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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/6413.txt b/6413.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9cbddc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/6413.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3709 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of From October to Brest-Litovsk, by Leon Trotzky + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: From October to Brest-Litovsk + +Author: Leon Trotzky + +Release Date: September, 2004 [EBook #6413] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on December 8, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FROM OCTOBER TO BREST-LITOVSK *** + + + + +Produced by Julie Barkley, David Starner +and the Online Proofreading Team. + + + + + +From October to Brest-Litovsk + +By Leon Trotzky + +Authorized Translation from the Russian + +1919 + + +TRANSLATOR'S NOTES: + +1. In this book Trotzky (until near the end) uses the Russian Calendar +in indicating dates, which, as the reader will recall, is 13 days behind +the Gregorian Calendar, now introduced in Russia. + +2. The abbreviation S. R. and S. R.'s is often used for +"Social-Revolutionist(s)" or "Socialist-Revolutionaries." + +3. "Maximalist" often appears instead of "bolshevik," and "minimalist" +instead of "menshevik." + + + +THE MIDDLE-CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION + +Events move so quickly at this time, that it is hard to set them down +from memory even in chronological sequence. Neither newspapers nor +documents are at our disposal. And vet the repeated interruptions in the +Brest-Litovsk negotiations create a suspense which, under present +circumstances, is no longer bearable. I shall endeavor, therefore, to +recall the course and the landmarks of the October revolution, reserving +the right to complete and correct this exposition subsequently in the +light of documents. + +What characterized our party almost from the very first period of the +revolution, was the conviction that it would ultimately come into power +through the logic of events. I do not refer to the theorists of the +party, who, many years before the revolution--even before the revolution +of 1905--as a result of their analysis of class relations in Russia, +came to the conclusion that the triumphant development of the revolution +must inevitably transfer the power to the proletariat, supported by the +vast masses of the poorest peasants. The chief basis of this prognosis +was the insignificance of the Russian bourgeois democracy and the +concentrated character of Russian industrialism--which makes of the +Russian proletariat a factor of tremendous social importance. The +insignificance of bourgeois democracy is but the complement of the power +and significance of the proletariat. It is true, the war has deceived +many on this point, and, first of all, the leading groups of bourgeois +democracy themselves. The war has assigned a decisive role in the events +of the revolution to the army. The old army meant the peasantry. Had the +revolution developed more normally--that is, under peaceful +circumstances, as it had in 1912--the proletariat would always have held +a dominant position, while the peasant masses would gradually have been +taken in tow by the proletariat and drawn into the whirlpool of the +revolution. + +But the war produced an altogether different succession of events. The +army welded the peasants together, not by a political, but by a military +tie. Before the peasant masses could be drawn together by revolutionary +demands and ideas, they were already organized in regimental staffs, +divisions and army corps. The representatives of petty bourgeois +democracy, scattered through this army and playing a leading role in it, +both in a military and in a conceptual way, were almost completely +permeated with middle-class revolutionary tendencies. The deep social +discontent in the masses became more acute and was bound to manifest +itself, particularly because of the military shipwreck of Czarism. The +proletariat, as represented in its advanced ranks, began, as soon as the +revolution developed, to revive the 1905 tradition and called upon the +masses of the people to organize in the form of representative +bodies--soviets, consisting of deputies. The army was called upon to +send its representatives to the revolutionary organizations before its +political conscience caught up in any way with the rapid course of the +revolution. Whom could the soldiers send as deputies? Eventually, those +representatives of the intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who chanced +to be among them and who possessed the least bit of knowledge of +political affairs and could make this knowledge articulate. In this way, +the petty bourgeois intellectuals were at once and of necessity raised +to great prominence in the awakening army. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, +journalists and volunteers, who under pre-bellum conditions led a rather +retired life and made no claim to any importance, suddenly found +themselves representative of whole corps and armies and felt that they +were "leaders" of the revolution. The nebulousness of their political +ideology fully corresponded with the formlessness of the revolutionary +consciousness of the masses. These elements were extremely condescending +toward us "Sectarians," for we expressed the social demands of the +workers and the peasants most pointedly and uncompromisingly. + +At the same time, the petty bourgeois democracy, with the arrogance of +revolutionary upstarts, harbored the deepest mistrust of itself and of +the very masses who had raised it to such unexpected heights. Calling +themselves Socialists, and considering themselves such, the +intellectuals were filled with an ill-disguised respect for the +political power of the liberal bourgeoisie, towards their knowledge and +methods. To this was due the effort of the petty bourgeois leaders to +secure, at any cost, a cooperation, union, or coalition with the liberal +bourgeoisie. The programme of the Social-Revolutionists--created wholly +out of nebulous humanitarian formulas, substituting sentimental +generalizations and moralistic superstructures for a class-conscious +attitude, proved to be the thing best adapted for a spiritual vestment +of this type of leaders. Their efforts in one way or another to prop up +their spiritual and political helplessness by the science and politics +of the bourgeoisie which so overawed them, found its theoretical +justification in the teachings of the Mensheviki, who explained that the +present revolution was a bourgeois revolution, and therefore could not +succeed without the participation of the bourgeoisie in the government. +In this way, the natural bloc of Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki +was created, which gave simultaneous expression to the political +lukewarmness of the middle-class intellectuals and its relation of +vassal to imperialistic liberalism. + +It was perfectly clear to us that the logic of the class struggle would, +sooner or later, destroy this temporary combination and cast aside the +leaders of the transition period. The hegemony of the petty bourgeois +intellectuals meant, in reality, that the peasantry, which had suddenly +been called, through the agency of the military machine, to an organized +participation in political life, had, by mere weight of numbers, +overshadowed the working class and temporarily dislodged it. More than +this: To the extent that the middle-class leaders had suddenly been +lifted to terrific heights by the mere bulk of the army, the proletariat +itself, and its advanced minority, had been discounted, and could not +but acquire a certain political respect for them and a desire to +preserve a political bond with them; it might otherwise be in danger of +losing contact with the peasantry. In the memories of the older +generation of workingmen, the lesson of 1905 was firmly fixed; then, the +proletariat was defeated just because the heavy peasant reserves did not +arrive in time for the decisive battle. This is why in this first period +of the revolution even the masses of workingmen proved so much more +receptive to the political ideology of the Social-Revolutionists and the +Mensheviki. All the more so, since the revolution had awakened the +hitherto dormant and backward proletarian masses, thus making uninformed +intellectual radicalism into a preparatory school for them. + +The Soviets of Workingmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies meant, +under these circumstances, the domination of peasant formlessness over +proletarian socialism, and the domination of intellectual radicalism +over peasant formlessness. The soviet institution rose so rapidly, and +to such prominence, largely because the intellectuals, with their +technical knowledge and bourgeois connections, played a leading part in +the work of the soviet. It was clear to us, however, that the whole +inspiring structure was based upon the deepest inner contradictions, and +that its downfall during the next phase of the revolution was quite +inevitable. + +The revolution grew directly out of the war, and the war became the +great test for all parties and revolutionary forces. The intellectual +leaders were "against the war." Many of them, under the Czarist regime, +had considered themselves partisans of the left wing of the +Internationale, and subscribed to the Zimmerwald resolution. But +everything changed suddenly when they found themselves in responsible +"posts." To adhere to the policy of Revolutionary Socialism meant, under +those circumstances, to break with the bourgeoisie, their own and that +of the Allies. And we have already said that the political helplessness +of the intellectual and semi-intellectual middle class sought shelter +for itself in a union with bourgeois liberalism. This caused the pitiful +and truly shameful attitude of the middle-class leaders towards the war. +They confined themselves to sighs, phrases, secret exhortations or +appeals addressed to the Allied Governments, while they were actually +following the same path as the liberal bourgeoisie. The masses of +soldiers in the trenches could not, of course, reach the conclusion that +the war, in which they had participated for nearly three years, had +changed its character merely because certain new persons, who called +themselves "Social-Revolutionists" or "Mensheviki," were taking part in +the Petrograd Government. Milyukov displaced the bureaucrat Pokrovsky; +Tereshtchenko displaced Milyukov--which means that bureaucratic +treachery had been replaced first by militant Cadet imperialism, then by +an unprincipled, nebulous and political subserviency; but it brought no +objective changes, and indicated no way out of the terrible war. + +Just in this lies the primary cause of the subsequent disorganization of +the army. The agitators told the soldiers that the Czarist Government +had sent them into slaughter without any rime or reason. But those who +replaced the Czar could not in the least change the character of the +war, just as they could not find their way clear for a peace campaign. +The first months were spent in merely marking time. This tried the +patience both of the army and of the Allied Governments, and prompted +the drive of June 18, which was demanded by the Allies, who insisted +upon the fulfillment of the old Czarist obligations. Scared by their own +helplessness and by the growing impatience of the masses, the leaders of +the middle class complied with this demand. They actually began to think +that, in order to obtain peace, it was only necessary for the Russian +army to make a drive. Such a drive seemed to offer a way out of the +difficult situation, a real solution of the problem--salvation. It is +hard to imagine a more amazing and more criminal delusion. They spoke of +the drive in those days in the same terms that were used by the +social-patriots of all countries in the first days and weeks of the war, +when speaking of the necessity of supporting the cause of national +defence, of strengthening the holy alliance of nations, etc., etc. All +their Zimmerwald internationalistic infatuations had vanished as if by +magic. + +To us, who were in uncompromising opposition, it was clear that the +drive was beset with terrible danger, threatening perhaps the ruin of +the revolution itself. We sounded the warning that the army, which had +been awakened and deeply stirred by the tumultuous events which it was +still far from comprehending, could not be sent into battle without +giving it new ideas which it could recognize as its own. We warned, +accused, threatened. But as for the dominant party, tied up as it was +with the Allied bourgeoisie, there was no other course; we were +naturally threatened with enmity, with bitter hatred. + + + +THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKI + +The future historian will look over the pages of the Russian newspapers +for May and June with considerable emotion, for it was then that the +agitation for the drive was being carried on. Almost every article, +without exception, in all the governmental and official newspapers, was +directed against the Bolsheviki. There was not an accusation, not a +libel, that was not brought up against us in those days. The leading +role in the campaign was played, of course, by the Cadet bourgeoisie, +who were prompted by their class instincts to the knowledge that it was +not only a question of a drive, but also of all the further developments +of the revolution, and primarily of the fate of government control. The +bourgeoisie's machinery of "public opinion" revealed itself here in all +its power. All the organs, organizations, publications, tribunes and +pulpits were pressed into the service of a single common idea: to make +the Bolsheviki impossible as a political party. The concerted effort and +the dramatic newspaper campaign against the Bolsheviki already +foreshadowed the civil war which was to develop during the next stage of +the revolution. + +The purpose of the bitterness of this agitation and libel was to create +a total estrangement and irrepressible enmity between the laboring +masses, on the one hand, and the "educated elements" on the other. The +liberal bourgeoisie understood that it could not subdue the masses +without the aid and intercession of the middle-class democracy, which, +as we have already pointed out, proved to be temporarily the leader of +the revolutionary organizations. Therefore, the immediate object of the +political baiting of the Bolsheviki was to raise irreconcilable enmity +between our party and the vast masses of the "socialistic +intellectuals," who, if they were alienated from the proletariat, could +not but come under the sway of the liberal bourgeoisie. + +During the first All-Russian Council of Soviets came the first alarming +peal of thunder, foretelling the terrible events that were coming. The +party designated the 10th of June as the day for an armed demonstration +at Petrograd. Its immediate purpose was to influence the All-Russian +Council of Soviets. "Take the power into your own hands"--is what the +Petrograd workingman wanted to say plainly to the Social-Revolutionists +and the Mensheviki. "Sever relations with the bourgeoisie, give up the +idea of coalition, and take the power into your own hands." To us it was +clear that the break between the Social-Revolutionists and the +Mensheviki on the one hand, and the liberal bourgeoisie on the other, +would compel the former to seek the support of the more determined, +advanced organization of the proletariat, which would thus be assured of +playing a leading role. And this is exactly what frightened the +middle-class leaders. Together with the Government, in which they had +their representatives, and hand in hand with the liberal and +counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, they began a furious and insane +campaign against the proposed demonstration, as soon as they heard of +it. All their forces were marshalled against us. We had an insignificant +minority in the Council and withdrew. The demonstration did not take +place. + +But this frustrated demonstration left the deepest bitterness in the +minds of the two opposing forces, widened the breach and intensified +their hatred. At a secret conference of the Executive Committee of the +Council, in which representatives of the minority participated, +Tseretelli, then minister of the coalition government, with all the +arrogance of a narrow-minded middle-class doctrinaire, said that the +only danger threatening the revolution was the Bolsheviki and the +Petrograd proletariat armed by them. From this he concluded that it was +necessary to disarm the people, who "did not know how to handle +fire-arms." This referred to the workingmen and to those parts of the +Petrograd garrison who were with our party. However, the disarming did +not take place. For such a sharp measure the political and psychological +conditions were not yet quite ripe. + +To afford the masses some compensation for the demonstration they had +missed, the Council of Soviets called a general unarmed demonstration +for the 18th of June. But it was just this very day that marked the +political triumph of our party. The masses poured into the streets in +mighty columns; and, despite the fact that they were called out by the +official Soviet organization, to counteract our intended demonstration +of the 10th of June, the workingmen and soldiers had inscribed on their +banners and placards the slogans of our party: "Down with secret +treaties," "Down with political drives," "Long live a just peace!" "Down +with the ten capitalistic ministers," and "All power to the Soviets." Of +placards expressing confidence in the coalition government there were +but three one from a cossack regiment, another from the Plekhanov group, +and the third from the Petrograd organization of the Bund, composed +mostly of non-proletarian elements. This demonstration showed not only +to our enemies, but also to ourselves as well that we were much stronger +in Petrograd than was generally supposed. + + + +THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH + +A governmental crisis, as a result of the demonstration by these +revolutionary bodies, appeared absolutely inevitable. But the impression +produced by the demonstration was lost as soon as it was reported from +the front that the revolutionary army had advanced to attack the enemy. +On the very day that the workingmen and the Petrograd garrison demanded +the publication of the secret treaties and an open offer of peace, +Kerensky flung the revolutionary troops into battle. This was no mere +coincidence, to be sure. The projectors had everything prepared in +advance, and the time of attack was determined not by military but by +political considerations. + +On the 19th of June, there was a so-called patriotic demonstration in +the streets of Petrograd. The Nevsky Prospect, the chief artery of the +bourgeoisie, was studded with excited groups, in which army officers, +journalists and well-dressed ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign +against the Bolsheviki. The first reports of the military drive were +favorable. The leading liberal papers considered that the principal aim +had been attained, that the drive of June 18, regardless of its ultimate +military results, would deal a mortal blow to the revolution, restore +the army's former discipline, and assure the liberal bourgeoisie of a +commanding position in the affairs of the government. + +We, however, indicated to the bourgeoisie a different line of future +events. In a special declaration which we made in the Soviet Council a +few days before the drive, we declared that the military advance would +inevitably destroy all the internal ties within the army, set up its +various parts one against the other and turn the scales heavily in favor +of the counter-revolutionary elements, since it would be impossible to +maintain discipline in a demoralized army--an army devoid of controlling +ideas--without recourse to severe repressive measures. In other words, +we foretold in this declaration those results which later came to be +known collectively under the name of "Kornilovism." We believed that the +greatest danger threatened the revolution in either case--whether the +drive proved successful, which we did not expect, or met with failure, +which seemed to us almost inevitable. A successful military advance +would have united the middle class and the bourgeoisie in their common +chauvinistic tendencies, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat. +An unsuccessful drive was likely to demoralize the army completely, to +involve a general retreat and the loss of much additional territory, and +to bring disgust and disappointment to the people. Events took the +latter course. The news of victory did not last long. It was soon +replaced by gloomy reports of the refusal of many regiments to support +the advancing columns, of the great losses in commanding officers, who +sometimes composed the whole of the attacking units, etc. In view of its +great historical significance, we append an extract from the document +issued by our party in the All-Russian Council of Soviets on the 3rd of +June, 1917, just two weeks before the drive. + +* * * * * + +"We deem it necessary to present, as the first order of the day, a +question on whose solution depend not only all the other measures to be +adopted by the Council, but actually and literally the fate of the whole +Russian revolution the question of the military drive which is being +planned for the immediate future. + +"Having put the people and the army, which does not know in the name of +what international ends it is called upon to shed its blood, face to +face with the impending attack (with all its consequences), the +counter-revolutionary circles of Russia are counting on the fact that +this drive will necessitate a concentration of power in the hands of the +military, diplomatic, and capitalistic groups affiliated with English, +French and American imperialism, and thus free them from the necessity +of reckoning later with the organized will of Russian democracy. + +"The secret counter-revolutionary instigators of the drive, who do not +stop short even of military adventurism, are consciously trying to play +on the demoralization in the army, brought about by the internal and +international situation of the country, and to this end are inspiring +the discouraged elements with the fallacious idea that the very fact of +a drive can rehabilitate the army--and by this mechanical means hide the +lack of a definite program for liquidating the war. At the same time, it +is clear that such an advance cannot but completely disorganize the army +by setting up its various units one against the other." + +* * * * * + +The military events were developing amid ever increasing difficulties in +the internal life of the nation. With regard to the land question, +industrial life, and national relations, the coalition government did +not take a single resolute step forward. The food and transportation +situations were becoming more and more disorganized. Local clashes were +growing more frequent. The "Socialistic" ministers were exhorting the +masses to be patient. All decisions and measures, including the calling +of the Constituent Assembly, were being postponed. The insolvency and +the instability of the coalition regime were obvious. + +There were two possible ways out: to drive the bourgeoisie out of power +and promote the aims of the revolution, or to adopt the policy of +"bridling" the people by resorting to repressive measures. Kerensky and +Tseretelli clung to a middle course and only muddled matters the more. +When the Cadets, the wiser and more far-sighted leaders of the coalition +government, understood that the unsuccessful military advance of June +18th might deal a blow not only to the revolution, but also to the +government temporarily, they threw the whole weight of responsibility +upon their allies to the left. + +On the 2nd of July came a crisis in the ministry, the immediate cause of +which was the Ukrainian question. + +This was in every respect a period of most intense political suspense. +From various points at the front came delegates and private individuals, +telling of the chaos which reigned in the army as a result of the +advance. The so-called government press demanded severe repressions. +Such demands frequently came from the so-called Socialistic papers, also +Kerensky, more and more openly, went over to the side of the Cadets and +the Cadet generals, who had manifested not only their hatred of +revolution, but also their bitter enmity toward revolutionary parties in +general. The allied ambassadors were pressing the government with the +demand that army discipline be restored and the advance continued. The +greatest panic prevailed in government circles, while among the +workingmen much discontent had accumulated, which craved for outward +expression. "Avail yourselves of the resignations of the Cadet ministers +and take all the power into your own hands!" was the call addressed by +the workingmen of Petrograd to the Socialist-Revolutionists and +Mensheviki in control of the Soviet parties. + +I recall the session of the Executive Committee which was held on the +2nd of July. The Soviet ministers came to report a new crisis in the +government. We were intensely interested to learn what position they +would take now that they had actually gone to pieces under the great +ordeals arising from coalition policies. Their spokesman was Tseretelli. +He nonchalantly explained to the Executive Committee that those +concessions which he and Tereshchenko had made to the Kiev Rada did not +by any means signify a dismemberment of the country, and that this, +therefore, did not give the Cadets any good reason for leaving the +Ministry. Tseretelli accused the Cadet leaders of practising a +centralistic doctrinairism, of failing to understand the necessity for +compromising with the Ukrainians, etc., etc. The total impression was +pitiful in the extreme: the hopeless doctrinaire of the coalition +government was hurling the charge of doctrinairism against the crafty +capitalist politicians who seized upon the first suitable excuse for +compelling their political clerks to repent of the decisive turn they +had given to the course of events by the military advance of June 18th. + +After all the preceding experience of the coalition, there would seem to +be but one way out of the difficulty--to break with the Cadets and set +up a Soviet government. The relative forces within the Soviets were such +at the time that the Soviet's power as a political party would fall +naturally into the hands of the Social-Revolutionists and the +Mensheviki. We deliberately faced the situation. Thanks to the +possibility of reelections at any time, the mechanism of the Soviets +assured a sufficiently exact reflection of the progressive shift toward +the left in the masses of workers and soldiers. After the break of the +coalition with the bourgeoisie, the radical tendencies should, we +expected, receive a greater following in the Soviet organizations. Under +such circumstances, the proletariat's struggle for power would naturally +move in the channel of Soviet organizations and could take a more normal +course. Having broken with the bourgeoisie, the middle-class democracy +would itself fall under their ban and would be compelled to seek a +closer union with the Socialistic proletariat. In this way the +indecisiveness and political indefiniteness of the middle-class +democratic elements would be overcome sooner or later by the working +masses, with the help of our criticism. This is the reason why we +demanded that the leading Soviet parties, in which we had no real +confidence (and we frankly said so), should take the governing power +into their own hands. + +But even after the ministerial crisis of the 2nd of July, Tseretelli and +his adherents did not abandon the coalition idea. They explained in the +Executive Committee that the leading Cadets were, indeed, demoralized by +doctrinairism and even by counter-revolutionism, but that in the +provinces there were still many bourgeois elements which could still go +hand in hand with the revolutionary democrats, and that in order to make +sure of their co-operation it was necessary to attract representatives +of the bourgeoisie into the membership of the new ministry. Dan already +entertained hopes of a radical-democratic party to be hastily built up, +at the time, by a few pro-democratic politicians. The report that the +coalition government had been broken up, only to be replaced by a new +coalition, spread rapidly through Petrograd and provoked a storm of +indignation among the workingmen and soldiers everywhere. Thus the +events of July 3rd-5th were produced. + + + +THE JULY DAYS + +Already during the session of the Executive Committee we were informed +by telephone that a regiment of machine-gunners was making ready for +attack. By telephone, too, we adopted measures to check these +preparations, but the ferment was working among the people. +Representatives of military units that had been disciplined for +insubordination brought alarming news from the front, of repressions +which aroused the garrison. Among the Petrograd workingmen the +displeasure with the official leaders was intensified also by the fact +that Tseretelli, Dan and Cheidze misrepresented the general views of the +proletariat in their endeavor to prevent the Petrograd Soviet from +becoming the mouthpiece of the new tendencies of the toilers. The +All-Russian Executive Committee, formed in the July Council and +depending upon the more backward provinces, put the Petrograd Soviet +more and more into the background and took all matters into its own +hands, including even local Petrograd affairs. + +A clash was inevitable. The workers and soldiers pressed from below, +vehemently voiced their discontent with the official Soviet policies and +demanded greater resolution from our party. We considered that, in view +of the backwardness of the provinces, the time for such a course had not +yet arrived. At the same time, we feared that the events taking place at +the front might bring extreme chaos into the revolutionary ranks, and +desperation to the hearts of the people. The attitude of our party +toward the movement of July 3rd-5th was quite well defined. On the one +hand, there was the danger that Petrograd might break away from the more +backward parts of the country; while on the other, there was the feeling +that only the active and energetic intervention of Petrograd could save +the day. The party agitators who worked among the people were working in +harmony with the masses, conducting an uncompromising campaign. + +There was still some hope that the demonstration of the revolutionary +masses in the streets might destroy the blind doctrinairism of the +coalitionists and make them understand that they could retain their +power only by breaking openly with the bourgeoisie. Despite all that had +recently been said and written in the bourgeois press, our party had no +intention whatever of seizing power by means of an armed revolt. In +point of fact, the revolutionary demonstration started spontaneously, +and was guided by us only in a political way. + +The Central Executive Committee was holding its session in the Taurida +Palace, when turbulent crowds of armed soldiers and workmen surrounded +it from all sides. Among them was, of course, an insignificant number of +anarchistic elements, which were ready to use their arms against the +Soviet center. There were also some "pogrom" elements, black-hundred +elements, and obviously mercenary elements, seeking to utilize the +occasion for instigating pogroms and chaos. From among the sundry +elements came the demands for the arrest of Chernoff and Tseretelli, for +the dispersal of the Executive Committee, etc. An attempt was even made +to arrest Chernoff. Subsequently, at Kresty, I identified one of the +sailors who had participated in this attempt; he was a criminal, +imprisoned at Kresty for robbery. But the bourgeois and the coalitionist +press represented this movement as a pogromist, counter-revolutionary +affair, and, at the same time, as a Bolshevist crusade, the immediate +object of which was to seize the reins of Government by the use of armed +force against the Central Executive Committee. + +The movement of July 3rd-5th had already disclosed with perfect +clearness that a complete impotence reigned within the ruling Soviet +parties at Petrograd. The garrison was far from being all on our side. +There were still some wavering, undecided, passive elements. But if we +should ignore the junkers, there were no regiments at all which were +ready to fight us in the defense of the Government or the leading Soviet +parties. It was necessary to summon troops from the front. The entire +strategy of Tseretelli, Chernoff, and others on the 3rd of July resolved +itself into this: to gain time in order to give Kerensky an opportunity +to bring up his "loyal" regiments. One deputation after another entered +the hall of the Taurida Palace, which was surrounded by armed crowds, +and demanded a complete separation from the bourgeoisie, positive social +reforms, and the opening of peace negotiations. + +We, the Bolsheviki, met every new company of disgruntled troops gathered +in the yards and streets, with speeches, in which we called upon them to +be calm and assured them that, in view of the present temper of the +people, the coalitionists could not succeed in forming a new coalition. +Especially pronounced was the temper of the Kronstadt sailors, whom we +had to restrain from transcending the limits of a peaceful +demonstration. The fourth demonstration, which was already controlled by +our party, assumed a still more serious character. The Soviet leaders +were quite at sea; their speeches assumed an evasive character; the +answers given by Cheidze to the deputies were without any political +content. It was clear that the official leaders were marking time. + +On the night of the 4th the "loyal" regiments began to arrive. During +the session of the Executive Committee the Taurida Palace resounded to +the strains of the Marseillaise. The expression on the faces of the +leaders suddenly changed. They displayed a look of confidence which had +been entirely wanting of late. It was produced by the entry into the +Taurida Palace of the Volynsk regiment, the same one, which, a few +months later, was to lead the vanguard of the October revolution, under +our banners. From this moment, everything changed. There was no longer +any need to handle the delegates of the Petrograd workmen and soldiers +with kid gloves. Speeches were made from the floor of the Executive +Committee, which referred to an armed insurrection that had been +"suppressed" on that very day by loyal revolutionary forces. The +Bolsheviki were declared to be a counter-revolutionary party. + +The fear experienced by the liberal bourgeoisie during the two days of +armed demonstration betrayed itself in a hatred that was crystallized +not only in the columns of the newspapers, but also in the streets of +Petrograd, and more especially on the Nevsky Prospect, where individual +workmen and soldiers caught in the act of "criminal" agitation were +mercilessly beaten up. The junkers, army-officers, policemen, and the +St. Georgian cavaliers were now the masters of the situation. And all +these were headed by the savage counter-revolutionists. The workers' +organizations and establishments of our party were being ruthlessly +crushed and demolished. Arrests, searches, assaults and even murders +came to be common occurrences. On the night of the 4th the then +Attorney-General, Pereverzev, handed over to the press "documents" which +were intended to prove that the Bolshevist party was headed by bribed +agents of Germany. + +The leaders of the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik parties have known +us too long and too well to believe these accusations. At the same time, +they were too deeply interested in their success to repudiate them +publicly. And even now one cannot recall without disgust that saturnalia +of lies which was celebrated broadcast in all the bourgeois and +coalition newspapers. Our organs were suppressed. Revolutionary +Petrograd felt that the provinces and the army were still far from being +with it. In workingmen's sections of the city a short period of +tyrannical infringements set in, while in the garrison repressive +measures were introduced against the disorganized regiments, and certain +of its units were disarmed. At the same time, the political leaders +manufactured a new ministry, with the inclusion of representatives of +third-rate bourgeois groups, which, although adding nothing to the +government, robbed it of its last vestige of revolutionary initiative. + +Meanwhile events at the front ran their own course. The organic unity of +the army was shaken to its very depths. The soldiers were becoming +convinced that the great majority of the officers, who, at the beginning +of the revolution, bedaubed themselves with red revolutionary paint, +were still very inimical to the new regime. An open selection of +counter-revolutionary elements was being made in the lines. Bolshevik +publications were ruthlessly persecuted. The military advance had long +ago changed into a tragic retreat. The bourgeois press madly libelled +the army. Whereas, on the eve of the advance, the ruling parties told us +that we were an insignificant gang and that the army had never heard of +us and would not have anything to do with us, now, when the gamble of +the drive had ended so disastrously, these same persons and parties laid +the whole blame for its failure on our shoulders. The prisons were +crowded with revolutionary workers and soldiers. All the old legal +bloodhounds of Czarism were employed in investigating the July 3-5 +affair. Under these circumstances, the Social-Revolutionsts and the +Alensheviki went so far as to demand that Lenin, Zinoviev and others of +their group should surrender themselves to the "Courts of Justice." + + + +THE EVENTS FOLLOWING THE JULY DAYS + +The infringements of liberty in the working-men's quarters lasted but a +little while and were followed by accessions of revolutionary spirit, +not only among the proletariat, but also in the Petrograd garrison. The +coalitionists were losing all influence. The wave of Bolshevism began to +spread from the urban centers to every part of the country and, despite +all obstacles, penetrated into the army ranks. The new coalition +government, with Kerensky at its head, had already openly embarked upon +a policy of repression. The ministry had restored the death penalty in +the army. Our papers were suppressed and our agitators were arrested; +but this only increased our influence. In spite of all the obstacles +involved in the new elections for the Petrograd Soviet, the distribution +of power in it had become so changed that on certain important questions +we already commanded a majority vote. The same was the case in the +Moscow Soviet. + +At that time I, together with many others, was imprisoned at Kresty, +having been arrested for instigating and organizing the armed revolt of +July 3-5, in collusion with the German authorities, and with the object +of furthering the military ends of the Hohenzollerns. The famous +prosecutor of the Czarist regime, Aleksandrov, who had prosecuted +numerous revolutionists, was now entrusted with the task of protecting +the public from the counter-revolutionary Bolsheviki. Under the old +regime the inmates of prisons used to be divided into political +prisoners and criminals. Now a new terminology was established: +Criminals and Bolsheviks. Great perplexity reigned among the +imprisoned soldiers. The boys came from the country and had previously +taken no part in political life. They thought that the revolution had +set them free, once and for all. Hence they viewed with amazement their +doorlocks and grated windows. While taking their exercise in the +prison-yard, they would always ask me what all this meant and how it +would end. I comforted them with the hope of our ultimate victory. + +Toward the end of August occurred the revolt of Korniloff; this was the +immediate result of the mobilization of the counter-revolutionary forces +to which a forceful impulse had been imparted by the attack of July +18th. At the celebrated Moscow Congress, which took place in the middle +of August, Kerensky attempted to take a middle ground between the +propertied elements and the democracy of the small bourgeoisie. The +Maximalists were on the whole considered as standing beyond the bounds +of the "legal." Kerensky threatened them with blood and iron, which met +with vehement applause from the propertied half of the gathering, and +treacherous silence on the part of the bourgeois democracy. But the +hysterical outcries and threats of Kerensky did not satisfy the chiefs +of the counter-revolutionary interests. They had only too clearly +observed the revolutionary tide flooding every portion of the country, +among the working class, in the villages, in the army; and they +considered it imperative to adopt without any delay the most extreme +measures to curb the masses. After reaching an understanding with the +property-owning bourgeoisie--who saw in him their hero--Korniloff took +it upon himself to accomplish this hazardous task. Kerensky, Savinkoff, +Filonenko and other Socialist-Revolutionists of the government or +semi-government class participated in this conspiracy, but each and +every one of them at a certain stage of the altering circumstances +betrayed Korniloff, for they knew that in the case of his defeat, they +would turn out to have been on the wrong side of the fence. We lived +through the events connected with Korniloff, while we were in jail, and +followed them in the newspapers; the unhindered delivery of newspapers +was the only important respect in which the jails of Kerensky differed +from those of the old regime. The Cossack General's adventure +miscarried; six months of revolution had created in the consciousness of +the masses and in their organization a sufficient resistance against an +open counter-revolutionary attack. The conciliable Soviet parties were +terribly frightened at the prospect of the possible results of the +Korniloff conspiracy, which threatened to sweep away, not only the +Maximalists, but also the whole revolution, together with its governing +parties. The Social-Revolutionists and the Minimalists proceeded to +legalize the Maximalists--this, to be sure, only retrospectively and +only half-way, inasmuch as they scented possible dangers in the future. +The very same Kronstadt sailors--whom they had dubbed burglars and +counter-revolutionists in the days following the July uprising--were +summoned during the Korniloff danger to Petrograd for the defence of the +revolution. They came without a murmur, without a word of reproach, +without recalling the past, and occupied the most responsible posts. + +I had the fullest right to recall to Tseretelli these words which I had +addressed to him in May, when he was occupied in persecuting the +Kronstadt sailors: "When a counter-revolutionary general attempts to +throw the noose around the neck; of the revolution, the Cadets will +grease the rope with soap, while the Kronstadt sailors will come to +fight and die together with us." + +The Soviet organizations had revealed everywhere, in the rear and at the +front, their vitality and their power in the struggle with the Korniloff +uprising. In almost no instance did things ever come to a military +conflict. The revolutionary masses ground into nothingness the general's +conspiracy. Just as the moderates in July found no soldiers among the +Petrograd garrison to fight against us, so now Korniloff found no +soldiers on the whole front to fight against the revolution. He had +acted by virtue of a delusion and the words of our propaganda easily +destroyed his designs. + +According to information in the newspapers, I had expected a more rapid +unfolding of subsequent events in the direction of the passing of the +power into the hands of the Soviets. The growth of the influence and +power of the Maximalists became indubitable and had gained an +irresistable momentum. The Maximalists had warned against the coalition, +against the attack of the 18th of July, they predicted the Korniloff +affair--the masses of the people became convinced by experience that we +were right. During the most terrifying moments of the Korniloff +conspiracy, when the Caucasian division was approaching Petrograd, the +Petrograd Soviet was arming the workingmen with the extorted consent of +the authorities. Army divisions which had been brought up against us had +long since achieved their successful rebirth in the stimulating +atmosphere of Petrograd and were now altogether on our side. The +Korniloff uprising was destined to open definitely the eyes of the army +to the inadmissibility of any continued policy of conciliation with the +bourgeois counter-revolution. Hence it was possible to expect that the +crushing of the Korniloff uprising would prove to be only an +introduction to an immediate aggressive action on the part of the +revolutionary forces under the leadership of our party for the purpose +of seizing sole power. But events unfolded more slowly. With all the +tension of their revolutionary feeling, the masses had become more +cautious after the bitter lesson of the July days, and renounced all +isolated demonstrations, awaiting a direct instruction and direction +from above. And, also, among the leadership of our party there developed +a "watchful-waiting" policy. Under these circumstances, the liquidation +of the Korniloff adventure, irrespective of the profound regrouping of +forces to our advantage, did not bring about any immediate political +changes. + + + +THE CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS + +In the Petrograd Soviet, the domination of our party was definitely +strengthened from that time on. This was evidenced in dramatic fashion +when the question of the personnel of its presiding body came up. At +that epoch, when the Social-Revolutionists and the Minimalists were +holding sway in the Soviets, they isolated the Maximalists by every +means in their power. They did not admit even one Maximalist into the +membership of the Executive Committee at Petrograd, even when our party +represented at least one-third of all the Soviet members. Afterwards, +when the Petrograd Soviet, by a dwindling majority, passed the +resolution for the transfering of all power into the hands of the +Soviet, our party put forth the demand to establish a coalition +Executive Committee formed on a proportional basis. The old presiding +body, the members of which were Cheidze, Tseretelli, Kerensky, +Skobeloff, Chernoff, flatly refused this demand. It may not be out of +place to mention this here, inasmuch as representatives of the parties +broken up by the revolution speak of the necessity of presenting one +front for the sake of democracy, and accuse us of separatism. There was +called at that time a special meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, which was +to decide the question of the presiding body's fate. All forces, all +reserves had been mobilized on both sides. Tseretelli came out with a +speech embodying a programme, wherein he pointed out that the question +of the presiding body was a question of orientation. We reckoned that we +would sway somewhat less than half of the vote and were ready to +consider that a sign of our progress. Actually, however, the vote showed +that we had a majority of nearly one hundred. "For six months," said +Tseretelli at that time, "we have stood at the head of the Petrograd +Soviet and led it from victory to victory; we wish that you may hold for +at least half of that time the positions which you are now preparing to +occupy." In the Moscow Soviet a similar change of leadership among the +parties took place. + +One after the other the Provincial Soviets joined the Bolshevik +position. The date of convoking the Second All-Russian Congress of +Soviets was approaching. But the leading group of the Central Executive +Committee was striving with all its might to put off the Congress to an +indefinite future time, in order thus to destroy it in advance. It was +evident that the new Congress of Soviets would give our party a +majority, would correspondingly alter the make-up of the Central +Executive Committee, and deprive the fusionists of their most important +position. The struggle for the convocation of the All-Russian Congress +of Soviets assumed the greatest importance for us. + +To counterbalance this, the Mensheviks (Minimalists) and the +Social-Revolutionists put forth the Democratic Conference idea. They +needed this move against both us and Kerensky. + +By this time the head of the Ministry assumed an absolutely independent +and irresponsible position. He had been raised to power by the Petrograd +Soviet during the first epoch of the revolution: Kerensky had entered +the Ministry without a preliminary decision of the Soviets, but his +admission was subsequently approved. After the First Congress of +Soviets, the Socialist ministers were held accountable to the Central +Executive Committee. Their allies, the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) +were responsible only to their party. To meet the bourgeoisie's wishes, +the General Executive Committee, after the July days, released the +Socialist Ministers from all responsibility to the Soviets, in order, as +it were, to create a revolutionary dictatorship. It is rather well to +mention this, too, now that the same persons who built up the +dictatorship of a coterie, come forth with accusations and imprecations +against the dictatorship of a class. The Moscow Conference, at which the +skilfully manipulated professional and democratic elements balanced each +other, aimed to strengthen Kerensky's power over classes and parties. +This aim was attained only in appearance. In reality, the Moscow +Conference revealed Kerensky's utter impotence, for he was equally +remote from both the professional elements and the bourgeois democracy. +But since the liberals and conservatives applauded his onslaughts +against democracy, and the fusionists gave him ovations when he +cautiously upbraided the counter-revolutionaries, the impression was +growing upon him that he was supported, as it were, by both the former +and the latter, and, accordingly, commanded unlimited power. Over +workingmen and revolutionary soldiers he held the threat of blood and +iron. His policy continued the bargaining with Korniloff behind the +scenes--a bargaining which compromised him even in the fusionists' eyes: +in evasively diplomatic terms, so characteristic of him, Tseretelli +spoke of "personal" movements in politics and of the necessity of +curbing these personal movements. This task was to be accomplished by +the Democratic Conference, which was called, according to arbitrary +forms, from among representatives of Soviets, dumas, zemstvos, +professional trade unions and co-operative societies. Still, the main +task was to secure a sufficiently conservative composition of the +Conference, to dissolve the Soviets once for all in the formless mass of +democracy, and, on the new organizational basis, to gain a firm footing +against the Bolshevik tide. + +Here it will not be out of place to note, in a few words, the difference +between the political role of the Soviets and that of the democratic +organs of self-government. More than once, the Philistines called our +attention to the fact that the new dumas and zemstvos elected on the +basis of universal suffrage, were incomparably more democratic than the +Soviets and were more suited to represent the population. However, this +formal democratic criterion is devoid of serious content in a +revolutionary epoch. The significance of the Revolution lies in the +rapid changing of the judgment of the masses, in the fact that new and +ever new strata of population acquire experience, verify their views of +the day before, sweep them aside, work out new ones, desert old leaders +and follow new ones in the forward march. During revolutionary times, +formally democratic organizations, based upon the ponderous apparatus of +universal suffrage, inevitably fall behind the development of the +political consciousness of the masses. Quite different are the Soviets. +They rely immediately upon organic groupings, such as shop, mill, +factory, volost, regiment, etc. To be sure, there are guarantees, just +as legal, of the strictness of elections, as are used in creating +democratic dumas and zemstvos. But there are in the Soviet incomparably +more serious, more profound guarantees of the direct and immediate +relation between the deputy and the electors. A town-duma or zemstvo +member is supported by the amorphous mass of electors, which entrusts +its full powers to him for a year and then breaks up. The Soviet +electors remain always united by the conditions of their work and their +existence; the deputy is ever before their eyes, at any moment they can +prepare a mandate to him, censure him, recall or replace him with +another person. + +If during the revolutionary month preceding the general political +evolution expressed itself in the fact that the influence of the +fusionist parties was being replaced by a decisive influence of the +Bolsheviki, it is quite plain that this process found its most striking +and fullest expression in the Soviets, while the dumas and zemstvos, +notwithstanding all their formal democratism, expressed yesterday's +status of the popular masses and not to-day's. This is exactly what +explains the gravitation toward dumas and zemstvos on the part of those +parties which were losing more and more ground in the esteem of the +revolutionary class. We shall meet with the same question, only on a +larger scale, later, when we come to the Constituent Assembly. + + + +THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE + +The Democratic Conference, called by Tseretelli and his +fellow-combatants in mid-September, was totally artificial in character, +representing as it did a combination of Soviets and organs of +self-government in a ratio calculated to secure a preponderance of the +fusionist parties. Born of helplessness and confusion, the Conference +ended in a pitiful fiasco. The professional bourgeoisie treated the +Conference with the greatest hostility, beholding in it an endeavor to +push the bourgeoisie away from the positions it had approached at the +Moscow Conference. The revolutionary proletariat, and the masses of +soldiers and peasants connected with it, condemned in advance the +fraudulent method of calling together the Democratic Conference. The +immediate task of the fusionists was to create a responsible ministry. +But even this was not achieved. Kerensky neither wanted nor permitted +responsibility, because this was not permitted by the bourgeoisie, which +was backing him. Irresponsibility towards the organs of the so-called +democracy meant, in fact, responsibility to the Cadets and the Allied +Embassies. For the time being this was sufficient for the bourgeoisie. +On the question of coalition the Democratic Conference revealed its +utter insolvency: the votes in favor of a coalition with the bourgeoisie +slightly outnumbered those against the coalition; the majority voted +against a coalition with the Cadets. But with the Cadets left out, there +proved to be, among the bourgeoisie, no serious counter-agencies for the +coalition. Tseretelli explained this in detail to the conference. If the +conference did not grasp it, so much the worse for the conference. +Behind the backs of the conference, negotiations were carried on without +concealment with the Cadets, whom they had repudiated, and it was +decided that the Cadets should not appear as Cadets, but as "Social +workers." Pressed hard on both right and left, the bourgeois democracy +tolerated all this dickering, and thereby demonstrated its utter +political prostration. + +From the Democratic Conference a Soviet was picked, and it was decided +to complete it by adding representatives of the professional elements; +this Pre-Parliament was to fill the vacant period before the convocation +of the Constituent Assembly Contrary to Tseretelli's original plan, but +in full accord with the plans of the bourgeoisie, the new coalition +ministry retained its formal independence with regard to the +Pre-Parliament. Everything together produced the impression of a pitiful +and impotent creation of an office clerk behind which was concealed the +complete capitulation of the petty bourgeois democracy before the +professional liberalism which, a month previously, had openly supported +Korniloff's attack on the Revolution. The sum total of the whole affair +was, therefore, the restoration and perpetuation of the coalition with +the liberal bourgeoisie. No longer could there be any doubt that quite +independently of the make-up of the future Constituent Assembly, the +governmental power would, in fact, be held by the bourgeoisie, as +despite all the preponderance given them by the masses of the people the +fusionist parties invariably arrived at a coalition with the Cadets, +deeming it impossible, as they did, to create a state power without the +bourgeoisie. The attitude of the masses toward Milyukov's party was one +of the deepest hostility. At all elections during the revolutionary +period, the Cadets suffered merciless defeat, and yet, the very +parties--i.e., the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks--which +victoriously defeated the Cadet party at the elections, after election +gave it the place of honor in the coalition government. It is natural +that the masses realized more and more that in reality the fusionist +parties were playing the role of stewards to the liberal bourgeoisie. + +Meantime, the internal situation was becoming more and more complicated +and unfavorable. The war dragged on aimlessly, senselessly and +interminably. The Government took no steps whatever to extricate itself +from the vicious circle. The laughable scheme was proposed of sending +the Menshevik Skobeloff to Paris to influence the allied imperialists. +But no sane man attached any importance to this scheme. Korniloff gave +up Riga to the Germans in order to terrorize public opinion, and having +brought about this condition, to establish the discipline of the knout +in the army. Danger threatened Petrograd. And the bourgeois elements +greeted this peril with unconcealed malicious joy. The former President +of the Duma, Rodzyanko, openly said again and again that the surrender +of debauched Petrograd to the Germans would not be a great misfortune. +For illustration he cited Riga, where the Deputy Soviets had been done +away with after the coming of the Germans, and firm order, together with +the old police system, had been established. + +Would the Baltic fleet be lost? But the fleet had been debauched by the +Revolutionary propaganda; ergo the loss was not so great. The cynicism +of a garrulous nobleman expressed the hidden thoughts of the greater +part of the bourgeoisie, that to surrender Petrograd to the Germans did +not mean to lose it. Under the peace treaty it would be restored, but +restored ravaged by German militarism. By that time the revolution would +be decapitated, and it would be easier to manage. Kerensky's government +did not think of seriously defending the capital. On the contrary, +public opinion was being prepared for its possible surrender. Public +institutions were being removed from Petrograd to Moscow and other +cities. + +In this setting, the Soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet had its +meeting. Feeling was tense and turbulent, Was the Government incapable +of defending Petrograd? If so, let it make peace. And if incapable of +making peace, let it clear out. The frame of mind of the Soldiers' +section found expression in this resolution. This was already the +heat-lightning of the October Revolution. + +At the front, the situation grew worse day by day. Chilly autumn, with +its rains and winds, was drawing nigh. And there was looming up a fourth +winter campaign. Supplies deteriorated every day. In the rear, the front +had been forgotten--no reliefs, no new contingents, no warm winter +clothing, which was indispensable. Desertions grew in number. The old +army committees, elected in the first period of the Revolution, remained +at their places and supported Kerensky's policy. Re-elections were +forbidden. An abyss sprang up between the committees and the soldier +masses. Finally the soldiers began to regard the committees with hatred. +With increasing frequency delegates from the trenches were arriving in +Petrograd and at the sessions of the Petrograd Soviet put the question +point blank: "What is to be done further? By whom and how will the war +be ended? Why is the Petrograd Soviet silent?" + + + +INEVITABILITY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER + +The Petrograd Soviet was not silent. It demanded the immediate transfer +of all power into the hands of the Soviets in the capitals and in the +provinces, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, the +workingmen's control of production, and immediate opening of peace +negotiations. So long as we remained an opposition party, the +motto--all power to the Soviets--was a propaganda motto. But as soon +as we found ourselves in the majority in all the principal Soviets, this +motto imposed upon us the duty of a direct and immediate fight for +power. + +In the country villages, the situation had grown entangled and +complicated in the extreme. The Revolution had promised land to the +peasant, but at the same time, the leading parties demanded that the +peasant should not touch this land until the Constituent Assembly should +meet. At first the peasants waited patiently, but when they began to +lose patience, the coalition ministry showered repressive measures upon +them. Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly was receding to ever remoter +distances. The bourgeoisie insisted upon calling the Constituent +Assembly after the conclusion of peace. The peasant masses were growing +more and more impatient. What we had foretold at the very beginning of +the Revolution, was being realized: the peasants were seizing the land +of their own accord. Repressive measures grew, arrests of revolutionary +land committees began. In certain uyezds (districts) Kerensky +introduced martial law. A line of delegates, who came on foot, flowed +from the villages to the Petrograd Soviet. They complained that they had +been arrested when they attempted to carry out the Petrograd Soviet's +programme and to transfer the estate holder's land into the hands of the +peasant committees. The peasants demanded protection of us. We replied +that we should be in a position to protect them only if the power were +in our hands. From this, however, it followed that the Soviets must +seize the power if they did not wish to become mere debating societies. + +"It is senseless to fight for the power of the Soviets six or eight +weeks before the Constituent Assembly," our neighbors on the Right told +us. We, however, were in no degree infected with this fetish worship of +the Constituent Assembly. In the first place, there were no guarantees +that it really would be called. The breaking up of the army, mass +desertions, disorganization of the supplies department, agrarian +revolution--all this created an environment which was unfavorable to the +elections for the Constituent Assembly. The surrender of Petrograd to +the Germans, furthermore, threatened to remove altogether the question +of elections from the order of the day. And, besides, even if it were +called according to the old registration lists under the leadership of +the old parties, the Constituent Assembly would be but a cover and a +sanction for the coalition power. Without the bourgeoisie neither the S. +R.'s nor the Mensheviks were in a position to assume power. Only the +revolutionary class was destined to break the vicious circle wherein the +Revolution was revolving and going to pieces. The power had to be +snatched from the hands of the elements which were directly or +indirectly serving the bourgeoisie and making use of the state apparatus +as a tool of obstruction against the revolutionary demands of the +people. + +All power to the Soviets! demanded our party. Translated into party +language, this had meant, in the preceding period, the power of the S. +R.'s and Mensheviks, as opposed to a coalition with the liberal +bourgeoisie. Now, in October 1917, the same motto meant handing over all +power to the revolutionary proletariat, at the head of which, at this +period, stood the Bolshevik party. It was a question of the dictatorship +of the working class, which was leading, or, more correctly, was capable +of leading the many millions of the poorest peasantry. This was the +historical significance of the October uprising. + +Everything led the party to this path. Since the first days of the +Revolution, we had been preaching the necessity and inevitability of the +power passing to the Soviets. After a great internal struggle, the +majority of the Soviets made this demand their own, having accepted our +point of view. We were preparing the Second All-Russian Congress of +Soviets at which we: expected our party's complete victory. Under Dan's +leadership (the cautious Cheidze had departed for the Caucasus), the +Central Executive Committee attempted to block in every way the calling +of the Congress of the Soviets. After great exertions, supported by the +Soviet fraction of the Democratic Assembly, we finally secured the +setting of the date of the Congress for October 25th. This date was +destined to become the greatest day in the history of Russia. As a +preliminary, we called in Petrograd a Congress of Soviets of the +Northern regions, including the Baltic fleet and Moscow. At this +Congress, we had a solid majority, and obtained a certain support on the +right in the persons of the left S. R. faction, besides laying important +organizational premises for the October uprising. + + + +THE CONFLICT REGARDING THE PETROGRAD GARRISON + +But even earlier, previous to the Congress of Northern Soviets, there +occurred an event which was destined to play a most important role in +the subsequent political struggle. Early in October there came to a +meeting of the Petrograd Executive Committee, the Soviet's +representative in the staff of the Petrograd Military District and +announced that Headquarters demanded that two-thirds of the Petrograd +garrison should be sent to the front. For what purpose? To defend +Petrograd. They were not to be sent to the front at once, but still it +was necessary to make ready immediately. The Staff recommended that the +Petrograd Soviet approve this plan. We were on our guard. At the end of +August, also, five revolutionary regiments, complete or in parts, had +been taken out of Petrograd. This had been done at the request of the +then Supreme Commander Korniloff, who at that very time was preparing to +hurl a Caucasian division against Petrograd, with the intention of once +for all settling with the revolutionary capital. Thus we had already the +experience of purely political transfer of regiments under the pretext +of military operations. Anticipating events. I shall say, that from +documents brought to light after the October Revolution it became clear +beyond any doubt that the proposed removal of the Petrograd garrison +actually had nothing to do with military purposes, but was forced upon +Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin, against his will, by none else but +Kerensky, who was striving to clear the capital of the most +revolutionary soldiers, i.e., those most hostile to him. But at that +time, early in October, our suspicions evoked at first a storm of +patriotic indignation. The Staff people were pressing us, Kerensky was +impatient, for the ground under his feet had grown too hot. We, on the +other hand, delayed answering. Danger undoubtedly threatened Petrograd +and the question of defending the capital loomed before us in all its +terrible significance. But after the Korniloff experience, after +Rodzyanko's words concerning the desirability of the German occupation, +whence should we take the assurance that Petrograd would not be +maliciously given up to the Germans in punishment for its seditious +spirit? The Executive Committee refused to affix its seal blindly to the +order to transfer two-thirds of the garrison. It was necessary to +verify, we said, whether there really were military considerations back +of this order, and therefore it was necessary to create an organization +for this verification. Thus was born the idea of creating--by the side +of the Soldiers' section of the Soviet, i. e., the garrison's political +representation--a purely military organization, in the form of a +Military Revolutionary Committee, which subsequently acquired enormous +power and became the real tool of the October Revolution. Undoubtedly, +even in those hours, when putting forth the idea of creating an +organization in whose hands would be concentrated the threads for +guiding the Petrograd garrison on the purely military side, we clearly +realized that this very organization might become an irreplaceable +revolutionary tool. At that time we were already openly heading for the +uprising, and were preparing for it in an organized way. + +As indicated above, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets was ret for +October 25th. There could be no longer any doubt that the Congress would +declare itself in favor of power being handed over to the Soviets. But +such a resolution must forthwith be put into actuality, else it would +turn into a worthless, Platonic demonstration. The logic of events, +therefore, required us to set the uprising for October 25th. Exactly so +the entire bourgeois press interpreted it. But in the first place, the +fate of the Congress depended upon the Petrograd garrison: would it +allow Kerensky to surround the Congress of Soviets and disperse it with +the assistance of several hundred or thousand military cadets, ensigns +and thugs? Did not the very attempt to remove the garrison mean that the +Government was preparing to disperse the Congress of Soviets? And +strange it would be if it were not preparing, since we were, before the +entire land, openly mobilizing the Soviet forces in order to deal the +coalition forces a death blow. + +Thus the conflict at Petrograd was developing on the basis of the +question of the garrison's fate. First and foremost this question +touched all the soldiers to the quick. But the working-men, too, felt +the liveliest interest in the conflict, fearing as they did that upon +the garrison's removal they would be smothered by the cadets and +cossacks. Thus the conflict was assuming a character of the very keenest +nature and developing on a soil extremely unfavorable for Kerensky's +government. + +Parallel with this was going on the above-described struggle for +convoking the All-Russian Congress of Soviets--we, openly declaring, in +the name of the Petrograd Soviet and the Northern Region Congress, that +the Second Congress of Soviets must set Kerensky's government aside and +become the true master of the Russian land. As a matter of fact the +uprising was already on. It was developing quite openly before the eyes +of the whole country. + +During October the question of the uprising played an important role in +our party's inner life. Lenin, who was in hiding in Finland, insisted, +in numerous letters, upon more resolute tactics. The lower strata were +in ferment, and dissatisfaction was accumulating because the Bolshevik +party, which had proved to be in the majority in the Petrograd Soviet, +was drawing no practical conclusions from its own mottos. On October +10th a conspiratory meeting of the Central Committee of our party took +place, with Lenin present. The question of the uprising was on the order +of the day. By a majority of all against two votes it was decided that +the only means of saving the Revolution and the country from final +dissolution lay in armed insurrection which must transfer power into the +hands of the Soviets. + + + +THE DEMOCRATIC SOVIET AND "PRE-PARLIAMENT" + +The Democratic Soviet which had detached itself from the Democratic +Conference had absorbed all the helplessness of the latter. The old +Soviet parties, the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks, had +created an artificial majority in it for themselves, only the more +strikingly to reveal their political prostration. Behind the Soviet +curtains, Tseretelli was carrying on involved parleys with Kerensky and +the representatives of the "professional elements" as they began to say +in the Soviet,--in order to avoid the "insulting" term bourgeoisie. + +Tseretelli's report on the course and issue of the negotiations was a +sort of funeral oration over a whole period of the Revolution. It turned +out that neither Kerensky nor the professional elements had consented to +responsibility toward the new semi-representative institution. On the +other hand, outside the limits of the Cadet Party, they had not +succeeded in finding so-called "efficient" social leaders. The +organizers of the venture had to capitulate on both points. The +capitulation was all the more eloquent, because the Democratic +Conference had been called exactly for the purpose of doing away with +the irresponsible regime, while the Conference, by a formal vote, +rejected a coalition with the Cadets. At several meetings of the +Democratic Soviet which took place prior to the Revolution, there +prevailed an atmosphere of tenseness and utter incapacity for action. +The Soviet did not reflect the Revolution's march forward but the +dissolution of the parties that had lagged behind the Revolution. + +Even previous to the Democratic Conference, in our party faction, I had +raised the question of demonstratively withdrawing from the Conference +and boycotting the Democratic Soviet. It was necessary to show the +masses by action that the fusionists had led the Revolution into a blind +alley. The fight for building up the Soviet power could be carried on +only in a revolutionary way. The power must be snatched from the hands +of those who had proven incapable of doing any good and were furthermore +even losing their capacity for active evil. Their method of working +through an artificially picked Pre-Parliament and a conjectural +Constituent Assembly, had to be opposed by our political method of +mobilizing the forces around the Soviets, through the All-Russian +Congress of Soviets and through insurrection. This could be done only by +means of an open break, before the eyes of the entire people, with the +body created by Tseretelli and his adherents, and by focusing on the +Soviet institutions, the entire attention and all the forces of the +working class. This is why I proposed the demonstrative withdrawal from +the Conference and a revolutionary agitation, in shops and regiments, +against the attempt to play false with the will of the Revolution and +once again turn its progress into the channel of cooperation with the +bourgeoisie. Lenin, whose letter we received a few days later, expressed +himself to the same effect. But in the party's upper circles hesitation +was still apparent on this question. The July days had left a deep +impression in the party's consciousness. The mass of workingmen and +soldiers had recovered from the July debacle much more rapidly than had +many of the leading comrades who feared the nipping of the Revolution in +the bud by a new premature onslaught of the masses. In our group of the +Democratic Conference, I mustered 50 votes in favor of my proposal +against 70 who declared for participating in the Democratic Council. +However, the experience of this participation soon strengthened the +party's left wing. It was growing too manifest that combinations +bordering on trickery, combinations that aimed at securing further +leadership in the Revolution for the professional elements, with the +assistance of the fusionists, who had lost ground among the lower levels +of the people, offered no escape from the impasse into which the laxness +of bourgeois democracy had driven the revolution. By the time the +Democratic Soviet, its ranks filled up with professional elements, +became a Pre-Parliament, readiness to break with this institution had +matured in our party. + + + +THE S. R.'S AND MENSHEVIKS + +We were confronted with the question whether the S. R.'s would follow us +in this path. This group was in the process of formation, but this +process, according to the standards of our party, went on too slowly and +irresolutely. At the outset of the Revolution, the S. R.'s proved the +predominating party in the whole field of political life. Peasants, +soldiers, even workingmen voted en masse for the S. R.'s. The party +itself had not expected anything of the kind, and more than once it +looked as if it were in danger of being swamped in the waves of its own +success. Excluding the purely capitalistic and landholder groups and the +professional elements among the intellectuals, one and all voted for the +revolutionary populists' party. This was natural in the initial stage of +the Revolution, when class lines had not had time to reveal themselves, +when the aspirations of the so-called united revolutionary front found +expression in the diffuse program of a party that was ready to welcome +equally the workingman who feared to break away from the peasant; the +peasant who was seeking land and liberty; the intellectual attempting to +guide both of them; the chinovnik (officeholder) endeavoring to adjust +himself to the new regime. + +When Kerensky, who had been counted a laborite in the period of Czarism, +joined the S. R.'s Party after the victory of the Revolution, that +party's popularity began to grow in proportion as Kerensky mounted the +rungs of power. Out of respect, not always of a platonic nature, for the +War Minister, many colonels and generals hastened to enrol in the party +of the erstwhile terrorists. Old S. R.'s, with revolutionary traditions, +regarded with some uneasiness the ever increasing number of "March S. +R.'s" that is, such party members as had discovered within themselves a +revolutionary populist soul only in March, after the Revolution had +overthrown the old regime and placed the revolutionary populists in +authority. Thus, within the limits of its formlessness, this party +contained not only the inner contradictions of the developing +Revolution, but also the prejudices inherent in the backwardness of the +peasant masses, and the sentimentalism, instability and career-chasing +of the intellectual strata. It was perfectly clear that in that form the +party could not last long. With regard to ideas, it proved impotent from +the very start. + +Politically, the guiding role belonged to the Mensheviks who had gone +through the school of Marxism and derived from it certain procedures and +habits, which aided them in finding their bearings in the political +situation to the extent of scientifically falsifying the meaning of the +current class struggle and securing the hegemony of the liberal +bourgeoisie in the highest degree possible under the given +circumstances. This is why the Mensheviks, direct pleaders for the +bourgeoisie's right to power, exhausted themselves so rapidly and, by +the time of the October Revolution, were almost completely played out. + +The S. R.'s, too, were losing influence more and more--first among the +workingmen, then in the army, and finally in the villages. But toward +the time of the October upheaval, they remained still a very powerful +party, numerically. However, class contradictions were undermining them +from within. In opposition to the right wing which, in its most +chauvinistic elements, such as Avksentyef, Breshko-Breshkovskaya, +Savinkoff, etc., had finally gone over into the counter-revolutionary +camp, a left wing was forming, which strove to preserve its connection +with the toiling masses. If we merely recall the fact that the S. R., +Avksentyef, as Minister of the Interior, arrested the Peasant Land +Committees, composed of S. R.'s, for their arbitrary solution of the +agrarian question, the amplitude of "differences" within this party will +become sufficiently clear to us. + +In its center stood the party's traditional leader, Chernoff. A writer +of experience, well-read in socialist literature, an experienced hand in +factional strife, he had constantly remained at the head of the party, +when party life was being built up in emigrant circles abroad. The +Revolution which had raised the S. R. party to an enormous height with +its first indiscriminating wave, automatically raised Chernoff, too, +only to reveal his complete impotence even as compared with the other +leading political lights of the first period. The paltry resources which +had secured to Chernoff a preponderance in the populist circles abroad, +proved too light in the scales of the Revolution. He concentrated his +efforts on not taking any responsible decisions, evading in all critical +cases, waiting and abstaining. For some little time, tactics of this +kind secured for him the position as center between the ever more +diverging flanks. But there was no longer any possibility of preserving +party unity for long. The former terrorist, Savinkof, took part in +Korniloff's conspiracy, was in touching unanimity with the +counter-revolutionary circles of Cossack officers and was preparing an +onslaught on Petrograd workingmen and soldiers, among whom there were +quite a few left S. R.'s. As a sacrifice to the left wing, the Center +expelled Savinkof from the party, but hesitated to raise a hand against +Kerensky. In the Pre-Parliament, the party showed signs of extreme +disruption: three groups existed independently, though under the banner +of one and the same party, but none of the groups knew exactly what it +wanted. The formal domination of this "party" in the Constituent +Assembly would have meant only a continuation of political prostration. + + + +WITHDRAWING FROM THE PRE-PARLIAMENT. THE VOICE OF THE FRONT + +Before withdrawing from the membership in the Pre-Parliament where, +according to Kerensky's and Tseretelli's political statistics, we were +entitled to some half a hundred seats, we arranged a conference with the +left S. R. group. They refused to follow us, claiming that they still +had to demonstrate practically before the peasantry the insolvency of +the Pre-Parliament. Said one of the leaders of the left S. R.'s: + +"We deem it necessary to warn you that if you want to withdraw from the +Pre-Parliament in order forthwith to go into the streets for an open +fight, we shall not follow you." + +The bourgeois-fusionist press accused us of striving to kill prematurely +the Pre-Parliament, for the very purpose of creating a revolutionary +situation. At our faction meeting in the Pre-Parliament, it was decided +to act independently and not wait for the left S. R.'s. Our party's +declaration, proclaimed from the Pre-Parliament rostrum and explaining +why we were breaking with this institution, was greeted with a howl of +hatred and impotence on the part of the majority groups. In the +Petrograd Soviet of Deputies, where our withdrawal from the +Pre-Parliament was approved by an overwhelming majority, the leader of +the tiny "internationalist" Menshevik group, Martof, explained to us +that the withdrawal from the temporary Soviet of the Republic (such was +the official appellation of this little-respected institution) would be +sensible only in case we proposed immediately to assume an open +offensive. But the point is that this is just what we intended. The +prosecutors for the liberal bourgeoisie were right, when accusing us of +striving to create a revolutionary situation. In open insurrection and +direct seizure of power we beheld the only way out of the situation. + +Again, as in the July days, the press and all the other organs of +so-called public opinion were mobilized against us. From the July +arsenals were dragged forth the most envenomed weapons which had been +temporarily stored away there after the Korniloff days. Vain efforts! +The mass was irresistibly moving toward us, and its spirit was rising +hour by hour. From the trenches delegates kept arriving. "How long," +said they, at the Petrograd Soviet meetings, "will this impossible +situation last? The soldiers have told us to declare to you: if no +decisive steps for peace are made by November 1st, the trenches will be +deserted, the entire army will rush to the rear!" This determination was +really spreading at the front. There the soldiers were passing on, from +one unit to another, home-made proclamations, summoning them not to +remain in the trenches later than the first snowfall. "You have +forgotten about us," the delegates on foot from the trenches exclaimed +at the Soviet meetings. "If you find no way out of the situation, we +shall come here ourselves, and with our bayonets we shall disperse our +enemies, including you." In the course of a few weeks the Petrograd +Council had become the center of attraction for the whole army. After +its leading tendency had been changed and new presiding officers +elected, its resolutions inspired the exhausted and despondent troops at +the front with the hope that the way out of the situation could be +practically found in the manner proposed by the Bolsheviks: by +publishing the secret treaties and proposing an immediate truce on all +fronts. "You say that power must pass into the hands of the Soviets, +grasp it then. Yon fear that the front will not support you. Cast all +misgivings aside, the soldier masses are with you in overwhelming +majority." + +Meanwhile the conflict regarding the transfer of the garrison kept on +developing. Almost daily, a garrison conference met, consisting of +committees from the companies, regiments and commands. The influence of +our party in the garrison was established definitely and indestructibly. +The Petrograd District Staff was in a state of extreme perplexity. Now +it would attempt to enter into regular relations with us, then again, +egged on by the leaders of the Central Executive Committee, it would +threaten us with repressive measures. + +Above, mention has already been made of organizing, at the Petrograd +Soviet, a Military Revolutionary Committee, which was intended to be, in +fact, the Soviet Staff of the Petrograd garrison in opposition to +Kerensky's Staff. "But the existence of two staffs is inadmissible," the +representatives of the fusionist parties dogmatically admonished us. +"But is a situation admissible, wherein the garrison mistrusts the +official staff and fears that the transfer of soldiers from Petrograd +has been dictated by a new counter-revolutionary machination?" we +retorted. "The creation of a second staff means insurrection," came the +reply from the Right. "Your Military Revolutionary Committee's task will +not be so much to verify the operative projects and orders of the +military authorities as the preparation and execution of an insurrection +against the present government." This objection was just: But for that +very reason it did not frighten anybody. An overwhelming majority of the +Soviet was aware of the necessity of overthrowing the coalition power. +The more circumstantially the Mensheviks and S. R.'s demonstrated that +the Military Revolutionary Committee would inevitably turn into an organ +of insurrection, the greater the eagerness with which the Petrograd +Soviet supported the new fighting organization. + +The Military Revolutionary Committee's first act was to appoint +commissioners to all parts of the Petrograd garrison and all the most +important institutions of the capital and environs. From various +quarters we were receiving communications that the government, or more +correctly, the government parties, were actively organizing and arming +their forces. From various arms-depots-governmental and private-rifles, +revolvers, machine guns and cartridges were being brought forth for +arming cadets, students and bourgeois youths in general. It was +necessary to take immediate preventive measures. Commissioners were +appointed to all arms-depots and stores. Almost without opposition they +became masters of the situation. To be sure, the commandants and +proprietors of the depots tried not to recognize them, but a mere +application to the soldiers' committee or the employees of each +institution sufficed to cause the immediate breakdown of the opposition. +After that, arms were issued only on order of our Commissioners. + +Even prior to that, regiments of the Petrograd garrison had their +commissioners, but these had been appointed by the Central Executive +Committee. Above, we said that after the June Congress of Soviets, and +particularly after the June 18th demonstration which revealed the ever +growing power of the Bolsheviks, the fusionist parties had almost +entirely deprived the Petrograd Soviet of any practical influence on the +course of events in the revolutionary capital. The leadership of the +Petrograd garrison was concentrated in the hands of the Central +Executive Committee. Now the task everywhere was to put in the Petrograd +Soviet's Commissioners. This was achieved with the most energetic +cooperation of the soldier masses. Meetings, addressed by speakers of +various parties, had the result, invariably, that regiment after +regiment declared it would recognize only the Petrograd Soviet's +Commissioners and would not budge a step without its decision. + +An important role in appointing these Commissioners was played by the +Bolsheviks' military organization. Before the July days it had developed +a widespread agitational activity. On July 5th, a battalion of cyclists, +brought by Kerensky to Petrograd, battered down the isolated Kshessinsky +mansion where our party's military organization was quartered. The +majority of leaders, and many privates among the members were arrested, +the publications were stopped, the printing shop was wrecked. Only by +degrees did the organization begin to repair its machinery afresh, +conspiratively this time. Numerically it comprised in its ranks but a +very insignificant part of the Petrograd garrison, a few hundred men all +told. But there were among them many soldiers and young officers, +chiefly ensigns, resolute, and with heart and soul devoted to the +Revolution, who had passed through Kerensky's prisons in July and +August. All of them had placed themselves at the Military Revolutionary +Committee's disposal and were being assigned to the most responsible +fighting posts. + +However, it would not be superfluous to remark that precisely the +members of our party's military organization assumed in October an +attitude of extraordinary caution and even some skepticism toward the +idea of an immediate insurrection. The closed character of the +organization and its officially military character involuntarily +inclined its leaders to underestimate the purely technical and +organizational resources of the uprising, and from this point of view we +were undoubtedly weak. Our strength lay in the revolutionary enthusiasm +of the masses and their readiness to fight under our banner. + +Parallel with the organizing activity a stormy agitation was being +carried on. This was the period of incessant meetings at works, in the +"Modern" and "Chinizelli" circuses, at clubs, in barracks. The +atmosphere at all the meetings was charged with electricity. Each +mention of the insurrection was greeted with a storm of plaudits and +shouts of delight. The bourgeois press merely increased the state of +universal panic. An order issued over my signature to the Syestroyetsk +munitions factory to issue five thousand rifles to the Red Guard evoked +an indescribable panic in bourgeois circles. "The general massacre" in +course of preparation was talked and written about everywhere. Of +course, this did not in the least prevent the workingmen of the +Syestroyetsk munitions factory from handing the arms over to the Red +Guards. The more frantically the bourgeois press slandered and baited +us, the more ardently the masses responded to our call. It was growing +clearer and clearer for both sides that the crisis must break within the +next few days. The press of the S. R.'s and Mensheviks was sounding an +alarm. "The Revolution is in the greatest danger. A repetition of the +July days is being prepared--but on a much wider basis and therefore +still more destructive in its consequences." In his Novaya Zhizn, +Gorki daily prophesied the approaching wreck of all civilization. In +general, the Socialistic veneer of the bourgeois intellectuals was +wearing off at the approach of the stern domination of the workers' +dictatorship. But, on the other hand, the soldiers of even the most +backward regiments hailed with delight the Military Revolutionary +Committee's commissioners. Delegates came to us from Cossack units and +from the Socialist minority of military cadets. They promised at least +to assure the neutrality of their units in case of open conflict. +Manifestly Kerensky's government was losing its foundations. + +The District Staff began negotiations with us and proposed a compromise. +In order to size up the enemy's full resistance, we entered into +pourparlers. But the Staff was nervous; now they exhorted, then +threatened us, they even declared our commissioners to be without power, +which, however, did not in the least affect their work. In accord with +the Staff, the Central Executive Committee appointed Captain of Staff +Malefski to be Chief Commissioner for the Petrograd Military District +and magnanimously consented to recognize our commissioners, on condition +of their being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner. The proposal was +rejected and the negotiations broken off. Prominent Mensheviks and S. +R.'s came to us as intermediaries, exhorted, threatened and foretold our +doom and the doom of the Revolution. + + + +THE "PETROGRAD SOVIET DAY" + +At this period the Smolny building was already completely in the hands +of the Petrograd Soviet and of our party. The Mensheviks and the S. R.'s +transferred their political activity to the Maryiinsky Palace, where the +infant Pre-Parliament was already expiring. In the Pre-Parliament +Kerensky delivered a great speech, in which, stormily applauded by the +bourgeois wing, he endeavored to conceal his impotence behind clamorous +threats. The Staff made its last attempt at opposition. To all units of +the garrison it sent out invitations to appoint two delegates to +conferences concerning the removal of troops from the capital. The first +conference was called for October 22nd, at 11 P. M. From the regiments +we immediately received information about it. By telephone we issued a +call for a garrison conference at 11 A. M. Withal, a part of the +delegates did get to the Staff quarters, only to declare that without +the Petrograd Soviet's decision they would not move anywhere. Almost +unanimously the Garrison Conference confirmed its allegiance to the +Military Revolutionary Committee. Objections came only from official +representatives of the former Soviet parties, but they found no response +whatever among the regimental delegates. The Staff's attempt brought out +only more strikingly that we were standing on firm ground. In the front +rank there was the Volhynian Regiment, the very one which on July 4th, +with its band playing, had invaded the Tauri'da Palace, in order to put +down the Bolsheviks. + +As already mentioned earlier, the Central Executive Committee had charge +of the Petrograd Soviet's treasury and its publications. An attempt to +obtain even a single one of these publications brought no results. +Beginning with the end of September, we initiated a series of measures +toward creating an independent newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet. But +all printing establishments were occupied and their owners boycotted us +with the assistance of the Central Executive Committee. It was decided +to arrange for a "Petrograd Soviet Day," for the purpose of developing a +widespread agitation and collecting pecuniary resources for establishing +a newspaper. About a fortnight before, this day was set for October +22nd, and consequently it coincided with the moment of the open outburst +of the insurrection. + +With complete assurance, the hostile press announced that on October +22nd an armed insurrection of the Bolsheviks would occur in the streets +of Petrograd. That the insurrection would occur, nobody had any doubt. +They only tried to determine exactly when; they guessed, they +prophesied, striving in this way to force a denial or confession on our +part. But the Soviet calmly and confidently marched forward, making no +answer to the howl of bourgeois public opinion. October 22nd became the +reviewing day for the forces of the proletarian army. It went off +magnificently in every respect. In spite of the warnings coming from the +Right that blood would flow in torrents in the streets of Petrograd, the +masses of the populace were pouring in floods to the Petrograd Soviet +meetings. All our oratorical forces were mobilized. All public places +were filled. Meetings were held unceasingly for hours at a stretch. They +were addressed by speakers of our party, by delegates arriving for the +Soviet Congress, by representatives from the front, by left S.R.'s and +by Anarchists. Public buildings were flooded by waves of working-men, +soldiers and sailors. There had not been many gatherings like that even +in the time of the Revolution. Up rose a considerable mass of the petty +townfolk, less frightened than aroused by the shouts, warnings and +baiting of the bourgeois press. Waves of people by tens of thousands +dashed against the People's House building, rolled through the +corridors, filled the halls. On the iron columns huge garlands of human +heads, feet and hands were hanging like bunches of grapes. The air was +surcharged with the electric tension that heralds the most critical +moments of revolution. "Down with Kerensky's government! Down with the +war! All power to the Soviets!" Not one from the ranks of the previous +Soviet parties ventured to appear before those colossal throngs with a +word of reply. The Petrograd Soviet held undivided sway. In reality the +campaign had already been won. It only remained to deal the last +military blow to this spectral authority. + +The most cautious in our midst were reporting that there still remained +units that were not with us: the cossacks, the cavalry regiment, the +Semyonofski regiment, the cyclists. Commissioners and agitators were +assigned to these units. Their reports sounded perfectly satisfactory: +the red-hot atmosphere was infecting one and all, and the most +conservative elements of the army were losing the strength to withstand +the general tendency of the Petrograd garrison. In the Semyonofski +regiment, which was considered the bulwark of Kerensky's government, I +was present at a meeting which took place in the open air. The most +prominent speakers of the right wing addressed it. They clung to the +conservative guard regiments as to the last support of the coalition +power. Nothing would avail. By an overwhelming majority of votes, the +regiment expressed itself for us and did not even give the ex-ministers +a chance to finish their speeches. The groups which still opposed the +Soviet watch-words were made up mainly of officers, volunteers and +generally of bourgeois intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. The masses +of peasants and workmen were with us one and all. The demarcation ran as +a distinct social line. + +The Fortress of Peter and Paul is the central military base of +Petrograd. As commandant thereof we appointed a young ensign. He proved +the best man for the post and within a few hours he became master of the +situation. The lawful authorities withdrew, biding their time. The +element regarded as unreliable for us were the cyclists, who in July had +smashed our party's military organization in the Kshessinsky mansion and +taken possession of the mansion itself. On the 23rd, I went to the +Fortress about 2 P. M. Within the courtyard a meeting was being held. +The speakers of the right wing were cautious and evasive in the extreme, +painstakingly avoiding the question of Kerensky, whose name inevitably +aroused shouts of protest and indignation even among the soldiers. We +were listened to, and our advice vas followed. About four o'clock, the +cyclists assembled nearby, in the "Modern" Circus, for a battalion +meeting. Among the speakers appearing there was Quartermaster-General +Paradyelof. He spoke with extreme caution. The days had been left far +behind, when official and semi-official speakers referred to the party +of the workers merely as to a gang of traitors and hired agents of the +German Kaiser. + +The Lieutenant-Commander of the Staff accosted me with: "We really ought +to be able to come to some agreement." But it was already too late. The +whole battalion, with only thirty dissenting votes, had voted for +handing over all power to the Soviets. + + + +THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION + +The government of Kerensky was restlessly looking for refuge, now one +way, now another. Two new cyclist battalions, and the Zenith Battery +were called back from the front, and an attempt was made to call back +some companies of cavalry.... The cyclists telegraphed while on the road +to the Petrograd Soviet: "We are led to Petrograd without knowing the +reasons. Request explanations." We ordered them to stop and send a +delegation to Petrograd. Their representatives arrived and declared at a +meeting of the Soviet that the battalion was entirely with us. This was +greeted by enthusiastic cheers. The battalion received orders to enter +the city immediately. + +The number of delegates from the front was increasing every day. They +came to get information about the situation. They gathered our +literature and went to bring the message to the front that the Petrograd +Soviet was conducting a struggle for the power of the workers, soldiers +and peasants. "The men in the trenches will support you," they told us. +All the old army committees which had not been reelected for the last +four or five months, sent threatening telegrams to us, which, however, +made no impression. We knew that these committees were no less out of +touch with the rank and file of the soldiers than the Central Executive +Committee with the local Soviets. + +The Military Revolutionary Committee appointed commissaries to all +railroad depots. These commissaries kept a watchful eye upon all the +arriving and departing trains and especially upon the movements of +troops. Continuous telephone and motor car communication was established +with the neighboring cities and their garrisons. The Soviets of all the +communities near Petrograd were charged with the duty of vigilantly +preventing any counter-revolutionary troops, or, rather, troops misled +by the government, from entering the capital. The railroad officials of +lower rank and the workmen recognized our commissaries immediately. +Difficulties arose on the 24th at the telephone station. They stopped +connecting us. The cadets took possession of the station and under their +protection the telephone operators began to oppose the Soviet. This was +the first appearance of the future sabotage. The Military Revolutionary +Committee sent a detachment to the telephone station and placed two +small cannons there. In this way the seizing of all departments of the +government and instruments of administration was started. The sailors +and Red Guards occupied the telegraph station, the post office and other +institutions. Measures were taken to take possession of the state bank. +The center of the government, the Institute of Smolny, was turned into a +fortress. There were in the garret, as a heritage of the old Central +Executive Committee, a score of machine guns, but they were in poor +condition and had been entirely neglected by the caretakers. We ordered +an additional machine gun company to the Smolny Institute. Early in the +morning the sailors rolled the machine gun with a deafening rumble over +the cement floors of the long and half-dark corridors of the building. +Out of the doors the frightened faces of the few S. R.'s and Mensheviks +were looking and wondering. + +The Soviet held daily meetings in the Smolny and so did the Garrison +Council. + +On the third floor of the Smolny, in a small corner room, the Military +Revolutionary Committee was in continuous session. There was centered +all the information about the movements of the troops, the spirit of the +soldiers and workers, the agitation in the barracks, the undertakings of +the pogrom instigators, the councils of the bourgeois politicians, the +life at the Winter Palace, the plans of the former Soviet parties. +Informers came from all sides. There came workers, officers, porters, +Socialist cadets, servants, ladies. Many brought pure nonsense. Others +gave serious and valuable information. The decisive moment drew near. It +was apparent that there was no going back. + +On the evening of the 24th of October, Kerensky appeared in the +Preliminary Parliament and demanded approval of repressive measures +against the Bolsheviki. The Preliminary Parliament, however, was in a +sad state of indetermination and complete disintegration. The +Constitutional Democrats tried to persuade the right S. R.'s to adopt a +vote of confidence. The right S. R.'s exercised pressure upon the +center. The center hesitated. The "left" wing conducted a policy of +parliamentary opposition. After many conferences, debates, hesitations, +the resolution of the "left" wing was adopted. This resolution condemned +the rebellious movement of the Soviet, but the responsibilities for the +movement were laid at the door of the anti-democratic policy of the +government. The mail brought scores of letters daily informing us of +death sentences pronounced against us, of infernal machines, of the +expected blowing up of the Smolny, etc. The bourgeois press howled +wildly, moved by hatred and terror. Gorki, who had forgotten all about +"The Song of the Falcon," continued to prophesy in his Novaya Zhizn +the approach of the end of the world. + +The members of the Military Revolutionary Committee did not leave the +Smolny during the entire week. They slept on sofas and only at odd +intervals, wakened by couriers, scouts, cyclists, telegraph messengers +and telephone calls. The night of the 24th-25th was the most restless. +We received a telephone communication from Pavlovsky that the government +had called artillery from the Peterhof School of Ensigns. At the Winter +Palace, Kerensky gathered the cadets and officers. We gave out orders +over the telephone to place on all the roads leading to Petrograd +reliable military defence and to send agitators to meet the military +detachment called by the government. In case persuasion would not help +they were instructed to use armed force. All the negotiations were held +over the telephone in the open, and therefore were accessible to the +agents of the government. + +The commissaries informed us over the telephone that on all the roads +leading to Petrograd our friends were on the alert. A cadet detachment +from Oranienbaum nevertheless succeeded in getting by our military +defence during the night and over the telephone we followed their +further movements. The outer guard of the Smolny was strengthened by +another company. Communications with all the detachments of the garrison +went on continuously. + +The companies on guard in all the regiments were awake. The delegates of +every detachment were day and night at the disposal of the Military +Revolutionary Committee. An order was given to suppress the agitation of +the Black Hundred without reserve, and at the first attempts at pogroms +on the streets, arms should be used without mercy. + +During this decisive night all the most important points of the city +passed into our hands--almost without any opposition, without struggle +and without bloodshed. The State Bank was guarded by a government +detachment and an armored car. The building was surrounded on all sides +by our troops. The armored car was taken by an unexpected attack and the +bank went over into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee +without a single shot being fired. There was on the river Neva, behind +the Franco-Russian plant, the cruiser Aurora, which was under repair. +Its crew consisted entirely of sailors devotedly loyal to the +revolution. When Korniloff, at the end of August, threatened Petrograd +the sailors of the Aurora were called by the government to guard the +Winter Palace, and though even then they already hated the government of +Kerensky, they realized that it was their duty to dam the wave of the +counter-revolution, and they took their post without objection. When the +danger passed they were sent back. Now, in the days of the October +uprising, they were too dangerous. The Aurora was ordered by the +Minister of the Navy to weigh anchor and to get out of Petrograd. The +crew informed us immediately of this order. We annulled it and the +cruiser remained where it was, ready at any moment to put all its +military forces and means at the disposal of the Soviets. + + + +THE DECISIVE DAY + +At the dawn of the 25th, a man and woman, employed in the party's +printing office, came to Smolny and informed us that the government had +closed the official journal of our body and the "New Gazette" of the +Petrograd Soviet. The printing office was sealed by some agent of the +government. The Military Revolutionary Committee immediately recalled +the orders and took both publications under its protection, enjoining +upon the "gallant Wolinsky Regiment the great honor of securing the free +Socialist press against counter-revolutionary attempts." The printing, +after that, went on without interruption and both publications appeared +on time. + +The government was still in session at the Winter Palace, but it was no +more than its own shadow. As a political power it no longer existed. On +the 25th of October the Winter Palace was gradually surrounded by our +troops from all sides. At one o'clock in the afternoon I declared at the +session of the Petrograd Soviet, in the name of the Military +Revolutionary Committee, that the government of Kerensky had ceased to +exist and that forthwith, and until the All-Russian Convention of the +Soviets might decide otherwise, the power was to pass into the hands of +the Military Revolutionary Committee. + +A few days earlier Lenin left Finland and was hiding in the outskirts of +the city, in the workingmen's quarters. On the evening of the 25th, he +came secretly to the Smolny. According to newspaper information, it +seemed to him that the issue would be a temporary compromise between +ourselves and the Kerensky Government. The bourgeois press had so often +clamored about the approach of the revolution, about the demonstration +of armed soldiers on the streets, about pillaging and unavoidable +streams of blood, that now this press failed to notice the revolution +which was really taking place, and accepted the negotiations of the +general staff with us at their face value. Meanwhile, without any chaos, +without street fights, without firing or bloodshed, the government +institutions were occupied one after another by severe and disciplined +detachments of soldiers, sailors and Red Guards, in accordance with the +exact telephone orders given from the small room on the third floor of +the Smolny Institute. In the evening a preliminary session of the Second +All-Russian Convention of Soviets was held. In the name of the Central +Executive Committee, Dan presented a report. He presented an indictment +of the rebellious usurpers and insurgents and attempted to frighten the +Convention with a vision of the inevitable failure of the insurrection, +which, he claimed, would be suppressed by the forces from the front. His +address sounded unconvincing and out of place within the walls of a hall +where the overwhelming majority of the delegates were enthusiastically +observing the victorious advance of the Petrograd revolution. + +By this time the Winter Palace was surrounded, but it was not yet taken. +From time to time there were shots from the windows upon the besiegers, +who were closing in slowly and cautiously. From the Petropavlovsk +Fortress, two or three shells from cannons were directed at the Palace. +Their thunder was heard at the Smolny. Martof spoke with helpless +indignation from the platform of the convention, about civil war and +especially about the siege of the Winter Palace, where among the +ministers there were--oh, horror!--members of the Mensheviki party. The +sailors who came to bring information from the battle-place around the +Palace took the floor against him. They reminded the accusers of the +offensive of the 18th of June, of the treacherous policy of the old +government, of the re-establishment of the death penalty for soldiers, +of the annihilation of the revolutionary organization, and wound up by +vowing to win or die. They also brought word of the first victims from +our ranks in the battle before the Palace. + +All arose as if at an unseen signal and, with a unanimity which could be +created only by a high moral inspiration, sang the Funeral March. He who +lived through that moment will never forget it. + +The session was interrupted. It was impossible to deliberate +theoretically the question of the means of reconstructing the government +among the echoes of the fighting and shooting under the walls of the +Winter Palace, where the fate of that very government was being decided +in a practical way. The taking of the Palace, however, was rather slow, +and this caused hesitation among the less determined elements of the +convention. The orators of the right wing prophesied our near +destruction. All anxiously awaited news from the arena of the Palace. +Presently Antonoff appeared, who directed the operations against the +Palace. A death-like silence fell upon the hall. The Winter Palace was +taken; Kerensky had fled; other ministers had been arrested and +consigned to the fortress of Petropavlovsk. The first chapter of the +October revolution was over. + +The Right Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, altogether sixty men, that +is, about one-tenth of the convention, left the session in protest. As +there was nothing else left to' them, they "placed the entire +responsibility" for the coming events upon the Bolsheviki and Left S. +R.'s. The latter were passing through moments of indecision. The past +tied them strongly to the party of Chernoff. The right wing of this +party swerved to the middle and petty bourgeois elements, to the +intellectuals of the middle classes, to the well-to-do elements of the +villages; and on all decisive questions went hand in hand with the +liberal bourgeoisie against us. The more revolutionary elements of the +party, reflecting the radicalism of the social demands of the poorest +masses of the peasantry, gravitated to the proletariat and their party. +They feared, however, to sever the umbilical cord which linked them to +their old party. When we left the Preliminary Parliament, they refused +to follow us and warned us against "adventurers," but the insurrection +put before them the dilemma of taking sides for or against the Soviets. +Not without hesitation, they assembled on our side of the barricades. + + + +THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES + +The victory in Petrograd was complete. The power went over entirely to +the Military Revolutionary Committee. We issued our first decree, +abolishing the death penalty and ordering reelections in the army +committees, etc. But here we discovered that we were cut off from the +provinces. The higher authorities of the railroads, post office and +telegraph were against us. The army committees, the municipalities, the +zemstvos continued to bombard the Smolny with threatening telegrams in +which they declared outright war upon us and promised to sweep the +insurgents out within a short time. Our telegrams, decrees and +explanations did not reach the provinces, for the Petrograd Telegraph +Agency refused to serve us. In this atmosphere, created by the isolation +of the capital from the rest of the country, alarming and monstrous +rumors easily sprang up and gained popularity. + +When finally convinced that the Soviet had really taken over the powers +of the government, that the old government was arrested, that the +streets of Petrograd were dominated by armed workers, the bourgeois +press, as well as the press which was for effecting a compromise, +started a campaign of incomparable madness indeed; there was not a lie +or libel which was not mobilized against the Military Revolutionary +Committee, its leaders or its commissaries. + +On the 26th there was a session of the Petrograd Soviet, which was +attended by delegates from the All-Russian Council, members of the +Garrison Conference, and numerous members of various parties. Here, for +the first time in nearly six months, spoke Lenin and Zinoviev, who were +given a stormy ovation. The jubilation over the recent victory was +marred somewhat by apprehensions as to how the country would take to the +new revolt and as to the Soviets' ability to retain control. + +In the evening an executive session of the Council of Soviets was held. +Lenin introduced two decrees: on peace and on the land question. After +brief discussion, both decrees were adopted unanimously. It was at this +session, too, that a new central authority was created, to be known as +the Council of People's Commissaries. + +The Central Committee of our party tried to win the approval of the Left +S. R.'s, who were invited to participate in establishing the Soviet +government. They hesitated, on the ground that, in their view, this +government should bear a coalition character within the Soviet parties. +But the Mensheviki and the Right S. R.'s broke entirely with the Council +of Soviets, deeming a coalition with anti-Soviet parties necessary. +There was nothing left for us to do but to let the party of Left S. R.'s +persuade their neighbors to the right to return to the revolutionary +camp; and while they were engaged in this hopeless task, we thought it +our duty to take the responsibility for the government entirely upon our +party. The list of Peoples' Commissaries was composed exclusively of +Bolsheviki. + +There was undoubtedly some political danger in such a course. The change +proved too precipitate. (One need but remember that the leaders of this +party were only yesterday still under indictment under Statute Law No. +108--that is, accused of high treason). But there was no other +alternative. The other Soviet groups hesitated and evaded the issue, +preferring to adopt a waiting policy. Finally we became convinced that +only our party could set up a revolutionary government. + + + +THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NEW REGIME + +The decrees on land and peace, approved by the Council, were printed in +huge quantities and--through delegates from the front, peasant +pedestrians arriving from the villages, and agitators sent by us to the +trenches in the provinces--were strewn broadcast all over the country. +Simultaneously the work of organizing and arming the Red Guards was +carried on. Together with the old garrison and the sailors, the Red +Guard was doing hard patrol duty. The Council of People's Commissaries +got control of one government department after another, though +everywhere encountering the passive resistance of the higher and middle +grade officials. The former Soviet parties tried their utmost to find +support in this class and organize a sabotage of the new government. Our +enemies felt certain that the whole affair was a mere episode, that in a +day or two--at most a week--the Soviet Government would be overthrown. +The first foreign councillors and members of the embassies, impelled +quite as much by curiosity as by necessary business on hand, appeared at +the Smolny Institute. Newspaper correspondents hurried thither with +their notebooks and cameras. Everyone hastened to catch a glimpse of the +new government, being sure that in a day or two it would be too late. + +Perfect order reigned in the city. The sailors, soldiers and the Red +Guards bore themselves in these first days with excellent discipline and +nobly supported the regime of stern revolutionary order. + +In the enemy's camp fear arose lest the "episode" should become too +protracted, and so the first force for attacking the new government was +being hastily organized. In this, the initiative was taken by the +Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. In the preceding period they +would not, and dared not, take all the power into their own hands. In +keeping with their provisional political position, they contented +themselves with serving in the coalition government in the capacity of +assistants, critics, and benevolent accusers and defenders of the +bourgeoisie. During all elections they conscientiously anathematized the +liberal bourgeoisie, while in the government they just as regularly +combined with it. In the first six months of the revolution they +managed, as a result of this policy, to lose absolutely all the +confidence of the populace and army; and now, the October revolt was +dashing them from the helm of the state. And yet, only yesterday they +considered themselves the masters of the situation. The Bolshevik +leaders whom they persecuted were in hiding, as under Czarism. To-day +the Bolsheviki were in power, while yesterday's coalitionist ministers +and their co-workers found themselves cast aside and suddenly deprived +of every bit of influence upon the further course of events. They would +not and could not believe that this sudden revolt marked the beginning +of a new era. They preferred to consider it as merely accidental, the +result of some misunderstanding, which could be removed by a few +energetic speeches and accusational newspaper articles. But every hour +they encountered more and more insurmountable obstacles. This is what +caused their blind, truly furious hatred. + +The bourgeois politicians did not venture, to be sure, to get too close +to danger. They pushed to the front the Social-Revolutionists and +Mensheviki, who, in the attack upon us acquired all that energy which +they had lacked during the period when they were a semi-governing power. +Their organs circulated the most amazing rumors and lies. In their name +it was that the proclamations containing open appeals to crush the new +government were issued. It was they, too, who organized the government +officials for sabotage and the cadets for military resistance. + +On the 27th and 28th we continued to receive persistent threats by +telegraph from army committees, town dumas, vikzhel zemstvos, and +organizations (which had charge of the management of the Railroad +Union). On the Nevsky Prospect, the principal thoroughfare of the +capital's bourgeoisie, things were becoming more and more lively. The +bourgeois youth was emerging from its stupor and, urged on by the press, +was developing a wider and wider agitation against the Soviet +government. With the help of the bourgeois crowd, the cadets were +disarming individual Red Guardsmen. On the side-streets Red Guardsmen +and sailors were being shot down. A group of cadets seized the telephone +station. Attempts were made by the same side to seize the telegraph +office. Finally, we learned that three armored cars had fallen into the +hands of some inimical military organization. The bourgeois elements +were clearly raising their heads. The newspapers heralded the fact that +we had but a few hours more to live. Our friends intercepted a few +secret orders which made it clear, however, that a militant organization +had been formed to fight the Petrograd Soviet. The leading place in this +organization was taken by the so-called Committee for the Defence of the +Revolution, organized by the local Duma and the Central Executive +Committee of the former regime. Here and there Right +Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki held sway. At the disposal of this +committee were the cadets, students, and many counter-revolutionary army +officers, who sought, from under cover of the coalitions, to deal the +Soviets a mortal blow. + + + +THE CADET UPRISING OF OCTOBER 29TH + +The stronghold of the counter-revolutionary organization was the cadet +schools and the Engineering Castle, where considerable arms and +ammunition were stored, and from where attacks were made upon the +revolutionary government's headquarters. Detachments of Red Guards and +sailors had surrounded the cadet schools and were sending in messengers +demanding the surrender of all arms. Some scattering shots came in +reply. The besiegers were trampled upon. Crowds of people gathered +around them, and not infrequently stray shots fired from the windows +would wound passers-by. + +The skirmishes were assuming an indefinitely prolonged character, and +this threatened the revolutionary detachments with demoralization. It +was necessary, therefore, to adopt the most determined measures. The +task of disarming the cadets was assigned to the commandant of +Petropavlovsk fortress, Ensign B. He closely surrounded the cadet +schools, brought up some armored cars and artillery, and gave the cadets +ten minutes' time to surrender. Renewed firing from the windows was the +answer at first. At the expiration of the ten minutes, B. ordered an +artillery charge. The very first shots made yawning breaches in the +walls of the schoolhouse. The cadets surrendered, though many of them +tried to save themselves by flight, firing as they fled. + +Considerable rancor was created, such as always accompanies civil war. +The sailors undoubtedly committed many outrages upon individual cadets. +The bourgeois press later accused the sailors and the Soviet government +of inhumanity and brutality. It never mentioned, however, the fact that +the revolt of October 25th-26th had been brought about with hardly any +firing or sacrifice, and that only the counter-revolutionary conspiracy +which was organized by the bourgeoisie and which threw the young +generation into the flame of civil war against the workers, soldiers and +sailors, led to unavoidable severities and sacrifices. + +The 29th of October marked a decided change in the mood of the +inhabitants of Petrograd. Events took on a more tragic character. At the +same time, our enemies realized that the situation was far more serious +than they thought at first and that the Soviet had not the slightest +intention of relinquishing the power it had won just to oblige the +junkers and the capitalistic newspapers. + +The work of clearing Petrograd of counter-revolutionary centers was +carried on intensively. The cadets were almost all disarmed, the +participators in the insurrection were arrested and either imprisoned in +the Petropavlovsk fortress or deported to Kronstadt. All publications +which openly preached revolt against Soviet authority were promptly +suppressed. Orders were issued for the arrest of such of the leaders of +the former Soviet parties whose names figured on the intercepted +counter-revolutionary edicts. All military resistance in the capital was +crushed absolutely. + +Next came a long and exhausting struggle against the sabotage of the +bureaucrats, technical workers, clerks, etc. These elements, which by +their earning capacity belong largely to the downtrodden class of +society, align themselves with the bourgeois class by the conditions of +their life and by their general psychology. They had sincerely and +faithfully served the government and its institutions when it was headed +by Czarism. They continued to serve the government when the authority +passed over into the hands of the bourgeois imperialists. They were +inherited with all their knowledge and technical skill, by the coalition +government in the next period of the revolution. But when the revolting +workingmen, soldiers and peasants flung the parties of the exploiting +classes away from the rudder of State and tried to take the management +of affairs into their own hands, then the bureaucrats and clerks flew +into a passion and absolutely refused to support the new government in +any way. More and more extensive became this sabotage, which was +organized mostly by Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and which was +supported by funds furnished by the banks and the Allied Embassies. + + + +KERENSKY'S ADVANCE ON PETROGRAD + +The stronger the Soviet government became in Petrograd, the more the +bourgeois groups placed their hopes on military aid from without. The +Petrograd Telegraph Agency, the railroad telegraph, and the +radio-telegraph station of Tsarskoye-Selo brought from every side news +of huge forces marching on Petrograd with the object of crushing the +rebels there and establishing order. Kerensky was making flying trips to +the front, and the bourgeois papers reported that he was leading +innumerable forces against the Bolsheviki. We found ourselves cut off +from the rest of the country, as the telegraphers refused to serve us. +But the soldiers, who arrived by tens and hundreds on commissions from +their respective regiments, invariably said to us: "Have no fears of the +front; it is entirely on your side. You need but give the word, and we +will send to your aid--even this very day--a division or a corps." It +was the same in the army as everywhere else; the masses were for us, and +the upper classes against us. In the hands of the latter was the +military-technical machinery. Various parts of the vast army proved to +be isolated one from another. We were isolated from both the army and +the people. Nevertheless, the news of the Soviet government at Petrograd +and its decrees spread throughout the country and roused the local +Soviets to rebel against the old government. + +The reports of Kerensky's advance on Petrograd, at the head of some +forces or other, soon became more persistent and assumed more definite +outlines. We were informed from Tsarskoye-Selo that Cossack echelons +were not far from there, while an appeal, signed by Kerensky and General +Krassnov, was being circulated in Petrograd calling upon the whole +garrison to join the government's forces, which were expected any hour +to enter the capital. The cadet insurrection of October 29th was +undoubtedly connected with Kerensky's undertaking, only that it broke +out too soon, owing to determined action on our part. The Tsarskoye-Selo +garrison was ordered to demand of the approaching Cossack regiments +recognition of the Soviet government. In case of refusal, the Cossacks +were to be disarmed. But that garrison proved to be ill-fitted for +military operations. It had no artillery and no leaders, its officers +being unfriendly toward the Soviet government. The Cossacks took +possession of the radio-telegraph station at Tsarskoye-Selo, the most +powerful one in the country, and marched on. The garrisons of Peterhof, +Krasnoye-Selo and Gatchina displayed neither initiative nor resolution. + +After the almost bloodless victory at Petrograd, the soldiers +confidently assumed that matters would take a similar course in the +future. All that was necessary, they thought, was to send an agitator to +the Cossacks, who would lay down their arms the moment the object of the +proletarian revolution was explained to them. Korniloff's +counter-revolutionary uprising was put down by means of speeches and +fraternization. By agitation and well-planned seizure of certain +institutions--without a fight--the Kerensky government was overthrown. +The same methods were now being employed by the leaders of the +Tsarskoye-Selo, Krasnoye-Selo and the Gatchina Soviets with General +Krassnov's Cossacks. But this time they did not work. Though without +determination or enthusiasm, the Cossacks did advance. Individual +detachments approached Gatchina and Krasnoye-Selo, engaged the scanty +forces of the local garrisons, and sometimes disarmed them. About the +numerical strength of Kerensky's forces we at first had no idea +whatever. Some said that General Krassnov headed ten thousand men; +others affirmed that he had no more than a thousand; while the +unfriendly newspapers and circulars announced, in letters an inch big, +that two corps were lined up beyond Tsarskoye-Selo. + +There was a general want of confidence in the Petrograd garrison. No +sooner had it won a bloodless victory, than it was called upon to march +out against an enemy of unknown numbers and engage in battles of +uncertain outcome. In the Garrison Conference, the discussion centered +about the necessity of sending out more and more agitators and of +issuing appeals to the Cossacks; for to the soldiers it seemed +impossible that the Cossacks would refuse to rise to the point of view +which the Petrograd garrison was defending in its struggle. +Nevertheless, advanced groups of Cossacks approached quite close to +Petrograd, and we anticipated that the principal battle would take place +in the streets of the city. + +The greatest resolution was shown by the Red Guards. They demanded arms, +ammunition, and leadership. But everything in the military machine was +disorganized and out of gear, owing partly to disuse and partly to evil +intent. The officers had resigned. Many had fled. The rifles were in one +place and the cartridges in another. Matters were still worse with +artillery. The cannons, gun carriages and the military stores were all +in different places; and all these had to be groped for in the dark. The +various regiments did not have at their disposal either sappers' tools +or field telephones. The Revolutionary General Staff, which tried to +straighten out things from above, encountered insurmountable obstacles, +the greatest of which was the sabotage of the military-technical +employees. + +Then we decided to appeal directly to the working class. We stated that +the success of the revolution was most seriously threatened, and that it +was for them--by their energy, initiative, and self-denial--to save and +strengthen the regime of proletarian and peasant government. This +appeal met with tremendous practical success almost immediately. +Thousands of workingmen proceeded toward Kerensky's forces and began +digging trenches. The munition workers manned the cannon, themselves +obtaining ammunition for them from various stores; requisitioned horses; +brought the guns into the necessary positions and adjusted them; +organized a commissary department; procured gasoline, motors, +automobiles; requisitioned provisions and forage; and put the sanitary +trains on a proper footing--created, in short, the entire war machinery, +which we had vainly endeavored to create from above. + +When scores of heavy guns reached the lines, the disposition of our +soldiers changed immediately. Under cover of the artillery they were +ready to repulse the Cossacks' attack. In the first lines were the +sailors and Red Guards. A few officers, politically unrelated to us but +sincerely attached to their regiments, accompanied their soldiers to the +lines and directed their operations against Krassnov's Cossacks. + + + +COLLAPSE OF KERENSKY'S ATTEMPT + +Meanwhile telegrams spread the report all over the country and abroad +that the Bolshevik "adventure" had been disposed of and that Kerensky +had entered Petrograd and was establishing order with an iron hand. On +the other hand, in Petrograd itself, the bourgeois press, emboldened by +the proximity of Kerensky's troops, wrote about the complete +demoralization of the Petrograd garrison; about an irresistible advance +of the Cossacks, equipped with much artillery; and predicted the +imminent fall of the Smolny Institute. Our chief handicap was, as +already stated, the lack of suitable mechanical accessories and of men +able to direct military operations. Even those officers who had +conscientiously accompanied their soldiers to the lines, declined the +position of Commander-in-Chief. + +After long deliberation, we hit upon the following combination: The +Garrison Council selected a committee of five persons, which was +entrusted with the supreme control of all operations against the +counter-revolutionary forces moving on Petrograd. This committee +subsequently reached an understanding with Colonel Muravief, who was in +the opposition party under the Kerensky regime, and who now, on his +own initiative, offered his services to the Soviet government. + +On the cold night of October 30th, Muravief and I started by automobile +for the lines. Wagons with provisions, forage, military supplies and +artillery trailed along the road. All this was done by the workingmen of +various factories. Several times our automobile was stopped on the way +by Red Guard patrols who verified our permit. Since the first days of +the October revolution, every automobile in town had been requisitioned, +and no automobile could be ridden through the streets of the city or in +the outskirts of the capital without a permit from the Smolny Institute. +The vigilance of the Red Guards was beyond all praise. They stood on +watch about small camp fires, rifle in hand, hours at a time. The sight +of these young armed workmen by the camp fires in the snow was the best +symbol of the proletarian revolution. + +Many guns had been drawn up in position, and there was no lack of +ammunition. The decisive encounter developed on this very day, between +Krasnoye-Selo and Tsarskoye-Selo. After a fierce artillery duel, the +Cossacks, who kept on advancing as long as they met no obstacles, +hastily withdrew. They had been fooled all the time by tales of harsh +and cruel acts committed by the Bolsheviki, who wished, as it were, to +sell Russia to the German Kaiser. They had been assured that almost the +entire garrison at Petrograd was impatiently awaiting them as +deliverers. The first serious resistance completely disorganized their +ranks and sealed the fate of Kerensky's entire undertaking. + +The retreat of Krassnov's Cossacks enabled us to get control of the +radio station at Tsarskoye-Selo. We immediately wirelessed the news of +our victory over Kerensky's forces. Our foreign friends informed us +subsequently that the German wireless station refused, on orders from +above, to receive this wireless message. + +[Footnote: I cite here the text of this wireless message: + +"Selo Pulkovo. General Staff 2:10 P. M. The night of October 30th-31st +will go down in history. Kerensky's attempt to march +counter-revolutionary forces upon the capital of the revolution has +received a decisive check. Kerensky is retreating, we are advancing. The +soldiers, sailors and workingmen of Petrograd have shown that they can +and will, gun in hand, affirm the will and power of proletarian +democracy. The bourgeoisie tried to isolate the army of the revolution +and Kerensky attempted to crush it by Cossackism. Both have been +frustrated. + +"The great idea of the reign of a workingmen's and peasants' democracy +united the ranks of the army and hardened its will. The whole country +will now come to understand that the Soviet government is not a passing +phenomenon, but a permanent fact of the supremacy of the workers, +soldiers and peasants. Kerensky's repulse was the repulse of the middle +class, the bourgeoisie and the Kornilovites. Kerensky's repulse means +the affirmation of the people's rights to a free, peaceful life, to +land, food and power. The Pulkovsky division, by their brilliant charge, +is strengthening the cause of the proletarian and peasant revolution. +There can be no return to the past. There is still fighting, obstacles +and sacrifice ahead of us. But the way is open and victory assured. + +"Revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Government may well be proud of +their Pulkovsky division, commanded by Colonel Walden. May the names of +the fallen never be forgotten. All honor to the fighters for the +revolution--the soldiers and the officers who stood by the People! Long +live revolutionary and Socialist Russia! In the name of the Council of +People's Commissaries, L. Trotzky, Oct. 31st, 1917."] + +The first reaction of the German authorities to the events of October +was thus one of fear--fear lest these events provoke disturbances in +Germany itself. In Austria-Hungary, part of our telegram was accepted +and, so far as we can tell, has been the source of information for all +Europe upon the ill-starred attempt of Kerensky to recover his power and +its miserable failure. + +Discontent was rife among Krassnov's Cossacks. They began sending their +scouts into Petrograd and even official delegates to Smolny. There they +had the opportunity to convince themselves that perfect order reigned in +the capital, thanks to the Petrograd garrison, which unanimously +supported the Soviet government. The Cossacks' disorganization became +the more acute as the absurdity of the plan to take Petrograd with some +thousand horsemen dawned upon them--for the supports promised them from +the front never arrived. + +Krassnov's detachment withdrew to Gatchinsk, and when we started out +thither the next day, Krassnov's staff were already virtually prisoners +of the Cossacks themselves. Our Gatchinsk garrison was holding all the +most important military positions. The Cossacks, on the other hand, +though not yet disarmed, were absolutely in no position for further +resistance. They wanted but one thing: to be allowed as soon as possible +to return to the Don region or, at least, back to the front. + +The Gatchinsk Palace presented a curious sight. At every entrance stood +a special guard, while at the gates were artillery and armored cars. +Sailors, soldiers and Red Guards occupied the royal apartments, +decorated with precious paintings. Scattered upon the tables, made of +expensive wood, lay soldiers' clothes, pipes and empty sardine boxes. In +one of the rooms General Krassnov's staff had established itself. On the +floor lay mattresses, caps and greatcoats. + +The representative of the Revolutionary War Committee, who escorted us, +entered the quarters of the General Staff, noisily dropped his +rifle-butt to the floor and resting upon it, announced: "General +Krassnov, you and your staff are prisoners of the Soviet authorities." +Immediately armed Red Guards barred both doors. Kerensky was nowhere to +be seen. He had again fled, as he had done before from the Winter +Palace. As to the circumstances attending this flight, General Krassnov +made a written statement on November 1st. I cite here in full this +curious document. + +* * * * * + +November 1st, 1917, 19 o'clock. + +About 15 o'clock today, I was summoned by the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, Kerensky. He was very agitated and nervous. + +"General," said he, "you have betrayed me--your Cossacks here positively +say that they will arrest me and turn me over to the sailors." + +"Yes," I answered, "there is talk about it, and I know that you have no +sympathizers here at all." + +"But are the officers, too, of the same mind?" + +"Yes, the officers are especially dissatisfied with you." + +"Then, what am I to do? I'll have to commit suicide." + +"If you are an honest man, you will proceed immediately to Petrograd +under a flag of truce and report to the Revolutionary Committee, where +you will talk things over, as the head of the Government." + +"Yes, I'll do that, General!" + +"I will furnish a guard for you and will ask that a sailor accompany +you." + +"No, anyone but a sailor. Don't you know that Dybenko is here?" + +"No, I don't know who Dybenko is." + +"He is an enemy of mine." + +"Well, that can't be helped. When one plays for great stakes, he must be +prepared to lose all." + +"All right. Only I shall go at night." + +"Why? That would be flight. Go calmly and openly, so that everyone can +see that you are fleeing." + +"Well, all right. Only you must provide for me a dependable convoy." + +"All right." + +I went and called out a Cossack from the 10th Don Cossack regiment, a +certain Rysskov, and ordered him to appoint eight Cossacks to guard the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief. + +Half an hour later, the Cossacks came and reported that Kerensky had +gone already--that he had fled. I gave an alarm and ordered a search for +him. I believe that he cannot have escaped from Gatchinsk and must now +be in hiding here somewhere. + +Commanding the 3rd Corps, + +Major-General Krassnov. + +* * * * * + +Thus ended this undertaking. + +Our opponents still would not yield, however, and did not admit that the +question of government power was settled. They continued to base their +hopes on the front. Many leaders of the former Soviet parties--Chernoff, +Tseretelli, Avksentiev, Gotz and others--went to the front, entered into +negotiations with the old army committees, and, according to newspaper +reports, tried even in the camp, to form a new ministry. All this came +to naught. The old army committees had lost all their significance, and +intensive work was going on at the front in connection with the +conferences and councils called for the purpose of reorganizing all army +organizations. In these re-elections the Soviet Government was +everywhere victorious. + +From Gatchinsk, our divisions proceeded along the railroad further in +the direction of the Luga River and Pskov. On the way, they met a few +more trainloads of shock-troops and Cossacks, which had been called out +by Kerensky, or which individual generals had sent over. With one of +these echelons there was even an armed encounter. But most of the +soldiers that were sent from the front to Petrograd declared, as soon as +they met with representatives of the Soviet forces, that they had been +deceived and that they would not lift a finger against the government of +soldiers and workingmen. + + + +INTERNAL FRICTION + +In the meantime, the struggle for Soviet control spread all over the +country. In Moscow, especially, this struggle took on an extremely +protracted and bloody character. Perhaps not the least important cause +of this was the fact that the leaders of the revolt did not at once show +the necessary determination in attacking. In civil war, more than in any +other, victory can be insured only by a determined and persistent +course. There must be no vacillation. To engage in parleys is dangerous; +merely to mark time is suicidal. We are dealing here with the masses, +who have never held any power in their hands, who are therefore most +wanting in political self-confidence. Any hesitation at revolutionary +headquarters demoralizes them immediately. It is only when a +revolutionary party steadily and resolutely makes for its goal, that it +can help the toilers to overcome their century-old instincts of slavery +and lead them on to victory. And only by these means of aggressive +charges can victory be achieved with the smallest expenditure of energy +and the least number of sacrifices. + +But the great difficulty is to acquire such firm and positive tactics. +The people's want of confidence in their own power and their lack of +political experience are naturally reflected in their leaders, who, in +their turn, find themselves subjected, besides, to the tremendous +pressure of bourgeois public opinion, from above. + +The liberal bourgeoisie treated with contempt and indignation the mere +idea of the possibility of a working class government and gave free vent +to their feelings on the subject, in the innumerable organs at their +disposal. Close behind them trailed the intellectuals, who, with all +their professions of radicalism and all the socialistic coating of their +world-philosophy, are, in the depths of their hearts, completely steeped +in slavish worship of bourgeois strength and administrative ability. All +these "Socialistic" intellectuals hastily joined the Right and +considered the ever-increasing strength of the Soviet government as the +clear beginning of the end. After the representatives of the "liberal" +professions came the petty officials, the administrative +technicians--all those elements which materially and spiritually subsist +on the crumbs that fall from the bourgeois table. The opposition of +these elements was chiefly passive in character, especially after the +crushing of the cadet insurrection; but, nevertheless, it might still +seem formidable. We were being denied co-operation at every step. The +government officials would either leave the Ministry or refuse to work +while remaining in it. They would turn over neither the business of the +department nor its money accounts. The telephone operators refused to +connect us, while our messages were either held up or distorted in the +telegraph offices. We could not get translators, stenographers or even +copyists. + +All this could not fail to create such an atmosphere as led various +elements in the higher ranks of our own party to doubt whether, in the +face of a boycott by bourgeois society, the toilers could manage to put +the machinery of government in working order and continue in power. +Opinions were voiced as to the necessity of coalition. Coalition with +whom? With the liberal bourgeoisie. But an attempt at coalition with +them had driven the revolution into a terrible morass. The revolt of the +25th of October was an act of self-preservation on the part of the +masses after the period of impotence and treason of the leaders of +coalition government. There remained for us only coalition in the ranks +of so-called revolutionary democracy, that is, coalition of all the +Soviet parties. + +Such a coalition we did, in fact, propose from the very beginning--at +the session of the Second All-Russian Council of Soviets, on the 25th of +October. The Kerensky Government had been overthrown, and we suggested +that the Council of Soviets take the government into its own hands. But +the Right parties withdrew, slamming the door after them. And this was +the best thing they could have done. They represented an insignificant +section of the Council. They no longer had any following in the masses, +and those classes which still supported them out of mere inertia, were +coming over to our side more and more. Coalition with the Right +Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki could not broaden the social +basis of the Soviet government; and would, at the same time, introduce +into the composition of this government elements which were completely +disintegrated by political skepticism and idolatry of the liberal +bourgeoisie. The whole strength of the new government lay in the +radicalism of its program and the boldness of its actions. To tie itself +up with the Chernofi and Tseretelli factions would mean to bind the new +government hand and foot--to deprive it of freedom of action and thereby +forfeit the confidence of the masses in the shortest possible time. + +Our nearest political neighbors to the Right were the so-called "Left +Social Revolutionists." They were, in general, quite ready to support +us, but endeavored, nevertheless, to form a coalition Socialist +government. The management of the railroad union (the so-called +vikzhal), the Central Committee of the Postal Telegraph employees, and +the Union of Government Officials were all against us. And in the higher +circles of our own party, voices were being raised as to the necessity +of reaching an understanding with these organizations, one way or +another. But on what basis? All the above-mentioned controlling +organizations of the old period had outlived their usefulness. They bore +approximately the same relation to the entire lower personnel as did the +old army committees to the masses of soldiers in the trenches. History +has created a big gulf between the higher classes and the lower. +Unprincipled combinations of these leaders of another day--leaders made +antiquated by the revolution--were doomed to inevitable failure. It was +necessary to depend wholly and confidently upon the masses in order, +jointly with them, to overcome the sabotage and the aristocratic +pretensions of the upper classes. + +We left it to the Left Social-Revolutionists to continue the hopeless +efforts for coalition. Our policy was, on the contrary, to line up the +toiling lower classes against the representatives of organizations which +supported the Kerensky regime. This uncompromising policy caused +considerable friction and even division in the upper circles of our +party. In the Central Executive Committee, the Left Social +Revolutionists protested against the severity of our measures and +insisted upon the necessity for compromises. They met with support on +the part of some of the Bolsheviki. Three People's Commissaries gave up +their portfolios and left the government. A few other party leaders +sided with them in principle. This created a very deep impression in +intellectual and bourgeois circles. If the Bolsheviki could not be +defeated by the cadets and Krassnov's Cossacks, thought they, it is +quite clear that the Soviet government must now perish as a result of +internal dissension. However, the masses never noticed this dissension +at all. They unanimously supported the Soviet of People's Commissaries, +not only against counter-revolutionary instigators and sabotagers but +also against the coalitionists and the skeptics. + + + +THE FATE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY + +When, after the Korniloff episode, the ruling Soviet parties tried to +smooth over their laxness toward the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, +they demanded a speedier convocation of the Constituent Assembly. +Kerensky, whom the Soviets had just saved from the too light embraces of +his ally, Korniloff, found himself compelled to make compromises. The +call for the Constituent Assembly was issued for the end of November. By +that time, however, circumstances had so shaped themselves that there +was no guarantee whatever that the Constituent Assembly would really be +convoked. + +The greatest degree of disorganization was taking place at the front. +Desertions were increasing every day; the masses of soldiers threatened +to leave the trenches, whole regiments at a time, and move to the rear, +devastating everything on their way. In the villages, a general seizure +of lands and landholders' utensils was going on. Martial law had been +declared in several provinces. The Germans continued to advance, +captured Riga, and threatened Petrograd. The right wing of the +bourgeoisie was openly rejoicing over the danger that threatened the +revolutionary capital. The government offices at Petrograd were being +evacuated, and Kerensky's government was preparing to move to Moscow. +All this made the actual convocation of the Constituent Assembly not +only doubtful, but hardly even probable. From this point of view, the +October revolution seems to have been the deliverance of the Constituent +Assembly, as it has been the savior of the Revolution generally. When we +were declaring that the road to the Constituent Assembly was not by way +of Tseretelli's Preliminary Parliament, but by way of the seizure of the +reigns of government by the Soviets, we were quite sincere. + +But the interminable delay in convoking the Constituent Assembly was not +without effect upon this institution itself. Heralded in the first days +of the revolution, it came into being only after eight or nine months of +bitter class and party struggle. It came too late to play a creative +role. Its internal inadequacy had been predetermined by a single fact--a +fact which might seem unimportant at first, but which subsequently took +on tremendous importance for the fate of the Constituent Assembly. + +Numerically, the principal revolutionary party in the first epoch was +the party of Social-Revolutionists. I have already referred to its +formlessness and variegated composition. The revolution led inevitably +to the dismemberment of such of its members as had joined it under the +banner of populism. The left wing, which had a following among part of +the workers and the vast masses of poor peasants, was becoming more and +more alienated from the rest. This wing found itself in uncompromising +opposition to the party and middle bourgeois branches of Social +Revolutionists. But the inertness of party organization and party +tradition held back the inevitable process of cleavage. The proportional +system of elections still holds full sway, as every one knows, in party +lists. Since these lists were made up two or three months before the +October revolution and were not subject to change, the Left and the +Right Social Revolutionists still figured in these lists as one and the +same party. Thus, by the time of the October revolution--that is, the +period when the Right Social Revolutionists were arresting the Left and +then the Left were combining with the Bolsheviki for the overthrow of +Kerensky's ministry, the old lists remained in full force; and in the +elections for the Constituent Assembly the peasants were compelled to +vote for lists of names at the head of which stood Kerensky, followed by +those of Left Social Revolutionists who participated in the plot for his +overthrow. + +If the months preceding the October revolution were months of continuous +gain in popular support for the Left--of a general increase in Bolshevik +following among workers, soldiers and peasants--then this process was +reflected within the party of Social Revolutionists in an increase of +the left wing at the expense of the right. Nevertheless, on the party +lists of the Social Revolutionists there was a predominance of three to +one of old leaders of the right wing--of men who had lost all their +revolutionary reputation in the days of coalition with the liberal +bourgeoisie. + +To this should be added also the fact that the elections themselves were +held during the first weeks after the October revolution. The news of +the change traveled rather slowly from the capital to the provinces, +from the cities to the villages. The peasantry in many places had but a +very vague idea of what was taking place in Petrograd and Moscow. They +voted for "Land and Liberty," for their representatives in the land +committees, who in most cases gathered under the banner of populism: but +thereby they were voting for Kerensky and Avksentiev, who were +dissolving the land committees, and arresting their members. As a result +of this, there came about the strange political paradox that one of the +two parties which dissolved the Constituent Assembly--the Left +Social-Revolutionists--had won its representation by being on the same +list of names with the party which gave a majority to the Constituent +Assembly. This matter-of-fact phase of the question should give a very +clear idea of the extent to which the Constituent Assembly lagged behind +the course of political events and party groupings. + +We must consider the question of principles. + + + +THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP + +As Marxists, we have never been idol-worshippers of formal democracy. In +a society of classes, democratic institutions not only do not eliminate +class struggle, but also give to class interests an utterly imperfect +expression. The propertied classes always have at their disposal tens +and hundreds of means for falsifying, subverting and violating the will +of the toilers. And democratic institutions become a still less perfect +medium for the expression of the class struggle under revolutionary +circumstances. Marx called revolutions "the locomotives of history." +Owing to the open and direct struggle for power, the working people +acquire much political experience in a short time and pass rapidly from +one stage to the next in their development. The ponderous machinery of +democratic institutions lags behind this evolution all the more, the +bigger the country and the less perfect its technical apparatus. + +The majority in the Constituent Assembly proved to be Social +Revolutionists, and, according to parliamentary rules of procedure, the +control of the government belonged to them. But the party of Right +Social Revolutionists had a chance to acquire control during the entire +pre-October period of the revolution. Yet, they avoided the +responsibilities of government, leaving the lion's share of it to the +liberal bourgeoisie. By this very course the Right Social Revolutionists +lost the last vestiges of their influence with the revolutionary +elements by the time the numerical composition of the Constituent +Assembly formally obliged them to form a government. The working class, +as well as the Red Guards, were very hostile to the party of Right +Social Revolutionists. The vast majority of soldiers supported the +Bolsheviki. The revolutionary element in the provinces divided their +sympathies between the Left Social Revolutionists and the Bolsheviki. +The sailors, who had played such an important role in revolutionary +events, were almost unanimously on our side. The Right Social +Revolutionists, moreover, had to leave the Soviets, which in +October--that is, before the convocation of the Constituent +Assembly--had taken the government into their own hands. On whom, then, +could a ministry formed by the Constituent Assembly's majority depend +for support? It would be backed by the upper classes in the provinces, +the intellectuals, the government officials, and temporarily by the +bourgeoisie on the Right. But such a government would lack all the +material means of administration. At such a political center as +Petrograd, it would encounter irresistible opposition from the very +start. If under these circumstances the Soviets, submitting to the +formal logic of democratic conventions, had turned the government over +to the party of Kerensky and Chernov, such a government, compromised and +debilitated as it was, would only introduce temporary confusion into the +political life of the country, and would be overthrown by a new uprising +in a few weeks. The Soviets decided to reduce this belated historical +experiment to its lowest terms, and dissolved the Constituent Assembly +the very first day it met. + +For this, our party has been most severely censured. The dispersal of +the Constituent Assembly has also created a decidedly unfavorable +impression among the leading circles of the European Socialist parties. +Kautsky has explained, in a series of articles written with his +characteristic pedantry, the interrelation existing between the +Social-Revolutionary problems of the proletariat and the regime of +political democracy. He tries to prove that for the working class it is +always expedient, in the long run, to preserve the essential elements of +the democratic order. This is, of course, true as a general rule. But +Kautsky has reduced this historical truth to professorial banality. If, +in the final analysis, it is to the advantage of the proletariat to +introduce its class struggle and even its dictatorship, through the +channels of democratic institutions, it does not at all follow that +history always affords it the opportunity for attaining this happy +consummation. There is nothing in the Marxian theory to warrant the +deduction that history always creates such conditions as are most +"favorable" to the proletariat. + +It is difficult to tell now how the course of the Revolution would have +run if the Constituent Assembly had been convoked in its second or third +month. It is quite probable that the then dominant Social Revolutionary +and Menshevik parties would have compromised themselves, together with +the Constituent Assembly, in the eyes of not only the more active +elements supporting the Soviets, but also of the more backward +democratic masses, who might have been attached, through their +expectations not to the side of the Soviets, but to that of the +Constituent Assembly. Under such circumstances the dissolution of the +Constituent Assembly might have led to new elections, in which the party +of the Left could have secured a majority. But the course of events has +been different. The elections for the Constituent Assembly occurred in +the ninth month of the Revolution. By that time the class struggle had +assumed such intensity that it broke the formal frames of democracy by +sheer internal force. + +The proletariat drew the army and the peasantry after it. These classes +were in a state of direct and bitter war with the Right Social +Revolutionists. This party, owing to the clumsy electoral democratic +machinery, received a majority in the Constituent Assembly, reflecting +the pre-October epoch of the revolution. The result was a contradiction +which was absolutely irreducible within the limits of formal democracy. +And only political pedants who do not take into account the +revolutionary logic of class relations, can, in the face of the +post-October situation, deliver futile lectures to the proletariat on +the benefits and advantages of democracy for the cause of the class +struggle. + +The question was put by history far more concretely and sharply. The +Constituent Assembly, owing to the character of its majority, was bound +to turn over the government to the Chernov, Kerensky and Tseretelli +group. Could this group have guided the destinies of the Revolution? +Could it have found support in that class which constitutes the backbone +of the Revolution? No. The real kernel of the class revolution has come +into irreconcilable conflict with its democratic shell. By this +situation the fate of the Constituent Assembly had been sealed. Its +dissolution became the only possible surgical remedy for the +contradiction, which had been created, not by us, but by all the +preceding course of events. + + + +PEACE NEGOTIATIONS + +At the historic night session of the Second All-Russian Congress of the +Soviets the decree on peace was adopted. (The full text is printed in +the Appendix.) At that moment the Soviet government was only becoming +established in the important centers of the country and there was very +little confidence abroad in its power. The Soviet adopted the decree +unanimously. But this seemed to many no more than a political +demonstration. Those who were for a compromise preached at every +opportunity that our resolution would bring no results; for, on the one +hand, the German imperialists would not recognize and would not deal +with us; on the other hand, our Allies would declare war upon us as soon +as we should start negotiating a separate peace. Under the shadow of +these predictions we took our first steps to secure a general democratic +peace. The decree was adopted on the 26th of October, when Kerensky and +Krassnov were at the gates of Petrograd. On the 7th of November, we +addressed by wireless an invitation to our Allies and enemies to +conclude a general peace. In reply the Allied Governments addressed to +General Dukhonin, then commander-in-chief, through their military +attaches, a communication stating that further steps to separate peace +negotiations would lead to the gravest consequences. To this protest we +answered the 11th of November by appealing to all the workers, soldiers +and peasants. In this appeal we declared that under no circumstances +would we permit our army to shed its blood under the club of the foreign +bourgeoisie. We swept aside the threat of the Western imperialists and +took upon ourselves the responsibility for our peace policy before the +international working class. First of all, we published, in accordance +with our promises, made as a matter of principle, the secret treaties +and declared that we would relinquish everything in these treaties that +was against the interests of the masses of the people in all countries. +The capitalist governments made an attempt to make use of our +disclosures against one another, but the masses of the people understood +and recognized us. Not a single social patriotic publication, as far as +we know, dared to protest against having all the methods of diplomacy +radically changed by a government of peasants and workers; they dared +not protest against us for denouncing the dishonest cunning, chicanery +and cheating of the old diplomacy. We made it the task of our diplomacy +to enlighten the masses of the peoples, to open their eyes to the real +meaning of the policy of their governments, in order to weld them +together in a common struggle and a common hatred against the bourgeois +capitalist order. The German bourgeois press accused us of "dragging on" +the peace negotiations; but all nations anxiously followed the +discussions at Brest-Litovsk, and in this way we rendered, during the +two months and a half of peace negotiations, a service to the cause of +peace which was recognized even by the more honest of our enemies. The +question of peace was first put before the world in a shape which made +it impossible to side-track it any longer by machinations behind the +scenes. On the 22nd of November a truce was signed to discontinue +military activities on the entire front from the Baltic to the Black +Sea. Once more we requested our Allies to join us and to conduct +together with us the peace negotiations. There was no reply, though this +time the Allies did not again attempt to frighten us by threats. The +peace negotiations were started December 9th, a month and a half after +the peace decree was adopted. The accusations of the purchased press and +of the social-traitor press that we had made no attempt to agree with +our Allies on a common policy was therefore entirely false. For a month +and a half we kept our Allies informed about every step we made and +always called upon them to become a party to the peace negotiations. Our +conscience is clear before the peoples of France, Italy and Great +Britain.... We did all in our power to get all the belligerents to join +the peace negotiations. If we were compelled to start separate peace +negotiations, it was not because of any fault of ours, but because of +the Western imperialists, as well as those of the Russian parties, which +continued predicting the approaching destruction of the workmen's and +peasants' government of Russia and who persuaded the Allies not to pay +serious attention to our peace initiative. But be that as it may, on the +9th of December the peace conversations were started. Our delegation +made a statement of principles which set forth the basis of a general +democratic peace in the exact expressions of the decree of the 26th of +October (8th of November). The other side demanded that the session be +broken off, and the reopening of the sessions was later, at the +suggestion of Kuehlmann, repeatedly delayed. It was clear that the +delegation of the Teuton Allies experienced no small difficulty in the +formulation of its reply to our delegation. On the 25th of December this +reply was given. The diplomats of the Teuton Allies expressed agreement +with our democratic formula of peace without annexations and +indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples. We saw +clearly that this was but pretense; but we had not expected even that +they would try to pretend; because, as the French writer has said, +hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The fact that the +German imperialists found it necessary to make this tribute to the +principles of democracy, was, in our eyes, evidence that the situation +of affairs within Germany was serious enough.... But if we, generally +speaking, had no illusions concerning the love for democracy of Messrs. +Kuehlmann and Czernin--we know well enough the nature of the German and +Austro-Hungarian dominating classes--it must nevertheless be admitted +that we had not the slightest idea of the chasm which separated the real +intentions of German imperialism from those principles which were put +forth on the 25th of December by Mr. von Kuehlmann as a parody on the +Russian revolution--a chasm which was revealed so strikingly a few days +later. Such audacity we had never expected. + +Kuehlmann's reply made a tremendous impression upon the working masses +of Russia. It was interpreted as a result of the fear felt by the +dominant classes of the Central Empires because of the discontent and +the growing impatience of the working masses of Germany. On the 28th of +December there took place in Petrograd a joint demonstration of workmen +and soldiers for a democratic peace. The next morning our delegation +came back from Brest-Litovsk and brought those brigand demands which Mr. +von Kuehlmann made to us in the name of the Central Empires as an +interpretation of his "democratic" formulae. + +At the first glance it may seem incomprehensible why the German +diplomacy should have presented its democratic formulae if it intended +within two or three days to disclose its wolfish appetite. What was it +that the German diplomacy expected to bring about? At least, the +theoretic discussions which developed around the democratic formulae, +owing largely to the initiative of Kuehlmann himself, were not without +their danger. That the diplomacy of the Central Empires could not reap +many laurels in that way must have been clear beforehand to that +diplomacy itself. But the secret of the conduct of the diplomacy of +Kuehlmann consisted in that that gentleman was sincerely convinced of +our readiness to play a four-handed game with him. His way of reasoning +was approximately as follows: Russia needs peace. The Bolsheviki got the +power because of their struggle for peace. The Bolsheviki desire to +remain in power and this is possible for them only on condition that +peace is concluded. It is true that they bound themselves to a definite +democratic program of peace, but why do diplomats exist if not for the +purpose of making black look white? We Germans will make it easier for +the Bolsheviki by covering our plunders by democratic formulas. The +Bolshevist diplomacy will have plenty of reason not to dig for the +political essence of the matter, or, rather, not to expose to the entire +world the contents of the enticing formulae.... In other words, +Kuehlmann relied upon a silent agreement with us. He would return to us +our fine formulas and we should give him a chance to get provinces and +peoples for Germany without a protest. In the eyes of the German +workers, the annexations by force would thus receive the sanction of the +Russian Revolution. When during the discussions, we showed that with us, +it was not a matter of empty words or of camouflaging a conspiracy +concluded behind the scenes, but a matter of democratic principles for +the international life of the community of nations, Kuehlmann took it as +a willful and malicious breaking of the silent agreement. He would not +by any means recede from the position taken in the formulas of the 25th +of December. Relying upon his cunning, bureaucratic and judicial logic, +he tried in the face of the entire world to show that white is in no way +different from black, and it was our own perverseness which made us +insist that there was such a difference. Count Czernin, the +representative of Austria-Hungary, played a part in those negotiations +which no one would consider inspiring or satisfactory. + +He was an awkward second and upon instructions from Kuehlmann took it +upon himself in all critical moments to utter the most extreme and +cynical declarations. General Hoffmann brought a refreshing note into +the negotiations. Showing no great sympathy for the diplomatic +constructions of Kuehlmann, the General several times put his soldierly +boot upon the table, around which a complicated judicial debate was +developing. We, on our part, did not doubt for a single minute that just +this boot of General Hoffmann was the only element of serious reality in +these negotiations. The important trump in the hands of Mr. Kuehlmann +was the participation in the negotiations of a delegation of the Kiev +Rada. For the Ukrainian middle classes, who had seized the power, the +most important factor seemed to be the "recognition" of their government +by the capitalist governments of Europe. At first the Rada placed itself +at the disposal of the Allied imperialists, received from them some +pocket money, and immediately thereupon sent their representatives to +Brest-Litovsk in order to make a bargain behind the back of the Russian +people with the government of Austria-Hungary for the recognition of the +legitimate birth of their government. They had hardly taken this first +step on the road to "international" existence, when the Kiev diplomacy +revealed the same narrow-mindedness and the same moral standards which +were always so characteristic of the petty politicians of the Balkan +Peninsula. Messrs. Kuehlmann and Czernin certainly had no illusions +concerning the solidity of the new participant in the negotiations. But +they thought, and correctly so, that the participation of the Kiev +delegation complicated the game not without advantage for themselves. + +At its first appearance at Brest-Litovsk, the Kiev delegation +characterized Ukraine as a component part of the Russian Federated +Republic that was in progress of formation. This apparently embarrassed +the diplomats of the Central Empires, who considered it their main task +to convert the Russian Republic into a new Balkan Peninsula. At their +second appearance the delegates of the Rada declared, under dictation +from the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, that Ukraine refused to join the +Russian Federation and was becoming an entirely independent republic. In +order to give the reader an opportunity to get a better idea of the +situation which was thus created for the Soviet power in the last moment +of the peace negotiations, I think it best to reproduce here in its +basic parts the address made by the author of these lines in his +capacity as the People's Commissar on Foreign Affairs at the session of +the Central Executive Committee on the 14th of February, 1918. + + + +ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLES COMMISSAR ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS + +Comrades: Upon Soviet Russia has fallen the task not only to construct +the new but also to recapitulate the old to a certain degree, or, +rather, to a very large degree--to pay all bills, first of all the bills +of the war, which has lasted three and a half years. The war put the +economic power of the belligerent countries to a severe test. The fate +of Russia, a poor, backward country, in a protracted war was +predetermined. In the terrible collision of the military machines the +determining factor, after all is said and done, is the ability of the +country to adapt its industries to the military needs, to rebuild it on +the shortest notice and to produce in continuously increasing quantities +the weapons of destruction which are used up at such an enormous rate +during this massacre of peoples. Almost every country, including the +most backward, could and did have powerful weapons of destruction at the +beginning of the war; that is, it obtained them from foreign countries. +That is what all the backward countries did, and so did Russia. But the +war speedily wears out its dead capital, demanding that it be +continuously replenished. The military power of every single country +drawn into the whirlpool of the world massacre was, as a matter of fact, +measured by its ability to produce independently and during the war +itself, its cannons and shells and the other weapons of destruction. + +If the war had decided the problem of the balance of power in a very +short time, Russia might conceivably have turned out to be on that side +of the trenches which victory favored. But the war dragged along for a +long time, and it was not an accident that it did so. The fact alone +that the international politics were for the last fifty years reduced to +the construction of the so-called European "balance of power," that is, +to a state in which the hostile powers approximately balance one +another, this fact alone was bound--when the power and wealth of the +present bourgeois nations is considered--to make it a war of an +extremely protracted character. That meant first of all the exhaustion +of the weaker and economically less developed countries. + +The most powerful country in a military sense proved to be Germany, +because of the strength of the industries and because of their modern +and rational construction as against the archaic construction of the +German State. France, with its undeveloped state of capitalism, proved +to be far behind Germany, and even such a powerful colonial power as +Great Britain, owing to the conservative and routine character of the +English industries, proved to be weaker than Germany. When history put +before the Russian Revolution the question of the peace negotiations, we +had no doubt that in these negotiations, and so long as the decisive +power of the revolutionary proletariat of the world had not interfered, +we should be compelled to stand the bill of three and a half years of +war. There was no doubt in our minds that in the person of the German +imperialism we were dealing with an opponent who was saturated with the +consciousness of his immense power, which was strikingly revealed during +the present war. + +All the arguments made by bourgeois cliques that we might have been +incomparably stronger if we had conducted these negotiations together +with our allies are absolutely without foundation. In order that we +might at an indefinite future date conduct negotiations together with +our Allies, we should first of all have had to continue the war together +with them. And if our country was weakened and exhausted, the +continuation of the war, a failure to bring it to a conclusion, would +have still further weakened and exhausted it. We should have had to +settle the war under conditions still more unfavorable to us. In the +case even that the combination of which Russia, owing to international +intrigues of Czarism and the bourgeoisie, had become a part--the +combination headed by Great Britain--in the case even that this +combination had come out of the war completely victorious--let us for a +moment admit the possibility of such a not very probable issue--even in +that case, comrades, it does not mean that our country would also have +come out victorious. For during further continuation of this protracted +war, Russia would have become even more exhausted and plundered than +now. The masters of that combination, who would concentrate in their +hands the fruits of the victory, that is, Great Britain and America, +would have displayed toward our country the same methods which were +displayed by Germany during the peace negotiations. It would be absurd +and childish to appraise the politics of the imperialistic countries +from the point of view of any considerations other than those +considerations of naked interests and material power. Consequently, if +we, as a nation are at present weakened before the imperialism of the +world, we are weakened, not because of extricating ourselves from the +fiery ring of the war, having already previously extricated ourselves +from the shackles of international military obligations: no! we are +weakened by that very policy of the Czarists and the bourgeois classes, +which we, as a revolutionary party, have always fought against before +this war and during this war. + +You remember, comrades, under what conditions our delegation went to +Brest-Litovsk last time, right after one of the sessions of the Third +All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. At that session, we reported on the +state of the negotiations, and the demands of our opponents. These +demands, as you remember, were really no more than masked, or, rather, +half-masked annexationist aspirations at the expense of Lithuania, +Courland, a part of Livonia, the Isles of Moon Sound, as well as a +half-masked demand for a punitive war indemnity which we then estimated +would amount to six, eight or even ten milliards of rubles. During +interruption of the sessions, which continued for about ten days, a +considerable disturbance took place in Austria-Hungary; strikes of +masses of workers broke out, and these strikes were the first +recognition of our methods of conducting peace negotiations that we met +with from the proletariat of the Central Empires, as against the +annexationist demands of the German militarism. We promised here no +miracles but we did say that the road we were pursuing was the only road +remaining to the revolutionary democracy for securing the possibility of +its further development. + +There is room for complaint that the proletariat of the other countries, +and particularly of the Central Empires, is too slow to enter the road +of open revolutionary struggle, yes, it must be admitted that the pace +of its development is all too slow--but, nevertheless, there could be +observed a movement in Austria-Hungary which swept the entire state and +which was a direct echo of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. + +Leaving for Brest-Litovsk, it was our common opinion that there was no +ground to believe that just this wave would sweep away the Austro-German +militarism. If we had been convinced that this could be expected, we +would gladly have given the promise that several persons demanded from +us, namely, that under no circumstances would we sign a separate peace +with Germany. I said at that very time, that we could not make such a +promise, for it would amount to taking upon ourselves the obligation of +vanquishing the German militarism. The secret of attaining such a +victory was not in our possession. And inasmuch as we would not +undertake the obligation to change the balance of the world powers at a +moment's notice, we frankly and openly declared that revolutionary power +may under certain conditions be compelled to agree to an annexationist +peace. A revolutionary power would fall short of its high principles +only in the event that it should attempt to conceal from its own people +the predatory character of the peace, but by no means, however, in the +event that the course of the struggle should compel it to adopt such a +peace. + +At the same time, we indicated that we were leaving to continue +negotiations under conditions which were seemingly improving for us and +becoming worse for our enemies. We observed the movement in +Austria-Hungary, and there were signs indicating (this was made the +basis for statements by representatives of the German Social Democracy +in the Reichstag) that Germany was on the eve of similar events. We went +with this hope. During the first days of this visit to Brest-Litovsk the +wireless brought us from Vilna the first news that in Berlin an enormous +strike movement was developing; this movement as well as that of +Austria-Hungary was directly connected with the course of negotiations +in Brest. However, as is often the case, by reason of the dialectic of +the class struggle, just this conspicuous beginning of the proletarian +rising, which surpassed anything Germany had ever seen, was bound to +push the property classes to a closer consolidation and to greater +hostility against the proletariat. The German dominating classes are +saturated with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preservation to +understand that concessions in such an exigency as they were in, under +the pressure of the masses of their own people--concessions however +small--would amount to capitulation before the idea of the revolution. +That is why, after the first moment of perplexity and panic, the time +when Kuehlmann deliberately dragged out the negotiations by minor and +formal questions, had passed--as soon as the strikes were disposed of, +as soon as he came to the conclusion that for the time being no imminent +danger threatened his masters, he again changed front and adopted a tone +of unlimited self-confidence and aggression. + +Our negotiations were complicated by the participation of the Kiev Rada. +We called attention to this last time, too. The delegation from the Kiev +Rada appeared at a time when the Rada represented a fairly strong +organization in the Ukraine and when the way out of the war had not yet +been predetermined. Just at that time, we made the Rada an official +offer to conclude a definite treaty with us, making as one of the +conditions of such a treaty the following demand: that the Rada declare +Kaledin and Korniloff to be counter-revolutionists and put no hindrance +in the way of our waging war on these two leaders. The delegation from +the Kiev Rada arrived, just when we hoped to reach an understanding with +it on these matters. We declared that as long as the people of the +Ukraine recognized the Rada, we considered its independent participation +in these negotiations permissible. But with the further development of +events in Russian territory and in the Ukraine, and the more the +antagonism between the Ukrainian masses and the Rada increased, the +greater became the Rada's readiness to conclude any kind of treaty with +the governments of the Central Empires, and, if need be, to drag German +imperialism into the internal affairs of the Russian Republic, in order +to support the Rada against the Russian revolution. + +On the 9th day of February (N. S.) we learned that the peace +negotiations carried on behind our backs between the Rada and the +Central Powers, had been signed. The 9th of February happened to be the +birthday of Leopold of Bavaria, and, as is the custom in monarchical +countries, the triumphant historical act was timed--with or without the +consent of the Kiev Rada for this festive day. General Hoffmann had a +salute fired in honor of Leopold of Bavaria, having previously asked +permission to do so of the Kiev delegation, since by the treaty of peace +Brest-Litovsk had been ceded to Ukraine. + +Events had taken such a turn, however, that at the time General Hoffmann +was asking permission for a military salute, the Kiev Rada had but very +little territory left outside of Brest-Litovsk. On the strength of the +telegrams we had received from Petrograd, we officially made it known to +the Central Powers' delegation that the Kiev Rada no longer existed, a +circumstance which certainly had some bearing on the course of the peace +negotiations. We suggested to Count Czernin that his representatives +accompany our officers into Ukrainian territory to ascertain whether the +Kiev Rada existed or not. Czernin seemed to welcome this suggestion, but +when we asked him if this meant that the treaty made with the Kiev +delegation would not be signed before the return of his own mission, he +hesitated and promised to ask Kuehlmann about it. Having inquired, he +sent us an answer in the negative. + +This was on February 8th. By the 9th, they had to sign the treaty. This +could not be delayed, not only on account of Leopold's birthday, but for +a more important reason, which Kuehlmann undoubtedly explained to +Czernin: "If we should send our representatives into the Ukraine just +now, they might really convince themselves that the Rada does not exist; +and then we shall have to face a single All-Russian delegation which +would spoil our prospects in the negotiations."... By the +Austro-Hungarian delegation we were advised to put principle aside and +to place the question on a more practical plane. Then the German +delegation would be disposed to concessions.... It was unthinkable that +the Germans should decide to continue the war over, say, the Moon +Islands, if you put this demand in concrete form. + +We replied that we were ready to look into such concessions as their +German colleagues were prepared to make. "So far we have been contending +for the self-determination of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians, Letts, +Esthonians, and other peoples; and on all these issues you have told us +that such self-determination is out of the question. Now let us see what +your plans are in regard to the self-determination of another +people--the Russians; what designs and plans of a military strategic +nature are behind your seizure of the Moon Islands. For these islands, +as an integral part of an independent Esthonian Republic, or as a +possession of the Federated Russian Republic would have only a defensive +military importance, while in the hands of Germany they would assume +offensive significance, menacing the most vital centers of our country, +and especially Petrograd." + +But, of course, Hoffmann would make no concessions whatsoever. Then the +hour for reaching a decision had come. We could not declare war, for we +were too weak. The army had lost all of its internal ties. In order to +save our country, to overcome this disorganization, it was imperative to +establish the internal coherence of the toilers. This psychological tie +can only be created by constructive work in factory, field and workshop. +We had to return the masses of laborers, who had been subjected to great +and intense suffering--who had experienced catastrophes in the war--to +the fields and factories, where they must find themselves again and get +a footing in the labor world, and rebuild internal discipline. This was +the only way to save the country, which was now atoning for the sins of +Czarism and the bourgeoisie. We had to get out of the war and withdraw +the army from the slaughter house. Nevertheless, we threw this in the +face of the German militarism: The peace you are forcing down our +throats is a peace of aggression and robbery. We cannot permit you, +Messrs. Diplomats, to say to the German workingmen: "You have +characterized our demands as avaricious, as annexationist. But look, +under these very demands we have brought you the signature of the +Russian revolution." Yes, we are weak, we cannot fight at present. But +we have sufficient revolutionary courage to say that we shall not +willingly affix our signature to the treaty which you are writing with +the sword on the body of living peoples. We refused to affix our +signature. I believe we acted properly, comrades. + +I do not mean to say, friends, that a German advance upon Russia is out +of the question. It were too rash to make such an assertion in view of +the great strength of the German imperialistic party. But I do believe +that the stand we have taken in the matter has rendered it far more +difficult for German militarism to advance upon us. What would happen if +it should advance? To this there is but one thing to say: If it is +possible in our country, a country completely exhausted and in a state +of desperation, to raise the spirits of the more revolutionary energetic +elements; if a struggle in defence of our Revolution and the territory +comprised within it is still possible, then this is the case only as a +result of our abandoning the war and refusing to sign the peace treaty. + + + +THE SECOND WAR AND THE SIGNING OF PEACE + +During the first few days following the breaking off of negotiations the +German government hesitated, not knowing what course to pursue. The +politicians and diplomats evidently thought that the principal objects +had been accomplished and that there was no reason for coveting our +signatures. The military men were ready, in any event, to break through +the lines drawn by the German Government at Brest-Litovsk. Professor +Krigge, the advisor of the German delegation, told a member of our +delegation that a German invasion of Russia under the existing +conditions was out of the question. Count Mirbach, then at the head of +the German missions at Petrograd, went to Berlin with the assurance that +an agreement concerning the exchange of prisoners of war had been +satisfactorily reached. But all this did not in the least prevent +General Hoffmann from declaring on the fifth day after the Brest-Litovsk +negotiations had been broken off--that the armistice was over, +antedating the seven-day period from the time of the last Brest-Litovsk +session. It were really out of place to dilate here on the moral +indignation caused by this piece of dishonesty. It fits in perfectly +with the general state of diplomatic and military morality of the ruling +classes. + +The new German invasion developed under circumstances most fatal for +Russia. Instead of the week's notice agreed upon, we received notice +only two days in advance. This circumstance intensified the panic in the +army which was already in state of chronic dissolution. Resistance was +almost unthinkable. The soldiers could not believe that the Germans +would advance after we had declared the state of war at an end. The +panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of such individual detachments +as were ready to make a stand. In the workingmen's quarters of Petrograd +and Moscow, the indignation against the treacherous and truly murderous +German invasion reached a pitch of greatest intensity. In these alarming +days and nights, the workers were ready to enlist in the army by the ten +thousand. But the matter of organizing lagged far behind. Isolated +tenacious detachments full of enthusiasm became convinced themselves of +their instability in their first serious clashes with German regulars. +This still further lowered the country's spirits. The old army had long +ago been hopelessly defeated and was going to pieces, blocking all the +roads and byways. The new army, owing to the country's general +exhaustion, the fearful disorganization of industries and the means of +transportation, was being got together too slowly. Distance was the only +serious obstacle in the way of the German invasion. + +The chief attention of the Austro-Hungarian government was centered on +the Ukraine. The Rada, through its delegation, had appealed to the +governments of the Central Empires for direct military aid against the +Soviets, which had by that time completely defeated the Ukrainians. Thus +did the petty-bourgeois democracy of the Ukraine, in its struggle +against the working class and the destitute peasants, voluntarily open +the gates to foreign invasion. + +At the same time, the Svinhufvud government was seeking the aid of +German bayonets against the Finnish proletariat. German militarism, +openly and before the whole world, assumed the role of executioner of +the peasant and proletarian revolution in Russia. + +In the ranks of our party hot debates were being carried on as to +whether or not we should, under these circumstances, yield to the German +ultimatum and sign a new treaty, which--and this no one doubted--would +include conditions incomparably more onerous than those announced at +Brest-Litovsk. The representatives of the one view held that just now, +with the German intervention in the internal war of the Russian +Republic, it was impossible to establish peace for one part of Russia +and remain passive, while in the South and in the North, German forces +would be establishing a regime of bourgeois dictatorship. Another +view, championed chiefly by Lenin, was that every delay, even the +briefest breathing spell, would greatly help the internal stabilization +and increase the Russian powers of resistance. After the whole country +and the whole world had come to know of our absolute helplessness +against foreign invasion at this time, the conclusion of peace would +everywhere be understood as an act forced upon us by the cruel law of +disproportionate forces. It would be childish to argue from the +standpoint of abstract revolutionary ethics. The point is not to die +with honor but to achieve ultimate victory. The Russian Revolution wants +to survive, must survive, and must by every means at its disposal avoid +fighting an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the Western +revolutionary movement will come to its aid. + +German imperialism is still engaged in a fierce annexationist struggle +with English and American militarism. Only because of this is the +conclusion of peace between Russia and Germany at all possible. We must +fully avail ourselves of this situation. The welfare of the Revolution +is the highest law. We should accept the peace which we are unable to +reject; we must secure a breathing spell to be utilized for intensive +work within the country and, especially, for the creation of an army. + +At the conference of the Communist party as well as at the Fourth +Conference of the Soviet, the peace partisans triumphed. They were +joined by many of those who in January considered it impossible to sign +the Brest-Litovsk treaty. "Then," said they, "our signature would have +been looked upon by the English and French workingmen as a shameful +capitulation, without an attempt to fight. Even the base insinuations of +the Anglo-French chauvinists to the secret compact between the Soviet +Government and the Germans, might in case that treaty had been signed +find credence in certain circles of European laborers. But after we had +refused to sign the treaty, after a new German invasion, after our +attempt to resist it, and after our military weakness had become +painfully obvious to the whole world, after all this, no one dare to +reproach us for surrendering without a fight." + +The Brest-Litovsk treaty, in its second enlarged edition, was signed and +ratified. + +In the meantime, the executioners were doing their work in Finland and +the Ukraine, menacing more and more the most vital centers of Great +Russia. Thus the question of Russia's very existence as an independent +country is henceforth inseparably connected with the question of the +European revolution. + + + +CONCLUSION + +When our party took over the government, we knew in advance what +difficulties we had to contend with. Economically the country had been +exhausted by the war to the very utmost. The revolution had destroyed +the old administrative machinery and could not yet create anything to +take its place. Millions of workers had been wrested from their normal +nooks in the national economy of things, declassified, and physically +shattered by the three years' war. The colossal war industries, carried +on on an inadequately prepared national foundation, had drained all the +lifeblood of the people; and their demobilization was attended with +extreme difficulties. The phenomena of economic and political anarchy +spread throughout the country. The Russian peasantry had for centuries +been held together by barbarian national discipline from below and +iron-Czarist rule from above. Economic development had undermined the +former, the revolution destroyed the latter. Psychologically, the +revolution meant the awakening of a sense of human personality among the +peasantry. The anarchic manifestations of this awakening are but the +inevitable results of the preceding oppression. A new order of things, +an order based on the workers' own control of industry, can come only +through gradual and internal elimination of the anarchic manifestations +of the revolution. + +On the other hand, the propertied classes, even though deprived of +political power, will not relinquish their advantages without a fight. +The Revolution has brought to a head the question of private property in +land and the tools of production--that is, the question of vital +significance to the exploiting classes. Politically this means +ceaseless, secret or open civil war. In its turn, civil war inevitably +nourishes anarchical tendencies within the workingmen's movement. With +the disorganization of industries, of national finances, of the +transportation and provisioning systems, prolonged civil strife thus +sets up tremendous difficulties in the way of constructive organizing +work. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government can look the future in the +face with perfect confidence. Only a careful inventory of all the +country's resources; only a rational organization of industries--an +organization born of one general plan; only wise and careful +distribution of all the products, can save the country. And this is +Socialism. Either a complete descent to colonial status or a Socialist +resurrection--these are the alternatives before which our country finds +itself. + +The war has undermined the soil of the entire capitalistic world. Herein +lies our unconquerable strength. The imperialistic ring that is pressing +around us will lie burst asunder by the proletarian revolution. We do +not doubt this for a minute, any more than we doubted during our decades +of underground struggle the inevitableness of the downfall of Czarism. + +To struggle, to unite our forces, to establish industrial discipline and +a Socialist regime, to increase the productivity of labor, and to +press on in the face of all obstacles--this is our mission. History is +working in our favor. The proletarian revolution will flare up, sooner +or later, both in Europe and America, and will bring emancipation not +only to the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, but also +to all suffering humanity. + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's From October to Brest-Litovsk, by Leon Trotzky + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FROM OCTOBER TO BREST-LITOVSK *** + +This file should be named 6413.txt or 6413.zip + +Produced by Julie Barkley, David Starner +and the Online Proofreading Team. + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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