2. <i>The supports may be commanded by inexperienced -leaders, who will not always act with the good judgment the -situation demands and will fail to seize the right moment -for advancing.</i> (This can perhaps never be avoided).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page102">[102]</span></p> - -<p>3. <i>Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to -mix units, makes control more difficult, and impairs the -efficacy of fire.</i> These criticisms are not applicable to a -company, for it is in any case impossible for the company -commander to control the fire; this is the business of platoon -commanders.</p> - -<p>The advantages of supports are, that they increase the -number of targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason -of their small size, they can utilize every accident of -the ground; that they can be kept close enough to the firing -line to reinforce it in case of sudden emergency; and that -they allow companies in the second line to be kept farther -to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force, need -not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following -the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. -The drawbacks of the <i>petits paquets</i> would appear -only if every company were to preserve a support up to the -decisive stage of the action.</p> - -<h4>11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED -ORDER.</h4> - -<p>In <b>close order</b> the men are placed so close together that -they can be led by word of command and directly influenced -by their officers. The position of the individual soldier is -fixed; the men on either side of him interfere with his utilizing -cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid of cover, close -order formations present such large targets to infantry fire, -that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire -of the enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. -Thus the hostile fire compels the most extended deployment.<a id="FNanchor102" href="#Footnote102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote102" href="#FNanchor102" class="label">[102]</a> Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ close -order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken enemy, although -this was still prescribed by the regulations. Whenever this was attempted tremendous -losses resulted. In the battle of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies -of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment, formed into a half-battalion, and following the -other companies of the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, -suffered in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of about -400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression produced was -so overpowering that the commands for extending and deploying could not be -executed at all and that the half-battalion had to be withdrawn in rear of the -cemetery where it was assembled by the three officers still remaining.” <cite>Geschichte -des Regiments Nr. 35</cite>, p. 23.</p> - -<p>In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not at all -exceptional.</p> - -<p>On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry, advancing -from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in half-battalion column, to -within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12 officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and -437 men killed and wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile -artillery and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments -of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 724. -<cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 152.</p> - -<p>The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the 29th -Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of the opponent. -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29</cite>, p. 499.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page103">[103]</span></p> - -<p>In <b>extended order</b> the soldier’s position is not definitely -fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed -position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers -as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, -confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in -taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well -as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the -skirmisher.</p> - -<p>The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased -by the noise and other disorganizing influences of -the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether -an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best -shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control -of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made -on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all -proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this -initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of -combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual -soldier.</p> - -<p>In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy -them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order -formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile -fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed -employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled<span class="pagenum" id="Page104">[104]</span> -in close order without regard to the previously existing organization.</p> - -<p>In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported -by other arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently -in colonial wars<a id="FNanchor103" href="#Footnote103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> as well, the importance of close -order formations increases when the troops show a disposition -to get out of hand.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote103" href="#FNanchor103" class="label">[103]</a> -The British <i>Infantry Training</i> contains special regulations governing “savage -warfare,” in which close order battalion formations are explicitly given the -preference (order in echelon, square).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount -obstacles, cross difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage -of the accidents of the ground, as cover against hostile -fire and as rifle rests. In extended order, infantry is, moreover, -able to develop its fire power most effectively, while -at the same time offering the smallest possible targets to the -hostile projectiles. Thus the <i>skirmish line</i> is the principal -combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is -initiated and carried through to the end.</p> - -<p>Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline -in the simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. -At Jena the Prussian battalions were not defeated because -of their drill, but because they were poorly led. What function -drill had fulfilled at that time is pretty well illustrated -by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian infantry and -by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which -they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their -steadiness. No properly led army has been able to dispense -with drill in developing its discipline. In the days of linear -and column tactics the ultimate object of training was the -leading of battalions in close order, in magnificent array, -against the enemy. By means of drill a passive discipline -was to be created in which intelligence played no part whatever. -We know with what energy the army of the First -Napoleon was drilled according to the wholly superannuated -regulations of linear tactics in the camp at Boulogne and<span class="pagenum" id="Page105">[105]</span> -during the brief pauses between campaigns. A well drilled -organization has ever, when well led, proved equal to the -occasion.<a id="FNanchor104" href="#Footnote104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> The electrifying word of command is an important -factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to -overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense -with this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company -of Count Finkenstein during the advance against the -Shipwald, that officer halted his command, brought it to -shoulder arms and did not continue the movement until order -had been completely restored.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote104" href="#FNanchor104" class="label">[104]</a> Compare herewith -<cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 463, in regard to the importance of -discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training -two distinct methods by means of which efficient soldiers -may be created. To quote: “In this connection the most -perfect results would undoubtedly be attained by efficient -drill and thorough skirmish training.” Where both these -methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended order -fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises -the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, -but not soldiers, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>men whose devotion to duty surpasses -their fear of death</i>. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding -combat drill. In this term he includes the painstaking -execution of all those accomplishments which the -skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to -use correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To -this category belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, -good pointing in any position, accurate aiming, cool firing, -quick locking of the piece, prompt jumping up for the advance, -taking advantage of accidents of the ground in lying -down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect, crawling -forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these -things must be practiced individually, and since many of -them do not permit of simultaneous execution by an entire -unit, we usually speak of combat training instead of combat -drill, without, however, intending any other meaning.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page106">[106]</span></p> - -<p>“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make -the skirmisher load quickly and carefully, can cause him to -take the position of aim, just as he drills the correct execution -of present arms and the rise preparatory to advancing -by rushes. Training is directed at the mentality of the man, -it makes him independent and allows him to exercise initiative, -even when he is no longer directly under his superior -officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no -longer able to follow their example.</p> - -<p>“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate -sphere; the scope of both is closely defined and -neither one could be dispensed with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating -the ‘soldier,’ because it develops the characteristics which -must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance in surmounting -hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of his -will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill -in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The -addition of training will, of course, increase the value of this -‘soldier’ very considerably.</p> - -<p>“Training alone will never attain this object. To -arouse and develop the man’s intellect may make him a good -skirmisher, a skillful member of a patrol, but for battle he -remains incomplete, since his awakened mental powers have -not been made available by the disciplining drill. His energies -are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give -us the assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive -moment. He is no soldier.”<a id="FNanchor105" href="#Footnote105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote105" href="#FNanchor105" class="label">[105]</a> -<span class="smcap">V. D. Goltz</span>, -<cite>Zur Gefechtsausbildung</cite>, p. 26.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard -this drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral -factors: “Moral powers are the mightiest pillars of success. -Honor and patriotism fill troops with the noblest devotion. -The spirit of self-sacrifice and the determination to win ensure -success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the influence -of the leaders and the coöperation of all the elements.”<a id="FNanchor106" href="#Footnote106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote106" href="#FNanchor106" class="label">[106]</a> -<cite>Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page107">[107]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“However, when necessity demands the creation of new organizations—whether -militia, volunteers, or <i>gardes mobiles</i>,—it is a great mistake -to expect everything from moral factors; even though hatred of the enemy, -enthusiasm for the fatherland, the republic or for glory, rise to the highest -pitch. ‘Victory or death’ is the watchword when marching out—but neither -is quickly attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting -marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon -the intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the -sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be -annihilated at once by a rapid assault—not at all; the advance is made very -slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to evaporate during -the many hours in which death is constantly faced.” <span class="smcap">Layman.</span></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish -performance of duty, and unquestioning subordination of the -will of the individual to that of the leader. To be sure, on -days of success enthusiasm will suffice, but not when everything -around us begins to waver and to yield. The importance -of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything else, does -not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until -the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which -stalks by the side of enthusiasm.</p> - -<p>“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known -work <cite>Drill or Training</cite>, “must not be confounded with the -snappy drill of troops, and can, moreover, not be attained by -means of it. The straightjacket has never yet cured one -insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined through the -body. One must work from the inside and not from the -outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of -a tree are beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite -of its deceptive appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the -first storm may bring it down. The inner man must look -beautiful; firmness and steadiness are needed within; the -marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain are of no -moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of self-sacrifice -is the important factor.”</p> - -<p>It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the -title of the brochure <cite>Drill or Training</cite>, written by Archduke<span class="pagenum" id="Page108">[108]</span> -John, to <cite>Drill and Training</cite>. Training necessitates a good -corps of instructors and a great deal of time, whereas drill -will accomplish in a shorter time results which are not so -enduring. It is again presupposed that the recruits are willing -to be trained, otherwise all efforts are unavailing. The -question whether the individual man can be influenced sufficiently -in a two years’ service period to overcome even -sentiments inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends -or relatives, can only be answered by the next war. To -answer this question at the present time would be premature; -but one thing is certain: the sharp word of command, the -whole influence of a well-organized body of troops, will -sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.</p> - -<p>The importance of the tactical formations which at -one time constituted minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; -unfavorable formations, in so far as they increase or reduce -losses, increase or restrict one’s fire effect, can be offset by -the fighting efficiency of the soldier and by proper leading. The -unfortunate termination of the battle of Jena for the Prussian -arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation to drill as -such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for -linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular -war and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions -of Borke’s Brigade in line overran the French -columns. Within certain limits, numerical inferiority and -lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by leadership. But -numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the decisive -factors for success.</p> - -<p>The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the -troops and not to leadership. This is likewise true of -Wörth. The lion’s share in the victory of Vionville is certainly -due to the fighting efficiency of the gallant Brandenburgers. -Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced by the -commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity -of the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under -the most destructive hostile fire.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page109">[109]</span></p> - -<p>Increased demands must at present be made upon the -combat training of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, -self-sacrificing, cold-blooded men who are imbued -with the spirit of the reckless offensive. “The combat requires -thinking leaders, <i>trained to rely upon themselves</i>, and -<i>skirmishers having initiative</i>.” (Par. 2 German I. D. R.). -“Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused -and continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 -German I. D. R.). “The aim of all exercises should be -to develop the soldier into a self-thinking and conscientiously -working skirmisher.” (Par. 158 German I. D. R.). “All -training should be directed toward producing self-reliance -in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251 German -I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for -taking the offensive; its actions must be guided by the one -thought, <i>forward, at the enemy, no matter what the cost</i>.” -(Par. 265 German I. D. R.). “The continuous desire to -press forward and the endeavor to surpass all other units -must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par. 327 -German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with -skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them -earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position.” -(Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those who fall must -be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an abatement -of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in -the previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of -the combat.” (Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander -who is ever willing to shoulder responsibility will not shrink -from throwing troops into the fight <i>regardless of consequences</i> -even when the outcome of the battle is doubtful.” -(Par. 304 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a -soldier by discipline, in an officer this must be brought about -by a higher sense of duty and honor. On the battlefield the -desire to live does not appear in a cultured person, as a rule, -in its ordinary, undisguised form; it makes itself felt rather<span class="pagenum" id="Page110">[110]</span> -in the shape of tactical scruples, whether the leader would -be justified in leading his subordinates to certain death, -whether it would not be his duty to preserve the force entrusted -to him for more important duty in the service of the -fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, -an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, -from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its -feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual -war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous -nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his -senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the -better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops have -become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common -to colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as -indications of good leadership.<a id="FNanchor107" href="#Footnote107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Great victories are, as a -rule, invariably accompanied by great losses.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote107" href="#FNanchor107" class="label">[107]</a> In this connection and in regard to the British losses in South Africa, see -my lecture: <cite>Die Lehren des Burenkrieges</cite> (1904), p. 8, et seq. The behavior of -Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and Spionskop is interesting. See <cite>The Times History -of the War in South Africa</cite>, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page111">[111]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS -FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.</h4> - -<h5>1. THE FIELD GUN.</h5> - -<p>The field artillery of all the states that need be considered -is armed with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and -capable under peace conditions of firing as many as twenty -shots per minute. Its caliber varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. -(Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia, 7.62, and England, 8.38 -cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The German gun fires -shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and the French -7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the same -weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 -and the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through -the action of combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to -5000, in France and Russia to 5500 m.). The projectiles -have a maximum range of 8000 m., when percussion fuze is -used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which bursts -approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is -set at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with -a light field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing -12.8 kg. (time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and -shell weighing 15.7 kg. (time fuze ranging from 500 to -5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field howitzers (cal. 14.91 -cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of 6870 m.) in the -heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5 cm. -Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another -long piece of 12 cm. caliber.</p> - -<h6 class="inline">Percussion shrapnel</h6> - -<p class="hinline">is used for defense at short range, -and in fire for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range<span class="pagenum" id="Page112">[112]</span> -and the nature of the ground. It is effective against troops -lodged in tall timber. Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently -cause the premature burst of the projectiles.<a id="FNanchor108" href="#Footnote108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote108" href="#FNanchor108" class="label">[108]</a> -Engagement of Azay (6th January, 1871). <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. -20</cite>. <span class="smcap">Hoffbauer</span>, -<cite>Deutsche Artillerie</cite>, I, pp. 16 and 49. <cite>Taktik</cite>, VI, p. 42.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately -in front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, -depending upon the range). However, even in this case, the -bullets often pass over low targets, such as skirmishers lying -down, and low parapets afford sufficient protection. An -adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is directed -on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields, terrain -covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the -ground, or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the -angle of fall is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece -at ranges of 3300 m. and over) half of the bullets penetrate -the ground, the remainder ricochet and pass on at a greatly -reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary effect of shrapnel -is insignificant owing to the smallness of the bursting -charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the -projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.<a id="FNanchor109" href="#Footnote109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote109" href="#FNanchor109" class="label">[109]</a> Consult <cite>Taktik</cite>, -VI, p. 45, in regard to the incendiary effect of projectiles.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">Percussion Shrapnel.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo112.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<h6 class="inline">Time shrapnel</h6> - -<p class="hinline">(used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is -fairly independent of the terrain, the burst being<span class="pagenum" id="Page113">[113]</span> -easily observed since the bullets are embedded in a “smoke-producing -composition.” The extreme range at which this -projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing -the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, -both of which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, -model ’96, may be effectively employed up to a range of -4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire is so annihilating that decisive -results are produced in a short time. (Par. 630 German -F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account of its -certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits the -trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This -fuze also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly -advancing targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short -range. The French Regulations give the width of the beaten -zone of a single shrapnel as 20, that of two from the same -piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of the beaten zone is -300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the German -shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel -(model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines -following 250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base -charge shrapnel these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. -from the first line. The German shrapnel gives very good -results when set to burst 30 to 150 m. in front of the target, -the height of burst being regulated accordingly (approximately -<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> of the whole number of hundreds of meters of -the range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect -may, however, be expected even when the fuze is set to burst -the projectile 300 m. in front of the target. (Par. 30 German -F. A. F. R.).</p> - -<p>Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down -from 1000 to 3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and -against standing skirmishers at the same ranges when burst 56 -to 45 m. short. The two tables given below, borrowed from -the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery tactics,<a id="FNanchor110" href="#Footnote110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page114">[114]</span> -give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel, and of the -effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the -target:</p> - -<table class="shrapnel" summary="Effects"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">TARGETS.</th> -<th colspan="5" class="text">When firing at the targets named (1 skirmisher per m.) with time shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to -burst 50 m. short, the following <i>hits per shrapnel</i> may be expected after the adjustment has been effected:</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">500 m.</th> -<th class="br">1000 m.</th> -<th class="br">2000 m.</th> -<th class="br">3000 m.</th> -<th>4000 m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers standing</td> -<td class="hits br">18.4</td> -<td class="hits br">14.2</td> -<td class="hits br">12.0</td> -<td class="hits br">11.0</td> -<td class="hits">10.4</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers kneeling</td> -<td class="hits br">10.6</td> -<td class="hits br"> 8.2</td> -<td class="hits br"> 6.9</td> -<td class="hits br"> 6.3</td> -<td class="hits"> 5.8</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers lying down</td> -<td class="hits br"> 6.4</td> -<td class="hits br"> 4.9</td> -<td class="hits br"> 4.1</td> -<td class="hits br"> 3.8</td> -<td class="hits"> 3.5</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Head targets</td> -<td class="hits br"> 3.5</td> -<td class="hits br"> 2.7</td> -<td class="hits br"> 2.3</td> -<td class="hits br"> 2.1</td> -<td class="hits"> 1.9</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt"> -<th colspan="6"> </th> -</tr> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">TARGETS.</th> -<th colspan="5" class="text">When firing at the targets named (skirmish line with 1 skirmisher per m.), -under service conditions, with time shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to burst 50-100 m. short, the following hits per minute -may be expected on an average:</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">500 m.</th> -<th class="br">1000 m.</th> -<th class="br">2000 m.</th> -<th class="br">3000 m.</th> -<th>4000 m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers standing</td> -<td class="hits br">364</td> -<td class="hits br">202</td> -<td class="hits br">109</td> -<td class="hits br"> 46</td> -<td class="hits"> 14</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers kneeling</td> -<td class="hits br">210</td> -<td class="hits br">117</td> -<td class="hits br"> 63</td> -<td class="hits br"> 27</td> -<td class="hits">  8</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="target">Skirmishers lying down</td> -<td class="hits br">126</td> -<td class="hits br"> 70</td> -<td class="hits br"> 38</td> -<td class="hits br"> 16</td> -<td class="hits">  5</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="target">Head targets</td> -<td class="hits br"> 70</td> -<td class="hits br"> 39</td> -<td class="hits br"> 21</td> -<td class="hits br">  9</td> -<td class="hits">  3</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote110" href="#FNanchor110" class="label">[110]</a> -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Die Taktik der Feldartillerie</cite>, -Berlin, 2nd Edition, p. 9.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and -bullets from shrapnel bursting within 100 m. are disabled. -The penetration of shrapnel bullets is so great, at ranges under -2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, -they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially -true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m. The effect -of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with shields is -insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile employed<span class="pagenum" id="Page115">[115]</span> -by artillery against animate objects, provided these are -not located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, -or under bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against -such cover on account of the flatness of the trajectory and -the sensitiveness of the fuze.</p> - -<p>Shrapnel is to be supplemented by <b>shell</b> filled with explosive -charge, model ’88, which has a great explosive effect -at extreme ranges and in tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 -German F. A. F. R., in regard to action against shielded batteries).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Percussion shell, on account of its very sensitive fuze, bursts on -penetrating the shield, while percussion shrapnel goes entirely through -the shield and bursts about <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> m. in rear of it.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">Percussion Shell, Model ’96.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo115.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under -light splinter proofs may be reached with time shell burst -directly over or close in front of them. The depth of the -beaten zone of this projectile is small, seldom exceeding 50 m., -even when the fire is directed against targets in the open. -About 75% of all the fragments are capable of inflicting disabling -wounds when the interval of burst is short. The -peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful -adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French <i>obus -allongé</i>, a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; -angle of the cone of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed -only for the destruction of material objects.<a id="FNanchor111" href="#Footnote111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote111" href="#FNanchor111" class="label">[111]</a> When firing on animate objects, the beaten zone of this projectile does -not exceed a space 50 m. wide and 20 m. deep, but the concussion of the -explosion will undoubtedly be felt at a greater distance. The explosive effect -of the projectile is equivalent to that of 30 kg. of powder. The explosion of -the projectile produces a cone-shaped crater having a diameter of 2 and a depth -of 0.50 m. Ten melinite shells per running meter are required to destroy a -parapet 3 m. thick and 2.30 m. high.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page116">[116]</span></p> - -<p>The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts -only after it has pierced thin walls or shields.</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<p class="caption">Time Shell, Model ’96.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo116.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<h4>2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER.</h4> - -<p>The realization that the power of resistance of a defender -lodged in deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of -guns having a flat trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun -capable of high angle fire, which had been eliminated from -the field artillery upon the advent of rifled cannon.<a id="FNanchor112" href="#Footnote112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote112" href="#FNanchor112" class="label">[112]</a> After March, 1859, the artillery of a mobilized Prussian army corps consisted -of three horse batteries, each armed with six 6-pounder guns and two -7-pounder howitzers; six foot batteries, each armed with eight 12-pounder -guns; and three foot batteries, each armed with eight 7-pounder howitzers. -Thus the artillery of an army corps numbered 30 howitzers and 66 guns.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light -field howitzer, model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. -(500 jacketed bullets, @ 10 g.; time fuze graduated from -300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (0.37 kg. explosive -charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500 to -5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to -utilize to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the -projectile before it bursts.</p> - -<p>A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a -greater number of hits, when the point of burst is favorably<span class="pagenum" id="Page117">[117]</span> -situated, than one fired from a field gun. However, the -projectiles fired from the latter have a deeper beaten zone on -account of the flatter trajectory of the piece, and a greater -penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity. The -German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the -effect of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the -principal ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to -150 m.) from the target. The effect of shrapnel from the -field gun and from the light field howitzer is considered -adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when bursts are regulated -to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in front of the -target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field gun -is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a -result of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point -of burst). But in this connection it is to be borne in mind -that the effect of single shots only is here considered. The -shrapnel fire of the field gun is considerably superior to that -of the howitzer. This is due to the fact that the howitzer -fires more slowly than the field gun and must expend twice -the weight of ammunition to produce the same results. If, -in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries -approximately 2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> times as many shrapnel as the light field -howitzer battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will -be 2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> times as effective, against targets in the open, as that -of the latter.</p> - -<p>The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself -when it becomes necessary to destroy material objects.</p> - -<p>The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is -employed against troops immediately behind cover. The shell -is burst immediately in front of, over, or in rear of the target, -which is thus struck by splinters from above. The more nearly -perpendicular the splinters strike the target, and the greater -their number and weight, the greater will be the effect produced. -The angle of the cone of dispersion is about 200 degrees; -with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing -15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges<span class="pagenum" id="Page118">[118]</span> -beyond 2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of -penetrating the splinter proof cover usually employed in the -field. At ranges under 2100 m. its angle of fall is too small -to make an adequate effect certain.</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<p class="caption">Time Shell, Model ’98.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo118.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<h4>3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER.</h4> - -<p>The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 -kg., containing an explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with -a percussion fuze either with or without delay action. This -shell is designed to penetrate the roofs of splinter proofs. An -earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary to afford protection -against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm. shell produces -a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter, <i>i.e.</i>, 2 cu. m. -(in made ground this crater is three times this size). The -heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded -batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, -is capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action.</p> - -<h4>4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF -FIRE.</h4> - -<p>Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable -when firing lines are to be reinforced and when troops -intended for the decisive attack are to be pushed closer to the -enemy. Formations calculated to minimize the effect of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page119">[119]</span> -hostile fire must be taken up in time, since it is not always -possible to make use of cover. The efficacy of the fire -depends upon the accurate determination of the range and -height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful -observation of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).<a id="FNanchor113" href="#Footnote113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> The -effect of this fire is considerably increased when the opponent’s -infantry, against whom the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable -formations (particularly broad line formations). Infantry -has frequently found it advantageous to advance in small -detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals in extended -order.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote113" href="#FNanchor113" class="label">[113]</a> The color of uniforms exerts considerable influence on observation. According -to experiments made in France, colors rank as follows as regards visibility: -white (invisible at night), light blue, alizarine red, green, dark brown, gray, or -yellowish brown. <cite>Schweizer Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie</cite>, 1896, I, p. 39. -The following colors protect against heat, in the order named (in reverse order -against cold): white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, black. The position -of gray in the list depends upon the amount of white or black mixed -with it.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the -Hostile Fire.</h5> - -<p>A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds -with percussion fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to -750 m. The time required for securing adjustment at the -longer ranges is as follows:</p> - -<table class="adjusttimes" summary="Adjustment times"> - -<tr> -<td>At</td> -<td> 800-1500 m.,</td> -<td>on</td> -<td>low</td> -<td>infantry</td> -<td class="punctfollows">targets</td> -<td class="punctuation">,</td> -<td>1.5</td> -<td class="punctfollows">min.</td> -<td class="punctuation">,</td> -<td>6-9</td> -<td>rounds</td> -<td>with</td> -<td>perc.</td> -<td class="punctfollows">fuze</td> -<td class="punctuation">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>1700-2250 m.,</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td class="punctfollows">„</td> -<td class="punctuation">,</td> -<td>3.7</td> -<td class="punctfollows">„</td> -<td class="punctuation">,</td> -<td>11</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td class="punctfollows">„</td> -<td class="punctuation">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>2000-3000 m.,</td> -<td colspan="5" class="left">on artillery targets,</td> -<td>4.6</td> -<td class="punctfollows">„</td> -<td class="punctuation">,</td> -<td>11</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td class="punctfollows">„</td> -<td class="punctuation">;</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are -very unfavorable targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for -a battery commander to determine the relative position of -bursts on the flank of a column with respect to the leading -element thereof. Such shots are frequently considered as over. -Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to designate -a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery to -secure adjustment.</p> - -<p>Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page120">[120]</span> -objects, as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.<a id="FNanchor114" href="#Footnote114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> -Intrenchments that have just been thrown up should -be made to look as nearly as possible like the surrounding -country by covering them with snow, sod, or brush. It is -made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure adjustment, -if our infantry changes position to the front or to a -flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote114" href="#FNanchor114" class="label">[114]</a> The cutting down of a poplar at Königgrätz decreased the effect of the -Austrian artillery fire, which, previous to this, had caused rather serious losses. -<cite>Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 2</cite>, p. 36. A similar effect was produced by tearing -down a house at Lovtcha. <span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, -<cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf -den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg</cite>, I, p. 59.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire -upon masks, but difficult to determine the distance between -mask and target. It is an advantage when masks are situated -obliquely to a position. As masks (rows of trees) may cause -the premature burst of projectiles having percussion fuzes, -they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they are to -<b>screen</b>.<a id="FNanchor115" href="#Footnote115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> When so situated they frequently afford better protection -than actual intrenchments.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote115" href="#FNanchor115" class="label">[115]</a> -Fight of some Prussian batteries against a French battery masked by -chaussee trees at Weiszenburg. See <span class="smcap">Hoffbauer</span>, -<cite>Deutsche Artillerie</cite>, I, pp. 13 -and 49. The 4th Light and the 4th Heavy Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery -(German) were able to maintain their position east of Mars-la-Tour, under -the fire of superior hostile artillery, because they were screened by the trees -and the embankment of the chaussee thirty paces in their front. <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Einzelschrift</cite>, 25, p. 18.</p> - -<p>The sustained bombardment of Schlosz Ladonchamps (situated on the -Moselle flats north of Metz) with 12 cm. guns, which fired 200 shots per day -from Oct. 9th to 10th, and 100 per day from Oct. 11th to 16th, 1870, was -unsuccessful, because the percussion shells were ineffective. This will not be -changed in the future by the adoption of high-explosive shells. According to -<span class="smcap">Dick de Lonlay</span>, the garrison of the castle and its park lost only 5-10 men per -day during this time. The defensibility of the castle was not impaired, although -projectiles finally fell into the building itself during the sustained bombardment. -According to the same author (IV, p. 556) 1,022 shells fell into the park and -castle of Ladonchamps on October 7th, but only ten men were placed out of -action.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire.</h5> - -<p>Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as -for example lines and columns, and positions in which a flank -is refused, should be avoided. It is a good plan to increase<span class="pagenum" id="Page121">[121]</span> -the number of targets and to employ narrow columns (column -of twos) that are not too deep. Supports must be far enough -in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being struck -by one and the same shrapnel.</p> - -<p>Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese -war, platoons or sections in columns of squads or twos,<a id="FNanchor116" href="#Footnote116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> -separated by a maximum interval of 50 paces, were indeed -found more suitable under fire than line formations, but the -losses were nevertheless very serious except where cover -screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them -actual protection.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote116" href="#FNanchor116" class="label">[116]</a> -The advance against Beaumont and the height of Chancy during the battle -of Beaumont. <span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, -<cite>Beaumont</cite>, pp. 124 and 238. <cite>Geschichte -des Regiments, Nr. 93</cite>, II, p. 97. At Gravelotte this formation was employed -with advantage by the <i>Königin</i> Regiment during its advance on Amanweiler, and -later in the campaign during the assault on Le Bourget. <cite>Geschichte des Regiments -Königin</cite>, pp. 9 and 132.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns -of twos was found advantageous on several occasions.<a id="FNanchor117" href="#Footnote117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> -This formation has the following disadvantages, however: -it is very susceptible to flanking fire; the influence of the -officers is principally restricted to the leading elements; intervals -are easily lost and on that account it becomes more difficult -to form line. It would seem to be better, therefore, to -advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of squads, -or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos -or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between -squads are easily lost, however, and the company then becomes -a dense skirmish line of from four to six ranks. To echelon -the platoons slightly has very little value on account of the -depth of the beaten zone of modern shrapnel.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote117" href="#FNanchor117" class="label">[117]</a> -This formation is also well adapted for passing through woods. <cite>Taktik</cite>, -VI, p. 108.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese -war, both belligerents finally made use of thin successive -skirmish lines for advancing; these lines followed each -other at 200-300 m. and united again on reaching cover.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page122">[122]</span></p> - -<h4>5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY -AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS.</h4> - -<p><i>Germany.</i> According to computations made by Lieutenant-General -Rohne,<a id="FNanchor118" href="#Footnote118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> the following hits may be expected -from every time shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average -of 50 m. short of the targets named:</p> - -<table class="expecthits" summary="Expected hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br">Range<br />m.</th> -<th class="br">Standing.</th> -<th class="br">Kneeling.</th> -<th class="br">Prone.</th> -<th>Intrenched<br />Skirmishers.<br /><a id="FNanchor119" href="#Footnote119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 500</td> -<td class="br">18.4</td> -<td class="br">10.6</td> -<td class="br">6.4</td> -<td>3.5</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1000</td> -<td class="br">14.2</td> -<td class="br"> 8.2</td> -<td class="br">4.9</td> -<td>2.4</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">2000</td> -<td class="br">12. </td> -<td class="br"> 6.9</td> -<td class="br">4.1</td> -<td>2.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">3000</td> -<td class="br">11. </td> -<td class="br"> 6.3</td> -<td class="br">3.8</td> -<td>2.1</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br">4000</td> -<td class="br">10. </td> -<td class="br"> 5.8</td> -<td class="br">3.5</td> -<td>1.9</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote118" href="#FNanchor118" class="label">[118]</a> -<cite>Die Taktik der Feldartillerie</cite>, p. 9 <i>et seq.</i></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote119" href="#FNanchor119" class="label">[119]</a> One skirmish figure per meter.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing -50 shots at 500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at -3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m., is as follows:</p> - -<table class="expecthits" summary="Expected hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br">Range<br />m.</th> -<th class="br">Standing.</th> -<th class="br">Kneeling.</th> -<th class="br">Prone.</th> -<th>Intrenched<br />Skirmishers.<br /><a id="FNanchor120" href="#Footnote120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 500</td> -<td class="br">364</td> -<td class="br">210</td> -<td class="br">126</td> -<td>70</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1000</td> -<td class="br">202</td> -<td class="br">117</td> -<td class="br"> 70</td> -<td>39</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">2000</td> -<td class="br">109</td> -<td class="br"> 63</td> -<td class="br"> 38</td> -<td>21</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">3000</td> -<td class="br"> 46</td> -<td class="br"> 27</td> -<td class="br"> 16</td> -<td> 9</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br">4000</td> -<td class="br"> 14</td> -<td class="br">  8</td> -<td class="br">  5</td> -<td> 3</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote120" href="#FNanchor120" class="label">[120]</a> One skirmish figure per meter.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page123">[123]</span></p> - -<p><i>France.</i><a id="FNanchor121" href="#Footnote121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> According to the French Field Artillery Regulations -(footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel -covers effectively a front of 25 m., and a battery of four -pieces, a front of 100 m. This intensity of fire, which is obtained -when each piece fires one shot with proper corrector -and range settings (the battery four shots) Aubrat calls -“<i>Density 4</i>.” When <i>rafale</i> fire (two shots per piece) is employed -against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting, -density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., -the deflection of the pieces must be changed between successive -shots (<i>tir avec fauchage</i>). To obtain density 8 against -a front of 150 m., each piece must fire three shots, as prescribed -in the regulations. When progressive fire (<i>tir progressif</i>) -is employed, four different ranges are given, of which -only one can be considered effective. When not sweeping, in -this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining a -density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, -to one round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, -against a front of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires -one salvo against a target having a front of 50 m., density 8 -is obtained; by firing two salvos, density 16 is obtained.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote121" href="#FNanchor121" class="label">[121]</a> -The following is taken from Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne’s</span> essay on the -work of Squadron Commander <span class="smcap">Aubrat</span>, -<cite>Les exercices de service en campagne</cite>. -The essay mentioned appeared in the December, 1907, number of <cite>Artilleristische -Monatsschriften</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The <i>Commission d’études pratiques du tir</i> has made a -thorough investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel -fire. The following table gives a general idea of the effect to -be expected when firing against service targets (<i>i.e.</i>, the percentage -of figures one may expect to hit when employing fire -of varying density):</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page124">[124]</span></p> - -<table class="targethits" summary="Targets hit"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">TARGETS.</th> -<th colspan="4">DENSITY.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">4</th> -<th class="br">8</th> -<th class="br">16</th> -<th>32</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">%</th> -<th class="br">%</th> -<th class="br">%</th> -<th>%</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or a single rank line</td> -<td class="numbers br">25  </td> -<td class="numbers br">40  </td> -<td class="numbers br">65</td> -<td class="numbers">——</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire but protected by shields of the French type. Space between shields and ground not closed</td> -<td class="numbers br"> 7.5</td> -<td class="numbers br">15  </td> -<td class="numbers br">25</td> -<td class="numbers">40</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun crews protected by shields. Space between shields and ground not closed</td> -<td class="numbers br">——</td> -<td class="numbers br"> 7.5</td> -<td class="numbers br">15</td> -<td class="numbers">25</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="descr">Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, but not firing; gun crews protected -by shields. Space between shields and ground closed so that bullets cannot pass through</td> -<td class="numbers br">——</td> -<td class="numbers br">0-2</td> -<td class="numbers br">——</td> -<td class="numbers">——</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would -suffer a loss of 15% irrespective of its strength, from progressive -fire (<i>tir progressif</i>; 32 rounds, density 8). If the -interval between skirmishers in the open amounts to 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> paces, -for instance, the front would contain 62 skirmishers, and the -resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men have placed -their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced -by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength -as the one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or -25 men, when standing up or advancing. About 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> minutes -are required to fire one <i>tir progressif</i>, after adjustment has -been secured. The same effect could be obtained in about 20 -seconds by firing a <i>rafale</i> of eight rounds, provided the battery -has accurately adjusted its fire.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page125">[125]</span></p> - -<h5 title="6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON -ANIMATE TARGETS.">6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON -ANIMATE TARGETS.<a id="FNanchor122" href="#Footnote122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote122" href="#FNanchor122" class="label">[122]</a> -<span class="smcap">Bircher</span>, Colonel -and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army Corps, <cite>Die -Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse</cite>, Aarau, 1899. <span class="smcap">Küttner</span>, -<cite>Kriegschirurgische -Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege 1900</cite>. Tübingen, 1900. -<span class="smcap">Hildebrand</span>, -<cite>Die Verwundungen durch die modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen</cite>. I (1905). -<span class="smcap">Bohne</span>, <cite>Über die Wirkung des -Schrapnelschusses</cite>, in <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, No. -74, 1902.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to -those caused by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of -the past. When the bullet strikes normally to the surface, it -produces a wound circular at the point of impact and considerably -enlarged at the point of exit; bones are frequently -shattered; and the most serious effect is the introduction of -foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles of earth or -sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.</p> - -<p>The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends -upon the striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) -and on their density, those of smaller cross-section having -the greater penetration. The closer the point of burst is -to the target, the greater the velocity, and, naturally, the effect.</p> - -<p>Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” -necessary to put animate targets out of action. In France, -an energy of at least 4.8 kgm. is considered necessary to disable -human beings, and for horses an average of 19 kgm., while in -Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is deemed sufficient. -The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of 12.3 mm., -retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120 m. -At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by -fragments and bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. -(and beyond this range from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) -are put out of action. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.). In -comparison, artillery projectiles produce a greater number of -fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.</p> - -<p>It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords<span class="pagenum" id="Page126">[126]</span> -protection against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of -100 m. and against half of those having a velocity of 200 m. -The overcoat roll stops shrapnel bullets having a velocity of -less than 250 m. The penetration of these bullets is so great, -at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital -organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. -This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than -100 m.</p> - -<h4 title="B. INFANTRY FIRE.">B. INFANTRY FIRE.<a id="FNanchor123" href="#Footnote123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote123" href="#FNanchor123" class="label">[123]</a> Lieutenant-General -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>. -Colonel <span class="smcap">Minarelli-Fitzgerald</span>, -Austrian Army, <cite>Modernes Schieszwesen</cite>, 1901.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine -arm employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in -clips. The adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In -these rifles the recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty -shells and for placing a fresh cartridge into the chamber at -the same time. The objections made to the adoption of such -a rifle (complexity of the mechanism, danger of wasting ammunition) -are similar to the reasons advanced against the -adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition -to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the -effect of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. -Moreover, the elimination of the recoil makes a -further increase in the initial velocity of the projectile possible.</p> - -<p>The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two -points of view, viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single -projectile, and the effective hit in itself.</p> - -<h5 title="1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON -ANIMATE TARGETS.">1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON -ANIMATE TARGETS.<a id="FNanchor124" href="#Footnote124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote124" href="#FNanchor124" class="label">[124]</a> See -<cite>Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte</cite>, 1905, p. 475, and 1906, p. 412, -which contain complete references to military literature. <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, -No. 1, 1906.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties -used the following small arms and projectiles:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page127">[127]</span></p> - -<table class="japanrussia" summary="Small arms"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="3" class="br"> </th> -<th rowspan="3" colspan="3" class="br">Rifle.</th> -<th rowspan="3" class="br">Model<br />(year).</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Cal.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">PROJECTILE.</th> -<th rowspan="2">Initial<br />Velocity.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="br">Description.</th> -<th class="br">Weight.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">mm.</th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">g.</th> -<th>m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="thinline br"> </td> -<td colspan="3" class="thinline br"> </td> -<td class="thinline br"> </td> -<td class="thinline br"> </td> -<td class="thinline br"> </td> -<td class="thinline br"> </td> -<td class="thinline"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="country">Japan</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="brace right">-</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="brace bt bb bl"> </td> -<td class="type">Arisaka</td> -<td class="data br">’97</td> -<td class="data br">6.5 </td> -<td rowspan="3" class="text bb">Hardened lead core with copper-nickel jacket.</td> -<td class="data br">10.5 </td> -<td class="data">715</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="type">Murata</td> -<td class="data br">’94</td> -<td class="data br">8.0 </td> -<td class="data br">15.42</td> -<td class="data">564</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">Russia</td> -<td colspan="3" class="data br">——</td> -<td class="data br">’91</td> -<td class="data br">7.62</td> -<td class="data br">13.7 </td> -<td class="data">615</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The ballistic qualities of the <i>Arisaka</i> rifle were superior -to those of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two -rifles was about equal. The striking energy of the projectiles -was not sufficient in every case, however, to put a man out of -action. The explosive effect produced by bullets striking interior -organs and bones at short ranges (within 500 m.) was -more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by the -<i>Arisaka</i> rifle.<a id="FNanchor125" href="#Footnote125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote125" href="#FNanchor125" class="label">[125]</a> -“The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces and consequently -destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The projectile communicates -a portion of its energy to the molecules struck, and these in turn transfer -that energy to adjoining ones. The greater the velocity of the projectile at the -moment of impact, the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in -organs filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with the -greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the past has never -been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the impression that the -projectile has exploded in the body. In order to produce this effect a velocity of -about 350 to 400 m. is required, which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles -of older pattern, and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle. -Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it shatters -it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to a considerable extent, -all because the bone is filled with a liquid substance.” -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Schieszlehre für -die Infanterie</cite>, p. 69.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, -unless produced by tumbling bullets.<a id="FNanchor126" href="#Footnote126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote126" href="#FNanchor126" class="label">[126]</a> -See also <i>Ricochets</i>, <a href="#Page185">p. 185</a> infra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters -varying resistance (for example, if the projectile -strikes an obstacle, even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates -materials of different density (for instance, if, in penetrating -a body, it strikes first upon a fleshy part, then upon -bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet will frequently -tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a series<span class="pagenum" id="Page128">[128]</span> -of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second -board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. -Projectiles which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a -human body change their form more or less, according to the -character of the ground on which they ricochet. As the jacket -is frequently torn, thus exposing the leaden kernel, wounds -may be produced which will equal those made by explosive -bullets.</p> - -<p>The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to -perforate two men at 1200 m. From experiments made with -the <i>Lebel</i> rifle on corpses, it appeared that the projectile passed -clear through 5 bodies at 100 m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. -(even when large bones were struck) and through 2 bodies -at 1200 m.</p> - -<p>In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as -follows, on a basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, -25.4; abdominal region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, -and head, 11. Flesh wounds are generally slight. This is due -to the fact that the hole made by the bullet is small, that the -exterior flow of blood is insignificant, and that the wound -rarely becomes infected. Projectiles remain in the body now -much more rarely than in the past.</p> - -<p>The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered -by projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) -are cleanly perforated.</p> - -<p>Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates -the lungs, chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms -than in past wars.<a id="FNanchor127" href="#Footnote127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote127" href="#FNanchor127" class="label">[127]</a> “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been shot in the -chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest railway station, a -distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well except for a slight difficulty in -breathing. A lance corporal of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having -received a similar wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on -a two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an extent, -however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a distance of -30 km.” Dr. <span class="smcap">Seldowitschi</span> in <cite>Wratsch</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese -war, wounds in joints healed without suppuration, the joint<span class="pagenum" id="Page129">[129]</span> -and its mobility being saved. Amputations were extremely -rare, and the surgeon’s skill was, as a rule, seldom necessary -in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest wounds were slight, -and often many men walked a few <i>versts</i> to the dressing station, -some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing. As -a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds -were more serious when the heart or the large blood vessels -were injured; but even in these cases cures were effected. -Abdominal wounds were not so serious as in the past. Contrary -to past experience, skull wounds, in which the projectile -had passed entirely through the brain, were treated with fair -success.</p> - -<p>The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have -amply demonstrated that wounds produced by jacketed bullets -of small caliber are not so serious as those caused by 11 mm. -projectiles. In addition, these campaigns have shown that -a further decrease in caliber is undesirable from the tactician’s -point of view, for a hit by no means affords the certainty, in -every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of action.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a -short time he can again participate in action. The British -report of losses for the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, -1900, contains the names of a great many men who were -wounded at Magersfontain on December 11th, 1899. According -to British statements, 40 men out of every 100, seriously -wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty -after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates -that of 154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty -with their organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the -knee, only 28 could be sent back to duty. Wounds produced -by the small caliber <i>Arisaka</i> rifle during the Russo-Japanese -war healed more rapidly than those caused by the Russian -weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for example, -healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The -following observations were made on wounds produced by the -Russian rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by<span class="pagenum" id="Page130">[130]</span> -a scab; after three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and -a part of the wounded were then able to return to the front. -The remainder, irrespective of the number of wounds received -by any one individual, were ready for duty in seven months. -Wounds in which bones were perforated without splintering, -healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return to -duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. -When bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably -retarded.</p> - -<p>The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable -from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been -obtained by the adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the -“S” bullet in Germany and the “D” bullet in France).<a id="FNanchor128" href="#Footnote128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote128" href="#FNanchor128" class="label">[128]</a></p> - -<table class="sdbullets" summary="Bullets"> - -<tr> -<th> </th> -<th colspan="3">Rifle mod. ’88.</th> -<th colspan="3">Rifle mod. ’98;<br />“S” bullet.</th> -<th colspan="3">Lebel rifle;<br />“D” bullet.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Caliber</td> -<td class="wholenr">7.</td> -<td class="fraction">9</td> -<td class="unit">mm.</td> -<td class="wholenr">7.</td> -<td class="fraction">9</td> -<td class="unit">mm.</td> -<td class="wholenr">8.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">mm.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Weight of bullet</td> -<td class="wholenr">14.</td> -<td class="fraction">7</td> -<td class="unit">g.</td> -<td class="wholenr">10.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">g.</td> -<td class="wholenr">13.</td> -<td class="fraction">2</td> -<td class="unit">g.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Initial velocity</td> -<td class="wholenr">640.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">860.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">730.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Remaining velocity at 800 m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">270.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">362.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">377.</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Maximum ordinate of trajectory at 700 m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">3.</td> -<td class="fraction">80</td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">1.</td> -<td class="fraction">85</td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -<td class="wholenr">2.</td> -<td class="fraction">10</td> -<td class="unit">m.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1906, No. 53; -<cite>Vierteljahrshefte</cite>, 1907. II, p. 281.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce -serious wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These -wounds, while not inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, -or, at any rate, postpone his recovery indefinitely.</p> - -<p class="tabhead"><b>The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.</b></p> - -<table class="corpses" summary="Effects"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="3" colspan="3" class="br">Of the Total Number<br />of Men<br />Hit in Each Case.</th> -<th colspan="6">THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Fatally<br />injured.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Instantly<br />disabled.</th> -<th colspan="2">Incapacitated<br />for some time.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th colspan="2" class="br">%</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">%</th> -<th colspan="2" >%</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="injury">Flesh wounds<br />produced at</td> -<td class="right padl1 padr1 w3m bb">800</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2 br bb">m</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">——</td> -<td class="right padr0 w3m">36</td> -<td class="left padl0 w3m br">.4</td> -<td class="right padr0 w3m">27</td> -<td class="left padl0 w3m">.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="right padl1 padr1">1350</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2 br">m</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center br">——</td> -<td class="right padr0">43</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.8</td> -<td class="right padr0">37</td> -<td class="left padl0">.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="injury">Bones struck<br />at</td> -<td class="right padl1 padr1 bb">800</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2 br bb">m</td> -<td class="right padr0 w3m">20</td> -<td class="left padl0 w3m br">.3</td> -<td class="right padr0">79</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.2</td> -<td class="right padr0">75</td> -<td class="left padl0">.0</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="right padl1 padr1">1350</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2 br">m</td> -<td class="right padr0">11</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.1</td> -<td class="right padr0">88</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.9</td> -<td class="right padr0">88</td> -<td class="left padl0">.9</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="3" class="center br">Average</td> -<td class="right padr0">7</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.97</td> -<td class="right padr0">62</td> -<td class="left padl0 br">.07</td> -<td class="right padr0">57</td> -<td class="left padl0">.12</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page131">[131]</span></p> - -<h4>2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.</h4> - -<p>The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the -“S” bullet (rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Penetration"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr3">60 cm</td> -<td class="left padr0">at</td> -<td class="right">100 m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr3">80 cm</td> -<td class="left padr0">at</td> -<td class="right">400 m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr3">35 cm</td> -<td class="left padr0">at</td> -<td class="right">800 m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr3">10 cm</td> -<td class="left padr0">at</td> -<td class="right"> 1800 m.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet -amounts to 90 cm. According to experiments, 3 mm. steel -plates were pierced at 350 m., while hay stacks afforded protection -when 4 m. thick; when of less thickness, the latter -caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen snow 1 m. -thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m. thick, -were not pierced even at 250 m.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page132">[132]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<p>Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing -effect on the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, -wear out, and consume them. The fire will have a stunning -and paralyzing effect when it is suddenly concentrated upon a -narrow front, thereby producing fear and terror, provided -actual losses are added to this moral effect.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear -out, and destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a -prolonged period over an extended front. In this case the -material losses suffered and the exhaustion of his physical -energies may force the conviction on the enemy that he has no -longer a chance to gain the victory. This conviction will cause -a suspension of all his energies and consequently of his determination -to fight.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Modder River</b> (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on -the British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire until -the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.<a id="FNanchor129" href="#Footnote129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote129" href="#FNanchor129" class="label">[129]</a> -General <span class="smcap">Minarelli-Fitzgerald</span>, <cite>Die Gefechte in Natal und der Kap-Kolonie</cite>, -1899.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted in -a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and moral -powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually destroying -fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and continuously -on tactically important targets that were comparatively easy to hit. Minarelli -makes the following comments on the attack made by the British 9th -Brigade and Brigade of Guards at <b>Modder River</b>: “All further attempts -to induce the Guards to advance had to be abandoned. For hours they lay -on the dearly bought ground under a blistering African sun, utilizing as -cover every ant hill, every tuft of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, -and being morally certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail -of shot.” In regard to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author -states: “Meantime the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been -able to get a little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then -unable to advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour<span class="pagenum" id="Page133">[133]</span> -fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade, surprised -at <b>Magersfontain</b>, fared still worse. The fight growing out of the -surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at which this action -was fought, the Boer method of fire (<i>i.e.</i>, to fire only when an enemy -raised himself to get better aim, and then to employ only an effective concentrated -fire) necessarily produced a depressing effect.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is -necessary that the individual soldier combine coolness and -presence of mind with good marksmanship, and that company, -platoon and squad leaders maintain fire control and fire -direction.</p> - -<h4>1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.</h4> - -<p>Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire -direction. It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders -and signals, as well as the scrupulous observation of all -regulations bearing on the handling of the rifle and on combat -in general. Fire discipline must be maintained even -though the fire control and fire direction exercised by the -leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the -action.</p> - -<p class="highline15"><b>Fire discipline</b> requires:</p> - -<p>Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot -be returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, -and careful observation of the enemy. It requires further, -taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and -in delivery of fire; an increase of fire by individuals whenever -the targets become more favorable, and a cessation of fire -when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of ammunition.</p> - -<p>The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported -by machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of -troops pushed to within short range of the hostile position will -in many cases suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that -the assault encounters nothing but evacuated or feebly defended -works. The Boer war and the Russo-Japanese war<span class="pagenum" id="Page134">[134]</span> -demonstrate that determined troops will hold a position until -the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge, or at least -until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples: -Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd -Division on March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 -and 18.</p> - -<p>Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance, -irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets -will ever be crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of -the most important means of strengthening the moral force -of the individual soldier; of developing in him energy, -initiative, and courage for making a dashing advance.”<a id="FNanchor130" href="#Footnote130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote130" href="#FNanchor130" class="label">[130]</a> <cite>Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations.</cite></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Since the armament of the different armies is almost the -same, good individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control -and fire direction, and firmly rooted fire discipline, are the -deciding factors in an action in which two equal skirmish lines -contend for the superiority of fire.</p> - -<h4>2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.</h4> - -<p>The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to -bring about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly -concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. -This is the only way in which a moral effect may be produced -on the troops against whom the fire is directed, while, at the -same time, their losses attain such proportions as to become -unbearable. At mid and long ranges, the efficacy of fire depends -more on fire control and fire direction than upon good -individual marksmanship.<a id="FNanchor131" href="#Footnote131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> -Whenever the appropriate rear<span class="pagenum" id="Page135">[135]</span> -sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of -dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its -hitting the target diminish as the error in estimating the range -and the standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote131" href="#FNanchor131" class="label">[131]</a> -See <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Schieszlehre -für die Infanterie</cite>, 3rd Edition, p. 85. “The -importance of the line shot (<i>i.e.</i>, a hit on the vertical stripe through the center -of the German bull’s-eye target) in the marksmanship training of the soldier -should by no means be underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true -value. The line shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the -latter forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting (<i>i.e.</i>, hitting -the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target) becomes a moral factor of the -highest value in field firing. It cannot be denied, however, that the importance -of the line shot, as such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to -transfer the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely -failed.” Captain <span class="smcap">Krause</span>, -<cite>Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der Infanterie</cite>, -Berlin, 1904, p. 1.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon -commanders,<a id="FNanchor132" href="#Footnote132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. -Fire control and direction embrace: the opening and -cessation of fire; the designation of a target and of the elevation -to be used; the kind of fire and its distribution; the number -of rounds to be fired, and the observation of the effect of -the fire. As a rule, the fire will be distributed over the whole -front, but portions of the hostile line that are not clearly -visible should by no means be neglected (distribution of fire). -Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual -leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander -possesses in his squad leaders a medium for communicating -with his platoon. (Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The -movements of the skirmishers, the correct <i>comprehension of -the target</i>, the <i>distribution of fire</i>, the <i>rate of fire</i>, and the <i>employment -of the terrain to the best advantage</i>, are regulated -through the squad leaders. The lack of thoroughly drilled coöperation -on the part of squad leaders inevitably results, as -might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The platoon -commander cannot communicate directly with every individual -man of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his -eight squad leaders, who, by reason of their position in the -line, can exert the proper influence on their skirmishers.<a id="FNanchor133" href="#Footnote133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote132" href="#FNanchor132" class="label">[132]</a> -The <cite>Belgian Firing Regulations</cite> require that the officer directing and controlling -the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The time necessary to produce -a certain effect with a given number of rifles; 2. The number of rounds -necessary to produce a certain effect in a given period of time; 3. Whether a -given target justifies the expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or -the efficacy of the fire. The requirements of the <cite>Italian Firing Regulations</cite> -are similar.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote133" href="#FNanchor133" class="label">[133]</a> Austria: The position of the platoon leader is not so definitely fixed as -in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad leaders participate in the firing. -In skirmish line fire control and fire direction are to remain as long as possible -in the hands of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged -with concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the proper -time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing the ammunition. -At long ranges he designates the companies that are to fire, and also the position -from which fire is to be opened.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page136">[136]</span></p> - -<p>The squad leaders are charged with <i>constantly supervising</i> -the setting of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, -and the rate of fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.</p> - -<p><i>The squad leaders participate in the firing only</i> when -their duties as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the -case in a prolonged engagement in the same position, especially -at short ranges. These remarks apply also to the range -finders.</p> - -<p>In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in -the firing when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. -The advantage of thus gaining a few better shots for the firing -line is more than offset by the more careful supervision of -the skirmishers as is required in Germany, France and Austria. -The platoon leader unaided is in no position to supervise -the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure of ammunition; -his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable -to relieve the company commander from the actual duty -of fire direction and fire control. The company commander -is responsible for leading the company on the battlefield; this -does not preclude his thoroughly supervising his platoons and -observing the effect of their fire.</p> - -<p>“Whenever the company commander is in the firing -line, he selects and designates the target and gives orders for -opening fire. He announces the range found by the range -finders and observes the effect of the fire. Aside from this, -he leaves fire control and fire direction to his platoon commanders, -and interferes only when he desires to concentrate -the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a -certain target, or when he observes something that has escaped -the notice of the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction -will frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss -of the leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in -the noise of the combat. To provide for such contingencies,<span class="pagenum" id="Page137">[137]</span> -the skirmishers must be taught that, in the absence of fire -control and fire direction, they may fire (<i>not that they must -fire</i>) at all targets within 600 m.; that between 600 and 1200 -m., they should fire at tall and wide targets only; and that, at -ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire at all.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the pamphlet entitled, <cite>Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese -War</cite>, p. 11, et seq., Captain <span class="smcap">Soloviev</span>, 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, -1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost ungovernable -tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown themselves down, to -open fire without orders; paying attention neither to the target designated, -nor to setting their sights.</p> - -<p>“This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning -the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * * It -is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men have not -been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of hostile projectiles, -and the thunder of our own artillery make such a deafening roar that -one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long firing lines make it -extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders; even squad commanders can -not make themselves understood. Volley firing must therefore be dispensed -with.</p> - -<p>“Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers, -can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal. -With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this direction; -it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole length of -the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight.</p> - -<p>“The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in proportion -to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of the enemy, -especially on the defensive. The men get more and more restless, their -nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer and greater. In such -a moment the leader must make every effort to keep his men in hand, and -prevent the firing from degenerating into a wild blazing away at nothing. -This is always a sign that the leader has lost control of his troops.</p> - -<p>“The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the -nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed to -active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire discipline -ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the fire the necessary -efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle, the more embittered -the fight, the greater the losses, the more fatigue and nervous strain gain -the upper hand, the greater and more important the role which the officer -has to play. The success of the 200 men under his command depends -entirely upon the company commander. The war in the Far East might -well be called the war of company commanders. The soldiers watch their -leader constantly and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his -bearing, his determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge<span class="pagenum" id="Page138">[138]</span> -the situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the conduct -of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to great heights, -but it may also sink very low. To show depression or faint-heartedness -is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once communicated to the men, -the leader loses control of his command, and the mischief is done.</p> - -<p>“In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander -and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as -great a role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of -peace become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become -second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war.</p> - -<p>“I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute shout, -in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously quieting effect -upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here and there, a remark -concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have the sights not been -set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at once that it is done.’ -Because the commander is angry, and notices neglect, everything goes -well, so the men reason, and no danger need be apprehended. The men -quiet down, forget the whistling of the bullets, set their sights carefully, -point their pieces properly, and aim again.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.</h4> - -<p>While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the -maximum benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical -situation is the determining factor in the choice of a position. -The requirements as to a field of fire and the use to be made of -it will vary, depending upon whether it is desired to avoid -an engagement at short range (delaying action) or whether -a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the first case -a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.</p> - -<p>Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not -interfere with constant observation of the enemy. It is not -permissible to hide entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered -in each case. To rise from behind cover, for the purpose -of firing, and to disappear subsequently behind that -cover for loading, is out of the question in the firing line. -This is physically impossible and much less attainable for -psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present -a much larger target than when lying down. When portions -of the firing line cannot see the target during an attack, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page139">[139]</span> -platoon commander should consider this a hint, either to gain -a better position farther to the front, or to suspend his fire -temporarily. (Par. 190 German I. D. R.). In defense, in a -similar case, cross fire would frequently be the proper expedient. -The attacker will often see nothing except the heads -of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep -the foreground, while these men will present targets of half a -man’s height to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, -it is important to select positions that cannot easily be -found by the enemy. Positions in which the skirmishers are -silhouetted against the sky line should be avoided whenever -possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying in the -shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience, while -the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined targets. -The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases -single officers standing upright draw attention to the position. -The extent of the position must be commensurate with the -strength of the force; too dense a line reduces the efficacy of -fire and increases the losses, while, on the other hand, too -dispersed a force increases the difficulties of fire control and -fire direction.</p> - -<h4>4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.</h4> - -<p>This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although -a thin firing line may be employed when the situation is still -in doubt (protection against surprise), it must be strong when -the superiority of fire is to be attained. If the firing line is -made too weak, we are condemned to fight a superior force -continuously with an inferior one because we have voluntarily -sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority. On the -defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack develops, -the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary -for holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we -should endeavor to place as few men in action as possible; -and to compensate for the lack of rifles by an increased expenditure -of ammunition. All firing is done from the prone -position, in so far as the ground permits. The French attempt<span class="pagenum" id="Page140">[140]</span> -to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the number of -rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire to -be used.</p> - -<p>In Switzerland and England,<a id="FNanchor134" href="#Footnote134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> it is recommended that -supports use “Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable -(hilly country). The German Infantry Drill Regulations -(par. 340) contain a similar provision. When the supports -cannot see the firing line on account of the conformation of -the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the latter.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote134" href="#FNanchor134" class="label">[134]</a> -<cite>Infantry Training</cite>, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1, 2; p. 136, par. 6; -p. 155, par. 1. See <a href="#Page154">p. 154</a>, infra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).</span></h4> - -<p>Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. -An imperfect knowledge of the range may be compensated -for by the flatness of the trajectory of the individual rifle and -by the favorable conformation of the ground in respect to the -cone of dispersion. In collective fire, at mid and long ranges, -each rear sight graduation commands a beaten zone approximately -100 m. deep—good aim, proper elevation, and careful -firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the -densest portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the -efficacy of the fire.</p> - -<p>The following results were obtained in Italian firing -tests in which 100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and -30 m. wide with the 6.5 mm. rifle:</p> - -<table class="ittests" summary="Tests"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="3" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">MEASURED RANGE.</th> -<th colspan="2">ESTIMATED RANGE.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="br">Slow fire<a id="FNanchor135" href="#Footnote135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></th> -<th class="br">Rapid fire<a href="#Footnote135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></th> -<th class="br">Slow fire<a href="#Footnote135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></th> -<th>Rapid fire<a href="#Footnote135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Percentage<br />of hits.</th> -<th class="br">Percentage<br />of hits.</th> -<th class="br">Percentage<br />of hits.</th> -<th>Percentage<br />of hits.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">At  500 m.</td> -<td class="center br">21.5</td> -<td class="center br">15.8</td> -<td class="center br">14.8</td> -<td class="center">11.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">At 1000 m.</td> -<td class="center br">11.1</td> -<td class="center br"> 8.1</td> -<td class="center br"> 6.5</td> -<td class="center"> 5.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">At 1500 m.</td> -<td class="center br"> 5. </td> -<td class="center br"> 3.4</td> -<td class="center br"> 2.6</td> -<td class="center"> 2.2</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Average results at—</td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td class="br"> </td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Ranges under 1000 m.</td> -<td class="center br">18.2</td> -<td class="center br">13.6</td> -<td class="center br">12.1</td> -<td class="center"> 9.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="left padr2 br">Ranges over 1000 m.</td> -<td class="center br"> 7.1</td> -<td class="center br"> 5.1</td> -<td class="center br"> 3.2</td> -<td class="center"> 3.2</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote135" href="#FNanchor135" class="label">[135]</a> Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page141">[141]</span></p> - -<p>Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater -influence upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship -of the skirmishers.<a id="FNanchor136" href="#Footnote136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> When an improper elevation has -been selected, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness -of the “cone of dispersion” increases; in other words, -the efficacy of the fire decreases as the excellence of the -marksmanship of the men and their coolness in the face of -the enemy increase. (See <a href="#Page170">pp. 170</a> and <a href="#Page171">171</a>, infra).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote136" href="#FNanchor136" class="label">[136]</a> -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Das -Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie</cite>, p. 13.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be -mentioned:</p> - -<p class="rangefinding"><span class="letter">(<i>a</i>)</span> Pacing and galloping;</p> - -<p class="rangefinding"><span class="letter">(<i>b</i>)</span> Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by -comparison with known distances; by estimating part of the -distance);</p> - -<p class="rangefinding"><span class="letter">(<i>c</i>)</span> Firing trial volleys (ranging);</p> - -<p class="rangefinding"><span class="letter">(<i>d</i>)</span> Taking the range from a map of large scale or -obtaining it directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;</p> - -<p class="rangefinding"><span class="letter">(<i>e</i>)</span> Measuring the range directly on the ground.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p class="blankbefore75">Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate -results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man takes -per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of pace depends -upon the character and slope of the ground.<a id="FNanchor137" href="#Footnote137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> In pacing over varied -ground, a man follows the slope line while the projectile follows an airline. -Therefore it would seem that pacing is only practicable at short -ranges when the enemy is not near. The same is true of galloping over -the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump at a gallop is on an average -3 m.).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote137" href="#FNanchor137" class="label">[137]</a> Professor -<span class="smcap">Rziha</span> ascertained the following diminution of the length of a -pace at different degrees of slope:</p> - -<table class="slopepace" summary="Pace length"> - -<tr> -<td class="descr"><i>Descending</i> slope, degrees.</td> -<td>0</td> -<td>5</td> -<td>10</td> -<td>15</td> -<td>20</td> -<td>25</td> -<td>30</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Length of pace in cm.</td> -<td>77</td> -<td>70</td> -<td>62</td> -<td>56</td> -<td>50</td> -<td>45</td> -<td>30</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Number of paces per 100 m.</td> -<td>129</td> -<td>143</td> -<td>161</td> -<td>179</td> -<td>200</td> -<td>222</td> -<td>333</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr highline"><i>Ascending</i> slope, degrees.</td> -<td class="highline">0</td> -<td class="highline">5</td> -<td class="highline">10</td> -<td class="highline">15</td> -<td class="highline">20</td> -<td class="highline">25</td> -<td class="highline">30</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Length of pace in cm.</td> -<td>77</td> -<td>74</td> -<td>72</td> -<td>70</td> -<td>67</td> -<td>60</td> -<td>50</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Number of paces per 100 m.</td> -<td>120</td> -<td>135</td> -<td>138</td> -<td>143</td> -<td>148</td> -<td>166</td> -<td>200</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>According to Major <span class="smcap">Czerny</span>, Austrian Army -(<cite>Treffwahrscheinlichkeit</cite>, in -<cite>Streffleur</cite>, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent of the range.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts<span class="pagenum" id="Page142">[142]</span> -approximately to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;<a id="FNanchor138" href="#Footnote138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> this -may be corrected by taking the mean of a considerable number -of estimates, or by employing combined sights at ranges -over 1000 m. (the difference between rear sight elevations -being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of the beaten -zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced by local -and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.). Estimates -usually fall short of the correct distance when made -in bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in -rear of the man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; -over water; when the target is set off by a bright background; -when made over rolling ground, especially when the -several depressions cannot be seen. On the other hand, estimates -frequently exceed the correct range when made in a -flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; -when the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; -in woods; and against an enemy who is only partially visible. -According to the Swiss Firing Regulations (1906) estimates -made from a height downward are usually too short, and those -made from low ground up, too great.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote138" href="#FNanchor138" class="label">[138]</a> -Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Das -Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der -Infanterie</cite>, 4th Edition, p. 12.</p> - -<p>The following statement is taken from a report made at the British -Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of estimates -under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were obtained:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Errors"> - -<tr> -<th rowspan="2"> </th> -<th> </th> -<th colspan="2">———Error———</th> -<th> </th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="padl1 padr1">Correct</th> -<th>±50<br />yards</th> -<th>±100<br />yards</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1">Greater<br />errors</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Officers of the Regular Army</td> -<td class="center">15</td> -<td class="center">49</td> -<td class="center">20</td> -<td class="center">14%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Officers of Militia and Volunteers</td> -<td class="center">20</td> -<td class="center">44</td> -<td class="center">22</td> -<td class="center">20%</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of -instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and non-commissioned -officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are -usually short.<a id="FNanchor139" href="#Footnote139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> -Peace training proves that the skill of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page143">[143]</span> -majority of soldiers in estimating distances can be improved -only up to a certain point.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote139" href="#FNanchor139" class="label">[139]</a> The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment on August -18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height northwest of Amanweiler: -“The companies, who supposed the enemy to be much nearer” (the -actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced, cheering, and were received -with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire (from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad -line.” <span class="smcap">Hessert</span>.</p> - -<p>Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn fields: -“The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish works were reached was -underestimated. One company cheered when at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces -from the hostile works: the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward -at a run.” <span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, -<cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Germany.</b> All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to -800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range finders) -are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid ranges, -and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I. F. R.).</p> - -<p>“Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more -than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the -range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly. -The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as -follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example: -350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.; over -1000 m., 300 m.”</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating -the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges -up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable privates -participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted by an officer -in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book. The following is -the classification:</p> - -<p>Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and -never 100 m.</p> - -<p>Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and -in exceptional cases 150 m.</p> - -<p>Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 -and never 200 m.</p> - -<p>Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m.</p> - -<p>The <b>Russians</b> estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer ranges -are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the first year -of their service all the men are drilled in estimating ranges from 400 to -800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected men from each company -up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers and men) are to make at -least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190 Russian I. F. R.). The result -is considered good when the error in the estimate does not exceed the -figure given below at the ranges named:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Errors"> - -<tr> -<th colspan="4" class="padr4">Range<br />in paces.</th> -<th colspan="2">Error<br />in paces.</th> -<th colspan="6" class="center padl4">Percentage<br />of error.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center"> 400</td> -<td class="center"> to </td> -<td class="center">1000</td> -<td class="center padr4"> paces</td> -<td class="center"> 50</td> -<td class="left"> or</td> -<td class="right padl4 padr0">12</td> -<td class="left padl0">.5</td> -<td class="center"> to </td> -<td class="right padr0">5</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center"> %</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">1000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">2000</td> -<td class="center padr4">„</td> -<td class="center">100</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padl2 padr0">10</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padr0">5</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">2000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">3000</td> -<td class="center padr4">„</td> -<td class="center">200</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padl2 padr0">10</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padr0">6</td> -<td class="left padl0">.6</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The Russian range finding instrument (<i>Souchier</i>) is used by officers -and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in determining -ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent.</p> - -<p>In <b>Switzerland</b> recruits are trained to estimate distances up to 600 -m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned officers<span class="pagenum" id="Page144">[144]</span> -estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500 m. Three weeks -after the recruits join, those of the most skilled in estimating distances—about -an eighth of the total number—are selected to undergo further -instruction. For this purpose they are placed under the orders of an -officer charged with this instruction, who trains them for at least three -hours, every other day, in estimating distances on varied ground. The -better half of these men, regardless of the company to which they may -belong, receive further instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain -are to be had with these men and not only extended marches but even -railway journeys not exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose.</p> - -<p>In <b>Austria</b> the men are required to estimate distances up to 800 paces -(600 m.), <i>i.e.</i>, up to the range within which they might frequently have -to choose their target independently. Only officers, non-commissioned -officers, and specially skilled men are required to estimate ranges up to -2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty determinations at short, -mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range finder,” is not to exceed 12 per -cent. The <i>Roksandic</i> range finding apparatus is said to give errors not -exceeding 2-3 per cent when skillfully used.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an -aid in arriving at a correct estimate of the range, is not considered -as simulating actual service conditions, since the power -of vision of the men differs. Furthermore, one sees the -enemy mostly in a prone position in action, and it is not to be -expected that the men will remember the various rules for -determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s -skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes -that the soldier estimating the range is to judge the -effect which the target makes upon him. (England and -Austria).</p> - -<p>It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range -directly from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, -in comparison to the scale of most of the maps, especially -those available in the field, that it is difficult to take them -between the points of a pair of dividers. Moreover, in an -infantry action conspicuous objects are not likely to be located -often enough near the position of the skirmishers to make it -practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate -maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its -ranges are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a<span class="pagenum" id="Page145">[145]</span> -map. Moreover, artillery is generally posted on or near -prominent points, which may be found on almost any map. -It should be remembered that a map is a horizontal projection, -that any range scaled from a map is the base of a right triangle, -and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing uphill, -follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.</p> - -<p>An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter -is not necessary, as meteorological conditions,<a id="FNanchor140" href="#Footnote140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> especially temperature -and illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) -affect the range of the projectile. Meteorological -conditions may necessitate sight corrections amounting to 100 -m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long ranges. According -to the French Firing Regulations a difference of temperature -of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by -18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the -range on account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes -a factor in the selection of a rear sight elevation at an -altitude of approximately 1000 m. According to the French -Firing Regulations, the range of their rifle at 1000 m. is -increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by 18; at 1000 -m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote140" href="#FNanchor140" class="label">[140]</a> -Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, p. 51, and also -par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature and of the altitude of the -battlefield was strikingly illustrated in the Boer war.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>These meteorological influences can be eliminated by -obtaining the range from troops already engaged (artillery) -or by determining the proper rear sight elevation (not the -range) by trial volleys (pars. 190 and 191 German I. F. R.) -or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland: fire at will, one -round).</p> - -<p>To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, -practicable only when the terrain near the target is visible; -when the target itself is stationary; when the ground is such -that the strike of the bullets can be observed; when the firing -party is not under fire; and, finally, when the necessary time -is available. Since all of these preliminary conditions will<span class="pagenum" id="Page146">[146]</span> -rarely be fulfilled, it will only in exceptional cases be possible -to determine the proper elevation by this method.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>When this method is employed, volleys are fired either by sections -or by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target. -For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below the proper -one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of the target can be -expected with certainty. This procedure is then repeated, as often as -necessary, with correspondingly raised or lowered rear sight leaves, until -the correct elevation is obtained.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, -if any one of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions -is not fulfilled. It is advantageous to establish a bracket -by firing volleys, as is done by artillery, but even with a good -glass it is very difficult to observe the strike of small caliber -bullets. Whether it would be advisable to adopt for this ranging -a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled shell weighing -about 400 g., is a question.<a id="FNanchor141" href="#Footnote141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote141" href="#FNanchor141" class="label">[141]</a> The 32 mm. -<i>Nordenfeld</i> machine gun fires a shell weighing 400 g.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The older range finding instruments depend upon angle -measurements at both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The -large range finder (<i>Hahn</i>) has been adopted in the German -army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.). This apparatus permits -a range to be measured from one point, up to 1200 m. -on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers -standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently -accurate when the error amounts to</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargins" summary="Errors"> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">2</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0">-</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr1">3%</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0"> up</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0"> to a</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0"> range</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0"> of </td> -<td class="right">1000</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0"> m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">3<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0">-</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr1">5%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">2000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">3</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0">-</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr1">3<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">1500</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>On the defensive the large range finders will find employment -before and during the action. The men charged -with the measurement of the range should be careful not to -betray the position by their activity, before fire is opened. -The utility of these instruments is much more restricted in -an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the fire<span class="pagenum" id="Page147">[147]</span> -fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected -for the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. -According to Soloviev range finders failed completely in action -in Manchuria. (See <a href="#Page137">p. 137</a> supra).</p> - -<h4>6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR -OPENING FIRE.</h4> - -<p>In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered -that the fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the -target is well within effective range. The leader should ask -himself whether the result to be expected is properly commensurate -with the probable expenditure of ammunition entailed, -and whether this expenditure is warranted in view of the -total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target -once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of -the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since -all experience teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the -morale of one’s own troops, while it raises that of the enemy.</p> - -<p>In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the -principal determining factor. The fire is first directed upon -the most dangerous, generally the nearest target, or the one -which is soon to become the most dangerous. Subsequently -the fire should be directed upon targets which, owing to their -height, width, depth, and density, promise the greatest number -of effective hits.</p> - -<p>Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and -promising target, and the fire should be directed against the -firing line, since the troops following it in close order will in -any event come within range during their advance. In Italy, -when two targets are available, the fire is to be directed on -the one promising the best results.</p> - -<p>Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether -fire should be opened at long or at short ranges.</p> - -<p>Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed -against low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges<span class="pagenum" id="Page148">[148]</span> -over 1200 m. a decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure -of a large amount of ammunition. Skirmishers -standing may be fired on with good effect even at ranges over -1200 m. (long ranges).</p> - -<p>When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will -be effective against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding -to the highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. -However, when the targets are narrow, a side wind is very -apt to throw the cone of dispersion off the target.</p> - -<p>The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long -ranges in defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a -time when the danger to our own troops is still very small, -is, at first glance, very tempting. Military history shows that -such fire was successful here and there, especially where one -of the contending parties was armed with a much superior -weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply the proper remedy. -But even in these cases it was successful only up to a -certain point. There is this to be said against employing long -range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with -the expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to -replenish ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of -the skirmisher. Poorly trained troops finally do not raise -their rifles at all, but blaze away without aiming. To be sure, -fire opened at an early moment annoys the advance of the -enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire is -opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the -enemy—we want to annihilate him.</p> - -<p>Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at -long ranges on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire -staggering fire effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, -wholly for the purpose of annihilating the enemy.</p> - -<p>Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by -the naked eye, present themselves to the attacker, the fire of -the defender should not be returned at once. The forward -movement should be continued by utilizing every expedient<span class="pagenum" id="Page149">[149]</span> -(rushes with breathing spells, and cover) until serious -losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear that his -men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without -orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while -the others continue to advance. The endeavor should be to -open fire only when the attacking force has gotten as close as -possible to the lower limit of mid combat range (800-1200 -m.).<a id="FNanchor142" href="#Footnote142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote142" href="#FNanchor142" class="label">[142]</a> At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the Highland Brigade -advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of the hostile position. This -advance, to be sure, was made under cover of the fire of the right wing of the -9th Brigade, which had made a lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory -of the rifle only at short ranges, and only at these -ranges can there be any question of an effective preparation of -the attack by fire. These views are expressed in the German -regulations.</p> - -<p>Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker -opened fire at long ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, -that the troops in many cases fired away all their ammunition, -and that the whole attack failed.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately -a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by -Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center group) -on Sept. 11th, 1877, at <b>Plevna</b>, is characteristic of the Russian ideas. On -the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on the Turkish works -without fire preparation; the firing lines halted 400 to 600 m. from the -Turkish position and commenced firing. They succumbed because it -never occurred to the leaders to reinforce them and attempt to gain a -superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s attack there was no sign of actual -fire preparation, but, as soon as the line halted, strong reinforcements -were pushed in to carry it forward. The attack, made on a front of -about 800 m., suffered heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations -were in complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the -decimated first line (8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies -carried it forward some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies -in one body, which carried the line forward to within approximately -100 to 150 m. of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself -into the fight and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his -badly cut up troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one -worthy of imitation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page150">[150]</span></p> - -<p>The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive -in this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated, -which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at long ranges. -The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within decisive range of -the position of their opponents.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle -equipped with an excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed -itself to be enticed, by the long range fire of the Boers, into -opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m. (Guard at Modder River) -and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at Paardeberg) -against an enemy whose position was not discernible even -through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small -and not to be compared with those which our Guard suffered -without firing, during their advance on St. Privat. The advance -of the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop (29th May, -1900) to within short range of the hostile position, without -firing a shot, although they themselves were under fire from -2000 m. on, was splendid.<a id="FNanchor143" href="#Footnote143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote143" href="#FNanchor143" class="label">[143]</a> -<cite>The Times History of the War in South Africa</cite>, IV, p. 141.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, -and the latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain -ranges, construct rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition -without difficulty, it is proper in defense to open fire at long -ranges, especially in delaying actions, for then fighting at short -ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is absolutely correct -for the defender to make the most of the advantages above -mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in -the defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process -of forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile -firing line has systematically deployed and has made a lodgment -within short range of his position, or should he produce losses -and create confusion in its ranks by suddenly opening fire?</p> - -<p>The employment of long range fire on the defensive is -justified when sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery -is not present, and when the hostile infantry pursues the -tactics of advancing to short range without firing. “Infantry<span class="pagenum" id="Page151">[151]</span> -should never attempt to take the place of artillery at long -ranges or compete with the fire of that arm.” If it is important -for the attacker to reach the extreme limit of mid ranges -with as little firing as possible, the defender should in the first -place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not suffice -or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him -from accomplishing his object.</p> - -<p>At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so -great, when directed upon an infantry line advancing without -fire support, that it becomes an important factor. At ranges -from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to 25% hits can be counted on when -the fire is directed against advancing skirmishers; and even -assuming an error of <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>8</sub> in the estimated range, 3 to 12% hits -may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F. R.).</p> - -<p>If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire -by using cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; -his attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. -Fresh troops are necessary to carry the attacking line forward -anew. The success of the defense is assured, if the defender -is able to prevent the attacking force from getting within short -range of the position. The defender’s chance of making a -successful counter-attack disappears, however, as soon as the -attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the -position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will -he be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire -enjoyed by the defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom -of action, at short ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions -upon the defense which make the growing power of -the attack sensibly felt. The moment the defender begins -firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target for the -artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently betrays -his position prematurely by opening fire.</p> - -<p>The <i>moral effect</i> of withholding the fire (<i>fire surprise</i>) is -very great.<a id="FNanchor144" href="#Footnote144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> -A strong fire will be actually annihilating if<span class="pagenum" id="Page152">[152]</span> -suddenly directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially -if he is still in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance -of the defender’s position. (Example: The British brigade -under Hart at Colenso, 15th Dec., 1899, and the Highland -Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899) or if the morale -of his troops is questionable.<a id="FNanchor145" href="#Footnote145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> What good troops should do -in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to -the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of -the 20th Infantry at Coulomiers.<a id="FNanchor146" href="#Footnote146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> Steady nerves and iron -discipline are, however, prerequisites for the execution of a -fire surprise by the defender.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote144" href="#FNanchor144" class="label">[144]</a> -Marshal <span class="smcap">Bugeaud</span> gives a very graphic description of the moral effect of -fire in his <cite>Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre</cite>, based upon his experiences in -the fights with the British in the Peninsula: “The men began to get excited -when still 1,000 m. from the enemy; they talked to each other; the march -became more and more hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the -columns. The British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor -was not without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the -men shouting: ‘<i>Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!</i>’ Shakos were -raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double time; the ranks -became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here and there; and a few -shots were fired from the column. The British continued to stand immovable, -and seemed to pay no attention to us even when only 300 paces separated the -two forces.</p> - -<p>“The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to deal -with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld by the enemy -would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled; the moral power -which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises over confusion, which seeks -to drown itself in noise, made itself felt in our ranks. At this moment, when -the highest tension had been reached, the British line raised its rifles—an indescribable -feeling rooted many of our men to the spot—and began to fire. The -volleys, coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we -wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three overpowering -cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to the bayonet attack, and -everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly flight.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote145" href="#FNanchor145" class="label">[145]</a> -The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, -pp. 157 to 212.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote146" href="#FNanchor146" class="label">[146]</a> -Dec. 15th, 1870. <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20</cite>, p. 246. -<span class="smcap">Kortzfleisch</span>, -<cite>Feldzug gegen den Loir</cite>, p. 81.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive -by the French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered -the most serious losses at ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and -by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the Russian losses were -such that they were obliged to begin advancing by rushes. The -losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached. The -long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an -annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, -at extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at<span class="pagenum" id="Page153">[153]</span> -Beaune la Rolande; in the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;<a id="FNanchor147" href="#Footnote147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> -in the defense of Shipka Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, -and in the engagement at Gorni Bugarov (1st Jan., -1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range zone -while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until -they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks -made by the Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).<a id="FNanchor148" href="#Footnote148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote147" href="#FNanchor147" class="label">[147]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Entscheidungskämpfe -des Korps Werder</cite>, II, pp. 53, 93 and 143. The -village was situated in a valley and had only a limited field of fire.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote148" href="#FNanchor148" class="label">[148]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kühne</span>, <cite>Kritische -Wanderungen</cite>, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp. 86 and 113. -As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power of the needle gun -(<i>Zündnadelgewehr</i>) at point blank range (280 m.) corresponds to the effect -of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to 900 m. At Nachod the regiments -named below suffered in two hours the losses given:</p> - -<table class="losses2hours" summary="Losses"> - -<tr> -<th>Regiment.</th> -<th>Strength;<br />men.</th> -<th>Loss, men;<br />prisoners<br />included.</th> -<th>Prisoners.</th> -<th>Percent-<br />age.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">20th Infantry</td> -<td class="center">2,500</td> -<td class="center">722</td> -<td class="center">165</td> -<td class="center">28.8%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">60th Infantry</td> -<td class="center">2,500</td> -<td class="center">685</td> -<td class="center">185</td> -<td class="center">27.4%</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> “<i>In attack, everything must be done to get as close as possible -to the enemy before fire is opened.</i>” In each fire position the fire -should be delivered with steadiness and without haste.</p> - -<p>In <i>defense</i>, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets appear -within effective range. Sometimes—especially in minor operations—it -may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and then open -fire on him suddenly.</p> - -<p>A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are -situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of ammunition -which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the -enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to consider whether -a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long range fire should, -in any case, be used only when the size of the target makes an adequate -fire effect probable, and when the range is known, or can be ascertained -with accuracy. In long range fire the use of small units, each expending -a large amount of ammunition, is as a rule to be recommended. The -<i>distribution</i> and <i>concentration</i> of fire should be regulated by the officer -charged with fire direction.</p> - -<p>“<i>Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an enemy -in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively small forces, -shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective manner.</i>” (Fire -surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but especially when the enemy -has used up all, or nearly all, of his reserves, comparatively small detachments, -skillfully led, can contribute materially to success, or even bring -about the decision, if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear<span class="pagenum" id="Page154">[154]</span> -and open fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should -be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are present.<a id="FNanchor149" href="#Footnote149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote149" href="#FNanchor149" class="label">[149]</a> In minor operations this would be a proper place for the employment -of large scouting detachments, the importance of which decreases with the size -of the contending forces. Such tasks can, however, be just as well performed -by a well-trained body of infantry.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>France.</b> In <i>attack</i>, fire is opened as late as possible, at any rate not -until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the forward movement. -Fire is the only means which makes a further advance possible.</p> - -<p>In <i>defense</i>, long range fire may be used under certain circumstances. -“Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range take the attacker by -surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many men.”</p> - -<p><b>England</b> (1905). <i>Attack.</i> Infantry is to advance as close as possible -to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be endured. Fire is -decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and infantry should support -each other. Attention is called to the support afforded advancing -skirmishers by the fire of infantry units and machine guns held in rear. -The British are thus the first to prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing -Regulations require that “fire of position” be practiced by company at a -range of 900 m. The company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) -while movable disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire -is to increase in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level -ground or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire -of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable occasionally. -Aside from its employment in “fire of position,” long range fire is -to be used in attack in the following cases: In enveloping movements for -the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line; when favorable targets present -themselves; in containing actions or in feints; in concentrated collective -fire; and finally in pursuit. <i>Defense</i>: Fire is to be opened at -1000 m. on skirmishers, but it may be advantageous to withhold it until -the hostile line comes within short range. This will give good results -when the enemy is in ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the -attack is made by poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire -tires the eye and the hand.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> In <i>attack</i>, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit of short -range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to open fire before this -with a part of the advancing force is only permissible when necessary to -carry the line forward. <i>Defense.</i> As soon as the defender has a chance -of obtaining some fire effect, he should open fire to prevent the attacking -infantry from getting within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) -and at mid ranges (up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. -The battalion commander determines when fire is to be opened.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the -time when infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following -<b>General</b> <span class="nowrap"><b>Rules</b>:—</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page155">[155]</span></p> - -<p>It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in -exceptional cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, -which assures the efficacy of fire and a high moral -effect from the very beginning, is of greater importance.</p> - -<h6>(a) IN ATTACK.</h6> - -<p>The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at -which an adequate fire effect against the low targets presented -by the defender may be expected. To open fire at an -earlier moment is permissible only when the defender’s fire -is so strong that effective ranges cannot be reached without -firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a pursuit -long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose -of annoying the enemy.</p> - -<h6 title="(b) IN DEFENSE.">(b) IN DEFENSE.<a id="FNanchor150" href="#Footnote150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></h6> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote150" href="#FNanchor150" class="label">[150]</a> In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire on favorable -targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition -is available, only when the object is to gain time, -and in decisive actions, when the enemy presents favorable -targets and we have no artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, -fire is opened as soon as targets are clearly discernible -and easily brought into line with the sights. It is advisable -to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery is superior, when -the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when it is impossible -to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in unsuitable -formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision -must be sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.</p> - -<h4 title="7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.">7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.<a id="FNanchor151" href="#Footnote151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote151" href="#FNanchor151" class="label">[151]</a> -A Russian company commander contributes the following in <cite>Mitteilungen -der Infanterie Schieszschulen</cite>: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904, the fire in one of the -trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout the entire day. The men were finally -completely exhausted; their shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be -given some rest, and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, -only to die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective, as -they were completely exhausted and used up.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Swiss.</b> Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense -to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then to<span class="pagenum" id="Page156">[156]</span> -remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A prompt -resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be assured.”</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and -takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant resumes -his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense formations -on open ground.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction -with reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, -pauses in the fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke -to clear away; at present they are of advantage because they -give the men a breathing spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable -ammunition to be distributed, and allow preparations to be -made for concerted action. In making use of such pauses -good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant -readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement -the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire -or they rest. If the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire -must cease, only to be resumed with full vigor when favorable -targets appear. The attacker (like the British in -South Africa advancing against the Boers) will in many -cases—especially at the beginning of a campaign—be deceived -into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should -the attacker now advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming -his fire, will surprise him to such an extent that he may be -repulsed.<a id="FNanchor152" href="#Footnote152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> Pauses in the fire are a practical expedient for -maintaining fire discipline and enable the leader to keep his -troops in hand. An organization is capable of performing its -duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease firing.” It -might be well at this point to determine when the defender -should <i>change his rear sight elevations</i> if the attacker advances -by rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, -so as to present no target to the enemy when his line throws -itself down after a rush, and to utilize this interruption for<span class="pagenum" id="Page157">[157]</span> -changing the rear sight elevation. When this is done during -a forward rush of the enemy, the rapidity of fire will suffer -at the most favorable moment for bringing an effective fire to -bear upon the enemy.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote152" href="#FNanchor152" class="label">[152]</a> -Compare <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie</cite>, p. 145, -relative to the various opinions entertained in the staffs of Generals v. Göben -and Steinmetz in regard to the pause in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. -<cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 269, 271 and 352.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>8. KINDS OF FIRE.</h4> - -<p>In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the -importance of the <i >volley</i> was due to the fact that it enabled the -leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable -moments, or, in other words, when large targets were -visible for a short time. Modern combat is conducted under -different conditions. When black powder was used the volley -had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to clear -away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.</p> - -<p>In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at -will” almost exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at -long ranges; by troops held in rear and, after an assault, to get -the men in hand. These views are not changed in the new -regulations, but immediately after firing a volley the men are -to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained. The -Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,<a id="FNanchor153" href="#Footnote153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> but -were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations -recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, -not so much because of a belief in the superior efficacy -of this kind of fire, but out of distrust of the individual training -of their men; certainly an admission of the deficiency of -that kind of training in their army. It was feared that fire -at will would impair fire discipline and cause waste of ammunition, -and it was believed that the immediate influence of -superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional -regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may<span class="pagenum" id="Page158">[158]</span> -be employed by section or by platoon. Fire at will may be -divided into slow fire (one shot from each squad) and lively -fire with counted cartridges.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote153" href="#FNanchor153" class="label">[153]</a> At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders ordered their -men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing from cover to cover (“<i>Boer -Attack</i>”) to discontinue that fire, and to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently -avoided presenting large targets to the British volley fire.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><i>Germany.</i> <i>Volleys</i> (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) -are to be employed by platoons or companies when in close -order; in skirmish line (par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when -the enemy is surprised or the organization is to be kept firmly -in hand. Volleys, however, can be used only when the troops -themselves are not exposed to an effective fire. An organization -will be able to ascertain the range by means of trial volleys -only in exceptional cases.</p> - -<p>“<i>The highest attainable rate of fire</i>—the word rapid fire -has been elided—is to be used in attack during the preparation -for the assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in -warding off a cavalry charge; in all combat situations in -which a sudden or immediate collision with the enemy occurs; -and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208 German I. F. R.).</p> - -<p><i>Fire at will</i> is used both in extended and close order.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<h5 class="inline"><b>Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).</b></h5> - -<p class="hinline">“<i>Il n’y -a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté.</i>” -<span class="smcap">Napoleon</span>.<a id="FNanchor154" href="#Footnote154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote154" href="#FNanchor154" class="label">[154]</a> “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when engaged with the -enemy.” <span class="smcap">Napoleon</span>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history of -effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the so-called -volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In a few instances -the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually their effect -was insignificant.” <span class="smcap">v. Boguslawski</span>.</p> - -<p>“Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction -of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order to -fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes a certain -amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if allowed to -continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later perhaps into -disorderly flight.</p> - -<p>“The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged—some men -even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an example -likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the point of -getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections drowned the -voice of the commander. In such situations only personal experience and -resourcefulness can tell a company commander what to do. We recommend<span class="pagenum" id="Page159">[159]</span> -a course which has always been attended with success in practice. -Let the officer commanding a section jump upon the parapet and from -there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if the enemy’s fire permits, -and his own heart is stout enough, let him order the next volley from -his position on the parapet. When once the force is again under control, -the volleys will be as good as if the enemy were not so close.” -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span> -<cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg</cite>, -II, pp. 304 and 310.</p> - -<p>In his <cite>Comments on Drill Regulations</cite> (16th Nov., 1840) Prince -<span class="smcap">William</span>, subsequently Emperor <span class="smcap">William I.</span> of Germany, says:</p> - -<p>“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion -that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this fire -be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after volley firing, -even though not ordered, <i>because in my opinion it is impossible to combat -human nature</i>, which finds more security in rapid loading and firing -than in awaiting the commands....”</p> - -<p><i>Russian experiences in Manchuria.</i> “At first <i>volleys</i> by formed bodies -of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used. In the latter, -the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to bring their pieces -down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible to see the enemy—who -was advancing by rushes—to change their rear sight elevations at the -whistle signal of their commander.... When at a distance from -the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless volleys. When the -enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The Russians used only fire -at will at ranges under 800 paces. This enabled the men to fire on individual -hostile skirmishers and to place the boldest out of action.” <span class="smcap">Soloviev</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> <i>Volleys</i> are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close -order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon targets -which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably be visible -for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind of fire used, the -rate of fire being increased or decreased by the men according to the -existing situation. When necessary, the leaders should regulate the fire; -but this should only be done in exceptional cases as the men are apt to -increase rather than diminish the rate of fire (“Rapid fire”).</p> - -<p>The <i>maximum rate of fire</i> is to be employed: “In <i>attack</i>, for the -purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in <i>defense</i>, for -the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It is moreover to be -used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a defeated enemy as long -as he is within effective range; and, finally, in fire surprises, repulse of -cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with the enemy.”</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The French <i>Lebel</i> rifle has a cylindrical magazine situated -under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges which have to be -loaded singly. As a rule, <i>fire with counted cartridges</i> is employed (<i>feu à -cartouches comptées</i>) for the purpose of obtaining a “burst of fire” -(<i>rafale</i>). The <i>rafale</i> -consists of firmly controlled, concentrated, collective<span class="pagenum" id="Page160">[160]</span> -fire. Fire at will (<i>feu à volonté</i>) is also used, eight rounds per minute -being fired at the short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be -increased up to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the -magazine (<i>feu à répétition</i>). One minute is required to fill the magazine. -Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes necessary -to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are directed -to fire.</p> - -<p><b>England and Switzerland.</b> The only fire employed is fire at will. -The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the target and -the range.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks).</p> - -<p><b>Japan and Russia.</b> (See <a href="#Page157">p. 157</a>, supra).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>The Rate of Fire.</h5> - -<p>As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, -viz., <i>slow fire</i>, <i>accelerated fire</i>, and <i>rapid fire</i>. The command -“fire more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose -of diminishing (or increasing) the rate of fire.</p> - -<p>The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the -character of the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable -illumination and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing -the target at long ranges will reduce the rate of fire. The -aiming position (<i>i.e.</i>, whether the rifle is fired from a prone -position or from a rest) also affects the rate of fire. A well -trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able to -fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.</p> - -<p>Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The -rapidity with which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce -the maximum fire effect in the minimum time against -narrow targets. <i>The desire of the soldier to make every shot -a hit, carefully inculcated in time of peace, will of itself regulate -the rate of fire.</i> As the rate of fire depends upon the distinctness -with which the target can be seen, it will naturally -increase as the range decreases, thus generally corresponding -to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover, as -it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also -exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page161">[161]</span> -case may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal -to bring about a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He -states: “The opposition to an increased rate of fire is perhaps -due to the belief that it is invariably coupled with a reduction -in accuracy. This is not the case, however, and even if it -were true to a certain extent, it need not necessarily be harmful. -To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely due to the -excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be condemned -because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is -the product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily -preclude good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a -high rate of fire to load and point quickly, to keep the target -constantly in view, and, at the same time, to aim accurately -and to pull the trigger without flinching.</p> - -<p>“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle -in order to save ammunition, wastes lives and time, -both more valuable than ammunition. Disabled soldiers are -more difficult to replace than ammunition, and lost time cannot -be replaced at all.”<a id="FNanchor155" href="#Footnote155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote155" href="#FNanchor155" class="label">[155]</a> -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, 2nd Edition.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with -waste of ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be -wasted if fire were delivered for hours at the same high rate. -It is very probable, however, that in the battles of the future -the fire will be moderate for some time, or, better still, cease -entirely, only to break forth like a thunderstorm over the -enemy when opportunity offers or necessity demands. The -slower the troops fire the longer they will present a target to -the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual shots at -the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the -impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field -firing. Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following -average results:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page162">[162]</span></p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Results"> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Ranges</td> -<td class="center"> up to </td> -<td class="right">400</td> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="center"> m. </td> -<td class="right">5</td> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="center"> rounds</td> -<td class="center"> per </td> -<td class="center">minute;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> from </td> -<td class="right">400</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">700</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">4</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">5</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">700</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">1000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">3</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">4</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">1000</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">1300</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">2</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">3</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">1300</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">1500</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">1</td> -<td class="center">-</td> -<td class="right">4</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> over </td> -<td class="right">1500</td> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -<td class="right">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to -fire entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their -nervousness. Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, -not through rapidity of fire, but through accuracy. Only the -determination to make hits is calculated to overcome nervousness. -Wherever this determination is lacking, wild firing (fire -panic), which is in any case difficult to prevent, will surely result. -Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected rencontres is -almost invariably ineffective.<a id="FNanchor156" href="#Footnote156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> For this reason most of the -firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,” -which is only calculated to produce confusion.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote156" href="#FNanchor156" class="label">[156]</a> -At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a long advance -at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile battalion. The men became -excited, raised the leaves of their rear sights, and opened rapid fire, which had -no effect whatever, as the range was only 200 paces. <cite>Geschichte des Regiments, -Nr. 27</cite>, p. 95.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following -statement in regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see <a href="#Page140">p. -140</a> supra).<a id="FNanchor157" href="#Footnote157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote157" href="#FNanchor157" class="label">[157]</a> Consult also -<cite>Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule seit dem -Jahre 1900</cite>, Vienna, 1905. <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, 2nd Edition, -p. 132.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>1. <i>When the appropriate elevation is used</i>, two-thirds -of the percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from -each rifle per minute, may be expected when firing at the rate -of 12-14 rounds per minute.</p> - -<p>2. <i>When the elevation selected is too great or too small -by 100 m.</i>, rapid fire produces almost the <i>same percentage</i> of -hits as ordinary fire at will.</p> - -<p>3. <i>When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m.</i>, -rapid fire produces almost <i>twice as great a percentage</i> of hits -as fire at will.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page163">[163]</span></p> - -<p>From the above it follows that, when the appropriate -elevation is not used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses -upon the enemy than ordinary fire at will in the same length -of time. Within equal periods of time the actual number of -hits will be greater in animated fire at will than in slow fire; -but in the latter the percentage of hits will be higher.</p> - -<p>Of all the different kinds of fire, the <i>volley</i> is best adapted -to meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating -the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. -Volleys are of value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry -attacks, and in preventing premature firing against the wishes -of the commander. They should be used against staffs which -would be able to seek cover or spread out when exposed to -fire at will.</p> - -<p>As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading -their pieces, the rate of fire is very little increased by the use -of volleys. The command “Fire” can only be given when the -pieces of the entire unit are directed upon the target. The -length of the pause between preliminary command and command -of execution varies, depending upon the distinctness with -which the target can be seen, the range, and the aiming position. -When the fire is delivered from a prone position it will -be difficult to determine when the command of execution -should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing -or kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed -to eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops -lack coolness—mental as well as physical—which is indispensable -in every volley.</p> - -<p>The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless -very considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard -when a deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about -the efficacy of the fire when the men revert of their own accord -from volleys to fire at will, which they will do when their<span class="pagenum" id="Page164">[164]</span> -officers are either killed or wounded and they themselves are -exposed to fire?<a id="FNanchor158" href="#Footnote158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote158" href="#FNanchor158" class="label">[158]</a> During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of the 10th -Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for the purpose of -firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good one, however, and the men -at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant C—— jumped in front of the men -to stop the firing, but was shot in the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire -continued along the entire line.” <cite>Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12</cite>, p. 454.</p> - -<p>During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always opened -the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had occurred among the -officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the steady volley fire soon degenerated -into wild, hurried fire at will, which produced no effect whatever.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at -will without any of its advantages, besides which, commands, -given by so many leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, -it is very difficult to handle the platoon, to stop firing, -to change target, and to initiate movements. Volley firing is -therefore confined to the preparatory stage of combat and to -rare moments in which the troops firing are not themselves -under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions many -opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. -The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear -sight elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and -it may be remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on -some definite point produces the same results.</p> - -<p>The French, who retained volleys longer than the other -powers (to keep the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure -of ammunition, and to direct a concentrated collective fire -upon the most important target according to the will of the -leader), found a substitute in the fire with counted cartridges,<a id="FNanchor159" href="#Footnote159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> -the “burst of fire” (rafale).<a id="FNanchor160" href="#Footnote160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> This was also adopted by -their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the sudden effect -produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but the -same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while<span class="pagenum" id="Page165">[165]</span> -in Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not -for the purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping -the men in hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses -in the fire are regulated formally, and that these pauses occur -frequently at the very moment when a favorable target is still -visible. Will the individual soldier remain cool in the excitement -of battle and carefully count the three or five cartridges -which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire is proper, because -the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely hidden during -the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable targets -only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure of -ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available -for rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in -well directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by -rushes to the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate -into wild, uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of -which decreases only when the ammunition runs short. The -employment of this class of fire might sometimes be advisable -in action when it becomes necessary to hold the enemy, that -is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is -thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale -fire may be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed -up against a wall, for the purpose of warding off an adversary -who is able to decide the controversy with one well-aimed -blow.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote159" href="#FNanchor159" class="label">[159]</a> Temporarily adopted in Germany also.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote160" href="#FNanchor160" class="label">[160]</a> -Par. 194.1 of the <cite>French Infantry Drill Regulations</cite> of Dec. 3rd, 1904, -states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent by the fire is much more -considerable when the fire is concentrated and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” -Par. 194.4 states: “The efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is -augmented when the enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The -fire is, as a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent; and, -in exceptional cases, by volleys.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.</h4> - -<p>In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear -sight elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even -when the range is not accurately known. The French regulations -are silent on this subject. In Germany one rear sight -elevation is used, as a general rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond<span class="pagenum" id="Page166">[166]</span> -that range combined sights may be used in which the two rear -sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 m.<a id="FNanchor161" href="#Footnote161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote161" href="#FNanchor161" class="label">[161]</a> -See <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, <cite>Schieszlehre -für die Infanterie</cite>, p. 93, et seq.</p> - -<p>In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author recommends -the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the longer ranges, the employment -of combined sights, in which the elevations differ from each other by -200 m. In peace time the use of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in -which rear sight elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to -increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable conditions found -on the target range are lacking.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by -making proper sight corrections, rear sight elevations being -less than the range when the fire is delivered against advancing -targets and greater than the range when the fire is delivered -against receding targets. At short ranges the same result -may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It should be -noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, -the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to -700 m.” (Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the -proper aiming point is the lowest line of the target. When -it becomes necessary to aim at the center, to one side of or -below a target, its dimensions will serve as a guide. A change -in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium and long -ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges it is -practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When -the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable -to distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges -the selection of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, -be left to the discretion of the individual skirmishers.</p> - -<h4>10. COMMANDS.</h4> - -<p>In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, -the regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of -the tasks devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command -draws the skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second -indicates the range; the third directs him to open fire.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page167">[167]</span></p> - -<h4>11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.</h4> - -<p>The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication -of the location of the sheaf of fire directed against -him; the observed strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. -It is especially difficult to judge of the distribution -of projectiles from their strike in front and in rear of the target. -Suggestions from the subordinate leaders, whose view -of the target is generally restricted, are often more confusing -than valuable.</p> - -<h4>12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.</h4> - -<h5>COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND -ARTILLERY FIRE.</h5> - -<p>In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. -In 1870-71 the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. -Up to the battle of Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered -the following losses:</p> - -<table class="japanlosses" summary="Losses"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="3" class="br2">PERCENTAGES.</th> -<th colspan="3">WOUNDS.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Small<br />arms<br />fire.</th> -<th class="br">Art’y<br />fire.</th> -<th class="br2">Cutting<br />weapons.</th> -<th class="br">Serious.</th> -<th class="br">Slight.</th> -<th>Very<br />slight.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="division">Guard Div.</td> -<td class="data br">88.42</td> -<td class="data br">11.50</td> -<td class="data br2">0.08</td> -<td class="data br">32.17</td> -<td class="data br">62.49</td> -<td class="data"> 5.34</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="division">2d Div.</td> -<td class="data br">89.43</td> -<td class="data br"> 7.91</td> -<td class="data br2">2.30</td> -<td class="data br">44.05</td> -<td class="data br">54.89</td> -<td class="data"> 1.06</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="division">12th Div.</td> -<td class="data br">80.52</td> -<td class="data br">14.48</td> -<td class="data br2">2.09</td> -<td class="data br">39.12</td> -<td class="data br">46.36</td> -<td class="data">14.52</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bt bb"> -<td class="center br">Average</td> -<td class="data br">86.12</td> -<td class="data br">11.30</td> -<td class="data br2">2.09</td> -<td class="data br">38.45</td> -<td class="data br">54.58</td> -<td class="data"> 6.97</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including -killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of -course, only a relative value. The following figures express -the average losses of Russians and Japanese:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page168">[168]</span></p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Losses"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Losses through rifle fire</td> -<td class="right padl2">85.9%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Losses through artillery fire</td> -<td class="right padl2">11.4%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Losses through cutting weapons</td> -<td class="right padl2">3.2%</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the -purpose of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid -fire, suddenly delivered, for annihilating him.</p> - -<p>While a statement of the percentage of hits<a id="FNanchor162" href="#Footnote162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> throws some -light upon the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal -conditions, the number of figures placed out of action affords -a standard of comparison by means of which tactical -success may be measured, and aids in deciding how to distribute -the fire. Differences in fire effect on like targets are best -determined by comparing the number of figures hit per minute -by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, -which is not the case when the percentage of hits is -taken.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote162" href="#FNanchor162" class="label">[162]</a> -In this connection the following works have been consulted: <cite>Das Gefechtsmäszige -Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie</cite>, 4th Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, and -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, 2nd Edition (1906), by the -same author; also <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite> No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute -trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the conditions of -firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by Lieutenant-General Rohne, they -serve as an excellent standard of comparison, and, when their relative value is -considered, as a basis for tactical deductions.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>(a) Influence of Training.</h5> - -<p>Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance -when firing at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. -A good marksman, firing at will, may (not <i>must</i>) expect a -hit from each round fired, at any target within 250 m., at a -single kneeling opponent within 350 m., at a kneeling file -within 500 m., and at a standing file within 600 m. At ranges -beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of the rifle, -make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such an -extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate -them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order -to produce an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short<span class="pagenum" id="Page169">[169]</span> -and others over, the hits are thus distributed over a greater -area. But even here skill in marksmanship is apparent in that -the cone of dispersion of the excellent shots produces a shot -group of small diameter, that of the poorer shots one of -very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne computed -(<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, p. 84) that when firing rifle -model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, -the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the -number of hits given at the ranges indicated:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Rifle hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="3" class="br">Range.</th> -<th colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Number of Hits Obtained by</span></th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="padl1 padr1 br">Excellent<br />shots</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1 br">Fair shots</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1">Poor shots</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th colspan="3">Out of 100 rounds fired.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">1000 m.</td> -<td class="center br">27. </td> -<td class="center br">17.6</td> -<td class="center">8.9</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="left padr2 br">1500 m.</td> -<td class="center br">14.2</td> -<td class="center br"> 9.7</td> -<td class="center">4.8</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage -of the excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation -is not used. The <a href="#Ref1">figure</a> given below, in which the -curves of hits are traced, shows that even poor shots may obtain -better results in this case.</p> - -<p>From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly -and accurately ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic -qualities of our rifle and our thorough marksmanship training -can assert themselves fully only when the range has been -accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. too great an accuracy -in collective fire may be actually detrimental. In this -case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is -to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some -degree of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known -only in a general way. The importance of training soldiers -in precise marksmanship is ethical rather than practical, for -a good target shot need not necessarily be a battle marksman. -For the latter a cool head is of more value than all the marksmanship -skill of the target range.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page170">[170]</span></p> - -<h5>(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.</h5> - -<p>At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the -flatness of the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a -probable error in estimation of <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>8</sub> (12.5%) of the range in -his computations. The Swiss Firing Regulations of 1905 -count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 m. at 500 to 1,000 -m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average is taken to -be <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>5</sub> of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range -finding instruments see <a href="#Page146">p. 146</a>, supra.</p> - -<div class="container w40em" id="Ref1"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo170.png" alt="Charts" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page171">[171]</span></p> - -<p>In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds -fired, at a target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown -<span class="nowrap">under—</span></p> - -<p>“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation -is used;</p> - -<p>“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding -to his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, -however, that the ranges are generally estimated correctly. -(<span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, 2nd Edition, -p. 102).</p> - -<table class="hitsper100" summary="Target hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br">Range.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Excellent<br />shots.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Fair shots.</th> -<th colspan="2">Poor shots.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br">a</th> -<th class="br">b</th> -<th class="br">a</th> -<th class="br">b</th> -<th class="br">a</th> -<th>b</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 400</td> -<td class="br">65.1</td> -<td class="br">58.5</td> -<td class="br">50.4</td> -<td class="br">47.8</td> -<td class="br">26.6</td> -<td class="">26.4</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 600</td> -<td class="br">46.6</td> -<td class="br">32.9</td> -<td class="br">32.9</td> -<td class="br">26.6</td> -<td class="br">16.9</td> -<td class="">15.8</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 800</td> -<td class="br">35.2</td> -<td class="br">15.5</td> -<td class="br">23.3</td> -<td class="br">13.9</td> -<td class="br">11.8</td> -<td class=""> 9.7</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1000</td> -<td class="br">27. </td> -<td class="br"> 7.5</td> -<td class="br">17.6</td> -<td class="br"> 7. </td> -<td class="br"> 8.9</td> -<td class=""> 5.9</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1200</td> -<td class="br">20.5</td> -<td class="br"> 4. </td> -<td class="br">13.6</td> -<td class="br"> 3.9</td> -<td class="br"> 6.8</td> -<td class=""> 3.5</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1400</td> -<td class="br">16.1</td> -<td class="br"> 2.4</td> -<td class="br">10.8</td> -<td class="br"> 2.4</td> -<td class="br"> 5.4</td> -<td class=""> 2.2</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br">1600</td> -<td class="br">12.5</td> -<td class="br"> 1.5</td> -<td class="br"> 8.7</td> -<td class="br"> 1.5</td> -<td class="br"> 4.4</td> -<td class=""> 1.4</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The above table shows that when the elevation selected is -in error, the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater -the skill of the marksman; and that an error in estimation is -of less importance than marksmanship only at ranges under -800 m.</p> - -<p class="tabhead fsize90">DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”</p> - -<table class="hitsper100" summary="Differences"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th class="br">Range.</th> -<th class="br">Excel-<br />lent<br />shots.</th> -<th class="br">Fair<br />shots.</th> -<th>Poor<br />shots.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th> </th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 400</td> -<td class="br"> 6.6</td> -<td class="br"> 2.6</td> -<td>0.4</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 600</td> -<td class="br">13.7</td> -<td class="br"> 6.3</td> -<td>1.1</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 800</td> -<td class="br">19.8</td> -<td class="br"> 9.4</td> -<td>2.1</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1000</td> -<td class="br">19.5</td> -<td class="br">10.6</td> -<td>3.0</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1200</td> -<td class="br">16.4</td> -<td class="br"> 9.7</td> -<td>3.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1400</td> -<td class="br">13.3</td> -<td class="br"> 8.4</td> -<td>3.2</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br">1600</td> -<td class="br">11. </td> -<td class="br"> 7.2</td> -<td>2. </td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page172">[172]</span></p> - -<h5>(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds -to be Expended.</h5> - -<p>The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of -time in a limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. -It should therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire -direction to bring about a decisive effect within the shortest -possible time. The leaders must bear in mind from the beginning -of the fire fight that the ammunition carried is limited -and that the expenditure of a certain amount is equivalent to -a loss of power, and this is permissible only where commensurate -results would be achieved. When once a decision -has been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary -to accomplish the object of the fight must be expended without -stinting, since ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own -troops and raises that of the enemy.</p> - -<p>When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, -and is deployed in line at one man per meter of front, presenting -breast targets only, the number of rounds per rifle, given -in round figures in the following table, will be required to -place about one-third of the enemy’s force out of action:<a id="FNanchor163" href="#Footnote163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> - -<table class="thirdhit" summary="Requirements"> - -<tr> -<td>At</td> -<td>a</td> -<td>range</td> -<td>of</td> -<td> 300</td> -<td>m.</td> -<td> 3 </td> -<td>rounds,</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 400</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 5  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 500</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 6  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 600</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 7.5</td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 700</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>10  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 800</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>13  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td> 900</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>16  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1000</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>25  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1100</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>45  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1200</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>50  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1300</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>57  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1400</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>63  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1500</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>72  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>1600</td> -<td>„</td> -<td>80  </td> -<td>„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote163" href="#FNanchor163" class="label">[163]</a> -According to <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, 2nd Edition, p. 214.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page173">[173]</span></p> - -<p>In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation -of 7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two -elevations were used. Against head targets, approximately -twice the number of rounds indicated above must be expended; -and against exposed skirmishers, visible at full height, about -half of the number of rounds given. The efficacy is increased -when the fire comes from a flank. The following data are -taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 skirmishers, -firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained -4.3% hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under -the enfilading fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of -hits rose to 10.5%, and the number of incapacitated figures -to 80%.</p> - -<h5>(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.</h5> - -<p>Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling -the trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense -of fire effect on the actual target selected. When we -consider the excitement of men in action, and the numerous -sources of error in setting the sights, in pointing and firing, it -is clear that we have to reckon with the <b>effect of misses</b> on -the field of battle more than with the really well aimed and -well delivered collective fire of a considerable number of marksmen. -Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian -Army,<a id="FNanchor164" href="#Footnote164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement -for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases -his deductions upon the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in -action depends entirely upon the mental and physical condition -of the individual soldier at the moment; that in serious -engagements this condition is such that accurate aiming cannot -be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, according -to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his piece -at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces -a rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain<span class="pagenum" id="Page174">[174]</span> -extreme angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) -corresponds to a mean angle of error; that, for each class of -rifles, the depth of the resulting beaten zone is constant; and -that the depth of this zone increases with the range corresponding -to the angles of error. It follows that the depth of -this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles than in those of -older pattern.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote164" href="#FNanchor164" class="label">[164]</a> <cite>Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht</cite>, 1883.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission -if the skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position -to which he has become habituated through years of practice. -This position can be none other than that in which the -piece is horizontal.</p> - -<p>Although the theory of the <b>Rigid, Constant Cone of -Misses</b>, is not tenable in this form, because there will always -be a reasonably compact core of hits (the dimensions of which -depend upon the conditions indicated in the firing regulations) -at the center of the cone of fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi -have, nevertheless, a certain value for us, and find application -in large, hotly contested battles, especially when the firing line -has been exposed to the material and moral influences of hostile -fire for a considerable length of time. At the commencement -of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed fire”; -but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, -100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with -a 30 and 40% core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by -greater dispersion of the bullets.</p> - -<p>According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a -good shot makes a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when -using the horizontal aiming position; a poor shot, one of ±40 -minutes; the average error being ±25 minutes. In this, however, -the sources of error, due to excitement on the part of -the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal angular -errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and -this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger<span class="pagenum" id="Page175">[175]</span> -and the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the -magnitude of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and -by their effect. Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the -longer it continues, the greater the danger appears to him; -while the less the effect of that fire, and the better he is sheltered -from it, the less he will think himself endangered. On -this account, the nervous tension of the individual soldier will -reach different degrees of intensity according to the magnitude -of the danger.</p> - -<p>“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, -and entire engagements in which the impression -produced by danger may be called moderate; moreover, even -in lively actions phases may occur in which this is equally true. -The circumstances of each particular case will, therefore, determine -how long it is possible to fire as prescribed in the firing -regulations, and from what moment a reduction of efficacy, -according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.</p> - -<p>“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or -less by better discipline and training; and, in addition, at the -commencement of an action, we may count on the men putting -into practice, to a certain extent, what they have been taught -in time of peace. However, the efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate -gradually, as the danger and the intensity of the fight -increase, until it reaches the stage which Wolozkoi considers -peculiar to all of the more serious actions.</p> - -<p>“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of -the men to keep under cover may lead them to duck even -their heads and to fire their rifles at high angles. In this case -the decisive short ranges would not be swept by fire, making -it possible for the more determined of the two opponents to -advance to the assault.</p> - -<p>“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (<i>i.e.</i>, the delivery -of fire at high angles) may also take place when troops are -surprised and, in consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains<span class="pagenum" id="Page176">[176]</span> -why the enemy’s fire passes entirely over a body of -troops which has gotten quite close to his position—by no -means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”<a id="FNanchor165" href="#Footnote165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote165" href="#FNanchor165" class="label">[165]</a> F. C. v. II. -<cite>Zum Studium der Taktik</cite>, p. 97.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant -cone is formed by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure -of less than 4 degrees, while the lower trajectories of -the whole cone of fire correspond to an angle of 1 degree and -30 minutes, and the upper trajectories to one of 14 degrees -and 30 minutes. If we apply these figures to a particular rifle -we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% of the hits (central -zone) at 560-1500 m. for the <i>Chassepot</i> rifle; at 1000-2000 -m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 mm. -rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are -applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are -under fire, while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with -bad aim.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the <b>Franco-German war</b> the German troops learned by experience -that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on the attacker -at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did not increase as the -skirmishers came closer to his position; that, on the contrary, the intensity -of the hostile fire effect fell off noticeably at ranges below 600 m.</p> - -<p>During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against <b>St. Privat</b>, -the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges from -1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges from 500-600 -m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain stationary on -the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the enveloping movement -made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500 m. corresponds -approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees for the <i>Chassepot</i> rifle. -The 20th Infantry Division was molested by rifle fire from <b>St. Privat</b>, -during its march from <b>St. Ail</b> to <b>St. Privat</b> (the range in this case was -2200 m., which corresponds to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 -minutes for the <i>Chassepot</i> rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, -against whom this fire was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from -the French position.</p> - -<p>In the <b>Russo-Turkish war</b> of 1877-78, the same thing occurred. Infantry -projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were still -2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of departure -of 14 degrees 30 minutes).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page177">[177]</span></p> - -<p>Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond -(5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle fire were -very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from the hostile position, -on the other hand, the losses were remarkably small, sometimes even -ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their heads under cover altogether.</p> - -<p>A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement at -<b>Slivnica</b> on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from the -enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the reserves, -stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray shots.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the -occurrence of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful -supervision by squad and platoon leaders over the individual -soldier in the firing line, and the severe punishment of -every act of carelessness in pointing, aiming, and setting of -the sight, in peace time. In war one must constantly endeavor -to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it tires the eye and the -arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable rapidity of fire, -and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. This includes, -in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in -giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make -every effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of -the attacker’s fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition -to repulse the assault. This requires the construction -of splinter proofs, head cover, and, in case the hostile fire -becomes too deadly, a cessation of fire, which is again resumed -when the enemy attempts to advance. To carry this out -properly, covered observation stations should be built, and the -men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at a signal -previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition -replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is -not unfit to resist an assault simply because it has suffered a -certain percentage of losses, but because each individual soldier -is so mastered by the feeling that he is in danger of losing his -life that he fires his piece without raising his head above the -parapet. A body of troops in such a state will fire its projectiles -in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page178">[178]</span></p> - -<p>A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of -peace, will still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of -its projectiles with good aim and with the proper rear sight -elevation, provided its officers are equal to their task.</p> - -<h5>(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.</h5> - -<p>Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the -skirmisher fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the -accuracy of the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, -Dutch, and Italian regulations authorize the bayonet, in the -absence of other expedients, to be stuck into the ground as a -rifle-rest, while this is forbidden in Germany. Collective fire -of short duration delivered at mid ranges has not been found -superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire delivered from -a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel of the -piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand -supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) -and when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing -from a rest, high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;<a id="FNanchor166" href="#Footnote166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> -and there is also danger, when under fire, that the men will -not raise their heads over the parapet, but will fire their -pieces into the air. This, as corroborated by the more recent -campaigns, is why a fire fight at short range is by no means -decided in so short a time as the peace performances of modern -rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses do not take place -until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the ground, -rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained -stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.<a id="FNanchor167" href="#Footnote167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> -The<span class="pagenum" id="Page179">[179]</span> -Japanese found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 -paces the hostile fire had no effect.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote166" href="#FNanchor166" class="label">[166]</a> -According to the <cite>Swiss Firing Regulations</cite> the change in height in the -point of the target struck amounts to <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>1000</sub> of the range.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote167" href="#FNanchor167" class="label">[167]</a> -The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of subsequent -reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on Spionskop from 3 A. M. -until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men in 18<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> hours (one officer to every -18.5 men), <i>i.e.</i>, 28.2%. See <a href="#Page189">p. 189</a> infra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5 title="(f) Influence of the Ground.">(f) Influence of the Ground.<a id="FNanchor168" href="#Footnote168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote168" href="#FNanchor168" class="label">[168]</a> -<span class="smcap">Mondeil</span>, <cite>De -la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ de bataille</cite>, -Paris, 1900.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire -on level ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced -by the inclination of the ground upon which the cone -of dispersion falls. Where the ground rises in respect to the -line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is decreased; where -it falls in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten -zone is increased.<a id="FNanchor169" href="#Footnote169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote169" href="#FNanchor169" class="label">[169]</a> -Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne’s</span> definitions are given below in explanation of -certain technical terms:</p> - -<p>“<i>Danger Space</i>” is the distance measured along the line of sight within -which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the target nor falls -below the target.</p> - -<p>“<i>Beaten Zone</i>” is the distance measured along the surface of the ground -within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of the target.</p> - -<p>Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not been -correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space. In pointing at the -bottom line of the target, the aiming position (<i>i.e.</i>, the height at which the -piece is held) does not affect the danger space. When pointing at the center -of the target the danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations -and tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low targets, -as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target. “The evil effects -of errors in estimating the range decrease as the ‘danger space’ increases, -which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon the ballistic properties of the rifle, -upon the range, and the height of the target. The danger on the ground in -rear of the target fired upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements -and ammunition over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition -depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The importance of this circumstance is frequently so magnified in the -French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For example, -they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a height can be -covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the ascent to a plateau by -evacuating the military crest and occupying the reverse slope, keeping the -slope facing the enemy under a grazing fire with the tail ends of the -trajectories.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page180">[180]</span></p> - -<div class="container w40em" id="Ref2"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo180.png" alt="Trajectories" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>Let A B B¹, in the accompanying <a href="#Ref2">figure</a>, represent a horizontal -plane pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle -α, forming the beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls -from B in the direction B D, it is obvious from the <a href="#Ref2">figure</a>, -that the angle of fall β decreases and the beaten zone -B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached when the -angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the projectile. -In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. If, on -the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be -C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone<a id="FNanchor170" href="#Footnote170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> decreases to B D¹. The smaller -the angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of -the ground.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote170" href="#FNanchor170" class="label">[170]</a> -The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula deduced by -Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span> -in his work <cite>Schieszlehre für Infanterie</cite>, p. 127:</p> - -<p class="noindent highline15">Let<br /> -<span class="padl4">α = angle of fall;</span><br /> -<span class="padl4">γ = angle of slope (rising or falling);</span><br /> -<span class="padl4">β = beaten zone on level ground;</span><br /> -then<br /> -<span class="padl4"><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">α</span> -<span class="bot">α - γ</span></span> β = beaten zone on falling ground;</span><br /> -<span class="padl4"><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">α</span> -<span class="bot">α + γ</span></span> β = beaten zone on rising ground.</span></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent -hands the appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at -B D will be fully taken advantage of, while firing on slope -like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops will, however, rarely -be in a position from which they can see a target on the slope -B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more or less<span class="pagenum" id="Page181">[181]</span> -a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation -will in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, -since each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain -number of projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the -slope rises in respect to the line of sight. A line is more easily -missed than a column of considerable depth on the march.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following data in regard to the increase (diminution) of the -depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of Lieutenant-General -<span class="smcap">Rohne</span> on <cite>Das -gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie</cite>, p. 44:</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Beaten zones"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th class="br">Range.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Rising Slope.</th> -<th colspan="2">Falling Slope.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br">1°</th> -<th class="br">2°</th> -<th class="br">1°</th> -<th>2°</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"> 800</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br">∞</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2">∞</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br">1000</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>2</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br">2</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2">∞</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br">1200</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>5</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2">3</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br">1400</td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>4</sup>⁄<sub>5</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>4</sup>⁄<sub>6</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2 br"><sup>4</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub></td> -<td class="center padl2 padr2">2</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="container w40em" id="Ref3"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo181.png" alt="Efficiency of fire" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The above <a href="#Ref3">figure</a>, taken from Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne’s</span> work, -<cite>Schieszlehre für die Infanterie</cite>, p. 128, shows the influence of the ground -on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a target, 100, 200 m. -etc., in rear of which are other targets of the same dimensions but situated -either on level ground, on a 2-degree rising slope, or a 1-degree falling -slope. On a rising slope of 2 degrees the depth of the beaten zone is -decreased by half, and on a downward slope of 1 degree increased by half.</p> - -<p>“The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great importance<span class="pagenum" id="Page182">[182]</span> -to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’ shots for -the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in battle will approximate -theirs more nearly than any other. From this we may deduce -that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing line, less distance -will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire directed at the firing -line than on level ground; and that, if the ground in rear of the firing -line slopes downward, the distances must be increased unless the slope -is so great or the hostile trajectories so flat that bullets pass over the -crest, forming a ‘defiladed space,’ into which no projectiles strike.”</p> - -<p>On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (<i>i.e.</i>, on the slope -of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground, the -slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on ground -falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope of hills and on -plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses.</p> - -<p>Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of -the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800 m.) a -defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring supports nearer -to the firing line than would be practicable on level ground. If we assume -that each graduation of the rear sight over 600 m. commands a space -100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we obtain the following depths -of the beaten zones at a range of 1500 m., with rifle model ’98 (angle -of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes):</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Beaten zones"> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Ground</td> -<td class="center"> rising </td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center"> in </td> -<td class="center">10</td> -<td class="center"> = </td> -<td class="center">6°</td> -<td class="center"> = </td> -<td class="center"> 50</td> -<td class="center"> m. </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">in</td> -<td class="center">20</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">3°</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center"> 64</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">in</td> -<td class="center">50</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">1°</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center"> 81</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Ground</td> -<td class="center">falling</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">in</td> -<td class="center">10</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">6°</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">360</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">in</td> -<td class="center">20</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">3°</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">180</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">in</td> -<td class="center">50</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">1°</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">113</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo182a.png" alt="Efficacy of fire" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo182b.png" alt="Efficacy of fire" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page183">[183]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The figures on <a href="#Page181">pages 181</a> and <a href="#Page182">182</a> show to what extent the ground is -capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French assert -that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles in the defense -of the park wall at <b>Villiers</b>. It was, at any rate, only an accident that the -masses of troops on the west side of the gently sloping Mamelon de -Villiers suffered heavy losses on November 30th, 1870.</p> - -<p>General <span class="smcap">Paquié</span> -of the French Army<a id="FNanchor171" href="#Footnote171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> lays down the following rule: -“When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle of -fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the -beaten zone will be 2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> times greater than on level ground. When the -angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of fall of the mean -trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the beaten zone will be -2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> times greater than on level ground. When the lowest trajectory of -a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a hill at the height of a man, -and when the reverse slope of that hill is equal to <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>100</sub> of the range, the -depth of the beaten zone will be five times as great as on level ground.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote171" href="#FNanchor171" class="label">[171]</a> -See also <cite>Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques du camp de Châlons</cite>. -<cite>Journal des sciences militaires</cite>, Sept., Oct., Nov., -1808—<cite>Le Joindre Général. -Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs</cite>, 1904.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to -increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain, and -train the eye in judging such situations.</p> - -<p>The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing -on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy in -shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective—as shown in the action against -the French IInd Corps at <b>Point du Jour</b> and by the experiences of the -Russians at <b>Plevna</b> and <b>Gorni Dubniac</b>. This condition becomes aggravated -the smaller the angles of fall of the projectiles, and the higher the -target is situated relative to the firing position of the attacking party.</p> - -<p>Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the -greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top of the -height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as the position is -approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a <i>Main Firing Position</i>. -(See Figure, <a href="#Page182">p. 182</a>. Fire effect from A and from B). For the purpose -of determining the favorable range, “D,” corresponding to a certain height -(of the enemy’s position) “H,” Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span> has deduced -the following formula for rifle model ’88:<a id="FNanchor172" href="#Footnote172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p class="formula">D = 15.H + 500.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote172" href="#FNanchor172" class="label">[172]</a> -Capitaine <span class="smcap">Cugnac</span>, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work of Captain -<span class="smcap">Knobloch</span>, -<cite>Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen Höhenstellungen</cite>, <cite>Swiss Monthly -Journal</cite>, 1907.</p> - -<p>The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at present -crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35 m.) could be -effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons at 1025 m.; a further -advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle model ’98 the formula might be -stated: 20.H + 600.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page184">[184]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible -to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender must -take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope facing the -enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to) without being himself -exposed to view, is of still less value for use in the field. According -to General Warnet of the French Army, if “p” is the degree of slope expressed -in centimeters, the defender should choose between two points -which lie between (p + 5) 1000 and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of -slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the defender should take up his position either -600 or 300 m. in rear of the main crest. In such a position the defender -will, it is true, be protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but -can only very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration -of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an -opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under fire. -Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the numerous -tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here, to show the -strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic principle may -develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely forgotten that in war -only that which is simple succeeds.</p> - -<p>“Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible from -the firing position. In this connection, the following is taken from the -report of Captain <span class="smcap">Knobloch</span>, -Austrian Army,<a id="FNanchor173" href="#Footnote173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> -on <cite>Schieszaufgaben unter -feldmäszigen Verhältnissen</cite>:</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote173" href="#FNanchor173" class="label">[173]</a> -<cite>Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des Gefechtswertes -unserer Infanterie</cite>, Vienna, 1904. <cite>Feldmäsziges Schieszen der Infanterie aus -versteckten Stellungen. Organ der militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine</cite>, Nos. 1 and -2 of 1906. <cite>Resultate der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer. Mitteilungen -über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens</cite>, No. 12 of 1905. <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, -1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are used. -These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with it. It goes -without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these conditions will -rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not be selected at -random at some particular elevation, because the angle between target and -aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear sight leaf, might possibly -lead to a negative sight setting.</p> - -<p>“In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of appropriate -height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect; but the -aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite the fact that -the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as trees, woods, factory -chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could be found on the terrain -itself. This largely determines the value of indirect rifle fire in the field.”</p> - -<p>This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover, -its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that we -could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison. Indirect -rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do damage to the -enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page185">[185]</span></p> - -<p>It remains to mention briefly the effect of <b>ricochets</b> -which, as a rule, tumble<a id="FNanchor174" href="#Footnote174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> after striking. Their range upon -rebounding is short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on -water, on rocky and hard ground, more rarely on wet meadows, -and on tilled soil, but they do not ricochet at all on sandy soil. -Ploughed fields, in which the furrows run obliquely to the line -of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets almost entirely. When -jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D” projectiles) -strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter their -form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably -increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The -range of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the -angle at which they are deflected. When the lateral deflection -is 30 degrees their range may amount to about 1300 m. The -nearer a bullet strikes to the skirmisher firing it, and the smaller -the angle of deflection of the consequent ricochet, the greater -its range; under favorable conditions this may amount to -2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing at a range -of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a -man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at -1850 m. from the skirmisher who did the firing.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote174" href="#FNanchor174" class="label">[174]</a> According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble even when only -grazing small twigs.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="13. LOSSES IN ACTION.">13. LOSSES IN ACTION.<a id="FNanchor175" href="#Footnote175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote175" href="#FNanchor175" class="label">[175]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 76 <i>et seq.</i></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>An attempt to move troops in close order formations -within the zone of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under -1500 m. when the enemy is still in condition to direct his fire -on them, is bound to lead to losses which make the further -tactical employment of these troops impossible.</p> - -<p>Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have -to deploy when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can -find cover. It is a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every -opportunity to return to close order formation must be utilized.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page186">[186]</span></p> - -<p>Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only -to accidental shots, should employ narrow rather than broad -formations. It might therefore seem advisable to remain in -route column so long as no flanking fire is received. The -Italian Firing Regulations contain the following <a href="#Ref4">figure</a> showing -the effect of fire directed on troops in the formations indicated.</p> - -<div class="container w40em" id="Ref4"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo186.png" alt="Chart" /> -</div> - -<div class="illotext"> - -<p>Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected. Horizontal axis: Range in meters.</p> - -<p>Dash-dot curve: Company Column.<a id="FNanchor176" href="#Footnote176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a><br /> -Dotted curve: Line of platoons.<a id="FNanchor177" href="#Footnote177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a><br /> -Solid curve: Line of skirmishers.<br /> -Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace intervals.</p> - -</div><!--illotext--> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote176" href="#FNanchor176" class="label">[176]</a> In Germany called “Column of Platoons.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote177" href="#FNanchor177" class="label">[177]</a> In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>According to the <a href="#Ref4">figure</a>, the Italian Company Column -(German Column of Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the -least losses are sustained by the company formed in line of -platoons, each in route column, at intervals of 15 paces. According -to French experiments, this formation is said to be no -longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at ranges under -1300 m.</p> - -<p>According to French firing tests made in Châlons,<a id="FNanchor178" href="#Footnote178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> the -following percentages of hits may be expected when using the -Lebel rifle firing old model steel jacketed bullets:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page187">[187]</span></p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Expected hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th colspan="4">At a range of</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br padl1 padr1">1200 m.</th> -<th class="br padl1 padr1">1400 m.</th> -<th class="br padl1 padr1">1600 m.</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1">1800 m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Platoon (one rank)</td> -<td class="center br"> 4.4</td> -<td class="center br"> 3.4</td> -<td class="center br"> 2.2</td> -<td class="center"> 1.4</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals</td> -<td class="center br"> 1.2</td> -<td class="center br">——</td> -<td class="center br">——</td> -<td class="center">——</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Platoon in column of fours</td> -<td class="center br"> 6.6</td> -<td class="center br"> 3.8</td> -<td class="center br"> 2.2</td> -<td class="center"> 1.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Platoon in column of twos</td> -<td class="center br"> 5.6</td> -<td class="center br"> 3.2</td> -<td class="center br"> 1.9</td> -<td class="center"> 1.1</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="left padr2 br">Company column (German<br /><span class="padl1">column</span> of platoons)</td> -<td class="center br">22.0</td> -<td class="center br">18.0</td> -<td class="center br">14.0</td> -<td class="center">10.0</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote178" href="#FNanchor178" class="label">[178]</a> <cite>Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs</cite>, p. 15.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, in his work, -<cite>Schieszlehre für -die Infanterie</cite>, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability -of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., -purely frontal fire only being considered, we obtain with every -1000 rounds fired with the appropriate elevation, the following -number of hits <span class="nowrap">against—</span></p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br padl1 padr1">Line.</th> -<th class="br padl1 padr1">Column<br />of<br />platoons.</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1">Infantry<br />in route<br />column.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Standing</td> -<td class="center br">116</td> -<td class="center br">160</td> -<td class="center">98</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="left padr2 br">Prone</td> -<td class="center br"> 20</td> -<td class="center br"> 65</td> -<td class="center">72</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>And against a company deployed in line of platoons:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Hits"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="padl1 padr1 br">3 platoons,<br />each in<br />route column.</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1 br">3 platoons,<br />each in<br />column of twos.</th> -<th class="padl1 padr1">6 sections,<br />each in<br />column of twos.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2 br">Standing</td> -<td class="center br">57</td> -<td class="center br">39</td> -<td class="center">29</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="left padr2 br">Prone</td> -<td class="center br">28</td> -<td class="center br">25</td> -<td class="center">14</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page188">[188]</span></p> - -<p>The company deployed in line of sections in columns of -twos would thus seem to be the most favorable formation for -movements, and the line lying prone is especially well suited -for halts. For movements under purely frontal, concentrated -fire, the line is the least favorable formation, while the route -column offers the narrowest target. In this, the character of -the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing on targets consisting -of columns, it has been assumed that a single projectile will -place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire the -formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability, -the line formation being less favorable than the column of -platoons, since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.</p> - -<p>The total losses in battles and more serious engagements -amount to from 10 to 20% of the participating troops. In -some organizations the losses in killed and wounded may -amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an organization -will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency. Good -troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as, -for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), -and which have been trained to look upon heavy -losses as unavoidable, will be capable of enduring a loss of -25% in the course of a battle without going to pieces and without -discontinuing the attack.<a id="FNanchor179" href="#Footnote179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote179" href="#FNanchor179" class="label">[179]</a> It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses spoil troops -and their leaders in this respect.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At the battle of <b>Gravelotte</b>, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200 sabres, and -732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated on the German -side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the decisive action. The -losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as follows: 899 officers and 19,260 -men; according to arms: infantry, 10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, -5.74%. On the decisive flank, the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of -almost 30%. On this flank, the Rifles of the Guard (<i>Gardeschützen</i>) lost -44%, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their -enlisted strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 -men.</p> - -<p>Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the 18th -Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless they may -amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in single bodies of -troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page189">[189]</span></p> - -<p>At <b>Magersfontain</b>, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of -their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the officers; -i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion of the Black -Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders, 23.9%. -At <b>Colenso</b> (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost 6.4% of their total strength; -the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 23.9%.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p class="tabhead fsize90"><b>Spionskop</b> (Jan. 24th, 1900):</p> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Hits"> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Attacking troops </td> -<td class="center">2,694</td> -<td class="center"> men </td> -<td class="center"> in </td> -<td class="center">18<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center"> hrs. </td> -<td class="center">40</td> -<td class="center"> officers, </td> -<td class="center">721</td> -<td class="center"> men </td> -<td class="center"> = </td> -<td class="center">28.2%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Supports</td> -<td class="center">1,600</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">10<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> 8</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> 95</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center"> 6.4%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Reserves </td> -<td class="center">1,500</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> 4<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">15</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">170</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">12.3%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Staffs </td> -<td class="center bb">——</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bb"> </td> -<td class="center bb">——</td> -<td class="bb"> </td> -<td class="center bb"> 5</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -<td class="center bb">——</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bb"> </td> -<td class="center bb">——</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">5,794</td> -<td class="center">men</td> -<td colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="center">68</td> -<td class="center">officers,</td> -<td class="center">986</td> -<td class="center">men</td> -<td class="center">=</td> -<td class="center">17.5%</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing the -fire were shot down.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Ratio"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Attacking troops</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center"> officer</td> -<td class="center"> for </td> -<td class="center">every </td> -<td class="center">18</td> -<td class="center"> men</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Supports</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">12</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Reserves</td> -<td class="center bb">1</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -<td class="center bb">11</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">officer</td> -<td class="center">for</td> -<td class="center">every</td> -<td class="center">14</td> -<td class="center">men</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the -Prussian Grenadier Battalion “<i>von Wedel</i>,” consisting of 12 officers and 390 -men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour during the -battle of <b>Soor</b> (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered by the Grenadier -Battalion “<i>von Münchow</i>” at <b>Kesselsdorf</b> are possibly not much lower. -The effective strength of the last named battalion is not given; it lost 5 -officers and 371 men.<a id="FNanchor180" href="#Footnote180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> - -</div><!--tetxquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote180" href="#FNanchor180" class="label">[180]</a> -<cite>Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen</cite>, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and 47.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Kolin</b>, the Grenadier Battalion “<i>Nymschöfsky</i>” lost 652 men, and -six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, <i>i.e.</i>, considerably -more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the battle, the Grenadier -Battalion “<i>Nymschöfsky</i>” numbered only 24 men and the enlisted -strength of six infantry regiments was 233, 296, 602, 651 and 711 men -respectively. The number of stragglers was undoubtedly very great.<a id="FNanchor181" href="#Footnote181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> At -<b>Kolin</b>, the infantry lost in all 12,307 men out of 19,000, <i>i.e.</i>, 65%.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote181" href="#FNanchor181" class="label">[181]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is -by no means due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to -pick off the leaders in the combat at short range, but to the -fact that, in order to lead their men, officers must expose themselves. -This becomes more and more necessary the greater the -moral effect of the combat on the nervous systems of the men,<span class="pagenum" id="Page190">[190]</span> -and the poorer the troops. According to past experience, the -casualties among officers are especially heavy in the early -stages of a war.<a id="FNanchor182" href="#Footnote182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote182" href="#FNanchor182" class="label">[182]</a> -See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are -given, in round figures, in the following table:</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<table class="dontwrap fsize90" summary="Ratios"> - -<tr> -<td class="center">At </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Weiszenburg</b> (Vth Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center"> officer </td> -<td class="center">for</td> -<td class="center"> every </td> -<td class="center">14  </td> -<td class="right padr0"> men</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Wörth</b> (Vth Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">20  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Wörth</b> (XIth Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">15  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Vionville</b> (IIIrd Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">21  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Vionville</b> (Xth Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">24  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Gravelotte</b> (Guard Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">22.5</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Gravelotte</b> (XIIth Army Corps)</td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">20  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Colenso</b></td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">15  </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„ </td> -<td class="left padr2"><b>Magersfontain</b></td> -<td class="center">1</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">11.8</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0">;</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Colonel <span class="smcap">Hessert</span><a id="FNanchor183" href="#Footnote183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> -writes the following in regard to the losses among -the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight of the 16 -field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with the regiments and -battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost all of these officers -were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company commanders—almost all of -them dismounted—and 43 of the 151 company officers were placed out of -action. This would be a loss of 50% in field officers, 42% in adjutants, -37% in company commanders, and 29% in company officers.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote183" href="#FNanchor183" class="label">[183]</a> -<cite>Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre M/74 und -M/66</cite>, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its officers -and 44% of its men—19 officers and 431 men, in about three-quarters of -an hour.</p> - -<p>On Sept. 11th, 1877, at <b>Plevna</b>, the <i>Ugla</i> Regiment lost 20 of its officers, -<i>i.e.</i>, 40%; the <i>Jaroslaw</i> Regiment, 25 officers, <i>i.e.</i>, 64%; the total -loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%, that of the last named -to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the <i>Vladimir</i> Regiment, 14 -were placed out of action.</p> - -<p>After the assault on the <b>Tuminling Pass</b> on Oct. 12th, 1905, the East -Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing line, and after -the battle of <b>Sandepu</b> only 5. These examples are not isolated ones. After -the battle on the <b>Yalu</b>, the 11th Rifle Regiment had present for duty only -one field officer, and the 12th only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the -<i>Yoshihoka</i> Regiment (3rd Japanese Division) had present for duty only -3 lieutenants; one battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one -company by a private.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page191">[191]</span></p> - -<h4>14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.</h4> - -<p>The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: -as the sum of the impressions influencing the soldier at all -times in action, and as the momentary general impression produced -by a sudden considerable increase in the losses. The -great material effect of fire creates such a consciousness of -danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more than half -of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.</p> - -<p>“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain -themselves owing to their numerical inferiority, but because -they fear the losses which they would suffer if they -advanced further. The determination to conquer has been -overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of impressions -increases with the size of the force. Taken individually, the -men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are -claimed either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the -mind is completely replaced by imagination; everything is believed; -nothing is appraised; exaggeration prevails everywhere; -and precipitation produces unthought of results. When the -men come to their senses, it is as if they were awakened from -a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could have -induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, -most surely, have saved them from destruction.”<a id="FNanchor184" href="#Footnote184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote184" href="#FNanchor184" class="label">[184]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, -<cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, p. 150.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, -General von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either -extraordinarily excited or stupefied. Their faces are distorted -and only a few still retain firm will power.”</p> - -<p>General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the -battle of Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our -battalion was lying, facing eastward, in the neighborhood of -the wood of Fröschweiler. The shrieking of the Prussian -shells, but especially the noise of the shells bursting in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page192">[192]</span> -midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division in position in our -rear, made a considerable impression on our men. Their joking -ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale -faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had -no desire to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. -The latter were congregated here and there in small groups; -a few were trying hard to joke, others were walking up and -down, with a cigarette between their lips, making convulsive -efforts to appear at ease; a small number were entirely calm -as if no danger was present.... The first batch of -wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce -the Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. -The fire of the Turcos drowned all other sounds. There was -nothing to indicate that the enemy was also concentrating a -heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into line to the right. -The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had reached the -edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling commenced. -It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly -under our very noses. At this moment our men lost -their heads. They blazed away like mad, crowded in three, -four, and five ranks at the foot of the downward slope. The -men in front had thrown themselves to the ground, the others -fired kneeling or standing, leaning against trees. Since all of -the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover by a dense, -impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in greater -danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the -enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid -being shot down by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to -us, at a range of 300 to 400 m., there rested a white smoke -cloud, and we could indistinctly discern the enemy, who was -keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke enveloping us -was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This excitement -gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get -the troops again under control.</p> - -<p>The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements -of the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions<span class="pagenum" id="Page193">[193]</span> -existing in the theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton -spoke the same language. During the first few days of the -campaign, surrenders of detachments of considerable strength -took place. These were not punished with sufficient severity. -One almost gains the impression that the men considered the -surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a difficult situation.</p> - -<p>On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and -swept for great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very -difficult to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements -were undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this -may be added the fact that it was easy for the Boers, who -were mounted, to bar the way to isolated British forces. It -must be remembered, moreover, that the operations took place -during the hottest season and in a country where water is -scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit -of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment -than would have been the case under different conditions. -Thus, the surrender at Stromberg of troops exhausted from -a night march, is perhaps excusable; not so, however, the surrender -of Colonel Carleton’s detachment, which laid down its -arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble resistance. In -the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen, who -had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so -that the commander of the British force did not really know -just what action to take in this situation. His hesitation decided -his fate. The demand must unquestionably be made in -future also,<a id="FNanchor185" href="#Footnote185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> that troops surrounded in the field make a serious -attempt to cut their way out before permitting thoughts of -surrender to enter their minds.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote185" href="#FNanchor185" class="label">[185]</a> -In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found all but three -of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st, 1900, justified. In the -three cases in which the verdict was adverse only a few men had surrendered. -Within a period of eight months the British lost a total of 1680 officers and -2124 men killed and wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 -officers and 4984 men.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses -troops are able to endure. After the Franco-German War it<span class="pagenum" id="Page194">[194]</span> -was believed that troops had reached the limit of endurance -after losing one-third to one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays -this limit would appear to be reached much sooner. It -may be pointed out, however, that the neglect of continuing the -attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss 7.2%), -may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; -and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles -and deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement -at Paardeberg (loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to -continue the attack. The greater the degree of efficiency and -freshness of troops, and the less the degree of suddenness with -which they enter a difficult situation, the greater the losses -which they will be capable of enduring. Furthermore, we -should not forget that our modern personnel has become much -more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The steadily -improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of -self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. -The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, -and this militates directly against that courage which has a -contempt for death. The fast manner of living at the present -day undermines the nervous system,<a id="FNanchor186" href="#Footnote186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> the fanaticism and the -religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age are lacking, -and, finally, the physical powers of the human species are also -partly diminishing. The influence exerted by officers on the -firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller than -in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the -nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions -on the battlefield are much greater at present than in the -past. The “<i>void of the battlefield</i>”<a id="FNanchor187" href="#Footnote187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> -has become especially pronounced<span class="pagenum" id="Page195">[195]</span> -since the introduction of smokeless powder. “<i>The -invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the -soldier, the sources of his energy and his courage. The soldier -who cannot see his enemy, is inclined to see him everywhere. -It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and -then to fear.</i> The inertia of the troops for whole days at -Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more -than 800 m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, -but by the moral depression which is caused within the effective -zone of rifle fire.” (General <span class="smcap">Négrier</span>.)<a id="FNanchor188" href="#Footnote188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote186" href="#FNanchor186" class="label">[186]</a> See -<span class="smcap">Spaits</span>, <cite>Mit -Kasaken durch die Mandschurei</cite>. After the author had -turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote: “And we Europeans -will feel just like this in war. We will get to a certain point where the strength -of our will and our physical powers will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, -and this state we will reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were -better off in regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness -is carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about <i>Courage</i>, <i>ibid.</i>, -p. 206.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote187" href="#FNanchor187" class="label">[187]</a> This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not new. A Saxon officer -complains of it in his <cite>Vertrauten Briefen</cite> (Cologne, 1807), and the French -officers report on the “void of the battlefield” in the fights around Metz. -<span class="smcap">Bonnal</span>, <cite>L’art -nouveau en Tactique</cite>, p. 90.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote188" href="#FNanchor188" class="label">[188]</a> <cite>Revue -des deux mondes</cite>, for June, 1902.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated <span class="nowrap">by—</span></p> - -<p class="highline15">1. Derangement of tactical units;</p> - -<p class="highline15">2. The mixing of men of the different units during the -action; and</p> - -<p class="highline15">3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>According to the <cite>History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment</cite> (p. 113) immediately -after the battle of <b>St. Privat</b>, most of the companies numbered only -30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although, allowing for losses, -there should have been 1922 men. The three companies of the 39th Füsilier -Regiment which had fought in the <b>Stiring Wald</b> at <b>Spicheren</b>, numbered -only 6 officers and 150 men at the close of the fight in the evening,<a id="FNanchor189" href="#Footnote189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> which -means that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle of -<b>Colombey</b>, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment was assembled, -three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men, respectively. -This battalion had lost about 300 men.<a id="FNanchor190" href="#Footnote190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote189" href="#FNanchor189" class="label">[189]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, -I, p. 366.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote190" href="#FNanchor190" class="label">[190]</a> <cite>Geschichte des Regiments</cite>, p. 347.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account -(<cite>Gt. St. W.</cite>) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different infantry -regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying a front of -1200 paces, in the following order:</p> - -<div class="trooporder"> - -<p><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">7.</span><span class="bot">Jägers.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">1.</span><span class="bot">55.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">4.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">8.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">4.</span><span class="bot">53.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">6.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">12.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">7.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">10.11.12.</span><span class="bot">13.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">1.</span><span class="bot">13.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">1.</span><span class="bot">73.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">9.10.</span><span class="bot">15.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">4.3.</span><span class="bot">73.</span></span>, -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top noline">Cos.</span><span class="bot">Inf.</span></span></p> - -</div><!--trooporder--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page196">[196]</span></p> - -<p>At <b>Wörth</b> 17 different regiments were represented on a front of -5700 paces.</p> - -<p>“The assault on <b>Elsaszhausen</b> (<b>Wörth</b>), after preliminary forest -fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some -cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was -the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear of -it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army Corps) -which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves. Even the -battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical entities.”<a id="FNanchor191" href="#Footnote191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote191" href="#FNanchor191" class="label">[191]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 268.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into -formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers, easily -succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units disintegrated -rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.<a id="FNanchor192" href="#Footnote192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote192" href="#FNanchor192" class="label">[192]</a> For details see <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, XVI, pp. 122, 124, -177, 231-234.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the <b>Giefert Wald</b> (<b>Spicheren</b>) out of 32 companies (4 brigades) -only four companies fought together as a battalion. In the little <b>Wenzelberg -Wood</b> (at <b>Nachod</b>) there were engaged 7<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> Austrian battalions (belonging -to four different regiments) and 2 Jäger-Battalions, all of these -troops belonging to three different brigades.<a id="FNanchor193" href="#Footnote193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> No attempt was made to -lead these troops as one body.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote193" href="#FNanchor193" class="label">[193]</a> <cite>Austrian Gen. St. W.</cite>, 1866, III, p. 81.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the oak wood at <b>Dubno</b> (<b>Skalitz</b>), there were engaged 12<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> and -8<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> battalions belonging to four different regiments and to two different -army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up of the order of -battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades, regiments and battalions. -In consequence of this, control was lost to a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, -and the result achieved was mainly due to the skill and -intelligence of the subordinate leaders—especially that of the commanders -of battalions and half battalions.”<a id="FNanchor194" href="#Footnote194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote194" href="#FNanchor194" class="label">[194]</a> <span class="smcap">Kühne</span>, <cite>Kritische Wanderungen</cite>, II, p. 48.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“The wooded region in rear of <b>St. Hubert</b> was thickly infested with -stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to be -seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets, some -with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present except those -stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers riding through -the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved only a small force -that they gathered, for the greater portion of the men were safely ensconced -to one side of the bottom of the valley.”<a id="FNanchor195" href="#Footnote195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> “At 5 P. M., the garrison of -<b>St. Hubert</b> had increased to 43 companies, belonging to seven different -regiments, and the result was utterly hopeless confusion.”<a id="FNanchor196" href="#Footnote196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote195" href="#FNanchor195" class="label">[195]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie</cite>, p. 139.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote196" href="#FNanchor196" class="label">[196]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 167.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page197">[197]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps occupied -a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east of the -Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the enemy was -so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious mistakes with -impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”<a id="FNanchor197" href="#Footnote197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote197" href="#FNanchor197" class="label">[197]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 224.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“At <b>Sedan</b> bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the 46th -Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up with the -43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments of the 43rd -Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the capture of <b>Cazal</b> -the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal but the most heterogeneous -mass of troops consisting of about a battalion.”<a id="FNanchor198" href="#Footnote198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote198" href="#FNanchor198" class="label">[198]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 1249.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“In penetrating into <b>Lovtcha</b> (1877) the foremost battalions became -disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around in -irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and sought cover -in drainage ditches.”<a id="FNanchor199" href="#Footnote199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> “In one battalion of the <i>Kasan</i> Regiment, which -was to move through the town from the left flank, officers and men -threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire became effective and only -with difficulty could they be induced to rise. When the regimental commander -fell, everybody fled, carrying along those in rear. Only two company -columns, composed of stragglers of different organizations, resisted, -deployed into a dense skirmish line and, encouraged by their officers, -rushed forward cheering.”<a id="FNanchor200" href="#Footnote200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote199" href="#FNanchor199" class="label">[199]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, pp. 68 and 72.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote200" href="#FNanchor200" class="label">[200]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 72.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers left -to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at <b>Plevna</b>.</p> - -<p>The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the <i>Kaluga</i> Regiment (in the third -battle of <b>Plevna</b>) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly continued the -advance in complete disorder.</p> - -<p>“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a reserve, -but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of the officers -was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging to various companies. -The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Kaluga Regiment were -scattered all over the battlefield, the companies had become completely -mixed up, and it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to re-form them.”<a id="FNanchor201" href="#Footnote201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote201" href="#FNanchor201" class="label">[201]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 154.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments, attempted -to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way; 400 paces from -the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the organizations participating -in the action gradually assembled in Work No. 1, which had -been taken. While only a couple of hundred men had taken the work, -thousands were now assembled there. Not a single company or battalion<span class="pagenum" id="Page198">[198]</span> -was intact, every vestige of organization had disappeared; the commanders, -and officers generally, had become separated from their units.”<a id="FNanchor202" href="#Footnote202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote202" href="#FNanchor202" class="label">[202]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, pp. 236 and 238.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Prince <span class="smcap">Imeretinski</span> succeeded in forming stragglers into the following -improvised units:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Units"> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">3</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center"> provisional </td> -<td class="center">companies</td> -<td class="center"> of</td> -<td class="center"> the </td> -<td class="left"><i>Libau</i></td> -<td class="left"> Regiment.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">2</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> „</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left"><i>Susdal</i></td> -<td class="center"> „</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">2</td> -<td class="left padl0"><sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> „</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left"><i>Vladimir</i></td> -<td class="center"> „</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">1</td> -<td> </td> -<td colspan="6" class="left">detachment of 100 men of the <i>Reval</i> Regiment.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance -and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”<a id="FNanchor203" href="#Footnote203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote203" href="#FNanchor203" class="label">[203]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 243.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of -Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians succeeded -in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in companies -irrespective of the regiments to which they originally belonged. This -gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the afternoon of the 12th -of September. The continuance of the fight was made possible only by -constantly re-forming the remnants into new organizations and then sending -these forward into the fight.”<a id="FNanchor204" href="#Footnote204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote204" href="#FNanchor204" class="label">[204]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 258.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The remedies provided by the regulations against these -evils are, above all else: Restriction of the front of the several -units, the deployment of tactical units side by side in action -(instead of in rear of each other) and the use of every -opportunity for re-establishing the original organizations. -Other suggestions for stemming the tide of disorder as made -by the author of <cite>Summer Nights Dream</cite> (1888) (platoons -formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing -toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The -disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical -cohesion. It is better to recognize this fact than to face the -enemy with illusory ideas.</p> - -<p>It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow -willingly any officer, whether he belong to their own or to -another organization; and, for that reason, exercises in provisional -organizations are requisite for tactical training—a -large number of officers being told to fall out at these exercises -to assimilate losses which would occur in action. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page199">[199]</span> -control of mixed firing lines by word of command of an officer -is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a prerequisite -of success in the battles of the future. In a successful -engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident -than during a reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy -losses or receive fire from the flank or rear. Troops formed -into well-organized units can well stand such a test, but in an -improvised organization, composed of fractions and men of -different units, especially when their own officers are absent, -such a crisis may lead to panic.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion, -4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at <b>Colombey</b> -(14th August, 1870) under French shell and <i>Chassepot</i> fire. The morale -of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two shells which burst, one -after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20 men out of action. “The men -began to hesitate; their steps grew shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible -power, the company executed a half right turn, another half right -turn, then another and another. One would have thought the movement -was being executed at command. The column was now facing to the rear, -and although not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie -with suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did -everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned officers -assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its movement to the -rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the perspiration pouring out of -every pore, I shouted to the men, repeatedly commanding: ‘Company -... Forward!’ But all in vain. At that moment the battalion commander—he -was called the ‘marble statue’ on account of his coolness—galloped -up on his bay, shouting: ‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; -see how far it has advanced.’ Then another superior officer jumped in -front of the men with the words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At -this instant I yelled again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men -belong to the color company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell -was broken. As if on the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the -front; obediently they executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry -arms ... Forward!’ and soon thereafter we again occupied our position -between the 2nd and 4th Companies.”</p> - -<p>The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among -them its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession -within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company lost -a total of 86 men (including officers).<a id="FNanchor205" href="#Footnote205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote205" href="#FNanchor205" class="label">[205]</a> <span class="smcap">Retzlaff</span>, <cite>Aus meinem Tagebuch</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page200">[200]</span></p> - -<p>Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than -the example of fear or cowardice.<a id="FNanchor206" href="#Footnote206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> Appeals, threats, and -intimidation are of little avail. The most effective remedy -lies in developing the individual soldier’s initiative, in training -him to act with common sense even when his officers are absent. -We should send our soldiers into battle with a reserve -of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral -and mental depreciation of the individual.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote206" href="#FNanchor206" class="label">[206]</a> Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:</p> - -<p>The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against Italian -infantry. <cite>Oesterreichs Kämpfe</cite>, II, p. 74.</p> - -<p>The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie</cite>, pp. 170, 184, 193 -and 215.</p> - -<p><cite>Sedan</cite>, <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 1243.</p> - -<p><cite>Wald- und Ortsgefecht</cite>, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the capture of -Servigny).</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lehaucourt</span>, <cite>Campagne de la Loire</cite>, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes Mobiles -after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page201">[201]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>1. NORMAL PROCEDURE.</h4> - -<p>The characteristic tendency of modern times is the -liberation of the individual from antiquated ideas and from -the restraint exercised by ostensibly reactionary governmental -power. The key-note of this tendency, which places -individualism above collectivism, is absolute independence of -the individual in municipal and national affairs, in science -and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent -by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be -assured by the sum-total of a number of negative or positive -individual efforts, but only by the simultaneous launching -of masses controlled by a single will. Within these limits -the independence of the individual is permissible, for a commander -does not exact apathetic obedience, but, on the contrary, -intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and -this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules.</p> - -<p>Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the -German Drill Regulations leave the leader free to dispose -of his troops according to the purpose of the combat and -the nature of the ground. In this he is assisted by the -initiative and independent action of his subordinate leaders. -Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite however, -in armies in which the tactical training of commanders -and subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared -that the latter will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where -such normal formations are prescribed, it is assumed that -hard and fast rules are requisite for training; that the average -officer cannot be expected to estimate a situation correctly -and arrive at proper decisions; and that the majority<span class="pagenum" id="Page202">[202]</span> -of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are -to render any service at all.</p> - -<p>Drill regulations should facilitate quick mutual understanding -between leader and organization and lay down general -principles for ordinary situations, for combat tasks, and -for formations, but should not, by their rules, direct the -actions of a leader from the very beginning into definite -grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure, there -is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and -that the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail -in war at the very moment when its presence is most vitally -necessary.<a id="FNanchor207" href="#Footnote207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote207" href="#FNanchor207" class="label">[207]</a> “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of drill and -who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the lame man deprived -of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived of his spectacles.” <span class="smcap">von -Seidlitz</span>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the -ground, therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what -might happen in each particular case.” (<span class="smcap">Frederick the -Great</span>). Whether or not a particular normal procedure is -appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but solely -upon the tactical situation.<a id="FNanchor208" href="#Footnote208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote208" href="#FNanchor208" class="label">[208]</a> It is only in cases where precisely identical situations may be presumed to -exist that there can be any question of a normal procedure. The last stages -of the infantry attack in fortress warfare present features of this nature and -on that account a normal procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of -the European armies.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to -the general manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ -radically as to details. “If all the advocates of a normal -attack had to describe it in words, there would be about as -many suggestions as there are advocates. Which of the -many normal attack schemes is the most suitable for average -troops? A conference called for the purpose of investigating -this point would probably have the strange result that -each representative would concede that what the others desire<span class="pagenum" id="Page203">[203]</span> -is practicable but need not be done.”<a id="FNanchor209" href="#Footnote209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> Anyone who thinks -himself capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear -in mind that all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill -the expectations entertained for them because of obstacles -which could not have been foreseen during their preparation. -Regulations that prescribe too many details are very apt to -lead to stereotyped forms and to that which cannot stand the -test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises in -store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future. -Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only -if they have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the -letter of their regulations, if they have been individually -trained and accustomed to strict discipline, and if their leaders -have been taught to reflect on tactics. It is better to send -troops into battle with the order, “Help yourselves as best you -can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of doubtful -value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, -because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their -own initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the -same proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders -had in the lauded universal remedy, the normal procedure. -In spite of the excellence of our regulations, we should accustom -ourselves to the idea that a future war may correct their -provisions.<a id="FNanchor210" href="#Footnote210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote209" href="#FNanchor209" class="label">[209]</a> General -<span class="smcap">Bronsart v. Schellendorff</span>, <cite>I, Betrachtungen</cite>, etc. p. 42</p> - -<p><cite>British Drill Regulations</cite>: “Although a normal attack is apparently capable -of being changed to suit the various situations, the continual practice of it leads -to a stereotyped formation, to lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages -coupled with a normal attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they -will make themselves felt through losses and failures.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote210" href="#FNanchor210" class="label">[210]</a> Major <span class="smcap">von Hülsen</span>, -<cite>Schema oder Selbständigkeit?</cite>, (Berlin, 1906).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The enunciation of certain technical combat principles -as a guide in the training of the troops is, however, far removed -from laying down a stereotyped form for attack -(normal attack). Every thinking officer will anyhow, consciously -or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind some -sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion -of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If<span class="pagenum" id="Page204">[204]</span> -such combat regulations are called “drill attack” (<i>Schulangriff</i>), -many of the objections advanced against the normal -attack are eliminated. Such definite provisions facilitate in -a great measure the intercourse between leader and troops.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (<cite>On War</cite>, -II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should not be regarded -as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as good general -forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most suitable.... -By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill, precision, and -confidence, the possession of which qualities on their part will make the -whole machine run easier....</p> - -<p>“The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends -to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances imperceptibly -change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and -thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals (Prince -Louis at <b>Saalfeld</b>; Tauenzien on the <b>Dornberg</b> at <b>Jena</b>; Grawert in front -of and Rüchel in rear of <b>Kapellendorf</b>) without exception came to grief -by employing Frederick the Great’s system of tactics, it was due not merely -to the fact that they had gotten into a certain groove of acting which -was out of date, but to the most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed -system of tactics has ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for -themselves, they involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never -before or since overtaken any army on the battlefield.”</p> - -<p>General von Boguslawski<a id="FNanchor211" href="#Footnote211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> demands that the conduct of the attack -be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in action. -He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even the -simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present time, -are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse the soldier and -the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by no means incompatible -with adaptation to the varying features of the terrain in a given case, and -will infuse unity and certainty into offensive movements. A normal formation -must be prescribed, but it should be flexible.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote211" href="#FNanchor211" class="label">[211]</a> <cite>Taktische Darlegungen</cite>, p. 51.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal -attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the basis -of troop training—a solid foundation for further development. In carrying -out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be done on -varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack. The formations -taught on the drill-ground should be retained as long as possible. -The training of officers and men must be such, however, that they will -deviate, whenever necessary, from these normal formations. But if the -formations, as well as the training and drill, are truly practical and adapted -for war, departures from the scheme laid down in the regulations will be -insignificant. This, briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform<span class="pagenum" id="Page205">[205]</span> -procedure, which not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the -contrary, is absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the -higher leader.”</p> - -<p>General von Scherff states:<a id="FNanchor212" href="#Footnote212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a></p> - -<p>“It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of responsibility -if the regulations would definitely <span class="nowrap">prescribe:—</span></p> - -<p>“1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for -battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning appropriate -missions;</p> - -<p>“2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of a -mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient provided by -the regulations, the formation in which his organization is to carry out the -task assigned; and, finally,</p> - -<p>“3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed -by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the drill-ground, -so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component parts.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote212" href="#FNanchor212" class="label">[212]</a> <cite>Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter -Angriff</cite>, Berlin, 1902.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT -FOR ACTION.">2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT -FOR ACTION.<a id="FNanchor213" href="#Footnote213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote213" href="#FNanchor213" class="label">[213]</a> <i>Aufmarsch</i>, <i>Entfaltung</i>, <i>Entwicklung</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Column tactics, which influenced us even after the -Franco-German war, required that troops be concentrated, -prior to an action, from the narrow route column into a broad -combat formation. This tedious systematic <b>concentration</b><a id="FNanchor214" href="#Footnote214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> -was invariably employed before entering an action, except -when, in critical situations, companies and battalions had to -be launched into the fight directly from route column. The -commander of a force could reduce the time required for going -into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly -formation.<a id="FNanchor215" href="#Footnote215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote214" href="#FNanchor214" class="label">[214]</a> “By <i>concentration</i> is meant the passage from route column to a broader -close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of decreasing the depth -of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German I. D. R.)</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote215" href="#FNanchor215" class="label">[215]</a> Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of Gravelotte, -see <cite>Taktik</cite>, III, p. 305.</p> - -<p>The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the Bistrits -to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The army first approached in -route columns, then concentrated, again formed route columns, and finally concentrated -for action. <span class="smcap">v. Lettow-Vorbeck</span>, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I -know of the terrain the advance should in this case have been made in assembly -formations.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page206">[206]</span></p> - -<p>Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation -was not pressing, the leader was obliged, for example, to -allow a regiment having a depth of 1200 m. to close up to -a depth of 100 paces. When this had been done, he was -forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper distance -to the front. The rear elements were able to follow -only when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately -equal to the former depth of the entire column. Such -a concentration is only proper however, when the commander -wishes to launch his troops subsequently in several -directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity -for decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column -of sections).</p> - -<p>The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties -even in close country, if, as recommended by the -author,<a id="FNanchor216" href="#Footnote216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> the battalions in route column are placed abreast -of each other and are permitted to go around obstacles and -take advantage of the cover available. However, even at -long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable -targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote216" href="#FNanchor216" class="label">[216]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, III, p. 307.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The British were surprised in close order formations at <b>Magersfontain</b> -and <b>Colenso</b>. In subsequent engagements, in order to avoid this, -their infantry, when still a great distance away from the enemy, took up -an attack formation which permitted only movements directly to the front -(at <b>Poplar Grove,</b> for example, this was done when 10 km. from the -enemy). An advance in such a formation was possible only because the -plains of South Africa presented no obstacles, and because the British had -only to hold the enemy who stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade -formed its four battalions into an open double column with a front -of 2000 and a depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions -being 300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so -that its eight companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace -intervals between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 -paces. The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used -in other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page207">[207]</span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<p class="caption">The Formation of a Brigade of Four Battalions of the 6th -Infantry Division<br /> -<span class="nonbold">during the advance on <b>Poplar Grove</b> on March 7th, 1900. -Front about 800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.</span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo207.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>When an engagement is expected, the different elements, -each in route column, are directed upon their several objectives, -i.e., the column is <i>developed for action</i>. This is done -because it is necessary to gain a start over the enemy in -deployment and advantageous to move in route column. Thus -a <b>development for action</b> (<i>Entfaltung</i>)<a id="FNanchor217" href="#Footnote217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> is nothing but an -extension of front accomplished by breaking up the original -route column into a number of separate columns. The latter -march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route<span class="pagenum" id="Page208">[208]</span> -column. Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate -extension is not anticipated. During the development -for action, preparations should be made providing for the -necessary depth of the combat formation.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote217" href="#FNanchor217" class="label">[217]</a> The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of front, -“development for action” (<i>Entfaltung</i>, pars. 315 and 466), and “distribution in -depth” (<i>Gliedern</i>, pars. 287-291 and 427). The term “to form for attack” -(<i>Auseinanderziehen</i>, par. 241), means that troops are given a combat formation -both as regards frontage and depth.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the -concentration into an assembly formation should be avoided, -since it generally entails a loss of time and energy, and the -development for action chosen instead. (Par. 315 German I. -D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage of affording -a higher degree of readiness for action without letting the -troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from -route column but also from assembly formation.<a id="FNanchor218" href="#Footnote218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote218" href="#FNanchor218" class="label">[218]</a> See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov on September -2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in <cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, by von Lüttwitz.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The development for action should begin as soon as -there is danger of getting under effective artillery fire. The -length of time required for going into action may be reduced -by shortening the route column (by concentrating the troops -into deep column); by forming several route columns abreast, -unless column of sections has already been formed; by clearing -the roads of troops; by marching across country; by -indicating beforehand on which side of the infantry the -artillery is to be brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. -R.); and, finally, by directing the heads of the various elements -upon their respective objectives. (Development for -action).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not so -clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in rencontres -is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it becomes apparent, -during the preparatory stage of the action, that the enemy has a visible -start in deployment.” When time is not pressing, the regulations prescribe -a concentration for action and, simultaneously therewith, such a grouping -of the principal units (if possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile -guns, and well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only -straight to the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the -zone of hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is -discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place, in order -to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for artillery, it will -be necessary to leave the road and to advance across country. This will,<span class="pagenum" id="Page209">[209]</span> -as a rule, result in widening the front of the advancing force, even though -this be only to the extent of placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly -halts are to be made, so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition -and time for reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods -and in close country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is -specially called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised -in defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by a concentration -of the troops in concealed and protected positions.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The <b>deployment for action</b> (<i>Entwicklung</i>) consists of -forming the troops for battle and includes the extension into -line of skirmishers. As a rule, the deployment follows the -development for action, but may be made directly from route -column or from an assembly formation.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to define clearly where the development -for action ceases and where the deployment begins. The -formation of a line of skirmishers to cover a route column -does not constitute a deployment. There is no room for -doubt that the regulations have in mind the rencontre, in -which the passage from route column to skirmish line proceeds -naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared -to defend a position, the procedure is much more -cautious. In this case the force which has been developed -for action is withdrawn as much as possible from the view -and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German I. D. R.), and -led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I. D. R.). -Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good -plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, -viz: “First direct the troops upon the proper objective, then -give them a suitable formation.”</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching of -troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at <b>Vionville</b>) or -whether they should first be regularly concentrated (6th Infantry Division -at <b>Vionville</b>) is of special interest. The concentration of the 1st Prussian -Army Corps at <b>Waterloo</b>, and of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at -<b>Nehweiler</b> (<b>Wörth</b>), almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At -<b>Nachod</b>, the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration, -lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops -from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced by<span class="pagenum" id="Page210">[210]</span> -parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This reinforcement, -while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient.</p> - -<p>During its march to the battlefield of <b>Gravelotte</b>, the 3rd Infantry -Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then it -formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of Rezonville, -and from there moved on in echelon formation. The concentration -of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870 (<b>Spicheren</b>), was still -less justifiable. About noon, when the head of the brigade reached the -exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl, it received orders to cross the -Saar. Upon receiving this order, the five battalions present concentrated, -unfurled their flags and then marched across country to the railroad bridge -of Mattstall. In order to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed -again. The delays which occurred here led the parts of the force which had -crossed first, to throw themselves into the fight.<a id="FNanchor219" href="#Footnote219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote219" href="#FNanchor219" class="label">[219]</a> <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77</cite>, p. 51.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE -BRIGADE.</h4> - -<p>When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken -up into companies either by directing the latter upon their -respective objectives, or by forming for attack by command.</p> - -<p>When forming for attack by command, the front, the -base company, intervals, distances, and the relation of the -companies to each other must be indicated. The intervals -should be sufficiently large to permit the companies to move -unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities of marching -will not be communicated from one to the other.</p> - -<p>A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon -will suffice for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies -at war strength would be 150 paces, and between -companies at peace strength 100 paces. Intervals may be -increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable the -troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same -holds true for distances. For rules in regard to the distance -between the second and first line, see <a href="#Page121">p. 121</a>, supra. When -a battalion has formed line of companies at long range from -the enemy for the purpose of reducing the effect of the hostile<span class="pagenum" id="Page211">[211]</span> -fire, distances should be diminished to facilitate the transmission -of orders.</p> - -<p>When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend -upon the purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, -some of the Japanese battalions, stationed at points -where the decision was not sought, were each assigned a -front of 800 m. In these cases the four companies of each -battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at large -intervals.</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo211.png" alt="Battle order" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment -for particular situations. In each case the formation of the -battalion depends upon the situation, the purpose of the -combat, and the nature of the ground, the battalion commander -having the option of going into action in one, two, -or three lines.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the formation depends upon <span class="nowrap">whether—</span></p> - -<p>1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger -force; and whether one or both of its flanks are resting on -impassable obstacles;</p> - -<p>2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; -whether it is to attack or to stand on the defensive;</p> - -<p>3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire<span class="pagenum" id="Page212">[212]</span> -or is to take advantage of the preparation effected by other -troops; and, finally,</p> - -<p>4. Whether or not it has to fight at night.</p> - -<p><b>A battalion acting alone</b>, whose flanks are not resting -on natural obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies -successively into action so as to retain complete organizations -for other purposes. It will seldom be proper for the battalion -to form for attack in the regular manner. When this -can be done the battalion should form in three lines in conformity -with its task of initiating, carrying out, and deciding -the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced -by the second company as soon as the situation has become -sufficiently clear. More frequently, the battalion commander -will send only a single company into action, retaining the -others for the time being under cover.</p> - -<div class="container w30em" id="Ref5"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo212a.png" alt="Companies" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The <b>advance guard battalion</b> of a regiment will, as a -rule, be compelled to develop considerable fire in a <i>rencontre</i> -(par. 357 German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance -of the enemy, and for this purpose it will frequently place -two companies into action at once. But since the battalion -commander cannot count upon reinforcements and, moreover, -as he does not know on which flank the combat is subsequently -going to develop, he will provisionally retain the -other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them -in rear of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above <a href="#Ref5">figure</a>).</p> - -<div class="container w30em" id="Ref6"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo212b.png" alt="Companies" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page213">[213]</span></p> - -<p>In a <b>containing action</b> one should endeavor to employ -few rifles but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, -and keep supports and reserves far in rear so as to minimize -the losses. If the force is to deploy first of all only for fire -action, but is later to participate in the decisive attack, it -will be advisable to place two companies in the first line, one -in the second, and one in the third. The companies in the -second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile -fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching -one and then the other company, to exercise an influence -on the course of the action during a longer period than -would otherwise be possible. (See “<a href="#Ref5">b</a>”).</p> - -<div class="container w30em" id="Ref7"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo213.png" alt="Companies" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><b>When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force</b>, -and when both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports -for feeding the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) -and can cover a greater front. A reserve may either be entirely -dispensed with, or made very weak.</p> - -<p>When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened -flank should be protected by echeloning the supports -and the reserve in rear of it. In this position, these echelons -are not so apt to be bullet-stops as when they are placed in -rear of the center. Besides, they can more easily execute -enveloping movements and can take a hostile flank attack in -flank. When both flanks are in the air, only the most essential -precautions should be taken on the one flank, while on the -other everything available is united for the decisive attack.</p> - -<p>In <b>defense</b>, three companies can sometimes be taken -into the first line for the purpose of developing a strong fire,<span class="pagenum" id="Page214">[214]</span> -while the fourth company is held in rear of a threatened -flank or in rear of the center. (See “<a href="#Ref6">d</a>”). When it is desired -to employ the reserve offensively, only one or two companies -are placed in the first line, the others being held in -reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive. -Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve.</p> - -<div class="container w30em" id="Ref8"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo214.png" alt="Companies" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to -make an immediate attack which has been prepared by the -fire of other troops, all its companies may be taken at once -into the first line. In this case the battalion may be formed -for attack with its companies at close intervals. This might -also be a suitable combat formation for night operations. -All these formations are subject to change however, as soon -as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary.</p> - -<p>The general principles stated for a battalion are also -applicable to a <b>regiment</b>. The regiment may either be directly -formed for attack, or the heads of the battalions may be -deflected toward the points where the deployment is to take -place. An interval of 300-400 m. between heads of battalions -is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent deployment. -The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the -purpose of the combat.</p> - -<p>The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion -commanders, but leaves the latter entire freedom of action in -regard to the formation to be taken up and the manner of -deploying. He should interfere with companies only in exceptional<span class="pagenum" id="Page215">[215]</span> -cases. Such interference is justified only when the -conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity of -action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe -the proper channels in communicating an order.</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<p class="caption">Methods of Forming a Battalion for Attack.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo215.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page216">[216]</span></p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo216.png" alt="Brigade development" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>In developing the <b>brigade</b><a id="FNanchor220" href="#Footnote220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> -for action, the depth of<span class="pagenum" id="Page217">[217]</span> -column begins to exert an influence. Every concentration -of the brigade retards its entry into action. If the longest -distance to be covered in developing the brigade is assigned -to the leading element of the column, the march into action -will be accelerated.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote220" href="#FNanchor220" class="label">[220]</a> For historical references in regard to the importance in action of the -brigade, see essay published in <cite>Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine</cite> (August-September -number of 1877) entitled, <cite>Die Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung -aus der Brigade von 1812</cite>. In regard to the employment of the regiments in -line or in echelon, see <span class="smcap">Moltke</span>, <cite>Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges -von 1866</cite>. <span class="smcap">Moltke’s</span> <cite>Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze</cite>, p. 99, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo217.png" alt="Infantery brigade" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is -to prolong the flank of the fighting line, its entry into action -might be hastened, perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue -the march in the original direction while the leading -regiment takes the longer route. The rear regiment would -then be abreast of the leading one after about 15 minutes. If -the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating lines,<span class="pagenum" id="Page218">[218]</span> -the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes, -have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of -skirmishers.</p> - -<p>When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each -regiment is assigned a separate task (attack of a point, or -defense of a section). If the tasks assigned are definite and -harmonize with each other, mutual coöperation will be assured. -The brigade commander ordinarily sends his orders to the -regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste, correction -of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he -should inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade -consisting of two regiments, its commander, in order to be -able to influence the action, will be compelled to retain at least -one battalion as a reserve.</p> - -<p>Brigades of three regiments<a id="FNanchor221" href="#Footnote221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> (each of three battalions) -have an advantage in this respect. But if such an increase -in infantry units were contemplated, it would be better, for -reasons that will be given later on,<a id="FNanchor222" href="#Footnote222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a> to form the additional -troops into a third division in each army corps.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote221" href="#FNanchor221" class="label">[221]</a> The British division consists of twelve battalions formed into three -brigades.</p> - -<p>In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly marked. -The division consists of three brigades, each brigade of three regiments, and each -regiment of three battalions. The battalions have a strength of only 400 men.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote222" href="#FNanchor222" class="label">[222]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite> (<cite>Kriegsgliederung</cite>), III, p. 31, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Base Units.</h5> - -<p>The possibility of regulating the movements of a body -of troops by means of a base unit, depends upon a number of -preliminary conditions which will seldom be fulfilled in war:</p> - -<p>1. <i>The leader of the base unit would have to remain -unharmed to the very last.</i> If he were disabled the command -of the unit would devolve upon the next in rank who -would perhaps not join it in every case.</p> - -<p>2. <i>The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus -necessary for a further advance, would have to maintain the<span class="pagenum" id="Page219">[219]</span> -direction after the original base unit had ceased to exist on -account of the mixing of organizations.</i></p> - -<p>3. <i>The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties -during its advance than the other units of the force.</i> -If the base unit were to encounter greater difficulties than -the other units, this might serve as an excuse for reducing -the rate of advance. In attack, the organization nearest the -enemy, in other words, the one that is led better and more -energetically than the others, is quite naturally charged with -maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization will -be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements -in rear.</p> - -<p>The designation of a base unit<a id="FNanchor223" href="#Footnote223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> or unit of direction -on the battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the -initiative of the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. -A base unit is only profitable in night operations, in -crossing unfavorable ground (woods), and in bringing the -fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile fire. “With -the entry into action, the importance of the base company -gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. -(Par. 242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, -it is better to indicate either the objective on which the -troops are to march, or the flank toward which they are to -maintain connection.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote223" href="#FNanchor223" class="label">[223]</a> “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have to regulate -their movements without thereby being curbed in their endeavor to advance -(base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.)</p> - -<p>In France units of direction are prescribed (<i>la direction est confidée aux -unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles du terrain</i>), but their -duties are not given in detail. Units of direction are also prescribed in Austria.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A <i>change of direction</i> of march is executed by wheeling -or turning with the subordinate units toward the new front. -(Par. 185 German I. D. R.). A <i>change of front</i> is effected -in the same manner. With long lines, echeloning and movements -by the flank will result, which can only be rectified -gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When skirmishers -have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a deployment<span class="pagenum" id="Page220">[220]</span> -in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion -of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the -desired direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to -withdraw, at the same time, those parts of the former -skirmish line which are no longer necessary.</p> - -<h5>Examples of Changes of Front.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. Engagement at <b>Helmstedt</b>, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry -had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the Ütting Hill.<a id="FNanchor224" href="#Footnote224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote224" href="#FNanchor224" class="label">[224]</a> <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20</cite>, p. 54.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the -<b>Niederwald</b> after crossing the Sauer (battle of <b>Wörth</b>).<a id="FNanchor225" href="#Footnote225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote225" href="#FNanchor225" class="label">[225]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of -<b>Loigny-Poupry</b> (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example of the -conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon the -advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held <b>Lumeau</b>. The 33rd Brigade, -its battalions in double column, was concentrated south of <b>Champdoux</b>. -The division commander retained two battalions as a reserve and -ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter wheel to the -right and to form his command for attack in the general direction of -Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on the Bavarians defending -<b>Schlosz Goury</b>. The attack was directed against the French Division -Jauréguiberry, which was attacking Schlosz Goury. This division first came -under fire at 3-400 m. and then approached to within about 150 m. of the -defenders’ position; strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but -otherwise nothing was done to protect the right.</p> - -<p>By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade -would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury, and, as -Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a fan-shaped -extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation, would have been -unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies at his disposal and -decided to advance in a southerly direction until his second line overlapped -the most advanced hostile line, so that the attack as planned would have -struck simultaneously both the first and second lines of the enemy. The -slight loss of time involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could -carry out his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the -enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade -formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200 m. -from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the brigade -after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page221">[221]</span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo221.png" alt="Troop movement" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of the 76th -Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the -same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th and 8th Companies of -the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The center half-battalion, (2nd -and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry), the unit of direction, was ordered -to march on the church spire of Loigny. All the units of the force, with -the exception of the IInd Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of -skirmishers. The 1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, -75th Infantry, covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the -eleven companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line -(approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the second.</p> - -<p>The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy -quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The attack -came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were taken in flank, -and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to oppose the onslaught -of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense, unwieldy masses of the -French were more and more crowded together by the uninterrupted -advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives to the German -marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by the artillery in -position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the brigade to Ecuillon.</p> - -<p>The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The -right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry, -which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to march on -the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing penetrated -into Loigny.<a id="FNanchor226" href="#Footnote226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote226" href="#FNanchor226" class="label">[226]</a> See <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, IV, p. 80; also <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Loigny</cite>, p. 105.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against -the <b>Forbach Hill</b> (<b>Spicheren</b>).<a id="FNanchor227" href="#Footnote227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote227" href="#FNanchor227" class="label">[227]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I. p. 356.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page222">[222]</span></p> - -<h4 title="4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF -COMBAT FORMATIONS.">4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF -COMBAT FORMATIONS.<a id="FNanchor228" href="#Footnote228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote228" href="#FNanchor228" class="label">[228]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, -<cite>Gefechtslehre</cite>, p. 38.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The infantry combat is decided by the combined action -of long firing lines. Retained forces, not launched against -the enemy for the purpose of crushing him, exert no influence -whatever on the decision, since they only increase losses -without contributing to the fire effect. In the battles of the -past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of the combat -(unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing the -flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the -short range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in -readiness so close to the firing line that they could assault -<i>en masse</i> at once and without any diminution of their -strength. The deciding factor, which rested in retained reserves -during the Napoleonic era, lies at present in the firing -line.<a id="FNanchor229" href="#Footnote229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote229" href="#FNanchor229" class="label">[229]</a> The French still entertain a contrary opinion.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><b>Distribution in depth</b> <i>is, therefore, only a means to an -end; an expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line -permanently at a constant strength; to give the firing line the -impetus for the assault; to protect it against a reverse; and -to secure its flanks. Victory is assured only by the simultaneous -employment of superior fighting forces. A force -should go into action in a deep combat formation, but it must -extend its front during the fight.</i> To launch an insufficient -number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually -is a fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a -superior force continually with an inferior one, without being -able to take advantage of the superiority which we may actually -possess.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The Russian attacks in the battles around <b>Plevna</b> are very instructive -in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the <b>Grivica</b> intrenchments were<span class="pagenum" id="Page223">[223]</span> -attacked by two columns consisting of nine battalions. The Ist and IInd -Battalions of the 121st Infantry succeeded in reaching the trench, but then -the attack failed. The IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result -Thereupon the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were -launched, but these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of -the trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner, -likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by the -entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.<a id="FNanchor230" href="#Footnote230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote230" href="#FNanchor230" class="label">[230]</a> <cite>Russisch-Türkischer -Krieg</cite> (<cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>), German Translation, III, pp. -254 and 264.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th -Infantry Regiments on the <b>Omar Bey Tabia</b> had been repulsed, the 64th -and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the 31st -Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned force was -not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army Corps) were -placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In spite of the heavy -losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure of the first attack had -demonstrated that such a small force was insufficient for taking the Turkish -work, only two regiments were again sent forward to the attack (in other -words, 6 battalions instead of 18). When this assault had also been -repulsed, and one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown -in, 6 battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they -likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only when -the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions lost 115 -officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in reserve would -have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous employment of -adequate forces would have assured the success of the Russian infantry.<a id="FNanchor231" href="#Footnote231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote231" href="#FNanchor231" class="label">[231]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, p. 211.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The same thing occurred at <b>Gorni-Dubniac</b>. As the Russians, who -advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak garrison -of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the isolated attacking -groups which followed each other.</p> - -<p>The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient fire -power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the battles in the -<b>Russo-Japanese war</b>. On the left flank, at <b>Wafangu</b> (15th June, 1904), the -1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced with one battalion of the 2nd -Regiment and one of the 3rd in the first line, with four battalions in the -second line, and with three battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. -A full development of the fire power of the division did not take place -at all.<a id="FNanchor232" href="#Footnote232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> The 2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers -and 1464 men. The 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> batteries attached to the division were shot to -pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote232" href="#FNanchor232" class="label">[232]</a> -<span class="smcap">Löffler</span>, <cite>Russisch-Japanischer Krieg</cite>, I, p. 56.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page224">[224]</span></p> - -<p>Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory -stage of the fight, as it enables the commander to meet -unexpected developments in the situation. Moreover, it is -justifiable so long as the information in regard to the strength -and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. When reconnaissance -work is not thoroughly performed, the force may be -obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally -chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and -movements by the flank can only be made when the front is -narrow. Moreover, after a force is once deployed within -the zone of hostile fire, it is committed to the direction chosen -and can only move straight to the front. Considerable -changes of front can only be executed by the lines in rear. -The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and -to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. -As the losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a -force can cover a broader front and keep its supports in -closer proximity to the firing line in the former than in the -latter case, especially if it was able to strengthen its position. -The reserve, however, should be kept at a greater distance -from the firing line than in attack, in order that it may retain -complete freedom of movement—in covering the retreat, or -in making a counter-attack—and may not be involved in the -fire fight.</p> - -<p>The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, -give the impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which -the attacking line can rally, and cover the re-forming of the -troops after a successful attack. The several echelons of the -attack formation, except the small fractions immediately -supporting the firing line<a id="FNanchor233" href="#Footnote233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> and covering its flanks, should -have become merged with that line by the time the decisive -moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes -up an unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an -advantage; on the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys<span class="pagenum" id="Page225">[225]</span> -in force, exposes himself to grave danger. <i>The troops -should be sent into action in a deep combat formation, since -the firing line is to be fed from the rear until the decisive -moment arrives, but every available man should be thrown in -for the assault.</i></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote233" href="#FNanchor233" class="label">[233]</a> The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the line is -clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Beispiele</cite>, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><b>Distribution in depth and frontage</b> are interdependent; -the greater the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, -and vice versa. In every deployment for action the following -question awaits solution by the troop leader: “How deep -ought the formation to be and how great an extension of -front is allowable.” The result of the combat depends in -many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad -combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning -and flank movements, but their energy is not constant when -the means are not available to replace casualties. In addition, -the difficulty of leading, the danger of the line being -penetrated, and the weakness of the flanks grow apace with -the extension of front. Distribution in depth makes it possible -to initiate the combat with a part of the force and to -get information of the situation; to fight the action with another -part of the force in accordance with this information; -and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits -of that decision with the third part. A deep combat formation -enables the leader to exercise a constant influence on -the course of action; it gives him the means with which to -execute turning movements or to repulse them—something -which would be entirely impossible, or, at any rate, only possible -under great difficulties, with troops deployed in the first -line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into -play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an -element of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a -broader front, may take advantage.</p> - -<p>Although the danger of going too far in distributing a -force in depth is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a -smaller error than the opposite extreme, that of deploying -troops, from the very start, on too broad a front.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page226">[226]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order -for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the <b>Roten Berg</b> -of the <b>Spicheren Heights</b>,<a id="FNanchor234" href="#Footnote234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> it being assumed that only insignificant hostile -forces were in front. The other brigade of the 14th Division was expected -to be able to take part in the action in about three hours. When the -attacking force was 2000 m. from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th -Infantry, and the IIIrd Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against -the French right flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of -the 74th Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly -covered a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten -Berg was undoubtedly difficult,<a id="FNanchor235" href="#Footnote235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> this wide extension, which made all leading -impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the first place, the -brigade commander led his two reserve battalions against the Roten Berg -and fell finally while leading a company. The brigade was too weak to -carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th Brigade, which followed, -came into action at various points of the battlefield, so that the two brigades -became mixed, thus considerably increasing the difficulties of leading. At -3 P. M., the following troops were in the first line on the right wing:<a id="FNanchor236" href="#Footnote236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a></p> - -<div class="trooporder"> - -<p><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">I. Bn.</span><span class="bot">53. Inf.</span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">II. Bn.</span><span class="bot sstype"><b>74. Inf.</b></span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">1. 2. and <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>3. Cos.</span><span class="bot sstype"><b>74. Inf.</b></span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">4. and 1. Cos.</span><span class="bot">77. Inf.</span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">10. 11. and 12. Cos.</span><span class="bot sstype"><b>39. Inf.</b></span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top"><sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>3. Co.</span><span class="bot sstype"><b>74. Inf.</b></span></span></p> - -</div><!--trooporder--> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote234" href="#FNanchor234" class="label">[234]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 310.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote235" href="#FNanchor235" class="label">[235]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 318.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote236" href="#FNanchor236" class="label">[236]</a> The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade. The 4th -Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the crow flies, from -the left flank of its battalion.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following troops were in the second line:</p> - -<div class="trooporder"> - -<p><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">Füsilier Bn.</span><span class="bot">53. Inf.</span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">2. and 3. Cos.<a id="FNanchor237" href="#Footnote237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></span><span class="bot">77. Inf.</span></span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn.</span><span class="bot">77. Inf.</span></span></p> - -</div><!--trooporder--> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote237" href="#FNanchor237" class="label">[237]</a> These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the other companies -of their battalion.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. -might have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar -situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the Giefert -Wald—39<sup>2</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th and 74th -Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600 m. It is true, -the peculiar situation existing on the German side, operated against a -simultaneous employment of the several bodies and a mixing of units was -unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have been possible to prevent such -a complete dissolution of all units, by François’ Brigade taking up a more -suitable formation before the action commenced. The mistake made here<span class="pagenum" id="Page227">[227]</span> -was repeated over and over again in the other preliminary combats of -the campaign, and invariably led to the same result.<a id="FNanchor238" href="#Footnote238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote238" href="#FNanchor238" class="label">[238]</a> Consult -<cite>Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei Wörth</cite>, <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 13, p. 10, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at <b>Magersfontain</b> -and <b>Paardeberg</b> may be traced to the lack of sufficient reinforcements. -At Magersfontain, the four battalions of the Highland Brigade -were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at Paardeberg on a front of -4000 m.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>In deciding how many men are required to occupy or -attack a position, the principal point to be considered is the -effect of fire. The modern long range magazine rifle will, -no doubt, enable us to defend a position with a smaller force -than was possible in the past with the older less improved -weapons. However, combats last longer nowadays, and the -shock action of Frederick the Great’s tactics is no longer -practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and the -tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer -occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole -force engaged are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable -conditions, certain organizations may suffer losses quite as -great as those incurred in the battles of Frederick the Great -and Napoleon.<a id="FNanchor239" href="#Footnote239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> Instead of the sanguinary hand-to-hand -fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged fire fight -carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly -fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as -possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. -This fire fight is frequently decided by psychological -factors and without the troops suffering material losses.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote239" href="#FNanchor239" class="label">[239]</a> At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of 93.1%, and -twelve other French regiments suffered a loss of over 50%. To be sure, the -losses sustained during the retreat are included in this total. At Albuera (16th -May, 1811), the 57th Regiment (British) and the Füsilier Brigade lost 70%; -in four hours the army of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which -originally numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“The duration of the combat under modern conditions,” -writes General Négrier,<a id="FNanchor240" href="#Footnote240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> “leads to a considerable mental exhaustion -of the troops which is apparent in nervous lassitude.<span class="pagenum" id="Page228">[228]</span> -This explains the impotency of leader and troops the -day after a defeat and even after a victory. This lassitude -is still greater on the day of the battle. While it is true that -this has always been the case, the nervous exhaustion has -grown in an inconceivable manner, its intensity increasing at -the same rate as the invisibility of the opponent. <i>The invisibility -of the enemy directly affects the morale of the -soldier, the sources of his energy and courage. The soldier -who cannot see his enemy is inclined to see him everywhere. -It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to -fear.</i> The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, -Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 -m. from the enemy, was not caused by their losses, but by the -moral depression produced within the effective zone of rifle -fire. Another factor, which governs the modern combat at -short ranges, the <i>impossibility of the commander making his -influence felt in lines which are seriously engaged</i>, is of still -greater importance. <i>The influence of the officers who lead -these lines is also limited. They are scarcely able to direct -the three or four men nearest them.</i> The combat depends -upon the individual fighters, and there never has been a time -when the personal efficiency of the individual soldier has had -a greater significance.” We should not forget that this change -occurred during a period in which we no longer fight our battles -with professional soldiers of long service, but, on the contrary, -with peace cadres of our conscript armies raised to war -strength by Reservists.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote240" href="#FNanchor240" class="label">[240]</a> <cite>Revue des deux mondes</cite>, June number, 1902.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Another factor to be considered is the fighting quality -of the opponent. In an action against an enemy who is a -match for us, the necessity for distribution in depth is, of -course, greater than when fighting against poor troops.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>General v. Werder could with impunity oppose the newly raised levies -of the French Republic on the <b>Lisaine</b> with 1.12 men per meter of front. -The victory was won by this very extraordinary extension of front, which, -if employed in the face of the Imperial army, would have led to defeat.<a id="FNanchor241" href="#Footnote241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote241" href="#FNanchor241" class="label">[241]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder</cite>, II, p. 11.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page229">[229]</span></p> - -<p><i>Considerations of importance in deciding upon the extent -of front to be covered by a force, similar conditions on both -sides being presumed,</i> <span class="nowrap"><i>are</i>—</span></p> - -<p>1. <i>Whether it is compelled to fight an independent action -alone</i>;</p> - -<p>2. <i>Whether it is fighting, from the preparatory to the -decisive stage of the combat, as part of a larger body, with at -least one, or perhaps both flanks secured</i>;</p> - -<p>3. <i>Whether it has been selected to make the decisive attack -against an enemy already shaken by other troops</i>.</p> - -<p>In the last mentioned case a sudden effect, a short, powerful -blow, is required, and the maximum frontage of all the -units employed on the same line is admissible. But even a -force advancing to the final assault can by no means dispense -with distribution in depth; supports and reserves are needed -to carry forward the firing line when it has been checked, to -cover its flanks, and to carry on the pursuit (second line).</p> - -<p>The frontage of an organization whose flanks are secure -and which is acting as a part of a larger force, depends upon -other troops; considerable extension of front is admissible -provided the firing line is constantly maintained at a strength -which will enable it to gain a superiority of fire over the -enemy. “While an organization which has only one flank -protected, is less restricted as regards frontage, it will have -to provide for distribution in depth on the exposed flank. In -this case, it is a good plan to move the units held in rear -toward the particular flank (echeloning). Interval and distance -increase with the size of this echelon.” (Par. 290 German -I. D. R.). The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. -397) further emphasize the fact that, when well-trained infantry -employs its rifles to good advantage in defense, it is -very strong in front; that it can hold a position with a comparatively -small force; and that, in this case, it has only one -weak spot, the flank, which it must seek to protect by distribution -in depth. This view is fully borne out by the recent events -in South Africa and in Manchuria. Under favorable conditions<span class="pagenum" id="Page230">[230]</span> -(deliberate defense), a battalion fighting as part of a -larger force may put all of its companies into the first line, a -front of 200 m. being assigned to each. The battalion can -thus defend a front of 800 m. The only restriction is the requirement -that the battalion commander must be able, at all -times, to direct the course of the combat.</p> - -<p>An organization acting alone which has to fight an action -independently from beginning to end under varying conditions, -cannot employ all of its available strength in the first -line at one time. A distribution into three parts, viz., firing -line, supports, and reserve, is therefore required. During the -preparatory stage, the firing line should be as weak as possible, -while, for sustaining and deciding the action, the reserve -should be as strong as possible. As a rule, this distribution -will not come into existence until the combat has begun; it -must disappear again, during the subsequent course of the -fight, through reinforcement of the troops that initiated the -action, thus resulting in an increase of the combat front.</p> - -<p>While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density -along the entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to -the fact that one will endeavor to increase the distribution in -depth only at the point where the decision is sought (offensive -wings), while one will seek to obtain results by a generous -expenditure of ammunition at points where the enemy is only -to be contained. When a broad front has to be held with a -weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in groups. Of -the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that the -skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages -of a piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). -Frequently, however, after an action is over, the assault that -penetrated a line is called the main attack, and the one that -failed, a demonstration. An organization fighting alone will -generally begin an action by deploying on a narrow front; it -will protect its flanks by distribution in depth; and, finally, -mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make the assault.<span class="pagenum" id="Page231">[231]</span> -The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack -in defense cannot be strong enough.</p> - -<p>Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon -the frontage is the task which a force is to perform, <i>i.e.</i>, -whether it is to make an attack or to stand on the defensive; -whether it is to fight a delaying action or is to withdraw. The -object of distribution in depth is to keep the firing line constantly -at the same strength; this requires stronger reinforcements -in attack (owing to the greater losses), than in defense, -and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front.</p> - -<p>The number of troops which will be required to hold a -given piece of ground must be determined separately in each -case. The strength of the fighting line depends upon the -effect of the hostile fire. Military history tells us how many -troops the leader sent into action in order to gain the victory, -but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of troops that -might have sufficed in the particular case.</p> - -<p>In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading -battalion may be fully engaged by the time the next one -arrives on the battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation -may require the employment of longer firing lines than would -be deemed proper for the size of the command when making -a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The assailant -should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who is likewise -advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to -that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s -debouchment from a defile.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Nachod</b>, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies in -reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon.</p> - -<p>The conduct of the advance guard of the 8th Infantry Division at -<b>Beaumont</b> is worthy of imitation. In this case, the support battalion was -deployed and the artillery went into position; strong detachments were -retained in rear of the left wing until the main body had arrived. Likewise, -a proper relation existed between frontage (4 battalions on a front -of 1400 m.) and distribution in depth. According to the General Staff -Account of the Franco-German war (II, p. 1045), the distribution was as -follows:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page232">[232]</span></p> - -<p><i>First line</i>: 4th Jäger-Battalion, which was subsequently reinforced -by the IInd Battalion, 96th Infantry and the Ist and IInd Battalions, 86th -Infantry.</p> - -<p><i>Support for the Artillery</i>: Füsilier Battalion, 96th Infantry.</p> - -<p><i>Reserve</i>: IIIrd Battalion, 86th Infantry.</p> - -<p>We have already mentioned the deployment of the advance guard at -<b>Spicheren</b> (<a href="#Page226">p. 226</a> supra). In that instance the whole force was thrown -in at once, whereas at <b>Beaumont</b> the deployment of the different units -was coördinated and proceeded systematically. An advance guard should -be able to repulse an attack and then assume the offensive without outside -assistance. An example which is not worthy of imitation is the engagement -of the 29th Infantry Brigade at the <b>Hallue</b>. The brigade began the -fight, without being compelled to do so, and deployed its 4530 men on a -front of 5000 m. The 30th Infantry Brigade (4070 men) then entered the -fight and deployed on a front of 3000 m. in prolongation of the line of -the 29th Brigade. If the French had made a decisive attack at this point, -the 15th Infantry Division would not have been able to repulse it.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Distribution in depth, for the purpose of warding off an -enveloping movement and for making a counter-attack, is -more necessary in defense than in attack; besides, a greater -front may be covered in the former case on account of the -smaller losses. The following factors in part determine the -extent of front to be occupied and the number of troops required -to defend it: (1) the strength, natural or artificial, of -the position; (2) obstacles in its front; (3) salient angles -which can be easily enveloped; (4) the intentions of the commander -(<i>i.e.</i>, whether he contemplates fighting a purely defensive -combat or one including offensive action).</p> - -<p><b>Delaying actions</b> are usually fought at long and medium -ranges as purely passive defensive combats and no provision -is made for replacing casualties, the object of the fight being -to avoid a decision. Few men should, therefore, be placed in -the firing line, but these should be supplied with abundant ammunition. -However, as the force desires to avoid a decisive -engagement by withdrawing, distribution in depth should be -provided to protect the flanks and to facilitate breaking off -the action. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). This requires that -distances be great.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page233">[233]</span></p> - -<p><b>Night attacks</b>, on account of the element of surprise involved, -do not require great distribution in depth; as a rule, -the fight is decided in a very short time by the collision of the -opposing forces. However, measures must be taken to protect -the flanks, to ensure victory, and to give the first line the -impetus necessary to carry it forward in case it is checked.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The British attack on the Egyptian position at <b>Tel el Kebir</b> (1882) -was made by only 11,000 men on a front of about 6 km. After a short -fight the works were taken.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>An attempt will now be made to give some approximate -figures for the extent of front that may be occupied in various -situations.</p> - -<p>Assuming one rifle for every three meters of front occupied, -the following might suffice for temporarily defending a -line 1000 m. long:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Rifles needed"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Firing line</td> -<td class="right padr1">300</td> -<td class="left">rifles</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Supports (one platoon in rear of each wing)</td> -<td class="right padr1">120</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Reserve (two companies)</td> -<td class="right padr1 bb">400</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Total</td> -<td class="right padr1">820</td> -<td class="left">rifles</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Thus 0.8 men per meter would be sufficient. This is -borne out by the Boer War. With a good field of fire, even -a thin firing line, provided with plenty of ammunition, is capable -of bringing any attack to a standstill, at least for the -time being.</p> - -<p><b>A defense seeking a decision</b> requires fighting at short -ranges; the firing line must be kept constantly at the same -strength; losses of about one-fifth (killed, wounded, and missing) -must be reckoned with; and, finally, a reserve, consisting -of about a third of the effective strength of the force, is required -for making the counter-attack. The firing line is, from -the outset, made as dense as possible, and echelons posted on -the flanks must oppose any advance against the flanks.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page234">[234]</span></p> - -<p>The following would thus suffice for defending a front -of 1000 m.:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Men needed"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Firing line</td> -<td class="right padr1">1000</td> -<td class="left">men</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Replacement of casualties</td> -<td class="right padr1">200</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Flank protection (2 companies)</td> -<td class="right padr1">400</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Reserve</td> -<td class="right padr1 bb">800</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Total</td> -<td class="right padr1">2400</td> -<td class="left">men</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Hence, 2.4 rifles per meter of front would be available -for defense.</p> - -<p>The defense is decided by a successful counter-attack -made by the reserve, whereas the attack requires an additional -force to cover and assure the assembling and re-forming of -the troops. The greater force is naturally required by the attacker, -who must be stronger than the defender at the moment -when the assault is made. The following would be required -for making an attack on a front of 1000 m.:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Men needed"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Firing line</td> -<td class="right padr1">1200</td> -<td class="left">rifles</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Replacement of casualties (<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>)</td> -<td class="right padr1">600</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Flank protection</td> -<td class="right padr1">400</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Reserve</td> -<td class="right padr1 bb">2000</td> -<td class="center bb">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">Total</td> -<td class="right padr1">4200</td> -<td class="left">rifles</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>This would be equivalent to 4.2 rifles per meter of front.</p> - -<p>These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of -course, and should be considered minima.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The number of troops required for attack or defense must be determined -separately for each individual case. At <b>Lovtcha</b>, 25 battalions, 92 -guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large a force for attacking -8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At <b>Gorni Dubniac</b>, 3 infantry divisions of -the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked 6 weak Turkish battalions having only -4 guns. After the first two unsuccessful assaults on <b>Plevna</b>, the Russians -overestimated the strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated -at 80,000 men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, -90,000 men and 400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 -Turks and 60 guns.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page235">[235]</span></p> - -<p>From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that -the <b>maximum frontage</b> is justifiable, when a force whose -flanks are secure, occupies a position prepared for defense, or -acts as a reserve and is to bring about a decision which has -been prepared by other troops. On the other hand, the <b>maximum -distribution in depth</b> is necessary for a force acting -alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between these two -extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore -impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of -an attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations -(par. 373) accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack -at 150 m. and that of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 -m. It is impossible to give a definite ratio of effective strength -to combat frontage. Thus, while in attack a company puts -into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of its front, the brigade -employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units a proportionally -greater number. The necessity for distribution in depth -increases with the size of the force and with the number of -units composing it.</p> - -<p>In a company, for example, a platoon is sufficient to fulfill, -within certain limits, all the functions of a reserve, while in a -larger force the duties of a reserve are so complex that each -task (protecting the flanks, reinforcing the firing line, giving -the impetus for the assault, and covering the assembling and -re-forming of the attacking force) must be assigned to a separate -unit. Moreover, the duration of a combat, and, in conjunction -therewith, the necessity of reinforcing the firing line -and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the force. -During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined -to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity -for reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why -5 to 6 men will not suffice, during the course of a combat, -for a front wherein only one man can use his rifle. From the -foregoing it follows that the frontage does not increase in -proportion to the number of men. Thus, an army corps would -not occupy a front four times that of a brigade, or twice that<span class="pagenum" id="Page236">[236]</span> -of a division. This is best illustrated by doubling or trebling -a plane area when both length and breadth have to be equally -increased.<a id="FNanchor242" href="#Footnote242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote242" href="#FNanchor242" class="label">[242]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 46, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The maximum frontage to be covered in attack by the -firing line of a <b>company</b> is fixed at 150 m., in order that the -density and fire power of that line may be constantly maintained -during a prolonged and costly action. During shorter -(<i>i.e.</i>, rear guard actions), or less costly actions (defense), it -is, however, permissible to exceed this limit. The regulations -by no means insist upon a literal interpretation of this paragraph, -since they mention the deployment of the entire company, -when it would certainly occupy a front of about 200 m. -There is no disguising the fact, however, that, when extended -on a front of 200 m., it is out of the question for the company -commander to lead his men.</p> - -<p>The regulations do not fix the combat frontage of a -<b>battalion</b>, as it depends upon the tactical situation, and the -battalion commander is at liberty to place one, two, three, or -four companies into the first line. The frontage of a battalion -would thus be 300 meters when making an independent attack, -and not exceeding 600 meters when fighting a purely defensive -action as part of a larger force, in other words, a mean frontage -of 400 meters.</p> - -<p>This is also true of the <b>regiment</b>. The combat frontage -of a regiment acting alone, will, at the start, seldom exceed -that of two battalions deployed abreast. From this we obtain -a frontage of 600-800 m. for the regiment when it is acting -independently, and a frontage of about 1200 m. when it is -fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger force.</p> - -<p>Military history tells us that an army corps consisting of -25 battalions, acting as a part of a larger force in a deliberately -planned attack, occupies an average front of 2.5 to 5 km. According -to this, the frontage of a brigade would amount to -about 800-1000 m., <i>i.e.</i>, to 6-7.5 rifles per meter of front.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page237">[237]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This limit was frequently exceeded during the <b>Franco-German war</b> -according to the circumstances under which the brigade went into action -and the commander’s estimate of the situation. If the brigades had to -cover the concentration of the columns in rear, and if the battalions came -into action successively, both brigade and battalion frontages were frequently -very great. The endeavor to close with the enemy as soon as -possible and the desire to bring a large number of rifles into action, led to -enormously increased frontages at the expense of depth. The brigades -which arrived later, entered the line where other brigades were already -engaged, and the result was a dissolution and admixture of all tactical -organizations.</p> - -<p>At <b>Colombey</b>, the 25th Brigade covered a front of nearly 3 km. with -28 companies, only four or five companies remaining in close order. -Connecting with this brigade on the north, 22 companies, belonging to -two different divisions of the 1st Army Corps, covered a front of 4 km., -supported by three or four companies in close order. With such an overextension -of front the offensive or defensive power of a force is, of -course, crippled.</p> - -<p>During the battle of <b>Amiens</b>, the 3rd Prussian Brigade advanced in -three columns against the heights north of the Luce. On the left, six -companies of the 4th Infantry advanced from Domart, in the center, four -companies from Hangard, and on the right, two companies from Demnin. -A battery and a troop (<i>Eskadron</i>) were attached to each column, and -the right column was followed by the 44th Infantry.</p> - -<p>The French advanced troops were pushed back without special difficulty, -but at the northern edge of the timber, the brigade now found -itself opposite the French main position Cachy—Villers-Bretonneux. The -attack on this position began at once, and in a short time the 4th Infantry -and two batteries were in action on the line East corner of the Bois de -Hangard—Gentelles (5 km. long). At the same time, the 44th Infantry -with one battery deployed on a front of about 2000 m. to the right of -this line. The right wing of the 44th Infantry subsequently advanced to -attack the trenches southeast of Villers-Bretonneux and captured them. -The enveloped French left wing withdrew to the village named, and -rallied on strong reserves.</p> - -<p>This was the situation when the fight came to a standstill toward -1 o’clock P. M. The brigade fought in a thin line over a mile (four -English miles) long. The reserve only consisted of three companies of -the 4th Infantry, at Gentelles, and four companies of the 44th Infantry, in -rear of the right flank.</p> - -<p>A defeat was averted only by the timely interference of other troops, -especially of strong artillery (76 Prussian guns against 24 French).<a id="FNanchor243" href="#Footnote243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote243" href="#FNanchor243" class="label">[243]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Nordarmee</cite>, I, p. 47, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page238">[238]</span></p> - -<p>The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to -make it easier for battalion and regimental commanders to -designate combat sections; the higher leaders reckon with regimental -and brigade fronts. In war, however, the numerical -strength varies constantly, and it is therefore advisable not to -reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number of -rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned -in drill regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent -of front to be covered by organizations which act as part of -a larger force in an attack seeking a decision. The extent of -front to be covered in other situations, under favorable or unfavorable -attack conditions, requires in each case a separate -estimate.</p> - -<p>In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions -of front, which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to -avoid the costly frontal attack.</p> - -<p>At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British -division under Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of -12 km.; and during the attack on Pieters Hill, on February -27th, 1900, the troops under General Buller (30,000 men) extended -over a front of 11 km.</p> - -<p>At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a -front of 17 km. (0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed -25,000 rifles, 5000 troopers, and 116 guns on a front of -32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In the engagement at Diamond -Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under Lord Roberts -(40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties -could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had -given up all thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February -18th, 1900, the 6th Division and the Brigade of Highlanders -succeeded in getting close to the enemy, but there the -attack failed on account of the lack of an impetus from the -rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages were -greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason -for this overextension lies in the fact that a numerically inferior<span class="pagenum" id="Page239">[239]</span> -assailant was desirous of vanquishing the defender, and -in order to accomplish this purpose, he was obliged to make -an extensive use of the spade and to put all rifles into the -first line.</p> - -<table class="frontage" summary="Frontage"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br"> </th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Jap.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Russ.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Front-<br />age.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">Per 10,000<br />men.<a id="FNanchor244" href="#Footnote244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></th> -<th colspan="2">Per m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Jap.</th> -<th class="br">Russ.</th> -<th class="br">Jap.</th> -<th>Russ.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">km.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">m.</th> -<th colspan="2">men.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="battle">Liao Yang (West and South front)</td> -<td class="center br">106,700</td> -<td class="center br">150,000</td> -<td class="center br">26</td> -<td class="center br">2600</td> -<td class="center br">1750</td> -<td class="center br">3.9</td> -<td class="center">5.9</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="battle">Shaho</td> -<td class="center br">148,000</td> -<td class="center br">257,000</td> -<td class="center br">48</td> -<td class="center br">3330</td> -<td class="center br">1980</td> -<td class="center br">3. </td> -<td class="center">5. </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="battle">Mukden (exclusive of Yalu Army)</td> -<td class="center br">247,000</td> -<td class="center br">336,000</td> -<td class="center br">96</td> -<td class="center br">3960</td> -<td class="center br">2970</td> -<td class="center br">2.6</td> -<td class="center">3.4</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote244" href="#FNanchor244" class="label">[244]</a> -According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the <cite>Journal of the Officers’ -Association</cite>, Tokio.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The realization that troops in fortified positions only require -small reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused -frontages to be increased and depth of combat formations to -be decreased. Gaps in the attacking line, provided they were -kept under observation, proved by no means a disadvantage.<a id="FNanchor245" href="#Footnote245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote245" href="#FNanchor245" class="label">[245]</a> At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km. between the -Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by only one infantry regiment -of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry regiments, and one battalion of artillery. -However, the Russians were fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The -insignificant danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised -by the French regulations.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese -lacked the necessary reinforcements.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page240">[240]</span></p> - -<p class="tabhead"><span class="sstype fsize90"><b>INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE -FORMATIONS.</b><a id="FNanchor246" href="#Footnote246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a></span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote246" href="#FNanchor246" class="label">[246]</a> -General <span class="smcap">Minarelli-Fitzgerald</span>, <cite>Infanteristische Reflexionen</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<table class="formdens" summary="Formation Density"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Rifle.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="br">Year<br />of the<br />Cam-<br />paign.</th> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">Battle.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="br">Belligerents.</th> -<th colspan="3" class="br">Per km. of the<br />combat frontage.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="2">Remarks.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Bat-<br />talions<br />@ 900<br />rifles.</th> -<th class="br">Es-<br />cadrons<br />@ 150<br />troopers.</th> -<th class="br">Field<br />guns.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="5" class="rifle">Muzzle loaders.</td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="year">1815</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="battle">Waterloo</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">French</td> -<td class="perkm">12  </td> -<td class="perkm">19  </td> -<td class="perkm">46  </td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="remarks">After Napoleon’s concentration for battle toward noon.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">British</td> -<td class="perkm">10  </td> -<td class="perkm">15  </td> -<td class="perkm">25  </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="year">1859</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="battle">Solferino</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">French and<br />Sardinians</td> -<td class="perkm">7  </td> -<td class="perkm">5  </td> -<td class="perkm">19  </td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="remarks">After the victorious advance of the Austrian VIIIth Corps to S. Martino.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Austrians</td> -<td class="perkm">7  </td> -<td class="perkm">2.5</td> -<td class="perkm">21  </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" class="year">1866</td> -<td class="battle">Custozza</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Austrians</td> -<td class="perkm">8  </td> -<td class="perkm">2. </td> -<td class="perkm">17  </td> -<td colspan="2"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="5" class="rifle">Breech loaders large caliber.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="battle">Königgrätz</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Prussians</td> -<td class="perkm">9.5</td> -<td class="perkm">10  </td> -<td class="perkm">39  </td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="remarks">Situation at noon.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Austrians<br />& Saxons</td> -<td class="perkm">10  </td> -<td class="perkm">8.5</td> -<td class="perkm">43  </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" class="year">1870</td> -<td class="battle">Wörth</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Germans</td> -<td class="perkm">9  </td> -<td class="perkm">5  </td> -<td class="perkm">37  </td> -<td rowspan="3" colspan="2"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="2" class="battle">Gravelotte St. Privat</td> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Germans</td> -<td class="perkm">11.5</td> -<td class="perkm">9  </td> -<td class="perkm">46  </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">French</td> -<td class="perkm">8  </td> -<td class="perkm">6.5</td> -<td class="perkm">32  </td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="2" class="rifle">Mag. rifles of small caliber.</td> -<td colspan="2" class="year">1899</td> -<td class="battle">Colenso 1st battle, Dec. 15th</td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="bellig">British</td> -<td class="perkm">1.5</td> -<td class="perkm"> </td> -<td class="perkm">4  </td> -<td colspan="2" class="remarks">Including 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> heavy guns.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="year">1900</td> -<td class="battle">Colenso, 2d battle, February 27th</td> -<td class="perkm">2.5</td> -<td class="perkm">1.5</td> -<td class="perkm">7.5</td> -<td colspan="2" class="remarks">Including 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> heavy guns.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td rowspan="9" class="rifle">7.6 mm. against 6.5 mm. Mag. rifles.</td> -<td rowspan="9" class="center br">M<br />u<br />k<br />d<br />e<br />n</td> -<td rowspan="9" class="year">1<br />9<br />0<br />5<br />.</td> -<td rowspan="3" class="battle">February 20th</td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="2" class="bellig">Russians</td> -<td class="perkm">1  </td> -<td class="perkm">0.4</td> -<td class="perkm">*5  </td> -<td colspan="2" class="remarks">Total extension from the Liao to Tung-wha-sien. *Incl. 1 heavy gun.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="perkm">3  </td> -<td class="perkm">0.7</td> -<td class="perkm">*5.5</td> -<td colspan="2" class="remarks">Excl. East and West Det. *Incl. 3 heavy guns.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td colspan="2" class="bellig">Japanese</td> -<td class="perkm">3.5</td> -<td class="perkm">0.8</td> -<td class="perkm">*15.5</td> -<td colspan="2" class="remarks">Exclusive of the approaching Vth army. *Incl. 2 heavy guns.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="4" class="battle bb">March 3d</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="front bb">West<br />front.</td> -<td class="bellig bb">Russians</td> -<td class="perkm bb">5  </td> -<td class="perkm bb">0.8</td> -<td class="perkm bb">†18  </td> -<td rowspan="6" class="exguns bb">†Ex-<br />clu-<br />sive<br />of<br />heavy<br />guns.</td> -<td class="remarks">Excl. of Trans-Baikal Cossack Div.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="bellig bb">Japanese</td> -<td class="perkm bb">3.5</td> -<td class="perkm bb">1  </td> -<td class="perkm bb">†11.6</td> -<td class="remarks">Excl. of 2d Cav. Brigade.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="front bb">South<br />front.</td> -<td class="bellig bb">Russians</td> -<td class="perkm bb">1.7</td> -<td class="perkm bb">0.5</td> -<td class="perkm bb">†6  </td> -<td rowspan="2"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="bellig bb">Japanese</td> -<td class="perkm bb">2.2</td> -<td class="perkm bb">0.3</td> -<td class="perkm bb">†5.6</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="battle bb">March 7th</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="front bb">West<br />front.</td> -<td class="bellig bb">Russians</td> -<td class="perkm bb">4.6</td> -<td class="perkm bb">0.7</td> -<td class="perkm bb">†15.6</td> -<td class="remarks">Excl. of Trans-Baikal Cossack Div.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="bellig">Japanese</td> -<td class="perkm">4  </td> -<td class="perkm">0.6</td> -<td class="perkm">†10.5</td> -<td class="remarks">Excl. of Cav. Div.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page241">[241]</span></p> - -<p>Let us now recapitulate the most important points which -have a bearing on combat frontage:</p> - -<p>1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely -fixed, as it depends upon the situation and the purpose of an -action.</p> - -<p>2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an -extended front to be obstinately defended with a weak force.</p> - -<p>3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the -size of the force.</p> - -<p>4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) -fighting as part of a larger force is justified in deploying on -a wider front than when acting alone.</p> - -<p>The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the -size of the force and with the number of units composing it -Only the result can decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage -was justified in a given case. A commander will endeavor -to hold certain parts of the line with a weak force, posted in -groups, while, at the decisive point, he will throw in every -available man in order to gain the victory.</p> - -<h5>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria-Hungary.</b> Frontage depends upon the tactical situation and -the terrain. The frontage of a company acting as part of a larger force -in attack is fixed at about 130-150 paces (97-112 m.). “In other situations, -a greater frontage is, as a rule, permissible.” The battalion acting -as part of a larger force in attack, “is, as a rule, not to cover a frontage -exceeding its own front when in line”—in peace exercises, 300-400 paces -(225-300 m.). With companies of 200 men, 2 rifles, and in the battalion -2.6 rifles are reckoned per meter of front. “The increased fighting power -of infantry, due to better fire effect, in general permits a greater frontage -to be covered. This will often be taken advantage of, in order to make -as many troops as possible available for the decisive stage of the combat. -But this frontage should not be so great, that the requisite power of -resistance is weakened, or that tactical coöperation or the attainment of -the object of the combat are impaired.” Further than this nothing is -prescribed.</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> Nothing definite is prescribed. The combat is carried on by -groups separated by intervals.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page242">[242]</span></p> - -<p>“When <i>an organisation is acting as part of a larger force</i> and has to -advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective, its commander -may from the outset push a strong force into action, retaining a -reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks of this force is in -the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in rear of the flank which -may be threatened. When <i>an organisation is acting alone</i>, and when -both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is pushed forward and a reserve -is retained....”</p> - -<p>The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be -held, especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions -are those dictated by necessity—always to assure effective control by the -leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical units.</p> - -<p>This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which -no longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.</p> - -<p><b>Belgium.</b> The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger force -in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased.</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical -with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a company -is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding that -of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does not exceed -1500 m. at the initial deployment.</p> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is -governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective strength, -and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No figures are given -for the larger units.</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin -firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite extreme -after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the first line may -employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (<i>i.e.</i>, 90 m.), distributed as firing -line, supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist either of one -company or of parts of several. Entire companies are deployed only in -exceptional cases, for instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult -to bring up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon -the losses likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses -will be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the firing -line and the supports combined. In accordance with these general principles, -a battalion may deploy for attack on a front not exceeding 800 -yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A brigade consisting of -four battalions will thus be able to cover either a front of 1400 or one of -2100 m., depending upon the number of battalions put into the line.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> Only general principles are prescribed. “Skill in judging the -proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of peace by -exercises on varied ground and under different situations, especially when -organizations approximately at war strength are used.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page243">[243]</span></p> - -<h4 title="5. COMBAT ORDERS.">5. COMBAT ORDERS.<a id="FNanchor247" href="#Footnote247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote247" href="#FNanchor247" class="label">[247]</a> <span class="smcap">v. Kiesling</span>, -<cite>Gefechtsbefehle</cite>, Berlin, 1907.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct -the course of an action by despatching adjutants from time to -time. This must be borne in mind when issuing a combat -order. Such an order can only regulate the launching of the -troops into action and prescribe a task as a guide for their subsequent -conduct. Since leaders change during the course of -the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the component -parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose -of the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander -expects of them; it is not sufficient to order them to -occupy a certain point—they must be told whether or not they -are to defend it. An order which directs troops “to oppose” -the enemy, conveys an extremely vague meaning; it should -specify instead whether they are “to attack” the enemy, or -whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate -leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, -forces the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends -to attack, or to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight -a delaying action, or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even -the lowest grades must be informed of this decision of the -commander. The troops will perform anything that is demanded -of them in definite terms. On the other hand, the -commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an -order and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative -when an order is not received or the situation changes.</p> - -<p>Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German -I. D. R.) and definite combat tasks, each complete in -itself (par. 293 German I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical -units to be employed in the first line (battalions in case of a -regiment; regiments, as a rule, in case of a division). In attack, -the order indicates the front upon which each one of the -larger units is to deploy and what portion of the hostile position<span class="pagenum" id="Page244">[244]</span> -it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent of -the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the -limits of which the particular unit must make the most of the -accidents of the ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, -unity of action is ensured by the mutual coöperation of the -tactical units fighting abreast of each other (par. 475 German -I. D. R.), and by the designation of a unit upon which the -others regulate their movements, without, however, thereby -being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of -combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander -“can shift the decisive point of the action to any place -desired, reinforce where he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations -of the combat, and, finally, bring about the decision.”</p> - -<p>The first orders—those for putting the troops in motion -in the desired direction—are usually verbal; more detailed orders, -which are the rule from the brigade on up, are issued -subsequently. (Par. 274 German I. D. R.). In most cases, -the commander knows quite well what he wants, but only the -effort required in expressing in writing what he desires to say, -enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary clearness. -Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order -and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation; -the superior remembers only what he desired to say at -the particular moment, but not the language in which the order -was couched. Written orders minimize the possibility of a -misunderstanding. They have the further advantage that the -recipient has in his possession a document to which he can always -refer in case of doubt.</p> - -<p>Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, -for protecting flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, -since these matters are attended to as a matter of -course, every leader being held responsible for making proper -dispositions, within the limits of his command, for the performance -of these duties. The higher the rank of the commander, -the farther he should stay away from the scene of -battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page245">[245]</span> -course of the action only by employing his reserves, he should -remain near them, or, at any rate, retain their leader on his -staff. If the commander selects a position too close to the -point where the first line is engaged, he loses sight of the action -in its entirety, and allows himself to be influenced too much -by events within his immediate range of vision.<a id="FNanchor248" href="#Footnote248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> The subordinate -commander, in selecting his position, has to consider -only good observation of the enemy, communication with -neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with -his subordinates.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote248" href="#FNanchor248" class="label">[248]</a> This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise of Kuropatkin. -The latter led in person too much and was completely lost in the details -of minor troop-leading.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully -apportioned among the different members of the staff.</p> - -<p>The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes -the enemy and his own force, while another officer -maintains communication with the neighboring force and with -the next higher headquarters (signal flag squads, telephone), -and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme described -would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It -is furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to -neighboring troops, and to detail officers from subordinate -units to receive orders.</p> - -<p>The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the -purpose of facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of -higher headquarters is very properly prohibited by par. 83 -German F. S. R.; on the march, this is permissible temporarily -only. The battalion supply officers will, however, frequently -be utilized as information officers, for, on the day of battle, -they would thus be most profitably employed.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In <b>France</b> this is regulated by <i>Agents de liaison</i>. These are to keep -the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the action of -subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders. “The importance -of permanent communication between leader and subordinate increases -with the distances separating troops in action; the leader’s influence -on the course of the combat can be ensured only by these <i>agents</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page246">[246]</span></p> - -<p>As a general rule, one mounted officer from every infantry unit, -from the battalion up, reports to the next higher commander for the -purpose of maintaining communication. This officer may detail a cyclist -or trooper to accompany him. He is to be prepared to give all necessary -information in regard to his unit, and to keep in touch with the general -situation in order to inform his immediate superior in regard to it. He -communicates with his own unit either by sending orderlies with messages, -or by carrying the orders of the commander in person.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD.</h4> - -<p>Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the -battlefield only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; -even intrenched connecting posts communicating with -one another by means of shouts or signals do not absolutely ensure -communication in a protracted engagement. Heliographs -or signal lamps are valuable only during the approach to the -battlefield and in large battles.<a id="FNanchor249" href="#Footnote249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> The same is true of the field -telegraph, by means of which, for example, division headquarters -may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. -In an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,<a id="FNanchor250" href="#Footnote250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> -and signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone -and telegraph has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at -headquarters, since the coming and going of messengers is -eliminated; on the other hand, the commander is at once informed -of every reverse (which may perhaps be only temporary) -and will not always be able to resist the temptation of -leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese -made a very extensive use of the various means of communication, -but neglected to guard against an interruption of -their lines of information by installing signal flag stations. -This cannot be dispensed with. In the Japanese army visual -signals<a id="FNanchor251" href="#Footnote251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> -were not used, and in the Russian army they were not<span class="pagenum" id="Page247">[247]</span> -adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of communication -did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both -armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, -as now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose -of establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.<a id="FNanchor252" href="#Footnote252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote249" href="#FNanchor249" class="label">[249]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, III, p. 116, et seq.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">von Löbell’s</span> <cite>Jahresberichte</cite> 1906, p. 390: -<cite>Employment of Heliographs and Signal Lamps in Southwest Africa</cite>.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote250" href="#FNanchor250" class="label">[250]</a> Wig-wag -signals have been abolished and Morse signals prescribed in their -stead by Cabinet Orders dated January 16th, 1908.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote251" href="#FNanchor251" class="label">[251]</a> Sir -<span class="smcap">Ian Hamilton</span>, <cite>A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book</cite>, I, pp. 173-174, 196, 241 -and 323.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote252" href="#FNanchor252" class="label">[252]</a> -The station apparatus furnished by the firm of “Zwietusch” of Charlottenburg, -weighs 5.5 kg. with its battery.</p> - -<p>In defensive positions, which are held for a prolonged period, it is, of -course, practicable to establish telephonic connection with the most advanced -line. This was, for example, the case in the Japanese 10th Division on the -morning of March 3rd, 1905 (Mukden). On this occasion the division commander -in rear was informed by telephone of the presence of wire entanglements -in front of the Russian position, and permission was asked and granted -to postpone the attack.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used -in Germany.<a id="FNanchor253" href="#Footnote253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> The signal motions are made in an upright position, -the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being -used. This method of signaling permits communication to be -kept up within a radius of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used -at night and in combined land and naval operations. The wig-wag -signals are easily learned and entirely sufficient for communicating -over distances within 3 km.; they also permit information -to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are employed -for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals -possess the additional advantage that they can be made -by a man while in a prone position.<a id="FNanchor254" href="#Footnote254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Wig-wag signals are a -very effective means of communication and will rarely fail.<a id="FNanchor255" href="#Footnote255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote253" href="#FNanchor253" class="label">[253]</a> <cite>Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine</cite>, June number, 1906, and March number, -1907.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote254" href="#FNanchor254" class="label">[254]</a> Signals with wig-wag flags can be made by a man lying flat on his belly -or on his back; this is, however, frequently impossible with outstretched arms -and the sender must be content to make the signals by grasping the staves of -the two flags in the middle, then placing them in appropriate position relative -to each other (for example in making the letters, d, e, k, l, p, u).</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote255" href="#FNanchor255" class="label">[255]</a> The signals prescribed in par. 11 German I. D. R. are very effective if -made with wig-wag flags; if made with signal flags they require constant -observation, without, however, precluding mistakes. For example, when given -with signal flags, the signal “halt” - “h, h, h,” (.... .... ....) is frequently -confused with the signal “the assault is about to begin” (... ... ...). This -mistake is not so apt to occur when wig-wag flags are used.</p> - -<p>When General Stakelberg, after his right flank had been turned at Wafangu, -sent orders to withdraw to General Gerngross, the commander on the left -flank, it took the officer who carried the order through this mountainous -country, nearly an hour to cover the 5 km. which separated the two commanders. -An order sent by means of wig-wag flags could have reached the leader in question -within a few minutes.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page248">[248]</span></p> - -<p>A commander should not exercise a constant influence on -his subordinates just because modern means of communication -permit him to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and -independence. The permanent communication to which we -are accustomed in time of peace, and the method of leading -produced thereby, do not allow real qualities of leadership and -initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy for a commander -to refrain from interfering when a deployment does -not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with -his wishes.<a id="FNanchor256" href="#Footnote256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote256" href="#FNanchor256" class="label">[256]</a> Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army with the -deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Beispiele</cite>, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience of the commander-in-chief was -natural perhaps, but, due to his interference, the enveloping movement skillfully -initiated by General v. d. Tann, could not be executed.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria-Hungary.</b> “Infantry telegraph detachments” are assigned to -every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.<a id="FNanchor257" href="#Footnote257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> These detachments -are charged with the duty of keeping up the visual signal and telegraph -service in field and mountain warfare. The Morse alphabet is used -in visual signaling and in telegraphic communication. In this the Austrian -regulations differ from the German. The infantry telegraph detachment -attached to an infantry division is divided into three sections, and -is equipped with telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each -section consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped -with 24 km. of wire.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote257" href="#FNanchor257" class="label">[257]</a> <cite>Streffleur</cite>, 1905, April-May number.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>France.</b> Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some -of the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of -visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are -expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire).</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment. -Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<p>It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in -strategic reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, -not only in Germany but also in France, the local, tactical -reconnaissance was less good and often deficient, so that in<span class="pagenum" id="Page249">[249]</span> -consequence thereof surprises were not rare. Frequently a gap -occurred in the reconnoitering line when the cavalry in front -of the various parts of the army was brushed aside and the -stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom -of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened, -cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly -to the infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route -columns, but this expedient was only partially successful. It -must be remembered that troopers cannot ride close enough to -the enemy to see anything of importance, and that they frequently -are in ignorance of the very things which are of value -for the infantry. In addition, the divisional cavalry is entirely -too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to it. Therefore -infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry reconnaissance. -The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry patrols -in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of providing -for its own reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in -the fact that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its -mounted officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate -duties except for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are -not available for carrying messages; and that, if officers carry -messages in person, the reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry -patrols, on account of the slowness of their movements, cannot -transmit messages quickly, and, as a result, such messages -frequently arrive too late to be of any value. On the other -hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in that, by utilizing -cover, they can get close to the enemy without being observed. -The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than -it was in the past, because troops can no longer change front -when deployed, and because those which come under hostile -fire while in close order formations may, in a short time, suffer -well-nigh annihilating losses.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed -in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers (<b>Magersfontain</b>, -<b>Colenso</b>), which induced it to deploy all of its lines on a wide -front at an early moment.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page250">[250]</span></p> - -<p>The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance, whereas -the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so that Kuropatkin -was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders. “Local reconnaissance -was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These carefully approached -our positions in small groups. One man of each group laid his -rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches, raised his head and -observed, while three or four of his companions, whom he had left farther -in rear, opened fire on the trenches. Occasionally all of these men threw -themselves flat on the ground for protection. This mode of procedure continued -for seven hours.”</p> - -<p>The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely -deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that -neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the Japanese -2nd Division at <b>Fuchau</b> and <b>Kapukai</b> on March 10th, 1905. This division -advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified Russian position, -was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had to fight under unfavorable -conditions, and while suffering heavy losses, from early morning -until 4 P. M., when the general situation compelled the enemy to evacuate -the position. The advance of the Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during -the battle of <b>Liao Yang</b> (2nd Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately -greater importance and with a tragic ending. The noise of the -battle at <b>Sykwantun</b> caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave -the position assigned him on the heights of the <b>Yentai</b> mines and to march -toward the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over -covered terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and -rear by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),<a id="FNanchor258" href="#Footnote258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> and thrown back in utter -rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had been -left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of the Japanese.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote258" href="#FNanchor258" class="label">[258]</a> -For details of the attack made by Sasaki’s Brigade, see <span class="smcap">Gertsch</span>, <cite>Vom -russisch-japanischen Kriege</cite>, I, sketch 14.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect -a force from surprise. This may be accomplished by sending -out combat patrols, and by company commanders riding ahead -in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.). The latter are likewise -charged with picking out avenues of approach to selected fire -positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance the -better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to -the best advantage.</p> - -<p>The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when<span class="pagenum" id="Page251">[251]</span> -we have to reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to -screen his force.<a id="FNanchor259" href="#Footnote259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote259" href="#FNanchor259" class="label">[259]</a> The attacker’s reconnaissance must be prevented as long as possible. -Frequently patrols in the foreground will suffice for this purpose. (Par. 406 -German I. D. R.)</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance -nor create the necessary opening through which the -leaders can reconnoiter in person. Stronger forces are requisite, -and “reconnaissance companies” may have to be sent out -toward the enemy to serve as a support for the patrols, to reinforce -them when necessary, and to constitute natural collecting -stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the result -of these endeavors to obtain information,<a id="FNanchor260" href="#Footnote260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> for the defender -will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an -attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in -this case, since the information obtained in regard to the position -and strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. -134 German F. S. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote260" href="#FNanchor260" class="label">[260]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, IV. p. 214, et seq. The results of the reconnaissance in force -made at Neuville aux Bois were very unsatisfactory.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining -information by means of detachments of all arms which -also prevent hostile reconnaissance. In minor operations the -French send out infantry detachments, which, from secure -hiding places, pick off observers, screen the position of their -own force, and prevent the enemy from using covered avenues -of approach. However, these very patrol combats may cause -the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to the -hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined -that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, -the details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance. -Then the commander will wish to know whether -or not an immediate attack is feasible, or whether it is advisable -to wait until nightfall for bringing up the infantry. -The local reconnaissance determines where the flanks of the -enemy are located; whether the position in front is the hostile -main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page252">[252]</span> -has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery -is posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the -engagement has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified -position,<a id="FNanchor261" href="#Footnote261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, -determine the position of obstacles and estimate whether they -can be surmounted with or without adequate apparatus. Then -it likewise becomes necessary to find and mark covered avenues -of approach.<a id="FNanchor262" href="#Footnote262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> In moving to new firing positions, it is important -that advanced positions, masks, and dummy trenches be recognized -in time. The commander of a unit on a flank should -make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for permanent -communication with neighboring units, even though no -specific orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange -as it may seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze—Rezonville -(battle of Vionville), by their failure to get into -early communication with the troops which had been on the -ground for some time, neglected to take advantage of the information -gained by those troops.<a id="FNanchor263" href="#Footnote263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote261" href="#FNanchor261" class="label">[261]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 243, et seq.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote262" href="#FNanchor262" class="label">[262]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hoppenstedt</span> (<cite>Schlacht der Zukunft</cite>, pp. 134 and 140) draws a graphic -picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality.</p> - -<p>The procedure outlined by that author (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 122) for indicating, by -means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile fire, seems practicable. He -states: “Holding his flag upright, the member of the patrol proceeds steadily -on his way to Weyer. Now he has arrived at the point where the road bends -slightly toward the south; his flag descends,” etc.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote263" href="#FNanchor263" class="label">[263]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8-9, p. 128, et seq., p. 243.</p> - -<p>The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the successful -“fire surprises” carried out by the Boers at Modder River on November 28th, -1899, and at Colenso, against Hart’s Brigade advancing in dense masses, on -December 15th, 1899.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance -should not be restricted to the preparatory stage of -the combat alone, but that it must be kept up during the whole -course of the action. To the duties enumerated, we may add, -occasional tasks, such as picking off staffs and signal men; -sneaking up on artillery that has been incautiously pushed forward; -and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. For such -tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”<a id="FNanchor264" href="#Footnote264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> -after the Russian pattern,<span class="pagenum" id="Page253">[253]</span> -have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness in -difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank -and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided -with ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can -hamper the reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of -their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective -battlefield, and finally, having made a skillful lodgment, -they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a -large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is -lacking. To form picked men into special organizations, as is -done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The constant -transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during the -second part of the South African war was fatal to the British -infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its -good men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned -officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal -of good men from an organization is of little importance; -the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, -however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence -of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents -the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly -appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during -critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels -his courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, -should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he -will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates, -whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 -German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote264" href="#FNanchor264" class="label">[264]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Tettau</span>, <cite>Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee</cite>, Berlin, 1901.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Hoppenstedt</span>, <cite>Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos</cite>, 1907.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry -force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better -to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment -whose leader would know his men only imperfectly.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Before the 95th Infantry (French) made its attack on the brewery of -<b>l’Amitié</b> (south of <b>Noisseville</b>), on August 31st, 1870, a reconnoitering<span class="pagenum" id="Page254">[254]</span> -detachment had ascertained the strength of the position and the manner -in which it was held by the defender.<a id="FNanchor265" href="#Footnote265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote265" href="#FNanchor265" class="label">[265]</a> <cite>Wald- und Ortsgefecht</cite>, p. 192.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Examples of the successful employment of flanking fire by small -forces:</b></p> - -<p>The flanking fire, delivered from the <b>Bois des Ognons</b> by about 30 -men of the 12th Company, 72nd Infantry, compelled the French to withdraw -their left flank. (Combat on the Gorze—Rezonville road, 16th August, -1870).<a id="FNanchor266" href="#Footnote266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote266" href="#FNanchor266" class="label">[266]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8-9, p. 146.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Gravelotte-St. Privat</b>, flanking fire is said to have caused the -withdrawal of nine French battalions which had until then delivered an -effective fire upon the Prussian Guard Artillery.<a id="FNanchor267" href="#Footnote267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote267" href="#FNanchor267" class="label">[267]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 10, p. 24, and 12, p. 24, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN.</h4> - -<p>The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting -unobstructed view, while the attack requires stretches of ground -hidden from the observation of the enemy and sheltered from -his fire, in order that the troops may be deployed for action -at the decisive ranges. A piece of ground will rarely possess -all these advantages, but, nevertheless, well-trained infantry -will be able to defend successfully a piece of ground that has a -poor field of fire, and infantry which is energetically and skillfully -led will be able to cross even an open plain.</p> - -<p>At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor -to keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely -be able to take advantage of available cover, but at a halt and -while firing they will be able to do so. Their taking advantage -of the ground should not lead to a diminution of the energy of -the advance, and should not cause parts of the force to fall -behind.<a id="FNanchor268" href="#Footnote268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> “The terrain exerts considerable influence on the -formation of troops. Open country requires that distances be -increased so that the losses may be minimized, while close country<span class="pagenum" id="Page255">[255]</span> -permits distances to be reduced. The commander should -take particular care not to let this advantage escape him, since -it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the first line -promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on -covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote268" href="#FNanchor268" class="label">[268]</a> This is equally true of ground that is difficult to march over; the troops -must cross it. The evasion of difficult portions of terrain usually leads to -disorder and a dispersion of the troops. For the advance of the 18th Infantry -Brigade at Wörth, see <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 14, p. 101. (Thick -underbrush in the woods on the Fuchshübel.)</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>An attack over a plain devoid of cover “should be avoided -as far as possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only -should be ordered to advance over it, while the bulk of the -force is launched at a point where an approach under cover -is practicable. If suitable terrain is lacking to permit this, then -the decisive attack must be led over the open plain.” (Par. -325 German I. D. R.). In contrast with the continuous skirmish -lines of the past, which are still favored by the Austrians, -the German regulations permit a gap to be left in the line -where an open plain devoid of cover exists, without thereby -implying that it cannot be crossed. The French regulations -(par. 257), contrary to the German, contemplate that “only -weak detachments be left in the open, fire swept spaces,” and -that the troops intended for the fire fight be pushed forward -under available cover, separate groups being thus formed.<a id="FNanchor269" href="#Footnote269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote269" href="#FNanchor269" class="label">[269]</a> This should be an important hint for the opponent. The lines of approach -may perhaps be sheltered with reference to a certain point, but there will always -be portions of the enemy’s line from which a fire may be directed upon these -avenues of approach and the troops marching thereon.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“This mode of fighting in groups does away with the continuous -firing lines of the past which no longer fulfill the requirements -of modern battle.</p> - -<p>“The rearmost fractions of the force endeavor to avoid -open spaces, or such as are swept by hostile fire, by moving, -sometimes in a close order formation and again widely extended, -toward the lines of cover, without regard to the direction -in which the enemy may happen to be. The unit that -finds the advance easiest takes the lead, and all the others, supported -by the fire of their immediate neighbors, endeavor to -follow it.</p> - -<p>“Depending upon the character of the terrain and available -cover, the forces deployed for the fire fight will, therefore,<span class="pagenum" id="Page256">[256]</span> -advance in a rather dense formation in the areas favorable -for such a procedure, while weak forces only will be -found on open and fire swept ground. The advance is regulated -by designating the objective of the attack and by stipulating -the necessity of mutual coöperation.”</p> - -<p>This French group attack owes its existence to the silently -accepted fact that an open plain cannot be crossed when swept -by unsubdued hostile fire; it reckons with an unfavorable terrain -such as an attacker will only find in exceptional cases. -We by no means fail to recognize the fact that individual portions -of the attacker’s force, when favored by the terrain, will -be able to advance more quickly than others, and that other -portions may even be compelled to discontinue their advance -for a time; but it seems a precarious proceeding to lay down -this result of the hostile fire effect as a guide in the training of -troops. The group tactics of the Boers stood the test only -on the defensive; they could not prevent individual groups -from being attacked by far superior forces. In an attack, the -units favored by the terrain will constitute the framework -upon which the units which are compelled to advance more -slowly, will form. There is, however, danger that these leading -groups will succumb to the superior fire of a defender who -is deployed on a broader front. Although this may not happen, -the spirit of the regulations tempts leaders to drive everything -forward, to rush ahead with isolated parts of the force. -An additional drawback of these systematic group tactics lies -in the difficulty of deploying the troops moving in the narrow -avenue of approach. If the French infantry really desires to -avoid the plain and wants to stick principally to cover, who -will guarantee that the great freedom allowed it, will not cause -it to crowd together under cover, lose the direction to its objective, -and become completely mixed up?<a id="FNanchor270" href="#Footnote270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> This danger is the<span class="pagenum" id="Page257">[257]</span> -more imminent since no importance is attached to a more -definite limitation of the frontage to be covered, while wide extension -is, on the contrary, actually preached. The fear of -losses will gain the upper hand and the attack will lose its -energy. “It is easy to teach troops to be over-cautious, but it -is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops against the -enemy.” (Sir <span class="smcap">Ian Hamilton</span>).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote270" href="#FNanchor270" class="label">[270]</a> The plentiful cover along the ravine of the Mance brook was by no -means an actual advantage for the Ist Army. The 18th of August presents the -strange phenomenon of the success of the attack on St. Privat, made over -terrain devoid of cover, and the failure of the attack on the French IInd Corps, -made over the most favorable terrain imaginable.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the -advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past <b>Vionville</b> on <b>Flavigny</b> and -the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire directed upon -these companies caused them to deviate to right and left, to leave their -battalions, and to lose the march direction designated by the regimental -commander.<a id="FNanchor271" href="#Footnote271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> One company of the IInd Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, -which formed the center (march direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated -in the assault made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the -other companies moved to the left against Vionville and were joined by a -company of the IIIrd Battalion.—“A peculiar feature of this fight was the -fire directed from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced -against the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies -of the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the -35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry) -were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move in a -totally different direction than was originally intended. The direction was -maintained to a certain extent only by two companies (the 3rd and 11th -of the 20th Infantry).”<a id="FNanchor272" href="#Footnote272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote271" href="#FNanchor271" class="label">[271]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 560.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote272" href="#FNanchor272" class="label">[272]</a> <span class="smcap">v. Scherff</span>, -<cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A) showing lines of -advance of the companies.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not -underestimate the difficulties of an advance over open ground, -they require that the march direction be maintained and that -cover be utilized only within the assigned “combat section”; -they leave it to subordinate commanders to choose suitable expedients -for crossing such unfavorable ground. “Within the -limits of the section assigned to an organization for an attack, -the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible, -or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered -to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a -point where an approach under cover is practicable. <i>If suitable<span class="pagenum" id="Page258">[258]</span> -terrain is lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must -be led over the open plain.</i>” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). -For purposes of instruction, it is entirely correct to require -“that even on terrain devoid of cover, well-trained infantry -should not open fire until the medium ranges are reached.” -(Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile -fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, -should not impair the energy of the advance and cause portions -of the attacking force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating -it. On the other hand, we should not be afraid to leave -gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy would, in any case, not -be able to use them for his own advance.</p> - -<p>Thus we have here the German united attack, on the one -hand, and the French group attack, on the other. Since group -tactics no doubt diminish losses, they should be used in delaying -actions, in holding attacks, and in defense; they should -unquestionably not be employed when a concerted, rapid -movement of skirmishers to the front becomes necessary. How -should the Vth Corps at Wörth and the Guard at St. Privat, -for instance, have attacked, according to the French regulations?</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page259">[259]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" title="VI. MACHINE GUNS.">VI. MACHINE GUNS.<a id="FNanchor273" href="#Footnote273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a></h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote273" href="#FNanchor273" class="label">[273]</a> <cite>Exerzierreglement und -Schieszvorschrift für die Maschinengewehrabteilungen</cite>, -1904.</p> - -<p>Captain <span class="smcap">Braun</span>, <cite>Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung</cite>, Berlin, -1905.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARM.</h4> - -<p>The effect of canister had decreased considerably with -the introduction of rifled guns, and this was the more noticeable, -because, simultaneously therewith, the accuracy and rate -of fire of the infantry rifle was greatly increased. The attempts -to re-invest the artillery with its one-time superiority -were directed in two channels: one aimed at perfecting shrapnel, -which had been rather neglected up to this time (England, -Prussia, Austria), while the other resurrected the mediaeval -idea of the “barrel-organ gun,” with a view of assembling -a number of rifle barrels and of combining thereby the accuracy -of the small arm with the moral effect of canister. Thus, -among others, the 4-10 barreled <i>Gatling</i> gun was invented in -America in 1861, it being the oldest representative of this type -of weapon. In order to obtain a weapon matching the Prussian -<i>needle</i> gun, Bavaria adopted the 4 barreled <i>Feldl</i> gun and -France the 25 barreled <i>mitrailleuse</i>.<a id="FNanchor274" href="#Footnote274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> The name <i>canon à balles</i>, -which was given the gun, sufficed to indicate the manner in -which it was intended to be used. As these guns frequently -failed in action, offered the same target and required the same -equipment and approximately the same road space as field<span class="pagenum" id="Page260">[260]</span> -guns, the states who had first adopted them, finally decided to -dispense with them on European theaters of war. The further -development of machine guns was not especially accelerated -by the fact that the French <i>mitrailleuses</i> had not fulfilled -the expectations entertained for them during the Franco-German -war, isolated cases excepted,<a id="FNanchor275" href="#Footnote275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> and that they were quickly -silenced by the German artillery, which was equipped only with -percussion shell, as soon as their position was ascertained. -Thus, these guns seemed useful only in colonial wars and on -board war ships for warding off torpedo boats. Although they -took up very little room when in position, they were not considered -useful for flank defense in fortresses, on account of -the frequent breakdowns. In addition to their height, other -defects developed; for example, they could obtain only a very -insignificant rate of fire, betrayed their position by the powder -smoke, and lacked the means for ascertaining ranges.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote274" href="#FNanchor274" class="label">[274]</a> -The 25 barreled <i>mitrailleuse</i>, cal. 13 mm., fired volleys at the rate of 125 -rounds per minute. Its fire was considered equivalent to that of 50 needle guns; -its weight was 1,485 kg., each of its four horses pulling 371 kg.; its maximum -range was 3,000 m. Its most favorable, practical range 500-1,500 m.—A glaring -defect of the gun was that fire pauses occurred whenever cartridges were fed -into the slot and that the lateral spread of its cone of dispersion was extremely -small.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote275" href="#FNanchor275" class="label">[275]</a> -Battle of Gravelotte. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, pp. 705-712, 723 and 781. The -employment of three Gatling guns in rear of the park wall of Yoré, during the -defense of the plateau of Auvours. (<cite>Revue d’artillerie</cite>, 1900, p. 297; <cite>Gen. St. -W.</cite>, IV, p. 817).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The situation changed entirely when a practicable, smokeless -powder was invented, and Hiram Maxim, an American, -succeeded in utilizing the energy of the recoil (a factor neglected -up to that time, although annoying to the marksman) -for opening the breech, inserting a fresh cartridge into the -chamber, closing the breech, and automatically firing the -piece.<a id="FNanchor276" href="#Footnote276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Through this invention it became possible to fire a -maximum of 900 and an average of 500 rounds per minute, -from a single barrel moving laterally back and forth. The -desire to obtain a still greater rate of fire was checked effectively, -because of the fact that with such an increase the danger -of jamming increased and the use of infantry ammunition was -precluded. The water in the jacket continues to be a decided -drawback to this type of gun, for it is not always easily procured, -impairs the mechanism by freezing, makes it difficult to<span class="pagenum" id="Page261">[261]</span> -change barrels, and constitutes a considerable weight. If cooling -the barrel by means of water were to be dispensed with, the -accuracy of the piece would rapidly diminish, and, after 1000 -rounds of continuous fire, bullets would tumble even at short -ranges. At the present time water is still the most effective -means of cooling the barrel.<a id="FNanchor277" href="#Footnote277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote276" href="#FNanchor276" class="label">[276]</a> -Of the other types the following may here be mentioned: <i>Hotchkiss</i> -(France), insufficient cooling of the barrel by air; <i>Schwarzlose</i> (Austria), -machine gun model 7, a very simple weapon which has only a single spring.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote277" href="#FNanchor277" class="label">[277]</a> -In the <i>Colt</i> Machine Gun, which is not water-cooled, after 500 rounds had -been fired, a cartridge inserted into the piece exploded in seven seconds, and -cartridges placed in the chamber a quarter of an hour later exploded in 20 -seconds.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Machine guns fire ordinary small arms ammunition carried -in loops on a canvass belt (weighing 1 kg. when empty), -which is generally capable of holding 250 rounds of 8 mm. -cartridges weighing 8.315 kg. These belts are very carefully -manufactured, the material being shrunk, so as to prevent their -shrinking when in use. Two men can refill an empty belt -with 8 mm. cartridges in seven minutes, according to Swedish -experiments, while a belt filling machine can refill one in a -still shorter time. The rate of fire of machine guns is approximately -500 rounds per minute. They are variously mounted,<a id="FNanchor278" href="#Footnote278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> -according to circumstances, on sleds (in which the gun rests -on a frame similar to that of a wheelbarrow), on tripods, or, -for mountain warfare, on basket frames. Although the greatest -readiness for firing was obtained with guns mounted on -cavalry carriages (two-wheeled carts, similar to limbers, and -equipped with shafts), which also permitted the greatest -amount of ammunition to be carried along, these guns offered -such a high target that their use, in an infantry action, was -entirely out of the question, leading only to their being quickly -silenced. Another defect was that the guns were unable to -follow immediately upon the heels of the organization to -which they were attached. Guns mounted on light tripods -possess the least readiness for firing, as the gun must be dismounted -during each change of position; but tripods are indispensable<span class="pagenum" id="Page262">[262]</span> -in mountain warfare. In India a tripod frame on -wheels is employed. The basket frame, which is very light and -is carried on the back of a soldier, affords nothing but a rest -for the gun. This type of mount has the disadvantage of -necessitating, in reality, freehand firing when the barrel is -supported near the muzzle; that the operator, when firing continuously, -becomes greatly fatigued, and that the accuracy suffers -in consequence thereof. The advantages of the tripod -and the wheeled carriage have been skillfully combined in the -carriage adopted in Germany. In this the gun rests on a sled; -this is in turn supported by the carriage proper, which is -wheeled. In exceptional cases the gun may be fired from the -carriage, but ordinarily it is fired from the sled, which is detached -from the carriage for that purpose. This sled permits -the gun to be laid at any desired height and enables it to follow -the infantry anywhere during an action.<a id="FNanchor279" href="#Footnote279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote278" href="#FNanchor278" class="label">[278]</a></p> - -<table class="gbmachinegun" summary="Weights"> - -<tr> -<td colspan="5" class="item">British cavalry machine gun with mount</td> -<td class="weight">152.3</td> -<td class="center"> kg.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Machine gun with tripod</td> -<td rowspan="3" class="brace bt br bb"> </td> -<td rowspan="3" class="left padl0">-</td> -<td rowspan="3" class="left padr2">latest model</td> -<td class="weight">16.5 + 18 =</td> -<td class="weight">34.5</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Machine gun with basket frame</td> -<td> </td> -<td class="weight">35.0</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="item">Machine gun with sled</td> -<td class="weight">16.5 + 24 =</td> -<td class="weight">40.5</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><a id="Footnote279" href="#FNanchor279" class="label">[279]</a> The following complement per gun is considered necessary:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Complements"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Germany</td> -<td class="right">14<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="left padr2"> men</td> -<td class="right">9</td> -<td class="left"> horses.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Switzerland</td> -<td class="right">8<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub></td> -<td class="left padr2"> men</td> -<td class="right">12</td> -<td class="left"> horses.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>In the Russo-Japanese war the machine gun detachments of the Russian -cavalry were equipped with <i>Rexer</i> guns which can scarcely be considered machine -guns owing to their slow rate of fire and extreme heating of the barrel.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Machine guns can be transported upon larger vehicles -capable of being unlimbered; they can also be carried on pack -horses or other pack animals, and for short distances by men. -Although pack animal transportation enables the guns to follow -the troops anywhere, the amount of ammunition that can -be carried along is limited, and the opening of fire is retarded, -since gun and tripod must first be assembled; the opening -of fire may even be delayed when a pack animal falls; ammunition -cannot be carried on the gun; and the animals get sore -backs even if pack saddles are carefully adjusted.</p> - -<h4>2. THE POWER OF MACHINE GUNS.</h4> - -<p>The machine gun is noted for its adaptability to any terrain, -and the constancy of its high rate of fire as compared -with that of a body of infantry, which decreases with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page263">[263]</span> -range, the diminishing visibility of the target, and prolonged -fire. On the other hand, a single jamming can make a machine -gun valueless, at least for the time being. For this reason, -the Germans employ machine guns only in platoons, as -a rule, and the Swiss let both guns of a platoon fire simultaneously -only in exceptional cases. Theoretically, the maximum -rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute will rarely be attained; -and 200-300 rounds per minute will usually suffice -against prone targets. In Germany volley and continuous fire -are employed; fire by a single piece is used only to ward off -patrols when the machine guns do not want to betray their -position.<a id="FNanchor280" href="#Footnote280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote280" href="#FNanchor280" class="label">[280]</a> The following kinds of fire are used in the countries named below:</p> - -<p>Austria: Single shots; volleys (20-25 rounds); fire by a single piece.</p> - -<p>Switzerland: Fire by a single piece; volleys (20-30 rounds); rapid fire -(volleys of 100 rounds); and fire at will (both pieces of a platoon simultaneously -employing rapid fire). The last-named is only employed in exceptional cases, -for example, when the danger is imminent and when favorable opportunities -offer.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A volley consists of about 25 rounds and is followed by -a pause for observing the effect of the fire. It is employed -in adjusting the fire upon difficult targets in rolling country. -Fire for effect consists, as a general rule, of “continuous fire,” -and is interrupted only when the tactical situation requires it. -The water in the jacket should be renewed and oiling attended -to during the pauses in the fire, whether these grow out of -the tactical situation, or are made necessary by technical considerations.</p> - -<p>The fire is either directed upon a point (concentrated -fire), the elevation and direction of the piece being fixed, or it -is distributed over the entire target or over a designated part -of the same (sweeping, and progressive fire).<a id="FNanchor281" href="#Footnote281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote281" href="#FNanchor281" class="label">[281]</a> For example, when sweeping the crest of the parapet of a line of trenches, -or the edge of a wood, both hands move the gun slowly and evenly from side to -side. When searching an area in the direction of depth and obliquely (progressive -fire with sweeping), the left hand gives the gun the proper horizontal -direction, while the right manipulates the slow motion elevating gear. When -firing on rapidly moving targets—for example skirmish lines advancing by -rushes—or targets advancing over rolling country, both the traversing and -elevating movements may be unclamped. The rapidity with which the gun is -moved, when sweeping or searching, depends upon the range and the kind of -target on which the fire is directed. As a rule, the piece is moved slowly and -steadily. The accuracy of the fire is impaired when the gun is moved too rapidly. -When the fire is well observed, it might be advantageous, in exceptional cases, -when firing against either stationary or moving targets, to direct the gun, without -aiming, after the bullets have been seen to hit their mark, by properly -manipulating the elevating and traversing apparatus while the firing is in -progress.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page264">[264]</span></p> - -<p>The ballistic properties of the gun are the same as those -of the infantry rifle.<a id="FNanchor282" href="#Footnote282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote282" href="#FNanchor282" class="label">[282]</a> The destructive power of the projectiles fired from a machine gun, as they -strike within a small space, is, of course, much greater than that of the -scattered projectiles of a body of infantry. Trees having a circumference of 30 -cm. are felled by machine gun fire in about 15 seconds at a range of 450 m.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In the machine gun an important factor in the dispersion -of infantry fire—flinching and errors in aiming—is eliminated, -while the heating of its barrel and the vibrations of its -carriage in continuous fire do not produce a corresponding increase -in dispersion. On this account the cone of dispersion of -the machine gun is more compact than that of the infantry -rifle and its accuracy at long ranges is therefore considerably -greater than that of the latter.<a id="FNanchor283" href="#Footnote283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> Firing tests indicate that the -accuracy of machine gun fire diminishes only very slightly -with increasing range, provided the appropriate elevation is -used.<a id="FNanchor284" href="#Footnote284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote283" href="#FNanchor283" class="label">[283]</a> According to Austrian experiments the depth of the beaten zone of a -machine gun is only <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> to <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> that produced by the fire of a platoon of infantry.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote284" href="#FNanchor284" class="label">[284]</a> The following average results were obtained in experiments made at the -Musketry School, while firing on infantry targets advancing alternately at quick -and double time:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Results"> - -<tr> -<td class="center">At </td> -<td class="center">ranges</td> -<td class="center"> from </td> -<td class="right">2000-1600</td> -<td class="center"> m. </td> -<td class="right">1.72%</td> -<td class="center"> hits</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">1500-1200</td> -<td class="center">m.</td> -<td class="right">2.53%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Firing against disappearing head targets placed at intervals of 0.60-0.70 m.:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap nomargin" summary="Results"> - -<tr> -<td class="left">At </td> -<td class="right">600</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0">-</td> -<td class="right">800</td> -<td class="center padr2"> m.</td> -<td class="right">1.89%</td> -<td class="left"> hits</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">800</td> -<td class="center padl0 padr0">-</td> -<td class="right">1100</td> -<td class="center padr2"> m.</td> -<td class="right">1.69%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>In firing first with an elevation of 1800, then with one of 1750 m. (the -range being 2000-1600 m. and 254 rounds being expended per gun), on 50 advancing, -kneeling targets, placed at intervals of 1 m. 3.10% hits were obtained -and 52% figures were placed out of action in 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> minutes.</p> - -<p>In firing at the same targets for 2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> minutes, with an elevation of 1900 -m. (304 rounds expended), the result dropped to 0.3% hits and 8.3% figures -placed out of action.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In war the influence of the compact cone of dispersion -will be still more potent, for we will then have to reckon with -a single, specially selected machine gun marksman who is -well protected, while the excitement of battle will produce a -far different impression upon an organization composed of -men differing materially from each other. The compactness<span class="pagenum" id="Page265">[265]</span> -of the cone of dispersion of the machine gun requires that the -appropriate elevation be used if the fire is to be effective -against well concealed prone skirmishers. This can be accomplished -only in part by employing range finders. Since the -probable error of these instruments is ±5% of the range, this -determination is so inaccurate for machine gun fire that nothing -remains but to increase the dispersion artificially. When -it is impossible to observe the strike of the bullets, the dispersion -may be artificially increased by employing combined -sights, two in a single platoon and three in a machine gun -battery (company), and above all by sweeping. The employment -of combined sights would appear to be too rigid a method; -sweeping fire is at any rate better.<a id="FNanchor285" href="#Footnote285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote285" href="#FNanchor285" class="label">[285]</a> Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span>, -<cite>Schieszlehre</cite>, 2nd Ed. p. 185, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>From general ballistic data, Lieutenant-General <span class="smcap">Rohne</span><a id="FNanchor286" href="#Footnote286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> -computes that the following results would be obtained by a machine -gun and a detachment of skirmishers when firing with -the appropriate elevation at a broad target 1 m. <span class="nowrap">high:—</span></p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Results"> - -<tr> -<th colspan="3"> </th> -<th class="padl2 padr2">Machine<br />gun</th> -<th colspan="2">Detachment of<br />skirmishers</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">At </td> -<td class="center"> 500</td> -<td class="center"> m. </td> -<td class="center">32.4</td> -<td class="center">16.8%</td> -<td class="center">hits</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">15.3</td> -<td class="center"> 8.1%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">1500</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">10.2</td> -<td class="center"> 5.1%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">2000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center"> 6.4</td> -<td class="center"> 3.2%</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote286" href="#FNanchor286" class="label">[286]</a> -<cite>Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine</cite>, 1901, IV, p. 268.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>This nearly double superiority is reversed, however, -when the appropriate elevation is not used:</p> - -<table class="rangeestimates" summary="Results"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th rowspan="3" class="br2">Range.<br />m.</th> -<th colspan="8">Firing on a target 1 m. high, the following percentages of<br />hits may be -expected when the error in estimating the range <span class="nowrap">is—</span></th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th colspan="2" class="br">50 m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">100 m.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="br">150 m.</th> -<th colspan="2">200 m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">Machine<br />guns.</th> -<th class="br">Skir-<br />mishers.</th> -<th class="br">Machine<br />guns.</th> -<th class="br">Skir-<br />mishers.</th> -<th class="br">Machine<br />guns.</th> -<th class="br">Skir-<br />mishers.</th> -<th class="br">Machine<br />guns.</th> -<th>Skir-<br />mishers.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br2"> 500</td> -<td class="br">27.5</td> -<td class="br">16.0</td> -<td class="br">19.0</td> -<td class="br">13.8</td> -<td class="br">7.0</td> -<td class="br">11.7</td> -<td class="br">1.3</td> -<td>7.3</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br2">1000</td> -<td class="br"> 9.2</td> -<td class="br"> 6.8</td> -<td class="br"> 2.0</td> -<td class="br"> 4.8</td> -<td class="br">0.2</td> -<td class="br"> 2.7</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td>1.0</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br2">1500</td> -<td class="br"> 3.6</td> -<td class="br"> 3.9</td> -<td class="br"> 0.2</td> -<td class="br"> 1.8</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td class="br"> 0.5</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td>0.1</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br2">2000</td> -<td class="br"> 1.7</td> -<td class="br"> 2.2</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td class="br"> 0.8</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td class="br"> 0.2</td> -<td class="br">—</td> -<td>—</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page266">[266]</span></p> - -<p>From this it follows that the good qualities of the machine -gun can be utilized to the fullest advantage only when -the appropriate elevation is used. When this is not accurately -known, the fire effect of the machine gun drops down to zero -more quickly than that of a skirmish line. Where local conditions -are at all favorable, the determination of the appropriate -elevation is facilitated by observing the strike of the -projectiles in “volley fire.”</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>According to British firing tests, at ranges from 500-1000 yards an -error of estimation of 100 yards, reduces the effect of the fire 50 per cent. -According to firing tests 75% of all shots fired by a machine gun and -body of infantry are distributed as follows:</p> - -<table class="rangeestimates" summary="Distribution"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th rowspan="2" class="br">At</th> -<th class="br">Machine<br />gun.</th> -<th class="br">Detachment<br />of infantry.</th> -<th rowspan="2" colspan="4">Errors of<br />estimation<br />permissible<br />for the<br />machine gun.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<th class="br">Depth of<br />75% strip</th> -<th class="br">Depth of<br />75% strip</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th class="br">m.</th> -<th colspan="4">m.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 450</td> -<td class="br">112</td> -<td class="br">192</td> -<td>54</td> -<td>=</td> -<td>12  </td> -<td>%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br"> 900</td> -<td class="br"> 63</td> -<td class="br">108</td> -<td>31</td> -<td>=</td> -<td> 3.5</td> -<td>%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="br">1350</td> -<td class="br"> 54</td> -<td class="br"> 90</td> -<td>27</td> -<td>=</td> -<td> 2  </td> -<td>%</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="br">1800</td> -<td class="br"> 67</td> -<td class="br">140</td> -<td>31</td> -<td>=</td> -<td> 1.8</td> -<td>%</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>It is clearly apparent that the permissible error of the -range finder is smaller than the depth of the vertical dispersion -strip covered by 75% of the bullets.</p> - -<p>The difficulty of hitting a target lodged in some feature of -the terrain requires that the machine gun be used first of all -against large targets that are visible for a short time only. -When the appropriate elevation is used, a decisive effect may -be confidently counted on within a short space of time; when -an inappropriate elevation is used and the fire is not properly -observed, only accidental hits can, as a rule, be expected, even -when the fire is directed on tall, dense targets. When the fire -is directed on skirmishers lying down, the effect produced is -not commensurate with the amount of ammunition expended, -and a slight error in the elevation used may nullify the effect<span class="pagenum" id="Page267">[267]</span> -entirely. A straight line of trenches, which is plainly visible, -is, on the other hand, an eminently favorable target. The -heating of the barrel, and the difficulty of replenishing ammunition -and renewing the water in the jacket, tend to work -against a participation of machine guns in a protracted fire -fight. The machine gun is not at all suited for carrying on a -prolonged fire action.</p> - -<p>It is very difficult to determine the relative combat value -of a body of infantry as compared with that of a machine gun. -One will not be far wrong in placing this value between 50 and -60 men.</p> - -<p>In experimental field firing at the Swiss Infantry Musketry -School, it was demonstrated that 30-40 skirmishers -almost in every case rapidly gained the upper hand over a -machine gun in the open, at 900 m., but that the infantrymen -had small chances of success when the position of the machine -gun could not be accurately determined. In Switzerland -a machine gun is considered equivalent to 50 infantrymen. -Skirmishers are the most difficult target for machine guns to -fight, and, at the same time, they are the most dangerous. -When the fire is well observed, a good effect can, indeed, still -be counted on, when the fire is directed at prone skirmishers -at ranges up to 1000 m., but this is not true when the fire cannot -be observed; in the last mentioned case, no effect worth -mentioning is produced.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> In a field firing test (which was repeated four times) between -a machine gun (gun pointer covered by a shield) and 30 infantrymen, -the following results were obtained at 600 m. in 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> minutes:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Hits"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Infantrymen</td> -<td class="right">120</td> -<td class="left padr4"> rounds</td> -<td class="right">10</td> -<td class="center"> hits </td> -<td class="right padr0">(9%)</td> -<td> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Machine gun</td> -<td class="right">215</td> -<td class="center padr4">„</td> -<td class="right">14</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right padr0">(7%)</td> -<td class="left padl0"><a id="FNanchor287" href="#Footnote287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a></td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote287" href="#FNanchor287" class="label">[287]</a> Firing tests of the Army Musketry School at Bruck, a.d. Leitha, 1905. -<cite>Streffleur</cite>, Apl. 1906, p. 524.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>England.</b> At the Infantry School at Hythe, in a firing test at 300 -yards, lasting 5 minutes—perhaps the longest period during which continuous -fire is possible—the power of a Maxim gun was found to be equivalent -to 60 rifles. In field firing this comparative power dropped down to -25-35 rifles. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that moral<span class="pagenum" id="Page268">[268]</span> -influences do not make themselves felt in firing under peace conditions, -and that, on the other hand, a single favorable hit can place the machine -gun out of action for a long period, while the skirmishers can keep up -the fire.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>3. INFANTRY VERSUS MACHINE GUNS.</h4> - -<p>It will rarely be possible to concentrate upon a machine -gun battery of six guns a fire equivalent to its own. Because -of the small target offered by machine guns, it is necessary for -a firing line to concentrate its fire upon one machine gun at a -time, thus gradually silencing the battery in detail. This procedure -is feasible because it is very difficult for the machine -guns to reach with their fire all parts of a well concealed skirmish -line. The normal relation, unfavorable for the infantry, -changes in its favor, however, as machine guns cannot keep -up a high rate of fire for a prolonged period, even when nothing -is considered but ammunition supply; as serious breaks are -especially apt to occur when the gun is worked to its maximum -capacity; and as the ammunition expended in one minute -(3600 rounds) cannot produce an effect unless not only the -correct range but also the proper elevation is accurately -known.</p> - -<p>The fight against machine guns may be advantageously -conducted according to the following principles:<a id="FNanchor288" href="#Footnote288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a></p> - -<p>1. Infantry skirmishers should conceal themselves so -well that it will be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery -to find them. Color of immediate vicinity (shade) and background -should be considered; platoon and other leaders must<span class="pagenum" id="Page269">[269]</span> -not stand upright; objects that are clearly visible should be -avoided.</p> - -<p>2. It should be made difficult for the hostile machine -guns to observe their fire (ricochets) and to measure the range. -(No prominent features that would facilitate such measurements -should be located near the infantry position).</p> - -<p>3. The firing line, as far as this is possible, should not -be continuous; the several parts of the line should be posted -in echelon.</p> - -<p>4. Kinds of fire: Lively fire at will should be used.</p> - -<p>5. Expenditure of ammunition: At least 600 rounds -should be expended against each machine gun.</p> - -<p>6. At the outset a single company should concentrate its -fire upon a single machine gun, picking out the one that is -most clearly visible. Machine guns on the flanks are not good -targets, as a strong wind may deflect the fire directed upon -them.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote288" href="#FNanchor288" class="label">[288]</a> Switzerland: Machine guns, “on account of their small gun squads, are -more sensitive to losses than artillery. They cannot adjust their fire so easily -as artillery, but, when once on the target, the effect of their fire is great.</p> - -<p>“The principles governing the combat against artillery are applicable, in -general, to the fight against machine guns. It may be assumed that at medium -ranges, one platoon of infantry will suffice for silencing one machine gun, -provided the platoon of infantry fights the action under favorable conditions. -At short ranges, a few good marksmen suffice for silencing a machine gun. -For this reason selected men are sent forward, when the situation permits, to -sneak up to the machine guns and to pick off the men serving them.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The following rules, governing the conduct of infantry -when exposed to machine gun fire, may be deduced from the -above:</p> - -<p>Even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over -terrain devoid of cover, when exposed within a range of 1500 -m. to the unsubdued fire of machine guns; nothing remains but -for them to lie down, and to gain ground to the front in -groups, or one by one.</p> - -<p>The same is true of route columns. They can only deploy -to the right and left front at double time, and take cover.</p> - -<p>The most unsuitable formation under machine gun fire -is the column of platoons, whether lying down or in motion.<a id="FNanchor289" href="#Footnote289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote289" href="#FNanchor289" class="label">[289]</a> -Within <sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> to 1 minute a column of platoons (lying down) sustained an -average of 4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at 900-1100 m. with 42 and -32%, respectively, figures placed out of action.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If the column of platoons is reached by effective machine -gun fire, when lying down, line must be formed. The men -must not rise, however, to execute this movement, but the<span class="pagenum" id="Page270">[270]</span> -platoons should crawl forward into line. For the men to rise -would mean annihilation.</p> - -<p>The low target offered by machine guns makes them a -difficult target for field artillery to hit, in spite of the accuracy -with which the latter can adjust its fire.</p> - -<h4>4. MACHINE GUNS IN GERMANY.</h4> - -<p>The German machine gun (drawn by 4 horses driven -from the saddle) is mounted upon a sled which forms the -firing frame. On the march, this sled is placed on a wheeled -carriage, from which it must first be detached (10-15 seconds) -before the gun is used; in exceptional cases, the gun can -be fired from the wheeled carriage.</p> - -<p>The gun commander is mounted. Two of the gunners -are seated on the axle chest of the carriage, their carbines -buckled to the gun carriage; two are seated on the limber chest, -their carbines slung over their backs. When surprised by a -direct attack, all the men that can be spared form as skirmishers -in the intervals between the guns of the machine gun battery. -The machine gun can be served by a single man. The -water in the jacket need not necessarily be renewed when the -gun is fired for a short time only.</p> - -<p>The machine guns can be used on any terrain passable -for infantry. When detached from the wheeled carriage they -can even surmount considerable obstacles. In action, they -present no larger target than skirmishers fighting under similar -conditions, and are capable of offering more resistance -than infantry.</p> - -<p>The sled can be carried or drawn by the men for short -distances. The ammunition, placed in belts holding 250 -rounds each, and packed in six boxes, is similarly drawn on -an ammunition sled. If the conditions permit, the guns may -be drawn by horses.</p> - -<p>The “fighting battery” consists of six guns, formed into -three platoons, and an ammunition platoon (three ammunition -wagons and one store wagon); the combat train consists of -officers’ and other led horses. The field train consists of one -baggage wagon, one ration (commissary) wagon, one forage -wagon, and a second store wagon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page271">[271]</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption large">Machine Guns in Germany.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo271a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Lead Team Hitched to Gun.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo271b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Carrying the Machine Guns.</p> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page272">[272-<br />273]<a id="Page273"></a></span></p> - -<p>The movements and gaits of a machine gun battery are -the same as those of a field battery: the order in line, at close -or extended intervals, in which the guns are abreast, the intervals -between them, measured from center to center, being -5 and 17 paces, respectively. The order in line, at extended -intervals, is used in moving to the front or rear; the order in -line, at close intervals, for assembly, for movements in that -formation, for parking, and for parade. The section column<a id="FNanchor290" href="#Footnote290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> -is the principal maneuver formation on the battlefield; it is -employed as an assembly formation on a road, and as route -column. (Par. 320 German F. S. R.). In section column -the guns follow each other at a distance of four paces. In -addition to this column, a column of platoons is used, in which -the platoons follow each other at a distance of 22 paces. (This -may be reduced to 6 paces).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote290" href="#FNanchor290" class="label">[290]</a> The guns are placed in rear of each other, the ammunition wagons and -other vehicles bring up the rear. <i>Translator</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A machine gun battery has available 87,300 rounds of ammunition -(10,500 rounds with each gun and 8100 rounds in -each ammunition wagon, or a total of 14,550 rounds per gun), -which may be drawn forward to the firing position upon sleds, -in boxes holding 250 rounds each. The ammunition wagons -are refilled from the ammunition wagons of the light ammunition -columns of the cavalry division and from the wagons of -the infantry ammunition columns marked with a red stripe, -which carry ammunition for machine gun units. A reserve -machine gun is carried with the ammunition column.</p> - -<p>The machine gun battery combines high infantry fire -power (approximately equivalent to that of the skirmishers of -a German cavalry regiment, armed with carbines, or to that of -4-6 platoons of infantry)<a id="FNanchor291" href="#Footnote291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> with instant readiness for firing, -and a mobility which enables it to follow the mounted arms -anywhere. The chance of producing a sudden fire effect within -a short space of time must be especially utilized, and, therefore, -an endeavor should be made to put entire machine gun batteries -into the first line. The employment of single guns is -precluded owing to the danger of breakdowns, and the employment -of platoons is especially proper on the defensive as well -as in action at short range.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote291" href="#FNanchor291" class="label">[291]</a> A German cavalry regiment at peace strength numbers from 552 to 576 -sabers: a platoon of infantry (on a peace footing) numbers from 48 to 53 men.</p> - -<p>In making a comparison between a cavalry regiment and a machine gun -battery, it must be borne in mind that horse holders are deducted from the -strength given for a cavalry regiment. <i>Translator</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page274">[274]</span></p> - -<div class="split6040"> - -<div class="left6040"> - -<p class="caption">Order in Line<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(extended intervals).</span></p> - -<div class="figcenter nomargin"> -<img src="images/illo274a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--left6040--> - -<div class="right6040"> - -<p class="caption">Order in Line<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(close intervals).</span></p> - -<div class="figcenter nomargin"> -<img src="images/illo274b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--right6040--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split6040--> - -<div class="container w50pc"> - -<p class="caption">Explanation of Symbols used:</p> - -<div class="figcenter nomargin"> -<img src="images/illo274c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> - -<div class="container w10em"> - -<p class="caption">Column of Platoons<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(closed up).</span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo274d.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--left5050--> - -<div class="right5050"> - -<div class="container w10em"> - -<p class="caption">Section Column.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Route Column).</span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo274e.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -</div><!--right5050--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split5050--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page275">[275]</span></p> - -<p>The duties of machine guns naturally grow out of their -tactical advantages. Their fire power should be saved for decisive -moments, when the development of strong fire power -at short ranges is requisite, and when the available time and -the situation do not permit of pushing infantry into action. -The machine gun batteries, which constitute an independent -arm, and which are assigned to cavalry and infantry divisions, -are best adapted for these duties.</p> - -<p>The heavy matériel and the teams designed for rapid -movements make the machine gun battery less suited for employment -in infantry combat, where such a high degree of mobility -is not so necessary. In the battle on the Shaho an employment -of machine guns by platoons in the first line, came -about quite naturally. The guns prepared the assault, reinforced -weak points, and supported the advance. In Germany, -provisional machine gun companies consisting of six two-horse -machine guns, driven from the carriage (these guns cannot -be fired from their carriages), have been adopted for this purpose. -These machine gun companies are principally an auxiliary -weapon of the infantry, and, distributed by platoons to -the battalions, or sent into action as a single unit by the regimental -commander, they serve the purpose of augmenting the -fire of the infantry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page276">[276]</span></p> - -<p>Movements at increased gaits are possible in exceptional -cases only; as a rule, the guns follow the infantry at a walk, -and in combats terminating in a defeat, it may frequently be -impossible to keep them from falling into the hands of the -enemy. The permanent assignment of machine guns to battalions -does not seem to be advisable.</p> - -<h4>5. GOING INTO POSITION.</h4> - -<p>The principles which govern the reconnaissance and occupation -of a position by field artillery are applicable also to machine -guns. The tactical situation determines whether the -guns should move into position under cover or in the open. -As a rule, the interval between two adjacent machine guns in -line is 17 paces; but the proper utilization of favorable cover -does not preclude posting the guns close together. It may likewise -be advantageous to post the guns in echelon on the flanks.</p> - -<p>In action the carriages remain, as a rule, in the nearest -cover in rear of the line. The advance from this point is effected -by the men carrying or dragging the detached guns -and ammunition sleds; under certain circumstances, it may -also be advisable to have the guns or ammunition sleds drawn -forward by single horses (mounts of gun commanders). On -level ground the ammunition platoon and the wheeled carriages -of the machine guns take post in rear of and as close -as possible to the guns. Whether the two groups are combined, -or whether the machine gun carriages should occupy the nearest, -and the ammunition wagons the more distant cover, depends -upon the available cover. The commander of the machine -gun carriages sends full ammunition sleds to the firing -line at an early moment and has empty boxes and belts brought -back.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page277">[277]</span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo277.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">A Machine Gun Platoon Crawling Into Position.</p> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page278">[278-<br />279]<a id="Page279"></a></span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo279.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption rangefinder">Range Finder.</p> - -<p class="caption">A Machine Gun Platoon in Position.</p> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page280">[280-<br />281]<a id="Page281"></a></span></p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo281.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">A Machine Gun Platoon Intrenched.</p> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page282">[282-<br />283]<a id="Page283"></a></span></p> - -<h4>6. THE FIRE FIGHT.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The machine gun. squad consists of one gun commander and four -gunners, numbers 1-4; number 2 is the gun pointer. The gun commander -sees that the gun is set up for the prone, sitting, or kneeling fire position, -according to the terrain, supervises the service of the gun, which can be -served in any position of the body, and removes all obstructions that interfere -with its effective use. The gun pointer handles the gun, <i>i.e.</i>, he loads -it, sets the sight, aims and fires it. No. 3, who lies to the right of the gun -pointer, assists the latter in these duties, places a box of ammunition on -the right of the gun, and feeds the ammunition belt into the slot. When -necessary, he takes the place of the gun pointer. No. 1 lies in rear of the -gun pointer, keeps his eye on the battery and platoon commanders, and -transmits their orders to the gun commander and gun pointer. No. 4 has -charge of the replenishment of ammunition; he takes cover or lies down -20 paces in rear of, or on a flank of the gun.</p> - -<p>The range finders, without special orders to that effect, measure the -range to targets as they appear, or to fixed points, and call it out to the -battery commander. The battery commander designates the target, the -range, and the kind of fire to be used. The platoon commanders assign -a section of the target to each of their guns, designate the elevation that -is to be used, and supervise the service of the guns; they are especially -held responsible that the fire is directed upon the proper target. Platoon -commanders constantly observe through their field glasses the strike of -the bullets and the enemy. The commander of the gun carriages is -charged with their supervision; he constantly sends forward ammunition, -and, when necessary, men and matériel, into the firing position. When -the detached guns change position, he follows the movement under cover -with the gun carriages, bringing them as close to the firing position as -possible.</p> - -<p>After machine gun batteries had been employed at maneuvers as an -auxiliary arm of the cavalry, they did especially good work in the fights -in Southwest Africa,<a id="FNanchor292" href="#Footnote292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> where they were not opposed by artillery.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote292" href="#FNanchor292" class="label">[292]</a> <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1904, Nos. 136, 139 and 140.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Through their ability to follow a skirmish line into the densest thickets, -they were a valuable support to the infantry in the close country in -which the African fights took place, where artillery of necessity had to -fail owing to absence of a clear field of view. It was demonstrated, however, -that the machine gun squads became so engrossed in the work of -serving their guns that supporting troops had to guard them against -surprise.</p> - -<p>In the engagement at the <b>Waterberg</b>, the machine guns did splendid -work in meeting, with an effective volley fire, the sudden, energetic -attacks made by the Hereros against the flank and rear of the Germans.<span class="pagenum" id="Page284">[284]</span> -In two critical moments, during the attack against the left flank of the -advance guard, and during the attack made with a yell against the -right and rear of headquarters, it was principally due to the machine -guns that the enemy, who had come within short range, was repulsed. -Participants of this fight believed that the Hereros did not dare to make -a real attack when machine guns went into action against them. It had -been impossible to avoid using single machine guns. Just as the enemy -was making an attack upon the 11th Company, machine gun No. 3 (2nd -Machine Gun Battery), which had done splendid work, broke down. This -was the only case of jamming that occurred. Although exposed to a -galling hostile fire, the gun commander managed to change barrels in 30 -seconds, and then to resume the firing. The 2nd Machine Gun Battery -expended 20,775 rounds of ammunition; the expenditure of the different -guns varied between 7350 and 120 rounds, according to the part taken -by them in the action. The ammunition supply was certain and steady; -no shortage of ammunition, not even a temporary one, occurred anywhere.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>7. MACHINE GUNS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Switzerland.</b> In 1892 Switzerland began to organize four mounted -Maxim machine gun companies, which were assigned to the weak cavalry -brigades (consisting of six troops<a id="FNanchor293" href="#Footnote293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a>) on account of the defensive role of -the Swiss cavalry and the lack of batteries of horse artillery. Three -machine gun companies were assigned to the fortifications on the St. -Gotthard and one to St. Moritz for the purpose of augmenting the fire -of the advanced positions belonging to those fortifications, and to cover -the approaches thereto.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote293" href="#FNanchor293" class="label">[293]</a> Eskadrons.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A Maxim machine gun company consists of 6 officers, 105 non-commissioned -officers and privates, 99 horses (24 pack horses and 24 draft -horses), 8 guns mounted on tripods, and 7 vehicles (two of these are -two-horse supply and baggage wagons, one four-horse field forge with field -kitchen, 4 two-horse ammunition wagons, each carrying 15,520 rounds of -ammunition). The guns and the ammunition are carried on pack animals. -A packed gun horse carries a load of 108 kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats. -An ammunition horse carries a load of 123 kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats -and 8 ammunition boxes (each holding 250 rounds, or a total of 2000 -rounds weighing 90.5 kg.). A machine gun company of eight guns is -divided into four platoons, each consisting of two guns and four ammunition -horses, and the combat train, consisting of four ammunition wagons -and the field kitchen. Every gun is commanded by a “gun chief,” and -two of the five men belonging to the gun squad are horse holders. After -the command “halt” has been given, 1-1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> minutes are required to get -the gun ready for firing. The company carries 5940 rounds of ammunition -for each gun.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page285">[285]</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption large">Switzerland.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo285a.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Machine Gun and Ammunition Horse.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo285b.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption">Gun Commander and Gun Ready to Fire.</p> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page286">[286-<br />287]<a id="Page287"></a></span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Route column from line is formed by the guns moving successively -in the proper direction, the two ammunition pack animals following directly -in rear of the gun to which they belong. The company takes up a road -space of 150 m. For movements off the road the company may move in -“mass,” or with the platoons in “combat formation.” When in “mass” -the platoons, each in route column, are abreast, with intervals of 10-20 -paces between them. When the platoons are in “combat formation,” the -two guns of each are placed abreast at equal intervals.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="container w15em"> - -<p class="caption">Platoon In Route Column.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo287.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The three machine gun companies assigned to the line of fortifications -consist of two to three platoons, each of four guns. A platoon consists -of 2 officers and 60 non-commissioned officers and privates. The men are -armed with rifles and equipped with alpine sticks. “Gun carriers” (<i>Waffenwarte</i>) -carry the gun basket, which weighs 33 kg. The weight of -the water in the jacket is only 1 kg. “Ammunition carriers” (<i>Munitionswarte</i>) -carry the ammunition in specially constructed frames, each man -carrying 500 rounds.</p> - -<p>Kinds of fire: “<i>Fire by a single gun</i>” is employed at the opening of -an action to drive away patrols and reconnoitering officers, when it is not -desired to betray the presence of machine guns to the enemy.</p> - -<p>“<i>Volley fire</i>” is the usual fire employed by machine guns and corresponds -to the volley fire of infantry. After the target and the elevation -have been designated, the platoon commander directs that fire he opened -by calling the name of the gun pointer who is to fire. A pause is made -after every series of 20-30 shots, which is used to make necessary corrections.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page288">[288]</span></p> - -<p>As soon as the proper elevation has been determined, “<i>rapid fire</i>” is -opened. In this the <i>guns of a platoon fire alternately</i>. The fire is delivered -in series of 100 rounds, and the time during which one of the guns is not -firing is utilized by the non-commissioned officer with it to examine and -oil the mechanism.</p> - -<p>The “<i>fire at will</i>” (continuous fire) of the machine guns corresponds -to the magazine fire of the infantry. <i>All the guns fire simultaneously</i> series -of 50 to 100 rounds, interrupting the fire for a moment at the end of each -series for the purpose of examining and oiling the mechanism; then they -resume the fire with a new series of 50 to 100 rounds. On account of the -great expenditure of ammunition entailed, and also in order to prevent -the premature deterioration of the matériel, fire at will is used in exceptional -cases only, for example, when danger is imminent, or when favorable -opportunities offer.</p> - -<p>“<i>Progressive fire</i>” may be employed against narrow, deep targets, when -the range could not be accurately determined. It may also be employed for -searching an area 100-200 m. deep.</p> - -<p><b>Austria</b> has begun to organize <i>cavalry and mountain machine gun batteries</i> -consisting of four guns each. The machine gun Model 7 (<i>Schwarzlose</i>), -with pack animal equipment, has been adopted. The gun horse -carries 500, and each of the two ammunition horses, 1500 rounds of ammunition. -During mobilization two ammunition horses are to be added for -each gun. Mountain machine gun batteries are similarly organized; each -ammunition horse carries 2000 rounds of ammunition. On the gun itself, -and on the gun frame, 44 belts, each holding 250 rounds, or a total of -11,000 rounds, are carried.<a id="FNanchor294" href="#Footnote294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote294" href="#FNanchor294" class="label">[294]</a> The Schwarzlose machine gun weighs 18 kg. exclusive of frame and the -water in the jacket. (The Maxim weighs 28 kg.).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The formations employed by the cavalry machine gun batteries are the -order in line (at close intervals), the combat order, and the route column.</p> - -<p>The mountain machine gun batteries, carrying guns and ammunition -upon pack horses, are equipped with tripod and basket mounts. These -machine gun batteries combine the system of mounting and carrying employed -by the Swiss cavalry and mountain machine gun companies. Three -pack animals are employed to transport each gun with its ammunition. The -gun squad consists of three men. Officers and non-commissioned officers -are mounted; the other men of the battery are not. Unpacking the guns, -posting them, and getting them in readiness for firing, is managed in a -similar manner as in the Swiss machine gun companies.</p> - -<p>The gun adopted for <i>infantry machine gun batteries</i> is the light and -simple Schwarzlose machine gun, Model 7.</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Comparison"> - -<tr> -<th class="padr2"> </th> -<th class="padl2 padr2">Springs</th> -<th class="padl2 padr2">Parts of<br />breech</th> -<th class="padl2 padr2">Screws<br />& Pins</th> -<th colspan="2" class="padl2">Weights</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Maxim</td> -<td class="center">14</td> -<td class="center">35</td> -<td class="center">52</td> -<td class="center padl2">27.5</td> -<td class="center"> kg.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Schwarzlose</td> -<td class="center"> 1</td> -<td class="center">11</td> -<td class="center">13</td> -<td class="center padl2">17.5</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>Tripod mounts and pack animal transportation are necessary in view<span class="pagenum" id="Page289">[289]</span> -of Austrian theaters of war. The batteries consist of four machine guns.</p> - -<p>“The great length of modern battle fronts, and the gaps and local -combats along the latter, would seem to make a distribution of machine -guns along the entire front desirable. Attention is thereby directed to -organizing the machine guns to be employed with the infantry as ‘Regimental -Machine Guns.’ Such an organization would best ensure the training -of this new arm for the infantry combat and the prompt attainment of -an understanding of its employment.</p> - -<p>“In the cavalry, the difficulties of organizing, training, and employing -machine guns are considerably greater than in the infantry. These difficulties -are best overcome by organizing the machine guns assigned to -cavalry into independent batteries, and placing them at the disposal of the -higher cavalry commanders.</p> - -<p>“In determining upon the size of the machine gun batteries attached -to infantry, an attempt should be made to combine minimum size with -adequate fire effect and maximum mobility. Two machine guns would -seem to be almost the maximum number that should be posted at one -point in an infantry action. From a tactical point of view, it is, moreover, -undesirable to post a greater number at one point, because gun shields, -steam, etc. would frequently form too prominent a target, for the hostile -artillery to forego firing on it promptly and with telling effect.</p> - -<p>“In connection with the desire for more than two machine guns in -each infantry and Jäger organization—about two guns per battalion—the -tremendous increase in ammunition trains should be considered. It would -also be well to bear in mind that we have, as a matter of fact, not even -become accustomed to the numerous ammunition columns of our rapid fire -artillery.</p> - -<p>“In the cavalry, the necessity of dividing a machine gun battery for the -purpose of assigning the parts thereof to brigades, and of assigning machine -guns to reconnaissance and other independent detachments, must be reckoned -with. When we bear in mind that single machine guns are to be used -only in exceptional cases, the machine gun battery intended for the cavalry -cannot well be made smaller than four guns.”<a id="FNanchor295" href="#Footnote295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote295" href="#FNanchor295" class="label">[295]</a> <cite>Streffleur</cite>, January, 1908, p. 114, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>England.</b> During the <b>Boer war</b> 1-2 machine guns mounted on a -high carriage were assigned to each of the British battalions. These guns -were unsuited to employment in an infantry combat and were quickly -silenced. The campaign demonstrated that these guns could frequently -not be used, and that they stood idle in rear of the line. They were -not combined into detachments for the purpose of supporting the attack, -as should have been done, until the engagement at <b>Pieters Hill</b> (27th Febr., -1900). On account of the long range at which these guns came into -action, the effect of their fire was indeed very small, but, nevertheless, its -moral effect impaired the steadiness of the Boer aim. Since the great -fire power of these guns can be brought into play only when several of<span class="pagenum" id="Page290">[290]</span> -them are employed together, it is not a good plan to assign single guns -to cavalry regiments for the purpose of supporting the dismounted line in -action. Only the commander of the entire force, and not each battalion -commander, is able to judge where the employment of machine guns would -be advantageous. The proposal to assign machine guns to the artillery was -not followed, as it was justly feared that the machine guns would then -be assigned tasks to which they were not adapted.</p> - -<p>At the present time, each battalion has a machine gun platoon consisting -of two guns. Both guns with their tripods, and a portion of the -ammunition, are transported on one wagon drawn by two horses. They -are in addition equipped with a two-horse ammunition cart. The complement -consists of 1 non-commissioned officer, 15 privates, 1 saddle horse, -and 4 draft horses.</p> - -<p>Each battalion of mounted infantry has a machine gun platoon which -is similarly organized. Each of the four vehicles of this platoon is, however, -drawn by four horses. In addition, this platoon is equipped with six -machine gun pack saddles for transporting the guns on pack animals. -The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 first sergeant, 23 privates, 16 -saddle horses, and 16 draft animals.</p> - -<p>The machine gun platoon of a cavalry regiment consists of only one -gun, which is carried on a four-horse wagon, and a four-horse ammunition -wagon. The platoon is equipped with three pack saddles. The complement -consists of 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 13 privates, 11 -saddle horses, and 8 draft horses.</p> - -<p>The following ammunition is carried by the British machine gun -platoons:</p> - -<table class="ukammo" summary="Ammunition"> - -<tr class="btd bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">With the<br />organiza-<br />tion.</th> -<th class="br">In the<br />ammunition<br />column<br />of the<br />F. A. Bns.</th> -<th class="br">In the<br />Division<br />ammunition<br />column.</th> -<th>Total No.<br />rounds.</th> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Infantry M. G. P.</td> -<td class="rounds br">11,500</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds">31,500</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="descr">Mtd. Infantry M. G. P.</td> -<td class="rounds br">19,500</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds">39,500</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="descr">Cavalry M. G. P</td> -<td class="rounds br">19,500</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds br">10,000</td> -<td class="rounds">39,500</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><b>Japan</b> and <b>France</b> seem to have decided to follow the British in assigning -machine gun platoons to regiments. In <b>Japan</b>, soon after the -outbreak of the <b>Russo-Japanese war</b>, the Guard, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th -and 6th Divisions, and the two independent cavalry brigades, had machine -gun batteries consisting of 6 guns each. During the winter 1904-5, 320 -machine guns were gradually placed in position, singly and by platoons, -in the fortifications on the Shaho.</p> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> At the outbreak of the <b>Russo-Japanese war</b>, a machine gun -company was assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 5th East Siberian Rifle Brigades.<span class="pagenum" id="Page291">[291]</span> -This company consisted of 5 officers, 85 combatants, 13 non-combatants, 10 -saddle horses, 29 draft horses, and eight guns. The latter were mounted -on high carriages, and were protected by steel shields. Of the ammunition, -1350 rounds, in belts holding 450 rounds each, were carried on each -gun carriage, and 4500 rounds on each of the six two-wheeled ammunition -carts. The field train consisted of nine one-horse carts. The loss of -the machine gun company at the <b>Yalu</b> was probably due to the fact that the -guns, mounted on high carriages, were quickly deprived of their mobility in -their second position, after they had, from their first position, effectively -flanked the advance of the Japanese infantry. Immediately after this -first lesson, the high wheeled carriage was apparently abolished, and the -tripod adopted. On September 26th, 1904, the machine gun companies -were reorganized. There were (old) wheeled, and (newly-organized) so-called -“mountain machine gun companies,” the latter having pack animal -transportation. These companies were assigned to infantry and Rifle -divisions and were designated by the numbers of their divisions.</p> - -<p>On December 12th, 1906, the machine gun organization was again -changed, because it was asserted that the assignment of machine gun -companies to divisions hampered the division commander; that the employment -of 8 guns at one point was injudicious; and that so large a machine -gun battery actually induced a scattering of the guns. Infantry, -Reserve, and Rifle regiments are each assigned a machine gun organization -consisting of 4 guns, mounted on tripods, equipped with 6 mm. steel shields, -with pack animal transportation.</p> - -<p>Complement: 3 officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 46 privates, 7 -non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 21 pack and draft horses (8 of these for -carrying ammunition), 4 ammunition carts, and 5 train wagons. The personnel -is drawn from a regiment in which the men to be detailed for -machine gun duty are trained.</p> - -<p>According to an officer who commanded a machine gun company in -the battle of <b>Liao Yang</b><a id="FNanchor296" href="#Footnote296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a>, his company went into position on August -30th, on the right flank of its division behind an earth embankment at the -south edge of the village of Gutsealing, and 300 m. from the railroad running -in a southwesterly direction. This position was taken up with the -object of preventing the envelopment of the right flank of the division. -Sufficient time was available for cutting down the kaoliang crop for 650 m. -Beyond this range the kaoliang fields continued for several hundred -meters. Directly in front of the position of the company there was a -hill, upon which several mounted men showed themselves toward 10 A. M. -As soon as fire was opened on them, they threw themselves down in a field -covered with tall kaoliang. When these mounted men had reached a fairly -open space, about 900 m. from the machine gun company, they could be -clearly seen. In rear of them was observed a mountain battery of artillery, -which endeavored to go into position on the hill mentioned, apparently with -a view of directing a flanking fire on the Russian skirmishers farther to<span class="pagenum" id="Page292">[292]</span> -the front than the machine guns. Fire was opened at once, without first -bracketing the target, the first gun firing at 1200 paces (about 850 m.), and -each succeeding gun increasing the range by 25 paces, thus covering with -fire a space 150 m. deep. Immediately after fire was opened on it, the -mountain battery attempted to escape to the right, but succumbed to the -fire of the machine guns. The latter had fired about 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> minutes, and had -expended 6000 rounds of ammunition. About noon, hostile (Japanese) -skirmishers attempted to cross the railroad embankment, one by one, -apparently with a view of flanking the machine guns. The latter opened -fire on the Japanese, combined sights, and, for a short period, rapid fire -with sweeping being resorted to. The movement made by the Japanese -was discontinued; an advance made by groups against the front of the -machine guns got only as far as the edge of the cleared kaoliang field. In -the open, the skirmishers were unable to advance a single step; every -attempt, on their part, to rise, was prevented. Whether it would have -been possible to advance by crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, -can, of course, not be determined now.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote296" href="#FNanchor296" class="label">[296]</a> <cite>Russian Invalid</cite>, October 1904.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and -annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire. -At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from the -machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness, however, -in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered. When their -fire became more and more galling, the machine gun commander decided -to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15 men (Reservists and -horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to drive them out. The undertaking -was successful. It was found that this continuous annoying fire -had been kept up by only 1 officer and 24 men.</p> - -<p>At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a signal -detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry, directed on -this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after two machine guns, one -using an elevation of 1025, the other one of 1075 m., had fired on that point -for a short time, the Japanese disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns -succeeded in repulsing an enveloping movement made against their right -flank. This movement was betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang -stalks. Toward 7 P. M., the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the -machine guns, which suffered considerable losses, although the personnel -was protected by an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. -This fire did not cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was -evacuated by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night -found the machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company -had lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition, -or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority -of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish line -can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter.</p> - -<p>In the defensive position on the <b>Shaho</b> and at <b>Mukden</b>, machine -guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets and<span class="pagenum" id="Page293">[293]</span> -under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel <span class="smcap">Anisinow</span>, -good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050 m., against closed -bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry (<i>Eskadrons</i>) up to 1400 -m.; against batteries of artillery, halted in the open, staffs, and columns, -the fire was sufficiently effective up to 1960 m.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN -BATTERIES.</h4> - -<p>Machine guns will never be able to replace artillery at -long ranges; on the other hand, they will often find an opportunity -to support other arms with their fire at medium and -short ranges.</p> - -<p>It has been asserted that machine guns do not always follow -the movements of the firing lines in action, that the commander -of a force is not always able to find a good position for -them; and the question raised whether the space taken up by -the machine guns and their ammunition wagons in a column -could not be more profitably filled by companies of infantry -or by a portion of an ammunition column of corresponding -length. To be sure, machine guns are a special arm; the justification -of their existence lies in the combination of constant -readiness for firing with highly developed mobility, so that, -held back under direct control of the commander of a force, -they give him the means wherewith to produce within a short -time a sudden effect, in the nature of a surprise. This is the -very purpose for which machine guns were created. They are -not intended for prolonged fire action, not for accompanying -an infantry skirmish line in an advance by rushes, and, least -of all, for fighting well covered firing lines. In addition, -the fact that machine guns make it possible to concentrate fire -quickly on any space, whereby the moral effect is considerably -increased, ought not to be underestimated. It would seem to -be advisable to employ machine guns in conjunction with infantry -when it is impossible to develop a powerful fire on account -of the conformation of the ground, but when such fire -is desirable for commanding approaches or defiles; further,<span class="pagenum" id="Page294">[294]</span> -when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example, -in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be -pushed far to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, -which can then be held by a few men during the pauses in the -fight.<a id="FNanchor297" href="#Footnote297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> Although machine gun fire may perhaps be relatively -less accurate than that of a body of infantry, the value of -pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy within a brief -space of time should not be underestimated.<a id="FNanchor298" href="#Footnote298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote297" href="#FNanchor297" class="label">[297]</a> At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was not easy for -a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the shaft of a search light; -few men possessed the requisite eyesight to make this possible. It would no -doubt be practicable, however, to attach such men to the machine guns posted -in a defensive position. A considerable increase in fire effect could thus be -obtained.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote298" href="#FNanchor298" class="label">[298]</a> Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing from 1200-1100 -paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>, and machine gun fire, in 3% hits. -The three kinds of fire, when directed against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, -in one minute, in 13, 18, and 10% hits, respectively.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are -employed as a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend -upon whether it is contemplated to employ them in a -purely defensive way for the purpose of reinforcing the several -weak points, or offensively in fire surprises or in covering the -flanks. The distribution by platoons has the undeniable disadvantage -that single guns will frequently not find an opportunity -to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition supply is -increased; and that the combined employment of the several -platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. -On the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons -each, an employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution -by platoons is permissible in a passive defense, the employment -of the guns by battery (company) against the flanks -of the attacker permits the mobility and fire power of the -arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a distribution -of machine guns by platoons—if we except colonial and mountain -warfare—is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless -frittering away of fighting units.<a id="FNanchor299" href="#Footnote299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote299" href="#FNanchor299" class="label">[299]</a> -Lieutenant <span class="smcap">Ulrich</span> (retired), who participated in the fighting in Manchuria, -voices the same opinion in <cite>Jahrbücher</cite>, March number, p. 285:</p> - -<p>“The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of strong machine -gun units is one of the most important requirements of modern battle.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page295">[295]</span></p> - -<p>Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers into -play to the best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, -when, from their position as far forward as possible in the -column, they are pushed to the front to occupy important points -and to compel the enemy to deploy his infantry. The commander -should, however, endeavor to withdraw the machine -guns from the fight as soon as his own infantry has deployed, -in order to avoid involving the guns in a protracted fire fight -necessitating an expenditure of a great amount of ammunition -and in which the accuracy of their fire would gradually -suffer.<a id="FNanchor300" href="#Footnote300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a> The proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment -as a separate arm, whether they are posted so as to -flank an enemy, or are kept at the disposal of the commander -as an ever ready reserve, which is pushed forward to keep the -point to be attacked under fire, to meet a counter-attack, or—and -to this use they are best adapted—to participate in the -pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear guard actions, -since they are able to remain in position longer, for -example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are -paralyzed by the thought of getting away from the enemy in -time. Machine guns are much more independent than infantry -on account of their ability to withdraw at an increased gait. -On account of their greater staying power and the greater intensity -of their fire, they increase the delay which the enemy -suffers, as well as the start gained by their own force; they -moreover enable their own force to get away from the enemy -and to escape pursuit.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote300" href="#FNanchor300" class="label">[300]</a> This applies particularly to machine guns which have air cooled barrels. -After four minutes of continuous fire, part of the projectiles, and after seven -minutes all of the projectiles fired from a Hotchkiss machine gun go over the -target (platoon). <cite>Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift</cite>, January number, 1907.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In employing machine guns in defense, it must be borne -in mind that the guns are not adapted to carry on protracted -fire actions; and that the advantage of the mobility of machine -gun batteries cannot be properly utilized if they have been assigned, -from the outset, a definite section to defend. As a -rule, it will be advisable, in defense, to keep the machine guns<span class="pagenum" id="Page296">[296]</span> -at first with the reserve, and to employ them later, as necessity -requires, even by platoons, to reinforce the defensive line at -threatened points, or, by battery (company), to prevent an -envelopment, or to participate in offensive movements. This -does not preclude the employment of machine guns during the -preparatory stage of the engagement, for example, to command -important approaches. When a covered withdrawal of -the guns is assured, it will also be possible to post machine gun -batteries in such a manner in front of, or to a flank of the -main defensive position, that they can suddenly sweep with -their fire the ground on which the opponent will probably -place his artillery. Flanking machine gun fire can sometimes -be employed for sweeping dead angles.</p> - -<p>The provisions of the Austrian machine gun regulations -correspond in the main to those of the German Army. In -Austria special stress is laid upon the use of machine guns -with cavalry, while in Germany they are in addition a mobile -reserve. Machine gun batteries accomplish the principal objects -which cavalry expects to attain by the assignment of infantry,<a id="FNanchor301" href="#Footnote301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> -viz., relief from fighting on foot, great fire power, -and mobility. Even in reconnaissance duty, machine guns will -be employed to break down the resistance of the enemy in occupied -localities and to augment the resistance of their own -force in such places. During an advance, machine guns should -go into position at an early moment in order to cover as effectively -as possible the approach and the deployment for attack. -It is advisable to post the guns of a machine gun battery -together, so as not to have numerous lines of fire interfere -with the movements of the cavalry; this is especially -emphasized by the Austrian regulations. Machine gun batteries, -like horse batteries (artillery), remain with the cavalry -divisions during a battle.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote301" href="#FNanchor301" class="label">[301]</a> In regard to the employment of machine guns in the maneuvers of 1905, -see <cite>Streffleur</cite>, 1906, May number.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>German machine guns are especially adapted for resisting -cavalry, while guns transported upon pack animals are entirely<span class="pagenum" id="Page297">[297]</span> -helpless on the march and when going into position, and -require the support of the other arms. German machine guns, -whether on their wheeled carriages or on their sleds, are capable -of warding off cavalry. The fire of the guns should be -distributed over the entire front of the mounted attacking line. -Special attention should be paid to lines following the first attacking -line, to the flanks of the guns themselves, and to -covering the carriages when they are not with the guns. Machine -guns are able to advance on open ground without regard -to cavalry, so long as the latter is not supported by -artillery or infantry, or is not so superior in force that it can -attack simultaneously from several directions, or in several -lines.</p> - -<p>In action against artillery it should be borne in mind -that artillery possesses an unquestioned superiority of fire at -the longer ranges; at ranges at which machine guns are able -to fire at all, they must seek to find protection under cover, -or by distributing the guns. Artillery is very susceptible to -flanking fire. When that arm is to be engaged, the machine -gun sleds should be brought as close as possible to the hostile -batteries. In this case it is, moreover, advisable to have large -intervals between the machine gun platoons. The great mobility -of the machine gun battery, when limbered, will sometimes -enable it to take up a position from which it can flank -the enemy. In distributing machine gun fire it would be well -always to assign the same task to two guns. It is not a good -plan to have all the machine guns sweep the entire front of -a firing battery (artillery).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The opinions in regard to machine gun employment in field warfare—mountain -and fortress warfare are not considered here—differ considerably. -In <b>England</b> machine guns are attached to battalions, and Japan of late leans -toward this mode of employment. In <b>Switzerland</b> machine guns serve in -addition as a substitute for horse batteries, which their army lacks.</p> - -<p>The <b>English</b> view is obviously affected by their experience in colonial -wars.</p> - -<p>The following are given as the duties of machine guns <i>in attack</i>:</p> - -<p>1. The machine gun is above all to be employed at long ranges. In<span class="pagenum" id="Page298">[298]</span> -open country it will seldom be possible for the gun to reach a position in -the first line, where, moreover, the gun would offer too good a target. -Covered terrain should be taken advantage of to get the gun close to the -enemy. The advance of infantry may be supported at long ranges by machine -gun fire (fire of position).</p> - -<p>2. The delivery of volley fire against any point of the hostile position.</p> - -<p>3. The warding off of counter-attacks or attacks made by cavalry.</p> - -<p>4. The utilization of flanking positions.</p> - -<p>5. The support of cavalry during delaying actions (ammunition being -in this case a substitute for men) although the fire effect against low targets -is very small.</p> - -<p>6. The holding of captured positions.</p> - -<p><i>In defense</i> the isolated employment of machine guns at a distance from -the organization is prohibited and their use against extended skirmish lines -cautioned against. Machine guns are well adapted for protecting flanks -and can be kept back as a reserve to prevent the advance of hostile reinforcements, -to support counter-attacks, to direct fire against deep and -dense targets, and, finally, to support the firing line in action at short -range.</p> - -<p><i>In defense</i> the principal duties of machine guns will consist <span class="nowrap">of—</span></p> - -<p>1. Sweeping obstacles and commanding terrain which is specially -favorable for the attack; flanking of salients.</p> - -<p>2. Reinforcing weak points.</p> - -<p>3. Firing on advancing hostile reinforcements.</p> - -<p>The cavalry regulations, contrary to those of the infantry, also permit -a massed employment of machine guns when ordered by brigade or division -commanders.</p> - -<p>“As a rule, it will not be advisable to open fire on isolated mounted -men or small groups of approximately platoon strength, as this would -betray the position prematurely. In action, machine guns may be employed -in conjunction with dismounted skirmishers for the purpose of -forming a supporting point for movements, a rallying position, or for protecting -a flank. Finally, during an attack, machine guns may support the -fire of the horse battery, on the outer flank of which they go into position, -to serve as support, or to facilitate by their fire a withdrawal.”</p> - -<p>These official regulations are not entirely in accord with the views -entertained in the army. The combined use of the machine guns of a -brigade, such as quite naturally resulted in the engagement at <b>Pieters Hill</b>, -is advocated by many. At the longer ranges, machine gun companies are -to fire on favorable targets, discontinuing their fire when their object has -been accomplished. In addition they are to cover the advance or withdrawal -of the infantry; to fire on certain points of the hostile position; to act -against the enemy’s flanks in pursuit; and, in defense, posted in pairs,<span class="pagenum" id="Page299">[299]</span> -they are to flank salient angles and make it difficult for the enemy to -approach the obstacles.</p> - -<p>In <b>Switzerland</b> machine guns are considered an auxiliary arm. “Our -field army should be capable of accepting and sustaining battle in the -mountains and on highland plateaus without necessitating the creation of -numerous special detachments for that purpose. Machine gun companies -should be a tool which can be used in the mountains and on highland -plateaus, and which can be turned over for use to any organization.”</p> - -<p>The platoon is the firing unit; the company commander posts his -platoons at large intervals and regulates their mutual coöperation. Fire, -suddenly delivered from various points, frequently rather far distant from -each other, is considered to have a particularly demoralizing effect; the -scattered posting of the platoons makes it difficult for the enemy to combat -effectively the individual platoons which are skillfully concealed on the -terrain. “The indefinable, uncanny and confusing aspect of their appearance -enhances the effect of the fire surprise.” The defensive character -is here especially clearly marked, for cavalry which counts in the first -place on the offensive will prefer a combined employment of machine -guns, so as not to be hampered in its movements by the various lines of -fire. On the march, machine guns are posted as far forward as possible -in the column; single platoons may also be attached to troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) -of advance guard cavalry, and, in exceptional cases only, to troops -(<i>Eskadrons</i>) of reconnoitering cavalry. Machine guns, supported by weak -cavalry detachments, may be pushed forward to occupy defiles; moreover, -the machine gun company assigned to a cavalry brigade may be sent into -action either as a whole unit, or it may be divided from the start or during -the course of the fight. This machine gun company may also be attached to -regiments, troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) or platoons of cavalry charged with special -missions, in which case it is, as a rule, broken up into platoons. The premature -detaching of machine gun units is especially cautioned against. -“The mobility of the machine gun unit is such that it is not at all dangerous -to hold them back until the last moment before sending them -to the actually threatened point.”</p> - -<p>The regulations deem a special support necessary for the machine -gun batteries when they are sent on independent missions. Single guns -are not to be so used. Machine guns, distributed by platoons, invest cavalry -dismounted for fire action with a special power of resistance. It will -frequently be advantageous to occupy the enemy in front with weakly supported -machine gun batteries, while maneuvering with the main body of -the mounted force so as to gain the enemy’s weak point, and attacking him -there with fire or a charge. In a cavalry fight Maxim machine gun marksmen, -by timely, hold, and energetic action, will very often be able to create -favorable conditions for their own troops, facilitate the selection of a -point of attack, and retard and interfere with the hostile deployment.</p> - -<p>The following statements taken from the regulations for the <cite>Service -and Training of <b class="nonitalic">Swiss</b> cavalry</cite> (1904) are of interest:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page300">[300]</span></p> - -<p>“Machine guns invest pursuing cavalry with tremendous power.—Their -violent fire, suddenly breaking forth, especially when quickly delivered -at the flanks of the retreating mass, must have an annihilating -effect and convert the retreat into a rout.</p> - -<p>“In a retreat, Maxim gun marksmen with their guns can quickly -occupy rallying positions (when possible, flanking), which, thanks to their -mobility, they are capable of holding longer than other arms. Thereby -they facilitate for the other troops the critical breaking off of the engagement.</p> - -<p>“The retreat will proceed with greater steadiness and time will be -gained for organizing resistance and for making that resistance more obstinate.</p> - -<p>“When, during the crisis of battle, every available man joins in the -fight, machine guns may take a hand in it, even when the terrain is unfavorable -for the employment of cavalry, by gaining the flanks at a rapid -gait, turning and firing upon the hostile flank or the hostile masses launched -for the counter-attack.</p> - -<p>“It would be incorrect, however, at such a moment, simply to throw -the machine guns into the fighting line or to a flank. By doing this the -mobility of the guns would not be utilized, and they would lose their character -of a mounted arm.</p> - -<p>“The assignment of machine guns to cavalry augments the fighting -power and independence of the latter and increases to the utmost its desire -to go ahead, its enterprise and bold initiative. With the aid of machine -guns, our militia cavalry, even when opposed by better drilled cavalry, can -go into battle calmly on our terrain, with the firm conviction of defeating it.</p> - -<p>“But a cavalry leader should never shrink from sacrificing his machine -guns when the object to be attained requires it, and when no other -means remain to save the force. <i>These weapons should never be more -to him than a welcome and powerful aid toward the fulfillment of his -mission. Cavalry which degenerates into a mere support for its machine -guns has ceased to be cavalry.</i>”</p> - -</div><!--textqote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page301">[301]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" title="VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY. (Par. 451 German I. D. R.).">VII. -INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.<a id="FNanchor302" href="#Footnote302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a><br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Par. 451 German I. D. R.).</span></h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote302" href="#FNanchor302" class="label">[302]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, -II, p. 137: <cite>Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf Infanterie</cite>. For -examples from military history consult the splendid works of Major <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -especially <cite>Die deutsche Reiterei</cite>, and <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 5.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who -knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the -individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains -cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle -properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is -even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains -its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by -cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while -cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid -charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral -effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces -upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and -misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged, -and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger -and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be -able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would look differently -upon the possibility of making a mounted charge during a -battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on the -Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand -of infantry that it close with the enemy after it has -suffered tremendous losses, why should we not demand the -same of cavalry whose mobility is disproportionately greater.” -(<cite>Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June 15th, 1882</cite>). The less -the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the greater the certainty -of such success. The troops should be accustomed in -time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation<span class="pagenum" id="Page302">[302]</span> -made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian -army is, at any rate, worthy of consideration.<a id="FNanchor303" href="#Footnote303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> He proposed -that cavalry ride at full speed through infantry lines deployed -with three paces between files. Some infantrymen are, -indeed, bound to be injured in such charges, but the wounds -produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry accustomed to -such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in action as -when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on the -battlefield.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote303" href="#FNanchor303" class="label">[303]</a> <cite>Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf</cite>, I, p. 55.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the -Austrian army at <b>Custozza</b> with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans, may -be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry was not accustomed -to field service and lacked training. This small force of cavalry -broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade (Italian) and struck the -route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing it into complete panic, so that -of five battalions only one remained intact. The three platoons of cavalry, -which numbered about 100 sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 -horses killed and wounded. The charge made by three troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) -of the Dragoons of the Guard at <b>Mars-la-Tour</b>, to facilitate the retreat -of the defeated 38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th -Hussars at <b>Sapignies</b> were likewise successful.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for -warding off cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry -charge passes suffer losses that scarcely deserve mention. The -fight is not hopeless even when the hostile troopers halt within -the ranks of the infantry. When cavalry has charged through -a skirmish line, the latter should be careful not to face about -to fire at the troopers,<a id="FNanchor304" href="#Footnote304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> as that would give a second cavalry -line an opportunity to approach and strike it unawares.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote304" href="#FNanchor304" class="label">[304]</a> “The French firing lines through which the cavalry had charged (evening -attack made by Rauch’s Brigade in the direction of Rezonville on August 16th, -1870) fired after the Hussars, while the French Infantry units in rear fired in -the opposite direction. The result was a frightful cross-fire, which, while undoubtedly -disastrous for the Hussars, certainly must have worked havoc among -the French.” <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Reiterei</cite>, p. 153.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The supports in rear of the first line form the objective -of the cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. -These supports must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless -of the skirmishers in front.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page303">[303]</span></p> - -<p>The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when -that line is not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened -wing should never be bent forward since that interferes -with the fire of adjacent units. The task of repulsing an attack -directed against a flank had best be left to the supports in -rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill Regulations -(par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk of the -supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing -line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank -would be insignificant; and that at any rate a <i>new</i> firing line -could not be formed within a short time; and, therefore, that -a charge against its flank would be advantageous. This statement -should be a warning for us always to retain echelons or -machine guns in rear of the flanks. The most critical situation -for infantry is that in which it is charged by cavalry while -retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports available -to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be -left to each individual to save himself as best he can.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the battle of <b>Scheinovo</b>, three companies of the 11th Russian -Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under the -pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to charge their -left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the 4th Company, which -was most seriously threatened, halted and formed square as if on the -parade ground. During this maneuver, all the officers and many non-commissioned -officers were either killed or wounded. The heavy losses of -the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be ascribed to this halt under the -most violent fire of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor305" href="#Footnote305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote305" href="#FNanchor305" class="label">[305]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, p. 166.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, -however, the hostile infantry and artillery will have to stop -firing, and it may then be possible to rally or re-form the -defeated force, provided the men will heed their leaders.</p> - -<p>Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front -or flank for the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to -fire in close order only when not themselves subjected to hostile -fire. The front and flanks of a body of infantry in proper<span class="pagenum" id="Page304">[304]</span> -formation are equally strong, but, in this connection, it should -be borne in mind that a deployment toward a flank, for the -purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt to impair the -steadiness of the men.<a id="FNanchor306" href="#Footnote306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote306" href="#FNanchor306" class="label">[306]</a> -General <span class="smcap">von Scherff</span> (<cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, II, p. 263) believes that a frontal -charge made by cavalry of sufficient strength has better chances of succeeding -than a charge in deep formation against a flank. In a frontal charge, the -suddenly appearing cavalry is exposed “only to the fire at will of individual -skirmishers whose continuous front masks the fire of units in rear.” In the -other case (charge against a flank) the cavalry receives not only the fire of the -closed bodies first encountered, but also that of the supports firing through the -gaps between these groups. The frontal attacks executed with superb gallantry -by the French cavalry at Sedan rather prove the opposite.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, -such as ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the -hostile cavalry. It is not necessary, however, for the infantry -to occupy the obstacle itself; in fact, it is better to take up -a position some distance away. The shortness of our rifles -obliges us to form the firing unit at right angles to the line -of advance of the approaching cavalry, and to avoid aiming -obliquely. The provision contained in a number of drill regulations, -including the French, that the bodies in close order -(supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable, -as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as -the French infantry did in repulsing the charge made by -Bredow’s Brigade and the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). -The deployment from “broad” and “deep” column to -meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be ordered directly -by company commanders on the caution of the battalion commander, -the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided -upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for -firing and to protect the flanks by means of echelons.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the commanders -of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading -companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for -example, the following scheme would be appropriate:</p> - -<p><i>The 1st Company</i> forms left front into line so that its front is at -right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry;</p> - -<p><i>The 2nd Company</i> forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the -first company;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page305">[305]</span></p> - -<p><i>The 3rd Company</i> forms right front into line, and prolongs the line -of the first company;</p> - -<p><i>The 4th Company</i> also forms right front into line, or is held in readiness -as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the approaching -cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight platoons.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="container w20em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo305.png" alt="Battle order" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge -directed against the flank of a marching column (form line by -wheeling by squads). When the cavalry charge is directed -against the head or the tail of a column, as recommended by the -German Cavalry Drill Regulations (par. 350), there will not -be time enough, as a rule, for the entire company or battalion -to form line. It will suffice to let the leading elements form -line, the rear elements moving out of the column and forming -in rear of the flanks as supports.</p> - -<p>Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation -taken up; in fact the latter is of importance only when it increases -the feeling of security. The morale of an organization -is of more importance than the formation taken up. A proud -confidence in victory and morale are the only factors which -decide success, and the training of infantry should be such as -to develop these qualities.</p> - -<p>Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a -success if it causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to<span class="pagenum" id="Page306">[306]</span> -take up formations which interfere with the highest development -of its fire, or which offer favorable targets to the hostile -infantry and artillery. This is especially the case where infantry -is in the act of beginning an assault, when the slightest -hesitation may jeopardize success. If cavalry actually begins to -charge at this moment, only the bodies immediately threatened -halt at the signal “attention,”<a id="FNanchor307" href="#Footnote307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> and face the cavalry; the -remainder continue the march.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote307" href="#FNanchor307" class="label">[307]</a> The German army is the only one that employs an appropriate signal for -this purpose. The attack made by the 28th Infantry Brigade against the wood -of Bor at Königgrätz is very instructive in this connection. <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Taktik der -Zukunft</cite>, p. 56. At the signal, “cavalry,” the threatened portions of the brigade -halted and formed square. Fortunately the Saxons had already begun to retire -from the edge of the wood. A stray hostile troop (<i>Eskadron</i>) had caused all the -trouble.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces -such a tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately -threatened, that they either watch the attack passively, -or else too many of them take a hand in repulsing it. -This moment, in which the attention of the troops is so completely -riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized for the purpose -of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a withdrawal.<a id="FNanchor308" href="#Footnote308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> -It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s -self the success which the French army could have gained at -Waterloo if infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s -cavalry squadrons. In the battle of Vionville the German -infantry fired at the most incredible angles at the charging -French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s Brigade was making -its charge during the same battle, part of the infantry of the -6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers, to follow -with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking place -on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page307">[307]</span> -natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by -such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of -executing a movement or holding him with our own fire. It -also seems absolutely necessary to support with rifle fire the -charge made by one’s own cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the -hostile infantry from firing undisturbed on our troopers.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote308" href="#FNanchor308" class="label">[308]</a> “Every leader should carefully watch the progress of a cavalry charge, and, -as soon as he observes that friendly cavalry has succeeded in penetrating the -hostile line or that the enemy is shaken and directs all of his fire against the -charging cavalry, he should immediately advance to the attack and be upon the -enemy with the bayonet before the latter recovers his senses. Such an attack will -not have been made in vain, even if the cavalry has been repulsed.” General -<span class="smcap">Gurko’s</span> comments on the maneuvers of 1893.</p> - -<p>Prince <span class="smcap">Frederick Charles</span>, in his <cite>Winke für die Offiziere der unter Meinen -Befehlen ins Feld rückenden Truppen</cite> (1870), also demands that the infantry -should quickly follow up cavalry attacks.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout -should be kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry -drill regulations recognize that a charge has greater chances -of succeeding when it is made in deep formation, in successive -lines, or simultaneously from several directions. The fire of the -infantry is distributed, and, unless a good lookout is kept, a -part of the cavalry, scarcely or not at all molested by fire, may -perhaps succeed in driving the attack home. This will be the -case when infantry allows itself to be enticed into developing -a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is made, -while the main attack comes from another, or from several -other directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ -more rifles in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, -while the mere threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly -led infantry to develop an excessive volume of fire.</p> - -<p>On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at -a considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed -to effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. -The men lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by -the hostile troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping -on them, besides which, the danger space is greater than when -the men fire standing. In rolling or close country, where cavalry -cannot be seen by men lying down, the aiming position -kneeling or standing should properly be assumed. The losses -inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured. Horses and -riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright -human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling -or prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the -charge. What is of greater importance, however, is that men<span class="pagenum" id="Page308">[308]</span> -standing upright can more easily execute a change of front, -fire on passing cavalry, and use their bayonets in case the -cavalry actually penetrates their line. The British and Italian -regulations very properly prescribe that the front rank of a -body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases.</p> - -<p>As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon -the steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would -seem to be advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry -gets within short range.<a id="FNanchor309" href="#Footnote309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> General Dragomirov says in his -forcible manner, “It is not the bullet which has been fired, but -the bullet which is still in the rifle-barrel, and reserved for -short range, that harms charging cavalry.” If infantry in -line was able to repulse a cavalry charge in the past at 40 -paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first volley,<a id="FNanchor310" href="#Footnote310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> the -chances of doing this with modern rifles would be still greater, -if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were absolutely -certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is -necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.<a id="FNanchor311" href="#Footnote311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> -If infantry does<span class="pagenum" id="Page309">[309]</span> -not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have -to reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be -able to carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes -of instruction in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If -an infantry unit is trained in time of peace always to open -fire at the medium ranges on charging cavalry, the unexpected -appearance of hostile cavalry at short ranges in actual war, -is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks of such a unit, -than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its fire until the -cavalry has come within short range.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote309" href="#FNanchor309" class="label">[309]</a> “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted charges is for all -commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and coolly to size up the situation, -and to act with determination. All precipitation or haste would be disastrous, -for it would communicate itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired -too late upon cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister <span class="smcap">v. Wäldstatten</span>.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote310" href="#FNanchor310" class="label">[310]</a> At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at 140 and 80 -paces, and repulsed the charge. <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 46</cite>, p. 186. In -the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the 87th Infantry repulsed a -charge at 60 paces. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 1217.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote311" href="#FNanchor311" class="label">[311]</a> The <cite>France Militaire</cite> contains the following statement in regard to the -effect produced on horses by bullets from the French Lebel rifle in the engagements -near Casablanca in 1907: “Many officers serving in the field observed that -the small caliber bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or -when a vital organ had been hit. <i>At Casablanca, horses that had been hit by -several bullets continued to gallop for a long while.</i> This is a remarkable -phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as out of action every horse -that has been hit by a projectile. This is entirely incorrect. <i>Many wounded -horses carry their riders into the melée and do not die until the day after the -fight.</i> This was observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.</p> - -<p>“Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of penetrating the -hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first place, they would have to be -hit, and that, in itself, is not such an easy matter. This is still more difficult -for the infantry, if it knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate -the dash of our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in -our peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time of -peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are training our -cavalry for panic in time of war.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Garcia Hernandez</b> (1812), a French square was broken by a -wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This is, -however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two ranks. -Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line—whether or not the -horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such an event in -exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are generally insignificant.</p> - -<p>The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it -attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its -fire. During the retreat after the battle of <b>Jena</b>, on October 28th, 1806, the -Grenadier Battalion <i>Prinz August</i>, threatened by hostile cavalry, did not -feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and attempted to cross the -Ucker farther down. In the expectation that a cavalry charge would be -made, square was formed and the officers were told not to fire until the -cavalry had approached to within 20 paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry—the -brigade which had crossed at Golmitz as well as the remainder -of Beaumont’s Division, under its commander, in all nine regiments—approached. -The first charge was made by nine troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) under -the division commander. They approached at a gallop. When the expected -fire did not come, the dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that -finally they were going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the -command “Fire” was given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers -fell, the rest galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent -charges were repulsed in a similar manner.”<a id="FNanchor312" href="#Footnote312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote312" href="#FNanchor312" class="label">[312]</a> -<span class="smcap">von Lettow-Vorbeck</span>, <cite>Der Krieg von 1806-7</cite>, II, p. 279. The charge of the -5th Lancers at Beaumont forms a counterpart of the above. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Beispiele</cite>, 5, p. 18.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the -strength of the infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and -whether the latter charges from several directions or in several<span class="pagenum" id="Page310">[310]</span> -successive lines. A small force of infantry, especially when -it may anticipate attacks from several directions, must open fire -sooner than a strong infantry force which has to contend with -an attack coming from one direction only. In the first mentioned -case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by -one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals.</p> - -<p>It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not -directly threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry -charge made on another unit; then it is advisable to open fire -at an early moment in order to break the momentum of the -charge at long range. (11th Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th -Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan).</p> - -<p>This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should -be used. The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, -although this has been done on the drill ground by well trained -soldiers without impairing the continuity or accuracy of the -fire. According to the table of ordinates of the trajectory -(par. 23 German I. F. R.), a bullet fired when the sight is -set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the feet of the horse, does -not rise above the height of a mounted trooper throughout -that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the target -however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement -of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain -covered with grass or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the -target and aim above that line. It is better, therefore, to aim -at the breast of the horse, with sights set at 600 m., and to -fire as soon as the target gets within 800 m. On account of -the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is not advisable -to change sights.</p> - -<p>It is a good plan to fire one volley first and then to employ -fire at will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting -the onrushing mass of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the -opinion of the leader, the first shot may be fired. But this -waiting is of great importance to prevent the fire from becoming -wild and ineffective. Since the elimination of powder<span class="pagenum" id="Page311">[311]</span> -smoke, there is no reason why other volleys should be fired -after the first, for in the excitement of the fight the volley -cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find the -rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack -of a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a -unit to be kept better in hand, may be an important factor -under certain circumstances however. The volley should, as a -rule, be used by supports that are not exposed to fire. (8th Company -of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st and 2nd Companies -of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers -at Sedan).</p> - -<p>Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion -of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the -center while charging, no special importance need be attached -to the distribution of the fire.</p> - -<p>As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry -consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per -minute), should be a match for 1-3 troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>), and -a company of infantry, under favorable conditions, may be able -to deal with a cavalry brigade.<a id="FNanchor313" href="#Footnote313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> Cavalry can become dangerous -for infantry only when the infantry is surprised, finds no -opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and morale, or attempts -to reach cover by running.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote313" href="#FNanchor313" class="label">[313]</a> A German cavalry brigade consists of eight troops -(<i>Eskadrons</i>). <i>Translator</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at -Vionville.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies -of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny -towards the Metz—Mars-la-Tour <i>chaussee</i>. As French infantry was not on -the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and the Guard -Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former regiment went -to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been assigned to it.</p> - -<p>The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m. distance -between them, with two troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) in each line, a fifth troop<span class="pagenum" id="Page312">[312]</span> -(<i>Eskadron</i>) following as a reserve. Although hampered in its movements -and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage wagons and other camp -litter that covered the ground, the regiment nevertheless made the charge -with superb gallantry.</p> - -<p>The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry, -under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their -leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view at a -distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was received -with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop -(<i>Eskadron</i>) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians, but a -part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to the left. It is -said, that of the leaders only one officer and one non-commissioned officer -remained in the saddle, and that only twenty cuirassiers were rallied after -the charge. The left troop (<i>Eskadron</i>) missed its objective completely. -The Prussian rear rank faced about and fired on some French troopers -who attempted to make an attack from the rear and who now also received -fire from other units of Prussian infantry.</p> - -<p>During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines had -become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke in two, -the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian infantry and -suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which did not stop the -movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German accounts, to be -sure, do not mention that the second line could not be seen on account of -the powder smoke, and that the fire was discontinued to let the smoke -clear away. When the French line was 100 m. away it received the command -<i>chargez</i> and the Prussian infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which -shattered the attack, the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about -10 paces in front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired -and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just -as little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the -Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd Infantry -and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry, deployed -in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts of this -battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped by the fire of -this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers was prevented by -Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French regiment, which had -begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22 officers, 208 men (36.2% of -its strength), and 243 horses. According to Dick de Lonlay,<a id="FNanchor314" href="#Footnote314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a> after this -charge, the regiment was able to form only 4 troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) of 62 -troopers each, instead of 5 troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) of 115 troopers each, -which would mean a loss of 248 men. The first line had suffered the -heaviest losses; in the 4th troop (<i>Eskadron</i>), which had lost all of its -officers and non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote314" href="#FNanchor314" class="label">[314]</a> -<cite>Français et Allemands</cite>, III, p. 84. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 5, -p. 11. The French <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, pp. 301-309, gives the losses as 18 officers, -170 men, and 208 horses.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page313">[313]</span></p> - -<p>A charge has a better chance of succeeding if it is prepared -by artillery fire.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the attack made by two troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) of Landwehr -Hussars against the 1st Battalion <i>Gyulai</i> at <b>Tobitschau</b>, an Austrian -square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated it. During the -attack of Bredow’s Brigade at <b>Vionville</b>, the artillery was able to send its -last shells against the enemy immediately past the right flank of the -cavalry brigade.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in -all armies, compels us to consider the case when infantry must -advance over open ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special -units must then be designated, who, by means of long range -fire, repulse the cavalry or keep it at a distance. At Minden -(1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry succeeded in driving the -hostile cavalry from the field, and at Vauxchamps and Etoges -(14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry succeeded in breaking -through the French cavalry. It will be easy to do the -same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not -very superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, -machine guns, or artillery.</p> - -<p>Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to -bring long range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them -by a flank attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long -and medium ranges is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, -and besides, the better marksmanship of the infantry is -bound to make itself felt at short ranges. When the infantry -has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.) of the dismounted -cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will still be able -to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it to do so -(par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can -be effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in -the fight.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page314">[314]</span></p> - -<h4>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>England.</b> The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost -universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are immediately -threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be fixed. -An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered when infantry -has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced to retire; -and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by dust, fog, or heavy -rain.</p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> <i>Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from cavalry -charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of mind, and morale, -and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at short range.</i></p> - -<p>When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should -be ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the -purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and for better -utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly made from a -short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow formation than to deploy -hastily, provided the fire is delivered with steadiness. As cavalry frequently -attacks only for the purpose of forcing the infantry to discontinue -its advance, or to induce it to take up a close order formation, all units -not immediately threatened by the attack should continue their movement -or remain in their positions.</p> - -<p>When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which -make it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions, companies, -or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly meet the -cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support each other in -warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place themselves within the protected -area thus formed.</p> - -<p>The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly utilizing -cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary, fix bayonets. -Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as seems necessary for -warding off the attack; the other parts continue to carry out the task assigned -them. The commander retains a part of his force in readiness for -warding off unexpected attacks.</p> - -<p>“When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, -the men should assume the position offering the smallest target.</p> - -<p>“If a platoon is <i>directly attacked</i> by cavalry, it will only in rare cases -be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.); <i>frequently -it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come up close</i>. When the -platoon participates in warding off a cavalry attack made against another -unit, it may open fire at longer ranges.</p> - -<p>“Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off -cavalry.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page315">[315]</span></p> - -<p><b>France.</b> Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be, -has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in superior -numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand, and makes -good use of its fire.</p> - -<p>When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old. -Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations of combat, -especially during critical moments.</p> - -<p>If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies by -echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its task so long -as the cavalry does not begin an attack.</p> - -<p>Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet -a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even the boldest -cavalry.</p> - -<p>When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for the -infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the purpose -of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts.</p> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> Nothing prescribed.</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced -to discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose -of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial defeat. Only -those fractions that are absolutely necessary for repulsing the cavalry should -take up the fight against it.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page316">[316]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>1. THE PASSAGE OF INFANTRY THROUGH ARTILLERY -LINES.</h4> - -<p>The artillery of a mobilized German army corps with its -twenty-four batteries takes up approximately 2500 m. of the -front of about 4000 m. available for the corps. When the -ground is unfavorable, the front available for the other arms -may be still further reduced. All remedies suggested for reducing -the frontage required by artillery offer no real solution -of the difficulty; in fact, they have resulting drawbacks, -such as the reduction to ten paces of the interval between -guns, and the posting of artillery in two lines, one in rear of -the other. On account of these drawbacks, a commander will -avail himself of these remedies only in case of the most urgent -necessity. The question as to how infantry can best pass -through these long artillery lines is therefore of especial interest. -While artillery will generally seek commanding positions -and avoid covered terrain, infantry will make use of depressions -and cover as the natural routes of advance for passing by batteries -in action and for deploying subsequently in front of them. -In this case the solution of the problem is simple. The difficulties -are disproportionately greater when terrain impassable -for artillery is lacking. Nothing could be more desirable for -hostile artillery which has adjusted its fire upon our batteries, -than for the intervals between our guns to become suddenly -filled with infantry, whereupon our artillery, until now under -fire, would have to cease firing so as not to endanger our infantry. -This pause in the fire will be more noticeable, when -our artillery has not yet succeeded in gaining a superiority of -fire over the hostile guns; and its length will depend upon the<span class="pagenum" id="Page317">[317]</span> -depth of the infantry formation. In this case the infantry -cannot avoid heavy losses as it must cross the fire-swept space -in rear of the guns, and soon thereafter must enter the zone of -the opponent’s actual “fire for effect,” besides losing for the -time being the support of its own artillery fire. It is obvious -that for infantry to advance in deployed lines through artillery -in action, condemns the latter to long silence, and even exposes it -to the danger of being placed altogether out of action. Infantry -can pass through artillery lines at certain points only, its passage -being subject to an agreement between the infantry and -artillery commanders. It is advisable to have those batteries -cease firing whose fire has the least influence on the course -of the artillery combat. It is, however, of the utmost importance -that the fire of all hostile batteries which possibly could -fire on our infantry, be kept down by the increased fire of our -artillery. In this manner, we may perhaps be able to draw the -fire of the hostile artillery away from those points at which -our infantry is to pass through our artillery line. This is -especially important. It will also be advantageous to designate -successively, different points in the artillery line for the -passage of infantry. This should be done for two reasons: -first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance -the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may -not be presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged -period; second, in order that movements by the flank on the -part of the infantry may be obviated. The column of squads -would be a suitable formation in which two battalions of infantry -could simultaneously pass through the line of guns -approximately within the space occupied by one battery. These -battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line -toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume -firing only when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. -in front of them. The artillery will be able to resume its fire -earlier when it is posted in rear of a crest, and for this reason -such points should be selected for the passage of infantry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page318">[318]</span></p> - -<h4 title="2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.">2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY -FIRE.<a id="FNanchor315" href="#Footnote315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote315" href="#FNanchor315" class="label">[315]</a> -A lecture delivered by Major <span class="smcap">C. E. D. Budworth</span>, R.A., at the Royal -Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled, <cite>Infantry Formations in the -Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of View</cite>, contains some interesting information. -The lecture mentioned appeared in <cite>The Journal of the Royal Artillery</cite> for -February, 1909. <i>Translator</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance -for considerable distances under artillery fire without being able -to take advantage of cover. It should guard against being -surprised by artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation.</p> - -<p>In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s -adjustment and observation of fire should be avoided. (See -<a href="#Page119">p. 119</a> supra). To this end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily -long near objects that are clearly visible at a great -distance. If it is noticed that the enemy is beginning to adjust -his fire on some prominent feature of the terrain, that point -should be passed as quickly as possible; the same is true of a -plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns, separated -by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are advantageous. -This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously -striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the -enemy to judge the relative position of the smoke from the -burst of his shrapnel with respect to the target. This increases -the difficulties of the enemy’s observation of fire, as it is not -easy for him to determine whether his shots go over or fall -short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m. deep, as used -in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses, owing -to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles.</p> - -<p>The narrowest possible front should be presented to the -enemy when within his zone of fire.</p> - -<p>It is moreover desirable to make the further observation -of fire difficult for the hostile artillery, and to diminish the -effect of his projectiles at the target (see <a href="#Page120">p. 120</a> supra) by -taking up suitable formations. Broad, shallow formations -were suitable against the shell fire of the past. However, they -had the great drawback of considerably facilitating the observation -of shots falling short or going over, as the smoke<span class="pagenum" id="Page319">[319]</span> -from the burst hid the target in the first case, and as the -target appeared silhouetted against the smoke from the burst -in the second. The cone of dispersion of the modern base -charge shrapnel combines comparatively small lateral spread -with great effect in depth. The effect of a well-placed shrapnel -may be confined to one target, and that of projectiles bursting -in the intervals reduced by taking up a formation in which -narrow columns (columns of squads) are separated by wide intervals -(up to 50 m.).</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo319.png" alt="Columns" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The range is determined or verified by bracketing; that is, -by enclosing the target between shots which, fired at a known -difference of range, strike respectively, short of and beyond -the target. In France this is done either by battery salvo or by -piece. In the former case, the French distribute the fire -equally over the entire space which they wish to cover with -fire; hence, they do not direct it upon the individual columns,<span class="pagenum" id="Page320">[320]</span> -especially when they employ indirect laying, their favorite -mode of procedure. It is in this kind of fire especially that -narrow columns, separated by wide intervals, are a great -advantage, because it is pure accident if a projectile falls so -that its burst can be observed. Moreover, when the columns -are not abreast of each other, the observations of bursts may be -contradictory. Thus, in one salvo, “over” and “short” bursts -may be obtained, especially if several bursts could not be reliably -observed, and the salvo will have to be repeated. When -a projectile bursts “short,” immediately in front of the 1st -company, for example, it may be assumed that the next projectile -will be fired at a range increased by 100-200 m. The -1st company should therefore move to the front at double -time, the 2nd and 3rd likewise, while the 4th executes platoons -front into line and takes to cover in anticipation of an “over” -shot. The “over” meant for the 1st company will then be -the signal for the 4th company to rush forward. <i>The following -general rule may be given: A projectile bursting “over” -or just “short” of the target requires that the force fired -upon move quickly; a projectile bursting far “short” of the target -requires that cover be taken.</i> The platoon and squad leaders -of the attacking force should not betray its presence by -standing upright; the force should disappear absolutely without -leaving a trace.</p> - -<p>A force cannot, in the long run, prevent artillery from -effecting an adjustment of fire upon it; all it can do is to -postpone the beginning of the fire for effect.</p> - -<p>Fire for effect is of three kinds:</p> - -<p>1. “Progressive fire” (<i>tir progressif</i>).<a id="FNanchor316" href="#Footnote316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a> In this fire, after -establishing a bracket (as a rule, one of 200 m.), every piece -fires two rounds at each of four ranges, viz., at a range 100 m. -less than the short limit of the bracket, at both ranges of the -bracket, and at a range 100 m. greater than the long limit of the -bracket. For example, if a bracket has been established for<span class="pagenum" id="Page321">[321]</span> -the target at 3000 and 3200 m., the battery would fire at 2900, -3000, 3200, and 3300 m.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote316" href="#FNanchor316" class="label">[316]</a> Called “Zone Fire” in our field artillery. <i>Translator</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>2. “Sweeping” (<i>fauchage</i>) is employed when it is desired -to cover a broader zone. In this every gun fires three -rounds at each of the ranges designated. The first round is -fired with the line of sight directed on the right portion of the -target (or on the aiming point). Before firing each of the -succeeding rounds, the direction of the piece is changed to the -left by three turns of the traversing handwheel. At the next -range this process is reversed, the direction of the piece being -changed to the right by three turns of the traversing handwheel -after each round. At 2500 m., for example, a battery -can cover, in this manner, a space twice the width of its own -front.</p> - -<p>3. “Fire at successive ranges” (searching fire). In this -fire salvos or volleys are delivered at the target at a number of -ranges to be designated by the battery commander.<a id="FNanchor317" href="#Footnote317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote317" href="#FNanchor317" class="label">[317]</a> The Belgian Drill Regulations (1907) give the following details in regard -to the fire effect of a French four gun battery: In “progressive fire” (<i>tir -progressif</i>), 32 rounds cover a space 100 m. wide and 400 m. deep (1 fragment -covers 6 sq. m.). When direct laying is employed, one fragment covers 2 sq. -m. In “progressive fire with sweeping” (<i>tir progressif avec fauchage</i>), 48 -shrapnel cover a space 200 m. wide and 400 m. deep, each fragment covering 8 -sq. m. Depending upon the range, 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> to 5 minutes are required to secure -adjustment. (See <a href="#Page119">p. 119</a> supra).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the Russo-Japanese war, all close order formations -proved unsuitable under artillery fire, except when the terrain -afforded cover. The Japanese infantry recognized very soon -that the best protection against artillery fire lay in constant -motion (irregular rushes made by small units) and in wide -extension. The following procedure, employed at Yoshirei on -July 31st, 1904, seems worthy of imitation:<a id="FNanchor318" href="#Footnote318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> The several -platoons of the companies followed each other in deployed -lines at distances of 200-300 m. When they had to cross -open ground in order to reach a designated line, the platoons -sought to advance by squads, whose men were deployed at intervals -of 5-10 paces and who moved at a rapid gait interrupted -by breathing spells. The men invariably assembled -when cover was reached. The losses were insignificant. The -Russians also made use of a similar procedure after their first -disastrous experiences. In many instances the platoons ran -forward in single rank. “Change of gait and direction, as -well as the use of loose irregular skirmish lines make it difficult -for the artillery to hit anything.” (Par. 450 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote318" href="#FNanchor318" class="label">[318]</a> <span class="smcap">Sir Ian Hamilton</span>, -<cite>A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book</cite>, I, p. 337.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page322">[322]</span></p> - -<p class="caption">Formations used by Infantry during the Russo-Japanese -War when under Artillery Fire.</p> - -<div class="container w15em"> - -<p class="caption">a.</p> - -<p class="caption long nonbold">A platoon in route column -forms four columns of files.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo322a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w20em"> - -<p class="caption">b.</p> - -<p class="caption long nonbold">A company in column of platoons, each -in line of skirmishers with the men 2-4 -m. apart.</p> - -<p class="caption long nonbold">(It would be better to use sections instead -of platoons).</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo322b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w20em"> - -<p class="caption">c.</p> - -<p class="caption long nonbold">The ranks of the sections in each platoon of the company following each -other at a distance of 100 m.</p> - -<p class="caption long nonbold">This formation was taken up from company column (German).</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo322c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page323">[323]</span></p> - -<p>These formations made it possible to advance at a walk -to within 3000 m. of a hostile position; beyond that an advance -by rushes had to be resorted to, in which the attacking force -avoided showing itself simultaneously in long lines. The -simplest scheme might be to move forward in column of -sections, each section in skirmish line. Formation “a” is well -adapted for quickly crossing fire swept places, and when there -is hope of re-forming the column subsequently. Formation “c” -is suitable for quickly deploying from company column. However, -the last-named formation no longer guarantees a proper -leading of the company, and quite naturally does not absolutely -prevent losses. After the Japanese 5th Brigade (Nambu) had -taken possession of Yuhuntun<a id="FNanchor319" href="#Footnote319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> and the three houses during the -night of March 6/7, 1905, the following dispositions for attack -were made by the Russians about noon on the 7th: On -the right, the 5th and 10th Rifle Regiments, in five lines, each -consisting of one battalion (total depth of the formation 600 -m.); in the center, the 123rd Infantry (Koslov) of which the -companies of three battalions were deployed in single rank -lines, each consisting of one company, with the men at intervals -of from 3 to 5 paces, the companies in rear of each -other at distances of 100 paces; the IVth Battalion, similarly -formed, was posted in echelon to the left rear. The 124th<span class="pagenum" id="Page324">[324]</span> -Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment, -advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, -was fired on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving -from 4000 to 2000 m. The regiment lost about 600 men. This -loss is insignificant when the size of the target (about 600 m. -wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered. The Japanese did not -care to become involved in a serious infantry action and -therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better to -advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded -no cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient -time, they crossed such plains singly, one by one, and then -assembled under cover for the attack.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote319" href="#FNanchor319" class="label">[319]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Tettau</span>, <cite>Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei</cite>, -II, p. 334.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Spaits</span>, <cite>Mit Kasaken</cite>, p. 310.</p> - -<p>Col. <span class="smcap">Csicserics v. Bacsany</span>, <cite>Unser neues Feldgeschütz</cite>, 1907, pp. 17 and 21.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION</h4> - -<p class="noindent">was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire -on artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small -that the expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.<a id="FNanchor320" href="#Footnote320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a> The -gap between the steel shields of the French field gun is not -large enough to exert a noticeable influence. Steel shields, -3 mm. thick, afford protection against steel jacketed bullets -fired at or beyond 300 m.; against “S” and “D” projectiles they -afford protection, it is said, beyond 500 m. only. Machine -guns directing continuous fire on a point may obtain better results. -According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate can be -pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel -projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of -which is precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional -density, and difficulty of manufacture).<a id="FNanchor321" href="#Footnote321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> For this reason, it -is better to leave the task of destroying shielded batteries, even -when they are in the open, to one’s own artillery, than to attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page325">[325]</span> -them with infantry. The fire effect of the infantry is -not noticeably increased when delivered obliquely against the -front of the battery. (Par. 184 German I. D. R.). In Germany -the gun commander and cannoneer No. 3, who is posted -at the trail, are then especially endangered; but in order to -flank the guns effectively and to reach in rear of the shields -with its fire, the infantry must move to a flank a distance at -least equal to <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> of the range, and even then the fire effect -is very small. The effect may even be entirely nullified when -the flanking fire is delivered from the side on which the caisson -bodies are posted. In this case it suffices to push forward -the caisson body to protect the personnel. It is a good plan<span class="pagenum" id="Page326">[326]</span> -for infantry to direct its fire on the limbers and the reserve. -And again, infantry should not let any opportunity pass to -fire on artillery in motion or in the act of limbering or unlimbering -within effective range. Guns moved by hand into -positions from which direct laying can be employed for the -purpose of warding off the infantry attack, offer particularly -favorable targets. Infantry that is to capture artillery must -approach its objective by means of irregular rushes made by -small groups, and increase its fire to the utmost intensity when -the limbers are brought up to the guns. The effect of artillery -fire is small under 200 m., in the absence of canister.<a id="FNanchor322" href="#Footnote322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote320" href="#FNanchor320" class="label">[320]</a> Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated that infantry -was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries so as to render them immobile; -it could only interfere with the <i>personnel</i>, but could not demolish the batteries.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote321" href="#FNanchor321" class="label">[321]</a> -<cite>Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und Geniewesens</cite>, 1907, No. 5.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote322" href="#FNanchor322" class="label">[322]</a> The capture of the Smolenski Artillery Battalion on October 14th, 1904 -(Shaho). <cite>Artilleristische Monatshefte</cite> for March, 1908.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption large">Germany.</p> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> -<p class="caption">Field Howitzer.</p> -</div> - -<div class="right5050"> -<p class="caption">Field Gun.</p> -</div> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split--> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo325a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="container w50pc"> - -<p class="caption large">France.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo325b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. -Hubert, during the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult -it is to unlimber on open ground when under effective -infantry and artillery fire; but, if five limbers with their teams -had not stampeded, perhaps it might have been possible after -a while, for the battery to reopen fire. Hasse’s Battery, also -at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving in a short -time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to continue -its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of -the guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover -of a garden wall at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there -under enfilading infantry fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s -Battery lost 17 men and 37 horses; Hasse’s Battery, -38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15 men and -40 horses.<a id="FNanchor323" href="#Footnote323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote323" href="#FNanchor323" class="label">[323]</a> <span class="smcap">Hoffbauer</span>, -<cite>Deutsche Artillerie</cite>, III, p. 227.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range -will always produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s -Battery, and in the two British batteries of Colonel Long at -Colenso.<a id="FNanchor324" href="#Footnote324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a> These two batteries did not cease firing because -they had suffered too heavily, but only because they had expended -all their limber ammunition and the caissons were unable<span class="pagenum" id="Page327">[327]</span> -to come up. It was impossible for these batteries to limber -up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to destroy -a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great -quantities of ammunition were expended.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote324" href="#FNanchor324" class="label">[324]</a> <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 32, p. 43.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry -Division suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections -were up and the men with them were detailed to assist -in working the guns, the gun squads in both batteries had -dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P. M., <i>i.e.</i>, within half -an hour.” Immediately after the French attack had been repulsed, -one of these batteries was able to accompany the advancing -infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light -Battery) could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had -lost 29 men and 34 horses.<a id="FNanchor325" href="#Footnote325" class="fnanchor">[325]</a> This example proves again that -when artillery has once managed to go into position and to open -fire, it cannot be annihilated by infantry alone, and therefore -need not fear to take up a more than temporary position in -the first line.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote325" href="#FNanchor325" class="label">[325]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hoffbauer</span>, <cite>Deutsche Artillerie</cite>, 8, pp. 44 and 210.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, <cite>Beaumont</cite>, p. 40.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance -from hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry -screen, even if only a weak one. In the days when -batteries had no shields, this screen enabled artillery to devote -its entire attention to the principal target without regard to -hostile infantry. At the present time, especially in positions -in rear of a crest and in long artillery lines, the principal object -of such a screen is to prevent hostile patrols from molesting the -artillery. Small detachments posted at wide intervals are sufficient -for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now as in -the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to -daring, sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. -(Par. 448 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At the battle of <b>Vionville</b>,<a id="FNanchor326" href="#Footnote326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> about 5 P. M., four horse and seven field -batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near <b>Flavigny</b> with ten<span class="pagenum" id="Page328">[328]</span> -French batteries. After this artillery duel had lasted half an hour, French -Guard Infantry advanced to the attack. This was repulsed by artillery fire -at a range of 800 m., but the fire of the artillery was diverted from its -proper objective by the advance of this infantry. Similarly, at <b>St. Privat</b>, -two batteries of the Guard Artillery had to direct their fire on French -skirmishers.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote326" href="#FNanchor326" class="label">[326]</a> <cite>Gen St. W.</cite>, I, p. 557.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page329">[329]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">IX. THE ATTACK.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<p>The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack -can annihilate him. The decision as to whether the force is to -attack or stand on the defensive depends upon the tactical situation -and the will of the commander, and not upon numerical -superiority, of which one is not aware, as a rule, until after the -battle.<a id="FNanchor327" href="#Footnote327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> Determined attacks, again and again repeated, in spite -of all failures, are the surest means of gaining victory and of -preventing the enemy from becoming aware of his superiority. -Only pressing reasons (marked hostile superiority, necessity -for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or the failure of an -attack), and never favorable terrain conditions, should determine -a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the -eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. -A commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the -purpose of letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him -in turn, reaps only the disadvantages and never the advantages -of both the offensive and the defensive.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote327" href="#FNanchor327" class="label">[327]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 121, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The attack may take various forms, depending upon -whether the dispositions have to be made under hostile fire -(surprise and rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced -the initiative and awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or -in a position prepared for defense (deliberately planned attack). -In the last case the attack requires more careful preparation -and in many instances even necessitates the employment -of special auxiliaries (such as guns capable of high angle fire, -and engineer trains). However, the advance of a strong firing -line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and the uninterrupted -fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all attacks.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page330">[330]</span></p> - -<p>Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and -the rencontre there is an attack formation more closely resembling -the rencontre in character, which may be called the -<i>abridged attack</i>.<a id="FNanchor328" href="#Footnote328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a> This attack formation is used in forestalling -the enemy in occupying important points, in preventing -enveloping movements, in carrying out flank attacks, in surprising -the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise, in relieving -the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover appropriate -where the conformation of the ground or the time of -day prohibit a use of the rifle.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote328" href="#FNanchor328" class="label">[328]</a> <i>Abgekürzter Angriff</i>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The first stages of the fight of the 6th Infantry Division at <b>Vionville</b> -are of this character. The fire fight was relegated to the background -in view of the constant movement to the front. The situation prohibited -our properly taking advantage of our superior marksmanship.—The attack -on the railroad cut of <b>Nuits</b>, during the late afternoon of December -18th, 1870, progressed similarly.<a id="FNanchor329" href="#Footnote329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote329" href="#FNanchor329" class="label">[329]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Gefecht von Nuits</cite>, p. 19, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="1. THE SURPRISE.">1. THE SURPRISE.<a id="FNanchor330" href="#Footnote330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote330" href="#FNanchor330" class="label">[330]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 190.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation -where it will be obliged to go into action directly from -route column or from a formation unsuitable for combat, -against an enemy who unexpectedly opens a lively fire at short -range, thus increasing the moral effect of the surprise by -actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by surprise -will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation -and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of -the opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming -to a decision.</p> - -<p>Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as -possible, a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to -let the troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. -A bold decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such<span class="pagenum" id="Page331">[331]</span> -a critical situation.<a id="FNanchor331" href="#Footnote331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and -open fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire -is still less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound -to lead to a complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a -defeat can only be averted, in such a case, by assuming the -offensive and thus repulsing the enemy. The decision for attacking -directly from route column (or, when the enemy is -still at a distance, at least for deploying toward the front) is -the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares an ambuscade -for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in numbers, -morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he -does not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm -the enemy with fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An -impetuous advance may perhaps intimidate him, and our losses -will be less, at any rate, than if we turn our backs on him and -await our fate in what is at best but a poor position, as it is -taken up, as a rule, during the first moment of panic. However, -even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot avert -disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at -least save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the -rencontre on the battlefield.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote331" href="#FNanchor331" class="label">[331]</a> “No matter how unexpectedly the enemy may appear, you should never -forget that he may be annihilated either with the bayonet or with fire. The -choice between the two is not a difficult one, and the formation to be adopted -is of secondary importance. When the enemy is at close quarters, always -use the bayonet; if he is still at a distance, fire on him, and then use the -bayonet.” <span class="smcap">Dragomirov</span>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Examples of Surprises.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The surprise at <b>Baalon</b> on September 17th, 1870.<a id="FNanchor332" href="#Footnote332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> The surprise at -<b>Vouziers</b> on December 15th, 1870.<a id="FNanchor333" href="#Footnote333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a> The conduct of the French infantry -when surprised in its camp at <b>Beaumont</b>.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote332" href="#FNanchor332" class="label">[332]</a> <span class="smcap">Cardinal von Widdern</span>, -<cite>Krieg an den rückwärtigen Verbindungen</cite>, I, p. -149.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote333" href="#FNanchor333" class="label">[333]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, II, p. 125.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the battle of <b>Noisseville</b> there occurred an unusually instructive -episode, the disastrous results of which could have been easily avoided -if the mounted officers on duty with the force had been sent out to reconnoiter. -Six companies of the 44th Infantry (Prussian) were advancing<span class="pagenum" id="Page332">[332]</span> -from <b>Flanville</b> against <b>Montoy</b>. On the French side, the 62nd Infantry -was likewise advancing against Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when -the 44th Infantry (Prussian) very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. -The French regimental commander decided to attack at once. “The Prussian -detachments advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west -slope of the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly -encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was -immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns in close -order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians was attacked -from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from the park through -the west entrance of the village. The Prussian skirmish lines were repulsed -in an instant, and thrown into complete confusion. The hostile -fire had an annihilating effect on account of the short range, and the situation -was at once completely reversed. The Prussians sought in vain to -gain a firm foothold in the eastern outskirts of the village of Montoy. -Their losses were heavy. The four companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) -of the 44th Infantry numbered in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 -officers and 480 men, of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) -were taken prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th -and 12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective -strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%.”<a id="FNanchor334" href="#Footnote334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote334" href="#FNanchor334" class="label">[334]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Noisseville</cite>, p. 32, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th -Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position -to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence, the -French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from Flanville, -which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering some losses.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, -the advantage rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and -advances to the charge first. This onslaught with cold steel -should become second nature to the troops. In traversing close -country, a force should be in a formation that enables it to -develop an adequate fire and to make a charge in compact formation. -A line formation is entirely unsuitable, as a rule, on -account of the difficulties of the terrain to be overcome, and in -a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control the men.</p> - -<p>For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,<a id="FNanchor335" href="#Footnote335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> -company column is a suitable formation, and for -dense woods platoons advancing either abreast or echeloned, -each platoon in line of squads in columns of files. If the platoons<span class="pagenum" id="Page333">[333]</span> -or sections were to advance in single file, the columns would -be too long, and it would be next to impossible to maintain the -intervals. The six or eight small columns of files of a platoon -are, on the other hand, close enough together to keep each other -in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed for firing -and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily -than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can -exercise better control over the men than in skirmish line, which -invariably bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, -while connection is not maintained at all at other points and -march direction and cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the -Bois de Givodeau during the battle of Beaumont).<a id="FNanchor336" href="#Footnote336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote335" href="#FNanchor335" class="label">[335]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, VI, p. 117, et seq.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote336" href="#FNanchor336" class="label">[336]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, VI, p. 125, with sketch. -<span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, <cite>Beaumont</cite>, -p. 112, et seq.</p> - -<p>Examples: The conduct of the infantry of the IXth Army Corps in passing -through the Niederwald of Wörth, may serve as a model. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Beispiele</cite>, 13, p. 108, et seq.</p> - -<p>Engagement of La Landrière on January 11th, 1871. <cite>Geschichte des -Regiments Nr. 20</cite>, p. 292.</p> - -<p><cite>Wald- und Ortsgefecht</cite>, p. 109.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="2. THE RENCONTRE. (Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).">2. -THE RENCONTRE.<a id="FNanchor337" href="#Footnote337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a><br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote337" href="#FNanchor337" class="label">[337]</a> See also <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 192, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in -war. During marches in campaign the opponents will frequently -not gain detailed information of each other until they -come into actual contact. Thus the rencontre develops out of -a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision -occurs frequently at a point not intended by either; as -every minute brings the heads of the two columns closer together -no time is to be lost. The commander who desires to -wait until he can come to a decision consonant with the results -of the reconnaissance will arrive too late. The tactical situation -in its entirety determines whether or not an attack should<span class="pagenum" id="Page334">[334]</span> -be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting moment -the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be any -better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment -from route column is not made because the commander -desires it, but because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis -in the leading line. The commander who is acting under hostile -pressure should endeavor to regain the upper hand as -quickly as possible so that he can dispose of the troops of the -main body with a definite object in view. In a rencontre, the -advantage rests almost invariably with the commander who -quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds -in throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous -attack, which would lead to disaster in the presence of an -opponent already deployed, may, in this case, be productive -of victory. The direction in which the attack is made is of -less importance than a prompt decision on the part of the commander -and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in -a definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. -In covered terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased -still more, while in open country, the preparatory stage of the -combat will soon lose that character, because the side which -has an advantage as regards terrain will make use of it, and -the conviction will force itself upon the opponent that victory -cannot be gained by an impetuous attack alone. It will be -easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the action to -be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that -the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the -advanced troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). <i>The -rencontre increases the difficulties of troop leading, but makes -the attack easier for the troops.</i></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The difference between a deliberately planned attack and -a rencontre is most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance -guard. Its task is to secure the prospective artillery<span class="pagenum" id="Page335">[335]</span> -position and to create favorable conditions for the combat of -the main body. This requires that ground be gained to the -front so as to enable the main body to deploy while moving -forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and -hold important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions -of the commander of the whole force. It is moreover -desirable for the advance guard to interfere with the hostile -deployment. Points lying on the flanks or in advance of the -artillery position, especially if they command the latter, should -be quickly seized; when necessary, the advance guard must -fight for their possession. Its commander should quickly pick -out the points that are important for this purpose; he should, -by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the -point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances -the main body will have to concentrate for action -farther to the rear so as to hasten the deployment and to take -advantage of favorable terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable -start in deployment, the commander may decide to -let the opponent advance to the attack, and then bring about -the decision by simultaneously launching his main body. Only -thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior numbers -with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is -much easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, -than to answer the question as to whether the strength -of the advance guard will suffice for the task of taking it. -The reports of the cavalry in regard to the enemy’s strength -and the composition and formation of his columns, will scarcely -furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer to this -question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell, until -after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment -has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines -demand caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated -by the combat frontage alone. A factor of far greater -importance is which force has been most successful in making -preparations for going into action by developing its main body -and by having artillery near at hand. It is artillery that clears -up the situation. When an infantry division encounters a<span class="pagenum" id="Page336">[336]</span> -hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this does not -necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically -concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss -of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. <i>The general -situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance -for the commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for -action of the opposing forces.</i></p> - -<p><i>Issue of orders.</i> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 197.</p> - -<p>The advance guard must be promptly informed of the -intentions of the commander (<i>i.e.</i>, whether he intends to attack, -to concentrate for attack farther to the rear, or to let -the enemy attack<a id="FNanchor338" href="#Footnote338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a>) and of the location of the prospective artillery -position. The attack order should be withheld until the -combat of the advance guard has sufficiently cleared the situation, -but a development of the force should be ordered at once.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote338" href="#FNanchor338" class="label">[338]</a> Par. 350 German I. D. R.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a -start in deployment over the enemy and cover the advancing -artillery in front and flank, by quickly deploying strong firing -lines and pushing machine guns to the front. After they have -done this, they should promptly advance to the attack. Through -this, our firing line, while in the act of deploying, runs the -serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short range, the fire -of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the troops approaching -the field are still too far distant to increase its fire -power.<a id="FNanchor339" href="#Footnote339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a> Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at -once move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon -the impressions received by the commander. His dispositions -should be such as to compel the enemy to disclose his available -forces at an early moment. Every fighting line is so sensitive -to fire simultaneously delivered against its front and flank, that -an attempt to turn the hostile position will instantly force the -enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is unable to -keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable to -deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs<span class="pagenum" id="Page337">[337]</span> -should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the -reverse state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of -reinforcements. But in order to obtain this insight into the -existing situation the troops must get close to the enemy. Such -an insight into the hostile dispositions cannot be gained at -long range. The extent of a hostile position may perhaps be -determined at long range with the best field glasses, but the -strength and power of resistance of the enemy can never be -gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack -home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. -When opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it -will unquestionably be necessary to approach to the extreme -limit of short ranges. From here the dispositions of the enemy -may be clearly recognized, and, in addition, at 600-800 m., a -firing line that has made a lodgment in some feature of the -terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating losses. Misconceptions -are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation. One -must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the -training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it -will not give up the position it has once reached; it should -firmly hold the ground gained, and persevere.<a id="FNanchor340" href="#Footnote340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote339" href="#FNanchor339" class="label">[339]</a> This induces the British -<cite>Infantry Training</cite> to prescribe that in a rencontre -a concentration for attack should invariably be ordered.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote340" href="#FNanchor340" class="label">[340]</a> Military history furnishes a multitude of examples of the fact that a -force can persevere in spite of the most galling fire (St. Privat. Gorni Dubniac). -A reverse does not occur, as a rule, until the advent of unforeseen circumstances. -The Brigade of Highlanders held out for hours at Magersfontain, and an -insignificant change of front on the right flank subsequently caused the whole -line to retire. See <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 32, p. 74.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity -of occupying important supporting points and of gaining -ground for the concentration for action, requires a broad front -to be covered. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, -which will arrive soon thereafter, will then bring relief to the -infantry in critical situations.</p> - -<p>In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight -is at a standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may -notice that, although it is impossible to push the attack home -without further reinforcements, the space in which the concentration -for action is to take place, is secured against a<span class="pagenum" id="Page338">[338]</span> -hostile attack, or that the enemy has been deprived of the -initiative and has been thrown on the defensive. This is the -moment in which the commander regains the initiative and in -which, by means of an <i>attack order</i>, he can dispose of the -troops of the main body as he sees fit. <i>The “rencontre” differs -from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the -latter, the concentration for action can proceed smoothly as -desired by the commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, -for the time being, dictates the course of action. Therefore -the commander should make efforts to free himself from this -restraint, i.e., he should endeavor to launch his troops in a -manner not influenced by the dispositions of the enemy.</i></p> - -<p>The degree of control which a commander retains over -the course of the combat depends upon the promptness with -which he gains a general idea of the situation. For this, if for -no other reason, he should be as near the head of the column -as possible while on the march. The troops sent first into -action, supported by the artillery, must put every available man -into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the enemy -and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an -entity. In any case, the battalions of the main body should -not be successively thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, -for the purpose of overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving -the advance guard from a dilemma. The machine gun -batteries, whose employment was particularly important during -the preparatory stage of the fight, should be withdrawn as -early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in the hands -of the commander.</p> - -<p>In bringing the main body into action, deployments by -the flank should be avoided. The deployment should be initiated -by subordinate units (in an infantry division, by regiments) -moving out of the route column and toward the objective -points determined by the purpose of the combat.<a id="FNanchor341" href="#Footnote341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote341" href="#FNanchor341" class="label">[341]</a> -General <span class="smcap">von Schlichting</span> holds a different view in his work <cite>Taktische -und strategische Grundsätze</cite>, I, p. 106. “In a rencontre, the piece on the board -of the battlefield can be moved only when the next one is clear of the march -column and ready for action. Further action is then not only permissible but -imperative.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page339">[339]</span></p> - -<h5>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In all the regulations, those of Germany excepted, the rencontre is -treated with marked reserve.</p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> “When a collision occurs with an opponent who is likewise -in the act of advancing—<i>rencontre</i>—the different parts of the force and -their subdivisions must make strenuous efforts to advance in the designated -direction. In a rencontre, it will be proper to concentrate the main forces, -prior to making the attack, only in case it becomes apparent during the -preparatory stage of the action that the enemy has gained a visible start -in deployment. The endeavor to forestall the enemy, and the necessity -of promptly reinforcing the troops already engaged, will often curtail -or preclude the preparatory concentration of the main body in a rencontre, -and force the commander to permit at least parts of his approaching troops -to go directly into action.” If conditions are eminently favorable for the -enemy at the point where the collision occurs, it may sometimes be more -desirable to stand provisionally on the defensive with the advance guard -until other troops come up.</p> - -<p>“Under such circumstances, it may even be advisable to withdraw -the troops covering the march; but in that event, the relation of the force -to neighboring columns should be considered.”</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The commander should decide promptly whether to attack, -to stand on the defensive, or to avoid an engagement for the time being. -The regulations do not provide for employing the troops directly from -route column. The advance guard is frequently thrown on its own resources; -it is often forced to fight on a very broad front, and to place all -of its troops into action at the very beginning of an engagement for the -purpose of seizing and holding supporting points necessary for the subsequent -deployment.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>Examples.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. The deployment for action of the 5th Infantry Division from the -defile of Gorze, against the French Division Vergé, at the battle of <b>Vionville</b> -(16th August, 1870), is especially instructive.<a id="FNanchor342" href="#Footnote342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote342" href="#FNanchor342" class="label">[342]</a> -<cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 549. <span class="smcap">Von Scherff</span>, -<cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, II, p. 50. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8-9, p. 32, et seq. <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 210.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at <b>La Thibaudine</b> -(<b>Beaumont</b>). The French concentration for action had progressed farther -than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry was -insufficient.<a id="FNanchor343" href="#Footnote343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote343" href="#FNanchor343" class="label">[343]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, <cite>Beaumont</cite>, p. 90.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at <b>Trautenau</b>.<a id="FNanchor344" href="#Footnote344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> Likewise the fight -of the Vth Army Corps at <b>Nachod</b> on June 27th, 1866.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote344" href="#FNanchor344" class="label">[344]</a> -<cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 206. <span class="smcap">Strobl</span>, <cite>Trautenau</cite>, -p. 8, et seq. <span class="smcap">Kühne</span>, <cite>Kritische -Wanderungen</cite>, 3, p. 16.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page340">[340]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR -DEFENSE.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>1. LESSONS OF WAR.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>During the <b>Boer War</b> (1899-1902), the British infantry always attacked -positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated -fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British, their failures -in the early engagements of the war may generally be traced to the -following <span class="nowrap">causes:—</span></p> - -<p>1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to -be surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of -the Guards at <b>Modder River</b>). In many instances, the British forces -were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s -Brigade at <b>Colenso</b>).</p> - -<p>2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted -against each other. (<b>Modder River</b>, <b>Magersfontain</b>, <b>Colenso</b>).</p> - -<p>3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire surprises -carried out by small detachments.</p> - -<p>4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.</p> - -<p>5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions). -The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted action -was a rare exception.</p> - -<p>6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of -an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.</p> - -<p>7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At <b>Magersfontain</b> -only 8<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> battalions out of 13, and at <b>Colenso</b> only 6 battalions -out of 16<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>, had been seriously engaged. When <b>Spionskop</b> was evacuated, -11 battalions had not as yet been engaged. The attacks were begun, -but not pushed home.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The combat tactics of the Russian infantry<a id="FNanchor345" href="#Footnote345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> (Russian I. D. R. of 1903) -were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep formations. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page341">[341]</span> -bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the result of the belief in -decisive psychological impressions and the consciousness that the Russian -fire tactics, based upon volley fire, were inadequate to annihilate a -well concealed defender. Thus, the endeavor to cross blades with the -opponent as quickly as possible, led to a headlong rush to the front, without -creating the preliminary conditions necessary for pushing the attack -home. The hesitation of the higher commanders to throw in every available -man at the decisive stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the -lowest grades, of creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted -unfavorably with this splendid offensive spirit.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote345" href="#FNanchor345" class="label">[345]</a> “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive spirit and -instinct for hand to hand fighting.” <span class="smcap">Count Marenzi</span>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit -of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy tendencies -after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and initiative of -all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night combats and of using -the spade. In addition, the way for success was carefully, almost cautiously, -prepared by the commander-in-chief, who left nothing to chance. -It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold and daring, when they know -that the commander-in-chief has neglected nothing to ensure victory. The -principal characteristics of the Japanese combats <span class="nowrap">were—</span></p> - -<p>1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;</p> - -<p>2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of -infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole front;</p> - -<p>3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point -where the decisive attack was not to take place;<a id="FNanchor346" href="#Footnote346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote346" href="#FNanchor346" class="label">[346]</a> The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;</p> - -<p>5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;</p> - -<p>6. The absence of pursuit.</p> - -<p>The fights at <b>Wafangu</b>,<a id="FNanchor347" href="#Footnote347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> as well as the attack made by the Guard and -the 12th Division at the <b>Yalu</b><a id="FNanchor348" href="#Footnote348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> proceeded entirely according to German -pattern.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote347" href="#FNanchor347" class="label">[347]</a> <cite>Einzelschriften -über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg</cite>, Vienna, 1906, I, p. -226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank by the Japanese 19th Brigade -is especially instructive.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote348" href="#FNanchor348" class="label">[348]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, -I, p. 79, et seq. <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 39-40, p. 123, -et seq. Consult also <span class="smcap">Von Lüttwitz</span>, <cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, p. 2.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when -the Russian artillery—whose ballistic properties were superior to those of -its antagonist—brought a greater number of guns into the field, and when, -in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically inferior in the -battles after Liao Yang.<a id="FNanchor349" href="#Footnote349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a></p> - -</div><!--tetquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote349" href="#FNanchor349" class="label">[349]</a> The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing forces are still -very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese confronted 150,000 Russians; -at Mukden the Russians had perhaps 10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy -pieces of ordnance more than the Japanese.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page342">[342]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the -government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.<a id="FNanchor350" href="#Footnote350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> The -peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to maneuver the -enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing remained for the -Japanese—unless they wished to renounce the offensive entirely—but to -conquer the enemy by attacking him in front. Since the advantages of -the attack—superior numbers and the freedom of choosing the point of -attack—were thus dissipated, the victory had to be gained by making use -of defensive expedients. As the demoralizing and retarding effect produced -by fire increased more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, -nothing remained but to intrench and to take advantage of the cover -afforded by darkness as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior -forces available precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate -development of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to -push forward resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. -Favored by the purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an -envelopment of their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The -Japanese were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance -of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the offensive, -they availed themselves of defensive expedients although their -movements were retarded thereby.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote350" href="#FNanchor350" class="label">[350]</a> C. H. <cite>Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und neuzeitlichen Offensive. -Streffleur</cite>, 1907, October number.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced -by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly country, -perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and long rushes -than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged to resort to a wide -extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth Armies were differently -situated, as the attack over open plains fell to their lot.</p> - -<p>Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard to the -method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:<a id="FNanchor351" href="#Footnote351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> Units were pushed into action -abreast; objective points were assigned to each; and certain lines or points, -according to which they had to maintain touch, were indicated to subordinate -units. To avoid a surprise, if for no other reason, thin firing -lines were formed at the outset, and in a serious attack whole companies, -in dense firing lines capable of developing a strong fire, were at once -thrown in; these advanced to mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, -under 1000 m. The Ist army had a special <i>penchant</i> for making rushes of -80-100 m.,<a id="FNanchor352" href="#Footnote352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many -instances, begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then -pushed home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but -assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined to<span class="pagenum" id="Page343">[343]</span> -intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify quickly a captured -position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will find the best -lessons applicable to our conditions.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote351" href="#FNanchor351" class="label">[351]</a> <cite>Streffleur</cite>, 1907, January number.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote352" href="#FNanchor352" class="label">[352]</a> -This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See <span class="smcap">von Lüttwitz</span>, <cite>Angriffsverfahren -der Japaner</cite>, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made “as the men otherwise -got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance was made by squads and -crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill Regulations warn against making -rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On the other hand, according to the opinion -of von Lüttwitz, the length of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Examples.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. The engagement of the Guard Division at <b>Yangtsuling</b> on July -31st, 1904.<a id="FNanchor353" href="#Footnote353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote353" href="#FNanchor353" class="label">[353]</a> -<span class="smcap">Gertsch</span>, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). <span class="smcap">Sir Ian Hamilton</span>, <cite>A Staff -Officer’s Scrap Book</cite>, I, p. 313. <cite>Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern</cite>, -I, p. 57.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry -Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against <b>Temple Hill</b> (<b>Terrayama</b>), which -was held by 4-6 companies.<a id="FNanchor354" href="#Footnote354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote354" href="#FNanchor354" class="label">[354]</a> -<span class="smcap">Bronsart v. Schellendorff</span>, <cite>Beim japanischen Feldheer</cite>, p. 132.—<span class="smcap">von -Lüttwitz</span>, <cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, p. 23.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and -supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500 m., -the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried.</p> - -<p>The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated fire.</p> - -<p>3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, -1904, against a height south of <b>Huaku</b> (battle on the <b>Shaho</b>).<a id="FNanchor355" href="#Footnote355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote355" href="#FNanchor355" class="label">[355]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 24.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) -under General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against -the heights south of <b>Shotasko</b> (battle on the <b>Shaho</b>).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="outlinesketch"> - -<p class="center highline15"><i>Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade.</i></p> - -<p class="center highline15">Frontage about 2000 m.</p> - -<div class="split6040"> - -<div class="left6040"> - -<p class="center highline15">4. Infantry:</p> - -<p class="noindent highline15"><span class="underl">5. and 6.</span> -<span class="padl4 padr4"><span class="underl">4. and 2.</span></span> -<span class="underl">12. and 11.</span> Cos.</p> - -<p class="noindent highline15"><span class="underl">7. and 8.</span> -<span class="padl4"><span class="underl">1. and 3.</span> Cos.</span></p> - -</div><!--left6040--> - -<div class="right6040"> - -<p class="right padr1 highline15">29. Infantry:</p> - -<p class="right highline15"><span class="underl">10. and 2.</span> Cos.</p> - -<p class="right highline15"><span class="underl">9. and 3.</span> Cos.</p> - -</div><!--right6040--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split6040--> - -<p class="center highline2">Brigade Reserve:</p> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> - -<p class="right highline15 padr2"><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">9. and 10. Cos.</span> -<span class="bot">4. Infantry.</span></span></p> - -</div><!--left5050--> - -<div class="right5050"> - -<p class="noindent highline15 padl2"><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">11. and 12. Cos. </span> -<span class="bot">29. Infantry.</span></span></p> - -</div><!--right5050--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split5050--> - -<p class="center highline2">Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed:</p> - -<p class="right highline15"><span class="horsplit"><span class="top">1. and 4. Cos.</span> -<span class="bot">29. Infantry.</span></span> -<span class="padl3 padr3">and</span> -<span class="horsplit"><span class="top">II. Bn.</span> -<span class="bot">29. Infantry.</span></span></p> - -</div><!--outlinesketch--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval -between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces.</p> - -<p>The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and the -distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men that could -not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then followed independently. -At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at will, which lasted for two<span class="pagenum" id="Page344">[344]</span> -minutes, and then advanced by rushes by companies (first the right, then -the left companies of the battalions). During this advance the supports -(2 battalions) were absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the -brigade reserve approached closer to the firing line (the original distance -between reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was -300 m.). The last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s -position, and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted -only to 235 men.<a id="FNanchor356" href="#Footnote356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote356" href="#FNanchor356" class="label">[356]</a> <span class="smcap">von Lüttwitz</span>, -<cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, p. 24. <span class="smcap">Sir Ian Hamilton</span>, -<cite>A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book</cite>, II. Consult the same work on the unsuccessful -pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the Chosenrei Pass.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain devoid -of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced. The distinguishing -features of this mode of attack were thin firing lines (skirmishers -at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very gradually in density, -and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion 800, and a brigade 2000-3000 -m.).<a id="FNanchor357" href="#Footnote357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> -This caused the attack to falter in many instances as soon -as it had come within 400 m. of the hostile position, whereupon nothing -remained but for the line to intrench and to work forward slowly from -one position to another.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote357" href="#FNanchor357" class="label">[357]</a> -<span class="smcap">Von Lüttwitz</span>, <cite>Angriffsverfahren der Japaner</cite>, p. 47.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Examples.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, -1904, at <b>Shiliho</b> (battle on the <b>Shaho</b>).<a id="FNanchor358" href="#Footnote358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote358" href="#FNanchor358" class="label">[358]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 26.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to -9th, north of <b>Madiapu</b> (battle of <b>Mukden</b>). This division required three -days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting distance of the -enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was constructed at -1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that under 300 m. being built -of sand bags.<a id="FNanchor359" href="#Footnote359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote359" href="#FNanchor359" class="label">[359]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 52. -The attack order of the 5th Infantry Division, in <cite>Urteile und -Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern</cite>, I, p. 121.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904 -(battle of <b>Mukden</b>).<a id="FNanchor360" href="#Footnote360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote360" href="#FNanchor360" class="label">[360]</a> -<span class="smcap">Bronsart von Schellendorff</span>, <cite>Beim japanischen Feldheer</cite>, pp. 217, et seq., -225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand bags, consult <i>ibid.</i>, pp. -236 and 292.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons of -the <b>Russo-Japanese war</b>, make the following deductions: “* * * * -The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance by infantry, -of which considerably more must be demanded than has been done up<span class="pagenum" id="Page345">[345]</span> -to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover, the advantages -of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of the action, and -the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and long range fire on such -lines in which it is desirable to advance, without halting on the way, to -within 1000 yards of the enemy. The necessity of gaining a superiority -of fire before advancing to the assault, and the necessity of an increased -supply of ammunition, are confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated -that the bayonet of the infantryman is still capable of playing an important -role in battle.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>2. THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SUCCESS -DEPENDS.</h4> - -<p>The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the -issue of combat is but little influenced by the formations taken -up; that <i>esprit</i> and the determination to conquer are of far -greater importance than any formation. The most difficult task -that infantry can be called upon to perform consists of successfully -pushing home an attack over open ground commanded -by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said Fieldmarshal -Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations that -a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy -under cover. <i>But every superior commander ought to consider -what such an operation portends.</i>” Heavy losses are -unavoidable in a destructive fire fight lasting for hours.<a id="FNanchor361" href="#Footnote361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a> The -attack will not succeed so long as the enemy commands the -plain with his fire. The commander of the attacking force -must find ways and means to wrest this command from the -enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated -that an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly -prepared by infantry and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate -forces, and is pushed with determination close to the -enemy; and that such an attack is, in fact, superior to the -defensive. The success of an attack on a position prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page346">[346]</span> -for defense might depend upon the following preliminary -conditions:</p> - -<p>(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining -the most favorable direction for the attack.</p> - -<p>(b) Occupation of the foreground of the hostile position. -When the foreground is entirely open, an advance must -be made under cover of darkness up to the medium ranges.</p> - -<p>(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest -coöperation of infantry and artillery.</p> - -<p>(d) Timely determination of the point at which the -decisive attack is to be made.</p> - -<p>(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, -so as to allow of delaying the opening of fire until the -force is as close as possible to the enemy.</p> - -<p>(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment -of a strong force for the purpose of bringing about -a superiority of infantry fire. The organization detailed to -make the attack must have its entire effective strength available -for accomplishing its proper task, and not be compelled -to detach parts for guarding its flanks.</p> - -<p>(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the -part of the attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any -idea of assuming the offensive, at least for the time being, the -attacker should not allow the advantage to escape him of -choosing time and direction of the attack.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote361" href="#FNanchor361" class="label">[361]</a> General -<span class="smcap">von Schlichting</span>, in his work <cite>Taktische und strategische Grundsätze</cite>, -maintains the opinion—in contrast to General <span class="smcap">von Scherff</span>—that open -terrain commanded by hostile fire is impassable for infantry. At any rate, -military history has yet to furnish proof of this.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>3. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.</h4> - -<h5>Reconnaissance. Preparatory Position.</h5> - -<p>“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces -the initiative for the time being. The attacker will -then have time to reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh -all the circumstances that favor the attack. He should not -limit himself to reconnaissance by the cavalry and to observation<span class="pagenum" id="Page347">[347]</span> -through field glasses. Mounted officers’ and infantry officers’ -patrols should supplement this reconnaissance, and complete -the information gained as the enemy is approached.” -(Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>The local reconnaissance (see <a href="#Page248">p. 248</a> supra) should be -conducted with all possible care; timely directions should be -given in regard to it during the approach to the battlefield;<a id="FNanchor362" href="#Footnote362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> -the activity of the reconnoitering bodies should continually -increase as the enemy is approached; and the work itself -should be divided in a systematic manner. Excessive thoroughness -may retard reconnaissance work to such an extent, -on short winter days especially, that success may be jeopardized. -(Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of -action will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It -would be wholly wrong to postpone the decision for making -the attack until something definite is known of the strength -and dispositions of the enemy. These matters are almost -never cleared up until after the battle. The decision as to -whether or not an attack should be made is determined primarily -by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). -The latter may force a commander to advance promptly without -permitting him to await the results of the reconnaissance. -The character of the terrain and the preparation the enemy -is known to have made, determine whether the commander -ought to attack at once, whether he ought to utilize the cover -of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops, or whether -he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his position.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote362" href="#FNanchor362" class="label">[362]</a> According to experience the reconnaissance work generally flags during -a halt, although that is the very time when an increased activity is desirable. -The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on August 18th, 1870, from the -arrival at Caulre until the advance guard opened the fight, is particularly instructive. -<cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 124, et seq. and 215.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The information required as a basis for this decision will, -as a rule, not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the -objections arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot -be avoided, if it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight<span class="pagenum" id="Page348">[348]</span> -into the enemy’s situation. It cannot be expected that the defender -will passively permit the assailant to gain an insight -into his dispositions. A feint will accomplish nothing; the -enemy must be seriously engaged, so that he will show his -hand.<a id="FNanchor363" href="#Footnote363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> Yet in spite of these combats, misapprehensions are -not precluded.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote363" href="#FNanchor363" class="label">[363]</a> It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on October 10th, -1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army before it had completed -its concentration for battle. The advance guards of the Reserve Division and of -the 5th Division encountered advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth -Army Corps), and at Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, -however, not recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been -encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the night 10/11th -October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the 11th. 9th Supplement to -the <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1906, p. 327.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor -to gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find -themselves suddenly within short range of the enemy. In -such a situation, the detachment should maintain its position, -as its fire will frequently facilitate the approach of the other -attacking troops. Almost every one of the more serious engagements -furnishes examples illustrating this feature.<a id="FNanchor364" href="#Footnote364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote364" href="#FNanchor364" class="label">[364]</a> The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the “three houses” -(Yuhuntun near Mukden). <cite>Vierteljahrshefte</cite>, 1907, p. 78. The perseverance of -the troops in the Palungshan works, captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being -enveloped on both flanks. (Port Arthur). <cite>Streffleur, Einzelschriften</cite>, 4, pp. 81 -and 91. The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard -Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). <cite>Urteile und Beobachtungen -von Mitkämpfern</cite>, I, p. 60.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being -driven back, if for no other reason, it is advisable to place in -readiness an adequate force of artillery. As the artillery is -protected by shields, it can take up the fight even against superior -artillery with better chances of succeeding than in the past.</p> - -<p>If the commander has decided to attack and has determined -against what part of the hostile position the main attack -is to be made, the foreground of the hostile position is at once -occupied, and the enemy’s advanced troops forced back, so as -to prevent the defender from gaining an insight into the dispositions -of the assailant.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page349">[349]</span></p> - -<p>The assailant should launch as few troops as possible -for initiating the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely -in a fire fight with the infantry of the hostile main -position, even if the terrain would permit a covered approach -to short range. If the advanced troops allow themselves to be -enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the danger -of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole -force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for -the main attack.<a id="FNanchor365" href="#Footnote365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote365" href="#FNanchor365" class="label">[365]</a> “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain permits to the -enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose of opening fire.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue -precipitation in issuing orders may place advanced troops in -such an unfavorable situation. If the defender allows himself -to be tricked into assuming the offensive for the purpose -of driving off harassing detachments, so much the better for -the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then find an opportunity -to fire on the enemy.<a id="FNanchor366" href="#Footnote366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote366" href="#FNanchor366" class="label">[366]</a> The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of French infantry -during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. -174 and 179.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will have -to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line may be -formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will nevertheless still -abstain from advancing into the zone of effective fire.” The Austrians -usually employ strong covering bodies. The Germans desire to ensure -simultaneous action on the part of all the troops in opening the combat.</p> - -<p>At <b>Spicheren</b> the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under -the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only occupied -by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders to General -von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of Frossard’s -Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which the artillery was -posted.<a id="FNanchor367" href="#Footnote367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote367" href="#FNanchor367" class="label">[367]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 310.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the -Vth Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer -with four battalions at <b>Wörth</b> and <b>Spachbach</b> (1500 m. apart) and to -occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac -Mahon was in position.<a id="FNanchor368" href="#Footnote368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote368" href="#FNanchor368" class="label">[368]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 320.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page350">[350]</span></p> - -<p>The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the -advance guard, into a preparatory position, is made in such a -manner that units are opposite their objectives when the subsequent -forward movement against the enemy is begun.<a id="FNanchor369" href="#Footnote369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> This -frequently requires a rearrangement of the forces so that even -an assailant who is numerically inferior may be superior at the -decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the front and -flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the -economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to -failure, and is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly -superior in numbers or morale.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote369" href="#FNanchor369" class="label">[369]</a> The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near Ste. Marie -aux Chênes, against St. Privat. <cite>Der 18. August</cite> p. 408.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on -the course of the combat and makes it difficult to change the -direction of the attack. Route columns, taking advantage of -all available cover, will, therefore, be retained as long as possible, -and only subordinate units permitted to march directly -toward their proper objectives, until the hostile fire compels a -more extended deployment (development). The preparatory -position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front of the -hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to -accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and -to shield it from the observation and the fire of the enemy.</p> - -<p>In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have -to be placed in a preparatory position when three kilometers -or more from the enemy, even when the latter’s artillery will -in all probability be neutralized by our own.</p> - -<p>“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various -units into the preparatory position, it is advisable, especially -in close country, to have them move from one covered position -to another. If this is done, units whose march was favored -by the nature of the ground, will not arrive prematurely -within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while others who -had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are still a -considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his<span class="pagenum" id="Page351">[351]</span> -dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance -from one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position -carefully prepared for defense will consume several days, the -assailant placing his artillery in position on the first day and -reconnoitering under cover of infantry, which is pushed to the -front.<a id="FNanchor370" href="#Footnote370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> The troops of the first line are pushed forward far -enough before daylight so that they can intrench under cover -of darkness and open fire at dawn. This will be more difficult -to accomplish when covering troops or advanced positions are -located in front of the hostile position. If the assailant has -succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops back -upon the main position, an advance to within effective range -may be made during the night in order that the fire fight may -be opened on the succeeding day. Although the chance of -taking the enemy by surprise is eliminated in such a case, the -advantage of having diminished the distance that will have to -be crossed under fire remains.<a id="FNanchor371" href="#Footnote371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote370" href="#FNanchor370" class="label">[370]</a> -The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail in <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. -237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest cooperation of field artillery, foot -artillery, infantry and pioneers.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote371" href="#FNanchor371" class="label">[371]</a> The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an interesting -example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this instance, was made during -the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, -which must be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the -leading line. These rear echelons must either be intrenched -or at least sheltered by masks. General actions should be -avoided at night.</p> - -<h4>4. THE COÖPERATION OF INFANTRY AND -ARTILLERY IN BATTLE.</h4> - -<p>Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), -the infantry has to advance within the zone of effective -infantry fire. In doing this the infantry must either pass by -or through the artillery which is already engaged.<a id="FNanchor372" href="#Footnote372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote372" href="#FNanchor372" class="label">[372]</a> See <a href="#Page316">p. 316</a>, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page352">[352]</span></p> - -<p>During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in -spite of the mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced -the artillery of both belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse -slope of heights. When this was neglected and when batteries -went into position in the open, within effective range, they were -quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel caused both sides to -advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order formations at -an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively. This -alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished -a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident -that the first few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred -coincidentally with the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, -which was superior both as regards numbers and power. The -new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in contrast with the previous -edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the infantry attack should -not be postponed until a superiority of fire has been gained. -Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from the modern -armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile -positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at -Plevna and the British in South Africa).</p> - -<p>“<i>The principal duty of field artillery is to support the -infantry in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably -connected with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, -always fight the targets that are most dangerous for its -infantry.</i>” (Par. 364 German F. A. D. R.).</p> - -<p>The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe -that the guns should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry -(par. 375), and that single batteries should accompany -the infantry attack to within close range of the enemy (par. -471). When an assault is to be made, the infantry expects the -artillery to direct its fire against the point of attack until immediately -before the assault begins.</p> - -<p>“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with -the support of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable -protection, even at the short ranges. <i>At the decisive moment -the artillery should not shrink even from the heaviest infantry -fire.</i>” (Par. 369 German F. A. D. R.).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page353">[353]</span></p> - -<p>“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery -to consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively -supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is -chosen as an objective will depend upon the situation. As a -rule, the hostile artillery will be the proper objective for our -artillery during the preparatory stage of the action. As the -distance between the opposing infantry forces decreases, it will -become more and more necessary for the artillery to devote -itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432 German F. A. D. R.).</p> - -<p>If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote -itself for some time to the most important target without -regard to the hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely -occupying the latter’s attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. -R.). To silence artillery in a concealed position requires curved -fire and a good deal of ammunition; but, on the other hand, artillery -so posted cannot fire upon advancing skirmishers.<a id="FNanchor373" href="#Footnote373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> -Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant should -force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose itself -to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. -D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote373" href="#FNanchor373" class="label">[373]</a> This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted quickly enough, -and that it is difficult to follow moving targets. Besides, when the targets are -small and numerous, they are difficult to hit.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of -both sides will engage each other’s attention with only a small -part of their guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile -infantry. It is obvious that the infantry will very soon demand -of its artillery in definite terms that it should first annihilate -the hostile artillery before the infantry can think of -continuing the attack.</p> - -<p>The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the -fusion of activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely -new departure. The commencement of the infantry attack -is accordingly no longer dependent upon the result of the artillery -combat; on the contrary, both combats are of equal importance -and proceed along parallel lines; the only danger is -that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the front before -a superiority of fire has been gained.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page354">[354]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned by -the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched artillery -can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional circumstances, -as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as soon as the hostile fire -becomes too hot, and resume its fire again when that of the enemy abates. -The infantry attack should therefore be launched without awaiting the -result of the artillery combat, but the infantry must insist upon the artillery -completely engaging the attention of the hostile guns during the -advance. Another reason for not awaiting the outcome of the artillery -combat, lies in the great frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful -attack made by a division will then frequently cause the neighboring unit -to make an immediate attack.”</p> - -<p><b>Austria</b> (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the -necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long as -the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved a noticeable -success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile artillery, the infantry -attack remains a difficult undertaking.”</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action: -The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly -as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely necessary. -The commander should give the order for the attack only when the preparation -is considered sufficient.</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing infantry -forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so as to -compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile batteries -have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances to the attack, the -fire is directed upon the point of attack in order to prepare and to cover -the assault.”</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm for -infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from the start -by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery or infantry, the -attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to draw its fire upon themselves, -in order to facilitate the deployment of their own infantry. If, -on the other hand, the hostile artillery remains concealed for the purpose -of saving its fire for the infantry when the latter offers a favorable target -upon arriving within effective range, then it would seem advisable for -the artillery of the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only -with enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s -artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the defender’s -artillery is compelled to come into action in order to support its own -infantry against the advance of the attacker’s infantry.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry -and artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing -at all times with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting<span class="pagenum" id="Page355">[355]</span> -guidons),<a id="FNanchor374" href="#Footnote374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> since the elimination of powder smoke and the -adoption of neutral tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance -that, while we have a signal for increasing the range -of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have none for indicating that -the fire is to be concentrated upon certain points. “Uninterrupted -communication with the fighting line in front must be -provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal -or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are -primarily to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the -enemy, in order that the artillery may keep up its fire as long -as possible.” (Par. 376 German F. A. D. R.). In England, -it has been suggested to indicate the point upon which fire is to -be concentrated, by the colored ball of smoke of a special projectile. -It requires strict attention on the part of the infantry -to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery. Every -opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced -under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. -This is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is -to be blinded by a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of -the artillery will either cause the most advanced line to make a -rush, or the troops of the rear line to come up to the firing -line in order to reinforce it or to carry it forward as much -as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable shield for the -infantry (<i>véritable bouclier de l’infanterie</i>).” <span class="smcap">Langlois</span>.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote374" href="#FNanchor374" class="label">[374]</a> During the attack on the Waterberg, on August 11th, 1904, the various -units were ordered to carry, on their outer flanks, flags attached to long poles. -These flags were white in Estorffs, red in v.d. Heyde’s, blue in Müller’s, and -green in Deimling’s detachment.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.">5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.<a id="FNanchor375" href="#Footnote375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote375" href="#FNanchor375" class="label">[375]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 138.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The reconnoitering troops are charged with the duty of -ascertaining the parts of the hostile position which can be -approached under cover, which are weaker than the others -(frequently true of the flanks),<a id="FNanchor376" href="#Footnote376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> or which can be enfiladed. -The attack will usually be directed against the weakest point<span class="pagenum" id="Page356">[356]</span> -in the hostile position, or that on which the greatest volume -of fire can be concentrated from enfilading or commanding -positions. At all other points of the battlefield, the assailant -will endeavor to deceive the opponent, with weak forces, as -to his true intentions, but, at the decisive point, he should -launch superior numbers. The French regulations contend that -such weak points will only become apparent during the course -of the fight, and therefore separate the troops into a preparatory -and a decisive combat group.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote376" href="#FNanchor376" class="label">[376]</a> Example: The right flank of the French position at Wörth, and at Roncourt -(St. Privat).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The desire to strike the weakest point in the enemy’s line -causes the decisive blow to be directed against a flank, and -the numerical superiority requisite for gaining the superiority -of fire, leads to</p> - -<h4>6. ENVELOPMENT.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 392-396 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<p>The desire of the attacker to put a superior number of -rifles into the fight, in order to gain a superiority of fire more -quickly, naturally leads to an extension of the firing line and -to an overlapping of the defender’s line. The advantage of -overlapping the enemy’s line lies in the fact that part of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page357">[357]</span> -line attacked is exposed to both frontal and oblique fire. The -effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending the wing of -the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line -succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only -the hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment -is brought about with the result that the lines of fire of -the assailant cross each other within the hostile position. If -the defender refuses a wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. -This will cause such heavy losses that the defender -will begin to succumb first at the salient point of his line. A -further advantage is gained by a pressure on the enemy’s line -of retreat.</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo356.png" alt="Envelopment" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;<a id="FNanchor377" href="#Footnote377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> they -may perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate -him.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote377" href="#FNanchor377" class="label">[377]</a> It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks made by the -Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made by the 72nd, 40th -and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height of Maison Blanche south of -Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8-10, -p. 128.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether -the commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile -flank; individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, -regiments, finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear -of the front of the enemy should not lead the enveloping -force to attempt to execute another enveloping movement when -it encounters a newly formed front. Surprise is, to a certain -extent, essential to the success of a flank attack.<a id="FNanchor378" href="#Footnote378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> The troops -holding the enemy in front [secondary attack] must, therefore, -hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance -about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that -he will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. -If this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham -from reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing<span class="pagenum" id="Page358">[358]</span> -force with more troops than are absolutely necessary. In this -connection, compare the conduct of the 1st Army at Königgrätz -and of the Prussian Vth Army Corps at Wörth with the vacillating -action of the Russian IIIrd and Ist Armies at Sandepu.<a id="FNanchor379" href="#Footnote379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> -So long as the enemy is not firmly held in front, he will be able -to evade an envelopment by withdrawing. The combats of the -Boers in the Orange Free State furnish numerous examples -of this fact. The Austrian regulations have very properly -coined the term “attack on two fronts”, which better indicates -the task of both parts of an attacking force.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote378" href="#FNanchor378" class="label">[378]</a> -The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). <span class="smcap">v. Lettow-Vorbeck</span>, II, -p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of Forbach at Spicheren by six -battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I. p. 356. The assault and -capture of the Mont de Brune (Beaumont) by 6<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> Prussian companies, which -were followed by 4<sup>2</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub> companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 -battalions and 3 batteries; 6 guns were captured. <span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, <cite>Beaumont</cite>, -pp. 132 and 227.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote379" href="#FNanchor379" class="label">[379]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>. V. p. 42.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Whether the decisive blow is directed against the front -or a flank, depends upon the result of the fire. The advantages -offered by an enveloping movement must not lead to holding -the enemy once and for all in front, while the main attack -is directed against his flank. A frontal attack made in conjunction -with a threatening demonstration against the hostile -flank frequently offers far greater prospects of success.<a id="FNanchor380" href="#Footnote380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> -If a superiority is to be employed to advantage, an envelopment -must be made; all objections advanced against the “enveloping -craze” are disposed of by this statement.<a id="FNanchor381" href="#Footnote381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> “A condition -precedent to an envelopment is that the enemy be held -in front. For this purpose a determined demonstration is -most effective.” (Par. 392 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote380" href="#FNanchor380" class="label">[380]</a> -The attack on Flanville, on September 1st, 1870, is an instructive example. -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Noisseville</cite>, p. 87. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II. p. 1407.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote381" href="#FNanchor381" class="label">[381]</a> <span class="smcap">v. d. Goltz</span>, -<cite>Das Volk in Waffen</cite>, pp. 328 and 332. <span class="smcap">Blume</span>, <cite>Strategie</cite>, p. -170. <span class="smcap">Meckel</span>, <cite>Truppenführung</cite>, p. 221.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The risks involved in an envelopment must not be overlooked—overextension -and dispersion of the troops;<a id="FNanchor382" href="#Footnote382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> the possibility -that the troops fighting in front and those fighting on -the flank, separated from each other, may be defeated in detail, -whether this be brought about by the defender assuming -the offensive, or by the force holding the enemy in front -allowing itself to be enticed into making a premature advance -and suffering a defeat before the envelopment has a chance -to become effective.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote382" href="#FNanchor382" class="label">[382]</a> -The attack made by François’ Brigade during the battle of Spicheren. <cite>Gen. -St. W.</cite>, I. p. 318. Between 12 and 1 o’clock, this brigade covered a front of -4000 m. See <a href="#Page262">p. 262</a>, supra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page359">[359]</span></p> - -<p>“The envelopment is effected in the simplest manner if -the forces designated for this task, when still at a distance -from the enemy, are given a march direction that will bring -them against the hostile flank.</p> - -<p>“When initiated during the development for action or -when carried out by retained reserves, the envelopment is much -more difficult.” (Par. 393 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>In the last-mentioned case it may happen that the force -detailed to make the flank attack strikes the enemy’s front instead -of his flank. The same is true of attempts to envelop -with parts of the infantry of the first line that are already -deployed, perhaps already engaged, when the terrain is not -specially favorable for such a movement. Such movements -may, in special cases, be carried out at night. (Enveloping -movements of the divisions of the Japanese IIIrd Army at -Mukden). As a rule, this brings about only an overlapping -and flanking of the parts of the hostile position next adjacent -to the wing making the movement, but does not produce a -concentric effect on the hostile flank. Yet, even weak detachments -that reach positions from which they are able to enfilade -the enemy, facilitate the advance to the front.</p> - -<p>In starting an enveloping movement when at a considerable -distance from the enemy, the force which is to make it, -is directed upon a point located in rear of the hostile position, -approximately where his reserves are presumed to be. If -then the fighting line is further extended toward the outer -flank, the assailant avoids facing the hostile front directly, -and will almost invariably have a start over the defender in extending -the threatened wing. The troops still in the act of -withdrawing from the route column naturally take charge of -the protection of the flanks.<a id="FNanchor383" href="#Footnote383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote383" href="#FNanchor383" class="label">[383]</a> Compare the deployment for action of the 1st Guard Division at Königgrätz -with that of the 4th Japanese Division at Wafangu. In the last-mentioned -case, the leading (10th) brigade was launched in a very skillful flank attack; the -second brigade took charge of protecting the flank.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>If a flank march in front of the enemy should become -necessary, it can be undertaken with sufficient safety only when -proper preparations have been made—distribution in depth,<span class="pagenum" id="Page360">[360]</span> -shortening of route columns, due regard being had to protection -of the front and flanks—to permit a deployment of the -force at the right moment and in a suitable formation toward -the hostile side.<a id="FNanchor384" href="#Footnote384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> Within effective range of the enemy, such -a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover -is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force -the troops making the flank march to face to the front.<a id="FNanchor385" href="#Footnote385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote384" href="#FNanchor384" class="label">[384]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Schlichting</span>. <cite>Taktische und strategische Grundsätze</cite>, I, p. 90, et seq. -The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions against the Hill of Forbach -(Spicheren) is especially instructive in this connection. The attacking force -was threatened by hostile troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment -caused the attacking force to face toward the front of the French position. -As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in order to be -pushed into the fight again at another place. <span class="smcap">Gernier</span>, <cite>Einmarschkämpfe</cite>, -p. 184.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote385" href="#FNanchor385" class="label">[385]</a> Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at Villermain-Cravant, -on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a violent snow storm and thick -weather made it possible for this force to disengage itself from the enemy and -to join the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Cravant.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French position -on the <b>Hallue</b><a id="FNanchor386" href="#Footnote386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a>: The 30th Brigade used the road leading along the -hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its movement. The -leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry, on debouching from -Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying flanking fire and endeavored -to advance in the face of it, while the brigade commander, energetically -carrying out the orders given him, led the 68th Infantry toward -Frechencourt, thus forestalling several French battalions that were hurrying -up from the east. The village was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry, -but a frontal offensive movement against the hostile main position -could not be carried out from here either, in spite of the inferiority of -the French troops.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote386" href="#FNanchor386" class="label">[386]</a> -<span class="smcap">v. Malachowski</span>, <cite>Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht</cite>, p. 24, et seq. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Nordarmee</cite>, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the conduct of the 15th Infantry -Division, which was to hold the enemy in front and which advanced prematurely -before the enveloping movement of the 16th Division had become effective, consult -<a href="#Page282">p. 282</a> supra, and <cite>Taktik</cite>, V. p. 163.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at -once without being first placed in a preparatory position<a id="FNanchor387" href="#Footnote387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> -or whether it should first be concentrated, depends upon the -situation of the troops engaged in front with the enemy (the -necessity of relieving the pressure on the Ist Army engaged in -front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon the counter-measures -taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters a<span class="pagenum" id="Page361">[361]</span> -newly formed front, it would be a mistake for him to attack -successively with the different units.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote387" href="#FNanchor387" class="label">[387]</a> -According to the opinion of General <span class="smcap">v. Schlichting</span>, a preparatory position -should be taken up. <cite>Taktische und strategische Grundsätze</cite>, III, pp. 133 and -154, et seq. See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 174.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Whether the troops holding the enemy in front participate -in the assault during an enveloping movement, depends -upon circumstances. They may frequently better ensure the -success of the attack by delivering an enfilading fire than by -advancing. The commander should, at any rate, not lose -sight of this advantage. If both groups (the enveloping and -the holding group) advance to the decisive attack, they should -do so simultaneously. The group holding the enemy in front -must resist the temptation of moving to the front before the -envelopment can become effective.<a id="FNanchor388" href="#Footnote388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote388" href="#FNanchor388" class="label">[388]</a> -Consult <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 377, 561 and 590. In regard to the attack made -by the Guard and the Saxons and the premature attack made by the Guard at -St Privat.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The attack on <b>Ste. Marie aux Chênes</b>, on August 18th, 1870,<a id="FNanchor389" href="#Footnote389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> and -that made by the 37th Infantry Brigade on <b>Ladon</b><a id="FNanchor390" href="#Footnote390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a> are models worthy of -imitation. “The brigade commander personally directed Lieutenant-Colonel -v. Hagen (commanding the troops holding the enemy in front) to have -the signal ‘forward double time’ sounded as soon as he could see the -skirmishers of the 78th Infantry coming over the heights to the right -front.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote389" href="#FNanchor389" class="label">[389]</a> The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard received orders “to form for -attack against St. Privat, but not to attack that village before the expected -arrival of the Saxon Corps.” <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 167 and 288.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote390" href="#FNanchor390" class="label">[390]</a> -<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Gefechtsbilder</cite>, III, pp. 58 and 49.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Gorni Dubniac</b>, on October 30th, 1877, the scheme of designating -the moment for attack by means of artillery salvos, failed. During the -attack on <b>Scheinovo</b>, on January 9th, 1878, the simultaneous advance of -Prince Mirski’s troops was regulated by the clock.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>If the attacker desires to deliver an effective blow against -the enemy’s flank, <i>a considerable interval must be left between -the troops charged with the holding attack</i> [secondary attack] -<i>and those detailed to make the flank attack</i>, when the envelopment -is initiated. (Par. 393 German I. D. R.). The width of -this gap is increased to a seemingly dangerous degree by the -range of modern weapons, but real danger is not to be apprehended -as a counter-attack of the defender exposes both of -his flanks to an enveloping attack. If the enveloping group<span class="pagenum" id="Page362">[362]</span> -continues to advance, that advance in itself will very soon set a -limit to the enemy’s counter-attack. The seemingly dangerous -gap in the line, at the commencement of an action, is closed -more and more as the enemy is approached. Nevertheless, this -gap may induce a cautious leader to draw the enveloping group -closer to the frontal group, thereby impairing the effectiveness -of the envelopment. The flanking groups accomplish the best -results, but in following up tactical objectives, they should -never lose sight of the annihilation of the enemy. The difficulty -of coördinating the action of the separated parts of the line -is greater than the danger to be apprehended from a hostile -counter-attack against the frontal group. As a rule, the entry -of the enveloping group into action will be the signal for a -general attack. The effectiveness of the enveloping attack is -proportional to the energy with which it is made, but the danger -to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack increases -in the same ratio.</p> - -<div class="container w40em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo362.png" alt="Gap in line" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<h5>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> When possible, the reserve is to be designated to make the -enveloping movement. (Par. 407 Austrian I. D. R.). When practicable, -a part of the reserve is employed from the start for the envelopment, and, -under certain circumstances, also for the purpose of gaining positions from -which an enfilade fire can be delivered, and for supporting the advance of -the frontal attack. The group holding the enemy in front may at first -fight a purely defensive action to prevent a hostile counter-attack, to screen -our own dispositions, and finally, by means of a fire fight at effective ranges, -to hold the hostile troops in their position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page363">[363]</span></p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The envelopment is occasionally mentioned in the regulations -(for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). The Field Service Regulations, -in discussing the attack, whose different stages may vary in length -depending upon the intentions of the commander, state, however, that the -attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy, with superior forces, -for the purpose of annihilating him.”</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> The importance of flank attacks, even those in which the -defender is subdued by the flanking fire of mounted troops, is specially -mentioned, but, in this connection, it is emphasized that it is immaterial -whether the attack is finally directed against the front or a flank of the -enemy. The holding attack is to be carried out with energy in front to -prevent the enemy from drawing reinforcements to other points.</p> - -<p><b>Italy.</b> While the regulations of 1891 still unqualifiedly acknowledged -that any frontal attack might succeed, the regulations of 1903 called -attention to the importance of the envelopment, without denying “that -the frontal attack might be the decisive one.” Surprise is an advantageous -factor for success, and for this reason, even covering troops, for example, -may have to be dispensed with on the march.</p> - -<p>If a force desires to take the enemy by surprise, it must carefully take -advantage of the ground. The surprise may be made more complete, if -the accompanying frontal attack is energetically pushed. On the other hand, -considerations for the troops in the holding attack, set a limit to the extension -of the flanking movement. The fire power of the troops in the -holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops themselves defeated by -a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of the general advance arrives. -They must pay the strictest attention to the course of events on the opponent’s -side; if the enemy retires, or shifts parts of his force in order -to meet a flank attack, the troops in the holding attack must act with -energy. If such signs are not apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, -be proper only when the pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt -on the enemy’s line. This is the only way in which “simultaneous action -by both attacks may be ensured, and this is of decisive importance to -the successful issue of the combat.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>7. REMOVAL OF PACKS.</h4> - -<p>It is advisable for infantry to remove packs for an attack; -such tremendous physical exertions await the troops that -everything ought to be done to reduce the load carried by the -individual man.<a id="FNanchor391" href="#Footnote391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> “As soon as it becomes doubtful whether -the troops will be able to perform the task assigned them in -action without such relief, all independent commanders, and, -in organizations larger than a regiment, commanders of regiments<span class="pagenum" id="Page364">[364]</span> -and of higher units, have authority to order the men to -remove their packs. In issuing such an order they should bear -in mind the disadvantages which may result from leaving the -packs behind. When knapsacks are removed, the ammunition -and iron rations should be taken from them. Overcoats, cooking -utensils, canteens, bread bags, and intrenching tools remain -on the men.” (Par. 301 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote391" href="#FNanchor391" class="label">[391]</a> Examples from military history in -<cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1902, No. 32.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>According to the French Manual of Field Engineering, -the skirmishers, especially when intrenching, may utilize the -knapsack as cover.</p> - -<p>In a defeat knapsacks will frequently be lost. Thus the -Russians, after the second battle of Plevna, and Frossard’s -Corps, after the battle of Spicheren, lost their knapsacks with -camp equipment and iron rations, and, in consequence thereof, -suffered great hardships during the succeeding days. On the -other hand, during their retreat, the 43rd, 44th and 45th Infantry -Regiments of the Ist Army Corps managed to recover -without trouble the packs which they had removed before -entering the battle of Trautenau.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The infantry of the Xth Army Corps had left its knapsacks behind on -August 8th, 1870, and did not get them again until the early part of September. -The knapsacks were not hauled on wagons after the organizations, -but were left at the railroad station of St. Ingbert. On August 6th, -1870, the Würtemberg Field Brigade had left its knapsacks in a bivouac -near Reimersweiler at the risk of never seeing them again. Among other -reasons, General v. d. Tann considered it impossible for the 2nd Bavarian -Division to advance beyond Wörth, because the organizations might perhaps -thereby have been separated for several days from their baggage, -which they had left behind between Preuschdorf and Görsdorf.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>When knapsacks are removed, a detachment will have to -be left behind to guard them, otherwise they may be robbed -of their contents.<a id="FNanchor392" href="#Footnote392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a> The troops always consider the trip to the -rear to get the baggage a special hardship; wagons will very -rarely be available for this purpose, as after great battles all -the wagons in the entire neighborhood will be requisitioned for -transporting the wounded, and as supply wagons will, as a rule, -not be at hand.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote392" href="#FNanchor392" class="label">[392]</a> This was neglected by the 20th and 35th Infantries, on August 16th, 1870.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page365">[365]</span></p> - -<h4>8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS.</h4> - -<p>In an attack upon a defensive position which is held in -force, machine gun batteries will generally be held in rear for -the time being. They form a mobile reserve in the hands of the -commander-in-chief, who may employ it for quickly reinforcing -threatened points, for exerting a pressure upon the wings -and flanks of the enemy, and for preparing the assault. Machine -gun companies, either broken up into platoons or not, as -the case may be, endeavor to reach positions from which they -can facilitate the advance of their infantry.</p> - -<p>It is especially advantageous if the fire that is directed -upon the point where the hostile position is to be penetrated, -comes from a position permitting a good view, or from an -oblique direction, because the fire will not have to be discontinued -even when the infantry continues its advance or moves -to the assault. If such a position, permitting the greatest fire -effect, is reached (at about 800 m. or less from the hostile -position) any further advance of the machine guns is faulty, -because it interrupts the fire and necessitates fresh laying and -adjustment.</p> - -<p>Upon the victorious termination of a fight, the machine -guns should participate in the first stages of the pursuit by -making an extended use of their fire. They hurry forward -into the captured position, as soon as it is apparent that the -victory has been gained, in order to support the infantry in -holding the position, to cover the infantry while it is re-forming, -and to reduce the last vestige of the enemy’s resistance. -If the attack fails the machine guns cover the retiring troops.</p> - -<h4>9. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK.</h4> - -<p>In an infantry attack, the art of minor troop leading consists -of pushing a firing line, superior to the enemy, to the -strip of ground from which the power of our rifle can be -utilized to the best advantage for vanquishing the enemy; secondly,<span class="pagenum" id="Page366">[366]</span> -of bringing up supports, without exposing them to unnecessary -losses, so that they will be promptly available in -case of need. The preparations which the enemy has made for -attaining the maximum fire power (by intrenching, placing -ammunition in readiness, and by ascertaining ranges) must be -offset by employing a superior number of rifles. The commander -who brings a greater number of rifles into action -than his opponent, may count on gaining a superiority of fire -quickly and with certainty.</p> - -<p>The task of higher troop leading consists of simultaneously -launching the troops against the common objective.</p> - -<p>The effect of modern projectiles requires that, on open -ground, the first deployment be made when 4000-5000 m. -from the enemy. The best scheme would be to advance, without -halting, to within decisive short range of the defender, and -then to open fire, but, as previously stated, the defender should -endeavor to prevent the assailant from ever reaching these -ranges. This design of the defender must be frustrated; if -artillery is unable to accomplish this, machine guns or a part of -the infantry must enter the fight; but all parts of the force not -required for this fire fight at medium ranges should continue -their movement without interruption.</p> - -<p>The most difficult task that infantry may be called upon -to perform consists of advancing over an open plain, in the -face of unsubdued artillery, when the situation does not permit -night or the effect of an envelopment to be awaited.</p> - -<p>The first deployment as skirmishers is made for the purpose -of protecting the advancing troops against surprise. Frequently, -a squad or a section per company will suffice for this -purpose, but these units should cover the entire front available -for the organization to which they belong. A uniform and -simultaneous advance along the whole line is impossible however, -on account of the diversity of the ground at various -points. When cover is available, skirmish lines may be formed -quickly and pushed forward as entities, but when cover is lacking, -firing lines may have to be deployed slowly and piecemeal.<span class="pagenum" id="Page367">[367]</span> -The unit that has pushed farthest to the front must facilitate -with its fire the advance of those who have encountered greater -obstacles in advancing.</p> - -<p>Long, dense firing lines and the supports following them -are exposed to such heavy losses in open country, even at long -ranges, that their advance will soon hesitate. Moreover, the -defender will only fire on targets whose size and density promise -a great number of hits. Therefore, the assailant should endeavor -to lead his infantry forward in loose, disconnected -skirmish lines, which are difficult for the enemy to hit. As a -rule, the assailant should not open fire until after he has been -reinforced and has sufficient fire power available. (Par. 334 -German I. D. R.). The situation in which these thin firing -lines are placed is by no means a favorable one, as the defender -will concentrate his fire on the points where the assailant -seems to be filling up his line “for the purpose of overwhelming -the defender permanently by a superiority of fire.” (Par. 413 -German I. D. R.). The skirmishers will then quite naturally -open fire for the purpose of interfering with the cool delivery -of the defender’s fire.</p> - -<p>Such a piecemeal, almost independent advance, during -which the effect of the accustomed word of command is considerably -reduced and control and supervision of the individual -skirmisher is impossible, presupposes that the troops are well-drilled, -individually trained, and, above all, intelligent. Attention -must also be called to the fact that the firing line can -offer but a weak resistance to an enemy advancing unexpectedly -in force. But, in spite of these drawbacks, this mode of advance -has its advantages for crossing a plain devoid of cover. -It permits favorable fire positions to be reached with greater -safety, especially if these positions can be picked out with the -aid of field glasses, than would be the case if dense skirmish -lines were led forward simultaneously.</p> - -<p>The advance of the infantry under hostile fire, over open -ground, may accordingly be <span class="nowrap">conducted—</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page368">[368]</span></p> - -<p>1. At a walk, by long rushes made by strong units (by -platoons at least), supported by powerful artillery fire or by -the fire of a machine gun battery or a detachment of skirmishers -posted in a favorable position;</p> - -<p>2. By shorter rushes made by smaller units (“proper -only when conditions demand it”);</p> - -<p>3. By crawling, or, in exceptional cases (for example in -passing through fields of standing grain), by employing</p> - -<p>4. Fire while in motion.</p> - -<p>The fire fight at long ranges and near the extreme limit -of mid ranges is only a means for the purpose of reaching -the decisive battle ranges, and of interfering with the undisturbed -delivery of the enemy’s fire. Fire must be opened at -as late a moment as possible. Our firing line should in any -case be strong enough, upon entering the zone of mid ranges, -to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire. Experience has shown -that an assailant who opens fire at “long” ranges rarely reaches -short ranges. (See <a href="#Page149">p. 149</a> supra).</p> - -<p>The distances at which the echelons in rear follow the -firing line should be less (as laid down in the Italian and Russian -regulations) than the distance which separates the firing -line of the attacker from that of the defender. The distances -may be increased without danger at this stage of the combat, -as the decision is not imminent, but on the flanks the supports -will have to be brought up closer in order that an unexpected -flank attack may be effectively opposed. All parts of the attacking -force move—as long as possible at a walk—straight to -the front. Subordinate leaders, taking advantage of all available -cover, should endeavor to lead the supports skillfully after -the firing line. This requires that the ground to be crossed -be reconnoitered. As a rule, a movement by the flank upon -leaving cover is costlier than an advance by squads or sections -over open ground. Long lines make it easier for the hostile -artillery to adjust and observe its fire, while, when a greater -number of targets of smaller frontage is exposed, this is made -more difficult. For this reason, supports are not led forward<span class="pagenum" id="Page369">[369]</span> -as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, -under certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller -units. The units following in rear remain as long as possible -in close order formations, preferably in route columns. “Man -is by nature exceedingly timid. Soldiers, even those drawn -from the educated classes, who were fully aware of the supreme -importance of gaining the victory, broke down on coming under -fire. In close order the moral encouragement due to the proximity -of superiors and comrades kept up their courage.” (Hessert).<a id="FNanchor393" href="#Footnote393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> -Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to -be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which -deploy and follow each other at considerable distances.<a id="FNanchor394" href="#Footnote394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote393" href="#FNanchor393" class="label">[393]</a> “We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal, and, in doing -so, to ignore the psychological element of combat.” Major-General Stieler.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote394" href="#FNanchor394" class="label">[394]</a> The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian reserves at Plevna -(11th September, 1877), and during the attack made by the Guard on Gorni -Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the part of the reserves.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders -must decide whether or not it ought to be returned; but the -closer one can get to the enemy without firing a shot, the -better. According to the German F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, -uninterrupted forward movement of skirmish lines -in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is possible -only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, -even skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. -from the enemy.</p> - -<p>Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, -which, in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, -and which, subsequently, is to produce a superiority of -fire. As taught by experience, this cannot be accomplished -from a single position, if the enemy is efficient.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A so-called “main firing position”, which was to be located 400-600 -m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the -purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making -use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious infantry -attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first firing position -and the assaulting position, was not appreciated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page370">[370]</span></p> - -<p><b>Austria.</b> (Par. 589 I. D. R.). “When conditions are very favorable, -it might be possible to choose the firing position in which the decisive fire -fight is to be begun, so close to the enemy that the decision can be gained -from it.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The fire fight must be taken up by enough troops to make -it impossible for the defender, who holds his position strongly, -to gain a superiority of fire over some parts of the attacking -force. The supports will now move closer to the firing line, -in order to fill every gap in that line and to meet every attempt -of the defender to gain the upper hand. The echelons of the -second line which have not as yet been absorbed by the firing -line, move up in a similar manner. If the hostile fire abates, -parts of the firing line should endeavor to get closer to the -enemy; they are followed by the next adjoining units. At this -stage of the action the attacker will have to give up, to some -extent, his distribution in depth.</p> - -<p>Superiority of fire is an essential condition to victory. It -is attained by better marksmanship, fire control and fire direction, -by taking advantage of cover, and by concentrating a powerful -fire against the decisive point. When the attacker’s troops -are not well trained, a greater number of rifles and more ammunition -will be required to gain this superiority. Accordingly, -the attacker will either make an envelopment or employ fire of -position. The attacker possesses a great advantage, in that -he does not need to gain a superiority of fire along the whole -front, but only at a single point. It suffices for him to contain -weak portions of the hostile front with suitable, well concealed -combat groups capable of quickly developing a powerful -fire, while he masses the bulk of his forces against the decisive -point. The defender, who never knows where the decisive blow -is going to fall, ought not to allow himself to be enticed into -occupying portions of his line more weakly than the rest.</p> - -<p>The attainment of the superiority of fire requires time, -and, in addition, coolness and patience on the part of the leaders. -All the ammunition that is expended in gaining this superiority -is later compensated for by fewer losses. The heavy losses<span class="pagenum" id="Page371">[371]</span> -sustained by the Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du -Jour, on August 18th, 1870, may be traced directly to the fact -that the leaders did not know how to wait.</p> - -<p>Superiority of fire<a id="FNanchor395" href="#Footnote395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> is absolutely essential to the success -of the attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead -to such heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach -the enemy’s position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.<a id="FNanchor396" href="#Footnote396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote395" href="#FNanchor395" class="label">[395]</a> For the situation of the British Guard at Modder River (28th November, -1890), see <a href="#Page182">p. 182</a> supra. The Guards were closely hugging the ground at a -distance of 800 m. from the enemy. After 29 ammunition carriers had been -shot at the very beginning of the engagement, all attempts to carry orders or -ammunition to the firing line were abandoned. No attempts were made to -relieve the pressure by means of the fire of sharpshooters, by bringing up reinforcements, -or by gaining ground by crawling.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote396" href="#FNanchor396" class="label">[396]</a> “Battles are won by the superiority of fire.” <span class="smcap">Frederick the Great</span> in -his <cite>Military Testament</cite>, 1768.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, -the attacker will have succeeded in working forward little by -little until he is close to the enemy’s position. His superiority -will now make itself felt; the fire from the part of the hostile -line that is to be penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, -single groups, then several, and finally, whole units of the -enemy’s line will commence to crumble away. The attacker -should wait until this effect is produced before he begins the -assault; if he does not do this, the attack is sure to fail.</p> - -<p><i>Austria.</i> (Par. 590 I. D. R.). “The close approach of -a long firing line to an enemy who occupies a good position, -may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, -this does not, under all circumstances, furnish assurance -that a forward movement for the purpose of penetrating -the hostile position will now succeed; a premature -assault may still result in disaster. <i>As long as the conduct of -the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power -is crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue -the fight for the superiority of fire.</i>”</p> - -<p>Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from -easy to recognize when the defender of a position has been -sufficiently subdued by fire to make an assault feasible, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page372">[372]</span> -when the proper moment has arrived for launching the reserves. -It is only necessary to recall the premature advance -of the artillery and cavalry over the ravine of the Mance -brook, on August 18th, 1870.</p> - -<p>The cessation of the defender’s fire, in itself, is not a sure -sign that his firing line is shaken, as the attacker is unable to -distinguish between a fire pause ordered by the commander -on the defensive and the forced discontinuance of the fight. -Sure indications are not available until men actually leave the -defender’s fighting line here and there, and attempts of the -leaders to hold the wavering ones are clearly apparent.</p> - -<p>At this moment, a leader who has resolved to assault, -should order bayonets fixed.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The temporary interruption of the fire occasioned by -fixing bayonets is of no importance, as the superiority of fire -has already been gained. If bayonets are prematurely ordered -to be fixed, the accuracy of the fire will soon be impaired, as -the firing of rifles, weighted down by the attached bayonets, -increases the fatigue of the men. When the troops are excited, -the downward deflection of the bullets caused by -fixing the bayonet can, however, only produce a good effect. -It is best to fix bayonets at the signal “Fix bayonet”. In the -excitement prevailing at the moment, it will be impossible to -execute the order with any uniformity, but it is a good plan, -in time of peace, to require one man of each file to fire while -the other one fixes his bayonet. The approaching reserves -fix bayonets while on the march.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page373">[373]</span></p> - -<h4>10. THE ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>“The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the -domain of tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and -under what conditions the assault should be made in war, cannot -be formulated. At any rate, fire tactics are not only an -essential factor but also the crowning act of combat; the -assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern combats -show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in -consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are -exposed to the annihilating effect of fire. This lesson was -thoroughly learned by the Austrians in 1866, and by the Russians -in front of Plevna. Of what avail were ‘self-sacrifice’, -the ‘unconquerable determination to gain the victory’, the -‘desire for hand to hand conflict’, and all the other terms -that are employed to prove that the moral factors are the -decisive ones in war? That they are the decisive factors -needs no proof whatever; it follows, as a matter of course, -from uniform training, uniform leadership, and uniform arms. -But tactics fit for use in war, are to furnish, above all else, -ways and means, showing how and by what methods the -fighting energy of troops may be preserved most effectively, -and thus contribute directly toward preventing the premature -deterioration of the morale of the troops.”<a id="FNanchor397" href="#Footnote397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote397" href="#FNanchor397" class="label">[397]</a> -Colonel <span class="smcap">Keim</span> in <cite>von Löbells Jahresberichte</cite>, 1899, II, p. 561.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault -with fixed bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A -premature advance to the assault, with all the peculiar features -attending it, produces an aversion against the attack, an undue -extension of battle lines, and makes it impossible for reinforcements -to come up, except under cover of darkness.</p> - -<p>The decision for making the assault emanates either -from the subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the -commander of the whole force. The latter may give the impulse<span class="pagenum" id="Page374">[374]</span> -for the assault by launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly -the safer procedure. “When the decision to assault -emanates from the commanders in rear, notice thereof is -given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be repeated -by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At -this signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. -The parts of the firing line which are still in rear, move -forward, as quickly as possible, to a position close to the -enemy. All reinforcements in rear hasten straight to the -front. As soon as the leading line is to form for the assault, -all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double time’, all -the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force throw -themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. -It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow -the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating -the enemy’s position. When immediately in front of -the enemy, the men should charge bayonet and, with a cheer, -penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive -when the proper moment for making the assault has arrived, -as he is compelled to remain so far in rear of the fighting -line, especially where large forces are concerned, that he can -only follow the general course of the attack. The first indication -which he receives as to whether the enemy’s fire power -has been broken all along the line, is the advance of his own -firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in time -when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, -and it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with -sufficient promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to -good account.<a id="FNanchor398" href="#Footnote398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote398" href="#FNanchor398" class="label">[398]</a> “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the closing of a -telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of constructive theory, which -seeks, by this means, to increase the energy of the first line, but only succeeds -in massing too many men in front of the enemy, a better condition than which -the enemy could not desire.” <span class="smcap">von Malachowski</span>, <cite>Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik</cite>, -p. 230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the -Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. <span class="smcap">F. Hönig</span>, <cite>Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher -Strategie</cite>, p. 145. <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 271.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page375">[375]</span></p> - -<p>The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take -the initiative in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, -especially if the enemy evacuates the position, that -the firing line, quickly taking advantage of this moment, pass -over to the bayonet attack. If the firing line were to wait -until the reserves are up, valuable time would be lost, under -certain circumstances; the enemy might recover from his -temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive -reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the -attacker would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the -position unmolested, retire in good order, and perhaps take up -a new position, or at least evade quickly the pursuing fire of the -assailant. The firing line would be the first, in such a case, to -perceive when and where the resistance of the enemy abates; -it should therefore make the most of this knowledge and throw -itself upon the part of the defender’s force that is in the act -of withdrawing.</p> - -<p>When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing -line, there is danger that instead of a general attack only a -local one will result. It is impossible to conceive that the -whole firing line will simultaneously consider that the moment -for the assault has arrived; in general, only a part of that -line at a time will come to this conclusion. Such local attacks -are hazardous, however, and have some chance of succeeding -only in covered terrain. A local assault made by a single -battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a considerable -portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash -itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly -charging unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile -line at some one point, the defender will at once attack it in -vastly superior force and compel it to retire with heavy loss. -Furthermore, the failure is usually not confined to the one -unit. The troops on the right and left of it, although they -are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not yet shaken -him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the assault, -as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule,<span class="pagenum" id="Page376">[376]</span> -when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, -a series of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, -however, bring good troops closer and closer to the enemy, -until the great moment of definitely gained superiority finally -arrives.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The General Staff account of the Franco-German war<a id="FNanchor399" href="#Footnote399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> very aptly -describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of the -tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the prolonged fight -at close range; the time was now ripe for the decision and the German -corps commanders issued orders for the assault. Before this order reached -the leading line, however, the German general officers on the spot had -decided, at about 7:30 P. M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, -as they considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the -signal given by them, and in many instances of their own accord, the -Prussian and Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, -on the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended -by the enemy.” (<b>St. Privat</b>). Consult, <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 525 and 571.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote399" href="#FNanchor399" class="label">[399]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 800.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“When the XIth Army Corps issued from the <b>Niederwald</b> (near -<b>Wörth</b>), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the direction -of <b>Elsaszhausen</b> that the troops had to choose between either advancing -farther or giving up the advantages that had been gained at such great -sacrifices. The former course was indeed open to objection, as the troops -were exhausted, as organizations were in confusion from the fighting they -had just gone through, and as only three formed and fresh battalions were -available.”—“General von Bose now ordered a general attack. At the -signal ‘the whole force will advance’, the firing lines rushed from the -Niederwald and, with loud cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”<a id="FNanchor400" href="#Footnote400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote400" href="#FNanchor400" class="label">[400]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 267.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been -gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become unbearable. -Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any numerical -superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative of the defender, -and to the fact that he confined himself to purely defensive action.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the -initiative of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the -entire force. In some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, -if disaster is to be avoided. When a portion of the firing -line advances, however, and the tactical situation in any way -permits, neighboring units should at once conform to the -movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in this<span class="pagenum" id="Page377">[377]</span> -case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without -regard to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being -repulsed. (Par. 345, German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters -of the assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” -in this assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault -by the entire line. This might obviously cause the troops to -advance prematurely to the assault, a danger which might be -brought about by the junior platoon commander. No one but -the supreme commander, therefore, has the right to order this -signal to be sounded when he wishes a general assault to be -made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill Regulations -(par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides -to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of -signals (s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain -the skirmishers by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general -assault all along the line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. -If a unit moves to the assault contrary to the wishes of the -supreme commander, he should possess enough nerve to look -on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much better for -him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the -failure of the general attack by a premature advance.</p> - -<p>“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously -as possible, this is not to be understood as meaning -that all the units should penetrate the hostile position at one -and the same time. Such simultaneous action is immaterial, -and might, indeed, cause parts of the line who had a chance -of successfully carrying out the assault, to hesitate because -others are still in rear. The power of the attack would accordingly -be impaired. All units that have once started must -continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended -for the holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. -If they can bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of<span class="pagenum" id="Page378">[378]</span> -attack from an oblique direction and thereby ensure the success -of the attack, they should make the most of this advantage. -(Par. 340 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, -as laid down in the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers -throw themselves down for the purpose of firing. The -supports in the act of moving up continue their march. If the -enemy faces about, all the troops press after him.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack:</p> - -<p>“If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens to carry -the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place -sheltered from view, attack him energetically, while the troops already -engaged increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic -counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to -retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until he has had -time to recover.... The troops in the counter-attack should move forward -without hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement -has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall -cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that of tiring -and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment -arrives when the commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The German Infantry Drill Regulations contain no further -rules for the conduct of the assault. If the physical and -moral power of the enemy is so broken by the preceding fire -fight that he commences to evacuate his position, it is quite immaterial -what sort of an assault is made; the men simply fire -and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case the -assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight.</p> - -<p>A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically -led, will not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his -position by fire alone; to compel him to evacuate his position -will at the very least require that an assault be threatened.</p> - -<p>Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the -effect of the fire fight alone was so great that the assault would -strike nothing but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended -position. The assault was to commence after the enemy had<span class="pagenum" id="Page379">[379]</span> -ceased firing and had sought protection in his trenches. The -following statement is made by one who fought on the Boer -side:</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived within -300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a brief period -of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the assault simultaneously -in one long line. This assault, made without fire support, was repulsed -without trouble by the Boer fire. On several occasions, short lines -of our opponent had begun to advance, but these were in every instance -forced to throw themselves down after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon -the whole British line, in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, -began to advance. One could clearly hear the British leaders call to their -men to cease firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the -cheer ‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the -whole hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me -like a grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder -and the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently -happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same -moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but was soon -better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling, ‘Steady boys, -steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and more men fell in -the British line, and, when it had arrived within 100 or 80 paces of our -position, its energy had spent itself. A part of the men threw themselves -down behind boulders and fired, while the majority rushed back to the -shelter of some bushes; but even there it was for the most part impossible -to hold them. An assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, -even if he is numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire -a number of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position -the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one -will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under -hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves without shelter -to the hostile fire.”<a id="FNanchor401" href="#Footnote401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote401" href="#FNanchor401" class="label">[401]</a> Supplement 8 to the <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1901.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The same lesson was learned long ago at <b>Gorni Dubniac</b> and at -<b>Plevna</b>.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of -such an assault. This should be furnished in the first place -by the artillery. In furnishing this support, artillery can employ -time fire only until the infantry arrives within 300 m. of -the enemy, while percussion fire may be continued until the -infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy. During the<span class="pagenum" id="Page380">[380]</span> -attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said to -have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if -two or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. -The following statement appears in a British memorial on the -lessons of the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced -by artillery fire, which forced the defenders to take to -cover and did not even permit them to raise their heads above -the parapet, was so highly esteemed by the Japanese infantry -that it requested the batteries to continue firing, without regard -to the losses thereby inflicted in its own ranks, until it -had taken the position or unfurled small national flags as an -indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According -to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted -in their infantry by their own guns were insignificant -in comparison to the losses which the defender could inflict -by delivering his fire undisturbed at a range of a few hundred -meters, when not kept down by the attacking artillery.” According -to the Austrian regulations, one unit is to remain -halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the point of -attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision -involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to -retain a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, -instead of launching his whole force in the assault.</p> - -<p>When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the -artillery will perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry -has reached a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, -when the guns will have to cease firing, and when even -the infantry units which have been left behind to support the -attack, will no longer be able to direct their fire upon the enemy -on account of the wide frontage of the assaulting force. The -defender’s troops would have to be poor indeed, if they would -not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has practically -ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose of -emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even -though the fire be unaimed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page381">[381]</span></p> - -<p>If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, -while the attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be -compelled to keep under cover. <i>This can only be accomplished -by employing fire while in motion.</i></p> - -<p>This fire is practicable because the defender, who has -been overwhelmed in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his -works; it is advantageous, as it is only to compel the enemy -to keep under cover. It would unquestionably be a mistake, -and not justifiable in any case, to employ fire while in motion, -when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the enemy is not -completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover, ready -to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault -with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing -the defender from bringing up his reserves.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton, -perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good fortune, -at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close up to the -enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations are promulgated -in time of peace, the men will fire during the assault. You may -rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing this. One would do -well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from the very start. The greatest -danger is always that the men will throw themselves down instead -of continuing the advance. And, if the men have once thrown themselves -down during the assault, they will rise only for the purpose of retreating.”<a id="FNanchor402" href="#Footnote402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote402" href="#FNanchor402" class="label">[402]</a> In -<cite>Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff</cite>, p. 63, Colonel <span class="smcap">von der Goltz</span> -makes the following statement in regard to an experiment: “As the line -gradually drew closer to the defender’s position, the desire of the individual -men to get into the hostile position as quickly as possible, became more and -more apparent; the prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling -position, finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while in -motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized by the regulations -and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its employment in this case -may be traced to the very proper desire of not allowing the enemy, who has -been held down this long, to raise himself above his parapet. This fire while -in motion should not be confused with the fire while in motion formerly -employed by long skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. -The latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already overwhelmed, -but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an unshaken opponent.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.) -that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point -at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and the men -form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a run or by<span class="pagenum" id="Page382">[382]</span> -crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is begun at a greater -distance than 35 m. from the hostile position, fire while in motion is employed, -“in order that the enemy may not regain his senses and may be -prevented from rising above his parapet.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable -terrain (Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate -fights for the possession of fortifications (the Grivica -Work at Plevna, Scheinovo), bayonet combats are unavoidable, -provided both forces are equally determined. During the fight -for the possession of Servigny, on the evening of August 31st, -1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred in the narrow -village streets.<a id="FNanchor403" href="#Footnote403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> The Russo-Japanese war also proved beyond -the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain -their positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.<a id="FNanchor404" href="#Footnote404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote403" href="#FNanchor403" class="label">[403]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Noisseville</cite>, p. 51. See -<a href="#Page134">p. 134</a> supra. Fieldmarshal <span class="smcap">Moltke</span> makes -the following observations in regard to the bayonet fights of the campaign of -1859: “General Niel credits his victory at Solferino to the use of the bayonet. -The question as to how often the advance to hand to hand conflict is carried -out, may be left open. As a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed -that the enemy will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in -regard to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If the -bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the campaign of 1859, -were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if the simple prosaic truth could -be ascertained, by far the greater number of these reports would be corrected in -so far as to state that the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided -the actual collision.”</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote404" href="#FNanchor404" class="label">[404]</a> Examples: -The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, in <cite>Angriffsverfahren -der Japaner</cite>, <span class="smcap">von Lüttwitz</span>.—The capture of works No. 17 and No. 18 -by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905 (Mukden).—Description by an eyewitness -of a bayonet fight. Sir <span class="smcap">Ian Hamilton</span>, <cite>A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book</cite>, -p. 252.—A bayonet fight occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th -Rifle Regiment broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the -Yalu, (see <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 39-40, p. 131), and in Bernaul’s -Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July 24th, 1904.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the -line; frequently isolated groups and then entire units will -leave his line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes -effective. Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable -privates will endeavor to keep the weak-kneed from -running away.<a id="FNanchor405" href="#Footnote405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote405" href="#FNanchor405" class="label">[405]</a> At Villepion, Captain von Hoffmann made a wavering section hold its -position by springing toward them, revolver in hand, and yelling: “I’ll shoot -the first man who gets up! my revolver will hit too, whether Chassepot bullets -will hit you is a question.” <cite>Geschichte des Bayerischen Leibregiments</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page383">[383]</span></p> - -<p>If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may -pass, but a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, -bring about the decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually -decides those who have remained in the position, to make -no further resistance. The attacker must make use of the -moral factors in an assault, hence the importance of running, -cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in close -order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.<a id="FNanchor406" href="#Footnote406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote406" href="#FNanchor406" class="label">[406]</a> One must read -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 13, pp. 80, 116, 123 -and 156, in order to appreciate what an electrifying influence the beating of -drums may have even on retreating lines.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when undertaken -in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by cheers -and beating drums.” <span class="smcap">Boguslawski</span>.</p> - -<p>“Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von -Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his -men rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”—“The mere launching -of the attack from the direction of <b>Point du Jour</b> sufficed to induce the -well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel pits, likewise -to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.” <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the -conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent; -that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal -of his own. The soldier should not be taught to shrink from -the bayonet attack, but to seek it. If the infantry is deprived -of the <i>arme blanche</i>, if the impossibility of bayonet fighting is -preached, and the soldier is never given an opportunity in time -of peace of defending himself, man to man, with his weapon -in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed, which is -unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most essential -quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position.</p> - -<p>“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness -of the bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be -found who are equally capable of making use of it. Indeed, -the bayonet cannot be abolished for the reason, if for no other, -that it is the sole and exclusive embodiment of that will power -which alone, both in war and in every-day life, attains its<span class="pagenum" id="Page384">[384]</span> -object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the attainment -of the object.</p> - -<p>“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases -success in battle on fire action, and takes for granted that the -enemy will not be able to get near enough to make a bayonet -attack. If this army were to encounter another army which, -without undervaluing the effect of fire, remembers the bayonet -at the proper time, it would be filled with the most dreadful -dismay when the enemy actually assails it with the bayonet. -With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good substitute -for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only of troops -who do not fear annihilation, <i>i.e.</i>, troops trained to use the -bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. -If this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure -waste of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with -the enemy, if necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into -the air.</p> - -<p>“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the -enemy from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally -prefer this mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very -little risk of getting hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an -aversion for exposing himself to danger, <i>i.e.</i>, he will shrink -from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach too much importance -to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained soldier, -who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who -is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight. -Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, -but does not improve his morale.” <span class="smcap">Dragomirov</span>.</p> - -<p>Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced -by cutting weapons:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Stabbing and cutting"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr4">Campaign of 1859</td> -<td class="right">1.67%</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr4">Campaign of 1864</td> -<td class="right">4.0 %</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr4">Campaign of 1866 (Prussians)</td> -<td class="right">5.4 %</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr4">St. Privat (Germans)</td> -<td class="right">1.0 %</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr4">Russo-Turkish war</td> -<td class="right">0.9 %</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page385">[385]</span></p> - -<p>In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about -150 m. During the Franco-German war, the assault against -Elsaszhausen (battle of Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.<a id="FNanchor407" href="#Footnote407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a> -and that against St. Hubert at 100-200 m. from the enemy.<a id="FNanchor408" href="#Footnote408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> -The 107th Infantry, after charging over a distance of more -than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held by the French -north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the northern outskirts -of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be covered.<a id="FNanchor409" href="#Footnote409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> -In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the center -column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a -wild, headlong assault against its outskirts.”<a id="FNanchor410" href="#Footnote410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> The Japanese -frequently had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, -but there were also instances where their assaulting troops had -only to cover a few meters (1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote407" href="#FNanchor407" class="label">[407]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 267.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote408" href="#FNanchor408" class="label">[408]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie</cite>, p. 127.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote409" href="#FNanchor409" class="label">[409]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 804.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote410" href="#FNanchor410" class="label">[410]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Le Bourget</cite>, p. 21.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><b>If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position</b>, he -will be at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be -in confusion and exhausted, and a large number of officers -will be gone. If the defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, -takes advantage of this moment, he may be able to turn the -tide of the battle. The inclination of the men to pursue the -enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and making the -most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in all battles. -The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his victorious -infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue the -enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or -quickly assembled detachments should advance on the flanks -in pursuit of the enemy. There is a wide difference between -a wild, headlong rush after the enemy and a systematic pursuit. -Infantry that rushes headlong to the front after penetrating -a position must be brought back at any cost, unless it -can enter a second position simultaneously with the enemy.<a id="FNanchor411" href="#Footnote411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote411" href="#FNanchor411" class="label">[411]</a> The conduct of the 47th Infantry Brigade after the capture of Ste. Marie -aux Chênes. <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 184. The second line of the position at -Düppel was carried by the pursuing victors at the first rush. <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, 1864, -II, p. 539.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page386">[386]</span></p> - -<p>In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker -should re-form his troops without regard to their original -arrangement (if the enemy gives him time enough, the original -organizations should be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish -ammunition, and remove the prisoners. It is a mistake to -mass more rifles in the captured position than can be employed -to advantage, as the enemy will in all probability direct a heavy -fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been decided, the echelons -in rear should be halted, so that they can be employed as -occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often have -to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German -I. D. R.). Preparations should be made to the end that -hostile counter-attacks may be at once repulsed. These rules -are particularly important when the position that has been -carried is not the main position but only an advanced post.<a id="FNanchor412" href="#Footnote412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> -These measures must be taken independently by all leaders -who participated in the assault, without waiting for orders from -superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as -possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while -the enemy is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with -his re-forming, to prevent his taking up route column, and to -overrun his rallying positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted -of a whole series of such pursuing actions. The arrival -of night should by no means be used as an excuse for discontinuing -the pursuit, for night above all else is the mightiest ally -of a bold victor.<a id="FNanchor413" href="#Footnote413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote412" href="#FNanchor412" class="label">[412]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken after the -capture of St. Privat. <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 533. The situation in Fröschweiler; -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>. <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the -signals, ‘the whole force assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded -everywhere. How little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the -conduct of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 87-90. The -10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear to a -bivouac which they had left in the morning.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote413" href="#FNanchor413" class="label">[413]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V. p. 436.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><b>If the attack fails</b>, it will be the duty of the commander -to arrest the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the -rear under hostile fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt<span class="pagenum" id="Page387">[387]</span> -these men while they are exposed to the most effective fire of -the enemy. Only when the nearest cover is reached can there -be any question of halting. (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). When -cover is not available near at hand, the exhaustion of the troops -will soon stop the flight, or the leaders may be able to face them -again to the front, as soon as the hostile fire abates. However, -the retreating troops will have placed quite a distance between -themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and the -latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to -take full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless -the attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No -matter where the retreating troops come to a halt and face -to the front, there they must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, -intrench.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of -<b>St. Privat</b>,<a id="FNanchor414" href="#Footnote414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at <b>Magersfontain</b>, -immediately in front of the Boer position, on December 11th, 1899, is worthy -of imitation.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote414" href="#FNanchor414" class="label">[414]</a> The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill is variously -given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment) -and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See <cite>History of the 3rd -Guard Regiment</cite>, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of the <cite>1st Guard Regiment</cite>, p. 165; -that of the <cite>2nd Guard Regiment</cite>, p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who -still remained, the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and -self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. -872.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The assault on <b>Gorni Dubniac</b> came to a standstill at very short -range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov Regiments -maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian skirmishers -320 m., from the trench.<a id="FNanchor415" href="#Footnote415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote415" href="#FNanchor415" class="label">[415]</a> -<span class="smcap">Pusyrewski</span>, <cite>Die russische Garde</cite>, p. 126.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<p>In every attack there are situations in which it may be -advantageous to use intrenching <span class="nowrap">tools—</span></p> - -<p>1. In fortifying rallying positions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page388">[388]</span></p> - -<p>The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very -cautious, fortified the initial positions from which their attacks -were made, in order that they might have rallying positions in -case of defeat.<a id="FNanchor416" href="#Footnote416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote416" href="#FNanchor416" class="label">[416]</a> On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army) had pushed -back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a position 2700 m. from -the new Russian position at Yushuling. From this position the 12th Division -advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian attack had not taken place. The extended -fortifications facing the Russian Shaho position were made with the same end -in view. The war in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army -possessed sufficient freedom of action. See <a href="#Page341">p. 341</a>, et seq., supra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover -of darkness to within effective range of the enemy for the -purpose of opening fire at daybreak. In this case, the advancing -force is, as a rule, instructed to advance until it comes -under hostile fire and then to intrench.<a id="FNanchor417" href="#Footnote417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote417" href="#FNanchor417" class="label">[417]</a> During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the Canadians -were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches located 500 m. -from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down and to intrench as soon as -they were fired upon. This was done when the force was 100 m. from the -enemy. <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 33, p. 60.</p> - -<p>The Japanese 45th Infantry, in its advance under cover of darkness against -Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000 m., whereupon -the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the hostile fire abated, -the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy resumed his fire, it intrenched. -A third advance brought the regiment within 500 m. of the defender’s -position and it was able to make the assault during the forenoon of October -12th, 1904.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>3. In intrenching an echelon posted to cover advancing -infantry.</p> - -<p>4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of -intrenching tools in quickly putting captured positions in a -state of defense, so often felt during the Franco-German war -and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been removed by the -introduction of portable tools.<a id="FNanchor418" href="#Footnote418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> -The necessity of quickly preparing<span class="pagenum" id="Page389">[389]</span> -captured positions for defense presented itself in a number -of instances.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote418" href="#FNanchor418" class="label">[418]</a> Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later the French -in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion, on December 1st, 1870 (<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, III, p. 257; <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Loigny</cite>, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, -1871 (<cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20</cite>. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the -second ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877 -(<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October -11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were repulsed -from the captured position, which had been prepared for defense. The fights -for the possession of the village of Linchinpu (on the right bank of the Shaho, -north of the railway), captured on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the -position had to be prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (<span class="smcap">von -Tettau</span>, <cite>Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei</cite>, II, p. 136).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack -when further advance is impossible, that is, in situations such -as confronted the infantry of the Guard on August 18th when -its first attack came to a standstill. During the attack on -Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish war, the Russian Guard -intrenched when a further advance became impossible. During -the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days later, specific -orders were issued for the troops to intrench when 1000-2000 -m. from the Turkish works.<a id="FNanchor419" href="#Footnote419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote419" href="#FNanchor419" class="label">[419]</a> <span class="smcap">Pusyrewski</span>, <cite>Die russische Garde</cite>, p. 166.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish -war, general instructions were issued to the Russian infantry -on the subject of intrenching in attack. According to these -instructions, the spade was to be used in attack in the following -cases: In fortifying a captured position, as a protection -against a possible offensive return of the defender; in holding -supporting points necessary to a continuation of the attack; -and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense. The -order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases, -by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to -be observed: “Every man equipped with a spade and who is -not sheltered by some feature of the terrain, places his rifle on -the ground and, lying on his left side, begins to excavate a hole -parallel to his body. This hole should be as long as the distance -from his left elbow to his knee, as wide as the length of the -spade-handle, and as deep as the width of the blade of the -spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front of his -head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. -When this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated -hole, and, lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When -he has obtained sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other -man of the file, who proceeds in a similar fashion.”</p> - -<p>The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority,<span class="pagenum" id="Page390">[390]</span> -found it necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, -and therefore made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, -or utilized sand bags,<a id="FNanchor420" href="#Footnote420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> which were carried along. In this -manner, they laboriously worked their way to within assaulting -distance of the enemy. In many instances, this necessitated -whole days of fighting when an envelopment was impossible. -Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen or -when the sod was not thick.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote420" href="#FNanchor420" class="label">[420]</a> -See <a href="#Page344">p. 344</a> supra. Frequently the bags, which could be tied with a string, -were filled near the place where they were to be used. The advance was considerably -retarded by carrying along sand bags. During the attack on Yuputz, -on March 1st, 1905, by the 8th Infantry Division of the IInd Army, the first -sand bag cover was constructed 700 m. and the last 250 m. from the village.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><i>Results of Russian experiments.</i> The sand bag employed was made -of coarse linen of grayish green color and when filled and tied, was approximately -50 cm. long (width of a man’s shoulders), 30-35 cm. wide, and -30-35 cm. high. The filled sand bag weighed 14-20 kg., depending upon -the filling material (sand or broken stone). When filled with sand or -broken stone, the sand bag stopped all projectiles, while, when filled with -earth, even two bags placed in rear of each other did not afford sufficient -protection. The sand bags were scarcely discernible with the naked eye -at 400 m. They were not an easy target to hit, and, even at 300 m., it -was difficult to aim at them.</p> - -<p>The men had a distinct aversion against constructing shelter trenches -while lying down. During the war they could be made to intrench only -by great exertions on the part of the officers. The reason for this is obvious; -digging with the small spade while in a prone position is uncomfortable. -The skirmisher considers it much more profitable to fire than -to puzzle out how he can best stir up the soil with the small spade while -in a prone position. Moreover, he knows that at any moment he may have -to make a rush to the front.</p> - -<p>The beautiful idea that these trenches were to be used and widened -by the reserves, was usually not carried out. The reserves preferred to -make longer rushes and to take advantage of folds of the ground rather -than occupy themselves with intrenching under hostile fire.</p> - -<p>At ranges from 2000-1000 m., single men made short rushes, only 30-40 -m. long, as the filled sand bag constituted a considerable load. Before -a man ran forward, he slung his rifle, grasped the sand bag with one -hand at the tied end, with the other at a loop specially provided for that -purpose; then he jumped up, ran forward 30-40 m., as rapidly as he -could in a crouching position, placed the sand bag on the ground, and -threw himself down behind it. Under effective hostile fire, at 1000-550 -m. (during our peace maneuvers at 420-280 m.), the men then crawl<span class="pagenum" id="Page391">[391]</span> -forward, utilizing the sand bag as cover. The men would rather crawl -a greater distance with the sand bag than intrench while lying down.</p> - -<p>From the position of the enemy, the skirmishers lying behind grayish -green sand bags could not be recognized with the naked eye at 2000-1000 -m. It is reported that both officers and men were at first very much -disinclined toward making these experiments, but that they changed their -views after one or two exercises, and the principal apprehension, that of -increasing the weight of the field equipment, disappeared because of the -undeniable advantages of the sand bag.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Such cover constructed by the assailant has no greater -value than natural cover found on the ground over which the -attack is made; it affords protection during halts and induces -retreating skirmishers to face to the front again at an earlier -moment than would otherwise be the case.</p> - -<p>“It should not be forgotten, however, that time gained -is of greater benefit to the defender than to the assailant. -Moreover, the great difficulty of inducing a firing line which -has made a lodgment under hostile fire, to advance from its -laboriously constructed cover, admonishes us to be cautious -in employing the spade during an attack. The construction -of cover ought never to impair the desire for making an impetuous -attack, or destroy the offensive spirit.” (Par. 313 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it -must detach half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot -be offset by an increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, -range finders, and musicians, take part in the fight, as the men -offer a taller target while intrenching, and as the newly turned -earth facilitates the enemy’s aim. A superiority of fire that -has been gained may thereby be lost. However, when the -defender’s troops have been so shaken that the assailant can -detach half of his rifles with impunity, the latter need not -remain lying on the ground, but can advance, in most cases, -closer to the enemy’s position. The use of the spade is, therefore, -proper only when ground that has been gained is to be -held, and when the enemy’s fire permits intrenching.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page392">[392]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Russia.</b> In instructions issued by General Kuropatkin, the following -statement in regard to the Japanese infantry appears: “It advances -in widely deployed lines. The firing line advances by short, alternating -rushes, the men then throwing themselves down and intrenching. In spite -of our extraordinarily violent fire, the firing line continues to advance by -alternate rushes, leaves its half completed shelter trenches and begins to -dig new ones. The supports then advance by alternate rushes, occupy the -first line of trenches and complete them. When the firing line advances -from the second line of trenches, they are occupied by the supports, while -the reserves move up into the first line of trenches. In this manner, the -advance is continued by successive rushes. From this, it is apparent that -the infantryman in the firing line must act on his own initiative in selecting -a point for intrenching.”</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> In a number of cases, the Japanese conducted an attack in the -manner described. At Liao Yang, on September 1st, 1904, shelter trenches -were dug at 750 and at 530 m. from the Russian position. The advance -beyond this was so managed that the men intrenched after every rush, -finally arriving, in the course of the day, within 300 m. of the enemy. -An assault made from this position on the afternoon of the 2nd was -repulsed. The whole Japanese line again faced to the front on arriving -in the shelter trenches which they had dug 300 m. from the hostile position. -The Japanese now perfected their weak intrenchments and were -even able to repulse two counter-attacks made by the Russians. This was -certainly an exceptional case, and, besides, it involved an attack on a -fortified position.</p> - -<p>The German Manual of Field Engineering (No. 46) recommends that -the man, when lying on his left side, construct in the first place a parapet -30 cm. high, as head cover and rifle rest. This produces pits 50 cm. wide, -60 cm. long, and 40 cm. deep, usually deeper in front than in rear, which -makes aiming uncomfortable.</p> - -<p><b>France.</b> According to the <cite>Instruction pratique sur les travaux de -campagne</cite> (24th October, 1906), the men are to improve available cover; -where natural cover is wanting, artificial cover is to be constructed when -the hostile fire compels a halt or the men are forced to halt to regain -their breath. At short ranges, the skirmishers dig individual pits. It is -desirable for the soldier to use his knapsack as cover while working, and -to leave it in position later also, to get better head cover.</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> Although the troops are not equipped with portable intrenching -tools, it is prescribed that captured positions be fortified; in -open country, when the hostile fire is too hot, this is to be done at -night.</p> - -<p>The suggestion of creating cover for skirmishers by using the pits -produced by short shell salvos, is a singular one. Detailed experiments -have been made in <b>Austria</b>.<a id="FNanchor421" href="#Footnote421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> -In instructions issued by the commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page393">[393]</span> -of the XIth Corps, it was recommended that, when exposed to moderate -hostile fire, the soldier should hug the ground as closely as possible while at -work. The intrenching proceeded most rapidly when the soldier first -excavated the ground in front and threw it forward. But in order to do -this, the man has to push himself backward during the work and must -throw the earth some distance. The parapet is low, but affords sufficient -protection.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote421" href="#FNanchor421" class="label">[421]</a> <cite>Streffleur</cite>, 1906, III, p. 387.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="container"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo393.png" alt="Trenching" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The task is greater when the soldier lies first on his left, then on -his right side, removes earth from a borrow pit at his right and then -from one on his left, and piles it up in front. As the skirmisher lies on -the natural surface of the ground during this operation, he naturally -constructs a higher parapet.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The following general rules governing the use of the -spade in attack may be laid down:</p> - -<p>1. An invariable use of the spade in attack must be -unhesitatingly condemned. The best means of gaining the -superiority of fire, and the best protection against hostile fire, -is our own fire.</p> - -<p>2. It must not be left to the soldier’s discretion, as to -whether or not he shall intrench. The order for intrenching -should in every case emanate from the supreme commander.</p> - -<p>3. As a rule, the spade should be used in those phases -of combat that partake more of a defensive character, in <span class="nowrap">particular—</span></p> - -<p>(a) To protect artillery and prepare rallying positions -during the preparatory stage of the action;</p> - -<p>(b) To shelter troops detailed to contain the enemy -while enveloping movements are in progress;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page394">[394]</span></p> - -<p>(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile -fire by their own delivered from enfilading or commanding -positions;</p> - -<p>(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point -that has just been gained, whether this has been captured from -the enemy or whether the attack has come to a standstill at -that point and a pause in the fighting occurs.</p> - -<p>4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to -trench is advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack -is a purely frontal one and is made over ground devoid of -cover.</p> - -<h4 title="12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES. (Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).">12. -THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.<a id="FNanchor422" href="#Footnote422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a><br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).</span></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote422" href="#FNanchor422" class="label">[422]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, V. p. 334, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. -It would seem desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of -approach, or the position one wishes to attack, from the very -outset with a dense, continuous line of rifles, and to overcome -the resistance of the enemy in the earliest phases of the combat -by means of an overwhelming volume of fire from as many -rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in the way of -carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of the -enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be -driven from his position only by an attack; the impulse for -an advance must be given by fresh troops; and the success -gained by the firing line must be clinched by a retained assaulting -force. The necessity of having a formed body of troops -available, until the fight is in full swing, to meet unforeseen -contingencies, further requires that a reserve be provided. -Organizations should not be broken up any more than is absolutely -necessary. The number of troops which the commander -will retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of<span class="pagenum" id="Page395">[395]</span> -information he has in regard to the situation. During an -attack the reserve is frequently not designated until a preparatory -position is taken up. In attack about <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub>-<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>3</sub>, and in -defense <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>6</sub>-<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> of the whole force is put in the reserve, -depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a purely -defensive one or the decision is sought.</p> - -<p>The reserve enables the commander to “shift the center -of gravity of the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce -his line where he considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of -the combat, and, finally, to bring about the decision.” (Par. -294 German I. D. R.). As the combat progresses, the commander -must decide whether the situation is such as to compel -him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,<a id="FNanchor423" href="#Footnote423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> or whether -it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose of -gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the -attack fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting -in all the reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a -mistake not to employ the reserve, to keep it in readiness to -cover a possible retreat, if its intervention can yet bring about -a favorable termination of the combat.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote423" href="#FNanchor423" class="label">[423]</a> See deliberations -of General v. d. Tann at Coulmiers. <span class="smcap">Helvig</span>, <cite>Das erste -bayerische Armeekorps</cite>, p. 203.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The employment of the reserves by the Russians at <b>Plevna</b>, on -September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine battalions -and was too weak to make an impression at one point; fifteen battalions -were detailed to cover the lines of communication and the artillery (which -was not at all in danger). Forty battalions that did not enter the fight -were scattered all over the battlefield, no one being able to account for -their presence.<a id="FNanchor424" href="#Footnote424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a> When Skobeleff had effected a lodgment in the Turkish -position, every available man should have been sent to this point. Although -there were 9 battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (<i>Eskadrons</i>) available, -only the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in -previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that more -for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of the -success that had been gained.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote424" href="#FNanchor424" class="label">[424]</a> In the Franco-German war, the same thing happened on the German side. -<cite>Der 18. August</cite>, p. 221.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all -their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch numerous -detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely ignoring existing<span class="pagenum" id="Page396">[396]</span> -organizations (this had, indeed, also the advantage that a suitable -leader could be found for carrying a special mission into execution), and -to form strong reserves by details from any and all imaginable units. -These reserves were frequently not used at all.<a id="FNanchor425" href="#Footnote425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote425" href="#FNanchor425" class="label">[425]</a> On July 31st, 1904, when, in pursuance of orders from General Headquarters, -a regiment and a battery was to be despatched to Mistshenko’s -Cavalry Division, 15 km. away, a provisional regiment of two battalions was -formed, without apparent reason, for the purpose from the 139th and 140th Infantry -Regiments. In regard to the inclination of the Russians to form detachments, -see <span class="smcap">Löffler</span>, I, pp. 11, 27, 53 and 54.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On March 5th, 1905, the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps -(Zerpitzki) had available one brigade of his 31st Division, one regiment -of his 9th Division, one regiment of the VIIIth Corps, three Rifle regiments -of the mixed Rifle Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and one regiment -of the Vth Siberian Army Corps.<a id="FNanchor426" href="#Footnote426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote426" href="#FNanchor426" class="label">[426]</a> See <span class="smcap">v. Tettau</span>, -<cite>Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei</cite>, -II, p. 483.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On October 15th, in the battle on the <b>Shaho</b>, the general reserve of -the army consisted of 32 battalions belonging to five different divisions -and five different army corps. In his order for the battle, Kuropatkin laid -particular stress on the necessity of forming reserves (Army Orders dated -August 15th, 1904): “Keeping back more than half of the force in -reserve is the best guarantee for success.” On December 27th, 1904, he -made a similar statement.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>The reserves are created to be used; every available man -must participate in the decisive stage of the combat. If the -enemy yields before the reserve is launched, so much the better; -if he does not give way, all the troops that are at hand must -be put in. The main thing is to gain the victory; scruples may -be indulged in afterwards. A defeated commander who leaves -the battlefield with troops that are still partially intact, has not -made the most of the means at his disposal for combat, provided -the situation was such that the launching of the reserves -could have secured the victory. As shown by Hastenbeck -(1757), by Idstedt (1850), and by Bapaume, at the moment -of the crisis there is no sharp dividing line between victory and -defeat, and the reserves may decide the fate of the day. The -decision of Archduke Albrecht, during the battle of Custozza -(1866), to push his last reserves into the fight was worthy of -a great commander.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page397">[397]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In contrast with this, <b>Russia</b> (1904): “In employing the general -reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than the -troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to support this -or that section, <i>but he should in no case use up his whole reserve before -the decision has occurred</i>.” The failures of the British in the South -African war may likewise be traced in part to a faulty use of the reserves. -Thus, we read in the regulations of 1896: “The reserve should -occupy a favorable defensive position in order to check the enemy in -case of defeat; if the attack succeeds, the reserve should move up into -the position and take charge of the pursuit.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>“Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, -after having made the most inconceivable exertions to swim -across a broad, deep river, shrinks from the last spurt and -drowns, although he need only stretch out his arm to reach -the opposite shore.” (<span class="smcap">Dragomirov</span>).</p> - -<p>In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that -the whole available force must be launched at the decisive -moment at the decisive point, and that the commander ought -not to detach portions of the force intended for the decisive -blow for tasks of secondary importance.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The launching of L’Estocq’s Corps at <b>Preussisch-Eylau</b>, is still a -model worthy of imitation.<a id="FNanchor427" href="#Footnote427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote427" href="#FNanchor427" class="label">[427]</a> <span class="smcap">Lettow-Vorbeck</span>, -<cite>Feldzug von 1806 und 1807</cite>, IV, p. 107.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the battle of <b>Vionville</b>, three battalions and four batteries were -detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived during the -afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in the action of the -5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed necessary on the right -flank. When the head of the division reached Tronville, the question -was discussed, as to whether it was desirable first to concentrate the -division for action, or to throw the leading battalions into the Tronville -forest, where portions of Lehman’s Brigade were still holding their -ground. As an advance of the French out of the woods would have endangered -the left flank of the Prussian artillery line, three battalions were -at once thrown into the forest, while the six remaining battalions were -kept in reserve for the time being. Subsequently, three more battalions -were sent forward to reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page398">[398]</span></p> - -<p>“What a decisive blow the 20th Division could have struck, if it had -been employed in one body!” (<span class="smcap">v. Liebert</span>).<a id="FNanchor428" href="#Footnote428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote428" href="#FNanchor428" class="label">[428]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, -I, p. 595. <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 18, p. 580.—<span class="smcap">v. -Scherff</span>, <cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, II, p. 146.—Essay by <span class="smcap">v. Liebert</span> published in Supplement -of the <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1895. From the description contained in the -4th Supplement of the <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1895, p. 177. It appears, at any rate, -that the support given by the 39th Half-Brigade was not absolutely necessary. -On the right flank as well, a united employment of the force for the attack of -Hill 970 ought to have been possible; as it was, regiments were cut up in -making isolated assaults, which had no effect whatever on the outcome of the -general action. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The decision is usually brought about by pressure on a -flank, but it might become necessary to accomplish this result -by launching large masses against some point of the hostile -front.<a id="FNanchor429" href="#Footnote429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote429" href="#FNanchor429" class="label">[429]</a> General -<span class="smcap">Minarelli-Fitzgerald</span>, <cite>Infanteriemassen im Angriff</cite>. Colonel -<span class="smcap">Csicserics von Bacsany</span> of the Austrian Army, in a brilliant study entitled -<cite>Die Schlacht</cite> (Vienna, 1908), argues that with the increased combat frontage -of armies, local successes have no longer the same Influence on the outcome of -the battle as of old. Compare, for example, the envelopment of the Russian left -flank at Liao Yang, and the penetration of the line at Yuhuntun (Mukden), with -the effect produced by the capture of Chlum and St. Privat on the outcome of -the battles of Königgrätz and Gravelotte, respectively.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The difficulties of accomplishing this are best illustrated -by the situation of the IIIrd Army Corps on the afternoon of -August 18th, 1870, when Prince Frederick Charles yielded -to the entreaties of General von Alvensleben and permitted -him to advance south of the Bois de la Cusse.<a id="FNanchor430" href="#Footnote430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a> Similar situations -resulted in the case of the Austrian 1st and VIth Army -Corps at Königgrätz, the French IIIrd and IVth Army Corps, -on a front of 2.75 km., with the Guards in rear, between Noisseville -and Failly, and, finally, the advance of the 1st East Siberian -Rifle Division at Wafangu. The French regulations likewise -contemplate a decisive attack made by large masses on a -narrow front. If these troops which are to clinch the success -gained by the fighting line, are deployed on the front laid down -in regulations, they will be unable to use their weapons. It -isn’t mechanical shock action, but fire effect that decides the -battle. In such a mass of troops, only fractional parts will -be able to fire, the major portion is crowded together and becomes -a dense, defenseless target, exposed to all the psychological<span class="pagenum" id="Page399">[399]</span> -impressions produced by crowding human beings into -a narrow space.<a id="FNanchor431" href="#Footnote431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote430" href="#FNanchor430" class="label">[430]</a> <cite>Der 18. August</cite>, pp. 484 and 558, sketches 34 and 35.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote431" href="#FNanchor431" class="label">[431]</a> The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors in colonial -wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that, for our purposes, -deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat of the two French brigades -at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). <span class="smcap">Lehaucourt</span>, -<cite>Les Expéditions de Tonkin</cite>. The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st -March. 1896).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of -1500 m., <i>i.e.</i>, put only about <sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> of its men in the first line; -but no objection can be made if the brigade, in moving to the -final decisive assault, at once advances on a front of 2500-3000 -m.</p> - -<h4>13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION.</h4> - -<p>The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of -the commander to control and direct all ranks in action by -words of command diminishes. In action, therefore, those -means must be adopted that will facilitate the transmission of -orders. This requires first of all the choice of an appropriate -position for the leader.</p> - -<p>The beginning of an action should find the leader as far -forward as possible; during the advance to the battlefield, -with the advance guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for -neither messages nor reports, nor a map can adequately take -the place of personal inspection of the situation of the enemy, -of neighboring units, and of the ground. So placed, he can -best direct the first deployment, upon which the future course -of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making -prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops -from making detours, handle them in accordance with a definite -plan, and preclude arbitrary action on the part of the commander -of the leading unit.</p> - -<p>During the action, the superior commander can influence -the course of the fight, his personal example excepted, only -by employing his reserves. His place is, therefore, near the<span class="pagenum" id="Page400">[400]</span> -reserves, at a point that can be readily found, and never in -the firing line.</p> - -<p>A company commander should remain where he believes -he can best control his company, as a rule, perhaps in the -firing line. He provides for the supply and distribution of -ammunition that is brought up from the rear, and regulates the -coöperation of the platoons. (Pars. 216, 457 and 458 German -I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>A battalion commander should only in very exceptional -cases take post in the firing line; he should nearly always -remain with parts of the force that are held back for the -time being, but, in any case, where he can effectively supervise -his battalion. The choice of a regimental commander’s position -is influenced by the same considerations; when his regiment -is acting as part of a brigade, he must select his position so -as to facilitate the transmission of orders from brigade headquarters. -The brigade commander will, as a rule, remain near -his reserves, at a point from which he can best overlook the -deployment of his brigade.</p> - -<p>On account of the fact that extended order fighting predominates, -leaders of all grades must be particularly careful -to maintain connection between the several parts of their command, -with each other, and with adjoining units, and to preserve -their influence over their firing lines. Superior commanders -should, in addition, see that their troops do not get -out of hand, and all subordinate leaders, after carrying out a -task assigned them, should endeavor promptly to rejoin their -proper commands, or place themselves at the disposal of the -commander of troops still engaged with the enemy.</p> - -<p>These requirements will be fulfilled, if superior commanders -order nothing that they should not and cannot order, -and if the officers charged with the execution of the orders -coöperate to attain the desired end, and do not abuse the freedom -of action allowed them.</p> - -<p>While subordinate leaders, up to and including company<span class="pagenum" id="Page401">[401]</span> -commanders, are mainly occupied with fire control and fire -direction, and should influence the men by their personal example, -superior commanders have other tasks, which they -must not neglect for the purpose of interfering in the sphere -of action of their subordinates. They can influence the fire -action only by sending the necessary forces to those portions -of the firing line whose fire they wish to augment. An interference -on their part with the action of subordinates is permissible -only in case of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes, -which would cause the combat to take a course other -than that intended. The larger the unit commanded by an -officer, the greater the latitude that must be allowed him. -The leaders should concentrate their attention upon the general -execution of their special tasks as part of the whole scheme, -rather than upon supervision of details. It is by no means -essential for all parts of the force to employ identical means -to attain one and the same object. Every leader should bear -in mind that <i>omission or neglect are greater crimes than a -mistake made in the choice of means</i>.</p> - -<p>The initiative of leaders of all grades is the foundation -of great victories in war, but this initiative must neither -jeopardize unity of action nor direct the course of events into -channels not intended by the commander.<a id="FNanchor432" href="#Footnote432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote432" href="#FNanchor432" class="label">[432]</a> See <cite>Taktik</cite>, III, p. 174, and V, p. 57, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The best safeguard against the results of an act of unjustifiable -initiative is to ask oneself: “What orders would my -superior have to give me, if he were in my place and knew -what I know?”</p> - -<h4>14. UNITED ACTION VERSUS TACTICAL MISSIONS.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Although no one disputes that victory depends upon a superiority of -fire at the decisive point, yet there is a great diversity of opinion as to -how this superiority is to be attained.</p> - -<p>General Bronsart von Schellendorff states:<a id="FNanchor433" href="#Footnote433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> “Every battle seeks to -bring about a decisive victory, but this is, after all, invariably the sum<span class="pagenum" id="Page402">[402]</span> -of local victories. Successful battle-tactics consist of correctly estimating -the tactical value of these local successes and of contriving to gain a -victory at the decisive point; in other words, to manage so that the sum-total -of positive factors will be greater than that of the negative factors.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote433" href="#FNanchor433" class="label">[433]</a> -<cite>Betrachtungen über die zeitgemäsze Fechtweise der Infanterie</cite>, 1891, p. 36.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the opinion of the advocates of this course,<a id="FNanchor434" href="#Footnote434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> unity of action is -attainable by practice and study, but not by set formations. If unity of -action could be ensured in all bodies of troops by means of study and -practice, there would seem to be no reason why the regulations should -lay down still more definite rules to govern the manner in which an -attack should be conducted. The matter is not so simple, however. Bearing -in mind the great latitude that the regulations allow each individual in -choosing the formation which he deems proper in a given case, it is obvious -that many very different procedures may result. This in itself is no -drawback, and to a certain extent this condition must exist, as the task in -hand, the nature of the country, and the existing situation vary. But, -if a given problem can be correctly solved in several ways, it will also admit -of a decidedly incorrect solution; and it is the more likely to be solved -incorrectly, the less study and practice is indulged in by a large part of -the corps of officers, and the less this class of officers finds in existing -regulations as a guide to conduct. When, in spite of undeniable progress, -we see dispersed attacks and an unquestionably incorrect conduct in every -maneuver, and this with a corps of officers nearly all of whom are professional -soldiers, who have had the advantage of study and practice, what -may we expect in war, where the corps of officers will be very largely -composed of officers of the Reserve and Landwehr, who have but very -limited opportunities for study and practice, but who, after the very -first battle, may have to command companies.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote434" href="#FNanchor434" class="label">[434]</a> -General <span class="smcap">von Schlichting</span>, <cite>Taktische und strategische Grundsätze der -Gegenwart</cite>. See also the essay in the July number of <cite>Jahrbücher für Armee -und Marine</cite>, 1898.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>General von Scherff,<a id="FNanchor435" href="#Footnote435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> the chief advocate of “united action,” is opposed -to the “combat with units of command” (<i>Kommandoeinheiten</i>) briefly -sketched above. He makes a distinction between battle-tactics and the -tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of the local successes -can by no means gain the victory; that can only be done by the -united launching of adequate forces at the decisive point. “No weapon in -the world will ever alter the fact that five battalions united in one body -have a greater inherent fighting power than five separate battalions—not -to mention twenty separate companies—always provided that a united -body of troops is also launched as one body.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote435" href="#FNanchor435" class="label">[435]</a> -<cite>Kriegslehren in Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen der Neuzeit</cite>, I-IV, <cite>Ein -Schlachtenangriff</cite>, 1898.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>Examples Illustrating the Necessity of a United Attack.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>1. The 26th Infantry Brigade was alarmed and put in march toward -the battlefield to support the advance guard brigade of the VIIth Army<span class="pagenum" id="Page403">[403]</span> -Corps, engaged at <b>Colombey</b>. The commander of the 26th Infantry -Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It -was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the 25th -Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and Colligny, -and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The troops already -engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and physical energy was -exhausted. It is only too patent that the first battalion (1st Battalion, -13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was thrown into the fight to afford -at least temporary relief, but this insufficient reinforcement was involved -in the general failure. After about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade -(the IIIrd Battallion, 73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) -was concentrating for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united -attack, only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This -battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the “Tannenwäldchen” at the “Todten-Allee”, -but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall back with considerable -losses, prevented the further advance of the IInd Battallion of -the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry, -on the bank of the Vallières brook. “Although the General Staff -account of the war is silent on this subject, we are justified in assuming -that only the presence of the brigade commander, who had learned a -lesson from the second local assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the -13th Infantry from making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the -organizations, the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, -proceeded more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing -on the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a -second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the IInd -Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time. The -result was that the enemy was completely routed.”<a id="FNanchor436" href="#Footnote436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote436" href="#FNanchor436" class="label">[436]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, -I, p. 470. <span class="smcap">von Scherff</span>, <cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, I, p. 41, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated -attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three different -brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a higher -commander been present, a united attack launched by him would undoubtedly -have been successful.<a id="FNanchor437" href="#Footnote437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote437" href="#FNanchor437" class="label">[437]</a> -<cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, I, p. 631. <span class="smcap">von Scherff</span>, <cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, II, p. 271. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb -of <b>St. Martin</b>, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th Infantry -Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a large body of -massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry Division, in particular -the attack made on <b>Grugies</b> (battle of <b>St. Quentin</b>) is the antithesis -of the above-mentioned attack. Although the situation did not necessitate -the simultaneous launching of the available forces, the brigade attacked -in driblets. The attack made by these fractions, launched one -after another, was not able to bring about a decision. In the first -place, at about 11 A. M., three companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th<span class="pagenum" id="Page404">[404]</span> -Infantry), soon afterwards supported by the 8th Company of the 29th -Infantry, and the 8th Company of the 69th Infantry, attacked the French -position at the railway embankment and cut. The Prussian troops fought -with great gallantry, the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry -making four attacks, and the other two companies, three. Although these -five companies succeeded in gaining temporary successes, they lacked -a common commander, and were supported from the rear only when they -were thrown back after fighting for three-quarters of an hour.</p> - -<p>About noon, the four companies of the Ist Battalion, 29th Infantry, were -brought up, but did not engage until the first line had been forced back -and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry, at any rate, -were out of action for the time being. Incidentally, it may be mentioned -that the Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry attacked in three groups, the -strongest of which consisted of 2-l/2 companies, the weakest of only half a -company. Only the strongest of these groups scored a success, and the -Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry was completely routed after a bloody -fight. The 9th and 10th Companies, 29th Infantry, did not arrive on the -battlefield until after the companies of the Ist Battalion of this regiment, -whose heroic fight cannot be sufficiently praised, had ceased to exist as -tactical units.</p> - -<p>At 12:30 P. M., the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 70th Infantry were -brought up and threw back the French, but were in their turn defeated. -At this moment the 10th and 11th Companies of the 40th Infantry arrived; -these companies were also able to advance, but their success was a temporary -one only.</p> - -<p>At 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion of the 40th Infantry appeared, threw -the French back, but was soon attacked by superior forces and suffered -the same fate as its predecessors.</p> - -<p>At 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion of the 70th Infantry and the 9th -and 12th Companies of the 40th Infantry were brought forward, but only -the former engaged seriously at once—again without success. A little -while later, the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced energetically. -At about 3:30 P. M., the French made a very strong counter-attack; -all that had been gained seemed about to be lost again, when -the decision was finally brought about by the vigorous action of the 41st -Infantry and a charge made by Reserve Dragoons.</p> - -<p>The capture of Grugies, of the sugar mill, and, a little later, of -Gauchy, now followed.</p> - -<p>The resistance of the French was broken. General von Barnekow -had thus, apparently, gained his object; but at what a price? In this engagement, -the launching of troops in driblets may be very accurately -followed:</p> - -<p>1. At 11 A. M., five companies were launched in two separate groups -(5th, 6th, and 7th Companies, 69th Infantry—8th Company, 29th Infantry -and 8th Company, 69th Infantry);</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page405">[405]</span></p> - -<p>2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry) -were also launched in separate groups;</p> - -<p>3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th -Companies, 29th Infantry);</p> - -<p>4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and -4th Companies, 70th Infantry);</p> - -<p>5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were -pushed in;</p> - -<p>6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought -up;</p> - -<p>7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the 9th -and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced.</p> - -<p>Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually -drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different detachments, -from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division at -Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on the -battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was exhausted.<a id="FNanchor438" href="#Footnote438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote438" href="#FNanchor438" class="label">[438]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Nordarmee</cite>, II, pp. 135 and 212.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary -one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally forced them -to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of partial successes, -which became reverses, however, in a very short time.</p> - -<p><i>Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required -beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved the -weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster, without turning -the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only be brought about -by simultaneously launching masses.</i></p> - -<p>“The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer practicable -under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the opposite extreme -of extended order, company column tactics, with which all were sufficiently -familiar, since it had been carefully practiced in minor field exercises in -time of peace.” (The attack made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against -<b>Schlosz Aubigny</b>, August 14th, 1870<a id="FNanchor439" href="#Footnote439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a>)</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote439" href="#FNanchor439" class="label">[439]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, -I, p. 466; <span class="smcap">von Scherff</span>, <cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, I, p. 16; <span class="smcap">von Malachowski</span>, -<cite>Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik</cite>, p. 18. This example is the more -instructive, as both advocates of these opposing views show how, in their -opinion, the attack should have been made. The same attack is, moreover, -treated in <cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title -<cite>Selbständigkeit und Auftragsverfahren</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the -continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not be able -to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate leaders restoring -this unity, and “that, in the end, no higher commander will any longer -have the assurance that his wishes will be carried out.” The battles around -Metz during August, 1870, show a tendency on the part of the infantry to<span class="pagenum" id="Page406">[406]</span> -leave behind, in reserve and in rallying positions, parts of the troops -launched to perform a certain combat task, “to detach parts to maintain -communication (very often not at all endangered) with neighboring detachments”, -and to despatch others to a distance to cover a flank, or to -make a wide turning movement for the purpose of enveloping the enemy’s -flank.</p> - -<p>To prevent a battle from degenerating into a number of disconnected, -local combats, and to ensure that the enemy will be actually subjected to the -fire of as many rifles as the supreme commander intended, General von -Scherff proposes that the battle formation, consisting of several echelons -separated by fixed distances, be taken up outside of the zone of hostile -fire, and that these echelons then advance simultaneously and as uninterruptedly -as possible upon the enemy. In this movement the terrain is to -be taken advantage of only so far as the orders permit. In view of the -flat trajectory of the modern rifle, he concedes that fire while in motion, -formerly considered permissible by him at long and medium ranges, may be -replaced by an advance by rushes of the firing line, alternating with firing -in a prone position, the ammunition to be expended at each halt being -fixed by the officer charged with fire direction. He moreover considers -it necessary to have a main firing position, located approximately at the -outer limit of short ranges, for the purpose of gaining the superiority of -fire. Base units must be designated in order to prevent weak detachments -from encountering the enemy single-handed. Moreover, he intends to -keep the advance going by increasing the fire, and by detailed and definite -orders providing for the constant reinforcement of the firing line by men -of the steadily following supports and reserves. Further, since according -to his proposal, a halt by the rear echelons of an attack that has once been -launched, is excluded on principle, it follows of necessity, that, for the -fire effect of the firing line at the really decisive ranges, there can remain -only a very brief period of time, measurable in minutes, which is amply -sufficient, in his opinion, for the object to be accomplished.</p> - -<p>It is charged that General von Scherff’s proposal<a id="FNanchor440" href="#Footnote440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> -(see <a href="#Page205">p. 205</a> supra) -favors a set scheme for conducting every fight. This is not true; there -is quite a difference between “more definitely regulating the conduct of -an attack”, aimed at by the author of <cite>Kriegslehren</cite>, and the formulation -of a normal procedure.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote440" href="#FNanchor440" class="label">[440]</a> -The 10th Supplement of the <cite>Internationale Revue</cite> 1900, gives General von -Scherff’s ideas on the infantry attack. See also his <cite>Reglementarische Studien</cite>, -p. 58, and <cite>Ein Schlachtenangriff</cite>, p. 102. <cite>Vergleichender Rückblick auf die -neueste Tagesliteratur über den Infanterieangriff</cite>, 1906.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Where a number of individuals are to coöperate for the purpose of -performing a certain task, the nature of the case requires that each one -be able to picture to himself beforehand the nature of the task, so that -his share in it will appear clear and definite. Each one must know what -he is to do, when and where he should engage, what his role is to be, -etc. etc., or the result will be hopeless confusion.”—“The drill regulations<span class="pagenum" id="Page407">[407]</span> -must supply this picture and the drill-ground is the place where its -general forms should be impressed upon every individual participating -in the performance of a task.” Experience has taught us that this image -of the drill-ground becomes distorted in war through influences which -have almost never permitted it to appear on the battlefield in its true -form. The initiative of subordinate leaders should overcome the obstacles -which stand in the way of a realization of this ideal image.</p> - -<p><b>The system of tactical missions</b> reckons with the sum-total of -local successes, assigns tasks to the different units of command, and -leaves to the latter the choice of the means, without restricting their -independence. The course of the combat can be influenced only by the -action of retained forces, and it is sought to produce united action by -acquainting all leaders with the object of the combat, they in turn endeavoring -to attain this object even though they do so in different ways.</p> - -<p><b>The system of united action</b> seeks to ensure victory by simultaneously -placing in readiness all the forces intended for the general combat, -by an orderly concentration for action, and by launching the troops at one -and the same time, without, however, requiring all parts of the force -to employ the same formations. This system dictates to the leader the -number of troops he should launch. Since in action everything is ordered -as necessity therefor arises, the result is that the leader loses sight of the -general action in view of the great number of separate orders that must -be issued.</p> - -<p>In the system of tactical missions, there is danger of arbitrary action -on the part of subordinates, and of dispersion; moreover, it is not always -easy to deploy strong firing lines, and there is an increased tendency to -overestimate the value of cover and, in consequence, to overstep the -assigned frontage.</p> - -<p>The system of united action is open to the objection that initiative of -the individual disappears and that the rules laid down in drill regulations -degenerate into a pattern devoid of all spirit.</p> - -<p>In <b>Austria</b> (1906), Captain Wachtel<a id="FNanchor441" href="#Footnote441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> suggests that, when a decision -is not sought, an attack in groups be made, and that, when a decision -is sought, a united attack be made. In <b>Switzerland</b>, Major Sonderegger<a id="FNanchor442" href="#Footnote442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> -advocates a procedure based on that of General von Scherff.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote441" href="#FNanchor441" class="label">[441]</a> <cite>Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff</cite>.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote442" href="#FNanchor442" class="label">[442]</a> <cite>Der ungebremste Infanterieangriff</cite>, 1906.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The initiative of the individual should carry the troops over difficulties -occasioned by the terrain or the enemy. Such checks occur most -frequently from the time a force enters the zone of effective hostile fire until -the assault has been decided upon. In the author’s opinion, the individualized -attack is a concession made, at the expense of united action, for the -purpose of making the attack succeed at all.</p> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page408">[408]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" title="XI. THE DEFENSE.">XI. THE DEFENSE.<a id="FNanchor443" href="#Footnote443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote443" href="#FNanchor443" class="label">[443]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, -V, p. 308. <span class="smcap">Hoppenstedt</span>, <cite>Taktisches Handbuch für den Infanterieoffizier</cite>, -p. 30.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The invariable guiding principle in defense is to make -the most profitable use of fire. This principle governs in the -selection of a position and in strengthening it artificially.</p> - -<p>The defender’s object may <span class="nowrap">be—</span></p> - -<p>1. <b>Temporary occupation</b> of a piece of ground;</p> - -<p>2. <b>Purely passive defense</b>, outpost, rear guard, and -delaying actions;</p> - -<p>3. <b>Offensive-defensive action</b>, <i>i.e.</i>, to bring about a -decision by combining the offensive with the defensive.</p> - -<p>In fortress warfare, situations may arise which may -make it necessary to hold a piece of ground obstinately, without -it being possible to assume the offensive. In the French, -Russian, and Italian regulations, only the offensive-defensive -is considered. The Italians see in the defensive nothing but -a preparation for the offensive; the Russians seek to shake -the enemy with fire in defense, so that they can subsequently -assume the offensive.</p> - -<p>The defensive is dependent upon the terrain, and is subject -to the condition that the locality where the tactical situation -requires a stand to be made offers a position favorable for -employing fire to good advantage, and that the opponent -actually attacks where the defender expects him. The employment -of the defensive is restricted by its dependence on the -ground and on the measures of the enemy. Its employment -may frequently be explained by the fact that one of the contending -parties allows itself to be checked to such an extent -by the initiative of the other that it can only offer a passive -resistance. Such passive resistance may here and there score<span class="pagenum" id="Page409">[409]</span> -a success by chance (Plevna, St. Privat), but, as a rule, only -the assailant reaps a benefit from such situations.</p> - -<h4>1. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE</h4> - -<p class="noindent">seeks to avoid a decision, and must therefore endeavor, by -opening fire at an early moment, to prevent the enemy from -reaching short ranges. (See <a href="#Page147">p. 147</a> supra). It is not absolutely -necessary to have a clear field of fire or strong reserves, but the -latter, kept a considerable distance in rear, must be strong -enough to enable the force to disengage itself from the enemy.</p> - -<p>Since only a temporary resistance is to be made, it is -permissible for the force to cover a greater front. The defender -should endeavor to compensate for his numerical inferiority -by expending a large amount of ammunition and by -employing machine guns. It is an advantage to have obstacles -in front of the position and cover in rear of it, because the -former retard the enemy’s advance and the latter shelters the -troops from his fire in case of a retreat.</p> - -<h4 title="2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION.">2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A -DECISION.<a id="FNanchor444" href="#Footnote444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote444" href="#FNanchor444" class="label">[444]</a> During the attack on the large work at Gorni Dubniac, the Finnland -Regiment was unable to advance from its last position, only 70-100 paces distant -from the enemy, over the foreground swept by grazing fire. Several -attempted assaults were repulsed.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Decisive results can only be obtained at short and medium -ranges. Long range fire may, indeed, inflict losses on the -enemy and delay his advance, but it cannot repulse him. -(See <a href="#Page148">p. 148</a> supra).</p> - -<p>It is not sufficient merely to ward off the attack with -fire; the offensive must be assumed. When this is not done, -the assailant can repair his losses and try another attack. -When the defender has repulsed the enemy, he should follow -up this success with an attack. However, as he will rarely -be able to do this with the force at his disposal, fresh troops<span class="pagenum" id="Page410">[410]</span> -will be required. (Beaune la Rolande, Lisaine). The change -from the tactical defensive to the offensive offers the same -difficulties as the corresponding strategical move; but, in the -former case, there is present, in addition, the element of -danger and the difficulty of perceiving the right moment.<a id="FNanchor445" href="#Footnote445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote445" href="#FNanchor445" class="label">[445]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, -V, p. 320. Compare this with Benedeck’s hesitation at Königgrätz.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>A position is of value only when it compels the enemy -to attack, directs his movements into definite channels, and -induces him to make wide turning movements, which cause him -to lose time and produce favorable conditions for the assumption -of the offensive on the part of the defender. Every -position that enables the defender to use all his weapons, and -does not deter the enemy from making an attack, is suitable -for this purpose.</p> - -<p>“By placing our troops in an unassailable position, we -actually refuse battle and force the enemy to seek the decision -in another manner. * * * A defensive position approaches -its ideal to the extent that its strength is hidden and opportunity -is offered of surprising the enemy by our tactical combinations. -One should endeavor to conceal the advantages -which one intends to derive from the formation of the ground, -just as one hides from the enemy the bulk of one’s troops -and their actual position. This is, indeed, only practicable to -a certain extent, and requires perhaps a peculiar and little used -method of treatment.”<a id="FNanchor446" href="#Footnote446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote446" href="#FNanchor446" class="label">[446]</a> -<span class="smcap">Clausewitz</span>, <cite>On War</cite>, VI, 12 (<cite>Militär-Klassiker</cite>, p. 364). The Boers were -masters of the art of concealing defensive positions. At Colenso, on the Modder -River, and at Magersfontain, their positions were located in places where -neither the British artillerists nor the reconnoitering detachments suspected -them to be.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Modern firearms make the defense so strong in front -that it suffices to hold this part of the position with a weak -force supplied with plenty of ammunition, and provided with -weak supports, at a few points, to replace losses. As these -supports have a definite task to perform, they are posted as -near the first line as the available cover permits, in order to -cut down the distance to be traversed by them under fire.<span class="pagenum" id="Page411">[411]</span> -When practicable, they are intrenched within the firing line -itself. As it is advisable to supply these troops with a great -deal of ammunition, some of the ammunition wagons belonging -to the battalions held in reserve may be turned over to -them. The general reserve intended for offensive action should -be kept far in rear of the line. When kept too close to the -first line, the defender will be unable to move it to any point -desired, after the direction of the attack becomes apparent. -The defender should examine his position from the point of -view of the attacker, and ask himself, “<i>With how weak a -force may I occupy the position and still obtain the frontal -strength described in the regulations, and how strong can I -make the general reserve so as to bring about a decision?</i>”</p> - -<p>At some parts of the position, an attack will have good -prospects of succeeding, at others it would encounter difficulties, -and, finally, at others it could not possibly succeed. -While many troops are needed in the first-mentioned portions -(sections), comparatively few troops will suffice to hold those -sections which are less favorable for the attacker (on account -of their free field of fire, obstacles, and the absence of artillery -positions in which the attacker can place his guns). This -leads to a division of the defensive position into sections, each -forming a separate unit of command (battalion or company) -and, when necessary, detailing its own reserve (section -reserve). When the frontage of the sections, as determined by -the above-mentioned examination of the position, is considerable, -or when obstacles lie within the position, a further subdivision -may become necessary. This does not imply that the -position must be held in equal strength all along the line; portions -of the line that are very difficult to attack need only be -kept under observation. Gaps in the defensive line are, as a -rule, of very little value to the assailant, as the defender will -frequently be able to sweep the space in front of them from -a flank. “In order to keep all parts of the foreground under -observation, and to prevent portions of the hostile force from -escaping the defender’s fire, a division of the foreground corresponding<span class="pagenum" id="Page412">[412]</span> -to the division into sections must be made when -necessary.” (Par. 403 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>Weak points, <i>i.e.</i>, points against which the assailant -can suddenly mass superior forces at short range, or in the -defense of which a coöperation of infantry and artillery is -impossible, must be specially strengthened: by obstacles; provision -for flanking the hostile advance; and preparation of -supporting points in rear of the position. In addition, such -weak points must be occupied with a strong garrison, by -employing two firing lines, one above the other; reserves; -and machine guns.</p> - -<p>Enclosed farm yards (Point du Jour, on August 18th, -1870), and small patches of timber, are best not occupied at -all; they are far more valuable as sham defenses in that they -draw the fire of the assailant. At any rate, it is a question -whether, at the last moment, when the hostile assault must be -warded off, it will be possible to occupy such points.</p> - -<p>As a general rule, only a single defensive position, consisting -of an infantry and an artillery line, is selected.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The Russians invariably posted strong advanced detachments in -front of their main defensive positions. As a result, the most serious -fights usually occurred in the positions taken up by these advanced troops.<a id="FNanchor447" href="#Footnote447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> -At <b>Haicheng</b>, for example, a strong main position had been prepared, -in which a stand was to be made. In spite of this, the IInd Siberian -Corps was left in a strongly fortified advanced position west of <b>Simutcheng</b>. -This corps, in its turn, fortified two lines of advanced positions -far in its front.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote447" href="#FNanchor447" class="label">[447]</a> <span class="smcap">Löffler</span>, -<cite>Russisch-japanischer Krieg</cite>, I, p. 109. See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 305, in -regard to the numerous positions in the valley of the Shaho.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“Thus, on July 31, 1904, only seven battalions of this corps finally -fought at <b>Daputsi</b> and <b>Liadapu</b>. When they were thrown back by superior -forces, the mistake was made of bringing up fresh troops to regain -the position captured by the enemy. These troops arrived too late and -had to make a difficult attack on the Japanese, who had already occupied -the captured position. Naturally their frontal attack accomplished -nothing.</p> - -<p>“The force thus suffered a defeat needlessly, and, although the defensive -had been decided upon, a lot of men were sacrificed in an attempt -to retake an advanced position that had been captured by the enemy.<span class="pagenum" id="Page413">[413]</span> -The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when its line of -retreat was endangered by Mistshenko’s being forced back. The Russians -likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when news was received -that strong hostile forces were advancing against the left flank -of the position.”<a id="FNanchor448" href="#Footnote448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote448" href="#FNanchor448" class="label">[448]</a> See <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften</cite>, 41/42, p. 49.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy <b>advanced positions</b>,<a id="FNanchor449" href="#Footnote449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a> -<i>i.e.</i>, positions lying within effective range of the main -position. Supporting points immediately in front of the main -position, projecting from it like caponiers, and flanking the -ground over which the assailant will have to make his attack, -must not be confounded with these advanced positions. St. -Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on the battlefield of Gravelotte -are good examples of both classes of positions. In order -to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it advantageous -to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying -still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing -this, favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful -leadership are essential.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote449" href="#FNanchor449" class="label">[449]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, -p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to the contemplated -construction of advanced positions in front of the Shaho position, as the Russians -desired to gain time for the offensive movement to be made by their left -wing. The uncertainty and hesitation produced by the constant changes in -orders, and the excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which -allowed themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In <b>France</b> and <b>Russia</b> much is expected of advanced positions. In -<b>England</b> particular importance is attached to them when they draw the -enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a counter-attack. The -British consider that supporting points lying in front of the position had -best be left unoccupied, unless they can be supported by artillery fire -from the main position.</p> - -<p>“Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will -frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible to -gain an approximate idea of the enemy’s strength only by a fight. For -this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of Belfort, in -January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is to deceive the -enemy as to the defender’s strength, and to compel him to deploy, will -have a greater justification now than at that time. Nowadays, such detachments -may cover a considerable front without danger, especially -when they are plentifully supplied with ammunition. This will make it<span class="pagenum" id="Page414">[414]</span> -still more easy to deceive the enemy, and a skillful defender will know -how to make the most of it.”<a id="FNanchor450" href="#Footnote450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote450" href="#FNanchor450" class="label">[450]</a> <cite>Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik</cite>, II, p. 237.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Advanced positions<a id="FNanchor451" href="#Footnote451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> are apt to mask the fire from the -main position, and fights for their possession may easily lead -to the defeat of the troops holding them. The danger of the -fight taking place and being decided in the advanced position -must be reckoned with. (Battles of Ligny and on the Hallue). -On the other hand, it may be advantageous to employ scouting -detachments, cyclists, and machine guns, and to construct -dummy intrenchments in front of the main position. (Par. -407 German I. D. R.). The French, more than anyone else, -are convinced of the advantages to be derived from an employment -of advanced positions (for example in deceiving the -enemy as to the location of the main position). In a deliberately -planned concentration and advance into action, such positions -are, however, so effectively enveloped that they do not -come into play at all and fall an easy prey to the enemy. However, -we do not wish to deny their occasional usefulness in -cases where it is necessary to gain time for concentration and -for strengthening the main position. In fights for their possession, -an idea may frequently be gained of the intentions and -dispositions of the assailant. Moreover, they offer opportunities -for surprising the enemy with fire, and induce him to make -premature attacks and to mass his troops in the ones he has -captured.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote451" href="#FNanchor451" class="label">[451]</a> Par. 21 German <cite>Manual of Field Engineering</cite>: “Their use is principally -restricted to special cases in fortress warfare.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Next to a free field of fire (clearing the foreground, and -ascertaining ranges), the determining factors in selecting a -position are elbow room in and in rear of the position, supporting -points for the flanks, and cover. The natural cover -available on the ground is made use of as best suits the purpose -of the action.</p> - -<p>The line in which the artillery intends to fight the decisive -action constitutes the “framework” of the position. Although<span class="pagenum" id="Page415">[415]</span> -artillery will rarely be able to perform all its tasks in a single -position, its first position is selected with due regard to the -position of the hostile artillery. The most important position -is that from which the hostile infantry attack is to be repulsed. -This should be selected far enough in front of the artillery -to enable the latter to fire over it, and to deprive the assailant’s -artillery of the opportunity of hitting the defender’s infantry -and artillery at one and the same time. (Par. 401 German -I. D. R.). A distance of 600 m. between infantry and artillery -is considered sufficient for this purpose. In view of the protection -afforded by gun shields against infantry fire, it is -scarcely necessary to post skirmish lines in advance of the -artillery. But, where the infantry line is not continuous in -front of the artillery, troops should be posted, so as to protect -the artillery personnel from being annoyed by hostile patrols. -It will seldom be possible for a commander to do justice to the -requirements of both arms; in every compromise, one or the -other arm is only too apt to be placed at a disadvantage. The -needs of the infantry, whose choice of a position is more -restricted, take precedence. While infantry can govern its -action by that of the artillery during the preparatory stage of -an attack, this is impossible in defense, as the infantry is obliged -to carry the fight through to its logical conclusion in the position -in which it is begun.<a id="FNanchor452" href="#Footnote452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote452" href="#FNanchor452" class="label">[452]</a> As the artillery is less restricted in the choice of positions, and as the -final outcome of the fight depends, after all, on the outcome of the infantry -action, the demands of the infantry, contrary to par. 292 German I. D. R., -must be considered in the first place.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4 title="3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.">3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.<a id="FNanchor453" href="#Footnote453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote453" href="#FNanchor453" class="label">[453]</a> Germany: -<cite>Manual of Field Engineering</cite>, 1905. France: <cite>Instruction pratique -sur les travaux de campagne</cite> (December 24th, 1906). England: <cite>Manual of -Military Engineering</cite>, 1905. Russia: <cite>Mitteilungen vom Ingenieur Comité</cite>, No. -41 (1906). The Austrian and Italian regulations are undergoing revision.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The apprehensions formerly entertained in regard to prematurely -fortifying a position, and which are still shared by -the French regulations, are no longer to be found in the new<span class="pagenum" id="Page416">[416]</span> -regulations. The construction of field fortifications requires -time, if they are to be of value, and if they are to give -leaders and troops the assurance that they can be defended -by the minimum number of men.<a id="FNanchor454" href="#Footnote454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a> Even intrenchments that -have been constructed in vain will frequently prove useful -in deceiving the enemy. In many cases, it will be necessary -to be prepared to meet a hostile attack made from several -directions. This contingency should be taken into account by -at least preparing for the work beforehand.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote454" href="#FNanchor454" class="label">[454]</a> At 10 A. M., on August 18th, 1870. General Canrobert received orders to -place St. Privat in a state of defense. At 11 A. M., the first reports of the -approach of the Prussian Guard were received, and at 4 P. M., Ste. Marie aux -Chênes was in German hands. Hence, only five hours were available for these -preparations for defense.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>“If the situation turns out to be different than was -expected, the intrenchments already constructed should not -influence the decisions of the commander. On the other -hand, the consideration that the works might be built unnecessarily -must not cause their construction to be omitted altogether.” -(Par. 311 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the preface to the French regulations, it is emphasized that intrenching -a position ought neither to impair the spirit of the offensive -nor hamper the movement to the front. “Intrenchments are a means to -an end, but not the end itself. They should only be used when no violence -is done thereby to the tactical situation, and one should never hesitate, -for a single moment, to abandon them, if the situation requires, or to -construct others, at another place, if it becomes necessary.” The men -should therefore be trained in handling the portable intrenching tools, -until they can use them skillfully in any position of the body.</p> - -<p>“The use of intrenchments may also be abused. To remain inertly -in a place is just as fatal as to advance without making use of cover. -When temporary halts are made, the commander for the time being, often -placed in that position by chance (<i>chef du moment, chef d’unité ou chef de -groupe éventuel</i>), indicates whether or not intrenchments are to be constructed.”</p> - -<p>Battle intrenchments are to protect the soldier against hostile fire, -without hampering him in using his rifle. “They are one of the factors -which ensure economy in men, in that they save a body of troops from -suffering unnecessary losses. But their importance always recedes before -the general requirements of an action, and they should never in any way -interfere with the advance of troops; on the contrary, intrenchments are<span class="pagenum" id="Page417">[417]</span> -to make it possible to bring troops within effective range of the enemy, -without impairing their physical condition or their morale.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Intrenchments enable a commander to save troops, which -he can use offensively at the decisive point. They do not fulfill -the object for which they were intended, when they make it -easier for the enemy to pick out the position. “Works which -cannot be perceived from the foreground even through powerful -field glasses, afford the most effective protection against -artillery fire.” Trenches should therefore be deep, have a -low parapet, and be properly masked.</p> - -<p>The commander indicates when work is to begin. Every -unit must intrench the portion of the defensive line which -it is to defend; working parties, specially detailed from troops -not intended for the immediate defense of the position, can -be counted on only when extensive works are to be constructed.</p> - -<p>Continuous lines of trenches are seldom built; it suffices -to construct a line of works with intervals, <i>i.e.</i>, battalion -groups, the intervals being simply held by a weak force.</p> - -<p>These battalion groups (par. 24 German Manual of -Field Engineering) are constructed without regard to any -fixed form, as the tactical employment of the companies -requires. They consist of firing trenches (flanks refused and -echelons in rear of the wings), provided with splinter proofs, -and adequate cover trenches, so that all the men, if possible, -will be sheltered from artillery fire.</p> - -<p>The aim is, first of all, to construct inconspicuous standing -firing trenches. These should have low parapets and be -provided with numerous traverses to restrict the effect of high -explosive shell. In order that these traverses may not betray -the location of the position, they should not rise above the -parapet.<a id="FNanchor455" href="#Footnote455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote455" href="#FNanchor455" class="label">[455]</a> These traverses afford very little shelter against enfilading fire; it is -advisable to keep sand bags in readiness as a protection in case such fire is -received.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page418">[418]</span></p> - -<p>Deep, narrow trenches afford the best protection against -artillery fire (the trench should be about 0.60 m. wide at -the bottom). Narrow trenches are especially difficult to pick -out from a balloon. In constructing trenches having no -parapet at all, special precautions must be taken in order that -their location may not be betrayed by the scattered earth or -by their rear wall, which will be visible when they are located -on the slope facing the enemy. When the trenches are to -be held for some time, provision must be made for the construction -of splinter proofs,<a id="FNanchor456" href="#Footnote456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> other overhead cover, and loopholes -of observation.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote456" href="#FNanchor456" class="label">[456]</a> These lie about 0.50 m. below the natural surface of the ground and -accommodate 5-6 men: they are separated from each other by an earth wall -1 m. thick.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Numerous light splinter proofs are generally to be preferred -to a few larger and stronger ones, as they afford sufficient -protection against shrapnel bullets and fragments. They -may be protected against direct hits from field guns, or other -guns having a flat trajectory, by sloping their roofs to the -rear at an angle as nearly as possible coincident with the angle -of fall of those projectiles.</p> - -<p>Since field intrenchments are incapable of furnishing protection -against direct hits from guns having a curved trajectory, -this object must be attained by skillfully distributing splinter -proofs along the front. These should be inconspicuous and -should not take up too much room. The comfort of the troops -in the trenches should also be provided for by constructing -kitchens, latrines, drainage ditches, and dressing stations.</p> - -<p>In addition, field magazines for storing ammunition should -be built, and alarm arrangements made. Moreover, covered -communication should be provided along the line and to the -rear. The front and gaps in the line may be very effectively -flanked by fire from skillfully constructed refused wings.</p> - -<p>In constructing a battalion group of intrenchments, provision -will have to be made, in addition, for the following:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page419">[419]</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption sstype"><i>Intrenchments for a Battalion.</i></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo419a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption sstype"><i>Firing Trench with Cover Trench.</i></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo419b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption sstype"><i>Firing Trench with Splinter Proofs.</i></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo419c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page420">[420]</span></p> - -<div class="container"> - -<p class="caption large sstype">Profiles.</p> - -<p class="caption sstype">Firing Trench in ordinary soil.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo420a.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="caption sstype">Splinter Proof.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo420b.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -<div class="split5050"> - -<div class="left5050"> - -<p class="caption sstype">Communicating Trench.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo420c.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--left5050--> - -<div class="right5050"> - -<p class="caption sstype">Communicating Trench without Parapet.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo420d.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--right5050--> - -<p class="clearline"> </p> - -</div><!--split5050--> - -<p class="caption sstype">Machine Gun Pit.</p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo420e.png" alt="" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>1. <b>Observation of the foreground</b>, “for the purpose of -reconnaissance and security, as well as for noting the effect of -one’s own fire.” In order that observers may not betray the -location of the position, it is recommended that they be posted -at inconspicuous points affording a sufficiently extended view,<span class="pagenum" id="Page421">[421]</span> -and screened from the observation of the enemy. When they -have to be posted in the defensive line, the terreplein is either -lowered in places, so that they can just look over the parapet, -or special observation stations are constructed. Provision must -be made for communication between the several parts of the -line and with the next higher headquarters.</p> - -<p>2. <b>Clearing the foreground.</b> As a rule, it will be practicable -to employ for this work troops not needed in digging -trenches. As time is lacking in field warfare for extensive -work, such as cutting down embankments and removing dead -angles, one will have to be content with trampling down or -burning standing grain, removing objects which the enemy -might use as aiming points, and cutting clearings through -woods. It is not advisable to demolish stone walls and houses, -as the debris is difficult to remove and affords cover to the -enemy.</p> - -<p>3. <b>Dummy intrenchments and masks.</b><a id="FNanchor457" href="#Footnote457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a> These are to -deceive the assailant as to the position and extent of the -defensive works. They should not be located in the same -fire swept zone as the defensive works themselves, and at a -distance should look like real fortifications. Masks are to -screen defensive works or troops, without restricting the fire -of the latter. Natural features are best suited for this purpose, -but may be replaced or supplemented by artificial masks.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote457" href="#FNanchor457" class="label">[457]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 291. At Magersfontain, the Boers constructed dummy -trenches on the crest, while the trenches actually held by them were located at -the foot of the slope. The result is well known.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In many cases, it will suffice to place a few skirmishers -behind a parapet that has been hastily thrown up with a plow.</p> - -<p>4. <b>Cover trenches and communicating trenches.</b> -These constitute a considerable portion of the defensive works. -Communicating trenches may be either covered ways or zigzags, -and connect the cover trenches with the firing trenches. -Sortie steps should be provided in order to facilitate a prompt -advance from the trenches. In many cases, it is impossible to -avoid placing firing and cover trenches so close to each other -that the enemy’s shells can strike both simultaneously.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page422">[422]</span></p> - -<p>5. <b>Obstacles.</b> These need only be constructed when -two forces confront each other for a protracted period. The -purpose of obstacles is to hold the enemy where he will be -exposed to the most deadly fire; retard his advance; compel him -to confine his movements to certain avenues of approach (this -is especially valuable in night combats); and eliminate dead -angles in front of the position. The presence of extensive -obstacles forces the enemy to advance systematically. As a -rule, they can only be removed by pioneers. They should not -be located too near the position, as they are apt to be damaged -by artillery fire directed at the position, and interfere with the -defender’s fire. When they are too far in front of the position, -the defender will not be able to guard them and prevent their -destruction. In general, they should not be more than 200 m. -from the position. It is better to construct several lines of small -obstacles than a single line of large ones. The requirement -that obstacles must not interfere with the defender’s fire, must -not afford the enemy an opportunity to approach under cover, -and must remain intact under hostile artillery fire, is best -met by marshy ground and by wire entanglements. Obstacles -should be provided with a slight glacis in order to prevent -artillery fire from destroying them prematurely. When wire -entanglements are too high, they are easily seen at a distance, -and, although they are little damaged by artillery fire, the -attacker can make preparations to remove them.</p> - -<h5>Russian Views.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A defensive position consists of an advanced position, a fighting line -with firing trenches and batteries, supporting points in rear, and, finally, -a fourth line, which serves as a rallying position. The key to a position, -which lay formerly in the line of supporting points, lies at present in the -firing trenches in which supporting points must be provided. (Colonel -Golenkin advocates the use of semi-circular works as supporting points, -and Lieutenant-Colonel Mordovin large closed works). “These semi-circular -works are in a sense the anchors by means of which the firing -line clings to the position which it has occupied.” It does not matter if -the enemy penetrates the first line and captures one or two of these<span class="pagenum" id="Page423">[423]</span> -supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and the -second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat -indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated -into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able to -sustain the counter-attack made by the defender’s reserves, and its temporary -success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this may be -accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely essential. -Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number than is -employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose. According -to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are essential in order -to check an enemy who has penetrated the first line, and to facilitate the -defender’s final retreat in case of necessity.</p> - -<p>Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions -for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks, and, -finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either to serve -“reconnaissance purposes,” by forcing the enemy to an early deployment, -or to do duty as “caponiers” from which a flanking fire may be brought to -bear on the foreground.</p> - -<p>Advanced positions, doing duty as “caponiers,” are invariably to -consist of closed works, those serving “reconnaissance purposes” of open -works. The latter are to be defended “to the last ditch,” and are not to -be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or less, but -the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a bayonet fight.</p> - -<p>In contrast with this distribution in depth—2 km., in the model given—Lieutenant-Colonel -Jabel, whose views are based on the same experiences, -advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He states: -“The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks, as well -as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery fire in particular, -produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that the decisive action -could be fought only in a single line. With its capture, further fighting -had only small prospects of success * * *” “When firing trenches -have been constructed at the points where the best effect can be obtained -from long and short range fire, they should not be evacuated prematurely, -but held, in order to make the most of this fire effect, until the -enemy arrives close enough to use his bayonets. If the troops holding -the trenches retire immediately before the bayonet fight, their retreat -invariably becomes a rout, and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, -after leaving their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open -to the hostile fire.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE.</h4> - -<p>In his <cite>Tactical Handbook</cite>, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a -method, well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of -artillery fire on a defensive position. He believes that dummy<span class="pagenum" id="Page424">[424]</span> -intrenchments, not too conspicuously located, partially, but not -skillfully masked and occupied, will deceive the attacker’s -artillery for some time, at any rate, until the advanced troops -of the attacker induce the defenders to man their parapet and -expose themselves to shrapnel fire. The “defense should be -conducted in such a manner that the garrison of the main -position will not need to expose itself to the enemy’s artillery -fire as soon as his advanced troops appear.” Major Hoppenstedt -believes that this can be attained, in hill positions, by -conducting the fire fight, at long and medium ranges, from -positions in rear, the defender moving up into the main position, -specially prepared for this purpose, when the attacker -disappears in the defiladed spaces in front of it. The objection -to this method is that it necessitates too large a force to hold -the position.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>“In a protracted, obstinate fight, the defender’s trenches, exposed to -the combined hostile infantry and artillery fire, will finally become filled -with dead and wounded, and it will rarely be practicable to remove them. -The arrival of reinforcements will increase the confusion and the losses, -and the fighting energy of the troops will decrease with tremendous rapidity. -This is one of the greatest disadvantages of the defense as compared -with the attack and its constantly moving lines.</p> - -<p>“In such cases, which will be typical at points where the attacker intends -to penetrate the line, it may be a real act of salvation for the -defender’s firing line to rush to the front.</p> - -<p>“In fighting at short ranges, especially just before the assailant makes -his assault, such a rush to the front on the part of the defender’s line, -may be a good move for another reason. As is well known, the attacker’s -artillery must change targets when its infantry arrives within a certain -distance of the defender’s position. The Germans (par. 446 I. D. R.) -fix this point at 300 m. from the enemy, and the French, whose guns have -a flatter trajectory, fix it at 500 m. In attacking a hill position, when the -fire is well observed, the distance of this point from the position will be -considerably greater.</p> - -<p>“But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be, -skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point fixed by the -regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid interfering with the fire -of its artillery. Under such circumstances, it may be a skillful move for -a defender who is still full of fight, to decrease the distance which separates -him from the hostile infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may -escape from the hostile artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures -his vision. If he finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, -for he will then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.”</p> - -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page425">[425]</span></p> - -<p>The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger -of a sudden attack being directed against a flank. The assailant -will endeavor to avoid making an attack against the front of -a position prepared for defense, when such an attack has small -chances of succeeding, and seek the decision by attacking a -flank, where conditions are, to a certain extent at least, equalized. -The danger of a flank attack increases with the length -of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move to prolong -the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat) -for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power -of extension is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and -the wing attacked will then be so weak and attenuated that -it will not be capable of offering serious resistance.</p> - -<p>To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise -promises little success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will -make itself felt, first of all, at the salient thus formed (see -<a href="#Page357">p. 357</a> supra), and his convergent artillery and infantry fire, -which may even enfilade parts of the line, will paralyze all -tactical movements of the defender at this point.</p> - -<p>By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only -postpone the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope -with an envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different -manner.</p> - -<p>The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping -force by posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring -about a decision by employing the reserve offensively. However, -for carrying out these measures, more time is required -than for merely refusing a flank. Time may be gained by -making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with strong -detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the -flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could -think of attacking the main position.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne -in mind that they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire<span class="pagenum" id="Page426">[426]</span> -fights, and that the mobility of the machine gun batteries -cannot be utilized when, from the very start, they are assigned -a section to defend.</p> - -<p>In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the -machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, -when necessary, to reinforce the defensive line at threatened -points, to prevent envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to -participate in an offensive movement.</p> - -<p>This does not preclude their coming into action at the -very opening of an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary -to command important avenues of approach.</p> - -<p>When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be -possible to post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in -front or on a flank of the main position, that they can bring a -sudden fire to bear on the area in which the opponent will in -all probability post his artillery.</p> - -<p>Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep -defiladed spaces in front of the defensive line.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation -of the position should not be longer deferred. It is always -risky to occupy the position in the face of hostile batteries, -especially as the fire of the defender’s guns is masked by the -skirmishers moving forward. If the defender can manage to -give the attacker the impression that the position is still unoccupied, -perhaps thereby inducing him to advance less cautiously, -and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral effect far -exceeding the material success may be counted upon.<a id="FNanchor458" href="#Footnote458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> The -firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will -have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the -troops should not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively -insignificant in defense, and as it is important to develop<span class="pagenum" id="Page427">[427]</span> -a heavy fire so as to make it difficult for the enemy to gain the -fire superiority. The principles governing the moment for opening -fire have already been discussed (<a href="#Page147">pp. 147</a> and <a href="#Page154">154</a> supra).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote458" href="#FNanchor458" class="label">[458]</a> Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899. Engagement at -Colenso, on December 15th, 1899.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority -of fire. This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire -from a large number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s -force in motion. The defender should make the most of the -advantage which his preparedness gives him. The attacker’s -firing line with its supports forms the target. A departure -from this rule is in order, in the case of a French -assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the -reserves and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable -for the defender to discontinue his fire and to take -cover when the assailant lies down and fires; but, while under -cover, everything should be prepared for resuming the fire -when the enemy rises to continue his advance (<a href="#Page156">p. 156</a> supra).</p> - -<p>If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from -reaching the extreme limit of short ranges, the commander -must decide whether to continue the fight until a decision is -reached, or whether to break off the action.</p> - -<p>When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, -it will be too late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain -in rear of the position is especially favorable, or other troops -can take a hand in the fight to cover the withdrawal. The -onrushing assailant is received with accelerated fire; the -defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk a fight at close -quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is already -casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”</p> - -<p>While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for -the defender to step upon the rear wall of the trench so that -the latter would become an obstacle for the attacker. But this -scheme can only be employed when the troops are completely -in hand.</p> - -<p>While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost -intensity by the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page428">[428]</span> -general reserve, which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to -bring about the decision by advancing to attack. On arriving -close enough to assault, the attack reaches its most critical -stage, and even a counter-attack made by a comparatively -small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense.</p> - -<h4 title="5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.">5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.<a id="FNanchor459" href="#Footnote459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote459" href="#FNanchor459" class="label">[459]</a> See -<span class="smcap">F.C. v. H.</span> <cite>Zum Studium der Taktik</cite>, p. 418 et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed -by well posted bodies of troops will often determine the -commander of the force on the defensive to contain the enemy -at one point with a strong defensive position, while at -the same time assuming the offensive at another. (This was -planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813, and at Troyes, -early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in Lee’s -operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June, -1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, -because Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports -in regard to the position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent -in reality). Whether the offensive should be assumed -while the enemy is still in the act of deploying,<a id="FNanchor460" href="#Footnote460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a> or whether one -must be satisfied with assuming the offensive at the last -moment, is best determined by the relative strength of the opposing -forces. When battle-fronts are short this may still be -advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack can -affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major -portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then -the position and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local -success.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote460" href="#FNanchor460" class="label">[460]</a> Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. -1805 (<cite>Schlachterfolg</cite>, p. 28); Salamanca, -1812.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the -defense, but the commander must not await exhaustive -messages. Prompt action is necessary, either for throwing -back the advanced troops of the assailant, or for striking a<span class="pagenum" id="Page429">[429]</span> -blow at the hostile flank. In the latter case, it is an advantage -if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile forces making -a turning movement may also be encountered, and the commander -will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and -assail the enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.<a id="FNanchor461" href="#Footnote461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote461" href="#FNanchor461" class="label">[461]</a> -The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of Noisseville. <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Noisseville</cite>, p. 41.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point -will make itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the -most is made of it. As a rule, tactical considerations determine -where the commander should launch his reserves for the -counter-attack.</p> - -<p>The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander -of the whole force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger -force and in numerically inferior forces, the warding off of -the flank attack remains almost always the only remedy.</p> - -<p>“The general reserve should be posted at the point from -which it can best move forward, counter to the probable -direction of the hostile attack, while, at the same time, making -the most of the features of the ground. When only one flank -is secure, the general reserve is, as a rule, placed in echelon in -rear of the unprotected wing. When both flanks are in the -air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves in readiness -in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment, while -retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other for -the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned -general reserve must have room for development, whether this -be for warding off a hostile envelopment or for making a -counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p>The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center -of the position only when the front is short and the situation -is not as yet cleared up. In this position it will frequently -be exposed to the fire directed against the first line, and its -entry into action will usually involve a loss of time. When -adequate information is available of the measures taken by the -opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him to direct<span class="pagenum" id="Page430">[430]</span> -his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines the -position of the general reserve.</p> - -<p>Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, -the position of the general reserve must be concealed, and -precautions must be taken to keep hostile patrols in the dark, -as long as possible, in regard to its actual location. The ground -over which the general reserve is to advance should be free from -obstacles, so that the counter-attack can be made rapidly and -with uniformity.</p> - -<p>Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to -direct his attack against a flank, the general reserve of the -defender should be posted at such a distance in rear of the -threatened wing that the troops composing it will be sheltered -to some extent from hostile fire. In order that the fully -deployed general reserve, when making a counter-attack, may -clear with its inner flank the outer flank of the line holding -the position, and not get into the latter’s zone of fire, a sufficient -interval must be left between the two. This interval -should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the -counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision -when the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the -defender. This requires that the general reserve and the line -holding the position be separated by an interval of at least -200 m. In addition, the counter-attack must be so made that -it will actually strike the assailant in flank; and this it cannot -do unless the general reserve is posted sufficiently far to a flank. -The center of the reserve should be launched so as to strike not -only the flank of the enemy’s firing line, but that of his supports -as well. If the general reserve is posted too near the first -line, there is danger of it being enveloped together with the -first line, and committed to purely defensive action (refusing -a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a flank, -its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the -assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive -position, and defeat it in detail. The farther the general -reserve is off to a flank, the more effectively will it strike the<span class="pagenum" id="Page431">[431]</span> -enemy in flank, but it will be correspondingly more difficult to -conceal it. The necessity of pushing the general reserve far to -a flank decreases, as the scope of the attacker’s envelopment -of the defensive line increases. It may frequently be to the -defender’s advantage to induce the assailant to make a far-reaching -envelopment, provided the line defending the position -is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so doing. -Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned -in rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack -must similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed -flank in order to protect themselves against a flank attack.</p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo431.png" alt="Reserves arrangement" /> -</div> - -</div> - -<p>It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for -the reserve. This depends upon the strength of the position, -and the degree of resistance the intrenchments are capable of -rendering; but, in any case, the force intended for local defense -should be strong enough to compel the enemy to deploy completely, -and prevent his carrying the defenses before the -counter-attack is made. Large quantities of ammunition and -intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance must -compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, -in order that the general reserve may be made as strong as -possible. The question, as to how thinly the position must be -occupied, and how strong the general reserve may be made, -can only be answered in each particular case. If the attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page432">[432]</span> -made by the general reserve is to produce any effect, it must -not be undertaken with too small a force, as it could then be -checked by weak detachments.</p> - -<p>While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it -may <span class="nowrap">either—</span></p> - -<p>1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more -groups, and deploy during its forward movement; or</p> - -<p>2. Take up the attack formation from the start.</p> - -<p>The first method has the advantage, when the space -required is small, of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, -and allows changes to be made in the direction of -march and in the dispositions.</p> - -<p>The second, although it enables the reserve to advance -promptly to the counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve -in combat formation is not so easily concealed, as it is more -difficult to make changes in the dispositions and the direction -of march, and as this formation seems only practicable for -making an advance in one direction—straight to the front.</p> - -<p>It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack -should be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely -frontal action, no special disadvantages result from prematurely -launching the general reserve; if it enters the action too -late, it will still be able to throw back the assailant who has -penetrated into the position. With the counter-attack it is different; -it must take place when the opponent is under the most -effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is made -prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons -of the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, -indeed, exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will -be able to take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely -independent actions may result, and the counter-attack made -by the general reserve may be checked by the retained echelons -of the attacker and repulsed by their fire. When launched -prematurely, the counter-attack will not always repulse the -hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps<span class="pagenum" id="Page433">[433]</span> -still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will -never produce decisive results.</p> - -<p>A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated -into the position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the -garrisons of such supporting points as still offer resistance, -reckons with the fact that the hitherto victorious assailant, -exhausted and in confusion, will not be a match for a well -aimed blow delivered by a considerable number of troops. -However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such an employment -of his general reserve; for him the important thing -is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. -Although military history presents comparatively numerous -instances of such <i>retours offensifs</i>, this may be explained by -the fact that the counter-attack was launched too late. The -weakness of the assailant is but momentary, and the most -must be made of this by advancing against him promptly by -the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to re-form -and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to -make a counter-attack.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into <b>Servigny</b> -under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town -systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out again by -a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.<a id="FNanchor462" href="#Footnote462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote462" href="#FNanchor462" class="label">[462]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Noisseville</cite>, p. 52. <cite>Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht</cite>, p. 181.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle -of <b>Wörth</b> (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade) -pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery fire, and did -not have the expected success. The well-led French counter-attack made -by about 1200 men from the south edge of the <b>Niederwald</b>, was discontinued -at a timely moment.<a id="FNanchor463" href="#Footnote463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> The well-directed counter-attack made by -the 1st Turco Regiment at <b>Wörth</b>, after the capture of <b>Elsaszhausen</b>, -was successful and is especially instructive.<a id="FNanchor464" href="#Footnote464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> The attack made by General -de Sonis for the purpose of retaking <b>Loigny</b> was undertaken too late and -with inadequate forces.<a id="FNanchor465" href="#Footnote465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a> The same is true of the counter-attack made by -the 3rd Bavarian Division on <b>Zella</b> (4th July, 1866).</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote463" href="#FNanchor463" class="label">[463]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote464" href="#FNanchor464" class="label">[464]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, XVI, p. 187, et seq.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote465" href="#FNanchor465" class="label">[465]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, IV, p. 124.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page434">[434]</span></p> - -<p>The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, -which may be successful when employed against an opponent -not prepared to meet it. “Under certain circumstances, -counter-attacks may be combined with retreat maneuvers. -The advanced troops should bring the enemy to a standstill -with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they -should break off the action without becoming involved in a -fight at close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn -onto terrain reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, -hidden up to the last moment, attack him impetuously under -favorable conditions at a time when he is tired and worn out -by a long movement.”</p> - -<p>The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize -the right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to -foretell how long it will take the enemy to arrive within -assaulting distance, no rule can be laid down as to the proper -moment for launching the counter-attack. The best plan -would be to screen the movements of the reserve, and, as the -attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually up to the -point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires -wide practical experience and great force of character -to judge the situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully -aware that launching the counter-attack either too soon or -too late may prejudice the result. There is always danger -that the suggestions which reach him from various quarters -may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger the -general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, -the more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; -and he will not find it easy to resist the temptation to -grant these requests and accordingly weaken the general -reserve, which is intended for offensive action.</p> - -<p>We must now consider the question as to whether the -counter-attack should rely on fire action alone, or should -resort to the bayonet as well. The unexpected advance of a -large body of troops against a flank of the enemy will rarely<span class="pagenum" id="Page435">[435]</span> -fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does not yield to -fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. A -counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at -the start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success -when not supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take -place resulting in the defeat of the defender’s entire force.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of -the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries -which had gone into action near <b>Goury</b> (battle of <b>Loigny</b>). The Ist and -IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions, 12th Infantry, -and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and when the batteries -finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing back the French battalions -immediately opposing it. The twenty-one companies now made the -mistake of attacking <b>Ecuillon</b>, which they occupied. The attacking force -had traversed about 2000 m., and as there were no reserves and flank -echelons, the Bavarians were obliged to give way before an assault made -by seven fresh battalions against their unprotected left flank. The mistake -of pushing forward too far, and the lack of supports in rear of the -exposed flank, was bound to exact a penalty, as soon as the French were -in a position to advance on their own account.<a id="FNanchor466" href="#Footnote466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote466" href="#FNanchor466" class="label">[466]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, IV, p. 43.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near -<b>Tsinortun</b>. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division -advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of enveloping -the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The commanding -general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve (apparently -parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a counter-attack -against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian counter-attack was -taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which followed in rear of the -Japanese attacking force, and had to retire. The decision was then -brought about by the counter-attack made by the 140th Infantry, which -unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the Japanese. The engagement -at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest as regards the Japanese -method of attack.<a id="FNanchor467" href="#Footnote467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote467" href="#FNanchor467" class="label">[467]</a> -<span class="smcap">Löffler</span>, <cite>Allgemeine Lage</cite>, I, pp. 68 and 69. -<span class="smcap">v. Hoen</span>, <cite>Der russisch-japanische -Krieg</cite>, in <cite>Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereins</cite>, p. 166. <span class="smcap">Niessel</span>, -<cite>Enseignements tactiques</cite>, p. 158.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>So far we have only considered the counter-attack made -against the flank of an attacker, and against the front of -an enemy who has victoriously penetrated into a position. -The success of a counter-attack against the enemy’s flank -depends primarily on moral factors; besides, after protracted<span class="pagenum" id="Page436">[436]</span> -fighting, supports and reserves in rear of the flank are frequently -lacking, so that the attacker cannot quickly form an -adequate firing front towards a flank.<a id="FNanchor468" href="#Footnote468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote468" href="#FNanchor468" class="label">[468]</a> Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s flank: Battle -of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack made by 21 companies of -the 4th Brigade at Goury (<span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, <cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, IV, p. 55), and that made by -the Ist Battalion, 10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry, -at Goury (<i>ibid.</i>, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’ Brigade -(<i>ibid.</i>, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made by the garrison -of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General Sonis: the brilliant flank -attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th Infantry, during the battle of -Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Orleans</cite>, p. 148); and the counter-attack -made by General Bataille on the Stiring Wald during the battle of -Spicheren. The last-named counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception -and execution. (<cite>Wald- und Ortsgefecht</cite>, pp. 93 and 96).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, <i>i.e.</i>, one made -straight to the front from a position, while the assailant is -advancing to the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the -least chances of success, but military history proves the contrary -in those cases where the defender awaited the proper -moment. This moment arrives when the defender clearly -perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the attacker -begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This -becomes apparent through a slackening in the attack, through -an uncertainty of movement, and, finally, through hesitation, -the latter being usually preceded by wavering.<a id="FNanchor469" href="#Footnote469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote469" href="#FNanchor469" class="label">[469]</a> “The defender will only be able to make a frontal counter-attack from his -position when he has repulsed the assault and has made the most of fire action, -or when it is important to drive away the enemy who has been brought to a -standstill in front of the defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may -lead to the loss of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with -cold steel during the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly -be great. Meckel says<a id="FNanchor470" href="#Footnote470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a>: “Here likewise, it is of -the greatest importance to bring up the supports promptly, so -as to increase the volume of fire to the utmost and to produce -that superiority which quite naturally resolves itself into an -offensive movement. The defender who does not fix bayonets -is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of -retreat.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote470" href="#FNanchor470" class="label">[470]</a> <cite>Lehre von der Truppenführung</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page437">[437]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of -<b>Elsaszhausen</b> against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps appearing -at the northern edge of the <b>Niederwald</b>. The success they met with at the -start induced the French to continue their advance, and when a reverse -occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen was taken by the Hessians -without difficulty.<a id="FNanchor471" href="#Footnote471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote471" href="#FNanchor471" class="label">[471]</a> <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, -<cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, XIII, p. 121, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong -firing line of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s -fire, were frequently successful in war, this was due to the -moral effect produced on the attacker by the sudden and -unexpected onset of a long line of infantry. Troops thus -unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the support -of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads. -However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, -remains cool, meets the counter-attack of the defender with a -powerful fire at short ranges, and brings up his supports, in -order to follow up the effect of his fire with an offensive -movement, there can be no doubt as to the result.<a id="FNanchor472" href="#Footnote472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote472" href="#FNanchor472" class="label">[472]</a> The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples of this. -(<cite>Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen</cite>, II, pp. 75 and 234). In both cases the defender’s -frontal counter-attack forced the assailant to face about; but at Soor a second -line of infantry, and at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally -turned the scale in favor of the assailant.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the -defender still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which -he has kept in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing -line until the decisive moment. An organization acting as -part of a larger force, and whose flanks are secure, as a rule -has no choice but to make a frontal counter-attack, unless -offensive action is to be dispensed with altogether.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully -by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century. (In these -counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then advanced to the -assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made during the battles -of <b>Vimiero</b>, <b>Maida</b>, <b>Busaco</b>, and especially <b>Waterloo</b>.<a id="FNanchor473" href="#Footnote473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote473" href="#FNanchor473" class="label">[473]</a> At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and the British -Guards repulsed the French attack. <span class="smcap">von Ollech</span>, <cite>Feldzug von 1815</cite>, pp. 230 and -247. See also <a href="#Footnote144">note p. 151</a> supra.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At <b>Beaumont</b>, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the -French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to<span class="pagenum" id="Page438">[438]</span> -waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance caused -the French to retire.<a id="FNanchor474" href="#Footnote474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote474" href="#FNanchor474" class="label">[474]</a> <span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, -<cite>Beaumont</cite>, p. 53.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the battles of the <b>Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78</b>, frontal counter-attacks -were successfully made in several instances.</p> - -<p>In the engagement at <b>Kazeljevo</b> (5th September, 1877), the frontal -counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far inferior, -saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were obstructed by -their trains, which had gone astray.<a id="FNanchor475" href="#Footnote475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote475" href="#FNanchor475" class="label">[475]</a> <span class="smcap">Springer</span>, -<cite>Der russisch-türkische Krieg</cite>, III, p. 171.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of -<b>Gorni Bugarov</b> (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment, -which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments, occupied -a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans, on the road -leading from <b>Orchanie</b> to <b>Sofia</b>. The Russians allowed the Turks to -approach to very short range before they opened fire, which was immediately -followed by a counter-attack all along the line. This seems to -have been the result of the initiative of the several battalion commanders. -The Turks (15 battalions) faced about and retired on Sofia. The Russian -infantry was led back to its first position.<a id="FNanchor476" href="#Footnote476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote476" href="#FNanchor476" class="label">[476]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, VII, p. 134.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment of -the Russian Guard at <b>Tashkessen</b> was repulsed by the frontal counter-attack -made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.<a id="FNanchor477" href="#Footnote477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote477" href="#FNanchor477" class="label">[477]</a> <span class="smcap">Baker-Pasha</span>, -<cite>War in Bulgaria</cite>, II, p. 57.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks -were very frequently made. When undertaken with -inadequate numbers, they were invariably repulsed by the -fire of the Japanese, especially when the latter found cover -in previously constructed trenches.</p> - -<h5>Provisions of Various Regulations.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>Austria-Hungary.</b> If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander -should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general -reserve for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case, -the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the opponent -advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy and carry out -the counter-attack with determination by directing a powerful fire against -the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement on one flank is absolutely -essential to the execution of the counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks -are to be avoided; the enemy is to be annihilated by fire.</p> - -<p>When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general -reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing the -troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops making -an enveloping attack on the position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page439">[439]</span></p> - -<p><b>France.</b> The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack -(<i>contre attaque</i>) and offensive return (<i>retour offensif</i>). A counter-attack -is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates into the energetically -defended supporting points. In contrast herewith, every attempt -to retake a captured position is called an offensive return.</p> - -<p>A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon -as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful and -suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the first line, -will, at the very least, check the enemy until the fighting line has had time -to recover.</p> - -<p>Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but to -force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon him, then to -break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on, in order to draw -him, by this means, onto previously selected and reconnoitered terrain, -where he is suddenly attacked in flank by fresh troops. Military history -shows that this very procedure has frequently been successful. “If the -attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens to carry the -defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place -sheltered from view, attack him energetically, while the troops already -engaged increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic -counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels him -to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until he has -had time to recover.”</p> - -<p>“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must prevail -everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy must -be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the counter-attack -should move forward without hesitation and regardless of the cost -When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the commander -must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should be directed -toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant -counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the commander must order -the offensive to be assumed.”</p> - -<p><b>England.</b> The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison -of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the general -reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive counter-attack. -The moment when the attacker has used up his reserves and is -about to assault is generally considered as the most propitious for making -the counter-attack.</p> - -<p><b>Japan.</b> The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans. -“The better the position, the location and construction of the intrenchments, -and the distribution of troops, the greater the number of men that -can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the stronger the general -reserve available for an offensive movement. By this means the chances -of victory are increased. * * * Frequently there is danger that the -defender will be committed to purely passive defense, and that freedom -of action will be lost. Therefore, when the proper moment arrives, the -decisive counter-attack should be made.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page440">[440]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">XII. THE RETREAT.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Par. 426 German I. D. R.).</span></h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<p>A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; -only the presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting -line should induce a commander to come to the weighty -decision of reaching it by running. (Russia). On account -of the great range of modern weapons, defeated troops, on -open ground, cannot escape from fire by running.<a id="FNanchor478" href="#Footnote478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> No rules -can be laid down in regulations as to the conduct of a retreat -after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is no longer -possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops in -position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire -in a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,<a id="FNanchor479" href="#Footnote479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> and -cannot re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at -least abates. (Par. 428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which -is moved to the rear at a timely moment, and all available -cavalry should cover the retreat of the infantry, so as to prevent -the hostile cavalry from making the most of its opportunities -for effective action.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote478" href="#FNanchor478" class="label">[478]</a> Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be underestimated. See -<span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, XIII, p. 49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to -the panic created in a skirmish line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett -(Wörth). This skirmish line was running to the rear toward a rallying position -and the panic was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! -March! March!” The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of -a mounted field officer. Major v. Below.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote479" href="#FNanchor479" class="label">[479]</a> The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and roughly -handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to its left rear through -the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused the two regiments to change -places. (The attack made by the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche -Einzelschriften</cite>, 25, p. 35.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>To order a retreat at the right moment requires military -instinct; rules cannot be laid down in regard to it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page441">[441]</span></p> - -<p>“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are -either withdrawn by order or defeated, can no longer choose -their line of retreat. If the enemy pursues, they must retire -perpendicularly to their former front, without changing formation, -and need a force on which they can rally in order to -prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that a -systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force -still has some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, -for a force intended for decisive action to retain a -reserve for covering the retreat instead of employing it for -the purpose of gaining the victory.”</p> - -<p>To break off the action by systematically relieving the -troops engaged with the enemy,<a id="FNanchor480" href="#Footnote480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> is only possible if the force -still has reserves available, if cavalry and artillery are in a -position to take a hand in the fight, or if the troops that have -been withdrawn are sheltered from the enemy’s fire by -features of the ground—all of which depends in many cases -on chance.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote480" href="#FNanchor480" class="label">[480]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 344.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense -than in attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches -closer with every moment. This brings up the question, as -to whether it would not be better for the defender to hold -out until darkness sets in than expose his troops to the incalculable -results of a retreat under fire. When the assailant -has once entered the zone of short ranges, the defender will -no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the -defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should -be begun at the point where the enemy is not pressing his -attack, or where he has been unable to gain a superiority of -fire. When a withdrawal is made, the whole local front -should retire at once and simultaneously; it would be a mistake -to reduce gradually the strength of the units engaged, -for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to annihilate -completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot -maintain its position, a platoon certainly could not do so.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page442">[442]</span></p> - -<div class="container w30em"> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/illo442.png" alt="Retreat" /> -</div> - -</div><!--container--> - -<p>As soon as the commander decides to break off the -action, the reserve, if one is still available, should be sent to -the rear to take up a rallying position, which should be so -situated that it can make its influence felt as soon as the -main position is evacuated. As every defeated force, or -one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to the rear, -the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding it -to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a -flank of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position -can be advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, -but this will only be practicable in minor engagements. The -distance of the rallying position from the main defensive position -should be such as to compel the enemy to advance again -under fire, and prevent his carrying both the main defensive -position and the rallying position at one rush. On the other -hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear -that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they -enter its effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying -position are also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good -plan for them to engage the enemy from the start at too -short a range. “It is most desirable when artillery and -machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this purpose, -while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The -mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 -German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page443">[443]</span></p> - -<p>The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that -all dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without -precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges -is requisite to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive -ranges. The firing line should, therefore, be strong and the -supports weak. If a reserve is still available, it is at once -sent back into a second rallying position, to cover the withdrawal -of the troops occupying the first rallying position. A -free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is not necessary. -If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line should -be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can -still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the -extreme limit of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, -will be sheltered as soon as possible. Fire should be opened -as soon as possible, in order to retard the enemy’s advance.</p> - -<p>The troops holding a rallying position should delay the -enemy’s advance long enough to give the retiring force ample -time and room to re-form, so that it can effect its retreat in -good order. When this has been accomplished, the troops -occupying the rallying position retire, unless there is hope -that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state of -affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary, -but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly -favorable position. When a retreat has once been decided -upon, it is generally necessary to get away from the enemy -as quickly as possible.</p> - -<p>“The commander must conduct the combat attending a -retreat according to a well-ordered plan. He must indicate -where the rallying position is to be, what troops are to -occupy it, and assign march directions to the different columns. -Only after he has given these orders and has assured -himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, -in order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new -orders.<a id="FNanchor481" href="#Footnote481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a> -The rest is the business of subordinate leaders.”<span class="pagenum" id="Page444">[444]</span> -(Par. 432 German I. D. R.). The latter remain with their -organizations for the purpose of maintaining order and -cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants and -officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear -ahead of the troops.<a id="FNanchor482" href="#Footnote482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote481" href="#FNanchor481" class="label">[481]</a> This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of other armies, -was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all blame for leaving his -troops and the battlefield. <span class="smcap">v. Schlichting</span>, I, p. 115. See <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 350.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote482" href="#FNanchor482" class="label">[482]</a> For the conduct of a retreat, see <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 373, et seq.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page445">[445]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4>THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING -ATTACK.</h4> - -<p>Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the -defender, and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by -force of arms, it is obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” -or “held” only when he permits this to be done. It is -difficult to conduct a delaying action or a holding attack, -because our training, which is based on offensive action, -causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage. -In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding -attacks, the offensive intention predominates. The latter -may consist of merely threatening the enemy with an attack, -or of seriously engaging him. (Par. 392 German I. D. R.). -Both the delaying action and the holding attack aim at -deceiving the enemy.<a id="FNanchor483" href="#Footnote483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> Accordingly, the characteristic features -of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of -ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few -rifles, in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of -our force. In both combats, troops require considerable distribution -in depth. The object of a delaying action is to -gain time until the troops in rear can deploy, neighboring -columns can come up, or a turning movement can become -effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a -delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so -that they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is<span class="pagenum" id="Page446">[446]</span> -still more necessary in a holding attack,<a id="FNanchor484" href="#Footnote484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a> in order that the -troops may be able to repulse a counter-attack made by the -enemy, or, by attacking him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. -A force fighting a delaying action should keep its -supports far to the rear, while a force charged with holding -the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly -employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an -influence on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German -I. D. R.). Since a delaying action is to be fought at long -ranges, a field of fire is only required at those ranges; defiladed -spaces in the foreground may frequently be a positive -advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so long as it is -necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding -attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; -the violent fire breaking forth from time to time must teach -the defender that a force is lying in waiting opposite him, -ready to rush forward at a moment’s notice.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote483" href="#FNanchor483" class="label">[483]</a> This is still -more pronounced In demonstrations. (<cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 11). -“Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions, but they may consist of -offensive action. The regulations do not lay down specific rules either for -them or for other more rare methods of combat; accordingly, their conduct will -vary with the situation.” (Par. 420, German I. D. R.).</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote484" href="#FNanchor484" class="label">[484]</a> <cite>Taktik</cite>, V, p. 161.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>The object of threatening with an attack may frequently -be accomplished by engaging the enemy with several detachments -which are separated by intervals. (Par. 288 German -I. D. R.). The negative object of preventing the enemy -from withdrawing may be accomplished with a weak force; -the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up his -reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive -point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A -determined commander will not allow himself to be held by -demonstrations. The manner in which the Vth Army Corps -forced the French to bring up their reserves into the first -line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation.</p> - -<p>The size of the group charged with holding the enemy -depends upon the extent of front to be covered and the -probable duration of the combat. The conduct of such a -force will vary considerably, depending upon the distance -to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When<span class="pagenum" id="Page447">[447]</span> -the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the -enemy energetically.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>England.</b> The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the direction -in which the main attack will be made, and, when the crisis of the -action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from those parts of his -front which are only threatened and opposing the decisive attack with -nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops making the holding attack -should act vigorously, as soon as the attack develops, and be in readiness -to transform their demonstration instantly into a real attack.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page448">[448]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO -VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<h4 title="THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.">THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF -1903.<a id="FNanchor485" href="#Footnote485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote485" href="#FNanchor485" class="label">[485]</a> The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry Drill Regulations -are skillfully compared by Major-General <span class="smcap">Regenspursky v. Regeny</span>, -Austrian Army, in an article entitled <cite>Die taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements -für die k. k. Fusztruppen vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem -deutschen Reglement 1906</cite>. (<cite>Militär-Wochenblatt</cite>, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>ATTACK.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense -are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been -revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his main -body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body farther -to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive. The <b>attack -on a position prepared for defense</b>, even after the attacker’s artillery has -succeeded in paving the way for its infantry, consists of a laborious advance -from one firing position to another. The question as to whether an attack -is feasible without the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect -that it will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has -sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations divide -the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance to the decisive -firing position (the main firing position), and the decisive action.</p> - -<p>The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views -considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here merely -be made to point out several differences. The combat formation necessary -for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during the preparatory stage, -so that, when the forward movement commences, the troops need only -move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a division, by appropriately -combining “tactical units”, echelons are formed, whose strength depends -upon the purpose of the combat, the information of the enemy, and the -relation of the division to other bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). -Rules for the employment of thin or dense firing lines are not given. -“The attacker should advance impetuously to the point where he can employ -his rifles effectively,” (Par. 582).</p> - -<p>“In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective range -of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par. 323). -When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open fire independently, -if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it finds a good opportunity<span class="pagenum" id="Page449">[449]</span> -for firing which the company commander has overlooked. (Par. 338). -Unless the battalion commander has reserved to himself the right of -designating the moment for opening fire, the company commanders direct -when fire shall be opened, and conduct the fire fight at mid and short -ranges. At long ranges, the battalion commander designates the companies -that are to fire.</p> - -<p><b>Kinds of fire.</b> Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a rule, -volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but may also be -used in skirmish line to test the range. According to par. 331, the rate -of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and 686, fire surprises are -authorized.</p> - -<p>When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to <b>advance by rushes</b>. -These are to be made by alternate units moving forward, supported by the -fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in exceptional cases to -be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The length of the rushes -depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical situation, as -well as upon the physical condition of the men. They serve as an expedient -for reaching the next firing position.” (Par. 313).</p> - -<p>Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by -<b>crawling</b>. This is considered especially useful in rectifying alignments. -(Par. 196).</p> - -<p>For <b>envelopment</b>, see <a href="#Page362">p. 362</a> supra.</p> - -<p>For the <b>use of the spade in attack</b>, see <a href="#Page393">p. 393</a> supra.</p> - -<p><b>Assault.</b> “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who -occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s -superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances, furnish -assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of penetrating the -hostile position will now succeed; a premature assault may still result in -disaster.</p> - -<p>“As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear indications -that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for the attacker -but to continue the fight for the superiority of fire. In doing this, the -commander should not hesitate to put in his last man if necessary. The -assault—in case the enemy still offers resistance—should not be made -until the attack has been pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, -and the power of resistance of the enemy is palpably broken.</p> - -<p>“It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act -of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation strained -to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no longer any -chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment, honor and -salvation lie wholly in moving to the front.</p> - -<p>“When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be -carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical stage of -the action, may nullify the previous success, and must therefore be quickly<span class="pagenum" id="Page450">[450]</span> -overcome by the reserves, if any are still available, taking a hand in the -fight.” (Pars. 590-592).</p> - -<p>The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from -the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the -units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops are to -conform to the movement of that line. The following provision, which -applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German regulations, -viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s force should, -whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it upon any hostile -reserves that may appear.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The regulations governing the <b>defense seeking a decision</b> differ -but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work of -preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the direction -in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known. The assailant -is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining information of the -position and the measures taken for strengthening it. This is to be -accomplished by pushing small detachments to the front to hamper the -enemy’s advance.</p> - -<p>In the past, <b>advanced positions</b> were decidedly opposed by the Austrians, -but at present their use is recommended in cases where time is -to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where fire from such -positions would inflict considerable losses on the enemy. However, the -regulations seek to obviate the danger of the principal fight taking place in -the advanced position instead of in the main position, by adding: “But such -a measure should not cause the commander to swerve from the firm -determination to carry out his original intention.”</p> - -<p>The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it -possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while the -remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the actual -decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist every -temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than for carrying -out the <b>counter-attack</b>, which should be ordered when the assailant is -under the most effective fire of the position. The general reserve should -then be quickly deployed and should make its attack with determination, -by directing a violent fire against the flank of the enemy. Local frontal -counter-attacks are to be avoided. The garrison is only charged with -the task of annihilating the enemy with its fire, which should be increased -to the utmost intensity.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page451">[451]</span></p> - -<h5 title="THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND -1906.">THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.<a id="FNanchor486" href="#Footnote486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote486" href="#FNanchor486" class="label">[486]</a> Major-General <span class="smcap">Mikulicz -Radecki</span>, Austrian Army, <cite>Das neue Exerzierreglement -der italienischen Infanterie</cite>, Vienna, 1906. <span class="smcap">v. Grävenitz</span>, <cite>Die neueren -taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische Heer</cite>, in <cite>Vierteljahrsheft</cite>, 1905, I, -p. 90, et seq. <cite>Der Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene</cite>, in <cite>Streffleur</cite>, -1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special pamphlet -form).</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">P. Rath</span>, <cite>Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur</cite>, in <cite>Militärische Welt</cite>, 1907, -January-February number.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h6>ATTACK.</h6> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in -Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many defiles, -causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.<a id="FNanchor487" href="#Footnote487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a> The regulations -emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of infantry and artillery.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote487" href="#FNanchor487" class="label">[487]</a> Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against the hostile -forces which it encounters in its march, whether its action be to determine, -as quickly as possible, the strength of the opponent and to save its main -body from an unnecessary delay, or whether it be to deceive the opponent as -to the location of its own forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a -surprise. (Par. 37).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up -in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken up -until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the leading -element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed formation. To -neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible as the action progresses, -the firing line is formed into groups separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, -although this increases the casualties. These intervals may be increased, -when required, to 10 paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing -line are usually at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to -advance until increased casualties force it to open fire.</p> - -<p><b>Kinds of fire.</b> Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used when -the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The battalion -commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as soon as it is -certain that a good effect can be produced. When two targets appear, the -fire is to be directed upon the one promising the best results (<i>i.e.</i>, not -necessarily the one that is tactically most important). “In order that the -intensity of the fire may correspond to the requirements of the tactical -situation existing at the moment, officers, by reason of their tactical training, -should be able to state approximately how many rounds are necessary -to produce the desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character -of the target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as -the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From these<span class="pagenum" id="Page452">[452]</span> -estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in order to -bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.”</p> - -<p>The <b>advance by rushes</b> may be made either at a walk or at a run, -but the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted. -The following points are considered especially important: The time for -making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by a whole -unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon various circumstances, -which the leader, alter due consideration of the terrain and -the hostile fire, as well as of the physical condition and morale of his -men, is to judge in each particular case. In doing this, he is to bear in -mind that the rush must be made as unobserved by the enemy as possible, -so that the latter cannot direct his lire upon the advancing unit.</p> - -<p>The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line which -are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority of fire over -the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units which could -only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and useless losses, -are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed ahead, support these -with their fire, and then advance in turn under cover of the fire of the -others.</p> - -<p>As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are to -be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The length -of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run, depends -upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire is to be -opened at once.</p> - -<p>When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the organizations -have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by entire units but -only by squads or like fractions. These leave the firing line and endeavor to -reach the next cover at a rapid run. or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves -down in order to open fire again at the shorter range thus gained. -As a rule, the leading echelons open fire at once from their new positions, -so as to facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances -make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have reached -a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.</p> - -<p>At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile -fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups consisting -of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining flanks of neighboring -units cease firing, so as not to injure the men of the advancing -unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead, while squad leaders -see that all of the men move forward.</p> - -<p>Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the -firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are to -carry that line forward, to come up in that formation.</p> - -<p>The <b>assault</b> is to be made either in close or extended order to the -tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page453">[453]</span></p> - -<p>The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained -by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the participation -of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat. When engaged with -an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position, only a part of the -leading line is to be launched against certain sections (<i>tratti</i>) of the -defensive position, while other parts, by means of rapid fire, prevent the -enemy from supporting the threatened sections. In conjunction with this -frequently emphasized scheme of penetrating several specially important -sections of the hostile position, the regulations express the view—by no -means generally considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously -chosen points will force the enemy to retreat.</p> - -<p>The assault is, as a rule, to be made by order of the commander of the -whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault is -suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (<i>attenti</i>), and at the -command “to the assault” (<i>per l’assalto</i>), the men throw themselves with -loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets and the beating -of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already gotten so close to the -enemy that further waiting would be useless, it advances to the assault, -after getting permission therefor, or, otherwise, on its own responsibility. -All the rest of the troops are to join in this movement.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy -will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as -possible. The decision is to be brought about by a <b>counter-attack</b>. Long -range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open terrain -devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened until the enemy -arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened, all the supports are -to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is undertaken by the first line -only in exceptional cases.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904.</h4> - -<h5>ATTACK.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference -for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might -produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination towards -shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term “shock troops” -has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The forward movement -alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is the element that -executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army as a probable -opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance with mixed detachments. -The regulations do not touch upon the tactics of the rencontre, -and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the advance guard than the<span class="pagenum" id="Page454">[454]</span> -German regulations.<a id="FNanchor488" href="#Footnote488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> The advance guard is to occupy supporting points, -under cover of which the main body can deploy, and to complete the -reconnaissance by its fight. The necessity of infantry detachments completing -the reconnaissance made by the cavalry is particularly emphasized.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote488" href="#FNanchor488" class="label">[488]</a> See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in -the manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The -danger of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German -regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The French -regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat elements, -and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain devoid of cover -is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French attack does not -lie in the firing line—the fight for the superiority of fire is not mentioned—but -in maneuvering troops cautiously led after the firing line. The defender -is to be engaged all along the line and, when the weak points of his -position are recognized, the commander-in-chief is to give the order for -the assault.</p> - -<p>This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the -French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A brigade -is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st regiment in -the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third battalion (<i>troupe -d’entrainement</i>); the 2nd regiment follows at a like distance as a reserve.</p> - -<p>The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the infantry -preparation (<i>préparation</i>), the decisive action (<i>l’action décisive</i>), and the -completion (<i>l’achèvement</i>).</p> - -<p><b>The artillery in the preparatory action.</b> The artillery is to endeavor -to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible, without, however, expending -more ammunition than is absolutely necessary.... The -commander is not to give the order for the attack until the preparation -is considered sufficient.</p> - -<p>The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful -manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered -and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached to -every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner in -which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely separated -parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong hostile firing line, -and may be defeated in detail.</p> - -<p>The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations issued -in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix, formerly -commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice President of the -Supreme War Council.</p> - -<p><b>Assembly.</b> The division is assembled in division square (<i>carré de -division</i>), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the regiments in -line of double columns or in line of company columns, abreast or in -echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which successive lines are -pushed forward without any attempt to envelop (in other words a pure<span class="pagenum" id="Page455">[455]</span> -frontal attack), the division is concentrated with the brigades abreast, -their regiments in echelon. If a flank attack is to be made, in which -the leading brigade must be protected by an echelon and a reserve ready for -any eventuality, the division is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, -their regiments abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a -road in rear of the <i>carré</i>. The pioneer company is divided into four -parts, corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled -troops, for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during -the forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled -force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and cavalry.</p> - -<p><b>Preparations for the advance in mass formation.</b> During the concentration, -mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of the terrain -which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed division, and -later these officers act as guides.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h6 class="french">Preparatory attack formation.</h6> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p><b>A. Pure frontal attack.</b> The leading regiment in each brigade is to -have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to be -echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions are to be -protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of cavalry. The -second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in rear of the inner -flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional cavalry is to be held in -rear of the division, in readiness to advance to the right or the left.</p> - -<p><b>B. Flank attack.</b> The two regiments of the leading brigade are to -furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third regiment -is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the fourth regiment is to -form the general reserve. The cavalry is to reconnoiter on the outer -flank. In this case, as well as in a pure frontal attack, the artillery is to -take up a position from which it can support the attack. Drummers, -trumpeters, and bands, are to march with the general reserve. The regulations -state that it is absolutely essential for infantry units to be sheltered -from hostile observation during their forward movement, and that they -must remain under control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops -are not to deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According -to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at -5000 m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move -by a flank, but only straight to the front.</p> - -<p>The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause -lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when necessary, -from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast rules -or normal formations are prescribed for this advance.</p> - -<p>The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot. -When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as the only -means of making a further advance possible.</p> - -<p><b>Kinds of fire.</b> Fire at will (<i>feu à volonté</i>), principally used at short -ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire with -counted cartridges (<i>feu à cartouches comptées</i>), the number being given<span class="pagenum" id="Page456">[456]</span> -(this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (<i>feu à répétition</i>); and -the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley fire has been again -prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (<i>rafales</i>) are typical of French fire tactics. -(See <a href="#Page164">p. 164</a> supra).</p> - -<p>After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but -the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made.</p> - -<p>The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry -combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They emphasize -that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by means -of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At the -point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile troops -as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight, while the troops in -the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance impetuously.</p> - -<p>A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features all -along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated by the regulations, -are very apt to fail prematurely. This is particularly likely to -happen because some of the troops will fall behind, while others are able -to push ahead more rapidly. These attacks are to destroy the power of -resistance of the enemy and to exhaust him physically. The leading units -are to cover with their fire the advance of those who are less favored by -the terrain.<a id="FNanchor489" href="#Footnote489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a> During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill -at a range of 600 to 800 m.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote489" href="#FNanchor489" class="label">[489]</a> According to -<span class="smcap">Dencausse</span>, in <cite>Journal des Sciences Militaires</cite>, 1906, and -November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor to approach -within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing a shot.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The supports (<i>renforts</i>) follow in a similar manner, ready to move -up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or independently -in case the situation requires it. Their entry into action is in a general -way determined by the commander of the whole force. They are to -augment the fire power of the firing line or to carry it forward. The -efforts of all are to be directed toward constantly keeping up the advance.</p> - -<p>At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports, will -be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points, and to effect a -lodgment on the ground captured. At other points the attacking group will -be too weak to push the attack home. In such a case, the troops are to -effect a lodgment on the terrain (<i>s’accrochent sur le sol</i>) in rear of the -nearest cover, as close as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain -themselves there until artillery or neighboring troops can support -them. The fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that -an attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these usually -protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a decisive attack at -some points. The infantry should endeavor to compensate for its numerical -inferiority by skillfully utilizing the ground and intrenchments, by -great activity, and, above all else, by invincible pertinacity. The supporting -point will thus become the center of the fight of a separate combat -group.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page457">[457]</span></p> - -<p>The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize -fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the artillery -and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat, the commander -must decide where the retained troops should be launched for -the assault. The selection of a point of attack is essentially the personal -task of the commander and is an index of character and of eye for the -value of ground, neither of which can be regulated by fixed rules. The -regulations do not believe that close order formations can be dispensed -with in launching the assaulting troops. Troops in close order, utilizing -the ground to the best advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from -hostile fire, are to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon -formation in order to give to that line, as <i>troupes d’assaut</i>, the impetus -for the assault.</p> - -<p>According to Thomas de Colligny,<a id="FNanchor490" href="#Footnote490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> formerly general staff officer of -the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an assault -should form in four lines, each consisting of one company; the distance -between lines being 150 m., and the front covered likewise 150 m. Each -of the three leading lines should be formed in line of platoons in columns -of route at deploying intervals sufficient to allow single rank line to be -formed, and the fourth line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals -between platoons. When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding -one is to carry it forward. If the French believe such close order -formations to be indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more -extensive use of cover.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote490" href="#FNanchor490" class="label">[490]</a> <cite>Conseils à mon bataillon</cite>, p. 107.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General -Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One regiment, -on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (<i>avant ligne</i>), in rear -of that, the assaulting troops (<i>troupes d’assaut</i>). First line: one regiment, -its twelve company columns abreast; second line: one regiment, -its three battalions in double column at extended intervals, 300 m. in -rear of the first line; third line: the fourth regiment, its battalions in route -column abreast of each other, 300 m. in rear of the second line. While, -during our peace maneuvers, we continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line -in the expectation that his supports and reserve will in the end enter our -zone of fire, it might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, -to direct our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible.</p> - -<p><b>Envelopment.</b> This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations (for -example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service Regulations, -in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in length depending -upon the intentions of the commander, state that the attacker “may -assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior forces for the purpose -of annihilating him.”</p> - -<p>For the <b>use of the spade in attack</b>, see <a href="#Page392">p. 392</a> supra.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page458">[458]</span></p> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced -positions, and advanced posts<a id="FNanchor491" href="#Footnote491" class="fnanchor">[491]</a> (intended to prevent hostile reconnaissance), -and numerous counter-attacks.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote491" href="#FNanchor491" class="label">[491]</a> -These frequently consist of detachments of all arms (<i>détachements de -couverture ou de contact</i>). General -<span class="smcap">Bonnal</span>. (<cite>Deutsche Revue</cite>, December number, -1907) says: “The French regulation—in contrast to the German—provide -in defense for detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the -purpose of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him -on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have their advantages -and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the opinion that in sending -out advanced detachments one must exercise great care in order that these -may not be defeated in detail, for this is invariably detrimental to the whole -force.”</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its supports, -and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended for offensive -action. In addition to calling attention to the necessity of overwhelming -with fire the hostile troops advancing over open ground, the regulations -recommend that the fire be withheld occasionally and that the enemy be -allowed to run into the greatly accelerated fire which is unexpectedly -directed upon him. The fire is to be discontinued as soon as the enemy -takes to cover, and is to be increased to the utmost intensity when he moves -in dense formation over open ground. The supports are to be used to -augment the fire power of the firing line.</p> - -<p><b>Counter-attack.</b> General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is -met by the offensive return (<i>retour offensif</i>), the flank attack by the -counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander should ride -ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what counter-measures he -should take. The artillery can render the most effective assistance by registering -its fire upon the points at which the enemy will probably advance, -and by preventing him from leaving his position. If the attack is successful, -the local reserve advances beyond the firing line, which has entered -the hostile position, and fires upon the retreating enemy. The general -reserve now becomes the local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms -and becomes the general reserve.”</p> - -<p>The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack (<i>contre -attaque</i>) and offensive return (<i>retour offensif</i>). A <b>counter-attack</b> is made -by the reserve before the enemy penetrates into the energetically defended -supporting points. In contrast herewith, every attempt to retake a -captured position is called an <b>offensive return</b>. (For details see <a href="#Page439">p. -439</a> supra).</p> - -<p>Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but to -force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon him. then to -break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on, in order to draw -him, by this means, onto previously selected and reconnoitered terrain,<span class="pagenum" id="Page459">[459]</span> -where he is suddenly attacked in flank by fresh troops. Military history -shows that this very procedure has frequently been successful.</p> - -<p>“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must prevail -everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy must be -quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the counter-attack -should move forward without hesitation and regardless of the cost. When -such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the commander must -decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward -one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, -until the moment arrives when the commander must order the -offensive to be assumed.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4 title="THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.">THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF -1905.<a id="FNanchor492" href="#Footnote492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a></h4> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote492" href="#FNanchor492" class="label">[492]</a> <cite>Infantry Training.</cite> -<cite>Combined Training</cite>.—<cite>Vierteljahrshefte</cite>, 1906, III, <cite>The -Development of the Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War</cite>.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h5>ATTACK.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive -battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment made -in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his main position, -and paves the way for a further advance; every advance must be thoroughly -prepared and systematically carried out.”</p> - -<p>In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions is -used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the protection -of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a “preparatory formation”, -the battalions in one or more lines of “quarter columns” (column -of companies). As soon as the commander has decided which flank of the -enemy he will envelop, against which portion of the enemy’s line he will -launch his decisive attack, he assembles his subordinate commanders to -receive the orders. According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible -to issue orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as -a general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented by -verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention to the -peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile counter-attack is -possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade commander designates the -position to be taken up by the machine guns, and gives directions to them -in regard to supporting the advance by long range fire. A base battalion -is to be designated. When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack -is assigned to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion -is led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given a compass -direction. Every leader is to provide independently for reconnaissance and -for communication by signal flags and also by telephone; a mounted signal -corps man accompanies the brigade commander.</p> - -<p>Every unit is formed in three lines for attack.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page460">[460]</span></p> - -<p>The <b>first line</b>, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports, is -made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than one-fourth -of the whole force.</p> - -<p>The <b>second line</b>, the reserves of the firing line, is under the orders -of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce the firing -line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The second line is -to fill up the firing line to the maximum density, <i>i.e.</i>, to one man per -yard of front (0.9 m.).</p> - -<p>The <b>third line</b>, the general reserve, is to assure the success of the -attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than one-fourth -of the whole force.<a id="FNanchor493" href="#Footnote493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> “The general reserve is directly under the -orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables him to meet -the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward off counter-attacks. -If the attack succeeds, the general reserve pushes forward rapidly -to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails, it serves as a rallying force, -but before the commander decides to leave behind even a part of it, he -should consider whether, by launching all the troops at his disposal, he -could break down the resistance of the defender. The commander can -only exercise an influence on the course of the action by means of a -reserve. If he keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it -in his power to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, -to restore the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, -to meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the -additional strength required to drive the attack home.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote493" href="#FNanchor493" class="label">[493]</a> According to the old regulations, a part of the general reserve had to -remain in rear in rallying positions. (See <a href="#Page397">p. 397</a> supra).</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under -the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault, it is -advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying position. Even -a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least half a company at -his disposal. The British were not without reason censured because their -flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa on account of the lack of -energy of the frontal groups, and their new regulations accordingly contain -detailed rules for the conduct of the “holding attack”. The troops -holding the enemy in front are to threaten him for the time being. This is -to be accomplished by wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by -occasional bursts of lire (<i>rafales</i>), by employing machine guns, by retaining -supports far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing -to decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main -attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order to -deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be launched and -that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See <a href="#Page447">p. 447</a> supra).</p> - -<p>Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no longer -given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more front than when -acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive attack, a battalion in the -first line may put 125 rifles on every 100 yards (90 m.) of front; these -are distributed between firing line, supports, and battalion reserve; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page461">[461]</span> -latter may consist of one or more companies. Entire companies are only -deployed in exceptional cases, for example on open ground, where it is -difficult to bring up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon -the losses to be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, -in all probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line -plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a front -not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A brigade -of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m., depending upon -the number of battalions engaged.</p> - -<p>When the force arrives within 4 or 5 km. of the enemy, the battalions -are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first line -is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn protected by -scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther, they lie down and -await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter advances under cover -of the supporting fire of infantry, machine guns, and artillery. Fire of -position is considered necessary. Fire at will is from now on used. This -is to vary in intensity according to the character of the target, and the -range. It is to increase to special violence when the attacking infantry -advances over level ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be -discontinued when the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line -is to advance as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive -losses. Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, -but small losses are to be borne.</p> - -<p>After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with more -rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by controlled -fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according to the regulations, -at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of effective fire, all the troops -are to deploy. In consequence of this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work -forward independently, are scattered all over the terrain over which the -attack is being made. At the initial deployment, the interval between -skirmishers is to be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where -the decision is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or -three yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub>-3<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> paces). Another paragraph -of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one rifle -per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those entertained -by them immediately after the South African war, have undergone a -noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of a firing line; dense -firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are at present deemed essential -to a decisive fight, while the fire of widely extended lines is considered -ineffective. The intervals may vary considerably, but the regulations state -that it should be borne in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight -are increased and the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; -moreover, that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated, -an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity -of moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the men be -trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a difficult situation,<span class="pagenum" id="Page462">[462]</span> -and to do everything in their power to carry out the original intentions -of the commander.</p> - -<p><b>Rushes</b> over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92 -m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an example -given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards (22 m.) -long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is to be -continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no opportunity -to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are to be made -from one covering feature to another.</p> - -<p>“On open ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, -rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making -short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy -unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The -rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The shorter -the range, the smaller the advancing unit will have to be, and the -shorter the length of the rushes.”</p> - -<p>The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as -possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to -advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads are -unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly.</p> - -<p>The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the strength -of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of platoons at -full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer comparatively small -losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200 m.). The troops -are to deploy before reaching effective ranges (1200-600 m.), as they -will otherwise suffer serious losses. At decisive ranges the firing line -is to be filled up to its maximum density.</p> - -<p>The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the -<b>assault</b>; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops is -considered particularly important. The order for the assault is to be -given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of conducting -it is left to company commanders.</p> - -<p>When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are -to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting distance, -where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single field guns -are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a brief but -violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports, -and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons for -the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The object of -<b>advanced positions</b> is to mislead, deceive, and check the enemy. They -are to be evacuated before the troops in them become seriously engaged. -It is not considered necessary for the <b>main position</b> to consist of a continuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page463">[463]</span> -line of trenches; every platoon and even every squad may have -its own trench. The principal requirements are good field of fire and -mutual support by oblique or enfilade fire.</p> - -<p>The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the -field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state that, -under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad front, but -that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong garrison is -required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as dummy intrenchments, -are not to be constructed so as to stand out against the horizon. -The importance of masking firing trenches, and of constructing overhead -cover is emphasized; special cover trenches for the supports may be -constructed in rear of the crest.</p> - -<p>Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also -considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short -range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the -assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his attack -with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing tires the -eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a <b>counter-attack</b> -made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks by section -reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the British to make the -section reserves very strong has been frequently observed. The final -stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s day, of a counter-attack -all along the line. As soon as the opponent has arrived within assaulting -distance, the troops holding the position are to fix bayonets and, after -delivering magazine fire, are to make a short frontal counter-attack.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.</h4> - -<h5>ATTACK.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but -take their peculiar theater of war into consideration.</p> - -<p><b>Kinds of fire.</b> Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used.</p> - -<p><b>Rushes</b> are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the regulations -admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making rushes -that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m., their value -will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise to avoid sending -forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that the advance may not -be too much retarded and the difficulties of leading increased.</p> - -<p>The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be possible -“to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this account, -the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the assault with cold -steel. They further state that, when the enemy can be kept down by -artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will be easy; that, as it is<span class="pagenum" id="Page464">[464]</span> -difficult to obtain a timely effect from artillery fire directed upon an -enemy who takes advantage of cover or who occupies a fortified position, -the infantry cannot wait for the successful termination of the artillery -combat, but, on the contrary, should advance while that combat is in -progress, for only by so doing can it count upon the effective coöperation -of its artillery. But, nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, -even if it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the -artillery.</p> - -<p>The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position -prepared for defense.</p> - -<p><b>Rencontre.</b> The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the advance -guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time, deliberate attack; -that the commander should promptly decide what to do, even if the -situation is not entirely clear; and that, when practicable, the main body -should be launched as an entity. A fight against a superior enemy is -only to be avoided, for the time being, in case the latter has gained a -start in deployment.</p> - -<p><b>Attack on a position prepared for defense.</b> The commander -frames his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance, -and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory position, -where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable, combat sections -to the different units. In order that they may utilize the covering -features of the ground to the best advantage, the different units are to -avoid advancing abreast. On account of the difficulties attending an -advance over ground swept by hostile fire, it is considered desirable for -the troops to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness. In -order that, in such a case, serious lateral displacements of the troops -may be avoided, the fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to -endeavor to drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main -position. The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to -be made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense, -there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by intrenching -successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances permit, an -attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to the enemy’s -position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is to be designated -during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and detailed preparations -are to be made for the advance. As soon as the troops arrive -during the night in the selected position, they are to construct cover -quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard that intrenching -tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is to be had to the sand -bags that are carried along. The men engaged in digging trenches are -at all times to be ready for action.</p> - -<p>The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an -assaulting position should make the <b>assault</b> immediately at dawn or -should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and that, -if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend on the suddenness<span class="pagenum" id="Page465">[465]</span> -and rapidity with which it is carried out. The reconnaissance of -the position and the work of removing obstacles is to be completed, if -possible, during the night, so that avenues of approach will be open for -the assaulting troops.</p> - -<p>If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and -if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the -night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at -night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it will -depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly, directly -from the last firing position, or whether it is carried out upon the completion -of works of approach. When necessary the assaulting bodies are -to carry along hand grenades and demolition tools, the latter being -selected in conformity with the results of the reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>The regulations state that to have captured a position does not -suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the -victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile position -are to continue the advance until they again find a field of fire, whereupon -they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The troops which do -not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly, secure the captured -position, take requisite measures for security, and make preparations to -meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are not to be assembled in large -bodies at points exposed to hostile artillery fire. As soon as the enemy -has gotten out of range, all the troops are promptly to resume the -forward movement, and are to pursue him vigorously so far as due -regard for cohesion and order permits.</p> - -<p><b>Intrenching tools</b> are to be used in attacks on fortified positions, -and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide for -economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and a general -reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect the flanks. Dummy -intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make it difficult for the -enemy to gain information of the defensive position. The Japanese -views in regard to <b>advanced positions</b> are not so pronounced as the -German, for, while their regulations mention the combat of the outposts -pushed forward from the position, the danger of advanced positions is not -especially emphasized.</p> - -<p>The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has -fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position with -the bayonet.</p> - -<p>Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position -from that of the artillery. If information is received that the attacker -has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting position, small -detachments are to advance and prevent him from strengthening his -position.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page466">[466]</span></p> - -<h4>THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.</h4> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training -and combat.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908.</h4> - -<h5>ATTACK.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German -regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the combat -and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander in deciding -whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The regulations state that -decisive results are only offered by the attack; that considerations of a -presumable hostile superiority and other apparently unfavorable conditions -should not diminish the energy of the attack; and that the decision to -launch the troops should never be made dependent upon the receipt of -reports in regard to the enemy.</p> - -<p>The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation or -the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The regulations -state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon superiority of fire -and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous advance and an -unswerving determination to win are of just as much importance. The -conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon whether it is made -in a rencontre or on a position prepared for defense.</p> - -<p>The views entertained in regard to the <b>rencontre</b> coincide with the -German views. The regulations say that the result of the reconnaissance -should not be awaited, because success depends largely upon prompt -action. The commander may launch parts of his main body in succession, -as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating in close country, when -it is necessary to gain ground quickly on debouching from a defile, or -when the enemy makes an impetuous advance. The commander is to -direct all his efforts toward throwing the enemy upon the defensive, and -then to launch the main body as an entity.</p> - -<p>The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only discuss -the <b>attack on a fortified position</b>; various modifications of the attack, -depending upon the preparations made by the enemy, are authorized. -Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by darkness, and an -extensive use is to be made of <b>intrenching tools</b>. The regulations state -that an assault by day only has a chance of succeeding when the defender -is completely subdued, and when only insignificant obstacles and defenses -are encountered. When this is not the case, the day is to be used for -making preparations for the attack, and the night for executing it.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page467">[467]</span></p> - -<h5>DEFENSE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the -deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating an -assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of gaining -time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the direction in -which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt, or when the commander -intends to assail the enemy while the latter is in the act of -deploying. In the <b>defense seeking a decision</b>, advanced positions are -not to be used, because it is believed that the employment of detachments -of troops in front of the defensive position will weaken the latter, and a -hostile enveloping attack will soon force the advanced troops to fall -back upon the main position. The regulations point out that if the -advanced troops are supported by fire from the main position, the latter -will be prematurely disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced -troops is, however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive -the enemy, or to support the cavalry.</p> - -<p>The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be -constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to fire are -not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page468">[468]</span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" title="XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF -AMMUNITION.">XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF -AMMUNITION.<a id="FNanchor494" href="#Footnote494" class="fnanchor">[494]</a></h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote494" href="#FNanchor494" class="label">[494]</a> Lieutenant-Colonel -<span class="smcap">Kovarik</span>, <cite>Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren Systems für -den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf</cite>, Berlin, 1903.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<h4>1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.</h4> - -<p>The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital -importance to the infantry. To solve it correctly means to -assure the success of the infantry in fire action. The first -question that needs consideration is, whether the experiences -of past wars show that the ammunition at present carried by -the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances, even when -ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time because -all the roads are choked with troops.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the <b>Franco-German -war</b>, in which breechloaders were used for the first time against -breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80 cartridges, and the 6-horse -battalion ammunition wagons carried 20 additional rounds per -man.<a id="FNanchor495" href="#Footnote495" class="fnanchor">[495]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote495" href="#FNanchor495" class="label">[495]</a> Historical data given by -<span class="smcap">D. Günther</span> in <cite>Die Entwickelung der Feuertaktik -der Infanterie</cite>, 1902.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during -any campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could -ever have taken place. In the <b>Franco-German war</b>, the expenditure of -ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000 -rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44 -per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about 58 -per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of ammunition -expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon discontinued, -as it was found that the necessary data were lacking, the only -information available being the record of the number of rounds issued by -the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to the field army from -the depot battalions, must have brought with them in each case a very -considerable amount of ammunition, as each man carried 80 rounds, but no -records are available to show how much ammunition was forwarded in -this way. Furthermore, there is no record of the number of rounds<span class="pagenum" id="Page469">[469]</span> -actually expended and of the amount of ammunition lost or left on the -dead and wounded. It is well known, that in the long periods, during -which no engagement had taken place, an enormous amount of ammunition -was lost on marches and in bivouacs. This applies likewise to -battlefields. The commander of an ammunition column had his men -pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in unbroken packages -on the battlefield of <b>Hühnerwasser</b>.</p> - -<p>A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops, on -removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes filled -with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at <b>Sedan</b>),<a id="FNanchor496" href="#Footnote496" class="fnanchor">[496]</a> -or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the rear with the -field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on January 19th, 1871, in -the battle at <b>Mont Valérien</b>, and in the 38th Brigade, at the battle of -<b>Beaune la Rolande</b>).<a id="FNanchor497" href="#Footnote497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote496" href="#FNanchor496" class="label">[496]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, II, p. 1175.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote497" href="#FNanchor497" class="label">[497]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Volkskrieg</cite>, II, p. 259.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard to -the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements. Moreover, -these statements are only approximations and, as a rule, cannot -lay claim to trustworthiness.</p> - -<p>The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the -war was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the -Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery. Moreover, -the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.</p> - -<p>“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of -the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more rapidly -and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the difficulties -of fire control and fire direction were frequently increased on account of -the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these circumstances, so much ammunition -was expended that, among the troops fighting in the first line, -the ammunition carried by the men was no more than enough. This -explains why it not infrequently happened that the fighting efficiency of -the infantry was impaired by a lack of ammunition. The first general -shortage of ammunition occurred at the battle of <b>Mars-la-Tour</b> in the -infantry of the IIIrd Army Corps.”<a id="FNanchor498" href="#Footnote498" class="fnanchor">[498]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote498" href="#FNanchor498" class="label">[498]</a> <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite>, V, p. 1460.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On August 16th, at the battle of <b>Vionville</b>, the Prussian IIIrd -Army Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486 -cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet, in -spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the battle -at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded, each -man in the 35th Infantry<a id="FNanchor499" href="#Footnote499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a> was again supplied with about 200 rounds -of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the afternoon, -so that toward evening another shortage occurred.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote499" href="#FNanchor499" class="label">[499]</a> <cite>Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35</cite>, p. 32.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page470">[470]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition -during the battle of <b>Vionville</b> are taken from <cite>Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele</cite>, -8 and 9, by Major <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Ammunition used"> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">IInd Bn. Leib Regt.</td> -<td class="right">12,749</td> -<td class="left"> rounds</td> -<td class="center"> for </td> -<td class="right">850</td> -<td class="left"> rifles,</td> -<td class="center"> or </td> -<td class="right">15</td> -<td class="center"> per </td> -<td class="left">rifle.</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">Ist Bn. 40th Inf.</td> -<td class="right">35,000</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">450</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">78</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">IInd Bn. 40th Inf.</td> -<td class="right">6,650</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">350</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">19</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left padr2">IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf.</td> -<td class="right">4,520</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">300</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">15</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts -of the Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry -Regiments in front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had -sufficient ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith -to inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd -Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after -they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two -hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses: Ist -Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).<a id="FNanchor500" href="#Footnote500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote500" href="#FNanchor500" class="label">[500]</a> For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at Beaumont, see -<span class="smcap">Hopffgarten-Heidler</span>, <cite>Beaumont</cite>, p. 184.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The defense of the stone wall at <b>Buzanval</b> by the 50th Infantry -(German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate defensive -fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy at this point -was overwhelming and his troops were excellent, nevertheless the regiment -maintained the same splendid fire discipline it had already exhibited -at Lundby. The fight lasted nine hours. In his history of the -regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v. Boguslawski says:</p> - -<p>“The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately determined. -Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note showing -that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not -fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far the -greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the 6th -and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no record -showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle. To -cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of -ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180 -men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges. He -therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition originally -supplied him.</p> - -<p>“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going -into billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume -that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten rounds -per hour.”</p> - -<p>In the battle of <b>Beaune la Rolande</b>, some of the companies of the -56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In -the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able to replenish<span class="pagenum" id="Page471">[471]</span> -its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons near Romainville. -The defenders of Beaune did not receive such assistance however, as only -one ammunition wagon was brought up (by the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th -Infantry), toward the close of the battle, for the units engaged there. -The ammunition it contained was distributed among the men, but was -not used. Organizations belonging to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over -some of their ammunition, but, in general, the brigade had to rely practically -on the ammunition carried by the men, for all the ammunition -wagons had driven off at the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this -battle was fought almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the -men—about 80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously -directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in -the fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition to the -most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well disciplined organization, -it is not difficult to send ammunition promptly to the most seriously -threatened points by simply passing it along the line. This was actually -done at Beaune la Rolande. In consequence of this redistribution, at -some points in the cemetery, men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but -others fired only 40 or less; the result, however, was the same, for the -ammunition was almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men—80 -rounds per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even -unopened packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the -position occupied by the 38th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition -expended at <b>St. Privat</b> by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August -19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820, and the -Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition supply. -When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken into account, -the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be considered excessive.<a id="FNanchor501" href="#Footnote501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote501" href="#FNanchor501" class="label">[501]</a> <cite>Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz</cite>, -p. 250.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard -managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition, -without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which -were left intact.<a id="FNanchor502" href="#Footnote502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote502" href="#FNanchor502" class="label">[502]</a> <cite>Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons</cite>, p. 121.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably -greater in all the battles. At <b>Champigny</b>, every French infantry soldier -carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove sufficient, however, -to meet the demand. In the French Army of the Rhine, the average expenditure -of ammunition from August 6th to 31st was 30 rounds, and in the -fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27 rounds per rifle. In individual cases, -the expenditure of ammunition was far in excess of these figures. The -men of Grenier’s Division, against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was -directed, claim that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August -16th. In the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general<span class="pagenum" id="Page472">[472]</span> -of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.<a id="FNanchor503" href="#Footnote503" class="fnanchor">[503]</a> Shortage of -ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz on August 17th. -Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of Metz, the French VIth -Corps was unable to replenish its supply of ammunition before it was attacked -by the Prussian Guard. Detailed information available in regard to -the ammunition expended by the 25th Infantry (French)<a id="FNanchor504" href="#Footnote504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a> shows that each -man had only 30 instead of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked -by the Franz and 3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men—9% -hits). The statement made in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. -233), that every French soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on -August 18th, cannot be substantiated by French records.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote503" href="#FNanchor503" class="label">[503]</a> <span class="smcap">Hönig</span>, -<cite>Taktik der Zukunft</cite>, p. 159.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote504" href="#FNanchor504" class="label">[504]</a> <span class="smcap">Paquié</span>, -<cite>Le tir en terrain varié</cite>, p. 39.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The expenditure of ammunition in the <b>Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78</b>, -amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side. The following -detailed statements in regard to the expenditure of ammunition are -available. In the engagement at <b>Aiaslar</b>, on August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia -Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at <b>Karahassankioi</b>, the 140th Infantry -expended 155 rounds per man. On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion -expended 122 rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked -that the Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition -in his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional -rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed -by the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an -organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available, and -each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.</p> - -<p>In front of <b>Plevna</b>, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in six -hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition carts. -On July 30th, during the second assault on <b>Plevna</b>, they expended in four -hours all the ammunition carried by the men.<a id="FNanchor505" href="#Footnote505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> -In the engagement at <b>Lovtcha</b>, -the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired during the pursuit. The brigade commander -explained afterwards that his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During -the advance, the ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations -to which they belonged, and no provision had been made for -bringing up the necessary ammunition.<a id="FNanchor506" href="#Footnote506" class="fnanchor">[506]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote505" href="#FNanchor505" class="label">[505]</a> -Details given in the German translation of the Russian <cite>Gen. St. W.</cite> -(Vienna), III, pp. 330-331.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote506" href="#FNanchor506" class="label">[506]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, p. 88.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack -on the <b>Omar Bey Tabia</b>, expended the following ammunition:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Ammunition used"> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">63</td> -<td class="left padl0">rd </td> -<td class="left padr0">Infantry</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2"><a id="FNanchor507" href="#Footnote507" class="fnanchor">[507]</a></td> -<td class="right">55,296</td> -<td class="left"> rounds,</td> -<td class="center"> or </td> -<td class="right">21</td> -<td class="center"> per </td> -<td class="left">rifle</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">119</td> -<td class="left padl0">th </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="left padl0 padr2"><a href="#Footnote507" class="fnanchor">[507]</a></td> -<td class="right">99,744</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">43</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">64</td> -<td class="left padl0">th </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td colspan="2" class="right">24,650</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">10</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="right padr0">115</td> -<td class="left padl0">th </td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td colspan="2" class="right">45,360</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="right">24</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote507" href="#FNanchor507" class="label">[507]</a> -These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> hours.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page473">[473]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition -than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short at the -moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the Turks commenced. -The same misfortune befell other organizations, after the fire -fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as apparently they had neglected -to remove the cartridges from the dead and wounded.</p> - -<p>During the assault on <b>Scheinovo</b>, on January 9th, 1878, each man of -the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an average -of 2 rounds per man, per minute.</p> - -<p>The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles -than did the Russians.<a id="FNanchor508" href="#Footnote508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a> It is said that at <b>Gorni Dubniac</b>, each man had -800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact, that the force -of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed 3,533 Russians out -of action, in a fight lasting 9<sup>1</sup>⁄<sub>2</sub> hours, while the Turkish losses in killed and -wounded only amounted to 1,280 men. During the attack, some Turks -managed to fire more than 100 rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty -cartridge shells beside a dead Turkish soldier.<a id="FNanchor509" href="#Footnote509" class="fnanchor">[509]</a> In the engagement at -<b>Tashkessen</b> (31st December, 1877),<a id="FNanchor510" href="#Footnote510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a> which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend -Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle Battalion 263 -rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote508" href="#FNanchor508" class="label">[508]</a> -Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack mules carrying -60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from 100 to 120 rounds -on his person.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote509" href="#FNanchor509" class="label">[509]</a> -<span class="smcap">Kuropatkin-Krahmer</span>, <cite>Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen -Krieg</cite>, I, p. 170.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote510" href="#FNanchor510" class="label">[510]</a> <span class="smcap">Baker</span>, -<cite>War in Bulgaria</cite>, II, p. 160.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>There is very little information available in regard to the expenditure -of ammunition during the <b>Russo-Japanese war</b>. The Russian infantryman -carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8 one-horse ammunition carts carried -6,600 rounds per company, and the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the -battalions 14,400 rounds each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, -this would give 210 rounds per man. In the engagement at <b>Hamatan</b> -(<b>Yalu</b>), several Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A -number of rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, -3rd and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without -difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a -thoroughly reliable report published in the <cite>Kölnische Zeitung</cite> of September -24th, 1905:</p> - -<p>During the battle of <b>Liao Yang</b>, which lasted six days, the 138th Infantry -fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On September 1st, the -137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other words, nearly twice as -much in one day as either of the other regiments expended in six. This -excessive expenditure of ammunition was due to the very severe attacks -which this regiment had to withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated -on the next day and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. -From October 13th to 18th, at <b>Linshinpu</b>, the 139th Infantry<span class="pagenum" id="Page474">[474]</span> -expended 351,800 rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded -in getting within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up -at 15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian position. -The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and 250 men wounded. -Major V. Tettau<a id="FNanchor511" href="#Footnote511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a> states that during the battle of <b>Liao Yang</b> (30th August, -1904), the 36th Infantry expended 416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the -34th Infantry (two battalions), 250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an -average of not less than 160 rounds per rifle.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote511" href="#FNanchor511" class="label">[511]</a> <cite>Achtzehn -Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei.</cite></p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, -in addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of -ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which -were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The Japanese -infantry invariably followed the principle that each man should be supplied -with as much ammunition as possible before going into action. In the -engagement at <b>Kinchau</b> (26th November, 1904), the 1st Infantry Division -expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143 rounds per man of the original -effective strength.<a id="FNanchor512" href="#Footnote512" class="fnanchor">[512]</a></p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote512" href="#FNanchor512" class="label">[512]</a> <cite>Streffleur, Einzelschriften</cite>, I. p. 224.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p>Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 -rounds of ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, -cases may arise where troops could fire a greater number -of rounds to good advantage. This must be taken into account -when determining the number of rounds with which the infantryman -should be supplied—on his person and in the ammunition -wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the -supply can be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition -columns after a battle, so long as it is still possible to assign -a separate road to each army corps. When this is no -longer practicable, the ammunition columns will encounter almost -insurmountable difficulties in supplying the infantry -with ammunition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page475">[475]</span></p> - -<h5>AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD.</h5> - -<table class="ammosupply" summary="Supply"> - -<tr class="btd"> -<th rowspan="2" class="sstype brd"><b>C<br />o<br />u<br />n<br />t<br />r<br />y<br />.</b></th> -<th class="br">Year of construction.</th> -<th class="br">Caliber.</th> -<th class="br">Weight of cartridge.</th> -<th class="br">System of loading.</th> -<th class="br">Weight of clip.</th> -<th class="brd">Weight of clip filled.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="brd">Number of rounds carried by a man.</th> -<th class="brd">Ammunition wagons.</th> -<th colspan="2" class="brd">Number of rounds carried by ammunition wagons.</th> -<th class="brd">Reserve supply.</th> -<th class="br">Supply available in a division.</th> -<th>Supply available in an army corps.</th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">mm.</th> -<th class="br">g.</th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th class="br">g.</th> -<th class="brd">g.</th> -<th class="br">No.</th> -<th class="brd">Weight<br />kg.</th> -<th class="brd"> </th> -<th class="br">No.</th> -<th class="brd">No.<br />per<br />rifle.<br /><a id="FNanchor513" href="#Footnote513" class="fnanchor">[513]</a></th> -<th class="brd"> </th> -<th class="br"> </th> -<th> </th> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">G<br />E<br />R<br />M<br />A<br />N<br />Y</td> -<td class="year">1905 S.</td> -<td class="number">7.9 </td> -<td class="number">27.19 </td> -<td class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with clip holding 5 cartridges.</td> -<td class="number"> 7  </td> -<td class="number bd">126   </td> -<td class="center br"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="center">150</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">N. C. O.</td> - <td class="numberinside">45</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Trumpeter</td> - <td class="numberinside">90</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Drummer</td> - <td class="numberinside">30</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="center brd">4.5  </td> -<td class="text bd">4 Company ammunition wagons.</td> -<td class="center br">14,400</td> -<td class="right brd">77</td> -<td class="text noindent bd">Each of the 34 am. wagons of the 4 inf. am. columns of an army corps, carries 23,000 rounds or 144 per rifle.</td> -<td class="center br">150<br /> 77<br /><span class="bt">227</span></td> -<td class="center">150<br /> 77<br />144<br /><span class="bt">361</span></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="country">A<br />U<br />S<br />T<br />R<br />I<br />A</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="year">1895</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">8.  </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">28.35 </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with frame holding 5 cartridges.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">Frame<br />16.5</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number bd">158.25</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center br"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="center">120</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">N. C. O.</td> - <td class="numberinside">40</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center brd">4.31 </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="text bd">4 Company ammunition wagons.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center br">9,450</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="right brd">47.2</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="text noindent bd">Each division has one div. am. park of 30 am. wagons, -which carry 769,500 rounds or 57 per rifle.<br />The corps am. park same strength as a div. park.</td> -<td class="text noindent br">16 battalions of 800 rifles each.</td> -<td class="text noindent noright">3 divisions</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="center br">120  <br /> 47.2<br /> 57  <br /><span class="bt">224. </span></td> -<td class="right padr1">224<br />18<br />about <span class="bt">242</span></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="2" class="country">I<br />T<br />A<br />L<br />Y</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="year">1891 Carcan-Mannlicher.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">6.5 </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">22.   </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with frame holding 6 cartridges.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number">12  </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="number bd">138   </td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center br"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="center">162</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Sergt. and Trumpeter</td> - <td class="numberinside">126</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Inf. Pioneers</td> - <td class="numberinside">108</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center brd">3.736</td> -<td rowspan="2" colspan="3" class="center brd"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Infantry of the line, in field train</td> - <td class="numberinside">24</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Alpini, on pack animals and on carts</td> - <td class="numberinside">244</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="text noindent bd">In the 3rd section of the am. column, 40 rounds per -rifle;<br />In the Arty. park of the army corps, 45 rounds per rifle;<br />In the Alpini am. column, 90 rounds per rifle.</td> -<td rowspan="2" class="center br"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td class="textinside br">Line:</td> - <td class="textinside">Alpini:</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="numberinside br"><span class="padr1">162</span></td> - <td class="numberinside"><span class="padr1">162</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="numberinside br"><span class="padr1">24</span></td> - <td class="numberinside"><span class="padr1">244</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="numberinside br"><span class="padr1">40</span></td> - <td class="numberinside"><span class="padr1">90</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="numberinside br"><span class="padr1"><span class="bt">226</span></span></td> - <td class="numberinside"><span class="padr1"><span class="bt">496</span></span></td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="left">Inf. of the line:</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="center">162<br /> 24<br /> 40<br /> 45<br /><span class="bt">271</span></td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">E<br />N<br />G<br />L<br />A<br />N<br />D</td> -<td class="year">1908 Lee-Enfield.</td> -<td class="number">7.71</td> -<td class="number">27.5  </td> -<td class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with clip holding 5 cartridges. <a href="#Footnote513" class="fnanchor">[514]</a></td> -<td class="number">Clip<br />12.5</td> -<td class="number bd">150   </td> -<td class="center br">115</td> -<td class="center brd">3.48 </td> -<td colspan="3" class="center brd"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">8 Pack animals</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="numberinside">250</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">8 Ammunition wagons</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="text noindent bd">In the division am. column, 125 rounds per rifle.</td> -<td class="center br">115<br />250<br />125<br /><span class="bt">490</span></td> -<td class="text noindent noright">400 rounds per 1,000 rifles.</td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">F<br />R<br />A<br />N<br />C<br />E</td> -<td class="year">1886-98, 1905 D Lebel.</td> -<td class="number">8.  </td> -<td class="number">29.   </td> -<td class="text">Mag. under barrel, cartridges loaded singly.</td> -<td class="number">—</td> -<td class="number bd">—</td> -<td class="center br"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="center">120</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">N. C. O.</td> - <td class="numberinside">56</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="center brd">3.48 </td> -<td class="text bd">4 Company ammunition wagons.</td> -<td class="center br">16,384<br />or<br />19,000<br /><a href="#Footnote513" class="fnanchor">[515]</a></td> -<td class="right brd">82</td> -<td class="center bd"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="textinside">In the corps am. park:</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">Ist echelon</td> - <td class="numberinside">44.2</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">IInd echelon</td> - <td class="numberinside">66.2</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="center br">120<br /> 82<br /><span class="bt">202</span></td> -<td class="center">110<br /><span class="bt">312</span></td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">R<br />U<br />S<br />S<br />I<br />A <a href="#Footnote513" class="fnanchor">[516]</a></td> -<td class="year">1891 (Three line rifle).</td> -<td class="number">7.62</td> -<td class="number">25.812</td> -<td class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with clip holding 5 cartridges.</td> -<td class="number"> 9.6</td> -<td class="number bd">137   </td> -<td class="center br">120</td> -<td class="center brd">3.33 </td> -<td class="text bd">24 am. carts:<br /><span class="noindent">Ist</span> echelon, 8 -1-horse carts<br /><span class="noindent">IInd</span> echelon, 16 2-horse carts</td> -<td colspan="2" class="center brd"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td class="textinside br">In each of the 8 1-horse carts 6000</td> - <td class="numberinside">=36</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside br">In each of the 16 2-horse carts 14,400</td> - <td class="numberinside">=30</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="br"> </td> - <td class="numberinside bt">66</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="center bd"> - <table class="tableintable" summary="Data"> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">In the light Arty. park</td> - <td class="numberinside">81</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="textinside">In the reserve park</td> - <td class="numberinside">164</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="numberinside bt">245</td> - </tr> - </table> -</td> -<td class="center br">120<br /> 66<br /> 81<br /><span class="bt">267</span></td> -<td class="center">267<br />164<br /><span class="bt">431</span></td> -</tr> - -<tr class="bb"> -<td class="country">J<br />A<br />P<br />A<br />N <a href="#Footnote513" class="fnanchor">[516]</a></td> -<td class="year">1897 Arisaka (Meidji 80).</td> -<td class="number">6.50</td> -<td class="number">22.4  </td> -<td class="text">Mag. in rear of barrel, loaded with clip holding 5 cartridges.</td> -<td class="number">8.5</td> -<td class="number bd">120   </td> -<td class="center br">120</td> -<td class="center brd">2.9  </td> -<td class="text bd">Each company has one cart.</td> -<td class="center br">16,000</td> -<td class="right brd">80</td> -<td class="center bd">—</td> -<td class="center br">—</td> -<td class="center">—</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page476">[476]</span></p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the -number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles specified:</p> - -<table class="dontwrap" summary="Weights"> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="4" class="left">Paper<br />Shells</td> -<td rowspan="4" class="brace right padr0">-</td> -<td rowspan="4" class="brace bt bb bl"> </td> -<td class="left">Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket</td> -<td class="right">85</td> -<td class="center"> rounds </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Prussian rifled infantry musket(new model)</td> -<td class="right">55</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Prussian needle gun M/41-69</td> -<td class="right">78</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">French chassepot rifle M/66</td> -<td class="right">90</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td colspan="6" class="thinline"> </td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td rowspan="3" class="left">Metal<br />Shells</td> -<td rowspan="3" class="brace right padr0">-</td> -<td rowspan="3" class="brace bt bb bl"> </td> -<td class="left">Infantry rifle M/71</td> -<td class="right">69</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81</td> -<td class="right">98</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="left">Rifle, M/98 with loading clips</td> -<td class="right">103</td> -<td class="center">„</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -<p>The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:</p> - -<table class="cartridges" summary="Cartridges"> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>Germany</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying"><b>45</b> rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and <b>60</b> in the knapsack;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>Austria</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying"><b>20</b> rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and <b>60</b> in the knapsack;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>Russia</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying"><b>30</b> rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to the waist belt, in a breast cartridge -box, and in a reserve cartridge box attached to the knapsack;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>France</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying"><b>120</b> rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and one behind;</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>England</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying">In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding <b>15</b> rounds (in addition each soldier -carries a shoulder belt holding <b>50</b> rounds);</td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="army"><b>Japan</b>:</td> -<td class="carrying"><b>30</b> rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and <b>60</b> rounds in the cartridge box -behind.</td> -</tr> - -</table> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h4>2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF -AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES.</h4> - -<h5>GERMANY.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.)</span></h5> - -<p>On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition -wagons of the battalions, as this renders supervision -easier, and enables the battalion commander to regulate the -replenishment of ammunition. Companies acting alone, as -well as those forming the support of an advance guard, are -followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not seem -desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or -of a brigade on account of the distance separating the different -battalions. During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition<span class="pagenum" id="Page477">[477]</span> -should be taken out of the knapsacks, and the contents -of the ammunition wagons distributed among the men. -The men carry this extra ammunition in their haversacks and -in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc.</p> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width -of track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the -ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to carry -ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned within a -shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors in front and -in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments (to be emptied -separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of cartridges placed on -end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15 cartridges in clips each. Each -bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25 kg.</p> - -<p>As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man, according -to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1 non-commissioned officer and -21 men are detailed to unload the ammunition wagon. The unloading is -managed as follows: Four men take post on each side of the wagon, two -handing out the bundles to the other two, who lay them on the ground. -The remaining men place the bundles in piles of three in such a manner -that the carrying loops of two in each pile can be interlaced and held together -by a stick or a bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in -this manner in four minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together -are slung over the left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, -and the third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can -carry 21.8 kg.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<p>Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition -wagon. These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued -too soon, this additional burden causes considerable inconvenience, -and consequently reduces the marching power of the -men. The leader must also decide what shall be done with the -ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely, and the -troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition -wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the -mounted wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. -When refilled, they rejoin their proper organizations. -If requested, ammunition must be issued to any body of -troops.</p> - -<p>On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have -been emptied, follow the movements of the several companies -and take up a position under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster,<span class="pagenum" id="Page478">[478]</span> -as close as possible to the firing line—never more than -800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases, this must be done without -regard to losses. The firing line is supplied with ammunition, -when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward. When -the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact -is communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the -signal “m”. This signal, when made to the front by the troops -in rear, signifies, “ammunition is coming up at once.”</p> - -<p>In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to -the firing line by individual men, the latter should invariably -be detailed from troops in rear which have not as yet been engaged. -These men must endeavor to reach the firing line by -rushes or by crawling, and must then remain with that line.</p> - -<p>It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the -ammunition taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly -replaced. The higher commanders would do well to provide -a reserve supply of ammunition, until the arrival of the ammunition -columns, by assembling the ammunition wagons of -the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.). It will also -be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons of the -troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all -probability, expend a large amount of ammunition.</p> - -<p>The ammunition should be removed from the dead and -wounded. If this is done by the men of an advancing skirmish -line, there is danger that the forward movement will be -retarded, and that some of the men will take advantage of -this opportunity to make themselves “scarce.” Officers and -men should endeavor to replenish ammunition at every opportunity, -without awaiting specific orders to that effect, and, in -general, see that not only the prescribed number of rounds, but, -on the contrary, as much ammunition as possible is on hand -in the organization.</p> - -<p>When the force is to stand on the defensive, especially if -the position to be occupied has been prepared for defense, ammunition -should be deposited all along the firing line. (Cartridge -boxes or other utensils may be used as receptacles). It<span class="pagenum" id="Page479">[479]</span> -is advisable to use first the cartridges carried in caps, haversacks, -coat and trousers’ pockets. The contents of the right -cartridge box are saved for decisive moments when great -rapidity of fire is essential. In replenishing ammunition, the -right cartridge box is filled first, then the left, and the surplus -is accommodated in haversack, coat and trousers’ pockets.</p> - -<h5>AUSTRIA.<br /> -<span class="nonbold">(Par. 70 Regulations of 1903).</span></h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention. -If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional rounds -before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each non-commissioned -officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition wagon, so that the latter is -about half emptied.<a id="FNanchor517" href="#Footnote517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a> This brings the total amount carried by each soldier -up to 140 rounds, and increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and -that of the non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into -action, the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion -reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the attention -of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion reserve has -been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons accompany the -regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the wagons maintain -intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are either placed under -the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the senior supply officer present -with them, as may be directed by the battalion commander.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote517" href="#FNanchor517" class="label">[517]</a> The company ammunition wagon carries 9,450 rounds of ammunition, -packed in seven compartments. It consists of a body and a limber, has a -width of track of 1.13 m., and is supplied with eight sacks which serve to -carry ammunition to the troops. During the day its position is indicated by -a red flag, and at night by a green lantern.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>In attack, it will, as a rule, only be possible to replenish ammunition -until troops get within about 1,000 paces (750 m.) of the enemy. From -this point on, however, it will be extremely difficult to supply ammunition. -Every lull in the fight must be taken advantage of to replenish ammunition. -The firing line receives a fresh supply of ammunition through reinforcements -or through small detachments under non-commissioned officers sent -forward from the reserves. These detachments, after distributing the ammunition -they have brought up, remain with the firing line. The companies -engaged in the fire fight later take advantage of every opportunity to replenish -and to redistribute ammunition.</p> - -<p>In defense, all the ammunition wagons may be emptied before the -action begins, and sent to the rear to be refilled. The ammunition should -be deposited in the vicinity of the firing line. The subsequent replenishment -of the supply should be managed as in an attack. If ammunition is very<span class="pagenum" id="Page480">[480]</span> -urgently needed by the firing line, and when no other remedy suggests itself, -a part of the ammunition of the reserves may be turned over to the firing -line. Special detachments should be detailed to remove the ammunition -from the dead and wounded. Wounded men who are able to walk to the -dressing station, turn over their ammunition to their comrades.</p> - -<p>If another organization requests to be furnished ammunition, the entire -amount required, or a part thereof, depending upon the urgency of the case -and the amount available, should be turned over to it.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5 title="RUSSIA.">RUSSIA.<a id="FNanchor518" href="#Footnote518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a></h5> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote518" href="#FNanchor518" class="label">[518]</a> In each battalion, the ammunition wagon of the 2nd company carries 108 -explosive cartridges, weighing 200 g. each, and that of the 3rd company -carries 48 fuzes.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The ammunition carried in the cartridge boxes of the men may prove -insufficient during an action. On open ground the ammunition wagons, -assembled by regiment, accompany the regimental reserve, and in covered -terrain, they are assembled by battalion, and follow the battalion reserve. -When practicable, their position is to be indicated during the day by red -flags placed on their flank, and at night by green lanterns. In defense, an -adequate supply of ammunition should be deposited in rear of the firing line, -or should be at once distributed among the men. In attack, the ammunition -supply of the firing line and of the supports is to be replenished when they -enter ranges under 700 m. The best means of preventing shortage of ammunition -is to husband it at long ranges. Ammunition wagons are not to -be emptied and their contents distributed before an action begins; on the -contrary, the ammunition is to be issued during the fight, one wagon after -another being emptied. Ammunition may be sent forward from the reserve -to the firing line, the men who carry it remaining with that line. On the -other hand—and this seems to be the method most frequently employed—men -from the firing line may be sent to the rear for ammunition. The men -of the reserves at once turn over one-half of their cartridges to these men, -who are then assembled and sent forward under the command of a non-commissioned -officer. The ammunition is carried forward in sacks—so-called -“bashlicks.”</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>FRANCE.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Each company has one ammunition wagon, which is a part of the combat -train (<i>train de combat</i>), and carries 16,384 Lebel cartridges, and 36 -intrenching tools. It can carry 19,000 rounds of the new “D” ammunition,<a id="FNanchor519" href="#Footnote519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> -So long as any ammunition remains in the ammunition wagons, they -remain under all circumstances with their battalion. They are assembled -in battalion groups on the left flank of their battalion. When the battalion<span class="pagenum" id="Page481">[481]</span> -is broken up for advance, flank, rear guard, or outpost work, they remain -with the main body of the battalion. When the companies are separated -for a protracted period, the battalion commander decides whether or not -the ammunition wagons should accompany their respective companies. The -ammunition in the wagons is, as a general rule, to be distributed before the -commencement of an action. If this is impossible when the force is taken -by surprise, the commander of the group of ammunition wagons must bring -them up as close as possible under cover, and the battalion commander must -supervise the distribution of the ammunition. In quarters and on the -march, the ammunition is to be replenished by taking the ammunition from -the sick, from the men detailed away, or from the supply carried by the -baggage wagon.<a id="FNanchor520" href="#Footnote520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> The ammunition in the baggage wagon is only to be -used when all these other sources are exhausted. When an encounter with -the enemy may be expected, and only a short march is anticipated, the ammunition -carried in the baggage wagons may be distributed before starting.</p> - -</div><!--longqote--> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote519" href="#FNanchor519" class="label">[519]</a> The company ammunition wagon Model 1893 weighs 287 kg. when empty, -and 770 kg. when filled. It carries 14,400 rounds of ammunition (net capacity -48%) or 66 rounds per rifle.</p> - -<p><a id="Footnote520" href="#FNanchor520" class="label">[520]</a> The baggage wagon weighs 450 kg. when empty, and 1054 kg. when -loaded. It carries 36 intrenching tools, and a tool chest. Its net capacity -is 45%. Forty knapsacks may be transported on this wagon in lieu of the -ammunition.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>Any further replenishment of ammunition is to be ordered by the -division commander. The empty company ammunition wagons are assembled -in regimental groups and follow at least 1,000 m. in rear of the -regimental reserve. At each halt, the wagon train is to prepare for defense. -The regimental commander is to regulate the distribution of the -ammunition sent forward by the ammunition columns.</p> - -<p>When this distribution cannot be made for some reason or other, the -wagons, assembled in groups of four, follow their battalions. It is the duty -of the battalion commander to keep the firing line supplied with ammunition. -The contents of the company ammunition wagons are not to be -replenished from the ammunition columns during an action. The ammunition -is to be removed from the dead and wounded.</p> - -<p>The source of the ammunition supply is the corps ammunition park, -which is divided into three echelons, as follows:</p> - -<p>1st echelon consists of two infantry ammunition columns and marches -at the head of the combat train of the troops engaged;</p> - -<p>IInd echelon consists of three infantry ammunition columns;</p> - -<p>IIIrd echelon carries artillery ammunition only.</p> - -<p>Two infantry ammunition columns of the 1st echelon, which, as a rule, -constitutes the “ammunition supply center” at the commencement of an -action, march at the head of the combat train (<i>train de combat</i>). A half-filled -infantry ammunition column must at all times be available at this -“ammunition supply center.” Ammunition wagons of the infantry ammunition -column are sent forward at the request of the division commander -to the position taken up by the company ammunition wagons. The latter -are generally posted not more than 1,000 m. in the rear of the fighting line, -and parts of each infantry ammunition column (usually one ammunition<span class="pagenum" id="Page482">[482]</span> -wagon for each battalion) are posted by an officer not more than 1,500 m. in -rear of these. The empty company ammunition wagons are not refilled, -the ammunition being sent forward directly from the ammunition columns. -As soon as the infantry ammunition columns are informed which organizations -they are to supply, they send out non-commissioned officers to locate -the ammunition wagons of those organizations and establish communication -with them. The commander of the ammunition column directs where empty -ammunition wagons are to assemble. In emergencies, wagons of the infantry -ammunition column may also drive close up to the fighting line. In -this case, empty wagons assemble near the groups of company ammunition -wagons, and from there they are sent back in trains to the ammunition -column to which they belong.</p> - -<p>Every opportunity, such as a lull in the fight, or an abatement of the -hostile fire, etc., must be utilized to distribute the ammunition of the company -wagons or of the ammunition column.</p> - -<p>It is prohibited to send wagons or men to the rear for the purpose of -bringing up ammunition on the battlefield. All men sent forward with -ammunition should remain in the firing line.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>ENGLAND.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>The British infantryman is usually provided with 115, and each machine -gun with 3,500 rounds of ammunition. Each battalion is, in addition, provided -with 8 pack animals, each carrying two ammunition chests containing -4,400 cartridges (77 kg.), and with 8 ammunition wagons.</p> - -<p>On the march, the pack animals and half of the ammunition wagons -follow immediately in rear of the battalion. The (16) remaining wagons -form a reserve ammunition column at the disposal of the brigade commander, -and march at the tail of the brigade. When an engagement is anticipated, -50 additional rounds (1.3 kg.) may be issued to each man before -leaving camp. During an action, one pack animal and two ammunition -wagons follow each half-battalion. Empty company ammunition wagons -are refilled from the brigade reserve ammunition column. When the -wagons of the latter are empty, they are replaced by filled wagons from -the ammunition column. The teams are not transferred with the wagons, -but remain with the organization to which they belong.</p> - -<p>Ammunition wagons are expected to approach to within about 900 m. -of the firing line, and pack animals to within 450 m. One non-commissioned -officer and two or three privates are to be detailed from each company to -bring up ammunition. Each man is to carry a sack containing 600 cartridges -(16 kg.). That this method of supplying ammunition is practicable -under fire is shown by the distinguished conduct lists for <b>Paardeberg</b>, -where men were praised or decorated for endurance and fearlessness in -bringing up ammunition. (See p. 371 supra). The men who bring up -ammunition may be kept in the firing line when the ground is devoid of -cover.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page483">[483]</span></p> - -<p>The division ammunition columns, although they carry both infantry -and artillery ammunition, constitute an integral part of the artillery battalions.</p> - -</div><!--longquote--> - -<h5>ITALY.</h5> - -<div class="longquote"> - -<p>When an encounter with the enemy is anticipated, the ammunition -wagons are to be emptied, the men detailed to carry ammunition are to -remove their packs, and each one of them is to carry ammunition weighing -about 7.5 kg.</p> - -<p>The packs are to be removed only in case of urgent necessity. When -this is ordered, however, the soldier first removes all the cartridges and -the emergency ration from his pack. The ammunition knapsacks, which are -always to be taken along, are, however, carried in turn by all the soldiers -of the company.</p> - -<p>The advancing units that are in need of ammunition, may demand it -from troops ordered to remain behind. They take along their own ammunition -carriers. The latter, assembled in a squad, distribute the ammunition -along the firing line, and remain with that line. In the first lull that occurs, -they assemble again as a squad and take part as such in the action.</p> - -<p>The empty ammunition knapsacks belonging to organizations in reserve -are to be refilled as rapidly as possible from the ammunition wagons sent -forward from the ammunition park to the fighting line.</p> - -<p>The ammunition of the dead and wounded is to be removed ind distributed -among the remaining men. During pauses in the fire, the ammunition -is to be equalized in all organizations engaged in the fire fight.</p> - -<p>The ammunition wagons of the echelons in rear are to approach the -fighting line as far as the available cover permits. Their position is to be -indicated by flags. The ammunition carriers are to come to these wagons -to refill the empty ammunition knapsacks.</p> - -</div> - -<h4>3. WHAT DEDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THE -REGULATIONS OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES.</h4> - -<p>1. The contents of the ammunition wagons should be -distributed at the commencement of an action. This should not -be done too early as the packing and unpacking of ammunition -takes time, and as the soldier will not march so well when -loaded down at the wrong time with 60 to 75 additional cartridges -(1.8 to 2.4 kg.), unequally distributed in haversack and -pockets. It is also a good plan to issue as many rounds of<span class="pagenum" id="Page484">[484]</span> -ammunition to the non-commissioned officers as to the men. -During a fight this ammunition can then be distributed to the -men.</p> - -<p>2. As soon as the ammunition wagons have been refilled -from the ammunition columns, which have been brought up, -they should at once endeavor to rejoin their battalions and -should then follow as close as possible in rear of the latter. -The expenditure of ammunition will never be equally distributed -along the line; therefore, if the battalion commander -retains all four ammunition wagons directly under his own -orders, he will be better able to equalize the supply of ammunition -than would be the case if each ammunition wagon, as soon -as it is refilled, were to follow its own company, which, in -many cases, it will scarcely find again.</p> - -<p>3. It is the duty of the commander to assign a few ammunition -wagons belonging to organizations held in reserve to -bodies of troops which will in all probability need a greater -quantity of ammunition.</p> - -<p>4. The organization must be in possession of an adequate -supply of ammunition on entering the zone of effective fire, -i.e., at a distance of 600 m. from the enemy. The sending of -individual men to the rear for the purpose of bringing up -ammunition will only be practicable in rare cases. As a rule, -the violence of the hostile fire will make this impossible. Only -the best men can be sent back. It is asking too much to expect -them to cross twice the zone swept by hostile fire. Moreover, -the best men are needed in the firing line to encourage the -weaker element, and to replace disabled squad leaders. Under -no circumstances should the firing line be withdrawn to get -ammunition from the ammunition wagons, as an attack made -unexpectedly by the enemy might find the position unoccupied -and thus cause its loss.<a id="FNanchor521" href="#Footnote521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a> It is a general principle that ammunition -must be sent forward from the rear.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote521" href="#FNanchor521" class="label">[521]</a> -Examples: The loss of the park at Coulmiers (<span class="smcap">Helvig</span>, <i>Das 1. bayerische -Armeekorps</i>, p. 202). The engagement at Daix on January 21st, 1871 (<i>Geschichte -des Regiments Nr. 61</i>, p. 174). <span class="smcap">Kunz</span>, <i>Loigny-Poupry</i>, p. 77.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page485">[485]</span></p> - -<p>5. The ammunition can be removed from the dead and -wounded only in defense, or in attack when the forward movement -has come to a standstill. In an advance, it cannot be -done without retarding the movement and without affording -individual men an excuse to remain behind.</p> - -<p>6. The bringing up of ammunition by individual men, -left to their own devises, is not to be recommended, as it facilitates -“shirking”; moreover, if one of the men is disabled, the -ammunition he carries will never reach the firing line. Ammunition -should either be sent to the firing line with each support, -or it should be carried by detachments sent forward in thin -skirmish lines under the command of non-commissioned officers. -These detachments should remain with the firing line.</p> - -<p>7. Whether or not signals for informing the troops in -rear of a shortage of ammunition in the firing line will fulfill -the expectations entertained for them, can only be determined -by the test of war.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page486">[486-<br />487]<a id="Page487"></a></span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">INDEX.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<ul class="index"> - -<li class="newletter">A.</li> - -<li class="level0">ACCELERATED FIRE, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ACCELERATED TIME, in various armies (tables) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ACCURACY, effect of, in collective fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ACTION</li> -<li class="level1">Breaking off an <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page441">441</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct and duties of the leaders in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Containing <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Delaying <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ADJUSTMENT, artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page319">319</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCE</li> -<li class="level1">Crawling—see <a href="#IndRef1">Crawling</a></li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a>, <a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Firing line in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations suitable for, through timber <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Impulse from the rear <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes—see <a href="#IndRef2">Rushes</a></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCE BY CRAWLING—see <a href="#IndRef1">Crawling</a></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCE BY RUSHES—see <a href="#IndRef2">Rushes</a></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCE GUARD.</li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formation for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page212">212</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct in a rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of, France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Conduct of,</span> Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCED POSITIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Danger of fight being decided in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page412">412</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Example of attack on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ADVANCED TROOPS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AGENTS DE LIAISON <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page245">245</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AIM, points of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page165">165</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AIMING POSITION, warding off cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page307">307</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ALPINI <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page22">22</a>, <a href="#Page24">24</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ALTITUDE, effect of, on ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AMMUNITION<span class="pagenum" id="Page488">[488]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Franco-German War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russo-Turkish War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Expenditure of, during advance by rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How carried by soldier in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Knapsacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rate of fire versus waste of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page161">161</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Shortage of, examples <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply and distribution in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply, Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page479">479</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Deductions from various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page482">482</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supply, </span>Various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wagon—see <a href="#IndRef3">Ammunition Wagons</a></li> -<li class="level1">Weight of, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AMMUNITION CARTS—see <a href="#IndRef3">Ammunition Wagons</a></li> - -<li class="level0">AMMUNITION KNAPSACKS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef3">AMMUNITION WAGONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page479">479</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page482">482</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page477">477</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">APPLICATORY METHOD OF INSTRUCTION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page10">10</a>, <a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">APPLIED TACTICS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a>, <a href="#Page13">13</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ARBITRATION, Courts of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ARMY CORPS, frontage in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef5">ARTILLERY,</li> -<li class="level1">Adjustment of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page319">319</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge supported by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat of infantry against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page316">316</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat of machine guns against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combination fuses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page113">113</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation with infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a>, <a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Effect of fire (France) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page123">123</a>, <a href="#Page124">124</a>, <a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Field guns, in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page111">111</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire at successive ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire diverted by advancing infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect of French 4-gun battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect of (French data) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page123">123</a>, <a href="#Page124">124</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire for effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Howitzer, heavy field <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Howitzer, </span>Light field <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page116">116</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry screen<span class="pagenum" id="Page489">[489]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Line, distance from infantry line in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page415">415</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses, Franco-German War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses, </span>Percentage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page188">188</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses, </span>Under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a>, <a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percussion shell (Model 96) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page115">115</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percussion shrapnel <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page111">111</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Positions in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparatory action (France) in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Progressive fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Searching fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Shields, protection afforded by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Shrapnel <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page112">112</a>, <a href="#Page113">113</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Effect of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page114">114</a>, <a href="#Page122">122</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sweeping fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time required for adjusting the fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page119">119</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time shell (Model 96) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page116">116</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Time shell </span>(Model 98) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time shrapnel <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page112">112</a>, <a href="#Page113">113</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Unlimbering under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Zone fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ASSAULT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page373">373</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page374">374</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Decision to make an <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page373">373</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page376">376</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire support <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page379">379</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page381">381</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Guidons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page355">355</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page452">452</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moment for making the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page374">374</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pursuit after successful <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Successful, conduct after <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signal, fix bayonet <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page377">377</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Unsuccessful, conduct after <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page386">386</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ASSAULTING DISTANCE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a>, <a href="#Page424">424</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ASSEMBLY FORMATIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France (<i>carré de division</i>) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page329">329</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Abridged <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance of the firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, conduct of the—in a rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced troops <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page352">352</a>, <a href="#Page373">373</a>, <a href="#Page374">374</a>, <a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a>, <a href="#Page424">424</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade, frontage of a, in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a>, <a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Comparison with defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page329">329</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conditions upon which success depends <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page345">345</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation of infantry and artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a>, <a href="#Page352">352</a>, <a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Decision to assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page373">373</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deliberately planned, comparison with rencontre<span class="pagenum" id="Page490">[490]</span> -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a>, <a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deployment, initial <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distances <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Of supports from firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page99">99</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Duration of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page459">459</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page356">356</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples</li> -<li class="level2">Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a>, <a href="#Page345">345</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fixing bayonets <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page372">372</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation for, of a battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page211">211</a>, <a href="#Page212">212</a>, <a href="#Page213">213</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Advance in mass formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Group attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page255">255</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Preparatory attack formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Army corps <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a>, <a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Company <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a>, <a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">General rules for use of intrenching tools <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page393">393</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Higher troop leading, duties <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Holding <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a>, <a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry against dismounted cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">I. Army <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page342">342</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Influences determining tactics in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Launching the enveloping force <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page359">359</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lessons of the Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Lessons of the </span>Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local reconnaissance in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page347">347</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Methods of forming a battalion for (plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page215">215</a>, <a href="#Page216">216</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Minor troop leading, duties <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moment for making the assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page374">374</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Normal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page203">203</a>, <a href="#Page204">204</a>, <a href="#Page205">205</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Number of men required <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On an enemy deployed for defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Orders, issue of, in rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Over plain devoid of cover <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page255">255</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Point of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page355">355</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Position of commander in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparation by infantry and artillery (France) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page346">346</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparatory position, advance into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page350">350</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations in re use of spade in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pure frontal <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Range finding instruments, employment in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page346">346</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In force <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page347">347</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Compared with deliberately planned attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Conduct of main body in a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page336">336</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserve, strength of<span class="pagenum" id="Page491">[491]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page394">394</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rules for the advance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page367">367</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sand bag cover <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a>, <a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Secondary <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Separation of holding and flank attacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Signal (fix bayonet) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page377">377</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Spade, use of, in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a>, <a href="#Page392">392</a>, -<a href="#Page449">449</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a>, <a href="#Page465">465</a>, <a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Successful, conduct after <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Superiority of fire, necessity of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page370">370</a>, <a href="#Page371">371</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supports, advance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Supports, </span>Distance from firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page99">99</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time for opening fire, general rules <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Troop leading, duties of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a>, <a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">United, examples illustrating necessity of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page402">402</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Unsuccessful, conduct after <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page386">386</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ATTACK ON A POSITION PREPARED FOR DEFENSE</li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">AUSTRIA</li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced troops <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page479">479</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack on a position prepared for defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a>, <a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column of platoons, how formed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Column of platoons, </span>(plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company, strength of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation of infantry and artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a>, <a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Crawling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Seeking a decision <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Development for action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page208">208</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire control and fire discipline <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page135">135</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page159">159</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>Time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>While in motion, experiments with <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Firing line, method of reinforcing the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Firing line, </span>Position, choice of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page370">370</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a>-<a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page314">314</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool equipment (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by a soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine gun<span class="pagenum" id="Page492">[492]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">And infantry, relative fire effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, ascertaining <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page144">144</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reinforcing the firing line, method of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a>, <a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Superiority of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page371">371</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page479">479</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Telegraph detachments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">B.</li> - -<li class="level0">BASE UNIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page218">218</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advantages and disadvantages <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page218">218</a>, <a href="#Page219">219</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Of combat, designation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BATTALION</li> -<li class="level1">Acting alone, formation for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page212">212</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, formation for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page212">212</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack formation, France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austrian, formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a>, <a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Broad column (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander, duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Commander, </span>Post in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deep column (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Depth on the march <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">English, formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation, in a containing action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page213">213</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Forming for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page211">211</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French, formation of the (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage in attack and defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">German, formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Group intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Historical development <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool equipment (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenchments for a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italian, formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japanese, formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Method of forming for attack (plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page215">215</a>, <a href="#Page216">216</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Normal formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Organization of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a>, <a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Part of a larger force, formation in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page213">213</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Part of a larger force, formation </span>In defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page213">213</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Route column, formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Route column, </span>Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russian, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Swiss, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BATTALION COMMANDER</li> -<li class="level1">Duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BATTLE UNIT<span class="pagenum" id="Page493">[493]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BAYONET FENCING <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page134">134</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BAYONET FIGHTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BEATEN ZONE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Depth at various angles of slope—General Paquié’s rule for determining <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formulae for computing depth of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page180">180</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Increase and diminution of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page181">181</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BELGIUM</li> -<li class="level1">Fire control and fire direction <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page135">135</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BREAKING OFF AN ACTION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page441">441</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BRIGADE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack formation of a French <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry, strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Development for action (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page216">216</a>, <a href="#Page217">217</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a>, <a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Importance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a>, <a href="#Page38">38</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Three-unit organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page218">218</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">BROAD COLUMN (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">C.</li> - -<li class="level0">CADENCE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page53">53</a>, <a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CAVALRY</li> -<li class="level1">Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Charge supported by artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Charges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a>, <a href="#Page303">303</a>, -<a href="#Page304">304</a>, <a href="#Page305">305</a>, <a href="#Page306">306</a>, <a href="#Page308">308</a>, -<a href="#Page309">309</a>, <a href="#Page310">310</a>, <a href="#Page311">311</a>, <a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat of infantry against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page301">301</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page314">314</a>, <a href="#Page315">315</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat of machine guns against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page296">296</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dismounted, infantry attack against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses</li> -<li class="level2">Charge of French cavalry at Vionville <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page312">312</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Franco-German War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Percentage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page188">188</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Massed employment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of a charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page306">306</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regiment, strength of German <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relative strength as compared to infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CHANGE OF DIRECTION, how executed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page219">219</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CHANGE OF FRONT</li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a>, <a href="#Page221">221</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How executed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page219">219</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CHASSEURS ALPINS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page22">22</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CLEARING THE FOREGROUND <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CLOSE COLUMN, definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CLOSE ORDER<span class="pagenum" id="Page494">[494]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page56">56</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with extended order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regiment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CLOSE ORDER FORMATIONS,</li> -<li class="level1">Effect of fire on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page103">103</a>, <a href="#Page104">104</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLLECTIVE FIRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLOR, position of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLT MACHINE GUN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMN</li> -<li class="level1">Attack in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a>, <a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion in route <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Broad (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Close, definition of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Comparison with line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a>-<a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deep (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dimensions of broad and deep (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Double <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French double (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Open, definition of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Route (machine gun battery) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Section (machine gun battery) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMN OF FOURS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How formed (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">And squads compared <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page59">59</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMN OF PLATOONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page61">61</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How formed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine gun battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">(plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMN OF SQUADS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page59">59</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">(plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMN OF TWOS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page56">56</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COLUMNS, line of company, France (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT</li> -<li class="level1">Conduct and duties of the leaders <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Drill, importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page105">105</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Duration of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page178">178</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage—see <a href="#IndRef4">Frontage</a>.</li> -<li class="level1">Infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a>-<a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a>-<a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a>-<a href="#Page459">459</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a>-<a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a>-<a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Japanese, Characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a>-<a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page316">316</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page301">301</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page268">268</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine Guns<span class="pagenum" id="Page495">[495]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page296">296</a>, <a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page296">296</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Orders <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a>, <a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Necessity for written <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Patrols <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a>, <a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sections <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page257">257</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Assignment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Division of a position into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tasks, assignment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Train (machine guns) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Unit <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT DRILL, importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page105">105</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT FRONTAGE—see <a href="#IndRef4">Frontage</a></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT ORDERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Items that should not appear in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Written, necessity for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT PATROLS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT SECTIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page257">257</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Division of a position into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT TRAIN, machine gun <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBAT UNIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMBINED SIGHTS, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page166">166</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMMANDER</li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, post of, in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company, post of, in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Interference with subordinates <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page401">401</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post of, in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post of, in rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page398">398</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regimental, post of, in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Selection of a position during combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMMANDS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page166">166</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMMUNICATING TRENCHES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMMUNICATION</li> -<li class="level1">With neighboring troops and next higher headquarters <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page245">245</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMPANY <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition wagons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a>, <a href="#Page477">477</a>, -<a href="#Page479">479</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a>, <a href="#Page482">482</a>, <a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austrian, in column of platoons (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Columns of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page56">56</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander, duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Commander, </span>Post in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dimensions of the 3 and 4 platoon company (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page52">52</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Division into platoons, sections, squads <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>-<a href="#Page53">53</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Division into </span>3 or 4 platoons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a>, <a href="#Page53">53</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French 4-rank formation (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page65">65</a>, <a href="#Page66">66</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">French </span>In line (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Frontage in </span>Attack and defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Frontage in </span>Defense and rear guard actions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">German,<span class="pagenum" id="Page496">[496]</span></li> -<li class="level2">In column of platoons (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In column of squads (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In company column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page60">60</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In line (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In route column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements in line and column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page56">56</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Non-commissioned officers, posts of, in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Organization of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a>, <a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Range finders, post of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russian, in column of platoons (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page24">24</a>, <a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In the various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMPANY AMMUNITION WAGONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a>, <a href="#Page477">477</a>, -<a href="#Page479">479</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a>, <a href="#Page482">482</a>, <a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMPANY COLUMN (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page60">60</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COMPANY COMMANDER,</li> -<li class="level1">Duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CONCENTRATED FIRE, machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CONCENTRATION</li> -<li class="level1">For action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page205">205</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French, into <i>carré de division</i>, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CONE OF DISPERSION, machine gun fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page264">264</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CONE OF MISSES, Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CONTAINING ACTIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Delaying action and holding attack compared <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COÖPERATION</li> -<li class="level1">Formation of a battalion in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page213">213</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry and artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a>, <a href="#Page352">352</a>, <a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Difficulties of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COUNTER-ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page378">378</a>, <a href="#Page428">428</a>, <a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">After position is carried <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Decision brought about by the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a>, <a href="#Page435">435</a>, -<a href="#Page436">436</a>, <a href="#Page437">437</a>, <a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a>, <a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In conjunction with a movement to the rear <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page434">434</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moment for making <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page432">432</a>, <a href="#Page434">434</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a>, <a href="#Page439">439</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COURTS OF ARBITRATION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COVER</li> -<li class="level1">Sand bag <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a>, <a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page256">256</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">By firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page138">138</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">COVER TRENCHES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef1">CRAWLING<span class="pagenum" id="Page497">[497]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page86">86</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How executed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page87">87</a>, <a href="#Page88">88</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CUTTING WEAPONS, wounds produced by (%) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page384">384</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">CYCLISTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page28">28</a>, <a href="#Page29">29</a>, <a href="#Page30">30</a>, <a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Depth of detachment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page29">29</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rate of march of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page29">29</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of, on battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">D.</li> - -<li class="level0">“D” BULLET</li> -<li class="level1">Data regarding <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page130">130</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Effect on steel shields <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DANGER, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DANGER SPACE, definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEEP COLUMN (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEFENSE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion group intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Clearing the foreground <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat sections, division of the position into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Communicating trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a>, <a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company, frontage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Comparison with attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page329">329</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page423">423</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a>, <a href="#Page428">428</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">After position is carried <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Frontal <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Moment for making <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page432">432</a>, <a href="#Page434">434</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page419">419</a>-<a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distance of general reserve from defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dummy intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Field magazines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page427">427</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Firing trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flanks, protection of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page425">425</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation of a battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page213">213</a>, <a href="#Page214">214</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fortifying the position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page415">415</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Framework of the position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a>, <a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage of a battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Frontage of a </span>Company <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">General reserve, location of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">General reserve, </span>Position of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page429">429</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">General reserve, </span>Strength of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page431">431</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Interval between general reserve and defensive line<span class="pagenum" id="Page498">[498]</span> -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching, time essential for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page416">416</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenchments, purpose of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page416">416</a>, <a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Long range fire, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page150">150</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page295">295</a>, <a href="#Page425">425</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Number of men required in temporary <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Observation of the foreground <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Obstacles, construction of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Occupation of the position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page426">426</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Offensive,</li> -<li class="level2">Assumption of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page428">428</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">—defensive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Necessity of assuming the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Passive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Position,</li> -<li class="level2">Advanced <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Determining factors in selecting a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Division of the, into sections <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Fortifying the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page415">415</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Framework of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Requirements of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Purely passive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Range finding instruments, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Refusing a flank <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page425">425</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserve, strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Section reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sections, division of the position into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Seeking a decision <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a>, <a href="#Page234">234</a>, -<a href="#Page409">409</a>, <a href="#Page450">450</a>, <a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Splinter proofs <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>, <a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Superiority of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page427">427</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supports <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Temporary,</li> -<li class="level2">Frontage in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Number of men required in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Occupation of a position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Terrain, character of, required by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time for opening fire, in (general rules) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Traverses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trenches (dimensions) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Troops required to occupy the position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a>, <a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Weak points, strengthening of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page412">412</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a>, <a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Number of men required <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DELAYING ACTION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with holding attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEMOLITION TOOLS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEPLOYMENT<span class="pagenum" id="Page499">[499]</span> -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page78">78</a>, <a href="#Page80">80</a>, <a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">For action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France, from 4-rank formation (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page65">65</a>, -<a href="#Page66">66</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Initial, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef16">DEPTH</li> -<li class="level1">Battalion on the march <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cyclist detachment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page29">29</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a>-<a href="#Page225">225</a>, -<a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page237">237</a>, <a href="#Page241">241</a>, <a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DEVELOPMENT FOR ACTION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page216">216</a>, <a href="#Page217">217</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DISARMAMENT, proposals for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DISCIPLINE and the moral factors <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page107">107</a>, <a href="#Page108">108</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DISPERSION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page33">33</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DISTANCE,</li> -<li class="level1">Definition of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a>, <a href="#Page424">424</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Between elements in the battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a>, <a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Facing, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">General reserve from defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Support from firing line in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page99">99</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Maximum, when necessary <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Necessity for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page224">224</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Necessity for, increase with size of force <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a>, <a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relation to frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page225">225</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page223">223</a>, <a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DIVISION, attack formation, France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DOUBLE COLUMN, France (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DOUBLE TIME <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page55">55</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DRILL AND TRAINING <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page105">105</a>, <a href="#Page106">106</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DRILL ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page204">204</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">DRILL, importance of combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page105">105</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef14">DRILL REGULATIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page13">13</a>-<a href="#Page16">16</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various—see under name of country</li> - -<li class="level0">DUMMY INTRENCHMENTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a>, <a href="#Page423">423</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">E.</li> - -<li class="level0">ECHELON FORMATION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">EFFECT OF FIRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">As regards time <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page172">172</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">At medium ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page151">151</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the elevation selected <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On artillery when unlimbering <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On close order formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On thin and dense skirmish lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Standard of measurement of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">EFFICACY OF FIRE<span class="pagenum" id="Page500">[500]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Against hill positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dependent upon accuracy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the ground on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of training <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ELEVATIONS, rear sight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page165">165</a>, <a href="#Page310">310</a></span></li> -<li class="level0">ÉLITE TROOPS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page21">21</a>, <a href="#Page22">22</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ENGLAND</li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a>, <a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page482">482</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page459">459</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation of infantry and artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a>, <a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire fight in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page461">461</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire of position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page154">154</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page154">154</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>Kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page460">460</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Group intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Holding attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page447">447</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page459">459</a>-<a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Infantry </span>Versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page314">314</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page289">289</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">And infantry, relative fire effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page266">266</a>, <a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Views on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mounted infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page26">26</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Normal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page203">203</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rallying position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page460">460</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, use of, prior to Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page397">397</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a>, <a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page482">482</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Telephone detachments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ENVELOPMENT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page356">356</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dangers involved <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page358">358</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page363">363</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a>-<a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page363">363</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a>, <a href="#Page363">363</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ESKADRONS<span class="pagenum" id="Page501">[501]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Number in German brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page32">32</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ESTIMATING DISTANCES—see Range</li> - -<li class="level0">EQUIPMENT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page38">38</a>-<a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page38">38</a>-<a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tent, weight of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Weight of, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples from military history <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a>-<a href="#Page474">474</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Franco-German War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russo-Turkish War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">EXPLOSIVES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">EXTENDED ORDER <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page75">75</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page81">81</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">F.</li> - -<li class="level0">FACING DISTANCE, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIELD ARTILLERY—see <a href="#IndRef5">Artillery</a></li> - -<li class="level0">FIELD GUN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page111">111</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef11">FIELD MAGAZINES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIELD TRAIN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIGHTING UNIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page33">33</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FILE CLOSERS, position of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef8">FIRE</li> -<li class="level1">Accelerated, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Beaten zone, definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Collective, effect of accuracy in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combined sights <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page166">166</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commands for firing <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page166">166</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Constant cone of misses, Wolozkoi’s theory of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Continuous, fatigue produced by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Control <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page134">134</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Curve of hits obtained by various marksmen <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page170">170</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Danger space, definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Direction <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page134">134</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Discipline <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page133">133</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution of, against charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">As regards time <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page172">172</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">At medium ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page151">151</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Influence of the elevation selected on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On artillery when unlimbering <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On close order formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On thin and dense skirmish lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Efficacy of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Against hill positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Dependent upon accuracy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Influence of the ground on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Influence of training on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Elevations and points of aim<span class="pagenum" id="Page502">[502]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page165">165</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">To be used in warding off cavalry charges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page310">310</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Employment of infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page132">132</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Expedients for minimizing the effect of hostile <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flanking <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formula for determining favorable range for firing against hill positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Hits obtained by various marksmen (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page171">171</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Hostile, expedients for minimizing effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Hostile, </span>Formations suitable under <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a>, <a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Hurried, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Increasing difficulties in adjusting hostile artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page119">119</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Indirect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page184">184</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page126">126</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Against charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">And machine gun, relative value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page265">265</a>-<a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page132">132</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influences affecting accuracy of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the ground on efficacy of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a>-<a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">To be used in warding off a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page310">310</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Long range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page148">148</a>, <a href="#Page150">150</a>-<a href="#Page153">153</a>, <a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses produced by long range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine gun—see <a href="#IndRef6">Machine Guns</a></li> -<li class="level1">Marksmanship, effect of, in collective <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Misses</li> -<li class="level2">Effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page191">191</a>, <a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page309">309</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Number of rounds to be expended to accomplish a certain result <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page172">172</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Oblique, effect of, against shielded batteries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Observation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pauses in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page149">149</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations in re kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Provisions of various regulations in re </span>Time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rafale <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rate of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">At various ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus waste of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page161">161</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ricochets, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page185">185</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rifle-rests, influence of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page178">178</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Superiority of, in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page427">427</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page147">147</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">General rules <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Training, influence of, on efficacy of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trial volleys <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Volley, value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a>, <a href="#Page163">163</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">With counted cartridges<span class="pagenum" id="Page503">[503]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Withholding the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page151">151</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of misses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE AT SUCCESSIVE RANGES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE EFFECT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">As regards time <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page172">172</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">At medium ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page151">151</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the elevation selected, on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On artillery when unlimbering <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On close order formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">On thin and dense skirmish lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Standard of measurement of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE FIGHT</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a>, <a href="#Page369">369</a>, <a href="#Page461">461</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page427">427</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Superiority of fire in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page370">370</a>-<a href="#Page371">371</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE FOR EFFECT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE OF POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRE WHILE IN MOTION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a>, <a href="#Page381">381</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austrian experiments with <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses when using <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRING LINE</li> -<li class="level1">Advance in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assembling the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page97">97</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Closing in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page97">97</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page75">75</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Prolonging the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Re-forming the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page97">97</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reinforcing the, method of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Selection of line to be occupied by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page138">138</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength and density <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page75">75</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page139">139</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of cover by the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page138">138</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIRING TRENCHES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a>, <a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FIXING BAYONETS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page372">372</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Signal for, in assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page377">377</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FLAGS, Guidon <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a>, <a href="#Page63">63</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FLANK ATTACK</li> -<li class="level1">Separation from holding attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FLANKS, protection of the, in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page425">425</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FOREGROUND, division into sections <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FORMAL TACTICS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FORMATIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance through woods <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assembly <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a>, <a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a>, <a href="#Page52">52</a>, -<a href="#Page58">58</a>, <a href="#Page62">62</a>, <a href="#Page69">69</a>, <a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>-<a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page504">[504]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page43">43</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Belgium <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>-<a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a>, <a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a>, <a href="#Page65">65</a>, -<a href="#Page66">66</a>, <a href="#Page70">70</a>, <a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a>, <a href="#Page52">52</a>, -<a href="#Page57">57</a>, <a href="#Page60">60</a>, <a href="#Page62">62</a>, <a href="#Page67">67</a>, -<a href="#Page68">68</a>, <a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page318">318</a>, <a href="#Page321">321</a>-<a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of various rifles on density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a>, <a href="#Page70">70</a>, <a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a>, <a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Line and column, comparison of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page43">43</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page287">287</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Netherlands <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a>-<a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Purpose of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regiment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Route <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a>, <a href="#Page62">62</a>, <a href="#Page69">69</a>, <a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sweden <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page71">71</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tactical, importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page108">108</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Troops in rear of firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of various <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page181">181</a>, <a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Warding off a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FORTIFYING THE POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page415">415</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FORTRESS WARFARE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page13">13</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FOURS, column of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with column of squads <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page59">59</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How formed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FRAMEWORK OF A POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FRANCE</li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance in mass formation in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery fire, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page123">123</a>, <a href="#Page124">124</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assembly (<i>carré de division</i>) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Artillery in the preparatory action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Formation</li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Attack Formation </span>Battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Attack Formation </span>Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Attack Formation </span>Division <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Infantry preparation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page454">454</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formation of the (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Strength of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><i>Contre attaque</i> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation of infantry and artillery<span class="pagenum" id="Page505">[505]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page378">378</a>, <a href="#Page439">439</a>, <a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In conjunction with a movement to the rear <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page434">434</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page363">363</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page159">159</a>, <a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire pauses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page154">154</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a>, <a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Group attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page255">255</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Group combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a>, <a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a>-<a href="#Page459">459</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page315">315</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching, tool equipment (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page416">416</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page159">159</a>, <a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Line of company columns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Offensive return <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Platoon in 4-rank formation (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page65">65</a>, <a href="#Page66">66</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparatory attack formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pure frontal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rafale fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><i>Retour offensif</i> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a>, <a href="#Page91">91</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Signal detachments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supports, conduct in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page456">456</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Units of direction <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page219">219</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of various formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef4">FRONTAGE</li> -<li class="level1">Army corps in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page460">460</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion in attack and defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Belgium <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a>, <a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Company in </span>Attack and defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Company in </span>Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Company in </span>Rear guard action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Considerations governing in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page229">229</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense, factors governing in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Defense, </span>Seeking a decision <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a>, <a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Defense, </span>Temporary <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England<span class="pagenum" id="Page506">[506]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a>, <a href="#Page460">460</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page223">223</a>, <a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a>, <a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Maximum, when justifiable <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Overextension of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a>, <a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regiment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relation to distribution in depth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page225">225</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Resumé of most important points governing <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page241">241</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Various battles <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FRONTAL COUNTER-ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a>, <a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE in various countries (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">G.</li> - -<li class="level0">GAPS IN THE ATTACKING LINE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GAPS IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GATLING GUN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GENERAL RESERVE</li> -<li class="level1">Distance from defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Interval from flank of defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Position of the, in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a>, <a href="#Page429">429</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page431">431</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GERMANY</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Broad column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry brigade, number of <i>Eskadrons</i> in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column of platoons (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column of squads and route column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Strength of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page60">60</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration, defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page205">205</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deep column (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a>, <a href="#Page68">68</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Development for action, defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth, defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><i>Eskadron</i>, strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page32">32</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool equipment (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns—see <a href="#IndRef6">Machine Guns</a></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, ascertaining <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page143">143</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes<span class="pagenum" id="Page507">[507]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">“To form for attack,” definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GROUND, influence of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GROUP INTRENCHMENTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GUARDS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page22">22</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">GUIDON FLAGS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a>, <a href="#Page63">63</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of the use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page355">355</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">H.</li> - -<li class="level0">HATCHET, weight of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HEADQUARTERS, distribution of work at <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page245">245</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HELIOGRAPH, use of, on the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HISTORY—see <a href="#IndRef7">Military History</a></li> - -<li class="level0">HITS</li> -<li class="level1">Number of, obtained by various marksmen (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Curves of hits (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page170">170</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percentage of, standard of measurement of effect of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HOLDING ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with delaying action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page445">445</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Separation from flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page446">446</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HOTCHKISS MACHINE GUN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">HOWITZER</li> -<li class="level1">Heavy field <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Light field <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page116">116</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">I.</li> - -<li class="level0">INDIVIDUALISM, influence of, on tactics <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page201">201</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INDIRECT FIRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page184">184</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INFANTRY FIRE—see Fire</li> - -<li class="level0">INFLUENCE OF THE GROUND <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page179">179</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INFANTRY</li> -<li class="level1">Advance under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page318">318</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance under fire, rules for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page367">367</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack</li> -<li class="level2">In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a>-<a href="#Page345">345</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On dismounted cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat</li> -<li class="level2">According to various drill regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a>-<a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Against artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page316">316</a></span></li> -<li class="level2"><span class="hide">Against </span>Cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page301">301</a></span></li> -<li class="level4">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page314">314</a>-<a href="#Page315">315</a></span></li> -<li class="level2"><span class="hide">Against </span>Machine guns, general principles <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page268">268</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Value of, as compared with machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct under machine gun fire<span class="pagenum" id="Page508">[508]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page269">269</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation with artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a>, <a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cyclists <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page28">28</a>, <a href="#Page29">29</a>, <a href="#Page30">30</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deployment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page201">201</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">For firing on charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page303">303</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Élite <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page21">21</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Equipment, weight of (table) in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, effect of, against shielded batteries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a>, <a href="#Page325">325</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect, as compared with machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page265">265</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire of position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Firing on artillery in position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations for advancing under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page318">318</a>, -<a href="#Page321">321</a>, <a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Importance and employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page19">19</a>-<a href="#Page32">32</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japanese, tactics in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local reconnaissance of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses in Franco-German War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Percentage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page188">188</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Manner of fighting <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page19">19</a>, <a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Method of warding off a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page304">304</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mounted infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page25">25</a>, <a href="#Page26">26</a>, <a href="#Page27">27</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Passage through artillery lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page316">316</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Proportion to other arms <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page19">19</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relative strength as compared to cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russian, tactics in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Screen for artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tactical unit <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page32">32</a>-<a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tactics in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time for opening fire on charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INFANTRY COMBAT</li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a>-<a href="#Page450">450</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page459">459</a>-<a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a>-<a href="#Page459">459</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a>-<a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a>-<a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a>-<a href="#Page467">467</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INFANTRY SCREEN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INFORMATION OFFICERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page245">245</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef12">INSTRUCTION</li> -<li class="level1">Method of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page7">7</a>-<a href="#Page13">13</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Applicatory (or inductive) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page10">10</a>, <a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deductive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Maneuvers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page8">8</a>, <a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Map problems <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page8">8</a>, <a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Military history, study of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page7">7</a>, <a href="#Page8">8</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGNS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page15">15</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INTERVAL</li> -<li class="level1">Between general reserve and flank of defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Definition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INTRENCHING IN ATTACK</li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan<span class="pagenum" id="Page509">[509]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page38">38</a>-<a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INTRENCHING TOOLS</li> -<li class="level1">General rules for use in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page393">393</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page393">393</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">INTRENCHMENTS</li> -<li class="level1">Battalion groups of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Communicating trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dimensions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dummy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a>, <a href="#Page423">423</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Field magazines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Firing trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a>, <a href="#Page419">419</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Foreground, clearing the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Foreground, </span>Observation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Narrow trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Obstacles, construction of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Purpose <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page416">416</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Splinter proofs <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Traverses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">IRON RATION, weight of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ITALY</li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition knapsacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page452">452</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company, strength of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Coöperation of infantry and artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cyclists, rate of march of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page29">29</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page362">362</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>Time for opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page154">154</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a>-<a href="#Page453">453</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool equipment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page451">451</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, ascertaining <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page143">143</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a>, <a href="#Page452">452</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of various formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">J.<span class="pagenum" id="Page510">[510]</span></li> - -<li class="level0">JAPAN</li> -<li class="level1">Advance in skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On a position prepared for defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a>, <a href="#Page342">342</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry</li> -<li class="level2">Combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a>-<a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page315">315</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pursuit <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a>, <a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level0">JÄGER <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page21">21</a>-<a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">K.</li> - -<li class="level0">KAISERJÄGER <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page24">24</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">KINDS OF FIRE—see <a href="#IndRef8">Fire</a></li> - -<li class="level0">KNAPSACKS</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Loss of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Weight of, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">L.</li> - -<li class="level0">LEADERS</li> -<li class="level1">Conduct in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a>, <a href="#Page400">400</a>, <a href="#Page401">401</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Posts in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page399">399</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LEADING—see <a href="#IndRef9">Troop Leading</a></li> - -<li class="level0">LESSONS OF THE BOER WAR, in re</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a>, <a href="#Page89">89</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, in re<span class="pagenum" id="Page511">[511]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire control and fire direction <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page137">137</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a>-<a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page89">89</a>, <a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LINE</li> -<li class="level1">Comparison with column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a>-<a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LINE FORMATION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LINE OF COMPANY COLUMNS, French (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page70">70</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LINE OF PLATOONS, vulnerability of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE—see <a href="#IndRef10">Reconnaissance</a></li> - -<li class="level0">LONG RANGE FIRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page148">148</a>, -<a href="#Page150">150</a>-<a href="#Page153">153</a>, <a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">LOSSES</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a>, <a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">British, in Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page193">193</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a>, <a href="#Page36">36</a>, -<a href="#Page45">45</a>, <a href="#Page50">50</a>, <a href="#Page51">51</a>, <a href="#Page153">153</a>, -<a href="#Page167">167</a>, <a href="#Page168">168</a>, <a href="#Page176">176</a>, <a href="#Page178">178</a>, -<a href="#Page188">188</a>, <a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a>, <a href="#Page193">193</a>, -<a href="#Page227">227</a>, <a href="#Page312">312</a>, <a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Franco-German War (by arm) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French Cuirassiers in charge at Vionville <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page312">312</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page185">185</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percentage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page188">188</a>, <a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Produced by</li> -<li class="level2">Long range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Artillery and infantry fire, comparison <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a>, <a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers and men, comparison <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page81">81</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">When using fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page92">92</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">M.</li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef6">MACHINE GUNS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Supply</li> -<li class="level3">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">Battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page291">291</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level3">Transportation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assignment to cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page296">296</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack, employment in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Basket mount <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battery (Germany)</li> -<li class="level2">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Column of platoons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Combat train <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page276">276</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page293">293</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Field train <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Fighting <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Movements and gaits <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Order in line<span class="pagenum" id="Page512">[512]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Relative combat value <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Route column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Section column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Belts, ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Colt <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column of platoons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat</li> -<li class="level2">Against artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level2"><span class="hide">Against </span>Cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page296">296</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Of infantry against, general principles <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page268">268</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Train <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Value as compared with skirmishers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Companies</li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page275">275</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cone of dispersion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page264">264</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Crawling into position (illustration) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page277">277</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Employment in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page425">425</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Development, historical <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">English views on employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page297">297</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Feldl gun <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page219">219</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Field train <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fighting battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Comparison with infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page265">265</a>-<a href="#Page267">267</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Concentrated <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Cone of dispersion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page264">264</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page264">264</a>, <a href="#Page294">294</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a>, <a href="#Page287">287</a>-<a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Progressive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Rate of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Sweeping <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a>, <a href="#Page287">287</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations</li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page287">287</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page264">264</a>, <a href="#Page294">294</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">As compared with a body of skirmishers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page265">265</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire of position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gatling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Going into position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page276">276</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Historical development <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Hotchkiss <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In position (illustration) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page279">279</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenched (illustration)<span class="pagenum" id="Page513">[513]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page281">281</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Kinds of fire</li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a>, <a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a>, <a href="#Page287">287</a>, <a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mitrailleuse <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mountain batteries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mounting, method of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a>, <a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Organization</li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a>, <a href="#Page271">271</a>, <a href="#Page275">275</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page291">291</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Order in line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>-<a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Progressive fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Schwarzlose <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Searching fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Section column <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sled mount <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sweeping fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Swiss views on employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page299">299</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Tripod mount <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Various countries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a>-<a href="#Page293">293</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Weights of various, with mounts <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page261">261</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MAGAZINES—see <a href="#IndRef11">Field Magazines</a></li> - -<li class="level0">MAIN BODY, conduct in a rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page336">336</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MAIN FIRING POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page369">369</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MANEUVERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page8">8</a>, <a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MAP PROBLEMS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page8">8</a>, <a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MARCH, rate of, cyclists <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page29">29</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MARCHING, length of pace and <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page53">53</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MARKSMANSHIP, value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page169">169</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MASKS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MATTOCK, weight of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, effect of, on range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">METHOD OF INSTRUCTION—see <a href="#IndRef12">Instruction</a></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef7">MILITARY HISTORY, EXAMPLES FROM</li> -<li class="level1">Abridged attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance, impulse from the rear <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page412">412</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Attack on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page89">89</a>, -<a href="#Page90">90</a>, <a href="#Page468">468</a>, <a href="#Page474">474</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery fire diverted from proper objective by advancing infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery supporting a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Artillery </span>Under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a>-<a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page376">376</a>, <a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting guidons, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page355">355</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a>-<a href="#Page345">345</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Formation of a brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalions, strength of<span class="pagenum" id="Page514">[514]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a>, <a href="#Page303">303</a>, -<a href="#Page304">304</a>, <a href="#Page305">305</a>, <a href="#Page306">306</a>, <a href="#Page308">308</a>, -<a href="#Page309">309</a>, <a href="#Page310">310</a>, <a href="#Page311">311</a>, <a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Changes of front <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a>, <a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Close order formation, effect of fire on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column as attack formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a>, <a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combats, duration of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page178">178</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Companies, consolidation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration for action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page205">205</a>, <a href="#Page209">209</a>, <a href="#Page210">210</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack</li> -<li class="level2">After position is carried <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Against a hostile flank <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page435">435</a>, <a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover,</li> -<li class="level2">Construction of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page257">257</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defensive position, location of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deployment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page206">206</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Of reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page369">369</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth and frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a>, <a href="#Page223">223</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dummy trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Effect of danger <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a>-<a href="#Page200">200</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Effect of </span>Fire on charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a>, <a href="#Page358">358</a>, -<a href="#Page359">359</a>, <a href="#Page360">360</a>, <a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Expenditure and supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a>-<a href="#Page474">474</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fatigue produced by continuous fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire,</li> -<li class="level2">Effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page132">132</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Kinds of, used in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a>, <a href="#Page159">159</a></span></li> -<li class="level2"><span class="hide">Kinds of, used in </span>Russo-Turkish War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a>, <a href="#Page159">159</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Withholding the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page151">151</a>, <a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire control and fire direction, difficulties of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page137">137</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect on close order formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire pauses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire preparation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page149">149</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire support during an assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page380">380</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flanking fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations suitable under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Formations suitable </span>Under artillery fire -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a>, <a href="#Page322">322</a>, <a href="#Page323">323</a>, -<a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a>, <a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">And distribution in depth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Of battalions at Mukden <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page211">211</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Overextension of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter attacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a>, <a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Improvised units, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of various rifles on density of battle formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page24">24</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Length of rushes and expenditure of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page89">89</a>-<a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lessons of the Boer War, in re attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Lessons of the </span>Russo-Japanese War, in re attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page250">250</a>, <a href="#Page253">253</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Long range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page149">149</a>, <a href="#Page150">150</a>, -<a href="#Page151">151</a>, <a href="#Page152">152</a>, <a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Long range fire </span>In defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses<span class="pagenum" id="Page515">[515]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a>, -<a href="#Page50">50</a>, <a href="#Page51">51</a>, <a href="#Page153">153</a>, <a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Percentage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page188">188</a>, <a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Produced by infantry and artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level2"><span class="hide">Produced by </span>Long range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Relative, officers to men <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a>, -<a href="#Page275">275</a>, <a href="#Page283">283</a>, <a href="#Page289">289</a>, <a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mistakes caused by trumpet signals <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page306">306</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Moral effect of </span>Fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page426">426</a></span></li> -<li class="level4"><span class="padl2">Gen.</span> Bennal’s impressions at Wörth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page191">191</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Moral effect of Fire </span>On charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page309">309</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Number of troops required for attack and defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Passage through timber <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, underestimation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page142">142</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Removal of packs <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a>, -<a href="#Page395">395</a>, <a href="#Page396">396</a>, <a href="#Page397">397</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a>, <a href="#Page94">94</a>, <a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Rushes, </span>Length of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page89">89</a>, <a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sand bags, use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a>, <a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Study of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page7">7</a>-<a href="#Page8">8</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page208">208</a>, <a href="#Page250">250</a>, -<a href="#Page252">252</a>, <a href="#Page331">331</a>, <a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surrender of British troops in Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page192">192</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Telephone communication at Mukden <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page247">247</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Temperature, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signals, mistakes caused by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">United attack, necessity of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page402">402</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a>, <a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Value of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page8">8</a>, <a href="#Page9">9</a>, <a href="#Page10">10</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Void of the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page194">194</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Volleys, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Woods, passage through <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wounds</li> -<li class="level2">Produced by cutting weapons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page384">384</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Character of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page128">128</a>, <a href="#Page129">129</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MINOR TACTICS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MISSES, effect of; Wolozkoi’s theory <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MITRAILLEUSE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page259">259</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MIXING OF ORGANIZATIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How prevented <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a>, <a href="#Page97">97</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MORAL EFFECT</li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page306">306</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page191">191</a>, <a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page309">309</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MORAL FACTORS and discipline <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page107">107</a>, <a href="#Page108">108</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MOUNTAIN TROOPS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MOUNTAIN WARFARE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MOUNTED INFANTRY <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page25">25</a>, <a href="#Page26">26</a>, <a href="#Page27">27</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MOUNTED MESSENGERS, use on battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">MUSICIANS<span class="pagenum" id="Page516">[516]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Duties in skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Posts in skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">N.</li> - -<li class="level0">NEEDLE GUN, compared with rifle, model 98, as regards flatness of trajectory <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NETHERLANDS, column of fours <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NIGHT ATTACKS, distribution in depth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NIGHT OPERATIONS, close order formations, importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page104">104</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, posts of, in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NORMAL ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page203">203</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">v. Boguslawski’s views <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page204">204</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Clausewitz’s views <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page204">204</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">v. Scherff’s views <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page205">205</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">NORMAL FORMATIONS, necessity for, in some countries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page201">201</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">O.</li> - -<li class="level0">OBSERVATION OF THE FOREGROUND <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Compared with deliberately planned attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a>, <a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OBSERVATION STATIONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OBSTACLES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OBUS ALLONGÉ <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page115">115</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OFFENSIVE</li> -<li class="level1">Assumption of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page428">428</a></span></li> -<li class="level0 faux"><span class="hide">OFFENSIVE </span>In defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Spirit of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page109">109</a>, <a href="#Page110">110</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OFFENSIVE RETURN (France) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page439">439</a>, <a href="#Page458">458</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OFFICERS</li> -<li class="level1">Demeanor, influence of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page84">84</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses among <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page50">50</a>, <a href="#Page51">51</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Franco-German War (by arm) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Relative to men <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">OPEN COLUMN, depth of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ORDER IN LINE, machine gun batteries <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ORDERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a>, <a href="#Page244">244</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Contents of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Issue of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In a rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page336">336</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ORGANIZATION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a>, <a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a>, <a href="#Page38">38</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a>, <a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns,<span class="pagenum" id="Page517">[517]</span></li> -<li class="level2">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page270">270</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mounted infantry (England) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page26">26</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regiment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ORGANIZATIONS</li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">How prevented <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page96">96</a>, <a href="#Page97">97</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of improvised <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">P.</li> - -<li class="level0">PACE</li> -<li class="level1">Diminution of length of, on various slopes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page141">141</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Length of, and marching <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page53">53</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Length of, </span>In various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PACES, number of, per minute <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PACKS, removal of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page363">363</a>, <a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PANIC <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page27">27</a>, <a href="#Page107">107</a>, <a href="#Page441">441</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PASSIVE DEFENSE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a>, <a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PATROLS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page27">27</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PEACE, eternal <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page1">1</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PENETRATION, “S” bullet <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page131">131</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PLATOON</li> -<li class="level1">Column of twos, vulnerability of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander, post in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page63">63</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Commander, post in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">French 4-rank formation (with plates) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page65">65</a>, <a href="#Page66">66</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry, strength of the German <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">One-rank, vulnerability of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PLATOONS</li> -<li class="level1">Column of (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page61">61</a>, <a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">How formed <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page49">49</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Machine gun battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Division of the company into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Three or four platoons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">POSITION</li> -<li class="level1">Advance into a preparatory <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page350">350</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion groups of intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Communicating trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Determining factors in selecting a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dummy intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Foreground, clearing the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Foreground, </span>Division into sections <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Foreground, </span>Observation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fortifying the<span class="pagenum" id="Page518">[518]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page415">415</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Framework of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the defensive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenchments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>-<a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Obstacles, construction of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Occupation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page426">426</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rallying <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Requisites of a defensive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russian views in re defensive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sections, divisions into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Temporary occupation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">POSTS</li> -<li class="level1">Battalion commander in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander in a rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company commander in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Musicians in skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a>, <a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Non-commissioned officers in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Platoon commanders in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page63">63</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Platoon commanders in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Range finders in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Range finders in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a>, <a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Squad leaders in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Squad leaders in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Regimental commander in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page352">352</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page346">346</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">By artillery, provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page354">354</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PREPARATORY POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page350">350</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PROGRESSIVE FIRE</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PURE FRONTAL ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">PURSUIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">Q.</li> - -<li class="level0">QUICK TIME, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">R.</li> - -<li class="level0">RAFALE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a>, <a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RALLYING POSITION <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page460">460</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Occupation of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page443">443</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef13">RANGE</li> -<li class="level1">Altitude, effect of, on the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ascertaining the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Pacing and galloping <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page141">141</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page143">143</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ascertaining the<span class="pagenum" id="Page519">[519]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Range finding instruments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Trial volleys <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Error of estimation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page141">141</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formulae for determining favorable range for firing against hill positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of error in estimating the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page170">170</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Influence of </span>Knowledge of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page140">140</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Meteorological conditions, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Range finding instruments, permissible error <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trial volleys <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RANGE FINDERS</li> -<li class="level1">Classification <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page143">143</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Duties in machine gun detachments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Post in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a>, <a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RANGE FINDING INSTRUMENTS</li> -<li class="level1">Errors permissible <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Principle of construction <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page146">146</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RANGING—see <a href="#IndRef13">Range</a></li> - -<li class="level0">RANKS, influence of rate of fire upon the number of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RATIONS, weight of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">REAR GUARD ACTION, frontage of a company in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef10">RECONNAISSANCE</li> -<li class="level1">Companies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page251">251</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Detachments of all arms <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page251">251</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page346">346</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In force <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page251">251</a>, <a href="#Page347">347</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page347">347</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Local, </span>Object of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Local, </span>Of the infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Patrols and scouting detachments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page27">27</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">REGIMENT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry, strength of German <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page236">236</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page214">214</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page73">73</a>, <a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Importance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page37">37</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">REGIMENTAL COMMANDER</li> -<li class="level1">Duties in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Post in action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page400">400</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">REGULATIONS—see <a href="#IndRef14">Drill Regulations</a></li> - -<li class="level0">REMOVAL OF PACKS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page363">363</a>, <a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RENCONTRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, conduct of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page334">334</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page448">448</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander, position of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of main body <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page336">336</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page464">464</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns, examples of, in a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page295">295</a>, <a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Main body, launching of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page338">338</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Orders, issue of<span class="pagenum" id="Page520">[520]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page336">336</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of echelon formation in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page74">74</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, influence of, on war <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RESERVE</li> -<li class="level1">Employment of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page394">394</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a>, -<a href="#Page395">395</a>, <a href="#Page396">396</a>, <a href="#Page397">397</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">General, distance from defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">General, </span>Interval from flank of defensive line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page430">430</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">General, </span>Position in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page429">429</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">General, </span>Strength of, in defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page431">431</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">In retreat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Launching or withholding the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page396">396</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Section <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Size of, in various units <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page235">235</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of the (in attack and defense) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RETREAT</li> -<li class="level1">Direction of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page440">440</a>, <a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rallying position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserve <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page442">442</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RICOCHETS, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page185">185</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RIFLE—see <a href="#IndRef15">Rifles</a></li> - -<li class="level0">RIFLEMEN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page22">22</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RIFLE-RESTS, influence of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page178">178</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef15">RIFLES</li> -<li class="level1">Automatic <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page126">126</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of various, on density of battle formations (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Used in Russo-Japanese War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page127">127</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Weight of, in various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">ROAD SPACE—see <a href="#IndRef16">Depth</a></li> - -<li class="level0">ROUTE COLUMN (with plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine gun battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef2">RUSHES</li> -<li class="level1">Advance by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page82">82</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page462">462</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of the employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a>, <a href="#Page94">94</a>, <a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gait to be employed in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page82">82</a>, <a href="#Page86">86</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">How made in various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a>, <a href="#Page91">91</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page452">452</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a>, <a href="#Page463">463</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Length of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page83">83</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lessons of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a>, <a href="#Page89">89</a>, <a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Long or short <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a>, <a href="#Page86">86</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Preparation for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page83">83</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a>-<a href="#Page91">91</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Short or long <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page85">85</a>, <a href="#Page86">86</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of the rushing unit <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page83">83</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time required for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page83">83</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">RUSSIA<span class="pagenum" id="Page521">[521]</span></li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page413">413</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, how carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Regulations in re <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page381">381</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalion, formations of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a>, <a href="#Page73">73</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Column of platoons (plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page62">62</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Company, strength of (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page35">35</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defensive position, views on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page422">422</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, kinds of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page160">160</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page242">242</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front and facing distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page48">48</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry</li> -<li class="level2">Combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page315">315</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tool equipment of Russian companies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page38">38</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Load carried by soldier <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pace, length and number per minute <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page54">54</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, ascertaining <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page143">143</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page91">91</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sandbag cover, results of experiments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish line, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supply of ammunition <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of general reserve <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page397">397</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Use of </span>Spade in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">S.</li> -<li class="level0">“S” BULLET</li> -<li class="level1">Effect on corpses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page130">130</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Effect on </span>Materials <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page131">131</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Effect on </span>Steel shields <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SAND BAGS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a>, <a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Results of Russian experiments <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SCHWARZLOSE MACHINE GUN <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SCOUTING DETACHMENTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page27">27</a>, <a href="#Page28">28</a>, <a href="#Page414">414</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Use of, in reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page252">252</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SEARCHING FIRE</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SECONDARY ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SECTIONS</li> -<li class="level1">Assignment of combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page243">243</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defensive position, division into combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page411">411</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Division of the platoon into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SECTION COLUMN, machine gun battery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page273">273</a>, <a href="#Page274">274</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SHARPSHOOTER PLATOONS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page21">21</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SHELL</li> -<li class="level1">Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page117">117</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percussion (Model 96) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page115">115</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time (Model 96)<span class="pagenum" id="Page522">[522]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page116">116</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Time </span>(Model 98) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page118">118</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SHIELDS</li> -<li class="level1">Protection afforded by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page324">324</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SHRAPNEL</li> -<li class="level1">Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page117">117</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Effect (tables) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page114">114</a>, <a href="#Page122">122</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">On animate targets <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page125">125</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Incendiary effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page112">112</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Percussion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page111">111</a>, <a href="#Page112">112</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Time <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page112">112</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SIGNAL LAMPS, use of, on battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SIGNALS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assemble <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attention <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deploy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Employment of, by combat patrols <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fix bayonet <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a>, <a href="#Page377">377</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Halt <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Misunderstanding of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SITUATION, estimate of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page11">11</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SKI DETACHMENTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page30">30</a>, <a href="#Page31">31</a>, <a href="#Page32">32</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SKI RUNNERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page30">30</a>, <a href="#Page31">31</a>, <a href="#Page32">32</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SKIRMISH LINES</li> -<li class="level1">Boer advance in thin <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page75">75</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page256">256</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Efficacy of fire against thin and dense (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire effect, as compared with machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page265">265</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page78">78</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In various armies <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page80">80</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaits of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page81">81</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japanese advance in thin <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page81">81</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page81">81</a>, <a href="#Page82">82</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Thin and dense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Vulnerability of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SNOW SHOE MARCHING <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page30">30</a>, <a href="#Page31">31</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SPADE</li> -<li class="level1">Use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a>, <a href="#Page388">388</a>, -<a href="#Page392">392</a>, <a href="#Page449">449</a>, <a href="#Page457">457</a>, <a href="#Page465">465</a>, -<a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Small, weight of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page40">40</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SPLINTER PROOFS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a>, <a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SQUAD LEADERS</li> -<li class="level1">Posts in close order <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a>, <a href="#Page47">47</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Posts in </span>Skirmish line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page79">79</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SQUADS</li> -<li class="level1">Column of, compared with column of fours <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page59">59</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Column of, </span>(Plate) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page57">57</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Division of the company into <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page46">46</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine gun, composition and duties of members of (Germany)<span class="pagenum" id="Page523">[523]</span> -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">STAFFS, division of work in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page245">245</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">STRATEGY</li> -<li class="level1">Definitions of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page4">4</a>, <a href="#Page5">5</a>, <a href="#Page6">6</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relation of tactics to <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page6">6</a>, <a href="#Page7">7</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SUPERIORITY OF FIRE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page370">370</a>, <a href="#Page371">371</a>, <a href="#Page427">427</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION</li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page479">479</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deductions from various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">England <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page482">482</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Germany <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page476">476</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Italy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page483">483</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russia <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a>, <a href="#Page480">480</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Various armies (table) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page475">475</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SUPPORTS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a>, <a href="#Page99">99</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page100">100</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">In attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page368">368</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advantages of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Arguments against <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page101">101</a>, <a href="#Page102">102</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Commander, duties of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page100">100</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct, French regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page455">455</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Defense <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deployment in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page369">369</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distance from firing line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a>, <a href="#Page99">99</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Duties <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page100">100</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Movements <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page100">100</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Necessity <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Purpose <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SURPRISE <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Examples of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page331">331</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SURRENDER, British troops in Boer War <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page192">192</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SWEDEN, column of fours <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page58">58</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">SWEEPING FIRE</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page263">263</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">T.</li> - -<li class="level0">TACTICAL FORMATIONS, Importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page108">108</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TACTICAL MISSIONS, compared with united action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page401">401</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TACTICAL UNIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page32">32</a>, <a href="#Page33">33</a>, <a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TACTICS</li> -<li class="level1">Applied <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a>, <a href="#Page13">13</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Changes in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page13">13</a>, <a href="#Page14">14</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Definitions of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page4">4</a>, <a href="#Page5">5</a>, <a href="#Page6">6</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formal <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Grand <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japanese infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Minor <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page12">12</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Relation of strategy to <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page6">6</a>-<a href="#Page7">7</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Russian infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TARGET, selection of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page524">[524]</span> <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page147">147</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TASKS</li> -<li class="level1">Assignment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page218">218</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dangers of assigning <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page405">405</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TELEGRAPH, FIELD, use of, on battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TELEPHONE, FIELD, use of, in infantry combat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TEMPORARY OCCUPATION of a position <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page408">408</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TERRAIN, importance of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TIMBER, advance through <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TRAINING and drill <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page105">105</a>, <a href="#Page106">106</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of, on efficacy of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page168">168</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TRAVERSES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page417">417</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TRENCHES <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page416">416</a>-<a href="#Page420">420</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dimensions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page418">418</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef9">TROOP LEADING</li> -<li class="level1">Duties of higher <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page366">366</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Duties of </span>Minor <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page365">365</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TROOP UNIT <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page34">34</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TRUMPET SIGNALS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page41">41</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">TWOS, column of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page56">56</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">U.</li> - -<li class="level0">UNIFORM, color of, influence on visibility <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page119">119</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">UNITED ACTION</li> -<li class="level1">Compared with tactical missions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page401">401</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dangers of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page405">405</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">UNITED STATES, three-unit organization <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page38">38</a>, <a href="#Page218">218</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">UNIVERSAL SERVICE, influence of, on war <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page4">4</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">USE OF SPADE IN ATTACK <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Austria <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page449">449</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">France <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page457">457</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Japan <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page465">465</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Provisions of various regulations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Switzerland <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page466">466</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">V.</li> - -<li class="level0">VOID OF THE BATTLEFIELD <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page194">194</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">VOLLEY</li> -<li class="level1">Value of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a>, <a href="#Page163">163</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trial <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page145">145</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">VULNERABILITY of various formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page186">186</a>, <a href="#Page187">187</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">W.<span class="pagenum" id="Page525">[525]</span></li> - -<li class="level0">WAR <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page2">2</a>, <a href="#Page3">3</a>, <a href="#Page4">4</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Importance and necessity of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page2">2</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of representative government in reducing number of wars <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of universal service on <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page4">4</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lessons of, in re attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Lessons of, in re </span>Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a>, <a href="#Page89">89</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Purpose of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page4">4</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><i>Ultimo ratio</i> of state policy <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page2">2</a>, <a href="#Page3">3</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WEAPONS, changes and improvements in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page13">13</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WIGWAG FLAGS, use of, in infantry action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page246">246</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WIRE CUTTERS <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page39">39</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WITHDRAWAL <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page441">441</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Conduct of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page441">441</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WOLOZKOI’S THEORY of the constant cone of misses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page173">173</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WOODS, advance through <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0">WOUNDS</li> -<li class="level1">Produced by cutting weapons, (%) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page384">384</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Produced by </span>Infantry and artillery fire, comparison <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page167">167</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Produced by </span>Jacketed bullets <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page129">129</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Produced by </span>Shrapnel bullets <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page125">125</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Produced by </span>Small arms in Russo-Japanese War, character of -<span class="righttext"><a href="#Page127">127</a>, <a href="#Page128">128</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">Z.</li> - -<li class="level0">ZONE FIRE, artillery <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page320">320</a></span></li> - -</ul> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page526">[526-<br />527]<a id="Page527"></a></span></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak">INDEX OF -EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY.</h3> - -</div><!--chapter--> - -<ul class="index"> - -<li class="newletter">A.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Aiaslar</span>, August 25, 1877. <span class="righttext fsize80">PAGE</span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Albuera</span>, 1811.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Amiens</span>, November 27, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Austerlitz.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Attacking column, formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Azay</span>, January 6, 1871.</li> -<li class="level1">Masks, effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page112">112</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">B.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Baalon</span>, September 17, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page331">331</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Beaumont</span>, August 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Advance guard, deployment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a>, <a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery, losses of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page309">309</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Deployment of an advance guard <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a>, <a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a>, <a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a>, <a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ineffective rapid fire at short ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page162">162</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Line of platoons in columns of twos <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses, artillery under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page331">331</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Woods, passage through <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Beaune la Bolande</span>, November 28, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page470">470</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Ammunition, </span>Shortage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Short range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Withholding the fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Belmont</span>, November 22, 1899.</li> -<li class="level1">Night march <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page351">351</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Boer War</span>—see <a href="#IndRef17">South African War</a> (1899-1902).</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Busaco.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Buzanval</span>, January 19, 1871.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page470">470</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter"><span class="pagenum" id="Page528">[528]</span>C.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Casablanca</span>, 1907.</li> -<li class="level1">Effect of infantry fire on charging cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Chagey</span>, January 11, 1871.</li> -<li class="level1">Short range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Champigny</span>, November 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page471">471</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the ground on efficacy of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Jägers, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Chevilly</span>, November 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Chlum</span> (Königgrätz), 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Colenso</span>, December 15, 1899.</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Boer position, location of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Density of battle line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Insufficient reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a>, <a href="#Page426">426</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pure frontal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance, lack of local <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page249">249</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Withholding the fire, moral effect <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Colombey</span>, August 14, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack on Aubigny <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page405">405</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Attack </span>On the “Tannenwäldchen” <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page403">403</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page199">199</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Coulmiers</span>, November 9, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition supply <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page484">484</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserve, employment of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Coulomiers</span>, December 15, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Withholding the fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Custozza</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Cavalry charge </span>Moral effect of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page200">200</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page396">396</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">D.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Daix</span>, November 26, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page484">484</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Datshishiao</span>, July 24, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example"><span class="pagenum" id="Page529">[529]</span>Diamond Hill</span>, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Doornkop</span>, May 29, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Opening fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page150">150</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">E.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Etoges</span>, 1814.</li> -<li class="level1">Infantry versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">F.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Franco-German War</span> (1870-71).</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page468">468</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Close order formations, impossibility of employing, in first line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, efficacy of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontages <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page237">237</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses among officers, percentage of (by arm) <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page20">20</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers, number of, per 1000 men <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page51">51</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Proportion of the various arms <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page19">19</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Fuchau</span>, 1905.</li> -<li class="level1">Local reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">G.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Garcia Hernandez</span>, 1812.</li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page309">309</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Gitschin</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Gorni Bugarov</span>, January 1, 1878.</li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Short range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Gorni Dubniac</span>, October 24, 1877.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault, inability to <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page409">409</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, ineffectiveness of uphill <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page389">389</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Isolated attacks with inadequate forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page223">223</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, deployment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page369">369</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes, advance by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Signal for attack, failure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength, relative, of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef19"><span class="example">Gravelotte</span> (St. Privat).</li> -<li class="level1">Advance to the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page471">471</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery under infantry fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page376">376</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack made by the III. Army Corps <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page398">398</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page530">[530]</span>Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Close order formations under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Columns of twos, line of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Companies, consolidation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration for action <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page210">210</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Density of battle lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Enfilade fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire,</li> -<li class="level2">Artillery under infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Close order formation under <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Columns of twos, line of, under <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Enfilade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Long range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Pause <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Perseverance under <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page108">108</a>, <a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Uphill, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flanking fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry fire, artillery under <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenchments, construction of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses, aggregate and detail <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page188">188</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses, </span>At various ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses, </span>Franz regiment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses, </span>Officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page33">33</a>, <a href="#Page51">51</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lull in the fight at Point du Jour <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page156">156</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">March formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mitrailleuses, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers, losses among <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page33">33</a>, <a href="#Page51">51</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Organizations, mixing of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, underestimation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page142">142</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance, relaxing in the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page347">347</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page398">398</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Stragglers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Uphill fire against trenches, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">H.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Haicheng</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions, several lines of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page412">412</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Hallue</span>, December 23, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page6">6</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Attempted, by first line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page360">360</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page232">232</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">l’Hay</span>, September 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Helmstedt</span>, July 25, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Change of front <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Hühnerwasser</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition found on the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter"><span class="pagenum" id="Page531">[531]</span>K.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Karahassankioi</span>, August 23, 1877.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Katzbach</span>, August 26, 1813.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack in line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page108">108</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Kazeljevo.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Kesselsdorf</span>, 1745.</li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Kinchau</span>, November 26, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page474">474</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Kolin</span>, 1757.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Königgrätz</span>, July 3, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Adjustment of fire facilitated by a poplar <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance to the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page205">205</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge, moral effect of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page306">306</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a>, <a href="#Page359">359</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Jägers, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">L.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Ladon</span>, November 26, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Ladonchamps</span> (near Metz).</li> -<li class="level1">Artillery fire, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Ladysmith</span>, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Supports <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page98">98</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Le Bourget</span>, October 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Columns of twos, line of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page121">121</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a>, <a href="#Page94">94</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Le Mans.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Battalions, strength of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gatling guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page260">260</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers, number present for duty <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page50">50</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Liao Yang</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a>, <a href="#Page474">474</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page155">155</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page392">392</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page291">291</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page208">208</a>, <a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="pagenum" id="Page532">[532]</span><span class="example">Linshinpu</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Lisaine.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page228">228</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Loigny</span>, December 2, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Advance to the battlefield <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack, <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a>, <a href="#Page435">435</a>, <a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Lovtcha</span>, September 1, 1877.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Registration mark for artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">M.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Magersfontain</span>, December 11, 1899.</li> -<li class="level1">Boer position, location of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Convalescence of wounded <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page129">129</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Dummy trenches <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page421">421</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page133">133</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a>, <a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lack of reinforcements <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page137">137</a>, <a href="#Page387">387</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pure frontal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance, lack of local <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page249">249</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reinforcements, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Withholding the fire, moral effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Maida.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Marengo</span>, 1800.</li> -<li class="level1">Attacking column, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Mars-la-Tour</span>—see <a href="#IndRef18">Vionville</a>.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Minden</span>, 1757.</li> -<li class="level1">Infantry versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Modder River</span>, November 28, 1899.</li> -<li class="level1">Boer position, location of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page410">410</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page132">132</a>, <a href="#Page371">371</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page426">426</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Opening fire at long range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page150">150</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page132">132</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Pure frontal attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page252">252</a>, <a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page252">252</a>, <a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Montoy</span> (Noisseville).</li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Mont Valérien</span>, January 19, 1871.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, shortage of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="pagenum" id="Page533">[533]</span><span class="example">Mukden</span>, 1905.</li> -<li class="level1">Advance in thin skirmish lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assault with cold steel <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page134">134</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack, mode of Japanese <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page343">343</a>, <a href="#Page344">344</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a>, <a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fights <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Construction of cover in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Gaps in the attacking line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page292">292</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a>, <a href="#Page396">396</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Sand bags, use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish lines, thin <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Telephone communication <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page247">247</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">N.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Nachod</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page231">231</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Nicholson’s Neck</span>, October 24, 1899.</li> -<li class="level1">Crawling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page87">87</a>, <a href="#Page88">88</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Volleys, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page157">157</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Noisseville.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page429">429</a>, <a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flank attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page358">358</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page332">332</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page253">253</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page331">331</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Nuits</span>, December 18, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Abridged attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">O.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Oerrshikiatsy</span> (Shaho), 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Orleans</span>, December 3, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of German battalions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page36">36</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">P.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Paardeberg</span>, February 18, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Advance without firing <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page149">149</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Convalescence of wounded <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page129">129</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Crawling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page87">87</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of, in attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page534">[534]</span>Opening fire at long range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page150">150</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reinforcements, lack of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish lines, thin <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Pieters Hill</span>, February 27, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Fire support <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page380">380</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page289">289</a>, <a href="#Page298">298</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Plevna</span>, 1877.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attacks with inadequate forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a>, <a href="#Page223">223</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fights <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Combat impressions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page191">191</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire, opening <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>Uphill, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Fire, </span>While in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Improvised units <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a>, <a href="#Page198">198</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Isolated attacks with inadequate forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a>, <a href="#Page223">223</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Knapsacks, loss of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses among officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Losses </span>At various ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a>, <a href="#Page177">177</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers, losses among <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Opening fire at long range <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page152">152</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ranges, underestimation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page142">142</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, deployment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page369">369</a></span></li> -<li class="level1"><span class="hide">Reserves, </span>Employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page234">234</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Underestimation of ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page142">142</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Volleys <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page158">158</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Podol</span>, June 26, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Jägers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Poplar Grove</span>, March 7, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Advance in attack formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page206">206</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack formation of a brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page207">207</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">R.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Russo-Japanese War.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance in thin skirmish lines <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page76">76</a>, <a href="#Page77">77</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formations under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a>, <a href="#Page322">322</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page137">137</a>, <a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Local reconnaissance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page250">250</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page290">290</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page89">89</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Strength of opposing forces <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wounds, character of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page128">128</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Russo-Turkish War</span>, 1877-78.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page472">472</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page222">222</a>, <a href="#Page223">223</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attacks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page176">176</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter"><span class="pagenum" id="Page535">[535]</span>S.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">St. Privat</span>—see <a href="#IndRef19">Gravelotte</a>.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">St. Quentin</span>, January 19, 1871.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack on Grugies, isolated <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page403">403</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Sandepu</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses among officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Sapignies.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Scheinovo</span>, January 9, 1878.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page94">94</a>, <a href="#Page95">95</a>, <a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page303">303</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page94">94</a>, <a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page94">94</a>, <a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Simultaneous attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page361">361</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Sedan.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page308">308</a>, <a href="#Page310">310</a>, <a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses among officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page51">51</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page197">197</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Packs, removal of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Shaho</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Advanced positions <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery, capture of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page326">326</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack formation of a brigade <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page343">343</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page239">239</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Infantry attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page343">343</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page292">292</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page396">396</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Shiliho</span>, 1905.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page344">344</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page90">90</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Shipka Pass</span>, 1877.</li> -<li class="level1">Short range fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Skalitz</span>, 1812.</li> -<li class="level1">Jägers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Slivnica</span>, November 17 and 19, 1885.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses at long ranges <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page177">177</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Solferino</span>, 1859.</li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Soor</span>, 1745.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Soor</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Jägers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef17"><span class="pagenum" id="Page536">[536]</span><span class="example">South African War</span> (1899-1902).</li> -<li class="level1">Assaults <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page379">379</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Crawling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page87">87</a>, <a href="#Page88">88</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front, overextension of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page238">238</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Lessons gained from the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a>, <a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page289">289</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mounted infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page25">25</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Skirmish lines, thin <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page75">75</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Surrenders <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page192">192</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Wounds, character of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page129">129</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Spicheren.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance in assembly formation <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page210">210</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack, orders for <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Change of front <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page210">210</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page436">436</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page357">357</a>, <a href="#Page358">358</a>, <a href="#Page360">360</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Formation in echelon and in line <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page74">74</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Front, change of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontage <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Knapsacks, loss of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a>, <a href="#Page226">226</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Orders for attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Stragglers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page195">195</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Spionskop</span>, 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Crawling <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page88">88</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses at short ranges, insignificant <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page178">178</a>, <a href="#Page189">189</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page340">340</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">T.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tagliamento</span>, 1797.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tashkessen</span>, January 1, 1878.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page438">438</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tel el Kebir</span>, 1882.</li> -<li class="level1">Night attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page233">233</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Terrayama</span> (Temple Hill), October 11, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page343">343</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tobitschau</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Towan</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Trautenau</span>, 1866.</li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page153">153</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Jägers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page23">23</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Packs, removal of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="pagenum" id="Page537">[537]</span><span class="example">Tsinortun</span>, August 26, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page435">435</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tugela</span> (Pieters Hill), 1900.</li> -<li class="level1">Rushes <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page95">95</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Tuminling Pass</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses, officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">V.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Vauxchamps</span>, February 14, 1814.</li> -<li class="level1">Infantry versus cavalry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Villepion</span>, December 1, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Holding wavering troops <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Villermain-Cravant</span>, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Flank march along hostile front <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page360">360</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Villiers</span>, October 30, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Influence of the ground on the efficacy of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Vimiero.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0" id="IndRef18"><span class="example">Vionville.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Abridged attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page330">330</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Advance in broad formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page67">67</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page469">469</a>, <a href="#Page470">470</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Artillery fire diverted by infantry <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page327">327</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge, <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a>, <a href="#Page304">304</a>, <a href="#Page311">311</a>, <a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Moral effect of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Preparation by artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page313">313</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Close order formations, losses in <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cover, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page257">257</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Direction of retreat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page440">440</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Flanking fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses in close order formations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page102">102</a>, <a href="#Page103">103</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of a cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page302">302</a>, <a href="#Page303">303</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Packs, removal of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Rencontre <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page339">339</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserves, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page397">397</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Retreat <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page440">440</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page42">42</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">United attack, necessity of a <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page403">403</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Volley fire, ineffectiveness of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page164">164</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Vouziers</span>, December 15, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Surprise <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page331">331</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">W.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Wafangu</span>, June 15, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Communication <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page247">247</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth, excessive <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page223">223</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Envelopment <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a>, <a href="#Page359">359</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Wagram</span>, 1809.</li> -<li class="level1">Attacking column, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a>, <a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="pagenum" id="Page538">[538]</span><span class="example">Waterberg</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting guidons <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page355">355</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns, employment of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page283">283</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Waterloo</span>, 1815.</li> -<li class="level1">Attacking column, formation of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page44">44</a>, <a href="#Page45">45</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Frontal counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page437">437</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Weiszenburg</span>, August 2, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Losses among officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page51">51</a>, <a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Masks <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page120">120</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Wörth</span>, August 6, 1870.</li> -<li class="level1">Assault <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page376">376</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Assaulting distance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page385">385</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack, orders to <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Battle lines, density of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page240">240</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Cavalry charge <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page310">310</a>, <a href="#Page311">311</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Change of front <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page220">220</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Colors <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page69">69</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Concentration <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page209">209</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distance, elimination of, during advance <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page72">72</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Distribution in depth <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page224">224</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Fire while in motion <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page93">93</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Interference by the commander-in-chief <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page248">248</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page227">227</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page51">51</a></span></li> -<li class="level2">Relative, officers and men <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Mixing of organizations <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Moral effect of fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page191">191</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Officers, losses among <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page51">51</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Orders to attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page349">349</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Packs, removal of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page364">364</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Panic <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page440">440</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Passage through woods <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page333">333</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Reserve, employment of the <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page395">395</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Stragglers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page196">196</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Supports <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page224">224</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Uphill fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page183">183</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Woods, passage through <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page254">254</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">Y.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Yalu</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Ammunition, expenditure and supply of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page473">473</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page341">341</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Bayonet fight <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page382">382</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Losses, officers <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page190">190</a></span></li> -<li class="level1">Machine guns <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page291">291</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Yangtsuling</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page343">343</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="pagenum" id="Page539">[539]</span><span class="example">Yoshirei</span>, July 31, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Formations under artillery fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page321">321</a>, <a href="#Page323">323</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Yuhuntun</span>, 1905.</li> -<li class="level1">Perseverance under fire <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page348">348</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Yuputz</span>, March 1, 1905.</li> -<li class="level1">Sand bags, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page390">390</a></span></li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Yushuling</span>, 1904.</li> -<li class="level1">Intrenching tools, use of <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page388">388</a></span></li> - -<li class="newletter">Z.</li> - -<li class="level0"><span class="example">Zella.</span></li> -<li class="level1">Counter-attack <span class="righttext"><a href="#Page433">433</a></span></li> - -</ul> - -<div class="tnbot" id="TN"> - -<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Depending on the hard- and software used to read this text, not all elements may display as intended.</p> - -<p>The language used in this text is that of the printed book, including the use of inconsistent, erroneous, -unusual or archaic spelling, hyphenation, capitalisation, punctuation, etc., except as indicated under Changes -below. This applies to proper and geographical names and non-English words and phrases as well; accents and diacriticals -have not been added or corrected unless mentioned below.</p> - -<p>The use of physical units has not been corrected; for example, the author regularly uses m for speed, kgm for energy, etc.</p> - -<p>In addition to the abbreviations given on page xxi, the book regularly uses differently abbreviated or shortened -titles (sometimes single words) or translations of references; this has not been standardised.</p> - -<p>Page ix, Table of Contents: the differences between the Table of Contents and the headings in the text have not been -rectified. Apart from (minor) differences in wording, not all headings in the text occur in the -Table of Contents, and not all entries in the Table of Contents occur as headings in the text. -Any auto-generated Table of Contents may therefore differ from the one on page ix ff.</p> - -<p>Page 71, “in double column of twice the width of front”: the source document was unclear at this point, the text might -also have read “in double column or twice the width of front”.</p> - -<p>Page 183, 187: (Général) Le Joindre is the author of the publication, but his name is presented here as part of the title.</p> - -<p>Page 195, troop diagram: depending on -the available display width, this may or may not be visible as a single front in this e-text (the diagram was displayed -over two rows in the printed book as well).</p> - -<p>Page 475: The table appears to contain totals that do not agree with the data provided. Since it is not clear where the error -was made, these calculations have been left as they were: row Germany, last column; row Austria, last column but one; -row France, last column.</p> - -<p id="Footnote513">The table contains footnote markers, but there are no corresponding footnotes on this or the following pages. In an earlier -edition of the book, the footnotes (using the numbering from the table in this text) were as follows:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a href="#FNanchor513" class="label">[513]</a> The strength of a company is assumed as 200 men (England excepted).</p> - -<p><a href="#FNanchor513" class="label">[514]</a> 10 Cartridges packed in a box.</p> - -<p><a href="#FNanchor513" class="label">[515]</a> New “D” ammunition.</p> - -<p><a href="#FNanchor513" class="label">[516]</a> During the Russo-Japanese war.</p> - -</div><!--footnote--> - -<p class="blankbefore15"><b>Changes made</b></p> - -<p>Some minor obvious typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected silently; some -tables have been re-arranged for better readability.</p> - -<p>Footnotes and illustrations have been moved outside text paragraphs.</p> - -<p>Spaced and non-spaced and italicised or regular “i.e.” and “Ibid./ibid.” have been standardised to “<i>i.e.</i>” and -“<i>Ibid.</i>”/“<i>ibid.</i>” “Minarelli Fitzgerald” -has been standardised to “Minarelli-Fitzgerald”.</p> - -<p>Elements in <span class="illotext">dotted lines</span> are not present as such in the text, but have been -transcribed from the accompanying illustration for the sake of clarity.</p> - -<p>Page 8: “sans le comprendre” and “sans le faire” changed to “sans la comprendre” and “sans la faire”.</p> - -<p>Various pages: “Wald und Ortsgefecht” and “Gruppen und Einheitsangriff” have been changed to -“Wald- und Ortsgefecht” and “Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff”.</p> - -<p>Page 11, footnote [18]: opening quote marks inserted before When one attempts ....</p> - -<p>Page 93: closing quote marks inserted after ... (300-400 paces).</p> - -<p>Page 143, footnote [139]: closing quote mark deleted at end of footnote.</p> - -<p>Page 162: “<i>... seit dem Jahre</i>, 1900,” changed to “<i> ... seit dem Jahre 1900</i>,”</p> - -<p>Page 180: B′, C′ and D′ in the text have been changed to B, C and D cf. -the illustration. Footnote [170]: angles have been transcribed α, β and γ for consistency with the illustration and the text.</p> - -<p>Page 195: Negrier changed to Négrier; footnote anchor [191] inserted.</p> - -<p>Page 229: closing quote mark inserted after ... the size of this echelon.</p> - -<p>Page 253: “Patrouillen und Radfahrkommandos” changed to “Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos”.</p> - -<p>Page 257: “and that cover to be utilized only” changed to “and that cover be utilized only”.</p> - -<p>Page 265, table: the column header “Machine gun” has -been considered to be a heading a single column only.</p> - -<p>Page 304, footnote [306]: closing quote mark inserted after ... of units in rear.</p> - -<p>Page 324: “Csicseries v. Bacsany” changed to “Csicserics v. Bacsany”; “Feldgeschüts” changed to “Feldgeschütz”.</p> - -<p>Page 354: closing quote mark inserted after ... the advance of the attacker’s infantry.</p> - -<p>Page 355: “veritable bouclier” changed to “véritable bouclier”.</p> - -<p>Page 395: “Helwig” changed to “Helvig”.</p> - -<p>Page 399: footnote [430]: “<i>pp.</i> 484 and 558” changed to “pp. 484 and 558”; footnote [431]: “Les Expéditions -de Tonkins” changed to “Les Expéditions de Tonkin”.</p> - -<p>Page 429: closing quote mark inserted after ... or for making a counter-attack.</p> - -<p>Page 458, footnote [491]: “détachments de couverture” changed to “détachements de -couverture”.</p> - -<p>Indexes: some entries moved to their proper alphabetical order.</p> - -<p>Page 513: page number 363 changed to 263 (entry Machine guns, Kinds of fire, Switzerland).</p> - -</div><!--tnbot--> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICS, VOLUME I (OF 2) ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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