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diff --git a/old/64834-0.txt b/old/64834-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5c30e25..0000000 --- a/old/64834-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10572 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Origin of Thought and Speech, by M. -Moncalm - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Origin of Thought and Speech - -Author: M. Moncalm - -Translator: G. S. Whitmarsh - -Release Date: March 15, 2021 [eBook #64834] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Turgut Dincer, Craig Kirkwood, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND -SPEECH *** - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Text enclosed by underscores is in italics. - -Additional Transcriber’s Notes are at the end. - - * * * * * - -THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH - - * * * * * - - - - -THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH - - - BY - M. MONCALM - - TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH - BY - G. S. WHITMARSH - - “Language is the autobiography of the human mind.” - _The Science of Thought_ (MAX MÜLLER). - - “Language is our Rubicon which no brute will dare to cross.” - _The Science of Language_ (MAX MÜLLER). - - - LONDON - KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., LTD. - DRYDEN HOUSE, 43 GERRARD STREET, W. - 1905 - - * * * * * - -With the approval of the Author’s representative, the translator has at -times followed the exact words of Max Müller rather than the literal -translation, where the latter has differed slightly from the former. - -The thanks of the translator are due to friends who have kindly revised -the MS. and a portion of the proof sheets. - - * * * * * - -The books used by the Author in this work are:-- - -MAX MÜLLER. - - _Introduction to the Science of Religion._ - _Origin and Growth of Religion._ - _Chips from a German Workshop._ - _The Science of Language._ - _The Science of Thought._ - _Natural Religion._ - _Physical Religion._ - _Anthropological Religion._ - _Theosophy, or Psychological Religion._ - -CH. DARWIN. - - _Origin of Species._ - _The Descent of Man._ - _Expression of the Emotions._ - -L. NOIRÉ. - - _Der Ursprung der Sprache._ - _Die Lehre Kants, und der Ursprung der Vernunft._ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - INTRODUCTION 1 - - CHAPTER I HYPOTHESES 14 - - CHAPTER II OUR ARYAN ANCESTORS 41 - - CHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 51 - - CHAPTER IV ANIMALS 57 - - CHAPTER V PRIMITIVE HUMANITY 63 - - The 121 Original Concepts 89 - - CHAPTER VI ANCIENT LANGUAGE 93 - - CHAPTER VII MYTHS 99 - - CHAPTER VIII BETWEEN SLEEPING AND WAKING 118 - - CHAPTER IX A DECISIVE STEP 140 - - Kant’s Teaching 149 - Sensation 149 - Space and Time 152 - Phenomena 152 - The Categories of the Understanding 153 - Cause and Effect 154 - Axioms 154 - Metaphysics 156 - - CHAPTER X THE VEDIC HYMNS 173 - - CHAPTER XI MAN’S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION 214 - - The Sacred Writings of the Hebrews 228 - The Various Names of God 231 - The Genius of Languages 234 - Metaphor 235 - The Later Name for God amongst the Hebrews 236 - On the Prophets (Nābhī) 238 - The Views of Spinoza 242 - Obedience 246 - The Law 249 - The Law in the Gospel 251 - Biographical Note 252 - The Ideas of Plato 255 - Episodial 257 - An Excursion into a Country little known 258 - Anthropomorphism 261 - The Sacred Codes and the Codes of Laws 262 - - CHAPTER XII OF WORDS 276 - - CHAPTER XIII OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS 286 - - Physics 287 - Comparative Sciences 288 - Concerning some Authors 291 - Religion and Religions 293 - Opposition 298 - Abstraction, Inattention 298 - Speech 300 - Résumé 303 - - * * * * * - -THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -When opening my eyes in the morning, and whilst still struggling with -an inclination to sleep, I review the day and what it will have in -store for me; but the pictures drawn are confused, and my will takes no -part in it. - -For some time I have been haunted by the impression that the mental -faculties of the generality of men have not succeeded in throwing -off a species of torpor resembling that of a person hardly awake; -the supposition that this torpid condition prevents our minds from -attaining that degree of lucidity to which they have a right to aspire, -is perhaps a hallucination, yet possibly I may be right in thinking it. - -How many confused ideas traverse my brain in one day, and how seldom -those come of which I follow the thread. We know well that injunction -so often given by parents to children, and by schoolmasters to their -pupils: “Try to concentrate your attention.” It almost seems as if that -which we require of children is beyond my powers, for I have hardly -resolved to disentangle a problem of whatever kind, when, under the -form of useless, futile, inept thoughts, obstacles heap themselves -across my path. I conclude from this that a fatal somnolence paralyses -my faculties. - -When a person has to be awakened who is disinclined to be disturbed, -he is violently shaken. What movement would suffice to energise a -man whose mental powers were drowsy? I do not see anything from the -outside; and a personal effort could not be looked for, from an -enervated will. - -And yet I am possessed by the desire to penetrate the mystery of my -existence; I ask myself what I am, and why I am on this earth; from the -moment that I put this question to myself I feel that the awakening may -be possible for me. I know two classes of men who never ask it; first -those who do not see that there is any problem to solve; and secondly -those who are content with infantine and superficial teaching; or more -or less elaborate and learned, but coming from one who appears to -himself to be the depository of a collection of supernaturally inspired -truths. I own that I do not belong to the first of these divisions, -since I shall have no rest as long as I am ignorant of what passes in -me and around me; neither do I belong to the second of these classes, -since those who compose it are content to believe; but faith is not -knowledge, and I am anxious to comprehend what has been discovered, -known, and established by evidence. But how shall I submit to this -labour of research, when the habitual condition of my thoughts is to -wander at will amongst my impressions, and when I am so incurably -absent-minded? - -We live in an atmosphere of many and varied ideas; ideas true and -false, good and bad; they pulsate in the air we breathe; they are like -the winged antheral seeds which are lifted up by the slightest breeze -of autumn and carried afar; they are little heeded; but should it -happen that these seeds attached themselves to our garments we should -notice how strikingly the one form varied from the other. - -Amongst those ideas which wander at large is this aphorism--that we -are ignorant of that of which we know not the commencement, or in -other words of that which we do not examine from the practical point -of view; he who wishes to learn how something is made, whatever it may -be, must know how to begin it. This truth has so ancient a date that -we cannot conceive of a time when it was absent from the mind of man; -only it had the common lot of all truths with which we are so familiar -that apparently there is nothing to learn from them, and this aphorism -appears at first sight to be the ramblings which we hear but to which -we do not listen. - -To me it is of value, as it strengthens my conviction that the mist -which obscures my vision will not be dissipated until I have traced -certain problems to their source; I know by experience that few -phenomena are easy of explanation when their appearances only are -examined at any given moment; and close questioning fails to elicit -light, whilst ignorance prevails concerning their beginning. - -How does it happen that in spite of such unfavourable circumstances, -often with no clear purpose, and with eyes half shut, humanity can -advance? For the progress is indubitable. The public conscience has -developed; and its actions make themselves felt; civilised nations -have become more humane; they understand better than they did formerly -that peace is more profitable than war; certain social problems are -being seriously discussed, and some are on the point of solution. In -the physical sciences, as well as in mechanical arts, progress is most -marked. But I see that though imagination, observation, and a talent -for invention have had much to do with this progress, the capacity of -imitation has also been a powerful factor. When William Herschel gave -up music for astronomy, he perfected the optical instruments which -were in use at that time, and manufactured some excellent telescopes -at comparatively moderate prices, with the result that his fellow -astronomers and their successors were able to devote themselves to the -study of the heavens with greater ease and readiness; and the discovery -of Uranus was soon followed by that of a large number of celestial -bodies. Again, at one of the National Exhibitions of our time, there -was shown to all comers the model of a recently invented apparatus -for the conveyance of the wounded on battlefields; since which, each -country now produces its own design with various improvements, and the -victims of the barbarism, still lingering in war, were benefited by -these modern appliances, due entirely to the art of imitation. - -In short, progress exists, but not all along the line. As thought -travels slowly in its own domain, so mental science is behindhand. -A true idea is not mechanically reproduced, it must be tended for -it to bear fruit, but what tendance would avail, if it is only with -difficulty that we discriminate between what we know already, and what -we do not yet know, for this distinction must accompany conscious -progress. - -Everything around us tends to keep us in this penumbra, which is -so favourable to inertia, ignorance, sleep. Certain groups of -philosophical ideas become condensed and systematised; in some systems -there are one or two great thoughts only. This suffices--these systems -remain, germinate and direct contemporaneous generations as well as -those of the future. It may also happen that these same ideas invade -brains little prepared to receive them, and thus deviate from their -course, err as they advance, and end by becoming so travestied that -it is no longer possible to know what they were at their origin--a -swerving movement has taken place, which causes suffering to -contemporaries, and, still more, to those who come after. Thus the bulk -increases, the bulk of truth and the bulk of error; and this fatal -expansion of the true and the false, intertwined the one with the -other, pursues its encroaching and troublous way. - -This confusion is something impersonal; it is an opaque body which -interposes itself between the truth and ourselves, and prevents us -from contemplating it; but the confusion may also arise directly from -those whose mission it is to guide us. I open a book written by some -grave thinker who, I imagine, knows his subject thoroughly, and I -begin to read in all confidence; at first I think I understand him; -then I am stopped by a word, and I wonder what meaning the author has -attached to it; a little further I come upon the same word, which now -seems invested with another signification; this disconcerts me, and -I close the book. I take another, but the same disagreeable surprise -awaits me, and I find everywhere terms whose meaning varies to suit the -convenience of the author; and what we are to understand by these words -is nowhere explained. These defects arise probably from the fact that -certain philosophers, taking their confused opinions for new ideas, -seek for words in which to express them, and not finding them in their -vocabulary, they coin them, using terms to which no precise meaning is -attached; which terms remain more or less enigmatical to the authors -themselves, and, consequently, unintelligible to the readers; in this -way does the confusion of ideas arise and is propagated. A philosopher, -I think it was Haman, made the following very true and very alarming -statement: “Language is not only the basis of our power of thought, but -also the point from which our misunderstandings and errors spring”; and -Hobbes also says: “It is obvious that truth and falsehood dwell only -with those living creatures who have the use of speech.” - -But all that I have just said indicates merely a superficial portion -of my passing impressions; in going below the surface I find in the -past other causes for our present perturbation of mind. For centuries -we have frequented schools in order to learn to distinguish truth -from error, yet it is always a mixture of truth and error that we -are taught. What result had we attained on the eve of the twentieth -century? We are still asking ourselves whether science does or does not -harmonise with religion. After that we cannot but give ourselves up to -the deepest despondency, we cannot but fold our arms in despair and -question whether we shall ever see things clearly. - -Amongst our ancestors there were sometimes found men of great -resolution who, in order to punish themselves for cowardice and luxury, -administered discipline to themselves; the idea is not so extravagant -as it appears to some people. A few good strokes of the whip might -result in reviving or strengthening the will, and in forcing it to -resist the moral supineness which is so apt to increase; but physical -discipline is no longer in use amongst us, and in my own case I have -substituted an illustration of which I try never to lose sight. I -picture to myself an ideal potter, whose whole ambition would be to -make good vessels, and, having succeeded in making some of great -solidity, he would choose out those of the finest shape for the market. -He attains success, and his thoughts being occupied with his pottery -only, at last he makes vases of absolute perfection. With what feelings -of envy I contemplate this creature of my imagination, who is to serve -as my model, and yet whom the want of concentration of thought prevents -me from imitating. - -It would have been perhaps prudent on my part to follow the example -of this workman, and to accustom myself to reflect on subjects less -immeasurably above me than those which have such a powerful attraction -for me; but I yield to the impulse--once given. I often lose myself -when pondering on the world where destiny has placed me; and I ask -myself--How did life first appear on the earth? Was there nothing but -a cellule from whence all that fills space came? Was there one cellule -for the vegetables and another for the animals? If man did not spring -from the cradle of all things that live and grow on the surface of -the globe, was he an individual of his own species at the beginning, -or two individuals, or many? After what fashion did man speak at his -first appearance? What were his thoughts? “How can it be explained,” I -asked myself again, “that of all the members of the animal kingdom, one -only should have marvelled at and pondered on his position with regard -to the universe and himself? That one only should have manifested -the desire to understand his role in life, whilst all the creatures -that surrounded him, lived contentedly in blissful ignorance? It -would be impossible to conceive of a horse, an elephant, or a mammoth -disquieting itself concerning its origin and the end of its being; why -has man only sought a solution of these problems?” The learned scholars -who occupy themselves with these questions are far from agreeing -unanimously concerning them; thus I--I, who am only one link in the -interminable chain of units which composes humanity, past, present and -future; I, in my own individuality must live and die in my ignorance. -I revolt against this prospect, which I yet recognise as inevitable; -I refuse to acknowledge myself beaten, and I feel myself irresistibly -driven to seek for more knowledge; then feeling unable to supply the -lack, I cease to be anxious, and fall asleep again. - -Sometimes when led to investigate the inner tribunal, conscience, I -contemplate a phenomenon purely intellectual and moral, which the -uproar raised by the conflict of so many heterogeneous ideas cannot -make me forget, although it does not intrude itself upon me with -violence; on the contrary, it waits with an unparalleled patience and -discretion at my door. It is the phenomenon named religion. - -We read in the Bible that Moses, having noticed a burning bush that -yet was not consumed, went up to it, the more closely to investigate -this marvel. For many people religion has borne the same aspect that -the burning bush did for Moses, and those, like Moses, have approached -it in the endeavour to discover what it could be. Religion has always -compelled attention, its metaphysical side has been described in -voluminous theological and philosophical treatises; historians on their -side have made many researches concerning the forms in which it has -clothed itself on earth during a long succession of centuries, and -amongst many peoples; it is even said there are learned men who have -studied all the Bibles and catechisms; and it is added that few amongst -them know what religion really is. It does not on that account play -a less important part in our existence; it is from religion that all -those acts of devotion and charity spring, to which millions of human -creatures give themselves. There are few who ask themselves whence -comes this breath which inspires them so fully, and since when has its -influence extended itself amongst us; to be nourished with its fruits -sufficed. Such is the disposition of soul of the majority of those -for whom religion is more than a name--whatsoever it be--pronounced -in an unknown tongue. Would it not be natural to desire to make its -acquaintance more closely? Apparently not; we accept it as something -known by intuition, without concerning ourselves with its aspect. - -This strange fact I have also noticed. When studying history very -attentively, and with an attitude of mind free from all prejudice, -it is possible to fix the exact period at which errors, more or less -generally acknowledged as such, have first crept into the world; but I -have vainly sought in history for the corresponding moment when truths -first made their appearance; truths, which have been accepted, if only -by a few isolated individuals, or by certain groups of individuals, of -whatever race, or of whatever period of the life of humanity they might -be. But as it is acknowledged that amongst the errors which trouble -us, we possess some truths, it is evident that they have manifested -themselves; but when and how? At this I do not arrive. - -This silence of history indicates, I think, that the truths of which -we seek the commencement have been revealed to man in prehistoric -days. I do not feel that I know positively concerning the first human -beings who appeared on the earth; I picture them like soft wax ready to -receive a definite form from the hand which created them. These first -comers who knew nothing, never having had any training, and possessing -only their five senses to aid them in arriving at knowledge, were -infinitely better placed than I am to embrace truth, since I should -have to disentangle myself from a vast mass of ideas which disfigure -the natural simplicity of my soul; I should have to forget, even the -truths which I believed myself to possess, and to transform myself -into white plastic blank wax, with no impress whatsoever, and to wait -until my Creator traced the image He wished; this is now not possible. -I should not be now here if I could have been contemporaneous with my -ancestors, and I had been permitted to follow in the steps of their -pilgrimage, this would have pleased me well. - -I perceive my friends are uneasy--“Take care,” they say, “an _Idée -fixe_ is dangerous.” - -But is it quite certain that an _Idée fixe_ is always harmful? -Have they never seen a man wandering in a forest without any fixed -determination to quit it? Is it credible that our first parents had no -fixed idea of discovering the import towards themselves, of the vast -world in which they had been placed, knowing nothing of the reason -of their position? Equally ignorant of the reason why the sun, the -moon, fire, hurricanes, storms, thunder, rivers, mountains existed, -always above and around them. The whole of nature itself required to -be interrogated. In what way could this settled determination have -harmed them? It is true that they are all dead, but determination did -not kill them. And their _Idée fixe_ must have been very tenacious and -powerful for this thirst for knowledge to have descended with their -blood into our own veins; their wish to gain information is reproduced -in us; this is the legacy that our fathers have left us, and the -singular feature of the legacy is that unlike others, of which the -parts are subdivided and diminished, this in its entirety has passed -down to each of the milliards and milliards of inheritors. - -Must we then feel that we are destined to ask perpetually, and to -receive no answer? That need not be. Many things that our ancestors -could not fathom are clear to us; what was unknown to them is known -to us. That which prevents us from following up this line of progress -through these phases is that each reply brings forth anew fresh -questions, and thus it will be to the end--if the end should ever -arrive. This last question we do not put to ourselves, which is an -indication that we are not careful to arrive at the answer. When I -compare the present state of our knowledge, and of our condition of -mind, to which I have given the epithets of torpor and inertia--and -they are rightly given--to that which held sway in the dark ages when -the earth rested on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, and the -tortoise swam in the void, I must acknowledge that we now see things -more truly. - -But to start from the point of the sum of our acquired knowledge -in this march of progress would be fatal to us; the ground we have -won will only retain its solidity in proportion as we keep in sight -the path we have trodden, with all its encountered and vanquished -obstacles, and that will only be by pursuing the same path again in -company with our ancestors. - -Here my friends interpose--“That would be a vain task, you cannot -picture humanity in its infancy, that is an impossibility.” - -Doubtless, and since I am too practical to attempt the impossible, -abstaining from every superhuman effort, and submitting my imagination -to a strict discipline, I will again consult history, but not history -as I know it, nor that history which is written in our days, polished, -cautious, honestly critical, that which notes the old traces of -humanity when they occur on the route mixed with events, and which -treats the eternal truths as though they had no existence, and, -truly, they do not belong to its dominion. I would study the other -history, which at first was related, not written, because speech came -before writing. I should try to collect information from the ancient -literatures of the people concerning the manner in which our ancestors -depicted divinity to themselves, especially with regard to dealings -with mortals at the time when visits between the celestial inhabitants -and those on earth were common.... We possess the Old Testament of the -Hebrews, the sacred books of the Hindoos, and the mythology of the -Aryan family; the mine is rich, so rich that I should have time to die -a thousand times before I should have finished the task of searching in -this mixed medley of historical remains, fantastic recitals, sublime -thoughts, and flagrant falsehoods. Happily this work of digging in the -past in quest of an idea is not the work of one man nor of one epoch, -but that of many men and many epochs, and it never ceases. - -Moreover, a short time ago no one imagined that documents very much -more ancient than those I have just named, would have been discovered -in hitherto unexplored regions of the physical and mental world. Two -enterprising men, Darwin and Max Müller, visited and studied them. -Darwin sought to explain what the origin of organic beings might have -been, and in what way they passed through a series of evolutions, from -one form to another of great dissimilarity. He who speaks of evolution -implies researches into the beginnings of things; this was exactly what -I needed. All the world knows Darwin’s name, even those who abstain -from dealing with scientific problems; he has some ardent admirers who -are not careful to define very accurately what it is they admire in -him, and some furious adversaries, who, judging mainly by hearsay, have -formed a conception of him which is either very superficial or very -false. - -The development of human reason has been one of the objects of Max -Müller’s researches. This great thinker, who is at the same time the -first philologist of our time, has sought in the science of Language -for the origin of thinking man. Very few amongst the men of the world, -who are nothing more than men of the world, know what the name of Max -Müller represents, even the existence of a science of Language is -unknown to them. - -Even if Darwin and Max Müller have not been absolutely the first to -strive to go back, the one to the origin of the organic world, the -other to the dawn of human speech, no others have yet walked in this -darkness so courageously and so perseveringly as these two men. - -Not only have the journeys of exploration been much multiplied of -late, but a principle of action has been extracted from beneath the -scaffolding used in the building up of new theories; which is, “If you -have an idea, and you wish to see whither it may lead, take it from its -first commencement, and advance confidently.” This is what I am about -to do. - -I am undertaking a long journey; I carry with me but few plans; turning -my eyes away from whatever might attract my curiosity either on the -right hand or the left, I shall still more carefully guard myself -from being dazzled by the mirages which I am told are frequent in -those countries; or frightened by the phantoms which it is possible -I may meet on the road. I shall always remind myself that one hour -of feebleness, indecision, hesitation might cause me to lose my -equilibrium, and that it would only require one moment of dizziness to -cause my retrogression to the elephant and the tortoise. God forbid! It -is to the opposite pole to which I shall direct myself; if truth exist, -reason is here to find it. - - - - -CHAPTER I HYPOTHESES - - -Thinkers of all times have asked themselves the question whence does -this world come on which we live. Curious to know whether the universe -was self-made, or was the work of a great primal ancestor, or personal -Creator; philosophers who considered the matter in its entirety have -left us two hypotheses. - -“According to one, chaos reigned at the beginning, or in other words, -the possibility of everything; and from the midst of this chaos certain -realities were evolved,”[1] from an inherent aptitude for development; -this aptitude has been named in many ways, such as “natural selection,” -“survival of the fittest.” The Greek sages were already acquainted -with the thought implied in these terms. Empedocles said that the -fittest would always preponderate, since conservation is an integral -part of their nature; whilst what is unfit, or not in accord with -the surroundings, must disappear. But the partisans of this theory -find themselves confronted by a serious difficulty: if a blind force -has produced the universe, whence comes the order which reigns in -nature? It is freely acknowledged, even by those with small powers of -observation, that the inhabitants of the terrestrial globe are divided -into animal and vegetable, which are again subdivided into distinct -classes, separated by distinct lines of demarcation. If we admitted -that the vegetable and animal kingdoms were not at first so entirely -separated as they are at present, there would always remain a question -awaiting reply: How is it to be accounted for, that two families -issuing from the same source, become so separated, and have remained -distinct ever since? - -Amongst the propagators of the second hypothesis, some admit the -existence of a primordial germ possessing the power of infinite -production; others believe in a Personal Creator who formed all things, -whether by the means of pre-existent material or from nothing. In -accepting this theory of a reasonable Being we must at once lay aside -that of pure chance, since to Him is attributed the permanence of the -separation described above, this separation or division is of such a -nature as to induce the impression that thus it is by premeditation -and co-ordination. Certain philosophers putting aside the question -of the origin of the organic world in its entirety, have restricted -their field of investigation, and taken it in detail. Thus: What is -the origin of man? How is it that man thinks and speaks? What is -human thought and human speech? Is it man’s nature that compels him -to speak, or has language been from the first a matter of convention? -The Greeks whilst pursuing their researches amongst the lofty regions -of metaphysics expressed some very subtle theories on this subject, -coupled with vast systems which comprehended the whole of humanity. -By these they weighed the words spoken, their derivation, the ideas -which these words represented, and the primitive source of the -various phenomena exhibited by man, for the ancients recognised man’s -indivisibility. - -Heraclitus considered that each object combines in itself a thought -and its expression, emanating from the object, and that man is the -recipient only; that he breathes a spiritual atmosphere; thus it is -that every name necessarily designates the object it denotes. - -Plato said that all the objects of the external world have in them -something which constitutes their essence, and that this essence is -capable of being transmitted from objects themselves into the human -mind; that ideas constitute the essence of objects, and that words are -therefore necessarily related to the constituent parts of the objects, -and their impression on the human understanding. - -Epicurus said that human language is the result of the pressure -exercised by the external world on the sensitive essential matter in -man, and that as soon as man sustains this pressure he emits words -spontaneously; the most ancient words used seem to have been expressive -sounds, and with the human race it was as natural for them to talk as -to groan, to cough, or to sneeze. - -Thus the Ancients did not distinguish speech from conception. - -The problem of the origin of speech, treated in antiquity with as -much depth as calmness, profoundly agitated the minds in the Middle -Ages, and the theologians naturally introduced this variant in their -exposition of the subject: Has language a divine or human origin? -The Christian philosopher replies: “The intellect of God created the -world, and the human soul, made in the likeness of the mind of God, -has in itself the source of all knowledge: thought and language are -of divine origin; left to himself, with only the help of his own -powers, man would never have found a means of expressing his thoughts.” -Such was the belief of the greatest thinkers of the Middle Ages; and -they accepted the fact of a primordial language which men must have -received directly from the Creator; this opinion was perpetuated until -the most recent times. But from the earliest Christian centuries -there were certain philosophers such as Gregory of Nyssa, who, whilst -acknowledging the existence of a primitive universal language, -considered that it redounded more to the glory of the Almighty Creator -to endow man simply with the power of speech, and they deny that this -language with its grammar and orthography was divinely revealed. - -The materials for the study of these questions are lacking. The -only document in our possession on the origin of mankind--the Old -Testament--was carefully consulted; there we read that God created -man after His image, that He made him of the dust of the earth, that -He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, so that man became -a living creature. The Bible narrative is one of simple facts, and it -was necessary to look upon them as so many facts, for any effort to -pierce beneath the surface of these mysterious words was like groping -in the dark. Another recital was also given in Genesis. God brought -all the animals of the earth, and the birds of the air to Adam that he -might name them, and whatsoever Adam called every living thing that -was the name of it. This seemed difficult to interpret, and renewed -the questions under other forms. Did man at the beginning resemble a -newly born babe who cries but cannot speak? In this case how did he -begin to express his thoughts? If man was created an adult, but did not -receive a complete language from heaven, how did he acquire the faculty -of speech, this faculty which we know to be the distinguishing mark of -humanity, and which is missing in other creatures? - -The eighteenth century decided that this way of treating a scientific -question left much to be desired; it resulted in a _cul de sac_, and a -fresh beginning had to be made. Some philosophers, thinking to simplify -matters, affirmed that primitive man, tired of wandering through woods -like other animals, decided to group themselves into companies; the -members of this society, feeling the necessity of making themselves -mutually understood, expressed themselves at first by the aid of -signs and gestures, then by sounds peculiar to the things denoted, -afterwards, in one way or another, actual words were pronounced. -This reasoning was used in the eighteenth century, and not knowing -where to find better, those who employed it felt satisfied with their -perspicacity; language which was formerly considered as a gift direct -from God, became a physiological endowment, a conventional art; this -century had an intense horror of the supernatural, so that it readily -accepted any system in which God did not appear. - -The lack of reflection shown in the building up of these hypotheses -concerning the commencement of humanity has been severely criticised, -and that they were very superficial must be conceded. It is equally -clear that all these tentative efforts had this in common, that they -were the results of the influence on immature minds of the period, of -the necessity of explaining the awakening of human reason in a rational -manner. - -The search was continued. At last the nineteenth century considered -that a solution had been found. Certain ideas which had received -attention during divers periods were now collected, sorted, re-examined -more closely, and classified, and from these labours there arose the -two theories of interjection and imitation. According to the first, -language consists of sounds drawn involuntarily from man by his -emotions and feelings; by degrees man became accustomed to reproduce -similar exclamations when wishing to express the same feelings, and -these exclamations would serve as the roots of words; this is the -interjectional theory. The imitative or onomatopœic proceeds from -another source; when man was confronted by all the objects of the -exterior world he began to imitate the sounds emitted, such as the -cries of various animals, the whistling of the wind, the fall of a -stone; the many sounds which fill the air were reproduced by the human -voice and formed the basis for future words. Objections to both of -these theories are not lacking. If emotions such as joy, pain, anger, -love, disgust--or if physical sensations such as result from the -sting of a bee or from a blow of the fist, could furnish the roots -of a language, and if it were the same with the imitation of noises -produced by nature, the sounds of the words should retain a definite -impress of these emotions and feelings, and should reproduce, if only -approximately, these various noises. Even if we admit that a small -number of primitive men set themselves to imitate the murmur of the -stream, the rolling of the thunder, the barking of a dog, the groans -of the wounded, the only result would have been infinite variations -of clamour quite impossible to distinguish or to understand. Strictly -speaking, the prolonged sound of “_bée_” and “_mou_” might awaken the -conception of a goat and cow in the mind; but in order to convey the -idea of a herd of oxen it would be necessary to avoid equally the sound -of “_bée_” and “_mou_,” as belonging exclusively to the two special -animals. The warbling notes of birds have always attracted attention, -and essays have been made to reproduce them by imitative harmony, -but the various peoples have given various interpretations,[2] and -in the generality of cases there is no resemblance between the names -of animals and their cries.[3] After examining the testimony of the -name “cuckoo” (no doubt convincing taken by itself), which is the -prominent argument brought forward by the advocates of the imitative -theory called by Max Müller the bow-wow theory, we are not able to -advance further in that direction. Darwin in his book, _The Descent -of Man_, promulgates the idea that language may have originated from -interjections and imitations, but elsewhere in the _Expressions of -the Emotions_ he hastens to add with his accustomed frankness: “But -the whole subject of the differences of the sounds produced under -different states of the mind is so obscure that I have succeeded in -throwing hardly any light on it; and the remarks which I have made have -but little significance.”[4] - -Scholars and literary men have taxed the resources of all the treasures -of their imagination in endeavouring to picture the beginnings of -language; in the present day many efforts are made by learned men to -discover, from nurses surrounded by their charges, how the first words -were reproduced by primitive man. It would be as useful to study the -nature of primitive rocks amongst a mass of bricks and mortar, since -the chasm is wide between the thoughts which our little ones have when -they first begin to speak and those which primitive man had in trying -to name his surroundings. We who speak because we know point out father -or mother to a little child, naming them at the same time--“this is -mother,” “this is father;” by degrees attributes become connected in -the child’s mind with these names; such as mother’s hair, or her dress; -or father’s beard, his pin; and whilst naming them we again point them -out; and when the child pronounces these words in its own fashion, that -is incorrectly, is this defect in pronunciation to be a sign-post to -us--pointing out the direction to be followed in judging of primitive -language? At a later period the child distinguishes between the -mother’s smile and the father’s voice; later still its mind comprehends -all the moral and physical attributes covered by these two terms; and -thus with all other objects--“here is the cow,” and “here is the piece -of sugar,” which so soon become familiar to the child, with their -cognate words, milk and sweetness. Our children thus learn to speak -under very different conditions from those in which our first ancestors -found themselves, when with no previous experience they tried to put -forth their first words. - -Conjectures increased and developed into systems, which, however, -contained nothing beyond germs of fresh conjectures and fresh systems, -of which none rested on a reasonable basis. - -At the beginning of the eighteenth century it was quite natural that -there should be uncertainty as to the path to be followed in seeking -the beginning of human speech. Was it necessary to trace all the known -languages to their source? Would not the same feeling of confusion -arise when attacking all the dialects spoken on the surface of the -earth as oppressed those who were at the base of the Tower of Babel? An -idea which was universally adopted rather tended to check the progress -of this study: it sprang from the theory that humanity had received the -gift of speech from the Creator; and as the Jewish people alone were -thought to be the recipients of a supernatural revelation, it followed -that Hebrew must be the earliest language, and consequently that all -existing languages were derived from the Hebrew. It is hardly possible -to conceive the number of works put forth by the learned to remove -any doubt with regard to this strange affiliation; the difficulty was -to support or prove the supposition that Hebrew had given birth to -Greek, Latin, and the rest; this Biblical language was tortured and -twisted about in the endeavour to prove the descent of the others from -it, but no satisfactory result was obtained. It was by the advice of -Leibniz that as many facts as possible were collected concerning the -modern languages then in use. He asked for the assistance of monarchs, -European princes, ambassadors, missionaries, and travellers. It was -during these investigations that the attention of certain philologists -was directed to Sanscrit, a language which had been dead 300 years -before the Christian era, and about which the learned in Europe had -troubled themselves very little. - -At the time of Plato and Aristotle a vague notion was current in -Greece that India, as well as Egypt, was the birthplace of matchless -learning, only it was not known in what this learning consisted, and -even the name of the Vedas (the most ancient collection of sacred -writings of the Hindoos) was unknown to the philosophers. The first -Christian writers who mentioned the religions of India, and who knew -up to a certain point how to distinguish Brahminism from Buddhism, -never quoted the Vedas; this name is first used by some Chinese -converts to Buddhism, at the beginning of the Christian era, who had -undertaken a pilgrimage to India, considered by them as a holy land. -In the sixteenth century Francis Xavier went there as a missionary, -but without knowing Sanscrit; in the seventeenth century Roberto -de Nobili, another missionary, acquired the language, and caused a -compilation to be made of Hindoo and Christian doctrines. It was not -well done; the French translation was sent to Voltaire, who praised it -and spoke of it as the most precious gift for which the West had ever -been indebted to the East. The Père Calmette, who had heard of the -importance of the Vedas, was the first European to obtain authentic -fragments, but these attracted little attention in Europe. In the early -part of the nineteenth century some members of the Asiatic Society -residing in Calcutta discovered a collection of Sanscrit MSS., amongst -them some portions of the laws of Manu, two epic poems, the Râmayana -and the Mahâbhârata, some philosophical treatises, works on astronomy -and medicine, plays and fables. These works possessed great interest -for those scholars who were occupied with the study of humanity, -such as Herder, Schlegel, Goethe, and Humboldt. For the most part -the preconceived ideas with which these literary men received them -tended to diminish the benefit to be derived from them to a great -extent, as they endeavoured--consistently with the spirit of the -time--to establish the identity of thought running through the sacred -literature of the Hindoos and the Bible. They also sought to point out -the supposed connection between the historical recitals of the Old -Testament, the Indian legends, and the Greek and Latin mythologies. -Certain MSS. containing passages from the sacred code of the Hindoos -having been translated by Anquetil Duperron, Schopenhauer drew from it -the foundations of his own philosophical belief; nothing less than the -genius of this German scholar would have sufficed for the presentation -of the sublime truths which the original contained, by means of this -very defective translation. One of the first historiographers of -Buddhism was the Abbé Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, but yet his labours -have not served to raise the veil hiding the true meaning of the -Brahman writings, for without the knowledge of the early Sanscrit, it -was not possible to seize the inner meaning of a literature which the -sages of India had required fifteen centuries to complete. Thus it was -that Europe only knew the more accessible portions, and those better -calculated to strike the imagination, but not necessarily the most -important. “Much had been said and written about Buddhism, enough to -show the Roman Catholic clergy that the Lamas of Thibet had anticipated -them in the use of auricular confession, the rosary, and the tonsure; -and to disconcert philosophers by showing them that they were outdone -in positivism and nihilism by the inmates of Chinese monasteries.”[5] - -The strangeness of this religion attracted public attention, which -was especially directed towards certain blemishes, which had crept -into it during a decadent period, and tarnished its original purity, -and although learned men continued to devote themselves to a study -more and more deeply penetrated with the Sanscrit language, they -were yet so unprepared for the results which must inevitably follow -this study, that certain German universities became the scenes of -veritable scandals, when some of the learned declared that they had -found a community of origin between the people of Athens, of Rome, -and of India, and the stupefaction of the philologists knew no bounds -when, in 1833, Bopp’s work appeared, _The Comparative Grammar of -the Greek, Latin, Gothic, Sanscrit, Zend, Lithuanian, Slavonic, and -German Languages_, whilst the effect on the younger students was quite -bewildering. - -But that which created the greatest furore in all Europe was the -promulgation of the scientific discoveries of Eugène Burnouf, Professor -of Oriental Languages in the Collège de France. Long centuries had -passed during which no original Sanscrit document had come to light, -and now in the short space of ten years three complete collections -of Oriental literature were known, the sacred books of the Brahmans, -of the Buddhists, and of the Magians. “The critical examination and -restitution of the Zend texts, the outlines of a Zend grammar, the -translation and philological anatomy of considerable portions of -the Zoroastrian writings were the work of the learned young French -scholar.”[6] - -A few proper names and certain titles were up to this time all that -could be deciphered of the cuneiform inscriptions on the walls of -Persian palaces. Classical or oriental scholars had hitherto only -seen in them a quaint conglomeration of nails, wedges, or arrows; but -when at last the meaning was disentangled, it suddenly flashed upon -the discoverers that there was a close relationship between languages -hitherto held to be quite distinct. Facts, at first only suspected, now -received full confirmation; those previously unknown were discovered -and claimed, if only provisionally, in the name of Science. Historians -and philologists pressed eagerly into this new path. In looking back -they could see that the human family was divided into three distinct -groups, the Semetic family, the Aryan family--sometimes called the -Indo-Germanic--and the Turanian class, the northern division of which -has the name Ural-Altaic given to it occasionally. I use the word -_class_ advisedly, as the characteristic traits hardly merit the rank -of family. They also discovered that human speech had equally marked -divisions, making three groups or families, corresponding to the three -great human races. The Semetic family produced the Hebrew of the Old -Testament, the Arabic of the Koran, and the ancient language graven on -the monuments of Phœnicia and Carthage, of Babylon and Assyria; the -Greek and Latin, Persian and Sanscrit, the Germanic languages, Celtic -and Slavonic, all belong to the Aryan family; from the Ural-Altaic -group come the Tungusic, Mongolic, Turkic, Samoyedic and Finnic; there -still remains the Chinese language, which is monosyllabic and stands by -itself, the only remnant of the earliest formation of human speech. - -These discoveries caused a complete change in the methods adopted -by philologists; at the present time the ancient systems of the -classification of tongues are entirely abandoned. The comparative -philologist ignores altogether geographical locality, the varying -ages of languages, and their classical or illiterate character. -Languages are now classified genealogically, according to their real -relationship; and Hebrew, coming down from its pedestal, took its -natural place amongst the languages of the Semetic family.[7] - - * * * * * - -I revert here for a moment to the past in order to quote a page from -Plato, which shows us the small esteem in which the purely speculative -method, in the treatment of philosophy, was held by one of the -profoundest minds of antiquity:-- - -“Dost thou see that very tall plane-tree?” said Phædros to Socrates. - -“Certainly, I do.” - -“Tell me, Socrates, is it not from the foot of this plane-tree that -they say Boreas carried away Oreithyia from the Ilissos?” - -“So they say.” - -“But tell me, O Socrates, dost thou believe this mythe to be true?” - -“Well, if I did not believe it, like the wise people, I should not -be so very far wrong; and I might set up an ingenious theory and say -that a gust of Boreas, the north wind, carried her down from the rocks -in the neighbourhood, and that having died in this manner, she was -reported to have been carried off by Boreas from thence. As for myself, -Phædros, I think these explanations, on the whole, very pleasant; a man -is, after all, not much to be envied, if it were only for this, that -when he has set right this one fable, he is bound to do the same for -a second, then a third, and thus much time is lost. I, at least, have -no leisure to spare for these things, and the reason, my friend, is -this, that I cannot yet, according to the Delphic line, know myself; -and it seems to me ridiculous that a man who does not yet know this, -should trouble himself about what does not concern him. Therefore I -leave these things alone, and, believing what other people believe -about them, I meditate, as I said just now, not on them, but on -myself--whether I be a monster more complicated and more savage than -Typhon, or a tamer and simpler creature, enjoying by nature a blessed -and modest lot.”[8] - -“Thus, to the mind of Socrates, man was pre-eminently the individual -... he is ever seeking to solve the mystery of human nature by brooding -over his own mind, by watching the secret workings of the soul, by -analysing the organs of knowledge, and by trying to determine its -proper limits; and thus the last result of his philosophy was that he -knew but one thing, and this was, that he knew nothing.”[9] - -More than 2300 years have elapsed since the intercourse between -Socrates and his disciple took place. But the problems which we of the -twentieth century have not yet succeeded in solving, have so entirely -absorbed our attention, that it seldom occurs to us to measure the -distance which separates us from the commencement of philosophical -studies. Although the scientific equipment of our forefathers occupies -a small portion of our thoughts in our leisure moments, we yet -discover--in comparison with ourselves--how very indigent they were. - -This earth was unintelligible to the Greeks, they looked upon it as a -solitary being, without a peer in the whole universe; to us it is a -planet; one of many, all governed by the same laws, all moving round -the same centre. It is the same with man who also remained a riddle to -the ancients. An intelligent study of the world’s history, which they -knew but imperfectly, has enriched our language with a word which never -passed the lips of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle--humanity. Where the -Greeks saw barbarians, that is, human beings other than themselves--we -see brethren; those whom they called heroes and demi-gods are our -ancestors; those who appeared to them strangers, united by no ties, -are to us one family in work and suffering, divided by language and -severed by national enmity, but pressing forward step by step almost -unconsciously towards the fulfilment of that inscrutable purpose for -which the world was created. As we have ceased to see in nature the -working of demons or the manifestation of an evil principle, so we -deny in history an atomistic conglomerate of chances, or the despotic -rule of a mute fate; we turn over the leaves of the past seeking for a -hidden train of thought in the actions of the human race; we understand -that every effect has its cause; that connecting links run through -the moral world, as well as the physical world; that there is nothing -irrational in either history or nature, and we believe that the human -mind is called upon to discover in both the manifestations of a Divine -Power, the source of our existence.[10] - -This result, however, we could not have attained without first -recognising the fact that man is no isolated being, complete in -himself; that if he is to be effectively studied he cannot be -disassociated from his family, all the members of which are governed by -the same laws, all move round the same centre, and all receive their -light from the same focal point. He is one of a class, of one genus -or kind, whom it would be impossible to estimate correctly, if we set -aside his relations to his fellows. - -“To understand man,” an illustrious naturalist has said recently, “it -is not sufficient _not_ to separate him from those whom he resembles in -every point; it is quite as necessary to study him in connection with -those closely related to him, the inferior animals.” - -Hitherto I have not mentioned a hypothesis which has been promulgated -in our days on the origin of man, which would have been considered -the most remarkable this century had seen, had it not appeared -simultaneously with another treatment of a like subject equally -noticeable for its profundity in another direction. - -During a voyage which he made in South America, Darwin had been struck -by the very close affinity which existed between the living and the -fossil species of this continent; this link between the past and -present appeared to him to throw considerable light on the obscurity -which enveloped the question of the origin of species. The degree in -which organs were capable of modification was especially to be taken -into account; the study of the variation of animals and plants under -domestication led Darwin to the path he followed; the uninterrupted -reproduction of characteristics in the structure of organic beings, -intensified rather than attenuated by a succession of modifications, -caused him to see in all living creatures, not independent entities, -the one apart from the other, but descendants from common ancestors now -extinct. - -Evolution, like many another theory, may be dangerous if not thoroughly -grasped, and if it lead to a denial of the permanence of the well -marked lines of demarcation in nature. Evolution, according to Darwin, -starts from beginnings which are quite distinct; and leads on to -well defined ends; thus Darwin does not acknowledge only one common -progenitor for all the great natural races, but many, and nothing more -clearly demonstrates his transparent sincerity in scientific matters -than what his critics are pleased to call his inconsistencies. - -At the end of many years of persistent labour, Darwin published his -book on the _Origin of Species_. - -I do not propose to give a summary of it. The author does not adopt -the method of a learned writer expounding his system; his attitude is -that of a naturalist who, during his excursions, examines nature in -its innumerable and most minute details; when two facts, both of which -he considers true, appear to contradict each other, he notes both -equally, since he is too sincere to conceal that one from the public -which apparently invalidates his theory. Moreover at each step he avows -that this theory is not yet entirely free from the fog which invariably -envelops each new idea at its birth. An explorer such as he is, who -has succeeded in explaining so many mysteries, might very naturally -become elated, but it is not so with him; his thoughts never seem -directed towards himself; with all his genius, self does not appear to -exist with him; the only things that are prominent--with a distinct -existence--are the phenomena which he studies. - -The notion that all organic beings have been such as we now see them -from the beginning, was almost inevitable, as long as the theory was -held that the formation of the world was of comparatively recent date; -and those who, without further investigation, held the traditional -belief of the independent and individual creation of each species, -could only offer one explanation, if all animals--all plants--are -as they are it is because it has pleased the Creator to make them -so. Because the Darwinian theory has cast a doubt on the successive -creation of living things, it has been said that Darwin’s views were -inimical to religion. These impressions are transitory--as were those -expressed by Leibniz when he reproached Newton with introducing “occult -qualities and miracles into philosophy;”[11] and when he attacked his -law of gravitation “as subversive of natural, and inferentially of -revealed religion.”[11] - -After explaining in what manner nature had produced all the variations -of plants and inferior animals from a small number of germs, Darwin -did not feel himself under the necessity of adding one more to the -germs in order that what was afterwards termed humanity might appear -on the scene; the principle of evolution as already applied to the -organic world, would suffice to explain all difficulties; the natural -forces all engaged in the same movement, would spread and branch out -in various directions, until they reached the culminating point of -incorporation with the human creature. - -Darwin’s book, the _Descent of Man_, contains the genealogical table -of this higher animal which the author so often compares with the -lower animals. If both have so much in common, such as the chemical -composition of their bodies--their germinal vesicles--their laws of -growth and reproduction; it is--so he conceives--that both have come -from the same ancestor; moreover, all helps to prove that man has -received from his prototype amongst the mammifers, all the special -characteristics of its own organs. Thus it is easy to understand that -in the eyes of many naturalists the embryonic structure is of more -importance for an accurate classification than that of an adult, since -the embryo is that condition in which the animal has undergone the -least modification, thus it better represents the original form of the -primitive progenitor. - -For a species of one of the inferior animals to have attained the -level of man, it was necessary that, following an universal law, it -must have undergone variations both corporally and mentally, during a -long succession of generations; the primary causes of these variations -is not clearly understood, but it has been proved that the conditions -of life or environment to which the living beings submitted were -potent agents in the renewal of phenomena. Like all other creatures -man increased out of all proportion to his means of subsistence, -and thus began the struggle for existence, when those who were best -equipped for the fight survived in the greatest numbers, and left the -greatest number of robust descendants. Man acquired the capability of -expressing his wants by means of language, at first, perhaps, little -different from that of the inferior animals, but the continued use -of language reacting on the brain furnished a means for the further -development of those mental faculties which of themselves constitute a -real distinction between man and beast. This difference, however, does -not become pronounced until a certain period of man’s existence, as -during the earliest stages the intelligence of the newly created human -beings does not differ from that of other mammifers. It begins to dawn -a little later, then gradually increases, and at last becomes most -strongly marked, even if a comparison be made between the intelligence -of a highly developed monkey and that of the lowest savage, who -has failed perhaps to find words with which to express the most -elementary emotions. But men are not all on the same level; without -speaking of the vast difference that exists between the faculties of -a Papuan and those which we know to have been possessed by a Newton -or a Kant, we notice a very sensible difference between the mental -powers of two individuals of the same race; but we always find these -extremes are connected by shades of difference which gradually melt -imperceptibly the one into the other. Darwin arrives at the conclusion -that the distinctions to be drawn between the intellect of man and the -intelligence of animals is one of degree rather than of kind. - -Darwin shares the opinion of those who consider the moral consciousness -in man as that which distinguishes him specially from the inferior -animals, and he conceives its origin to be found in the social -instincts whose most important constituent parts are family ties and -the emotions to which they give rise. This consciousness makes man -capable of approving of certain acts and disapproving of others. After -having been overcome by a temporary passion, he reflects and compares -the already weakened motives causing him to act as he did, with the -appeal made to him by his family and social instincts, and he resolves -to act differently in the future; the opinion of his neighbours -influences him, but it is not so much the opinion of the community in -general as that of his own small circle to which he belongs. - -Social instincts are found also amongst a large number of inferior -animals, but with them, this mutual sympathy does not extend to all the -species of their class, as with man it reaches only to the members of -their own small community. - -With the progress of civilisation and in proportion as the smaller -communities become larger, so man’s reason leads him to extend his -sympathy to all the men of his nationality; arrived at this point, -there remains a very impalpable barrier between that and the inclusion -of men of all races in feelings of universal benevolence; but if these -races are separated from his by strong dissimilarities in external -appearance and in habits of life, it would take much time for him to -learn and recognise in them the constituent parts of humanity similar -to himself. - -The moral consciousness which raises man to a level not attained by -beasts, leads him to conceive and apprehend the precept, “Do unto -others as you would they should do unto you.” The sympathy which -extends beyond the limits of humanity, such as compassion for animals, -seems the last quality to be developed. The moral sense in man has its -counterpart in animals of the inferior order; under the influence of -man the animal becomes more capable of improvement by the increased -exercise of his intelligence, by habits, by instincts of heredity, so -as to have transformed the prototype of the wolf and jackal to that of -a dog. - -There is nothing to lead us to suppose that primitive man had felt the -existence of a principle higher than nature. There is much to indicate -that what we mean by religious feeling was not known to him; but the -aspect of the question undergoes a change if by religious sentiment we -understand belief in invisible spirits, for this belief was universal. -This is natural; as soon as certain faculties of the imagination awoke -in man, such as astonishment, curiosity, he would seek to understand -all that passed around him; his first idea would be that all the -phenomena in nature would proceed from the presence inherent in them -of a power compelling to action in the same way as man feels himself -obliged to act. This belief in the course of age would easily tend -towards fetishism, then to polytheism and finally to monotheism; it -would simultaneously inculcate many strange superstitions, of which -some produced terrible effects, such as the sacrifice of human lives to -a powerful being eager for human blood, since savages readily attribute -to these superior powers the desire for vengeance as well as all the -other evil passions they themselves possess. - -Amongst civilised peoples the conception of an all-knowing, an -all-seeing God, exercises a powerful influence on morality; man learns -little by little, no longer to regard the praise or blame of society -as his sole guide; this external guidance is replaced by personal -inward convictions which come from his reason and which is conscience. -Religious devotion is a very complex human sentiment; it is composed of -love, submission, gratitude, hope, and perhaps of other elements; no -creature is in a position to experience so complicated an emotion whose -intellectual faculties have not attained a level of medium development. -Yet something approaching this may be seen in the depth of affection -manifested by a dog for his master, which is a combination of complete -submission, of fear, dependence, and perhaps also of other qualities. - -Learned writers have for some time agreed in looking upon language -as the barrier separating man from animals; all books on logic state -the fact. But this special characteristic of the human race attracted -Darwin’s attention in a very small degree. “Man, however, at first, -uses, in common with the lower animals, inarticulate cries to express -his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of -the face.”[12] “Certain animals,” he says, “do not lack the physical -conditions necessary for articulate language, since there is not a -letter in the alphabet that a parrot cannot pronounce.” Darwin goes -even beyond this. “It is not the mere power of articulation that -distinguishes man from other animals, but it is his large power of -connecting definite sounds with definite ideas.”[12] - -It would be difficult to be more explicit, and it must be owned that -this was a great concession on Darwin’s part; but afterwards, and -perhaps with the object of weakening the force of this statement, -he adds: “The fact of the higher apes not using their vocal organs -for speech, no doubt depends on their intelligence not having been -sufficiently advanced.”[13] However, no effort of thought, in the -present state of our knowledge, would cause us to understand how -any number of thousands of centuries passed in roaring and barking -could enable wolves and dogs to join a single definite idea to a -single definite sound; and if we said that, by the help of specially -favourable environments some unknown species of primitive animal had -acquired the power of speech, and had succeeded in imparting the -knowledge to its descendants, and in thus elevating them to the level -of human beings, we should only be relating fantastic tales, which -would have no connection with scientific research. - -Darwin does not allow himself to be affected by this consideration. “In -a series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to -man as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite -point where the term ‘man’ ought to be used.”[14] It is evident that -if the gradations were imperceptible, there would be no possibility of -marking the precise point where the animal ended and man began; “the -admission of this insensible gradation would eliminate, not only the -difference between ape and man, but likewise between black and white, -hot and cold, a high and a low note in music; in fact, it would do away -with the possibility of all exact and definite knowledge, by removing -those wonderful lines and laws of nature which ... enable us to count, -to tell, and to know.”[15] - -I will now bring together some passages which are scattered in various -parts of the _Origin of Species_ and the _Descent of Man_ which have -especially attracted criticism. - -“It is interesting to note that all that we are, all that we see, -has been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the -largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance, which is -almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and -direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a -Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a -consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and -the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, -from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable -of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly -follows.”[16] - -And again: “There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several -powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms -or into one.”[16] “Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having -risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the -organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of having -been aboriginally placed there, may give him hopes for a still higher -destiny in the distant future.”[17] “In the future I see open fields -for far more important researches. Psychology will be securely based on -newly laid down foundations; that of the necessary acquirement of each -mental power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be thrown on -the origin of man and his history.”[18] - -Again elsewhere: “The moral sense or conscience, as Mackintosh remarks, -has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action. -It is summed up in that short but imperious word _ought_,” and Darwin -proceeds to quote Kant’s apostrophe as follows: “Duty! wondrous -thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by -any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so -extorting for thyself always reverence, if not always obedience; before -whom all appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel. Duty! whence -thy original?”[19] - -Darwin continues: “This great question, ‘Whence thy origin?’ has been -discussed by many writers of consummate ability; and my sole excuse for -touching on it is ... that, as far as I know, no one has approached it -exclusively from the side of natural history.”[20] - -“But as the feelings of love and sympathy and the power of self-command -become strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes -clearer, so that man can appreciate the justice of the judgments -of his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independently of -any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, to risk his life for his -fellow-creature, or to sacrifice himself for any great cause. He -may then say, I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and, in the -words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of -humanity.”[21] - -The warmest admirers of Darwin wish that he had expressed himself -more definitely. Some amongst them are astonished to find the word -“_Creator_” in certain editions of the _Origin of Species_, and not -in all; others have drawn attention to the fact that Darwin could -say in all good faith, “I see no good reason why the views given in -this volume should shock the religious feelings of any one.”[22] -Darwin’s line of thought has perhaps not been perfectly grasped, and -his commentators have been numerous. This, however, is certain. From -the moment when the author of the _Descent of Man_ considered that -he had discovered in social instincts the first germ of the idea of -duty, it becomes a matter for surprise that he yielded to the desire -of referring to Kant and of quoting his apostrophe to Duty. But it -is quite evident that Darwin did not see in the universe only the -fortuitous result of a combination of matter; he admitted the existence -of a law acting from the beginning and continuing to act. In order -the better to grasp his thought, it is necessary to be in a position -to define his terms. He speaks of natural selection, but in ordinary -parlance selection presupposes the existence of distinction and -judgment; and to distinguish and choose, intelligence is necessary; and -if the essential nature is intelligent, what is this nature? - -The endeavour to prove that man has descended from a creature not -originally man has deeply stirred our generation, and the greater -number amongst us only yielded to a natural repugnance in repulsing -the idea with indignation. However, because this inward feeling -tells us that a proposition is false, it does not necessarily follow -that it is so; in looking at it more closely, we have to admit that -many humiliating facts are accepted by us without demur. We are not -scandalised at the notion of being composed of the same chemical -elements as the inferior animals, nor do we revolt against the -injustice of the circumstances and restraints imposed upon all by -the facts of birth and death; but this unreasoning submission has no -more rational basis than the revolt of our feelings, in presence of -the assumption, that an animal only was our ancestor. The notion that -animals so dissimilar as the monkey, the elephant, the bird, fish, and -man could have proceeded from the same parentage seems too monstrous to -be true; from the scientific point of view this feeling is of no value; -in the face of all the assertions of our moral convictions science, -as such, remains immovable; the only weapon admitted in a scientific -encounter is fact opposed to fact, argument to argument. Moreover, -any appeals which can be made to our pride, our dignity, our piety, -would be equally wide of the mark, so long as proof is lacking that -man possesses something which has no existence in lower animals either -actually or potentially. - -It is a matter for regret to have to acknowledge the fact that the -union of a profound knowledge, combined with true sincerity in -research, is insufficient to endow the world with a well established -truth. The world is too hasty in accepting or rejecting a new system -before giving itself the trouble to divide the system into two parts, -one of which can be placed at once amongst evident truths, whilst the -other must be subjected to minute investigation and close testing. -Precisely after this manner does Darwin’s work lend itself to a -division into two parts, the former is the history of the formation and -gradual development of the organic world, represented by plants and -animals, including man (_The Origin of Species_), but it is also the -history of the formation and gradual development of man considered as a -being composed of body and spirit (_Descent of Man_). In the author’s -mind this portion of the subject is closely connected with the former. - -At first sight it would appear that a tribunal, which was quick to -distinguish truth from error in this teaching, had not been found. -Certainly scientific materialism has no voice in the matter, since its -mission is only to deal with material and actual facts; and when from -the facts accumulated conclusions are deduced as applied to origins, -this would be out of its sphere, and the conclusions reached can only -be arbitrary; thus Darwin’s theory not being found free from the taint -of idealism, it was condemned without trial. Religious dogmatism did -not show itself any more capable of deciding the question, for this -dogmatism, whose domain is faith, considered that due reference was -not made to Divine intervention, and concluded that the theory was -only judged by the light of science, and thus condemned it unheard. -But all condemnation, which cannot prove itself to be just, has no -scientific value, only one tribunal is competent of judging and solving -the question, and that is the science of language, it alone possesses -documentary evidence. The exact point at which the animal ceases and -man begins can be determined with precision since it coincides with the -beginning of the “Radical Period” of language, and language is reason. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 98. - -[2] Thus Max Müller says: “In Chinese the number of imitative sounds is -very considerable.... We give a few, together with the corresponding -sounds in Mandshu. The difference between the two will show how -differently the same sounds strike different ears, and how differently -they are rendered into articulate language: - - The cock crows = _kiao kiao_ in Chinese - = _dchor dchor_ in Mandshu.” - ---Max Müller, _Science of Language_, vol. i. note p. 419. - -[3] Max Müller says again: “We listen in vain for any similarity -between goose and cackling, hen and clucking, duck and quacking.”--Max -Müller, _Science of Language_, vol. i., p. 410. - -[4] Darwin’s _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 93. - -[5] Max Müller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 190. - -[6] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 82. - -[7] Max Müller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 21. - -[8] Max Müller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 1. - -[9] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 5. - -[10] Max Müller, partly from _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. -p. 6. - -[11] Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, 6th Edition, p. 396. - -[12] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, 1871, vol. i. p. 54. - -[13] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 59. - -[14] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 235. - -[15] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, pp. 166, 167. - -[16] Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, p. 403. - -[17] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. ii. p. 405. - -[18] Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, p. 402. - -[19] Quoted by Darwin in _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 70. - -[20] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 71. - -[21] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 86. - -[22] Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, p. 396. - - - - -CHAPTER II OUR ARYAN ANCESTORS - - -Some of the studies undertaken and carried on in a tentative groping -fashion, with the purpose of ascertaining the nature of that complex -being man, have been placed before you. I have mentioned the more -or less fantastic suppositions set forth on the subject, and I have -dwelt rather more fully on a recent system, of which the fundamental -portion (a magnificent scientific monument, to which experimental tests -have given a solid basis) is followed by a second part which treats -especially of the descent of man. The time has now come to examine -the studies of a school of philosophy, which, guided by a new theory, -searches in the past, and passes under review all previous conceptions, -suppositions, or even misconceptions of the previous schools. - -The science of language, based on the close connection between thought -and speech, only dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. -The first problem presented to it is that of origin--the origin of -thought and speech in man--which two united in their essential parts, -make man what he is. The means by which this science works is called -comparative philology; it is by the analysis of languages--living as -well as dead--that it seeks to discover the infancy of human thought. -It is evident that in order to penetrate thus deeply, this analysis -must follow the whole progress of speech since it first sounded; to no -other school of philosophy had this idea occurred; all others ignored -the fact that previous to the commencement of human language, no -vestige of humanity could exist; therefore, probably, another fact had -been ignored; that the only archives in which it is possible to study -the history of humanity and the development of reason are those of -language. - -Wherever sacred writings exist, we find in them the most ancient -languages of the people who possess them; this is the case in Persia, -China, Palestine, Arabia, and India; thus it is in these writings which -are looked upon as being divinely inspired, that search must be made -for the genesis of the successive thought of these peoples. - -But these ancient writings differ widely the one from the other; for -the most part they contain ideas which are the product of various -ages; often also, as in Greece, and Rome and Persia, we find ourselves -confronted by thoughts or theories which had already arrived at a high -degree of development, or are beginning to lose their first clearness. -Only amongst the Hindoos is it possible to follow step by step the -growth of the conception, and the transformation of the names which -clothe them. The Vedas show us more clearly than any other literary -monument in the world, the uninterrupted course of the evolution of -language and thought from the first word pronounced by our ancestors to -our own most recent reflection. - -India does not possess remains of ancient temples nor of ancient -palaces. Edifices of this kind were probably unknown before the -invasion of Alexander. The Hindoos have always felt themselves -strangers in the land, and the constant efforts of the kings of Egypt -and of Babylon to perpetuate their names during thousands of years, -by means of bricks and blocks of stone, did not occur to them until -suggested by foreigners. But on the other hand, from the most remote -times, they have possessed sacred writings, and they still preserve -them in their ancient form. The number of separate works in Sanscrit of -which the manuscripts are still in existence is now estimated at more -than ten thousand. What would Plato and Aristotle have said, had they -been told that there existed in that India which Alexander had just -discovered--if not conquered--an ancient literature, far richer than -anything they possessed at that time in Greece, and dating back so far -that the old Sanscrit which clothed the religious and philosophical -thought of these early inhabitants was a dead language. This literature -has not ceased to increase, and contains the canonical books of the -three principal religions of the ancient world; the Zend-Avesta, the -sacred books of the Magians, written in Zend, the ancient Persian; -the Tripitaka, the sacred books of the Buddhists, which contain moral -treatises, dogmatic philosophy, and metaphysics; and the sacred -writings of the Brahmans called the Vedas. - -It would be difficult to say whether the Old Testament, or certain -portions of the Vedas, have existed for the greater number of -centuries; it is certain that the Aryan race had no existence previous -to the Vedas. The name _Veda_ signifies “knowing, or knowledge”; veda, -Greek _οἰδα_, is a verb with the same meaning in Sanscrit as in Greek, -“I know.” The book of the Vedas contains an epitome of the most ancient -Brahmanic science, and is composed of four collections of hymns; that -which is called Rig-Veda (hymns of praise) is the true Veda, and the -other Vedas are to the Rig-Veda what the Talmud is to the Bible. -The Rig-Veda, which for more than three thousand years had laid the -foundations of the moral and religious life of innumerable millions of -human creatures had never been published until Max Müller put forth -a complete edition, accompanied by authorised commentaries on Indian -theology. - -The composition of these hymns occupied many centuries, and in 600 -B.C. the collection seems to have been complete. Some early treatises -on these hymns tell us that at this date the theological schools had -accomplished a great undertaking, that of counting every verse, every -word, every syllable of the hymns; the number of syllables is 432,000, -the number of words 153,826, and the number of verses as computed in -these treatises varies from 10,402 to 10,622. Until the introduction of -writing, the Vedic hymns were entirely preserved by memory, with such -accuracy and fidelity that the rules contained in the treatise for the -repetitions correspond with great exactness with the actual text, its -accents, metre, and the divinity it praises. The Rig-Veda now forms the -foundation of all philological and mythological studies, as well as -those connected with the science and growth of religion; without it we -should never have obtained any insight into the belief of our ancestors. - - * * * * * - -We will now transport ourselves to the cradle of the Aryas “Noble,” -according to some writers situated on the Asiatic continent, according -to others more to the north, between the Baltic and the Caspian seas. -This will suffice for the first stage; I shall make few demands on -history, or on grammar. - -There was a time when the great mass of the Aryan people was -hesitating on the eve of abandoning their early habitations, previous -to a dispersion in two directions. This people was composed of two -branches, the tribes of the north, and those of the south; the former -went towards the north-west of Asia and Europe; here they established -themselves, and the great historical nations--historical, since most of -them have played noted parts amongst the nations--the Celts, Grecians, -Romans, Germans and Slavs were their descendants. Endowed with every -aptitude for an active life, they fostered these capabilities to the -highest degree; society was founded by them, morals brought to a -greater perfection, the foundation of science and art established, and -the principles of philosophy laid down. Although constantly in conflict -with the Semitic and Turanian races, these Aryans became in their -descendants the masters of the world. Whilst the northern division -followed a north-westerly direction, the southern went to the mountains -lying to the north of India; crossing the passes of the Himalayas, and -following the long watercourses, they descended into the vast fertile -valleys, and from that time India became as their own land. These -pleasant dwelling-places of the Aryan colonists, protected on the one -side by high mountains, and on the other by the ocean from all foreign -invasions, were not disturbed by any of the ancient conquerors of the -world; around them kingdoms rose and fell, dynasties were created and -became extinct, but the inner life of the tribes remained undisturbed -by these events. The ancient Hindoos were calm, contemplative dreamers, -a nation of philosophers, who could only conceive of disputes in -themselves, in their own thoughts; the transcendental nature of the -atmosphere in which his ideas worked, and in which the Hindoo lived, -could not fail to retard the development of practical, social, and -political virtues, and the appreciation of the beautiful and useful. -The Hindoo saw nothing in the past but the mystery of the Creation, -in the future but the mystery of his destiny; the present offered -nothing to him that could awaken physical activity, and apparently had -no reality for him; no people ever existed who believed more firmly -in a future life, or who occupied themselves less with this one; such -as they were in the beginning, such they remained. The only sphere in -which the Indian mind moves freely is the sphere of religion and that -of philosophy. In no other part of the world have metaphysical ideas -taken such deep root as in India; the forms in which these ideas were -clothed, in epochs of varying culture, and in the midst of divers -classes of society, were alternately those of the grossest superstition -and of the most exalted spiritualism. - -It has been asserted that in these two Aryan branches must we look for -our ancestors. How shall we verify the truth of this assertion? What -family likeness must we seek in order to recognise the relationship? -How feel certain that the languages we speak have been derived from -them? “If we knew nothing of the existence of Latin--if no historical -documents existed to tell us of the Roman empire--a mere comparison of -the six Romance dialects would enable us to say that at some time there -must have been a language from which all these modern dialects derived -their origin in common.”[23] - -Let us conjugate the verb _to be_ in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, -French, Walachian, and in Rhætian, and we shall see that it is clear: -first, that all are but varieties of one common type: secondly, that -it is impossible to consider any one of these six dialects as the -original from which the others had been borrowed, since no single one -contains the elements composing them. “If we find such forms as _j’ai -aimé_, we can explain them by a mere reference to the grammatical -materials which French has still at its command, and the same may be -said of _j’aimerai_, i.e. _je-aimer-ai_, I have to love, I shall love. -But a change from _je suis_ to _tu es_ is inexplicable by the light of -French grammar; it must have been a part of some language antecedent -to any of the Romance dialects; it is, in fact, the verb _to be_ in -Latin, which solves this difficulty; each of the six paradigms is but a -metamorphosis of the Latin.”[24] - -It was known that the roots were the same in all the Aryan languages, -that the same grammatical changes were common in many of the words -in everyday use, such as father, mother, heaven, sun, moon, horse, -and cow, as well as in the principal numbers; but it was the study -of Sanscrit in its primitive form which first led the learned to the -discovery of the reason of the vowel changes in certain words in use -in our day, and which changes the English word _to wit_, to know, into -_I wot_, I know, and the German _ich weise_ into _wir wissen_; these -changes are the result of a general law, the application of which can -nowhere be more clearly appreciated than in the Vedic Sanscrit, and -which was unknown until this language was studied in the Veda. (I -will here note that Sanscrit not being the original from which the -other Aryan dialects have their being, but an elder brother, when Max -Müller makes use of a Sanscrit phrase he does it to give an idea of -the process through which the language has passed which he considers -preceded Sanscrit.) - -There is another list of paradigms which, under a less familiar aspect -than the first, presents the same phenomenon. Conjugate the verb _to -be_ in Doric, Latin, old Slav, Sanscrit, Celtic, Lithuanian, Zend, -Gothic, and Armenian, and you will see that the nine are varieties of -one common type, and that it is impossible to consider any one of them -as the original of the others, since, here again, none of the languages -possess the grammatical material out of which these forms could have -been framed. Sanscrit cannot have been the source from which the rest -were derived, since Greek, in several instances, has retained a more -organic form than the Sanscrit. Nor can Greek be considered as the -earliest language from which the others were derived, for not even -Latin could be called the daughter of Greek, since Latin has preserved -certain forms more primitive than the Greek. Hence all these nine -dialects point to some more ancient language, which was to them what -Latin was to the Romance dialects; only at that early period there was -no literature to preserve to us any remnant of that mother-tongue that -died in giving birth to all the modern Aryan dialects.[25] - -There is one fact to be noted. If a comparison be made of the verb -_to be_ in these dialects, it will be seen that Sanscrit is no more -distinct from the Greek of Homer, or from the Gothic of Ulfilas, -or from the Anglo-Saxon of Alfred, than the Romance dialects from -each other; that, in fact, the resemblance is more striking between -Sanscrit and Lithuanian, and between Sanscrit and Russian, than between -French and Italian. This circumstance proves that all the essential -grammatical forms of these languages had been fully framed and -established before the first separation of the Aryan family took place, -that is to say, at a time before there were any Grecians to speak -Greek, or any Brahmans to invoke God’s name in Sanscrit. - -The science of comparative philology enables us to have glimpses of the -social condition of our Aryan ancestors before they left their first -abode. All historical documents of this period are lacking, for the -simple reason that the time of which we are speaking is anterior to any -historical records; “but comparative philology has placed in our hands -a telescope of such power that where formerly we could see but nebulous -clouds we now discover distinct forms and outlines.”[26] - -We see that our ancestors were no savages, but agricultural nomads, -that they laboured, made roads, possessed the art of weaving and -sewing; they built towns, kept domestic animals, lived under a kingly -government, and counted at least up to one hundred. We learn this not -only from the words father, mother, son, daughter, heaven, earth, but -also from house, town, king, dog, cow, hatchet, and many others, which -are found to be the same in the German, Celtic, Slavonic, Greek, Latin, -and Sanscrit. They are the same because they all point to some more -ancient language, the mother-tongue in use before the separation of -the various Aryan tribes. From this period the other words also date, -expressing all the degrees of relationship, even those by alliance, -thus giving clear proof of the early organisation of family life. - -At the same time a decimal system of numeration also existed, the -numbers from one to a hundred, “in itself one of the most marvellous -achievements of the human mind, produced from an abstract conception -of quantity, regulated by a spirit of philosophical classification, -and yet conceived, matured and finished before the soil of Europe was -trodden by Greek, Roman, Slav, or Teuton. Such a system could only have -been formed by a very small community, in which by the help of a tacit -agreement, each number could only bear one signification. If we were -suddenly obliged to invent new names for one, two and three we should -quickly feel the great difficulty of the task; to supply new names for -material objects would be comparatively easy, as these have different -attributes which could be used in their designation; we could call the -sea, the salt water; and the rain, the water of heaven; numbers are, -however, such abstract conceptions that it would be foolish to attempt -to find in them palpable attributes, and thus give expression to a -merely quantitative idea.”[27] - -Since the names of the Aryan numbers up to one hundred are the same, -it proves that they date from a time when our ancestors lived under -circumscribed conditions united by common ties. This is not so with -the word _thousand_; the names for _thousand_ differ in German and -Slavonic, because they have their rise after the dispersion of the -race. Sanscrit and Zend share the name for thousand, which proves the -union of the ancestors of the Brahmans and Zoroastrians--after their -exodus--by the ties of a common language. - -In this way the facts of language--which are so simple that a child -could seize them--enable us to travel from the known to the unknown, -and prove our descent from the once small family of the Aryas. - -Man in the abstract has been studied for long years. Max Müller -contemplates this abstraction in the Aryan man; this has not previously -been attempted. Certainly we Aryans of to-day differ greatly from our -first parents, but not _in toto_; the ties which connect us have not -been severed, and he it is--our Aryan ancestor--who will help us to -understand how we are verily the children of our fathers. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[23] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 18. - -[24] _Ibid._, vol. ii. p. 19. - -[25] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. pp. 18-20. - -[26] _Chips from, a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 17. - -[27] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 52. - - - - -CHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE - - -It is possible to distinguish in ourselves four things: sensation, -perception, conception, and the signs by means of which we designate -objects, that is their names; these enable us to separate the one -from the other. We must not imagine that these four exist as separate -entities, “no words are possible without concepts, no concepts without -percepts, no percepts without sensations.”[28]--_Science of Thought_, -p. 2. - -These four constituent elements of thought are merely four different -phases in the growth of what we call our mind. - -I employ these terms because they are in use in philosophical language; -there are also many others constantly on the lips of philosophers, some -of them newly coined. This is greatly to be regretted, as much of our -confusion of thought arises from this superabundance of philosophical -terms. If such words as impression, sensation, perception, intuition, -presentation, conception, soul, reason, and many others could for a -time be banished from our philosophical dictionaries, and some only -readmitted after they had undergone a thorough purification and were -made to return to their primitive signification, an immense service -would have been rendered to mental science; as every writer defines -them as he will, or uses them without definition; and he seems to -imagine that because there are so many words, there must also be so -many variations, “Because in the German language there are two words: -_verstand_ and _vernunft_, both originally expressing the same thing, -the greatest efforts have been made to show that there is something to -be called _verstand_, totally different from what is called _vernunft_; -and as there is a _vernunft_ by the side of a _verstand_ in German, -English philosophers have been most anxious to introduce the same -distinction between understanding and reason into English”;[29] and -“because we have a name for impression, and another for sensations, -we are led to imagine that impressions do actually exist by the side -of sensations. But what was originally meant by impression was not -something beside sensation, but rather one side of sensation, namely, -the passive side, which may be spoken of by itself, but which in every -real sensation is inseparable from its active side.”[30] - -All the various shades and developments of sensation were doubtless -distinguished and named for some very useful purpose; but the -inconvenience was great when the terms became too numerous. “We may -safely enjoy the wealth of language accumulated by a long line of -thinkers, if only we take care not to accept a coin for more or less -than it is really worth. We must weigh our words as the ancients often -weighed their coins, and not be deceived by their current value.”[31] -When we have bravely resolved to throw away superfluous words, we need -not imagine that we are the poorer, since we have only lost what we, in -reality, never possessed. So powerful, however, is the action of words -on thoughts, that as soon as we throw away a word, we feel ourselves -to have been robbed of the thing itself; the sun rises just the same, -though we say now that it does not rise. Those things which we call -mind, intellect, reason, memory, in fact the soul, have no existence -as such--that is apart from ourselves. This assertion may sound very -terrible to those philosophers who imagine that the dignity of man -consists in the possession of these and other powers; at last there -arises a complete mythology, a philosophic polytheism, when these are -spoken of as distinct possessions, independent powers, with limits not -very sharply defined; and however orthodox that polytheism has become, -it is never too late to protest against it. In making use of these -terms it should be understood that they represent certain modes of -action and phases of the Ego. - -It is to be regretted that our modern languages have nothing to replace -the word “mind,” such as there is in the Sanscrit language, meaning -“working within.” As soon as we speak of _mind_ we cannot help thinking -of an independent something dwelling in our body, whereas by mind I -mean nothing but that working which is going on within, embracing -sensation, perception, conception, and naming, and the worker who -accomplishes this is the Ego. - -Thus the Ego means nothing but consciousness of itself. - -There is one word which it would be desirable to reintroduce into our -philosophical phraseology and that is Logos; it means the word and -the thought combined. Logos is a single intellectual act under two -aspects; it is an untranslatable word. We were told at school that it -was strange that the Greeks should not have distinguished between Logos -Speech and Logos Reason, and it was represented as a progress toward -clearer thought that later writers should have distinguished between -Logos the spoken word and Logos the inner thought. - -But the Greeks were right: no doubt it may be an advantage to be able -to distinguish between two sides of the same thing, but that advantage -is more than neutralised if such distinction leads us to suppose that -these two sides are two different things. Let us avoid the very common -error that things which can be distinguished can therefore claim an -independent existence; we can distinguish between an orange and its -peel, but no orange can grow without peel, nor peel without the fruit. - -Let it not be supposed that I am such a bigoted upholder of the -unity of the Ego as to wish to see all these names banished from our -philosophical dictionaries. Let us use the word Sense when speaking -of the Ego as perceiving. Let us use Intellect when the Ego is simply -conceiving; and the word language when it is speaking; let us even use -the word _memory_ when we wish to speak of the partial permanence of -the work done by sensation, perception, and conception; and let us use -Reason or Reasoning for the process which produces what the logicians -call propositions and syllogisms; but let us never forget that neither -to remember nor to reason implies the possession of a thing called -reason or memory. All our mental life will remain just the same though -we deny the existence of the terms which obscure our vision; let us -hold fast to the existence of the Ego, it exists in its entity, it only -is the worker, and it receives its highest expression in the Logos. - -This truth, that thought and language are inseparable, that thought -without language is as impossible as language without thought has -only recently been affirmed by comparative philologists. Many learned -writers are still unwilling to admit that ideas without words are -impossible though at the same time they are quite willing to concede -that words are impossible without concepts.[32] - -We possess an immense number of books on logic, yet we are met -everywhere by the same vagueness on this subject. John Stuart Mill -speaks of language as one of the principal elements or helps of -thought, but he never mentions any other instruments. This lack is -probably owing to the unfortunate influence of modern languages -which have two words, the one for language, the other for thought; -this gives the impression that there is a substantial instead of an -apparent difference between the two; it is also owing to the dislike -of philosophers to allow that all which is most lofty, most spiritual -in us should be dependent on such miserable crutches as words are -supposed to be. Yet it is evident that we cannot advance one step -towards philosophy without acknowledging the fact that we think in -words and words only. This thought would be less difficult to grasp -if we defined clearly what are thoughts. Sensation, pain, pleasure, -dreaming, or willing cannot be called true thought, but variations of -inward activity; in the same way as shrieks, howls, or even the sounds -of real words, taken from a foreign language, are no more language -than our emotions are thoughts. The word Logos expresses this, since -it had originally the two meanings of gathering and combining, and so -became the proper name of all that we call reason; but as it also means -language, it tells us that the process of gathering and combining, -which begins with sensation and passes on to perception and conception, -reaches its full perfection only when the inward activity takes form in -the Logos or speech. - -Language therefore is not as has been often imagined, thought plus -sound; but thought is really language minus sound; words are the -external symbols of thought, sounding symbols when we articulate in -a loud voice, but mute when we confine ourselves to merely thinking -them, since it is a fact that we think in words, and it is not possible -to think otherwise. The possession of a language is shown even in the -tracing of whole sentences by ideographic signs, which need not be -pronounced at all, or as in the astronomical signs in our almanacks -which may be pronounced differently in different languages: or we -may substitute algebraic signs for words; we could as well calculate -without numbers as apply our reason without words I have freely and -fully admitted that thoughts may exist without words, because other -signs may take the place of words between persons speaking different -languages possibly between deaf and dumb people. Five fingers held -up are quite sufficient to convey the concept of five, thus the hand -may become the sign for five, both hands for ten, hands and feet for -twenty. In America and Australia where many dialects are spoken this -method has attained a great degree of perfection, but we notice that -in all cases under review each one thinks in his own language and then -translates his thought into pantomime. - -A final fact adduced against the theory that it is impossible to think -without language, which was very popular, is that deaf and dumb people -cannot speak, and yet can think; this argument has no great value, as -it is now averred that “a man born dumb who had always lived among -deaf and dumb people, and had not been taught to express thoughts by -signs would be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than a -monkey or an elephant; and this in spite of the fact that no naturalist -could distinguish any difference between the size of their brains and -those belonging to men who could speak.” For deaf mutes to be able to -think and reason, they must have learned from those who use words, then -only can they substitute other signs for their words and concepts. -Still Professor Huxley accords to these unfortunate men certain -intellectual heritages derived from their parents. - -These are some of the chief points in the science of language. The -fundamental law which this science lays down of the unity of thought -and speech is a torch which may throw light on the origin of man. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[28] Max Müller says: “I use percept instead of presentation, because -it is better understood in English.”--_Science of Thought_, p. 2. - -[29] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, p. 72. - -[30] _Ibid._, p. 17. - -[31] _Ibid._, p. 75. - -[32] _Science of Thought_, p. 30. - - - - -CHAPTER IV ANIMALS - - -Whilst philosophers and moralists have studied men, and naturalists -animals, Darwin considered it necessary to collect information -concerning both men and beasts simultaneously before making a biography -of the human being. With the modesty so often characteristic of a great -genius, the English naturalist acknowledges that “many of the views -which have been advanced are highly speculative, and some no doubt will -prove erroneous. False facts are highly injurious to the progress of -science, for they often long endure; but false views, if supported by -some evidence, do little harm, as everyone takes a salutary pleasure in -proving their falseness; and when this is done, one path towards error -is closed and the road to truth is often at the same time opened.”[33] - -Although there is no doubt that the facts observed by Darwin and -recorded in the _Origin of Species_, are perfectly correct, I hope to -be able to dispose of the opinion that “man and animals follow parallel -lines in their lives, but that man advances more quickly, and has taken -his place in the front rank.” - -Whilst making a short _résumé_ of remarks which Noiré and other learned -writers have made on animals, I also propose to draw a comparison -between the two who are so closely connected--the superior and inferior -animal. - -Darwin was not alone in his endeavour to prove that there exists no -essential difference between man and beast; some have even asserted -that the intelligence of certain animals is not only equal to, but -at times, superior to that of man. We must be on our guard, however, -against those numerous anecdotes which have led even philosophers -astray; we will also divest our minds of prejudice and preconceived -notions, that we may introduce some order into ideas which have been -disturbed by superficial observers and the makers of false systems, -those enemies of true science; let us candidly own the smallness of -our knowledge concerning the mind of an animal; we do not in the least -know how they philosophise, nor how an ox recognises his stable door. -Instead of having recourse to animals and seeking to draw parallels -between their mental faculties and ours, let us examine ourselves to -find out what passes in our own minds. We shall then discover that -we never in reality perceive anything unless we can distinguish it -from other things by means, if not of a word, yet of a sign; that is -till we have passed through the four stages of sensation, perception, -conception, and more important than all, for our present purpose, of -naming. When it is once acknowledged that concepts are impossible -without words, and that man alone amongst organised beings possesses -the power of language, and that the mental faculties of animals are -different from ours in kind, and not only in degree, it naturally -follows that a genealogical descent of man from animals is an -impossible assumption. - -Formerly, in comparing the characteristics of man and animals it was -contended that the latter were ruled by instinct in place of the reason -which was the attribute of the former; and although an affirmation -is not an explanation it appeared sufficiently plausible and was -accepted. But the fact is that both man and beast possess instinct. -If the spider weaves his net by instinct, a child takes his mother’s -breast also by instinct; both are with regard to instinct at one level. -Man involuntarily extends his arm to protect himself if he suddenly -perceives an object near him on the point of striking him. “If we tear -a spider’s web, and watch the spider first run from it in despair, then -return and examine the mischief and endeavour to mend it. Surely we -have the instinct of weaving controlled by observation, by comparison, -by reflection, and by judgment.”[34] - -No one has hitherto succeeded in explaining and analysing the instinct -said to be in animals. Cuvier[35] and other naturalists have compared -it with habit.[36] This comparison gives an accurate notion of the -frame of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but does -not necessarily explain its origin. - -As reason develops in man, instinct plays a less important part; -whereas a cat chases a mouse, a bird flies, and fish swim by instinct -from their birth to their last day; and the actions of ants, bees, and -moles, do not cease to amaze us, because they are inseparable from -their structure and their vital functions. The natural impulses which -guide birds and insects in making their nests, hives, and storehouses, -cocoons of silk with which they have so enriched our world and theirs, -are the results of constant and repeated acts, during the course of -innumerable generations. The fact of not distinguishing the instinct -which is in man from that found in animals and thus attributing -man’s conscious acts to the natural leanings which guide unconscious -creatures, has perhaps caused Renan to assert that the monotheistic -tendency of the Semitic race belongs to it by a religious instinct. - -It is certain that impressions are received both by man and by animals; -with both the knowledge of objects proceeds from the impressions made -on the senses, thus transmitting the image to the intelligence; but -there the likeness ends; the capacities differ. The animal remains the -slave--in every sense of the word--of his organs; the sight of a bone -to gnaw, the corner in which he lies, the signs of friendship that he -receives from human beings, call forth in a dog a chain of feelings -taking the place of the chain of ideas called out in man. - -Man’s capabilities of introducing intermediaries between the intention -and the fulfilment of his object witness to his wideness of mind, his -experience of the past and prevision of the future; all those things -that he owes to his power of imagination and conception even in the -case of things having no real existence, or which do not exist as yet; -he reproduces at will the outward likeness of what is not at the moment -before him. Thus man who names an object, _thinks_ it; but the animal -from not possessing language cannot _think_ it and cannot reproduce it -when out of its sight. - -The use or non-use of tools creates a great gulf between man and the -brutes. The most intelligent animal, a monkey of a high order, never -uses a tool--even the most primitive--to accomplish his will; no one -can ascribe to the animal creative actions, that is, it does not -fashion an implement that it may attain another end; it has never been -known to carry an object from one spot to another that it might act as -a ladder to bring the animal nearer to the fruit it desired to reach. - -But this concession, I think, we may make to Darwin; that even in the -sphere of mental activities we can never entirely separate ourselves -from the brute creation. We experience in ourselves a certain condition -of mind, where fancies alternate with passing agitation; these proceed -from intense, but confused emotions. This condition does not allow of -clear explanation even to ourselves, since it has nothing in common -with true thought, which is inseparable from the consciousness of -objects, and therefore is lacking in words with which to express -itself. To Mendelssohn this mental condition was perfectly known, and -he says, “It is exactly at that moment when language is impotent to -express the experiences of the soul, that the sphere of music opens to -us; if all that passes in us were capable of being expressed in words, -I should write no more music.” - -A flock of birds about to migrate, all follow an unanimous impulse in -uttering at starting a few high clear notes, perhaps impelled by an -unknown motive, their inclinations and wills find collective expression -therein, by a mutual impulse which comes from soundless depths of the -life of the senses, carrying all before it. This universal sympathy, -however difficult to explain, is one of the noblest possessions of the -inferior animals; even the aptitude they display for certain mechanical -acts of labour does not stand on the same level; but in the vocal -manifestations of birds there is no indication of true thought, the -basis of real language. - - * * * * * - -Now come, my dog, for a _tête-à-tête_. It would be impossible to hold -converse with ants, bees, monkeys, moles, or birds, as I should not -acknowledge them as my compeers, I should not admit them as intimates; -but you I know well; and, let me tell you, your judges have shown their -impartiality towards you; none of the vices which degrade us--your -superiors--have been laid to your account. You are called neither -gourmand, thief, idler, nor hypocrite; but you lack the qualities that -might have been yours had you possessed the faculty of combination. -They say that you create nothing because you fail to see what purpose -tools may serve; and you are ignorant of the fact that _A._ being -given, _B._ must follow--such is combination. Still, on looking -closely, it is possible to discover amongst us--your superiors--those -who are stupid--or awkward--who take small advantage of all the means -put within their reach to recede from a false position, to recover -from the effects of a wrong step, or, what is still more important, -remedy their ignorance. Yes, there are many such, and these also lack -the faculty of combination. - -Your judges also assert that from the want on your part of being able -to attach one idea to another, you do not think of your master when -he is absent from you. What ingratitude! But I wonder whether those -friends, who profess so much pleasure in my company, think of me when I -am absent; perhaps no more than you do. - -Let me continue my enquiries for a few minutes. We will suppose that -we two are in my study. I am occupied with a book, and am not thinking -of you at all. You are stretched at my feet with your nose between -your paws, watching a fly near you. I make a sudden movement, you look -at me, and at the same moment wag your tail.... Am I to suppose that -you wag it to hide your dislike to me? The noble quality which I and -all your superiors possess is lacking in you; you have no speech for -thought in which to tell me your love for me; but if you could speak, -that is, were like one of ourselves, would you be as truthful as you -are now, being only a dog that has nothing but his tail with which -to make his master understand his feelings towards him? Schopenhauer -... but you know nothing of Schopenhauer, if you could speak I should -teach you to read, and then you would know him. Schopenhauer is a great -and learned philosopher, who says, “How much this movement of the -tail surpasses in sincerity many other assurances of friendship and -devotion.”[37] - -This is a long digression on Darwin’s idea that man and animals lead -parallel lives, but that the one progresses quickly, the other slowly. -I think I have shown that it is not a question of rapidity or tardiness -of progress, but rather whether both travellers are equally well -equipped with the means of passing the Rubicon. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[33] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. ii. p. 385. - -[34] Max Müller’s _Science of Language_, vol. i. p. 402. - -[35] “Cuvier maintained that instinct and intelligence stand in an -inverse ratio to each other.”--Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. -37. Translator’s note. - -[36] Frederick Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have -compared instinct with habit.--Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, p. 191. - -[37] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, p. 178. - - - - -CHAPTER V PRIMITIVE HUMANITY - - -Some courage is required to attack the subject of comparative philology -as treated by certain learned authors; they are bold enough to seek to -transport themselves to an age of such remote antiquity that history is -silent on the subject, but in which a nascent humanity endeavoured to -find expression for its sensations in a language which probably had no -name. - -When my attention was first attracted to the work of this school, so -long as my mind was content to skim over the surface of an unknown -world, so immeasurably distant from us, and whilst flitting too rapidly -over it to be able to distinguish any of its features, it presented -itself to me as a creation of my heated imagination. Since then I have -lived in that world of wonders, and I then grasped the fact that it was -quite possible for this world to have been a reality. But to journey -thither, even to live in this strange country, the only path to which -is by induction, in company with Max Müller and Noiré, who, apparently, -are its inhabitants, from the ease with which they move in it, is a -totally different matter from explaining the methods of getting there, -or describing the sojourn. I should have to draw information from -various sources, and the scientific and hypothetical data connected -therewith would require sorting and rearranging to make them assimilate -more easily; these would present difficulties not readily surmounted. - -How could a reasonable and speaking being come forth from that which -had no reason and no language? - -The earliest traditions are silent on the manner of man’s acquisition -of his first ideas and his first words. But because a problem has not -been solved, that is no reason for the assertion that it is insoluble, -unless a refutation is at once demonstrable, as in the squaring of the -circle. “If every one had abstained from striving to penetrate hidden -things, no sciences would exist,” Noiré remarked. Newton might have -said: “The facts that a stone falls and the planets move are known -by actual experience, why search out the laws which produce these -phenomena?” And the theory of gravitation would have been lacking. -Lyell might have said: “We see that the crust of the earth is composed -of several strata, why reckon the time required for their formation?” -And there would have been no science of geology. Liebig might have -said: “We see that clover grows and cattle prosper, why should the -relation of cause and effect concern us?” And there would have been no -organic chemistry. Adam Smith might have said: “We know by experience -that valuable objects can be exchanged, and that their prices -fluctuate, why should we study the cause of rise and fall?” And this -chapter would have been missing from political economy. - -No road presents itself to me by which to arrive in the midst of -primitive humanity; of necessity, therefore, I have recourse to -analogy, which, under the circumstances, is not the worst expedient. - -When the Romans first encountered Germans, they were chiefly struck -by the great stature, the blue eyes, and the light hair of this -inimical race. Tacitus, in alluding to this fact, says that each -German exactly resembled his fellow. Although we are familiar with -the external appearance of various nations, yet if we found ourselves -in the presence of a large number of negroes we should experience an -analogous sensation, only by degrees should we distinguish one from the -other. In an intensified degree primitive man must have had similar -experiences when, first finding himself in a world of which he knew -nothing, and of which he understood nothing, the consciousness of -what he saw around him was making itself apparent. These early races -learnt the meaning of the details of surrounding nature but slowly; -their eyes followed the brilliant circle as it moved from one quarter -of the heavens to the other; they noticed the fire which came whence -they knew not; they heard the crash of thunder, reproduced by the -echoes in the mountains synchronising with the devastations caused by -the storm. If one man alone had witnessed these terrifying effects -in nature, his reason would have tottered from fear; the stones and -the herbs of the field could not share his agitation; the death of a -man from terror would leave them unmoved. Happily man was not alone, -all those around him shared his agitation, and the terror manifested -itself on each by signs which each would understand instinctively. -This period of semi-consciousness before the full awakening might -have been a prolonged one, but physical sensations and necessities -multiplied themselves, and were very various and imperative; action was -indispensable if privations were to be avoided; and instinct came to -their aid. The need of guarding themselves from the burning rays of the -sun caused them to provide shelters by interlacing branches of trees; -to protect themselves from cold they took the skins of wild beasts to -throw over their shoulders; where natural caverns were insufficient for -their wants they made themselves refuges in the sides of the mountains; -they were forced to light and maintain fires; sharpen stones either -for tools or for weapons of defence; the wants of one were the wants -of all, and all gave themselves to the task of satisfying them. It is -so evident that primitive activity must have been co-operative, that -it outrages common sense to picture each man labouring by himself for -himself alone. The mental phenomenon known as _intention_, was the -common property of all; the mutual sympathy played the part of the -electric current of our laboratories, and the inarticulate sounds -escaping involuntarily from the lips of each worker, served as a means -of communication. - -In order the better to understand the function of the voice in the -education of primitive man, let us look around us and listen. Whenever -our senses are excited, and our muscles hard at work, we feel a kind of -relief in uttering sounds which in themselves have no meaning. “They -are a relief rather than an effort, a moderation or modulation of the -quickened breath in its escape through the mouth.”[38] - -When men work together, on account of the nature of the task -requiring united effort, they are naturally inclined to accompany -their occupations with certain more or less rhythmical utterances, -which react beneficially on the inward disturbance caused by muscular -effort. When a body of men march, row, or wield hammers, they do not -keep silence; formerly soldiers sang as they marched to battle; our -modern civilisation only caused the substitution of fife and drums -for the songs; and our soldiers do not readily abandon these measured -accompaniments, which make them less susceptible of fatigue. When -savage races dance they make the air resound with measured cadences; -our peasants sing while joining in the country dances; the custom of -singing during work is more marked amongst those who belong to the -races which are less under the influence of civilisation, and are more -entirely absorbed by their manual occupation, and with whom personal -preoccupation has small hold. - -These inarticulate sounds which Noiré has named _clamor concomitans_ -and Max Müller _clamor significans_, uttered by primitive men when -working in concert, and always inseparable from acts, could be -differentiated in accordance with the acts performed; and at a period -when actual speech did not yet exist, they would always have this -practical value, they would awaken the remembrance of acts performed in -the past, and be repeated in the present, they would thus be instantly -understood by all, and readily retained by the memory. But what was -there to determine the application of certain sounds to certain -occupations? This has not been made clear. Plato, Socrates, and others, -have considered that the origin of language might be traced to the -imitation of the sounds of nature, and have sought for a resemblance -between these sounds and certain letters of the alphabet, but even were -it possible here and there to discover a faint analogy, our efforts -would only end in contradictions. There seems to be neither necessity -nor absolute freedom in the choice of the sounds expressive of these -acts, but rather the result of some accident, or of causes of which we -are ignorant. In any case these sounds were merely the materials of -which language was built. - -It will be easily understood that nothing would penetrate more deeply -into man’s consciousness, or produce mutual understanding more -readily, than acts undertaken and accomplished with the same end in -view by a number of men united in a common impulse. During the digging -of the caves, the weaving of the nets, the thrashing of the grain, -the workers would follow with their eyes the gradual transformation -perceptible in these activities, and the sounds which they emitted, -or the half-formed words issuing from their lips would be modified or -softened at each development in the work; these developments becoming -more and more distinct, more and more impressed with their own special -characteristic. The idea of individuality must have been very clouded, -very confused amongst primitive man; that which one saw the other saw -after the same manner; they designed each object in creating it; in -this way the world became as a book to them, this book, the result of -their combined labour, they learnt to read fluently by means of these -sounds and words which increased as they varied. Thus work--man’s good -genius--is proved to be the source of what is truly human, viz., reason -and language. - -Here I will note a curious fact and one which is historical. At a -period when writing was unknown in India, the Brahmans had already -established the rules of poetical metre, which were originally -connected with dancing and music. These rules had been preserved in the -Veda. The various Sanscrit names for metre are a witness of the union -of corporal and phonetic movements. The root of _Khandas_, metre, is -the same as the Latin _scandere_ in the sense of stepping; _vritta_, -metre, from _vrit_, verto--to turn, meant originally the last three -or four steps of a dancing movement, the turn, the _versus_, which -determined the whole character of dance or of the metre. _Trishtubh_, -the name of a common metre in the Veda, meant three-step, because -its turn--its _vritta_ or _versus_--consisted of three steps, ∪ - -. -Thus the innate necessity that man feels of linking the play of the -vocal chords to the movement of hands or feet, had been controlled by -fixed laws, twenty-four centuries ago, by the Hindoo grammarians; and -the most recent theories of modern writers on the subject attest the -excellence of these laws. The assertion that it is natural to peasants -not to keep silence when working is of very ancient date, but Noiré was -the first to deduce scientific data from the fact. - -The study of Sanscrit has shown us that two thousand years ago it -occurred to Hindoo grammarians to investigate the origin of the words -of their language, when they discovered that all words could be reduced -to roots, and that these roots all expressed various forms of activity; -that they were therefore verbs, and that the number of these roots was -very restricted. Our present philologists have continued this work -and are not only able to acknowledge the accuracy of the Brahmanic -discovery, but also to certify that the grammatical analysis of the -Hindoos, put forth 500 years before our era, has never been surpassed. -It is important to remember that roots are the fundamental elements -which permeate the whole organism of the language. Hebrew has been -reduced by Renan and other Hebraists to about 500 roots; the work -has still to be done for the whole Semitic family. The same process -has been carried out with regard to the Aryan languages; we find the -number of roots in Sanscrit reduced to about 800; of Gothic about 600; -rather more than 400 in the Teutonic family, and 600 in the Slavic. The -Ural-Altaic languages have also undergone a partial analysis of the -same kind, and the result at present corresponds to that obtained by -the examination of the other families. After eliminating the tertiary -and secondary roots from the Sanscrit the residuum is 600 or 500, -and we arrive at the fact that this entire language, and, in a great -measure, all the Aryan languages, can be traced back to an extremely -small number of roots. - -As the Hindoo grammarians asserted that all roots contain the -representation of various forms of activity, it behoved our -philologists to investigate this and discover their meaning. Professor -Noiré thought that the consciousness that men had of their own acts -must have formed the origin of the primitive concepts of the human -mind, and found expression in signs or words. Max Müller shows us[39] -that all the Sanscrit roots express a concept or consciousness of -the repeated acts, the acts with which man in his infancy would be -most familiar. But it must be noted that the concepts or signs are -not of single acts, but the realisation of repeated acts; to dig was -not to put a spade into the ground once, it is the action of digging -continuously; to sharpen was not to pass one flint over another -once, it was the continual action of sharpening. The consciousness of -accomplishing these repeated acts as if one act, became the first germ -of conceptual thought. During this initial phase of thought, when the -first consciousness of his own repeated acts awoke in man and assumed -a conceptual character, will, act and knowledge were as yet one and -undivided, and the whole of his conscious knowledge was subjective, -exclusively concerned with his own voluntary act. We possess the -genealogy of a large number of Aryan roots, and we find on examination -that the activity which formed their basis was at the beginning always -a creative activity, since it called into life conceptions which up to -that time had not existed. - -Nothing is more interesting than researches into the origin of the -growth of human thought, when carried out not according to the systems -of certain philologists of our day, but historically, after the fashion -of the Indian trapper, who notes on the sand every imprint of the -footsteps of him whom he pursues. - -For the present I will content myself by bringing forward in -illustration three primary roots. _Vê_ (_Vâ_), which is, to weave; -_Mar_, to crush; and _Khan_, to dig. _Vê_ (_Vâ_), _Mar_, and _Khan_ are -thus verbs. - -When we now picture the four acts of weaving, spinning, sewing, and -knitting, they appear so to differ the one from the other, that it -seems impossible to consider them other than four distinct acts, and -difficult to believe that there is one common origin to all. These four -processes, however, all had their germ in the one primitive act of -interlacing the boughs of trees to form a hedge or roof. This root _Vê_ -(_Vâ_) had an immense number of offshoots; from the acts of interlacing -and platting came the conception of binding, in Latin _vieo_, to twist, -to divide; in German, _winden_, _wickeln_; the Latin words _vitis_, a -vine; _vimen_, osier, a twig; _viburnum_, a climbing plant; the Slavic -word _vetla_, willow; the Sanscrit _vetra_, reed, rush; the German -word for rush, _binse_, is connected with _binden_, to join, and the -secondary meaning of ties of relationship and alliance: again, in the -Old High-German, _nothbendig_, or _nothwendigkeit_, bound, straitened, -and the Gothic _naudibandi_, tie, chain. All these words, whether in -the Roman, German, or Slavonic dialects, have retained the root _Vê_ -(_Vâ_), so that it is impossible not to recognise the trunk of which -these are the branches. Thus a large number of apparently dissimilar -images became entangled the one with the other, and in proportion as -we approach their starting-point do we find them discarding their own -special signification, and becoming absorbed in the single conception -of weaving and platting. - -The root _mar_, to grind, has also the meaning of to crush, to powder, -to rub down, etc., and whether we look at the Latin, Greek, Celtic, -German, or Slav, the words representing the verb _to mill_, and the -name _mill_ come thence; the transition from _milling_ to _fighting_ is -natural; thus Homer used the word _mar-na-mai_, I fight, I pound. _Mar_ -produced in Latin the words _mordeo_, I bite; _morior_ (originally, -to decay), I die; _mortuus_, dead; _mors_, death; _morbus_, illness; -in Greek, _marasmos_, decay; rendered in German by _sich aufreiben_, -to become exhausted. In Sanscrit we must remember that the consonants -_r_ and _l_ are cognate and interchangeable; thus, _mar_ = _mal_; -and that _ar_ in Sanscrit is shortened, and the vowel modified and -pronounced _ri_, _mar_ = _mri_; that _ar_ may be pronounced _ra_, -and _al_, _la_; _mar_ = _mra_ and _mal_ = _mla_: thus in Sanscrit -we find _mrita_, dead; _mritya_, death, and _mriye_, I die. One of -the earliest names for man was _marta_, the dying; the equivalent in -Greek for the Sanscrit _mra_ and _mla_ is _mbro_, _mblo_; and after -dropping the _m_ becomes _bro_ and _blo_; _brotos_, mortal. Having -chosen this name for himself, man gave the opposite name to the gods; -he called them _Ambrotoi_, without decay, immortal; and their food -_ambrosia_, immortality. An offshoot of _mar_ is _mard_ and _mrg_; -thence _mradati_, rubbing down, pulverising, grind to powder; _mrid_ -is in Sanscrit the word for dust, and afterwards was used for soil -in general or earth; _mrid_, to weaken, to soften, to melt; thus, -fluid mass. This idea in English takes the form _malt_, grain soaked -and softened; then the Greek _meldo_, and the Gothic _mulda_, soft -ground or morass, and that which is softened by use or the action of -time. The Latin _sordes_ and _sordidus_ are connected herewith, as the -same root may be found in _smarna_, Gothic, and the Greek _mélas_ and -_moros_, black, and in _murus_, brown-black; in the Russian _smola_, -wax and resin. “Colour was conceived originally as the result of the -act of covering or extending a fluid over a surface; it was not till -the art of painting, in its most primitive form, was discovered and -named, that there could have been a name for colour.”[40] The name of -colour in Sanscrit is _varna_, from _var_, to cover. The idea conveyed -by the words, to smooth, to flatter, to soften, to mollify, to melt a -hard substance, to polish a rough surface by constant rubbing, led to -the same terms being used for expressing the softening influence which -man exercised on man, by looks, gestures, words or prayers, and these -expressions were especially used by men in their relations to the gods, -when they strove to propitiate them by supplications and sacrifices: -thus the prayer which we now translate by “Be gracious unto us, O God,” -meant originally, “Melt to us; be softened, ye gods.” - -Language grew and made offshoots, but without confusion; disorder had -no place in the progress of thought (still less chance), which was -simple and rational. This was not the development of the conscious -effort towards some goal. At this period there was no such thing as -reflection properly so called; for instance, man did not ponder how -best to express a feeling of fear, since fear, like so many other -impressions, received vague expression before the concept of fear -acquired shape; but our ancestors had a root to express shaking (in -Sanscrit _kap_, _kamp_, to shake): they used it to describe fear, -which manifested itself in the trembling of voice or limbs. Thus, “I -shake” might mean, “I shake a tree,” or “I am shaken,” “I am shaken -by him” (by my horse), but also “I am trembling”; from it we have -in Greek _karnos_, smoke, not what shakes, or is shaken, but what -is in a shaking state, that which moves; _kup_, which is probably a -modification of _kamp_, means to shake inwardly, to be angry. - -Some learned writers have felt disconcerted when after tracing words to -their source, they have found nothing but roots with general meanings, -such as to go, to move, to run, to do; however, it is by means of these -vague, pale conceptions that language has obtained the material for -an entire language. The Aryan root _ar_ signified originally to go, -to send, to advance, to proceed, going regularly, to stir. Applied to -the stirring of the soil, it took the meaning of ploughing; in Latin -_ar-are_, in Greek _ar-oun_, in Irish _ar_, in Lithuanian _ar-ti_, in -Russian _ora-ti_; this root, from its meaning of advancing regularly, -was the name of the plough; one derivative was applied to the cattle -fit for ploughing, and also to the labourer. _Ar_ was also used for -the ploughing of the sea, or rowing, and was found in the words rower -and rudder. The Latin word _ævum_, originally from _i_, to go, became -the name of time, age; and its derivative _æviternus_, _æturnus_ was -made to express eternity. It was by a poetical fiat that the Greek -_probata_, which originally meant no more than things walking forward, -became in time the name of cattle. In French, the word _meuble_ means -literally anything that is movable, but it became the name of chairs, -tables, wardrobes, etc. In this way we see the power of language, -which, out of a few simple elements, has created names sufficient to -express the infinite aspects of nature. - -The ramifications of the Aryan root _Dâ_ give a good idea of the -process. Thus _Dâ_ = to give, is in the Sanscrit _dădāmi_, I give; -in Latin, _do_; in Old Slavonic, _da-mi_; in Lithuanian, _du-mi_; in -French, _donner_ and _pardonner_; in Latin, _trado_, to give over; in -Italian, _tradire_; in French, _trahir_, _trahison_; in Latin again, -_reddo_, to give back; in French, _rendre_ and _rente_. Side by side -with the root _Dâ_, there is another root also _Dâ_, exactly the same -in all outward appearance; it consists of _D_ + _Â_, but is totally -distinct from the former. While from the former we have in Sanscrit, -_dâ-tram_, a gift, we have from the latter _dâ´-tram_, a sickle. The -meaning of the second root is to cut, to carve; the difference is -shown by the accent remaining on the radical syllable in _dâ´-tram_, -_i.e._, the cutting (active); whilst it leaves the radical syllable in -_dâ-trám_, _i.e._, what is given (passive). - -The history of these roots _dâ_ affords an opportunity of noticing -a curious resemblance between natural history and philology, two -sciences which otherwise are totally different, but alike in one idea -which enters into the inwardness of both. Darwin admitted four or five -progenitors in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, so that the primary -elements of all living organisms are the simple cells. In the same -way philologists have discovered that there remain in the end certain -simple elements of human speech--the primordial roots--which have -sufficed to provide the innumerable multitude of words used by the -human race. A principle neglected by a great number of evolutionists -is that if two origins, whether the roots of language or living -cells, have at their starting-point an absolutely similar appearance, -and afterwards diverge, it is because at their origin they bore in -themselves the germs destined to produce this divergence. Darwin says -that two organic cells, which in the embryonic stage may perfectly -resemble each other, in growing, gradually develop, the one into an -inferior animal, the other into a superior animal, never varying the -process; the reason of which fact is that the cells, although not -distinguishable the one from the other, differ in the rudiments or -principle of life: in the same way philologists say that when two roots -have the same sound, but produce families of perfectly distinct words, -it is because the germs in each differ. We learn from this that the -sound of the words is a matter of indifference at the commencement of -a language; no one has succeeded, or will succeed, in making the sound -alone the vehicle of a conception. - -To Locke belongs the merit of having first clearly asserted that -roots, the true irreducible elements of language, which furnish -words for the most abstract and sublime conceptions, had at the -beginning only a material or sensuous meaning, and this fact, on which -idealists and materialists are agreed, is confirmed by comparative -philologists. All primitive roots express directly only those acts -and those conditions which come under the domain of the senses; all -express the consciousness of repeated acts familiar to the members of -a society in its infancy, such as pounding, striking, weaving, tying, -burning, rubbing, moving, cutting, sharpening, softening. By means of -generalisation and specialisation, the roots have acquired the most -abstract terms of our advanced society; thus the root to burn developed -into the thought of to love, and also to be ashamed; to dig, came -to mean to search for, to enquire; the root which means to gather, -expressed in primitive logic what we now call observation of facts; -the connection of major and minor, or even syllogism. This is without -doubt, and it is as certain that the words rake and pinchers came from -the verbs to rake and to pinch. - -To make the assertion of Locke the more striking, Noiré adds: “When -the representative words springing from one root are found side by -side, it is always the more ancient of the two which expresses the -more material act. The verbs to tear and to cut are the offshoots of -a single root; but the passage from the concept of tearing to that of -cutting would be slowly effected; the act of tearing was immediate with -man, cutting was a mediate act, and of later date, since it could not -be done whilst the instrument was lacking.” - -I shall now bridge over the distance between the primordial roots, -and the organised language as we possess it, in order to show how -our ancestors succeeded in forming real phrases, that is to say, -intelligible propositions; this will show us the continuous thread -which connects our present language with primitive speech. - -We can show that both dictionary and grammar are made up of predicative -roots and demonstrative elements. By the help of the first we make -affirmations concerning things, derived from our knowledge of another -object or of many, either in combination under one name, or taking each -separately. With the demonstrative element we point to any object in -space or time, by using such words as this, that, then, here, there; -near, far, above, below, and others of the same kind, whose existence -may be explained as a survival of the gesticulating phase in which -objects were neither conceived nor described but pointed out; from this -we are not to infer that gestures--even accompanied by sounds--gave -birth to speech, since they rather excluded it. In their primitive -form and intention, these demonstrative elements are addressed to -the senses rather than to the intellect. They have in themselves no -meaning, and to be of service they must be attached to words that -have. The history of the root _Khan_, to dig, will explain my thought. -When our Aryan ancestors had learnt to say _Khan_, and they wanted -to distinguish between those who were digging and the instruments -used in digging, between the object of the digging and the time and -place of the work, it is possible that these demonstrative suffixes, -combined with predicative roots, formed bases, such as _Khan-ana_, -_Khan-i_, _Khan-a_, _Khan-itra_, and still others, which were intended -probably for digging-here, digging-now, dig-we, dig-you. By means of -these combinations, which varied in their application according to -the customs of different villages and families, the speaker sought -to distinguish between the subject acting and the object acted upon; -and when this difficulty was surmounted, a great step had been taken, -the passage from perception to conception was accomplished, and this -passage no philosopher prior to Noiré had made clear. “We must always -bear in mind that we are speaking here of times, so far beyond the -reach of history, and of intellectual processes so widely removed from -our own, that none would venture to speak dogmatically on what was -actually passing in the minds of the early framers of language when -they first uttered these words.”[41] All we can do is to hazard an -explanation, and accept it in as far as it seems reasonable; and in the -interest of science, we must carefully guard ourselves from asserting -that our theory is the only true one. It is easy to conceive that -after centuries of constant use certain derivatives should have become -unalterably attached to certain meanings, and others should have also -retained their special meanings. But what we do not know, is how the -sounds destined to become demonstrative elements or personal pronouns -were restricted to the terms required for such words, as--here, there, -those, he, I, that, etc. There were cases in which a verb in the -infinitive would develop into a phrase without any additions being -made to it; it would suffice, for instance, if a man uttered the -word _Khan_ in a commanding voice--as we should say “work”--for his -fellow-labourers to understand that they were to begin to dig. Thus the -imperative could be considered a complete sentence with as much justice -as Veni-Vedi-Vici would be termed independent and complete sentences. -“The shortest sentence of all is, no doubt, the imperative, and it is -in the imperative that almost to the present day roots retain their -simplest form.”[42] - -Our intellects in the present day are developed by the discourses we -hear, the books we read, the reflections suggested by our experiences -of life; our vocabularies become enriched as our knowledge increases -and embraces a greater number of subjects; and if we retrace the path -taking us to our ancestors who could not count beyond four sometimes, -we should find words and ideas becoming fewer and conspicuous by their -absence. It does not therefore follow that because we use language -that we made it. It is not our invention; to us every language is -traditional. “The words in which we think are channels of thought -which we have not dug ourselves, but which we found ready made for -us. The work of making language belongs to a period in the history of -mankind beyond the reach of the ordinary historian, and of which we -in our advanced state of mental development can hardly form a clear -conception.” Yet that time must have been a fact not less possible of -verification than that geological period when “the earth was absorbed -in producing the carboniferous vegetation which still supplies us with -the means of warmth, light, and life, accumulating during enormous -periods of time small deposits of organic matter forming the strata of -the globe on which we live. In the same manner the human mind formed -that linguistic vegetation, the produce of which still supplies the -stores of our grammars and dictionaries”; and after a close examination -of these primordial roots whence our language has sprung, we find that -it does not consist in a conglomeration of words, the result of an -agreement amongst a certain number of men, or the result of chance, but -expresses human activity by means of verbs, the living and vivifying -portion of speech by the side of which the remainder may almost be -considered as dead matter. - -The question of the birth of the substantive, without being -deliberately posed as a problem, occupied the minds of the Grecian -philosophers, and was involved in their researches concerning the -relation of an object to the name it bears, of the unknown cause by -which a certain name designates a certain object and no other. Whilst -the Greeks speculated on the subject after a tentative manner, building -up theories which later observations were not long in upsetting, the -Hindoos were also engaged in efforts to solve the problem by the help -of a more reliable process--the historical. - -The early grammarians, having found that words came from roots -expressing general concepts, and that these concepts represented some -sort of activity, made this fact the basis of their studies; profound -thinkers as they were they discovered that man at first could not give -a name to a tree, an animal, a star, a river, nor to any other object -without discovering first some special quality that seemed at the time -most characteristic of the object to be named. Sanscrit has a root -_As_, having amongst other meanings sharpness, quickness; from the -same root came words for needle, point, sharpness of sight, quickness -of thought; this root is found in the Sanscrit name for a horse, which -is _asva_, runner or racer, one who leaves space quickly behind him. -Many other names might have been given to the horse besides the one -here mentioned, but all must recall some characteristic trait of this -animal; that name, _the quick_, could also have been given to other -animals, but having been repeatedly applied to one, it became unfit -for other purposes, and the horse retains undisputed possession. The -Sanscrit _aksha_, eye, comes from the same root as, which also meant to -point, to pierce. Another name for eye in Sanscrit is _netram_, leader, -from _nî_, to lead. - -Noiré has just put forth an ingenious theory, that the first -substantives would not be miller, digger, weaver, carpenter; but flour, -cave, pit, mat, hedge, club, arrow, boat, because these were what had -been thought and willed, whilst the agents, of no account from that -point of view, remained in the shade, forgotten, and it is possible -that for some time no names were given to them. - -“When we have once seen that thought in its true sense is always -conceptual, taking a verbal form, and that every word is derived from a -conceptual root, we shall be ready for the assertion that words being -conceptual can never stand for a single percept.”--MAX MÜLLER. - -Locke first insisted that names are not the signs of things themselves, -but always the signs of our concepts of them. This remark received -small attention at first, and remained little appreciated until such -time as the discoveries of our contemporaries, with no preconcerted -unanimity, confirmed its value. Max Müller explains Locke’s words -in the following manner: “Each time that we use a general name, if -we say dog, tree, chair, we have not these objects before our eyes, -only our concepts of them; there can be nothing in the world of sense -corresponding even to such simple words as dog, tree, chair. We can -never expect to see a dog, a tree, a chair. Dog means every kind of dog -from the greyhound to the spaniel; tree, every kind of tree from the -oak to the cherry; chair, every kind of chair from the royal throne to -the artisan’s stool. We may see a spaniel or a Newfoundland dog; we may -see a fir or an apple tree; we may see such and such a chair. People -often imagine that they can form a general image of a dog by leaving -out what is peculiar to every individual dog.”[43] - -This general idea we have in our mind of which we can talk, but our -eyes cannot see it as they could a real object. Nothing that we name, -nothing that we find in our dictionary can ever be heard, or seen, or -felt. “We can even have names for things which never existed, such as -gnomes; also for things which exist no more, or which exist not yet, -such as the grapes of the last harvest, and those of the next. The mere -fact that I call a thing past or future ought to be sufficient to show -that it is my concept of which I am speaking, and not the thing as -independent of me.”[44] - -Berkeley showed that it is simply impossible for any human being to -make to himself a general image of a triangle, for such an image would -have to be at the same time right-angled, obtuse-angled, acute-angled, -and other kinds also; such an object does not exist; whereas it is -perfectly possible to have an image of any single triangle; to name -some characteristic features common to all triangles, and thus to -form a name and at the same time a concept of a triangle.[45] This -mental process which Berkeley described so well as applied to modern -concepts we can adopt with regard to all, even the most primitive. -Man, in entering a forest, discovered in the trees something that was -interesting to him. For practical purposes trees were particularly -interesting to the primitive framers of language, because they could be -split in two, three, or four pieces, cut, shaped according to the size -of the piece into blocks, planks, boats, and shafts; any object for -which the necessity had made itself felt. Hence, from a root _dar_, to -tear, our Aryan ancestors called trees _dru_, or _dâru_, literally what -can be torn, or split, or cut; from the same root the Greeks called the -skin of an animal _dérma_, because it was torn off, and a sack _dóros_ -(in Sanscrit _driti_), because it was made of leather, and a spear -_dóry_, because it came from a tree, and was cut and shaped and planed. - -Such words being once given would produce many offshoots; the Celts -of Gaul and of Ireland called their priests _Druids_, literally the -men of oak-groves. The Greeks called the spirits of the forest trees -_Dryades_; and the Hindoos called a man of wood, or a man with a -wooden, or, as we say, flinty heart, _dâruna_, cruel. - -The immense number of intelligible roots gave birth to many new images, -these roots crossed and recrossed, for the concepts of to go, to give, -to move, to make, would be the foundations of others, in some ways -differing; one idea or thought in its flight would meet others perhaps -of a conflicting nature, thoughts and words would equally undergo -incessant modifications, which fact explains why in these earlier -stages of language the members of a community soon ceased to understand -each other if separated but for a short period of time. - -Ovid, in speaking of the chaos at the beginning of the world, makes -a picture which would equally well describe the birth of language. -“Matter was in an unformed mass ... the sky, the earth, the sea had all -one aspect; there where was the earth, was also the sea, and the sky -was there also.” - -The extraordinary destinies of the roots I have named constitutes a -short chapter only, in the birth and development of tongues; but short -as it is, it suffices to give us an idea of the elastic nature of -these roots, their faculty of extension, and the part they play in the -economy of language, and in the administration of the affairs of the -human mind. - -Every mental phenomenon has its history, which can only be discovered -by tracing it to its source; and as speech has undergone many phases, -of which the earlier must have been very different from those now in -existence, it is pardonable in the greatest philosophers of antiquity -not to have known the intricacies of the human mind, which this -changeable speech could alone interpret. The ancients knew their -own times, but were ignorant of the preceding ones, in the same way -they knew their own language only, and of this language only its -contemporary form; and in the case of a word whose meaning was lost or -of a foreign word, they sought its origin in an idiom with which they -were familiar; in other words, not where it could be found. - -For a long time man only knew one kind of being, his own; and possessed -one language only, that which expressed his own acts and his own -states; the primitive men were sufficiently advanced to say: “let us -dig,” “grind,” “they weave”; but if, at the beginning, concepts and -speech arose from the consciousness of their own activity, how was the -advance made when men desired to speak of the external objects of the -world which they saw around them, and were conscious of not having -made, and which consequently remained outside the sphere of their wills -and of their experience? It is clear that these outward objects to be -grasped and named, must have their part in the human activities for -which names had already been found. When he saw the lightning tearing -a hole in the field, or splitting the trunk of a tree, man could no -longer say, “_We_ have dug this hole, _you_ have split the tree.” It -was no longer _someone_, but _something_ that had dug and struck. -Nothing seems more simple to us than after saying “_I dig_” to say -also “_it digs_,” and yet it was a passing to a new world of thought, -from the conscious feeling of our own activity to the intuition of the -activity of an outward object; this mental act, though inevitable, -was by no means an easy one; men realised that the world around was a -reflex of themselves, the only light was the light from within. If men -could measure, so could the moon; hence he was called the measurer of -the sky, from the root _Mâ_, to measure; the moon was called _Mâs_, -that which measures, its actual name in Sanscrit; in Latin, _mensis_; -in Greek, _mêné_; English, _moon_; German, _Monat_; in Russian, -_miésets_. Men who ran called themselves runners; also the rivers -they named _sar_, running; and to designate the position of the river -they added the suffix _it_, _sar-it_; literally, running here. Thus -_sarit_ is river in Sanscrit; _Mâs_ and _sarit_ thus become complete, -intelligible sentences. What we call lightning was originally, tearing, -digging, bursting, sparkling; what we call storm and tempest were, -grinding, smashing, bursting, blowing; if man could smash, so could the -thunderbolt, hence it was called the smasher; and tempest and storm and -thunderbolt may have been, smashing, grinding, hurling; and with the -addition of the suffix, smashing here, now, there, then. - -We have seen that the attribute which was the peculiar characteristic -of an object supplied its name, but as most objects possessed more -than one attribute, more than one designation were given to it; thus -several names were used for river besides _sarit_, each representing -one of its aspects; when flowing in a straight line it was called -_sîrâ_, arrow, plough, plougher; if it seemed to nourish the fields -it was _mâtar_, mother; if it separated or protected one country from -another, it became _sindhu_, the defender, from _sidh_ or _sedhati_, -to keep off; if it became a torrent it received the name of _nadi_, -noisy. In all these forms the river is considered as acting, and is -named by roots expressing action; it nourishes, it traces a furrow, it -guards, it roars as a wild beast roars. The sun has many attributes; -he is brilliant, the warmer, the generator, the scorcher, he is -vivifying, overpowering, his many qualities giving him fifty different -names, all synonyms of the sun. The earth also had many, it was known -by twenty-one names, amongst others it was _urvî_, wide; _jurithvî_, -broad; _mahî_, great; but each characteristic trait of the earth could -also be found in other objects, thus _urivî_ also meant a river; sky -and dawn were called _prithvî_; and _mahî_ (great, strong) is used for -cow and speech. Hence earth, river, sky, dawn, cow, and speech would -become homonyms. - -These names are of clearly defined objects, all recognisable by the -senses; this fact entitles us to apply the following definition to this -primitive stage of language; the conscious expression of impressions -perceived by the senses. - -But there is another class of words differing somewhat from those -we have named, such words, as day, night, spring, winter, dawn and -twilight; these lack the individuality and tangibleness of the others; -and when we say “day approaches, night comes,” we attribute acts to -things which are not agents, we affirm propositions, which, logically -analysed, have no properly defined subjects. Semi-tangible names, such -as sky, earth, belong to the same category. When we say “the earth -nourishes man,” we do not allude to any well defined portion of the -soil, we take the earth as a whole; and the sky is not only the small -portion of the horizon grasped by our eyes, our imagination conceives -objects not within the ken of our senses, but inasmuch as we look upon -the earth or sky as a whole, see in it a power or an ideal, we make -of it, involuntarily, an individuality. Now these words had certain -terminations affixed to them indicating what we call gender, and -became masculine or feminine, the neuter gender at that time did not -enter into the language, until thought becoming more lucid perceived -it in nature. What was the result? That it was impossible to speak of -morning or night, of spring or winter, of dawn or twilight, of sky -and earth, without clothing them not only with active and individual -characteristics, but with personal and sexual attributes; hence all -the objects of discourse as used by the founders of language became -necessarily so many actors, as men and women act; and thought, when -once launched in this direction, being irresistibly attracted by the -tendency towards analogy and metaphor, overspread the whole world -of human experience with this method of representation. What is -called animism, anthropomorphism, and personification, have therefore -their source in this inevitable dynamic stage, as Max Müller calls -it, of thought and language, in which the psychological necessity of -representing the external objects as resembling themselves operated on -our ancestors. This necessity might have been named subjectivism had -it not received more specific terms such as _animism_, which consists -in conceiving of inanimate objects as animate; _anthropomorphism_, -conceiving objects as men, and _personification_, conceiving objects -as persons. As soon as this new mental act was performed, a new world -was called into existence, a world of names, or as we now call it, the -world of myths. - -“So long as the real identity of thought and language had not been -grasped, so long as people imagined that language is one thing and -thought another, it was but natural that they should fail to see the -real meaning of treating mythology, if not as a disease, at all events -as an inevitable affection of language. If the active verb was merely -a grammatical, and not at the same time a psychological, nay, an -historical fact, it might seem absurd to identify the active meaning of -our roots with the active meaning ascribed to the phenomena of nature. -But let it be once perceived that language and thought are one and -indivisible, and nothing will seem more natural than that what, as the -grammarian tells us, happened in language, should, as the psychologist -tells us, have likewise happened in thought.”[46] - -The men who spoke in this manner of the external phenomena understood -perfectly that they themselves, who struck, who measured, who ran, who -rose up, who lay down, were not to be confounded with the thunder, -the moon, the river, and the sun; those scholars who studied thought -as apart from language, rather allowed themselves selves to be misled -by the phraseology of the time, and considered it a proof that our -Aryan ancestors looked upon their physical surroundings as human -beings, endowed with the appropriate organs and acts. Not only had the -early Aryans perfectly understood that they were not identical with -themselves, but they were far more struck by the differences between -them than by any imaginary similarities. The confirmation of this -theory is preserved for us in the Veda. “The torrent is roaring--not -a bull,” _i.e._ like a bull; instead of saying as we do, “firm as -a rock,” the poets of the Veda would say “firm--not a rock.” “The -mountains were _not_ to be thrown down, but they were _not_ warriors,” -“The fire was eating up the forest, yet it was _not_ a lion.” - -The men of that time used few words; all thoughts that went beyond the -narrow horizon of their daily and practical lives had to be expressed -by the transference of a name from the object to which it properly -belongs to other well known objects. It was the birth of metaphor; it -was metaphor that enabled the inner consciousness to project itself -into the outer chaos of the world of objects; which it recreated with -personal images; and the fact that each natural phenomenon bore many -names, and that these same names were used for many other different -objects furnished germs of metaphor. Metaphor was to language what rain -and sunshine are to the harvest, it multiplies each grain a hundred and -a thousand fold; and metaphor in multiplying language disperses it in -every direction; without it no language would have progressed beyond -the simplest rudiments. - -We must be careful not to confuse the radical metaphor with the -poetical which we use daily, and which is very different from the -former. If we open any book of poetry at whatever page, we shall find -inanimate and mute objects described as speaking, rejoicing, praising -their Creator; there is no portion of nature however insentient, -however incapable of thought, in which we do not infuse our own -sentiments, our own ideas. This mode of expression is especially a -poet’s prerogative, and that it does not strike us as incongruous is -owing to the fact that poetry appeals to the generality of men, and -is more natural to them than prose, and that this outpouring of our -heart towards nature costs us less effort than to speak of it in the -abstract. It requires cold reflection to describe lightning as an -electrical discharge, and rain as condensed vapour; in this case it is -no longer the transference of the characteristic of a known object to -one still unknown, but that of a known object to another equally well -known; the poet who transfers the word tear to the dew has already -clear names and concepts both for tear and dew; the poetical metaphor -is thus a voluntary creative act of our mind, and as such takes no part -in the formation of the human mind. - -The world was astonished some few years ago by a declaration made by -students of the science of language that the 250,000 words comprehended -in the English Dictionary now being published at Oxford all proceeded -from about 800 roots; and it has now been found possible to reduce -this number. In any case 500 to 800 Sanscrit roots, on account of -their great fertility, sufficed our Aryan ancestors for all the many -words occurring in Sanscrit literature, and suffice also for us who -have 245,000 living animals and 95,000 fossil specimens to name; also -100,000 living and 2500 fossil plants, without speaking of crystals, -metals and minerals. Another surprising discovery is that every thought -that has ever passed through a human brain can be expressed in 121 -radical concepts, of which I give a list. It is taken from Max Müller’s -_Science of Thought_, p. 404. Each single word of every phrase that -we use has its origin in one of the 800 roots, and not a thought but -proceeds from the 121 fundamental concepts. This is as accepted a fact -as that all that is visible on the earth and in the vault of heaven is -composed of about 60 elementary substances. - - -THE 121 ORIGINAL CONCEPTS. - - 1. Dig. - 2. Plait, weave, sew, bind. - 3. Crush, pound, destroy, waste, rub, smoothe. - 4. Sharpen. - 5. Smear, colour, knead, harden. - 6. Scratch. - 7. Bite, eat. - 8. Divide, share, eat. - 9. Cut. - 10. Gather, observe. - 11. Stretch, spread. - 12. Mix. - 13. Scatter, strew. - 14. Sprinkle, drip, wet. - 15_a_. Shake, tremble, quiver, flicker. - 15_b_. Shake mentally, be angry, abashed, fearful, etc. - 16. Throw down, fall. - 17. Fall to pieces. - 18. Shoot, throw at. - 19. Pierce, split. - 20. Join, fight, check. - 21. Tear. - 22. Break, smash. - 23. Measure. - 24. Blow. - 25. Kindle. - 26. Milk, yield. - 27. Pour, flow, rush. - 28. Separate, free, leave, lack. - 29. Glean. - 30. Choose. - 31. Cook, roast, boil. - 32. Clean. - 33. Wash. - 34. Bend, bow. - 35. Turn, roll. - 36. Press, fix. - 37. Squeeze. - 38. Drive, thrust. - 39. Push, stir, live. - 40. Burst, gush, laugh, beam. - 41. Dress. - 42. Adorn. - 43. Strip, remove. - 44. Steal. - 45. Check. - 46. Fill, thrive, swell, grow strong. - 47. Cross. - 48. Sweeten. - 49. Shorten. - 50. Thin, suffer. - 51. Fat, stick, love. - 52. Lick. - 53. Suck, nourish. - 54. Drink, swell. - 55. Swallow, sip. - 56. Vomit. - 57. Chew, eat. - 58. Open, extend. - 59. Reach, strive, rule, have. - 60. Conquer, take by violence, struggle. - 61. Perform, succeed. - 62. Attack, hurt. - 63. Hide, dive. - 64. Cover, embrace. - 65. Bear, carry. - 66. Can, be strong. - 67. Show. - 68. Touch. - 69. Strike. - 70. Ask. - 71. Watch, observe. - 72. Lead. - 73. Set. - 74. Hold, wield. - 75. Give, yield. - 76. Couch. - 77. Thirst, dry. - 78. Hunger. - 79. Yawn. - 80. Spue. - 81. Fly. - 82. Sleep. - 83. Bristle, dare. - 84. Be angry, harsh. - 85. Breathe. - 86. Speak. - 87. See. - 88. Hear. - 89. Smell, sniff. - 90. Sweat. - 91. Seethe, boil. - 92. Dance. - 93. Leap. - 94. Creep. - 95. Stumble. - 96. Stick. - 97. Burn. - 98. Dwell. - 99. Stand. - 100. Sink, lie, fail. - 101. Swing. - 102. Hang down, lean. - 103. Rise up, grow. - 104. Sit. - 105. Toil. - 106. Weary, waste, slacken. - 107. Rejoice, please. - 108. Desire, love. - 109. Wake. - 110. Fear. - 111. Cool, refresh. - 112. Stink. - 113. Hate. - 114. Know. - 115. Think. - 116. Shine. - 117. Run. - 118. Move, go. - 119_a_. Noise, inarticulate. - 119_b_. Noise, musical. - 120. Do. - 121. Be. - -This classification of the roots is purely tentative. It has been -difficult to ascertain what is most likely to have been the original -meaning of some; there are certain words of which it is almost -impossible to find the etymology. The order in which the concepts -succeed each other is not very systematic. Max Müller tried to classify -them more correctly by keeping the special acts, such as to dig, -the general acts, such as to find, the special states, such as to -cough, and the general states, such as to stand--together. But it was -impossible to adhere strictly to such a plan, because there are roots -which express both acts and states; while in many cases it is difficult -to determine whether the special or general meaning predominates; thus -there are the words to boil, to make boil, or to be boiling. Some of -the roots have closely allied meanings, so that there are as many as -fifteen connected with the concepts to burn, and to speak; and many -more which can be traced to shine. - -We experience feelings at once humbling and elevating when we consider -that all we admire, all on which we pride ourselves, our thoughts, -whether poetical, philosophical, religious, our whole literature, all -our dictionaries, whether scientific or industrial; in fact, our whole -intellectual life is built upon this small number of mother-ideas, -of 121 concepts. We should feel neither humbled nor elevated; we are -making use of the wisdom of our ancestors. It is our duty to transmit -the legacy to our descendants which they gave us, but purged from alloy. - -Three chief points are to be noted, when we are concerned with the -progress of the intellect:-- - -1. The creative activity of humanity is the basis of all the roots of -words. - -2. The source of all abstract ideas lies in acts which are entirely -material. - -3. It has been satisfactorily proved that we speak the language derived -from that spoken by our primitive ancestors. It was the custom of -Nebuchadnezzar to have his name stamped on every brick that was used -during his reign in erecting his colossal palaces. Those palaces fell -to ruins, but from the ruins the ancient materials were carried away -for building new cities; and on examining the bricks in the walls of -the modern city of Bagdad, travellers have discovered on every one the -clear traces of that royal signature. Our modern languages were built -up with the materials taken from the ruins of the ancient languages, -and every word that we pronounce displays the royal stamp impressed -upon it by the founders. The formation of those derived languages, -by means of the roots with their successive change of meaning, the -construction of their grammatical forms, the continued changes amongst -the different dialects, all indicate the presence of a germ in man -tending from the first to make him a reasoning being. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[38] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, p. 300. - -[39] _Science of Thought_, p. 219. - -[40] Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 303. - -[41] Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 223. - -[42] Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 421. - -[43] _Science of Thought_, pp. 77, 78. _Natural Religion_, p. 381. - -[44] _Science of Thought_, p. 79. - -[45] _Natural Religion_, p. 382. - -[46] Max Müller, _Natural Religion_, p. 406. - - - - -CHAPTER VI ANCIENT LANGUAGE - - -Language may be divided into three distinct periods, when taken as a -whole. - -The first is, when language, finding itself released from those -restraints which enveloped it in its cradle, supplies those words which -are most indispensable to man in connecting the one word with others, -such as pronouns, prepositions, names of numbers, and of objects of -daily use. This must have been the first stage of a language hardly -yet agglutinate, free from trammels, with no sign of nationality, or -individuality, but containing in itself all the chief features of the -many forms belonging to the Turanian, Aryan and Semitic families; the -explorer of philosophic antiquity does not penetrate beyond this first -period. - -The second phase is that in which two linguistic families passing out -of the agglutinate stage, unattached as yet to grammatical forms, -received once for all the stamp of the formation which we find amongst -the popular and modern dialects belonging both to the Semitic and -Aryan divisions, and to which they owe this family resemblance, -which justifies their inclusion in one or other of these branches -of language; on the one side the Teutonic, Celtic, Slav, Italic, -Hellenic, Iranian and Indian; on the other Arabic, Armenian and Hebrew; -the yet unformed elements of grammar were eventually introduced -into these languages at the substitution of the amalgamate for the -agglutinate. The Turanian or Ural-Altaic languages have an entirely -different character; they preserved for some time--and one or two -still retain--the agglutinate form which retards the development of -the grammar, and hides the evidence of relationship to the languages -between China and the Pyrenees, and between Cape Comorin and Lapland. - -These two periods are followed by a third, generally known as the -mythological; it is obscure, and is calculated to shake one’s faith -in the regular and orderly progress of human reason. We find it to be -a phase through which all peoples have passed; yet in using the word -mythology our thoughts naturally turn to the mythology of Greece, the -only one with which we were made acquainted in our school days, and -also the only one with which those were familiar who had not given -themselves over specially to the study of the beliefs of antiquity. In -the schools this study ran side by side with history; from our earliest -days we had been taught the complete polytheism of heathen divinities; -our work as pupils was to know our lessons, the work of the masters -was to see that we learnt them. Mythology, therefore, was to us only -one chapter in that great work, entitled the compulsory course of -studies--a chapter which apparently required no more elucidation than -the gymnastic lesson. - -Our masters represented the Greeks as a people endowed with a vivid -imagination, who recounted in exalted pure language most fantastic -stories; we read in these authors: “Eos has fled--Eos will return--Eos -has returned--Eos wakens the sleepers--Eos lengthens the life of -mortals--Eos rises from the sea--Eos is the daughter of the sky--Eos -is followed by the sun--Eos is loved by the sun--Eos is killed by the -sun,” and so on _ad infinitum_; and we were told, “These are myths.” As -no explanation was given of the word myth, we were none the wiser. - -If the movements of Eos are inexplicable, they are not without a -certain picturesqueness. But what shall we say of the myth concerning -Saturn, who, on account of a prediction that he would be killed by his -children, swallowed them as soon as they were born, with the exception -of Jupiter, who was saved by the substitution of a stone, which Saturn -afterwards brought up with the children he had swallowed. Or again, -what can be said of the feast offered to the gods by Tantalus to test -their omniscience; he caused the members of the body of his son Pelops -to be mixed with other meats; a shoulder was eaten before Jupiter -discovered the deception; he ordered the remainder to be thrown into -a copper from which Pelops emerged alive with one shoulder lacking, -and one made of ivory was given to him. Can anything more grotesque be -imagined? And our children are subjected to this regimen, and their -memories charged with these fables, under the pretext that they will -the better appreciate the _chefs-d’œuvre_ of classical literature. - -The enigmatical part of this period of language will be more evident -if we examine the early traditional history which began at its close, -and at which time a light appeared in Greece destined to flood the -world with a splendour hitherto unknown; it was the epoch which -produced Thales, Pythagoras and Heraclitus, who, in the midst of much -ignorance, had thoughts of wonderful lucidity. A national literature -was beginning, where we find indications of the germs of political -societies; the creation of laws, and the development of morals. And we -ask ourselves: Whence come these sages? Who were their masters? How -could these glorious days of Greek civilisation have been preceded -by several generations whose principal occupation seemed to consist -in inventing and repeating to satiety absurd fables concerning gods, -heroes, and other beings whom no human being had ever seen; which -fables contravene the simplest principles of logic, morality and -religion? The ancient sages themselves were harsh in their judgment of -these revolting stories contained in Grecian mythology; Xenophanes, a -contemporary of Pythagoras, considered Hesiod and Homer responsible -for these superstitions, and blamed them for attributing to the gods -all that was most reprehensible in man. Heraclitus was of opinion -that Homer deserved to be banished from the public assemblies, and -Plato wrote, “Mothers and nurses tell their children stories full of -misstatements and immoralities which are gathered from the poets.” - -Thus spoke philosophers 500 years before our era, because they knew -that if the “gods commit anything that is evil they are no gods.” - -“Taken by themselves and in their literal meaning, most of these -ancient myths are absurd and irrational, and frequently opposed to -the principles of thought, religion, and morality which guided the -Greeks as soon as they appear to us in the twilight of traditional -history.”[47] - -Many explanations have been sought to account in a rational manner for -these strange tales; writers have striven to discover what can have -given rise to such ridiculous inventions; some have asserted that it -was the intention of the authors of mythology to convey to the people a -knowledge of certain facts of nature, and certain moral truths whilst -clothing them in allegorical form, and by endowing the divinities with -certain virtues which it would become men to imitate and acquire; and -that the worship of these divinities was instituted that man might be -more fully impressed, that the likeness of the virtues upheld might -be more deeply engraved in the heart of the pious worshipper. Zeus, -was mind; Athene, art; Hercules, energy and perseverance in labours of -great difficulty; whilst the Homeric heroes, Agamemnon, Achilles, and -Hector represented physical activities. According to another theory the -object with which the myths were composed was political, the laws of -government were supposed to emanate from the gods; and whoso refused -to recognise the excellence of the institutions of the country was -held to be in revolt against the gods themselves. The philosopher -Euhemerus was the author of a third theory, called the historical; he -represented the mythological personages not as gods, but as kings, -heroes, and philosophers, who, after their death, had received divine -honours among their fellow men; in this system Eolus, the god of the -winds, became a skilful mariner who could foretell atmospheric changes; -Atlas, supporting the sky and earth on his wide shoulders, had been -formerly a great astronomer; Jupiter, a ruler of Crete; Hercules, a -knight-errant. Although these ancient writers interpreted the fables -in so many different ways, they all agreed in denying that an atom of -truth is found in these stories concerning the gods, and they insisted -that no myth must be taken _au pied de la lettre_. At a later period -it was thought that reminiscences of a barbaric age could be found in -which the ancestors of the Greeks apparently occupied themselves by -stealing, killing, deceiving, and eating their offspring. “Lactantius, -St Augustine, and the first missionaries, in their attacks on the -religious belief of the Greeks, and Romans availed themselves of -these arguments of Euhemerus, and taunted them with worshipping gods -that were no gods, but known and admitted to have been merely deified -mortals.”[48] In later times the same theory was revived; certain -theologians, rather lacking in penetration, looked to Greek mythology -for traces of sacred personages, they imagined that they could -recognise in Saturn and his three sons, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, -the features of Noah and his sons, Ham, Japhet, and Shem; and in a -recently published book the author suggests that when Hesiod describes -the garden of the Hesperides, we have a tradition of the garden of Eden. - -Thus from the moment when, for the first time, the ancient philosophers -questioned “why?” from the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to -our own practical and matter-of-fact century, mythology has not ceased -to compel attention, and to furnish endless matter of conjecture. -Learned writers have sought in physical sciences, history, and -metaphysics, an explanation of this phenomenon; but in spite of this -vast labour inspired by a love of science, and carried on for more -than two thousand years, the secret of the sphinx of mythology remains -undisclosed, and we still ask, “what is mythology?” Is it an invention -of Homer and Hesiod? Or is it a phase in the development of the human -mind, a deviation in the growth of reason? - -The school of philology has a solution of its own to offer; will it be -as futile as the others? After hearing it shall we still say the Sphinx -is mute? This school takes upon itself to assert that the explanation -of the mystery can only be found in the Science of Language. It is a -fact that the history of language--which is the history of the human -mind--enables us to answer the preceding questions categorically. -Yes. Mythology was inevitable, an inherent part of language itself, -to be considered, not as a simple external symbol, but as the only -incorporation of thought possible. Mythology, in the widest acceptation -of the term, is the shadow which language casts on thought; and -the whole history of philosophy from Thales to Hegel has been one -uninterrupted struggle with mythology, a constant protest between -thought and language. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[47] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 11. Max Müller. - -[48] Max Müller, _Science of Language_, vol. ii. p. 436. - - - - -CHAPTER VII MYTHS - - -In order to appreciate truly our neighbour’s impressions and points of -view, we must constantly detach ourselves from our own special way of -seeing and feeling; this habit of abstraction--which is most difficult -to every one--is indispensable when we are endeavouring to understand -the natures of persons who lived many thousands of years ago, and who -thought and spoke in a totally different manner from ourselves. - -In seeking to grasp the phraseology of myths we perceive that its -chief elements consist in a repetition of phrases in which the acts of -nature are used as embodiments of the idea, under the figures of day -and night, dawn and twilight, the sun and the moon, the heavens and the -earth, as they stand in relation to man. - -When we in the present century speak of the last hours of the -day, we use precise and exact terms; we say, “It is late; the sun -is setting; the moon rises; it is night.” Our ancestors also had -occasion to mention these same hours, but as they did not speak of -the facts of nature without investing them with some of their own -personality, they preferred to say, “Dawn flies before the sun.” “The -sun loves--pursues--embraces the dawn.” “She dies in the arms of the -sun.” They spoke of the sun growing old--decaying--dying. Besides -these general terms our ancestors used special designations, which the -nature of their language suggested; the hymns of the Rig-Veda supply -instances. One of these modes of speech it would be difficult for me -to render in French, but the English language has the impersonal verb -which will illustrate my meaning, for all such atmospheric phenomena -such as rain, thunder, the light of day; instead of _it_ rains, _it_ -thunders, _it_ shines, our ancestors said, _he_ rains, _he_ thunders, -_he_ shines, without knowing who was this _he_, who for us is the third -person masculine; but, naturally for them, _he_ meant the rainer, the -thunderer, the lightener, or, in other words--the agent. - -Mythology, taken in its entirety, is the outcome of myths which -preceded it. If the original meaning of the Greek word Logos--as both -word and thought--has revealed to us a forgotten truth; the original -meaning of _mythos_ is also indispensable for the study of mythology. -This Greek term means simply _word_ as opposed to _deed_, and hardly -differed at first from Logos. Afterwards, however, a distinction was -made between myth,--a fable, a story, and logos, a historical account. -Thus a myth was at first a word. Almost all terms used in the first -spontaneous stage of language had for their basis striking metaphors, -whose signification may have been forgotten, and these terms having -lost their original as well as poetical meaning, remained words only, -current in familiar conversation. - -I give the following myths as they have come down to us. - -Endymion is the son of Zeus and Kalyke, but he is also the son of -Æthlios, a king of Elis, who is himself called a son of Zeus; for, -according to Greek customs, the reigning race of Elis derived its -origin from the king of the gods. Endymion is one of the many names -of the sun, but with special reference to the setting or dying sun; -it is derived from a verb which originally meant _to dive into_; an -expression such as “the sun dived” presupposes an earlier conception, -that it dived into the sea. But the verb _enduo_ is never used in -classical Greek for setting, because the simple verb _duo_ had become -the technical term for sunset. Thus this myth of Endymion owes its -origin to the use probably of _enduo_ in some Greek dialect, though not -the commonly received term for sunset. The original meaning of Endymion -being once forgotten, what was told originally of the setting sun was -now told of a name, which in order to have any meaning, had to be -changed into a god or hero. - -This handsome prince or shepherd, according to the different versions -of the tale, went to Karia, where on Mount Latmos he had strange -adventures; he slept in a cave to which the rays of the moon, Selene, -penetrated, and in the ancient poetical and proverbial language of -Elis it was said, “Selene loves and watches Endymion; Selene embraces -Endymion and kisses him into sleep.” The name Selene is so transparent -that the word moon pierces through it; we should have guessed that -the moon was intended, even if tradition had only preserved her other -name, Asterodia--“wanderer amongst the stars”; the names Hecate or -Lucina do not force us to acknowledge their fitness, they present to -our imagination a totally different figure (as they suggest opaqueness) -from Selene. Learned writers at times still put forward the explanation -with regard to mythology that it “was a past which was never a -present,” but this myth of Endymion was “present” with the people of -Elis at the period of its narration. - -These and similar expressions were repeated long after their meaning -had ceased to be understood; and as the human mind is generally as -anxious for a reason as ready to invent one, the poets added to this -story several details, and reasons why Endymion sank into eternal sleep -after a life of but one day; and if allusions were made to these by a -popular poet, it became a mythological fact, repeated and embellished -by later poets. - -The construction of such a name as Eos does not differ materially from -that of any other name, but as all roots expressed at the first denote -action, it follows that for all an agent must be found; the name of -Eos in Sanscrit is Ushas, dawn, or “the bright one” from the root Vas, -to shine; thus Eos meant originally “he or she shines.” But who was -“he” or “she”? Thus the inevitable myth is evolved. For us the dawn -is only the natural illumination of the sky, the brightness of the -morning; our ancestors received a different impression by the break of -day. After having coined a word meaning “he or she shines,” that is -the light, or Eos, the Greeks continued to portray each step of Eos as -she preceded the appearance of the sun on the celestial vault; “Eos -is followed by the sun--is loved by the sun”; she is conceived as a -bright and beautiful woman; if she appeared veiled in clouds, she would -be considered as a veiled bride; thus the epithets and relationships -showered on Eos become intelligible, she is the daughter of Hyperion, -thus her father would be the high heaven, since _hyper_ corresponds to -the Latin _super_; she is the sister of Helios and Selene, the sun and -the moon. As soon as a name such as Eos was first enunciated and used -in daily conversation, it grew and gathered new materials round itself; -all the names surrounding Eos in Greek and Aurora in Latin show us how -inevitably what we call mythology springs up from the soil of language. -Even such simple sentences as “Eos appears, disappears, or dies” are -changed at once into myth, fable, and legend, and it soon becomes -impossible to draw a line between what is simple language and what is -myth. - -We do not unfortunately always possess the original form of each legend -as it first passed from mouth to mouth in the towns and country; thus -our chief sources are the ancient chroniclers, who took mythology for -history, and used only so much of it as answered their purpose, and -these accounts do not reach us at first hand. - -We find a legend in Greek mythology which has much exercised the -learned; the nymph Daphne flies before Phœbus Apollo, her mother, the -earth, moved by compassion, takes her to her bosom, and immediately a -laurel appears and fills the abyss into which Daphne had vanished. The -mythologists asked themselves what could be the meaning of this; the -more phlegmatic amongst them considered that it had no special meaning -at all, but was simply to be looked upon as a fable; why seek further -for a hidden import? Why? Because people do not relate such stories -concerning their gods and heroes without some good motive. - -In the legend of Endymion the Greek language supplies all that is -needed to make it intelligible, but there are many instances of the -difficulty, or even the impossibility of explaining certain Greek names -by the help of Greek only; since a name is not converted into a myth -until its original meaning has become obscured in the language which -gave it birth, though still perfectly comprehensible in another of the -same family, it behoves the classical philologist to surrender all -etymological researches of this nature to the comparative philologist, -whose privilege it is to seek to discover the signification of a Greek -word by confronting it with contemporary witnesses from the German, -Celtic, or Sanscrit. In the Teutonic languages, for instance, day -has several names which are derived from the root _dah_, to burn, to -be hot; and this same root has also given rise to the Greek name for -dawn. In Sanscrit it is called Ahana, from _ahan_ or _dahan_, the root -of which is _ah_; _dah_ and _dahan_ may have lost their initial _d_, -or this letter may have been added to the root _ah_; these gains and -losses are met with frequently. - -The Sanscrit name Ahana, known before Greek and Sanscrit became -separated, occurs but once in a hymn of the Rig-Veda; in India this -mythological germ withered away, and even the name Ahana would not have -survived, but for this single verse which saved it from oblivion; but -it developed into a splendid growth in Greece, in the legend of Eos, -which I have quoted. - -In this hymn addressed to Ushas we read: “We have crossed the frontier -of this darkness; Ahana shining forth gives light, lighting up all the -world, awakening mortals to walk about--she received praise from every -thinker.” Ahana rises from the head of Dyu, the forehead of the sky; -she shows herself in the east, she advances and awakens the sleepers. -In Sanscrit _budh_ means to wake and to know, but light in Sanscrit has -again a double meaning, and means knowledge, much more frequently and -distinctly than light; this explains how Ahana, in awakening mortals, -causes persons to know. - -The stories of Daphne and of Ahana are closely allied, and the one -explains the other. As long as we remain ignorant of the fact that at -first Daphne and Aurora were one, this myth is inexplicable; but turn -the name Ahana into Greek, and you have the Dawn in the features of a -nymph loved by Apollo, and dying when the bright sun touched her with -his rays. - -But why, it may be asked, was Daphne supposed to have been changed -into a laurel-tree? The dawn was called daphne, the burning; so was -the laurel--as wood that burns easily, and whose flame throws a bright -light--two different objects, but alike under one aspect, though two -distinct acts. The root _dah_ is found in daphne for laurel equally -with Daphne, dawn, the synonymy of the two names producing the myth of -Daphne. Although this legend first came to life on Greek soil, it would -have been unintelligible without the help of the Veda, as the later -Sanscrit supplied no key to it. - -The Sanscrit root _Ah_ is also the germ of the name of Athena, the -termination of the name corresponding to Ahana; Athene is said to -spring from the head of Zeus. This extraordinary birth, though -post-Homeric, is no doubt of ancient date, since it repeats exactly -the birth of Ahana. The Hellenists maintain that the Greeks were -unconscious that the word Athene meant the dawn; doubtless few amongst -them knew that Zeus originally meant the surface or forehead of the -sky. It is also true that when the people of Athens worshipped Athene -as their tutelary deity, she became something very different from the -Indian Ushas; but if we notice carefully all the many and various ideas -concerning this Greek goddess, we shall be led to the supposition that -her cradle was no other than that of the dawn, namely, the east, the -forehead of the sky, or Zeus. Neither in the Veda, nor in Homer, is -there any mention of the mother of the dawn, although both mention _her -parents_. - -It is a curious fact that in the mythology of Italy, Minerva, who was -identical with Athene, should from the beginning have assumed a name -apparently expressive of the intellectual rather than the physical -character of the Dawn-goddess. Minerva or Menerva is clearly connected -with _mens_, the Greek _menos_, the Sanscrit _manas_, mind; _mane_ -in Latin is morning; _manare_ is specially used of the rising sun; -and _matuta_, another name of the same category, is the Dawn. The -root _man_, which in all Aryan languages means thought, was at a very -early time, like the Sanscrit _budh_, destined to express the revived -consciousness of the whole of nature at the approach of the light of -the morning. The equation Ahane = Athene is both phonetically and -mythologically irreproachable, the correlative Minerva can also be -explained mythologically. - -To reject the explanations of these myths which Comparative Philology -furnishes, it would be necessary to prove that Ahana and Eos do not -mean the dawn, that Athene does not correspond with Ahana, and that -Helios is not the sun. - -Mythologists have sometimes failed to discover the primitive character -of certain myths, because they have not looked beyond the Greek -etymology. The word Erinnys, “hovering in the gloom,” corresponds -exactly to the Sanscrit Saranyû = “break of day.” Poets sometimes speak -of the Dawn as avenging the crimes committed in the dark; the myth of -Erinnys denotes this same idea. Instead of our lifeless and abstract -expression, “A crime is sure to be discovered,” the old proverbial and -poetical saying amongst the Greeks and Hindoos was, Erinnys--Saranyû, -“will bring misdeeds to light.” At first this phrase was free from all -mythological taint, but it was afterwards transformed into a myth by -the Greeks, as they were ignorant of the true signification of the name -of Erinnys. - -When the mythology of Greece fails to furnish an explanation of many -of the Greek phrases, because it belongs to a later date than the -classical period, the Veda may then be questioned, and will supply us -with the information, by disclosing an ancient substratum of human -thought, such as existed amongst the inhabitants of one of the most -important regions of the world, India. It is with as much pleasure as -assurance that we repeat to those learned scholars, who decline to open -their eyes in order to see, or see only what they consider should be -there, the Brahmanic saying, “It is not the fault of the post that the -blind man passes it without noticing it.” - -It seems astonishing that a people so richly endowed as the Greeks -should have found pleasure in romancing so constantly concerning the -sun and the moon, the day and the night, the dawn and the twilight; -but the custom of repeating these mythological phrases, which much -resembled each other, dated from an epoch before the Greeks, when -nothing more powerfully attracted and fascinated the imagination of -man than the aspect of nature’s forces, especially the return of the -sun, bringing with it each morning light and heat and life. Repeated -thus incessantly these phrases became idiomatic, and were retold long -after the thread connecting them with the simple facts of nature was -broken and lost to memory. At first some old grandmother would repeat -them, partly understanding them in their true natural sense, and partly -metaphorically; the sons of the old people would repeat them with a -partial understanding; but the grandsons would relate them only for -their peculiarities, or for the charm of their style and setting; -and the great-grandchildren would hand them on at random, with no -comprehension of their meaning. At a much later period when all these -sayings, with no connection between them, had become traditional, the -poets would embody them in verse, giving them their first form and -permanence in a cycle of legends. They congratulated themselves on the -treasure-trove, but marvelled that the Greeks should enclose these -bald phrases of perpetual iteration in the casket of their literature. -They might as well ask why the Greeks apparently sanctioned all the -irregular verbs their language holds by retaining them in their -grammar. Is it not a historical fact that cannot be denied that the -whole Aryan peoples, without exception, have conserved as the heritage -of their common origin not only the names of their divinities, their -legends, and their folk-lore, but also remains of their primitive -language. Here is a noteworthy statement. Comparative Philology has -proved that there is nothing really irregular in a language, and -that what was formerly considered so in declensions and conjugations -is the stratum on which the edifice of each language raised itself -progressively. This same apparent irregularity is found also in -mythology, because it is itself only a sort of dialect or offshoot of -language. - -Since the _raison d’être_ of myths, as such, is a forgetfulness of -the original sense of the words, we cannot hope to be able to explain -all the mythological recitals; no one has more clearly stated the -difficulty, nor expressed it with greater modesty, than he who has laid -the most lasting foundation of comparative mythology. Grimm says: “I -shall indeed interpret all that I can, but I cannot interpret all that -I should like.”[49] - -In examining these archives, which, if only on account of their -antiquity, are very superior to any other evidence for our purpose, we -learn that identification differs from comparison. It is only possible -to identify two or more divinities by seeing if one name applies -equally to all, and by showing that this name denotes the essence of -each; this result is obtained when, for instance, we note a general -resemblance between a god or a hero of the Veda, and a god or hero -of Hesiod, and discover that though their names may be phonetically -dissimilar, yet that they have one source. Uranus, in the language of -Hesiod, is used as a name for the sky--“a firm place for the blessed -gods”; and the poet says that Uranus covers everything, and that when -he brings the night he is stretched out, everywhere embracing the -earth. This sounds like a reproduction of the name of Varuna, which -is derived from a root _Var_, to cover (the Sanscrit term _varutra_, -overcoat, would prove this if need be). The name Uranus in the Greek -apparently retains something of its primitive meaning, which is not -the case with the name of Zeus and Apollo. Varuna and Uranus evidently -both express the same mythological concept, that of the covering, -enclosing sky; this may even be one of the most ancient discoveries -of comparative mythology. In the same way we prove that Ushas, Eos, -Daphne, Ahana, and Athene were five names of the dawn, and that they -can be traced back to a time before Greek and Sanscrit were separated. -Thus, whilst one legend becomes differentiated from another by its -own peculiar form and attributes, the name of its original prototype -remains etymologically the same, though taking varying forms amongst -the various peoples who use the legend; it is in this immutable -name that the continuity of ideas lies, which nothing obliterates, -and which traverses the centuries, and connects the mythologies of -countries as totally distinct as India, Greece, and Ireland. But we -must remember that all that is taken for etymology is not always so; -the explanations which Homer gives of the names of the divinities only -proves that at his time the original meaning had been forgotten. To -us who now know the true principles of mythology, it is clear that it -represents a prehistoric period of language, and the light it throws -on the times that followed, has the same importance with regard to the -study of the human mind, that geology and paleontology have for the -knowledge of the earth. - -Sometimes we come upon difficulties of another kind when we seek to -translate the language of the poets into our modern forms of thought -and speech. In consequence of the absence of merely auxiliary words -in mythological language, each word, whether noun or verb, had its -full original power, it was heavy and unwieldy, it said more than it -ought to say. Here is an example: _Nyx_ (night), the mother of _Moros_ -(fate), of _Ker_ (destruction), of _Thanatos_ (death), of _Hypnos_ -(sleep), and of the _Oneïroi_ (dreams), and these,--her progeny, -_Night_ is said, by the poet, to have borne without a father. She has -also other children: _Momos_ (blame), _Oizys_ (woe), the _Hesperides_, -which are the evening stars, _Nemesis_ (vengeance), _Apate_ (fraud), -_Philotes_ (lust), _Geras_ (old age), and _Eris_ (strife). Now let -us use our modern expressions. “The stars are seen as the night -approaches,” “we sleep, we dream, we die,” “we run into danger during -night,” “nightly revels lead to strife, angry discussions, and -woe,” “many nights bring old age, and at last death,” “an evil deed -concealed at first by the darkness of night will at last be revealed -by the day,” “night herself will be revenged on the criminal”; and we -have translated the language of Hesiod, a language to a great extent -understood by the people to whom it was addressed many hundreds of -years ago, and it is made comprehensible to us by the addition of some -auxiliary words. This is hardly mythological language, but rather a -poetical and proverbial kind of expression known to all poets whether -modern or ancient, and frequently to be found in the language of common -people when it becomes proverbial. - -“In Greece the mortal element, inherent in all gods, was eliminated -to a great extent by the conception of heroes. Whatever was too human -in the ancient legends told of Zeus and Apollo was transferred to -so-called half gods or heroes, who were represented as the sons or -favourites of the gods. The two-fold character of Herakles as a god and -as a hero is acknowledged even by Herodotus, and some of his epithets -would have been sufficient to indicate his solar and originally divine -character. But in order to make some of the legends told of the solar -deity possible or conceivable, it was necessary to represent Herakles -as a more human being, and to make him rise to the seat of the -immortals only after he had endured toils and sufferings incompatible -with the dignity of an Olympian god.”[50] The divinities of a second -and third order, who were sometimes solicited for special favours, were -perhaps placed in the same category as some provincial or local saints, -who were considered more accessible and more pitiful in certain places, -just as some physicians make a practice of curing those ills only of -which they had made a speciality. - -There were also abstract divinities, representing certain virtues -in the eyes of the people, which were highly esteemed and useful to -possess; each of these qualities which were conceived separately, and -considered in the superlative degree, were from that time raised to -the rank of a divine person, thus altars and temples were dedicated to -Courage, Strength, and Piety; Fame was likewise thus honoured. “Great -Fame is never lost though scattered abroad,” said Hesiod, “it is in -itself a divinity.” - -The language of mythology was in use at a late period. History tells -us that the Greek town of Cyrene in Libya was founded about the -thirty-seventh Olympiad, the ruling race came from Thessaly; the -foundation of the colony was due to the oracle of Apollo at Pytho. This -simple historical fact has been thus rendered, from the habit of not -recounting events as they happened. “The heroic maid Cyrene, who lived -in Thessaly, was loved by Apollo, and carried off to Libya.” - -The question has been often asked, what can be the origin of the fables -which are identical in character and form, whether we find them on -Indian, Greek, Italian, Persian, Slavonic, Celtic, or Teutonic soil. -Was there a period of temporary insanity, through which the human -mind had to pass, and was it a madness identically the same in the -south of India and in the north of Ireland? The necessity of solving -this problem became more imperative when collections of these ancient -traditions were brought from countries which formerly were almost -unknown to us; incredible tales came from all parts, from amongst the -Hottentots, the Patagonians, Zulus, Esquimaux, and Mongols; in all -cases we were able to recognise the fables with which we were already -so well acquainted, from having seen them in Aryan literature. When Max -Müller first published his essays on the Greek myths, the mythologists -acknowledged generally that it was very natural he should devote so -much time to the explanation of the Greek legends, since these same -stories had been universally found in all parts of the globe, from the -one pole to the other; stories of men and women turned into trees, -trees transformed into men, men behaving as animals, animals talking -as if they were men, men swallowed by gods and brought up again whole, -as were the children of Kronos; in all places the same adventures were -told of the sun and moon, also swallowed, but the swallower not known. -The Greek myths--so it was asserted by the learned who did not care -to abandon the old paths--form only one page of that vast mythology -created by the disordered imagination of nations in their infancy; -the epidemic was general, and it is useless to seek for a definite or -peculiar meaning in such and such a local myth. - -Nevertheless, in presence of these striking likenesses, impartial and -clear-sighted science recognised that there must be something in the -human mind that of necessity tended to mythology, nay, that there -must be some reason in all the unreason that goes by the name of -myth. That “something” Max Müller discovered to be language, in its -natural progress from roots to words, up to definite and special names. -Mythology has now been acknowledged to be an inevitable phase in the -growth of language and thought; a form of expression which changes -non-personal beings into personal, and all relationships into actions; -it is a mental phenomenon so peculiar that it would be difficult to -avoid the admission that it emanated from a distinct stratum, it is -metaphoric language and thought; and it is the duty of the geologist of -language to establish the authenticity of this epoch of organic life -in humanity, which is contemporaneous with the most ancient forms of -language. - -If Hegel compares the discovery of the common origin of Greek and -Sanscrit to that of a new world, the same may be said with regard to -the common origin of all the mythologies, for already the science of -Comparative Mythology has risen to the same importance as Comparative -Philology. - -The supposition that grammatical gender of nouns must necessarily be -the cause of personification, and produce myths which had no previous -existence at the time when this denotation of sex did not yet exist, -has been proved incorrect. But the following fact, which concerns -language more than mythology, is not so evident at first sight, -viz., that however the various languages may differ externally, and -however they may lack gender, yet they have without exception what is -analogous to it, and takes its place; this is a system of fundamental -classification to which all equally submit, and which each language -supplies; the result is that at the foundation of thought common to all -humanity, certain forms are found answering the purpose of gender. Each -myth and each legend was at first the intelligible expression of an -intelligible thought, and as the thought contained in each recital must -evidently be the same wherever there were men to repeat it, the science -of Comparative Mythology seeks to place its hand on the expression -which best renders this one and the selfsame thought, under different -aspects. - -What is commonly called Hindoo mythology is of little or no avail for -comparative purposes, because nothing is systematically arranged. -Names are used in one hymn of the Rig-Veda as appellatives, in another -as names of gods. There are as yet no genealogies, and no recorded -marriages between gods and goddesses. As the conception of the poet -varied, so varied the nature of these gods; the myths are arranged -with little order. Nowhere is the wide distance which separates the -ancient poems of India from the most ancient literature of Greece -more clearly felt than when we compare the growing myths of the Veda -with the full-grown, or already decaying myths on which the poetry of -Homer is founded. The Veda is the real theogony of the Aryan races, -while that of Hesiod is a copy only of the original image. The Hindoo -Rishis differed much amongst themselves in their representation of -things; some of them attributed the dispersion of clouds by a solar -hero, to the will of some supreme or divine being; others considered -the combatants to be the supreme beings themselves, who dispersed the -clouds full of lightning and thunder, making the sky serene after the -fight. These are the two distinct interpretations of the solar and -atmospheric schools; the dualism in nature, which at a later period -took the character of light and darkness, even of good and evil, was at -the beginning the dualism of day and night, spring and winter, life and -death, represented by the two great luminaries of the physical world. - -The characteristic traits of the moon which made the deepest impression -on our ancestors were its increase, and afterwards its gradual -diminution, until its total disappearance. The eclipses, though filling -the minds of the people with sudden fear at first, did not continue -long to awaken dread or curiosity, as they were of rare occurrence and -transitory; the moon, it was thought, was swallowed and afterwards -disgorged by some hostile power; but the monthly increase and -diminution required some other explanation. The Hindoos, in seeking to -discover the abode of the gods and of their own ancestors, assigned the -brilliant sky to the former, and where, therefore, should the Fathers -live if not in the vast vault and in the moon? This was, in fact, the -belief of the whole Aryan race. But the subject is complicated, since -in an earlier period of lunar mythology, we find in the Vedic Pantheon -a divinity of the name of Soma, which certain poets identify with the -plant of that name, whose intoxicating juice played an important part -in the sacrifices; there is no doubt a great obscurity with regard to -these two rival powers, to which the same name had been given, and on -which mythologists have found it difficult to enlighten us; but quite -recently exponents of the Rig-Veda have discovered that Soma originally -meant the moon itself, thus the Rishis allow it to be apparent in -their hymns that there were at one time two Somas--the plant and its -juice, and at an earlier period the other Soma, known only to the old -Brahmans, which was the moon. A belief held by the Hindoos was that -the moon supplied nourishment to the gods, which was the cause of the -diminution; its increase was explained by the entrance into it of -the souls of their ancestors; the gods swallowing these also as an -integral portion of the moon. - -All these ideas were of slow development, and of successive growth; no -portion of mythology had a systematic elaboration. - -I will add as a curious scientific fact, that lately botanists have -sought in vain in Northern India and in Persia for a plant whose -qualities correspond to those of the Soma as described in the Vedic -hymns; they are more or less agreed that it must be akin to the -_Ephedra_, but as this plant abounded in the whole country between -Siberia and the Iberian Peninsula, there was no hope of discovering the -locality of the Aryans by means of the habitat of the plant. - -It has been often asserted that these stories of men and things that -have been swallowed must have come from countries formerly inhabited -by cannibals; learned writers, even Herbert Spencer--to quote one -instance--consider, not without some appearance of reason, that -Hindoos, Greeks, Romans and Germans could hardly have put forth similar -stories of this kind had there been no foundation in fact. But the -verbs to eat, to swallow, will admit of divers interpretations; we say -of a man that it was impossible for him to swallow such an insult, or -that he has consumed his fortune; and this mode of speech surprises no -one; where we speak of an eclipse, the inhabitants of the shores of -the Baltic say that the moon or sun is in the act of being eaten; in -India instead of saying such an one has been flogged, it would be said, -he has tasted the whip. A little reflection will convince us that if -nations who had nothing in common but human nature, spoke of the night -as covering, hiding, swallowing various beings, especially the sun -and the day, it was not more unreasonable on their part than to say, -as we do, that day and night follow each other, instead of expressing -ourselves after a more scientific manner, and not less correctly, in -saying that day and night are the successive effects of the rotation of -the earth on its axis. - -Having discovered that mythological phraseology was sometimes due to -misconceptions of names, and that poetical fantasies had their share, -philologists quoted an instance of the imagination being misled by a -simple mistake; that of the name “Great Bear” being given to a certain -group of stars. The Sanscrit root _Ark_ signified to brighten, to -praise, to glorify, to celebrate; man praised, glorified, celebrated -the sun, moon and stars; for these purposes the word _Ark_ was used. -For all we know the substantive _rik_ may really have conveyed all -these meanings during the earliest period of the Aryan language; but if -we look at the fully developed branches of that family of speech, we -find that in this, its simplest form, _rik_ has been divested of all -meaning in the Rig-Veda except one; it only means a song of praise, a -hymn, that gladdens the heart of man, and brightens the countenance -of the gods. The other words, however, which rik might have expressed -were not entirely given up, but the root was rendered more definite; -thus _arki_ and _arkis_ were formed, these no longer meant hymns of -praise, but light, ray. It is difficult to understand how _Riksha_, in -the sense of bright, has become the name of “the bear”; might it not -be on account of his brilliant tawny fur, or from his bright eyes? No -one knows. Certain it is that in Sanscrit bears were called _Riksha_. -But the word _Riksha_ had also another meaning, as shown by a passage -in the Rig-Veda 1, 24, 10. “These stars (riksha) fixed high above, -which are seen by night; whither did they go by day?” The Commentator -observed that the word _riksha_ is not used in the sense of stars in -general, but that according to tradition the name is only given to -that particular constellation, which in later Sanscrit is called “the -Seven Rishis,” or “the Seven Sages.” And thus it happened that when -the dispersion took place, and the Aryans left their primitive home -and settled in Europe, they ceased to use the plural form “_Arktoi_,” -or many bears, and spoke of the group of seven stars as the Bear, the -Great Bear, without knowing why these stars had originally received -that name. - -It did not escape the notice even of the less erudite that the gods -of Greece and Rome and of other Aryan nations had a close connection -with the most striking phenomena of nature; they also recognised the -same origin amongst the divinities of the Semitic nations, as well as -those of Egypt, Africa and America; this could, of course, be accounted -for by the presence of the same primitive stratum of human thought, -resembling those deeper geological layers, which only show themselves -in a partial and fragmentary manner. - -But none of these mythologists attached the least importance to the -_names_ of the divinities, and if they were told that they were nothing -but names, it sounded almost like heresy to them, and they ignored the -fact that one of the latest scientific discoveries was being submitted -to them. Yet it is indubitable that the sun and the moon were in the -places occupied by them at present before they were named; but not till -they were named was there a Savitar, a Helios, a Selene or a Mene. If -then it is the name which makes the gods in mythology, in enabling -us to distinguish one from another, it follows that we must call -the Science of Language to our aid in order to solve the problem of -mythology, since that alone discloses the causes which have despoiled -the names of their primitive meaning, and that alone shows how the -germs of decrepitude, inherent in language, affect both the phonetic -portion and also the signification of words, since words naturally -react on thought and mould it. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[49] Max Müller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 70. - -[50] Max Müller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 243. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII BETWEEN SLEEPING AND WAKING - - -The habit which I have contracted of living in the society of our -ancestors of prehistoric times, would, it might be thought, naturally -cause me to notice the dissimilarities between us and them rather than -the likenesses; this often happens, but not always. Our fathers, for -instance, did not know the thousandth part of our vocabulary, which -is very copious; this would seem to indicate that our knowledge has -considerably increased in the course of thirty or forty centuries. -Words of deep import are familiar to us; who amongst us does not -know and use such as these--Law, Necessity, Liberty, Spirit, Matter, -Conscience, Belief, Nature, Providence, Revelation, Inspiration, the -Soul, Religion, Infinite, Immortality, and many others, which are -either of recent origin, or have become new because their meaning has -changed? Here the difference between our fathers and ourselves springs -into sight. - -But the points of resemblance are still more striking. - -Long before our present era, certain philosophers asserted that their -world was full of gods, we may say with equal truth that God fills our -world; His name is in every mouth, and our little children know it -well. Moreover the complete identity between certain mental acts of our -fathers and our own is easily recognised. Our fathers were satisfied -not to enquire concerning the nature of their gods, they knew their -names, and that sufficed. We too have become accustomed to hear God’s -name repeated frequently, without always questioning ourselves as to -its meaning, and in what way He has made the earth His habitation. - -To talk of what we do not grasp must be essentially human, since we -find the practice in two social conditions, separated from each other -by thousands of years. - -It is incredible to what a point we of the nineteenth century carry -our lack of enquiry. If one day we were to count on our fingers the -number of interesting subjects we had allowed to pass by us without -any interrogations concerning them, fifty hands would not suffice us -for the tale; our ignorance would then become apparent. Should we -feel humiliated? In all probability no, for before arriving at this -much to be desired consummation, we should have been carried away by -many thoughts in no way bearing on the subject, and the one thought -which would come prominently to the front and hinder us from passing -our conduct in review would be, “I see no necessity to apply myself -to them.” In fact, nothing is easier and nothing so reposeful to our -mind as acquiescence in the popular opinion, which we allow to guide -us in our estimation of words and phrases; as so frequently happens -with ourselves (by “ourselves” I mean that very considerable portion -of society which separates the working classes from the savants and -philosophers). - -“All things are full of the gods,” was said by the heathen in former -days; and in fact divinities abounded; this was not surprising. “God -has chosen to Himself a people and spread His name over the whole -earth, and to make His will to be known,” as we say now. Thus we know -that God is, and that His commandments must be kept. - -To consider words as ideas is not wise. Why do we not imitate the -savages who when they hear an organ for the first time have a great -desire to open it in order to see what is inside; and we who are -civilised play with much light-hearted readiness on the gigantic -instrument of language without seeking to know the value of the sounds -we draw from it; and the names of beings and objects which should -exercise the most powerful influence to which moral things can be -subjected, are treated as mere sounds. - -Have we asked ourselves the meaning of the word God? Many must answer -no to this question. This is not well, in spite of the fact that those -who have asked it in this form have not always succeeded in obtaining -an answer; no one has formed a complete conception of God, since -neither sense nor reason is equal to the task. Plato, although named -“Divine” by the ancient philosophers and by Christian theologians, -did not like to speak of _The Gods_, but replacing the plural by -the singular used the word “Divine,” but he did not explain what he -understood by this word. Plato certainly mentions the Creator of the -Universe, the Father of humanity, but--“he does not tell His name, for -he knew it not; he does not tell His colour, for he said it not; he -does not tell His size, for he touched it not.”[51] Xenophanes, who -lived 300 years before Plato, said, “There is one God, the greatest -amongst gods and men; neither in form nor in thought like unto -mortals.”[52] - -The Greek philosophers protested against all attempts to apply a name -which should be adequate to the Supreme Being; since all the words -chosen failed to grasp His essence, and only designated certain sides -and points of view, predicting of Him whatever was most beautiful in -nature. For this reason early Christian writers who were Greeks rather -than Jews, who had studied in the schools of Plato and Aristotle, spoke -of God in the same abstract language, the same negative terms; they -said, “We cannot call Him Light, since Light is His creation; we cannot -call Him Spirit, since the Spirit is His breath; nor Wisdom, since -Wisdom emanates from Him; nor Force, since Force is the manifestation -of His Power.” - -Thus instead of saying what God is, the philosophers, heathen as well -as Christian, prefer to say what He is not. But in that case what -idea could man form of a Being whom the wisest amongst them could not -represent or describe? Do we understand the nature of this Supreme -Being better by using the name so well known of Providence? Again no; -since we have introduced several meanings into this word which are -inconsistent the one with the other. Amongst them there might well be -some that are erroneous, which would thus lead us to rest our hopes on -false foundations. - -This mist, hiding from us the meaning of words and obscuring our ideas, -is partly owing to a fault committed by the ancients themselves. - -When our ancestors communed with their divinities, they did not ask -themselves what the names they pronounced really meant; in invoking -Varuna, Helios, Athene, Prithvi, and the others, they were satisfied, -at least for the time being, since names possess a strange calming -property; this unquestioning acquiescence has been bequeathed to us. -We are neither more enquiring, more exact, nor more pedantic than -the greater part of our ancestors; we speak of angels, for instance, -without seeking to fathom their nature, much in the same way as we -might mention lords and dukes without troubling ourselves to reflect -that the one means “bread-giver” and the other “dux,” or one capable of -being a leader of men. - -In speaking of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and of religion, -we use words which have become common property, and it is not necessary -to analyse them in order to feel sure that they represent things which -are very real; still we do not strive to understand what these things -really are. Thus it happens that words whose meaning is unknown to us -or escapes us, are generally those of which we make daily use; we keep -to the impression received of them in our childhood, or accepted by -current opinion, or with which sentiment invests them, but this is -unsatisfactory; we should feel ashamed of not possessing more accurate -knowledge than this of geography or arithmetic. On the other hand, -there are scientific terms which seem to us so technical that we -willingly abandon their use to experts, and yet their meaning can be -readily and definitely grasped. - -What meaning, for instance, has the word _infinite_ for us, even if -taken in its most simple acceptation; this _infinite_ towards which our -thoughts travel when we raise our eyes to the skies? Astronomers say to -us, “Look at something greater than the greatest possible greatness, -that is the infinitely great.” They then quote figures, but these -figures of infinite greatness elude our imagination, we repeat them -mechanically and only out of respect to the high scientific authority -who guarantees the accuracy of the calculations or the value of the -appreciation. - -A small object, apparently of the size of a homeopathic globule, moves -in space, it contains our continents and our oceans, this globule moves -in company with other globules of the same nature. - -Astronomers speak to us of the millions of miles separating us from the -sun, yet this distance dwindles down to nothing as compared with the -nearest star, which, we are told, lies twenty millions of millions of -miles from our earth. Another stupendous thought is that a ray of light -traverses space at the rate of 187,000 miles in a second, and yet it -requires three years to reach us. - -But this is only a small matter. - -More than one thousand millions of such stars have been discovered by -our telescopes, and there may be millions of millions of suns within -our siderial system which are as yet beyond the reach of our best -telescopes; even that siderial system need not be regarded as single -within the universe, thousands of millions of similar systems may be -recognised in the galaxy or milky way.[53] - -Now let us turn our eyes to the infinitely little. One drop of water -taken from the ocean contains atoms so small that a grain of the finest -dust would seem colossal by the side of them; chemists are now able to -ascertain the relative positions of atoms so minute that millions of -them can stand upon a needle’s point. - -All this we gather from science when--working together with the -telescope--it investigates space; and this may still be little compared -to what we might see through glasses, which should magnify objects some -millions of times more than our best instruments. - -The infinite in space has engaged the attention of many thinkers; I -will quote from two only, as this infinite, which they studied from -different points of view, yet suggests thoughts somewhat alike. Kepler, -the discoverer of the laws on which our planetary system is based, -said, “My highest wish is to find _within_ the God whom I have found -everywhere _without_.” Kant, the philosopher, to whom the Divine in -nature and the Divine in man appeared as transcendent and beyond our -cognisance, and who refused to listen to any theological argument -tending to prove the existence of God, yet says, “Two things fill me -with new and ever growing admiration and awe: the starry firmament -above me, and the moral law within me; neither of them is hidden in -darkness, I see them both before me, and I connect them directly with -the consciousness of my own existence.”[54] - -These are very abstract thoughts; and it is pertinent to notice that -the most solemn religious terms, and the most striking expressions of -admiration, and poetical phrases of love, have their source in verbal -roots, indicative of acts and conditions palpable to the senses. - -But I am approaching too closely to matters of high import. I am drawn -by the word _Infinite_. Aristotle said truly, “the Infinite attracts.” -He was thinking of that other infinite, which is not the one intended -by astronomers; but for myself the infinite in nature captivates me so -powerfully that I find it difficult to touch earth again. Let us walk -in beaten paths; let us endeavour to grasp the meaning of the more -simple words learnt mechanically at school, such as those denoting -abstraction as well as nouns, and terms both general and particular; -and let us see to what phase of thought and speech these grammatical -exercises will carry us. - - * * * * * - -Each palpable object is known to us according as it affects our senses, -that is to say, by its properties; all impalpable objects cannot be -known otherwise than by their qualities; but nothing exists in nature, -whether palpable or impalpable, that has only one property or one -quality, each object has several; an object as it exists in reality -is concrete, and has a concrete name. If we wished to consider only -one of its attributes, we should have to take that apart and isolate -it, in order to fix our thoughts exclusively on that; “we must drop -that of which the attributes are attributes.”[55] We see white snow, -white chalk, white milk, we have the sensation of the white colour; -but to take whiteness apart from the snow, the chalk, and the milk, is -an operation which requires an instrument, a means, this we possess -in a word, viz., the word _white_. Without that word we should have -the sensation of whiteness, but not the idea; it is the word _white_, -whilst separating the white colour from the snow, the chalk, and the -milk, that gives us the abstract idea as well as the abstract term -whiteness. This mental act is called _abstraction_: and it is by this -process of abstraction that we really arrive at the true knowledge of -anything, apart from the sensation of it only. - -Here is another example of abstraction. Let us suppose that two persons -are in one room, and that there are in the room two windows, two doors, -two tables and two chairs. Let us try to obliterate in our mind the -persons, the windows, the doors, the tables and the chairs; nothing -now remains but the abstraction _two_. Now _two_, as such, apart from -objects, does not exist in nature; still it is a conception we can -retain in our mind, and this abstract idea can be incorporated in the -abstract word _two_. - -These two examples of abstraction tell us but little of what is meant -by it; and although they teach us little of the part abstraction plays -in our mental life, they are correct from a logical point of view, and -clearly demonstrate the impossibility of retaining a thought apart from -the word expressing it, since evidently the representation of _two_ and -of _whiteness_ could not have been made if the words had been lacking. - -The faculty of abstraction has no doubt taken time to develop in man, -and the absence of abstract words and consequently of abstract ideas -was complete in primitive man as it now is in our very young children. -The faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. One -reason, amongst others, why we have no ground to think brutes have -abstract general ideas is that they do not speak, that they have no use -of the words without which it is impossible to carry out the operation -which I have just described, and to cause a conception to arise from a -sensation. - - * * * * * - -When, in our early days, our parents gave us instruction on the -three divisions of natural history, and explained to us of what -they consisted, we did not suspect that a period of immense length -had elapsed before man succeeded in thus skilfully classifying the -vast mass of names in the manner which struck us as so natural and -inevitable. Many thousands of objects were before us, each one entitled -to bear an expressive name; and in proportion as our knowledge of -things increased was science called upon to furnish new terms; their -name became legion and memory failed to retain them. It therefore -became a necessity to classify the objects of a common nature under one -name; hence the evolution of the terms animal, vegetable and mineral, -which relieved us from the burden of enumerating all the objects -composing genus and species; then in speaking of them to others we use -the generic term, which at the same time presents the image to our own -minds. Thus when we wish to denote men having the same nationality as -ourselves we employ the collective term compatriot; in the same way the -word furniture includes all that serves to furnish our rooms. By the -help of this ingenious combination we relieve our memories of a mass of -encumbering words, we economise our time and our powers, and simplify -the machinery of our thoughts. - -This is evidently an advantage. But now a difficulty presents itself. -When employing these general terms, such as vegetable, animal, the -human race, we are speaking of things of which we are ignorant, and are -therefore for us as if they had no existence. We cannot have a complete -knowledge of vegetables since that word comprehends all plants and -trees on the earth; neither of animals, since “animal” includes not -only all beasts lacking reason but also man who is endowed with it. We -are equally ignorant of the human race, since it is composed of all -human creatures, past, present and to come. It is evident that we only -know individual persons and things, such as this fir tree or that oak, -this horse, this cow, Paul or James, and we know them because we are in -a position to distinguish them by naming them, or indicating them. - -How is it that philosophers of the mental calibre possessed by Locke, -Hume and Berkeley--whose minds follow so closely the progress of the -perception of general ideas--did not question how it was that terms -which were applicable to these ideas could equally well be applied to -particular things? What was the origin of the word _man_ that it could -be as suitable for Paul or James as for many men, in fact the whole -human race? This is a fact about which philosophers do not appear to -have troubled themselves, and which the science of language alone can -explain. - -In the time of our primitive ancestors human knowledge was evolved -gradually from what was confused and vague, before arriving at what was -deemed settled and distinct. Man’s vocabulary was small, substantives -were rare; that which we now understand by garden, courtyard, field, -habitation, was merged into one and the same conception, and would be -expressed by one vocable, of which the modern equivalent is enclosure; -the word _serpent_ designated all creatures that crawled, the word -_fruit_ implied all that could be eaten, the word _man_ all who could -think; each name was a general term expressive of a general idea. - -We may remember that the Sanscrit word _sar_, to run, which was -at first used for rivers in general, became a particular name; a -demonstrative element joined to the verb, changing it into _sarit_, -run here, sufficed at once to turn it into an intelligible phrase, -and the name of a particular river. In order to form the word -_man-u-s_, man, the constructors of language combined the root _man_, -measurer, thinker, in its secondary form _man-u_, with the suffix -_s_, which gives the meaning think-here. This was at first not of -general application, but as it could be repeated any number of times -and referred each time to different persons, who could each be named -thinker-here, it became a general term. We thus see that the name -_manus_ was from the beginning something more than a mere conventional -sign applied to a particular person as are all proper names. It was -a predicative name, that is applicable to all possessing the same -attributes, viz., of being able to think, and capable of the same act, -that of thinking. - -This discovery was followed by another not less unexpected. When -examining the oldest word for name, which in Sanscrit is _nâman_, in -Greek _onoma_, in Latin _nomen_, we find that it dates from a time when -the Sanscrit, Greek and Latin languages were all one; consequently the -English _name_ and the German _Name_ are not as we supposed, words -invented by the ancient Saxons, but they already existed before the -separation of Teutonic idioms from their elder brothers. - -After some further steps our contemporary philologists discovered -the sources whence proceeded this Sanscrit _nâman_; it is formed -of the root _nâ_, originally _gnâ_, to know, joined to a suffix -which generally expresses an instrument, a means; _nâman_ is the -representative of _gnâman_, which we recognise in the Latin _cognomen_, -the consonant _g_ being dropped as in _natus_, son, which was formerly -_gnatus_. This word _name_ had at first a much more extended meaning -than that of a simple arbitrary sign applied “to what we call a -thing.” The constructors of the word were aware of a fact of which -consciousness was afterwards lost, and which the learned ignored during -all the supervening centuries--viz., that all names, far from being -mere conventional signs used to distinguish one thing from another, -were meant to express what it was possible to know of a thing; and -that a name thus places us in a position really to be cognisant of a -thing. A natural insight taught the early framers of our language a -truth only acquired by us after interminable researches, such as Hegel -expresses when saying, “We think in words,” and which we find again in -this somewhat tautological expression “nominibus noscimus” = “tel nom, -telle notion.” - -The fact that names, which are signs not of things, but of particular -concepts, are all derived from general ideas, is one of the most -fruitful discoveries of the science of language; since it not only -expresses the truth which has been stated below, that language and the -capability of forming general ideas separate man from the animals, but -also a second truth that these two phenomena are two sides of the same -truth. This explains the reason why the science of language rejects -equally the interjectional theory and the mimetic, but accepts the -final elements of language, those roots which all contain concepts. - -The name man, which we all apply to ourselves, is a title of nobility -to which none other can compare. It is the direct issue of _man_, which -in its turn came from _mâ_, to measure, this gave _mâs_, moon, to the -Sanscrit language. The word man contains in itself the kernel of subtle -thought; if we connect the word with the celestial body that helps us -to measure our time, we do not therefore necessarily invest the moon -with a living and thinking personality; it is sufficient to consider -that if our ancestors conceived of it as measuring the nights and days, -they had in themselves the capabilities with which they invested the -words they created. - -We must also notice that the creators of this name having connected -it with the loftiest thing of which they could conceive--thought--did -not stop there; the sight of what was lowest--the dust--inspired them -with another name, _homo_ = earth-born; this Latin word having the -same source as _humus_ = the soil. Our fathers also gave themselves -a third name, which was _brotos_ in Greek, _mortalis_ in Latin, and -_marta_--the dying--in Sanscrit; they could hardly have applied the -word mortal to themselves if they had not at the same time believed in -other beings who did not die. - -And this strange fact has come to pass, that on our planet there -existed in former days men--simple mortals as they were--who -manipulated thought, incorporating it with language, the only domain -in which it can exist; then these marvellous men so entirely eclipsed -themselves, and passed out of our ken, that their posterity do not -recognise them under their modest garb of anonymity; for their work -though still living through thousands of centuries, is so unrecognised -that men ask themselves, “Why is it not possible to think apart from -words?” - -Thus we acknowledge the profound wisdom of the conceptions of our -ancestors; but their understanding worked unequally, on certain points -it was very advanced, but on others behindhand. - -In following the march of human intellect in the past, we are struck -by the slowness with which thought and speech co-operated. As long as -our ancestors had no occasion to speak of the action of covering a -surface with a liquid or soft substance, they did not possess the word -_var_ = to cover; “the name of colour in Sanscrit is _varna_, clearly -derived from this word; and not till the art of painting, in its most -primitive form, was discovered and named, could there have been a name -for colour.” For some time they continued to view various objects -differently coloured without distinguishing the tints; it is well known -that the distinction of colours is of late date; our ancestors gazed on -the blue sky, or the green trees, as in a dream, without recognising -blue or green, as long as they lacked words to define the two colours, -and some time elapsed before they particularised the colours by giving -each its proper title. - -We speak of the seven colours of the rainbow, because the intermediate -tints elude us; the ancients acted much in the same way, Xenophanes -speaks of the rainbow as a cloud of purple, red, and yellow; Aristotle -also speaks of the tri-coloured rainbow, red, yellow, and green; and -Democritus seems only to have mentioned black, white and yellow. - -Does this indicate that our senses have gradually become more acute and -accurate? No, no one has asserted that the sensitiveness of the organs -of sense was less thousands of years ago than it is now; the sensation -has not changed, but “we see in this evolution of consciousness of -colour how perception goes hand in hand with the evolution of language, -and how, by a very slow process, every definite concept is developed -out of an infinitude of indistinct perceptions.”[56] - -The names of colours have not been applied arbitrarily, any more than -the names given to divinities. Blue, for instance, owes its origin to -the visible results of violence, or of an accident; the science of -etymology shows us that the Old Norse words, blár, blá, blatt, which -now mean blue, meant originally the livid colour of a bruise. Grimm -traces these words back to the Gothic _bliggvan_, to strike; and he -quotes as an analogous case the Latin _cæsius_--a bluish grey, from -_cædere_, to cut. If the assertion that blue and green are rarely -mentioned until a late date be correct, it would follow that they had -been worked out of an infinity of colours before they took their place -definitely as the colour of the sky and the colour of the trees and -grass. - -As we trace etymology to its source, we see how man’s perception was -confused at first. From the Sanscrit root _ghar_, which has many -different meanings, such as to heat, to melt, to drip, to burn, to -shine, come not only many words--heat, oven, warmth, and brightness, -but also the names of many bright colours, all varying between yellow, -green, red, and white. But the most striking example is afforded by -the Sanscrit word _ak-tu_. Here we have the first instance of the -uncertainty in the meaning of the names of colours which pervades -all languages, and which can be terminated at last by scientific -definition only. This word has two opposite meanings--a light tinge -or ray of light, and also a dark tinge, and night; this same word in -Greek, _ak-tis_, means a ray of light. Thus, whilst ideas are not -definitely named, even the most simple, such as those of white and -black, are not realised; philosophers have long known this, but the -learned in physical science seem only recently to have drawn attention -to the fact. Virchow was the first to make the following assertion: -“Only after their perceptions have become fixed by language, are the -senses brought to a conscious possession and a real understanding of -them.”[57] - -Surgeons have explained that the faculty of sight proceeds from the -movement of an unknown medium, which in the case of light has been -called ether, this strikes the retina, and is conveyed to the brain -by the optic nerve; “but what relation there is between the effect, -namely, our sensation of red, and the cause, namely, the 500 millions -of millions of vibrations of ether in one second, neither philosophy -nor physical science has yet been able to explain.”[58] - -We are able to picture to ourselves the difficulties which assailed man -in his efforts to express his impressions in primitive times, since -we find ourselves at times struggling with the same difficulties, and -there are occasions when we struggle in vain, we do not conquer the -difficulty. - -Sensations which are subjective and personal are of all others the -most difficult to define, since we lack words to express what is from -its nature purely personal; and yet we have frequently occasion to -mention them, how can we best express ourselves? As the required word -does not seem forthcoming we have recourse to metaphor, and almost -unconsciously we use terms borrowed from external phenomena connected -with the sense of hearing, of smelling, and of tasting, and which -for the most part are acts or conditions in the domain of the sense -of sight. Our old acquaintances the roots, whose meanings are to -cut, to pinch, to bite, to burn, to hit, to sting, to soften, having -formed the base of the adjectives sharp, sweet, keen, burning, we use -these to describe certain sensations. We do not know how better to -particularise a physical pain than by comparing it to something that -tears, cuts or stings. But if certain physical ills, certain colour -perceptions, certain impressions of sharpness, sweetness and heat -experienced when tasting various foods find metaphorical expression in -external acts, there still remains a whole category of simple ideas -for which no words can be found. There are certain sensations of taste -which cannot be expressed in words. Yesterday I ate a pear, to-day I -have eaten a peach; I am quite capable of distinguishing the special -flavour of each, but finding nothing in the world of facts with which -to compare them, I am without words to apply to them, and it would be -as impossible for me to convey an idea of the flavour to any one who -had never eaten a pear or a peach as to make any person understand if I -spoke in a language which was unknown to him. - -Since all words that succeed in expressing our sensations are drawn -from external phenomena, we are in a position to know the origin and -historic past of these words. But I cannot thus easily foresee even -the near future of some of these words. The sound of the clarionet and -that of the hautbois, the whistling of the wind, the whisper of the -waves, the yellow of the straw and that of the lemon, the green of the -emerald and the blue of the sky, all characterise objects belonging -to the material world; but if these words: clarionet and hautbois, -wind and waves, straw and lemon, emerald and sky, which alone enable -us to define clearly to our minds certain sounds and certain colours -were lacking in our vocabulary, I do not know how a musician could -have composed a symphony, or an artist painted his picture, although -the creation of both works of art proceeds equally from personal -inspiration invisible to the eye. - -The tie that binds thought to speech has been alternately acknowledged -and forgotten; if Plato believed that the origin of language was the -imitation of the voices of nature (an error which weighed heavily -on humanity during the space of two thousand years), he also knew -that words are indispensable to man for the very formation of -thought. Abelard was more explicit on this point, he said: “Language -is generated by the intellect, and generates intellect.” Hobbes -understood so well that language was meant first of all for ourselves, -and afterwards only for others, that he calls words, as meant for -ourselves, _notæ_, and distinguishes them from _signa_, the same -words as used for the sake of communication, and he added: “If there -were only one man in the world he would require _notæ_.”[59] The -close connection between thought and speech cannot be more clearly or -concisely expressed. - -This discovery makes its way slowly in the world, because certain -philosophers who have been rendered immobile by tradition, darken -counsel by their speculations. Some of the Polynesians would seem to -have a far truer insight into the nature of thought and language than -these philosophers to whom I have made allusion; they call thinking -“speaking in the stomach,” which means of course to speak inaudibly, -and it is this absolutely inarticulate speech which is so often -mistaken for thought without words; because the fact is ignored that -_notion_ and _name_ are two words for one thing. “It is certain,” they -say, “that a thought may be conceived in the mind, but is formulated -at a later period; for instance, if you have to write a letter of no -great importance, and which affects you little, take your pen, and -before the idea appears to you completely clothed, your hand has passed -over the paper, and you proceed to read your ideas in the words you -see before you.” This is an illusion. We can no doubt distinguish the -written word from the word-concept, but the former could not exist -without the latter. I defy our opponents to think of the most ordinary -and familiar object, such as a dog for instance, without saying to -themselves the word dog. They would explain that the remembrance only -of a special dog, or of its bark would suffice to call up the image of -the dog in their minds; they do not see that the likeness of a dog, or -the remembrance of its bark is equivalent to the word dog, and that -they cannot possibly become conscious to themselves of what they appear -to be thinking, without having the word in reserve in some part of -themselves, either “in the stomach,” as some savages say, or, as is -more gracefully expressed by the Italians, _in petto_. - -Descartes was a learned Christian, who pondered for some time over the -questions whether the human mind could be certain of anything without -being supernaturally enlightened; he resolved to prove it; and to this -end he imagined that he, Descartes, was certain of nothing--doubted of -all--even mathematical conclusions; he then reflected on this position, -and after a time the idea occurred to him that as he was capable of -reflection it proved without a doubt that he, Descartes, existed, and -that consequently it was no longer possible to have doubts of his own -identity. - -The portrait of this philosopher as depicted on the cover of his works, -represents him reclining in a chair thinking--thinking--thinking--and -exclaiming, “Cogito ergo sum.” - -Those persons amongst us who are not specially interested in any -system of philosophy are certainly in the majority; all know that -such systems exist, and that they are noted, but from the want of -reflection, however little, some persons look upon them as having -sprung fully equipped, and in their present form, from the brains of -their founders. But it would be incorrect, simply on the evidence of -a frontispiece, to consider these philosophical processes as thus -instantaneous. The systems of philosophy, even those of small value, -require much time for their elaboration, and ripen slowly, and are -never free from opposition. They establish close links between the -living thinkers of to-day, and those who are no longer on earth. The -philosophers of the Middle Ages consulted those of antiquity, the -thinkers of to-day strove to be in agreement with those alike of the -Middle Ages and of antiquity, and there arise from this intercommunion -of knowledge, groups of ideas of which some are borrowed and some -original, some true and some false; these are dependent on the -intellectual lucidity and vigour of the latest arrivals in the arena. -Many problems are thus threshed out before our eyes. Not long ago three -philosophers were in dispute and Noiré records the arguments; the -discussion turned on the question of priority of thought or speech. - -They agreed on the fundamental point, all three said there could be -no reason without language, nor language without reason. But as they -penetrated more deeply into the question, they perceived divergencies; -although the conception and the word be inseparable, yet there may be -a moment of time--infinitely little, doubtless--between the arrival of -the one and of the other, as with twins. - -According to Schopenhauer conceptions were the first in the field, and -their immediate duty consisted in creating words; since the mind could -not deal with ideas at will, could neither evoke them, grasp them, nor -reject them, whilst no signs were attached to them. - -To this Geiger objected. How could ideas be produced whilst no signs -existed with which to represent them? Words came first, and thought, -rendered possible by the development of language, followed; “language -has created reason; before language, man was without reason.”[60] - -Max Müller replied to both. How could there be a sign when there was -nothing to represent? Conceptions and words, inseparable from the -beginning, were produced on the same day; the day when man’s history -begins; before that what was a fugitive impression and a vocal sound -void of sense, became a conception. Max Müller adds: “If Geiger had -said that with every new word there is more reason, or that every -progress of reason is marked by a new word, he would have been right, -for the growth of reason and language may be said to be coral-like, -each shell is the product of life, and becomes in turn the support of -new life.”[61] - -The most important results obtained during the Middle Ages on these -subjects find their representations in this discussion carried on by -the three learned contemporaries. Max Müller’s point of view is one -which reconciles the two diverse opinions. - -Men still find themselves under the magic influence of the past after -some thousands of years; the first words which our ancestors used in -the midst of their ordinary occupations have not ceased to appear -in our daily conversations, in our philosophical writings, and in -the reports of scientific proceedings; it is impossible to speak -of our family or social relations, of our affections, our ordinary -obligations, our most sacred duties, our observance of laws, without -having recourse to words and expressions, which represent the acts -of linking or _tying_, those early activities of our ancestors. The -chemist speaks of the _affinity_ of the substances with which he is -working; the poet and the devout believer when giving free scope to -their highest aspirations do not find truer or loftier terms than -_links_, _chains_, _ties_, for that which connects them with the Giver -of all pure, sublime thoughts. - -As it is possible in the present day to speak of _delving_ into a -question (_creuser_) and of _racking_ our brains (creuser) when -we puzzle over a conundrum; of _linking_ one idea to another; of -_polishing_ our manners by the help of art and letters; of seeking -to _soften_ the heart of God by offerings (as if He were a mercenary -Judge), of linking ourselves with others the better to accomplish -a good work, of uniting in freeing ourselves from an undesirable -opponent; it follows that our ancestors as they emerged from their -condition of muteness found it necessary to _dig_ (creuser) cabins for -themselves, to _polish_ stones, to weave and plait branches together, -and to soften tough roots for their nourishment. The same words repeat -themselves from time immemorial. - -But how comes it that these words, which have remained the same -outwardly, have so completely changed their meaning as exactly to adapt -themselves to modern usage? We have been deceived by appearances. These -words have not changed their meaning, but at first they were applied to -tangible objects and visible acts, those which were the most necessary -and the most usual in daily life at that time; and now these words are -applied to intangible things, and invisible acts, the most necessary -and usual in our present mental life. - -Nor is this which follows less curious. This adaptation of the old -words to modern usages could only have been accomplished on one -condition, that we should forget many things, and be utterly oblivious -to the original destination of these words; that we should put from -before our eyes all images of caves, branches, stones and tough roots; -and this condition we have fulfilled absolutely; the forgetfulness has -been complete; no one suspects the source of these expressions; only a -small number of men knows it, but these men are thoroughly aware that -they are making use of the true primitive forms of the human language. - -A difficulty to be avoided still remains. It might be said that, as -it is the result of concerted action undertaken from a community of -interest, that these images have become fixed in the memory, and that -if the ideas and representations exercised so potent a spell on us, -that we were compelled to use the words which can be traced back to -the first period of language, does it not follow that we absolutely -resemble each other, and that consequently we must renounce the idea -of attributing the least individuality to ourselves? This is a great -mistake. Each one of us gives to these representations of ideas that -form towards which he is impelled by his own nature, his education, his -environment. A man who has some knowledge of astronomy will look at -the star-lit sky with quite another eye to that of the poet, who knows -nothing of the subject but is struck with its inexpressible splendour. -A landscape painter would see in a tree details of beauty which would -quite escape one who admired it, but had never sought to draw it; a -clever architect with one glance at a newly-built house could assign -it a place either with the failures or with those houses which were a -success, and this glance would sufficiently account for the murmured -exclamation, “How gladly would I live in it!” - -FOOTNOTES: - -[51] Max Müller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 100. - -[52] _Ibid._, p. 181. - -[53] Max Müller, _Natural Religion_, p. 138. - -[54] Max Müller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 393. - -[55] Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 80. - -[56] Max Müller. - -[57] _Science of Thought_, p. 151. Max Müller. - -[58] _Natural Religion_, p. 118. Max Müller. - -[59] _Science of Thought_, p. 40. Max Müller. - -[60] _On the Origin of Human Language and Reason._ Geiger. - -[61] _Science of Thought_, p. 299. Max Müller. - - - - -CHAPTER IX A DECISIVE STEP - - -How is it that primitive man, provided with five senses which bring him -into contact with the material world only, has found it possible to -conceive the existence of an invisible world peopled with beings whom -his eyes cannot see, nor his hands touch, nor his ears hear? - -Between the birth of human reason and the invention of writing a long -period of time elapsed; when the art of writing was followed by that of -printing, man then printed all that he had thought and written, and at -present we possess thousands of volumes which will inform us on all the -truths and errors which have alternately illuminated and obscured the -human mind. - -Whoever would take the trouble to examine this mass of documents, and -read those which furnish an approximate estimate of the mental activity -of our primitive ancestors, will see that the human _ego_ pursued -science unconsciously long before scholars appeared, and applied the -name of philosophers to themselves, because they had sought patiently -and with many discussions, through thousands of centuries, to find the -best way of arriving at the truth. - -These ancestors of ours were of an enquiring turn of mind. - -The appearance of religion amongst men is at the same time the most -natural and the most supernatural fact in the history of humanity. - -The greater number of philosophers have recognised that the tendency of -the human mind to turn towards that which is outside the domain of the -senses is as powerful in man as the desire of eating and drinking is in -all living beings. The ancients acknowledged this to be a true sense, -as irresistible as the rest of the operations of our external senses, -and they have well named it _sensus numinis_--the consciousness of the -divine. The desire of understanding the secrets with which the Unknown -was invested naturally led to the investigation of the influence which -these secrets might exercise on the destinies of mankind. Amongst -certain peoples this gave birth to the art of divination. To this they -abandoned themselves in all sincerity, not doubting that omnipotent -beings would always be ready to make their will known to mortals. - -The men of modern times have shown that they have the critical faculty -more highly developed, and their investigations have dealt more with -practical matters. In the eighteenth century, writers, historians and -philosophers--Voltaire amongst the number--wishing to know how the -phenomenon of mental religion appeared in the world, collected all the -data to be obtained from travellers concerning savages; they found -that without exception all believed in occult powers, as distinct from -material or human forces, and doubted not the efficacy of certain magic -arts in use amongst them to attract these powers to themselves, and -to constrain them to act on their behalf. Judging by analogy these -writers contend that primitive man, doubtless impressed by the alarming -phenomena of nature, would make search for the unknown beings around -him, whom the storms, the thunders and the lightnings obey, but these -beings were invisible, consequently there must be an invisible world in -communication with the visible or human world. - -In this way were the beliefs of the present-day savages supposed to be -those current at the dawn of religious conceptions of humanity. - -The ignorance of a subject, of whatever nature, has never prevented -the laying down of axioms concerning that subject. Towards the end of -the eighteenth century some Portuguese navigators, who never embarked -without providing themselves with talisman and amulet,--to protect -them during their voyages,--which they called _feitiços_, seeing -some negroes of the Gold Coast prostrating themselves with every -appearance of reverence, before bones, stones, or the tails of some -animals, concluded at once without further investigation that these -were considered as divinities by the negroes; and on their return to -their native land, they spread the report that savage races worshipped -_feitiços_. This word _feitiços_ corresponds to the Latin _factitius_, -meaning that which is made by hand, as the amulets were which belonged -to the Portuguese sailors. The well-known President de Brosses used the -name and promulgated the idea, and without having set foot on countries -inhabited by negroes, composed and published a book on their fetishes. -In this manner the French language was enriched in 1760 by the new -word fetish. All this seemed so natural and plausible that the word, -and the idea of the adoration of fetishes became quite general; the -theory of the worship of fetishes penetrated rapidly, and took deep -root in the public mind, it found its way very readily into school -books and manuals, and we were taught that the religion of savages -consists solely in the worship of fetishes, and learned writers draw -the conclusion that fetishism must necessarily have been the primitive -religion of humanity. - -With what readiness do well-instructed persons, no less than the -ignorant, allow themselves to speak without sufficiently reflecting -on what they say. In order to elevate material objects, of whatever -kind, to the rank of divinities, it would be necessary previously to -possess the concept of a divinity. Writers on religion speak of that as -existing in primitive times which they seek to describe; they might -as well say that primitive men mummified their dead before they had -_mûm_ or wax to embalm them with. Fetishism cannot be considered as -absolutely primitive, seeing that from its nature it must presuppose -the previous growth of the predicate God. This idea of De Brosses and -his successors will remain for ever a striking anachronism in the -history of religion. - -The history of all primitive races opens with this note. “Man is -conscious of a divine descent, though made from the dust of the earth; -the Hindoo doubted it not, though he called Dyn his father, and Prithvi -his mother; Plato knew it when he said the earth produced men, but that -God formed them.” - -On the banks of the Rhine, Tacitus listened to the war-songs of the -Germans; they were to him in an unknown tongue. “It resembles the -whisperings of birds,” he said, but added, “They are cries of valour,” -and his ear caught the sound of two words which recurred frequently, -“Tuisto Mannus!” - -We now know what formed the basis of these songs; the Germans were -celebrating their lineal ancestors under the names of Tuisto, and -Mannus, his son. Tuisto appears to have been one form of Tiu, the -Aryan god of light. Tacitus tells us that the Germans “called by the -names of gods that hidden thing which they did not perceive except by -reverence.”[62] Mannus, so the Germans considered, sprang from the -earth, which they venerated as their mother-earth who before nourishing -her children on its fruits first gave them life. This Mannus, grandson -of the god of light, meant originally man. - -Certain races living beyond the pale of organised religious systems -having been interrogated have furnished the following information -concerning their belief. - -A very low race in India is supposed to worship the sun under the name -of Chando or Cando; they declared to the missionaries who had settled -amongst them that Chando had created the world. “How is that possible! -Who then has created the sun itself?” They replied with “We do not mean -the visible Chando, but an invisible one.”[63] - -“Our god,” said the original natives of California to those who asked -in what god they believed, “our god has neither father nor mother, and -his origin is quite unknown. But he is present everywhere, he sees -everything even at midnight, though himself invisible to human eyes. He -is the friend of all good people, and he punishes the evil-doers.” - -A Blackfoot Indian, when arguing with a Christian missionary, said: -“There were two religions given by the Great Spirit, one in a book for -the guidance of the white men, who, by following its teaching, will -reach the white man’s heaven; the other is in the heads of the Indians, -in the sky, rocks, rivers and mountains. And the red men who listen to -God in nature, will hear his voice, and find at last the heaven beyond.” - -These Indians consider that that external nature which to us is at the -same time the veil and the revelation of the Divine, is sufficient to -teach them so much concerning the Supreme Being that missionaries are -superfluous. - -Amongst those whose thoughts are occupied by the origin of religious -perception in man, there exist several theories; the first, that -the idea of infinity is a necessity to the mind of man, and that by -enlarging the boundaries of space and of time, it arrives at that -which is without space and without time. Thus may a true philosopher -reason; but primitive man was no philosopher, and the infinite of -philosophy had no existence for him. Another theory is that man is -naturally endowed with religious instincts, which render him--alone -of all living creatures--capable of perceiving the infinite in the -invisible; but the nature of this innate instinct not being clearly -defined, it is in vain that we try to explain one mystery by another. -Others again affirm that religious impressions were the result of a -supernatural revelation, but they seem vague with regard to the time in -the life of humanity, to which people, and in what manner this came to -pass. At the same time they draw attention to the fact that men have -always arrived at conclusions rapidly, and, as they consider, without -due reflection; one of these conclusions is that _God is_. Let us, for -the sake of argument, replace the word _man_ by the word _intuitive -sense_ or apprehension, and we shall understand why this intuitive -sense renders it a superfluous task to make great researches as to the -reasons of man’s decision that _God is_. This intuitive sense is wise, -and utters at times great truths; but the philosophers who consider it -their metier to seek for the reason of things are not content with what -satisfies intuitive sense, and they act on their right. - -In our days the religious problem is viewed from two sides. What -is understood by these words--the conception of God? This is the -question of questions; and the names of the writers on the subject, -both philosophical and theological, are too numerous to give. It is a -psychological and thought impelling study. - -How did the idea of God first arise in the minds of primitive man? This -is another question which few try and answer. It is a historical study. - -This presentation of the problem is perhaps not calculated to inspire -excitement or let loose agitating passions; and apparently the -end of the nineteenth century will not witness the renewal of the -philosophical debates on the subject which characterised the last half -of the eighteenth. - -Never either, before or since, has there been so much agitation, nor -have men’s minds been so tossed by diverse currents. Many various -theories were promulgated at the time, but opinions grouped themselves -chiefly round two diametrically opposite schools of thought, towards -one or the other of which they leaned. - -According to Hume, Condillac and their adherents, matter alone exists; -our understanding, our feelings, our will are only transformed -sensations. This was pure materialism. Pure idealism was represented by -Berkeley, who went so far as to deny the reality of matter; according -to him the bodies making up the universe have no real existence; the -true realities were God and the ideas He produced in us. - -Those who preserved their ancient beliefs were the most troubled, they -began to ask themselves whether the foundations of their faith were -solid, and they much desired to see certain problems solved. These -thoughts had exercised the minds of the sages of India, the thinkers of -Greece, the dreamers of Alexandria, and the divines and scholars of the -Middle Ages. They were the old problems of the world, what we know of -the Infinite, the questions of the beginning and end of our existence; -the questions of the possibility of absolute certainty in the evidence -of the senses, of reason or of faith. - -How much was comprehended in these enquiries. - -One hundred years previously, the cautious reasoner, Descartes, instead -of asking “What do we know?” posed in its place the question, “How do -we know?” - -This was in fact a fundamental question which appealed to philosophers -who followed Descartes, as of the utmost importance, and they also -asked themselves, “After what manner does the human mind acquire what -it knows?” - -What is called Locke’s tenet, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante -fuerit in sensu,” Leibnitz answered by “Nihil--nisi intellectus.” Noiré -gives this sentiment a fresh turn by saying: “There is nothing in this -plant that was not already in the soil, the water and the atmosphere, -but that which causes this plant to be a plant.” - -Condillac, who agreed with Locke, thus formulated his opinion: “Penser -c’est sentir”; or, “In order to feel it is necessary to possess -senses,” which is self-evident. - -Nevertheless, this sentence scandalised some of the philosophers, they -considered it degraded thought. It degraded thought only in Condillac’s -mouth, since he and his school had previously taken out of _sentir_ or -sensation all that possessed the right to be called thought; but for -those who admit that sensation is really impregnated with thought it is -no degradation; it is then true to say that thought is sensation, in -the same way as an oak-tree may be said to be the acorn; and a little -reflection will show us that “the acorn is far more wonderful than -the oak, and perceiving far more wonderful than thinking.” This was -not acknowledged by some who disagreed as to the nature of reason and -sensation; they considered the former a mysterious power that could -only be a direct gift of the Creator, and the senses, to which we owe -our perceptions, appeared so natural and simple, as not to require a -scientific explanation. - -If philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibnitz, succeeded in -influencing certain enlightened spirits, their language was not -understood by the general public; and Berkeley’s idealism when pushed -to the extreme point, proved too abstract to counterbalance the -sensualist doctrines; its language hardly penetrated beyond the inner -circle of the experts dealing with the subject, whereas the writings of -Locke, Condillac and Hume permeated all classes of society; everywhere -the same questions were asked, and often unanswered amidst the maze of -metaphysics, in which it would have been difficult to obtain a precise -explanation of a science not yet clearly defined. - -It is natural that reason after its high flight in pursuit of -truth, frightened by the obstacles met in its ascent, and by the -contradictions found in itself, should fall heavily to earth, -exclaiming with Voltaire, “O metaphysics, we are as advanced as in the -times of the Druids.” This same feeling of distrust towards proceedings -which resulted only in hypothesis, was also expressed by Newton, who, -recognising that philosophy moved nowhere so freely nor with such -certainty as in the domain of facts, recently cried, “O physics, -preserve me from metaphysics.” - -“Towards the end of the eighteenth century the current public opinion -had been decidedly in favour of materialism, but a reaction was slowly -setting in in the minds of independent thinkers when Kant appeared”; he -came so exactly in the nick of time that one almost doubts whether the -tide was turning, or whether he turned the tide. - -To sketch briefly the chief points in Kant’s system such as he has -given us in his book called _Critique of Pure Reason_, is a rash -proceeding; my object, which is to satisfy the imperious and more -immediate wants of our moral being, could only be attained by ignoring -the irradicable difficulties; this is excusable if we, unlearned -members of society, are to form any idea of this same philosophy. - -The technical terms which abound in philosophical works are useful in -the exposition of a system, but rather the reverse for those who are -striving to grasp its salient features; for understanding these terms -partially only, or not understanding them at all, they are tempted to -imagine that they take in the meaning; this leads to vague notions -being entertained on a subject which is nevertheless earnestly studied. -Generally I abstain from the use of esoteric terms, but Kant having -coined fresh ones to express his ideas it behoves us to use his own -formula. To paraphrase them so as to render them intelligible without -multiplying them might only further obscure the sense, and yet, on the -other hand, to enter freely into further developments would require a -volume, and the end would be better served by going direct to Kant’s -work. Hence the embarrassment I feel on approaching the subject. - - -KANT’S TEACHING. - -Kant undertook a work which no one before him had attempted. -Instead of criticising, as was then the fashion, the result of our -knowledge, whether in religion or in history, or science, he shut -his eyes resolutely to all that philosophy, whether sensualistic or -spiritualistic asserted as true, and making Descartes his starting -point he boldly went to the root of the matter; he questioned whether -human reason had the power of perceiving the truth, and in cases where -this power existed--but with limits--he sought to discover why these -limits existed. He therefore resolved to subject reason itself to his -searching analysis, and thus to assist, as it were, at the birth of -thought. He accomplished this extraordinary task with an ease of which -no one previously would have been capable. - -The world is governed by immutable laws, and the human race is subject -to them. Kant gives an account of those which it must necessarily obey -in order to pass from a passive “mirror” into a conscious mind. - - -SENSATION. - -In any material object I may seek to obtain, such as a table, my -interests are concentrated in the table itself, not on the tools which -the workman has used in its manufacture; but if it were a question of -thought, then the means by which it was produced by the human mind -engage us; and these means, of course, consist in the proper use of the -instruments at man’s disposal. - -That which was at the origin of mankind is repeated at the birth of -every human being; he comes into the world in a lethargic condition, -but endowed with latent instincts which we name in one word, sense; -common to man and to animals, it places them in relationship with the -things exterior to themselves; this sense, or capability of sensation, -is merely the general faculty of feeling. No newly-born child would -emerge from its torpor if it were not surrounded by material objects -which affirm their presence by reacting on him; his first act, at the -moment when he perceives his surroundings is the transference of his -own mind, until now isolated in itself alone, towards the objects which -solicit his attention. - -The sense which operates in each child is inward, we name it -briefly--sensation--to distinguish it from the five external senses, -which are more familiar to us, since even at school their functions and -modes of action have been explained to us. - -For instance, we know that it is only necessary to touch the strings of -an instrument to cause them to vibrate, the vibrations are communicated -to the air, and are then called waves of sound; they diffuse themselves -with an incredible swiftness in space, advancing and retreating in the -manner of the waves of the sea, they reach our ears, touch the auditory -nerve, cause the tympanum to vibrate, penetrate to the brain, and give -us instantaneously the sensation of sound. And it is to the waves of -light passing through the ether, and communicating with the optic -nerve of the organ of sight, that we owe the sensation of sight of the -objects before us. - -The vacant look of a newly-born infant, implies that it has undergone -an experience, it has felt something of the nature of a shock; a shock -always implies resistance and yielding. In the child it is the human -eye becoming conscious of itself amidst the impressions produced on -it by the confused sight of external objects, and hearing the noises -which occur around him. This instance is analogous to the vibratory -movement of the waves described and even drawn in all manuals on -physics. - -It is strange that a natural phenomenon which learned men have taken -some trouble to analyse, should find expression in the following -commonplace phrase. “From the clash of opinions light is generated.” If -this phrase were not only on our lips, but also implanted in our mind, -we should more readily have grasped the physiological fact of sensation. - -Sensation plays such an important part in the world of humanity, that -all the sciences, both physical and moral, deal with it; but we, who -grumble so readily and continuously at feeling either too hot or too -cold, probably never enquire what philosophy has to do with purely -bodily impressions. - -Sensations come to us from without, but they would leave us in a -condition of perturbation only, if whilst receiving them we were -passive as a mirror on which external objects are reflected; we might -have continued to sleep--perchance to dream--if a mental act on our -part did not mark the awakening of our intelligence when in contact -with the material world, and thus have proved the existence of a power -within us hitherto latent, but quite capable of accepting, knowing, and -realising sensations which come to us without having been summoned. - -We are nearing the solution of the problem. Descartes had asked: How -we know. Kant had clearly explained that all our knowledge has its -commencement in our senses, which give us pure intuitions, that is to -say, a clear direct view of external objects, and he also proved that -intelligence would not have been aroused without the aid of material -objects. But still greater discoveries awaited Kant. - -We feel that nothing in ourselves is so free as thought. It comprehends -the whole world, it mounts to the stars, it descends to the bowels of -the earth, arrested perhaps in its path by special objects on which it -dwells at will; but although free to encircle the universe, it may not -choose its path, thought is obliged--like the sun--to follow one which -has been previously traced out for it; of this we can readily convince -ourselves. - - -SPACE AND TIME. - -All objects of which we become conscious must be placed by us in the -imagination side by side in space, and at a distance from ourselves, -here or there; as being now present, or as having been, or about to -be; but always in succession, _i.e._, in time, time past, present and -future. - -According to Kant, Space and Time are two fundamental or inevitable -conditions of all sensuous manifestations, and he was the first to -observe that they are imposed by so absolute a power that no effort, on -our part, would enable us to escape from them, any more than we could -avoid seeing the light of day at noon, unless we are either blind or -have our eyes shut. - -We must make it clear that what we call Space and Time, being forms of -our sensuous intuition, do not exist apart from ourselves, or, as Max -Müller says, “depend on us as recipients, as perceivers.” It is we who -say there can be no _Here_ without a _There_, and no _Now_ without a -_Then_; and this is necessary, since we are dependent on the mould of -our minds, which work in accordance with their constitutions. - - -PHENOMENA. - -When opening a dictionary at the letters P. H. E. we should soon arrive -at the word Phenomenon and its meaning: whatever is presented to the -senses, or affects us physically or morally. - -As long as knowledge comes to us only by the way of our senses, it -follows that in speaking of affinity, electricity and magnetism as -natural phenomena, which are known to us only by their effect on Space -and Time, we speak in accordance with our method of representation, and -not as they are _in themselves_, since we have not the least idea what -these natural forces are _in themselves_. We recognise musical sounds -because our ears hear them, and we appreciate colours because our eyes -see them; we take cognisance of them as they appear to us, but we are -ignorant of both the one and the other as they are in actuality, that -is independently of our organs which correspond to them. Thus all the -objects that we know--from the manner of our knowledge--become for us -phenomena, and the world in which we live is a world of phenomena. - - -THE CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING. - -Besides these fundamental forms of sensuous intuition Space and Time, -Kant by his analysis of Pure Reason discovered other conditions of our -knowledge which could not have come from without. He divides them into -twelve distinct classes, and in the phraseology of philosophy they -are called Categories of the Understanding. Aristotle had previously -arranged a table of Categories, but in his Logic Aristotle concerns -himself with the laws of thought in general, the abstraction derived -from the practical use made of them; whilst Kant studies the facts -first themselves, or first principles, in their relation with certain -fixed objects. - -The different categories have certain traits in common, not a single -one of our thoughts but will find a place in the one or the other. -Another feature which characterises all is, that without them no -experience would be possible, they rule our understanding. This is -very marked in the category called Plurality. Let us try to think -of anything without thinking of it at the same time as one or many, -and we shall find it an impossibility. We cannot think of an apple or -speak of an apple without picturing more than one; and Max Müller has -demonstrated that rational speech is impossible, if we cannot when -speaking decide whether the subject of a sentence consists of one or -many. - - -CAUSE AND EFFECT. - -The ideas of _Cause_ and _Effect_ belong to those first principles -that reason draws from itself, and the category of causality is one -of the most important. We never experience a sensation, of whatever -kind, without attaching it, involuntarily and necessarily, to some -external object which we know possesses the qualities corresponding to -our sensations. Thus the impressions of heat or cold, sweet or bitter, -blue or yellow, evoke immediately the picture of certain objects which -are hot or cold, such as fire or ice; or which are sweet or bitter, -such as sugar or absinth; or blue, as the sky; or yellow, as the lemon; -and these external objects we consider as the causes, and our bodily -sensations as the effects. - - -AXIOMS. - -There are certain universal truths which are self-evident, and were -evolved not by experience only or argument, nor science, as they are -the natural appanage of common-sense, _e.g._, such axioms as the -following: the whole is greater than the part; a straight line is the -shortest distance between two points; each body occupies space; every -event occupies time; every effect has a cause. All these are more -certain than that the sun will rise to-morrow; common-sense has always -known them, and the entire human race has not waited for the coming of -Kant to recognise these facts. - -It is strange that the majority of men who know so many things that are -true by intuition, often make mistakes when they begin to reflect. They -imagine that all things falling under their observation have the power -of making themselves known directly, as if they entered an empty space -in the imagination which was ready to receive them. Are they ignorant -of the fact that in order to think of an external object, it is not -necessary to have it in actuality--as it exists in nature--before one’s -eyes, but that it suffices to imprint its image on the mind? This is -very simple, and no doubt common-sense itself would see a truism which -might be passed in silence. “What is there extraordinary,” common-sense -might say, “if in thinking of a lemon, for instance, there should be at -once presented to the mind a yellow fruit, of acid flavour, and of a -certain shape--a lemon in fact?” - -This remark is useful only in showing our natural incapacity for -experiencing a sensation, of whatever kind, without connecting it -with an external object possessing corresponding attributes to the -sensation, and which was its cause. - -In any case the truism is not to be ignored, since Aristotle, great -philosopher as he was, did not consider it beneath his dignity to -employ it. He said: “I think of a stone; the stone is not in my mind, -but its form is.” - -To prove to common-sense that its remark has no connection with -the thesis recently laid down, would serve no good purpose. A -personal mental act, if it be lawful to personate a quality, would -alone convince common-sense of its error; but when once convinced -common-sense would then have changed to something higher than it had -previously been. It will have mounted up one stage towards reason, and -in following this route under the guidance of increasing reason, it -will end by understanding this truth as demonstrated by Kant: he who -cannot distinguish a real object from its representation will never -understand the working of the human mind. - -The importance of this truth must excuse my digression. - - -METAPHYSICS. - -The name of Kant will always be intimately connected with the word -metaphysics, not because he buried himself in it, as some have supposed -who only know his system of philosophy by hearsay; but because his -labours consisted in forbidding reason to approach this science which -is constantly threatening to invade it, and to get the upper hand by -putting itself in its place. - -Kant was the first to trace with decision the line of demarcation -between the knowledge of which our reason is capable, and that of -which it is incapable. No one has drawn so sharp a line between the -knowable and the unknowable; this was to explain metaphysics. Alfred -Fouillée has defined them as “the critical study of problems which the -mind seeks to unravel from a necessity of its nature, although another -necessity of its nature renders it incapable of solving them”--such is -metaphysics. - -This definition is excellent, but for those who make no preparatory -studies in philosophy it would present itself rather in this form. If -certain questions are of necessity presented to the mind which it finds -it impossible to solve, it follows that the mind would necessarily -contradict itself. Thus this succinct definition of Fouillée requires -to be itself defined. - -Noiré, whilst giving more details, is also more exact. “Metaphysics -is only explained on the condition that we understand the nature -of our power of understanding, in so far as, on the one part, this -power is actively manifested in experience, and secondly, in so -far as it possesses anteriorly to any experience, and to anything -observed, certain ideas without which there could not possibly or even -conceivably, be any impression made in the human mind.” I am afraid -that this explanation of Noiré will also be lost upon those who are not -experienced in the subject. - -The explanation of Schopenhauer is not less definite, and is more -concise than the two preceding. The foundation upon which all our -knowledge and all our science rests, is the incomprehensible--I fancy -that the uninitiated will be equally unable to understand this. - -It is not surprising. Philosophers speak a language of their own, which -must be learnt before it can be understood, which is the case with all -languages. - -Kant develops this thesis with greater simplicity and clearness. “As -long as the human intellect moves in the sphere of the senses and of -experience it is safe; this sphere is very vast; it is there that all -phenomena may be known which appears in space and time, that is to say, -all belonging to the phenomenal world in which we live. But if the -intellect rebels against the gaoler which holds it captive in the magic -circle, breaks its chains and enters into the region of ideals, it will -err.” - -Kant relates the following anecdote: “A dove, which found great -pleasure in spreading its wings, was troubled because this pleasure -was of short duration; the simple bird was ignorant of the fact that -its structure did not admit of its taking flights such as the swallow -enjoys; not divining the real cause of its inability, it blamed the -fluid ether whose resisting power it had felt, and thought how much -better it would fly ‘in vacuo.’” The dove was mistaken. - -Kant’s crowning merit is having discovered the object of metaphysics -not only in the categories of the understanding, without which, as -Noiré says, no impression on the human mind would be possible, or even -conceivable, but chiefly in the power, inherent in our nature, of -resisting or yielding to impressions. It is this power, according to -Kant, which constitutes the transcendental side of our knowledge. - -The empirical school of philosophers is tried by Kant’s recognition -of the transcendental principle in man. Its members accuse the -spiritualists of seeking to raise human nature beyond its proper level, -and of wishing at the same time to open an inlet for other truths which -claim a mysterious character and a superhuman authority. But Kant is -the very last person to encourage the thought; on the contrary, through -the whole of his philosophy he insists that these _à priori_ forms, or -antecedent conditions of knowledge, have no authority whatever “except -in and for experience,” and to use the category of causality, for -instance, in order to establish the existence of God is, according to -Kant, a philosophical blunder. - -“If only we could always remember the first intentions of our words, -many philosophical difficulties would vanish.” In Greek οἰδα meant -originally, I have seen, and therefore I know. In a court of justice -the witness who says, “I saw” can hardly say anything more convincing. -To apply such a word to our knowledge of causes, forces, and faculties -would be a solecism--to apply it to God would be self-contradictory. - -Each of the abstract definitions of metaphysics given by Alfred -Fouillée, Noiré, and Schopenhauer contains the leading conception of -the subject; if presented in more simple language it would be within -the comprehension of all; our understanding is blind to all with which -it is not made acquainted by intuition derived from experience. Those -things for which we have a strong desire, of which we have a certain -conviction, but which are outside the sphere of our actual life, -“for these,” as Max Müller says in this connection, “we want another -word which should mean--I have not seen and yet I know, and that -is--faith.”[64] Our senses may not always authorise us to affirm their -reality. God and the future life are not made the subjects of phenomena. - -All that I have said as to what distinguishes knowledge acquired by -the senses from that which is anterior to all experience (Kant was the -first to make this distinction), might seem simple to those heedless -minds which are surprised at nothing, but complicated and confused -to minds however little attentive, and quite useless to the rest of -us. There may be something of truth in each of these primitive and -superficial estimations, but the whole truth is that all this is very -scientific, so scientific as to require a Kant to enable those who -reflect to give a lucid account of it. - -It was by the help of this learned science that Kant broke the serried -ranks of his antagonists. Confronted by two philosophical opinions, -both of which he considered erroneous, he proved to the materialists -Condillac, Hume, and Locke, that there is something within us which -could never have been supplied from without, which therefore belongs to -our ego, that is to say to the subject thinking and not to the object -thought of, or matter; then turning against the Idealists of the time -of Berkeley, he shows that there is something without us which could -never have been supplied from within; and when he proved that intellect -and matter are correlative, that they exist for each other, depend on -each other, form together a whole that should never have been torn -asunder, two streams of philosophic thought, which had been running in -separate beds, met for the first time. - -The existence of the phenomenal world being proved by the irrefragable -testimony of the senses, is admitted also by reason, and, as a -necessary consequence, another, not only in appearance, but which _will -be_, assuredly; as sound is independent of our hearing, as material -objects are independent of our sight; for though Kant declares our -inability to know objects as they are in themselves, he does not -deny their existence, since he says, “We should be capable, if not -of knowing things as they are in themselves, at least of knowing -them as they are to us, otherwise we should arrive at the irrational -conclusion, that there may be appearances without something that -appears.” - -Kant undertook to make an exact science of the necessary and universal -ideas of the human mind, such as logic and mathematics, which are parts -of human knowledge; to this end he wrote _Critique of Pure Reason_, -afterwards he composed another work, the _Critique of Practical -Reason_. Practical reason may also be called pure, in as much as it -does not allow itself to be influenced by anything but what proceeds -from itself, and reason becomes practical when it seeks an independent -principle which determines the will. This principle is formulated by -Kant in the following terms: “Let each individual follow commands which -may be considered as a universal law imposed alike on all human beings.” - -This law, which man possesses in his conscience, does not stop half way -in its exactions from man since it aims at perfection, it commands man -to love his neighbour, and to do good even to his enemy. To love and to -do acts of kindness when pleasant to oneself is natural, and requires -no command, but, otherwise, a law is required to coerce the will, the -man who submits is free, since he can choose to infringe or to obey it; -obedience to the moral law constitutes duty, which must be accomplished -because it is our duty, and embodies the satisfaction felt in its -performance. - -Man is under an obligation to be moral and to do his duty, but not -necessarily to be happy, yet he demands happiness. The union of virtue -and happiness being the _summum bonum_, we must acknowledge the -existence of a power external to ourselves, endowed with intellect -and will, which makes this union possible; this power is known to us -by the name of God. The perfect good is holiness; this life is too -short to enable us to attain to it in its perfection, it is therefore -a necessity that our life should be prolonged beyond the term of years -spent on this earth, thus we are assured of the survival of the soul -after what we term death. - -Thus Kant speaks in his _Critique of Practical Reason_. - -I may now be permitted to speak and give my own opinion. I hear the -Positivist perhaps say: “This result might be considered conceivable -if all that has been previously said were true; but to infer from the -desire for happiness that a supernatural power must infallibly satisfy -it might be a hallucination, or at least a hypothesis.” If this were -so we need not deride hypotheses; in the domain of human knowledge -reason would not be itself if it never made ventures in scientific -discoveries; its path starts from the possible in making excursions -from the known to the unknown, in going from darkness to light--hence -then hypothesis. - -There is also this fact to notice, some of the most important of our -acts are not guided by reason, it acts as a spectator; for instance, -reason is not active when we have perception of an object, and -intuitions occur in us without the intervention of reason. - -This was well understood by certain men who have come forward from time -to time from the multitude, the bearers of inspired messages to the -world; they have spoken of those things which “eye hath not seen nor -ear heard,” and they were hard to be understood of the people; but each -one alike said: “I give no proof of the truth of what I assert; do as I -say, and you will know the truth of my words.” - -There remains little more to be said on the subject of Kant. There is -a serious omission in the system of this profound thinker. - -Nothing has so stopped the progress of Darwin’s great conception as -the injudicious efforts of his so-called disciples to bring it to -perfection. Instead of correcting their chief, they should have weighed -thoughtfully all Kant’s arguments against the materialism of his -adversaries, and have sought to refute them; if they had succeeded in -proving that Kant makes a mistake when he admits that there is in man a -principle quite distinct from his body, they would have been authorised -in replacing Darwin’s theory by their own; if they had not succeeded, -Darwin and his theory would have remained unshaken, but they would be -annihilated. - -Max Müller examines the question from another point of view. “We admit -that as we know nothing, except by analogy, of the mind of animals, -we could not with the weapons that Kant has placed in our hands, make -head against the assertion that they might possess, for all we know, -the same forms of sensuous intuition and the same categories of the -understanding which we possess. Nothing, therefore, could have been -said from a purely philosophical point of view, against treating man -as a mere variety of some other genus of animals.”[65] But as the -origin of language was to Kant less than a secondary question--it -might almost be said to have no existence for him--it belongs to the -science of language to show, what Kant had never shown, that for all -human knowledge not only were percepts and concepts necessary, but also -names. How was it that it did not occur to Kant since he perceived that -there were mathematics of the forms or manifestations of sensation, -namely, time or duration and space? He said well: Each object of which -we think is attached in time or space to another; this can only be done -by the use of such indications as _now_, _then_, _here_, _there_; and -he saw in this gradation of perception, the first step towards the act -of counting, that is to say of reasoning, and consequently of speaking; -all of which was comprehended by the Greeks in their word Logos. As -an instance the word _cent_ exists in every language, but _cent_ in -French consists only of four letters placed side by side one after the -other, and would never be anything else to us if we could not count; -but to count is to add and to take away, that is to say, addition and -subtraction, thus to conceive and name; in order to possess a hundred -objects, it does not suffice to see them only, it is necessary to count -them up to the hundred. - -These two works of Kant’s, the _Critique of Pure Reason_ and the -_Critique of Practical Reason_ appear to emanate from two different -pens; in the first, whatever is asserted is proved. The second work is -dictated by a personal experience; Kant affirms that thus it is and -that it cannot be otherwise. But here again I perceive a lack, a want, -if not from the believer’s point of view, yet from that of those people -who ask what could be the religion of our primitive ancestors; personal -experience is not expressed as Kant expresses it, unless it is the -result of a long series of meditations and examinations of conscience; -in a word, experiences which have been transmitted from generation to -generation. This is a religion that has achieved much, it is not that -form of it which would be found amongst the generality of men, and -still less would it spring to life in the heart of primitive man. - -But here are two positivist philosophers who undertake to solve this -great problem: they consider reason as ready with a reply to those who -seek to know the meaning of God and of religion, two concepts which -are inseparable, the one from the other; and even ready to explain how -these two concepts have penetrated into the consciousness of all human -beings. These philosophers speak no doubt from experience, for having -questioned their reason it has replied to them: God and religion form -one conception. - -The first explanation is--man is conscious of his condition; he is -possessed with the desire of happiness, and is unable to realise it; -but his imagination represents to him another state in which the desire -of happiness will exist and in which there will be no obstacle to its -realisation; the first of these states is real, the other visible to -the mind’s eye; they are therefore not identical; to will and not to -have the power is to be man; to will and to be omnipotent is to be God. -Little by little man understands that these two states of conditions -having been conceived by the same mind, have the same origin; the -notion fixes itself firmly in his mind that the two states seem -gradually to approach each other, and are not always distinguishable; -the union of desire and power is the Divine essence; the growing -consciousness of this union is religion, which dawns and increases in -man. - -Man does not desire immortality because he believes in it, nor because -it is demonstrable; but he believes in it and demonstrates its -existence because he desires it. The sentence, “God sees all,” does not -mean, so we are told, what it appears to mean; it expresses the feeling -God knows all of which man is ignorant, but which he fain would know; -and the sentence, “God is beneficence,” is the cry of man who desires -happiness. All the predicates applied by man to the Deity in the course -of history and humanity have never, in the opinion of philosophers, had -any other origin than the representation of our wishes. - -But the inner combat, which has been long and unhappy, with no truce, -has exhausted man’s powers, and when the despondency checks, and at -times almost paralyses his flight after happiness, the instinct of -self-preservation leads him towards religion; as this instinct with the -incapacity of satisfying it is inseparable in man, motives of religion -are renewed continually in each individual and consequently in the -multitude. - -God and religion, _i.e._ the outward sign of our union with God, -yet emanates from ourselves. This system, of which Feuerbach is the -exponent, has many followers amongst the Positivists. - -The second explanation comes from a learned member of the extreme -Positivist school in Germany; but, as Max Müller says, it would -be impossible to represent religion in a worse light ... “and it -would be difficult to take a lower view of it.”[66] According to Dr -Gruppe, religion exists simply because it satisfies certain selfish -instincts of man. He notices two. The first instinct is common to all -organic beings; it tends towards the preservation of the individual, -and consequently to that of the race; it is elementary, and acts -from within outwards. The second instinct belongs only to man taken -collectively, and has vitality only in numbers; it belongs to a more -advanced stage, and acts from without inwardly. Man instinctively -grasps the greatest amount of happiness possible; he therefore seeks -that which he considers his greatest good, not after the fashion of the -beasts, but in his own way. - -“We call religious belief,” says Dr Gruppe, “a belief in an indefinable -state or being which we strive to bring into our sphere, and to render -permanent by means of sacrificial ceremonies, prayers, penances, and -self-denial.”[67] - -This indefinable something, the professor considers, would never -have appeared in the world without an impulsion, however light; an -accidental movement, a casual combination of a disordered brain, and -a personality endowed with a certain amount of energy, would have -sufficed to make a single individual the author of an idea totally -opposed to man’s good possession common sense, and the originator of -a movement which must find in the surroundings in which it came to -life, all facilities for its indefinite perpetuation. It is of no -consequence whether this mental phenomenon has been produced in one -individual or in more; figures are of little account in the matter. -If this disease called hallucination[68] had remained confined in the -circumscribed sphere of one individual or a few, a personal intelligent -effort might have overcome it, but being contagious and spreading -amongst the people it became impossible to conquer it. The natural laws -of reason once violated, the perturbed mind created a succession of -sophistical arguments which appeared to satisfy the ineradicable desire -for happiness in man; and an incredibly tenacious opposition on the -side of error assumed menacing proportions. If the belief that the sun, -instead of disappearing each night below the horizon, would continue to -shine during the night could in any way contribute to the happiness of -mankind, men would slowly but surely have accepted it. - -The man who isolates himself from his fellow men and becomes -self-absorbed is peculiarly apt to create for himself mental pictures -which give him pleasure; if, then, joy is indispensable to man’s -existence, the religion which gives it, or the illusion of it, enables -him to forget the tangible world, and substitute an imaginary one -peopled with phantoms. But the solitary man is a rare phenomenon, and -we judge favourably those men who live in the midst of their social -surroundings, and whose community of ideas and sentiments has made a -homogeneous whole, during many centuries. Each one will find means -to develop his personal faculties, and to strengthen his power of -resistance in the struggle of all against all, and the good which is -illusive in the solitary man becomes a benefit to the members of the -society. - -Religion might possibly cease to exist, in Gruppe’s opinion, were it -not for the inequalities of man’s condition, and for the troubles which -follow him; but the action of religion is helpful to society.[69] It -tells the poor not to hanker after riches which are not lasting. It -mirrors for them images of future compensations, thus the rich and the -noble here are enabled to enjoy their pleasures on earth in safety. In -its name bright hopes are built up for the wretched, and it takes its -stand in front of the palaces of the rich; sedatives are prescribed -for incurables, and rich foods for those who can pay for them. Charity -is preached to the compassionate, and persecutions to the fanatics: at -times it encourages the use of arts and sciences; at times it warns -its followers not to love overmuch the beautiful in art, nor to seek -too earnestly the truth in science. But the outcome of this religion, -whether good or the reverse, is of small importance compared with the -benefits it renders to society. It is the support of the civil and -moral law, and in lighting the hymeneal torch it adds to the sanctity -of families. - -Without attributing selfish motives, in the lowest sense, to the -founders of the various religions and sects which flourish in our -midst, Gruppe considers all of them unconscious egoists; he thinks that -had they been calm psychologists, which sincere prophets are not, they -would have recognised in themselves the attraction that glory had for -them; but in that case they would not have remained faithful unto the -death, and the power of communicating their own spirit and force to -their adherents would have failed them. Gruppe distinguishes with great -keenness the reflex action of our desire for happiness, which is no -other than the instinct of self-preservation, from the motives which -are sufficient to inspire certain enthusiasts to found new religions; -these two things are in reality quite distinct, although they may act -in concert; the desire for universal and permanent happiness paves the -way for the manifestation of individual enthusiasm; he asserts that -religions, while professing to found a new kingdom of heaven, only -succeed in inheriting the kingdom of this world. - -The struggle between an extreme positivism and a true idealism is a -sight that energises earnest men. Evidently impressed by the exposition -of the spiritualist doctrine, the learned doctor remarks: “The first -perception of the infinite, of law and order in nature, communicated an -impulse to the mind of man; but this force, when once in movement, did -not slacken before having called forth in our ancestors the conviction -that all is right and good, and the hope--even more than hope--that -all would be right and good. Such is the celebrated system of Max -Müller. It is not only the great personal worth of the author that -obliges us to give it close consideration, but also the fact that this -system is the most eloquent exposition of an idea which has also been -expressed by other writers in some remarkable works on the history of -religions. The position in which Max Müller has placed himself for a -starting-point is, from a positivist point of view, impregnable.” - -This commendation, which is particularly striking, coming as it does -from one of Max Müller’s fiercest adversaries, I have quoted word for -word. - -Gruppe is not only a positivist philosopher, but also learned in -Eastern languages and literature, and a clever mythologist; it would -have been better had he confined himself to fields of labour with which -he was acquainted. But as he admits that there is psychological and -spontaneous thought in man, side by side with the rational, he cannot -but acknowledge the right of humanity to say what it thinks. There -are certain literary documents which show us what the human mind has -thought in all ages and in all places, and we are of opinion that these -sentiments have not varied. - -It is said that an universal belief in any fact is not a proof of -the existence of this fact, and that consequently the conception of -super-sensible things need have no real basis; the observation is -just; I shall reply to it by a question. Is it possible to demonstrate -that this belief in things that cannot be proved is not only universal -but even inevitable? If it were possible much would be gained. In -geometrical calculations it is sufficient to know that three dimensions -only exist,--at least in this world--that the straight line is the -shortest, that two parallel lines never meet; it should suffice to know -that in this world belief, whether rational or illusory, in one or more -divinities, is inevitable for men constituted as we are. - -Our first fathers no doubt pictured a large space situated on the -further side of all that they could see, and we know how their -imagination peopled it with confused images, either hidden, or seen in -the visible phenomena. - -These flights of fancy, which may have lasted thousands of centuries, -became crystallised at last in the mythologies of all peoples, and it -is these mythologies by which we gain access to this initial stage -in the life of humanity, and which preserves for us the traces of -this eternal truth amidst many extravagances of the fancy misled -by language, which guided their first steps. There is a petrified -philosophy in mythology. - -Since history and legend, in one form or another, have voiced the -feelings called religion, these feelings, variously interpreted, have -changed their aspect from age to age, and from country to country; as -long as we have not traced the stream to its source, the question, as -to the manner in which the conception of God had birth in the human -mind, will always be before us. - -We take man at the time when he had recently appeared on the earth, -his sole possession being his five senses, which place him in contact -with the external world. We must distinguish between two classes of -senses; those of touch, scent, and taste being more evident; from the -evolutionist’s point of view the sense of touch has the largest share -in the building up of the human edifice which arose later; its use -is chiefly connected with the hands, and has thus given us the word -_manifest_; that which we call certainty hardly exists for us apart -from what is manifest. The two other senses, sight and hearing, are -less sure, and have frequently to be verified by those first named. - -The objects of which we obtain knowledge by means of our senses can be -divided into tangible, semi-tangible and intangible. The first are, -for instance, a stone, a bone, a fruit, the skin of an animal, these -can be touched as it were all round, and we are able to assert their -reality. The second, the semi-tangible, might be a river, a mountain, -the earth, a tree. We stand by the banks of a river and dip our hand -in the small volume of water passing away before our eyes; we can also -touch the ground on which we are standing, also the trunk of the tree -beneath which we are sitting; but it is only an insignificant part of -which we assert the reality by touching it, all the other parts remain -unknown to us; for the river itself consists of a large mass of waters -springing from a source which is not seen and flowing towards a spot -which we may never see; we are told that the earth is in the shape of -a globe, and that this globe is suspended in air, which fact it would -be difficult to verify; the tree is small in comparison with the river -and the earth, and yet how little we know of it, whence come its buds, -and its leaves, and the sap which rises each spring in the branches? -We say of a beam that it is dead wood, but of the tree we say that it -grows and lives; what is this life of the tree? We are in the presence -of the unknown. These are samples of semi-tangible objects. The sense -of touch has no place with regard to the sky, the stars, the clouds, -the winds; those are intangible objects, which we see and feel without -knowing them by personal grasp; the proof of their existence is also -in the fact that years of work are required to know astronomy and -meteorology. - -We now have primitive man provided with fine senses, in presence of -these natural phenomena, and the problem to be solved is this: How is -it that this man is able to think and to speak of things which are not -finite, finite things being the only ones of which his senses make him -cognisant? - -“I have before me,” says Max Müller, “a school of philosophy adverse -to my views; I am warned that nothing I say will be accepted, unless -I submit to the conditions imposed on me. I am told: ‘You pretend -to prove that man can know that God exists; whereas we affirm that -the great triumph of our age is that we have proved that religion is -an illusion. All knowledge must pass through two gates, the gate of -the senses and the gate of reason, consequently religious knowledge -even can enter by no other gate.’ In this way does positivism bar -the entrance which Kant left open, who in his definition of religion -considered morality the basis of it, which with him presupposed the -existence of God. Positivism refuses to hear a psychological and -historical explanation of one of the greatest psychological and -religious facts--namely, religion; it stops its ears when we say _Nihil -est in fide quod non ante fuerit in sensu_; but we are not discouraged -by the absurdity of imagining that by shutting our eyes, we can -annihilate facts; we accept the struggle on the common ground on which -the positivist and we have decided to fight; we also agree to use the -weapons chosen for us. Let us inspect the battlefield and measure the -ground. Both sides seem in accord that all consciousness begins with -sensuous perception, with what we feel, and hear, and see; what is -likewise granted is that out of this we construct what may be called -conceptual knowledge, consisting of collective and abstract concepts. -The conditions of the combat are fixed; at the two gates of the senses -and reason we take our stand; whatever claims to have entered in by -any other gate, whether that gate be called primeval revelation, or -religious instinct,[70] must be rejected as contraband of thought; and -whatever claims to have entered in by the gate of reason without having -first passed through the gate of the senses, will equally be rejected, -as without sufficient warrant.”[71] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[62] Tac. Germ. 9. “Deorumque nominibus appellant secretum illud quod -sola reverentia vident,” from Max Müller’s _Origin and Growth of -Religion_, p. 94. - -[63] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 214. - -[64] _Science of Thought_, p. 609. - -[65] _Science of Thought_, p. 125. - -[66] _Natural Religion_, pp. 74, 77. - -[67] _Ibid._, p. 76. - -[68] It is not surprising that Max Müller says, “We are not likely -to allow ourselves to be persuaded by Dr Gruppe that the only source -of religion all over the world was hallucination.”--_Anthropological -Religion_, p. 126.--TRANSLATOR’S NOTE. - -[69] Max Müller remarks: “His (Dr Gruppe’s) definition of religion -is at all events too narrow; it might possibly be found to apply -to religion, not in its original, but in its most depraved -state.”--_Natural Religion_, p. 77.--TRANSLATOR’S NOTE. - -[70] _Natural Religion_, p. 194. - -[71] Max Müller does not exclude faith in making this statement, which -also occurs in his work _The Origin and Growth of Religion_, as on the -next page he says, “What we call sense, reason, and faith are three -functions of one and the same perceptive self.”--_Origin and Growth of -Religion_, p. 227. - - - - -CHAPTER X THE VEDIC HYMNS - - -It has been possible to ascertain that the first words pronounced by -the most ancient members of the Aryan family are connected by a thread -of continuity to those which we use to-day in all languages, whether -living or dead; our family would not be a portion of the entire human -race, if this continuity of thought did not form a constituent part -of the mental equipment of all the other families; but as no others -possess in an equal degree with ourselves the archives sufficiently -extensive to contain indication of the gradual development of human -speech, such as the Veda furnishes, that is the authority to which -Max Müller appeals in all his works. And it is precisely because -there has been no cessation in the continuity of human thought, that -the historical method is the only one capable of linking us with the -primitive Aryans; our work will consist in collecting tokens of the -long pilgrimage undertaken by our ancestors, and with which we desire -to be associated, and which those who come after us must also undertake. - -“No doubt, between the first daybreak of human thought and the first -hymns of praise of the Rig-Veda, composed in the most perfect metre and -the most polished language, there may be, nay, there must be a gap that -can only be measured by generations, by hundreds, aye, by thousands of -years.”[72] The exodus and separation of the Aryan family, belonging -as it does to a prehistoric epoch and therefore unchronicled, and the -Vedic Hymns--the work of many centuries--having been completed and -collected together some hundreds of years before our present era, thus -at a time relatively recent, that which constitutes their chief claim -to great antiquity in our eyes is that the Hindoo poets or rishis -incorporated certain thoughts and words in them whose roots threw out -shoots in the primitive Aryan soil before the dispersion of its members. - -The period of the life of humanity into which the hymns enable us to -penetrate, is the most ancient of which mention is made. The rishis -sing in Sanscrit of thoughts conceived in the hidden recesses of souls -before they awoke to the consciousness of that concept to which the -name of God alone can be applied, before these same people pictured in -their imagination those whom they named gods, before the appearance of -myths and mythological fables, and before the Sanscrit language existed. - -Our Aryan ancestors had not left the cradle of their race when their -language, whatever it may have been, possessed the root _dyu_ and -_div_, two cognate words meaning to shine. The Veda shows that many -things were bright to the Vedic poets, the heaven, dawn, the stars -and several other things, such as the rivers, spring, the fields, the -eyes of man, all that would have the effect on us of being smiling, -flourishing, and rejoicing in life; and from this root the word _deva_ -was formed. Neither in Greek nor in Latin, nor in any living language -can a word be found which exactly expresses _deva_; Greek dictionaries -translate it by Theos, in the same way as we translate Theos by God; -but if--dictionary in hand--we put the word God in certain passages in -the hymns where this word is found, we should sometimes commit a mental -anachronism of a thousand years. At the time of the first Aryans, gods, -in one sense of the word, did not exist; they were slowly struggling -into being; it was therefore impossible for man to form any conception -of them even in dreams. As this word _deva_ changes its signification -so frequently, not only in the most ancient Brahmanic poems, but also -in works of a later date, we can only obtain even an approximate idea -of its meaning by writing its history, beginning from its etymology and -ending with its latest definition; but it is not necessary to undertake -this philological labour, and I shall content myself by showing that -originally _deva_ denoted a quality common to many natural phenomena, -that of light, and therefore _deva_ was a general term. - -Man at first received this impression passively, as animals would, but -by his nature he could not rest there; all the phenomena surrounding -him were animated, the most marvellous and those of peculiar intensity -moved in the upper regions of the firmament; in the midst of these -general movements the mind of man could not alone be inactive, and -thought and speech--that is reason--inevitably vindicated their right -to activity; names were given to all things. The Aryan root _svar_ or -_sval_, which signified to shine, to sparkle, and to heat, produced a -Sanscrit substantive meaning sometimes sun and sometimes the sky. - -The Hindoo poets, the authors of these hymns, gave various names to the -sun, according to the task it accomplished; and each name reproduced -the salient feature of the task. The sun when rising was Mitra = -friend; as it advances on its journey, giving new life, it is Savitar -= bringing forth, or leading day; the vivifying sun; when it collects -the clouds and sends rain on the earth, it is Indra, from _ind-u_ = -drops; and it continues to be Indra when its rays attain their zenith -and reach their greatest splendour; for no plant flourishes without -the combined action of light and humidity; the sun is Vishnu when -it makes “its three strides” in the vault of heaven, its position -in the morning, at noon, and in the evening; it is Varuna--the all -embracing--when it envelops itself in clouds as in a shroud, and -the sky darkens. Some phenomena descended on man from above, such -as thunder-bolts, winds, storms; the storms that came unexpectedly, -dealing destruction as they passed received the name of Maruts--from -the root _Mar_--and with the meaning of those who strike or beat to -death; the thunder was called Rudra = he who roars; the wind was Vayu = -he who blows. - -All these names indicated that which could be seen and that which could -be heard; the invisible things remained unnamed; how was it possible -for man to name that of which he was ignorant (except that they had a -real existence), he who could only conceive a name after having seen a -certain feature or quality in the object? They made use therefore of -the names they already knew, and they rang the changes on the storm, -the fire, and the firmament, which names they borrowed. Jacob’s prayer, -which arose in the darkness when he was wrestling with a great Unknown, -“Tell me, I pray thee, thy name,” must have been, in the early ages, -the question of all humanity; but uttered under a thousand varying -forms, and as, at the beginning, each name was imperfect, since it -expressed only one side of the object, every additional name denoted -a step forward, and every fresh check experienced by the mind in its -search after accurate names only stimulated it to look elsewhere. - -The first germ of the concept of law and order appears in the minds of -the poets, and to this they give the name of _Rita_. This word has no -equivalent in our languages, and translators are uncertain as to the -meaning attached to it by the rishis. Pliant and full of capability, -there seems no word more fitted to reflect new shades of thought; -and in our efforts to understand it conjecture is much called into -play, from the fact that we have to transfuse ancient thought into -modern forms; in that process some violence is inevitable. Max Müller -supposes, from etymological reasons, that Rita originally was used -to express the regular movement of the heavenly bodies, and the path -which they followed daily, from the one point of the heavens to the -other, and he translates _Rita_ by the “right path.” “If we remember -how many of the ancient sacrifices in India depended on the course of -the sun, how there were daily sacrifices, at the rising of the sun, at -noon, and at the setting of the sun; how there were offerings for the -full moon and the new moon, we may well understand how the sacrifice -itself came in time to be called the path of Rita.”[73] Rita expresses -all that is right, good, and true, and Anrita was used for whatever -is false, evil, and untrue; thus the Hindoos laid it down as an axiom -that there was an universal law in the world equally binding on the -physical phenomena and on conscious beings, such as themselves; and -it was this law which ruled the times of the sacrifices to be offered -to the divine powers; and this intuitive perception of law and order, -which is the foundation of the ancient faith of the Asiatic Aryans, is -far more important than all the histories of Savitar, Mitra, Rudra, and -Indra, which are recounted at a later period of the gods of India. This -belief in Rita, in law and order, as revealed in the unvarying movement -of the stars, or manifested in the unvarying number of the petals, and -stamens, and pistils of the smallest plant, was a grand thing; it was -all the difference between a chaos and a cosmos, between the blind -play of chance and a well defined plan. We have become so familiarised -with the idea of a fundamental law, that it now often occupies us less -than many of the secondary laws or causes; and yet our philosophers -often find themselves at fault when they endeavour to give an exact -idea of this primary law; but to the ancient prophets it must have been -infinitely more perplexing, though also infinitely more important in -their gropings after _terra firma_ on which to plant their feet. The -rishis are indefatigable in pointing to the straight path, or Rita, -followed by the day and night; and because the gods have themselves -followed this path, they have the strength to triumph over the powers -of darkness, and to those who ask for it they grant the grace to walk -in the same road. - -“O Indra, lead us on the path of Rita, on the right path over all -evils.”[74] - -To walk with regularity in the path of duty, imitating the example -of the astral bodies, or following step by step the sun which never -deviates from its orbit, cannot be an idea foreign to humanity since -it is equally familiar to the primitive races and the most elevated -minds. Cicero said of himself that he was born not only to contemplate -the order of the heavenly bodies, but to imitate this order in his own -conduct; this great orator, although he was ignorant of the existence -of the Vedic hymns, spoke after the same manner as the rishis; and the -Maoris are inspired neither by Cicero nor the Hindoo poets, when they -send forth their energetic cry, “Wait, wait, O sun, we will go with -thee.” - -To our first ancestors nothing in nature could have been indifferent; -all that they perceived must have come upon them as a continual -surprise; the Vedic hymns show that our surmise is correct. An -irresistible force led them continually to investigate and interrogate -those apparitions which, by their strangeness and grandeur, were -so striking, and to which they gave the names of the thunderers, -the rainers, the pounders or storm gods; no voice replied to their -questions; absolute silence reigned around them; the limits of the -known confronted them. Gradually a different perception forced itself -upon them, whether consciously or unconsciously; all limits have two -sides, the one towards ourselves, the other towards the beyond; they -were ignorant of what existed beyond, but they believed it to be there, -since the further boundaries came in contact with it. They wished to -draw near to it in order to examine it close at hand, but in what -direction should they advance? - -The sentiments which the sun and its forerunners awoke in our ancestors -must remain for ever beyond our powers of imagination; the rising -of this luminary is to us the result of a physical law, and is not -considered more extraordinary than the birth of a child in a large -family; we know that the dawn is the reflection of the sun’s rays in -the matutinal vapours; we have even learnt to calculate the time of its -duration in different climates; but the assurance with which we say, -“The sun will rise to-morrow, the day after to-morrow, every day,” our -ancestors never possessed, and it was this vast unknown domain, behind -the known, that from the very first supplied the human mind with the -impetus required to cause it to seek, to discover, what there could be -beyond the visible world. - -As nothing seems to be so far apart as the two points of the horizon -where the light of day appears and where he sets, it is there that the -rishis look for a solution of the problem of the beyond.[75] - -“That whence the sun rises, and that where he sets, that I believe is -the oldest, and no one goes beyond.”[76] - -The poets gave the name Aditi to the dawn. Aditi is derived from -_diti_, binding and bond, with the negative particle _a_; thus at first -_Aditi_ meant that which is without bonds, not chained, not enclosed, -infinite. But their imagination soon carried the poets beyond the dawn -itself, that came and went, but there remained always behind the dawn -that heaving sea of light or fire from which she springs; thus Aditi -herself could not be grasped by the senses. Was not this the visible -infinite? - -At this point the mind of the rishis conceived an original and -striking idea, at the sight of the sun following his path and touching -two opposite points of the horizon; they said that arrived at the -centre of its course at the zenith, Indra from thence could see at -the same time Diti and Aditi--“That is what is yonder and what is -here, what is infinite and what is finite, what is mortal and what is -immortal.”[77] - -Whilst searching increasingly for what he had not yet found, man had -mastered two ideas, those of law, and the beyond or the infinite, -though not understanding the accurate meaning of these words; on these -two points his mind was at rest. These two possessions once acquired -could not be taken from him; in Aditi--which is limitless--could be -found a home for things which had no bounds, and it could furnish an -answer to all questions; and Rita, the order which rules the movements -of the celestial bodies, is at the same time an incentive and a -promise. A violent convulsion of nature may have alarmed the hearts of -men, but the thought occurs to them, “This cannot last always.”[78] - -“Sun and moon move in regular succession--that we may see, Indra, and -believe.”[79] - -Without fear there could have been no hope, without hope there could -have been no faith. - -Śraddhâ, an ancient Aryan word used before the dispersion of the -various members of the family, is the same as the Latin Credo. Where -the Romans said _credidi_ the Brahmans said _śraddadhau_; where the -Romans said _creditum_, the Brahmans said _śraddhitam_. The germ of -the faculty of faith, therefore, must have existed in the earliest -strata of thought and language, since without the first glimpses of -faith in the soul, there could have been no word for “to believe.” - -As auxiliary verbs were lacking at first, the early Aryans found -it very difficult to say of a thing that it is or is not; but they -possessed the root _as_, which originally meant _to breathe_, and its -simplest derivation was _as-u_--breath. Man having discovered in all -the natural phenomena an activity resembling his own, said of the -moon that it measures, of the river that it runs, of the sun that it -rises and sets; thus each of these had certain activities peculiar to -itself. Was there nothing common to all? Doubtless, since an action can -be found which is shared equally by man and all animals, the act of -breathing is common to all, so that our fathers when wishing to affirm -that something existed said that it breathed. - -Man turns his gaze from the things that surround him to himself; -he feels superior to the physical phenomena, to the rivers, to the -mountains. He possesses another nature to that of the sun, of the -stars. He has discovered something in himself that is more than his -body. What is it? how is he to name it? He saw his father or his -mother, who had formerly been in every respect like himself, prostrate, -without motion, without speech. What had happened? What was it that -had left them? Knowing the root _as_, and its derivative _as-u_, he -called it from the first breath, then spirit, which originally meant -nothing more than the air absorbed by the lungs, from which it is -exhaled as breath. Nothing constrained our ancestors to believe that -because they had seen their parents die and their bodies decay, it -must follow that what had hitherto animated them was now annihilated. -This notion may have entered the brain of a philosopher, but man in -his primitive simplicity, though doubtless terrified at the sight of -death, would naturally incline to the belief that what he had known -and loved, and had called by the names of father and mother, must -still exist somewhere, although not in the body. The breath had not -been seen to decay. What had become of it? Various answers were given -to this question, at divers times and in divers countries. They were -all equally probable; no objections could be made to them, but neither -was there proof; they are beyond the reach of proof. “The best answer -was perhaps that contained in the most ancient Greek language and -mythology, that the souls had gone to the house of the Invisible, of -_Aides_. No one has ever said anything truer.” - -From the depths of the eastern sky Aditi arises each morning. To the -eyes of the ancient seers the dawn seemed to open the gates of another -world into which they begged to enter--into the abode of the gods. We -can understand that as the sun and all the solar deities rise from the -east, Aditi was said to be the mother of Mitra, Vishnu, Savitar, and -Varuna. Another conception also arose, that the east being the abode -of the bright gods, would also become the home of those parents and -friends who died, “the blessed departed who would join the company of -the gods that they might be transferred to the east.”[80] Aditi thus -embodied the mystery of life and death; and was the “Mot de l’Énigme” -of our existence. All the theogony and primitive philosophy of the -Aryan were concentrated in the dawn. Those souls who participate with -Aditi in the “birthplace of the Immortals” sometimes share the worship -offered by their children who are still on the earth. One off-shoot of -this ancient worship still survives, and the popularity of the festival -of the 1st of November in certain countries testifies that the homage -rendered to the memory of the dead is a necessity of the human heart. -And certainly those whom we are accustomed to speak of as dead are most -surely living. The rishis desired to contemplate their faces, and one -of them, speaking for all, cried: “Who will give us back to the great -Aditi, that I may see father and mother?”[81] - -All peoples have desired to know which part of the human body is the -seat of the soul and of life; the dictionaries of all languages, -whether spoken by civilised or uncivilised people, show that the words -blood, heart, chest, reins and breath have all been used to indicate -the seat of life, soul, thought, and the affections. Amongst the -Maoris, the words used for the internal organs mean at the same time -the heart, and the centre of joy and sorrow; the seat of conscience and -of desires and the will; it is strange that the brain, which we often -look upon as the cradle of thought, is not found in the psychological -nomenclature of the ancient world. The expression which we find in the -Bible, “The blood is the life,” and in other languages besides Hebrew, -inspired many religious and superstitious acts. It is singular that -in one of the dialects spoken in the south of India, Tamil, the word -used for soul has the sense of leaper or dancer; these are efforts to -express that which moves within us. We are here not amongst learned -metaphysicians, but concerned with simple children of nature; but the -greatest philosophers have at no time more clearly defined the soul -than by describing it as that which moves of itself, but is not moved. - -Our language is so rich in abstract terms, derived from a small number -of concrete words, that we are not aware how often we use the old -material words to express purely mental states or conditions; for -instance we speak of taking things to heart, or learning verses by -heart, without thinking of the heart that beats within our breasts. - -Fire has always occupied a prominent position in the imagination of -all people, of all nations; but with the exception of the Hindoos none -have left traditions which enable us to transport ourselves to the -simplest beginnings of the fire upon the hearth, and nothing more. -Heracleitus already mentions fire as everlasting or immortal, and the -“origin of all things, a higher conception than that of the gods of -the populace whom Heracleitus tolerated, though he did not believe in -them. ‘Neither one of the gods,’ he declares, ‘nor of men has made this -world, ... it always was and will be, ever-living fire, catching forms -and consuming them.’”[82] Heracleitus imagined that he knew what was -fire; but the rishis speak with less assurance; at first they express -their astonishment at the appearance of fire, it is one of the physical -apparitions which impressed them the most, although of all the devas -fire seemed the one most readily known, since it had its dwelling with -men, it was within reach of the hand, could be touched, but as it burnt -the fingers the experiment was only made once. Although seen so near at -hand fire remained a great enigma; our ancestors could not understand -how it could unite in itself at the same time such good and such -destructive qualities. It warmed the members numbed by cold, at night -it lighted the hut as if the sun were in it, yet at times it destroyed -suddenly whole forests; it seemed everywhere; when the thunder rolled, -fire escaped from a dark cloud like a flash; it appeared as a spark -when two flints were struck or two branches of wood rubbed together; -but its chief characteristic was its excessive mobility, nothing in -nature could compare with the velocity of its movements. - -The Aryans at that time possessed a root _ag_, which meant going, -marching, leading, running, forcing, pushing, chasing, and jumping, -and gives generally an idea of quick movement, and as fire moved -perpetually, our ancestors made use of this root _ag_, and called -fire _agni_; this Sanscrit word--which amongst many others was the -most popular--still survives in the Latin, as _ignis_, in Lithuania -as _ugni_, in old Slavonic, as _ogni_; another Sanscrit name for fire -is _vah-ni_, coming from the same root which we have in _veho_ and -_vehemens_, and it meant originally what moves about quickly. - -I have collected a few of the characteristic traits attributed by the -rishis to the deva Agni. - -“How did he come--living--from pieces of dead wood? How is he produced -from two stones? His mother does not nourish him, how does he grow -so rapidly, and proceed at once to do his work? He whom nothing -resists--like the heavenly thunderbolt--like a hurled weapon. Agni, -in a moment, does violence to the trees of the forest; he prostrates -them--all that moves--that which stands, trembles before him--making -the herbs his food--he licks the garment of the earth--he nourishes -himself. Turning about with his tongues of fire, Agni flares up in the -forests. Roused by the wind, he moves about among the tall trees, and -eats them with his sharpened teeth; he never tires; coming again and -again; turning about on all sides; resounding with his sickle; laughing -with his light.” - -“Professor Tyndal asks quite rightly: ‘Is it in the human mind to -imagine motion, without at the same time imagining something moved? -Certainly not. The very conception of motion includes that of a -moving body. What then is the thing moved in the case of sunlight? -The undulatory theory replies that it is a substance of determinate -mechanical properties, a body which may or may not be a form of -ordinary matter, but to which, whether it is or not, we give the name -of Ether.’ May not the ancient Aryas say with the same right (had he -been wise enough to put the question), ‘Is it in the human mind to -imagine motion without at the same time imagining some one that moves?’ -Certainly not. The very conception of motion includes that of a mover, -and, in the end, of a prime mover.”[83] And if, in the presence of -fire, the early Aryas had asked who then is the mover, he would have -been told (if any had been there wise enough to answer the question) -that it is a subject of determinate properties, a person who may or may -not be like ordinary persons, but to whom, whether he be or not, the -name Agni has been given. - -Thus the rishis spoke of Agni as of an agent, as well as of Indra, -Vayu, Rudra, and the Maruts; but we must always remember that they knew -nothing definite of these agents any more than we do when we speak -of physical phenomena as elements, or forces of nature, or certain -movements. - -This striking deva, Agni, manifested at first in the lightning and in -the spark, became as time went on, the most popular, and most desired -of all the powers; the fire on the hearth rendered winter bearable, -cooked herbs and roots, and transformed the devourer of raw flesh into -the eater of roast meat; caused the smoke of sacrifices offered to the -higher Powers to ascend up to heaven. What precautions were necessary -to prevent the capricious and uncertain fire from becoming extinct at -an inopportune moment, or in its rage from destroying men and things. -Fire was for the rishis a being more and more inexplicable. Becoming -increasingly impressed by his beneficence, they seek to call him by -some new name which shall express more perfectly this later impression; -the name deva--bright, shining--no longer satisfies them; they use -words such as invincible, almighty; even these do not suffice them; at -last they find the word Amartya--immortal. - - “Immortal amongst Mortals.” - -This expression may be understood in more ways than one; it is enough -for me that the Hindoos made use of it. It is possible to recognise -in it the first attempt to bridge over the gulf which human language -and human thought had themselves created between the visible and the -invisible, between the mortal and the immortal, between the finite -and the infinite. For the right appreciation of our intellectual -organisation, it is important to discover and distinguish the coarse -threads that form the woof of our most abstract thoughts. - -It must be noticed that the use of the word _immortal_ in this passage -does not imply that Agni is considered otherwise than as natural fire. -The Rig-Veda does not seem to acknowledge the presence of supernatural -beings; all the names given to the striking aspects of nature, even -those used to designate the unknown powers in general, such as Asura--a -living thing; Deva-asura--the living gods; Amartya--the immortal, still -retain physical elements in the most ancient hymns. - -Beings without definite attributes did not occur to the imagination of -those who supplied these names, and believed in the existence of those -which these names represented. - -That which has often been called the adoration of fire was at first its -application to the necessities of domestic life, and afterwards its use -in all mechanical and artistic pursuits. If we transfer ourselves to -that early stage of life, and picture the difficulties there were in -primitive times of procuring fire at a moment’s notice, and the dangers -which would menace a whole community deprived of fire in the midst of -winter, and plunged suddenly in darkness, we require no far-fetched -explanation for a number of time-hallowed customs throughout the world -connected with the lighting, and still more with the guarding of the -fire. The natural desire for possessing so useful an object, and the no -less natural terror of being deprived of it, would lead men to adopt -the practices for maintaining it, afterwards called superstitions, but -which during the infancy of humanity, were perfectly natural, and which -developed into a sacred rite; at a later period vestal virgins were -appointed to guard it in the temples; and the fires of St John, which -are still lighted annually on the tops of certain mountains, are the -last remains of these ancient customs. - -The Vedic hymns give us the many different channels whence the -phenomenon of fire proceeds, at one time coming in one way and then in -another, to attract man’s attention and to awaken his drowsy faculties. -Fire comes from the skies where it shines as the sun, from the waters, -since it comes as lightning, from the moist and rain-laden clouds, from -the stones, and from wood, in the shape of sparks, from dried leaves -and herbs placed on the altar to receive and nourish the sacrificial -flame. Ceaselessly fire applied at the door of each habitation. -Apparently it said to man, whose slowness of comprehension it seemed to -understand, “To you men, I come, that I may awake you from sleep, and -cause you to know what I am.” - -At last man understood, and the rishis reply to the fire. - -“Thou, O Agni, art born from the skies--thou from the waters--thou from -the stone--thou from the wood--thou from the herbs--thou, king of men, -the bright one.”[84] - -At the same time the mind of the poet seems illuminated with a new -thought. - -“If we have committed any sin against thee through human weakness, -through thoughtlessness, make us sinless before Aditi, O Agni, loosen -our misdeeds from us on every side.”[85] - -Of Agni, the fire, there would seem to be nothing left in that supreme -god whose laws must be obeyed, and who can forgive those who have -broken his laws. Between this transformed Being of whom the Aryans -implore mercy, and Him whom we call God, we can perceive no difference, -and yet, so mysterious are human speech and thought, the Hindoos, who -thought in ancient Sanscrit, declare that Agni has not yet thrown off -his physical characteristics, that he is not yet, and cannot be God; -they add that it is impossible to give the true Vedic impression in -its fulness, since no modern language possesses phrases in which to -express it. - -I read in another hymn addressed to Agni a curious verse. - -“O Heaven and Earth, I proclaim this truthful fact, that the child, as -soon as born, eats his parents. I, a mortal, do not understand this -fact of a god; Agni indeed understands, for he is wise.”[86] - -Are the rishis who utter this exclamation ignorant of the fact that the -parents of fire are two dry sticks? Or is it that the act of a god in -eating its father and mother is abhorrent to them? - -“If we, O gods--ignorant among the wise--transgress your commandments, -whatever of the sacrifice weak mortals with their feeble intellect do -not comprehend, Agni, the priest, who knows all rights, comprehends it, -makes it all good.”[87] - -The whole question of sacrifices is still hotly discussed; whether -they preceded or followed prayer. Did the Vedic poets wait till the -ceremonial was fully developed before they invoked the Powers, or did -their prayers suggest the performance of sacrificial acts? - -“Agni, accept this branch that I offer. Accept this my service--listen -well to these my songs. Whosoever sacrifices to Agni with a stick of -wood, with a libation, with a bundle of herbs, or with an inclination -of his head, he will be blessed.”[88] - -We nowhere hear of a mute sacrifice. That which we call a sacrifice the -ancients called simply _karma_, an act; a simple prayer, preceded by a -washing of the hands, or accompanied by an inclination of the head, may -constitute a _karma_, an act; to light the fire on the hearth, to bow -the head and utter the name of Agni with some kind epithet, might also -be termed an act. At first the sacrifice may only have been a prayer -accompanied by a gift. They may originally have been inseparable, but -in all this there is nothing opposed to the idea that it would be in -accordance with human nature that prayer should come first. In time the -act of sacrifice assumed a sacred and solemn character. In the earlier -vocabularies of the Aryan tongues the word sacrifice does not occur; -the Sanscrit and Zend root of the word are almost identical, and these -languages furnish many words indicative of minute detail of ancient -ceremonial. From this may be inferred that a hymn full of allusions to -the celebrations of sacrifices must date from a period posterior to the -separation of the families. - -“Agni, drive away from us the enemies--tribes who keep no fire came to -attack us.”[89] - -When the Aryans of Asia abandoned their first habitation, and advanced -southwards plundering as they went, they encountered some of the -aborigines of the country, whose territory they coveted. They were -wild tribes; the descriptions given by the rishis evidently refer to -the aborigines of India, whose descendants survive to the present day, -speaking non-Aryan dialects. The epithets of devil and demon are freely -used concerning them in the hymns. But apparently in their encounters -Agni, who opposes these hostile foes, by appearing under the form of -flaming torches, is not successful in overcoming them, since the Aryans -implore the aid of other allies. They invoke the help of the two chief -warlike powers, Indra and Soma, to destroy those “who worship other -gods, who do not speak the truth, and who eat raw meat.”[90] - -“O Indra and Soma, burn the devils, throw them down--they who grow in -darkness--tear them off, the madmen, kill them, slay the gluttons. -O Indra and Soma, up against the cursing demon--may he burn like -an oblation in the fire. Pour your everlasting hatred upon the -villain who hates the Brahman, who eats raw flesh, and who looks -abominable.”[91] - -Of Soma, who lends such capable aid to Agni when repulsing the enemies -of the Aryans, the Hindoos have four different conceptions. Soma is -sometimes the moon, the abode of the fathers. Soma is also the lord of -the moon. Soma is the bowl containing the drink of the gods, ambrosia. -Soma is sometimes ambrosia itself. The etymology of the word indicates -homonymy; originally it meant rain and the moon. Ambrosia was a type -of the rain fertilising the earth, yet being at the same time a -strengthening draught. It is sometimes quite impossible to decide of -which Soma the rishis are speaking, especially as they seem to find -pleasure in confounding the terms. This play upon words fills almost -the whole of one book of the _Rig-Veda_. - -“Meditate on the wisdom of Soma (moon) in all its greatness--yesterday -it was dead, to-day it is living.” - -“The poet has swallowed Soma (the juice), he has felt an overpowering -inspiration--he has found his hymn.” - -The exalted virtues of Soma have raised it to the rank of those -divinities who dispense immortality. - -“Where there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed, in -that immortal, imperishable world place me, O Soma, where life is free, -in the third heaven of heavens, there make me immortal.”[92] - -What is the third heaven? It is an expression with which we are -familiar, but what does it mean? The Aryans also call the children of -Rudra to their help; they are allied to Indra and are called Maruts. -They fill the air with alarming sounds; these noise-producing beings -are the representatives of storms and tempests, they never appear alone -in the Veda, they traverse space in groups of from twenty-five to -eighty in number, and they make the earth tremble. - -“Where are you going? towards whom do you go when you descend from -on high like a blast of fire? May power be with thee and thy race, O -Rudra. Come to us, Maruts, come and help us as quickly as lightning -before the rain! Let loose, O devourer, your anger like an arrow -against the proud enemy of the poets.”[93] - - * * * * * - -A deep problem now presents itself. What was there before anything -existed? Two contradictory ideas appear in the hymns, and the conflict -must have been trying. - -“Sages have said: In the beginning the world was--a single world--there -was not a second. Others have said: In the beginning this world had no -existence, and out of nothing, what now is, came.” - -Much confusion of thought reigned in the human mind. The world must -surely have been made from something, and by certain agents; but then, -how were the agents themselves formed? and what material served them -for the making of the world? - -Other questions followed. “Who has seen the firstborn? Where was the -life, the blood, the soul of the world? Who went to ask this from any -that knew it? What was the forest? what was the tree out of which they -shaped heaven and earth? Ye wise, seek in your mind on what he stood -when he held the world.”[94] - -Our ancestors would not have been human if they had not yielded to -the temptation of representing the invisible makers of the world by -some personality. They therefore speak of carpenters and workmen -“who have cunning hands; clever artificers who forge the lightning.” -Is it those who have made all that is visible? They know not. It is -certain that in speaking of carpenters, workmen, thunderers, tearers, -rainers, men approached, perhaps unconsciously, the domain of causes, -which from the beginning has been the ancient foundation of all that -is transcendental in our knowledge. It could not be otherwise, since -our reason is so constituted that it admits nothing but what is either -cause or effect. - -There are thoughts to be found in the Veda which are excessively -infantine, but again there are others of astonishing subtlety; perhaps -they date from different epochs; but individualities are apparent in -these hymns, and they anticipated by many centuries the greater number -of contemporary writers who followed at a slower pace. The rishis -who said, “There is one Being only, although the poets call him by a -thousand names,” perfectly expressed this truth; and the Hindoos for -centuries have invoked Indra, Mitra, Agni, and Savitar, though the more -profound thinkers have protested against the traditional use of these -names, just as Heracleitus 500 years before our era objected to the -thousand names, the thousand temples, and the thousand legends of the -Greek mythology. - -The rishis in asking themselves how all things began were not content -with representing the world as coming from the hands of clever workmen, -were they even invisible; it was no great labour to discover that; but -at times they had profounder thoughts. The sacred literatures of many -ancient peoples have reached us, in fragments more or less complete; -but the meditations which can equal those in the hymn 129 are rare. - -“The One in the form of the Un-born was not--the luminous firmament -existed not--nor the great vault of heaven--where was he hidden? Was -it in the bottomless abyss? Death existed not--nor immortality. There -was no distinction between day and night. The One breathed breathless -by itself. Other than it there nothing since has been. There was -darkness then; everything in the beginning was hidden in gloom--all -was like the ocean, without a light. Then that germ which was covered -by the husk--the One--was brought forth by the power of heat. On this -germ was love--the springtime of the spirit--yes. And the poets -whilst meditating upon it, discovered in their soul the link between -created things and things not created. This spark, comes it from the -earth--piercing all--penetrating through all--or comes it from the sky? -There seeds were scattered, and powerful forces came into being; nature -beneath, will and power above. Who knows the secret--who proclaimed -whence this manifold creation sprang? The gods themselves came later -into being; who knows whence this great creation sprang? He from whom -all this great creation came--whether his will created or was mute. -He, the most high seer, that is in highest heaven, he knows it--or -perchance even he knows not.” - -“Who knows whence this great creation sprang?” the Hindoos asked -themselves, thousands of years before our era; and again, “What was the -forest, what was the tree, from which they cut out heaven and earth? -What was there before anything existed?” These questions, differently -expressed, are found in many places in the Veda; every kind of problem -is presented to us under the form of enigmas. The Hindoos seem to have -had an idea that the visible world was preceded by something invisible, -yet much more real than the world of phenomena in which we live; -and that before apparitions existed, there was that which appeared -afterwards in time and space. - -These same questions will constantly be repeated in changing terms, -through the coming centuries, whilst a heaven and earth remain. - -The problem which occupied the powerful intellects of Hume and Kant, -and which these philosophers named the principle of causality, was -already exercising the brains of our fathers when they gave names for -the first time to the sky, the sun, the dawn, and the other physical -phenomena, by means of roots indicating activity; for the principle of -causality manifested itself in the beginning, not in the direct search -for a cause, but in the assertion of the existence of an agent. This -mental labour, commenced and accomplished thousands of centuries ago by -millions of human beings, deserves at least as much attention from us -as the learned speculations of two modern philosophers, be they Hume or -Kant. - -So striking an object as the sun, even before possessing a definite -name, must have been designated in some special way; perhaps as a -simple circle, such as we find in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, in the -Chinese writing, and in our astronomical almanacs; this symbol would -give little opportunities to the mythologists; but when the idea arose -that the sun was a ball, and that an analogy was found between a ball -and an eye, man began to speak of the sun as the eye of the sky. We say -readily in all languages, “God is omniscient,” but Hesiod, to express -the same truth said, “The sun is the eye of Zeus who sees and knows -all.” If the language appears childish to us, we must remember that it -was the expression of a poet who lived long before the philosophers of -Greece, we shall then be less struck by its harshness than by the happy -and pure thought which has been expressed. - -The sun has been an object of adoration with many of the primitive -nations; it seems uncertain whether as the divinity himself or as -his representative; most of the mythologists assure us that the -ancient Egyptians worshipped the sun’s disc itself. The first step is -invariably followed by a second, and a good example of development in -religious belief is afforded by a Mexican legend. The story is told of -the Inca Tupac Yupanqui, who, though reputed a son of the sun, began -to doubt the divine omnipotence of his divine ancestor. At a great -religious council, held at the consecration of the newly built temple -of the sun at Cuzco, he rose before the assembled multitude to deny -the divinity of the sun. “Many say,” he began, “that the sun is the -maker of all things. But he who makes should abide by what he has made. -Now many things happen when the sun is absent; therefore he cannot be -the universal Creator. And that he is alive at all, is doubtful, for -his journeys do not tire him. He is like a tethered beast who makes -a daily round; he is like an arrow which must go whither it is sent, -not whither it wishes. I tell you that he, our father and maker--the -sun--must have a lord and master more powerful than himself, who -constrains him to his daily circuit without pause or rest.”[95] - -We can follow in the Vedic hymns the gradual development which changes -the sun from a simple luminary, and the giver of daily light and life, -to the preserver and ruler of the world. He who brings life and light -to-day, is the same who brought life and light on the first of days; as -he drives away the darkness of night, and as “the stars flee before the -all-seeing sun, like thieves,” the eye fixed on men--the sun--sees the -right and wrong and knows their thoughts. - -Almost all peoples have raised their eyes to the sky, the abode of the -invisible Powers; and our ancestors, who addressed such fervent prayers -to all the phenomena of nature could not fail to invoke it. But the -sky shows itself under very varying aspects, it is sometimes the sky -dazzling with light, then there is the lowering sky, or the sky that -thunders, that rains; each time that it varies it changes its name; and -these names must be known to man since it is always invoked under the -special denomination of the power he is about to address. Varuna is one -of the names of the sky, his physical characteristic reflects it, it -is the vast vault or covering which protects the whole earth and its -inhabitants; it is also the sky which is itself obscured when the sun -disappears. In the Veda, Varuna is associated with Mitra, the light, -thus giving rise to a concept of correlative gods representing night -and day, morning and evening, heaven and earth. - -“He who should flee far beyond the sky--even he would not be rid of -Varuna, the king. King Varuna sees all this, what is between heaven -and earth, and what is beyond. This earth, too, belongs to Varuna, -the king, and this wide sky with its ends far apart. The two seas are -Varuna’s loins; he is also contained in this small drop of water.” - -“The great lord of these worlds sees as if he were near: if a man -stands or walks, if he goes to lie down or to get up, if he thinks he -is walking by stealth, the god Varuna knows it all. What two people -sitting together whisper, King Varuna knows it, he is there as the -third.”[96] - -The prayers of the rishis overflow with the acknowledgment of their -sins, and their belief that the gods have the power to deliver them -from the burden of their faults. - -“Let me not yet, O Varuna, enter into the house of clay (earth). Have -mercy, Almighty, have mercy. If I move along trembling, like a cloud -driven by the wind, have mercy. Through want of strength, have I gone -astray, thou strong and bright god, have mercy. Thirst came upon the -worshipper, though he stood in the midst of the waters--have mercy, -Almighty, have mercy.”[97] - -It is noticeable that in the Hindoo mind the sun, in its many -manifestations, is sometimes synonymous with the firmament: Indra, as -the illuminator of the zenith; Savitar, as the bestower of life; Mitra, -as the friend of humanity; the indefatigable Agni, so modest but so -active, in cooking the food and smelting iron, so powerful when it -bears the smoke of the sacrifices heavenwards, and so exalted when it -takes its place in the sun and descends in the form of lightning; and -the spacious firmament which holds them all in its bosom; they are all -one to the adorer of the divine powers; all are equally marvellous, it -is a galaxy of brilliance. What innumerable gods, and not one to whom -it could be said, “Deliver us from evil.” - -Urged on by an irresistible curiosity the rishis ceaselessly probe into -the unknown and the distant. - -“Beyond the sky, beyond the earth, beyond the Devas and the Asuras, -what was the first germ which the waters bore, wherein all gods were -seen? The waters bore that first germ in which all the gods came -together. That _one_ thing in which all creatures rested was placed -in the lap of the unborn. You will never know him who created these -things, something else stands between you and Him. Enveloped in mist -and with faltering voices, the poets walk along rejoicing in life.”[98] - -How was it that in the midst of the magnificence of their immense -Pantheon, the poets succeeded in obtaining glimpses of the _One_. Who -was He? The mists surround Him and prevent Him being clearly discerned. - -If there was one thing in nature more adapted than another to satisfy -the desire of bridging over the limits of the visible world, it was -certainly the vault of heaven; above the storms and clouds which are -temporary, beyond all that is changeable; amongst all the changing -objects which meet the eyes, surely the firmament was the most exalted, -the most extended, and immovable. We know the genealogy of the name -of the sky, Dyaus, which enables us to trace the transformations -and subsequent applications; and as we advance we shall glean some -particulars of that science which at a later date was called grammar. - -It is known that in the Aryan languages some of the oldest words are -without gender; speaking grammatically, pater is not a masculine, -nor mater a feminine; nor do the oldest words for river, mountain, -tree, or sky, disclose any outward sign of grammatical gender. But -though without any signs of gender, all ancient nouns expressed -activity. The distinction of gender began, not with the introduction -of masculine nouns, but with the setting apart of certain derivative -suffixes for feminine words; thus when _bona_ was introduced, _bonus_ -became masculine; when _puella_ could be applied to a girl, _puer_, -which formerly meant both boy and girl, became restricted to the -meaning of boy. Therefore, whenever it happens that we have a female -representative of a natural phenomenon by the side of a male, the -female may almost always be taken as the later form. This rule, which -has been strictly applied to the name of Dyaus, dates from so remote a -time that its origin is lost in the mists of ages. - -Dyaus, like _deva_, shining, comes from the root _div_ or _dyu_, but -this root bifurcates at once. In the Rig-Veda forms derived from the -base _div_ are masculine or feminine as the case may be, whilst those -which are derived from _dyu_ are always masculine; thus _dyaus_ from -_div_, is the firmament, the expanse above our heads, and is the later -feminine form; whereas _dyaus_ from _dyu_, is the sky considered as -a power, an active force, and is masculine, and consequently is the -earlier conception. These two words, _dyaus_, nominative singular, and -its base, _dyu_, being almost synonymous may be used indifferently. - -All vegetable cells are destined to become plants, though sometimes -different plants, this, observation of nature teaches us. All verbal -cells are destined to become words, though differing, that is, with -different meanings; the small amount of philological study to which we -have already devoted ourselves in these pages shows us this. All cells, -whatever their nature, possess a transitive movement; the French word -_éclater_ has the meaning of to disperse in brilliancy; if we imagine -scintillations of light escaping from a central luminary we obtain the -idea of a transitive luminous movement. Whilst a cell preserves its -primary condition it is not possible to predict its future; no human -intelligence could have foretold that the root _div_ and _dyu_ would -produce the Sanscrit word deva, which means to shine, and deva would -in time develop into deus, which now no longer means to shine, but God. -It is a curious characteristic of Vedic Sanscrit that this uncertainty -of meaning of such words as deva, which expresses equally the half -physical and half spiritual intention, is an evidence of its rays -having proceeded from the same source of light and heat. - -Human reason, in finding its way amongst crooked paths, often wanders; -the representations it makes of things are coloured by rays projected -by mythological or dogmatic mirages. We may recognise in the manner in -which our ancestors have viewed the supernatural powers the prototype -of our own errors of judgment. From the time that Dyaus became the -warming, life-giving sky and thus active, the rishis were authorised to -call him pitar, father, and to place by his side Prithvi, the earth, -who is the mother, and they then spoke of Dyaus as the father of the -dawn, and of day and night. These were thus considered as the first -attributes of the sky in Aryan mythology. - -We are inclined to ascribe these excursions of thought to the flights -of poetic fancy, but they are rather the results of the poverty of -language, which make it impossible not only to express abstract ideas, -but even to describe accurately the phenomena of the physical world. -Religion and language in those days were so closely allied that it -is possible to say of a religious idea in its infancy that it was a -fragment of ancient language; for in order to describe his impressions -the Aryan depended entirely on the words with which it furnished him. -For this reason many of the hymns, incoherent though they may appear, -are of inestimable value. Every one of their words weighs and tells, -but for the translator who endeavours to present the Vedic thought in -modern idioms, the results are so discouraging that he is tempted to -give up in despair. - -When at a later date the name of Dyaus became the centre of fabulous -tales, it still remained in the Sanscrit language of that time one -of the many traditional and unmeaning words for sky; but we must -understand clearly that in the most ancient hymns of the _Rig-Veda_ -this name is the incarnation of the Power which is beyond and above -conception, whose existence had been obscurely indicated from the -beginning, and who remained unnamed long after the beasts of the -forests and the birds of the air had received their appellations. - -From the time of their exodus the Aryan family, going in different -directions, were naturally divided into branches; vast distances -separated them, and they forgot that the same cradle, the same hearth, -had sheltered them at birth. But the ties which connected them -originally were not snapped at all points, since they brought away with -them words belonging to their mother-tongue, and certain intuitions -were the common property of all. Before the Greek, Latin, Sanscrit, and -German languages became separated, the name of a sovereign Power was -implied in those of the divinity which at a much later time occupied so -large a space in the history of Greece, Rome, India, and of Germany. - -Coupled with the word _pitar_ the name Dyaus appears in the most -ancient Aryan prayers as Dyaush-pitar, Zeus-pater, and Ju-piter. -These composite names are no invention of the poets; they are the -results of certain laws of language to which our minds--if they would -not turn from the right path--must submit. The initial _dy_ in Dyaus -is represented in Latin by _j_; Ju in Jupiter corresponds exactly -with Dyaus. The name of the Teutonic god Tyr, genitive Tys, also -corresponds, and as exactly, with Dyaus; in Gothic it would be Tius, -and in Anglo-Saxon Tiw, preserved in Tiwsdæg, the day of the god Tyr, -and Zio in Old High-German, where we find Ziestac for the modern -Dienstag, the day of the god Mars. Tius, Tiw, Tyr, and Zio are forms -that exist side by side, all of which of course proceed from that -wonderful root _div_, and represent the bright sky, day, and god. No -etymological interpretation would be satisfying which did not embrace -all these forms, since they are all dialectic variations of Dyaus, the -same name in different languages. All names truly related have but one -root, in the same way as living beings who are brothers have but one -mother. - -If another proof were needed of the uninterrupted continuity of speech -and thought amongst the chief of the Aryan people, the following fact -will afford it:-- - -At the time when the schools flourished in Athens, and when the Greeks -were hardly conscious of the existence of India, it would have been -possible, I suppose, to see young pupils seated before tables on which -the master had written the declensions which composed the task for the -day. There might be read:-- - - _Nom._ Zeús - _Gen._ Dios - _Dat._ Dii - _Acc._ Dia - _Voc._ Zeû - -Thus the young Athenians wrote the name of Zeus with an acute accent in -the nominative, and a circumflex in the vocative. - -At the same time the pupils of the Brahmans at Benares, when declining -the name of their supreme deity, accented the syllables exactly in the -same way as the Greeks, and they wrote:-- - - _Nom._ Dyaús - _Gen._ Dyvas - _Dat._ Divi - _Acc._ Divam - _Voc._ Dyaûs - -But there was this difference between the Grecian pupils and the -Hindoos, that the former were ignorant of the reason of these changes -of accent, since the explanation was lacking in the Greek grammar, -whereas the Sanscrit grammar explained to the latter the general -principles of accentuation on which the changes rested. - -The name of Dyaus was the source from which sprang an unique name, -coined once and for ever, adopted by our entire family; the Greeks -have no more borrowed it from the Hindoos, than the Romans and the -Teutons from the Greeks; for it was pronounced before the separation -of our ancestors with regard to language or religion; its meaning was -Heaven-Father. - -Our missionaries who go from one end of the earth to the other, -reciting the Lord’s Prayer in all the dialects of the world, do -not doubt the historical fact that this prayer was said one day at -Jerusalem for the first time; we also may feel as profoundly convinced -that under the name of Heaven-Father, the Supreme Being has been -worshipped on the Himalayan mountains, under the oaks of Dodona, on the -Capitol, and in the forests of Germany. It has required millions of men -to fashion this name alone, which is the most ancient prayer of the -Aryan race. - -“Five thousand years have passed, perhaps more, since the Asiatic -Aryans, speaking as yet neither Sanscrit, Greek, nor Latin, called upon -the All-Father as Dyu-patar, Heaven-Father. Four thousand years ago, -or it may be earlier, the Aryans who had travelled southwards to the -rivers of the Punjaub called him Dyaush-pita, the Heaven-Father. Three -thousand years ago, or it may be earlier, the Aryans on the shores -of the Hellespont called him Zeus-pater, Heaven-Father. Two thousand -years ago the Aryans of Italy looked up to that bright Heaven above and -called it Ju-piter, the Heaven-Father. And a thousand years ago the -same Heaven-Father was invoked in the dark forests of Germany, since -the Teutonic Aryans sacrificed to the same Heaven-Father; and his old -name of Tyr, Tiu, or Zio resounded then perhaps for the last time. - -“But no thought, no name, has ever been entirely lost.”[99] - -Some thousands of years have elapsed since these families have spread -abroad on all sides; each branch has formed its own language, its own -nationality, its mode of viewing life, and its philosophies; temples -have been built and razed to the ground; since then all have aged, -all are wiser, perhaps better, but the name which they gave to the -Invisible Power who enfolds them is still the same, “Our Father which -art in Heaven.” - -This name, whose unity has always been perfect, is a magical formula, -which brings our ancestors, even the most remote, within touch, and -enables us to see them as they were, as they spoke and felt, thousands -of years before Homer and the Hindoo poets. Guided by the science -of language and following the path in the Vedic hymns taken by the -humanity preceding us, we see how the concept of God, in its germ in -the name Deva, grew from the idea of light, to active light, the one -who wakens, the giver of daily light, of warmth and new life. - -It is easy to understand the difference between these two -assertions--first of this one--that the early Aryans called the -phenomena of nature themselves by the name of God; and the other--that -the Aryan mind distilled from the concept of these phenomena the -general idea of God. - -“If I were asked,” said Max Müller, “which is the most wonderful -discovery of the nineteenth century in the history of humanity, I -should reply it is that of the etymological equation of the Sanscrit -Dyaush-pitar, the Greek Zeus-pater, the Latin Ju-piter, and Tyr, Tiw, -and Zio of the Germans.” - -That the generality of people should be inconsequent is not a matter -of surprise. He may well be pardoned who does not at once, on the -word of another, credit a number of facts of which no proofs are -forthcoming, and who at the same time shows himself unwilling to -accept the deductions of a science of which he knows nothing, that of -etymology; but what does seem strange is that learned scholars who are -perfectly capable of following the progress made by philology, refuse -to recognise the identity of the different names given to the supreme -deity of the Aryan race. Certain positivists are in this case; nothing -irritates them more than to offer them grammatical proof that all the -Aryan families had, before their separation, the same belief; and they -try to demonstrate that the name of Dyaus at the first meant nothing -more than the sky; and that only at a later period people had changed -the name of sky and of firmament--physical phenomena only--into proper -names which transformed _nomina_ into _numina_. - -It is worthy of note that this assertion is founded on a fact, but a -fact not well understood. In the later literature of India which was -known before the Veda became so much studied, the name of Dyaus was -only known as a feminine; it was the recognised name for sky and day, -and implied nothing divine. The ancient Aryan Dyaus after a time paled -before Indra--a god of Indian soil; Indra, formerly the rain-giver--the -ally of Rudra--ceased to reside exclusively in the more menacing -phenomena of the atmosphere, and it is the pure light in which he is -worshipped. He is now supreme. - -“Before Indra the divine Dyu bowed, before Indra bowed the great -Prithivi.”[100] - -In order duly to celebrate Indra, the rishis did not content themselves -with the praises they considered fitting for the other gods. They -laboured hard to find the right expression and every hymn is a heroic -feat. - -“The other gods were sent away like shrivelled up old men; thou, O -Indra, becamest the king. No one is beyond thee, no one is better than -thou art, no one is like unto thee. Keep silence well! we offer our -praises to the great Indra in the house of the sacrificer. Does he find -treasure for those who are like sleepers? Mean praise is not valued -among the munificent.”[101] - -It is strange that it is in connection with the great Indra, the most -popular of all the gods of India, that indications of a struggle -between faith and doubt are apparent in the praises addressed to him. -The existence of the other divinities was as firmly established as -the splendour of the sun and stars, as the appearances of fire, the -movements of the winds, the impressions made by heat and cold; and -the confidence they inspired was too firmly established to require -stimulating; and then suddenly we find the rishis discoursing on and -enumerating the reasons that exist for man’s belief in Indra. - -“When the fiery Indra hurls down the thunder-bolt, then people put -faith in him. Look at this his great and mighty work, and believe in -his great power.” - -Whence came this insistence to recall the great power of Indra? It -almost suggests the thought that the rishis felt the approach of a -change in their conception of the omnipotence of some of the gods of -nature. - -“Offer praise to Indra, if you desire booty; true praise, if he truly -exists. One and the other says, There is no Indra, who has seen him? -Whom shall we praise? The terrible one of whom they ask where he -is.”[102] - -But the poet at once introduces Indra on the scene, and makes him say:-- - - “Here I am, O worshipper! behold me here. - In might I overcome all creatures.”--Id. - -In reading the Rig-Veda attentively, in spite of these efforts to -revive the ancient faith, here and there can be discovered slight -traces of scepticism, so slight as to be scarcely perceptible, and -these apart from the incredulity exhibited concerning the powerful -Indra. The Hindoo was by nature profoundly believing, but his intellect -was subtle and scrutinising, and he considered it due to himself to -give exact explanations of all; the rishis make the following true -remarks. - -“Fire is quenched by water, a cloud hides the sun, the sun also -disappears behind the sea;” and from these observations they draw the -following conclusions. - -“Water must not be worshipped, since a cloud can carry it away; nor the -cloud, since the wind can disperse it.” - - * * * * * - -The positivists have made too much of the fact that Dyaus, at one time -in India, meant simply the sky and day; a rock is not more immovable -than grammar, and it is moreover quite indifferent to all blows aimed -at truths other than it holds. - -Certain scholars in their researches after the origin of Aryan -divinities, were surprised and somewhat disconcerted at a gap which -confronted them and prevented further progress; nowhere in the later -literature of India could any trace be found of Dyaus as a god who -could correspond to the supreme divinity of the other branches of the -family. However, the very rational conviction that this deity must have -existed gradually strengthened in the minds of the learned. They were -thus at a standstill, when the Veda appeared under the strong light -of modern investigation and brought to view the name of Dyaus totally -different from the feminine dyaus, a Dyaus presenting in itself, not -merely the masculine substantive, but joined with pita--father. Amongst -the Hindoos it had paled before Indra, who was a god of later date, -but the other Aryan races had been uninfluenced by this. Dyaus, the -chief god, had accompanied them in their migrations, and Zeus-pater, -Ju-piter, Tyr, Tiw, and Zio, became the exact representative of him, -each in a different country; this discovery of Dyaush-pita, was like -finding at last a star in the very place of the heavens which had been -fixed before by calculation, but where previously there had been a void. - -This was not the only discovery due to the study of the Veda. No one -could ignore the fact, that amongst the Hindoos dyaus was the name of -the sky, since it bears in itself the root which attests this; but -it would have been impossible to discover the radical or predicative -meaning of Zeus by the help of Greek alone; it possesses no certificate -of birth, and the Greeks had no traditions connected with it that could -have taught us. With the help of comparative philology all is made -plain; Zeus was born when Dyaus was recognised as masculine and called -father, Dyaush-pitar, Ju-piter, Zeus-pater, and from the moment that -we are made acquainted with the origin of Zeus, the rest of his career -unrolls before us. - -Our ancestors, however, had still a long time to wander in the -wilderness of error, and lost themselves many times. - -The Hindoos thought for a time that they had found in Dyaus the object -of their search; but the supernatural light and the light of day became -confounded; when the word Dyaus was pronounced, the many natural bright -objects it might signify all vibrated in response and melted into one; -they became--as a double star does--one object, and Dyu, the god of -light, was eclipsed behind dyu the sky. - -When the question was asked for the first time whence came the rain, -the lightning, and the thunder, those who inhabited Italy replied that -rain came from Jupiter Pluvius, the lightning from Jupiter fulminator -and fulgurator, the thunder from Jupiter tonans. In Greece all that -concerned the higher regions of the atmosphere was attributed to Zeus; -it was Zeus who rained, who snowed, thundered, gathered the clouds, -let loose the tempests, held the rainbow in his hand; many legends were -grouped around these divine names; the more incomprehensible they were, -the more eagerly were they heard, until it is very doubtful whether any -trace remains of that Being who at the first gave to the name of the -sky its highest signification. - -A characteristic trait of the Hindoos, which is noticeable in the -hymns, is a tendency to praise all by which they are surrounded. Not -satisfied with celebrating the virtues of the invisible beings, which -they imagine to be behind the semi-tangible and intangible objects such -as mountains, rivers, trees, fire, the sun, storms, etc., the rishis, -carried away by the ardour of their feelings, glorify objects which are -perfectly tangible, even those which they may have made with their own -hands, or those which at least have nothing mysterious in them; these -are termed _devatas_, and the commentator explains that by this word is -meant the person or thing addressed; thus the victims to be offered, or -a sacrificial vessel, or a battle-axe or shield, all these are called -devatas; in some dialogues found in the hymns whoever speaks is called -the rishi, whoever is spoken to is the devata. - -“The late Herbert Spencer relates that even in our days the Hindoo -offers prayers to the objects which he uses; a woman adores the basket -which she takes to the market and offers sacrifices to it, as well as -to the other implements which assist her in her household labours. A -carpenter pays the like homage to his hatchet, the mason to his trowel, -and the Brahman to the style with which he is going to write. The -question is, in what sense did the author of _Principles of Sociology_ -use the word adore?”[103] - -The desire to have an exact account of what is happening alternates -with the prayers and adoration; the questions and praises interlace -like the threads of a web. - -“Unsupported, not fastened, how does he (the sun) rising up, not fall -down?” - -The poet is also anxious to know how the dawn and the sun appear each -morning; how there is so much rain, also such an abundance of rivers -and streams. - -“How many fires are there, how many dawns, how many suns, and how many -waters? I do not say this, O fathers, to worry you; I ask you, O seers, -that I may know.” - -The explanation also is desired by these enquirers how it is that a -red or brown cow can give white milk.[104] The rishis are rigorous -logicians, and consider that the powerful divinities who made the -world such as it is might have done better; and they do not scruple to -communicate their opinion to whom it concerns. “If we were as rich as -you we should not allow our worshippers to beg their bread.” - - * * * * * - -It has been asked whether humanity commenced by having a monotheistic -or a polytheistic religion. This is not the first time that this -question has been propounded; it has as an antecedent a very ancient -opinion, developed in the schools of theology in the Middle Ages; the -Fathers of the Church gave it as their opinion that a faith in one God, -from the days of the greatest antiquity, had been the glorious heritage -of the Semitic family, coming in a direct line from the first man. But -these same theologians considered Hebrew to be the primitive language -of the human race, an assertion now known to be erroneous.[105] We may -therefore subject the first assertion to an examination. - -The learned writers who dispute on the original form of religious -thought forget that the ancient Aryans could not have been either -monotheistic or polytheistic. The Vedic hymns show us that though there -were many gods, and that they were equal, yet whilst the worshipper -was addressing one, the rest were excluded from his mind, and were as -though they did not exist; each god became in turn the Supreme Power, -and received the highest praise; the rishis, who had represented the -sun under the names of Vishnu, Varuna, Mitra, Savitar as the creator -of the world, spoke of it immediately afterwards as the child of the -waters, born of the dawn, a god among other gods, neither better nor -worse; it is this characteristic of the Aryan religion, this worship -offered alternately to different divinities to which Max Müller has -given the name of Henotheism. - -“Among you, O gods, there is none that is great, and none that is -little--none old or young--you are all great indeed.” - -The religion of humanity in its entirety at the beginning was this -intuition of the divine, whose formula is that article of faith, -at once the simplest and the most important--God is God--the want -of definiteness in it making it the more applicable to the dawn of -thought. This primitive intuition of God was in itself neither -monotheistic nor polytheistic, though it might become either according -to the expression which it took in the language of man; in no language -does the plural exist before the singular; no human mind could have -conceived the idea of gods without having previously conceived the idea -of one God. “It would be, however, quite as great a mistake to imagine, -because the idea of a god must exist previously to that of gods, that -therefore a belief in one God preceded everywhere the belief in many -gods. A belief in God, as exclusively One, involves a distinct negation -of more than one God, and that negation is possible only after the -conception, whether real or imaginary, of many gods.”[106] If therefore -an expression had been given to this primitive intuition of the Deity, -which is the mainspring of all later religion, it would have been, -“There is a God,” but certainly not yet, “There is but one God.” - -These fine distinctions require close attention to grasp them; the fact -that in our modern tongues we have derived the singular _Theos_ from -the Greek plural _Theoi_ has caused confusion; from a historical point -of view, no doubt Theos has come from Theoi; but putting this aside, -the meaning of the word has gone through as complete a transformation -as that of the acorn to the oak; the evidence of this change has been -so deeply impressed even on our outward senses that as soon as our -intellect has attained some measure of development the sound of the -word God used in the plural jars on our ears as if we heard of two -universes or one twin. - -The Hindoo mind, however, oscillated between the representation of many -gods and of one only God; and the rishis appear to have attempted to -establish a sort of priority amongst their numerous deities. - -“That which is one, the seers call in many ways; they speak of Indra, -Mitra, Agni, and Varuna--they call it by various names--that which is, -and is one.” - -“In the evening Agni becomes Varuna--he becomes Mitra when rising in -the mornings; having become Savitri, he passes through the sky--having -become Indra he warms the heaven in the centre.”[107] - -This attempt, which might have led to monotheism, came to nothing; on -this point the Hindoos were behind the Greeks and Romans, who with -their polytheism had a presiding deity, viz., Zeus and Jupiter. - -“When we thus see the god Dyaus antiquated by Indra, and Indra himself -almost denied, we might expect in India the same catastrophe which in -Iceland the poets of the Edda always predicted--the twilight of the -gods preceding the destruction of the world. We seem to have reached -the stage when henotheism, after trying in vain to grow into an -organised polytheism on the one side, or into an exclusive monotheism -on the other, would by necessity end in atheism; yet atheism is not the -last word of the Indian religion.”[108] - -What is atheism? - -FOOTNOTES: - -[72] Max Müller, _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 231. - -[73] Max Müller, _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 250. - -[74] _Rig-Veda_, X. 133. 6. - -[75] “To the ancient seers the dawn seemed to open the golden gates of -another world, and while these gates were open for the sun to pass in -triumph, their eyes and their minds strove in their childish way to -pierce beyond the limits of this finite world.”--_Origin and Growth of -Religion_, p. 235. - -[76] _Atharva-Veda_, X. 8. 16. - -[77] _Rig-Veda_, I. 35. 2. - -[78] Max Müller’s words on the subject are as follows: “These two -concepts (the infinite, and order and law), which sooner or later -must be taken in and minded by every human being, were at first no -more than an impulse, but their impulsive force would not rest till -it had beaten into the minds of the fathers of our race the deep and -indelible impression that ‘all is right,’ and filled them with a hope, -and more than a hope, that ‘all will be right.’”--_Origin and Growth of -Religion_, p. 259. - -[79] _Rig-Veda_, I. 102. 2. - -[80] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 238. - -[81] _Rig-Veda_, I. 24. 1. - -[82] _Physical Religion_, p. 245. - -[83] _Physical Religion_, p. 127. - -[84] _Rig-Veda_, II. 1. 1. - -[85] _Ibid._, IV. 12. 4. - -[86] _Rig-Veda_, X. 79. 4. - -[87] _Ibid._, X. 2. 4, 5. - -[88] _Ibid._, II. 6. 1; VIII. 19. 5. - -[89] _Rig-Veda_, I. 189. 3. - -[90] _Ibid._, VII. 104. - -[91] _Rig-Veda_, VII. 104. - -[92] _Ibid._, IX. 113. 7. - -[93] _Rig-Veda_, I. 39. - -[94] _Ibid._, I. 164; X. 81. 4. - -[95] _Physical Religion_, pp. 183-4. - -[96] _Atharva_, IV. 16. - -[97] _Rig-Veda_, VII. 89. - -[98] _Rig-Veda_, X. 82. - -[99] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 223. - -[100] _Rig-Veda_, I. 131. 1. - -[101] _Rig-Veda_, I. 153; IV. 19. 2. - -[102] _Ibid._, VIII. 100. 3. - -[103] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 205 note. - -[104] Max Müller says: “There is also a common saying or riddle in -German which you may hear repeated to the present day:-- - - ‘O sagt mir doch wie geht es zu - Dass weis die milch der rothen Kuh?’” - - --_Physical Religion_, p. 101. - -[105] Dante at one time was of this opinion. “In his _Il Volgare -Eloquio_, lib. 1, cvi. p. 155, he says: ‘It was the Hebrew idiom which -was uttered by the lips of the first man who ever spoke in this world!’ -This idea was afterwards relinquished by him, as in the _Paradiso_ he -puts these words into the mouth of Adam:-- - - ‘The language I did use - Was worn away or ever Nimrod’s race - Their unaccomplishable work began.’ - -“The oldest form of human speech still remains lost in the darkness of -antiquity.”--Quoted from _Dante in Ravenna_ by Miss Phillimore. - -[106] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 354. - -[107] _Atharva_, XIII. 3. 13. - -[108] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 310. - - - - -CHAPTER XI MAN’S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION - - - “No one sufficiently recognises the power of reason.” - --ST THOMAS AQUINAS. - - “De nos jours, nous mouquons encore plus de raison que de religion.” - --FENELON. - -This question: “What is atheism?” has aroused me with a start. Led -aside as I had been by many beautiful, true, and striking thoughts, -which I noted as they presented themselves to me; being also very -preoccupied by depressing observations that I had made on my chronic -inability to turn them to account, I lost sight of the fact that it -is not sufficient to write and think at will merely, without definite -plan, not keeping the goal in sight. This is my eleventh chapter, and I -see with dismay that it is likely to exceed the two which precede it in -length, and that it follows one concerned more with the repetition of -words often spoken and seldom understood. I fear that I lack method. - -During our own time we have seen a school arise, the Historical School; -it was heralded in Germany by such men as Niebuhr, the two Humboldts, -Bopp--the author of the first Comparative Grammar--Grimm, and many -others. This School shows that an uninterrupted continuity connects -what has been thought of old with what is being thought at present; -that there is no break between the present and the past; and that the -difficulties which are presented to us by the study of the present -philosophical problems, would in a great measure disappear, if we knew -under what form these same problems presented themselves to man for the -first time. - -The Historical School advances step by step with the study of -comparative philology; this latter has shown that at the beginning the -number of words was very small; they lay, as it were, side by side, -before man’s eyes, as evenly and as regularly as the threads on a -weaver’s loom. But gradually, on account of our neglect, and our many -misunderstandings, the idea contained in these words became entangled, -and we have ceased to follow the course of the thread; the words have -remained in our memory, but the meaning has changed; they may even have -several meanings which contradict each other; the result is that we are -ignorant of many things it would be well for us to know with certainty. - -All problems whether of philosophy or of philology, are best solved -by the historical method; let us bravely face each obscure question -to which we have no key; each doubtful term the meaning of which is -lost, and bid all retrace their steps in the path by which they arrived -at us; avoiding the peril of the idle worker who has a theory, and a -remedy ready for everything; and the walks in the country of dreams -which have no chart to direct travellers. - -For us who are not learned linguists there is more than one method of -gaining information concerning words; the easiest is to note the use -made of them at various times in the past; another way which is more -important and more certain is to study their biographies, we should -find them in ancient documents; a third method that exacts neither a -knowledge of their history, nor their genealogy, consists simply in -reflection; this process, which should be within the reach of all, is -seldom used. - -As I am constrained to follow the development of the Vedic religion -at the commencement of what was neither polytheism nor monotheism; I -recur to the last word of the preceding chapter in order to find its -historical antecedents. - -History tells us that much in the same way as a wild beast pursues its -prey, this epithet of atheist is hurled at men who in truth have little -in common. “In the eyes of his Athenian judges Socrates was an atheist; -yet he did not even deny the gods of Greece, but he reserved to himself -the right to believe in something higher and more truly divine than -Hephaistos and Aphrodite.”[109] Spinoza was called an atheist by the -Jews, his co-religionists, because his conception of Jahveh or Jehovah -was wider than theirs. The early Christians were called _átheoi_ by the -Jews and Greeks because they believed not as the Jews and Christians -believed. Were the Hindoos atheists when they said, “What is Indra? -it is the sun, the rain only.” Were they atheists when they ceased to -believe in their Devas, the brilliant objects, the stars, the fields, -the rivers, the eyes of man? If the history of the word atheist had -only taught us one thing, _e.g._ that those who think differently -from ourselves do not deserve the reproach of atheism, it would have -extinguished the fires of many an _auto da fé_. - -But are there real atheists? Do those persons exist who are convinced -that the word God represents nothing? There may be; if you have -succeeded in convincing human reason that there can be an act without -a cause, a boundary without a beyond, a finite without an infinite; -then you will have proved without doubt that there is no God. “God is a -_great_ word,” said a German theologian, lately deceased, whose honesty -and piety have never been questioned, “he who feels and understands -that, will judge more mildly and more justly of those who confess that -they dare not say that they believe in God.”[110] - -We ought never to call a man an atheist till we know what kind of God -it is that he has been brought up to believe in, and what kind of God -it is that he rejects, it may be, from the best and highest motives. If -we can respect the childlike faith of a charcoal-burner, let us also -respect philosophical doubt; it may well indicate a turning-point in -the life of a man, in which he is perhaps abandoning a belief of which -he has seen the error, or is perhaps seeking to replace the less worthy -faith, however dear it may be to him, by one more perfect, however its -novelty may distress him; without such “atheism” as this our religion -would long ago have only been a congealed hypocrisy. - -In the life of an individual, as in the life of a nation, there comes -a moment when opinion becomes modified; the old theory of the world -being fashioned by a workman as a potter moulds his vessels of clay, -has gradually disappeared. These ideas were so repugnant to the -enlightened mind of Sakya-muni, the Hindoo Prince--universally known as -Buddha--that he considered it irreverent to enquire how the world was -made, and still more audacious to attempt to answer the enquiry. - -That which took the place of henotheism amongst the Hindoos might aptly -be termed adivism, a denial of the old Devas. Such a denial, however, -of what was once believed, but could be honestly believed no longer, so -far from being the end of religion, is in reality its vital principle. - -Whilst about to deal with ideas which I know are true, it is gratifying -to expose at the same time certain false opinions which have been -put forth on the subject; it is curious to note how to start with a -false opinion brings one to a wrong conclusion. Herodotus, Cæsar, and -Quintus Curtius, who have all written on popular religious beliefs, -relate that men adored the sun, the earth, the sky, fire, and water; -that they worshipped certain rivers, and certain trees, and considered -as gods all things that were useful to them. This was the opinion of -the ancient writers who knew no better, and modern theorists repeated -also: “Primitive men deified the grand natural phenomena of nature, -especially the stars, taking them for gods.” - -It is not a matter for surprise that primitive man should have formed -the opinion that either in the world or out of it there should be a -sovereign power which they considered as their gods. - -In the eighteenth century the theory of fetishism was held to explain -all the intuitions of primitive man; although not pertinent to the -subject, this was not perceived until afterwards, and the theory was -considered reasonable. - -Whilst the _Theorists_ take the predicate of God, when applied even to -a fetish, as requiring no explanation, the _Historical School_ sees in -it the result of a long continued evolution of thought. It was evident -that the human soul was so constituted that it must tend naturally and -inevitably towards the Unknown; it was also necessary that man should -learn that he possessed a soul. - -We recognise that we have one; but are we equally clear as to what it -is? - -We answer perhaps: “Yes, it is that part of us which is not the body -which perishes--the soul is immortal.” It is well to be able to make -such a reply, since it is true; our catechisms have sown the seed of -which this is the result. - -But since all human knowledge, whether abstract or practical, has the -same beginning, through the senses, and that neither eye, ear, nor hand -has to do with the soul, what can we know of it? Above all, what can -we learn of its existence after death, the time when immortality has -passed beyond the sphere of the experience of the senses? As man we -recognise the spirit inhabiting the body, but with no form, such as it -might receive after death; we can hardly clothe these ideas in words. - -This belief in a soul, exactly like the belief in gods, and at last in -One God, can only be understood as the outcome of constantly renewed -observations and long meditations; the annals of language furnish -material for this study, those ancient words, which, meaning originally -something quite tangible and visible, came in time to mean that which -is invisible and infinite. - -The last breath of a dying person gave the first conception of the -presence in man of a non-corporeal principle; it was recognised that -this perceptible breath, at the moment of death, was an accident and -transient. Language marks clearly the difference between the act of -breathing or breath, and that which breathed, the invisible agent of -this act--the living soul, the spirit. This agent received different -names, in the different languages; the Greeks named it Psyche, saying -that it was the breath which, at the hour of death, passed out through -the bars of the teeth; amongst the Hindoos it was called _Atman_, and -_Anima_ amongst the Latins, two words which originally were understood -by those using them as meaning something breathing. Cicero spoke of -_Anima_, but he refrained from defining it, and frankly avowed that he -did not know whether to call it breath or fire. - -The word breath has been used figuratively to express the Power -governing the world.[111] A poet in the Veda when speaking of the -Supreme Being says, “It breathed without air.” - -Although the word breath was most frequently used to denote the -principle of life, another expression was employed at a much earlier -period; in countries the most remote from each other, the words, -_the shadow of the dead_, were used, in order to express the idea of -something intangible yet closely related to the body. The influence -of language on thought is so real and so much more powerful than the -testimony of our senses, that those who named the soul a shadow, came -at last to believe that corpses threw no shadow because it had left -them. - -It was then considered that the soul was not a homogeneous whole, but -composed of parts of which some are ephemeral, destined to disappear -with the body; these parts form what the Greek and Latin writers call -the Ego, and the Hindoos _Aham_, what in French would be termed the -_moi_--three words for one thing--an object of contingency, since it -depends on circumstances--on the body, on age, and on sex. - -All men have endeavoured to solve the riddle of human life; but the -Hindoos, who especially excelled in researches dealing with the -formation of words, that is to say, with the birth or development of -ideas, whilst penetrating deeply into the mysteries of their soul, -their Atman, arrived at an abstraction of this Atman, entirely freed -from all earthly or physical particles, and this “vehicle of an -abstraction” they considered to be incapable of perishing, since it -had no connection with breath, it was the pure self, “freed from the -fetters and conditions of the human Ego,” hidden in the _Aham_; not -contingent on circumstances--the self-existent One. - -This new conception demanded a new name; the word Atman, which at first -signified all the concomitant elements of the soul--those which pass, -equally with those that remain--the Hindoos retained in their language, -and it was used to define the essence itself, the being with no -attributes, identical with the Being who vivified nature, the Infinite -that supported man’s own being, the Highest Self. Socrates knew this -same Self, but he called it _Daimonion_, the indwelling God, whom the -early Christians called the Holy Ghost. - -From the Hindoo point of view this idea holds in itself the solution of -the world’s great enigma. The commandment indicating the kernel of all -philosophy, “Know thyself,” was the Hindoo doctrine. Know thyself as -the self, or if we translate it into religious language, “Know that we -live and move and have our being in God” (Acts xvii. 28).[112] - -In recognising the soul as that which is the _self_, we see that this -fact of existing is more wonderful than the acts of breathing, feeling, -thinking, living, since none of these manifestations are possible but -on the sole condition of having proceeded from the Being--who _is_. - -After having analysed the human soul, the Hindoos followed it from -phase to phase from the moment when the breath which makes man a living -being received its first names. They thus traced its history through -time, and believed that they could follow it through eternity. - -Years were employed in the elaboration of this history, and we only -find its completion in a work which is posterior to the Vedic hymns, -the Upanishads. The study of the human soul is the central point in -Hindoo philosophy, and the Upanishads are the first psychological work -which has ever been made. - -There are persons who doubt the existence of things, of which others -feel certain; but no one ever doubted the existence of his own -soul. Why did the theologians who arranged the creeds not include -the article, “I believe in my soul.” It would not have found men -incredulous. - -Reflection enables us to admit that the soul without God could possess -no history, since neither the soul without God, nor God without the -soul, could constitute religion. For this which is called religion, -if under the form only of a soaring towards an unknown but longed-for -Being, has always existed since there have been men on the earth. - -We often meet the recurring questions “Whence?” “Why?” and the frequent -“Because”; and now we are told by a small number of thinkers that all -the explanations of speculative philosophy on the first impulses of -the human soul towards religion, are only worthless suppositions, -unless philosophers--as historians have done--have recognised that -there was a revelation at the beginning of time in the true sense of -the word; but opinions differ as to “the true sense of the word.” - -We are so accustomed to apply the expression “the Word of God” to the -sacred canon of Scripture, that we are inapt at seeking for God’s Word -elsewhere. But our first fathers read and studied it before the Bible -existed. - -To reflective minds, primitive man presents a moving spectacle, -drawn towards the Unknown--the Unseen--they abandoned themselves -unresistingly to the current leading them in certain directions. - -I imagine that our Aryan ancestors would not have fixed their attention -with such tenacity on the objects in nature which environed them, had -the stars and heavenly bodies been immovable. But the sun appearing on -the one side, traversing the sky and then disappearing on the opposite -side, made the remark of the Incas prince very natural: “There is some -power behind the sun causing it to ascend and descend.” It did not -occur to him that the sun travelled in accordance with natural laws. -Other princes and poets, with their eyes fixed on the moving objects -of the firmament, would have made the same reflection and sought the -invisible cause. - -If the world had been propelled by a moving power within itself, -creatures possessing reason would have been vaguely conscious of -it from the first. They would have been like the plants which turn -regularly and infallibly in one direction, since they are not free to -do otherwise. - -“You premise a revelation,” may be said to me, “and yet you direct us -towards Evolution; choose one of the two since the one contradicts the -other.” - -That remains to be proved. Apply the theory of the evolutionist to -the mollusc; we see it directing itself, and extending its tentacles, -towards a crumb of bread that floats on the water. If they touch -it the contact calls forth in the mollusc the act of seizing its -prey. This is only a movement of semi-consciousness, or perhaps -rather it is not entirely involuntary. Under the aspect of immediate -cause and effect, we see a principle anterior to the phenomenon; -certain perceptions which appear in the sight of many psychologists -to be innate, that is to say, impressions received on our mind -before we became conscious of ourself, may well be the result of the -receptability of our Ego, which enables us, when it is affected in -a certain fashion, to represent these affections to ourselves under -certain forms. - -The presentiment that unknown powers were to be found behind the -visible world only showed itself when the Aryans first named them sky, -sun, moon, storm, day, night, all terms previously used for various -parts of nature. - -With the perception of a Beyond, with the desire to know what it -contained, a gap made itself felt which separated it from the known -world. It must be crossed--a bridge was necessary. This thought spread -from one end of the globe to the other, but our ancestors were the -first bridge-makers. Scandinavian mythology mentions a bridge built by -the gods which was of three colours; it was clearly intended originally -for the rainbow. The Milky Way provided the Hindoos with a bridge; and -in the Upanishads mention is made of a path having five colours. Here -we have the rainbow again probably. The source of these legends is the -ineradicable belief in the heart of man, that the here and hereafter, -the immortal and the mortal, the divine and the human, cannot remain -apart for ever. - -Here I will comment on a striking feature of the _Rig-Veda_. The rishis -give accounts of the manner in which the hymns are composed. They say -that they worked at them as other workmen do, such as carpenters, -weavers, and potters. Sometimes they speak of the verses as coming -direct from the heart; another says his hymn moves as a skiff on the -river. Sometimes they speak of their hymns as god-given, and that the -gods themselves are seers and poets. In no part of the _Rig-Veda_ are -there traces of the theories of the verbal inspiration with the meaning -which the Greeks attached to the word as a theophany or manifestation -of divinity, nor as it was understood afterwards in all religions, -beginning with Brahmanism. - -It would be useless to seek for a complete exposition of Vedic thought -in the _Rig-Veda_; all the hymns found in it are not ancient; the -collection was made by the priests, and if they retained much that -was useless for our purpose in their worship, yet we should be very -grateful to them, as in this manner much has been preserved to us of -the ancient poetry of India, and it is they who recount the pilgrimage -undertaken by the Aryans in search of the invisible lodestone which -attracted them beyond what they could see and hear. As they advanced -they rejoiced, seeming to attain their desire; but cast down under the -weight of their sadness, as at times they found themselves misled. - -It is said in the Bible, that for God a thousand years is as one day, -and as I read the sacred books of India, not as a learned critic, but -as a man who is rejoiced to discover his own thoughts in the writings -of the Hindoo poets, the three or four thousand years appear to me as -one day during which these poets have not ceased to pour themselves out -in their hymns, and it would be possible to condense in one page the -sentiments expressed in the first hymns and the last Upanishads. - -“Simple minded, not comprehending in my mind, I ask for the hidden -places of the gods.”[113] “My ears vanish, my eyes vanish, and the -light also which dwells in my heart; my mind with its far-off longings -leaves me; what shall I say, and what shall I think?”[114] - -“There is no likeness of Him whose name is Great Glory. He is not -apprehended of the eye, nor by the other senses, nor by speech; not -by penance, or good works. We do not know, we do not understand, how -anyone can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above -the unknown, thus we have heard from those of old who taught us this.” - -“You will not find Him who has created these things; something else -stands between you and Him.”[115] - -These detached sentences acquire a very special value, when it is -remembered that they are not quotations drawn from some modern works, -which imitate the writings of another epoch; these exist nowhere but -in the _Veda_, a literary work composed in the silence and shade, by -writers who themselves were ignorant of the object of their desire. - -One point at last becomes clear in the mist; a thousand years probably -before the coming of Christ in Palestine, this verse was pronounced in -the north of India, “He who is above the gods alone is God.”[116] - -The Grecian, Roman, and German divinities disappeared before other -beliefs; but the Hindoos who knew that their gods were nothing more -than mere names, had no dawning religion within their reach that they -could adopt; therefore they did not abandon their traditions, and they -continued to grope, as one of their own poets says, “Enveloped in mist -and with faltering voices.” - -All the religious thought of the Vedic period can be found in the -Upanishads (the literal meaning of this name is, sessions or assemblies -of pupils round their master). There is not what could be called a -philosophical system in these Upanishads; they are fragments, and are -in the true sense of the word, guesses at truth; the spirit of the -work is liberal, all shades of opinion are represented in it, the most -divers, and sometimes contradictory. Conjectures abound with regard -to the creation, all start from the theory that the world we see is -not the true world, and that before it appeared there was the true -Self--the Self-existent--the One which underlies the whole world, from -which has come all that seems to exist and does actually exist. This -was the final solution of the search after the Unknown, the Invisible, -which had been foretold through a long chain of centuries; an intuition -more convincing than all the arguments which were used at a later -period to prove the existence of the Causa Causæ. - -The difficulties of the Brahmans in making a complete collection of -these vague presentiments, confused thoughts, and true intuitions, -were increased a hundredfold by the fact that they had to accept every -word and every sentence of the Upanishads as supernaturally revealed. -However contradictory at first sight, all that was said in the -Upanishads had to be accepted and explained. It would seem difficult to -construct a well-arranged literary monument out of such heterogeneous -materials; but it was harmonised and welded into a system of philosophy -that for solidity and unity will bear comparison with any other system -of philosophy in the world.[117] - -This gigantic work, which commenced with the Vedic hymns and ended in -the book called the Vedanta, or End, and was the end or supreme object -of the Veda, is also known under the name of Mîmâmsâ-sutras. Mîmâmsâ is -a desiderative form of the root _man_, to think, and a very appropriate -name for a philosophical work of this kind; and sûtra means literally -a string; but it is here used as the name of short and abstract -aphorisms, rendered still more enigmatical by the conciseness of the -language. There are several hundreds of these sayings or headings, -forming tables of contents, a magic chaplet of immeasurable length, -each word containing condensed thought. This work must have required a -concentration of mind which it is difficult for us to realise. - -The meaning and form of these aphorisms are characteristic--here is one. - -“I will declare in a line, that which has required millions of volumes. - -“Brahma is true, the world is false; the soul is Brahma and nothing -else.” - -Those who consider the Supreme Being as the Infinite in nature, and -the individual soul as the Infinite in man, must consider God and the -soul as one, not two, seeing there cannot be two Infinites; such is -the belief of the Hindoos; but this belief does not belong to them -exclusively, it existed amongst the Greeks, and it is encountered in -other places in our day besides India. - -As works of art these sûtras are of course nothing, but for giving a -complete and accurate outline of a whole system of philosophy they are -admirable. Under these fragmentary forms can be found treatises of -grammar, etymology, exegesis, phonetics, ceremonial, and jurisprudence. - -The aphorism which I have quoted is the pure quintessence of the -Vedanta. - -And of Pantheism also, it may be said. This word Pantheism is one of -the most difficult to define, and I shall not attempt to explain it. -I have a horror of epithets, and I am sorry that it is not always -possible to avoid them. I do not examine philosophical systems too -minutely, lest I should be drawn into hurling at them such words as -pantheism, mysticism, positivism, materialism, naturalism, without -being quite clear when it is no longer lawful to express myself in -these terms; epithets and labels are very apt to return home to roost. -I will therefore confine myself to this remark, with regard to the -belief of the Hindoos; if each definite colour can be broken up into -a number of tints too numerous to name, may it not be the same with -certain shades and meanings in words and thoughts? - -The Greeks hardly suspected the existence of the Veda; in more modern -times Europe caught glimpses of it; and now, although completely -discovered and studied, it is thoroughly known only to a few erudite -scholars, which explains the fact that this ancient creation of the -Hindoo mind has exercised so small an influence on our philosophy. - - -THE SACRED WRITINGS OF THE HEBREWS - -Whilst the hymns of the Rig-Veda, with their simple meditations, -invocations and interrogations--sent out by chance, as it were, into -space--accurately trace the march of thought which accompanies the -search for indications of the Unknown--the Infinite; we look in vain in -the Old Testament for the first dawnings, the first impressions made on -the human soul by the existence of things divine. From the time when, -in the garden of Eden, Adam and Eve entered into communion with the -Eternal, the sacred narrative of facts, evidently historical, continues -in such a manner as to have led some to regard it as merely allegorical. - -To verify in the light of scientific knowledge the titles which the -Bible can truly present to the veneration of the Christian world -appears to some more and more advisable.[118] Few persons amongst the -critical students of the Old Testament doubt that the books said to be -by Moses are a collection of ancient documents, a compilation made by -different individuals living at different periods, with long intervals -between them, each with his own point of view. The conscientious -examination to which these portions of the sacred writings have been -subjected was directed at first to isolated points, and in order to -exercise freely the critical faculties so much in evidence now, it was -necessary to modify the generally accepted view that the religion -of the Jews was cast in one piece, and perfect at the first. It was -necessary to separate the ancient documents from those of a more -recent date, but the attempt to make an exact chronological table of -the earlier history of the Hebrews was abandoned. Until the death -of Solomon only round numbers could be used, even the date of the -oldest fact in history, the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt, -cannot definitely be fixed. Amongst the Egyptologists, whose testimony -is of the greatest value, there is great hesitation in assigning a -date, though the greater number hold to the fifteenth century B.C. -Their representations with regard to Moses are so devoid of definite -historical data as to envelop his personality in great mystery. - -The idea of a revelation expressly delivered to the Jewish people -acquired a more definite form in the Middle Ages; and from the -Reformation the theory was promulgated, amongst those to whom the -idea was not repugnant, that to a small portion of humanity only--the -elect--had been consigned the task of disseminating the knowledge of -religious truth in the world. The study of the Scriptures spread to all -classes where it was not forbidden to the laity, and from that time -millions of human beings knew no other literature. - -Assured that the Old Testament contained the inspired words, Jews -and Christians alike read it with feelings of reverence which -naturally excluded all idea of captious criticism. But the spirit of -biblical criticism which animated the reformers was never afterwards -extinguished, and attentive readers discovered variations in the -construction of the Pentateuch which at that time were inexplicable. -The fact that the Bible contained many narratives which could not -always be reconciled the one with the other was known long before the -period of which we are speaking. St Jerome, when feeling the want of -more accurate Greek and Latin translations than those in use in his -time, undertook to make one, and wrote thus to a friend of his, a -priest: “Re-read the books of the Old and New Testaments, and you will -find so many contradictions in the numbers referring to the years, -and to the kings of Judah and Israel, that it would require a man of -leisure rather than a student to enter thoroughly into the matter.”[119] - -Side by side with this historical reconstruction which is now carried -on, there is a work of examination being pursued. It is asked by what -means did the Jewish people become so strong, so compact, whilst in -the midst of strange nations, and in spite of all vicissitudes. It is -also asked what was the earliest history of the Hebrews, and whether -it is due to the supernatural element that the tribes assembled at -the base of Mount Sinai were enabled to become an united people; and, -finally, these keen questioners desire to know the stages by which the -conception of the Deity entered the Semitic mind. - -The scholars who give themselves to these enquiries, generally -eliminate the question of popular orthodoxy from the subject, since -they consider that when theoretical theology finds its way amongst -such workers it does not assist research; it confuses their point -of view; they look upon the whole race as becoming prophets, and -the prophets become apostles, and thus, out of proportion. The work -advances slowly; each critic puts forth his own special lucubrations -concerning the biblical settings which all are naturally anxious to -retain; contentions are rife on the subject of the Hebrew writers; -their lack of Christianity, and their philosophy are both made matters -for discussion, and disputes between the commentators did not cease. - -Amongst those who are passive witnesses of the scientific -investigations, there are many who, without closely following this -modern exegesis, are sufficiently enlightened to recognise its aim and -its use, and they exclaim with a satisfaction mixed with astonishment, -“Whatever may be said one fact remains certain, our holy Scriptures -speak of God as God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth, as He most truly -is, therefore the Old Testament, the product of the Semitic mind, is -free from the taint which is perceptible in ancient Aryan literature, -that of mythology.” - -Let us seek the reason of this immunity accorded to the sacred books of -the Hebrews, let us seek it _in_ the language, not _apart_ from it, as -some do when looking for the origin of thought. - - -THE VARIOUS NAMES OF GOD - -According to the historians who have made a study of the ancient -religions, each name given to or descriptive of a deity corresponded to -a special conception formed by the people. This has been a generally -received principle, and it serves as a clue to guide us in our study of -primitive creeds. - -The Semitic languages, like the Aryan, possessed a number of names of -the Deity in common, all expressive of certain general qualities of -the Deity, but all raised by one or other of the Semitic tribes to be -the names of God, or of that idea which the first breath, the first -sight of the world, the feeling of absolute dependence on a power -beyond ourselves, had for ever impressed and implanted in the human -mind. These names were all either honorific titles, or represented -some moral qualities. El and El-Schadai--Strong, Powerful; Bel or -Baal--Lord; Adon or Adonai--my Lord, Master; Melk or Moloch--King; -Eliun--the Highest God. Such names as these, so clear and easily -understood, did not readily lend themselves to mythological contagion, -and they were adopted by Christian phraseology because they contained -nothing but what might be rightly ascribed to God. - -I could have wished to pass over the name Eloha, which eventually -became Elohim, in silence, as its history is a long one, but I shall -say a few words about it, as it is one of the most primitive names, -and indicates to us what the Semites understood by divine. The name -Elohim, applied to an unknown, invisible power, one not grasped by the -senses, was the expression of all that was superior and beyond what was -seen and known on the earth. At the same time the name was used not -exclusively for the Deity, but for others whose attributes, whether -physical or moral, demanded a superlative appellative ... there were -thus several Elohims of varying natures, the Semitic termination in -_im_ turning Eloha into a plural, still always took a singular verb -after it, and Elohim or the Elohim (pl.) were both used. - -If a comparison be made between the Semitic and Aryan methods of -treating the same subjects, the assertion seems amply justified that -mythology has not ventured to effect an entrance into the thoughts of -the Hebrew writers. If the subject Dawn be taken, it would remain with -the Semitic authors a natural daily occurrence, but the Aryan writers -would transform it into a personal agent taking the form of gracious, -kindly mythical personages. An example presents itself in the book of -Job. - -Jehovah, the Creator of the universe, “answered Job out of the -whirlwind,” who had sought to learn the secrets of nature. Jehovah said -to him:-- - - “Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days began, and caused the - dayspring to know its place? - - “Declare if thou knowest it all. - - “Where is the way to the dwelling of light; and as for darkness, - where is the place thereof? - - “Doubtless thou knowest, for thou wast then born. And the number of - thy days is great.” (Job xxxviii. 12, 18, 19, 21). - -This is dawn in biblical language and in nature; but who would -recognise it under the figure of Daphne, Eos, or Ahana? All of whom -have so exercised the brains of our mythologists. - -But Jehovah drives still more deeply the point of His discourse into -the conscience of Job. - - “Who hath cleft a channel for the water flood, to cause it to rain on - a land where no man is? - - “Hath the rain a father? - - “Or who hath begotten the drops of dew? - - “Canst thou lift up thy voice to the clouds, that abundance of waters - may cover thee?” (Job xxxviii. 25, 26, 28, 34). - -The Aryans had also described the rain, and their thoughts on the -subject coincided with those of the Semitic race, but they were clothed -in the grotesque language generally associated with myths. - -“The rain is represented in all the primitive mythologies of the Aryan -race as the fruit of the embraces of Heaven and Earth.”[120] This is -an advance towards the poetical metaphor which Æschylus at a later -date thus expressed: “The bright sky loves to fructify the earth; the -earth on her part aspires to the heavenly marriage. Rain falling from -the loving sky impregnates the earth, and she produces for mortals her -fruit.” - -It is necessary to possess a somewhat profound knowledge of the -morphological characteristics of the Semitic and Aryan languages -in order to note accurately the particulars to which I have drawn -attention, and to understand the amount of influence they exercise on -religious phraseology. - - -THE GENIUS OF LANGUAGES - -Each linguistic family has special features, just as each race has -its own physiognomy; the distinctive feature of the Semitic languages -is that the significative elements destined to form appellatives, -when once incorporated as roots in the body of a word, suffered no -modification, and the original meaning could never be ignored. Thus all -Semitic names for the dawn, the sun, the vault of heaven, the rain, -and other natural phenomena, preserving their appellative character, -could not be used for any other object; thus they could never express -an abstract idea, such as that of the Deity. The method followed with -regard to the arrangement of words in the greater number of Semitic -dictionaries, which are generally arranged according to their roots, -attest the truth of this fact. When we wish to find the meaning of a -word in Hebrew or Arabic, we first seek for its root, and then look in -the dictionary for that root and its derivatives. In similar languages -no ambiguity is possible; nothing lends itself to myths. - -In the Aryan languages, on the contrary, such an arrangement would -have been extremely inconvenient; here the roots were apt to become -so completely absorbed by the derivative elements, whether prefixes -or suffixes, that often substantives ceased almost immediately to be -appellative, and were changed into mere names or proper names; this -peculiarity of the language enabled the Hindoos to form such words -as Dyaus, Aditi, Varuna, Indra, which at first designate various -aspects of nature, and afterwards were applied to different aspects of -divinities. The preceding pages have afforded us many examples, and I -hope that the comparison I have drawn between the two representations -of the same object will suffice to explain why it is that we possess a -Grecian and Hindoo mythology, but that there was no Hebrew mythology. - - -METAPHOR - -But, on the other hand, the Old Testament is full of metaphor--these -pearls of discourse; these expressions so light and effective in -the mouths of poets as they skim over the surface of the subject in -hand, but which we make so ponderous and ungraceful with our literal -interpretations. When David speaks of God as a rock, a fortress, a -buckler, we have no difficulty in understanding his meaning, although -we might express ourselves differently, and probably speak of the -ever-present help of God. Where we allude to a temptation from within -or from without, it was more natural for the ancients to speak of a -tempter, whether in a human or animal form. What with us is a heavenly -message or a godsend was to them a winged messenger. - -What is really meant is perhaps the same, and the fault is ours, not -theirs, if we persist in understanding their words in their outward and -material aspect only; and forget that before language had sanctioned -a distinction between the concrete and the abstract, the intention of -the speakers comprehended both the concrete and the abstract, both -the material and the spiritual, in a manner which has become quite -strange to us.[121] I believe it can be proved that more than half -the difficulties in the history of religion owe their origin to this -constant misinterpretation of ancient language by modern language, of -ancient thought by modern thought, particularly whenever the word has -become more sacred than the spirit. - - -THE LATER NAME FOR GOD AMONGST THE HEBREWS - -Each divine name mentioned hitherto represented a quality or an -attribute; we now come to one of comparatively more recent date, which -contains neither attribute nor similitude; it is mentioned for the -first time in a conversation between God and Moses. God speaks from the -burning bush, and tells Moses to bring the children of Israel out of -Egypt. “And Moses said unto God: Behold, when I come unto the children -of Israel and shall say unto them: ‘The God of your fathers hath sent -me unto you’; and they shall say to me: ‘What is His name?’ what shall -I say unto them? And God said unto Moses: ‘I Am that I Am.’ And he -said: ‘Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent -me unto you’” (Exod. iii. 14, 15). - -God in speaking of Himself said: “I Am that I Am,” or, “I Am”; but -man in designating God used the word Jehovah. The etymology of this -word was sought, and it was regarded by many, rightly or wrongly, as a -derivative of the verb to be. Jehovah was thus--absolute existence, or -the Being. - -“And God spake unto Moses and said unto him: ‘I am Jehovah; and I -appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob as El Shaddai, but by -my name Jehovah I was not known to them’” (Exodus vi. 2, 3). - -Writers are now generally agreed that Jehovah should be pronounced -Jahveh. Renan notices this striking fact. “The name of God which -has conquered the world,” he says, “is unknown to all who are not -Hebraists, and even they do not know how to pronounce it.” - -By a superstition which some writers trace back to a very remote -period, the Israelites considered the name which God had used of -Himself to be too sacred to be uttered by human lips; gradually its use -was discontinued; and the name Lord was used in its place. - -Although the names of God all indicated the one true God, they did not -preserve the children of Israel from polytheism, since there was hardly -a tribe that did not forget the original meaning of the titles used. If -the Jews had remembered the meaning of the word El, they could not have -worshipped Baal as distinct from El; but in the same way as the Greeks -connected the worship of Apollos and Uranus with that of Zeus, so the -Jews were ready at times to invoke the gods of their neighbours. - -It is not that the earlier names of the Deity contained no second -meaning as qualificative adjective; Force, for instance, could be -symbolised, but the idea of absolute existence expressed by the words, -“I Am,” excluded all symbol and all likenesses. - -The Jews did not profit by this preservative from error; on the -contrary, with the advent in Israel of this new conception of the -Deity, the partial eclipse which so often obscured their reason seems -at times to have given place to one more complete. As soon as Moses had -constituted them a nation, they appear to have looked upon God as a -national God, ignoring His relationship with other peoples. - -The salient point in the Old Testament is the relation of God with His -people, an alliance or covenant between Jehovah and Israel of which -the rainbow became the first type. Threatenings and promises enforced -the keeping of the moral law, the good and evil things of this life; -if Israel obeyed the Lord and kept His commandments, the fields would -yield their crops, the trees their fruits, and peace would reign in the -land; if they were disobedient, the heaven would become brass, and -famine and pestilence would decimate the people, and the rest would be -led captive by foreign kings. - -Although no definite assertion concerning the immortality of the soul -may be found in the Old Testament, a belief in personal immortality is -taken for granted in several passages, and mention is frequently made -of an abode in which the spirits remain after their separation from the -body, that is Sheol, in which joy and suffering are equally unknown. -The picture drawn by David in some of the Psalms, of the abode of the -departed is sad and desolate. Though the word is not meant for an -individual grave, this idea may have been borrowed from it; the meaning -is that of a vast space in the interior of the earth; the dead lie down -and are together and at rest, but separated not only from man but also -from God. - -The Hebrews naturally mourned and compassionated their dead most -sincerely. “Alas my father, alas my mother, my poor children.” But why -should we Aryans, whose language is not allied philologically with -the Semitic, copy their phrases? Why should we Christians, who are -not linked to them by dogma, allow ourselves to use the same hopeless -expressions, instead of words instinct with life and hope? - - -ON THE PROPHETS (NĀBHĪ) - -The phenomenon of prophecy, one of the earlier developments of the -human mind, has been found amongst all peoples, at one time or other -of their history. Certain spontaneous psychical movements dominated -men. The important rôle played by the oracles in the history of Greece, -is well known; the Greeks classed both the priests who interpreted -the auguries, and those persons who considered themselves inspired by -the gods and claimed a knowledge of hidden things, under the name -of prophets, indifferently. In the third century B.C. the Jews of -Alexandria, when writing the Septuagint, translated the Hebrew word -_Nābhī_ by prophet. As amongst Hebraists the word Nābhī does not -necessarily imply the power of foretelling the future, whilst the word -prophet conveys that meaning, it might have been well to employ both -terms. - -The original meaning of the word Nābhī seems to have been “agitated -outbursts.” These men seem to have passed through a phase of nervous -exaltation before beginning their exhortations; when once they had -started their outpourings they no longer had control over their -spirit’s impulse; and were often physically prostrated, showing signs -of an overpowering compelling physical force, divinely irresistible. - -These Nābhīs, who appeared on the occasion of any crisis, when the -welfare of the public was at stake, were at the head of popular -movements, giving them a right direction; they were the first to rise -against the oppression of the ruling powers, and thousands of them -perished in misery. Isaiah likens them to sentinels, or watchmen always -on the alert, watching with eyes fixed on the horizon, charged with -the duty of sounding the alarm on the approach of danger. “One calleth -unto me out of Seir; Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the -night?” This same Isaiah compares the negligent prophets to “dumb dogs, -that cannot bark, lying down, loving to slumber.” - -Their preaching must have been very powerful; Luther, in speaking of -the prophecies of Isaiah, says, “Every word is a furnace.” - -Until now Jehovah had by the mouth of the Nābhīs addressed the people -as a nation; the individual was not singled out. But imperceptibly a -change took place; new indications presented themselves. Instead of the -order, “Slay, slay,” milder accents were heard; it was as though heart -spoke to heart: “Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself -before the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings; with -calves of a year old? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, -the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath showed thee, O -man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do -justly, and to love mercy” (Micah vi.). - -The individual becomes more evident; like the rishis, Elijah sought the -Lord; and he came to Mount Horeb: “And a great and strong wind rent the -mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord -was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was -not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord -was not in the fire; and after the fire a still small voice,” I imagine -that Elijah said to himself: “That still small voice is for _me_.” - -There were in certain places assemblies of Nābhīs, and schools in -which the young prophets were trained in rhetoric and in composing -discourses; for though some improvised, others--amongst them probably -Isaiah--previously wrote their messages. All used a rhythmical language -akin to poetry; the teaching of music no doubt formed a part of their -education, since we know that the sound of music helped to produce the -ecstasy which resulted in prophesy.[122] The gift seems to have been to -some extent contagious. Prophets were found in bands, prophesying, and -followed by musicians. - -During the eight centuries preceding our era, a succession of terrible -calamities took place. The Nābhīs upheld the courage of the people -by their immovable conviction that the Lord would send a leader, and -deliverer of the people from their enemies. Through the whole of this -time Israel, though often despairing and sometimes in revolt, resisted -doubt; an unknown phenomenon amongst the heathens of antiquity. That -which strikes us as so inexplicable is that Judaism showed itself -capable of such prodigies of devotion and self-sacrifice, though so -little sustained by the bright glimpses of the future life. - -The Elohim with whom the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were -permitted to hold intercourse, appeared more accessible to the -Israelites than the mighty Jehovah of whom they were forbidden to make -an image. The more we contemplate the infinite grandeur of the majesty -of God, of whom there is no similitude, whose name is “I Am,” to whom, -according to Fenelon, even the word spirit is inapplicable, and of -whom, according to Descartes and Bossuet, nothing may be said but this, -“The Being,” the more it seems possible to fear, to reverence Him; but -to love in those days seemed difficult--love was rarely seen. - -I desired to know what the best and most profound thinkers could say on -the ties uniting them with their Creator, those who had experienced the -action of the Divine love in themselves. At the same time I determined -to emphasise as little as possible the various forms these thoughts -might wear, whether in philosophical systems or in religions which had -been founded or organised in the visible Church. - -Amongst the thinkers who have occupied themselves with these matters, -I will mention one who, about two hundred years ago, was looked upon -as a dangerous heretic. Since that time Baruch Spinoza has been -anathematised as an atheist, and venerated as a saint; afterwards he -was declared by certain philosophers to be no atheist, but was counted -as a Pantheist. In our day he is known to be less of a Pantheist than -was thought. - -Shrinking from such epithets, which disturb my judgment, I will not -enter into the question as to which approaches more nearly to the -truth. - -I spoke once after this manner to some friends of mine, in the presence -of one whom I had not seen before. - -“You are too diffident,” he said to me, “I will give you a safeguard -against obscurity of judgment. Read any system of philosophy you like, -you will doubtless discover that error predominates in it; put it aside -for the time being and read another, make the round of several systems. -With each your first impression will probably be renewed. After that go -over each in your mind, not in detail, but taking each in its entirety. -You will find that you can point out a certain truth, _one_ truth which -will have occurred in all. Let this gradually expand in your mind -without unduly forcing it; you will have forgotten the epithets used, -and will find one dominant note which will enlighten your judgment.” - -The manner in which Spinoza interpreted the sacred writings of his race -has perhaps not attracted sufficient attention. His most important work -from this point of view has the somewhat repellant title of _Tractatus -theologico-politicus_. It is diffuse and heavy, and its translators -have not succeeded in rendering it more agreeable. It is very difficult -to grasp in detail, as omissions and reservations abound. - - -THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA - -When reading Spinoza it is necessary to bear in mind--which is not -easy--that he is neither a heathen philosopher nor a Father of the -Church nor a modern critic, but a learned Jew, living in the middle -of the seventeenth century. I will try to reproduce his opinions in -his own words, and endeavour to keep them uncontaminated, as far as -possible, with the views of the end of the nineteenth century. - -Spinoza asserts plainly that he receives the Bible as an inspired book; -in this he perhaps differs from some of our more recent exegetes who -examine the Bible as any other literary work of history and morality. - -Christians grow up in the truth that the Bible contains the Word of -God, and they claim that their teaching has its basis in the Old -Testament. But others have argued thus: What do these know of the -history of the Hebrews? They do not understand the language of their -writings, and they cannot say what caused those sublime teachers of the -people, the prophets, to speak on such and such an occasion, in such -and such a manner. Being ignorant on all these points it is possible -that interpretations of the Old Testament may have led us into error. - -The existence of what are now called the laws of nature being -unknown in those far-off days, the Hebrews were unable to recognise -secondary or mediate causes; the book of Job is an example of this. -God intervenes personally on each occasion. Our attention is directed -solely to two points: man who suffers, that is, who consents or is in -revolt, and God who wills or wills not. - -As everything without exception is placed in direct relationship with -God in the Old Testament, all is said to emanate from God; the cedars -of Lebanon are the cedars of God;[123] men of great stature, the -giants, are called in Genesis sons of God; the knowledge of nature and -of natural things which Solomon possessed is called the wisdom of God; -the discretion of a judge and the gains of a merchant are the gifts -of God; Assyria is the scourge of God, and the lightning His arrows. -And Spinoza asks: why are the children of Israel called God’s chosen -people? Because the Lord, having delivered them out of Pharaoh’s hands, -led them into the land of Canaan, where they lived under the laws -revealed to Moses, to which the surrounding nations were not subject. -“I will be your God, and ye shall be My people,” Jehovah had said by -the mouth of Moses. This was the covenant concluded on Mount Sinai -between the Lord God and the Jewish nation. These laws, which were at -the same time civil and religious, were included under the general -term, the Law of the Lord, and the Book containing these precepts was -called the Word of God. - -According to an ancient tradition, God revealed to Noah seven precepts -which corresponded to commandments given generally to all mankind -without distinction of race; there was thus perhaps a revelation given -at the beginning of time, even before the first and greatest of the -prophets, Moses; and this revelation the patriarchs knew. The light -which lightens every man born into the world impressed these first -precepts on the human heart; to the Jewish race it seemed perhaps -improbable that a divine law not promulgated by a human mouth nor -delivered in the name of the God of Israel, could be imposed on man; -as Moses was permitted to hear God’s voice amongst the lightnings and -thunders, the Israelites considered themselves on a higher level than -the rest of humanity, and held in less esteem eternal verities which -were the possession of all mankind. Moses told them that after his -death God would raise up a prophet amongst them on condition that they -should keep His Covenant and His Commandments to do them, and he warned -them of the consequences of breaking these: “I testify against you this -day that ye shall surely perish.” - -We find the second revelation in the books ascribed to Moses; written -in our memory as distinctly as in the Bible; it has so entirely -eclipsed the first that the greater number of us do not remember ever -to have heard of the seven precepts of Noah. - -After the death of Moses, prophets succeeded each other in Israel; -all from the first to the last acknowledged that they received the -revelation either by symbols or illustrations, or by the word; their -eyes saw certain objects and their ears heard the explanation of what -they saw. Ezekiel, like Moses, saw God under the appearance of a -flaming fire; Daniel saw Him as the “Ancient of Days, whose garment was -white as snow”; the disciples of Christ saw the Spirit of God under -the form of a dove; the Apostles as tongues of fire; and Saul, at the -moment of his conversion, recognised it in a bright light, and these -visions were always accompanied by words. - -The prophets rise above the level of other men by the intensity of -their faith, and by their vivid imagination; but imagination is mobile, -and their ecstatic conditions were not permanent; how could they feel -assured of being in direct communication with the Lord Himself? They -were so lacking in assurance that they often required some palpable -sign, thus did Abraham, Moses, Gideon and many others. Each time the -sign was granted to them; a fire descending from heaven to consume -the offering; a rod changed into a serpent; a healthy hand instantly -covered with leprosy; a fleece of wool remaining dry on ground that was -wet with dew, and other miraculous signs. - -According to Spinoza the gift of prophecy is on a lower level than that -of ordinary intellectual knowledge which requires no outward sign of -confirmation. - -The nature of the revelation depended also upon the temperament of each -prophet, on his education and his own personal opinions; the Magi who -studied astronomy and astrology, seeing a star in the east, at once -went in search of the expected child. But on one point all were agreed, -they all said with Moses: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all -thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might, and thou -shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” And they said with Isaiah: “Wash -you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings, cease to do -evil, learn to do well, relieve the oppressed.” - - -OBEDIENCE - -A striking feature of Spinoza’s philosophical system was the basis of -obedience upon which the whole edifice of a religious life rested; now -obedience presupposes the existence of a law. - -As the Israelites seemed incapable of appreciating the intrinsic -excellence of the precepts delivered to them, Moses enforced their -fulfilment, and spoke of God to them as a just and righteous law-giver -who would reward those who kept the commandments and punish those -who transgressed them. And when this law was given out, amongst -thunders and lightnings, the children of Israel acknowledged it with -acclaim--though not always fulfilling it--because they were the only -people possessing it. - -At last the time came when it was possible to say: “The appointed hour -has come.” The Jewish nation, for whose sake the Mosaic law had been -revealed, was on the point of crumbling to pieces, when Christ appeared -proclaiming the universal and divine law. Christ was no prophet in -the ordinary acceptation of the word, since neither word nor vision -revealed God’s Will to Him, the truth was in Him in all its plenitude, -His mind was identical with that of the Father, and Eternal Wisdom took -the form of humanity. - -Jewish as well as Christian theologians have equally contributed at -times to obscure the sense of the Holy Scriptures; they have taught -that man’s reason is unsound and can with difficulty penetrate the -mysteries of religion; and that the only way, therefore, was to accept -the Bible as infallible in all its details. The faithful extended this -doctrine of infallibility to every verbal peculiarity and failed to -distinguish the eternal principles, always clearly and simply expressed -by the prophets, from those vivid illustrations which enabled them -to speak, without hindrance, in terms most adapted for arousing -the wonder and belief of the ordinary hearer, of matters _per se_ -inexpressible, as for instance of the Divine Nature. Spinoza especially -blames the theologians for having introduced in their commentaries -notions borrowed from Grecian philosophers, which they adapted to the -Old and New Testament, clothing them in biblical language; this mixture -of divine inspiration and subtle argument more and more disturbed pious -souls who went to their Bibles for edification only. - -To those capable of understanding them Christ revealed the secrets -of the Kingdom of God; they were the higher truths of eternal life, -the counsels of perfection; to the multitude He spoke in parables and -gave them commandments which were to be obeyed that they might enter -the kingdom of heaven. The Apostles spread abroad the teachings of -Christ; they preached the love of God with that of our neighbour, -not as sufficing in itself, but as a commandment spoken in the name -of the Life and Passion of our Saviour. And then each one added to -these great truths minor teachings, varying the subjects according as -they addressed Jews or Gentiles; many different teachings were thus -promulgated, giving rise in the early Church to misunderstandings, -gradually leading to disputes and schisms; and after nineteen centuries -of study of the subject we still have not arrived at perfect mutual -understanding. Spinoza quotes in this connection a Dutch proverb: “Geen -ketter; sonder letter.” Without a text, no heresy. - -When shall we learn that the revelation of God is not confined to a -certain number of books, to a certain number of words? It must of -necessity be inscribed elsewhere also, since words are patient of -more than one interpretation, books go astray and are lost, paper -becomes mildewed and is torn, stones are smashed even in the hands of a -prophet. - -Spinoza tells us that he read and re-read the Holy Scriptures with -the greatest care before commenting on them, and he undertakes to -demonstrate to the Christian governments the necessity of reforming the -constitutions of the established churches by replacing a phantom Bible -by the Bible understood in spirit and in truth. - -The scientific portion of the task would not be complicated, since the -commandments of God are few in number, in fact they may be reduced -to one. “He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He -is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him”; and as a proof that -they seek Him they must practise justice and charity; these are the -foundations of the faith, and they are so clear and so simple, that -no commentary thereon is needed, nor are they affected by any of the -verbal differences or inaccuracies. - -The ecclesiastical authorities thus act sometimes contrary to the -divine will when they declare those who are leading a good and virtuous -life to be the enemies of God, simply because their opinions are not -in exact conformity with the theological definitions put forth by the -churches. The civil power ought to be able to judge of the belief of -its citizens by the fruits they produce, if their works are good, it -may be thought that in the eyes of God their belief is also correct, -but personal theological opinions, though in conformity with the -decrees permitted by the Church, would not prevail in God’s sight over -wrong doing. When governments act in accordance with these views, all -is well--individuals, the nation, and the governments. - -In order to believe that God’s Word may be found elsewhere, it -is necessary to believe that He exists. His existence cannot be -known;[124] we can, however, obtain some knowledge of it by certain -means of which we can know the reality; they are so real that we -cannot imagine any force that can invalidate them; these means or -notions are the fundamental axioms inherent in the human mind, and -are the bases of all knowledge; it is to these that we owe the power -of being able to distinguish good from evil, and this faculty we may -regard as the forerunner of the divine revelation. If we once admit -the possibility of these first principles--these axioms--becoming -obliterated, we should then admit a doubt of their intrinsic truth, -which would attack and weaken their immediate conclusion, which is -the existence of God; from that time we should possess no element of -certainty. This is why it has been said that attacks against reason are -more dangerous than attacks against the faith, because they destroy -with one blow the sacred edifice and the foundation which bears it. - - -THE LAW - -In a system where law is everything, how does Spinoza understand the -action of Providence? - -Men are accustomed to call that knowledge divine which surpasses the -human understanding, and that event miraculous when the cause is -unknown to them; and nothing better demonstrates to them the existence -of God, His power and His providence, than those things which appear to -them to change the order of nature. We sometimes show our ignorance by -attributing things of which we are ignorant to a special interposition -of providence. Those who think thus are not in a position to explain -what they mean by the order of nature. - -This manner of viewing things might well date from the time of the -early Hebrews, who wished to prove to those nations who were not -Semitic, and who worshipped visible objects, such as the heavenly -bodies, that these were subordinate deities, subject to the will of the -invisible God, whose miracles on their behalf they related, since they -were convinced that the whole of nature contributed to the well-being -of the Hebrew people exclusively. - -With God the understanding and the will are the same; to know and -to will is a single act; to know an object as it is in itself, and -to realise it effectively, is a necessity inherent in the Divine -perfection; since all truths come inevitably from the Divine intellect, -the universal laws of nature are the eternal decrees of God. - -If any event takes place in nature not in accordance with these -universal laws, then the mind of God has not conceived it; in other -words, he who affirms that in a certain case God has acted contrarily -to the laws of nature, affirms also that God has acted contrarily to -His own Divine nature, which would prove the speaker’s perversity. No -event happens that is not by the will and eternal decrees of God, each -event conforms to laws eternally necessary and absolutely true. To -believe that this could be otherwise would be to admit that God made an -imperfect nature, and established laws so incomplete that they required -to be retouched each time that they failed to realise the divine plan, -a strange conception, and for which there is no necessity. Those who -seek and find their supreme happiness in the love of God, and in doing -the greatest good, have no wish that nature should obey them; they -desire to submit to nature, knowing indubitably, that God governs all -things in accordance with general laws which are in agreement with -universal life. - -From this statement it will be seen that it is no longer a question of -resignation--of passive submission; man responds in every part of his -being to the supreme law which, as is the case with all men, leads them -blindly, and, for the most part, unconsciously towards happiness; and -causes, in a great nature, such as Spinoza’s, an unceasing effort to -maintain and to raise itself; the passage from excellence to perfection -is always accompanied by a feeling of joy, and sadness marks each -backward step towards imperfection. The being--Spinoza’s monad--thus -typifies perfection, and good, and evil consists in the increase or -diminution of the being. The natural love of man for life has been -transformed by Spinoza into law; his maxim is well known: Every being -tends to preserve its existence. - - -THE LAW IN THE GOSPEL - -The Old and New Testaments are an exposition of a long discipline of -obedience, this makes their power, and those who study them without -preconceived ideas discover this. - -Spinoza distinguishes between the spiritual needs of the majority of -men and the minority, and between the religions which suit the one and -the other. But all men, without exception, must acquire the religion -demanded by all, that is practical religion, which consists in keeping -those commandments given us in the sacred books. This obedience serves -to weaken passions; in the same proportion as man attains this end, so -a light, ever increasing in purity, illumines his intellect, and so -much the more does he comprehend that true happiness is the result of -virtue. Few men go beyond this, or--without any other guide than their -reason--experience that intellectual love of God, inseparable from the -true knowledge of God and man; this love, when entirely disinterested, -yields a joy which is not the reward of virtue, since it is one with -virtue itself. - -The divine law was in the world, as St John said, before the coming -of Moses or of Christ, but the world as a whole was ignorant of it; -reason leads us to it, and reason tells us that it leads to the highest -beatitude, and that those who follow it will not need to seek any other. - -But there is one thing of which reason cannot tell us; this--that the -moral effect of this universal law, which is obeyed, not because it is -true, necessary and perfect, but simply because Moses commanded the -observance of it, by reason of the covenant made by God, and because -Christ commands it in His own name, is the power of leading to this -beatitude, which those obtain who strive after the spirit of Christ, -perceiving in this law of God, absolute truth. This reason alone could -not have taught us, it is not written in the human heart, this we learn -in the Bible. - -That obedience only to a truth should inevitably produce certain -results can hardly be asserted with mathematical certainty, since -mathematical results are the effects only of those things which can be -deduced from the elements contained in them; but a moral certainty we -can feel, and this was the privilege and portion of the prophets; and -it was possible, as it was not contrary to reason. - - -BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE - -Spinoza belonged to a family of Portuguese Jews settled in Amsterdam. -He led an exemplary life; he was poor and apparently content to be so, -since he refused help from his friends, which he might have accepted -with a clear conscience; what he obtained by polishing spectacle lenses -seems to have satisfied him. He was advised to dedicate one of his -books to Louis XIV., a munificent patron of literary men, but he did -not do so. - -_Ethics_--the work to which he owes his fame--in accordance with his -express wish, only appeared after his death, and without the name of -the author, because, he said, the truth should go forth under no man’s -name; he feared also to attach his to a new school of philosophy. - -The Rabbis of Amsterdam had long sought to bring Spinoza into a more -orthodox path than the one he trod; his idea that the institution of -prophets had been a source of weakness rather than of strength to the -Hebrew people, threatened to develop into a formal heresy. - -The appearance in 1656 of Spinoza’s _Tractatus theologico-politicus_, -raised a storm of indignation; it was the only work of importance which -he published during his lifetime; it was followed by a sentence of -excommunication, read at the gate of the synagogue, and was in these -terms:-- - -“In the name of the Angels and by a decree of the Saints, we -anathematise and exorcise Baruch Spinoza, in the presence of the Sacred -Books and the six hundred and thirty precepts they contain. Cursed be -he by day and night; may the fury of the Lord consume this man, and -may all the maledictions written in the Book of the Law light on him; -may the Lord destroy him from amongst the tribes of Israel; let no -man go near him, nor speak to him, nor write to him, nor show him any -compassion.” - -How eloquent men can be when they are angry! Spinoza left his native -town on that day; he took refuge at the Hague, where he died in 1677, -at forty-four years of age. - -In reading the pages in which eminent critics have examined Spinoza’s -system, one seems to see not the man whose writings are known, but two -different men, or rather perhaps several different men; I do not think -even the philosopher would have recognised himself in these résumés. - -As has been noticed, Spinoza is neither a true Jew nor, apparently, -a Christian, since the negation of final causes is as foreign to the -spirit of the Old Testament, as his joyous stoicism is to that of the -New; some have remembered the words of Novalis: “Spinoza is inebriated -with God.” They added that with him the crown of the intellectual love -of God was the transport of a soul carried out of itself, but that -this transport must have differed from the ecstasies in which so many -of the saints of the Christian Church found the supreme delight of -the religious life. But amongst Christians what is their conception -of the highest beatitude? I see God in His heaven, but my neighbour, -where is he? On the one side are the happy, on the other the faulty; -we recognise ourselves in each, we see ourselves, we have fellowship -with all; painters have so often represented this scene on theological -lines, that it is familiar to us; is this really the beatitude we -picture to ourselves? - -The mental and moral condition of this philosopher lends itself little -to analysis; he who has the most carefully studied his views, would be -the most diffident in expounding them, having found so many obscure -points in them. In any case it is well to remember this circumstance, -Spinoza has now been dead more than two hundred years, and the -discovery that before speaking it is advisable to know something of the -meaning of the words used, dates from yesterday only. Spinoza in his -_Tractatus theologico-politicus_, uses constantly the words prophecy, -inspiration, revelation, faith, and theology, and the reader who has -sacrificed his rest for several nights that he may know what he means -by these five words, ends by acknowledging that his devotion has been -in vain. Happily, no one knows better than our philosopher the meaning -of the word obedience; this helps the reader; he only regrets that the -critics have laid little stress on this crucial point. - -Since no man’s writings are capable of being clearly understood if he -is isolated from those who have written on similar lines--beginning -from Novalis (that poetic and charming writer whose true name was -Hardenberg), points of comparison have been established between the -Dutch philosopher (Spinoza), the ecstatic Saint Theresa and the -enthusiastic Saint Francis d’Assisi. Let us now turn to the more sober -genius of Aristotle and see if he will succeed in throwing daylight on -the obscure thought of Spinoza. - -“Infinity attracts,” this word of Aristotle would have sufficed, but -the prince of critics gives a further explanation. “Man is face to face -with a truth, and the light lighteth every one that cometh into the -world; all who see see the same things, and all that man has seen is -true.... God works in us not as a workman who tires himself, but as an -all-powerful virtue which acts; He moves as an object of love.”[125] - -This opinion of Aristotle is shared by Plato, St Thomas Aquinas and St -Augustine. A complete unanimity. - -When I am sometimes struck by certain truths, dressed in all the -brilliance which pure virtues possess, but feeling unable to form -a rational whole of these virtues when they are not arranged in an -orderly manner, I should often have yielded to discouragement, if I -had not read in Bossuet’s _Traité du libre arbitre_ these words: “When -we begin to reason, we must first consider this as indubitable, that -we may know _with complete certainty_ many things of which we do not -understand their corollaries, nor all their results. The first rule of -our logic is that we must not abandon truths which we have once known, -whatever difficulties may present themselves when we are trying to -deal with them; but that we must hold both ends of the chain firmly, -although we may not be able to see the middle by which the two ends are -linked.” - - -THE IDEAS OF PLATO - -A philosopher said to me: “Since we can know nothing of the beyond, -let us make a virtue of necessity, and learn exactly what there is on -our side of the veil.” The advice is excellent. Astronomy teaches us -that perfect order reigns in the sphere studied by that science. The -world may be the result of certain chemical combinations which have -met by chance; but if chance has introduced order in these chemical -combinations, it might as easily derange them and replace them by -disorder; yet the astronomers have not succeeded in discovering the -least indication of disorder in their domain; that we know positively. - -It is generally admitted that the world has had a beginning; is it -reason or the absence of reason that we should expect to find at the -origin of the world? Does it proceed so regularly in obedience to laws? -Sages have said, “Laws govern matter, forces, movements, all things -that _are_, but might not have been, just as the world is or exists, -but might not have been.” - -Since Darwin wrote, much discussion has taken place with regard to -the origin of species, no one has thought of asking whether the Greek -philosophers had anything to say on the subject. If, for instance, -it had been discovered that the law of certain sidereal phenomena -compelled a circular or elliptical movement, or any other geometrical -form, then this law, in itself, would be a geometrical idea; that -could exist, although the phenomenon in which it was realised, might -disappear with the world itself. - -According to Kepler, geometry has given forms for all creation, and -Kepler has also said that God governs all things in conformity with -Himself; in that case geometry would be anterior to the world and -co-eternal with God, and if these geometrical forms which are perfect -have been thought out by a perfect intelligence, is it not the same -with all the component parts of the vegetable and animal kingdoms? -Would a horse, or whatever the ancestor of a horse may be, have been -produced spontaneously by nature? Must there not have been a type of -some kind, which was realised in all horses, multiplying and varying -for every new species? And in the same manner also for all trees and -plants. The first types of these things existed before man, that other -part of nature, and before all that man calls the good, the beautiful. -Were not all these things thought and willed by a mind capable of -thinking and willing? - -Thus Plato reasons. - -It is received in theology as in philosophy that all things have their -ideal in God; matter itself has its conception and _raison d’être_ in -God; St Thomas Aquinas was able to say with no trace of pantheism, “God -is eminently all things.” - - -EPISODIAL - -Two English travellers, Gatchet and Hall, finding themselves once -amongst the Klamaths, a tribe of Red Indians, asked them concerning -their beliefs; these Indians worshipped a supreme being who made the -world with its plants, animals and men, whom they called “The most -Ancient,” “The Ancient One on high.” The travellers then asked how He -had created the world, whether by means of tools or instruments; they -replied, “By thinking and willing.” This wonderful answer contains the -germ of the thought which, on Greek soil, became the _Logos_, the act -of thinking and speaking, the unique act which in the Creator means -willing and producing. This answer is an echo, and by no means a feeble -one, of the celebrated saying: “God is the Living One who is, in whom -is the Idea of Good” (Timaeus). Plato affirms that the world and all -that it contains has been made in the eternal pattern of the Idea of -Good, and this Idea of Good is not separable from the Creator. - -Again perfect unanimity, extending this time to the Red Indians. - -It might be thought that an electric current ran round the world; -certain psychical phenomena cannot otherwise be explained. - - -AN EXCURSION INTO A COUNTRY LITTLE KNOWN - -If there are proofs of the existence of God, they should be within -reach of all the world, both the learned and the ignorant, since God is -no more the God of a certain class of person than He is of a certain -nation. - -In some modern books on philosophy we see this phrase, “The influence -of the Infinite on souls,” though we may not pay much attention to it, -we perhaps have the feeling that the infinite does not exercise much -influence on us; but it does not allude to ourselves, it refers to our -primitive ancestors, who sought to discover what there could be behind -all they saw and heard; common sense, with its uncertain but powerful -instincts directed primitive man towards an invisible magnet. This is -not our common sense, that is, not as we should define it, self-evident -principles, spontaneous judgments, which direct our acts; but common -sense as Aristotle would understand the word; the faculty of feeling -and perceiving, where all our sensations are united, because all our -external senses converge thither; this common sense is so truly a -sense, that it has its own central organ, which is what we call heart. -But this influence of the invisible--another name for the infinite--had -at first no connection with religion; it merely deposited a germ in -the soul, without which no religious tendency could make itself felt; -and under the impulse of this power--this divine sense which Aristotle -calls the attraction of the desirable and the intelligible--the -passing from the finite to the infinite--the most natural and the most -necessary act of the moral life--is accomplished by a simple flight or -upward movement of the human spirit. - -Plato explains this mental phenomenon: “There is in the depth of our -soul a point which is the root of the soul and which forms a connecting -link between God and the soul; the soul apprehends because God has -touched it.” - -Perceiving in itself and all around it traces of goodness, beauty, -justice, love, and joy; feeling in itself and around it, life and its -forces; it is only necessary for the soul to send its ideas beyond the -limits of its own confined being, with its imperfect capabilities and -joys, and it will approach God. - -Kepler, when discovering the laws governing the planetary system, found -geometry in the sky; since then, the learned have found mathematics in -all the branches of physics. They have seen numbers and geometrical -figures in light and colour, in sound and in music under its sensible -form. Leibnitz, one of the world’s greatest mathematicians, who -discovered the infinitesimal calculus, saw that in this way one could -pass from finite grandeur to mathematical laws and forms such as belong -eternally to God--independent of all dimensions. - -Between the spontaneous flight of the soul with spreading wings, going -from finite facts to infinite, and the highest mathematics, which have -existed for about two hundred years only, the analogy is complete; -the learned demonstrations of the existence of God given by all true -philosophers are results which correspond with those obtained by the -ordinary methods used by all men. Thus the identity of the fundamental -process of a reasonable life with that of the geometrical process, -which both demonstrate the existence of God, is established. The -metaphysical certainty of the first process equals the geometrical -certainty of the second. For this reason Leibnitz could say, “There are -geometry, metaphysics, harmony, and morality everywhere.” - -I have well said that the human Ego used science and philosophy, before -the appearance of philosophers, to attest that the true path leading -to God is that natural movement of the soul described by the Hindoo -poets--during a time of great ignorance--in the Vedic hymns. This -movement is the universal act of prayer. - -For the philosopher, the proof of the existence of God may appear -to rest on a syllogism; for the historian it rests on the complete -evolution of the human mind. - -Is it necessary still to ask how the idea of a super-sensible principle -penetrated into the human mind, and how it is diffused over the world? -The reply to this question is in the Veda, where the hymns show -methodically, under an apparent confusion, what we have been able -to glean here and there from the mouth of sages of all times. This -idea revealed itself to man at first in external nature; then man -discovered it in his own personal and phenomenal self, the abridgment -of humanity in its entirety with its living and its dead. “At last -the consciousness of self arose from out the clouds of psychological -mythology, and became the consciousness of the Infinite or the Divine -within us. The individual self found itself again in the Divine Self. -Socrates knew it, but he called it _Daimonion_, the indwelling God. -The early Christian philosophers called it the _Holy Ghost_, a name -which received many interpretations and misinterpretations in different -schools of theology, but which ought to become again what it was meant -for in the beginning, the spirit which unites all that is holy within -man, with the Holy of Holies, or the Infinite.”[126] This may be called -natural religion, since it was revealed by nature, and the truth of -this revelation is demonstrated mathematically. - -All that I have just said has been epitomised in a few lines by a -thinker of our century, Bordas-Desmoulins: “Without mathematics it -would be impossible to penetrate to the depths of philosophy; without -philosophy it would be impossible to arrive at the foundations of -mathematics; without the two we could penetrate nothing.” - -Aristotle quotes these words of Anaxagoras, who lived one hundred -and fifty years before him: “The man who recognised in nature an -intelligence which is the cause of the arrangement and order of the -universe has alone kept his reason in the midst of the follies of his -predecessors.” - -There has been no break in the continuity of the first impression -experienced by man at the sight of lightning, and God whom each nation -named after its own way, and Him whom the Athenians worshipped without -knowing, whom the Apostle declared to them. - -I will here repeat the words of Aristotle, which must never be effaced -from our memories: “Man is face to face with the light that lighteth -every one that cometh into the world.” It was this that caused the same -philosopher to use those other surprising words, so difficult to grasp -when reading them for the first time in a book: “All who see see the -same things, and all that a man has seen is true.” - - -ANTHROPOMORPHISM - -Man at the beginning, knowing of two kinds of agents only, both -tangible, themselves and the beasts, conceived the idea that the -phenomena of nature were set in motion by invisible agents of some -kind, their imagination followed its natural bent in picturing these -agents under one or the other of the two aspects familiar to them, -and sometimes under the two united; since these unknown powers--for -instance amongst the Egyptians--often assumed the shape of creatures -half man and half fish, or bird, or quadruped. But with the progress -of civilisation these representations of divinities were modified. -Man having obtained glimpses of the difference between the phenomenal -and the non-phenomenal, was led to suspect the existence of an author -for the one and the other; and this author or agent was perceived -by him anthropomorphically, that is to say, arrayed with a human -personality, but endowed with all the qualities of goodness and -beauty which distinguish the highest and noblest of men. We know that -anthropomorphism in the abstract is wrong, yet without it man could -never have found the way of approach to this unknown author of all -created things, and the desire to know him nearer was irresistible. - -In one sense we are less advanced than our primitive ancestors. -Attracted on the one hand by the occult properties of the magnet, and -impelled by sensation, they advanced in all simplicity. At a later date -they desired to have those things explained to them which they did not -understand; men undertook this duty, greater distances grew up between -them, and the sacred code was the result. - - -THE SACRED CODES AND THE CODES OF LAWS - -History teaches us that each sacred Code grew gradually, and in the -same way as the Codes of Laws. A religion peculiar to each people -existed, though vague and indefinite, before the written Code. If there -had not been a growth of the law by means of decrees, pronounced at -various times by the heads of the people, accumulating slowly, and -accepted in the same degree by the people in general, there would have -been no definite Codes of Laws, such as those of Solon and Draco and -others. If there had not been a religious growth formulated in oracles -and prayers, and in commandments promulgated at different times by the -prophets, accumulating slowly, and accepted in the same degree by the -people in general, there would have been no sacred writings, such as -those of Moses, Confucius, Buddha, and others. - -It sometimes happens that Codes of Laws become transformed into -petrified fetishes, to which submission is blindly yielded, whilst -their origin is forgotten, and the sense of what is just or unjust -is lost in the question of what is written and thus legal; and some -sacred books are treated as fetishes, to which an implicit submission -is exacted, whilst their origin is forgotten and the sense of what is -true and divine is absorbed in the sole thought of what is written and -therefore orthodox. - -The sense of responsibility of the citizen with regard to the law of -his country is in danger of becoming paralysed when that law is applied -with such mechanical exactitude as to confuse the ideas of _law_ and -_equity_;[127] and the responsibility of the believer with regard to -the religion of his country may run risks of becoming paralysed when -that religion is framed in accordance with a ceremonial exactitude -rather than with a human feeling for what is true or false. The mere -possession of the sacred Scriptures may have become a substitute -for the love of God; the effective influence of the Infinite became -changed into a mere habit which drove away the spontaneous action of -the soul. We distinguish with difficulty organised religions from -religions as practised by each one, which was our primitive religion. -There are rites that we love; rites which at first reflected God have -imperceptibly taken the place of God who vivified our religious life. -We possess dogmas, but lose perhaps our hold of the personal assurance -of the existence of a Being whom Plato named “the Being apart,” or “the -self-existent Being.” The results of this are serious, since dogmata, -of themselves, do not always furnish sufficing arguments against -atheism. - -It may be asked for how many people is this Supreme Being anything more -than a name encountered in a book? To a small number of individuals -He was an intense reality at intervals during the course of ages, to -saints of the Christian Church and some of the heathen philosophers. -He may still be a reality for certain individualities which modern -philosophies have not classified, as amongst pantheists or atheists, -or minds full of inconsequent enthusiasm. This Being is also a reality -for the erudite mind, or the contemplative who make Him an object of -study. But the greater number of men, even the civilised, the baptised, -are content to pass by; they are satisfied with the reflection only. - -Some might say that it is by means of our reason rather than of -our heart that we are enabled to trace in God “the Being apart” or -“self-existent Being,” but Seneca says: “Reason is not only composed of -evidence; its best part is obscure and hidden.” - -In our days this remark of Seneca’s has been paraphrased and rendered -more in detail, it has been said: “There are certain minds which are -illumined, and there are others full of warmth; the warmth and the -clarity at times separate, but never the warmth and the nobility; in -the more noble minds there is more warmth.” - -If, as Spinoza thought, reason becomes less apt at raising itself to -the knowledge of God, in proportion as imagination and enthusiasm--to -which it gives rise--gain in strength, yet, on the other hand, the -world in general would no doubt have benefited by the work of prophets -which characterised the history of the Hebrew people; the greater -number of intellectual men amongst the ancient philosophers would not -have sought after the knowledge of God, when it was presented in a -form too pure and too abstract to impress the multitude. The divine -conception therefore descended and captivated them by a union of the -divine and human; and it is because the Bible contains this universal -element that the idea of a supernatural revelation has become deeply -engraved in the human conscience, and has caused some to consider the -Bible as the unique source of all revelation. For this reason the -people of Israel, though less prone to action than many of whom history -speaks, are, to those who think, the most important amongst the nations -of antiquity, since they have proved, as none others have done, the -power of the spiritual element in humanity. - -It is displeasing to many persons to hear the term “Science of -Religion” used. “How can a science be made,” they say, “of what is a -natural sentiment? We can believe without study.” Why do they not add, -“and without reflection?” - -Certainly religion did not commence in this world by study; men first -applied themselves to the natural sciences; they have hardly arrived, -at the present time, at the social sciences; and in the opinion -of certain theologians--Père Gratry, for instance--it was several -centuries before the science of religion became known, but it may be a -science without the religious sentiment suffering in any way. With this -view before us, let us begin not to build but to bring together the -materials; following the advice of the excommunicated philosopher of -Amsterdam, let us look at the sacred writings of the people in order to -form some idea of the different religions, which is much easier than to -know what religion is. - -Indifference and ignorance are so common that sometimes young men are -found--even those about to take orders--who would be incapable of -answering these questions: “What are the chief historical religions -of our day? How many are there? Who are their founders? What are the -titles of the sacred writings considered by these communities as -authorities in matters of Faith?” We know that it is not of Faith to -consider that the world was created in six days of ordinary length, but -we do not know the constitution and names of the religions whence for -thousands of years millions of human creatures have drawn their hope, -their consolation, and their rules of conduct. - -Eight supreme or “book” religions, as Max Müller calls them, are in -possession of Sacred Writings; Brahmanism, which is the religion of -the Veda, and the most ancient of the Aryan family, with Buddhism form -the two religions of India; Zoroastrianism, or Magism, the Persian -religion; two religions in China, one the result of the philosophical -teachings of Lao-tse; the other--which is more practical--of Confucius; -Judaism and Christianity; and Mohammedanism, the religion of -Arabia.[128] - -With regard to the non-Christian religions, there is one with which we -are little familiar; it seems to have an attraction for some people, -probably because we imagine it to contain much occult knowledge, which -stimulates us to search for its mysteries; this religion is Buddhism. -With what complacency we discuss it in our drawing-rooms, without -suspecting that we have erred from the first; we generalise on the -religious opinions of millions of souls separated from us by half -the globe, and by thousands of years, without remembering that these -opinions have varied and continue to vary amongst numerous sects, just -as the dialects of a language vary; and all the time the fundamental -principles of the religion have escaped us. - -I shall say a few words only as to Buddhism, and these will relate -first to orthography; it is necessary to distinguish between the words -Buddha and Budha, which are often confounded; they have nothing in -common but their roots. Buddha with two _ds_ is a participle of _budh_ -which means awakened, or enlightened with a special light; this name is -given to those who have attained the highest degree of human wisdom; -Budha with one _d_ is simply a wise man; and when the Hindoos taught -the Greeks a knowledge of the planets, they gave this name to the -planet Mercury. - -The custom of immolating the widow on the funeral pile of her dead -husband is naturally spoken of with astonishment and horror; for many -centuries neither the Hindoos nor Europeans knew that it arose from a -mistaken interpretation of some lines in the Veda. - -At last a time arrived when the Brahmans, who were the religious -nobility of the country and had the control of the Vedic religion, -pretended that each word of the Veda had been supernaturally revealed; -voices were now raised in protest against this affirmation; the Hindoo -people, who submitted patiently to the yoke of political despotism, -would not permit a monopoly of the teaching of eternal truths; and -to shake the authority of the clergy it was quite sufficient for one -man to step forth from amongst the multitude and assert that it was -possible to obtain eternal happiness without the intervention of the -Brahmanic priesthood, and without a blindfold faith in the books on -which they had placed the seal of infallibility. Five hundred years -before our present era this man appeared, the son of a king, of the -warrior caste, not belonging to the Brahman class; he was Gautama -Sâkya-Muni, known to the entire world afterwards as the Buddha. He -claimed the right of giving instruction, and handed it on to others who -were also enlightened. Two hundred years after his death, the famous -king Asoka convened a great council in order to determine the various -points of doctrine; and his edicts were engraved in the Sanscrit -dialect then in use, on rocks in various parts of his kingdom. - -If the teaching of Buddha awakened such an ardent sympathy amongst men, -and was propagated with so much rapidity, it was owing to the fact -that the Hindoo mind had been prepared to receive it by centuries of -meditation. - -In all probability it was not Buddha who coined the term Nirvâna; -he may have found it ready made in the Upanishads, where it meant -originally not annihilation of the soul, or absorption, but a “blowing -out, an extinction,” then an extinction of passions, a final moral -emancipation, and the union of the individual soul with eternal truth. - -In ending this short appreciation of Buddhism, I will add that, even -in our day, there are begging Brahmans, some living in communities, -others dispersed in villages, who know the entire Rig-Veda by heart, -as their ancestors did three thousand years ago; and although they had -manuscripts and even printed texts they made no use of them. - -Our knowledge of established religions has rendered one indubitable -fact clear to us, that is the deterioration to which all are subject; -none has remained what it was in its initial period; the most perfect -suffers from contact with the world, in the same way as pure air -undergoes a change when breathed by thousands of lungs. - -Christ’s teaching conquered alike the ignorant multitude and the most -civilised portions of the world, because from the first He used words -with which to express the most exalted truths, which could equally -be understood by the young Jew, the Roman publican, and the Greek -philosopher. Christianity broke down the barrier which divided nations; -until that time everyone who did not speak Greek, was, to the Greek, a -barbarian; to the Jew all the uncircumcised were strangers; the nascent -Christianity drew white and black together; the idea of the whole human -race forming one family had its birth at the word of Christ. - -The narrowness of outlook disappeared for a time; it returned when -efforts were made to confine the words of Christ within the narrow -compass of a rigid formula; and thus it came to pass that the recently -established doctrine soon ceased to fulfil its chief object, that -of being a link of universal charity. Zealous disciples, whilst -depreciating dissident religions, endeavoured to detach Christianity -from the uninterrupted chain of the government of the world or divine -Providence, thus forming an isolated branch in the history of the human -family. - -Each religion, like each language, has a past history, only we neglect -to study the beginnings, because we lose sight of the fact that the -founders of the great religions claim no exclusive right to the name of -sole author.[129] - -Justin Martyr, in his _Apology_ (A.D. 139), has this memorable passage -(_Apol._ i. 46): “One article of our faith, then, is that Christ is the -true Logos (or universal Reason) of which mankind are all partakers; -and therefore those who live according to the Logos are Christians, -notwithstanding they may pass with you for atheists; such among the -Greeks were Socrates and Heracleitus, and the like; and such among the -barbarians were Abraham, and Ananias, and Azarias, and Misael, and -Elias, and many others; ... and those who have lived in former times -in defiance of the Logos or Reason were evil, and enemies of Christ, -and murderers of such as lived according to the Logos; but they who -have made or make the Logos or Reason the rule of their actions are -Christians, and men without fear and trembling.”[130] - -St Augustine, speaking in the same strain, says: “What is now called -the Christian religion, has existed among the ancients, and was not -absent from the beginning of the human race, until Christ came in the -flesh, from which time the true religion, which existed already, began -to be called Christian” (_Retr._ i. 13). - -We know by heart certain passages of the New Testament, but it is -rather the sound than the meaning which is impressed on our memory; -when we come upon similar remarks made some centuries before the Gospel -was preached, they strike us forcibly; and it is as though we heard -them for the first time. Jesus Christ declared before the assembled -multitude: “Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born anew, -he cannot see the kingdom of God.” These words were said to a ruler of -the Jews named Nicodemus, who had come to Jesus by night, and he asked -Him to explain how these things could be. Jesus answered: “Art thou the -teacher of Israel, and understandest not these things?” - -No, the teacher of Israel understood not these things, but the heathen -Aristotle knew them; he had said in speaking of the contemplation of -God: “Such a life is superior to the ordinary life of man; it is not as -man that man lives this life, but by merit of a divine principle living -in him.” - -Jesus said unto the woman of Samaria who was sitting at the foot of -Mount Gerizim, a place sacred to those of her belief: “Woman, believe -Me, the hour cometh, when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, -shall ye worship the Father; ... but the true worshippers shall worship -the Father in spirit and truth.” Although nearly two thousand years -have passed men do not yet believe it. - -Origen, one of the early Fathers of the Church, wrote: “If we wish -at last to emerge from infancy, we must translate the temporal and -visible Gospel into that which is eternal and intelligible.” This -same Father was condemned by a council for certain opinions deemed -erroneous, amongst others those on the plurality of worlds, which he -said he found in the Gospel, this opinion might well be true. St Jerome -mentions the anathema used: “Like Satan, of whom he is the son, Origen -fell as lightning from heaven.” As a piece of eloquence it rivals the -condemnation of the philosopher of Amsterdam. - - * * * * * - -Many legends were disseminated amongst the people, they were the -natural productions of the moral atmosphere of Europe at the time when -the first germs of Christianity sank into a soil strewn with the debris -of ancient mythology. What happened then will always happen when the -multitudes learn the language of their rulers without at the same time -assimilating their ideas. - -It is related that in the thirteenth century, in a little town of -Italy, a Brother Thomas asked Brother Bonaventure whence came the power -and unction of which all his sermons were so full. Bonaventure pointed -to a crucifix hanging on the wall of his cell: “He it is who dictates -to me all that I say.” This reply was reported to the people, who -believed it literally, and the inhabitants of the town were convinced -that Brother Bonaventure possessed a crucifix that spoke. The painters -adopted the subject, amongst the first were those of Spain. Thus a -symbol took the place of a sacred truth. - -The Church has often been accused of tolerating like superstitions; -yet she endeavours to stop their propagation; but the task of trying -to restore each stone to its place is one of great delicacy, lest the -foundations should be shaken upon which the spiritual life of long -centuries has been built. Miracles are a prominent feature in all -religions; nevertheless, when the disciples of Buddha asked their -master to enable them to perform them, he replied: “I will teach you to -perform the greatest moral miracle. Hide your good deeds, and confess -before the world the sins you have committed” (_Phy. Religion_, p. 339). - -Mohammed, in the Koran, expresses the strongest contempt for miracles, -in the usual sense of that word, and he appeals to the true miracles, -the great works of Allah in nature: “I cannot show you,” he said to his -disciples, “signs more wonderful than what you see every day and every -night.” But the orthodox Mohammedans delight in relating the miracles -wrought by Mohammed, and which have made him the marvel of Arabia. - -Miracles seem to serve the purpose of impressing upon us that the -religion is true in which name they are performed; it has also been -observed that the same miracle is not generally performed twice, as -the second time it appears natural; it is extraordinary the faculty -man possesses of feeling no astonishment at those things which should -awaken his most profound astonishment. - -As critics we are now in a position to take note of the mental -aberrations of the mythological period; we can understand that when -the ancient peoples attributed a divine descent to their kings and -heroes, it was the highest praise that one man could give to another; -we know that the mythology as taught in the schools, was no more the -religion of the Greeks and Romans than rust is iron. Yet it is this -homage which has perhaps obscured our minds as we imagine absolutely -human intercourse taking place between mortals and immortals. The -action of metaphor overstepped the boundary of the fabulous ages; it -invaded, unknown to us, the domain of the modern thinker, and even -our religion was not sheltered from its attacks; we now use in our -religious phraseology the words of _father_ and _son_, without having -first despoiled them of their material meaning; and we hardly realise -that in this different sphere these words are a daring metaphor, upon -which, of our own initiative, we could not have ventured. A vague -idea that God is separated from us by space dominates us, so that the -belief that there can be no barrier between the divine and human is -often confounded with pantheism; yet without pantheism of this kind, -which differs _in toto_ from the dogmatic pantheism, Christianity would -not have made its appearance in the world. We invoke neither Jupiter -nor Jehovah; God is for us the God whose name is found in all modern -languages; but it is God around us, beyond us; in speaking of Him our -thoughts follow Him to Heaven. When a man takes God to witness of -his innocence, he involuntarily lifts his hand to Heaven; in a time -of disastrous drought, when the earth refuses its nourishment to man -and beast, pious souls are invited to pray to God for the blessing of -rain. Whilst the work of science has been specially directed to causes, -religion is content, as in the past, to attribute each act to an agent; -the influence of ancient ideas on our present thought is still in -force, and our mind has to live as the oyster, under a cover which it -has made for itself. But we must submit to evidence, and acknowledge -that if we do not yet escape from the power of mythology, it is that we -meet its language everywhere, even in our sacred writings. - -Language has moulded our thoughts; when they tend towards God, we make -a representation of Him as a person, we are not able to avoid such -representations; we know that the sun does not rise each morning, but -we cannot do otherwise than see it rise; we know that the sky is not -blue, but to us it wears no other appearance. - -We hear it repeated that an impersonal God is no God; but it is -forgotten that personification implies limitations, since it cannot be -conceived but from a human point of view, and thus with limits. When -Spinoza denied a Divine personality, his opposers believed him to be -denying God; the philosophers of the seventeenth century, including -Catholic theologians, did not define the personality of God.[131] -Descartes and Fenelon’s definition is “The Infinitely perfect Being, -without restrictions, the Being, to which nothing can be added.” In -regarding God’s personality as we do that of a human being, we might -logically say with Massillon: “God, in His anger, hears unwise prayers, -in order to punish those who use them”; you would also be logical if -you thought with that mother that God had taken away her child because -she had loved it too well. - -In tracing the progress of ideas concerning God throughout the -course of ages, it would be a sorry task to gather together the -characteristics chosen by Christian writers as those which mark -the supreme Being; these traits would furnish a whole Pantheon of -mythological divinities. - -All philosophers and all truly philosophical theologians have held that -God is impersonal Reason; Bossuet called Him “La Raison-Dieu.” This -Light that lighteth every one that cometh into the world is the source -of a principle of certitude; Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas -thus understood it when they said that mind cannot be mistaken. - -If we would make an approximate conception of God we must scrupulously -follow the advice of St Thomas Aquinas, “Eliminate, eliminate,” then -only shall we understand the meaning of the sages who said that -negation is fuller than affirmation. - -Thousands of years before St Thomas Aquinas, the Hindoos practised -his method; for it was the inadequacy of the names used to express -the indefinable attributes of divinity that led them always to search -for new ones, until at last, all the phenomena of nature having been -examined and rejected, the Hindoos in despair cried, “It is impossible -to seize that which we seek; it is not this, nor that, nor anything for -which we have a name.” At last they came to the conclusion that there -was no name worthy of God in the language of humanity, and that all -that could be said was, “No, no.” - -It is necessary, however, to use names as soon as we possess the ideas. -All those which have contributed to the education of humanity have been -the production of an impersonal work, the result of a long meditation -by the human mind. It has been said that the idea and name of “the -Being” for God, originated in the mind of Moses; perhaps this prophet -put the last touch. “I Am that I Am” was the name used by him for the -Eternal. The Hebrews employed another method when speaking of God, -they used the word Il or El. In Hebrew it occurs both in its general -sense of strong or hero, and as a name of God. Something equivalent is -found in the Zend-Avesta; “Looking around him, Il (Ahuramazda, the Zend -name for Ormazd) sees nothing but himself; and Il said, ‘I Am,’ and his -name became ‘I Am.’” - -But man at times yearns for a closer union with God than is expressed -by the name “Being.” When troubled and in pain he says, “My Father!” -and he remembers the names which he lisped as a child, and all come -crowding to his lips; and He who is above all hears and understands. - -We must not separate religion from philosophy; the subjects touching on -religion have always been those which have given birth to philosophy; -even if religion existed only on sentiment, as some people maintain, -it would be for philosophy to determine if this sentiment were an -illusion, or if it had a rational base; to separate them is to lessen -both. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[109] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 312. - -[110] Rothe in his “Stille Stunden,” _Anthropological Religion_, p. 16. - -[111] Psalm xxxiii. 6; Isaiah xi. 4. - -[112] _Natural Religion_, p. 164. - -[113] _Rig-Veda_, I. 164. 6. - -[114] _Ibid_., VI. 9. 6. - -[115] _Rig-Veda_, X. 82. 7. - -[116] _Ibid._, 121. 8. - -[117] _Theosophy or Psychological Religion_, p. 97. - -[118] Higher Critics. - -[119] We find from a letter of St Jerome’s to Paula that he was in the -habit of advising his disciples to read the Scriptures, which he so -reverenced, in the following order. He began by the Psalms, then took -the books of Solomon, then he would come to Job. After going through -this course of Old Testament history he would come to the Gospels and -then to the Acts and the Epistles. After this preparation he would turn -to the Prophets, who had foretold all that the Gospels related, and -ended by allowing his disciples to read the historical Books of the Old -Testament, which might, he thought, without such previous training, -trouble and perplex them.--TRANSLATOR’S NOTE. - -[120] From M. Renan’s work on Semitic languages. - -[121] _Introduction to the Science of Religion_, pp. 31, 32. - -[122] 2 Kings iii. 15. - -[123] Ezekiel xxxi. 8. - -[124] “A God understood would be no God at all.”--Dean Mansel, -seventeenth century. - -[125] _Metaphysics_, xii. - -[126] _Physical Religion_, p. 4. - -[127] Cf. _Summum jus est summa injuria_. - -[128] This study of religions hardly gives sufficient prominence -to Christianity; Max Müller says: “I make no secret that true -Christianity, I mean the religion of Christ, seems to me to become -more and more exalted the more we know and the more we appreciate -the treasures of truth hidden in the despised religions of the -world.”--_Introduction to the Science of Religion_, p. 28. - -“It may be said that my chief object has been to magnify Christianity, -by showing that it is the fulfilment of all that the world has been -hoping and striving for. In one sense that is true. But if I hold that -Christianity has given the best and truest expression to what the old -world had tried to express in various and less perfect ways, I have at -least given the facts on which I rely.”--_Anthropological Religion_, p. -388. - -[129] On this subject Max Müller says: “The ancient Fathers of the -Church spoke on these subjects with greater freedom than we venture to -use in these days.”--_Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i., Pref. -xxix. - -[130] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i., Pref. xxix. - -[131] In the seventh century the Personality was clearly set forth in -the Athanasian Creed. - - - - -CHAPTER XII OF WORDS - - - “Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum.”--LINNÉ. - -If language is the true autobiography of the human mind, our present -language may also be called a perfect photograph of our mind in its -present state of fog. Whether ignorant or learned we still talk and -discuss, and we seldom arrive at an understanding of the subject, -owing to our want of knowledge of the precise meaning of the terms. -The most advanced sciences are those about whose terms we no longer -dispute, mathematics, for instance. When we are quite convinced of -the identity of thought and speech, we shall introduce into our -ideas, and consequently into all our discourses, whether familiar or -philosophical, a clearness impossible to obtain in any other manner. - -It would be a great help to know the etymology of words, but that would -not suffice. “L’étymologie,” said Voltaire, “est une science où les -voyelles ne font rien, et les consonnes fort peu de choses.” This sally -bears on its face the date of the century of which this could be said -in all truth. At the time of Voltaire the science of etymology was -confined to ascribing the derivation of a word to another word to which -it bore a close resemblance in sound; and the clever writer was not the -only one to rally the few learned men who considered it possible to -trace words to a source which one can hardly suspect of being related -to them. If Voltaire had known that his sarcasm was nothing more than -a simple scientific truth, he would perhaps have found less pleasure -in expressing it. The science of etymology--a growth of our day--has -discovered that words, which in appearance have nothing in common, -neither sound nor meaning, yet have a common origin. - -That would be a curious chapter of the history of thought, in which -were demonstrated the errors that had been introduced and embedded in -our minds by the use of certain words, which in the course of time -gradually developed a meaning the exact opposite of that which they had -at the first. - -For instance, matter is generally represented as something tangible, -that is to say, all are agreed in finding it devoid of mind, and it -is a sign of condemnation to say of a century it is materialistic. -Yet we who daily touch tangible objects, such as stone, metal, wood, -never succeed in putting our hands on matter as such; we should not -know where to find it. Does this arise from the fact that matter is not -tangible? The Latin word _materia_ had originally the meaning of the -wood of a tree, then of wood or timber for building. This meaning was -generalised so as to include solid bodies capable of taking various -shapes. When idols were fashioned a distinction was made between the -wood and the shape which emerged; and afterwards, when sculptors carved -statues of marble or of metal, the marble and metal again received the -name of matter or material; and when it was asked of what all tangible -objects were made, even the world on which we live, the answer was that -all were made of matter whilst they differ in form. In this way have we -become possessed of our word matter, to which nothing tangible quite -corresponds; and no doubt, owing to its complexity of meaning, it has -not ceased to exercise the minds of learned men. - -If philosophers have not been able to explain accurately the meaning of -matter, physicists have not been more successful, since what we call -matter does not come under our senses. The word might have escaped -this ill fate had it always been used only by philosophers “who try -only to use words that have been clearly defined, but names are used by -the wise and the foolish, and the foolish, as we know, are in such an -immense majority that the wonder is that words have any definite sense -left at all.”[132] - -Max Müller says: “I am quite willing to admit that matter may be called -the objective cause of all that we perceive. For the very reason, -however, that it is a cause, matter can never fall under the cognisance -of our senses. All that we can predicate of matter is that it causes -our sensations, that it exists in space and time, that it is one, but -appears under an endless variety of phenomenal forms, that it remains -unchanged in the change of outward appearances.”[133] - -The history of the word matter teaches us then that speech, whose -sole duty it is to introduce light into our minds, admits error also -as long as we are ignorant of the original meaning of words: matter, -whilst it was the solid wood of a tree and wood for building, became -for those who had coined the word a fit object for perception and -conception; later, others, differently constituted, saw in it a word -“which contains to every man exactly what he has found in it or added -to it.”[134] - -There are many words whose transformations we are able to follow from -one language to another, but, on the other hand, there are others -whose history it is not possible to know with exactness, owing to the -many revolutions, the many breaks and pauses which here and there -have destroyed and scattered the links; but the science of language -progresses, and those who study it look forward to the day when its -foundations will be placed on philosophical bases. - -Many of the false ideas we have conceived of words are no doubt -owing to the translations we read of books. When we first begin the -study of a new language the task appears a simple one, the dictionary -supplies us with the equivalent words and the grammar with the correct -forms; but the further we advance the less we are satisfied; the -difficulties of finding expressions which content us increase; words -are too abundant, or too scarce; our conceptions are invaded by ideas -of complete disparity; and we seem to be entering an unknown land, -because new effects of light and shade have lent a novel character to -the country. A translation is therefore at best but an effort to bring -together thoughts which were designed to remain always apart. - -If in our modern languages certain words necessarily change their -meaning during the course of three or four centuries, ancient languages -are under the same necessity in an infinitely greater degree. - -Many scholars have devoted their entire lives to the task of -deciphering old documents, as it is impossible for literature of an age -anterior to our present era by many centuries to preserve its original -physiognomy two thousand years later. A translation of the hymns of -the Veda, or of the Zend-Avesta, requires exactly the same process as -the deciphering of the inscriptions in the time of Cyrus, Darius, and -Xerxes. The only certain way is to compare every passage in which the -same word occurs, and look for a meaning that is equally applicable -to all. From the lack of this method Sanscrit and Zend texts have -been rendered most incorrectly. It is precisely the Sacred Writings -that have suffered the most from the efforts of interpreters. Those -passages of the hymns which have no close connection with religious or -philosophical doctrines are generally correctly rendered, but as each -generation expects to find the ideas reflecting its own time in the -words of the ancient seers, the most simple discourse--if it can in any -way be construed to represent modern thought--is tortured and twisted -so as to coincide with preconceived ideas, however foreign to the mind -of the writer. - -It is the same with the Hebrew version of the Old Testament. At the -time when the seventy Jews at Alexandria were occupied in translating -the Scriptures into Greek, 250 B.C., although Hebrew could not be -looked upon as a dead language, yet even the most learned amongst these -elders did not understand the original of many of the expressions, and -probably few of the translators undertook the task of explaining how -far those to whom Moses’ discourses were addressed, understood them. - -If the Old Testament has lost amongst the Higher Critics some of its -ancient glories, it has, on the other hand, acquired a historical -value which theologians of former times had never contemplated. The -knowledge of comparative philology having been used in deciphering the -cuneiform inscriptions or hieroglyphics engraved on the ruined walls of -the temples and palaces of Nineveh and Babylon, we possess information -concerning the worship of the Phœnicians, the Carthaginians, and the -Nomads of the Arabian peninsula. We no longer seek the help of the -inscriptions in proving the truth of the biblical records; it is rather -these which confirm the correctness of all that we learn from the -inscriptions. - -One more remark on the subject of our venerable and venerated Bible. I -do not understand how it is that some people with literary tastes never -open the Old Testament to satisfy them. Lack of habit perhaps. Some -of the wits of the Renaissance looked down on the Old Testament; now -the admirers of classic literature know better how to appreciate its -literary beauties of many kinds of which it is full; some of our modern -writers have been much commended for their perorations; the perorations -of the chapters contained in the Bible are superb. - -“I will give an instance how the peculiar character of a language may -influence even religious expressions. A Mohawk (coming originally from -North America) was questioned concerning his mother-tongue. It seems -that in Mohawk it is impossible to say father, mother, child, nor the -father, the mother, the child. We must always say, my father, thy -mother, or his child. Once when I asked him to translate the Apostles’ -Creed for me, he translated ‘I believe in our God, our Father, and -his Son’ all right. But when he came to the Holy Ghost, he asked is -it _their_ or _his_ Holy Ghost? I told him there was a difference of -opinion on that point between two great divisions of the Christian -Church, and he then shook his head and declared that he could not -translate the Creed till that point had been settled.”[135] This fact -has an interest for linguists; what I am about to relate concerns all. - -A lady wishing to practise a little philosophy with the means within -her reach, wrote to me once: “I am perplexed; my heart tells me one -thing, and my soul another.” It required some moments of reflection to -understand what my correspondent meant; the heart was, in her eyes, -obviously, the seat of earthly affections; and the soul that of purely -spiritual aspirations. This hazy manner of explanation might, at first -sight, appear harmless, but on looking at it more closely, it is seen -to be unfortunate, for this confusion between thoughts and words, -meets one in many a book of so-called edification, where the reader -seldom takes note of it, especially if he be hurried or careless; but -one regrets to see good women waste daily half an hour in reading such -indefinite nothings, thinking to accomplish thereby a religious duty; -these persons, with intellectual culture would draw greater benefit to -themselves in devoting their half hour to the perusal of books of a -more sturdy tone. - -We believe ourselves to be in the possession of very clear notions -concerning conscience; earnest men speak of it as an inward monitor; -simple folk like ourselves call it the Voice of God; for the one and -for the other conscience seems to be a guide on which they can rely, -and the Greek poet Menander was not mistaken when he wrote the line -“Conscience is a god to all mortals.” But if we possessed within us a -faculty to tell us what is our duty, how could Pascal have said that -good and evil differ with a few degrees of latitude? It is a well-known -fact that the conscience of a Mormon speaks another language to that of -a non-Mormon. We say with truth that we are conscious of having done -well or ill, but it does not follow that it is to our conscience that -we owe the fact of knowing right from wrong; this consciousness is -the result of instruction from without, which we accept when our own -judgment and our own experience demonstrate its truth. - -In subjects of general interest, the task of defining terms should -consist in choosing amongst the various interpretations which have -gradually become attached to certain words, not always that one which -is most intimately or etymologically connected with the primary root, -but that which would indicate an important practical difference. Yet by -an unforeseen misfortune, the daily necessity comes before us of using -words whose meaning has never been clearly defined, so that at no time -has one meaning prevailed more than another; this is especially the -case with words connected with religion, faith, and objects of belief, -which each one understands after his own manner. - -In our days the possibility of an agreement between religion and -science is often debated; how can we enter on the discussion without -being quite clear as to what religion is? According to some it is -simply the feeling of love for God; according to others it is the -expression of our faith under the form of acts of worship, acts of -charity, or perhaps the holding of certain dogmas. - -The same holds good with that which we call faith, and which is often a -feeling of confidence--not always the result of thought--in the faith -of those surrounding us. Some give the name of faith to that enthusiasm -which has sufficed to cause men joyfully to meet martyrdom; others -apply it to the confidence with which the wise men followed the guiding -of the star, when it indicated the road they should follow. Faith is -only worthy of the name when it can be said to be a reasonable faith, -and thus accounting for its existence. If we are not amongst the number -of those who can give a reason for the faith that is in them, we must -take care that credulity does not glide in before we are aware of its -approach; it arises from a weakness of the mind and is compatible with -a tranquillity that differs very widely from peace; and when once -mistress of the situation, it increases, and occupies it. A wise Arab -well said, “He who builds his house on human credulity builds on a -rock.” - -“Abstract,” this word which we can trace back to Aristotle, has an -interesting history. Aristotle used it at first to characterise the -creation of a work of art; the sculptor carves out of a block of marble -the statue of a man or of a woman, rejecting the chips and dust which -serve no purpose. Afterwards Aristotle applied this same word to an -idea which an accurate thinker forms, giving it a suitable shape, and -separating it from all accidental thoughts that may have surrounded -it; that done, what remains is an abstract idea. Aristotle has so well -explained the meaning of abstract, that if our logicians had simply -spoken of _concrete_ as that which is non-abstract, all the world would -more readily have understood the meaning of the word--concrete. - -We possess and employ a vast number of words, and we apparently -increase them by endowing the same word--from a want of clearness -in our perceptions--with various meanings. The ancient Hindoos must -have felt that an over-abundance of words is pernicious, and for this -reason, no doubt, the Brahmans at a certain period of their literature, -imposed on themselves the rule of expressing their thoughts in the -fewest words possible. They succeeded in presenting each point of -doctrine denuded of all but the barest outline of words; they are the -authors of the aphorism, “A writer of the Sutras is happier in having -economised a portion of a diphthong than from the birth of a son.” The -full force of this sentence becomes apparent when it is remembered that -the Brahman who has no son to perform his funeral rites cannot hope to -enter heaven. It would be difficult to express more forcibly a respect -for words, and the great necessity there is for cultivating clearness -of thought. - - * * * * * - -What I am about to say concerns a word to which I owe the direction -of my views of life, and my resolution to undertake the study of the -subjects forming my present work; this word is the name of a man. - -When I was young I made the acquaintance of a very learned Jesuit -Father who employed his time in researches on the ecclesiastical -antiquities of the East. We once found ourselves in the company of -certain persons who were surveying the most remarkable of all the -scientific and philosophical works published in our day; Darwin, -Pasteur, Helmholtz and Max Müller were named. When the reverend Father -heard this last name, he exclaimed, with his accustomed impetuosity, -“Oh! Max Müller, his works are absolutely magnificent.” - -Twenty years later the announcement of a new work of Max Müller -reminded me of the Jesuit Father’s exclamation; hitherto I had read -nothing of this author’s; I procured the book which had appeared -recently; afterwards I read those that had preceded it. At the end -of some years I wrote to the reverend Father; the state of his health -had obliged him to settle in a town in the south, and I had not seen -him for some time. I thanked him for having drawn my attention to -Max Müller’s name. I received an immediate reply, the first lines of -which I will quote. “Your thanks are unexpected. Max Müller seems to -me an incomparable philosopher, but my admiration does not surpass his -merit.” A few weeks later the worthy Father died of consumption. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[132] _Science of Thought_, p. 568. - -[133] _Ibid._, p. 569. - -[134] _Ibid._, p. 570. - -[135] Max Müller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 171. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS - - -I had not decided beforehand on the number of my chapters; it seems -that there will be thirteen. If these pages have readers to whom the -number thirteen is distressing, I beg of them at once to dismiss -this feeling by saying: “He who objects to sit down thirteen at -table, acknowledges by this that he does not believe in a supreme -intelligence, superior to his own, which governs the world.” - - * * * * * - -Science, religion, reason, and faith, these four words form the circle -in which all intellects move, now more than ever; on this all the world -is agreed, but all the world does not know what the greatest thinkers -have understood by these four words. - -If we do not wish to deserve the title given to that collective -being, “the man in the street,” the best means of avoiding it is to -acknowledge openly that there are many unexplained problems facing us, -and that man exists in order to do his part in solving them. Humanity -is not composed of individuals who have been poured forth from a horn -of plenty, its destiny cannot therefore be to diffuse itself over the -surface of the earth without the means of knowing why it is there. - -An ancient Greek said once that the gods were ready to sell all kinds -of good things to mortals but at a high price, at the cost of hard -work. If then we can only acquire the promised good things by the aid -of hard work, our thoughts carry us at once to science, and we ask -what can this science do, upon which we so pride ourselves in this -century, to explain the motive of our existence? - - -PHYSICS - -In proportion as physical science studies this universe, so it -recognises more and more clearly that its most general phenomenon is -vibration, a periodical movement, which propagates itself in waves -succeeding each other at regular intervals. - -We have all noticed the effect produced by drops of rain falling on -water which the absence of wind leaves perfectly tranquil. Each drop -forms a circle, but the causes of perturbation of an aqueous surface -are infinite; the dip of an insect, the leap of a fish, all ceaselessly -cause new circles, which follow each other, become wider, and finally -lose themselves in each other under our eyes; the water is apparently -a prey to shivering fits; this is a type of the vibrations whose -percussions are felt by the whole world. We are all, body and soul, -subject to the law of vibrations, each sense recognises its power by -means of sensations whose various kinds are apprehended by physical -science, by the calculation of the number of vibrations which, in -a given time, affect differently each of our organs of sensation. -Science records the number of vibrations which denote to our skin the -exact degree of the external temperature, she counts the millions of -vibrations which enable our eyes to see definite colours in the space -of a second, and the thousands of vibrations which enable our ears to -hear, in the same space of time, well defined sounds. - -Thus physical science explains a general phenomenon which exerts its -influence, indubitably, on all men since there have been men on earth. - - -COMPARATIVE SCIENCES - -When Bordas-Desmoulins, one of the first of our learned thinkers to -study comparative science, said: “Without mathematics we cannot plumb -the depths of philosophy; without philosophy we cannot penetrate -mathematics; without the two we can reach the foundation of nothing,” -did he see that this truth is so great as to be all embracing? - -We see theologians walking steadily in the footsteps of those who -study comparative science with conviction. Father Gratry contends that -without it it is impossible to know God, man, and nature. Matter cannot -be conceived without spirit, nor spirit apart from matter. Whilst a -human being is in the embryonic stage, the soul, the principle of -life, is occupied in forming the body, destined to cover it during its -earthly existence. The moment arrives when this body is sufficiently -prepared to appear in the light of day; it contains two nervous -centres, the one supplying the vegetative life, the other the animal; -they are distinct though not separated, and the soul still continues -its work on the body, whether it sleeps or whether it wakes; but during -sleep, whilst man’s will is torpid, the soul supplies by rhythmic -movements of the nerves, the requisite matter for the reparation of the -losses sustained during the waking periods. - -This intimate union of mind and matter has been rejected by certain -great philosophers. Descartes, for instance, completely separated the -immaterial substance possessed of the property of thinking from the -material body. Apparently we are of his way of thinking since we always -speak of our soul as of one thing and our body as of another; this is -to make two truths out of one and the same truth. But it is better to -look upon it as one truth as Aristotle did formerly. At a later date -certain doctors of the Church became of the same opinion, and at -present Christian theologians, who are also thinkers, hold the same -view. - - * * * * * - -A fresh science is now in process of development. It connects psychical -phenomena, such as sensation, thought, and action, with that which -can be weighed and measured. This science bears several more or less -characteristic names; in order to keep to generalities I will call -it the new psychology; it is taught in Germany, England, Paris, and -Russia, and perhaps elsewhere. There is only one way of dealing rightly -with so vast a science, it should be treated in its entirety; but as I -am anxious only to make known some of its more recent discoveries, I -will content myself by doing this briefly and with many omissions. - - * * * * * - -Kant had as his disciple the physiologist J. Müller, who applied the -method of his master to the study of sensations; and Helmholtz was -trained by J. Müller. - -At one time, rather more than fifty years ago, the germs of life were -considered to be an exception on the terrestrial globe; but Helmholtz -discovered them even in rocky masses; and he proved to Liebig that -putrefaction was not a simple chemical reaction, but was due to the -action of a living organism. M. Pasteur was one of the first to profit -by this lesson. - -Each definite science has its own special sphere in which it is -occupied only with itself; Helmholtz, a physician and musician, worked -entirely in connection with his own science only; without reference to -the conclusion that comparative science might draw from his labours, -he gave himself up to the study of the rapidity of the transmission -of nervous impressions, and dogmatically laid down his thesis in his -book _The Physiological Theory of Music_, which is perhaps the most -important of his works; at least it is the one of which I have made the -most use. - -In nature we never hear simple sounds; nothing but a fusion of -noises reaches us. Helmholtz, however, succeeded in distinguishing a -fundamental sound in a mass of others; but it is quickly amalgamated -with two or three other sounds which are higher and feebler than -itself, as distant echoes. Helmholtz became convinced that music -is composed of single sounds accompanied by others of a decreasing -intensity, and he demonstrated by calculation that the number of -vibrations of these secondary sounds called harmonics are greater than -those of the fundamental sounds; and the differences of the grouping -of harmonic sounds determines the difference of timbre. In this way -Helmholtz discovered the cause of musical timbre, and was able to -explain the reason, hitherto unknown, of the sound of a flute differing -from that of a hautbois, or of a woman’s voice from that of a man’s. - -There are two marvellous things in music; timbre and rhythm. - -By rhythm is understood the number of a group of corresponding -vibrations recurring in a second. Rhythm may be defined as a recurring -movement, composed of unequal parts; the beat of a pulse, in which each -pulsation can be separately distinguished, will serve as an example. - -Rhythm may be found everywhere, in poetry equally with music; and it is -this which imparts its chief charm. The beauty of the rhythmic prose -of the Hebrew Nābhī naturally attracted the multitude independently -of the subject matter of their words; and the rhythmic language of -Renan’s translation of the book of Job enables us perfectly to grasp -and appreciate the special charm incidental to rhythm. - -Music is provocative of nervous effects, at times of great intensity; -beneficent to the greater number of persons, but to others quite the -reverse; in his infancy Mozart almost fainted on hearing the sound of -the trumpet. - -Professor Wundt--who in his works deals with the human soul and that of -beasts--founded at Leipzig, in 1879, a laboratory with this inscription -over the entrance, “Institute for Experimental Psychology.” Wundt -said: “The result of my researches does not accord with the dualism -of Plato and Descartes; from experimental psychology the animism of -Aristotle (who connects psychology and biology) alone is evolved, as -the plausible metaphysical conclusion.” - -A wonderful man this Aristotle! Whether we wish to analyse those -sensations which stir every fibre of our moral being, or to trace the -etymology of a word, or study the most modern of all our sciences, the -first to present himself to our mental vision is the sage of Stageira. - -The first notes of an air by Mozart or of a sonata of Beethoven could -never have been produced by them by chance, they were willed by a power -which their composers considered outside themselves. - -Inspiration--revelation--the same thing with all, in all time, and in -every place, they differ but in degree. It is possible that a musical -physician such as Helmholtz, added to a psychological physiologist as -Wundt was, and the two grafted on to a philosopher such as Aristotle, -might have been able to define, in a measure, the meaning of the words -Inspiration and Revelation. - -It is with a knowledge of causes that we are able to say: “The -universal phenomenon of vibration is a fight for life, a fight between -_being_ and _not being_.” - - -CONCERNING SOME AUTHORS - -We do not always occupy ourselves with science, and writers of a -poetical temperament like to write on the more serious subjects, at -the dictation of their heart and conscience only, especially when they -speak to themselves alone, with no thought of others. - -Renan, in his _History of the People of Israel_, writes: “In presence -of the social problems of our days, and of the question: Has life -a premeditated end and object? What is it? Is it for the good of -humanity? Is it for the good of the individual?” The author replies: -“The universe, whose last word we never learn, attains its end by -an infinite variety of germs; if we are amongst those who deceive -themselves and rebel against authority, that may not be attended by -serious consequences ... let us be quiet; if we miss the mark others -will hit it; that which Jahvah wills, will come to pass.” - -Understand if you can. - -Those who wish to adore, always find an object of adoration; Renan -seeks his religion in the love of science and art; Comte thought to -find it in a life devoted to the happiness of humanity. Is it not of -these, and of men similar to them, that the most intellectual and -clearest sighted of judges, the mythological god Krishna, spoke when he -said, “All those who adore idols, adore me.” - -Everywhere we encounter God and His power; either He triumphs over man, -or man vainly seeks to triumph over Him. - -I have noticed that Renan’s work, _La Vie de Jésus_, to which -earnest-minded persons have a great objection, has been the means of -consoling more than one sincere soul. Is it to be reckoned a good or -an evil? Who shall take upon himself to say? Renan has certainly an -attraction for certain readers, they do not succeed in finding out -what he believes, but that is not to the point; generally he confines -himself to troubling the water, it becomes muddy; in muddy waters fish -are sometimes taken--we throw our lines--and--marvellous--each one -draws out his favourite fish. - -Père Gratry has nothing in common with Renan, except that both are -poets. Plato having said that all but the wicked have their eternal -types in God, Gratry was authorised in the conclusion he drew in his -_Logic_ that “nothing in us, neither sentiment, nor imagination, nor -prayer, can go too far; all is more beautiful than that of which we -dream; all is higher than we can believe possible.” - -This language has displeased certain moralists, and they have not -spared their censures on the theologian who used it. They have accused -him of dreaming whilst dealing with religion, and they would have -preferred that Gratry should occupy himself simply with literature. -“Above all,” they say, “how is it that Gratry has ventured to write -five long chapters on the probable site of immortality, and to inquire -where men will live when there is no longer death.” - -Why should we not be permitted to ask ourselves these questions, and -to reply to them as we please? Are not theologians men like ourselves? -Especially that theologian who said: “The time when religion will have -acquired the characteristics of a science is yet far distant.” - - -RELIGION AND RELIGIONS - -At an early period of our present era, various groups of men formed -themselves into assemblies, “Churches,” as they were called, all -teaching religion, and each from his own point of view. The study of -these instructions is full of important lessons. First is to be noticed -this fact that the truths on which all were agreed weighed more heavily -in the balance than those on which they disagreed. It is necessary to -disentangle true religion in itself from its surroundings. There is -one true religion, as there is one God, and one logic. The expressions -which are current with us of natural religion and revealed religion -should be lacking in our conversation, since they cause us to believe -that they denote two different religions.[136] - -Opinions are sometimes attributed to the founders of organised -religions which really belong only to their disciples, or even to -theologians who live in an age much more recent than the historical -birth of the religion; if free discussion followed, suppositions and -doubts might often be dissipated, but in certain cases laws are imposed -and rules laid down which are considered infallible and not open to -discussion. - -According to the early Christian Doctors, the Church is external and -visible, together with that which is within and invisible; the title, -“Soul of the Church,” was given to the invisible union of men amongst -themselves and with God; its dogma is, “All the righteous, none but the -righteous can have their share in the soul of the Church; many are in -the visible Church who do not belong to its soul; many are out of the -visible Church who form a portion of the soul of the Church.”[137] - -In speaking thus the Fathers rested on an ancient tradition; it came -to them from Plato, whose words I have already quoted: “There is in -the soul a point, which is the root by which the Divinity suspends -his creatures to Himself; and this central point is the truth which -connects all men from one end of the world to the other.” This explains -the previous assertion of the Fathers. - -But they did not content themselves with an assertion only; they -imposed on reason the burden of explanation and the duty of knowing -all. The first effort of our reason in natural sciences consists in -examining facts and endeavouring to find the laws. If one eternal law -did not rule over the whole of nature our labour would be in vain; -if this same law did not govern our reason we should be incapable of -finding those laws which govern the phenomena around us; and it is -clear that there could consequently be no physical science. But it is -not so apparent at first sight that if our reason were not governed by -an eternal law, there could be no moral sciences either. - -Many observations have been made by men of attentive and profound -minds, but they have remained isolated for the most part. I will quote -one or two that I have collected here and there; it is well to pass -them in review, if only to assure one’s self that they are true. - -“It is a great mistake to suppose that those who have read many books -know many things. Reading supplies the material for knowledge, but -reflection alone causes it to take root and grow.” Locke made this -observation. I add to it that for reflection to bear fruit it must be -joined to a good method. Père Gratry, who is a practical man, also -enforces this in a chapter in his _Logic_, in which he lays great -stress on the importance of reserving the morning hours for study and -reflection. It is a fine paragraph, and worthy of being reproduced. - -“In the book of the Apocalypse we read, ‘And there was silence in -heaven for the space of half an hour.’ In the heaven of souls this is -rare. According to St Augustine the Eternal Wisdom does not cease to -speak to human creatures, and reason does not cease its activities -in us. We have only to listen, and to listen we must keep silence. -But amongst men, and especially amongst thinkers, who can keep still -silence? The generality of men, especially those who study, have not a -single half hour of silence in the day, men of learning either listen -to those who speak, or are speaking themselves; and when they find -themselves alone and silent, then they permit books to speak to them, -and they devour long discourses, with rapid glances, in a few minutes.” - -Under these conditions all study requiring much reflection is -impossible. - -Attention, Abstraction, Contradiction, Speech--only a few persons -appreciate the importance of these four words, and hardly any one -doubts that they know the part played in their lives by the things -which these words represent. - -If we wish to know ourselves many subjects of all kinds must be studied -simultaneously; religion and religions; the opinions of the ancients -and of our contemporaries; men as they now are and as they were. Renan -has well characterised primitive men in attributing to them “a special -feeling for nature which enabled them, with wonderful delicacy and -accuracy, of which we have no conception, to perceive the qualities -which furnished names; and they saw innumerable things at once.” - -The Hindoos, who were writers many centuries before our present era, -must have inherited from their primitive ancestors this special feeling -for nature, or they would not have composed those verses in the 129th -hymn: “Everything in the beginning was hidden in gloom--the germ which -was covered by the husk was brought forth by the power of heat. On -this germ rested love, the spring of the mind, yes, and the poets, -in meditating thereon, discovered in their souls the tie between the -things created and the things uncreated.--This spark, comes it from the -earth, piercing all, penetrating into all, or comes it from heaven?” - -These passages have something modern in them; they might have been -written now when science seeks to fuse heaven and earth, which was not -done formerly. - -The cord does not cease to vibrate. The persistence of this phenomenon -has different comments made on it. “It is the effect of heredity,” says -modern science; “it is a contemporaneous effect of the fall,” says -theology. Perhaps the one and the other make of the human race one -unique being which continues through the ages. - -It is as though time had no existence for humanity. Space also -apparently does not count for much with the race. If the singular -facts are true which we hear, two persons separated by a great -distance have the same thoughts at the same instant; not the universal -thought naturally inherent in the human mind, but entirely personal. -Has sympathy--which is as essentially human as it is mysterious--a -relationship with electricity, which is a distinctly physical -phenomenon? On those who reject such a supposition should fail the -burden of finding another. - -Each of us sees a landscape according to our sight; to the -short-sighted (and this is a normal condition) the landscape appears -simple; trees here, there houses and streets, men walking; but with -strong glasses, as is well known, it is possible to see many more -things. Again, the short-sighted can distinguish only the colour, veins -and serrated edge of a leaf, but if this were placed under a microscope -they would see a surface of green glittering with light, and strewn -with gold and diamonds. - -If there are two ways of looking at a leaf, there are at least three of -looking at life; it can be seen from its pleasant or painful side, this -is to feel that we live only; then we can grasp it with regard to the -duties it imposes on us. This is a right point of view, but it shows -one side only; or we may consider it as science represents it, that is -its moral, rational, and religious aspect combined. - -The more we observe and the more we reflect on what we observe, so -much the more do we exercise our faculty of understanding things; and -according as this faculty approaches or withdraws from the normal type, -so it will correspond either with the leaf seen by the naked eye or -with it as seen under the microscope. - - -OPPOSITION - -There are two kinds of opposition. Very often we come upon a true -thought in a book which shocks us because for the moment we do not -recognise its truth. We also forget that all truths can be viewed at -various angles; or we do not understand a truth because it is expressed -in a novel way. - -A manual treating of physics will best explain the reason of our -false impression. When a ray of light is transmitted from one medium -to another of different density, as from air to water, a change of -direction is impressed on the ray, making the straight line appear -broken; this change of direction is called _refraction_. Cardinal -Newman made a very true observation on this subject. “If an idea is -presented unexpectedly to us,” he said, “clothed in words to which -we are unaccustomed, it is sufficient to cause us to speak of it as -erroneous; this illusion is only a simple effect of the _refraction of -words_; that is to say, that in the mind of the writer of this truth -which startles us, the idea followed a straight line, but in our mind -it became broken.” - -The second kind of opposition is of a different nature. It is amusing -to watch two individuals who are taking opposite sides in a heated -discussion concerning some philosopher. “What I tell you is correct; -A, who is a great scholar, says so.” “Yes, but I also know a great -scholar, B, and he says just the contrary.” - -There seems to be a charm in controversy which few persons can resist; -they ignore what you say, and bluntly tell you that you are in the -wrong. - - -ABSTRACTION, INATTENTION - -Not only is abstraction fatal to study, but it often plays us sorry -tricks apart from our occupations. Sometimes a bright idea comes into -our mind, but touching only the surface; if by inattention or idleness -we do not fix it firmly in our memory by clothing it in suitable words, -it is a hundred to one that it is not irrevocably lost to us. It is not -more possible to arrest its flight than to fasten a placard to the wall -without nails or gum. - -It is difficult to note with exactness the amount of inattention which -so frequently accompanies the act of opening a serious book even with -the fixed intention of reading it. - -I once surprised myself in a flagrant act of inattention. I was staying -with a friend, and took up Pascal’s _Pensées_, which I had not read -for some time. The edition was not the same as the one I had at home. -Whilst turning over the leaves I said to myself occasionally, “How -the style has changed--this is not clear--this observation is very -shallow”; and so I went on, astonished at not being able to admire -this celebrated work as I had formerly done. Suddenly I came upon this -phrase, “Monsieur Pascal confond tout cela.” What was my humiliation -to discover that in this edition “les Pensées de Pascal” were followed -by “les Pensées de Nicole.” I had passed from the one to the other -without noticing it. But what could have given rise to this impression -of Nicole’s? I turned back a few pages, and read: “A book has just -appeared which is perhaps the most useful that could be placed in the -hands of princes; it is a selection of the ‘Pensées de Pascal.’ I do -not say that all are equally good ... I find amongst them many well -polished stones and fit to adorn a great building; but the remainder -appeared to be mixed material, for which I can hardly suppose that M. -Pascal could find a use.... There are even certain sentiments which -hardly appear to be exact, and are like scattered thoughts thrown -out at random, which are written only that they may afterwards be -examined with more care and attention. Monsieur Pascal supposes that -ennui comes from that which we see in ourselves--from what we think of -ourselves. That assertion is perhaps more subtle than solid. Thousands -of persons experience ennui without thinking of themselves at all; they -feel weariness not from what they think, but because they do not think -enough.... M. Pascal confond tout cela.” Upon my word, I felt consoled -for my lapse into inattention; to this fault I owe my acquaintance with -M. Nicole’s acute remark: “Men do not feel weariness from what they -think, but because they do not think enough.” - - -SPEECH - -When the members of the human family began to use the _clamor -concomitans_ which accompanied their occupations, as _clamor -significans_, these simple materials formed the roots which indicated -such and such acts, and produced verbal and nominatival bases composed -of predicative and demonstrative elements. During the course of ages -the first became conjugated and the second were declined. By means of -adding the successive acts together, and retaining them united in the -mind, or subtracting in several directions, our ancestors diversified -the meaning of all the primitive roots; they formed collective and -abstract nouns in their simplest form by combination. The process never -varied; thus the thought progressed from the first root to the last -concept. But the first word ever pronounced by a human creature was -a true proposition, and our last literary chef-d’œuvre consists of a -series of propositions. - -Descartes’ brief phrase “Cogito, ergo sum” may be better rendered and -still more briefly by one word. The Greek word Logos, meaning word and -thought combined, had originally, as I have already remarked, the two -meanings of assembling and combining. “Cogito” = I think, which is the -short for co-agito = I assemble. The act of assembling presupposes -that of separating, seeing that it is impossible to combine two or more -things without at the same time separating them from other things. The -child who is taught the first rules of arithmetic adds and subtracts, -which can only be done by combining and separating. However little -intelligence he may have, his task does not present great difficulties -to him; and yet the most abstruse mathematical problem consists in -adding and subtracting, and the most astounding calculations of Newton, -and the most profound mathematical speculations of Kant, are but the -results of addition and subtraction, of combining and separating. - -In the course of time all that fills our dictionaries and our -grammars was developed and achieved, and nothing remained for poets -and philosophers to do but to add to and deduce from the materials -which they had inherited or had themselves acquired as the result of -their own efforts; and however powerful the imagination of poets may -be, and however subtle the reasoning of philosophers, the materials -which both use to form their monuments are exactly the same, and -these are nothing but the words derived from roots and collected in -dictionaries. Most decidedly Michael Angelo was something more than a -mason or bricklayer, but yet the basilica of St Peter’s is made only -of stones and bricks and a little cement, which, when brought down to -its final constituents, is nothing but pulverised stone. Most decidedly -one of Shakespeare’s plays is possessed of other qualities than a -mere assemblage of the letters of the alphabet arranged in a certain -order, but the materials of which the plays are formed were drawn from -the inexhaustible supply of words accumulated during thousands of -years, and which contain no single particle of gold or silver that is -not found in the thousand roots of our language and the 121 concepts -conceived in our minds. - -Amongst the men who know how to think, many are astonished that the -so-called civilised portion of humanity should have advanced so little, -there is nothing astonishing in this; let us consider the point, and -remember that we are only now on the morrow of the day when we were -still immature humanity, and in which the human character, with its -germs of language and of thought, only began to be visible in us. The -universe obeys the unchangeable law which we name Divine Providence; -an irresistible law which compels matter to make certain predetermined -movements, and the mind to tend towards perfection; man knows that he -is morally free, and not necessarily subject to animal impulses. - -Man’s moral liberty being conceded, he uses it as he will; at times he -seeks and finds opportunities for resisting the moral law; man, even -the nominal Christian, stifles the spirit’s higher voice and compels -himself to listen to the lower voice of the flesh. Pascal said plainly: -“According to the carnal Christian the Messiah has come to dispense us -from the necessity of loving God by providing sacraments which act as -charms apart from our co-operation,” and our hatred and our injustice -continue--under cover of a scrupulous observance of rites--to infect -the world as well as ourselves. He spoke truly, and saw clearly, who -first said: “Every being tends to preserve its existence.” With regard -to the man of whom Pascal speaks, this means to follow incessantly his -evil practices. But, happily, there exist other men who feel that, -besides oxygen and pleasure, they must also absorb science and true -prosperity for their well-being. - -We read in the book of Ecclesiasticus: “In every good work trust thine -own soul” (Ecclesiasticus xxxii. 23). Yes, let us believe in our own -soul, which is the true Ego, and it will bid us live. I am far from -sharing Pascal’s opinion, which is, that the Ego always merits contempt. - -Science, after having noted and counted the exact number of vibrations -of all kinds which from all parts affect us, at a certain point -ceases to have the power to calculate further, and recognises that -beyond and above all vibrations there exists that which can neither -be named nor counted. In my opinion that which is the best part of -science is that it knows its limitations; with some people it is a well -known experience that when they have once grasped the fact that their -inability rightly to comprehend something they desire to know arises -from an immutable decree, they become at once imbued with a profound -quiescence, closely allied to certainty. - -After which there is but one step left to human reason, to forsake that -reason which is but temporary, and to lose oneself in that which has -neither beginning nor end. This last step is an act of faith. Someone, -who does not think sufficiently, calls this a leap in the dark, but for -him who accomplishes it this darkness becomes transparent as crystal. - -“Yes,” these persons exclaim, “and such was Kant’s last act.” It would -be more correct to say Kant ended as he began, by an act of reason, -since he drew the logical conclusion of what he had learnt. - - -RÉSUMÉ - -The evolution of the human race will not become clear to us unless we -remember that a time existed when man was without language and without -reason. - -During this obscure period which we name the dawn of humanity, the -material wants and their satisfaction, comprised the whole being of -man, as it does that of the animal. With man commenced the line of -individuals leading to the higher order of social life. It is possible -that the feeling of being one of many was one of the first to awake -in man, since it was owing to the support afforded him by his fellows -that he obtained what he needed; he was also conscious of family ties, -this emotion and sentiment was the cradle of all his best qualities; -afterwards would come the attractions of race; this feeling might -so dominate the individual as to cause him to forget that he was a -separate entity; then by a concurrence of circumstances difficult to -define, national feelings were developed from the salient features of -the race, and national languages separated themselves from the central -source. The knowledge of being a portion of humanity arrived at a much -later period; he is still at this present time a part of a feeble few, -and he can be summed up in the well-known sentence, of which the first -words are, “Homo sum.” If we consider the meaning of this classical -quotation it is very striking. - -We often mention the pre-historic times, but we seldom ask ourselves at -what date history can have begun. With the first heap of stones piled -up by the men of a certain tribe at the burial of a venerated chief, -history commenced; this heap became the point at which the past touched -the future, a visible link in the interminable chain of human thought. - -At the origin of all this mental activity we find an inspiration--a -poetical fiat. It was a historical moment--no other similar to it has -ever been, before or since--when the first group of human creatures -acclaimed with inarticulate cries their first cavern, or the first den -dug by themselves. At a much later date when man, looking up at the -vault of heaven--his curiosity aroused--wished to know what were the -brilliant things he saw moving high above him, was he not impelled by -the feeling of the presence of a Being hitherto unknown, and to whom -he paid unconscious homage by giving Him a name? If the feeling had -not made itself felt simultaneously with the awakened attention caused -by the appearance of the sky, the electric spark would not have burst -forth. - -At a later date still to what can we attribute the union of pure -thought and beating hearts but to the first definite perception of the -Divine breath, and the conception of an invisible yet longed for God, -whose name descended from generation to generation down to ourselves? -Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Kant, and Max Müller, have -all described this ascension of the reason from the first thought which -contained the germ of the idea, up to God Himself. - - * * * * * - -We thus arrive at a high level though starting from low ground; we -should be higher still, but that we are retarded equally by lack of -speech and of thought. As long as we fondly imagine that in possessing -a word we are also masters of the thought attached to it, and that -to penetrate to the heart of a thought is nothing but a linguistic -exercise, or an intellectual gymnastic feat, we shall not use the sole -method with which we are supplied, of growing morally, rationally, and -religiously. - -We form ideas of many things, but we know them only partially and -disjointedly; sciences which we have learnt possess unity, since with -grammar is connected synthesis, and with mathematics, algebra; (this -word algebra is of Arab origin, “al djabroun,” and means the reduction -of dislocated members), is it possible that we--the creators of these -sciences--should be destined to wander around and away from unity, and -never attain it? - - * * * * * - -It is time to end this study; I suspect that I am not the only one -of this opinion. It is possible that amongst my readers--if I have -any--some may already have found means of shortening it for themselves; -they will perhaps turn over the pages, read a few, and say, “How -tedious the old pedant is,” then shut the book and not open it again. - -This would be a pity in my opinion; they should read a little more. - -No philosophical work can be written without the words _perceive_ -and _conceive_ appearing very frequently in it. The Latin language -possesses the word “capio,” which means to seize something with the -hand; only convincing facts can lead us to believe that these terms -to _perceive_ and to _conceive_ are derived from _capio_; thus the -word expressing the well-known physical movement of taking something -with the hand was the origin of the two words _percept_ and _concept_, -without which no philosophical idea could take shape or be developed in -us. - -The space which separates the word _capio_ from _percept_ and _concept_ -includes neither more nor less than the entire evolution of man; that -is, our own history. - -That of which we think so little is in reality the indelible sign -impressed once for all on man, that which alone distinguishes him -from the animals, and which may yet help to form in man an excellence -hitherto unknown to us; this distinguishing mark is thought and speech. - -We are men--but has the type of the “genus homo” been realised? Is it -impossible? - -It has been undoubtedly proved that man is free in certain directions, -and not in others; happily he is not free not to be a man. - -THE END - -FOOTNOTES: - -[136] There is _one_ in the way in which St Paul speaks: “There is one -body, and one spirit, even as also ye were called in one hope of your -calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, -who is over all, and through all, and in all.” - -[137] As Savonarola said: “Yes, from the Church militant, but not from -the Church in Heaven,” in answer to his excommunication. - - * * * * * - - PRINTED BY - TURNBULL AND SPEARS, - EDINBURGH - - * * * * * - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Footnotes have been moved to the end of each chapter and relabeled -consecutively through the document. - -Punctuation has been made consistent. - -Variations in spelling and hyphenation were retained as they appear in -the original publication, except that obvious typographical errors have -been corrected. - -The following changes were made: - -p. 23: Llamas changed to Lamas (the Lamas of) - -p. 180: Lines below S and s have been standardized to acute accents -(Śraddhâ, śraddadhau, śraddhitam) - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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