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diff --git a/old/63467-0.txt b/old/63467-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 07654cf..0000000 --- a/old/63467-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36299 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Vol. 9, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 9 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: October 16, 2020 [EBook #63467] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS--VOL 9 *** - - - - -Produced by John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net. - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945 — 1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME IX - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - 8 March 1946 — 23 March 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - Seventy-seventh Day, Friday, 8 March 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 28 - - Seventy-eighth Day, Monday, 11 March 1946, - Morning Session 59 - Afternoon Session 99 - - Seventy-ninth Day, Tuesday, 12 March 1946, - Morning Session 135 - Afternoon Session 170 - - Eightieth Day, Wednesday, 13 March 1946, - Morning Session 194 - Afternoon Session 230 - - Eighty-first Day, Thursday, 14 March 1946, - Morning Session 262 - Afternoon Session 289 - - Eighty-second Day, Friday, 15 March 1946, - Morning Session 318 - Afternoon Session 333 - - Eighty-third Day, Saturday, 16 March 1946, - Morning Session 365 - - Eighty-fourth Day, Monday, 18 March 1946, - Morning Session 396 - Afternoon Session 426 - - Eighty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 19 March 1946, - Morning Session 457 - Afternoon Session 475 - - Eighty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 20 March 1946, - Morning Session 509 - Afternoon Session 540 - - Eighty-seventh Day, Thursday, 21 March 1946, - Morning Session 580 - Afternoon Session 614 - - Eighty-eighth Day, Friday, 22 March 1946, - Morning Session 647 - Afternoon Session 673 - - Eighty-ninth Day, Saturday, 23 March 1946, - Morning Session 696 - - - - - SEVENTY-SEVENTH DAY - Friday, 8 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have three -announcements to make. - -First, to avoid unnecessary translation, Defense Counsel shall indicate -to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents which they -propose to use, in order that the Prosecution may have an opportunity to -object to irrelevant passages. In the event of disagreement between the -Prosecution and the Defense as to the relevancy of any particular -passage, the Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently -relevant to be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated, -unless the Prosecution require translation of the entire document. - -Second, the Tribunal has received an application from Dr. Nelte, counsel -for the Defendant Keitel, inquiring whether a defendant, in order to -support his memory, may make use of written notes while giving oral -evidence. The Tribunal sanctions the use of written notes by a defendant -in those circumstances, unless in special cases the Tribunal orders -otherwise. - -Third, cases have arisen where one defendant has been given leave to -administer interrogatories to or obtain an affidavit from a witness who -will be called to give oral evidence on behalf of another defendant. If -the witness gives his oral evidence before the case is heard in which -the interrogatory or affidavit is to be offered, counsel in the latter -case must elicit the evidence by oral examination, instead of using the -interrogatory or affidavit. - -That is all. - -I now call upon counsel for the Defendant Göring. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, in -yesterday’s afternoon session, you observed that application Number 2, -which I had submitted as a supplement, had not yet been discussed -orally. I was unfortunately not present at the afternoon session -yesterday. It is a question of a subsequent, formal supplement to my -applications regarding the witnesses Westhoff and Wielen. Both of these -witnesses had already been granted me in the open Tribunal session. I -submitted these names again only in order to complete my application. - -As an addition I mentioned only State Secretary Stuckart, a witness who -also has already been granted me previously by a decision of the -Tribunal. I believe, therefore, that I do not need to discuss this -supplementary application, and that the Prosecution have no objection to -this action. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Nelte, General Westhoff and Wielen have already -been granted to you, and there is no need for any further application. - -DR. NELTE: Is State Secretary Stuckart also granted me, Your Honor? - -THE PRESIDENT: Westhoff and Wielen have already been granted to you, and -there is no need for any further application. I am afraid it is -difficult to remember these names. I think that Stuckart has been -granted to you. - -DR. NELTE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am told he has. - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, at -yesterday’s afternoon session my name was also mentioned in the -following connection: I have hitherto submitted only written -applications, and I must now present them orally. I assume that this -refers to the written application which I handed in with my document and -witness list, in which, in a rather lengthy written application, I -requested that I might have permission to submit in evidence as -historical documents of the time, quotations from theological and -philosophical works which were considered important at the time of -Rosenberg’s public power. I beg Your Honor to inform me whether this is -the application in question. - -I should like to repeat: The President told me yesterday that I should -repeat my written application orally. Therefore I should like to ask -whether this refers to the written request that I handed in with my list -of witnesses and documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, so far as the Tribunal knows, everything will -be covered by the written order which the Tribunal will make upon your -application. It is not convenient, really, to deal with these matters -now by way of oral requests, but everything that is in your written -application will be covered by a written order of the Tribunal. It will -be subject, of course, to the order which I have announced this morning, -in order to assure that there will be no more translation than is -absolutely necessary. - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President and -Gentlemen of the Tribunal, before I start with my presentation I beg to -make two supplementary applications. I am aware of the fact that -supplementary requests as such should be put in writing. But since it is -a question of several requests, I should like to have your decision -whether I should submit these applications now or whether the Tribunal -desires a written request. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may put your request now, verbally, but we would -prefer to have it in writing afterwards as soon as possible. - -DR. STAHMER: I name first Major Bütz, who is in custody here in -Nuremberg, as a witness for the following facts: Reich Marshal Göring -repeatedly opposed in the summer of 1944 the measures which Hitler had -ordered against aviators taking part in terror attacks. Furthermore, he -knows that no order was issued either by the Luftwaffe or by the -Wehrmacht corresponding to Hitler’s orders regarding terror aviators. -Finally, he can give evidence in regard to the following: An officer of -the Luftwaffe in May 1944 in Munich protected an airman, who had bailed -out, from the lynching which the crowd wanted to carry out. Hitler, who -had knowledge of this incident, demanded of Göring the name of this -officer, and that he be punished. In spite of repeated inquiries on -Hitler’s part, Göring did not give the name of this officer, although he -knew it, and in this way protected him. This is the application -regarding the witness Bütz. Another supplementary request is concerned -with the following: In the session of 14 February 1946 the Soviet -Prosecution submitted that a German military formation, Staff 537, -Pioneer Battalion, carried out mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war -in the forests near Katyn. As the responsible leaders of this formation, -Colonel Ahrens, First Lieutenant Rex, and Second Lieutenant Hodt were -mentioned. As proof the Prosecution referred to Document USSR-64. It is -an official report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet -Union which was ordered to investigate the facts of the well-known Katyn -case. The document I have not yet received. As a result of the -publication of this speech by the Prosecution in the press, members of -the staff of the Army Group Center, to which Staff 537 was directly -subordinate and which was stationed 4 to 5 kilometers from Staff 537, -came forward. These people stated that the evidence upon which the -Prosecution have based the statement submitted was not correct. - -The following witnesses are mentioned in this connection: - -Colonel Ahrens, at that time commander of 537, later chief of army -armament and commander of the auxiliary army; First Lieutenant Rex, -probably taken as a prisoner of war at Stalingrad; Lieutenant Hodt, -probably taken prisoner by the Russians in or near Königsberg; Major -General of intelligence troops, Eugen Oberhauser, probably taken -prisoner of war by the Americans; First Lieutenant Graf Berg—later -ordnance officer with Field Marshal Von Kluge—a prisoner of war in -British hands in Canada. Other members of the units which are accused -are still to be mentioned. I name these witnesses to prove that the -conclusion as to the complicity of Göring drawn by the Prosecution in -the above-mentioned statement is not justified according to the -Indictment. - -This morning I received another communication bearing on the same -question, which calls for the following request: Professor Naville, -professor of forensic medicine at the University of Geneva, carried out, -with an international commission at Smolensk, investigations of the -bodies at that time. He established from the state of preservation of -these corpses, from the notes found in the pockets of their clothes, and -other means of evidence, that the deed must have been committed in the -year 1940. - -Those are my requests. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you will put in those requests in writing, the -Tribunal will consider them. - -DR. STAHMER: And now I come to the . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute. Dr. Stahmer, if you would communicate -your written application to the Prosecution, they would then be able to -make a written statement if they have any objection to it. You will do -that as soon as possible. Let us have both your written application and -the Prosecution’s answer to it. - -DR. STAHMER: The Tribunal has ordered in its decision of 11 December -1945 that the Defense is entitled to one speech only. This shall take -place only after the conclusion of the hearing of the evidence. The -Tribunal decided some time later that explanatory words may be permitted -at the present stage of the proceedings in connection with the -presentation of documents by the Defense. The witnesses have already -been named by me. A decision has been made concerning their admission -except for today’s request and, with the Court’s permission, I shall -call a witness shortly. Before I do that, I wish to make the following -comments to the documents to which I shall refer during my final speech: - -The Prosecution have charged the defendant repeatedly with the violation -of the Treaty of Versailles. This charge is not justified in the opinion -of the Defense. Detailed statements on this question belong to the -concluding speech of the Defense and will therefore be dealt with there. -The present part of the proceedings deals only with the production of -documents which will be used to support the contention that the Treaty -was not violated by Germany but that the German Reich was no longer -bound by it. I submit that the Fourteen Points of the American President -Wilson, which were the basis of that Treaty, are commonly known, and -therefore do not need further proof, according to Paragraph 21 of the -Charter. - -The Treaty of Versailles has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It -was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1919, Page 687. Of this Treaty -of Versailles, Article 8 and Part V are important for its -interpretation. These provisions insofar as they are of interest here, -read as follows—I quote the first four paragraphs of Article 8: - - “The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of - peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest - point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by - common action of international obligations. - - “The Council, taking account of the geographical situation, and - circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such - reduction for the consideration and action of the several - governments. - - “Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at - least every 10 years. - - “After these plans shall have been adopted by the several - governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be - exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.” - -The first paragraph of Part V reads: - - “In order to render possible the introduction of a general - limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes - strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which - follow.” - -These regulations infer, not only that Germany had to disarm, but also -that the signatories of the pact were likewise bound to disarm. Germany, -however, was committed to start disarmament first. Germany completely -fulfilled this commitment. - -On 17 February 1927 Marshal Foch stated, “I can assure you that Germany -has actually disarmed.” - -Therefore, the signatories of the pact had to fulfill their commitment -to disarm. As they did not disarm, Germany was no longer bound by the -pact according to general principles of law, and she was justified in -renouncing her obligations. - -This interpretation agrees with the point of view which has been -expressed by French as well as by English statesmen. Therefore, I should -like to refer to the speech made by Paul Boncour on 8 April 1927, in -which Boncour stated as follows—I quote from Document Book 1, Page 28: - - “It is correct that the introduction to Part V of the Treaty of - Versailles concerns the limitation of armaments which was - imposed on Germany as a prerequisite and as the forerunner of a - general limitation of armaments. This brings out very clearly - the difference between the armament restrictions of Germany and - other similar armament restrictions which in the course of - history have been imposed after the conclusion of wars. This - time these regulations—and in this lies their entire - value—have been imposed not only on one of the signatories to - the Treaty, but they are rather a duty, a moral and legal - responsibility, for the other signatories to proceed with a - general limitation of armaments.” - -Further, I should like to refer to the speech by David Lloyd George on 7 -November 1927, in which he particularly describes the memorandum to the -skeleton note of 16 June 1919, as—and I quote from the Document Book 1, -Page 26: - - “. . . document which we handed Germany as a solemn pledge on - the part of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and 20 other - nations to follow Germany’s example after she was disarmed.” - -The Treaty of Versailles was felt not only by the German people to be a -bitter injustice—there were numerous voices even in foreign countries -that called the Treaty exceedingly unfair for Germany. I am quoting the -following from Rothermere’s _Warnings and Prophecies_, Document Book 1, -Page 30: - - “Germany was justified in feeling that she had been betrayed in - Versailles. Under the pretext . . .” - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -[_Interposing._] I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that the -documents which are now being read into the record are documents which, -as I understand it, were excluded as irrelevant by the Tribunal when -that matter was before it before. They are matters of a good deal of -public notoriety and would not be secret if they were not in evidence; -but I think the reading of them into the record is in violation of the -Tribunal’s own determination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal has suspected that these -documents had been excluded, and they have sent for the original record -of their orders. But I must say now that the Tribunal expects the -defendants’ counsel to conform to their orders and not to read documents -which they have been ordered not to read. - -[_At this point Defendant Hess was led out of the courtroom._] - -DR. STAHMER: Shall I continue? - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - - DR. STAHMER: “Under the pretext that it was the first step to - world disarmament, Germany was forcibly disarmed. Great Britain - was, indeed, also deceived. She had actually continued to disarm - for a period of 15 years. But from the day on which the various - peace treaties were signed, France encouraged a number of small - states to powerful rearmament and the result was that 5 years - after Versailles, Germany was surrounded by a much tighter ring - of iron than 5 years before the World War. It was inevitable - that a German regime, which had renounced Versailles, would at - the first opportunity rearm heavily. It was evident that its - weapons, diplomatically, if not in the true sense of the word, - were to be directed against the powers of Versailles.” - -In the same way the Locarno Pact is contested, with a breach of which -the defendant is also charged, and, as far as the Defense are concerned, -unjustifiably. - -Germany renounced this pact and could do so rightfully because France -and Soviet Russia had signed a military assistance pact, although the -Locarno Pact provided a guarantee of the French eastern border. This act -by France, in the opinion of Germany, was in sharp contrast to the legal -situation created by the Locarno Pact. - -In a speech of Plenipotentiary Von Ribbentrop before the League of -Nations on 19 March 1936, this opinion was expressed in the following -terms—I quote from Document Book 1, Page 32 . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have before me now the order of the -Tribunal of 26 February 1946, and Paragraph 4 of that order is in the -following terms: “The following documents are denied as irrelevant,” and -then the heading “Göring,” and the fourth of the documents is the speech -by Paul Boncour on 8 April 1927; and the sixth is the speech by Lloyd -George on 7 November 1927, which you have not read but which you have -put into your trial brief. I would again call your attention, and the -attention of all the Defense Counsel, to the fact that they will not be -allowed to read any document which has been denied by the Tribunal. Go -on. - -DR. STAHMER: This quotation is as follows: - - “. . . but it is also clear that if a world power such as - France, by virtue of her sovereignty, can decide upon concluding - military alliances of such vast proportions without having - misgivings on account of existing treaties, another world power - like Germany has at least the right to safeguard the protection - of the entire Reich territory by re-establishing within her own - borders the natural rights of a sovereign power which are - granted all peoples.” - -Before I take up the question of aggressive war in detail I have the -intention, if I have the permission of the Tribunal, to call on the -first witness, General of the Air Force Bodenschatz. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -[_The witness Karl Bodenschatz took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -KARL BODENSCHATZ (Witness): Karl Bodenschatz. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: General Bodenschatz, since when have you known Reich -Marshal Göring? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have known Reich Marshal Göring since June 1918. - -DR. STAHMER: In what capacity did you get to know him? - -BODENSCHATZ: I came to know him when he was the commander of the -Richthofen Squadron. I was at that time the adjutant of Rittmeister -Freiherr von Richthofen who had just been killed in action. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you taken into the Reichswehr at the end of the first -World War? - -BODENSCHATZ: At the end of the first World War I was taken into the -Reichswehr as a regular officer and remained from the year 1919 until -April 1933. - -DR. STAHMER: When, after the completion of the World War, did you resume -your connection with Göring? - -BODENSCHATZ: In November 1918 I was with Göring at Aschaffenburg, at the -demobilization of the Richthofen Fighter Squadron, and later in the -spring of 1919 I was with him again for several weeks in Berlin. There -our paths separated. Then I met Göring for the first time again at his -first wedding, and I believe that was in the year 1919 or 1920. I cannot -remember exactly. Up to 1929 there was no connection between us. In the -year 1929, and until 1933, I met Hermann Göring several times here in -Nuremberg where I was a company commander in Infantry Regiment 21. My -meetings with Göring here in Nuremberg were solely for the purpose of -keeping up the old friendship. - -DR. STAHMER: And then in the year 1939, you entered the Luftwaffe? - -BODENSCHATZ; In 1933 I reported to Hermann Göring in Berlin. At that -time, Göring was Reich Commissioner of the Luftwaffe and I became his -military adjutant. - -DR. STAHMER: How long did you retain this post as adjutant? - -BODENSCHATZ: I retained this post as adjutant until the year 1938. Later -I became Chief of the Ministerial Bureau, 1938. - -DR. STAHMER: And what position did you have during the war? - -BODENSCHATZ: During the war, I was liaison officer between the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Führer’s headquarters. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you at the headquarters, or where? - -BODENSCHATZ: I was alternately at the Führer’s headquarters and at the -headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you leave that position? - -BODENSCHATZ: I left that position on 20 July 1944, because I was -seriously wounded that day. - -DR. STAHMER: And what was the cause of your being wounded? - -BODENSCHATZ: The plot against Hitler. - -DR. STAHMER: You were present? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: And what were your tasks at the Führer’s headquarters? - -BODENSCHATZ: It was my duty in the Führer’s headquarters to report on -special events, special matters, inquiries, and desires of the Reich -Marshal if he were absent, and to transmit them. I also had to transmit -inquiries from the Führer’s headquarters direct to Hermann Göring. Then -I had to inform Hermann Göring early, that is, not through official -channels, regarding all that took place in the Führer’s headquarters -insofar as it was of interest to him in his capacity as Reich Marshal. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you take part regularly in the conferences? - -BODENSCHATZ: I was a listener at these conferences. - -DR. STAHMER: From what time onwards did Reich Marshal Göring lose his -influence with Hitler? - -BODENSCHATZ: According to my personal opinion and conviction, Hermann -Göring began to lose influence with Hitler in the spring of 1943. - -DR. STAHMER: And what were the reasons? - -BODENSCHATZ: That was the beginning of large-scale air attacks by night -by the R.A.F. on German towns, and from that moment there were -differences of opinion between Hitler and Göring which became more -serious as time went on. Even though Göring made tremendous efforts, he -could not recapture his influence with the Führer to the same extent as -before. The outward symptoms of this waning influence were the -following: - -First, the Führer criticized Göring most severely. Secondly, the eternal -conversations between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring became shorter, -less frequent, and finally ceased altogether. Thirdly, as far as -important conferences were concerned, the Reich Marshal was not called -in. Fourthly, during the last months and weeks the tension between Adolf -Hitler and Hermann Göring increased to such a degree that he was finally -arrested. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about this arrest? What was the cause? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have no exact information about it. I can only tell you -what I heard. I was at that time in Bad Reichenhall in the military -hospital. I merely heard that Reich Marshal Göring had sent a telegram -to the Führer, and in this telegram Göring requested that, since the -Führer no longer had freedom of action, he might act himself. As the -result of this telegram, which was sent by wireless to Berlin, the -arrest took place. I would like to emphasize that I only heard that. I -have no proof of any of these statements. - -DR. STAHMER: And who made the arrest? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you about that because I know nothing. I -heard, however, that a Kommando of the SS from Obersalzberg made the -arrest. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring have any previous knowledge of the -incidents against the Jews which took place during the night of 9 to 10 -November 1938? - -BODENSCHATZ: Göring had no previous knowledge of these incidents. I -inferred that from his demeanor—how he acted towards me with regard to -these incidents. He acted in the following manner: When he heard of -these happenings he was dismayed and condemned them. A few days later he -went with proof to the Führer and complained about the people who had -instigated these incidents. Captain Wiedemann, the adjutant of the -Führer, can give you further particulars on the subject on oath. - -Several weeks later, Hermann Göring called all the Gauleiter to Berlin, -in order to make clear his attitude regarding the incidents of the 9th -and 10th. He was violently opposed to these individual acts of -barbarism. He criticized them severely as unjust, as economically -unreasonable and harmful to our prestige in foreign countries. The -former Gauleiter, Dr. Uiberreither, who took part in this conference of -Gauleiter, has already given further particulars on oath. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conference which took place in the -beginning of August 1939 at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I personally took part in that conference. - -DR. STAHMER: Who was present there? - -BODENSCHATZ: As far as I remember the following were present: Hermann -Göring; Herr Dahlerus, from Stockholm; six to eight English economic -experts, whose names I do not recall; I was present, and there was an -interpreter, Ministerialrat Dr. Böcker. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the subject of this conference? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember it word for word, but as far as I can -tell you Hermann Göring made the following statements . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did the witness say where this conference -took place? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell us where it was? - -DR. STAHMER: [_To the witness._] Please repeat where this conference -took place. - -BODENSCHATZ: The conference took place at the beginning of August at -Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum, Schleswig-Holstein. - -DR. STAHMER: Please continue. You were going to tell us about the -subject of this conference. - -BODENSCHATZ: I repeat, in substance, Göring made the following -statement: At that moment relations between England and Germany were -very tense. Under no circumstances should this tension be increased or -peace be endangered. The welfare and the trade of our two countries -could only flourish and prosper in peace. It was to the greatest -interest of Germany and Europe that the British Empire should continue -to exist. Göring emphasized that he himself would do his utmost for the -maintenance of peace. He requested the British business leaders, on -their return home, to use their influence in authoritative circles for -that purpose. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Göring give you his opinion on how the foreign policy -of the Reich should be carried out? When and on what occasions did -conversations take place? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring often discussed these topics with me, in -1938 and 1939, especially during the period following the Munich -agreement. These conversations would take place perhaps in connection -with a report, or perhaps in his special train. Hermann Göring was -always of the opinion that the policy of the Reich must be directed in -such a way as to avoid war if possible. Hermann Göring dealt with this -topic at particularly great length in a conference with the Gauleiter in -the summer of 1938 in Karinhall. Dr. Uiberreither, whom I have -previously mentioned, has already given further sworn testimony to this -effect. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring speak to you before leaving for -Munich in September 1938? - -BODENSCHATZ: Before Hermann Göring left for Munich, he told me he would -do everything within his power to effect a peaceful settlement. He said, -“We cannot have war.” He exerted his influence on the Führer to this -effect, and during the negotiations in Munich, he worked decisively for -the preservation of peace. When he left the conference hall after the -conference at Munich he said to us spontaneously, “That means peace.” - -DR. STAHMER: Did he often discuss with you for what reason he was -against a war, and on what occasions? - -BODENSCHATZ: We talked about this topic very frequently. He always said -to me: - - “In the first World War as an infantry officer and as an air - force officer I was constantly at the front. I know the horrors - of a war, and, therefore, my attitude is to preserve the German - people from these horrors if possible. My ambition is to solve - conflicts peacefully.” - -In general, his opinion was that war is always a risky and unsure -business. Even if you win a war, the advantages are in no relation -whatsoever to the disadvantages and sacrifices which have to be made. If -you lose the war, then, in our position, everything is lost. Our -generation has already experienced the horrors of a great World War and -its bitter consequences. To expect the same generation to live through -another war would be unthinkable. - -I would like to add that Hermann Göring, according to his inner thoughts -and character, was never in favor of war. Nothing was further from his -mind than the thought of a war. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Göring converse with you about what were, according to -his wish, the aims to be accomplished by the rearmament which Germany -had undertaken? When and on what occasion? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring spoke with me about these matters in the -year 1935 after the Wehrfreiheit had been proclaimed. He described -Germany’s rearmament, after vain attempts to achieve general limitation -of armament, as an attempt at equality with the armament of other -countries, in order to be able to collaborate with other powers in world -politics with equal rights. - -DR. STAHMER: Did conversations of this kind take place after 1935 also? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. Now and then we resumed such conversations and he -spoke in a similar vein. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you find out through Reich Marshal Göring what purpose -the Four Year Plan was to serve? - -BODENSCHATZ: I happened to speak with Göring about this matter in the -year 1936, and that was after the Four Year Plan had been announced. He -explained it to me as follows: That in this plan he saw a means of -securing for Germany those raw materials which she could not import in -peacetime because of the lack of foreign exchange or whose import in an -emergency might possibly be cut off. - -DR. STAHMER: When and on what occasion did Göring give you his opinion -on the Russian campaign? - -BODENSCHATZ: Towards the end of 1941, after the first reverses in the -Russian campaign, Hermann Göring talked with me about the fighting in -the East. He said to me: - - “Adolf Hitler foresaw a very hard battle in the East, but he did - not count on such reverses. Before the beginning of this - campaign I tried in vain to dissuade Adolf Hitler from his plan - of attacking Russia. I reminded him that he himself, in his book - _Mein Kampf_, was opposed to a war on two fronts and, in - addition, I pointed out that the main forces of the German - Luftwaffe would be occupied in the East, and England, whose air - industry was hit, would breathe again and be able to recover.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 -minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has observed that the witness is using notes -whilst giving his evidence. The ruling which I announced this morning -was confined to the defendants and did not extend to witnesses. -Nevertheless, the Tribunal will allow the same rule to be applied to -witnesses. But the evidence must not be read, the purpose of the rule -being merely to assist recollection in giving evidence. - -[_Turning to Dr. Stahmer._] - -Yes, Dr. Stahmer. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether people turned to the Reich Marshal with -the request that their relatives should be freed from concentration -camps or to help them in their difficulties with the Gestapo? - -BODENSCHATZ: The Chief of Staff is the person who can answer that -question. I myself only heard that such requests were made to the Reich -Marshal. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you not have to deal with such requests in the military -section? - -BODENSCHATZ: In the military section I had to deal with the requests -which were concerned with the Luftwaffe. But they were only requests -regarding the arrests of German citizens who stated that they had not -been given the reason for their arrest. We also received communications -regarding detention, grievances, and also regarding arrests of Jews. -Requests of this kind came to me only from Luftwaffe sources or from my -immediate circle of acquaintances. - -DR. STAHMER: How were such requests treated? - -BODENSCHATZ: Such requests were always treated as follows: - -Most of the requests, which came from the broad masses of the people, -were submitted to the Reich Marshal through the Staff. Those requests -that came from the Luftwaffe were presented through my office, and -requests that came from the Reich Marshal’s relatives or friends, they -themselves presented. The Reich Marshal did not refuse his help in these -cases. In individual cases he asked the Führer personally for a -decision. - -In all the cases that I dealt with help could be given. - -DR. STAHMER: Did many Jews turn to Göring with requests for help? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, Jews, and particularly Jews of mixed blood applied to -Reich Marshal Göring. - -DR. STAHMER: How were these requests handled? - -BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal did not deny his help and he gave -instructions whenever possible that help should be given. - -DR. STAHMER: What was Göring’s general attitude to human society? - -BODENSCHATZ: In his feelings, thoughts, and actions, as far as human -society was concerned, he was a benefactor to all in need. He was always -ready to help those who were in need, for instance sick people, wounded, -the relatives of those who had been killed in the war and of prisoners -of war. - -Care for the working classes was particularly important to him. Here is -an example of this: The introduction of miners’ compensation. Every -miner who had completed 25 years of steady work was to receive over -20,000 marks. This is one of his most important social works. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you know of the conditions in the concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: I had no knowledge of the conditions in the concentration -camps. - -DR. STAHMER: Were the concentration camps spoken of at the Führer’s -headquarters during discussions with the Führer, or on any other -occasion? - -BODENSCHATZ: In the Führer’s headquarters I never heard the Führer speak -about the concentration camps. He never discussed them in our circle. - -DR. STAHMER: Was the question of the annihilation of the Jews discussed -there? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, it was not; not in his discussions with me, at any -rate. - -DR. STAHMER: Not even in discussions on the war situation? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I cannot remember him ever discussing the annihilation -of the Jews in my presence during discussions on the war situation. - -DR. STAHMER: Did anyone else there mention anything? - -BODENSCHATZ: No. - -DR. STAHMER: Not Himmler? - -BODENSCHATZ: He never discussed the subject with Himmler. I have only -heard since being in prison that Himmler’s reply to people who spoke to -him on this matter was, “What you have heard is not true; it is -incorrect.” I personally did not discuss this question with Himmler. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you know how many concentration camps there were? - -BODENSCHATZ: Everyone knew that the camps existed, but I was not aware -that so many existed. It was only after the war that I learned the names -of Mauthausen and Buchenwald from the newspaper. I only know of the camp -of Dachau because I happen to come from Bavaria. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you never hear of the atrocities either? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I never heard of the atrocities. The very first time I -heard was last year, when I reported to the Reich Marshal—to be exact -it was the middle of March 1945—when I reported my departure on sick -leave. The Reich Marshal told me during lunch that very many Jews must -have perished there and that we should have to pay dearly for it. That -was the first time that I heard of crimes against the Jews. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. I can now turn the witness -over to the other Defense Counsel and to the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions of -this witness? - -DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of -the German Armed Forces): I have only a few questions to ask this -witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] - -Witness, in your capacity as liaison officer of the Commander-in-Chief -of the Luftwaffe at the Führer’s headquarters you took part, as you have -already mentioned, in the discussions on the war situation. Did you also -take part in discussions on the war situation when front-line commanders -were making their reports to Hitler? - -BODENSCHATZ: I personally did not take part in such discussions. At two -discussions, however, I was in the adjoining room, once when Field -Marshal Von Kleist was there for a conference, and the second time was -when the leader of the Crimea Army came to make a report after the -evacuation of the Crimea. I was, as I said, not actually present at -those conferences, but I heard, in the adjoining room, that there were -some differences of opinion between Hitler and the commander in question -as they were raising their voices. That is all I can say. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear enough to follow the trend of this -discussion? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I could not follow the trend nor the substance of these -discussions. - -DR. LATERNSER: In that case I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You are at the present time a prisoner of -war of the United States? - -BODENSCHATZ: I beg your pardon. Could you please repeat the question. I -did not understand it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are at the present time a prisoner of war of -the United States? - -BODENSCHATZ: At the present time I am a prisoner of war of the United -States. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have been interrogated on a number of occasions -by representatives of the United States? - -BODENSCHATZ: I was interrogated several times by representatives of the -United States. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have also had a number of consultations with -Dr. Stahmer who has just examined you? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have had several discussions with Dr. Stahmer who has -just addressed questions to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Those questions were addressed to you some time ago -and you prepared your answers in writing? - -BODENSCHATZ: Those questions were submitted to me beforehand and I was -able to prepare my answers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Coming to the subject of the concentration camps -and the activities of your department in releasing persons from them—as -I understand, a large number of applications came to the Göring office -for release from concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: I stated before that the requests for release from -concentration camps did not come to my department but to the Staff -office. I received only the requests and complaints in which people -begged for help because they had been arrested, among them Jews who were -to be arrested. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And were those applications that did come to you -numerous? - -BODENSCHATZ: My sector covered only the Luftwaffe. There were perhaps 10 -to 20 such applications. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those applications were from persons who were -threatened with imprisonment, or had been imprisoned, or both? - -BODENSCHATZ: Partly from people who were threatened with arrest and -partly from people who had already been arrested. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in each case, as I understand you, you -intervened to help them. - -BODENSCHATZ: On the instructions of the Reich Marshal, I helped in all -cases that were submitted to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you know of any other cases that came to -the Staff in which help was not given to the imprisoned persons? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything about that. I only heard from Dr. -Gritzbach, Chief of Staff, that requests that came to him also were -settled in a humane way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were the persons that you intervened for -innocent of crime or were you helping out those who were guilty of -crime? - -BODENSCHATZ: Those I helped were innocent people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So it came to your notice that innocent people were -being put in concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: Could you please repeat that question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It came to your notice that innocent people then -were being put in concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: Had not been put into concentration camps, but were -destined for them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you said you intervened for some who had -been arrested. - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes; they were not taken to concentration camps. I will -give you a practical example. A comrade of mine, from the Richthofen -Squadron, a Jew by the name of Luther, was arrested by the Gestapo, that -is to say, he was not taken to a concentration camp, but first was -simply arrested by the Gestapo. His lawyer informed me. I informed the -Reich Marshal of this case, and the Reich Marshal instructed me to have -this man freed from his temporary custody by the Gestapo in Hamburg. He -was not yet in a concentration camp. So far as I know this case happened -in 1943. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he charged with when he was arrested? - -BODENSCHATZ: He was arrested because he was a Jew, and he had been told -that he had committed an offense against decency in that he had been -with an Aryan woman in a hotel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you make any inquiries as to whether the -charge was true? - -BODENSCHATZ: I did not have to make such inquiries because I had no -difficulty in obtaining his release. When I called up, he was released -and thereafter stayed under the protection of Hermann Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did you call up to get his release? - -BODENSCHATZ: The chief of the Gestapo office in Hamburg. I do not know -the name. I did not make the call myself but had it done by my -assistant, Ministerialrat Dr. Böttger. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that the Gestapo would release persons upon the -request of Hermann Göring? - -BODENSCHATZ: Not from Hermann Göring’s office, but the Reich Marshal -gave instructions that it should be carried out, and it was carried out. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you said your assistant called up. Did -Göring also call the Gestapo himself? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, he did not call himself, not in this case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that even though this man may have been guilty -of the charge, if he belonged to the Luftwaffe he was released, on the -word of the Reich Marshal? - -BODENSCHATZ: He was not a member of the Luftwaffe, he was a civilian. He -had previously been one of our comrades in the Richthofen Squadron. He -was not in the Wehrmacht during the war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your instructions were to release all persons -who were Jews or who were from the Luftwaffe? Were those your -instructions from Göring? - -BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal told me, again and again, that in such -cases I should act humanely, and I did so in every case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you find out that Jews were arrested -against whom there were no charges? - -BODENSCHATZ: In one case, in the case of the two Ballin families in -Munich, these were two elderly married couples, more than 70 years old. -These two couples were to be arrested, and I was informed of this. I -told the Reich Marshal about it, and he told me that these two couples -should be taken to a foreign country. That was the case of the two -Ballin couples who, in 1923, when Hermann Göring was seriously wounded -in front of the Feldherrnhalle, and was taking refuge in a house, -received him and gave him help. These two families were to be arrested. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For what? - -BODENSCHATZ: They were to be arrested because there was a general order -that Jews should be taken to collection camps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew of that order? - -BODENSCHATZ: I did not know of the order. It was only through these -examples which were brought to my notice that it became clear to me that -this evacuation was to take place. I had never read the order myself nor -even heard of it, because I had nothing to do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It came to your attention that Jews were being -thrown into concentration camps merely because they were Jews? - -BODENSCHATZ: In this case I am not speaking of concentration camps, but -it was ordered that people were to be brought to collection camps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not concentration camps, but special camps? Where -were they going from there? - -BODENSCHATZ: That I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where was this special camp that you speak of? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know where they were to be taken. I was told they -were to be taken away. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But neither you nor Göring had any suspicion that -if they were taken to concentration camps any harm would come to them, -did you? - -BODENSCHATZ: I knew nothing about what took place in the concentration -camps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now did you not hear about the concentration camps, -and was not the purpose of your saving these people from going to them, -that the people who went there were mistreated? - -BODENSCHATZ: I must reiterate that I freed people from their first -arrest by the Gestapo that were not yet in the concentration camp. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What would the Gestapo take them into custody for, -if not the concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: What purpose the Gestapo was pursuing with these arrests I -do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you intervened to save them from the Gestapo -without even finding out whether the Gestapo had cause for arresting -them? - -BODENSCHATZ: If the Gestapo arrested any one, then they must have had -something against him. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you made no inquiry into that, did you? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have already said it was generally known that these -people were taken to collection camps, not concentration camps. It was -known—many German people knew that they were to be taken away. They -knew that the people were taken to work camps, and in these work camps -they were put to work. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Forced labor? - -BODENSCHATZ: It was just ordinary work. I knew, for instance, that in -Lodz the people worked in the textile industry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where were they kept while they were doing that -work? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say, for I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were in a camp, were they not? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you all that, for I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You would not know about that? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have no idea. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is the difference between a work camp and a -concentration camp? You have drawn that distinction. - -BODENSCHATZ: A work camp is a camp in which people were housed without -their being in any way ill-treated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And a concentration camp is where they are -ill-treated? Is that your testimony? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I can only tell you that now because in the meantime I -discovered it through the press and through my imprisonment. At that -time I did not know it. I learned it from the newspapers. I was a -prisoner of war in England for quite a while, and I read about it in the -English press. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You spoke of collection camps, that many people -knew they were being taken to collection camps to be taken away. Where -were they being taken away? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know where they went from there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever inquire? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I never inquired. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were adjutant to the Number 2 man in Germany, -were you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you never ventured to ask him about the -concentration camps? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not speak to him on that subject. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only instruction you had was to get everybody -out that you could. - -BODENSCHATZ: Where a request or a complaint was made, I followed those -cases down, and in those cases I assisted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew that Hermann Göring was a close co-worker -with Himmler, did you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: I did not know that he was a fellow worker with Himmler, -because he never worked with him directly. Himmler frequently came for -discussions with Hermann Göring, but these were private conversations -just between the two. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that he was not only a friend, but -that he had aided Kaltenbrunner to his post when Kaltenbrunner came into -office, did you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, that I did not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not know that? - -BODENSCHATZ: I did not know that Reich Marshal Göring recommended -Kaltenbrunner for his office. My activity was confined simply to the -military sector. I was military adjutant to the Reich Marshal. I had -nothing to do with these matters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you have anything to do with the procedure of -making full Aryans out of half-Jews? - -BODENSCHATZ: On the question of mixed blood, requests concerning the -Luftwaffe came to me, and in fact, officers, according to the -regulations, would have to be dismissed if they were of mixed blood. In -many cases the Reich Marshal gave instructions that these officers -should not be dismissed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was done about it? - -BODENSCHATZ: In these cases the chief of the personnel office was -instructed not to dismiss these officers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in some cases some kind of an order was made, -was it not, that they were full Aryans, notwithstanding Jewish -parentage? - -BODENSCHATZ: At the moment I can remember no such case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You spoke of the requests for help from Göring -coming from broad masses of the people, and those requests were -submitted to his staff. Is that right? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the head of that staff? - -BODENSCHATZ: At the head of that staff stood the Chief of Staff, Dr. -Gritzbach. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many assistants did he have? - -BODENSCHATZ: There were three sections, a press section, with Dr. Gerner -in charge of that, and the private secretariat—there were three -sections. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And which of these sections handled the peoples’ -requests for relief from arrest? - -BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Gritzbach and Dr. Gerner were concerned with that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom did they talk about these matters, do you -know? - -BODENSCHATZ: These gentlemen, as well as myself, submitted these matters -to the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he was kept fully informed of what you did -and of what they did? - -BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal was kept fully informed of these -applications to you and to the other sections? - -BODENSCHATZ: He was informed by me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as I understand you, he never failed to give -his assistance to any one of the applications that was made to him, so -far as you know? - -BODENSCHATZ: As regards requests addressed to my office or to me -personally he never refused assistance and actually help was always -given. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And never inquired into the guilt or innocence of -the person he was helping? - -BODENSCHATZ: They were innocent; that was clearly established. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were present on the 20th of July at the -bomb explosion, as I understand from your direct testimony? - -BODENSCHATZ: On 20 July I was present at that meeting and stood very -near the bomb. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was Hermann Göring on that day? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring was in his headquarters on that day, about -70 kilometers from the Führer’s headquarters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Only 70 kilometers away; is that right? And at what -time were you instructed to represent him at that meeting? - -BODENSCHATZ: I was not instructed to represent him at this meeting. I -took part in this conference, as in any other, as a listener. I had no -orders to represent Göring, to represent him in the Führer’s -headquarters. I was merely in the Führer’s headquarters to inform him of -what went on there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You represented him to listen, but not to talk; is -that right? - -BODENSCHATZ: I did not say very much during those years. I was simply a -listener and had to inform him as to what took place at the conference; -what would interest him in his capacity as Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How far in advance of that meeting were you -instructed to attend? - -BODENSCHATZ: At this meeting? On 20 July? On 19 July I was on a special -commission, sent to the Münster Camp to take part in the review of an -Italian division. On 20 July, at noon, I came by air to the Führer’s -headquarters, gave Hitler a military communication, and Hitler said to -me, “Come and discuss the situation.” I did not want to go, but I went -with him and after 15 minutes the attempted assassination took place. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who sent you with the message? Whose message was it -that you were delivering? - -BODENSCHATZ: I was commissioned at that time by Reich Marshal Göring to -attend the review of the Italian division at the Münster Camp and to -tell Field Marshal Graziani that the men in that division were to be -used to command flak guns. After Field Marshal Graziani had declared -himself in disagreement with this, I was obliged to go to the Führer’s -headquarters by air. It had been proposed that I should go by -Mussolini’s special train which was in Münster, and on the night of 19 -to 20 . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Answer my question, Witness. Just answer the -question, please, and you will save us a great deal of time. Whose -messages were you carrying to the Führer? - -BODENSCHATZ: I brought the message that Graziani was not disposed to -hand over these soldiers of the Italian division. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And before you started for the Führer’s -headquarters you communicated with Göring about it, did you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Before my departure, when I flew to Münster Camp—that was -a few days before—I spoke to him and when I returned, before reporting -to the Führer, I telephoned Hermann Göring in his headquarters and gave -him the same message. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he instruct you to go to the Führer’s -headquarters at that time and give the message to the Führer? - -BODENSCHATZ: This trip from Münster Camp I made on my own initiative -because it was important for Adolf Hitler to know of this information -before Mussolini, who was expected to arrive at the Führer’s -headquarters at 3 o’clock in the afternoon on 20 July. . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As I understand you, Göring wanted a peaceful -outcome of the negotiations at Munich? - -BODENSCHATZ: He said that to me several times. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was highly pleased with the outcome that was -achieved there? - -BODENSCHATZ: He was very pleased. I emphasized that before when I said -that when he came from the conference room, he said spontaneously, “That -means peace.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you say that Göring wanted peace with -Poland, he also wanted that same kind of a peace, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Regarding peace with Poland, I did not speak to him. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he send someone or induce Hitler to take -someone to Munich in order to countercheck Ribbentrop? - -BODENSCHATZ: All I know personally on this subject is this: Here, in -imprisonment, Captain Wiedemann told me that Hermann Göring had -expressed the wish that Von Neurath should be taken, and Wiedemann told -me that Hitler had granted that wish. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated by the United States -about this subject before Wiedemann got here, were you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Before? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before Wiedemann was brought here. - -BODENSCHATZ: I was not interrogated on this subject—the Munich -Agreement and Von Neurath. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you interrogated on the 6th of November 1945, -and did you not then say that Göring used very harsh words about -Ribbentrop and asked Hitler to take Neurath to Munich with him in order -to have a representative present? Did you not say that to the -interrogators of the United States? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember at the moment. If that is in the record -then it must be so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting as to which you have—oh, by the way, -after Munich you know that Göring gave his word of honor to the Czechs -that there would be no further aggression against them, do you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that after Munich, when Göring was pleased -with the outcome, he gave his word of honor that there would be no -further aggression against the Czechs. Do you know that? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not know that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting that took place in London, I mean the -meeting that took place when the Englishmen were present . . . - -BODENSCHATZ: In Husum, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Swedish person who was present? - -BODENSCHATZ: Herr Dahlerus was the Swede who was present. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who were the English who were present? - -BODENSCHATZ: There were six to eight English economic experts. The names -I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at that time—by the way, have you fixed the -time of that? What was the date? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say precisely. It was the beginning of August. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it not 7 August? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Mr. Dahlerus there? - -BODENSCHATZ: The question as to whether Dahlerus was there—I cannot -remember one hundred percent whether he was there. I know only that when -I spoke to my lawyer he said that Dahlerus was there, but I cannot swear -one hundred percent that he was there. I assumed he was, since the -Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer told me that he was there. That was the -reason why I said previously that Hermann Göring and Dahlerus were -present at that meeting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the subject under discussion was the Polish -relations with the German Reich? - -BODENSCHATZ: Polish relations were not discussed, but relations between -England and Germany. There was no talk of relations with Poland. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring wanted the English gentlemen to see that -England did not attack Germany? - -BODENSCHATZ: He did not express it quite that way. He said, as I have -already stated, the English gentlemen should, when they returned home, -work in the same way that he was working—for peace, and to make their -influence felt in important circles. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was that not said in connection with the -Polish negotiations that were then going on? - -BODENSCHATZ: With the Polish negotiations? I cannot remember that any -mention was made of Polish negotiations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you with Hermann Göring when the Polish war -broke out? - -BODENSCHATZ: When the Polish war broke out I was in Berlin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you still in your office under Hermann -Göring’s command? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was at that time under Hermann Göring’s command. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first begin preparing for a movement -of your forces in the direction of Poland? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot make any definite statement on that subject; that -was a matter for the General Staff. I know only that during the period -before the outbreak of war the Chief of the General Staff several times -visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Hermann Göring, and -that such matters were discussed. I, myself, was not informed as to how -many forces were to be used in the Polish campaign. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you present at the conference in which Hermann -Göring stated that he, right after Munich, had orders to multiply the -Air Force by five? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot recall having been present at any such discussion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Air Force was greatly enlarged -after Munich? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, I do not know that. The Air Force was augmented -according to plan. In this connection I can say for certain that the -German Air Force, at the beginning of the Polish campaign, as regards -leadership, planning, or material, was not equal to its task. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, would you like to adjourn now or -would you like to go on in order to finish? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This would be a convenient time. I am sure we -cannot finish before lunch hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: You would like to adjourn now? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: We will have no open session tomorrow. - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I want to say -a few words with respect to the statement of Defense Counsel Stahmer. -When speaking about the document concerning the German atrocities at -Katyn, Defense Counsel Stahmer stated that it was not in his possession. -I do not want to speak about the nature of this document. I want to -report to the Tribunal that on 13 February this document, as Exhibit -USSR-54—30 copies of it, all in the German language—was given to the -Document Room for the purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we -had to present the document to each Defense Counsel separately. We -considered that if the document were given to the Document Room, the -Defense would take the necessary steps concerning it. That is all I wish -to say on this matter. - -DR. LATERNSER: There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this -document. It was submitted at that time in open session by the Russian -Prosecutor as Exhibit Number USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed. -I have not received it, and upon request at Information Room of the -Defense, upon two requests, I have not been able to obtain it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into the matter. - -[_The witness Bodenschatz took the stand._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Previous to the spring of 1943, as I understand -you, Hermann Göring was a man of great influence in the councils of the -Reich? - -BODENSCHATZ: Before the year 1943—that is, until the year 1943—Hermann -Göring always had access to the Führer, and his influence was important. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, it was the most important in Germany -outside of the Führer himself, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Within the Reich he had great influence, very great -influence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Air power was his special mission and his special -pride, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: As an old airman, he was very proud to be able to build up -and lead the Air Force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had more confidence in air power as a weapon of -war than most of the other men of his time, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: At any rate he was convinced that his Air Force was very -good. But I have to repeat what I said before, that at the beginning of -the war, in the year 1939, that stage had not been reached by the Air -Force. I repeat that at that time the Air Force was; as far as -leadership, training, and material were concerned, not ready for war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But ever since you first went with Hermann Göring -you had been rapidly building up the Air Force, had you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: The building up of the Air Force went relatively fast. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you first went with Göring—I have -forgotten what year you said that was. - -BODENSCHATZ: I came to Hermann Göring in April 1933. At that time there -was no Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, but only a Reich -Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time, the beginning of the -building up of the Air Force—the first beginnings—started. It was only -after 1935, however, when freedom from armament restriction was -declared, that it was speeded up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the building up of the Air Force was very -largely in bombers, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: It was not mainly bombers; it was mixed, both fighters and -bombers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring also had charge of the Four Year Plan? - -BODENSCHATZ: He was commissioned by the Führer to carry out the Four -Year Plan. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also held several other offices, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring, besides being Commander-in-Chief of the -Luftwaffe, was put in charge of the Four Year Plan. Before that, at the -beginning of the seizure of power, he was Minister of the Interior and -Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the Reichstag and -Reichsforstmeister. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I notice that you use here, as you have used in -your interrogations by the United States, the expression “seizure of -power.” That was the common expression used in your group, was it not, -to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler? - -BODENSCHATZ: It cannot be used in this sense. At that time it was -completely legal because the National Socialist Party was then the -strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor, -and the strongest party had, as such, the greatest influence. It must -not be interpreted to mean that they usurped the power, but that they -had the most influential and prominent position among the parties, that -is, by the completely legal means of election. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You want to change the word “seizure”? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have to change that. It is only an expression which was -common usage in the press at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring got along without any open break with Hitler -until 1945, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Until the year 1945 there was no open break. The arrest was -only quite at the end, as I have said before. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the arrest was the first open break that had -occurred between them, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, the first big break between the two which was apparent -to the public. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was -already a gradual estrangement in the attitude of the two men. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was kept from the public, was it not, kept -from the German people? - -BODENSCHATZ: It was not so visible to the public. It was a development -which took place gradually from the spring of 1943 to 1945—first to a -small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was -it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: I only heard that. It was said that in Obersalzberg a unit -of SS had arrived which arrested Hermann Göring in his small house and -confined him there. As to that, perhaps the witness who is going to -testify later, Colonel Brauchitsch, who was present at this arrest and -who was arrested himself, can give more details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not arrested by the SS? - -BODENSCHATZ: At that time . . . since 20 July 1944, when I was seriously -injured, I had been in the hospital. I was close to Berchtesgaden, at -Bad Reichenhall, convalescing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whenever there were conferences which you attended, -was it not the custom, at the conclusion of Hitler’s address to the -group, for Göring as the ranking man present, to assure the Führer on -behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plans? - -BODENSCHATZ: Of course I was not present at all conferences. I only took -the part of listener. At these discussions, or shall we say conferences, -in which I took part, it happened from time to time that the Reich -Marshal made a remark at the end and gave assurance that the will of the -Führer would be carried out. But at the moment I cannot remember -specifically any such conference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot remember any conference at which he did -not do it either, can you? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. It was not always done; on the contrary, he did not do -it as a rule. In the Reichstag Hermann Göring always made a concluding -speech, after a session had ended, expressing his confidence in Adolf -Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he not do that at every meeting of officers -at which the Führer was present? - -BODENSCHATZ: May I ask you to repeat the question? I have not quite -understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but I would like to mention that -owing to my injury I have lost 60 percent of my hearing, and therefore I -beg you to excuse me if I ask for repetitions. Please, repeat your -question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Quite all right, Sir. Do you know of any conference -between Hitler and his High Command at which Göring did not close the -meeting, as the ranking officer present, by making assurances of support -to Hitler’s plans? - -BODENSCHATZ: Some of the conferences I attended were concluded by a -declaration of that nature. There were, however, many conferences—in -fact most of the conferences—when nothing further was said at the end. -When the Führer had finished his speech, the meeting was ended. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1943, when Göring began to lose influence with -Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Göring, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring suffered from this fact. He often told me -that he would suffer very much on that account. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the fact that the Führer was losing confidence -in him? - -BODENSCHATZ: What was that? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was suffering from the fact that the Führer was -losing confidence in him? Was that what was causing his suffering? - -BODENSCHATZ: That may have been part of the reason, but differences of -opinion arose about the Luftwaffe. - -MR. JUSTICE. JACKSON: Now, in the spring of 1943 it was apparent to you -and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say that. The Reich Marshal did not tell me in -1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties, that -it would become very dangerous; but that the war was definitely lost—I -cannot remember that the Reich Marshal at that time, in the spring of -1943, made a statement to me of that kind, or a similar one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal had given his assurance to the -German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be -bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed? - -BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, he did not give the assurance in those -words. Before the war, when our Air Force was growing—I mean at the -beginning of the war, when the great successes in Poland and in France -were manifest—he said to the German people that the Air Force would do -its job and do everything to spare the country from heavy air raids. At -the time that was justified. It was not clearly foreseen then that -matters would develop differently later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then he had given his assurance to the German -people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy -bombers away from Germany? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that he gave an official assurance to the -German people in the form of a decree or a big speech. At times it was -said that the German Air Force, after the successes in Poland and -France, was at its peak. I do not know of any official statement whereby -it was made known to the German people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all events, it became apparent in the spring of -1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading? - -BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different, -owing to the fact that the British and American Air Forces came into the -picture in such large and overwhelming numbers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was also true that the air defenses of -Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is -that not a fact? - -BODENSCHATZ: The air defense of Germany was very difficult, as the -entire defense did not depend on the air crews alone, but it was also a -radio-technical war, and in this radio-technical war, it must be -admitted frankly, the enemy was essentially better than we were. -Therefore it was not only a war in the air, but if was also a radio war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had become apparent that Germany could not cope -with it—is that not a fact?—by 1943. - -BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 it was not yet a hundred percent clear. -There were fluctuations, low and high points. Efforts were made to -increase the fighter strength at the expense of the bombers. It was not -one hundred percent obvious that the enemy air force could not be -opposed successfully. That became obvious only after the middle of 1944. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer lost confidence in Göring as the bombing -of German cities progressed, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, indeed, from the moment the British Air Force started -with their large-scale attacks on German cities, particularly when the -first heavy British air attack on Cologne took place. From that moment -it was obvious that differences of opinion, at first not too serious, -were arising between the two men. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler accused Göring, did he not, of -misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know that the Führer ever accused the Reich -Marshal of any offense in this respect. Discussions between Adolf Hitler -and the Reich Marshal were, in spite of all tension, always very -moderate. The criticism is said to have become more vehement only later, -in 1944 and the beginning of 1945. But I was not present, because I had -been off duty since 20 July 1944. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you a question. I did not intend to imply -that the Führer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had -misled him or he had misunderstood the strength of Germany’s air -defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle? - -BODENSCHATZ: There could be no question of misleading. The reports which -the Air Force made to the Führer were always correct. The weaknesses of -the Air Force were also reported to the Führer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the efforts that were made by Göring, -which you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence -with the Führer? - -BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal, whenever there were conferences, asked -through me that he might participate. The Reich Marshal came more -frequently than usual to the Führer’s headquarters, and he also said to -me, “I will try everything to regain the right contact with the Führer.” -He said that personally to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was particularly careful after the spring of -1944 not to do anything that would offend the Führer? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say anything more about the year 1944, because -then I was no longer active. I had no further contact. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this bombing of German cities had become very -troublesome from the point of view of the German people’s criticism of -the government, had it not, in 1944? - -BODENSCHATZ: The German people suffered terribly under these bombing -attacks, and I can only say one thing—that Adolf Hitler suffered most -from them. When at night the bombing of a German city was reported, he -was really deeply moved, and likewise the Reich Marshal, because the -horror of such a bombing was indescribable. I have experienced a few -such bombings in Berlin myself, and whoever has lived through that, will -never forget it as long as he lives. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this was all becoming very embarrassing to -Hitler and to the Reich Marshal, was it not, to explain to the German -people why this was going on? - -BODENSCHATZ: That did not have to be explained, because the German -people felt it. No explanation was given. It was only said that all -possible measures would be taken to master this peril. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew at that time, and the Reich Marshal -knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it? - -BODENSCHATZ: No, no, no. I emphasized before that it was a -radio-technical war, and there were moments when, in the defense, we -could counter the measures of the enemy while constantly discovering a -new means to hit him. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you made the announcement to the German people -that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, -that you knew of, to use, did you, to prevent the bombing of the German -cities? - -BODENSCHATZ: Oh yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they, and why were they not used? - -BODENSCHATZ: There were, for example, the following means: The most -important areas were protected by anti-aircraft guns. Then there were -radio-technical means, jamming transmitters, which would have made it -possible, and which partly did make it possible, to jam the radio sets -in the enemy aircraft. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The movement to satisfy the German people under the -bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reich Marshal, was -it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal was very anxious that the population -should be informed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And see that the population was satisfied, was he -not? - -BODENSCHATZ: It is easy to say “satisfied.” He could only assure the -German people that he would do everything in his power to master these -attacks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler -when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam and of -Coventry? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports -came. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on -those bombings, I take it? - -BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by -the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces -of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times -Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city. -That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an -officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city -defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts -were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was -firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore -attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler’s ultimatum -had been rejected. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city? - -BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city -which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the -aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many -factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were -manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received -orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered, -it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you -not, by Colonel Williams? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain -fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of -1939, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you -know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel -Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz -broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only -that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which -happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed—that was only -my opinion—that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive -proof that anything had been staged on our part. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as -follows: - - “I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling - that all these provocations that had taken place had originated - from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real - proofs of that, but I always had that feeling.” - -Did you not say that? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you had talked with people about this, -from whom you got that feeling. Is that right? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that the -reports in the press gave me that suspicion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were asked, were you not, this question and -gave this answer: - - “Question: But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the - press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but - done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?” - -And did you not make this answer: - - “I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I - had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us.” - -Did you not make that answer to that question? - -BODENSCHATZ: The minutes will show it. If it is in the minutes, I said -it. At the moment I cannot remember the exact words. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not deny the fact, however? - -BODENSCHATZ: I had that feeling, but it was a purely subjective opinion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was your opinion? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now then, I ask you whether you were not -interrogated about the Führer’s desire to make war on Poland, and -whether you did not give this answer: - - “Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can - state under my oath that the Führer actually wanted the war - against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of - aggression against Poland by the circle surrounding the Führer - and the remarks that were made. I was present during the night - when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig, - and I concluded from all the conferences that the Führer had - with the Ambassador—I had the impression that the Führer did - not really want the Poles to accept those conditions.” - -And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams? - -BODENSCHATZ: I can make the following answer to that: - -I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I did not express -myself correctly. I was not at the conference that the Führer had with -Henderson, but I was standing in the anterooms with the other adjutants, -and outside in the anteroom one could hear the various groups, some -saying one thing, some another. From these conversations I gather that -the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening -were such, and that the time limit for answering these questions—which -was noon of the next day—was so short, that one could conclude there -was a certain intention behind it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is the impression that you received from -being in the anteroom and talking with the people who were about Hitler -that night? - -BODENSCHATZ: There were adjutants, the Reich Press Chief, and the -gentlemen who were waiting in the anteroom without taking part in the -conference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you, in order to make this very clear, -one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not -asked this question: - - “Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying - that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked - Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an - aggressive war against her; is that right?” - -And did you not make this answer: - - “I can only say this with certainty that from the night when he - told Henderson that he wanted Danzig and the Corridor, from that - moment, I was sure Hitler intended to wage an aggressive war.” - -Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer? - -BODENSCHATZ: If it is in the minutes, I said it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still -be your testimony now, would it not? It is a fact, is it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: My definition is precisely this: From the handing over of -Adolf Hitler’s demands to Henderson and from the short time that -Henderson was granted, I conclude that there was a certain intention. -That is how I should like to define it precisely now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number L-79, -United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-27. You have seen that -before, witness? - -BODENSCHATZ: A copy of this document was shown to me by Colonel -Williams, and I told him that I myself could not remember having been -present. But if my name is on the minutes, then I was there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your name is on the document, is it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Then I was there. I cannot remember the subject of this -conference. I told Colonel Williams that that must have been discussed -because Colonel Schmundt, whose handwriting I know—I was shown a -copy—I told him that Colonel Schmundt was a man who was very -conscientious in making his notes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all in his handwriting? - -BODENSCHATZ: That is it as I see it here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is signed by Colonel Schmundt? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is signed by Colonel Schmundt—Lieutenant Colonel -Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the body of the document is his handwriting? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is his own handwriting. I know it; yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you were asked about that by Colonel -Williams, you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: “I -think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are -the thoughts that the Führer usually voiced to us in a small circle.” -You made that statement? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I did say that, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said: “I cannot remember whether these -things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible that the -thoughts which are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler.” You -said that to Colonel Williams, did you not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that to Colonel Williams. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all I care to ask about that, Sir. - -I now ask to have shown to you the original exhibit, Document Number -798-PS, Exhibit USA-29 in evidence. - -BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, a copy of this speech by the Führer was -also shown to me by Colonel Williams. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. You said, did you not, that you did -not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were -expressed . . . - -BODENSCHATZ: The thoughts expressed there are correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They are correct. That is all about that. - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, but I must say one more thing. I tried to speak to -Colonel Williams again and could not reach him. Probably I attended this -meeting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will take that statement now and excuse -you from looking for Colonel Williams. - -I ask to have shown to you Document 3474-PS, United States exhibit in -evidence, Number USA-580. Is that your handwriting? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is my handwriting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And signed by you? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is a note of a conference of the 2d day of -December 1936, is it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You prepared this memorandum for your files; is -that right? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to whom I gave this. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it says the notes for the files on that -discussion; is that correct? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is a note for the files. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was present at that conference; is that -correct? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. He must have conducted it. It states here, “Present: -Generaloberst Göring.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, the note says he conducted it does it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were also present Milch, Kesselring, and -all of the others who are named in the list at the head of the note. - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you then recorded that Göring told—oh, by the -way, all of those men were men connected with the Armed Forces of -Germany, were they not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Those were all men from the Air Force, the leading men at -the time. General Milch was concerned with armament; Lieutenant General -Kesselring was, I believe, Chief of Staff; they were all officers who -were in leading positions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All concerned with the Air Force you say. And this -meeting was held on the 2d of December 1936. Are we correct about that? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring opened the conference by saying: “The -press all over the world is excited about the landing of 5,000 German -volunteers in Spain. Great Britain protests officially and takes up the -matter with France.” Refreshing your recollection, that is what -occurred, is it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring said, “The general situation is very -serious,” and that he took full responsibility, did he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. The general situation was very serious. England was -rearming intensively, and a state of readiness was desired. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he next said, did he not, “Silence until 1941 -is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications -before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is -being fired so far.” Did he say that? - -BODENSCHATZ: That is recorded in these minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he also said, did he not, that “beginning 1 -January 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall run as if -mobilization had been ordered.” - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is there in the text, is it not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is contained here in the minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have testified that Göring had no prior -knowledge of the action taken against the Jews on the night of November -9th and 10th of 1938. - -BODENSCHATZ: I gathered that from the fact that on the next day he came -to me and was very dismayed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was informed about them the next day? - -BODENSCHATZ: The next day that was in the press, in the newspapers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said that he complained about the people who -instigated them? - -BODENSCHATZ: That I was told by Captain Wiedemann, who was here with me -in captivity. He told me that a few days later Hermann Göring came to -the Führer with proof and complained about what had occurred. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did he complain about? - -BODENSCHATZ: He did not tell me that. Wiedemann told me that Göring -complained about Heydrich and Goebbels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get that answer. - -BODENSCHATZ: Wiedemann told me—this I did not learn myself from Hermann -Göring, but Wiedemann told me he had complained about the instigators, -and that the instigators were Heydrich and Goebbels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in -Hitler’s regime, were they not? - -BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Goebbels was Reich Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich -was Chief of the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, immediately following these pogroms Göring knew -and complained to Hitler that they had been incited by officials of the -Nazi regime? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the details as to what he said there. Captain -Wiedemann knows about that and can testify to it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was then at the height of his influence, -both with the Führer and with the country, was he not? - -BODENSCHATZ: He had at that time the greatest influence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I understand you to say that he immediately -called a meeting of Gauleiter? - -BODENSCHATZ: The meeting of Gauleiter was a few weeks later. I heard -about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Uiberreither, who is -imprisoned here with me. This Gauleiter Uiberreither took part in that -meeting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did he wait before he called the meeting? - -BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Uiberreither told me that it was a few weeks -afterwards. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did you know about his holding a meeting on -the 12th of November 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for -Aviation? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you remember that he had present at that -meeting Heydrich, Goebbels, and many others? Is that the meeting to -which you refer? - -BODENSCHATZ: In this case it might be necessary to ask Dr. Uiberreither -who was at that meeting. He told me that Dr. Goebbels was present as -well as the Gauleiter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was the custom of Göring to keep minutes of -the meetings that he conducted? - -BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring always had stenographers present, and these -stenographers took minutes of such meetings. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you want us to understand that Göring was -shocked and offended by what had happened to the Jews on the nights of -the 9th and the 10th of November 1938? - -BODENSCHATZ: He did not agree with it because, as I mentioned -previously, he said it would be a great wrong; it would be unreasonable -economically, and it would harm our prestige abroad. I was told by Dr. -Uiberreither that Göring had spoken in these terms to the Gauleiter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it known to you that on November the 12th, 2 -days after those pogroms, Göring promulgated the order fining all of the -Jews a billion Reichsmark, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new -decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that? - -BODENSCHATZ: I have heard of it, but I personally had nothing to do with -the idea and with this decree, as I was only the military adjutant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: These decrees were promulgated 2 days after this -pogrom that you say he complained about, is that right? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the connection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all. - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the -United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, I have only one matter -which I want to make clear. - -You have referred to a meeting which took place in Schleswig-Holstein in -July or August of 1939, at which Göring met a number of Englishmen, and -you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as -members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them—I -think you mentioned them as economic specialists? - -BODENSCHATZ: So far as I know now, they were English leading men in -economics, not members of the government. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say -that they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no -connection with the government whatsoever? - -BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to what degree these gentlemen were -influential. At any rate, Hermann Göring asked at the end that the -gentlemen should exert their influence on the authorities in England in -the interests of peace. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that that conference between Göring -and those gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus? - -BODENSCHATZ: Dahlerus is said to have brought about this meeting, but I -first learned of that in a conversation with Defense Counsel Dr. -Stahmer, who discussed the matter with me. Doctor Stahmer said he knew -that Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. It is -only on the basis of this information that I assume Dahlerus asked these -gentlemen to come. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you know that it was the object of Mr. -Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in -order that they should understand one another’s points of view? - -BODENSCHATZ: Mr. Dahlerus later . . . he was again in Berlin after that -meeting. On that occasion I met him in Berlin, and in conversations with -him there I gained the impression that he was greatly interested in -peace being maintained between Germany and England, and that he, -assisted by Reich Marshal Göring, tried to establish this connection -with influential British circles. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: One last question to you. Do you know that, in -arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations -thereafter, Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Göring and in -particular tried to impress Göring with the fact that the English were -losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the -German Government? - -BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember having discussed with Dahlerus this line -of thought which you mention now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Any other questions to ask? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. - -DR. STAHMER: I have only one more question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] In the minutes of 2 December 1936, which -were shown to you before and which you have before you, there is one -paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very -important for the interpretation and for the purpose and meaning of that -meeting. - -It says there: - - “The general situation is very serious. Russia wants war. - England is rearming strongly. Therefore, the order is: ‘From - today on, highest degree of readiness, no consideration for - financial difficulties. Generaloberst assumes full - responsibility.’” - -Was this order, “highest degree of readiness from today on,” issued -merely because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England is -rearming strongly? Was that the motive? - -BODENSCHATZ: What do you mean? - -DR. STAHMER: Was the gravity of the general situation the motive for the -order, “highest degree of readiness from today on”? - -BODENSCHATZ: At any rate, there was no intention of attack involved, but -a measure for defense. - -DR. STAHMER: If it says here “Generaloberst assumes full -responsibility,” could that be understood to refer to the words “no -consideration for financial difficulties” which would be a permissible -literal interpretation? - -BODENSCHATZ: That refers to financial difficulties, because the Reich -Marshal had frequent controversies on that point with the Reich Finance -Minister because the Luftwaffe had slightly exceeded its budget. - -DR. STAHMER: Thank you. I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. STAHMER: I should like to call as the next witness General Field -Marshal Milch. - -[_The witness Milch took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -ERHARD MILCH (Witness): Erhard Milch. - -THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty -and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and -add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you take part in the first World War? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: In what position? - -MILCH: First I was an artillery officer and at the end a captain in the -Air Corps. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you leave the Army after the end of the first -World War? - -MILCH: In the spring of 1920. - -DR. STAHMER: What were your activities after you left the Army? - -MILCH: I went into civil aviation. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you join the Wehrmacht again? - -MILCH: 1933. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you go straight into the Air Force? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: What position did you have when the second World War began? - -MILCH: I was General and Inspector General of the Air Force. - -DR. STAHMER: When did the military construction of the Luftwaffe start? - -MILCH: 1935. - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent? - -MILCH: A defensive air force was built up. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more details about that? - -MILCH: In the year 1933 Germany had left the League of Nations and -consequently also the Disarmament Conference. Hitler attempted to -discuss with the individual nations whether or not disarmament should -continue. These attempts to disarm failed, and Germany began to rearm. -It was questionable whether the other nations would approve of that. -Consequently Germany considered that it was imperative to have military -strength in the air also, and to achieve that, the Air Force was itself -to create an air power which would be sufficient for the defense of -Germany. This is shown by the fact that principally fighters and -anti-aircraft artillery were provided. - -Likewise, the organization of the German Air Force was constructed for -defense. It consisted at that time of four “air districts” (Luftkreise), -which one can picture as a kind of cross over Germany. There was a -Northeast section, Southeast, Northwest, and Southwest. Moreover the -strength of the Air Force, as it was organized, was not planned for an -aggressive war or for a large-scale war. Besides fighter planes there -were also bombers, but we always called these bomber formations the -Risiko Luftwaffe (Risk Air Force), that is to say, their function was to -prevent, if possible, any of Germany’s neighbors from entering a war -against Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the relations of the German Air Force with the -air forces of foreign countries during the period beginning with the -year 1935? - -MILCH: During the first years after 1935 Germany had no air force worth -mentioning. There were only the first units and the first larger schools -that were established. Also during these years, our industry was built -up. Before the rearmament started, our industry had been on a very small -scale. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire German -air force industry at the time of the seizure of power by the National -Socialists was about 3,000 to 3,300 men—constructors, business men, -technicians, and workers. - -The first contacts with foreign countries in the field of aviation -started in 1937. This was when, in January 1937, an English commission -led by Air Vice Marshal Courtney and three other high-ranking -officers—Courtney was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the -British Air Force—came to Germany. I myself accompanied this commission -and acted as guide during the entire time. We complied with every -request of these gentlemen as to what they wanted to see. Those were the -first units which were established. We especially showed our training -units, in which all new forms and models were first tried out, the -industries, the schools, and anything else about which the gentlemen -wanted to know. At the end of our conference the English vice marshal -suggested that we should start a mutual German-English exchange of -plans. I asked for the approval of my commander-in-chief and it was -granted. At the time we forwarded to the British the plans of the German -Air Force for 1937, 1938, and, I believe, 1939, and, on the other hand, -we also received from the British the corresponding figures. We agreed -that in the future also, should changes in plans occur or new units be -established, an exchange of data should again take place. The visit was -animated by a spirit of comradeship and was the beginning of further -contacts. - -In May of the same year, 1937, I was invited to Belgium with some other -gentlemen, as representative of my commander-in-chief, to visit the air -force there. Then in July . . . - -DR. STAHMER: What happened on this visit to Belgium? Can you give me -more details about that? - -MILCH: It was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the -Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, -and also of His Majesty the King, besides the officers of the air force, -who, of course, were of main interest to me. The discussion was friendly -on both sides, and the Belgians assured us of their personal feelings of -friendship for Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Was there also an exchange of data? - -MILCH: No. Not in the same way; but later in Germany we also showed the -Belgians everything, when the Chief of the Air Force, General Duvier, -returned our visit. Then there was a big international meeting in the -summer, in July 1937, on the occasion of the aviation meeting in Zurich, -which was held every five years. At this meeting we purposely showed our -latest models of fighters, bombers, and Stukas, also our new engines -which had just been produced, and anything else that would be of -international interest. There were large French, Italian, Czech, and -Belgian delegations present, besides the German one; and a commission of -British officers also attended to see the material displayed by us, but -did not take part in the contests as representatives of Great Britain. -We showed our material to the French, the British, and to the other -nations, in a spirit of comradeship. There was, for instance, the -Messerschmitt Fighter 109 with the improvements of the time, more or -less as it was flown until the end of the war; the newest Dornier bomber -type; the newest Stuka by Junkers; also the Daimler-Benz 600 and 601 -engines, and also of Junkers . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that this amount of detail is of any -interest to the Tribunal. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, please, no details; make it short. - -MILCH: Yes. Then in October 1937, there was an invitation to France from -the French Government to inspect their air force also. The inspection is -said to have been made in a very friendly spirit. Shortly after that, -about one week later, a visit at the invitation of England took place in -return for Air Vice Marshal Courtney’s visit. Here, also, factories, -organizations, schools and the War Academy were shown; also, as regards -industry, the “shadow factories” were shown, that is, industries which -produce peacetime goods in time of peace, and switch over to building -aircraft and aircraft engines in time of war. There were also reciprocal -visits with Sweden. I think I can conclude with that. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in a discussion with the Führer on 23 May -1939? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: In what way did that happen? - -MILCH: I was suddenly ordered to come on the morning of that day, -because the Reich Marshal was not there. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you remember the course of this conversation? - -MILCH: The Führer made a long speech to the three commanders-in-chief of -the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and their chiefs of staff. Several other -persons were also present. The gist of it was that Hitler declared he -had decided to solve in one way or another the question of a corridor -across the Corridor to East Prussia, and in connection with that he -discussed the possibility of complications which, in consequence, might -arise in the West. It was only a speech, not a discussion or a -conversation. - -DR. STAHMER: Was anything else discussed or presented by him, any -further details? - -MILCH: Yes, it was just the question whether the West—probably he was -thinking primarily of France—would keep quiet or whether it would -interfere. - -DR. STAHMER: Was anything said of the possibility of an attack on Poland -or, as I remember, was only the solution of this Corridor problem -mentioned? - -MILCH: Actually, I understood him to say that he would solve this -problem in any case, so his first thought was probably of negotiations, -but if these negotiations did not produce results, then a military -solution would probably have to be considered. - -DR. STAHMER: Were there any further discussions about that? - -MILCH: No, it was expressly ordered that any discussion by the -participants, even among themselves, was forbidden. I, for instance, was -forbidden to inform the Reich Marshal, who was not there. Hitler -declared that he himself would inform Göring. I remember that at that -time there was also issued the famous order which has been mentioned -previously, and which as Führer Order Number 1 had to be displayed in -every one of our offices, to the effect that nobody should tell anybody -anything he need not know; that nothing should ever be told sooner than -was necessary; and that only just as much should be told as was -necessary for the other person to know. - -DR. STAHMER: Then you did not inform the Reich Marshal about this -conference? - -MILCH: No; I was forbidden to do so. - -DR. STAHMER: When did he find out about it? - -MILCH: I do not know. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the then Field Marshal Göring -towards war? - -MILCH: I was always under the impression—this already became apparent -at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland—that he was worried lest -Hitler’s policy might lead to war. In my opinion, he was against war. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you find out for the first time that Hitler had -planned some operation against Russia? - -MILCH: As far as I remember, that was in the spring of 1941. May I -correct myself once more? I want to look in my notebook. On 13 January -the Reich Marshal told me that Hitler expected an attack against Germany -on the part of Russia; then for some time I did not hear anything -further and the Reich Marshal did not mention either what his opinion -was. At any rate, during the weeks and months following I did not hear -any more about it. It is true, however, that at that time I was very -seldom in Berlin and not at all at headquarters, but on inspection -tours, _et cetera_. When I returned—and I do not remember whether it -was in March or April—one of my subordinates made a report to me on a -question of clothing, and he put the question to me whether winter -clothing had to be provided in case of war against Russia. I was very -surprised at this question. I had not been previously informed. I could -only tell him that if it came to war with Russia we should then need -clothing for several winters, and I told him what kind of winter -clothing I would suggest. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you speak a second time to Field Marshal Göring about -this war? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: When was that? - -MILCH: On 22 May, on one of my tours, I again came into contact with the -Commander-in-Chief for the first time after a long interval. It was in -Veldenstein where Göring was at the time. There I discussed the question -with him and I told him that, in my opinion, it would be a great -historical task for him to prevent this war since it could only end with -the annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not -voluntarily burden ourselves with a two-front war, _et cetera_. The -Reich Marshal told me that he also had brought forward all these -arguments, but that it was absolutely impossible to dissuade Hitler from -this war. My offer to try to speak to Hitler once more was declared by -the Reich Marshal to be absolutely hopeless. We had to resign ourselves; -nothing could be done about it. From these words it was quite clear that -he was against this war, and that under no circumstances did he want -this war but that also for him, in his position, there was no -possibility of dissuading Hitler from this project. - -DR. STAHMER: Did it also appear from what he said that he had told -Hitler of his misgivings? - -MILCH: Yes, it was quite clear to me, that he had also spoken about the -question of a two-front war, and he told me that he had also laid before -Hitler the arguments I had brought forward; but he told me that it was -hopeless. I would like to say something more about the 23rd of May. -After this discussion, and owing to the fact that the German Air Force -had hardly any reserves of bombs available, I proposed that bombs should -be manufactured. Previously Hitler had considered this unnecessary and -superfluous for the time being. The shortage of iron came into the -question. After this conference, being under the impression that -complications might arise, I pointed out that the Air Force with its -bomber fleet was not ready for action. My proposal was again rejected by -Hitler after 23 May. He would let me know in time if and when we needed -bombs. When we pointed out that the manufacture of bombs would take -several weeks, even months, he declared that there would be plenty of -time for that later. From that I came to the conclusion and you know I -was not allowed to discuss it with anybody—that Hitler’s words on 23 -May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me. - -DR. STAHMER: When was this last conversation concerning the refusal to -manufacture bombs? - -MILCH: That was about—I spoke once in that connection, after May when -the situation was known. But later, during the latter part of summer, I -again brought it to his attention. Again it was rejected. The order to -manufacture bombs was not given by Hitler until 12 October 1939, -although we had pointed out that deficiency before. Hitler said, if I -remember correctly, “My attempts to make peace with the West after the -campaign against Poland have failed. The war continues. Now we can and -must manufacture the bombs.” - -DR. STAHMER: Did Hitler ever tell you that it was his serious desire to -live in peace with the West? - -MILCH: Yes. I did not go into the details of my visits. When I came back -from France, I was with Hitler for two hours on the Obersalzberg, to -report to him about the visit to France. Likewise, after the visit in -England about two weeks later, I had to make a report to Hitler which -lasted several hours. He was very interested, and after the second -report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared, “I wish to -carry on my policy in such and such a way, but you can all rest assured -that I will always rely on England. I shall try to co-operate with -England at all times.” This conversation took place on 2 November. - -DR. STAHMER: What year? - -MILCH: The year 1937, the 2d of November. - -DR. STAHMER: You mentioned two conversations? - -MILCH: Yes, the first was the report about the visit to France and the -second about the visit to England. Hitler, who did not know foreign -countries at all, was extremely interested to hear from a soldier -something about his reception, the country, armaments, and so forth. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the relations between Reich Marshal Göring and -Himmler? - -MILCH: It was not always clear to me. I had the impression that there -was always some rivalry on the part of Himmler. The mutual relationship, -however, must always have been very correct and very courteous on the -surface; how they really stood, I could not say. - -DR. STAHMER: In May of 1942, there was an exchange of correspondence -between you and the SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff? - -MILCH: Yes, Sir. - -DR. STAHMER: In particular, about medical experiments on inmates of the -Dachau Camp. Could you tell us anything about that? - -MILCH: I was interrogated about that question here in Nuremberg, and -what I no longer remembered of the matter was recalled by two letters—a -letter from Wolff, who was adjutant to Himmler at the time, and another -letter from Himmler to me and the answer which I had given, were -submitted to me. They concerned the experiments with air-pressure -chambers and chilling. These letters were addressed to me only because -Himmler did not know the official channels of the Luftwaffe. The letters -were delivered to the Medical Inspection department, which was not -subordinate to me. The Medical Inspection department also wrote the -answer and submitted it to me. I modified the answer a little and had it -mailed. I have not read a report sent by Himmler in this connection. He -also offered a film. I did not see the film. The Medical Inspector, whom -I asked what it was all about, told me that the Air Force was fully -informed about both problems, and that the experiments with air-pressure -chambers had been carried out by our young doctors who had volunteered -for that purpose. Likewise, in the question of chilling there was -nothing of interest to the Air Force. We both agreed to his suggestion -that we did not want to have anything to do with the matter. I asked him -what these experiments were made for. He told me that criminals were -subjected to these experiments. I asked him in what way. He said, in the -same way as our young doctors had subjected themselves to these -experiments. Then we wrote him a letter which was quite polite—one -could not write differently to these people—but completely repudiating -the experiments. We would have nothing to do with them. In Himmler’s -letter I had been asked to make a report to the Reich Marshal also about -that question. - -I had the impression that by these experiments the SS wanted to make -themselves important in Hitler’s eyes. These were the words also used by -the chief of the medical department to me. During a long report on quite -different questions I mentioned this matter briefly to the Reich -Marshal, because I had to expect that one day he would be approached by -Himmler, and perhaps would not know anything about the whole question. -The Reich Marshal asked me, when I told him about such and such -experiments, “What does this mean?” I gave him the reply which I had -been given by the Medical Inspector. I told him that we did not want to -have anything to do with them, and that we repudiated them. He said he -was exactly of the same opinion, but I should be very careful not to -provoke the SD or treat them badly. What the experiments were about I do -not know, neither do I know what was done to the people; I do not know -it even now. - -DR. STAHMER: Did the Reich Marshal know? - -MILCH: No, certainly not. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Dr. Rascher leave you soon after that to join the SS? - -MILCH: I could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and had nothing to do -with the question of transfer. Rascher was not subordinate to me any -more than was the chief of the medical department or the personnel -office. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether Reich Marshal Göring gave orders to the -troops under his command, saying that sabotage troops should be -annihilated, or that captured enemy terror-fliers should be turned over -to the SD without judicial procedure? - -MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you never hear anything of that kind? - -MILCH: No. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the Reich Marshal towards captured -airmen in general? - -MILCH: I sometimes used to speak to the Reich Marshal about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I wish to interpose an objection. I think we have -been very liberal. I think we have been very liberal in allowing all -kinds of statements, but it does seem to me that this passes anything -that is suitable as evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no -knowledge of the subject; he did not know the orders which are in -evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reich Marshal. I -have no objection to his making any statement of any facts from which -this Tribunal may be informed of the attitude of the Reich Marshal, but -I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another -person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what we can -possibly let go here into evidence. It does not help to solve the -problem and I respectfully object to the question and answer as not -constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any -facts and observations of the Defendant Göring. As the witness had just -said that he never heard of any action against the terror-fliers at all, -I do not see how he could give evidence as to the attitude of the -Defendant Göring about it. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President; I should like to formulate my question as -follows: Did Reich Marshal Göring discuss with the witness as to how -enemy airmen who had been shot down should be treated? - -MILCH: No. - -DR. STAHMER: That is, I suppose, a fact, is it not? - -MILCH: This was not discussed with me. - -DR. STAHMER: I have one more question. Did he speak to you about the -fact that he was opposed to any cruelty in the treatment of the enemy? - -MILCH: That was just what I wanted to say before. He said that to me -before the war, remembering the first World War. - -DR. STAHMER: And what did he say about it? - -MILCH: That once they have been shot down, they are our comrades; that -was the gist of it. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him -at the disposal of the Defense or the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions? - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, as you know, the Prosecution have grouped -together a certain circle of people consisting of the highest ranking -military leaders in order to declare this circle criminal. You probably -know this circle? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there such a grouping of equivalent offices within -the German Armed Forces? - -MILCH: I did not understand the question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever a grouping of offices within the German -Armed Forces like the one that has now been created in order to form -that group? - -MILCH: Yes. I believe that ever since an army existed there have also -been high-ranking leaders who were grouped under their -commander-in-chief. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were the holders of these offices occupied with the -elaboration of technical military problems on Hitler’s orders, or did -they work out subjects on their own initiative which were submitted to -Hitler for execution? - -MILCH: No. The military leaders acted only upon the orders of their -superiors, that is, the generals of the Air Force on the orders of the -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who got his orders from the -Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht—that was Hitler, and before him, -Hindenburg. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether this alleged group of the General -Staff and the OKW, as they are now combined, ever met collectively? - -MILCH: Before the attack on Poland only the Army and Navy commanders who -were assigned for action there were called together by Hitler. Likewise, -those who were to go into action in the West in the spring of 1940 were -called together by Hitler. The same thing happened again, as far as I -know, before the attack on Russia. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were you sometimes present at such conferences? - -MILCH: At some of them, yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Could you describe the course of any such conference? -Particularly I attach value to the point as to whether the higher -military commanders had an opportunity to make counter-suggestions -during these conferences? - -MILCH: I remember the conference with Hitler which took place on the -Obersalzberg before the Polish campaign. It was on 22 August. The -commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the commanders of the armies -attended. Hitler stood in front, behind a large desk, and the generals -sat in chairs next to or behind each other. He made a speech giving the -reasons, the political situation, as he usually did, and his intention. -During this conference any reply or discussion on the part of the -generals was impossible. Whether there was a subsequent conference -dealing with the details I do not know. I know only of this speech of -Hitler’s. Then, before the attack on Russia, there was a different -procedure. We sat around a very large table, and the respective -commanders of the army groups and armies had to demonstrate on the map -their intentions and the methods of executing the orders which they had -received, whereupon Hitler agreed in general or, perhaps, in certain -cases, said he would prefer greater strength here and less strength -there: his objections, however, were only very slight. - -DR. LATERNSER: That means these conferences were more in the nature of a -briefing? - -MILCH: Definitely, briefing. - -DR. LATERNSER: Can you tell me whether any member of the group “General -Staff” or of the so-called group “General Staff and OKW” ever made -suggestions to deviate from the international law then in force? - -MILCH: Not that I know of. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether members of this alleged group -frequently met with politicians or high Party members? - -MILCH: In my opinion, no. I mean that, of course, for the majority of -these gentlemen. It goes without saying that the commanders-in-chief of -the Armed Forces, or the Chief of the OKW, must frequently have held -conferences with politicians also. But the average commanders of the -army groups, fleet, or army had no opportunity to do so. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the members of this so-called group, those who -belonged to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, have discussions among -themselves? - -MILCH: If they were assigned to collaborate in a common task, for -example, if the commander-in-chief of an army or an army group had a -naval commander-in-chief working with him, there were naturally -discussions of that kind. But with a neighboring commander-in-chief the -relationship was certainly not close, and with a more remote neighbor it -did not exist at all. - -DR. LATERNSER: That means such discussions took place only with regard -to the execution of a common task? - -MILCH: Yes, for that purpose. - -DR. LATERNSER: Within the Air Force, is it true that this circle of -people included those officers who had held the position of Chief of -Staff of the Air Force or commander of the Air Force or of an air fleet -during a certain period? I have a list here of those generals of the Air -Force who belonged to that group, and I should like to ask you, with -regard to a few of them, what rank and position these generals had when -the war started. What was the rank of General Korten at the outbreak of -war? - -MILCH: I believe either colonel or lieutenant colonel, but I am not -quite sure. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know what position he held? - -MILCH: I believe he was Chief of Staff of the Munich Air Fleet. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then, from August to October 1944 General Kreipe was -Chief of Staff of the Air Force. What was this officer when the war -started? - -MILCH: I presume major or lieutenant colonel. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. Do you know what position he had? - -MILCH: No, at the moment I could not say exactly. It may be that he was -chief of staff of an air corps. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And what rank did he have at the time as Chief of -Staff of an air corps? - -MILCH: From major to colonel; that depends. - -DR. LATERNSER: General Koller also was Chief of Staff of the Air Force -for a short time. What was this officer when the war started? - -MILCH: I believe lieutenant colonel. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I have only a few more names. Do you know what rank -and position Dessloch had at the outbreak of war? - -MILCH: I do not remember exactly; perhaps major general or colonel. I do -not know exactly. - -DR. LATERNSER: And General Pflugbeil? - -MILCH: The same. - -DR. LATERNSER: General Seidel? - -MILCH: Seidel, I believe, was already Major General at the outbreak of -war. - -DR. LATERNSER: And what position did he have at that time? - -MILCH: He was Quartermaster General in the General Staff. - -DR. LATERNSER: What rank did that position have compared with commander, -commander-in-chief, divisional commander. . . ? - -MILCH: Corps commander is about the same as a quartermaster general. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I have a few more questions concerning the Air Force -itself and the highest military leaders. From your testimony it is to be -concluded that in 1939 the Air Force was not fully prepared for war. As -to this point, could you state the reasons for this unpreparedness of -the Air Force for war? - -MILCH: During the few years between 1935 and 1939—I gave the figures -for industry before—it would have been impossible for any soldier in -any country to build an air force equal to the tasks with which we were -faced from 1939 on. That is impossible. It is not possible to create the -units nor to establish the schools and furnish them with adequate -teaching staffs; nor is it possible to develop the planes which are -necessary, and then to build them by mass production. Nor is it possible -in that short period to train or produce air crews sufficiently -qualified to meet the high technical standards necessarily demanded for -modern aircraft. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to -produce ground crews which are technically highly qualified and to put -them at the disposal of the Air Force and also of the aviation industry. -At the same time also. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: He said that it is impossible. It should not be necessary -to go into this detail on this subject. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more specific questions. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did the Air Force expect resistance against -the invasion of Austria? - -MILCH: No. We knew definitely that there would be no resistance. We did -not take any arms with us. - -DR. LATERNSER: How was the reception there? - -MILCH: So friendly that it could not be more so in our own country. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as Field Marshal, informed in advance that war -was to be declared against the United States? - -MILCH: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: In this Trial there are serious accusations against -German soldiers and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Was -not every soldier sufficiently informed and instructed about the -regulations of international law? - -MILCH: Yes. Each soldier had a pay book. On the first page of the pay -book were pasted ten commandments for the soldier. They included all -these questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Can you give me examples of points contained in this -memorandum? - -MILCH: Yes. For instance, that no soldier—no prisoner, should be shot; -that looting was not permitted. By the way, I have my pay book here. -Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; civilian population -inviolable; attitude of soldier when himself prisoner of war and, in -conclusion, the threat of punishment for offenses. - -DR. LATERNSER: If it became known that soldiers had committed offenses -or outrages against the civilian population, did the commanders -concerned, so far as you know, interfere with the severity necessary? - -MILCH: I know of some cases, I knew of some cases, where that was -definitely the case, even the death penalty being imposed. - -DR. LATERNSER: So the commanders always strove under all circumstances -to maintain the discipline of the troops? - -MILCH: Yes. I can give a notable example. A general of the Air Force had -appropriated jewelry which belonged to a foreign lady. He was sentenced -to death and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in particular during the critical days of 1939 -you were in close official contact with Defendant Göring. Did you ever -hear through him about a large-scale plan for waging an extensive war? - -MILCH: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: In your opinion, did the other high military leaders hear -or would they have heard more about it? - -MILCH: No. All measures taken by Hitler—beginning with the occupation -of the Rhineland—came very suddenly, as a rule after only a few hours’ -preparation. That applies to Austria; that also applies to -Czechoslovakia and to Prague. The only time that we were told anything -beforehand was the affair with Poland, which I mentioned before, where -we had a conference on 23 May. - -DR. LATERNSER: In all other cases, therefore, it was rather a surprise -to the high military leaders? - -MILCH: Yes, a complete surprise. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now I have one more question: What was the possibility of -resignation for high military leaders during the war? - -MILCH: That has been told several times. I have also experienced it -myself—one was not permitted to hand in one’s resignation. It was said -if there was a reason for anyone to leave, he would be informed by his -superiors. In an authoritarian state the subordinate, the citizen has no -right to resign on his own initiative, whether he be a soldier or a -civilian. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SEVENTY-EIGHTH DAY - Monday, 11 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination? - -DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness. - -[_The witness Milch resumed the stand._] - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to refer again, very briefly, to -the extent of the unpreparedness of the Luftwaffe for war in 1939. While -on this subject I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the -Luftwaffe with the OKW, the Army, and the Navy had been secured in 1939? - -MILCH: In my opinion, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for a major war in -1939. No mutual agreements of any kind existed with the other branches -of the Armed Forces. At any rate, I knew of no such agreements. - -DR. LATERNSER: Had such agreements with other branches of the Armed -Forces existed, would you have known about them? - -MILCH: I imagine so, since at that time I certainly would have been -involved in these matters. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the co-ordination like between the more -important departments of the Luftwaffe? - -MILCH: From 1937, it was rather loose. The General Staff, the technical -branch and the personnel office were detached; they worked independently -and more or less on their own. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have just mentioned the General Staff. What -do you understand by the German “General Staff of the Luftwaffe”? - -MILCH: General Staff means in German leaders’ assistants; in other -words, junior officers who had been given specialized training, and who -acted as assistants to troop commanders, from divisional commanders -upwards. - -DR. LATERNSER: Of whom did the General Staff of the Luftwaffe consist? - -MILCH: It consisted of the officers in the administrative sections of -the General Staff, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe -himself downwards, and also of officers who had been assigned as staff -officers to divisions and corps in the field and to air fleets. - -DR. LATERNSER: What time limits were set for the formation of new units -of the Luftwaffe? - -MILCH: The formation of larger units had not yet been ordered, although -they had been discussed quite a long time before the outbreak of war. It -was intended to create a larger Air Force later, but, as far as I can -remember, the plans envisaged were scheduled for completion in 6 or 8 -years. - -DR. LATERNSER: In what year would the plans have been completed? - -MILCH: I should think about 1944-1946. - -THE PRESIDENT: Not only is there some technical fault—we are getting -two translations at once—but both the witness and the defense counsel -are going too fast. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist already in 1939 for day- and -night-fighter planes? - -MILCH: No, it did not exist at that time. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist for bomb warfare? - -MILCH: Not to the extent necessary for a war of aggression. - -DR. LATERNSER: What progress had been made at that time in the building -of airfields? - -MILCH: Airfields had been built with runways up to 1,000 meters, but -these were only suitable for fighter planes and not for loaded heavier -bombers. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe Signal Corps -network? - -MILCH: The operational network, that is, the cable network for -operations, did not exist at that time; it had to be improvised and -built up later on during the war. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Aircraft Observer Corps? - -MILCH: This also had not yet been organized. Reverting to the question -of bombers, the most I can add is that originally, in the early years, -models of 4-engine bombers, which would also have been suitable for -night use, were put into production. Although technically perfect, these -bombers were abandoned—I believe in 1937. It was thought that the big -expense entailed by such heavy bombers should be avoided, since, at that -time, nobody was thinking of war. This was at the time when Field -Marshal Kesselring was Chief of the General Staff, and the question was -submitted for decision to the Reich Marshal, who agreed to the -discontinuance of these large bombers. - -DR. LATERNSER: When was that? - -MILCH: One moment, I will just look it up. On 29 April 1937 the Reich -Marshal, acting on the recommendations of the Chief of the General -Staff, stopped the production of these long-distance bombers. Therefore, -in 1939, there were no night bombers which could in any way compare with -English machines of the Lancaster type, _et cetera_. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe crews? - -MILCH: We had just sufficient personnel replacements for a comparatively -small Luftwaffe at that time. The lack of personnel replacement was the -greatest handicap of all in building up the Luftwaffe. The whole -question of time limits, and so on, depended on the training of -personnel. It was the personnel question which regulated the pace. It -was possible to build planes more rapidly, but it was not possible to -expedite the training of the crews. And, as I said on Friday, this was -the main consideration when dealing with the question of time limits. -Pilots and technical personnel are of no use unless thoroughly trained. -It is much worse to have half-trained personnel than no personnel at -all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I do not want to interrupt your -cross-examination but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes -now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe was not ready for -war in 1939. It seems to me too much is being taken up with detail. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have one more question on this matter. Were there any -reserves of aluminum, magnesium, and rubber; and did any means exist for -producing these materials? - -MILCH: Not in sufficient quantities. - -DR. LATERNSER: And now—one last question. Witness, during your -testimony on Friday, you mentioned “Basic Order Number 1.” You also gave -us the contents of this order. In this connection I would like to ask: -Was this order strictly observed, or not? - -MILCH: Yes, very strictly. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel want to ask the -witness any questions? - -DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): I request permission -to ask the witness a few questions. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you remember when Hitler -demanded the construction of bomb-proof aircraft factories in caves or -concrete shelters? - -MILCH: As far as I remember it was when the British started the heavy -raids in 1943. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER; Do you remember a conference on the Obersalzberg at the -beginning of April 1944, and what you told Hitler at the time about the -difficulties in the building industry, and the orders issued by Hitler -on that occasion? - -MILCH: Yes. On that occasion Hitler ordered very solid structures to be -built. I believe he demanded six large bomb-proof factories, each with -600,000 square meters floor space. Later on, Speer, who had been absent -from the April meeting through illness, raised objections to these -orders. He considered this construction work to be on far too large a -scale and that it was too late to undertake it. Later he obtained -permission for all factories which by June 1944 were not in a -sufficiently advanced stage of construction—that is, which could not -start working by the beginning of 1945—to be discontinued immediately. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: I am above all interested in the question of labor. At -this discussion on the Obersalzberg, did the Führer allocate the -requisite labor for the construction of the factories demanded by him? - -MILCH: Yes. I think I remember rightly that, in answer to the objection -raised by one of the gentlemen present, he said that he himself would -see that the labor was made available. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you said that Herr Speer was opposed to these -constructions. What happened then? Speer was not present at that -meeting? - -MILCH: No, he was ill at the time. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us briefly what happened? - -MILCH: During Speer’s illness, requests reached the Führer from other -quarters that Speer should be relieved of construction work. -Difficulties arose owing to the fact that whereas in theory Speer still -remained in charge of building, in practice the work was nearly all -taken out of his hands. He was no longer able to have any say in -construction work, since it had been decided that the construction -department of the Todt Organization should receive orders direct from -Hitler. Thus, Speer was excluded more and more from this sphere of -activity. A great deal was said at that time about large-scale -constructions, but very little work was actually done on them. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler give a written order to Herr Dorsch, and did -he have it shown to Speer? Do you know anything about it? - -MILCH: As far as I can remember, such a written order was given and it -was also sent to Speer. I have a vague recollection that Speer once -showed me such an order. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: One last question on this matter. In this way, Dorsch, -who had been directly commissioned by the Führer, took over the -responsibility for these buildings and the necessary manpower? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you were a member of the Central Planning Board. -Can you tell me if the Central Planning Board was authorized to make -decisions on the use of foreign or German labor and its allocation? - -MILCH: No. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did the Central Planning Board ever make decisions of -this kind? - -MILCH: The Central Planning Board had been set up for the distribution -of raw materials only; but a certain control over transportation -devolved upon it. However, the matter of transportation was independent -of any activity concerning allocation of raw material. It had no say in -the allocation of labor. If the Central Planning Board attempted to -obtain some influence as to the allocation of workers, it was because it -was at the same time responsible for armaments, and therefore best able -to judge the existing requirements. But here, too, considerable -difficulties were encountered, and this branch of the Central Planning -Board’s work had to be dropped. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: So no decision was ever reached? We have records before -us which show that labor problems were sometimes discussed by the -Central Planning Board. - -MILCH: Yes, very frequently, as the armament offices which were -represented on the Central Planning Board were greatly concerned with -labor problems; but these discussions mostly concerned food supplies and -extra rations for the workers. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: And now—one last question on the subject. Did the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in any way look upon -the Central Planning Board as authoritative, that is, as the final -arbiter in the total plan for the utilization of manpower? - -MILCH: No, he could not do that, as he himself represented that -authority. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any reserves of German workers in 1943 or -1944, and did Speer request the utilization of this German manpower -instead of foreign labor? - -MILCH: Yes, again and again Speer made strong representations that any -German labor still available, even if difficult to mobilize, should be -brought in and put to work. This reserve consisted mostly of female -labor, women of professional circles and social stations who in wartime -had nothing to do apart from domestic work. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you have already told us that the Defendant -Speer was a sick man in 1944. Could you tell us approximately when his -illness began and when it ended? - -MILCH: His illness started in February, and I think it lasted until -about June. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Do you know anything about this long illness -being exploited in order to undermine severely his influence and -authority? Can you tell me who was primarily interested in doing that? - -MILCH: His influence was undermined in the above-mentioned building -projects. It is very difficult for me to name here the individuals who -probably hoped to succeed him. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did matters improve, or did they become worse after 20 -July? - -MILCH: Actually, as time went on they became worse. Speer’s position -became more difficult than ever, as the whole of Speer’s views differed -more and more from Hitler’s official opinion. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Now, may I remind you of something else? In -February 1945, by a Hitler order, the Defendant Speer was entrusted with -the distribution of motor vehicles; and you, if I am correctly informed, -were appointed as his representative. Can you tell me what the transport -situation was like at that time, and to what extent the armaments output -depended on the transport situation? - -MILCH: In those days, the transport situation was so deplorable, owing -to the American daylight raids, that the transport system was no longer -able to carry even the most essential commodities and armament -materials. Our great forge, the Ruhr district, was particularly hard -hit, as well as the transport system carrying products from the Ruhr to -the finishing industries in Central Germany, Berlin, and Saxony. If very -stringent measures had not been taken and extraordinary powers granted, -total collapse, due solely to transport difficulties, would have become -only a matter of hours. That was the situation at that time. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Could Speer, in his position, be expected to give -preferential treatment to armaments when available transport was -allocated? What did he actually do? - -MILCH: No; Speer, like myself, saw quite clearly that the whole armament -question could no longer influence the situation at that stage. -Therefore, acting on his own initiative, he gave priority to the -movement of food supplies for the population. The most urgent job was to -remove the foodstuffs from the German territory in danger of being lost -to the enemy. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these measures only taken to safeguard the current -food supply, or were they long-term measures? - -MILCH: The intention was to move all available and transportable food to -a place of safety. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, motor transport was a particularly difficult -problem at the time. Was the number of trucks and the quantity of fuel -to drive them cut down when transport was allocated to the armaments -industry; and what orders regarding trucks did Speer issue in -mid-February? Do you know? - -MILCH: I know that trucks were always in such short supply in the -armament industry that not even essential orders could be filled. All -kinds of alternative transport had to be found, such as electric trains, -a great number of horse carts, and other vehicles. But, as far as my -knowledge goes, here too, Speer used this means of transport for the -benefit of the German population in order to maintain some sort of food -distributing organization. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Fuel was, at that time, one of the most serious -bottlenecks, was it not? - -MILCH: It was, in fact, the most serious bottleneck of all. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, do you happen to know that after February 1945 -Speer granted priority to repair work on nitrogen factories producing -fertilizers for agriculture, which meant that repairs to fuel producing -plants had to take second place? - -MILCH: Yes, I do know, because Speer discussed with me in great detail -the emergency measures to be taken, now that we were faced with imminent -and inevitable collapse. He was of the opinion that first and foremost -everything that was still possible should be done to help the German -people to get through the very hard times which would follow the -collapse. These first measures dealt with food supplies, salvage of food -supplies, and transport for distribution. - -Secondly, he sought to avoid the destruction of the German factories -still in our possession, which was in direct opposition to Hitler’s -“scorched earth” tactics. - -Thirdly, he discussed the switch-over from war to peacetime production -of such factories as might still be standing. First of all, he had in -mind agricultural machinery and spare parts, and banked upon the -assumption that, if once the orders were placed, they would be carried -out in spite of the upheaval—for instance, even if some German -factories passed into enemy hands, or when, the fighting having ceased, -the government armament contracts would automatically fizzle out. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, we have now connected up an entire series of -questions and I am most grateful to you. I should, however, like to ask -you one more question: Could you give us any further details about the -prevention of destruction? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, will you explain to me why this evidence -that you are calling now is relevant and to what charge it is relevant? - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the Defendant Speer is charged with -participating in the conspiracy and in the common plan for waging -aggressive warfare until 7 May 1945. If I can now prove that his -activities, at least for some time before that date, were incompatible -with such common plan, then this item of evidence would be relevant to -the question whether this charge of the Indictment is justified or not. - -THE PRESIDENT: All the evidence that you have been giving for the last -15 minutes was related to 1943 and 1944, and was related to conferences -with reference to the erection of factories for the production of -bombers and the fact that—as far as I have understood it—the fact that -Speer was engaged more on attempting to feed the German people than on -building armament factories. What that has to do with it, I have not any -idea. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: The first point referred to Document 1584-PS, which the -Prosecution submitted as incriminating my client. The document says -that, at a conference on the Obersalzberg, the construction of certain -factories was ordered, and that 100,000 Hungarian Jews were employed on -this construction. The purpose of the interrogation of this witness was -to establish that the Defendant Speer could not be held responsible for -this construction, since Hitler had given the order for this work -directly to somebody else, and to eliminate this particular point -submitted by the Prosecution in support of their charge. That was the -purpose of the first question. The purpose of the second question, -concerning the avoidance of destruction and the safeguarding of -agricultural produce and the food supply of the German people, is -connected with the accusation of participating in a conspiracy for the -execution of a common plan; whereas all the activities, just confirmed -by the witness, were to serve an entirely different aim and had just the -opposite effect to the common plan alleged by the Prosecution. They did -not serve the war effort but were directed towards peacetime economy. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge against Speer on the ground that he -attempted to feed the German people during the war. The Prosecution have -not laid that against him as a charge. - -DE. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I never said that the Prosecution had -raised this charge against him. There must have been a mistake in the -transmission. - -[_Turning to the witness._] One last question, Witness. Can you tell us -to what extent Speer informed the Führer at a later date of the results -of the heavy air raids on Hamburg and on other cities? - -MILCH: He gave the Führer the fullest information and repeatedly drew -his attention to the difficulties. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did the -Central Planning Board also concern itself with labor problems? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were the manpower requirements established? - -MILCH: They were established by the industries and reported through the -labor exchanges. We also submitted figures on the shortages of manpower -in the armament industry. - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I interrupt you? What did you do, once the -requirements were established? And what was the purpose of establishing -them? - -MILCH: They showed the shortages in manpower caused by the continual -calling up of the workers for war service. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was this not done in order to bring in more workers? - -MILCH: The request for more workers came from the factories. We -supported the factories in their negotiations with Sauckel by telling -him that such and such an industry had applied for so and so many -workers. We also told him which of their figures were too high according -to our calculations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the figures represent the total sum of the workers -needed? - -MILCH: No. It was a general figure according to the statistics supplied -by Sauckel’s labor exchanges. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who fixed the requirements, Sauckel or the applicants for -labor? - -MILCH: The factories did. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the Central Planning Board’s task in connection -with labor problems? - -MILCH: The Central Planning Board dealt with the distribution of raw -materials. It also had to see that raw materials were made available -. . . - -DR. SERVATIUS: My question concerns the workers and not raw materials. - -MILCH: Please wait until I have finished what I want to say. You will -then understand what I mean. The raw materials had to be produced and -their production called for workers. For instance, in the mining -industry and the aluminum factories . . . - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, may I interrupt you? It is clear that workers -are essential for production; but what I want to know is who made the -request for labor, and who finally decided as to the numbers of workers -required? - -MILCH: The factories made the request and Sauckel decided on the -figures. He placed at their disposal as many workers as he could get, -but the numbers were always below the figure requested. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection did he have a free hand, or did the -Führer make the decisions? - -MILCH: As far as I know, the Führer intervened very frequently and -Sauckel was often summoned to confer with Hitler. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there not discussions at the Führer’s headquarters -on all essential programs, especially those involving manpower? - -MILCH: No, not all programs; but occasionally these matters were -discussed. However, the discussions with the Führer about labor problems -were mostly very brief. He did not wish to discuss the wider issues of -this matter. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What had the Four Year Plan to do with the matter? - -MILCH: The Four Year Plan, as far as I know, also dealt with these -problems. But I rather think that in this respect it served as an -auxiliary organization for Hitler, who did not wish to discuss these -matters in detail. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that according to decrees Sauckel had to -subordinate himself to the Four Year Plan, that is, to Göring, and that -he had to receive orders from him? - -MILCH: I do not exactly know how matters stood. - -DR. SERVATIUS: One more question. How did the workers, the foreign -workers, behave? Were they willing and hard working? - -MILCH: The majority were excellent workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How do you account for that? - -MILCH: In the first years these workers were pleased to be able to get -work and food. We treated them well, as far as I can judge, and their -rations were larger than those of the German population. They received -extra rations on the same scale as the German workers for heavy and very -heavy physical work, also for overtime. The French and Russian workers -worked exceptionally well. I occasionally heard complaints about the -Dutch workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Are you familiar with Sauckel’s regulations concerning -the welfare of the foreign workers? - -MILCH: I remember that on one occasion Sauckel spoke to us on this -subject at the headquarters of the Central Planning Board. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did he show a humane or a severe attitude? - -MILCH: His intentions were entirely humane. Sauckel had been set a very -difficult task by Hitler. As far as I know, he had been a workingman -himself and, as a seaman, had worked very hard in his time; -consequently, he was kindly disposed towards workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness. - -PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, -did you take part in the 1937 Wehrmacht maneuvers? - -MILCH: In Mecklenburg, I believe. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, that is so. Do you remember if any foreign officers -were present as guests? - -MILCH: Yes. I know that a large British military mission was present and -a general, who later was appointed Governor of Gibraltar. - -DR. JAHRREISS: General Ironside? - -MILCH: Yes, Ironside. I spoke to him personally and also welcomed some -of the gentlemen of his staff. There were also Italian officers and -officers from many other countries; at the moment I cannot say exactly -what countries—I have forgotten. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was there by any chance a French military mission as -well? - -MILCH: I think, so, but I cannot say for certain—I cannot remember so -far back. But I did speak to General Ironside. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know if at that time these foreign -officers were also shown the most up-to-date German armament equipment? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was all the equipment demonstrated in action? - -MILCH: Everything was demonstrated in action, with the exception of a -new plane not yet in use; but even this was shown. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know if we, that is, Germany, also allowed foreign -powers to inspect our air raid precautions equipment? - -MILCH: Yes, on many occasions. A Mr. Fraser came to see me from England, -together with Lord Trenchard. Mr. Fraser was interested in air raid -precautions equipment, and was immediately shown the latest -developments. - -DR. JAHRREISS: When was that, please? - -MILCH: I think it was in 1937 or 1938, but I will see if I can find the -date. [_Referring to his notes._] It was on 1 July 1937. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you remember if anybody else came from England at a -later date? - -MILCH: It was later followed by a personal interchange between our -services and the British. I myself, having brought them together, took -no further part in the matter. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. One more question. Do you remember the -conflict which arose over the reoccupation of the Rhineland? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: You also know how great was the excitement it caused. - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did the Luftwaffe also take part in the reoccupation of -the Rhineland—to be precise, on the left bank of the Rhine? - -MILCH: I cannot, at the moment, answer this question. The reoccupation -of the Rhineland was so sudden that I was taken unawares while on leave. -When I returned, the occupation was well under way. I know that -Düsseldorf had been occupied and that the Luftwaffe had taken part. I -myself went there a few days later. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But that is on the right bank of the Rhine? - -MILCH: That is on the right bank. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Then you know nothing about the left bank of the Rhine? - -MILCH: No, I cannot say anything about it at the moment. I do not -believe there was an airfield there; anyhow, I cannot remember exactly. - -DR. JAHRREISS: You say that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was very -sudden. But had nothing been arranged beforehand by the Luftwaffe to -provide for such an event? - -MILCH: The decision was made when I was on leave and everything we had -was naturally used for this purpose, but we did not have very much. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Quite so, but let us get it quite clear. Was the -Luftwaffe told to be ready for the first time while you were on leave? - -MILCH: Yes, definitely; otherwise I would not have gone on leave. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What was the earliest date on which the Luftwaffe was -given the alert before the reoccupation? - -MILCH: It might have been a matter of 14, 15, or 16 days. That would be -the maximum. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, on Friday you made a statement about the part -played by the Luftwaffe in the military operations for the completion of -the Anschluss policy in March 1938. On what day did the preparations -begin? - -MILCH: The preparations began less than 48 hours beforehand. That I know -exactly. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And when did you first learn that military preparations -were to be made for the solution of this problem? - -MILCH: About 36 hours before the march into Austria. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. - -DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Witness, am I -right in assuming that you were never in a position to issue orders to, -that is, never had anything to do officially with either the Gestapo or -with the concentration camps? - -MILCH: No, I never had anything to do with them. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you first hear of the establishment of these -camps? - -MILCH: Through the general announcements in 1933 that concentration -camps, or rather that one concentration camp had been established. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, during the years which followed, receive more -detailed information concerning further establishments of this kind? - -MILCH: Until the war ended I had heard of Dachau and Oranienburg only. I -knew nothing at all about any other concentration camps. At my own -request and in the company of some high-ranking officers of the -Luftwaffe, I inspected Dachau in 1935. I saw no other concentration -camps, nor did I know anything about what happened in them. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: During your inspection, what impression did you get of -the establishment itself and the treatment of the internees, _et -cetera_? - -MILCH: At that time there was so much talk about these camps, also in -Germany in our officers’ circles, that I decided to judge for myself. -Himmler gave his immediate consent to my request. At that time, I -believe, Dachau was the only concentration camp in existence. There I -found a very mixed assortment of inmates. One group consisted of major -criminals, all habitual offenders; other groups consisted of people who -repeatedly committed the same offense which were not crimes, but only -offenses. There was another group of persons who had participated in the -Röhm Putsch. One of the men I recognized as having seen before. He had -been a high-ranking SA leader and was now an internee. The camp, run on -military lines, was clean and properly organized. They had their own -slaughterhouse and their own bakery. We insisted on having the food of -the internees served to us. The food was good and one of the camp -leaders explained that they fed the inmates very well as they were -engaged on heavy work. All the inmates whom we approached explained the -reason for their internment. For instance, one man told us that he had -committed forgery 20 times; another, that he had committed assault and -other offenses 18 times. There were many cases of this kind. I cannot, -of course, say if we were shown everything in this large establishment. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned that the question had been -discussed in military circles, among the officers. Later, when you -returned, did you convey your impressions of Dachau to anyone? - -MILCH: I scarcely mentioned them to anybody, only if my more intimate -comrades broached the subject. As I have said before, I did not go -alone; there were several other gentlemen with me and, no doubt, they -too must have had occasion to discuss this subject in smaller circles. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Unheard of acts of cruelty were perpetrated in the -concentration camps. Did you come to hear of them and, if so, when did -you first hear of them? - -MILCH: On the day on which I was captured it was revealed to me for the -first time when internees from an auxiliary camp in the vicinity were -led past the place where I was captured. This was the first time I saw -it for myself. The rest I learned in captivity from the various -documents which we were shown. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Then it was completely unknown to you that more than 200 -concentration camps existed in Germany and in the occupied territories. - -MILCH: It was completely unknown to me. I have already mentioned the two -camps whose existence was known to me. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: It could be held against you that it must have been -impossible not to know of these facts. Can you explain to us why it was -not possible for you to obtain better information regarding existing -conditions? - -MILCH: Because the people who knew about these conditions did not talk -about them, and presumably were not allowed to talk about them. I -understand this to be so from a document in the Indictment against the -General Staff, in which Himmler—also erroneously considered as one of -the high-ranking military leaders—had issued an order to this effect. -This document dealt with some conference or other of high-ranking police -leaders under Himmler, in 1943, I believe. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I right in saying that any attempt to disclose -conditions prevalent in the concentration camps was impossible unless -the person in question was ready to risk his life? - -MILCH: In the first place the large number of concentration camps was -unknown to everybody, as it was unknown to me. Secondly, nobody knew -what went on there. This knowledge was apparently confined to a very -small circle of people who were in [on] the secret. Further, the SD was -very much feared by the entire population, not only by the lower -classes. If anybody tried to gain access to these secrets he did so at -the peril of his life. And again, how could the Germans know anything -about these things, since they never saw them or heard about them? -Nothing was said about them in the German press, no announcements were -made on the German radio, and those who listened to foreign broadcasts -exposed themselves to the heaviest penalties, generally it meant death. -You could never be alone. You could depend upon it that if you yourself -contravened that law, others would overhear and then denounce you. I -know that in Germany a large number of people were condemned to death -for listening to foreign broadcasts. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did it ever come to your knowledge that there had been -mass deportations of Jews to the Eastern territories? When did you first -hear about it? - -MILCH: I cannot give the exact date. Once, in some way or other, I can -no longer remember how, the information did reach me that Jews had been -settled in special ghetto towns in the East. I think it must have been -in 1944 or thereabout, but I cannot guarantee that this date is exact. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned ghettos. Did you know that these -mass deportations were, in effect, a preliminary step to mass -extermination? - -MILCH: No, we were never told. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask you further if, in this connection, you had any -idea about the existence of the Auschwitz extermination camp? - -MILCH: No. I first heard of the name much later. I read it in the press -after I was captured. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: So-called Einsatzkommandos were employed in the East, -where they carried out large-scale exterminations, also of Jews. Did you -know that these Einsatzkommandos had been created by order of Adolf -Hitler? - -MILCH: No. The first I heard of these Einsatzkommandos was here in -prison in Nuremberg. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that a special campaign was launched for the -extermination of Jewish citizens in the southeastern provinces of the -Reich, which, according to the statement of the leader concerned, named -Eichmann, caused the death of from 4 to 5 million Jews? - -MILCH: No, I know nothing at all about it. This is the first time I have -heard the name Eichmann mentioned. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I correct in stating that in Germany, under the regime -of an absolute leader, any opposition to a supreme order would most -probably have meant death? - -MILCH: That has been proved in many hundreds of cases. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I also correct in stating that the peril would have -been equally deadly even if the order had been opposed on legal and -moral grounds? - -MILCH: I believe that here, too, one would have had to be prepared to -pay the penalty, and not only one’s own, but the family’s as well. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. I have no more questions to ask. - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, I have only -a short question to ask you. You told us, on Saturday or on Friday, that -in 1937 you had discussions with an English mission. This mission was -headed by Air Vice Marshal Courtney. I should like to know from you if, -in the course of these discussions, it was agreed that the competent -German and British authorities should exchange information concerning -the establishment plans for their respective Air Forces? - -MILCH: Your surmise is correct. - -DR. SIEMERS: How was the agreement made? - -MILCH: The agreement was drawn up in writing. - -DR. SIEMERS: Had the British and German Air Forces establishment plans -for each year? - -MILCH: No. The plans covered several years. - -DR. SIEMERS: How many years ahead were covered by the 1937 plan? - -MILCH: I cannot tell you from memory. At that time it may possibly have -covered 2 or 3 years. - -DR. SIEMERS: That would have been from 1938 till 1940? - -MILCH: Possibly 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940. I cannot say for certain. I have -forgotten. - -DR. SIEMERS: Had this plan a technical name? Was it called -“Establishment Plan,” or did it have some other name? - -MILCH: I cannot remember now. We generally referred to it as the -projected establishment plan. - -DR. SIEMERS: On the English side, were the plans also drawn up to cover -a definite period—say 3 years? - -MILCH: I believe the periods covered were very much the same. The system -was more or less the same. - -DR. SIEMERS: I thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution now wish to cross-examine? Mr. -Justice Jackson, I am sorry to have called you up. Perhaps it would be -convenient to adjourn for 10 minutes now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, you are a prisoner of war of the United -States at the present time? - -MILCH: No, I am not a prisoner of war of the United States. I was an -English prisoner of war, and since I have been here I have been declared -an internee. I do not know what that means. At any rate, it is not -correct to apply it to a prisoner-of-war officer taken by the enemy -during action before the end of hostilities. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have been allowed to confer with counsel both -while this Trial was in progress and . . . - -MILCH: I have been able to confer with some of the Counsel for the -Defense, not with all of them. I assume that the other Defense Counsel -did not desire it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you will save a great deal of time if you will -answer my questions as briefly as possible and with “yes” or “no” where -possible. You have been allowed to prepare, keep, and bring to the Court -notes after your consultations with counsel? - -MILCH: The notes which I had with me were made by me before I conferred -with defendants’ counsel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have made none of the notes since your -consultations with counsel? - -MILCH: I made one note for myself about one consultation. It was merely -about a date which had been mentioned to me and which otherwise I could -not have remembered. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you occupied a very high position in the German -Air Force? - -MILCH: I was Inspector General. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You frequently attended conferences on behalf of -Göring? - -MILCH: On behalf of Göring, very rarely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You deny that you attended conferences on behalf of -Göring frequently? - -MILCH: No. I do not deny it at all, but I was called upon to attend some -of these conferences by virtue of my own office. I rarely had occasion -to represent Göring as he usually attended these conferences himself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had a very large part in building up the -Luftwaffe, did you not? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were honored for that, were you not, in -1941, by the Hitler regime? - -MILCH: 1941—no; I believe, Mr. Justice Jackson, you mean 1940. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 1940—well, perhaps I am wrong. - -MILCH: You mean the promotion to Field Marshal, don’t you? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was your promotion to Field Marshal? - -MILCH: On 19 July 1940. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you not receive a gift from the Hitler -regime in recognition of your services? - -MILCH: In 1942, on the occasion of my fiftieth birthday, I received a -recognition. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the recognition was in the form of cash, wasn’t -it? - -MILCH: Yes, it was a cash recognition, with which I could buy myself an -estate. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what did it consist of? - -MILCH: The sum amounted to 250,000 marks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And now you come here to testify, as I understand -your testimony, that the regime of which you were a part put Germany -into a war for which it was in no way prepared. Do I understand you -correctly? - -MILCH: It is correct insofar as Germany in 1939 entered into a war for -which she was not prepared as far as the Air Force was concerned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the head of the Air Force ever give any warning -of that fact to the German people? - -MILCH: That I am unable to say. I do not believe he could do that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that he ever did do it, do you? - -MILCH: I cannot remember that he ever gave such a warning to the people -publicly. I assume that the warning was given to his superior military -officer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what officer would be above him? - -MILCH: That would be the Führer, Adolf Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer, yes. - -MILCH: As a soldier, the Reich Marshal could not address himself to the -public. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, can you point to any time at any meeting of -the High Command, or at any other meeting that the Führer called, when -Reich Marshal Göring, in the presence of any of these people, raised the -question that Germany was not prepared for war? - -MILCH: I cannot remember such a conference, because such conferences -were held only between the two people concerned. The Reich Marshal never -strongly opposed the Führer in public, or before any large group of his -officers, because Hitler would not have tolerated such opposition. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know of any occasion when any one of the -defendants in the box ever took a public position against going to war? - -MILCH: Publicly, no; I cannot remember any occasion. But I rather think -that also to the gentlemen who now stand accused the whole question of -the war came as a great surprise. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You would like to believe that? - -MILCH: I do believe it, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do believe it. How long did it take the German -Armed Forces to conquer Poland? - -MILCH: To conquer Poland—18 days, I believe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Eighteen days. How long did it take to drive -England off the Continent, including the disaster of Dunkirk? - -MILCH: I believe 6 weeks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did it take to overrun Holland and -Belgium? - -MILCH: A few days. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did it take to overrun France and take -Paris? - -MILCH: Two months in all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And how long did it take to overrun Denmark and -take possession of Norway? - -MILCH: Also a short time. Denmark took a very short time, because -Denmark gave in immediately, and Norway gave in in a few weeks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testify, and you want this Tribunal to -understand you, as an officer, as saying that there was no preparation -known to the officers in advance of those movements? Is that your -testimony as an officer? - -MILCH: Pardon me, I did not understand you just now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that those were all surprise -movements to the officers of the Luftwaffe. You were surprised at every -one of them, you said. - -MILCH: I said, surprised by the outbreak of war, because at first it was -a question of Poland only. The other actions came very much later and -there was more time to prepare for this war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, relative to Poland, you do not deny that -Germany was well prepared for a war with Poland, or do you? - -MILCH: The might of Germany, as compared with Poland, was powerful -enough. What I meant to imply when speaking of preparedness for war in -my testimony, was a degree of preparedness for entering a world war. For -that Germany was not prepared in 1939. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But she was prepared for the campaign that she -initiated, was she not? - -MILCH: I would not say that; I would say that of course she had -armaments, in the same way as every other nation with armed forces. Our -armed forces were made ready against Poland and, to our own surprise, -proved sufficiently powerful to crush Poland in a very short time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you question or deny that, relative to the -other powers on the Continent of Europe, Germany was the best prepared -for war on the first day of September 1939? - -MILCH: I believe that, taking it all round, the British Air Force at -that time was stronger than the German. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you in reference to the Continental powers. -Do you question that Germany was far better prepared for war than any of -her immediate neighbors? - -MILCH: I am convinced that France and Poland, according to their -respective strength, were just as well prepared for war as Germany. They -had the advantage of a longer time in which to arm, whereas Germany -could only begin to arm 5 years before the outbreak of the war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first meet Hermann Göring? - -MILCH: I believe in the year 1928. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he then? What position did he hold? - -MILCH: He was then a member of the Reichstag. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what were you doing? What was your business? - -MILCH: I was then Director of the German Lufthansa, a civil aviation -concern. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you have some discussions with Hermann Göring -at about that time as to the use of an Air Force if the Nazi Party came -to power? - -MILCH: At that very early time, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first discuss that with Göring? - -MILCH: I believe Göring spoke to me on this subject in 1932, when a plan -was formed to take over the government in 1932. It was believed already -at that time that the other parties would form a government together -with the National Socialists. On that occasion, I think, Göring did -speak of the possibility of Germany being freed from armament -restrictions, given a government at the helm which included the National -Socialists. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Following that you became a member of the Nazi -Party, did you not? - -MILCH: I joined the Party only after 1933. When I again became an -officer my membership lapsed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You waited until after they had seized the power? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you recall a conversation that you had with -Hermann Göring on the 28th of January 1933? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where did that take place? - -MILCH: In my own residence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he call upon you? - -MILCH: I had guests in my house that evening, and he suddenly arrived -because he wanted to talk to me very urgently. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you relate to the Tribunal the -conversation that you had with Göring at that time? - -MILCH: He told me that an agreement had now been reached with the other -parties in question for the formation of a coalition government with the -National Socialists. Reich President Von Hindenburg had agreed to the -appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor in this government. - -He asked me whether I would be ready to offer my collaboration in an Air -Ministry to be set up. I proposed two other persons instead of myself, -explaining that I did not wish to leave the Lufthansa. Göring rejected -them and insisted that I place myself at his disposal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you agree to do so? - -MILCH: I asked for his permission to think the matter over, and I made -my consent dependent on whether Hitler would insist. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what did Hitler do? - -MILCH: I accepted on the 30th, after Hitler had told me once again that -he considered my technical knowledge and ability in the field of -aviation to be indispensable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, on the day that the Nazi Party came to power, -you took over the task of building a Nazi air force, did you not? - -MILCH: No, not an air force. The immediate problem was the linking up of -all the various branches of aviation which existed at that time. For -instance, there was one civil aviation transport company, or there might -have been two. There were the aviation industries, the training schools -for civilian pilots, the meteorological service, and I believe there -were several research institutes. That, I think, covers the entire field -of aviation of that time—but it had nothing to do with an air force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Perhaps, I will say, you took over the task of -making Germany predominant in the air? - -MILCH: No, I cannot agree with that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Put it in your own way. Tell us what you did; what -your object was in taking over this new task. - -MILCH: My first task was to develop the various branches in order to -build up a large air transport system. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You then made visits to France and England, and on -your return reported to Hitler personally, did you not? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you returned from England, did you warn Hitler -against the activities of Ribbentrop? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you tell Hitler about the activities of -Ribbentrop in England? - -MILCH: That I had gained the impression in England that Von Ribbentrop -was not _persona grata_. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you were interrogated before, didn’t you -state after your capture that you told Hitler that if he did not get rid -of Ribbentrop soon he was going to have trouble with England? Is that -not what you told Hitler in substance? - -MILCH: I cannot now remember the exact words. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But is that not the sense of it? - -MILCH: I was of the opinion that another man should be sent to England -to bring about mutual understanding as to policy, in accordance with the -wish so often expressed by Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before you talked with Hitler about that, you had -discussed it with Göring, had you not? - -MILCH: With whom? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring. - -MILCH: About the journey? Or about what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: About Ribbentrop. - -MILCH: No, I did not discuss him with the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when some engineers were sent to -Russia, were they not, to inspect the air construction there, factories, -facilities, and that sort of thing? - -MILCH: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This was a group of engineers, and you had -something to do with sending them there, did you not? - -MILCH: No, I had nothing to do with that group. At that time technical -research was not under my control. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Under whose orders were they? - -MILCH: Under General Udet, who, in turn, was under the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when they came back, you learned that they had -reported that Russia had greater capacity for building airplane engines -than all six of the German factories, did you not? - -MILCH: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What order did Göring give about that information -being made available even to the Führer? - -MILCH: Göring did not believe the information at that time. I know that -from the words of General Udet. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that you stated to the -interrogators before that Göring called these experts defeatists, -forbade them to repeat that information to anybody, and threatened them -with the concentration camp if they repeated that information? Did you -say that or didn’t you? - -MILCH: I never said it in that form. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, use your own words and tell us just what -Göring said on that subject. - -MILCH: At a considerably later date, when the question of American -armament figures came up, the Reich Marshal said to me, “Now, you too -are going to turn defeatist and believe these large figures.” I told him -then that I did indeed believe these figures; but that had nothing to do -with the Russian matter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were those Russian figures ever reported to Hitler, -to the Reichstag or in any way made public to the German people? - -MILCH: The Russian figures? That I cannot say. I had nothing to do with -the matter. The American figures were undoubtedly submitted to Hitler, -but Hitler did not believe them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified on Friday, I believe, that you knew -that the commencement of the war with Russia would mean the annihilation -of Germany. I remind you of that, and that is correct, is it not? - -MILCH: Not the destruction—the defeat. I think I said annihilation or -defeat. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You went to Reich Marshal Göring to protest against -the entrance into the Russian war, is that right? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did Göring agree with you that it would end in -the defeat of Germany? - -MILCH: No, he did not agree. He had to be extremely cautious in his -statements in deference to his relations with Hitler. I told him the -cause for Germany’s difficulties and he nodded. His words gave me the -impression that he had already put the same arguments to Hitler, and -that he had been unsuccessful. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, he agreed with you that it would -end with the defeat of Germany, but did not want it said to Hitler, is -that right? - -MILCH: No, I would not go as far as that. When I said that this meant -the defeat of Germany, I was voicing the conclusion reached by me. He -merely agreed that this war should be avoided at all costs and that it -would prove a misfortune for Germany. That was the way he put it; he did -not use the word “defeat” in this connection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it mentioned by you? - -MILCH: I mentioned that to open a second front against so strong an -enemy would mean the defeat of Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he disagree with you about that? Did he -take issue with you about that? - -MILCH: No, he did not argue about it, he only declared himself opposed -to taking on anything else, as he considered it impossible to do so; -what we thought would not make the slightest difference and it would -only give Hitler the impression that we in the Luftwaffe were -defeatists. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did not attempt any further to convey the -information, from which you thought Germany would be defeated if she -entered into war with Russia, to Hitler or to any other officer of the -High Command? - -MILCH: It was impossible for me to do so. I could not act against the -order of my superior officer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of the Reich Marshal? - -MILCH: Yes, of the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, so far as you know, after his talk with you he -never conveyed the information to Hitler that it was your opinion that -the war would end in disaster? - -MILCH: I had the impression that he had previously discussed the subject -with Hitler but without any degree of success, because with Hitler that -was impossible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, but you had been abroad for Hitler and -reported to him and he apparently had confidence in you, and I am asking -you if Hermann Göring ever reported to Hitler that you, from your -information, felt that it was a disaster to go into that war? - -MILCH: My trips were not made at Hitler’s order. They were made in -response to invitations from foreign governments to the Luftwaffe and at -the order of the Reich Marshal. It was only because I was aware of the -importance of these trips and because I incidentally heard political -statements—in spite of my reluctance at the time, since they did not -concern me as a soldier—that I thought it my duty to report personally -to Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Göring direct you to do that? - -MILCH: To go to Hitler? Yes, Göring told Hitler about it and Hitler -ordered me to report to him. I myself did not say, “I am now going to -see Hitler,” but I received an order to that effect from Hitler himself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he did not send you to Hitler until he knew -what you were going to report? - -MILCH: No, he himself had . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he did know? - -MILCH: He himself had no cognizance of the subject. He had no time to -receive me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring had no time to receive you? - -MILCH: No. Göring at that time had many other matters on hand and he did -not want to hear about these things. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he left that to Hitler, who was not busy, I take -it. Is that true? - -MILCH: Hitler was interested in the matter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you told us in interrogations that Göring -was not very industrious. Is that correct? - -MILCH: I should be very reluctant to answer that question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well, I withdraw it. It was not a kindly -question to begin with. When you found that Germany was going into a war -which you, an informed officer, considered a disaster, did you resign? - -MILCH: Resign? What from? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Resign your commission as an officer or take any -other steps to protest? - -MILCH: No, that was absolutely impossible. There was an order which -ruled it impossible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who gave that order? - -MILCH: Hitler himself. - -MR, JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you said you had experienced this yourself. - -MILCH: Not only in my own case. The order applied generally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said on Friday that you experienced it -yourself, that you could not resign. - -MILCH: No; one could not resign. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you try it at any time? - -MILCH: I frequently applied for my discharge in peacetime. My -resignation, however, was not accepted, the reason given being that I -had no right to ask for it, but that I would be told by higher -authorities when I had to go. During the war I never applied for my -discharge, because as a soldier in wartime I could not apply for it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not have some talk with Göring at one time -about retiring from your position, in which he not only forbade you to -leave, but also told you there would be no use in feigning ill health? - -MILCH: Yes. There was no possibility of giving this as the reason unless -one was really ill. When retiring from a high position it had been -customary in the past to plead ill health. Now this was no longer -possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he did suggest to you in that discussion one -way out, did he not? - -MILCH: No, he did not suggest a way out, but I did. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you suggest? What talk did you have about -suicide? Did Göring tell you that the only way you could get out was to -commit suicide? - -MILCH: That would have been the only possible way out. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did Göring tell you that? - -MILCH: No, I said that; not he. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he did not disagree with you, I take it. - -MILCH: No. He did not care if I did or not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have the regulations with you, which you -say were printed for the information of every soldier, about -international law and regulations. You have them with you this morning? - -MILCH: I have them with me; the regulations are contained in my service -book, the same as for every soldier. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You gave us a little information about that, but I -would like you to get that out and give us exactly the text of those -instructions or regulations, which you say reflect international law as -you understood it. - -MILCH: Do you want me to read it out now? The quotation . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not too fast. - -MILCH: No. - - “Ten Commandments for the Conduct of the German Soldier in War. - - “1. The German soldier fights chivalrously for the victory of - his people. Cruelty and needless destruction are unworthy of - him. - - “2. The fighter must wear a uniform, or else he must be provided - with insignia visible from a good distance. Fighting in civilian - clothes without such insignia is prohibited. - - “3. No enemy once he has surrendered shall be killed, not even a - partisan or a spy. The courts will administer the just - punishment. - - “4. Prisoners of war must not be maltreated or insulted. - Weapons, plans and notes are to be taken from them. Apart from - these, none of their possessions may be taken from them. - - “5. Dum-dum bullets are prohibited. Bullets may not be - transformed into dum-dum bullets. - - “6. The Red Cross is inviolable. Wounded enemies must be treated - humanely. Medical orderlies and chaplains must not be hindered - in the performance of their medical and spiritual functions. - - “7. The civilian population is inviolable. The soldier must not - plunder or wantonly destroy. Historical monuments and buildings - dedicated to religious service, art, science, or charity must be - treated with special care. Personal services and services in - kind shall only be required of the civilian population against - compensation, and if ordered by the superior officer. - - “8. Neutral territory must not be militarily involved by - trespassing, by planes flying over it, or by gunfire. - - “9. If a German soldier is captured, he must state his name and - rank when questioned. Under no circumstances may he say to what - unit he belongs, or speak about military, political, or economic - conditions on the German side, neither may he allow himself to - be induced to do so by threats or promises. - - “10. Any contravention of these orders while on active service - is punishable. Breaches by the enemy of the rules listed under 1 - to 8 are to be reported. Reprisals are permissible only by order - of the higher commanders.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now that, as you understand it, is the military law -conforming with international law, which was promulgated for the -governance of the troops in the field? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you understood, and it was generally understood -in the German Army, that that was international law, was it not? - -MILCH: Every soldier could not help knowing that these were the German -regulations because they were pasted on the first sheet of the pay book, -issued to every soldier, and which he had to carry on him. The common -soldier, of course, did not know that they represented international -law. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The higher commanders, like yourself did, didn’t -they? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That represented your understanding and -interpretation of your duties and obligations as honorable men in -combat? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you participate in the activities of -Hermann Göring in collecting the art treasures of France and other -occupied territories? - -MILCH: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you participate in the removal of the civilian -population for forced labor? - -MILCH: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that was done, do you not? - -MILCH: I did not know that the workers who came from foreign countries -had been deported; we were told that they had been recruited on a -voluntary basis. In the case of France, I know that up to a certain date -the French had wanted to come, but after that date they no longer wanted -to come, and that the French Government itself had issued directives to -deal with this. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Aside from that, then, you did not know anything -about involuntary or forced labor in Germany? Is that your testimony? - -MILCH: No. I only knew that . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Tell us what you did know about it and what you did -about it. - -MILCH: I knew that those people had been recruited and that they had -come voluntarily. I knew that many of them were very satisfied, but as -time went on and the German military situation deteriorated, discontent -began to set in among these foreign workers, although, according to the -information which reached my ears, only a small group was affected. I -would add that in a general way, we ascribed this ill feeling to the -fact that the food for these people was not everything they could wish; -consequently, sundry organizations, with Speer’s ministry at the head, -made efforts to improve their living conditions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have not yet answered my question. Did you know -that forced labor was being brought from occupied territories and -compelled to work in German industry? Did you know it? Answer that “yes” -or “no.” - -MILCH: I knew that only in the end Frenchmen were forced by their own -French Government to come. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that prisoners of war were forced to -work in the airplane industry, and were actually forced to man guns? Did -you know that? - -MILCH: I did hear about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you heard about it from your fellow officers, -did you not? - -MILCH: At the moment I cannot say from whom I heard it. I believe there -was a group which I think was called “Volunteers.” As far as I know it -was recruited on a voluntary basis from among those prisoners of war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you learn about—even if you did not -participate in it—the plan for the collection of art treasures from the -occupied countries? - -MILCH: No. I knew nothing of this plan as it then existed. I first heard -about it here in Nuremberg through some of the witnesses. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I want to ask you some questions about certain -exhibits; I refer to Document Number 343-PS, Exhibit USA-463. I will ask -to have that exhibit shown to you. - -[_Document 343-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -MILCH: These letters are signed by me and they are also written on my -stationery. They must have been drafted by the Medical Inspection -department. As I said a few days ago, I no longer remember the contents. -I should only like to say that the answers were drafted in such a way as -not to lead us, the Air Force, into any difficulties with Herr Himmler. -For instance, I never read the statements made by Dr. Rascher and Dr. -Romberg. They were read by the Medical Inspectorate. In this connection -I acted, so to speak, as postman between the SS and our Medical -Inspection department. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you testified, on interrogation, you had no -recollection of these letters; but on Friday you testified that you made -some alterations in one of them before it went out. Do you want to tell -us what that alteration was? - -MILCH: Yes, some of these letters were submitted to me during my -interrogation and it was then that I first remembered it. The changes -which I made were merely a matter of courtesy in style, in view of Herr -Himmler’s extreme susceptibility. I do not think that either of these -two letters contains the alteration; that, I believe, was in another -letter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was the other letter in which there was a -change, Number 1607? - -MILCH: I believe so, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in your examination, your interrogation, you -gave a reason why these were brought to you for signature instead of -being signed by the bureau chiefs. Do you remember what that reason was? - -MILCH: Yes. I had the impression that the Medical Inspector did not wish -to address his refusal to Himmler because he was afraid; whereas Himmler -had written to me because he always wrote only either to the Reich -Marshal or to me, as he was unacquainted with the organization of the -Luftwaffe in this particular sphere, for the Medical Inspector was not -subordinate to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I understand from your interrogation that you -gave as the reason why these letters were brought to you for signature, -that your office was in fear of Himmler and did not want to take the -responsibility of writing a letter to him, is that right? - -MILCH: Not my office, but I think the Medical Inspection department did -not wish to place themselves in an awkward position as concerns Himmler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you also said that the officials of -that department were afraid of the SS. - -MILCH: That is what I wished to express. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were they engaged in any illegal conduct or any -activity against the government? - -MILCH: I did not understand that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were those people who were afraid . . . - -MILCH: Who? The Medical Inspection department? No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were responsible officials doing their duty, -as far as you know, is that right? - -MILCH: Yes, Mr. Justice; but one must bear in mind the things which had -come to pass during the war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly what I want you to think about and -tell about. Why were these people, who were performing their duties in a -government office, afraid of Himmler or afraid of the SS? Explain that -situation to us. - -MILCH: Not afraid of the SS as such, but of the secret police. It was -not easy for any of us. We were all convinced that we were being -constantly watched, no matter how high our rank. There was probably not -a single person concerning whom a dossier was not kept, and many people -were subsequently brought to trial as a result of these records. The -ensuing difficulties did not affect only these people or other people or -me personally; they included everybody right up to the Reich Marshal, -who also was affected by them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you mean that from the Reich Marshal right down -to the humblest citizen, there was fear of Heinrich Himmler and his -organization? - -MILCH: Well, the degree of fear may have varied. It was perhaps not so -great among those in the highest and in the lowest positions. But things -were far more difficult in the intermediate grades, since it was quite -clear that the intermediate grades criticized everything that occurred -and these criticisms were not tolerated by the authorities at the top. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I take it, from your testimony, that the reputation -of the Gestapo was pretty well understood in Germany. - -MILCH: Particularly so in the later war years. I could not say how far -this feeling was justified, but at all events the feeling was there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I think you also testified that some high -military authorities did resign. I call your attention to your testimony -in your interrogation by us about Von Fritsch and Beck. They resigned, -didn’t they? - -MILCH: No, they did not resign. They were removed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were thrown out, is that it? - -MILCH: Yes. They were told they were no longer needed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood you to testify in your interrogation -that even the generals did not dare utter an opinion after those two -left. - -MILCH: No, I never put it like that. I cannot remember what I said. I -should be grateful if I could see the minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I have them. I will ask you if you were not -asked these questions and gave these answers: - - “Question: From your knowledge of discussions in army circles - among the Air Force and the General Staff people whom you knew, - could you form any opinion as to their attitude for the - beginning of war? Would they share your view?” - -The minutes show that you answered: - - “All officers agreed with me unanimously. All the higher - officers agreed with me. A long time ago, in 1937, I talked to - Field Marshal Von Blomberg about the danger of a war because of - the careless policy of our statesmen. At that time we feared - that England or France would not tolerate that policy in the - long run. On the 1st of November 1937, I had a long discussion - with Von Blomberg about this matter, and he was of the same - opinion.” - -MILCH: Yes, I remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is true? You were then asked this question: - - “Is it true that after General Fritsch and General Beck left - their offices, the positions in the Army were subordinated to - the political personalities?” - -MILCH: No, they had always been subordinate. The Army was always changed -in this respect. The head of the State was at the same time the Supreme -Commander. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At the time you were interrogated, your answer was -this: - - “Yes, because Hitler took over personally the Supreme Command of - the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. That was the position - that was held by Von Blomberg before. Blomberg was in a position - to resist Hitler, and he had done so very often, and Hitler - respected him and listened to his advice. Blomberg was the only - elderly soldier who was clever enough to reconcile military and - political questions. This resistance . . .” - -MILCH: Yes, that was my conviction. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Continuing._] “. . .This resistance could - not be kept up by the men around Hitler later on. They were too - weak for that. That is probably why he chose them.” - -Is that true? - -MILCH: That is my opinion. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Continuing._] “Question: Did the generals - with whom you associated not feel, even before 1939, that the - course of action which was being taken by Hitler would be likely - to result in a war? - - “Answer: Those who were able to think in foreign political - terms, yes; but they had to be very cautious about it, because - they could not utter any opinion; they dared not utter any - opinion.” - -Is that right? - -MILCH: Correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of what were the high generals in command of -the Army afraid, that they did not utter an opinion? - -MILCH: The generals would not have had a chance to report anything to -Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who would have done anything about it? There were -many generals and only one Hitler. Who was going to carry out any orders -against them? - -MILCH: It was just not possible. Hitler was so powerful that he just -turned down other people’s objections or else refused to listen to them -at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler had the SS, didn’t he, and Himmler and -Kaltenbrunner? - -MILCH: Yes, he had them as well. In addition he had the entire Wehrmacht -who had sworn an oath of allegiance to him. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you said in your interrogation that after -the 5th of March 1943, Hitler was no longer normal. Did you make that -statement? - -MILCH: I said that, in my opinion, the Hitler of the later years was not -the Hitler of the early period from 1933 until the outbreak of war, and -that after the campaign against France a change came over him. I formed -this opinion, which was a purely private one, because what he did -afterwards was diametrically opposed to what he had previously taught; -and that I could not consider normal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you want us to understand that Göring continued -to act as second man in the Reich and to take the orders from an -abnormal man from that period on? Is that your story? - -MILCH: The abnormality was not such that one could say, “this man is out -of his senses,” or, “this man is insane”; it would not have to reach -that stage. It often happens that abnormalities are such that they -escape both the public and the nearest associates. I believe that a -doctor would be better able to give information on that subject. I -talked to medical men about it at the time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was their opinion that he was abnormal? - -MILCH: That there was a possibility of abnormality was admitted by a -doctor whom I knew well, personally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: A doctor of repute in Germany? - -MILCH: No, he is not very well known. He never told anybody else. It -would not have been wise to do so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If he had, he would have been put in a -concentration camp, I suppose? - -MILCH: Or worse. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you had expressed your opinion that he was -abnormal, you probably would have been put there also, would you not? - -MILCH: I would have been shot immediately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON; So you never dared to tell your superior, Göring, -your opinion about Hitler? - -MILCH: I only once had an opportunity of stating my views about the war -to Hitler. That was the only time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You informed Göring of your opinion? - -MILCH: I talked to Göring. What I have just mentioned was a conversation -I had with Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not—I think you misunderstood me—you -do not mean that you informed Hitler that you considered him abnormal; I -am sure you do not mean that. - -MILCH: No, I did not tell Göring that either. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is what I said. You knew, did you not, that -Göring, who was your immediate superior, was issuing the anti-Jewish -decrees of the Reich Government? - -MILCH: No, I did not know that. As far as I know, they emanated from a -different office, from . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Didn’t you know that the decrees which excluded -Jews and half-Jews from holding posts were issued by Göring? - -MILCH: No, I did not know that. As far as I know, these regulations -emanated from the Ministry of the Interior, which also would have been -the proper department to deal with them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, did you not have to take -certain proceedings to avoid the effect of those decrees yourself? - -MILCH: No. I know what you mean. That was a question that had been -cleared long ago. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long before that was it cleared? - -MILCH: As far as I know, in 1933. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 1933, just after the Nazis came to power? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at that time Göring had you—we will have no -misunderstanding about this—Göring made you what you call a full Aryan; -was that it? - -MILCH: I do not think he made me one; I was one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he had it established, let us say? - -MILCH: He had helped me in clearing up this question, which was not -clear. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, your mother’s husband was a Jew; is that -correct? - -MILCH: It was not said so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had to demonstrate that none of your ancestry -was Jewish; is that correct? - -MILCH: Yes; everybody had to do that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in your case that involved your father, your -alleged father; is that correct? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you certainly were informed from the very -beginning of the attitude of the Nazi Party to Jews, were you not? - -MILCH: No, I was not informed. Everybody had to submit his papers, and -the certificate of one of my grandparents could not be found. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were never required to do that under the -Weimar Republic? - -MILCH: No, there was no such question at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that this whole question was raised by -the Nazi Party, of which you became a member in 1933; in other words at -about the time this happened. Is that right? - -MILCH: I had applied for membership earlier, before this question came -up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you apply for membership? - -MILCH: I do not know exactly—I think in March or April. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had to clear up this question before you -could become a member; wasn’t that the point? - -MILCH: That had been cleared up in the meantime. I cannot say exactly -when. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1933 you became aware of the concentration camp, -the first one? - -MILCH: Yes, I believe in 1933 there was a public announcement about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And later, as I understand you, you heard so many -rumors about concentration camps, that you thought the matter ought to -be investigated; that you ought to go there and see? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it that these rumors became so persistent -that you thought the matter should be investigated? - -MILCH: That must have been at the end of 1934 and in the spring of 1935, -because, if I remember correctly, I was in Dachau in the spring of 1935. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those rumors persisted throughout the entire -period until the collapse of Germany, didn’t they? - -MILCH: Those rumors which led me to ask to visit Dachau were really only -current in the circle of the higher officers, who passed them on to me. -I had little contact with other circles; I cannot say to what extent the -thing was generally discussed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, among the higher officers with whom you -associated, the rumor went about that these concentration camps were the -scene of atrocities as early as 1935. I understood you to say that; am I -correct? - -MILCH: No, not exactly. I said there . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now you tell us what it was that you went to -investigate. - -MILCH: I was quite unable to conduct any investigation; all I could do -was to see for myself—in order to dispel the many rumors—whether it -was true that many people were shut up there who should not have been -there at all, innocent people who were brought there for political -reasons only. At that time there was much talk about many members of the -so-called “Reaction” having been sent there. Some officers were very -concerned about this, and I told them that I would go and see for myself -to try to gain a personal insight. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not need to go to Dachau to find that out, -did you? You could have asked Göring; didn’t you know that? - -MILCH: To go where? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever ask Göring who were these people who -were sent there? - -MILCH: No. I did not talk to Göring about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not know that Göring publicly said that -political enemies of the regime were going to be sent there; that was -what they were founded for; did you know that? - -MILCH: I cannot say I ever heard that that had actually been said, but -that was what I surmised at the time, and I wanted to see for myself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found nobody there except criminals? - -MILCH: All that I was shown were people who had committed crimes or -rather serious offenses. The only political prisoners I saw were people -who had taken part in the Röhm Putsch. Whether there were others, I am -unable to say, because I cannot swear that I saw the entire camp. But we -saw all we asked to see. We said, “Now I would like to see this, or -that,” and the guide took us there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By whose authority did you get into the -concentration camp for an examination? - -MILCH; Himmler’s. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who asked Himmler if you could go? - -MILCH: I do not understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Göring know that you were making the trip? - -MILCH: I do not think so. I did not make a special trip. I had some -business in southern Germany in my military capacity, and I set aside -one morning for this purpose. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There were people in the concentration camp who had -to do with the Röhm Putsch, as you call it? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many were there who had to do with that? - -MILCH: I cannot say exactly. As far as I remember now, I should say that -altogether I saw about four or five hundred people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Four to five hundred people; and how many were -killed? - -MILCH: Well, I could not be too sure about this figure, there might -easily have been 700. I estimate it at around that figure. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were killed in the Röhm Putsch? - -MILCH: I can only give the figure which Hitler publicly stated in the -Reichstag; I cannot say from memory. I may be right if I said the number -ranged between 100 and 200. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now why were you so concerned about the -concentration camps? Did you have any official responsibility for them? - -MILCH: No, I had no responsibility whatsoever; but there was so much -talk about them at the time that I decided I would find out for myself. -I knew how many questions would be asked me, and I would not be able to -answer them, so I said I would go there and see for myself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Germany had ordinary prisons for criminal -prisoners, had she not? - -MILCH: Of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those prisons had sufficed for a good many -years to take care of the criminal population, had they not? - -MILCH: I could not say what their purpose was. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the concentration camp was something new that -came in after 1933? - -MILCH: Yes. It is true I never heard of anything like that in Germany -before. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you see any Jews in the concentration camp when -you inspected it? - -MILCH: Yes; there was one hut which contained Jews, but they all were -under heavy sentences for economic misdemeanors and crimes, such as -forging documents, and so on. We passed right through, and each one told -us, without even being asked, what his sentence was and the reason for -it, and not one of them told us that he was there for political reasons. -The only political prisoners were the SA men. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You could not find a single prisoner there who -claimed he was innocent of a crime? - -MILCH: No; everyone with whom we spoke related his case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who accompanied you on that trip? - -MILCH: As far as I remember, General Weber, who at that time was Chief -of the General Staff. I believe also General Udet and several other -gentlemen. But at the moment I do not remember who they were. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who showed you through the concentration camp? -Who guided you? - -MILCH: I cannot recollect his name. It was one of the officials of the -SD. I assume it was the commander of the camp himself, but I do not know -his name. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was running the concentration camp? What -organization was in charge of it? - -MILCH: I could not say, but I presume it was one of Himmler’s offices. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that the march into the Rhineland was -a great surprise to you? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where were you on your leave when this occurred? - -MILCH: I was on winter leave in the mountains, abroad. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Norway? - -MILCH: No, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In which country? - -MILCH: I was in the Alps; I believe it was Southern Tyrol, which, at -that time, was Italy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not hear of a meeting the minutes of which -are in evidence here as Exhibit GB-160 (Document Number EC-405), -concerning the Reich Defense Council meeting held on the 26th of June -1935, some nine months before the occupation of the Rhineland? - -MILCH: I cannot say whether I was present. I can no longer remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There were, according to the evidence, 24 members -of the Wehrmacht and five members of the Luftwaffe present, as well as -24 State and Party officials. Were you one of those present at that -conference at which this discussion took place? - -MILCH: May I ask again for the date? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The 26th of June 1935. - -MILCH: I cannot remember. I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever learn of that meeting? - -MILCH: At the moment I really cannot remember. What is supposed to have -been said at that meeting? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That the preparations for the occupation of the -Rhineland were to be kept secret, and the plan was made to invade the -Rhineland. Did you never learn of that meeting? - -MILCH: I cannot remember that. I do not think I was present. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Honors please, the usual time for -adjournment is here. I intend to take up a different subject involving -some documents. It might be a convenient time to adjourn. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you some questions regarding your -duties and activities on the Central Planning Board. You were a member -of the Central Planning Board, were you not? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was the period of your membership? - -MILCH: From the beginning—I believe that was in the year 1941 or -1942—until the end. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Members of that Board, in addition to yourself, -were the Defendant Speer? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Defendant Funk? - -MILCH: Yes, but only later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did he come on the Board? - -MILCH: At the moment when a large part of the civil production was -turned over to the Speer Ministry, the Ministry for Armament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Körner? Körner was a member of the Board? - -MILCH: Körner? Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Dr. Sauer? - -MILCH: Sauer was an official in the Speer Ministry, but he did not -belong to the Central Planning Board. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But he did keep some of the minutes, did he not? - -MILCH: No; I think he did not keep them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Sauckel frequently attended the meetings, did he -not? - -MILCH: Not frequently, but occasionally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the functions of the Central Planning -Board? - -MILCH: The distribution of raw materials to the various groups which -held quotas, such as the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and for civilian -requirements for various branches such as industry, mining, industrial -and private building, _et cetera_. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And labor? - -MILCH: Pardon me, labor? We did not have to distribute that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had nothing to do with labor? Do I understand -you correctly? - -MILCH: We could make suggestions, but not the distribution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean by that, not the distribution amongst -different industries which were competing to obtain labor? - -MILCH: That was a point which concerned Armaments more than the Central -Planning Board. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that Speer turned over to the United -States all of his personal papers and records, including the minutes of -this Central Planning Board? - -MILCH: I did not know that; I hear it now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that the minutes, volumes of minutes -which constitute U.S. Document R-124, offered in evidence as French -Exhibit Number RF-30, be made available for examination by the witness -in the original German; I shall ask you some questions about it. - -MILCH: Yes. - -[_Document R-124 was submitted to the witness._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you will point out to the witness Page 1059, -Line 22. - -This, Witness, purports to be the minutes of Conference Number 21 of the -Central Planning Board, held on the 30th of October 1942 at the Reich -Ministry of Armament and Munitions, and the minutes show you to have -been present. Do you recall being there at that meeting? - -MILCH: In that one sentence, I cannot see it, but I can well assume it. -Yes. I see here in the minutes that my name is frequently mentioned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention—Page 1059, Line 22−to -the following entry and ask you if this refreshes your recollection -about the functions of that Board: - - “Speer: The question of slackers is another point to be dealt - with. Ley has ascertained that the number of people reporting - sick decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth where there are - factory doctors and the workers are examined by them. SS and - Police could go ahead with the job and put those known as - slackers into undertakings run by concentration camps. There is - no other choice. Let it happen a few times, and the news will go - round.” - -Were you not concerned with the discussion of the labor situation in -that conference, and does that not refresh your recollection as to the -dealing with the labor question? - -MILCH: I do recall that the question of slackers as a whole was -discussed. It was rather a question of slackers, workers, people, who -while not normally employed in peacetime, as a result of the total -mobilization of manpower, were compelled to work during the war. Among -these people, who did not belong to the ranks of the workers, I repeat -that there were some slackers who upset the good spirit of the workers. -It was those people we had in mind. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Those were to be sent to concentration camps, as -you know? - -MILCH: Yes, I was told that. But no decision was arrived at. Moreover, -it was not for us to send anybody to a concentration camp. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was it not said that there was nothing to be -said against the SS taking them over? You knew that the SS was running -the concentration camps, did you not? - -MILCH: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, therefore, you knew that turning them over to -the SS and sending them to the concentration camps was a means of -forcing them to produce more goods, was it not? - -MILCH: Yes, of course, these people should be forced to do so. They were -Germans who refused to do their duty to their country. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did this apply only to Germans? - -MILCH: As far as I know this applied to Germans only. By slackers—they -were also called casual workers—was meant only those people who went -from place to place, who practically every week changed their job and -who were reported to us mainly by the representatives of our own -workers. Our own workers complained that these people availed themselves -of all privileges as to food, _et cetera_, while they did not do -anything, that they always gave up their jobs soon, and that every -establishment was glad to get rid of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And got rid of them by sending them to the -concentration camps under the SS? - -MILCH: They had to be taught, and we were told that if these people had -their additional—not their basic—rations made dependent on their -output, as was the case in the concentration camps, they would very -quickly learn. - -I do, however, remember that it was proposed to limit this treatment to -2 or 3 months, after which they would be brought back, and if they had -learned their lesson they would be given full freedom again. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you have anything to do on the Central -Planning Board with the work of prisoners of war? - -MILCH: No; I do not think so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I ask that you be shown the 22d conference of -the Central Planning Board minutes of the meeting held on the 2d of -November 1942, Page 1042, at Line 24, which quotes you. The English -translation is on Page 27. - -I ask you to refresh your recollection by reading this paragraph. - - “Milch: I think that agriculture must get its labor quota. - Assuming that we had given agriculture 100,000 more workers, we - would now have 100,000 more people who would be decently fed, - whereas, the human material we are now receiving, particularly - the prisoners of war, are not sufficiently fit for work.” - -Did you make that statement? - -MILCH: I cannot remember details. But I suppose I did. I do not know if -I have seen these minutes; but I know that we dealt with the question -that agriculture, if possible, should get its workers because the food -problem was so very important, and the farms could feed their people -over and above the rations which the civilian population received. This -proposal to put these people on the land was quite in accordance with my -views, but these were merely suggestions by the Central Planning Board. -I know Sauckel was present at that meeting. We also made suggestions to -the armament representatives as to how their problems could be solved. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you made recommendations to the Reich Marshal, -did you not? - -MILCH: I cannot remember having done so, I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never did? - -MILCH: I do not know, I cannot remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you knew the Reich Marshal’s wishes in -reference to the utilization of prisoners of war, did you not? - -MILCH: That prisoners of war were also working was known to me. -Especially on the land many prisoners of war were put to work. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attend a meeting between the Führer and -Minister Speer? - -MILCH: On which date? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The 5th of March 1944. - -MILCH: The 4th of March? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The 5th of March 1944. - -MILCH: On the 5th of March, yes, I attended a meeting with the Führer. -At that time there was a question of creating a “fighter” staff, that -is, a general effort by the entire armament industry to produce as many -fighter planes as possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now I will ask that you be shown Speer’s -memorandum of that meeting with the Führer at which General Bodenschatz -and Colonel Von Below were also present. Were they not? - -The English translation is on Page 35; the German on Page 139. - -I call your attention to this paragraph: - - “I told the Führer of the Reich Marshal’s wish to utilize the - producing capacity of prisoners of war further by placing the - Stalag under the SS, with the exception of the English and - Americans? The Führer approves this proposal and has asked - Colonel Von Below to take the necessary steps.” - -I ask you how the SS could increase the production of the prisoners of -war; what steps you expected to be taken? - -Now, just answer my question. What steps did you expect the SS to take -to increase the production of the prisoners of war? - -MILCH: I cannot remember now. At any rate at that time we did not know -what was being done by the SS—about their methods as we now know them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This was in March of 1944. - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have no knowledge of the methods by which -the SS would be able to speed up production by prisoners of war. That is -the way you want that to stand? - -MILCH: No, that is not the way I want it to stand. I have to think this -point over for a moment. I believe the point was whether or not -prisoners of war should be made available. It was not a question of -prisoners of war working for the SS, but of their being made available -for work. That, I take it was the point. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Put at the disposal of the SS, you mean? - -Well, let us go on to the 33d Conference by the Central Planning Board, -held on the 16th of February 1943, at which Speer and Sauckel among -others appear to have been present. The English translation is on Page -28; the German, Pages 2276 to 2307. There was at this meeting, to -summarize, considerable discussion of the labor situation, first a -report from Schreiber, and then Timm gave a general account of the labor -situation, and I call your attention to your contribution on Page 2298 -at the top. - -MILCH: Yes, I have just read it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is as follows: - - “Milch: We have demanded that in the anti-aircraft artillery a - certain percentage of personnel should consist of Russians. - Fifty thousand in all should be brought in. Thirty thousand are - already employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing, that - Russians must work the guns . . .” - -What was amusing about making the Russian prisoners of war work the -guns? - -MILCH: The words “We have demanded,” do not mean the Central Planning -Board, but that Hitler made this demand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We” means Hitler? - -MILCH: Yes, the German Government. And I myself find it strange that -prisoners of war should be made to shoot at planes of their allies. We -did not like it because it meant that these men could no longer work for -us. We were opposed to their being used in the anti-aircraft artillery. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said: “This is an amusing thing that the -Russians must work the guns.” - -What was amusing about it? - -MILCH: What is meant by amusing? . . . peculiar, strange, I cannot say, -however, whether this word was actually used. I have not seen the -minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to the rest of your -contribution. - - “. . . 20,000 are still needed. Yesterday I received a letter - from the Army High Command, stating: We cannot release any more - men, we have not enough ourselves. Thus there is no prospect for - us.” - -Whom does “for us” refer to, if not to your industry requirements? - -MILCH: I consider these minutes incorrect, it has never been discussed -in this manner, it must be wrong. I cannot accept the minutes as they -stand. To clarify this matter I may say that the proposal was to take -people out of the armament industry and put them into anti-aircraft -defense. We who were concerned with armament did not want to release -these men and were opposed to it. That was the idea of the whole thing, -and the OKH declared that they did not have enough people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand the sense of this to be that you -applied for certain workmen for the armament industry and that the Army -High Command refused to give you the men, saying that they are already -employed making guns and on other work. Now, is that the sense of that, -or is it not? - -MILCH: No, not quite. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, just tell me what the sense of it is. - -MILCH: As far as I remember, the armament industry was to release 50,000 -Russian prisoners of war to the Air Force for anti-aircraft defense, and -the armament industry could not spare these people. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adjourn due to some technical -difficulty. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, it may be convenient to you to know -that we are going to rise at 4:30 today. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I hope to have finished before. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I will ask to have your attention called to -Page 2297, in the English translation about Page 28, to your -contribution, which reads as follows: - - “Milch: There is of course a front also somewhere in the East. - This front will be held for a certain time. The only useful - thing the Russians will find in an area evacuated by us, is - people. The question is whether the people should not generally - be taken back as far as 100 kilometers behind the front line. - The whole civilian population goes 100 kilometers behind the - front.” - -Do you find that? - -MILCH: Yes, I have found it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I understood you this morning to state that it -was a rule promulgated in your book that the civilian population should -not be interfered with. - -MILCH: From the last paragraph, according to which people were no longer -to be employed on digging trenches, it appears that these people were -last employed on this work. I cannot say what kind of people these were, -only that they were already employed somewhere. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that. You knew that they were being -used for that kind of work? - -MILCH: So it says here. I do not remember it any more. It has been -recorded in the minutes, provided they are correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew they were being used, the civilian -population was being forced to dig trenches for your troops. - -MILCH: Today I cannot remember any more, but at that time it was -discussed according to the minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I will ask to have your attention called to -the minutes of Conference Number 11 of the Central Planning Board, held -on 22d of July 1942; German, Page 3062; English translation, 38. - -First let me call your attention to the fact that at that meeting it -appears that among those present were Speer, yourself, Körner. Did -Körner represent the Reich Marshal? - -MILCH: Yes, for the Four Year Plan; he was the representative for the -Four Year Plan. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all meetings of this Board, Körner represented -the Reich Marshal did he not? - -MILCH: Yes. He represented him as regards the Four Year Plan. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Sauckel was present, and representatives from -the Iron Association, the Coal Association, and the Ministry for -Armament and Munitions. - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was considerable discussion of the labor -problem, and the requirements of those industries. On Page 3062 I call -your attention to this entry: - - “General Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the - procuring of the Russian prisoners of war from the camps.” - -I ask you what measures you expected to take to accelerate procuring -prisoners of war from the camps. - -MILCH: As I was a soldier I undertook to submit this question to the -OKW, which was in charge of prisoners of war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not personally deal with the prisoners of -war, but you undertook to obtain them from the OKW? - -MILCH: The government had put these prisoners of war at our disposal for -work. The transfer was very slow, and as we had to deal with the OKW in -this matter, I was asked and I undertook to request the OKW to speed up -the transfer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us turn to Conference Number 36, dated 22d -of April 1943; the English translation, Page 13; German, 2125. There -again I call your attention to the fact that Speer, yourself, Sauckel, -and Körner were among those present. There again you discussed the labor -problem, did you not? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Körner reported as follows: - - “On 1 April agriculture was still in need of about 600,000 - workers. To cover this, labor from the East, mainly women, - should be brought in. This labor must be supplied before we take - other workers away from agriculture. We are now approaching a - very busy season in work on the land which requires many - workers,”—and considerably more, which I will not take the time - to quote. - -I call your attention to Page 2128, your contribution to that -discussion, which reads as follows: - - “If you do what I proposed and what has also been agreed to by - Timm, no harm can be done. It should definitely be done. - Moreover, I am also of the opinion that in any circumstances we - have to bring in workers for coal mining. The bulk of the labor - we are going to receive from the East, will be women. The women - from the East are, however, accustomed to agricultural work, - particularly to the kind of work which will have to be done - during the next few weeks, that is, hoeing and planting of root - crops, _et cetera_. We can use women quite well for this. Only - one thing has to be kept in mind—agriculture must get the women - before the men are taken away. It would be wrong to take men - away and to leave the farmers without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If - the women come after that, it will be too late.” - -I ask you how many women were transported to agriculture as a result of -this conference? - -MILCH: As a result of this conference none at all, as only suggestions -were put forward by us for an arrangement between industry and -agriculture to procure the necessary labor for the former. Without the -necessary labor in the coal-mining industry the war could not be carried -on. Therefore labor had to be found, and in this respect a suggestion -was made for an exchange, namely, to replace men engaged in agriculture -by women, who, of course, could not be put to work in the mines. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom did you make these suggestions? You say -they were not decisions but just suggestions. - -MILCH: No. The suggestions were made to representatives of the Ministry -of Labor or to the Office for the Allocation of Labor. I see Timm is -mentioned. He was one of the higher officials in this ministry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Sauckel? - -MILCH: I do not know whether Sauckel attended that conference. I see -only Timm’s name. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It appears from the minutes that he was there; but -whether he was or not, you made suggestions to Sauckel as to the needs -for labor, did you not, and called upon him to supply them? - -MILCH: Yes; it was necessary to get workers for coal mining. New workers -could not be found, thus there was no alternative but to make an -exchange. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We understand you. You will save a great deal of -our time if you will just answer the questions. - -Now I call your attention to Conference Number 54 of the Central -Planning Board, held on 1 March 1944; English translation Page 1, German -Page 1762. At this conference I remind you that it appears that Sauckel, -Milch, Schreiber, and Körner were among those present. It was held at -the Air Ministry and you discussed the desirability of draining off -young men from France so that they would not be available to act as -partisans in case there was an invasion by the Allies of French -territory. - -Do you recall such a meeting? - -MILCH: I cannot remember details. In the course of other interrogations -here in Nuremberg and in England I already stated that it is impossible -to remember in detail all these matters, which were heaped upon us, -especially as my memory has suffered through heavy blows on the head -received at the time of my capture. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will help you if you will refer to Page 1799, -opposite the name “Milch” and read the entry, as follows: - - “Milch: If landings take place in France and more or less - succeed, we will have in France a partisan uprising, such as we - never had in the Balkans or in the East, not because the people - are particularly able to carry it through, but because we allow - them to do so by failing to deal with them in the right manner. - Four entire age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 - and 23, that is, of an age when young people, for patriotic - reasons or because they have been stirred up, are prepared to do - anything to satisfy personal hatred—and it is only natural that - they do hate us. These young men should have been registered - according to age groups and brought to us, as they constitute - the greatest danger in the event of a landing. - - “I am firmly convinced, and have said so several times, that if - and when the invasion starts, acts of sabotage to railways, - works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence. The - Wehrmacht, however, will then no longer be able to deal with - this internal situation, as it will have to fight at the front - and will have in its rear a very dangerous enemy who will - threaten supplies, _et cetera_. If severe executive measures had - been taken, all would have been as quiet as the grave behind the - front at a time when things were about to happen. I have drawn - attention to this several times, but I am afraid nothing is - being done. When we have to start shooting these people, it will - already be too late. We shall no longer have the men to polish - off the partisans.” - -You then go on to state that you think the Army should handle the -executive action required in rounding up these people. Does that refresh -your recollection? - -MILCH: Yes, that was roughly what I meant to say, but I cannot say -whether I used these very words. In this life and death struggle of our -country we had to make sure that we were not suddenly stabbed in the -back by a secret army, as unfortunately happened later on. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you proposed to eliminate the population behind -the lines insofar as they might constitute a menace to your operations -in this invasion? - -MILCH: No, it was proposed to send these people at the right time to -work in Germany, as had been promised by the French Government. That was -my view. It was necessary that these people should come to work in -Germany, as the French Government had promised in its agreement with the -German Government, instead of allowing these people to join the Maquis -and commit sabotage, which would necessitate shootings as a -countermeasure. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not confine your use of forced labor to -your enemies; it was also applied against your own allies, was it not? -For example turn to Page 1814, and did you not contribute to this -discussion? - - “Milch: Would not the S-factories”—that is, protected - factories—“be better protected if we handle the whole problem - of feeding the Italians and tell them: ‘You will get your food - only if you work in S-factories or come to Germany.’” - -MILCH: That was after a part of Italy had broken away, and it applied to -Italian soldiers who had declared themselves against Mussolini. These -people remained behind the front, did not want to work, and committed -sabotage against the German Armed Forces. Thus it was proposed to say to -these people, “You will have your food and everything else provided, but -you will have to work somewhere, either in Italy in the iron ore mines, -or in Germany.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you said in your direct examination, or -perhaps earlier in your cross-examination, that you did not know about -any forced labor from occupied territory, you had no knowledge of that. -Is that still your statement? - -MILCH: I did not quite understand that. Forced labor? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Forced labor, yes. - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not know about it? - -MILCH: These people were prisoners of war, Italians, who were at our -disposal for work according to an agreement with the Italian Government -which we had recognized. Mussolini had expressly put these men at our -disposal for this purpose. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Excuse me for interrupting you, but let us not -bother with Mussolini here. I ask you whether you still stand by the -statement you made earlier, as I recall it, that you did not know of any -forced labor brought in from the occupied countries to Germany. Is that -your statement, or is it not? - -MILCH: Insofar as they were free workers and free people, I still -maintain this. My point is that these were people who had been placed at -our disposal, and, Mr. Justice, as far as we are concerned, at the time -this was said there was still an Italian Government, though this fact is -forgotten today; but at that time it still existed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask that your attention be brought to Page 1827 -of the minutes of this meeting at which you were present, and where the -discussion you just admitted took place; and I call your attention to -the line opposite the name “Sauckel,” from which it appears that Sauckel -then reported: “Out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in -Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” - -MILCH: No, I cannot remember that at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not have any recollection of that? All -right. - -MILCH: No, I have no recollection of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will go on then to Conference Number 23 of -the Central Planning Board, held the 3rd of November 1942. It is the -English translation, Page 27. The German text is on Page 1024, in which -it appears that you were present at and participated in the discussion, -and I call your attention to Page 1024, Line 10, to these entries of the -stenographic minutes: - - “Speer: Well, under the pretext of industry we could deceive the - French into believing that we would release all prisoners of war - who are rollers and smelters if they give us the names. - - “Rohland: We have installed our own office in Paris. I see, you - mean the French should give the names of the smelters who are - prisoners of war in Germany? - - “Milch: I would simply say, you get two men in exchange for one. - - “Speer: The French firms know exactly which prisoners of war are - smelters. Unofficially, you should create the impression that - they would be released. They give us the names and then we get - them out. Have a try. - - “Rohland: That is an idea.” - -Now, your contribution was to want two men in place of one; is that -right? - -MILCH: Yes; that is to say, two people from another trade for one of -these particular skilled workers. In what straits we were, you can see -from . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was your entire objective? - -MILCH: The entire purpose was to get these people and to give them -others in exchange. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us take up Conference Number 53 of the -Planning Board, held the 16th of February 1944; English translation, -Page 26, and the German from Page 1851 on. You will find yourself -included among those who were present and it was at the Reich Air -Ministry that it was held. I first call your attention to the entry on -Page 1863, the words opposite “Milch”: - - “The armament industry employs foreign workers in large numbers; - according to the latest figures, 40%. The latest allocations - from the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor are - mostly foreigners and we had to give up many German workers in - the recruitment drive. Particularly the aircraft industry, which - is a young industry, employs a great many young men who should - be called up. This will, however, be very difficult, as those - working for experimental stations cannot be touched. In mass - production, the foreign workers preponderate and in some - instances represent 95 percent and even more; 88 percent of the - workers engaged in the production of our newest engines are - Russian prisoners of war and the 12 percent are German men and - women. On the Ju-52, which are now regarded as transport planes - only, and the monthly production of which is from 50 to 60 - machines, only six to eight German workers are engaged; the rest - are Ukrainian women who have lowered the record of production of - skilled workers.” - -Do you recall that? - -MILCH: Yes, I can remember that distinctly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on Page 1873, you come forward with this -suggestion: - - “Milch: The list of slackers should be handed to Himmler. He - will make them work all right. This is of a great general - educational importance, and has also a deterrent effect on - others who would also like to shirk.” - -MILCH: Yes, this applies again to the slackers in agriculture as I -mentioned this morning. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among foreign workers, was it not? - -MILCH: No; these were Englishmen, the slackers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Englishmen are foreigners in Germany, are they not? -I do not know what you mean, they were not foreigners. They were -Englishmen. - -MILCH: Englishmen never worked for us. So they cannot have been -Englishmen. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they? You say they were all German. - -MILCH: What we understood as slackers were those people who were -compelled to work during the war, Germans who normally were not regular -workers, but were forcibly made to work during the war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that in a minute. First, I want to -ask you how Himmler was going to make them work. What did Himmler do, -what methods did Himmler use? Why were you making proposals to Himmler -in this matter? - -MILCH: Because Himmler at a meeting had stated that as regards -supplementary rations—the worker in Germany had the same basic rations -as the rest of the population, and apart from this he received quite -considerable additions which in the case of those doing the heaviest -work were several times the normal basic rations. The general routine -was that these rations were issued by food offices, irrespective of -where and how the individual was working. The suggestion was made by -Himmler that these additions should be made dependent upon the output of -the workers. This was possible in the case of those workers who came -from concentration camps, _et cetera_, and were under Himmler. This -procedure could not be applied to free workers; hence the proposal to -bring to reason those who sabotaged work in their own country, by -issuing additional rations, as laid down for their type of work, only in -proportion to their output. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know the difference between labor camps and -concentration camps, do you not? - -MILCH: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And these people who were doing work in these -industries were kept mainly in the work camps, were they not, in which -their rations were controlled without Himmler’s hands being in it at -all? - -MILCH: No; the German workers were not kept in labor camps but they -lived at home and, therefore, received their additional rations from the -local food offices. I want to stress again that it was the German -workers themselves who asked that measures be taken—the factory -foremen, who were infuriated to see that people who did not do anything, -who let their country down in times of stress, received more rations -than ordinary civilians. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You still say that all you are talking about were -German and never foreign workers. Now, be clear about that. - -MILCH: By slackers I meant German workers; in my opinion, only these -were in question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask that your attention be called to Page 1913: -This is your contribution at that point: - - “Milch: It is therefore quite impossible to utilize every - foreigner fully unless we make them do piecework and are in a - position to take measures against foreigners who are not doing - their bit.” - -Do you find that entry? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then you proceed to complain that: - - “If a foreman lays his hands on a prisoner of war and boxes his - ears, there is at once a terrible row; the man is put in prison, - and so on. There are many officials in Germany who consider it - their first duty to stand up for other men’s human rights - instead of looking after war production. I, too, am for human - rights, but if a Frenchman says, ‘You fellows will be hanged and - the works manager will be the first to have his head cut off’ - and then if the boss says, ‘I’ll give him one for that,’ then he - is in for it. Nobody sides with the manager, but only with the - ‘poor devil’ who said that to him.” - -Did you report that to the meeting? - -MILCH: That may well be the case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you suggest? - -MILCH: I can remember cases where foreign workers threatened and even -assaulted their German foreman, and when he defended himself action was -taken against him. I did not think it right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you provided your own remedy, did you not? In -the next line you say: - - “I told my engineers, ‘If you do not hit a man like this, then I - shall punish you. The more you do in this respect, the more I - shall think of you; I shall see to it that nothing happens to - you.’ This has not yet gone round. I cannot talk to every works - manager individually. But I should like to see some one try to - stop me, as I can deal with anyone who tries it.” - -Do you find that? - -MILCH: I cannot remember the exact words but I stick to the point that -it was an impossible situation for a prisoner or foreign worker to be -able to say to his German foreman, “We will cut your throat,” and the -foreman . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, do you mean to say that if a prisoner of war -attempted or threatened to cut his employer’s throat, that German -officers would stand up for him as against the employer? You do not mean -that, do you? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will go on: - - “If the small works manager”—I am still quoting from you—“does - that, he is put into a concentration camp . . .” - -Do you find that? - -MILCH: Yes, I see it here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: - - “. . . and runs the risk of having his prisoners of war taken - from him.” - -Now, I am still quoting you and I want you to find the entry. - - “In one case, two Russian officers took off with an airplane but - crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They - were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I wanted - them to be hanged in the factory for the others to see.” - -Do you find that? - -MILCH: I have found it, and I can only say I have never had anybody -hanged nor have I even given such an order. I could not possibly have -said such a thing. I had nothing to do with this question. Neither do I -know of any instance where two Russian officers tried to escape by -plane. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything else you would like to say with -reference to that entry? - -MILCH: No. I have nothing to say. I do not know anything about it and I -also do not believe I ever said it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all that I have at the present time. - -MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, I -have some questions on behalf of the British Delegation. My first point -is this: You said on Friday that, beginning in 1935, an air force was -built up in Germany for defensive purposes. Do you remember that? - -MILCH: Yes; 1935. - -MR. ROBERTS: And do you say that it remained on a defensive basis up to -December 1939? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: You do. I want you to listen to three pieces of -evidence—speeches made by your chief, the Defendant Göring. I am -quoting from the shorthand notes of the 8th of January, in the -afternoon, on Page 2306. In May 1935, Göring said: - - “I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should - strike, will burst upon the foe like an avenging host. The enemy - must feel that he has lost even before he has started fighting.” - -Does that sound like a defensive air force? - -MILCH: No, that does not sound like it; but one has to distinguish -between words and deeds. - -MR. ROBERTS: I shall come to the deeds in a moment. - -[_Laughter._] - -THE PRESIDENT: If there is any more of this laughter, the Court will -have to be cleared. - -MR. ROBERTS: On the 8th of July 1938 Göring, addressing a number of -German aircraft manufacturers, said: - - “War with Czechoslovakia is imminent; the German Air Force is - already superior to the English Air Force. If Germany wins the - war, she will be the greatest power in the world; she will - dominate the world markets, and Germany will be a rich nation. - To attain this goal risks must be taken.” - -Does that sound like a defensive German Air Force? Does it? - -MILCH: No, that certainly does not sound like it. I should like to be -allowed to say something to that, when you have finished. - -MR. ROBERTS: Please limit yourself, if you can, in the interest of time, -to answering my question, which is very short. Now may I read you one -further piece of evidence; the speech made by Göring on 14 October 1938, -that is less than a month after the Munich Pact. - - “Hitler has ordered me to organize a gigantic armament program, - which would make all previous achievements appear insignificant. - I have been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force - five times as large as the present one.” - -Does that sound like an air force for defensive purposes? - -MILCH: This air force would have taken many years to build. - -MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you that your evidence on that point was -grossly incorrect. I now want to come to my second point. You were -present at the conference of chiefs of the services in the Chancellery -on 23 May 1939? - -MILCH: What was the date please? - -MR. ROBERTS: I would like you to see the document, which is L-79. You -did see it on Friday, I think. - -MILCH: On 23 May, was it not? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right. I just want to remind you who else was -present. There were the Führer, Göring, Raeder, Von Brauchitsch, Keitel, -yourself, Halder, General Bodenschatz, Warlimont—was Warlimont the -deputy for Jodl? - -MILCH: I cannot say for whom he was there. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well—and others; I will not mention the names. Now, -Witness, those were leaders of the German Armed Forces? - -MILCH: May I say, as far as I can remember Field Marshal Göring was not -present. I cannot remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: He is down there as being present. You think he was not -there? - -MILCH: Yes. I cannot remember, but to my recollection I was sent there -at the last moment to represent him. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, apart from Göring, if he was not there, those -were mostly the leaders of the German forces, is that right? - -MILCH: Yes. It was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the OKW, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Would you describe them, from your knowledge of them, as -men of honor? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Is it one of the qualities of a man of honor that he keeps -his word? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: You knew, of course, did you not, that Germany had pledged -her word to respect the neutrality of Belgium, of the Netherlands, and -Luxembourg? - -MILCH: I suppose so, but I did not know the various agreements. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you not know that less than a month before that -meeting, namely on the 28th of April, Hitler in the Reichstag gave an -assurance of his respect for the neutrality of a large number of -countries, European countries, including the three I have mentioned? Did -you not know that as a matter of history? - -MILCH: I suppose so, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: We have seen the film, you know, in this Court, of that -very occurrence with the Defendant Göring presiding as President of the -Reichstag while that assurance was given. - -MILCH: I have not seen the film. I do not know the film. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It is a German newsreel. Do you remember that at that -conference Hitler said these words, which are well known to the -Tribunal: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by the Armed - Forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. . . . An - effort must be made to deal the enemy a heavy or decisive final - blow right at the start. Considerations of right or wrong, or - treaties, do not enter into the matter.” - -Do you remember those words being said? - -MILCH: I cannot remember exactly what the words were. I know that it was -a question of the Polish Corridor and Danzig, that in this connection -Hitler explained what complications might follow in the West, and what -he intended to do about it; but what he said in detail I can no longer -remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was any protest made by any of these honorable men at the -breach of Germany’s pledged word? - -MILCH: During this meeting it was impossible for anyone present to speak -at all. Hitler addressed us from his desk, and after the speech he left -the room. A discussion did not take place; he did not allow it. - -MR. ROBERTS: You say it is impossible for an honorable man to protect -his honor, Witness? - -MILCH: I cannot remember Hitler’s actual words shown here. - -MR. ROBERTS: Can you give the Tribunal your opinion of it? - -MILCH: At this meeting I did not have the impression that Hitler said -anything contrary to the obligations entered into. That I cannot -remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: Are you now saying that those minutes are wrong? - -MILCH: No, I cannot say that either. I can only say I have no -recollection of the exact words used. Whether the minutes are completely -correct I do not know either. As far as I know they were recorded -subsequently by one of the adjutants present. - -MR. ROBERTS: Because we know that is exactly what Germany did 12 months -after, when she broke her pledged word to Belgium, to the Netherlands, -and Luxembourg, and brought misery and death to millions. You know that -now, do you not? - -MILCH: That I know, yes; but as soldiers we had nothing to do with the -political side. We were not asked about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you call the honoring of . . . - -DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for the Defendant Schacht): I do not speak now -for the Defendant Schacht, but for the entire Defense. I ask the -Tribunal that the witness be questioned about facts, and not about his -opinion as to moral standards. - -THE PRESIDENT: He is being asked about facts. - -MR. ROBERTS: You have just said that you know now—we know, that 12 -months later Germany did violate the neutrality of Belgium, the -Netherlands, and Luxembourg. - -MILCH: But we do not know what the reasons were for this, and what other -obligations these countries might have entered into. It was not a job of -the soldiers to judge this. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was it not a job of the soldier to object if he was asked -to break his country’s word? - -MILCH: I fully agree with you, if a soldier breaks his word in matters -which are his province and where he has a say as a soldier. As regards -matters quite outside his province, which he cannot judge and about -which he knows nothing, he cannot be made responsible and called to -account. - -MR. ROBERTS: You can only speak for your own knowledge. Are you saying -that you did not know that your country was pledged to observe the -neutrality of these three small countries? - -MILCH: That I have read in the Reichstag speech. But I did not know how -the other side had reacted to that promise. It was not known to me, and -it could easily be that the other side did not at all want this -protection, or this promise, or this guarantee. The soldier could not -judge this at all; only the political authorities could know this. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, we perhaps will have to ask that of the soldiers in -the High Command, who are now in the dock, when they get in the witness -box. But I put it to you it must have been common knowledge in Germany -that Hitler was giving guarantees and assurances to all these smaller -countries? - -MILCH: Hitler proposed and offered many things. He offered limitations -of armaments for all countries; he offered not to use bombers; but in -these cases also his proposals were not accepted. Therefore the -political authorities alone could know what they should and could demand -from their soldiers. The only duty of a soldier is to obey. - -MR. ROBERTS: Will you please answer my question. That was not an answer -at all to my question. We know the facts now, Witness, from the -documents, from your own German documents. I want to test your knowledge -and your ideas of honor. Did you not think it grossly dishonorable to -give a pledge on 28 April, and to make secret resolution to break it on -23 May? - -MILCH: You are right, if the situation had not changed in any way, and -that I cannot judge. - -MR. ROBERTS: You must have your own code of honor, even though you are -in the service. You know, of course, that the neutrality of Norway was -violated? - -MILCH: Yes, according to our knowledge and in our opinion it was -violated twice. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on the 12th and 13th of March 1940 Jodl -was putting in his diary, “The Führer is still looking for a pretext” to -give out to the world for an invasion of Norway? Do you know that? - -MILCH: I do not know this diary and this entry. - -MR. ROBERTS: You took an active part in the invasion of Norway, did you -not? - -MILCH: A few days after the invasion started I was in command of the air -force up there for a short time. - -MR. ROBERTS: You had actually a command in Norway? - -MILCH: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I think it necessary to clear up a point which apparently -concerns a misunderstanding by the interpreter. I have just heard that a -diary entry by the Defendant Jodl has been wrongly translated back into -German. The German text says “nach einer Begründung,” that is “for a -justification.” I also believe the word “justification” is in the -English translation. It should not have been interpreted as “Ausrede,” -that would be “prétexte” in French and that is something quite -different. - -MR. ROBERTS: Whatever it reads in the translation, Witness, would you -agree that according to the entry in the diary, the Führer was still -looking for it, whether it was a reason or an excuse? - -Now I want to ask you only one more question on this side of the case. - -You know that Belgrade was bombed in, I think, April 1941? - -MILCH: I heard about that from the Army report at the time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Without any declaration of war, or any warning to the -civilian population at all, you heard that? - -MILCH: That I do not know, no. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you not discuss it with Göring? - -MILCH: The attack on Belgrade? No; I cannot remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did not even he express regret, shall we say, regarding the -large-scale bombing of a large capital without even one hour warning to -the civilian population? - -MILCH: I do not know. I cannot remember any such conversation. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is murder, is it not? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would rather not answer that question? - -MILCH: I cannot answer “yes” or “no,” because I know nothing of the -circumstances of the attack. I do not know whether war had been -declared; I do not know whether a warning had been given. Neither do I -know whether Belgrade was a fortress, nor which targets were attacked in -Belgrade. I know of so many bombing attacks about which the same -questions could be asked in the same manner. - -MR. ROBERTS: I asked the question, Witness, because we had the use of -the document in front of us, and knew that it was Hitler’s order that -Belgrade was to be suddenly destroyed by waves of bombers, without any -ultimatum, or any diplomatic arguments, or negotiations at all. Would I -put that question if I had not known of the document? Let me turn to -something else. - -MILCH: May I say I have heard of this document only today because you -quoted it. - -MR. ROBERTS: I want to put to you now an incident with regard to the -Camp Stalag Luft III at Sagan. Do you know about what I am talking? - -MILCH: Yes, I know about that now. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on 24 and 25 March 1944 about 80 air force -officers, British and Dominion, with some others, escaped from the -Stalag Luft III Camp? - -MILCH: I know about this from the British interrogation camp in which I -was kept, where the whole case was posted up on the wall. - -MR. ROBERTS: We will come to that in a moment. Do you know that of those -80, 50 were shot? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: In various parts of Germany and the occupied countries from -Danzig to Saarbrücken; you have heard of that? - -MILCH: I heard that about 50 were shot, but did not know where. - -MR. ROBERTS: Have you heard that quite unusually the bodies were never -seen again, but that urns said to contain their ashes were brought back -to the camp; you heard of that? - -MILCH: I heard of it in the camp where I was kept, from Mr. Anthony -Eden’s speech in the House of Commons. - -MR. ROBERTS: You heard that although these officers were reported by -your Government as having been shot while offering resistance or trying -to escape, yet not one was wounded, and all 50 were shot dead. - -MILCH: At first I heard only the official report in Germany, that these -officers had been shot while resisting or trying to escape. We did not -believe this version, and there was a lot of discussion about this -without precise knowledge. We were afraid that these men might have been -murdered. - -MR. ROBERTS: You were afraid that murder had been committed. It does -appear likely, does it not? - -MILCH: We got that impression, as the various details we heard could not -be pieced together. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is quite clear that if that was murder, the order for -that murder would have to come from a high level, is it not? - -MILCH: Certainly. I heard further details about this from the Inspector -General for Prisoners of War, General Westhoff, while both of us were in -captivity in England. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to ask you, first of all, about the -Prisoner-of-War Organization. Was the Prisoner-of-War Organization a -department of the OKW? - -MILCH: In my opinion, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Which was called KGW, Kriegsgefangenenwesen? - -MILCH: I cannot say anything about its organization, because I do not -know. I only knew that there was a chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen -with the OKW. - -MR. ROBERTS: And was the chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen at that time -Major General Von Graevenitz? - -MILCH: Von Graevenitz, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: This was an air force camp? Stalag Luft III was an air -force camp? - -MILCH: Yes. So it was called, but I understand that all prisoners were -under the OKW. That is what I thought. I cannot, however, state this -definitely because I did not know much about that organization. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was the directorate for supervising the air force camps, or -the inspectorate, rather, called Inspectorate Number 17? - -MILCH: There was an inspectorate, which as its name indicated had to -deal with supervision. What it had to do and what were its tasks, I -cannot say. Whether it was just for interrogation, I do not know. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was the head of that Major General Grosch? - -MILCH: I cannot say, it is possible, I know the name but not whether he -held that post. - -MR. ROBERTS: And the second in command, Colonel Waelde? - -MILCH: Not known to me. - -MR. ROBERTS: You were Number 2 in the Air Force at the Air Ministry in -March 1944, were you not? - -MILCH: There were several Number 2 people at that time. I held the same -rank as the chief of the general staff, the chief of the personnel -office, and the chief of technical armament, who were independent of me -and on the same level. As to seniority, I ranked as second officer in -the Air Force. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was there a conference in Berlin on the morning of -Saturday, the 25th of March, about this escape? - -MILCH: I cannot remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did not Göring speak to you about that conference? - -MILCH: I have no recollection. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring never tell you that there was a conference -between Hitler, Himmler, himself, and Keitel on that Saturday morning? - -MILCH: No. I do not know anything about that. I do not remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: At which the order for the murder of these recaptured -prisoners of war was given? - -MILCH: I cannot remember. According to what I heard later, the -circumstances were entirely different. I had information about this from -the previously mentioned General Westhoff and also from General -Bodenschatz. - -MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff we are going to see here as a witness. He -has made a statement about the matter saying . . . - -MILCH: I beg your pardon. I could not hear you just now. The German is -coming through very faintly. I can hear you, but not the German -transmission. - -MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff . . . - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: . . . has made a statement . . . - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: . . . and we are going to see him as a witness. - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: So perhaps I had better not put his statement to you, -because he is going to give evidence. Perhaps that would be fairer from -the point of view of the Defense. But are you suggesting that action -against these officers, if they were murdered—to use your words—having -escaped from an air force camp, that action could have been taken -without the knowledge of Göring? - -MILCH: I consider it quite possible in view of the great confusion -existing in the highest circles at that time. - -MR. ROBERTS: High confusion in March 1944? - -MILCH: All through there was terrible confusion. - -MR. ROBERTS: But it is quite clear . . . - -MILCH: Hitler interfered in all matters, and himself gave orders over -the heads of the chiefs of the Wehrmacht. - -MR. ROBERTS: But did you never discuss this matter with Göring at all? - -MILCH: No. I cannot remember ever speaking to Göring about this -question. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you not think this is a matter which reflects shame on -the Armed Forces of Germany? - -MILCH: Yes; that is a great shame. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yet Göring never spoke to you about it at all? Did you ever -speak to Keitel? - -MILCH: I could not say. During that time I hardly ever saw Göring. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you ever speak to Keitel about it? - -MILCH: No, never. I saw even less of Keitel than of Göring. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was there not a General Foster or Foerster at the Air -Ministry? - -MILCH: Yes, there was. - -MR. ROBERTS: General Foerster? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was he director of operations? - -MILCH: No. He was chief of the Luftwehr. As such he had to deal with -replacements of personnel and he worked with the departments concerned, -with the General Staff, and also the Reich Marshal. During the war he -was also in charge of civil aviation, and in that capacity he worked -together with me, but during the war it was a very small job . . . - -MR. ROBERTS: I was going to ask you, did he ever mention this shooting -to you? - -MILCH: I have been asked that before, but try as I may I cannot -remember. It is possible that in the course of conversation he may have -told me that officers had been shot, but whether he did so, and in what -way, under what circumstances, I cannot recollect. I did not receive an -official report from him; I had no right to ask for one either. - -MR. ROBERTS: If Foerster told you, did you ever report it to Göring? - -MILCH: I cannot remember a conversation with Foerster about it: I do not -think I spoke to him. He did not give me a report either, which I should -have had to pass on to Göring. Such a report would have been given by -him to Göring direct, through quite different channels and much quicker. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you take any steps to prevent this shooting from being -carried out? - -MILCH: When I first heard about it it was not clear to me what had -actually happened. But even if it had been clear, it was evident from -what Westhoff told me that it would unfortunately have been too late. - -MR. ROBERTS: Why too late? - -MILCH: Because Westhoff was the first officer to have knowledge of it. -When he was informed he was told that the order had already been carried -out. I may say that General Westhoff made this statement and will -confirm it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well, you never went to Göring at all in the matter, -as you say. - -MILCH: I do not know anything about it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I am going to deal further with three short points. -With regard to the use of labor for the armament industry, Mr. Justice -Jackson has asked you questions on that. Was labor from concentration -camps used? - -MILCH: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Would you just look at Document Number 1584-PS: That is -shorthand note 1357, 12 December, in the afternoon. - -Is that a teletype from Göring to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944? There -are various code numbers; then, to Reichsführer SS—that was Himmler, -Reichsminister Himmler. Who actually sent that teletype? It is signed by -Göring, but he would not be dealing with questions of labor, would he? - -MILCH: I could not say, I could not say from whom it originated. - -MR. ROBERTS: That was a subject with which you dealt, was it not, the -provision of labor for air armament? - -MILCH: Only while I had to do with air armament did I send demands for -labor to the respective offices. But this telegram did not come from my -office. - -MR. ROBERTS: If it did not come from your office, whose office did it -come from? - -MILCH: It deals with various matters, there is first the question of -another squadron. - -MR. ROBERTS: Please answer the question, whose office did it come from? - -MILCH: I cannot say that offhand. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well. - -MILCH: I do not know. - -MR. ROBERTS: Second sentence: “At the same time I request that a -substantial number of concentration camp prisoners be put at my disposal -for air armament, as this kind of labor has proved to be very useful.” -You had frequently used concentration camp labor, had you? - -MILCH: Latterly, yes. May I ask, is the teletype dated the 15th and what -is the month? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I told you, Witness, 14 February 1944. It is on the -top. - -MILCH: Yes, I could not read it here. - -MR. ROBERTS: No, I quite understand. And did Himmler respond by -providing you with 90,000 further concentration camp prisoners? I refer -to Document 1584-PS, Number 3, dated 9 March 1944. It is to the “Most -Honored Reich Marshal” from Heinrich Himmler. It says: “At present -approximately 36,000 prisoners are employed for the Air Force. It is -proposed to bring the number up to 90,000.” - -Then he refers in the last paragraph: “The transfer of aircraft -manufacturing plants underground requires a further 100,000 prisoners.” - -Now, those were concentration camp internees, Witness? - -MILCH: Yes; I see that from the letter. - -MR. ROBERTS: You said you were almost ignorant of the conditions in -concentration camps? - -MILCH: No; I do not know anything about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: You have not seen the films taken when the camps were -captured? - -MILCH: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: The grim contrast—just wait a moment—the grim contrast -between the plump and well-fed guards and civilians and the skeletons of -the internees? - -MILCH: I have not seen the film, but I saw photographs when I was in -England. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you close your eyes deliberately to what was going on -in Germany? - -MILCH: No, it was not possible for us to see it. - -MR. ROBERTS: You, in your position, could not know what was going on? - -MILCH: It was absolutely impossible. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I just want to deal very shortly with a matter -upon which Mr. Justice Jackson touched, but he did not read the letter. -That is the question of the experiments for the purpose of Air Force -research. I am anxious to refer to as few documents as possible, but I -can give the reference. - -Do you know that on 15 May 1941, and the reference is shorthand note -1848, Document Number 1602-PS, that Dr. Rascher wrote to Himmler? - -MILCH: I did not know him. I think I mentioned that during my -interrogation. - -MR. ROBERTS: He had very dangerous experiments to make for which no -human being would volunteer. Monkeys were not suitable, so he asked for -human subjects which Himmler at once provided—said he would be glad to -provide human subjects for the experiment. Now, that was in 1941. Did -you know that was taking place? - -MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, Rascher was . . . - -MILCH: I did not know Rascher personally. - -MR. ROBERTS: He was a doctor on the staff of the Air Force. - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Mr. Roberts, this is not a letter to this witness, -is it? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am leading up to it. The next letter is a letter -signed by this witness. That was preliminary. Perhaps I had better come -to the letter which he signed now; I am much obliged. - -I want to put to you now Document Number 343-PS, and I also want to put -to you, if the officer in charge of the documents would be so good, I -want to put to you Document Number 607-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has already been cross-examined upon this -letter, has he not? - -MR. ROBERTS: I did not think the letter was read or was dealt with -sufficiently. I believe Your Lordship thinks it was. - -THE PRESIDENT: The letter was put to him. I do not know whether it was -actually read. - -MR. ROBERTS: I shall be guided by the Court entirely. I know the matter -was touched upon. I felt perhaps the letter should be read but I may be -quite wrong. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told it was not read but the two letters were put to -him. - -MR. ROBERTS: I agree. If Your Lordship would be good enough to bear with -me for a very few minutes I can perhaps deal with the matters I think -should be dealt with. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You will see that on the 20th of May -1942—this is your letter to “Wolffy,” is it not, that is -Obergruppenführer Wolff, and that is signed by you is it not? - -MILCH: Yes, I signed it. That is the letter which, as I said this -morning was submitted to me by the Medical Inspection department and -from which it appears that we wanted to dissociate ourselves from the -whole business as politely as possible. - -MR. ROBERTS: The point of the letter is, if I may summarize it, that you -say: “In reference to your telegram of 12 May our Medical Inspection -department . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, if I remember right, when these letters were -put to the witness he said he had not read them; that he signed them -without reading them. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord, perhaps I had better leave the matter if -Your Lordship thinks I am going over ground which has been trodden too -often. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Are you asking this Tribunal to believe that -you signed these two letters to Wolff, who was liaison officer, was he -not, between—who was Wolff? - -MILCH: No, Wolff was not liaison officer, he was Himmler’s adjutant. He -sent a telegram to us, apparently for the attention of the Medical -Inspection department. The Medical Inspection department replied via my -office because for some reason or other it did not appear expedient to -reply direct. I stated in my interrogations that these letters, though -signed by me, were not dictated in my office, but that for this reply -from the Medical Inspection department my stationery was used as was -customary. I had nothing to do either with our high altitude experiments -or with the Medical Inspection department, nor was I in any way -connected with experiments by the SS. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you know that these pressure chamber experiments were -being carried out with human bodies, human souls, provided by Dachau? - -MILCH: On whom they were made appears from the letter submitted to me by -the Medical Inspection department. In the Air Force we made many -experiments with our own medical officers who volunteered for it; and as -we did it with our own people we considered it to be our own affair. We, -therefore, did not want any experiments by the SS; we were not -interested in them. We had for a very long time experimented with our -own people. We did not need the SS, who interfered in a matter which did -not concern them; and we could never understand why the SS meddled with -this matter. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did not Himmler write you a letter—the reference is -shorthand note 1852—in November 1942, that is Document Number 1617-PS, -in which he says: “Dear Milch: . . . both high pressure and cold water -experiments have been carried out. . . .” and that he, Himmler, provided -asocial persons and criminals from concentration camps? Do you remember -that letter? - -MILCH: This letter was shown to me but I cannot remember this letter -either. I do not know why Himmler wrote to me at all. These letters were -always passed on direct by my office, without my seeing them, to the -respective offices of the Medical Inspection department and replied to -via my office. I was not in a position to do anything in this respect -because I did not know what it was all about, nor had I any idea of the -medical aspect. - -MR. ROBERTS: If you say you know nothing about letters which you signed -I cannot carry the matter any further. - -Now I want to deal with the last point. - -MILCH: During the course of the day I had to sign several hundred -letters and I could not know what they dealt with in detail. In this -particular case it was a question for a specialist and I merely signed -in order to relieve the Medical Inspector of responsibility who, for the -reason mentioned this morning, did not want to sign himself. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I am leaving that point. - -Now then, the last point. You said on Friday that a German general has -been executed for looting jewelry. Where did the looting take place? - -MILCH: I cannot say that. I seem to recollect that it was in Belgrade. -The name of the general is General Wafer, this I still remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: It was jewelry looted from Belgrade? - -MILCH: That I cannot say. I know only what I said on Friday. - -MR. ROBERTS: So the German authorities regarded the death penalty as a -suitable one for looting; apparently that is right. - -MILCH: I could not hear the question. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, perhaps it was a comment. I will ask you the next -question. What was the value of the jewelry which was looted? - -MILCH: I can say only that I do not know how it was stolen, or what was -stolen, or how valuable it was; but only that it was said to be jewelry -which he had appropriated and that he was sentenced to death. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring ever speak to you about his art collection he -was getting from occupied countries? - -MILCH: I do not know anything about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: May I read you a piece of evidence, shorthand note 2317, -and it is an order of Göring signed on the 5th of November 1940. - - “Göring to the Chief of the Military Administration in Paris and - to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg: - - “To dispose of the art objects brought to the Louvre in the - following order of priority: - - “First, those art objects . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has never seen this document and he says -he knows nothing about it. - -MR. ROBERTS: If your Lordship pleases, if you do not think I should put -it to him . . . - -[_Turning to the witness._] You say Göring never discussed with you his -art collection? - -MILCH: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you not know that valuable art objects, according to an -inventory over 21,000 objects, were taken from the western occupied -countries? - -MILCH: No; that is not known to me. - -MR. ROBERTS: What ought the general who looted the jewelry, perhaps from -Belgrade, to have done with it? Given it to the Führer, or given it to -Göring? - -MILCH: I ask to be excused from answering this question. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell me when you heard of Hitler’s plan to -go to war with the Soviet Union? In January 1941? - -MILCH: As I said on Friday, I heard in January from Reich Marshal Göring -that Hitler had told him he expected there would be an attack on Russia. -Then for several months I heard nothing more about the whole thing, -until by chance I found out from a subordinate that war with Russia was -imminent and preparations for the clothing of the troops were being -made. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about Case Barbarossa? - -MILCH: I had heard the name, and I heard the plan expounded at a Führer -conference with the commanders of the various army groups and armies 1 -or 2 days before the attack. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And when did this take place—1, 2 days before the -invasion? - -MILCH: I will let you know the exact date in a minute. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Please do. - -MILCH: On 14 June. That is about eight days before the attack which took -place on the 22d. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And before that, you had neither heard of, nor seen this -plan? - -MILCH: I say that I had probably heard the name Barbarossa before. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And how long before? - -MILCH: That I cannot say, because during the months of January, -February, March, and also in April I was outside Germany and I did not -return until May. I was in Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the West. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am interested in the period when you were in the High -Command of the German Air Force. Were you in Germany in December and -January? - -MILCH: In December 1940. - -GEN. RUDENKO: So? - -MILCH: Only part of December as during that month I was in France and -also in Italy. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And where were you in January 1941? - -MILCH: I was in the West, and as far as I remember not one day in -Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you just told us that in January 1941 you had a talk -with Göring about the plan of war against the Soviet Union. - -MILCH: Yes, I . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: In January 1941? - -MILCH: Yes, on 13 January, but I cannot say now whether I spoke to -Göring in France, or whether it was over the telephone, or whether I was -in Germany for a day or two. That I cannot say, I did not make a note of -it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me; what has a telephone conversation to do with an -attack on the Soviet Union? - -MILCH: Not an attack on Russia, but an attack by Russia on Germany was -mentioned at that time, and we had . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say you discussed over the telephone the -question of an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany? - -MILCH: No, I have not stated anything like that, but I said I do not -know whether I received the information on a special line which could -not be tapped, or whether the Reich Marshal told me about it in France, -or whether on that particular day I was in Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you discuss this question with Göring, and -when did Göring express his apprehension as to this war against the -Soviet Union? - -MILCH: That was on 22 May. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The 22nd of May 1941? - -MILCH: 1941, yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And where was this question discussed? - -MILCH: In Veldenstein near Nuremberg. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did you discuss this question with Göring alone, or was -anybody else present at this conversation? - -MILCH: At that time only with Göring. We were alone. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And you assert that Göring did not wish to go to war with -Russia? - -MILCH: That was my impression. - -GEN. RUDENKO: So. And why did Göring not want this war against the -Soviet Union? This was a defensive war, was it not? - -MILCH: Göring was opposed to such a war, because he wanted, all of us -did . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: He was opposed also to a defensive war? - -MILCH: He personally was against any war. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is strange. Maybe you will be able to give me precise -reasons why Göring did not wish war against the Soviet Union. - -MILCH: Because a war on two fronts, especially a war against Russia, as -I saw it, meant losing the war; and I believe that many fighting men and -others thought as I did. - -GEN. RUDENKO: So you too were opposed to a war against the Soviet Union? - -MILCH: Yes, most definitely so. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Strange. Your statements are not very consistent. On the -one hand, you say that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany, and -on the other hand that German officers did not want a war with the -Soviet Union. - -MILCH: May I explain again. On 13 January Göring told me that Hitler had -the impression that Russia intended to march against Germany. That was -not Göring’s opinion, neither was it mine. I assume it was Hitler’s -opinion which he had expressed as his own. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me. Do I understand that neither you nor Göring -thought this opinion of Hitler’s to be correct? - -MILCH: I can only speak for myself. I often expressed it as my view that -Russia would not go against us. What Göring thought about it I could not -say. He did not talk to me about it. You should ask him. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and now I shall ask you. You mean to say that you -personally did not share Hitler’s opinion? And you mean that Göring, -too, did not want a war against the Soviet Union? - -MILCH: On 22 May, when I spoke to Göring about this matter and urgently -requested him to do everything to prevent a war with Russia, he told me -that he had used the same arguments with Hitler but that it was -impossible to get Hitler to change his mind; he had made his decision -and no power on earth could influence him. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I see. You mean that Göring was opposed to a war with the -Soviet Union, because he thought it impracticable while you were at war -with England, and he wanted to prevent war on two fronts? - -MILCH: From a purely military point of view, yes; and I believe that if -war had been avoided at that time it would not have come about later. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And you seriously maintain that it is possible to talk -about a preventive war so far ahead, and at the same time to work out -Case Barbarossa and all the directives to implement it, as well as -gaining allies for the attack on Russia? Do you seriously believe in the -preventive character of such a war? - -MILCH: I do not understand the meaning of the question. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you think one could make known that the Soviet Union -was going to attack Germany, and at the same time work out an aggressive -plan against the Soviet Union, and this as early as December 1940, as -appears from the dates of the official documents? - -MILCH: As I understand it, Hitler, expecting an attack by Russia—if he -really expected it—said that he had to meet a Russian invasion by a -preventive war. This, however, has nothing to do with the opinion for -which I have been asked here. Speaking for myself, I did not -unreservedly hold the view that Russia would invade us. Without being -able to judge the situation as a whole, I personally believed that -Russia in her own interest, which I tried to visualize, would not do -this. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. I should like to put a few questions to you -with regard to the prisoners of war. The employment of prisoners of war, -especially from the Soviet Union, on work in the aircraft industry has -already been mentioned here. - -MILCH: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What is your attitude to employing prisoners of war on -work against their own country? What do you think of that? - -MILCH: It is, of course, not a nice thing to do; but as far as I know it -was also done to our prisoners of war by all the other countries. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am talking of Germany now. You say it is not a nice -thing. Is not that a rather mild way of putting it? - -MILCH: It depends upon what the others do. All laws of warfare are based -on reciprocity, as long as there is any reciprocity. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to answer my question. What was the -German High Command’s attitude to this kind of employment? Do you -consider that by this employment the regulations of international law -were being violated? - -MILCH: That is a moot point which even now is not clear to me. I only -know that orders were given to employ them, and to use these men, as -well as women, in the struggle for our existence. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider this to be a legitimate order? - -MILCH: I cannot judge that; that depends upon conditions and, as I said, -upon reciprocity. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I ask to have this question and answer -stricken from the record. The witness has been asked to give a legal -opinion, and it is not for him to do so; since the question is not -admissible, the answer too should be stricken. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko? - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to say I did not realize that the witness -did not know whether or not this was a violation of international law. I -had every reason to believe that the witness was competent to answer -this question, the more so as at the beginning of his statement today, -and on Friday, he mentioned the ten rules of the soldier, which he said -must not be broken as they were based on international law. I thought, -therefore, the witness to be competent to answer the question concerning -the use of prisoners of war by the Luftwaffe against their own country. -If the Tribunal considers this question to be inadmissible, I will of -course withdraw it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The question might have been framed differently, as to -whether it was not a breach of the rules set out in the soldiers’ pay -book. However, as to international law, that is one of the matters which -the Tribunal has got to decide, and upon that, of course, we do not wish -the evidence of witnesses. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. I still have two questions to put to this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to rise at half-past 4. If it is your intention -to ask some more questions, perhaps we had better rise now, or, have you -finished? - -GEN. RUDENKO: We had better call a recess now, because I may still have -a few questions to put to this witness. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SEVENTY-NINTH DAY - Tuesday, 12 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, have you concluded your interrogation? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions? - -Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to examine further? - -DR. STAHMER: No, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. STAHMER: I call the next witness, Colonel of the Luftwaffe, Bernd -von Brauchitsch. - -[_The witness Von Brauchitsch took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -BERND VON BRAUCHITSCH (Witness): Bernd von Brauchitsch. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me. I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, what position did you hold on the staff of the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was the first military adjutant of the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. I held the rank of chief adjutant. -I had the job of making the daily arrangements as ordered by the -Commander-in-Chief and working out the adjutants’ duty roster. The -military position had to be reported daily; military reports and -messages only to the extent that they were not communicated by the -offices themselves. I had no command function. - -DR. STAHMER: In the course of your work did you know that on 25 March -1944 from the prison camp of Sagan, Stalag Luft III, 75 English Air -Force officers had escaped? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I knew of this as a special event, as at that time it -was reported that a number of air force officers had escaped. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you give us some information about the fate of these -officers after their escape? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The fate of these officers is not known to me. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you not ever informed that 50 of these officers were -shot ostensibly while trying to escape? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I heard only much later that a number of these officers -were said to have been shot. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us under what circumstances these shootings -were carried out? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know anything about that. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Reich Marshal Göring order the shooting, or did he have -any part in these measures? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know nothing about the Reich Marshal having taken -part or given an order in this matter. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know of the attitude of Hitler with regard to the -treatment of so-called terror-fliers who were shot down? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the spring of 1944 the number of civilian air-raid -casualties by machine-gunning increased suddenly. These attacks were -directed against civilians working in the fields; against secondary -railroads and stations without any military importance; against -pedestrians and cyclists, all within the homeland. This must have been -the reason for Hitler giving not only defense orders, but also orders -for measures against the fliers themselves. As far as I know, Hitler -favored the most drastic measures. Lynching was said to be countenanced. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the Reich Marshal of the Luftwaffe -to this order? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General -Staff expressed their opinion that a most serious view must be taken of -these attacks, which were directed solely against civilians. -Notwithstanding, no special measure should be taken against these -airmen. The suggestion that those who bailed out should be lynched and -not afforded protection could not be agreed with. In view of Hitler’s -instructions, the Luftwaffe was forced to deal with these questions. -They endeavored to prevent these ideas of Hitler, of which they -disapproved, from being put into practice. The solution was to pretend -that measures would be taken which, however, were not actually carried -out. - -Then I was given the task, which was outside my competence, of -conferring with the High Command of the Armed Forces about the -definition of the term “terror-fliers.” All those cases which -constituted violations of international law and criminal acts were the -subject of subsequent discussions and correspondence. These definitions -were meant to prevent lynching. The lengthy correspondence also shows -the endeavors of the office to put the matter off. At the end of June -1944, the term “terror-fliers” was defined. The Stalag was instructed to -report all cases of violation, but not to take any action. Thus we -avoided giving an order of the character Hitler had wanted. - -DR. STAHMER; In your opinion, therefore, could we say that the measures -directed by Hitler were not carried out by the Luftwaffe? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. It can be said that the measures directed by -Hitler were not carried out. As confirmed by the commanders of the air -fleets, their men did not receive any orders to shoot enemy airmen or to -turn them over to the SD. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about the Luftwaffe having received -directives to take hostages or to shoot them? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know of any directive or order dealing with -hostages. - -DR. STAHMER: Now one more question: Can you give us any information -about the treatment of the five enemy airmen who in March 1945 bailed -out over the Schorfheide and were captured? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: In March 1945, an American four-engined bomber was shot -down after an attack over the Schorfheide. Part of the crew saved -themselves by jumping. Some of them were injured and sent to a hospital. -The observer, an American captain of the reserve, who in civilian life -was a film director in Hollywood, on the following day was interrogated -by the Reich Marshal himself about this mission and his bringing down. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions for this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness -any questions? - -DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few questions for this witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] What post did you hold when the war started? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: At the outbreak of war I was at the war academy and had -just left my squadron. - -DR. LATERNSER: Can one say that the outbreak of war caused a happy -feeling among the professional soldiers? What was the mood like at that -time? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, one cannot say that the outbreak of war was greeted -with enthusiasm. Rather we faced the fact with great gravity. As young -soldiers, we saw our mission in training and educating our men for the -defense of our country. - -DR. LATERNSER: What posts did you hold during the war? Were you ever on -the staff of an air fleet? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was never on the staff of an air fleet. Except for a -short time, when I served as group commander, I was throughout adjutant -of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. - -DR. LATERNSER: As chief adjutant, as you said before, to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, you had a lot of inside information -about the Luftwaffe? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Insofar as material was available, yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, according to your inside information, did the chiefs -of air fleets have any influence on political decisions or the conduct -of the war? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: According to my information the chiefs of air fleets -had no influence on any political decisions. Their job was the technical -execution of the orders received, and orders on the conduct of the air -war were given more and more by Hitler himself. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the chiefs of air fleets make any suggestions to use -more severe methods in the conduct of the war? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know of any suggestions of that kind made by -chiefs of air fleets. They were professional soldiers who acted -according to orders. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have still one question: Was there any co-ordination -between the branches of the Wehrmacht? Was this co-ordination of a -purely official nature or did it go farther? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: There was co-ordination between the leading local -authorities at the front; at a higher level it was effected by the -Führer himself. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel wish to ask any -questions? Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would ask that the witness be shown Document -Number 1156-PS of the United States documents. - -[_Document 1156-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -Do you recognize this document, Witness? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, I do not know this document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the date, the 20th of -March 1941, and I call your attention to the fact that it purports to be -a report to Reich Marshal Göring at the 19th of March 1941 meeting. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: While in the service I attended military conferences -only if they did not take place at the Führer’s Headquarters, or if they -were not personal discussions. I have not seen this document and I do -not know the facts. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me call your attention to Item 2, which refers -to you, I take it, and which reads: - - “The directive worked out by the Wi regarding destructive - measures to be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in Case Barbarossa - was agreed to by the Reich Marshal. One copy was handed to - Captain Von Brauchitsch for transmission to the General Staff of - the Luftwaffe.” - -And I ask you whether that states the facts. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I cannot remember these facts, neither can I give any -information about the contents of the letter mentioned here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew about Case Barbarossa, did you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I did not hear about Case Barbarossa until the -beginning of 1941. I was not present at the conferences. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did know that certain destructive measures -were planned to be undertaken in connection with that by the Luftwaffe, -did you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know only of the first missions given to the -Luftwaffe, and I recollect that attacks on airfields were ordered. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it not also provide for attacks against cities, -particularly St. Petersburg? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: To my recollection and knowledge, at the time this -letter was written nothing was said about these targets but only about -attacks on airfields, which were the main targets of the Luftwaffe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that the witness be shown Document -Number 735-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-151. - -[_Document 735-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -That is in evidence and appears to be a most secret document of which -only three copies were made, is that correct? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I read this letter first before I answer the -question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention first to the signature at the -end of it and ask you if you recognize it? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The signature is Warlimont. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Warlimont? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Warlimont was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew him well and he knew you well, is that -not so? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I knew him by sight and on this occasion I spoke to him -for the first time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: On the occasion of this meeting that is recorded in -these minutes, is that the occasion when you first met and spoke to -Warlimont? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: When I first spoke to him officially, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was on the 6th of June 1944, when this meeting -was held? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: According to this letter, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to Paragraph Number 1 of -the minutes of this meeting, from which it appears that -Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner opened this meeting with a report that a -conference on the question of the fliers had been held shortly before -with the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Führer -SS. That is the opening of it, is it not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know nothing of the record of this conference or even -that it took place. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Reich Marshal at that time? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I remember the fact because on the 6th of June the -invasion started and during the night of the 5th to the 6th I phoned -Reich Marshal Göring himself at 0200 hours and informed him that the -invasion had begun. In the morning he left Veldenstein for Klessheim in -order to attend in the afternoon a conference there on the situation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this meeting is said to have been held in -Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th of June, is it not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I said once before that I do not know anything of the -meeting as such and of the subject of the discussion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I understand, you were not present. Göring was -Reich Marshal; is that right? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister at that time, was -he not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the Reich Führer SS? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Himmler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was as a result of that meeting at which -the Foreign Minister—just follow the next sentence, “. . . the Foreign -Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on the native -civilian population. . . .” It was agreed that this conference, which -you did attend, was to take place; is that not the sense of the first -paragraph? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the first place, I was not at this meeting and, -secondly, I do not know anything about the subject as shown in evidence -here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, were you not at the meeting with -Kaltenbrunner which Kaltenbrunner called? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was not at the meeting with Kaltenbrunner which is -mentioned here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Despite the signature of Warlimont on these minutes -which says you were? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: In spite of the signature. May I first read the whole -document before I give a definite answer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Read the last sentence. Witness, I may be -misinterpreting this. It does not say you were present, but it does say -that you gave them this information. I ask you to look at the last -paragraph and say whether that is not true? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The last paragraph of this document, above the -signature, can only refer to a conference which, if I remember -correctly, took place in the late afternoon of 6 June in General -Warlimont’s quarters and which I have mentioned in my previous -statement. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think I was confused about the two meetings and -that these minutes do not show you to have been present. There was such -a conference as Warlimont describes but it was not the same conference -at which Kaltenbrunner was present, is that correct? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes, that is correct. I know only of this one meeting -in the late afternoon of 6 June between Warlimont and myself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the conference to which he refers in -the first paragraph? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, the conference in the afternoon has nothing to do -with the first paragraph which I just read, and has no connection with -it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The third paragraph had no connection with the -first meeting, you say? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Paragraph Number 3 has no connection with Paragraph -Number 1. I had no knowledge of Paragraph Number 1. I mentioned before -that I was given the task of conferring with the OKW about the -definition of acts which were to be considered as violations of -international law, and criminal acts. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us ask it once more so we will have no -misunderstanding about it. The conference referred to in Paragraph -Number 3 of Warlimont’s minutes is a conference between you and him -later that afternoon and had nothing to do with the Kaltenbrunner -conference which was held earlier in the day. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what was the situation in the beginning of -1944 with reference to the bombing of German cities? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The situation was that the air raids had increased in -intensity and in the beginning of 1944 they were very heavy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was becoming very embarrassing to the Reich -Marshal, was it not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Of course it was very unpleasant for the Luftwaffe, -because their defensive strength was too weak to stave off these -attacks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And they were being blamed somewhat and the Reich -Marshal was being blamed for the air attacks, was he not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Of course, that goes without saying. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Reich Marshal was in the embarrassing -position of having assured the German people back in 1939 that they -could be protected against air attacks on the German cities. You -understood that fact, did you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I understand that to be so, but I also know that the -conditions in 1939, which led to this statement, were entirely different -from those of 1944 when the whole world was against us. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the fact was that German cities were being -bombed and the German people had looked to the Reich Marshal to protect -them, is that not a fact? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: It is clear that the German people expected the -Luftwaffe to use all available means to ward off these attacks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what were the relations between Göring and -Hitler at this time? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I ask to have the question repeated? I did not -understand it clearly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the relation between Göring and Hitler at -this time? Was there any change in the relations as this bombing of -German cities progressed? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The relations between the Reich Marshal and the Führer -were no doubt worse than they had been before. Whether that was only due -to the conditions caused by the air warfare is not known to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were very close to Reich Marshal Göring -throughout this period, the entire period of the war, were you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know what you mean by close in the relations -between a commander-in-chief and his adjutant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were particularly friendly; he had great -confidence in you and you had great regard for him. Is that not a fact? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can confirm that, but unfortunately only on very rare -occasions did the Reich Marshal disclose his real motives. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were with him on the 20th day of April 1945, -when he sent the telegram proposing to take over the government of -Germany himself, and was arrested and condemned to death? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes, I was present at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS seized you and the Reich Marshal and -several others and searched your houses, seized all your papers, and -took you prisoner, did they not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: It is correct that on 23 April at 1900 hours we were -surrounded. The Reich Marshal was led to his room and from that moment -on he was kept closely guarded; later we were separated and put into -solitary confinement. Finally we were separated from him altogether by -SS troops stationed at the Berghof. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this occurred at Berchtesgaden? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: It happened at Berchtesgaden. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have told us that you were all supposed -to be shot by the SS at the time of the surrender and were supposed to -approve it by your own signature. Is that correct? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, that is not quite correct. - -I know that an order existed that the Reich Marshal with his family and -his entourage should be shot in Berlin at the time of capitulation. - -The second thing you mentioned refers to something else, namely, that we -were to be compelled to report voluntarily to the SS. I must say, in -order to be just, that this SS leader would far rather not have had us -there at that time so as not to have to carry out this order. At that -time we were already separated from the Commander-in-Chief. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the state of your knowledge about the -activities of the SS? What was the SS and what was its relation to the -Wehrmacht at this time? What was its relation to the Luftwaffe? Tell us -about the SS. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can only say this much, that SS was a comprehensive -term, that the SD, Gestapo, and Waffen-SS were quite separate -subdivisions, and that the Gestapo was an instrument of repression which -restricted much personal freedom. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Waffen-SS likewise, is that not a fact? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Waffen-SS was a military force. I myself had -neither trouble nor any friction with them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But what about the SS proper? Witness, you know -this situation about the SS, I am sure, and you impress me as wanting to -tell us candidly what you know about this situation, and I wish you -would tell us a little, what the influence of the SS was on these -situations. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I pointed out once before that as a purely military -adjutant I am able to give you information only about the Luftwaffe, but -I am not in a position to say anything about general things of which I -have no expert knowledge but merely personal opinions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was not the SS the subject of a good deal of -discussion among you officers, and was not everybody aware that the SS -was an organization like the Gestapo which was repressive and cruel? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the Luftwaffe we had so many troubles of our own -because of the growing air power of the enemy that we had no time to -worry about anything else. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew, did you not, about the campaign -against the Jews of Germany and the Jews of occupied countries? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I did not know about the campaign against the Jews as -it has been presented here and in the press. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I do not want to interrogate you on what is -in the press, but do you want the Tribunal to understand that you had no -knowledge of a campaign against the Jews in Germany? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I only knew that some of the Jews were taken to -ghettos. I had, however, no knowledge of the cruelties against Jews as -now published in the press. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your father was Field Marshal, was he not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what period was he Field Marshal? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Field Marshal is a military rank which he held from -1940 until now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He has never been deprived of his rank, is that a -fact? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: He was never deprived of his rank. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when your father, as you know, -disagreed with Hitler as to military programs? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know that my father had great difficulties with -Hitler concerning political and military questions, and that this led to -his retirement in December 1941. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not say to the interrogator who examined -you for the United States that he retired from active command in 1941? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what did you understand to be the reason for -his retirement? - -You gave the reasons as follows, that neither in the military nor in the -political considerations did he see eye to eye with Hitler, and could -not come to any accord and, since he could not make his own opinions -prevail, he desired to manifest his dissent by resigning, and that -specifically also referred to religious questions. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is true, is it not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: That is correct, and I still maintain it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I hope you are proud of it. - -You were also asked this: - - “And from 1941 to the end of the war, do you know what he was - doing?” - -And you answered: - - “Well, he had, through his second marriage, a little house in a - small town in Silesia, Bockenheim, and he occupied himself with - studies of family history and also with forestry, economics, and - hunting, but did not take part . . .” - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Only with questions of military history and -agriculture. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Beg pardon. I did not get that. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: He was interested only in economic questions and -hunting, but not in military questions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not in military, yes. - - “. . . but did not take part in any sort of bloody political - endeavors.” - -You said that, did you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I ask to hear the question once more. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This is your answer in full. You interrupted me. -This is your answer to the interrogator: - - “Well, he had, through his second marriage, a little house in a - small town in Silesia, Bockenheim, and he occupied himself with - studies of family history and also with forestry, economics and - hunting, but did not take part in any sort of bloody political - endeavors.” - -And, with, the exception of economics, you still stand by that answer, -do you not? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I have never said that he ever took part in bloody -things. It must be an error. I never saw this record again. I did not -sign it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have not made myself clear. You said he did not -take part in any bloody political endeavors. That is what this says you -said. - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: He did not take part; but I did not say anything of a -bloody movement. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not use these terms in the examination? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, I cannot remember having said that. I did not sign -the protocol and I did not see it again after the interrogation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you say that you did not use these words on the -26th of February 1946 to Captain Horace Hahn, interrogator? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I say I did not use the words “take part in any bloody -endeavors,” _et cetera_, because that expression is foreign to me. -Neither do I know in what connection it is supposed to have occurred. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not know of any that he did partake -in, do you? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: No. My father retired. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Absolutely from this whole Nazi outfit. He -disassociated himself from them and retired to a little village rather -than go on with the program he did not agree with, did he not? Is that -not a fact? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. - -HERR HORST PELCKMANN (Counsel for SS): I believe that I have no longer -any formal right to question this witness after Justice Jackson has -cross-examined him, but I should be grateful if I might be permitted to -do so since Justice Jackson questioned the witness also about the SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness’ statement about the SS was that he knew -nothing about it. What ground does it give for a cross-examination by -you? - -HERR PELCKMANN: He was asked whether he was guarded by the SS on -Obersalzberg who also had the order to shoot him and Göring too. I -should like to have it made clear whether that was SS or SD. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -HERR PELCKMANN: I therefore ask the witness: Do you know whether these -people whom you have just mentioned were members of the SS or SD? Do you -know the difference, Witness? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I have a general idea of the difference. I believe that -the troops which had the task of guarding us were SS, but that the -Sicherheitsdienst (SD) had been given the special order. - -HERR PELCKMANN: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other counsel for the Prosecution wish to -cross-examine? - -Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine? - -DR. STAHMER: I have only two short questions. - -Colonel Von Brauchitsch, can you tell us something about the relations -between the Reich Marshal and Himmler? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: As far as I know and am able to give information, in -their outward relations Himmler and Göring exercised the utmost -circumspection, but there was no real personal contact between the two. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us whether the German people, until the last -moment, still had confidence in Reich Marshal Göring, and showed it on -special occasions? Can you mention any particular instances? - -VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can mention two cases. - -The first one was at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945—I cannot -say the exact date—in a public air raid shelter. The Reich Marshal had -no guards or escort and chatted with the people, and they greeted him -with the old cry, “Hermann, halt’ die Ohren steif! (Hermann, keep your -chin up).” - -Another example was on the trip from Berlin to Berchtesgaden during the -night of the 20th to 21st April. In the morning or towards noon of the -21st the Reich Marshal arrived at a town in Sudetengau, where he made a -short stop for breakfast at an inn. After a short while the market place -became so crowded with people asking for his autograph, that we could -not get his car through the crowd. Here too, he was greeted by the old -cry, “Hermann.” - -DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. - -DR. STAHMER: As next witness, I call State Secretary Paul Körner. - -[_The witness Körner took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Paul Körner? - -PAUL KÖRNER (Witness): Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, what official post did you hold before the -capitulation? - -KÖRNER: I was State Secretary in the Prussian State Ministry. - -DR. STAHMER: In this capacity were you one of the Reich Marshal’s close -collaborators? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you first meet the Reich Marshal? - -KÖRNER: In 1926. - -DR. STAHMER: When were you selected by him to collaborate? - -KÖRNER: At the end of 1931. - -DR. STAHMER: In what capacity? - -KÖRNER: I became his secretary. - -DR. STAHMER: When were you taken over by the Civil Service? - -KÖRNER: In April 1933. Pardon; the previous date was 1931. - -THE PRESIDENT: The translator said the previous date was 1931; which -date was 1931? - -DR. STAHMER: In 1931 he first came into contact with Göring and became -his private secretary. In 1933 he entered the Civil Service. - -DR. STAHMER: What post was given to you? - -KÖRNER: I became State Secretary in the Prussian State Ministry. - -DR. STAHMER: What do you know about the institution of the Secret State -Police, the Gestapo? - -KÖRNER: In the first months after the seizure of power the Secret State -Police evolved from the Political Police Department Ia. Basically the -Political Police Department remained; it was only reorganized under the -name of Secret State Police. - -DR. STAHMER: What was its range of activities? - -KÖRNER: Its main task was to watch the enemies of the State. - -DR. STAHMER: Have you any information about the establishment of -concentration camps? - -KÖRNER: I know that at that time concentration camps were established. - -DR. STAHMER: What purposes did they serve? - -KÖRNER: They were supposed to receive enemies of the State. - -DR. STAHMER: What do you mean by “receive”? - -KÖRNER: Elements hostile to the State, mainly Communists, were to be -concentrated in these camps. - -DR. STAHMER: And what was to be done with them there? - -KÖRNER: They were to be taken into protective custody, and, as far as I -remember, they were also to be re-educated so that later on they could -be incorporated into the community of the people. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything of the treatment meted out to the -inmates? - -KÖRNER: As far as I know, the treatment was always good. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you ever hear anything about unauthorized concentration -camps? - -KÖRNER: Yes, in 1933, in various places unauthorized concentration camps -were established. - -DR. STAHMER: By whom? - -KÖRNER: I remember that one was established in Breslau by SA -Gruppenführer Heines; and one in Stettin. Whether there were any others, -I do not know. - -DR. STAHMER: In Stettin? - -KÖRNER: I think it was Karpfenstein, but I cannot say for certain. - -DR. STAHMER: And what became of these camps? - -KÖRNER: When the Reich Marshal heard about them he had them instantly -disbanded because they were established without his permission. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the Reich Marshal’s attitude when he heard of -complaints? - -KÖRNER: He always followed them up immediately. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know of any case where he took specially strong -measures? - -KÖRNER: Yes, I can remember the case of Thälmann. - -DR. STAHMER: What happened in that case? - -KÖRNER: It had come to the Reich Marshal’s knowledge that Thälmann had -not been treated in the way the Reich Marshal wished. He immediately -followed the matter up and had Thälmann brought to him. - -DR. STAHMER: Who was Thälmann? - -KÖRNER: Thälmann was one of the leaders of the Communist Party and a -communist member of the Reichstag. - -DR. STAHMER: And how did the Reich Marshal speak to Thälmann? - -KÖRNER: He had him brought into his office and asked him to tell him -exactly why he had made a complaint. - -DR. STAHMER: And then? - -KÖRNER: Thälmann was very reticent at first, because he feared a trap. -When the Reich Marshal spoke to him in a humane manner, he realized that -he could speak freely. He told the Reich Marshal that on several -occasions he had not been treated properly. The Reich Marshal promised -him immediate redress and gave the necessary instructions. He also asked -Thälmann to notify him immediately if it happened again. In addition he -ordered that any complaints made by Thälmann should be passed on to him. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know how long the Reich Marshal was in charge of the -Gestapo in the concentration camps? - -KÖRNER: Until the spring of 1934; I believe it was March or April. - -DR. STAHMER: Under whom did they come then? - -KÖRNER: By order of the Führer, they came under the competence of -Reichsführer Himmler. - -DR. STAHMER: What do you know about the events in connection with the -Röhm revolt on 30 June 1934? - -KÖRNER: That a Röhm revolt was planned I heard when I was with the Reich -Marshal in Essen, where we were attending the wedding of Gauleiter -Terboven. During the wedding festivities Himmler arrived and made a -report to the Führer. Later the Führer drew the Reich Marshal aside and -told him in confidence of Röhm’s designs. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you also know what he told him? - -KÖRNER: I can only say that what Himmler told the Führer was also -brought to Göring’s knowledge. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you not know any further details? - -KÖRNER: No, I do not know any further details, but I think that is -sufficient. - -DR. STAHMER: What instructions did Göring receive? - -KÖRNER: The Führer instructed Göring to return to Berlin immediately -after the wedding festivities, and the Führer went to southern Germany -to investigate the reports personally. - -DR. STAHMER: When was this wedding? - -KÖRNER: As far as I remember, it was 2 days before the Röhm Putsch. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether, on the day after the Röhm Putsch, the -Reich Marshal was with Hitler? - -KÖRNER: No. The Reich Marshal was in Berlin. We returned to Berlin the -same evening. - -DR. STAHMER: And on the day after the Röhm Putsch on 30 June, that is on -1 July? - -KÖRNER: The Reich Marshal was in Berlin. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether there was a conversation between him -and Hitler? - -KÖRNER: Yes. I remember that the Reich Marshal drove to the Reich -Chancellery to report several things to the Führer. In particular the -Reich Marshal had heard that on this occasion innocent people also might -have or rather had fallen victim. Therefore, he wanted to ask the Führer -to stop the whole action immediately. - -DR. STAHMER: Was that done? - -KÖRNER: Yes, that was done. - -DR. STAHMER: In what way? - -KÖRNER: After the report of the Reich Marshal, the Führer himself issued -an order that no further unauthorized action should take place, that the -action was over, and if any guilty people were still found they should -be brought before the ordinary courts which would decide whether or not -proceedings should be brought against these people. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether the Reich Marshal had anything to do -with the action against the Jews during the night of 9 November 1938? - -KÖRNER: No, the Reich Marshal had definitely nothing to do with it and -had no inkling of it. - -DR. STAHMER: How do you know? - -KÖRNER: Because I was with the Reich Marshal on 9 November in Munich—he -was always there on that day. The same evening we went to Berlin. Had -the Reich Marshal known anything about it, he would certainly have told -me or those who were with him. He had no inkling. - -DR. STAHMER: When did he find out about it? - -KÖRNER: Shortly before he arrived in Berlin, or at the Anhalter Station -in Berlin. - -DR. STAHMER: Through whom? - -KÖRNER: Through his adjutant. - -DR. STAHMER: And how did he take the news? - -KÖRNER: He was furious when he received the report, because he was -strongly opposed to the whole action. - -DR. STAHMER: And what did he do about it? - -KÖRNER: He got in touch with the Führer immediately to ask for the -action to be stopped at once. - -DR. STAHMER: What were your tasks within the framework of the Four Year -Plan? - -KÖRNER: I was Chief of the Office of the Four Year Plan. - -DR. STAHMER: What were your tasks? - -KÖRNER: The management and supervision of that office. - -DR. STAHMER: How did the Four Year Plan come about? When and how did it -start? - -KÖRNER: The official Four Year Plan was announced in October 1936, but -its origin goes back to the food crisis of 1935. In the autumn of 1935 -the Reich Marshal received the order from the Führer . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, try not to go quite so fast. It is very -difficult to get the translation. - -KÖRNER: Yes, Sir. - -In the autumn of 1935 the Reich Marshal received the order from the -Führer to make the food for the German people secure, as the food -situation was serious because of the bad harvests of 1934 and 1935. At -the time we were short of at least 2 million tons of bread-grain and -several hundred thousand tons of fat, which had to be procured by some -means or other. - -The Reich Marshal solved this problem satisfactorily, and this led the -Führer to ask him for suggestions as to how the entire German economy -could be made proof against crises. These suggestions were worked out in -the first half of 1936 and by midsummer were submitted to the Führer. - -These suggestions gave the Führer the idea of a Four Year Plan, which he -announced on Party Day 1936. On 18 October 1936 the Führer issued a -decree appointing the Reich Marshal Delegate of the Four Year Plan. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the aims of the Four Year Plan? - -KÖRNER: As I said before, to make [the] German economy proof against -crises. The main tasks were to increase German exports to the utmost, -and to cover any deficits as far as possible by increased production, -particularly in the agricultural sphere. - -DR. STAHMER: Did the Four Year Plan also serve rearmament? - -KÖRNER: Of course it also served the rebuilding of the German Wehrmacht -indirectly. - -DR. STAHMER: Did the Four Year Plan also provide for the allocation of -labor? - -KÖRNER: Yes. The Four Year Plan provided for the appointment of a -General Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. The former -president of the Reich Labor Office, President Syrup, was appointed -Plenipotentiary General. - -DR. STAHMER: When was he appointed? - -KÖRNER: That was at the beginning of the Four Year Plan, in the autumn -of 1936. - -DR. STAHMER: What were his particular tasks? - -KÖRNER: He had to regulate the allocation of labor and thus put an end -to the great muddle on the labor market. - -DR. STAHMER: How long did Syrup remain in office? - -KÖRNER: Syrup left in the spring of 1942 for reasons of health. - -DR. STAHMER: Who became his successor? - -KÖRNER: His successor was Gauleiter Sauckel. - -DR. STAHMER: Who appointed Sauckel? - -KÖRNER: Sauckel was appointed by the Führer. - -DR. STAHMER: And what was his task? - -KÖRNER: His main task as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor was to regulate labor. - -DR. STAHMER: Under whom did he work? - -KÖRNER: He was formally under the Delegate of the Four Year Plan, but he -received his instructions straight from the Führer. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your part in it? - -KÖRNER: In the spring of 1942 I ceased to have any influence over the -allocation of labor, since Sauckel received his directions straight from -the Führer and carried them out accordingly. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you not have any more dealings with Sauckel? - -KÖRNER: No; there were no more dealings as far as I remember, because he -received his directions from the Führer. - -DR. STAHMER: Who allocated the manpower? - -KÖRNER: The labor exchanges allocated the manpower and were under -Sauckel. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the relations between the Reich Marshal and -Himmler? - -KÖRNER: They were not very cordial. There was frequent tension and -mutual confidence was completely lacking. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In your testimony you made some references to a -conversation between Göring and Thälmann. - -KÖRNER: Yes, I did. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us when that occurred? - -KÖRNER: That must have been in the summer of 1933. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In the summer of 1933? Was that before or after the -Reichstag fire? - -KÖRNER: That was after the Reichstag fire. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Thälmann was accused in the Reichstag fire -trial and acquitted by the court, was he not? - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember that very well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you remember it at all? Do you remember that he -was accused? - -KÖRNER: I can no longer remember whether he was accused. It may be. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know where he died? - -KÖRNER: No, I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know that he was interned in Buchenwald -after the Reichstag fire and remained there until he died in 1944? Did -you know that? - -KÖRNER: Yes, I remember it was said he was a victim of an air attack. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where was he when he was caught in this air -attack? - -KÖRNER: Where was Thälmann? I did not quite understand the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was he when he became a victim of an air -attack? - -KÖRNER: As far as I heard, he was said to be in the Buchenwald -concentration camp. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And how long had he been there? - -KÖRNER: That I do not know; I have no knowledge of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you present at the conversation between -Thälmann and Göring? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did he complain about then in the -concentration camp? - -KÖRNER: About treatment during interrogations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the only complaint he made? - -KÖRNER: Yes, as far as I can remember. The Reich Marshal asked him -whether he had good food and whether he was properly treated. All these -things were discussed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Thälmann found no fault with the concentration -camp except treatment during interrogation? - -KÖRNER: Yes; as far as I remember that was his chief complaint. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were the Communists regarded by the Nazis as -enemies of the country? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And concentration camps, then, were built to -receive Communists among others, were they not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Jews? - -KÖRNER: Yes, as far as they were known to be enemies of the State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were Jews also regarded as enemies of the State? - -KÖRNER: Generally not; only when they had been recognized as such. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Recognized as such—what, as Jews? - -KÖRNER: No, if a Jew was recognized as an enemy of the State, he was -treated as an enemy of the State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the test as to whether he was an enemy of -the State? - -KÖRNER: Well, his attitude, his active participation in actions hostile -to the State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Such as what? What actions? - -KÖRNER: I cannot give any details. I was not Chief of the Gestapo, and -therefore I do not know any details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you not with Göring as his secretary during -the time he was Chief of the Gestapo? - -KÖRNER: In April 1933 I became State Secretary in the Prussian State -Ministry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you not have to do with concentration camps -under the secret police as such? - -KÖRNER: No, I had nothing to do with that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who handled that for Göring? - -KÖRNER: The then Ministerialdirektor Diels. - -MR; JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that, in setting up the Secret State -Police, Göring used SS men to man the Gestapo? - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember that any more. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were a member of the SS, were you not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was your office in the SS? - -KÖRNER: I never held any office in the SS, neither was I in charge of an -SS formation. I was just a member of the SS. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you not Obergruppenführer? - -KÖRNER: Yes, I was an SS-Obergruppenführer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to these unauthorized concentration camps, -you were asked who set them up, and I do not think you answered. Will -you tell us about who set up these concentration camps? - -KÖRNER: I remember two camps. In the case of one, I know for certain it -was Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Gruppenführer of what? - -KÖRNER: SA-Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the other? - -KÖRNER: I cannot say exactly. I believe it was Karpfenstein, but I am -not sure of it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was he? - -KÖRNER: Karpfenstein was Gauleiter in Stettin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Gauleiter was a Party official? - -KÖRNER: Yes, he was a Party official. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the concentration camps were designed to take -care of not only enemies of the State but enemies of the Party, were -they not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Prime Minister of Prussia was the Chief of the -Secret State Police? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in his absence the State Secretary of the State -Ministry was to act as Chief of the Secret State Police? - -KÖRNER: No, that was Diels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that not the law, whatever was done about it? -Did you not know that that was the law under which the Secret State -Police was set up, Section 1, Paragraph 2? - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember that law any more. I no longer know the -details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know the law of 30 November 1933? You do not -know the law under which you were operating? - -KÖRNER: I do not remember that law now. I would have to see it again. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what was wrong with these concentration camps -that they had to be closed down? - -KÖRNER: These unauthorized concentration camps had been established -without permission of the then Prussian Prime Minister and for that -reason he prohibited them immediately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the only reason, that they were set up -without this authority? - -KÖRNER: I believe so; yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he had them stopped immediately? - -KÖRNER: Stopped; yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring did not tolerate concentration camps that -were not under his control and the Führer backed him up in it, is that -right? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from time to time complaints came to you about -the treatment of people in concentration camps, during all the time you -were with Göring, did they not? - -KÖRNER: Yes, there were frequent complaints. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did they complain of? - -KÖRNER: Various things. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Tell the Tribunal what the complaints were with -which you had to deal. - -KÖRNER: Well, mostly from relatives of the people taken to concentration -camps whose release was applied for; or complaints that these people had -been taken to a concentration camp without reason. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, that they were innocent people, innocent -of any offense? - -KÖRNER: The relatives asserted this. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you do anything to get them released from -concentration camps? - -KÖRNER: The Reich Marshal had ordered that all complaints were to be -replied to. Every case was followed up at once. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you find that many of these people were -innocent, or did you find that they were guilty? - -KÖRNER: If anybody was found to have been wrongly taken to a -concentration camp he was released immediately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to whom was the communication given, that he -had been found innocent and was to be released from the concentration -camp? - -KÖRNER: It was given to the Secret State Police. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom at the Secret State Police? Who was the man -you communicated with? - -KÖRNER: I cannot name the individual who dealt with these matters. The -chief, as far as I remember, was first Heydrich and then Kaltenbrunner -or Müller. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was on good terms with all of those, was he -not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well acquainted with all of those men? - -KÖRNER: Of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you say that Göring obtained the release -of people from concentration camps, are you talking about just one or -two cases or did he obtain the release of a good many people? - -KÖRNER: In the course of the years, there were naturally several cases. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What do you mean by “several”? - -KÖRNER: Well, I cannot give the number now, but there were quite a lot -of releases. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you find any where the people were guilty when -you investigated? - -KÖRNER: If they could not be released, then they were guilty somehow. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who decided that? - -KÖRNER: That, as far as I know, was decided by the chief men of the -Secret State Police. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, what did you do in requesting their -release? Did you advise the Secret State Police that you disagreed with -their conclusion that the man was guilty, or did Göring simply order the -man to be released or request his release? - -KÖRNER: No, they were told the exact reason why the man should be -released. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know of any instance in which Göring -requested the release of a person from a concentration camp, where it -was not granted? - -KÖRNER: I cannot say that now. I have to think it over. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot recall any today, can you, in which -Göring’s word requesting a release was not honored? - -KÖRNER: At the moment I cannot remember any particular case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were put in concentration camps as -a result of the Röhm revolt? - -KÖRNER: That I cannot say either. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were killed as a result of it? - -KÖRNER: I cannot say from memory. As far as I know, the figures were -published at the time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, would it be a couple of hundred people that -were killed for it? - -KÖRNER: I should not like to tie myself to a figure, because I may be -wrong. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was a very large number of people was it -not? - -KÖRNER: No, I am sure it was not a very large number. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Give a figure. - -KÖRNER: The number was published at the time. This could still be -checked. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, why did the Reich Marshal want Hitler to stop -punishing the people who had been a party to the Röhm revolt? - -KÖRNER: I did not quite understand the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your testimony to be that the Reich -Marshal went to Hitler at some time and wanted this campaign against -people who were in the Röhm revolt to be stopped. And I want to know why -he wanted it stopped? - -KÖRNER: In order to prevent innocent people being involved. Only the -really guilty were to be caught and punished accordingly. It was clear -that someone or other might seize this opportunity to take personal -revenge and do away with his enemy, and in order to prevent this the -action should be stopped immediately and only ordinary courts should -deal with the matter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was in charge of the selection of the people -who were shot or otherwise killed as a result of the Röhm revolt? - -KÖRNER: The Führer himself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Reich Marshal had sufficient influence to -stop that immediately when he complained? - -KÖRNER: At that time, yes, the Reich Marshal definitely had sufficient -influence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In connection with this Four Year Plan you said -that it was its function to regulate the confusion in the labor market? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the Reich Marshal at many -meetings, did you not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was not one of your functions to get prisoners -of war to work in the armament industry and other industries that needed -labor? - -KÖRNER: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never had anything to do with that? - -KÖRNER: No. The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor of -course applied for prisoners of war for labor. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended many meetings when that was discussed, -did you not? - -KÖRNER: I cannot recall that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you report to the Reich Marshal what happened -at those meetings? - -KÖRNER: When questions of a general nature were discussed, a report was -made and submitted to the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were a member of the Central Planning Board, -were you not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were representing the Reich Marshal on that -Board? - -KÖRNER: No. I did not represent the Reich Marshal there. It was a board -of three men—Minister Speer, Field Marshal Milch and myself. The -Central Planning Board was set up in the spring of 1942. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you? - -KÖRNER: The three of us were appointed to the Central Planning Board. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you? - -KÖRNER: As far as I remember, Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you reported to him, did you not, what occurred -from time to time? - -KÖRNER: The Central Planning Board was merely an office for the -distribution of raw materials. We usually met every 3 months in order to -fix the quotas for the following quarter. Previously the office of the -Four Year Plan, in co-operation with the Minister of Economics, handled -the distribution and, from the spring of 1942 on, the Central Planning -Board handled it in the interests of armament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you want us to understand that the Central -Planning Board only met every 3 months? - -KÖRNER: Yes, approximately. In very rare cases another meeting was -called, especially if there were urgent problems to be solved. I -remember, for instance, the case when it was said that agriculture was -not getting enough nitrogen and that if the nitrogen quota were too -small, agricultural production would suffer. In view of this State -Secretary Backe asked for a meeting to be called and this took place at -the Central Planning Board office. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you testify that Sauckel did not report to -the Central Planning Board, at a meeting at which you were present, that -out of all the labor that came to Germany only 200,000 came -voluntarily—out of the millions who came only 200,000 came voluntarily? - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you say that the Central Planning Board never -discussed labor questions? - -KÖRNER: At the Central Planning Board only demands for labor were -submitted, and the quota holders to whom raw materials were allocated -also demanded the necessary labor. Only very rough figures were given -and then passed on to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about prisoners of war? - -KÖRNER: With these the Central Planning Board was not at all concerned, -as it was given only rough figures. For instance, if some branch of -industry needed so many thousand workers, they were asked for. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about concentration camp labor? - -KÖRNER: The distribution of labor was dealt with by the labor exchanges. -The Central Planning Board had nothing to do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are you familiar with a letter dated 9 March 1944, -reciting that 36,000 concentration camp prisoners were now being used -and wanting an increase to 90,000? - -KÖRNER: I do not know about these demands. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the use of Russian prisoners of -war in manning anti-aircraft guns? - -KÖRNER: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After Göring closed the unauthorized concentration -camps, did you know that the number of concentration camps increased -very greatly in Germany? - -KÖRNER: This I do not know. What happened after they were turned over to -Himmler is beyond my knowledge. It may be that a large number of -concentration camps was then set up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How do you come to know about Göring’s relations -with Himmler? Did he tell you? - -KÖRNER: Göring once spoke about it, and I concluded that the relations -were not at all good. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the appointment of Kaltenbrunner -as head of the Austrian State Police after the Anschluss? - -KÖRNER: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know who obtained that appointment for -Kaltenbrunner? - -KÖRNER: No, I have no idea. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you say that Göring and you were in Munich on -the night or nights of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Goebbels also there? - -KÖRNER: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Go ahead; do you want to say something else? - -KÖRNER: On 9 November we traveled from Munich to Berlin, so Goebbels -could not be there then. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why could he not be there? - -KÖRNER: Because the Reich Marshal, with his entourage, traveled in his -train to Berlin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I mean, did you know that Goebbels was in Munich -before these uprisings? - -KÖRNER: Yes, that I heard afterwards—that Goebbels was in Munich. All -National Socialist leaders were in Munich because 9 November was a day -when all of them met. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Goebbels spoke in Munich on the Jewish question -that night, did he not? - -KÖRNER: That I do not know. I do not remember the speech. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was there to attend the meeting of the -National Socialist leaders, was he not? - -KÖRNER: Yes, on 9 November the entire leadership of the National -Socialist Party met in Munich. It was an anniversary meeting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring attended regularly? - -KÖRNER: Of course he did. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did? - -KÖRNER: I did also. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Hess attended? - -KÖRNER: As I said, all National Socialist leaders always attended if -they possibly could. Nobody ever failed to attend unless he were ill, or -prevented by official duties. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which of the defendants in the dock attended those -meetings? Ribbentrop, of course? - -KÖRNER: Ribbentrop, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Keitel? - -KÖRNER: I assume so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Kaltenbrunner? - -KÖRNER: I never saw Kaltenbrunner, because Kaltenbrunner held a public -post only during the latter years, and during these years the meetings -were not as regular as before. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Rosenberg, of course, was there? - -KÖRNER: Of course, as I said before. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Frank and Frick? - -KÖRNER: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Streicher? - -KÖRNER: Not during the latter years, I do not think so; but previously -he attended. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was that, during the latter years? - -KÖRNER: As far as I know, Streicher did not attend during the latter -years, but I do not know for certain. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He attended in November 1938 when the anti-Jewish -uprisings took place, did he not? - -KÖRNER: I believe so, because at that time Streicher was still in -Nuremberg. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active, was he not? - -KÖRNER: I did not understand the question quite correctly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active in the anti-Jewish matters, was -he not? - -KÖRNER: Yes; this is generally known. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he see Funk at those meetings? - -KÖRNER: I believe that Funk frequently attended these meetings. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the subject considered at this meeting of -9 November, the night of the anti-Jewish uprising? - -KÖRNER: I do not know of any discussions as there was always a fixed -program on that day, and I did not know about anything else, nor can the -Reich Marshal have known. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the adjutant who informed him on his -arrival the next morning that something had happened during the night? - -KÖRNER: This I cannot say exactly as the adjutants were always changing. -I only know that an adjutant came and reported. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did he say that happened? - -KÖRNER: He reported that during the night anti-Jewish riots had taken -place and were still going on; that shop windows had been smashed, goods -thrown into the streets. Göring was infuriated about this. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he infuriated about? - -KÖRNER: About the riots. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews? - -KÖRNER: About the entire action. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews? - -KÖRNER: Göring always showed a different attitude to the Jewish -question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You just tell us what it was. You may go into all -details. Tell us what his attitude was. - -KÖRNER: He always showed a moderate attitude towards the Jews. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Such as fining them a billion Reichsmark right -after the fire, right after these outrages? You know that he did that, -do you not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. The Führer demanded it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Führer is dead, do you not? Do -you know that for a fact? - -KÖRNER: Yes, I know he is dead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is generally understood, is it not, among all -of you, that the Führer is dead? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the Führer ordered the Reich Marshal to levy a -fine of a billion Reichsmark? Who ordered the confiscation of the -insurance of the Jews a few days after this assault? - -KÖRNER: That I do not know. I can no longer remember the details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you not remember that that was Göring’s order? - -KÖRNER: I cannot recall it now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why did Göring go to Hitler to get this stopped? -Why did he not go to the head of the police, which is supposed to -prevent crime? - -KÖRNER: Naturally he went to the highest chief so that an authoritative -order could be given for these riots to cease immediately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he have any idea who had started them? - -KÖRNER: It had gone round that Goebbels had instigated these riots. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know that the Gestapo and SS also -participated? - -KÖRNER: I do not know. As far as I know the SS did not participate. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo? - -KÖRNER: No, I do not know that either. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he went to Hitler to complain about Goebbels -instigating these riots, is that the fact? - -KÖRNER: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he knew the next morning that these riots -against the Jews had been instigated by members of the Government? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated at Obersalzberg, the -interrogation center, on the 4th of October of last year by Dr. Kempner -of our staff, were you not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you stated in the beginning of your -interrogation that you would not give any testimony against your former -superior, Reich Marshal Göring, and that you regarded Göring as the last -big man of the Renaissance; the last great example of a man from the -Renaissance period; that he had given you the biggest job of your life -and it would be unfaithful and disloyal to give any testimony against -him; is that what you said? - -KÖRNER: Yes, that is more or less what I said. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is still your answer? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution wish to examine -this witness? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can remember, Witness, the conference of the -heads of the German authorities in the occupied territories which took -place on 6 August 1942 under the chairmanship of Defendant Göring. - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember straight off what conference that could have -been. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can recall that after this conference of 6 -August you circulated the minutes to all the ministers. The appendix to -these minutes showed how much foodstuff and other raw materials should -be supplied to Germany by the occupied territories? - -KÖRNER: I cannot remember offhand. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I shall put before you a document signed by you yourself -which gives proof of this meeting. - -KÖRNER: Yes, I have read it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you circulated this document, do you -not? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The document shows that certain figures were fixed as to -how much foodstuff should be sent to Germany: 1,200,000 tons from -France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. From Russia, 3,000,000 -tons of grain were to be sent to Germany, _et cetera_. Do you not -consider such deliveries to be a spoliation of the occupied territories? - -KÖRNER: It was a matter of course that the occupied territories had to -make every effort in contributing to the food supply. Quotas were -imposed on the occupied territories which they could meet or, if they -were not in a position to do so, they could subsequently ask for -modifications. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You said something about “squeezing out,” I think? - -KÖRNER: No, I never talked of squeezing out. I said it was a matter of -course that the occupied territories had to contribute to the food -supply with all the means at their disposal. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That the occupied territories had to contribute? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Had these occupied territories asked Germany to come and -rule over them? - -KÖRNER: I did not quite understand that question. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I do not suppose you did. I now want to ask you another -question in connection with this. You did not see that this was plunder, -but do you not recall that Göring himself . . . - -KÖRNER: No, this could not have been plunder. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Göring himself at the same meeting said in his address -that he intended to plunder the occupied territories systematically; you -do not remember his expression “systematically plunder”? - -KÖRNER: No, I do not know this expression. - -GEN. RUDENKO: No, you do not remember. Perhaps you can recall that at -the same meeting, when addressing the leaders of the occupied -territories, he said to them, “You are sent there not to work for the -welfare of the people you are in charge of, but you are sent there in -order to squeeze out of that country everything possible.” Do you -remember these words of the Defendant Göring? - -KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember these words. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You cannot remember? - -KÖRNER: No. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not recall a lengthy correspondence between -Göring and Rosenberg in which Rosenberg insisted that all functions -relative to the economic exploitation of the occupied territories of the -Soviet Union should be taken away from the military economic offices and -transferred to the ministry headed by Rosenberg? - -KÖRNER: No, I do not recall this letter. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know. And in connection with this you do not -remember that this correspondence did not lead to a final settlement of -the question? - -KÖRNER: I do not know anything about this correspondence. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know anything, do you? In 1944 do you not -recall that . . . - -DR. STAHMER: I should like to point out that the interpretation is very -incomplete and hard to understand. We ourselves do not fully understand -the questions either. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I suggest it is not my fault if the witness does not get -all my questions. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you not recall that in 1944, after the -Red Army had driven the German troops from the Ukraine, Göring, wishing -to shelve the question of the economic exploitation of the Ukraine, -wrote to Rosenberg that it should be postponed until a more opportune -time, and Göring mentioned a second seizure of the Ukraine and other -Soviet territories? - -KÖRNER: Is this supposed to have happened in 1944? - -GEN. RUDENKO: In 1944. - -KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I shall not argue about it. - -[_Turning to the President._] Evidently, Mr. President, you wish to -adjourn now. I have a few more questions, but I assume it will be -convenient to resume after the adjournment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn at 4:30 today. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Witness, I intend to hand you a document which is a letter -addressed to you by the Permanent Delegate of the Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories. This is Document Number USSR-174. I want -you to read it and say whether you have ever seen this letter before. -You will see that this document begins with the words, “Honorable -Secretary of State and dear Party Comrade Körner.” - -This letter deals with the unification of economic leadership. - -KÖRNER: I have taken note of this document. I definitely received it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have received it; that is quite obvious. As is quite -clear from this communication, the question is that of holding a special -meeting under your leadership. - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore I may conclude that you were a very close -collaborator of the Defendant Göring in the matter of the so-called -unification of economic leadership? - -KÖRNER: Yes, for the conference mentioned. - -GEN. RUDENKO: One last question. Do you confirm that the Defendant -Göring as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at the head of both the -civilian and the military German organizations dealing with the economic -exploitation of all the occupied territories, and that you were his -closest collaborator where these economic measures were concerned? - -KÖRNER: The conference mentioned in this document never took place. The -unification of economic leadership was a problem which arose, but which -never really became a fact. Therefore the conference mentioned was -superfluous. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The problem was not solved, because of circumstances over -which you had no control. It depended on the advance of the Red and -Allied Armies. Am I right? - -KÖRNER: I did not understand the question clearly enough to answer it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You say that the question was not solved. I ask you, is it -not a fact that the problem was not solved because of circumstances -which did not depend on yourselves? You were prevented by the Red and -Allied Armies? - -KÖRNER: I believe that at the time this letter was sent no such -influence could have been felt. The question of the comprehensive -organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not, as a -fact, materialize because it was opposed by other circumstances. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I do not mean to discuss these causes with you at the -present moment, but you have not yet answered my last question. I asked: -Do you confirm that Göring, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at -the head of both the civilian and the military German organizations -dealing with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories, -and that you were his closest collaborator? - -KÖRNER: As far as the exploitation of occupied countries is concerned, -it cannot be dealt with in this manner. The Four Year Plan had the -possibility of exerting influence in economic questions in the occupied -countries, but it was done only if it was absolutely necessary. In -general it did not concern itself with such problems. The authorities -who took care of economic matters in the occupied countries were the -military commanders or the heads of the civil administration. In the -East was the Economic Staff East and Rosenberg’s Ministry. Only if there -was a matter between the military and the economic authorities or -between German departments, where there was a dispute or a disagreement, -could the Four Year Plan be drawn in. The Reich Marshal in those cases -could make special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases as, -for instance, in the case of this conference mentioned today, concerning -the occupied countries having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe. We -had the right, since in the occupied territories not only in the East -but also in the West, we carried out many new developments in the sphere -of agriculture. In the West I can point out . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: What right are you discussing? - -KÖRNER: I speak of the right which Germany had to share in the -agricultural production of these countries, because we introduced many -new developments there. I would like to point out that in the East, the -regions which had been completely devastated, which had no seed, no -machines, and with greatest difficulty . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: Who gave that right to the Germans? - -KÖRNER: The right? It is only natural that once we have occupied a -country and built it up, we are entitled to share in the surplus. We had -to take care of the whole of Europe and we knew what anxieties and -problems we encountered in the occupied countries. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you, where did the Germans get the right? - -KÖRNER: I am no jurist. Therefore I cannot answer the question. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you were talking about German rights. - -KÖRNER: I am speaking only of the natural right that if we built up a -country we should share in the results of that work of development. - -GEN. RUDENKO: After you had devastated these areas? - -KÖRNER: Germany did not devastate these areas, especially not in any -agricultural respect. We, in fact, instituted great developments. I -remember, in the West, that some parts of France were completely -devastated and our organizations performed reconstruction work there. -Thus we rebuilt the uncultivated land which we found in France, through -a German organization which had reconstructed whole areas in Reich -territory, and repatriated French people there, giving them the -possibility of working again as peasants and sharing in the agricultural -production of the country. In the East we found territories whose -agriculture had been greatly damaged through the war. All the machines -had disappeared. All the tractors had been taken away by the Russians, -and all agricultural implements had been taken away or destroyed. There -we had to start in the most elementary and primitive way to build up -agriculture again. - -That it was possible for us in the years of our occupation in the East -to restore agriculture, German initiative and German machinery alone are -to be thanked. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did German initiative also include, together with the -restoration of agricultural measures and developments, a vast net of -concentration camps which you established in the occupied countries? Was -that also included in the extent of the German initiative? - -KÖRNER: I had nothing to do with that problem, and can say nothing about -it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But I am asking you this question . . . - -KÖRNER: And therefore I do not understand what you mean. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You are not sufficiently informed on the question of -concentration camps, but it would appear that you are quite well -informed, or appear to be informed, on restoration work in the -agricultural field? - -KÖRNER: Naturally, I know a great deal about the rehabilitation of -agricultural areas. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you know nothing about concentration camps? - -KÖRNER: I was not concerned with these matters. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You knew nothing about the fact that millions were being -annihilated by the German occupational authorities? - -KÖRNER: No, I knew nothing about it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You really knew nothing about it? - -KÖRNER: I have only just found out about it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Only now? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further question to ask. - -HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, do you know that Heines was -Chief of Police at Breslau? - -THE PRESIDENT: I asked defendants’ counsel at the end of the examination -by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any questions, and they said -they did not wish to ask any questions. Therefore it is not your turn -now to ask any questions. - -HERR BOEHM: Mr. President. In the interrogation by Mr. Justice Jackson a -point arose which I did not know of before and which calls for comment. -It concerns the Chief of Police, Heines. May I be allowed to put two or -three questions to the witness so that the point in question may be -clarified? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We hope you will not take too long. - -HERR BOEHM: I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief -of Police at Breslau? - -KÖRNER: Yes. - -HERR BOEHM: Further, do you know that in that capacity he was in charge -of the prisons in Breslau? - -KÖRNER: Of course, the Police Chief is in charge of prisons. - -HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether at the time in question when this camp -was set up, the police prisons of Breslau were overcrowded? - -KÖRNER: That I do not know. I mentioned the case of Heines only as one -of the camps which at that time were set up without the permission of -the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior. - -HERR BOEHM: Then you also know that Heines could establish this camp -merely in his capacity as Chief of Police? - -KÖRNER: Yes, that may be. - -HERR BOEHM: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask? - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire. - -DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal I call as next witness, -Field Marshal Kesselring. - -[_The witness Kesselring took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name? - -ALBERT KESSELRING (Witness): Albert Kesselring. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, since when have you served with the Luftwaffe? - -KESSELRING: Since 1 October 1933. - -DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold on your transfer to the Luftwaffe? - -KESSELRING: Up to that time I was a colonel and officer commanding -artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired as air commodore. - -DR. STAHMER: You helped to build up the Luftwaffe? - -KESSELRING: During the first 3 years I was Chief of the Administrative -Office, subsequently Chief of the General Staff, and I then served in -the Gruppenkommando. - -DR. STAHMER: Was the Luftwaffe being built up for defensive or -aggressive purposes? - -KESSELRING: The German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense. I must, -however, add the comment that the single plane as well as the whole of -an air force by its very nature is an aggressive weapon. Even in land -fighting, mere defense unaccompanied by offensive movements is -considered not to lead to any appreciable results or successes. This -applies to a still greater degree to air warfare. The air force covers a -wider range, both for defense and attack. This had been realized by the -Reich Marshal and his generals. - -It is obvious that when an air force is being built up, only light -machines are produced, or are the first types to reach the units. Thus, -up to 1936-37 we had only light craft, fighters, Stukas, reconnaissance -planes, and a few “old sledges” as we called them, such as Ju 52, Do 11 -and D 13—all obsolete bomber types. - -One may hold the view that defense can be successfully conducted with -these light craft. On the other hand, I should like to point to the end -of the World War, when the German defensive air force was smashed by the -offensive air force of the enemy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is dealing -with this matter in far too great detail. - -KESSELRING: I will go on. Up to 1937-38 there was no offensive air -force, especially no bombers, and the bombers which were built later had -neither the range nor the load capacity necessary for an offensive -weapon. There were no four-engine bombers. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Warsaw? - -KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 1, I led this attack. - -DR. STAHMER: Did the military situation at the time justify this attack, -and how was it carried out? - -KESSELRING: Several attacks were made on Warsaw. In the German view, -Warsaw was a fortress, and, moreover, it had strong air defenses. Thus -the stipulations of the Hague Convention for land warfare, which can -analogously be applied to air warfare, were fulfilled. - -As to the first phase of the attack on Warsaw, according to the -operational principle governing the employment of the Luftwaffe, the -enemy air force and the aircraft factories in the immediate vicinity of -the airfields were to be attacked. These attacks were in my opinion -fully justified and they comply with the rules. - -The second phase concerns the combating of the operational movements of -the Poles. I may add that Warsaw is a junction for northern and central -Poland. When our long-range reconnaissance reported—this was confirmed -by the final phase—that the railway stations were crammed with material -and that reinforcements in increasing numbers were moving on Warsaw, the -air attack on these movements was ordered and carried out. - -It was mainly directed against railway stations and sidings and the -Vistula bridges. For the execution of these attacks I detailed Stukas -and ground “strafer” aircraft, because the precision of these machines -afforded the guarantee that mainly the military targets would be hit. - -The third phase was the shelling of Warsaw. I consider the shelling to -be an army action in which, at the request of the army, small units of -the Luftwaffe were employed against military targets. I myself was over -Warsaw, and after practically every air attack I consulted the army -commanders about the execution. From my own experiences and reports I -can assert that everything that was humanly possible was done to hit -military targets only and to spare civilian targets. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you confirm conclusively that these attacks were kept -throughout within the limits of military necessity? - -KESSELRING: Absolutely. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Rotterdam? - -KESSELRING: As Air Force Chief 2, to which rank I had been promoted, I -led air attacks on Holland, Belgium, and France, and the airborne corps -operated under my command also. The airborne corps was commanded by -General Student, who asked for his paratroops to be supported by a -bomber attack. General Student had such a comprehensive knowledge of the -ground situation that he alone must be considered responsible for -preparation and execution of the attack. The Fourth Air Corps was -ordered to provide air support, and one group, the smallest unit -necessary for this purpose, was employed. The attack was carried out -solely in accordance with the tactical requirements and technical -possibilities. The orders of General Student reached my command very -early. Thus all preparations could be made leisurely according to plan. -At the instance of the Reich Marshal the unit was informed of possible -changes within Rotterdam and of the approach of Panzer divisions. The -objective set by General Student was quite clear as to extent, central -and key points, and occupation. It was not difficult for seasoned troops -to grasp the objective. There was radio communication between General -Student’s command, my staff, and other staffs, including the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Any interruption of this -communication could only have been a very short one as radio orders were -transmitted by me or the Reich Marshal. The technique at that time made -it possible to maintain contact through this radio communication between -the tactical ground station and the flying unit, via its ground station. -The ground communications usual at that time such as flags, flares, and -signal code designations at the front were maintained according to plan. -They functioned without a hitch. In accordance with its training and its -orders the formation had sent out a reconnaissance aircraft which kept -them informed of the situation and the objective. In addition, by order -of the Reich Marshal, there followed a General Staff officer attached to -my air fleet who had the same mission. - -DR. STAHMER: Had the order been given that the situation and the -objective should be . . . - -KESSELRING: I myself never had any doubt that the attack had to be -carried out; I was only not quite sure whether or not it should be -repeated. And this was the question to which the signals referred. -Judging from my knowledge of General Student and—I stress this -particularly—his technique in leading an attack and his clearly stated -requirements, I had to expect the attack to be carried out. - -The attack was carried out according to plan and time schedule. The -report that the target had been accurately bombed came through very -quickly together with the message that no further attacks were -necessary. During the 3 days of fighting in Holland the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe was kept well informed. Particularly -on the third day, that is, the day I am talking of, the Reich Marshal in -his outspoken manner intervened more than usual in the direction of the -air fleet and did, in my opinion, everything that could possibly be done -from such a high position. I do not remember any message to the effect -that the bomber attack was no longer warranted by the tactical -situation. - -DR. STAHMER: Bombs are said to have been dropped when negotiations about -capitulation had already started. - -KESSELRING: As I said, no message to this effect had been received by -the command, neither had the formation operating over Rotterdam picked -up a message from the ground. Probably some confusion occurred at the -command in Rotterdam itself of which I know nothing. Neither do I know -about the agreements reached between General Student and the officer -commanding the Dutch troops in Rotterdam. I wanted later to have a talk -with General Student on this question, but it was not possible because -of his having received a serious head injury. If, contrary to my firm -conviction, the attack had been no longer warranted by the situation, -this would be most regrettable. As a soldier of 42 years’ standing, as -an artillery man, as an airman, as a General Staff officer, and as a -leader for many years, I wish to make it clear that this case was one of -those unforeseeable coincidences of war which, I am sorry to say, occur -in the armed services of all countries more frequently than one might -think; only the world does not know. - -DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the big fires that still broke out in -Rotterdam? - -KESSELRING: When I received the report from the formation I was very -pleasantly surprised to learn that the effect of the bombing was -confined to the target area, but this war has shown that most of the -destruction is not caused by the bombs themselves, but by the spreading -of fires. Unfortunately a bomb had hit a margarine or some other factory -in Rotterdam, causing oil to run out and the fire to spread. As after -the attack the capitulation was already effective, it should have been -possible to prevent the fires from spreading by bringing in the fire -services and the troops. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the military consequences of this attack? - -KESSELRING: The immediate consequence of the attack was the surrender of -the Rotterdam troops. General Wenninger, who was air attaché at the time -and who later was attached to my air fleet, told me that in consequence -of this attack the whole of the Dutch Army capitulated. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you lead the attack on Coventry in November 1940? - -KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 2 I took part in this attack, without -any doubt. I cannot say now whether Air Fleet 3 took part in it as well, -but I did. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the object of the attack? - -KESSELRING: According to the target index kept by the archives -department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Coventry was an -English armament center; it was known as “Little Essen.” This index was -compiled with meticulous care by experts, engineers, and officers, and -contained maps, charts, photographs, description of targets, key points, -_et cetera_. I myself, as well as my men, was fully familiar with these -details. Furthermore, I had the aforementioned General Wenninger and -several engineers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe give -lectures to the troops about targets, in order to make them acquainted -with the nature of the targets, their vulnerability, and the effects of -an air attack. - -Preparations for an attack were made most conscientiously. I was very -often present and the Reich Marshal himself occasionally inspected them. -The case of Coventry was extremely simple, as during those nights -favorable weather conditions prevailed, so that Coventry could be -reached without radio navigation. The distribution of the targets in -Coventry was likewise very simple, so that bombs could be dropped -without the help of flares, and it was hardly possible to miss the -target. But bombs follow the same law as other projectiles; in other -words, in land and air warfare dispersion covers a wide range. With an -air force this is the further peculiarity that if strong formations are -employed not the individual target but only the target area as a whole -can be aimed at, which naturally causes a deviation from the target -itself. By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and on the -reconnaissance pilot’s own initiative, all hits and attacks were checked -the following day by air photographs. The ground visibility was good -but, as I already said in the case of Rotterdam, the destruction of the -objective was not caused so much by the bombs themselves as by the -spreading of fire. - -I do not know whether I should add anything further. The Hague -Convention on land warfare did not provide for the requirements of air -warfare. In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of targets, the -Supreme Command had to go into the question and issue general directives -based on the preamble to the Hague Convention, the literature published -in the meantime, and finally, the special conditions governing the -Luftwaffe itself. Only those targets which we considered admissible -according to international law were assigned to the air fleet or -formation. This did not exclude the reconsideration and change of -targets in individual cases, which were discussed with the -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, and we took the responsibility -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking too fast. - -KESSELRING: By personal visits and other means we impressed upon our -units the need to study preparation, the dropping of bombs, aiming, the -meteorological conditions, so carefully that the highest degree of -accuracy could be obtained and regrettable deviations into the perimeter -of the objectives could be avoided. The case of Coventry was -particularly fortunate as it presented an important military target, and -no one could speak of it as an attack directed against the civilian -population. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel wish to ask questions? - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, since when were you commander of an army group? - -KESSELRING: I became commander of an army group in September 1943 after, -as commander of the German troops in the Supreme Command, I had already -served in a supervisory capacity as far as general strategic and -tactical questions were concerned. - -DR. LATERNSER: The army group which you led was in Italy? - -KESSELRING: The army group was in the Mediterranean area. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know the composition of the General Staff and High -Command group as presented by the Prosecution? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: First I have a preliminary question. What is, strictly -speaking, understood by the German General Staff of the individual -branches of the Wehrmacht? - -KESSELRING: The General Staff of the individual branches of the -Wehrmacht comprises all those officers who assist the -commanders-in-chief of the services and share their responsibility. - -DR. LATERNSER: Would you please state how this group was composed and -organized—in the Luftwaffe, for instance? - -KESSELRING: The General Staff of the Luftwaffe was the equivalent of the -General Staff of the Army and these organizations were as alike as two -pins. The General Staff consisted of the central department, called the -Operations Staff in the Luftwaffe, headed by the Chief of the General -Staff, the operational departments, the organizational groups, the -departmental chiefs of the Luftwaffe, the supply office, _et cetera_. -The various commands, from the air fleet down to the division, the -ground staff and the Luftgaue, had General Staff officers attached to -them to assist in the command. A chief of general staff no longer bore -co-responsibility, as was previously customary, since this was held to -be inconsistent with the Leadership Principle. These chiefs of general -staffs and the chief of the central department of the General Staff -exercised their influence regarding military and ideological training on -all the General Staff officers within the Wehrmacht, without prejudice -to the responsibility of the individual military commander. - -DR. LATERNSER: If I summarize your reply that by General Staff of the -Luftwaffe is meant the Chief of General Staff and the regimental staff -officers, would I then be describing correctly the composition of the -General Staff of the Luftwaffe? - -KESSELRING: Most certainly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you consider the term “General Staff” as has been -employed in these proceedings to be in accordance with military usage? - -KESSELRING: As I said before, the General Staff was composed of officers -assisting in the command, which did not include the commanders and -commanders-in-chief. According to German views they did not belong to -that category, because not all the commanders and commanders-in-chief -had had the same education and training as the General Staff officers. -The commanders-in-chief were single individuals. They would be treated -collectively only in connection with their rank as generals and for -budget and pay purposes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Would you consider it to be erroneous to apply the term -“General Staff” to the high military commanders? - -KESSELRING: According to the German conception it would be a misnomer. - -DR. LATERNSER: Have at any time in the history of the Wehrmacht the high -military commanders been subsumed under this group as is being done -here? - -KESSELRING: In Germany such subsumption was not indicated and for -various reasons was not even admissible. Neither did the -commanders-in-chief form a collective body to act in any way as a war -council or as a similar assembly with definite tasks. They were not -even, individually or collectively, members of the Reich Defense -Council, but were only appointed _ad hoc_ commanders of a front or a -command post. To set up the commanders-in-chief as a collective body for -any specific purpose was in my opinion quite impossible, for the simple -reason that they were under the commander-in-chief of the Army, the -Luftwaffe, or the Navy or under the High Command of the Armed Forces. -Moreover, some were 100 percent under the German Supreme Command; others -were 100 percent under Axis command. Some of them were under two -different commands, some were independent commanders-in-chief, others -were army commanders-in-chief subordinate to an army group. - -DR. LATERNSER: You are speaking too fast. Had the commanders-in-chief -only to work out military problems set before them, or did they -themselves draw up plans and submit them to Hitler for consideration? - -KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief were purely military leaders, -responsible only for the task allotted to them. Within the scope of this -task they could submit suggestions or improvements, _et cetera_, to the -OKW or to the OKH, but their activities in the sense of collaboration -were limited to these suggestions. - -DR. LATERNSER: You just mentioned improvements and modifications. Did -this mean that the commanders-in-chief were expected to suggest -modifications of a plan only from the military-technical aspect, or also -to submit suggestions as to whether or not a plan should be carried out -at all? - -KESSELRING: Generally it meant suggestions for modifications from the -military-technical aspect only. In matters of minor importance they had -a say also as to policy. If, however, the highest authority had made a -decision, the others kept silent. - -DR. LATERNSER: We will revert to this later. Did the “General Staff” -group as presented here ever meet collectively? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were there any rules providing for the organization of -this group? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did any members of this group ever suggest a departure -from the rules of international law? - -KESSELRING: I do not think so; rather the contrary. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there a frequent reshuffle of the holders of the -offices which make up this group, or did they hold the offices for a -long period? - -KESSELRING: In the course of the later years the commanders-in-chief and -commanders were rather frequently reshuffled. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the conferences Hitler held with -high-ranking military leaders? - -KESSELRING: There were two kinds of conferences. First, an important -address before a campaign to the higher leaders taking part in it. The -object of the address was generally to inform the leaders of the -situation and to brief them. In view of the Führer’s persuasive rhetoric -it was hardly possible for us to take any stand in the matter, -particularly as we were not informed about all the details. At such -conferences discussions did not take place; they were not allowed. There -sometimes followed military-tactical consultations, and every leader had -the chance of putting forward and stressing his views and requests. As I -have said, we had no say in political questions. We were, as is known, -fated with the accomplished fact, which we as soldiers had to accept. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend a conference held by Hitler on 22 August -1939, that is, shortly before the Polish campaign started? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was it not made known at the end of this conference that -we had concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union? - -KESSELRING: At the end, after the address, we were all called together -again and informed that the message had just been received that Russia -would adopt benevolent neutrality. - -DR. LATERNSER: What impression did this message have on you and the -other high military leaders? - -KESSELRING: It was a tremendous relief to me and to the others. -Otherwise we could not have dismissed the possibility of an extension of -the war toward the East. Now that Russia was going to hold herself -aloof, the Luftwaffe at least—I speak as an army commander—had a -superiority which guaranteed a rapid and decisive success, and which -over and above this, in my opinion, would possibly prevent the expansion -of the war. - -DR. LATERNSER: In any case, the message was a great relief to you? - -KESSELRING: Yes, very great. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you tell me whether members of the General -Staff and OKW group ever met and had discussions with leading -politicians and Party men? - -KESSELRING: If I may speak for myself, I was operating both in the -Mediterranean area and in the West. In the Mediterranean area I had to -work with the Gauleiter Rainer and Hofer and then in the West with . . . - -DR. LATERNSER: That was not the point of the question. I wanted to know -whether the high military leaders ever met and discussed any political -plans with leading politicians. - -KESSELRING: No, no. That I can definitely say was not the case. We as -soldiers generally did not bother about politics. Political decisions -were made by the politicians and we had to carry them out. - -DR. LATERNSER: Among military leaders, as a result of their many years -of experience in the Wehrmacht, which foster the principle of giving the -soldier a nonpolitical education, this attitude is customary, is it not? - -KESSELRING: This policy has been developed in the German Army since the -18th century. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military leaders had any -contact with the Fifth Column? - -KESSELRING: The military leadership had nothing to do with the Fifth -Column. This was beneath us. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was your impression of the conference Hitler held -with the higher military leaders before the Eastern campaign started? -Was the situation presented to you in such a way that war had to be -considered unavoidable? - -KESSELRING: I had the definite impression that the purpose of the -address to the leaders was to convince them of the necessity of the war -as a preventive war, and that it was imperative to strike before the -building up and the mobilization of the Russian armed forces became a -danger to Germany. - -DR. LATERNSER: Could you state the reasons for your impression? - -KESSELRING: As I have already said, the purpose of the address was to -give us a convincing picture of the general situation, of the military -situation and its time schedule—and it did convince us. In connection -with the Russian campaign I should like to say that up to the last day -of August I had no doubt . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you go more slowly please and have some -consideration for the interpreters. - -DR. LATERNSER: Would you please repeat the last answer. - -KESSELRING: I had still less reason to doubt Hitler’s words because, up -to the last moment, I, as Commander-in-Chief of Air Fleet 2, was engaged -in operations against England and had had neither time nor the means to -form a well-founded judgment of my own on the Russian situation. I had -to confine myself . . . - -DR. LATERNSER: This Trial has shown that the commanders-in-chief are -being made responsible for what is bound to happen in a war. I should -like you to describe the daily routine of a commander-in-chief of an -army group, an army, or an air fleet. - -KESSELRING: The daily routine depended of course on the personality of -the individual leader. If I may speak of myself . . . - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I ask you to be very brief. - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness—Dr. Laternser, surely that is cumulative to what -the witness has already been saying, and likely to be very long. About -the description of the day of a commander, this witness already said the -commander had nothing to do with politics and nothing to do with the -staff. Why should we be troubled with what the commander’s day consists -of? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I attach particular importance to this -question for the following reasons: In view of the range of a -commander-in-chief’s activities, especially at the front, not every -report can reach him because even reports from his own sector have to be -dealt with by the respective officers. Thus, only those reports come to -him which are of particular importance and of a decisive nature and -which have a direct bearing on the conduct of the action. - -THE PRESIDENT: Give it in that way then, rather than giving the witness -a full day to describe. - -DR. LATERNSER: Very well, I shall put it that way. - -Witness, in view of the range of your activities as commander-in-chief -did every report reach you, or only those which, after having been -studied by the respective officers, were found to be of such importance -that they had to be submitted to the commander-in-chief? - -KESSELRING: Especially when an action was in progress all reports could -not reach the commander-in-chief. In my particular case this was still -less possible as I spent 50 to 70 percent of my time at the front. The -staffs of the armies, air fleets, and navy units had to retain a -responsibility of their own within their competence. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the many activities of a commander-in-chief allow all -reports on violations of international law, even of a minor nature, to -be submitted to him? - -KESSELRING: This had to be aimed at. I doubt, however, for the -aforementioned reasons, whether this was possible in every case. - -DR. LATERNSER: In this matter, therefore, the commander-in-chief had to -rely on his staff, had he not? - -KESSELRING: Yes; 100 percent. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were you commander-in-chief of an air fleet on the -Eastern front from June to November 1941? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the extermination of Jews in -the East? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the Einsatzgruppen of the SS? - -KESSELRING: Nothing. I did not even know the name of these units. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you get to know anything about the regrettable order -that Russian commissars were to be shot after their capture? - -KESSELRING: I heard of this order at the end of the war. The air fleet, -not being engaged in ground fighting, had actually nothing to do with -this question. I think I can safely say the Luftwaffe knew nothing -whatsoever about it. Though I very frequently had personal dealings with -Field Marshal Von Bock, with commanders of armies and armored units, -none of these gentlemen ever told me of such an order. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you know about the Commando Order? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I did. - -DR. LATERNSER: And what did you think of this order? - -KESSELRING: I considered such an order, received by me as -commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, where I held a double post, as -not binding for me, but as the outline of an order which left me a free -hand in its application. On this question I held the view that it was -for me, as commander-in-chief, to decide whether a Commando action was -contrary to international law or whether it was tactically justified. -The view adopted more and more by the army group, which view was -directed by me, was that personnel in uniform who had been sent out on a -definite tactical task were to be treated and considered as soldiers in -accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention for land warfare. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Commando Order was consequently not applied within -your command? - -KESSELRING: In one case, yes, it was certainly applied. - -DR. LATERNSER: Which case do you mean? - -KESSELRING: I mean the case of General Dostler. - -DR. LATERNSER: The case of General Dostler has already been mentioned in -this Trial. Did you know about this case when it was pending? - -KESSELRING: As a witness under oath I have stated that I cannot remember -this case. I think there are two reasons why I was not informed of it. -Firstly, after a conversation with my chief, who spoke to another -commander about it, it appeared that none of us knew anything. Secondly, -because of the gigantic operations on the Southern Front, I was more -often absent than not from my headquarters. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if you had been called upon to make a decision -on the Dostler case, how would you have decided? - -KESSELRING: I am not well enough acquainted with the case. I know it -only from hearsay. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not think we can try Dostler’s case, or that -this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler’s case has -been tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no -objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as -to the guilt of his fellow officer is hardly helpful. - -THE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember. - -DR. LATERNSER: I withdraw the question. - -Witness, can you quote other cases where the Commando Order was not -applied in your area? - -KESSELRING: Small scale landings behind the lines at Commazzio, south of -Venice, also airborne landings north of Albenda in the region of Genoa -and minor actions in the Lago di Ortona district. I am convinced the -troops adopted this general view and acted accordingly. - -DR. LATERNSER: You were commander-in-chief of an air fleet in the East. -What can you say about the treatment of the Russian civilian population -during the campaign? - -KESSELRING: I was in Russia until the end of November and I can say only -that the population and the troops were on the best of terms, and that -the field kitchens were used everywhere for the benefit of the poor and -the children; also that the morality of the Russian woman, which, as is -known, is on a high level, was respected by the German soldiers to a -remarkable extent. I know that my doctors, during the hours of -attendance, were frequently consulted by the Russian population. I -remember this, because the doctors spoke to me about the fortitude they -showed in enduring pain. The war passed so quickly over the plains as -far as Smolensk that the whole area presented quite a peaceful aspect; -peasants were at work, fairly large herds of cattle were grazing, and -when I visited the area I found the small dwellings intact. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear of any excesses committed by German soldiers -in the East? Whenever cases of violations of international law were -reported to you, did you take action with all the means at your -disposal? - -KESSELRING: I at least tried to do so, if only for the sake of -maintaining the reputation of the German Wehrmacht and also in the -interests of the relations of the Wehrmacht with our Italian allies. I -therefore thought it expedient to deal severely with any German soldier -who committed an offense. As I was mindful of the fact that war is a -brutal business and the longer it lasts the more brutal it becomes, -particularly if the leaders and subordinates are no longer able to cope -with their tasks, I had recourse to preventive measures. The preventive -regulations, which I am sure were seen at many places by the Allied -Forces during their advance through Italy, my various announcements of -the penalties imposed which became generally known, are the best proof -of what I just said. - -As a preventive measure I ordered whole towns, or if this was not -possible, their centers to be cleared of military and administrative -offices and soldiers, and barricaded off. Furthermore, as far as air -raid precautions allowed, the soldiers were garrisoned and billeted in -confined areas. I also ordered detached individual soldiers, who are -usually the cause of such trouble—for instance soldiers going on and -returning from leave—to be grouped together, and nonmilitary vehicles -to form convoys. For control purposes I had cordons drawn by military -police, field police, gendarmes, with mobile courts and flying squads -attached to them. - -The buying-up of Italian goods, which was partly the cause of the -trouble, was to be restricted by establishing stores, in co-operation -with the Italian Government, along the return routes, and here the -soldiers could buy something to take home. This was enforced by -penalties. German offenders reported to me by the Italians, I had -prosecuted or I myself took proceedings against them. Whenever local -operations prevented my personal intervention, as for instance at Siena, -I notified the Wehrmacht that I would have the case dealt with by court -martial at a later date. In other cases, when the situation was -critical, I declared an emergency law and imposed the death penalty for -looting, robbery, murder, _et cetera_. The death penalty was, however, -rarely found to have a deterrent effect. I took action against officers -who, naturally disposed to shield their men, had shown too great -leniency. - -I understand all files are available here, so that all details can be -seen from the marginal notes on the reports sent in by the military -police. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you also know of any violations of -international law by the other side? - -KESSELRING: During my many visits to the front I did, of course, come -across a large number . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: I protest against this question. In my opinion, the -witness is not the person to make any statement as to whether Germany’s -enemies have violated international law. I think this question should be -omitted. - -DR. LATERNSER: May I explain my point? I am interested in an answer to -this question because I want to follow it with the further question to -the witness, whether after he heard of violations of international law -by the other side, he became more lenient concerning violations of -international law by his own men. That is why I am anxious to have this -question answered. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know exactly what your -question is and why you say it is competent. - -DR. LATERNSER: The exact wording of the question is as follows: - -I asked the witness, “Do you also know of any violations of -international law by the other side?” - -According to his answer I intend to put the further questions to the -witness, whether, in view of such violations of international law by the -other side, he either did not punish at all or dealt more leniently with -violations of international law by his own men. - -From the answer to this latter question I want to ascertain the attitude -of the witness as a member of the group, and that is why I consider the -answer to the first question to be important. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear what Counsel for the -United States says about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I believe it is a -well-established principle of international law that a violation on one -side does not excuse or warrant violations on the other side. There is, -of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable -here, on any basis that has been shown. - -In the second place, even if the treatment of the subject matter were -competent, I think it is being improperly gone into in this manner. Here -is a broad question, “Did you hear of violations of international law?” -It would at least, even if the subject were proper, require that some -particularity of a case be given. A broad conclusion of a charge—a -violation of international law—would hardly be sufficient to inform -this Tribunal as to the basis on which this witness may have acted. - -If there were some specific instance, with credible information called -to his attention, there might be some basis; but surely the question as -asked by counsel does not afford a basis here. - -It seems to me we are getting far afield from the charges here and that -this is far afield from anything that is involved in the case. I do not -know what particular atrocities or violations of international law are -to be excused by this method. There must have been atrocities committed, -on the basis of which there is sought to be excused atrocities committed -by somebody else. Who else committed them, why they were committed, is a -subject we might have to try if we went into this subject. It seems to -me that the inquiry is quite beside the point, and even if it were not, -if there were any way that it is within the point, it is improperly put -in this manner. - -DR. STAHMER: This question, which is of fundamental importance, was -argued before this Tribunal some time ago. This was when I applied for -permission to be given to produce White Books containing reports on -atrocities. I think it was during the sitting of 25 February. - -At that time Professor Exner defined his attitude to this question and -the Tribunal then permitted me to produce these White Books, with the -proviso that I would still have to state what I intended to present from -these books. - -Already on that occasion attention was drawn to the importance of the -question of whether atrocities were committed by the other side as well, -because this very point may contribute to a more just and possibly to a -more lenient judgment of German behavior. The motive of an act has -always a decisive bearing on the findings, and the view will be taken -here that an act on the German part will be judged differently if the -other side has not really shown entirely correct behavior. - -Furthermore it is an important question whether measures taken may have -been reprisals. On the strength of these considerations I hold that this -important question should be admitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have considered the questions which Dr. -Laternser proposed to put to the witness and have also considered the -objections made by General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, and they -hold the questions are inadmissible. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I assume that I am allowed to put the -following question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, did you either not punish at all or -deal more leniently with violations of international law by your own men -when violations of this law by the other side were reported to you? - -THE PRESIDENT: That seems to me to be putting in one question what -before you put in two. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this question is not meant to cause the -witness to give instances of violations of international law by the -other side. From the answer, I merely want to ascertain the fundamental -attitude of the witness, namely whether he, as commander-in-chief, dealt -most severely with violations of international law by his own men even -if violations on the other side were reported to him. I withdraw the -question. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would see no objection in your asking the -witness whether he was anxious to avoid violations of international law; -if you wish to put that question to him there will be no objection to -that question. The question which you have suggested putting is really -identical with the questions you put before. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, during this Trial severe accusations have been -made because of atrocities committed by German soldiers. Was not every -soldier sufficiently enlightened and instructed about the regulations of -international law? - -KESSELRING: I answer this question in the affirmative. The many talks -given by me and the commanders under me always contained such -admonitions and instructions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you, as commander of an army group, spare art -treasures and churches as far as possible? - -KESSELRING: I regarded it as a matter of course as my duty to spare -centers of art and learning and churches, and I gave orders accordingly, -and acted accordingly myself in all my operations and tactical measures. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the treatment of prisoners of war -who had fallen into German hands? - -KESSELRING: Prisoners of war were treated according to international -law. Wherever inspections ordered by me revealed any neglect, I had it -redressed and reprimanded the commandant in charge. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have still three more questions. Were you, as Field -Marshal, informed that Italy would enter the war? - -KESSELRING: No, I had not been informed about that. As far as I know, -the entry of Italy into the war was so spontaneous that even the -political leaders were surprised. - -DR. LATERNSER: And were you informed that war would be declared upon -America? - -KESSELRING: No. I cannot say anything about this question. - -DR. LATERNSER: And now the last question. What was the position -regarding the resignation of military leaders during the war? - -KESSELRING: Resignation from the Wehrmacht of one’s own free will, or an -application for permission to resign from the Wehrmacht, was not -allowed. In 1944 there was an order prohibiting this under threat of the -severest penalties. The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht reserved for -himself the exclusive right to make changes of personnel in the leading -positions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there a written order to this effect? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I think so. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, you said before that the commanders-in-chief -had, in military matters, the right and the opportunity to present their -demands and views to Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. Did -I understand that correctly? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did you personally have differences of opinion with -Hitler? - -KESSELRING: Considerable differences about operational and tactical -questions. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did it come to a real clash? - -KESSELRING: “Clash” is perhaps putting it too strongly; rather a -divergence of opinion on either side. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Shall we say disputes? Were they frequent? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: After all we have heard, here, Adolf Hitler must have -been a rather difficult customer. - -KESSELRING: That must be admitted. On the other hand, I found him—I do -not know why—understanding in most of the matters I put to him. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did you yourself settle these differences of opinion with -Hitler? - -KESSELRING: In critical cases Colonel General Jodl called me in if he -could not carry his point. - -DR. JAHRREISS: If you could not carry the point? - -KESSELRING: No, if Jodl could not carry the point. - -DR. JAHRREISS: If Jodl could not carry the point, you were called in? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl’s opinions, too, differ from Hitler’s? - -KESSELRING: On the various occasions when I attended for reporting I -observed very definite, differences of opinion between the two -gentlemen, and that Jodl—who was our spokesman at the OKW—put his -point of view with remarkable energy and stuck to it right to the end. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean, he was your spokesman? Whose spokesman? - -KESSELRING: My theaters of war, speaking as a general in the Wehrmacht, -were so-called OKW theaters of war, and the East was an Army theater of -war. The East was an Army theater of war, whereas the others were OKW -war theaters. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Had the OKW no say regarding the Army theaters of war in -the East? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And the Army had no say regarding the OKW theater of war? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I think not everybody will be able to understand this -difference. - -KESSELRING: It would be asking too much, because I myself cannot -understand it. - -DR. JAHRREISS: So, you were in an OKW theater of war? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What does OKW mean in this connection? - -KESSELRING: Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, I know that. - -KESSELRING: It meant that the commander-in-chief was directly under -Adolf Hitler, and headquarters under Jodl’s operations staff. - -DR. JAHRREISS: In a previous interrogation you spoke of orders from the -OKW, did you not? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Who is the OKW? Who gave orders? - -KESSELRING: Orders of a fundamental nature were issued by one person -only, and that was Adolf Hitler. All the others were only executive -officers. This did not prevent these executive officers from holding -views of their own or sharing the views of the army groups under them. -They presented these views energetically to Adolf Hitler. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What you are saying now rather surprises me, since the -opinion had been voiced that Jodl, who you say was a kind of spokesman -for the commanders-in-chief, was a willing tool of Adolf Hitler. - -KESSELRING: I think the one does not exclude the other. I cannot imagine -any marriage of 6 years standing without both partners having tried to -understand each other. On the other hand, I can very well imagine that -even in the happiest marriage serious quarrels occur. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But in the average marriage the husband does not -necessarily have to be a willing tool. - -KESSELRING: Here the situation is still a little bit different. As with -all comparisons, this comparison with marriage does not go the whole -way. In addition to this, in the army there is the principle of -unquestioning subordination. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but what you have just told us, about Jodl’s -position as spokesman for the commanders-in-chief, sounds as if Jodl -acted as an intermediary, does it not? - -KESSELRING: Jodl represented our interests in an outstanding way and -thus acted as an intermediary for all of us. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did he also pit his opinions against those of Adolf -Hitler when Adolf Hitler, in one of his famous fits of rage, had issued -an order? - -KESSELRING: I can state only that, on the occasion of my few visits to -headquarters, I saw Colonel General Jodl grow red in the face, if I may -say so, and in expressing his views he went very near the limit of what -is permissible for a military man. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned, until 13 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTIETH DAY - Wednesday, 13 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has made an order with respect to further -proceedings on the charge against organizations and the applications of -members thereof. I do not propose to read that order, but the order will -be posted on the Defense Counsel’s information board and will be -communicated to them and to the Prosecution. - -Dr. Jahrreiss, had you finished your examination? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Does any other of the Defense Counsel wish to -examine the witness? - -[_The witness Kesselring resumed the stand._] - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner first came into the public eye? - -KESSELRING: I have no knowledge of Kaltenbrunner’s becoming particularly -prominent in the public eye. I heard the name Kaltenbrunner for the -first time when he appeared as successor to General Canaris. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any recollection of him being made the Chief of -the Reich Security Main Office in January 1943? - -KESSELRING: I may have heard of it, but I have no certain recollection -of it. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner states that in April 1945 he tried to save -the country of Austria from further acts of war. Have you by chance any -recollection of that? - -KESSELRING: I merely heard that Kaltenbrunner was one of those persons -who were working for an independent Austria, but I have no definite, -accurate knowledge of the situation. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner states that he, on the basis -of an agreement with the Red Cross at Geneva, had arranged for the -return of civilian internees to their homeland through the firing line. -He had communicated a request to your office—not to you personally—to -the effect that a gap should be created in the fighting line to let -these civilian internees go home. Do you happen to remember that? - -KESSELRING: It is quite possible that such a request was actually -submitted. It did not come to my personal knowledge, because I was away -from my office a great deal. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when concentration -camps were first established in Germany? - -KESSELRING: Yes. It was in 1933. I remember three concentration camps, -but I do not know exactly when they were established: Oranienburg, which -I often passed by and flew over; Dachau, which had been discussed -vehemently in the newspapers; and Weimar-Nora, Weimar, a concentration -camp which I flew over quite frequently on my official trips. I have no -recollection of any other concentration camps; but perhaps I may add -that, as a matter of principle, I kept aloof from rumors, which were -particularly rife during those periods of crisis, in order to devote -myself to my own duties which were particularly heavy. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the internees in the concentration camps, did -you have any definite idea as to who would be brought to these -concentration camps? - -KESSELRING: I had an idea, without knowing where I got it from, which -seemed plausible to me; namely, that the National Socialist Revolution -should be achieved without the loss of life, and that political -opponents should be detained until the founding of the new State had -given sufficient security for them to return to public life. That is my -knowledge of the situation, from which I conclude, in order to answer -your question, that these people must, for the most part, have been -persons who were opposed to the National Socialist ideology. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you ever thought what the treatment in these -concentration camps would be like according to your idea? What was your -conception of the treatment of the prisoners in the camps? There may -perhaps be a difference according to whether you think of the earlier or -the later years? - -KESSELRING: I know nothing about the methods of treatment in the camps. -During the earlier years, when I was still working in Germany, rumors -were heard to the effect that treatment was normal. In the later years I -was abroad, that is to say, in theaters of war outside Germany; and I -was so far away that I knew nothing whatsoever of these incidents and -did not ask for any information about them. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right therefore to assume that as far as the -atrocities were concerned which did actually occur, you had no positive -knowledge? - -KESSELRING: No, I did not have any positive knowledge, not even in March -1945, when I became Supreme Commander in the West. Even then the -occurrences in the concentration camps were completely unknown to me. -This I attributed to two reasons: First, the personal attitude which I -expressed earlier, that on principle I concerned myself only with my own -business—which in itself was sufficiently extensive, and secondly, that -within the State a police state had developed which had hermetically -sealed and closed itself off from the rest of the world. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that there was more knowledge in your -officers’ circles than what you have just described with regard to -yourself? - -KESSELRING: I was in very close contact with my officers and I do not -believe that there can have been a large number of officers who knew -more about these things. Of course I cannot give information regarding -individuals. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that Hitler had decided to eliminate the -Jewish people physically? - -KESSELRING: That was absolutely unknown to me. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not have frequent opportunities to discuss -ideological questions with Hitler? - -KESSELRING: Whenever I was at headquarters only military and similar -questions concerning my theater of war were discussed during the -official part of the conversation. When I was invited to a meal, then -historical matters or matters of general interest were usually -discussed, but acute political problems or ideological questions never -came up for discussion. I personally cannot remember any instance when -Hitler influenced me, or any of the other generals, in any way -whatsoever with regard to professing themselves active National -Socialists. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you believe in Hitler’s personality in the sense that -Hitler was determined to lead the German people to a better Germany, -with consideration for personal freedom and respect for human dignity? -What was your conception about that? - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the relevancy of a witness’ belief upon a subject -of that sort? What relevancy has it got to do with any part of the case -of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner? The Tribunal considers this sort of -question a waste of the Tribunal’s time. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that in the absolute leadership state which -existed in Germany any opposition by a human being to a superior order -was impossible? - -KESSELRING: In that form I would not deny that. One could certainly -represent one’s own views against another view. But if one’s own views -were rendered invalid by a decision, absolute obedience became -necessary, and its execution was demanded and ensured under certain -circumstances by the application of penal law. Resistance to that order, -or an order, was, according to our knowledge of the personality and -attitude of Adolf Hitler, out of the question and would have achieved -nothing. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Would not a person attempting to resist a finally issued -order have to consider whether he might not be risking his life? - -KESSELRING: During the later years that was an absolute certainty. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you at any time think the war could not be won, and -if so, when? - -KESSELRING: In 1943, the possibility had to be considered that a -victorious peace might not be achieved. I emphasize expressly that one -had to consider that possibility, for by observing certain -organizational or operational measures, the situation might still have -been reversed. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever discuss this question with someone of -importance—the misgivings which you may have had about the continuance -of the war? - -KESSELRING: At various times when I discussed my own military sector, I -referred to certain difficulties which might influence the outcome of -the war in general; however, as representative of one military sector, I -considered myself in no way entitled to judge the entire military -situation, since I could not, from my limited viewpoint, judge the -situation regarding production and the organization of manpower -reserves. And as I said before, I refused, as an amateur, to make any -statement about a situation, which under certain circumstances might -have been regarded as official as it would have had the signature of -Field Marshal Kesselring. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly explain to the Tribunal what relevancy -the last two or three questions have to the case of Kaltenbrunner? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: The same applies to Kaltenbrunner, that he could not, as -he says, resist an order. It would have meant the loss of his life. - -THE PRESIDENT: You asked the witness whether at any time during the war -he thought how long the war would last. What has that got to do with -Kaltenbrunner? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution accuses several defendants of having -continued the struggle in spite of the fact that they knew it was -hopeless, and of having prolonged the war. That is the problem I wish to -clarify in my last question. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it was put specifically against -Kaltenbrunner. If it is your last question you may put it. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, Witness, what you are -trying to explain is that the leading motive of your continuing to fight -was also your duty towards your country? - -KESSELRING: That is a matter of course. I had other motives too. One was -that the possibility of a political termination of the war was denied, -at least officially; but that I believed in it, and I am still convinced -of it today, may be proved by the fact that I personally, together with -Obergruppenführer Wolff, undertook negotiations through Switzerland with -an American, in order to prepare the ground for a political discussion -to that end. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Any other Counsel for the Defense? - -HERR PELCKMANN: Witness, Dr. Kauffmann asked you whether the officers’ -corps had any knowledge of the conditions and the establishment of -concentration camps. Do you know that within the Armed Forces so-called -national-political instruction courses were held? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I know of that. - -HERR PELCKMANN: May I ask you whether you know that during one of the -Armed Forces national-political courses of instruction, which were held -from 15 to 23 January 1937, and I am referring now to Document Number -1992(a)-PS concerning the establishment of concentration camps, Himmler, -the SS Leader, in the presence of the assembled officers, made a speech -more or less to this effect: - - “Naturally, we make a difference between inmates who may be - there for a few months for educational purposes, and those who - will be there for a long time.” - -I skip a few sentences, and come to the ones I consider important: - - “The order begins by insisting that these people live in clean - barracks. This can, in fact, only be achieved by us Germans, for - there is hardly any other nation which would act as humanely as - we do. Linen is frequently changed. The people are instructed to - wash twice a day, and the use of tooth brushes is advised, a - thing which is unknown to most of them.” - -Do you know that the Armed Forces were given instructions of this kind, -which, as we know today, do not correspond to conditions as they really -were? - -KESSELRING: As I said earlier, we did not concern ourselves with such -questions at all, and this lecture by Himmler is unknown to me. - -HERR PELCKMANN: Unknown. Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? -Then the Prosecution may cross-examine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You understand, Witness, in giving your testimony, -as to the definition of the High Command and the General Staff, as that -definition is included in the Indictment, you are accused as a member of -that group, do you not? - -KESSELRING: I understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you are testifying here virtually as one -of the defendants? - -KESSELRING: I understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have spoken of the establishment in Germany of -a police state by the National Socialist Party, and I want to ask you -whether it is not a fact that the police state rested on two -institutions very largely, first, the Secret State Police, and secondly, -the concentration camps? - -KESSELRING: The assistance by the police is an established fact to me. -The concentration camp was, in my opinion, a final means to that end. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And both the secret police and the concentration -camp were established by Hermann Göring, is that not a fact known to -you? - -KESSELRING: The Secret State Police was created by Hermann Göring. -Whether it was formed by Himmler . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your lectures will be reserved for your own -counsel, and I shall ask to have you so instructed. Just answer my -questions. Was not the concentration camp also established by Hermann -Göring? - -KESSELRING: I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that. Did you favor the police -state? - -KESSELRING: I considered it as abnormal according to German conceptions -that a state had been formed within a state thus keeping certain things -away from public knowledge. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever do anything or can you point to -anything that you did in public life to prevent that abnormal condition -coming to Germany? - -KESSELRING: I cannot remember anything, except that during conversations -with my superiors I may have brought the point up for discussion. But I -emphasize expressly that in general I confined myself to my own sphere -and my own tasks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want this Tribunal to understand that you -never knew that there was a campaign by this state to persecute the Jews -in Germany? Is that the way you want your testimony to be understood? - -KESSELRING: A persecution of the Jews as such was not known to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that Jewish officers were excluded -from your army and from your command? - -KESSELRING: Jewish officers did not exist. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that certain officers of your -army, certain officers of the Luftwaffe, took steps to Aryanize -themselves in order to escape the effect of Göring’s decrees? Did you -know about that? - -KESSELRING: I heard rumors to that effect. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any Aryanizing, where the father was suspected of -Jewish ancestry, consisted in showing that the normal father was not the -actual father, did it not? - -KESSELRING: I admit that. Naturally there are other cases as well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. It might be that the mother was suspected of -Jewish ancestry? - -KESSELRING: That in certain exceptional cases certain facts were -overlooked. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Did you know anything about the Jewish riots, -anti-Jewish riots of November 9th and 10th in Germany in 1938? - -KESSELRING: Are you talking about the “Mirror Action” (Spiegelsache)? I -am not sure which day you are talking about. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am talking about the riots in which synagogues -were burned, which made Göring so very angry. Did you not hear about -that in 1938? - -KESSELRING: No, I did not hear anything about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where were you in 1938? - -KESSELRING: In 1938 I was in Dresden. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In November? - -KESSELRING: In November I was in Berlin as Chief of the Air Force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Berlin. And you never heard about the -anti-Jewish riots of the 9th and 10th of November 1938? - -KESSELRING: I only heard about the so-called “Mirror or Glass Campaign -(Spiegel- oder Glas-Campagne).” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was that? You have me down. I do not know -anything by that name. - -KESSELRING: That was the smashing of shop windows and more, which -assumed rather large proportions in Berlin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did hear, then, about the anti-Jewish riots? - -KESSELRING: About those, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you hear that Hermann Göring issued a -decree confiscating the insurance that was to make reparations to those -Jews who owned shops? Did you hear about Göring’s action in that -respect? - -KESSELRING: I did not quite understand. May I ask to have it repeated? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you hear about the decree passed by Hermann -Göring a few days later, November 12th, to be exact, confiscating the -insurance of the victims of those raids and fining the Jewish community -a billion Reichsmark? - -KESSELRING: It is possible that I heard about it at the time, but I now -have no certain recollection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did hear about it. You did not regard those -things as persecution? - -KESSELRING: Naturally I must regard this “Glass Campaign” as an excess -against the Jews. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have stated, as I understand you, based on your -experience with Hitler, that it was permissible for officers to differ -with him in opinion so long as they obeyed his orders. Is that what you -want understood? - -KESSELRING: I have to apologize, but I did not quite understand the last -half of that sentence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony this morning -that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make -suggestions to him and give him information, but that, after his mind -was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say -. . . - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is to say, an officer was at all times at -liberty to go to Hitler and give him technical information, such as the -state of the preparedness of his branch of the service? - -KESSELRING: Generally speaking, no. For that purpose the -commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces concerned were -the only people admitted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the only channel through which information as to -the state of the Air Force would reach Hitler was through Hermann -Göring, is that a fact? - -KESSELRING: Hermann Göring and, from time to time, State Secretary -Milch, deputy of the Reich Marshal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Hitler was about to engage in a war for which -the Luftwaffe was unprepared, based on your information of the -situation, would it or would it not have been possible for the Luftwaffe -officers to have advised Hitler of that fact? - -KESSELRING: We had complete confidence in our Reich Marshal, and we knew -that he was the only person who had a decisive influence upon Adolf -Hitler. In that way we knew, since we also knew his peaceful attitude, -that we were perfectly secure, and we relied on it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when you went into the East, did -you not, as a commander? You went into Poland and you went into Soviet -Russia, did you not? - -KESSELRING: Poland and Russia, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it not understood among the officers in -those Polish and Russian campaigns that the Hague regulations would not -be applied to Soviet Russia as to the treatment of prisoners of war? - -KESSELRING: That was not known to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a -weapon of defense, is that your testimony? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the German strength at the beginning of -the Polish campaign in various types of planes? - -KESSELRING: As I was not a member of the central board I can give you -only an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing the -historical certainty of these figures. All told, I would say we must -have had approximately three thousand aircraft. All in all, so far as I -can remember now, there were between thirty and forty bomber groups, the -same number of fighters, and there were ten groups of dive-bombers, -fighters . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you give me the number of each group? - -KESSELRING: About thirty aircraft, which would drop to seven, six or -five aircraft during the course of the day. To continue, there were ten -to twelve groups of dive-bombers, including ground “strafers” and -twin-engine fighters. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance -planes and a certain number of naval aircraft. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the proportion of bombers to fighters was -approximately two to one, was it not? - -KESSELRING: The proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one -or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and -about thirty fighter groups. If I include the twin-engine fighters, then -the figure would be about one to one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way you make up the total of about -three thousand units? - -KESSELRING. The reason why I can give you that figure is because during -these months of quiet reflection I made an estimate, without thereby -revealing the historical truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you count as a weapon of defense the -bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon? - -KESSELRING: I must speak of the bomber in the same way as the -dive-bomber and the fighter, equally as a defensive and as an offensive -weapon. I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or -offensive warfare is concerned, the task of the air force must be -carried out on the offensive and the targets are far and wide. I also -explained that an air force which has only light aircraft is doomed to -be destroyed, since it cannot attack the phases of the enemy’s aircraft -production, his air assembly areas, nor his movements in various -sectors. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive -weapon if you were on the defensive, and an offensive weapon if you were -on attack? - -KESSELRING: I did not understand the last half of the sentence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if -you were on the defensive, and as an offensive weapon if you were on -attack, is that not true? - -KESSELRING: One could put it like that. I would express it differently. -As I said, the air force is essentially an offensive weapon, no matter -whether it is used for defense or for attack. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in -the Netherlands, in Poland . . . - -KESSELRING: May I just say something else on the subject? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes. - -KESSELRING: Namely, what I said yesterday at the very end, that the -essential of an offensive air force is the long-distance four-engine -heavy bombers, and Germany had none of these. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did it come that Germany had none of those? - -KESSELRING: Firstly, because being actually in a period of danger, we -were confining ourselves to the absolute essentials of a defensive air -force only. - -Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to achieve as -much as possible by precision bombing, in other words, by dive-bombing, -utilizing the minimum of war material, and I am here thinking of the Ju -88 as a typical example of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were examined by the United States Strategic -Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June 1945? Do you recall -that? - -KESSELRING: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is quite certain, is it not? - -KESSELRING: I have often been interrogated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I ask you whether on the 28th of June 1945, -you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United -States Strategic Bombing Survey this: - - “Everything had been done to make the German Air Force from the - point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corps, signals, - and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led - to the fact that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940 at the - latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a dive-bomber viewpoint, - from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft, even - if the standard was not uniform entirely.” - -Did you not state that? - -KESSELRING: That is still my view today, that as far as material, -pursuit planes, dive-bombers, and fighters were concerned, we did in -fact have a certain advantage over the other powers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the failure to have the number of -four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was -it, or was it because of a mistake in judgment as to what the -requirements of war would be? - -KESSELRING: To that I must say the following: It would have been -insanity on the part of the Air Force leaders to consider producing a -complete air force within 3 to 4 years. It was in 1940, at the earliest, -that the possibility existed of building up an effective air force which -would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was -an amazing achievement of organization to have attained such -effectiveness under the existing limitations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood you to give as one of the indications -of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate -number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I -misunderstand you? - -KESSELRING: That is an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the -Air Force was, particularly in comparison with the small states, to be -regarded as sufficient; certainly not, however, in comparison with -powerful opponents who were fully equipped in the air. - -I have an example in mind. In a heated discussion with the Reich -Marshal, before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I asked for -reinforcements for fighters and dive-bombers. For certain reasons that -was refused. The certain reasons were, firstly, shortage of material, -and secondly, which I could also gather from the conversation, that the -Reich Marshal did not agree with this campaign. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not testify to the Bomber Investigating -Commission of the United States that you intended to build a long-range -heavy bomber but—and I quote your words: - - “We had developed the He 111 and the Ju 88 and they were - actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The - Ju 88 was then used in the French campaign and against England. - - “Question: The Ju 88 is not really a long-range bomber?” - -Your answer: - - “It was considered a long-range bomber at that time, but - unfortunately we had a low opinion of the four-engine aircraft, - and an erroneous belief which proved to be a mistake in the - course of later years.” - -Is that true? - -KESSELRING: That was my opinion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reason you did not build the four-engine -aircraft was your low opinion of it? - -KESSELRING: May I say the following: That was the conception of a -service department; the decisions in all these questions were made in -the highest service department. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The highest service department made a mistake about -the utility of the four-engine bomber? - -KESSELRING: Well, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say -that the absence of a four-engine bomber became extremely awkward. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the highest authority in aircraft -production was Hermann Göring. He was the head of the whole plan of -aircraft production, was he not? - -KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct but it did not exclude the fact that -erroneous conceptions of certain measures for the conduct of war or -organizational measures may exist temporarily. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in the Polish campaign you have said? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that the German Air Force made the -decisive contribution to that campaign as regards the time taken to -conquer Poland? - -KESSELRING: From the point of view of the Air Force officers I must -agree with that conception absolutely, but the army officers did not -quite share it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are testifying now as to your opinion. -And in that campaign you developed the technique of low-level attacks by -fighters, light bombers, and dive-bombers against marching columns, and -the dive-bomber, the light bomber, and the fighters all contributed to -the success of that movement. - -KESSELRING: I must admit that. The foundations of the short-range -bombing technique were certainly laid during the Polish campaign. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I turn now to the French campaign. You were in the -air in the French campaign, were you not? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Air Force contributed decisively to the -success of that campaign, did it not? - -KESSELRING: From the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must -consider that view as correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would -not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there? -That is true, is it not? - -KESSELRING: Dunkirk, did you say? I did not quite understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Dunkirk. - -KESSELRING: Yes. In my opinion, that is certain, and it would have been -even more so if bad weather had not considerably hindered our -operations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, the catastrophe would have increased for -the English except for bad weather. You had the air force to do a better -job at Dunkirk than you did, from your point of view? - -KESSELRING: We were grounded for about 2 days. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were one of the principal advocates of the plan -to invade England, were you not? - -KESSELRING: Personally I am of the opinion that, if the war against -England was to be brought to a successful end, this end could only be -achieved for certain by invasion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had an adequate Air Force after having -defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated -France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, -did you not? - -KESSELRING: I must give an explanation on that point. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First tell me if that is true. - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you please understand that you must answer -the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, -or nearly every question, admits of either an affirmative or negative -answer, and you will kindly give that answer and make your explanation -afterwards. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not advocate the invasion of England, and -was not the Air Force ready to invade England? - -KESSELRING: Subject to certain conditions, considering the existing air -situation at that time the Air Force was ready to fulfill that task. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you recommended very strongly to the Reich -Marshal that the invasion take place immediately after Dunkirk, did you -not? - -KESSELRING: Yes, and I still advocated that view later on too. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this -invasion were complete, and the invasion was called off only because the -procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true? - -KESSELRING: Yes. I have to supplement the previous statement by saying -that, of course, a certain interval between the French campaign and the -English campaign would have had to elapse in order to effect the -material replenishment of the air force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey -that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets, -including industrial production, but also the bombing of political -targets. Is that true? - -KESSELRING: After a certain date, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, to paralyze the government of the enemy. -That is what you meant by a political target, did you not? - -KESSELRING: That is not what I mean by political targets. I answered the -question differently; I understood it differently, namely, that this -order became effective at a later date. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended the speech made by Hitler in August of -1939? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time you were informed that the attack on -Poland would commence immediately or very soon? - -KESSELRING: During that conference, the final decision to commence the -Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Negotiations were still in -progress and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable -results. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were ordered on the 15th of August to get the -Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland? - -KESSELRING: This order as such is not known to me in detail, but I must -admit that for months before we had made air preparations and erected -bases in a general defensive direction, always thinking of a defensive -situation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You expected Poland to attack Germany in the air? -Is that your point? - -KESSELRING: At any rate, we took this possibility into consideration on -our side. The whole political situation was too unknown for us to be -able to form a pertinent, incontestable judgment on it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that you never held conferences with -Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians, -in substance, have you not? - -KESSELRING: Essentially, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was not your immediate superior the Number 2 -politician of Germany? Did you not know that? - -KESSELRING: I did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I -had with the Reich Marshal were 99 percent concerned with military and -organizational problems. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that he, at all times, was one of the -leading men in Nazi politics? - -KESSELRING: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you knew of the order to shoot -Soviet Commissars? - -KESSELRING: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you did not approve it and did not carry -it out. - -KESSELRING: I did not answer to that effect yesterday. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you answer? - -KESSELRING: I answered as follows: That the Air Force, which was not -fighting on the ground, was not concerned with this problem, and that an -official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who executed that order? Who was expected to -execute it? - -KESSELRING: I was in Russia only until November 1941 and I can give you -no information on it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever hear of the SS? - -KESSELRING: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And is it not a fact that the execution of that -order was committed to the SS? - -KESSELRING: I knew nothing about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you think the SS existed for? - -KESSELRING: In my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military -operations, was a special section of the Army, indeed a sort of guard of -the Army. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The SS was to guard the Army, or to guard whom? - -KESSELRING: No, but the SS divisions were, purely from the point of view -of men, numbers and material, well above the average Army division as -far as equipment and readiness were concerned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was commanding the SS? - -KESSELRING: The SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions -were used within the army, they were tactically under the army -commanders, commanders of the army groups, or the corps headquarters -staffs to which they were attached. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So far as they had special missions, they were -under the command of Himmler, is that right? - -KESSELRING: Yes, certainly; a very clear distinction. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified yesterday that you did not consider -Hitler’s Commando Order binding on you, and that you did not carry out -that order, is that right? - -KESSELRING: In the Mediterranean theater, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that because the order left discretion in your -hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands? - -KESSELRING: I made those reservations myself, firstly for ideological -considerations, and secondly because in the Mediterranean I had, as I -said yesterday, a twofold command, and the German orders could not be -included in the general administration without modification. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, the extent to which an order of that -kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of -the officer who received it, did it not? - -KESSELRING: I would like to express it somewhat differently. These -orders could be interpreted in different ways—that Commando Order, for -instance—insofar as it was certainly quite possible for the -Commander-in-Chief to consider an operation either as a special task or -as a tactical measure which was militarily justified. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in command of the forces in Italy at this -time, were you not, at the time of the Commando Order? - -KESSELRING: With a difference. I did not have full powers until -September 1943. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document Number 498-PS -in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-501. - -I call your attention to Paragraph Number 6 of that order which reads as -follows: - - “I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to - carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either - have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this - order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.” - -You see that paragraph in the order? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I have just read it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ever report that you were not carrying -out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether -it was being carried out? - -KESSELRING: In one special case that question was treated very -decisively at headquarters. This concerned the Commando action “Pescara” -where Adolf Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of -the fact that we, my troops and I, wanted to spare them. I think -particularly that the influence of Jodl here, as an intermediary, was -decisive; namely, that this subject was forgotten and that consequently -these people were kept alive, in hospitals and prisoner-of-war camps. - -But I should not like to call it deception, the word you used just now, -for I wish to emphasize that, in my military sector, I considered -actions of this kind as guiding orders, and this Commando Order -certainly allowed for several interpretations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the extent to which one of these -orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that -right, that Hitler could not depend on it that an order as emphatic as -this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the -German Army? - -KESSELRING: No, not that, but the situation can be explained as follows: -If, on the part of an army, such an operation is reported to a superior -as a Commando operation in the sense of that order, then the necessary -measures would have to be carried out. That depended, however, on the -way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already explained in -detail yesterday that a unified conception had gradually set in, that -men in uniform, who carried out a tactical move, were not Commandos -within the meaning of this order. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified today, and another witness has -testified here, that if an order of Adolf Hitler was resisted, it meant -death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute -Commandos, under threat of punishment if you failed, left you discretion -to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal -which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject. - -KESSELRING: I must repeat what I said before, namely, that the Italian -theater of war was not to be compared with the other theaters of war. -Through the co-operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very -obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily -be applied to the Italian theater of war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were applied everywhere, so far as you know, -except in the Italian theater, then? - -KESSELRING: That I cannot say. I have repeatedly explained that I -confined myself exclusively to my own sphere of operations, which was -considerable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified, as I understand you, that you -punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy. - -KESSELRING: As soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and -I most strictly ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to -do the same. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the punishment was very mild that you ever -inflicted for any looting, was it not? - -KESSELRING: I even went so far as to have culprits shot on the spot, and -in that manner I succeeded in remedying the disorder which had arisen. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So a German general, dealing with a German soldier, -considers shooting the proper penalty for looting? - -KESSELRING: These far-reaching conclusions are something I cannot admit. -On that subject I wish to make the following remarks: If an army—as was -the case with the 14th Army at the time—fell into a certain disorder, -the most severe measures were justified in the interests of the -reputation of that army, and in the interests of the population, in -order to bring about orderly conditions among the civilian population. I -had heated discussion at headquarters on that particular subject. - -Apart from that, I was of the opinion that all penalties eventually -became useless, and therefore, for some time I considered penalties -purely as an educational means and not really as punishment. -Consequently for some time, penalties were rather mild. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you took vigorous steps to -protect the art treasures of Italy. - -KESSELRING: Insofar as I was informed of art treasures, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What steps did you take, and against whom did you -take them? - -KESSELRING: Primarily they were preventive measures: First, by excluding -places of art and culture from the field of battle; secondly, by having -these places cleared if they were liable to air raids by the enemy; and -thirdly, by co-operating with General Wolff and having these cultural -and art treasures removed to secure places. I make mention of the art -treasures of Cassino and Florence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that any art treasure was removed from -Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin? - -KESSELRING: Much later, at Mondorf, I heard about that. At the time all -I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and -delivered to Göring from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that? - -KESSELRING: I once heard something about some statue of a saint, but I -cannot really give you any more details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Göring received such a thing from Mount -Cassino, was it a violation of your orders? - -KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was stationed in that sector. It -was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Göring, and it is clear -that there was a certain connection here, but to what extent I cannot -tell you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have a few more questions concerning your -interrogations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, Your Honors, that we will save some -duplication—perhaps save time—if I now yield to Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to -take up. I think he is in a better position to take up the examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -Witness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence? -Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer what to do to give evidence? - -KESSELRING: The individual points were communicated to me, without all -questions being directly defined. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to read you one sentence, so that you -will have it in mind, of Dr. Stahmer’s statement: - - “When Rotterdam became a battle zone in May 1940, it became a - military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled fighting - parachute troops, who had no support from the artillery, had - urgently asked for help from bombers.” - -Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind. - -KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember being asked about this incident -in the interrogation on the 28th of June, by the United States bombing -survey? Remember? - -KESSELRING: Certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say there at the question, “What about -Rotterdam?” - - “Answer: ‘First, Rotterdam had been defended in the parts which - were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice - that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought - immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was - approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of - Rotterdam.’” - -Do you remember saying that? - -KESSELRING: Approximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those -words yesterday. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to deal first with the strategic aspects. -I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and -real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, was -that not right? - -KESSELRING: That far-reaching task had not been given to me but, as I -said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to -me in such a way that close on the attack the total surrender of Holland -followed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I want you to think of your own words. This -was approved by the OKW; a firm attitude had to be taken. Was not your -purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization -of the people of Rotterdam? - -KESSELRING: That I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I -say, when I was at Mondorf, that I had to adopt a firm attitude. I -merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to -be carried out. We only had the one task, and that was to furnish -artillery support for Student’s troops. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you mean by saying that a firm attitude -had to be taken, if you did not mean that the people of Holland had to -be possibly terrorized into peace. - -KESSELRING: May I repeat in that connection that the conception of the -expression, “firm attitude,” is not in keeping with my accustomed -wording. I cannot admit that this word was in the minutes, and it was -not read out to me, either. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you think you said instead of firm -attitude, if you did not say it? - -KESSELRING: I remarked that severe measures would bring quick results. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly what I am putting to you, -Witness, “severe measures” . . . - -KESSELRING: But only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once -more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and did not act -as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with -Student’s requirements. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before I deal with the tactical -position—which I do with great pleasure—have you had to work with the -Defendant Raeder? Have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder at all? - -KESSELRING: Admiral Raeder? Only in a general way, insofar as naval -questions were concerned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to listen to the views which the -Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree -with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit Number GB-224, Document Number -C-157, and here is the transcript in Page 2735 (Volume V, Page 274). -Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind: - - “It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing - international law. However, measures which are considered - necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive - success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, - even if they are not covered by existing international law.” - -Do you agree with that? - -KESSELRING: I cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as -Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just for the moment we will deal with the -Defendant Raeder’s words. Do you agree with them? - -KESSELRING: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have an objection. I object to the earlier and to this -present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and -secondly because they do not refer to facts but opinions. The witness is -here to testify to facts. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out -carefully, to deal with what is military necessity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the -form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of -the views of the Defendant Raeder. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this -witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military -necessity. I was asking whether he did not agree with the views of one -of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the -Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of -military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a -number of fields, and I respectfully do not abandon that point, which -will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, I will come to the tactical position at -Rotterdam: Will you just tell the Tribunal who were the officers -involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major -General Student, who were in charge of the troops that were attacking -Rotterdam. Do you remember that? - -KESSELRING: Only General Student. General Schmidt is unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the evidence that is given in this case is -that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation, were actually written -out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam. I -suppose he would be General Student’s superior officer, would he not? - -KESSELRING: General Student was the senior German officer in the -Rotterdam sector and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is -unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that General Schmidt would be junior to -General Student, would he? - -KESSELRING: He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I do -not know of him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to have the times in mind: Do you -know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started? - -KESSELRING: As far as I know, in the early afternoon, about 1400 hours, -I believe. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I was going to put to you 1330. - -KESSELRING: Yes, that is quite possible. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that negotiations for a capitulation -had been in progress since 1030 in the morning? - -KESSELRING: No; as I said yesterday, I have no knowledge of these facts. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer, -Captain Backer, went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and -General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms -of capitulation at 1235? - -KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That had never been told to you? - -KESSELRING: It was not communicated to me. At least, I cannot remember -it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, Witness, it is 35 minutes before -the bombing began and . . . - -KESSELRING: The important factor would have been for Student to call off -the attack as such, but that did not happen. The cancellation never -reached me, and did not reach my unit either. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind, -and then I will ask you some questions. The terms that were discussed at -1235 were to expire; the answer was called for at 1620. After Captain -Backer left with the terms, at 1322 and 1325 two red flares were put up -by the German ground troops under General Student. Did you hear of that? - -KESSELRING: I did not hear of that either. Moreover, two red flares -would naturally not have sufficed for the purpose. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but in addition to that your ground troops -were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they -not? Will you answer the question? - -KESSELRING: I already said yesterday . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer the question? - -KESSELRING: Yes, and no. So far as I know, there was no immediate -communication between the ground station and the aircraft, but, as I -said yesterday, from the tactical force, through the ground station, to -the aircraft formation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If it had been wanted to pass the communication -to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been -done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares? - -KESSELRING: In my opinion, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am suggesting is, you see, that -everyone saw these bombers coming over. You know that. Student saw the -bombers coming over. You know that do you not? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that attack had any tactical significance -about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not? - -KESSELRING: I did not understand the final sentence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the object of this attack was merely -tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been -called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes, -could it not? - -KESSELRING: Yes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if -the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then -there could have been no doubt. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if in honest negotiations, Witness, terms of -surrender have been given and are to expire 3 hours later, it is only -demanded of a soldier that he will call off the attack, is it not? - -KESSELRING: If no other conditions have been made, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if he can stop the attack, it would have -been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my -suggestion quite clear—that this tactical matter had nothing to do with -the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam -was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the -Dutch into surrender. - -KESSELRING: May I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this -attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that I -disassociate myself completely from these political considerations. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know that General Student apologized -afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch -commander for the attack? - -KESSELRING: I do not know it and, as I explained yesterday, I saw -General Student when he was seriously injured, and I could not even talk -to him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take more time. I have put my -point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on -which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack -on Warsaw on 1 September 1939 was made because you considered Warsaw a -defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair? - -KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you know that at the same time—at 5 -o’clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September—the German Air Force -attacked Augostów, Nowy Dwor, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrów, -Radomsko, Toron, Kutno, Kraków, Grodno, Trzebinia, and Gdynia, which is -in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German Air -Force attacked these towns? - -KESSELRING: With my comrades—yes. Not the towns, I repeat, not the -towns. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, all this attack was made at 5 o’clock on -the morning of 1 September, was it not? - -KESSELRING: The attack started in the morning, but not, as you put it, -on the towns but on military targets; airfields, staff headquarters, and -traffic centers were attacked. As I have already explained, very -detailed instructions were published by the OKW that only these military -targets should be bombed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are suggesting that all these towns I had -read out were military targets? - -KESSELRING: Insofar as they were in my sector, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had not had time for a single reconnaissance -plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you? - -KESSELRING: That is correct. On the other hand, agents and others -furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation and, apart from that, -this whole plan was absolutely controlled by operational considerations -of air warfare. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, the whole plan had been worked out in -April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not? - -KESSELRING: At that time I did not even know that I was going to be -concerned in it, or that war would be declared. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not know, Witness, after you were -appointed, that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were -never told that? - -KESSELRING: That was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a -soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo many -alterations by September, and decisive alterations might still have to -be made even at the very last minute. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point I want you to have in mind. -Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland -at 9 o’clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that? - -KESSELRING: I believe I do. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 8 hours before your attack, and you -know, do you not, that the Defendant Göring had been at his secret -headquarters for a week before that, considering this matter? - -KESSELRING: That I can well imagine, if on the . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am putting to you is that this -general attack on Polish towns was again a well-planned scheme to try -and break down natural resistance for your attack? - -KESSELRING: May I say the following on that subject? If my statements as -Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are -considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not -serve any purpose. I have emphasized that it was not an attack against -towns, but an attack on military targets, and you must finally believe -me when I say that as a soldier. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal will decide as to the value of the -evidence. I am not going to discuss it. I am just going to ask you about -one or two other matters, in order to get your view on it, what you -consider to be of military necessity. You remember the orders with -regard to partisans in Italy during the time of your command? The orders -with regard to partisans? - -KESSELRING: Certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I want to put it perfectly correctly, so -tell me if I am wrong, but I understand this to be the position. The -Defendant Keitel issued a general order as to partisans on 16 December -1942. A copy was found in your headquarters or your ex-headquarters, and -your recollection is that it came to your attention later on, but you -are not quite sure of the date. Is that right? You are not quite sure of -the time? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to try, because you have had -time to consider it; do you think that Keitel’s order of December 1942 -had come to your attention before you issued your own order of 17 June -1944? Perhaps you would like to see your own order, would you? - -KESSELRING: It was read out to me; but in November, then again in -December, and subsequently in January, I requested that I should be -heard once more on these questions and these orders, as I had certain -doubts about the issuing of these orders, the distribution, the persons -to whom they were sent, and the date. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will pass you the orders, Witness, -because you ought to see them and recall them to your recollection. I do -not think they have been put in before. Let us take first Defendant -Keitel’s order of 16 December 1942. - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -I hope I have passed you the right document. Does it read—I will read -it very slowly. - - “The Führer has therefore ordered that: - - “1. The enemy employs, in partisan warfare, communist-trained - fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more - than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing - to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva - Convention. If the fight against the partisans in the East, as - well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means, - we will shortly reach the point where the available forces are - insufficient to control this area. - - “It is therefore not only justified, but it is the duty of the - troops to use all means without restriction, even against women - and children, as long as it insures success. Any consideration - for the partisans is a crime against the German people.” - -Do you remember that order? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you in turn issued an order on the 17th of -June 1944 when you were commanding in Italy? Do you remember that? I -will show you in one moment, if I can get the German copy out of the -file. I will just read a short passage again so that the Tribunal will -have it in mind; but Witness, please refer to any other passage because -I want to give a fair effect of the order: - - “1. The partisan situation in the Italian theater, particularly - central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent that - it constitutes a serious danger to the fighting troops and their - supply lines, as well as to the war industry and economic - potential. The fight against the partisans must be carried on - with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I - will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in - the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against - partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good, that - a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders is - better than failure or neglect to act.” - -Do you remember that, Witness? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I remember that order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember 3 days later, so that there -will be no mistake as to what you meant, you issued this further one, -another top-secret order. Reading the third line after saying, “The -announcement does not represent an empty threat,” you say: - - “It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt - the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by - partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted must - also give details of countermeasures taken. Wherever there is - evidence of considerable numbers of partisan groups, a - proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested; - and in the event of an act of violence being committed, these - men will be shot.” - -Now, I just want only to take two examples, Witness, of the way that -that was carried out. You remember when one of your officers, Colonel -Von Gablenz, was captured by partisans; do you remember? - -KESSELRING: General Von Gablenz? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think he was a colonel at this stage, it was -the 26th of June, just after your order. You remember Colonel Von -Gablenz being captured, do you? - -KESSELRING: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a colonel of the lines of communication; -not a very important officer, but still a colonel. - -KESSELRING: Yes, I remember. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at these two documents. Is this -right?—this is an extract from the daily situation report by the -Commander-in-Chief of Southwest Italy for the 26th of June. - - “Partisan situation. North of Arezzo, Colonel Von Gablenz, a - member of the staff of the officer commanding lines of - communication, area 10th Army, was captured by bandits. The - entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road - concerned was taken into custody.” - -It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the -captured colonel were not set free within 48 hours. Remember that? - -KESSELRING: Not in detail, but in general . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, but do you remember the incident? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at the next bit which is the 2-day -situation report, the report for 2 days later, the 28th of June, the -second paragraph: “As reprisal for the capture of Colonel Freiherr Von -Gablenz, so far 560 persons, including 250 men, have been taken into -custody.” - -Is that your conception of what is meant by “steps necessary to deal -with partisan warfare” that 410 women and children should be taken into -custody? - -KESSELRING: That was not necessary, but in connection with this I may -. . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take one other example. You remember -Civitella? You remember what was done with Civitella by your forces, do -you not? - -KESSELRING: At the moment, no. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you what was done at -Civitella—that was on the 18th of June, one day after your order. - - “Two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight - with partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals, - the inhabitants evacuated the village, but when the Germans - discovered this, punitive action was postponed. On June - 29”—that, you will remember, Witness, was 9 days after your - proclamation to reinforce your order—“when the local - inhabitants were returned and when feeling secure once more, the - Germans carried out a well-organized reprisal, combing the - neighborhood. Innocent inhabitants were often shot on sight. - During that day 212 men, women, and children in the immediate - district were killed. Some of the dead women were found - completely naked. In the course of investigations, a nominal - roll of the dead has been compiled and is complete with the - exception of a few names whose bodies could not be identified. - Ages of the dead ranged from 1 year to 84 years. Approximately - one hundred houses were destroyed by fire. Some of the victims - were burned alive in their homes.” - -That is the report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the -incident. Now, Witness, do you really think that military necessity -commands the killing of babies of 1 and people of 84? - -KESSELRING: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want to acquaint you with one -subject which you have dealt with yourself, that is the position of the -Hermann Göring Division. You mentioned one of the persons I have in -mind, but let me just, in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, get -clear who your officers were at that time. - -Did General Vietinghoff—sorry, I think it was Von Vietinghoff—did he -command the 10th Army? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1944? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he directly under your orders? - -KESSELRING: Yes, he was under my command. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I take it he is a fairly senior and -responsible general. I do not know his rank—full general or . . . - -KESSELRING: Full general. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under him was the 76th Corps, was it not, -commanded by General Herr; is that correct? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under General Herr was a Hermann Göring -Division, commanded by General Schmalz, whom you mentioned this morning; -is that right? - -KESSELRING: General Von Schmalz commanded, but previously I mentioned -another name. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it was Schmalz at this time. Now, the -Hermann Göring Division had been concerned in a number of three—I call -them incidents; I would not say—what I mean by incidents is the sort of -thing which I have been describing at Civitella. Let me remind you of -one or two. Do you remember at Stia, on the 13th to the 18th of April, -137 civilians were killed, including 45 women and children; do you -remember that incident? Civitella, that was on the 29th of June. And do -you remember Buchini on the 7th and 9th of July; do you remember an -incident at Buchini? - -KESSELRING: It is possible, but I would have to study the details first. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you will remember this. I will put it to -you generally, Witness, because it is a perfectly general course of -conduct, and there were a number of these incidents in which the Hermann -Göring Division was engaged. Do you remember that? - -KESSELRING: There were many incidents like that on both sides, and I -would first have to study the exact details of the question. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is what I really want you to apply -your mind to. Is it correct that the Hermann Göring Division was only -under General Herr and General Von Vietinghoff for tactical purposes, -and reported each day to Berlin to Reich Marshal Göring as to what they -were doing? - -KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was under the General Command -and the Army for tactical purposes, but I must assume that, in these -questions, subordination to the General Command and the Army actually -did exist. Whether there were any matters operating outside that, I do -not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put the words exactly, and you can see -where I have the words from the way I put them: - - “The 1st Airborne Division and the Hermann Göring Division came - under the army commanders only as regards tactics; for all other - questions, on the other hand, directly under the Reich Marshal, - to whom they had to send daily reports. They were not permitted - to receive orders from the army commanders concerning criminal - proceedings, nor to report the results of such proceedings. Thus - they carried on the war against guerrillas according to - principles which to some extent deviated from those of the - Army.” - -Is that a correct statement? - -KESSELRING: That conception is correct, but the question is, perhaps, -that the word “tactics” can, of course, be understood in a somewhat -wider or narrower sense. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The word what? - -KESSELRING: Tactics. That this tactical subordination can be understood -either in a wider or a narrower sense. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, that is why I read the whole thing to -you, because it is quite clear what the person’s statement I am reading -means there, is it not? He says that they were not permitted to receive -orders from the army commanders on criminal proceedings or to report the -results, and that they carried on the war against guerrillas according -to principles which deviated from those of General Von Vietinghoff, did -they not? - -KESSELRING: This is the first time that I have heard of this, but if -another officer has said so then I must assume it is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you sure it is the first time that you -have heard about it? It is very difficult to remember every incident. -Please, do not think that I want to be offensive, but I want you to try -to remember. Did not General Herr make numerous complaints to you about -this anomalous position with regard to the Hermann Göring Division, and -did you never give any official reply to General Herr’s reports? - -KESSELRING: Numerous reports certainly did not arrive from General Herr. -There may have been verbal consultations . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your command post? - -KESSELRING: Yes. And may I add once more that such definitions of -attitude were definitely in existence within the army group. With regard -to the case concerned, I must say that I do not know whether this comes -under the heading “tactics” or belongs to another function. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not really putting the point to you -quite clearly. What I am suggesting is this: If you disagree with -“numerous,” will you accept “some,” that on some occasions General Herr -reported to you that he was in difficulties through this anomalous -position of the Hermann Göring Division? - -KESSELRING: That I can assume. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Chief of Staff at this time was General -Roettiger, was he not? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the 10th of June onwards, just over this -time, did not General Roettiger also talk to you about the position of -the Hermann Göring Division being under the special protection of Reich -Marshal Göring in Berlin? - -KESSELRING: Yes. We discussed that subject quite a lot. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as far as the particular incident, in -which the Hermann Göring Division was involved, is concerned, they took -their orders from the Defendant Göring, who is sitting at the dock, did -they not, as to how they were to treat the partisans? - -KESSELRING: I could not tell you that. Those channels bypassed me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; they bypassed you. They bypassed General -Herr, they bypassed Vietinghoff, they bypassed you, and went straight to -Berlin. That is right, is it not? - -KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. That was the special channel for the SS and -for the Hermann Göring Division. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. You see, at the moment the Tribunal is -dealing with the case of the Defendant Göring. That is why I ask you -these questions. - -Now, just one or two short points. You remember Dr. Laternser asking you -one or two questions about the High Command and the General Staff. - -Do you remember Dr. Laternser asking you some questions? - -KESSELRING: Yes, I am aware of that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I wanted just to clear one part out of the -way altogether. You must have realized, Witness, that the body that is -mentioned in this case has nothing to do with the Staff Corps of the -German Army. I think you made that clear yourself yesterday. - -KESSELRING: With what did you say? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the staff corps. You had, both in the Army -and the Air Force, a corps of officers who had gone through the Military -Academy and were staff officers of all ranks, I suppose down to captain, -had you not? - -KESSELRING: The question is not quite clear to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry. You had in both the Army and the -Luftwaffe a staff corps of officers who had been to Military Academy and -were thereafter staff officers. And they had, I think, the right of -reporting directly to the Chief of Staff if they wanted to? Is that not -so? Is that right or wrong? - -KESSELRING: That is not correct, except, as I said yesterday, as far as -education was concerned. As far as the general attitude was concerned, -the General Chief of Staff had the right to influence General Staff -officers directly; but the other way around, no. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that corps went right down, I suppose, to -captain or lieutenant, did it not? - -KESSELRING: No, captain. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that was it. May I tell you, we are -not interested in that corps at all. The Prosecution are not interested -in that corps at all. - -Now, with regard to the persons who are named in the Indictment, you -know there are nine commander-in-chief or staff positions named, and -then the Oberbefehlshaber, who commanded in certain areas or commanded -certain fleets of the Luftwaffe. You have looked at that, I suppose, -have you? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to put it shortly, Witness, so that -we would not take time. I just want you to consider this. Are not these -people who are mentioned—that is, the heads of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, -and their deputies and the Oberbefehlshaber—the officers in the German -Armed Forces who would have had most to do with the policy and planning -of wars? - -KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces -were of course the advisory organs of the Supreme Head of the State in -all military-political questions. The commanders-in-chief of Army Groups -had no influence whatever. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like you to take the case of two -examples. I think you were present at both of these. Before the attack -on Poland there was a meeting on the 22d of August, which has been -mentioned here before. Did that consist of these higher officers that I -mentioned, the heads of the various branches, and also of the -Oberbefehlshaber? - -KESSELRING: It consisted of the commanding officers of the war in that -theater. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, at that time the sector which was -going to be the subject of war was Poland. At that time the main purpose -was considering the Polish campaign, was it not? The main purpose of -that meeting, I suppose, was to consider the Polish campaign with the -possibility of a campaign against the Western Powers if they came in? - -KESSELRING: About that I can give you no information. Generally speaking -we discussed only Polish questions . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal has heard about that meeting -so often I am not going to ask about it. I am only getting from you the -people who were there. - -Now, let me remind you of another meeting. On the 9th of June 1941 there -was a conference—Barbarossa—for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you -remember that? Berchtesgaden. - -KESSELRING: Whether it was on the 9th of June, I do not know. But I did -take part in one conference. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there, and again, before the Russian -campaign, the people who were there were the holders of these supreme -positions and the Oberbefehlshaber, were they not? - -KESSELRING: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including those that had territorial commands, -like, for example, General Von Falkenhorst, who was the Army High -Commander in Norway at that time? He was there? - -KESSELRING: General Von Falkenhorst? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -KESSELRING: It is quite possible. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Stumpf of Air Fleet 5, and, if I may, I -do not know what the ranks were so I just give the names. Rundstedt, -Reichenau, Stülpnagel, Schubert, Kleist, and of course Bock, Kluge, -Guderian, Halder, Kesselring? - -KESSELRING: The latter were certainly there. As for Stumpf and -Falkenhorst, I cannot say. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that before a campaign it was customary for -the holders of these high positions to meet, was it not—to meet the -Führer? - -KESSELRING: Certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help me on one other -small point. Do you remember saying yesterday to Dr. Laternser that the -members of this alleged group were far too concerned with high matters -of strategy to have anything to do with Fifth Columnists? Do you -remember saying that, words to that effect? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if you know, but outside Germany -the name Quisling has become an ordinary word of use as an alternative -to Fifth Columnist. Did you know that? You talk about a Quisling meaning -a Fifth Columnist. You have not heard that? - -KESSELRING: No, I did not know that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know who Quisling was? - -KESSELRING: Yes, indeed I do. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like you to listen to this, -because it concerns your service. The Defendant Rosenberg in January -1940 wrote to the Führer as follows: - - “Assuming that his”—that is, Quisling—“statements would be of - special interest to the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for - aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State - Secretary Körner by the Foreign Affairs Office.” - -Did he come to you at all for aero-strategical reasons? - -KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you know that the Defendant Raeder -introduced Quisling to Hitler in December 1939? Did you know that? - -KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that the head of the German Air Force -and the head of the German Navy are important members of this group of -commanders-in-chief, are they not? - -KESSELRING: Supreme commanders, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If they were dealing with the typical columnist, -perhaps members of the group had more to do with Fifth Columnists than -you knew. - -KESSELRING: Yesterday I merely spoke from the point of view of the -supreme commanders on the front and our tasks were in a different -sphere. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think I have finished, but perhaps -your Lordship would allow me just over the adjournment to see if there -is any small point. - -My Lord, the other thing is this. I think we ought to put in these -documents to which I have referred, because the Defense may want to deal -with them later on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if they have not already been put in. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think some of the orders have not been put in. -I have read part of them into the record, and I will put them in. - -THE PRESIDENT: They must be put in and marked then. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you direct your attention to the text after -the bomb plot in Rome on 23 March 1944. Do you remember what I have in -mind—the bomb plot in Rome? Remember? At that time your Chief of Staff -was General Westphal, and he reported the plot directly to General -Buettler? Perhaps you will help me as to the pronunciation? - -KESSELRING: Winter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General what? - -KESSELRING: General Winter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t he report to a General Buettler, spelled -B-u-e-t-t-l-e-r? - -KESSELRING: Von Buttlar. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar? - -KESSELRING: That was his predecessor. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar informed your Chief of Staff -that he would have to report the matter to the Führer, is that right? - -KESSELRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he got in touch with the Defendant Jodl, and -the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel reported the matter to the -Führer? - -KESSELRING: That is probably correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer gave an order that either 20 or -10—you aren’t quite sure which, but you rather think 20—Italians -should be killed? - -KESSELRING: I believe that that is a report from Westphal, which I must -assume is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember, Witness, whether it was 20 or -10 now? - -KESSELRING: I assume 10, I do not know the exact number. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know the exact number? - -KESSELRING: I assume 10. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take it as 10 for the moment. - -The competent authority for Rome was General Von Mackensen, was it not? - -KESSELRING: General Mackensen was Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Army, -and the commander of Rome was subordinate to him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the person, to use your words, who advised -him on this matter was a man called Kappler, wasn’t he? - -KESSELRING: Kappler, of the Security Service. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was he? An Obergruppenführer or something -like that? - -KESSELRING: Obersturmbannführer. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember, after some comments in the -_Osservatore Romano_ you had an inquiry directed into the incident by -your intelligence officer whose name was Zolling, don’t you? - -KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you also got a report from Kappler himself, -did you not? - -KESSELRING: Kappler merely had a brief report relayed to me by telephone -to the effect that he had a corresponding number of condemned men -available. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t Kappler tell you that he had executed 382 -people? - -KESSELRING: The execution lay in the hands of the 14th Army and I -finally received merely the news of its being carried out without any -further explanation, and had no direct conversation with Kappler. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you sure of that? - -KESSELRING: At the end—I expressly emphasize this once more—I -conversed with him briefly by telephone, after I had arrived at my -command post and this report had been given me, as I said earlier. -Otherwise I can recall no further direct communication. I do remember -that perhaps 8 or 10 days later I met him and I told him that I was to a -certain extent grateful to him that this very distasteful matter had -been settled in a way which was legally and morally above reproach. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what you had to be grateful for. You -were interrogated about this on the 8th of January. Do you remember -being asked this question? “Then Zolling didn’t tell you that all this -number that was executed had previously been convicted of some crime -punishable by death?” And you answered, “Yes, I said that already. Yes, -he did that. Even Kappler had told me that.” - -KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So the explanation which you say was given to -you was that they took a number of people, 382 I suggest, who had been -guilty of other crimes and executed them as a reprisal for the bomb -plot, isn’t that right? - -KESSELRING: That is correct, on the assumption that these people had -been sentenced to death. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This has already been put to you. This is -Kappler’s account—that of the 382, 176 had committed acts punishable by -death; 22 were people whose cases were marked “closed”; 17 had been -sentenced to terms of labor; 4 had actually been condemned to death; 4 -had been arrested near the scene of the crime. That made 223. - -Didn’t Kappler say to you, “Later the number of victims rose to 325 and -I decided to add 57 Jews?” Didn’t Kappler give you these figures? - -KESSELRING: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you agree with this, that a large number of -persons were executed in consequence of the order to kill 10 Italians, -or maybe 20 Italians, for one German who had been killed? - -KESSELRING: I admit that, on the assumption, as I have already stated, -that these were people who had already been convicted. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it didn’t make any difference to you whether -they had been convicted for the bomb outrage or for any other offense? - -KESSELRING: The situation was as follows: The Garigliano battle had -begun to rage on the Southern Front. At that time a bomb attack was made -on a police company by people of Rome, who had been treated with -unparalleled mildness until then. The excitement on the German side was -such that I, as well as the officers under my command, including Embassy -Counsellor Moellhausen, had to do anything we could to calm the -agitation. Therefore on the one side, and on the other, something had to -be done—something which seemed to me the most expedient measure for -preventing such incidents, namely a public humiliation, a notification -that nothing could be undertaken against the German Army without -consequences being faced. For me that was the essential point; whether X -or Y was involved in this outrage was for me a question of small -importance. This alone was of primary importance—that public opinion -should be quieted in the shortest possible time, on the Roman as well as -on the German side. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your prior point was to take a third attitude, -or some people might say, “terrorize” the population, so that they would -not repeat or do anything against the German Army. - -KESSELRING: I do not know—this expression comes from the Rotterdam -examination. As far as I know and believe I did not use this expression. -I have to repeat that I stood, if I may say so, on ideally friendly -terms with the Italians—for this very reason I was called to Italy—and -that I had the most compelling reason to win friendship and not to sow -enmity; and I intervened there, and certainly in a decisive way, only -because it was a matter of cutting off the root of this evil growth -within a short time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I asked you various questions about your acts of -friendship to the Italians this morning and I am not going back to them. -I only want to ask you one other point about which perhaps you will be -able to relieve my mind. On the 2d of November 1943 were you the -commanding general in Italy, that is, after you became . . . - -KESSELRING: May I add something to the first point? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You must come on to this point, and I want you -to tell whether you were the commanding general in Italy on the 2d of -November 1943? Were you? - -KESSELRING: Since November, since 2 November 1943? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember sending a telegram to the OKW -that three British Commandos taken prisoner near Pescara were to be -given special treatment? That means murder, “special treatment”; it -means that they were killed by the SS. - -KESSELRING: No. I beg your pardon . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you mean by “special treatment”? - -KESSELRING: That these people at Pescara, as I have already mentioned -once today, were not shot, but rather the wounded were taken to a -hospital and, as far as I recall, the unwounded to a prisoner-of-war -camp. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There were nine others who were taken to a -hospital and three, according to your telegram got “special treatment” -and nine others were taken to hospitals. I was going to ask you about -those taken to hospitals. What did you do with people who came under the -Commando Order who were taken to hospitals? - -KESSELRING: As I have already stated before, they were treated according -to the principles of the Hague Convention as generally practiced. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue with you whether -the Commando Order was in accordance with the Hague Convention. We know -what the Commando Order was, that people taking in Commandos were to be -shot. What I am asking you is, supposing some Commandos had the -misfortune to be wounded, what happened to them? - -KESSELRING: According to the text of this order they would have to be -shot. I stated before that this order in this case—I assume with the -collaboration of General Jodl—was carried out in the normal fashion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is heard evidence in this Court that in -Vilna it was the practice of the SS to kill offhand newborn Jewish -babies in hospitals. Can you give me your assurance that Commando troops -who were wounded and taken to hospitals were not killed offhand. - -KESSELRING: I assure you that I was not informed of any execution of -this sort and would also not have tolerated it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish any further cross-examination? -Then, Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine? - -DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has just submitted new facts which -were not known until now, especially about the shooting of hostages, -which was carried out in Italy by the Hermann Göring Division in -connection with the combating of partisans and for which the Defendant -Göring apparently is to be made responsible. In this connection new -documents were submitted. At the moment I am not in the position to -answer these facts and these serious charges, and to put pertinent -questions to the witness. - -After a careful examination of the material, I shall submit the -appropriate motions and I ask for the opportunity to make a statement as -to whether I need further witnesses and have to recall the witness -Kesselring. - -I shall of course limit myself to submitting only absolutely necessary -requests for evidence within the framework of the accusations just made, -in order to prevent an unnecessary prolongation of the trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks that you must re-examine -the witness now and that if you wish to make an application hereafter to -recall the witness you will have to show very strong grounds for doing -it. You may make written application to recall the witness at a later -stage, but I would point out to you that the cross-examination of this -witness has not been relevant solely to the case of the Defendant -Göring. He is a member of the General Staff and, as it was pointed out -to him at the opening of one part of the cross-examination, he is one of -the accused persons as such, and the evidence, therefore, may be -relevant to Göring, or it may have been relevant to the General Staff. -Is that clear to you? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, I quite follow; but I can naturally put questions to a -witness only if I am in possession of the facts. I am not in such a -position today because documents were referred to which are completely -unknown to me, and, as far as I know, the Prosecution has the intention -of making this material available to us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Documents were put to the witness and, as I say, the -Tribunal will consider any application which you make hereafter to have -this witness recalled, but you may continue now with your re-examination -and finish with the witness. - -DR. STAHMER: At present I have no further questions to address to the -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this morning I have noted that the witness -has been called a defendant twice, once by a member of the Prosecution -and now in your statement. First of all, the witness has appeared here -as a witness, and moreover not the individual member of the group but -rather the group itself is indicted, so that it cannot be correct to -call the witness a defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, possibly it was inaccurate to call him an -accused person, but he is a member of the General Staff. I rather think -that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe made it clear that he meant only a member of -the group which the Indictment asked the Tribunal to declare criminal. -That is all that is meant, and I was only pointing out to Dr. Stahmer -that the questions which have been asked were not necessarily relevant -to the Defendant Göring, but might be relevant and relevant alone to the -case of the General Staff. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I fully understand the position of the -individual generals. I just wished to prevent the generals being called -defendants now, which they are not. For that I wanted to have evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. STAHMER: If the High Tribunal agree, I wish to call the former Reich -Marshal, Defendant Hermann Göring, to the witness stand. - -[_The Defendant Göring took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your name please? - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING (Defendant): Hermann Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: When were you born and where? - -GÖRING: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Rosenheim, Bavaria. - -DR. STAHMER: Give the Tribunal a short account of your life up to the -outbreak of the first World War, but briefly, please. - -GÖRING: Normal education, first a tutor at home; then cadet corps, then -an active officer. A few points which are significant with relation to -my later development: The position of my father as first Governor of -Southwest Africa; his connections at that time, especially with two -British statesmen, Cecil Rhodes and the elder Chamberlain. Then the -strong attachment of my father to Bismarck; the experiences of my youth, -half of which was spent in Austria to which I already felt a close -attachment, as to a kindred people. At the beginning of the first World -War I was a lieutenant in an infantry regiment. - -DR. STAHMER: With what rank did you participate in the first World War? - -GÖRING: As I just mentioned, at first as a lieutenant in an infantry -regiment in the so-called border battles. From October 1914 on I was an -aircraft observer. In June 1915 I became a pilot, at first with a -reconnaissance plane, then for a short time with a bomber and in the -autumn of 1915 I became a fighter pilot. I was seriously wounded in -aerial combat. After recovery I became the leader of a fighter squadron, -and after Richthofen was killed I became the commander of the then -well-known “Richthofen Squadron.” - -DR. STAHMER: What war decorations did you receive? - -GÖRING: First the Iron Cross Second Class, then Iron Cross First Class, -then the Zähring Lion with Swords, the Karl Friedrich Order, the -Hohenzollern with Swords Third Class, and finally the Order Pour le -Mérite, which was the highest decoration possible. - -DR. STAHMER: Tell the Tribunal when and under what circumstances you -came to know Hitler. - -GÖRING: I should like to mention one basic fact in advance. After the -collapse in the first World War I had to demobilize my squadron. I -rejected the invitation to enter the Reichswehr because from the very -beginning I was opposed in every way to the republic which had come to -power through the revolution; I could not bring it into harmony with my -convictions. Shortly afterwards I went abroad to find a position there. -But after a few years I longed to get back to my own country. First, I -spent quite some time at a hunting lodge in the mountains and studied -there. In some way I wanted to participate in the fate of my country. -Since I could not and would not do that as an officer for the reasons -mentioned above, I had first of all to build up the necessary -foundation, and I attended the University of Munich in order to study -history and political science. I settled down in the neighborhood of -Munich and bought a house there for my wife. Then one day, on a Sunday -in November or October of 1922, the demand having been made again by the -Entente for the extradition of our military leaders, at a protest -demonstration in Munich—I went to this protest demonstration as a -spectator, without having any connection with it. Various speakers from -parties and organizations spoke there. At the end Hitler, too, was -called for. I had heard his name once before briefly and wanted to hear -what he had to say. He declined to speak and it was pure coincidence -that I stood nearby and heard the reasons for his refusal. He did not -want to disturb the unanimity of the demonstration; he could not see -himself speaking, as he put it, to these tame, bourgeois pirates. He -considered it senseless to launch protests with no weight behind them. -This made a deep impression on me; I was of the same opinion. - -I inquired and found that on the following Monday evening I could hear -Hitler speak, as he held a meeting every Monday evening. I went there, -and there Hitler spoke in connection with that demonstration, about -Versailles, the treaty of Versailles, and the repudiation of Versailles. - -He said that such empty protests as that of Sunday had no sense at -all—one would just pass on from it to the agenda—that a protest is -successful only if backed by power to give it weight. Until Germany had -become strong, this kind of thing was of no purpose. - -This conviction was spoken word for word as if from my own soul. On one -of the following days I went to the office of the NSDAP. At that time I -knew nothing of the program of the NSDAP, and nothing further than that -it was a small party. I had also investigated other parties. When the -National Assembly was elected, with a then completely unpolitical -attitude I had even voted democratic. Then, when I saw whom I had -elected, I avoided politics for some time. Now, finally I saw a man here -who had a clear and definite aim. I just wanted to speak to him at first -to see if I could assist him in any way. He received me at once and -after I had introduced myself he said it was an extraordinary turn of -fate that we should meet. We spoke at once about the things which were -close to our hearts—the defeat of the fatherland, and that one could -not let it rest with that. - -The chief theme of this conversation was again Versailles. I told him -that I myself to the fullest extent, and all I was, and all I possessed, -were completely at his disposal for this, in my opinion, most essential -and decisive matter: the fight against the Treaty of Versailles. - -The second point which impressed me very strongly at the time and which -I felt very deeply and really considered to be a basic condition, was -the fact that he explained to me at length that it was not possible -under the conditions then prevailing to bring about, in co-operation -with only that element which at that time considered itself -national—whether it be the political so-called nationalist parties or -those which still called themselves national, or the then existing -clubs, fighter organizations, the Free Corps, _et cetera_—with these -people alone it was not possible to bring about a reconstruction with -the aim of creating a strong national will among the German people, as -long as the masses of German labor opposed this idea. One could only -rebuild Germany again if one could enlist the masses of German labor. -This could be achieved only if the will to become free from the -unbearable shackles of the Treaty of Versailles were really felt by the -broad masses of the people, and that would be possible only by combining -the national conception with a social goal. - -He gave me on that occasion for the first time a very wonderful and -profound explanation of the concept of National Socialism; the unity of -the two concepts of nationalism on the one hand and socialism on the -other, which should prove themselves the absolute supporters of -nationalism as well as of socialism—the nationalism, if I may say so, -of the bourgeois world and the socialism of the Marxist world. We must -clarify these concepts again and through this union of the two ideas -create a new vehicle for these new thoughts. - -Then we proceeded to the practical side, in regard to which he asked me -above all to support him in one point. Within the Party, as small as it -was, he had made a special selection of these people who were convinced -followers, and who were ready at any moment to devote themselves -completely and unreservedly to the dissemination of our idea. - -He said that I knew myself how strong Marxism and communism were -everywhere at the time, and that actually he had been able to make -himself heard at meetings only after he had opposed one physical force -disturbing the meeting with another physical force protecting the -meeting; for this purpose he had created the SA. The leaders at that -time were too young, and he had long been on the lookout for a leader -who had distinguished himself in some way in the last war, which was -only a few years ago, so that there would be the necessary authority. He -had always tried to find a “Pour le Mérite” aviator or a “Pour le -Mérite” submarine man for this purpose, and now it seemed to him -especially fortunate that I in particular, the last commander of the -“Richthofen Squadron,” should place myself at his disposal. - -I told him that in itself it would not be very pleasant for me to have a -leading part from the very beginning, since it might appear that I had -come merely because of this position. We finally reached an agreement -that for 1 to 2 months I was to remain officially in the background and -take over leadership only after that, but actually I was to make my -influence felt immediately. I agreed to this, and in that way I came -together with Adolf Hitler. - -DR. STAHMER: And when was that? - -GÖRING: The end of October or the beginning of November 1922. - -DR. STAHMER: The end of October? - -GÖRING: Either the end of October or the beginning of November 1922. - -DR. STAHMER: And then you officially entered the Party? - -GÖRING: Yes, that was the same date. Just a few days after that I signed -up. - -DR. STAHMER: What tasks did Hitler then give you, that is, say, until -November 1923? - -GÖRING: The tasks arose from my position, which at that time had the -title “Commander of the SA.” At first it was important to weld the SA -into a stable organization, to discipline it, and to make of it a -completely reliable unit which had to carry out the orders which I or -Adolf Hitler should give it. Up to that point it had been just a club -which had been very active, but which still lacked the necessary -construction and discipline. - -I strove from the beginning to bring into the SA those members of the -Party who were young and idealistic enough to devote their free time and -their entire energies to it. For at that time things were very difficult -for these good men. We were very small in number and our opponents were -far more numerous. Even in those days these men were exposed to very -considerable annoyances and had to suffer all sorts of things. - -In the second place I tried to find recruits among workmen, for I knew -that among workmen particularly I should enroll many members for the SA. - -At the same time we had naturally to see to it that the meetings of the -Party, which generally were limited at that time to Munich, Upper -Bavaria and Franconia, could actually be carried through in a -satisfactory manner, and disturbances prevented. In most cases we -succeeded. But sometimes we had a strong party of our opponents present. -One side or the other still had weapons from the war and sometimes -critical situations arose, and in some cases we had to send the SA as -reinforcements to other localities. - -In the course of the year 1923 the contrast between Bavaria and the -Reich became even stronger. One could see that the Bavarian Government -of that time wanted to go a different way to that of the Reich -Government. The Reich Government was influenced strongly by Marxism, but -the Bavarian Government was free from that, it was bourgeois. - -Then suddenly the Bavarian Government was completely transformed when a -governor general—I believe he was called that—or something of the -sort, was appointed for Bavaria. It was Von Kahr, to whom the Bavarian -Government was subordinate and to whom the Bavarian Government delegated -all authority. Shortly after that the Reichswehr conflict developed. The -7th Reichswehr Division, which was stationed in Bavaria, was released -from its oath to the Reich, which it had sworn to the Reich -Constitution—I do not know its name any longer—that is to Von Kahr. -This led to the conflict of the Generals Von Seeckt and Lossow. The same -thing happened with the Bavarian police. - -The Bavarian Government at the same time curried favor with the -so-called national associations which were in part organized along -military or semi-military lines and also possessed weapons. The whole -thing was directed against Berlin and, as we expressed it, against the -“November Republic.” We could agree up to that point. - -On the Sunday, before the 9th of November, there was a large parade in -Munich. The whole Bavarian Government was there. The Reichswehr, the -police and the fatherland associations, and we too, marched past. -Suddenly, on that occasion, we saw that the figure in the foreground was -no longer Herr Von Kahr but the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. We were -very much taken aback by that. The suspicion arose among us that Bavaria -wished to follow a course which would possibly lead to a considerable -disintegration, and Bavaria might secede from the body of the Reich. But -nothing was farther from our intentions than to permit that. We wanted a -strong Reich, a unified Reich; and we wanted to have it cleansed of -certain parties and authorities which were now ruling it. - -We had become distrustful of the so-called “March on Berlin.” When this -became a certainty and Herr Von Kahr had called the well-known meeting -in the Bürgerbräukeller, it was high time to frustrate such plans and to -guide the whole undertaking in the direction of the “Greater Germany” -idea. Thus the events of 9 November 1923 materialized in very short -time. But as far as I personally am concerned, I was—and I never made a -secret of this—ready from the beginning to take part in every -revolution against the so-called November Republic, no matter where and -with whom it originated, unless it originated with the Left, and for -these tasks I had always offered my services. - -Then I was severely wounded at the Feldherrnhalle—the events are well -known—and with this incident I close this first chapter. - -DR. STAHMER: When, after that time, did you come together with Hitler -again? - -GÖRING: At first I was in a hospital in Austria. There was a trial -before the Bavarian People’s Court regarding the 9th of November. - -DR. STAHMER: Who was indicted? - -GÖRING: Hitler was indicted first of all, and naturally all those who -had been present and were apprehended. I had been in Upper Bavaria for -several days in a seriously wounded state and was then brought to the -border, was arrested there, and then the Bavarian police brought me back -to a different place. I asked Hitler at that time, whether I should -appear at the trial. He begged me urgently not to do that, and that was -a good thing. In this way the proceedings could not be held behind -closed doors, because I had made the statement that if that was done I, -for my part, would make an appropriate public statement with regard to -the trial. - -Then, after my recuperation, I spent about a year in Italy; then -elsewhere abroad. In the year 1926 or 1927 there was a general amnesty -for all the people involved in the different illegal—if I should call -them that—incidents which had occurred up to then, not only for us but -also for the Leftists and the peasants, and I could return to Germany. - -I met Hitler again for the first time in 1927 at a rather brief -conference in Berlin, where he was present. I was not active in the -Party then, rather I wanted first to provide myself with an independent -position once more. Then for months I was not in touch with Hitler -again. Shortly before the May elections of the Reichstag in 1928 Hitler -called me and told me he wanted to put me up as one of the first of the -Reichstag candidates for the National Socialist Party and asked me -whether I were willing and I said “yes,” and also whether my activity in -the Party to a still greater extent . . . - -DR. STAHMER: One question. Had you meanwhile joined the SA? - -GÖRING: No; at that time I had nothing more to do with the SA. In the -meantime there were new appointments in the SA and the new leader of the -SA, Von Pfeffer, naturally wanted to keep his position and would not -have liked to see me in close touch with the SA. - -DR. STAHMER: Then after 1923 you had no office or position in the SA? - -GÖRING: After 1923 my active position in the SA ceased. Not until after -the seizure of power, at a later date, when the so-called honorary -offices were created, did I receive, as an honorary post, the highest -rank in the SA. But to come back, in 1928 I was elected to the Reichstag -and from that time on I toured the country as a speaker for the Party. - -The SA, I do not recall in what year, had been re-established and was -now no longer limited to Bavaria, but had been extended to the whole -Reich. - -DR. STAHMER: Was it prohibited after 1923? - -GÖRING: After 1923, it was prohibited for the time being. - -DR. STAHMER: When was this prohibition rescinded? - -GÖRING: I cannot say exactly, at any rate at a time when I had not yet -returned to Germany. But in any case it had spread over all Germany and -was now urgently necessary. The parties at that time, the larger ones, -all had their so-called fighting units. Especially active, I remember, -was the Red Front, a collection of the fighting units of the Communists, -our greatest opponents, with whom we had repeated clashes and who very -often tried to break up our meetings. In addition, there was the -Reichsbanner, the organization of the Social Democrats, the Democratic -Party. Then there was the Stahlhelm; that was a nationalist organization -of the Right. And then there was our SA, which is to be mentioned in the -same connection. - -I should like to emphasize that at that time the SA often had to suffer -heavily. Most of the SA men came from the broad masses; they were minor -employees, workmen, men who took part only for idealistic reasons and -who had to give their services nights and evenings without receiving -anything in payment, and who did so only out of their real faith in the -fatherland. They were often most severely wounded and many of them were -shot in the clashes. They were persecuted by the government. They could -not be officials; an official could not join the SA. They had to endure -terrific pressure. I should like to emphasize that I had the highest -respect and affection for these men, these SA men, who were not -determined as has been pictured here, simply to do something cruel, but -who were rather men who really exposed themselves voluntarily to the -most difficult trials and vexations because of their idealism and their -aims, and renounced many things in order to realize their ideals. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your position in the Party during the period from -1928 until the seizure of power? - -GÖRING: I had no office in the Party. I was never a political leader in -the Party—that is perhaps strange—either in the Reich Party -Directorate or elsewhere. I was first of all, as I said, a member of the -Reichstag and thereby a member of the Reichstag faction of the Party. At -the same time I was the Party speaker, that is, I travelled from city to -city and tried to do whatever I could to extend the Party, to strengthen -it, to recruit and convince new members, and especially to win over to -our side Communist and Marxist adherents in order to create a broad base -among the people and not to have Rightist circles only, which were -nationalist of themselves. - -From the middle of 1932 on, after we had weathered countless elections -and for all of these elections had had to participate in the campaigns -by holding speeches, for example, often three in one evening, often the -whole night long; I, as a member of the Party, or better said, because -our Party had the strongest representation in the Reichstag, was chosen -President of the Reichstag and thereby took over a generally political -task. - -Shortly before, at the end of 1931, when I saw that the Party had grown -to an extraordinary extent and was gaining, the Führer said to me that -he would very much like to have a direct representative who was -independent of a Party office and who could carry out political -negotiations. This person was not to be tied down to any particular -Party office. He asked me whether I would take over this function, -especially as I was living in the capital of the Reich anyway. - -I took over this commission—it was not an office, but rather a -commission of a general nature. In a few sentences he gave me the -liberty to negotiate with all parties from the Communists to the extreme -Rightists, in order, let us say, to undertake specific joint action in -the Reichstag, or other suitable political steps. Naturally also I was -given in this connection, the task of effecting the dissemination and -the penetration of our ideals in all circles. To these circles belonged, -as has already been mentioned, the industrial and intellectual groups. -Since I had connections with and access to all these circles, it was -quite natural that the Führer considered me specially suited for this -task, as he could depend upon me absolutely in this respect and knew -that I would use all my powers to advance our ideas. When I became -President of the Reichstag my task in this capacity was greatly eased, -for now I was, so to speak, legally authorized and even obliged to -participate in political events. If, for instance, a government resigned -in the Reichstag or fell through a vote of no confidence, it was my duty -as President of the Reichstag, to suggest to the Reich President, after -having negotiated with the parties, what the possibilities were in my -opinion for a new coalition government. Thus the Reich President was -always bound to receive me in this capacity with regard to these -matters. So I was able to create a rather close connection between the -Reich President and myself. But I should like to emphasize that this -connection had already existed before; it was a matter of course that -Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, if I requested it, would always receive -me, because he had known me in the first World War. - -DR. STAHMER: What part did you play in the appointment of Hitler as -Reich Chancellor? - -GÖRING: I should just like to explain first that when I said that I held -no office in the Party, no political office, my position had -nevertheless naturally become stronger and stronger, especially since -the end of 1931, from which time on I worked more and more closely with -the Führer and was considered his special exponent—but only on the -basis of normal and natural authority which increased greatly after the -seizure of power. - -As to my part in the appointment of Hitler: If I am to explain this to -the Tribunal I must first describe the situation briefly. The balance -among the parliamentary parties had been disturbed as early as the end -of 1931 or the beginning of 1932. Things were going badly in Germany and -no proper enduring parliamentary majority could actually be procured, -and already the Enabling Act then in force had come into play to the -exclusion, in part, of the Constitution. I call to mind the Brüning -cabinet which had to work to a large extent with the Enabling Act and -which at the time was also greatly concerned with Article 48 of the -Reich Constitution. Then there followed the Cabinet of Von Papen, which -also could not put itself on a parliamentary basis, on a more lasting or -firmer basis. Herr Von Papen at that time tried to make that possible -and, in order to get a parliamentary basis, he asked the National -Socialists, the strongest party at that time, to establish such a basis -together with the other parties. There was some talk—Von Papen’s name -had been given to the President as a nominee for Reich Chancellor—that -Hitler should become the Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. I remember -that I told Herr Von Papen at that time that Hitler could become any -number of things, but never Vice. If he were to be made anything, he -would naturally have to be in the highest position and it would be -completely unbearable and unthinkable to place our Führer in any sort of -second position. We would then have had to play the role of governing, -but possibly not all according to our lights, and Hitler as a -representative of the strongest party would have had to be responsible -for these things. This we declined categorically. I do not emphasize -that because Herr Von Papen is in the dock with me. He knows that we -always respected him personally, but I told him then, after this gesture -had come to nought, that we would not only not support him, but would -also oppose his Cabinet in the Reichstag to the utmost, just as we would -consistently fight every succeeding cabinet which did not give us a -leading influence in the Chancellery. - -There came then—I do not remember exactly for how many months Herr Von -Papen held the reins—the well-known clash between him and me, he as -Reich Chancellor, I as the President of the Reichstag, in which it was -my intention to bring about the fall of his government, and I knew there -was to be a motion of “no confidence” by the Communists, in which -practically everybody would participate. It was necessary for this vote -of “no confidence” to be expressed under all circumstances in order to -show the Reich President that one could not govern with such cabinets -without some sort of strong reserve. I saw the “red portfolio” and knew -that the order for dissolution was in it, but let the voting be carried -through first. Thirty-two votes were for Von Papen and about five -hundred were against him. The Cabinet of Von Papen resigned. - -Up to that point all the parties had drawn up cabinets, apart from the -few small fragmentary parties. All men who were available had already -been presented to the people at some time. Towards the end, Reich -Defense Minister Von Schleicher, the political figure behind the scenes, -had played an increasingly important part. There were therefore only two -possibilities: Either the actual proportion of power would be taken into -account and the leader of the strongest party, as is generally -customary, would be brought into conferences and entrusted with the -power, or else the man who was operating behind the scenes, the only -possibility that was left, would be brought forward. And this happened. -Herr Von Schleicher himself took over the chancellorship in conjunction -with—and this is important—the office of Reich Defense Minister. It -was clear to us, not only to us but also to the other parties, that as -Herr Von Schleicher had far fewer personal sympathizers than Herr Von -Papen and could not bring about a majority, a military dictatorship was -finally aimed at by Von Schleicher. I had discussions with Herr Von -Schleicher and told him that at this moment it was even possible to form -a parliamentary majority. Through conferences I had succeeded in -bringing together the German Nationals, National Socialists, Center, -German People’s Party and smaller supporting groups, to form a majority. -It was clear to me that such a majority could be only temporary because -the conflicting interests were too great. But it was a matter of -indifference to me whether I brought our Party to power this way or -that—if by means of parliamentary negotiations, very good; if by the -Reich President’s summons, all the better. - -These negotiations were turned down by Herr Von Schleicher because he -knew that he would then not be able to remain chancellor. Then again -there were Emergency Laws and Enabling Acts. Parliament had thus been -more or less excluded even before our seizure of power. - -I immediately issued the same challenge to Herr Von Schleicher in the -Reichstag, much more emphatically than previously to Herr Von Papen. In -the meantime the presidential election had taken place and after that a -Reichstag election, in which, after the dissolution of Von Papen’s -Cabinet we lost several seats. We were reduced from 232 to 196 seats. -Then in January there were further elections, which showed an -extraordinary rise in favor of our Party and proved that the short -crisis had been surmounted and that the Party was on the upgrade more -strongly than ever before. - -On Sunday, the 22nd of January 1933—the 30th was a Monday—I was in -Dresden at a large political meeting, when I was summoned in the morning -by the Führer to motor to Berlin immediately. I arrived that afternoon, -and he told me, which I already knew, that the Reich President was no -longer satisfied with Von Schleicher and saw that political matters -could not continue in this way; nothing was ever accomplished; the Reich -President had independently arrived at the conclusion that somehow some -responsibility must now be given to the strongest Party. Before that -time, in a very clever way, a wrong personal impression of the Führer -had been created in the old gentleman’s mind and he was prejudiced—he -probably took offense at the word socialism, because he understood that -in a different way. - -Briefly, Hitler revealed to me that day, that that evening I was to -speak to the Field Marshal’s son at the home of Herr Von Ribbentrop. I -believe Herr Von Papen was to be present also and—I am not sure about -this—Meissner, who was the State Secretary of the Reich President. The -Field Marshal’s son wanted to inquire on behalf of his father what the -possibilities were of Hitler as chancellor and the inclusion of the -Party in responsibility. In a rather lengthy conversation I declared to -the son that he should tell his father that, one way or another, Von -Schleicher would lead to shipwreck. I explained to him the new basic -conditions for forming a new government, and how I had heard now of the -Field Marshal’s willingness to entrust Hitler with the chancellorship, -thereby regarding the Party as a main basis for a future government -majority if Adolf Hitler were also able to succeed on this occasion in -drawing in the German Nationals and the Stahlhelm—for he wanted to see -a definite national basis. The Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party -but it had many followers. The German Nationals under Hugenberg were a -parliamentary party. - -We did not discuss very much more that evening. I told Von Hindenburg’s -son that he could tell his father that I would undoubtedly bring that -about, and the Führer gave me orders to undertake negotiations during -the coming week with these parties on the one hand and with the Reich -President on the other. There were difficulties here and there. I found -that our conceding . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STAHMER: You were dealing with the question of your participation in -the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. Would you continue? - -GÖRING: I had arrived at the last decisive period. The negotiations had -become somewhat difficult. The Field Marshal, Reich President Von -Hindenburg, who, until then, had come to know the Führer personally only -through two conversations and who had not yet overcome his distrust of -him—a distrust which had been instilled and nourished for many years by -a variety of influences, simply because he did not know him—had at that -time demanded some severe restrictions, so that we, the strongest and -now the leading party, which would have to be responsible to the nation -for future measures, would be relatively very restricted and, in -comparison with our strength, weakly represented in the government. - -One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at the -lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million unemployed; all -programs had failed; confidence in the parties existed no more; there -was a very strong rise on the part of the revolutionary Leftist side; -and political insecurity. Therefore those measures were necessary which -the people would expect of us, if we were in the government, and for -which we had to stand. So it was a very heavy burden to take over such a -responsibility with such severe political conditions imposed. - -First condition: The Reich President wanted, under all circumstances, -that Herr Von Papen should become Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. Apart -from his sympathetic personality Herr Von Papen did not bring us -anything, because there was no party behind him. But the Reich President -demanded, beyond that, that Herr Von Papen should attend the -presentation of the reports which the Führer, after being appointed -Reich Chancellor, would have to make to the Reich President. But this -was abandoned very quickly, and by the Reich President himself. - -Secondly, the Reich President desired that the Foreign Office, -independent of all parties, should be in the hands of Herr Von Neurath. -Herr Von Neurath also brought us nothing in the way of political power, -apart from his knowledge and ability. - -Thirdly, the position of Prussian Prime Minister which, next to that of -the Reich Chancellor was always the most important in Germany during the -period after the World War, was likewise to be filled by the person of -Herr Von Papen. Before the World War, as it is known, the offices of -Reich Chancellor and Prussian Prime Minister were for these reasons -always combined in one person. - -Fourthly, the Reich President demanded that the office of Reich Defense -Minister should also be in the hands of an independent person, a -soldier; and he himself chose him, without our having anything to do -with it, namely, General Von Blomberg, who at that time was at the -Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Herr Von Blomberg was not known -personally either to the Führer or to me at that time. - -Even though the essential and definitely most important posts in the -Cabinet were thus already filled by persons in whose choice we had had -no influence, still further demands developed in the course of the week. -It was demanded that the Finance Ministry should be in the hands of -Count Schwerin von Krosigk, again a man backed by no political party. -The Ministry of Transportation was to be under Herr Von Eltz, to whom -the same applied. The leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, was to be taken -into the Cabinet. Certainly the Stahlhelm was a large and extensive -movement, but not politically, and it was not represented by a single -delegate in the Reichstag. - -There was left, as a really political party, only the German National -Party, with 36 seats—our only parliamentary ally, so to speak. Here -too, extraordinary demands were made, which were in no correct -proportion to the smallness of that party. - -In the end we, as the strongest party at that time with 232 seats, were -given only the following, as far as I remember: The office of Reich -Chancellor of course; then Dr. Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior, -in the Cabinet; and I third in the Reich Cabinet, with an assignment as -Reich Commissioner for Aviation, a very small subordinate division, an -insignificant branch of a small Aviation Department in the Ministry of -Transport, but no department otherwise. But then I succeeded in -becoming, without conditions attached, Prussian Minister of the Interior -and thereby a political minister of the largest German state, for in the -end Prussia was actually the place where the rise to internal power -started. - -It was so far an extraordinarily difficult affair. At the last moment -the forming of the Cabinet threatened to fail because of two factors. -The Führer had made the unconditional demand that shortly after the -appointment of the new Cabinet a new Reichstag election should take -place, knowing correctly that the Party would be greatly strengthened -thereby and possibly could represent a majority by itself, and thus be -in a position to form the government platform by parliamentary means. - -Hugenberg, as leader of the German National Party, absolutely opposed -this, knowing that his party would probably disappear more or less in -this election. Even 5 minutes before the meeting of the Cabinet there -was still danger that it would break up because of this. It was pure -chance that at this moment the Reich President undertook to administer -the oath to the new ministers; and so the Cabinet was formed. - -The second danger threatened from Schleicher who, through his confidant, -on the Sunday made the following offer to the Führer and me: He wanted -to emphasize that the Reich President was not a sure factor as far as -the new government was concerned; it would serve the purpose better if -he—even though he had withdrawn the day before—were to join us to form -a government now quite definitely not on a parliamentary basis of any -kind, but rather on the basis of an entirely new situation, a coalition -of the Reichswehr and the NSDAP. - -The Führer refused, recognizing that this would be impossible and that -the intentions were not honest. - -When Herr Von Blomberg arrived at the railroad station from Geneva on -the Monday morning, he was given two orders, one from Herr Von -Hammerstein, Chief of the Army Command and his superior, to come to him -immediately; the other from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come -to him immediately. There was at that time, known only to a few, the -threat of a Putsch by Schleicher and Hammerstein with the Potsdam -Garrison. - -On the Sunday evening I mentioned that to Reich President Von -Hindenburg, and that is the reason why, 2 hours before the rest of the -Cabinet, Herr Von Blomberg was appointed Minister of War, or at that -time Reich Defense Minister, in order to prevent any wrong move by the -Reichswehr. - -At 11 o’clock on the morning of the 30th the Cabinet was formed and -Hitler appointed Reich Chancellor. - -DR. STAHMER: Had the Party come to power in a legal way, in your -opinion? - -GÖRING: Of course the Party had come to power in an entirely legal way, -because the Party had been called upon by the Reich President according -to the Constitution, and according to the principles in force the Party -should have been called upon much earlier than that. The Party gained -strength and came to power only by way of normal elections and the -franchise law then valid. - -DR. STAHMER: What measures were now taken to strengthen this power after -Hitler’s appointment? - -GÖRING: It was a matter of course for us that once we had come into -power we were determined to keep that power under all circumstances. We -did not want power and governmental authority for power’s sake, but we -needed power and governmental authority in order to make Germany free -and great. We did not want to leave this any longer to chance, to -elections, and parliamentary majorities, but we wanted to carry out the -task to which we considered ourselves called. - -In order to consolidate this power now, it was necessary to reorganize -the political relationship of power. That was carried out in such a -manner that, shortly after the seizure of governmental authority in the -Reich and in Prussia, the other states followed automatically and more -or less strong National Socialist governments were formed everywhere. - -Secondly, the so-called political officials who according to the Reich -Constitution could be recalled at any time, or could be dismissed, would -naturally have to be replaced now, according to custom, by people from -the strongest party. - -As far as legality, that is, the opinion that we came to power legally, -is concerned, I should like to emphasize two considerations in -particular. - -Firstly: in the years 1925 to 1932 no fewer than 30 Reichstag, Landtag, -and presidential elections took place in Germany. The very fact that 37 -parties had candidates in one Reichstag election alone gives a clear -picture of how it happened that one strong coalition formed the -so-called government majority, and another strong grouping formed the -opposition, each with an entirely different point of view. Just think of -an opposition formed in common by Communists and National Socialists for -example, and the fact that one small party which had eight -representatives altogether was now the decisive factor, and in two -readings of a law, especially of a decisive law—every law had to have -three readings—voted against the government and then secured sufficient -political and material advantages to force the law through for the -government at its third, final reading. This may give a picture of the -conditions. - -The second point which I want to emphasize especially in regard to the -legality of our coming to power, is the following: - -Had the democratic election system of England or the United States of -America existed in Germany, then the National Socialist German Workers -Party would, at the end of 1931 already, have legally possessed all -seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every electoral -district in Germany at that time, or at the beginning of 1932 at the -latest, in every one—I emphasize this once more—the NSDAP was the -strongest party; that is to say, given an electoral system as it is in -Great Britain or in the United States all these weaker parties would -have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have had -only National Socialists in the Reich, in a perfectly legal way -according to the democratic principles of these two great democracies. - -For the further seizure of power the main political offices were now -filled by new holders, as is the case in other lands when there has been -a change-over of power among the political parties. Besides the -ministers there were first of all—taking Prussia as an example—the -administrative heads of the provinces, the official heads of -administrative districts, the police commissioners, county heads -(Landräte). In addition there was a certain further grade—I believe -down to ministerial directors—who were considered political officials. -District attorneys were considered political officials. This on the -whole describes the range of offices which were filled anew when a shift -in political power took place and had previously been bargained out -among the parties having the majority. It did not go so far as in other -countries—all the way down to the letter carrier. There was a change of -office holders, but only of the most important posts. - -In spite of that we did very little in this direction at first. First of -all, I requested Herr Von Papen to relinquish to me the position of -Prussian Prime Minister, as he, having no party behind him, could not -very well undertake this reshuffling, but rather I, that is, one of us, -should undertake it. We agreed at once. Thereupon I filled some, a -relatively small part, of the highest administrative Prussian offices -with National Socialists. At the same time I generously allowed Social -Democrats to remain in these posts for many weeks. I filled a few -important provincial offices with leading Catholic persons who were much -closer to the Center Party than to us. But slowly, by degrees, in the -course of time these offices, to the extent that they were key -administrative positions, were, of course, filled with National -Socialists—it could hardly be otherwise in the further course of the -change-over, since these offices at the same time corresponded to the -political districts. Even until the very end district heads remained in -part National Socialists, in part, however, simply officials. The same -was true of the Landräte. In the case of police commissioners, I should -like to emphasize for the information of the Tribunal that the police -commissioners at first had nothing to do with the Gestapo. A police -commissioner in the bigger cities had the same function as a Landrat in -the country, in part at least. These police commissioner posts had -always been filled by the largest political parties until the seizure of -power. Thus I found Social Democrats in these positions who could not, -with the best of intentions, remain, as they had always been our -opponents up to that date. That would have been absurd. I filled these -police commissioner posts partly with National Socialists but partly, -however, with people who had nothing to do with the Party. I remember -that to the most important police commissioner post in the whole German -Reich, the one in Berlin, I appointed Admiral Von Levetzow, retired, who -was not a member of the Party. In some of these offices I put former SA -leaders. - -For the purpose of consolidation of power, which seemed very important -not only to me but all of us because that was to form the basic -condition for our further work, a still stronger influence came into the -Reich Cabinet. New National Socialists received positions as ministers. -New ministries were created. In addition came a number of new basic -laws. - -It was indeed clear to everyone who had concerned himself with German -conditions, either abroad or especially in Germany, that we would put an -end to the Communist Party as quickly as possible. It was an absolutely -necessary consequence that it should be prohibited. We were convinced -that if the Communist Party, which was the strongest next to us, had -succeeded in coming to power, it would certainly not have taken any -National Socialists into its cabinet or tolerated them elsewhere. We -were aware that we would have been eliminated in an entirely different -manner. - -A further point in the consolidation of power was to eliminate to a -certain extent the Reichstag as a parliament, at least for a period of -time during the reorganization, because its influence was increasing -until then. That, however, had happened owing to the fact that we had an -absolute majority in the Reichstag after the new election. In some cases -we suggested to the former parties that they should dissolve themselves, -because they no longer had any purpose, and those which could not -dissolve themselves were dissolved by us. I was speaking of the -Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. Beyond that, we wanted -finally to fulfill an old, old longing of the German people and now not -only appear to have the structure of a Reich, but at last, really become -a unified German Reich. This purpose was served by firmly establishing -the Reich idea and the Reich’s power throughout the countless states and -provinces. If it had been difficult for a fervent German patriot before -the first World War to get along with a heap of petty princes, it was -even worse with those who took their places, for in the place of one -small will there now appeared the most various, party-bound officials. - -In the Reich there was a majority based on one thing; in Prussia, on -another; in Bavaria, on yet another; and in Hesse, on something quite -different. It was impossible in this manner to establish Reich -sovereignty and a Reich which could be great again. - -Therefore I suggested to the Führer that the state parliaments should be -dissolved and done away with as a matter of principle. In Prussia I -began with the elimination of state parliaments, which I considered -entirely superfluous, for the simple reason that the principle “Reich -dominion, not state authority” was already in force. I saw no reason why -so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary -frictions and discussions merely hindered constructive work. Yet, -however much I wanted to see and make the Reich structurally unified, I, -and the Führer above all, always supported the idea that within the -German states and provinces cultural life should remain many-sided and -bound to local traditions; that is to say, all the old centers of -culture, which, as is well known, had formed around Munich, Dresden, -Weimar, and so on, should continue to exist in that way and be -supported. - -For the further consolidation of power those laws were created which -would first of all eliminate any further obstacle to progress, that is -to say, on the basis of Paragraph 48, the law did away with the -so-called freedoms. The conception of these freedoms is a matter of -controversy. The “Law for the Protection of People and State” was -created, a law which was most urgently needed. In the past years much -had been prohibited which could have stimulated patriotic activity, yet -a senseless defamation had been allowed of the German people, its -history, the German State, and those symbols and objects which are, -after all, very holy things to a patriot; and they were not protected in -any way. - -It is a matter of course that in connection with the concept of -“conformity” which arose at this time, very many unnecessary and -excessive things were done, for after the seizure of power the whole -movement developed along revolutionary lines, although not in the way of -revolutions as they had been known in history until then, such as the -French Revolution, or the great Bolshevist Revolution—that is to say, -not by way of great conflicts and cruel changes, revolutionary tribunals -that executed people by hundreds of thousands—but still with a strong -revolutionary aim in the direction of unity of State, Party, and -National Socialism as the basis of leadership and of ideology. - -This “conformity” which I have just mentioned was then effected in -detail; but, as I have said, on the occasion of such drastic political -transformations people will always overstep the mark here and there. -Personally I did not consider it necessary that every organization -should now become National Socialist or that—if I am to express myself -quite drastically—every club or similar organization should absolutely -have to have a National Socialist chairman. But in decisive political -matters, and in matters of principle, our ideas and our ideology had to -be recognized more and more; for that was the basic condition for the -rebuilding, establishing, and strengthening of the Reich. - -An additional strengthening, which occurred only after the death of -Reich President Von Hindenburg in 1934, was the confirmation of the head -of the state and the Reich Chancellor in one person. To this I should -like to add that on this occasion I had a long conversation with the -Führer. Right from the beginning we had discussed whether Hitler would -and should take over the position of head of the State, and whether I -should take over the chancellorship. In view of the Führer’s temperament -and attitude it was unthinkable that the Führer, sitting on a throne -above the political clouds, so to speak, should appear only as head of -the State. He was definitely a political leader and hence a leader of -the government. Also the thought of putting in some other person as a -puppet head of the State we considered unworthy of the situation. - -The Führer told me then that the simplest thing to do would be to take -as example the United States of America, where the head of the state is -at the same time also the head of the government. Thus, following the -example of the United States, we combined the position of the head of -the State with the head of the government, and he called himself “Führer -of the German People and Reich Chancellor of the German Reich.” - -That he thereby automatically became also the Commander-in-Chief of the -German Armed Forces followed as a matter of course, according to the -Constitution, and also according to the previous Constitution, just as -is the case in other countries also. - -That was the position, broadly speaking, apart from a number of other -developments which probably will have to be mentioned later in my -testimony—as, for instance, the establishment of police power, the -basic element of the consolidation of power, and so on. - -In conclusion I wish to say: 1) It is correct that I—and I can speak -only for myself—have done everything which was at all within my -personal power to strengthen the National Socialist movement, to -increase it, and have worked unceasingly to bring it to power under all -circumstances and as the one and only authority. 2) I have done -everything to secure for the Führer the place as Reich Chancellor which -rightfully belonged to him. 3) When I look back, I believe I have not -failed to do anything to consolidate our power to such an extent that it -would not have to yield to the chances of the political game or to -violent actions, but would rather in the further course of -reconstruction, become the only factor of power, which would lead the -Reich and lead it—as we hoped—to a great development. - -DR. STAHMER: What offices did you hold after the seizure of power? - -GÖRING: First I was President of the Reichstag, as before, and I -remained that until the end. In the Reich Cabinet I was given at first -the post of Reich Minister and Reich Commissioner for Aviation, not the -Air Force. In parentheses I should like to say that from the very -beginning it was clear to me that we had to establish an air force. - -In Prussia I was given the position of the Prussian Minister of the -Interior, then on 20 April 1933, in addition, the post of Prime Minister -of Prussia. - -The Reich Commissariat for Aviation had become before this, I believe -already in March 1933, a Reich Ministry for Aviation. - -Then there were still several not very important offices, President of -the State Council, and so on. - -Important at that time, however, were the two offices of Prime Minister -of Prussia on the one hand and Minister of Aviation on the other. The -office of Prussian Minister of the Interior I handed over to the Reich -Minister of the Interior at the beginning of 1934, for it was part of -the consolidation of power and above all, of the clarification necessary -for proper governing authority in the Reich, that the Prussian -ministries should be combined with those of the Reich. Only in this way -was it possible for the Reich ministries to receive practical -information about the political work of the day and about the work of -the departments. Only through this combination was that possible. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you in your capacity as Prussian Minister of the -Interior create the Gestapo and the concentration camps which have so -often been mentioned here? When and for what purpose were they -established? - -GÖRING: I mentioned before that for the consolidation of power the first -prerequisite was to create along new lines that instrument which at all -times and in all nations is always the inner political instrument of -power, namely, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial -police. The most important was the Prussian police. This had already -been filled by our predecessors, the former parties, with their own -people, according to their political attitude. I have mentioned the -filling of the posts of police commissioners and those of the chiefs of -the main police offices within the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. -Thus it was that our opponents, our most bitter opponents, who up to -then had always opposed us most vigorously with this police power, were -still in the regional offices. - -A slight loosening up had taken place before I took charge, during the -time when the Social Democratic Braun-Severing government was replaced -by the government of Herr Von Papen. At that time the bitterest -opponents were also removed from the police. Nevertheless the most -important positions were still in the hands of definite political -opponents. I could not very well expect that those who until yesterday -were ready to employ the police with particular severity against us, -would today show the same loyalty to the new state. - -Before our time there was also a political police in Prussia. That was -Police Department Ia, and its task was first of all the supervision of -and the fight against the National Socialists, and also, in part, -against the Communists. - -Now, I could have simply put new people into this political police and -let it continue along the old lines. But the situation had changed -because of our seizure of power, for at this time, as I have mentioned -before, the Communist Party was extraordinarily strong. It had over 6 -million voters, and in its Red Front Organization it had a thoroughly -revolutionary instrument of power. It was quite obvious to the Communist -Party that if we were to stay in power for any length of time, it would -ultimately lose its power. - -Looking back, the danger positively existed at that time of political -tension, and with [an] atmosphere of conflict, that revolutionary acts -might have taken place on the part of the Communists, particularly as, -even after we came to power political murders and political shootings of -National Socialists and policemen by that party did not stop, but at -times even increased. Also the information which I received was such -that I was made extremely fearful of a sudden swing in that direction. -Therefore with this department as it was, I could not ward off that -danger. I needed reliable political police not only in the main office, -but also in the branch offices. I therefore had to enlarge this -instrument. - -In order to make clear from the outset that the task of this police was -to make the State secure I called it the Secret State Police, and at the -same time I established branch offices of this police. I took in a great -number of political officials who were experienced, and at the beginning -took fewer people from the Party circles because for the time being I -had to attach importance to professional ability. - -I also wanted this police to be concerned exclusively with protecting -the State, first of all against its enemies. And the leader whom I -selected for this police force was not from the Party but came from the -former police. He, Diels, was already there at that time as -Oberregierungsrat and later as Ministerialrat, and likewise the main -chiefs of the Gestapo were officials who were not from the Party. Later -the Party element appeared in the police more and more. Their mission -was first of all to create as quickly as possible all assurance of -security against any action from the left. - -I know—as was afterwards proved—that the headquarters of the -Communists in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was strongly fortified and -contained very many arms; we had also at that time brought to light very -strong connections between the Russian Trade Delegation and the German -Communist Party. Even if I arrested, as I did, thousands of communist -functionaries at one blow, so that an immediate danger was averted at -the outset, the danger as such was by no means eliminated. It was now -necessary to disclose the secret connections, the network of these -secret connections, and to keep them constantly under observation. For -that purpose a police leadership would have to crystallize. The Social -Democratic Party on the whole seemed to me not nearly so dangerous, -especially as far as its members were concerned. But of course they were -also absolute opponents of our new State. A part of their functionaries -were radical, another part less radical. The more radical I likewise -placed under observation, while a whole number of former Social -Democratic ministers, heads of Prussian provinces and higher officials, -as I said before, were quietly discharged and received their pensions, -and nothing further was undertaken against them. Of course there were -also other functionaries of the Social Democratic Party whom we -definitely had to watch carefully. Thus the Secret State Police was -created by me for these tasks, first of all in Prussia, because I had -nothing to do with the other states at that time. The organization of -the rest of the police is not of such importance here. - -DR. STAHMER: The concentration camps? - -GÖRING: When the need became evident for creating order first of all, -and removing the most dangerous element of disorder directed against us, -I decided to have the communist functionaries and leaders arrested all -at once. I therefore had a list made for that purpose, and it was clear -to me that even if I arrested only the most important and most dangerous -of these functionaries it still would involve several thousands, for it -was necessary to arrest not only the party functionaries but also those -from the Red Front Organization, as the Communists also had affiliated -organizations. These arrests were in accordance with reasons of State -security and State necessity. It was a question of removing a danger. -Only one possibility was available here, that of protective -custody—that is, whether or not one could prove that these people were -involved in a traitorous act or an act hostile to the State, whether or -not one could expect such an act from them, such an act must be -prevented and the possibility eliminated by means of protective custody. -That was nothing new and it was not a National Socialist invention. -Already before this such protective custody measures had been carried -out, partly against the Communists, and chiefly against us, the National -Socialists. The prisons were not available for this purpose, and also I -want to stress from the very beginning that this was a political act for -the defense of the State. Therefore, I said that these men should first -of all be gathered into camps—one to two camps were proposed at that -time—because I could not tell them how long the internment of these -people would be necessary nor how the number would be increased by the -further exposure of the entire communist movement. When we occupied the -Karl Liebknecht House we found so many arms, material, and preparations -for a civil war, that, as I said, one could not gain a general view of -its extent. I have already indicated, as is obvious, that in view of -such great political tension as existed between the extreme wings of -these political opponents and in view of the bitterness of the -opposition caused by the continuous fighting in the streets, the mutual -tension, _et cetera_, resulting from the political struggle, the -situation would conceivably not be a very pleasant one for the inmates. -For this reason I gave instructions that the guard, if possible to a -large extent, should consist of police forces; only where these were not -adequate should auxiliary forces be called. I have stated my opinion -with regard to the question of concentration camps and I should like to -point out that this name was not created by us, but that it appeared in -the foreign press and was then adopted. Where the name originated, is -rather an historical matter. At the end of 1933 in a book, which at -first appeared in English, at the request of an English publisher, and -which has already been presented by the Prosecution as evidence, I -stated my views on this matter quite openly—that was at the end of -1933. I point out again that it was for foreign countries, for -English-speaking countries. At that time I openly stated the following: -Of course, in the beginning there were excesses; of course, the innocent -were also hurt here or there; of course, there were beatings here and -there and acts of brutality were committed; but compared to all that has -happened in the past and to the greatness of the events, this German -revolution of freedom is the least bloody and the most disciplined of -all revolutions known to history. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you supervise the treatment of the prisoners? - -GÖRING: I naturally gave instructions that such things should not -happen. That they did happen and happened everywhere to a smaller or -greater extent I have just stated. I always pointed out that these -things ought not to happen, because it was important to me to win over -some of these people for our side and to re-educate them. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you do anything about abuses of which you heard? - -GÖRING: I took a personal interest in the concentration camps up to the -spring of 1934. At that time there were two or three camps in Prussia. - -Witness Körner has already mentioned the case of Thälmann. I would like -to speak about it briefly, because it was the most striking case, as -Thälmann was the leader of the Communist Party. I could not say today -who it was who hinted to me that Thälmann had been beaten. - -I had him called to me in my room directly, without informing the higher -authorities and questioned him very closely. He told me that he had been -beaten during, and especially at the beginning, of the interrogations. -Thereupon, as the witness who was present has said already, I told -Thälmann that I regretted that. At the same time I told him, “Dear -Thälmann, if you had come to power, I probably would not have been -beaten, but you would have chopped my head off immediately.” And he -agreed. Then I told him that in the future he must feel free to let me -know if anything of this sort should happen to him or to others. I could -not always be there, but it was not my wish that any act of brutality -should be committed against them. - -Just to demonstrate this case, which was not an unimportant one, I want -to stress that later Thälmann’s wife turned to me for help and that I -answered her letter immediately. - -At that time I also—this I can prove by evidence—helped the families -of the inmates financially so far as that was necessary. - -At this opportunity I should also like to speak about the unauthorized -concentration camps which have been mentioned, the purpose of which came -under the heading of abolition of abuses. At first I did not know -anything about them, but then I found out about one such camp near -Stettin. It had been established by Karpfenstein, at that time Gauleiter -of Pomerania. I had this camp closed at once—my Defense Counsel will -remember that he, independently of me, received information about this -during the Trial, from an inmate whom I do not know at all—and I had -the guilty persons, who had committed acts of brutality there, brought -before a court and prosecuted by the state attorney, which can likewise -be proved. Karpfenstein was expelled from the Party. - -A second camp of that kind was found in Breslau, which Heines had -established. I do not remember today what happened there. At any rate, -it was a camp not authorized by me. This one I likewise closed down and -did away with immediately. Heines was one of the closest of Röhm’s -collaborators, about whom I shall speak later. - -As far as I can remember—I cannot name the place exactly anymore—close -to Berlin another unauthorized concentration camp had been secretly -established by Ernst, the SA leader in Berlin, whom I had always -suspected of acts of brutality. That also was closed. Ernst belonged to -those evil figures who were eliminated in the Röhm Putsch. It is -possible to question persons who were inmates of these camps at that -time, 1933 and the beginning of 1934, as to whether during that time -anything happened which even approached that which happened later. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you, after a consolidation of power had taken place, -ever free inmates to any great extent and at what time did you do so? - -GÖRING: At Christmas of 1933 I gave orders for the release of the -lighter cases, that is the less dangerous cases, and those cases of -which one had the impression the people had resigned themselves to the -situation; that was about 5,000 people. I repeated that once more in -November 1934 for 2,000 inmates. I stress again that that refers only to -Prussia. At that time, as far as I remember—I cannot say exactly—one -camp was dissolved or at least closed temporarily. That was at a time -when nobody thought that it would ever be the subject of an -investigation before an international tribunal. - -DR. STAHMER: How long were you in charge of the Gestapo and the -concentration camps and until what date? - -GÖRING: Actually I was in charge until the beginning of 1934, that is, -at the beginning of 1934 Diels was the head and he gave me frequent -reports about the Gestapo and about the concentration camps. Meanwhile, -outside Prussia a re-grouping of police had taken place with the result -that Himmler was in charge of the police in all the provinces of Germany -with the exception of Prussia only. Probably following the example of my -measures, he had installed the Secret State Police there, because the -police at that time was still a matter of the states. There were the -police of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, _et cetera_. - -He had become the leader of all these police forces, and of course he -now sought to get the leadership of the police in Prussia as well. I was -very satisfied with Diels at that time, and from my point of view I saw -no reason for letting any change take place. - -These efforts, I believe, started as early as in the late summer of -1933. Shortly after I had transferred the Prussian Ministry of the -Interior to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in the spring of 1934, -and so was no longer a departmental minister, Himmler, I assume, -probably urged the Führer more strongly to put him in charge of the -Prussian police as well. At that time I did not expressly oppose it. It -was not agreeable to me; I wanted to handle my police myself. When, -however, the Führer asked me to do this and said that it would be the -correct thing and the expedient thing, and that it was proved necessary -for the enemy of the State to be fought throughout the Reich in a -uniform way, I actually handed the police over to Himmler, who put -Heydrich in charge. But legally I still retained it, because there was -still no Reich police in existence. - -The rest of the police, the state police—that is the uniformed -police—I did not turn over to him, because, as I shall explain later, I -had to a large extent organized this police in Prussia along military -lines, in order to be able to fit it into the future rearmament program. -For this reason I could not and did not want to give him the uniformed -police, because it had been trained for purely military purposes—by me, -at my instigation, and on my responsibility—and had nothing to do with -the actual police. It was turned over to the Armed Forces by me in 1935. - -In 1936 the Reich Police Law was issued, and thereby the office of the -Chief of the German Police was created. By virtue of this law the police -was then legally and formally turned over to the Reichsführer SS, or, as -he was called, the Chief of the German Police. - -DR. STAHMER: You mentioned before the Röhm Putsch. Who was Röhm, and -with what event was this Putsch connected? - -GÖRING: Röhm had become leader of the SA, Chief of Staff of the SA. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn. It is 5 o’clock now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-FIRST DAY - Thursday, 14 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in laying down the Party program? - -GÖRING: No. The Party program had been compiled and announced when I -heard about the movement for the first time and when I declared my -intention of joining. - -DR. STAHMER: What is your attitude towards these points of the Party -program? - -GÖRING: On the whole, positive. It is a matter of course that there is -hardly any politically minded man who acknowledges and agrees with every -point of the program of a political party. - -DR. STAHMER: In addition to these generally known points of the Party -program, were there other aims which were kept secret? - -GÖRING: No. - -DR. STAHMER: Were these aims to be achieved by every means, even by -illegal means? - -GÖRING: Of course, they were to be achieved by every means. The -conception “illegal” should perhaps be clarified. If I aim at a -revolution, then it is an illegal action for the state then in -existence. If I am successful, then it becomes a fact and thereby legal -and law. Until 1923 and the events of 9 November I and all of us had the -view that we would achieve our aim, even, if necessary, in a -revolutionary manner. After this proved a failure, the Führer, after his -return from the fortress, decided that we should in the future proceed -legally by means of a political fight, as the other parties had done, -and the Führer prohibited any illegal action in order to avoid any -setback in the activity of the Party. - -DR. STAHMER: When and with what aims was the SS created? - -GÖRING: The SS was created while I was abroad; I think it was in 1926 or -1927. Its purpose, as far as I remember, was to form, first of all, -within the Movement a specially picked body as a protection for the -person of the Führer. Originally it was extremely small. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you at any time belong to the SS? - -GÖRING: I never belonged to the SS in any way, at any time, neither -actively nor passively. - -DR. STAHMER: The assumption that you were a general in the SS is -therefore incorrect? - -GÖRING: Yes, absolutely incorrect. - -DR. STAHMER: What did you understand by the term “master race”? - -GÖRING: I myself understood nothing by it. In none of my speeches, in -none of my writings, will you find that term. It is my view that if you -are a master you have no need to emphasize it. - -DR. STAHMER: What do you understand by the concept “living space”? - -GÖRING: That conception is a very controversial one. I can fully -understand that powers who together—I refer only to the four signatory -powers—call more than three-quarters of the world their own, explain -this idea differently. But for us, where 144 people live in 1 square -kilometer, the words “living space” meant the proper relation between a -population and its nourishment, its growth, and its standard of living. - -DR. STAHMER: An expression which is always recurring is that of “seizure -of power.” - -GÖRING: I should like to call “seizure of power” a _terminus technicus_. -We might just as well have used another term, but this actually -expresses as clearly as possible what did in fact occur, that is to say, -we seized power. - -DR. STAHMER: What is your attitude to the Leadership Principle? - -GÖRING: I upheld this principle and I still uphold it positively and -consciously. One must not make the mistake of forgetting that the -political structure in different countries has different origins, -different developments. Something which suits one country extremely well -would perhaps fail completely in another. Germany, through the long -centuries of monarchy, has always had a leadership principle. Democracy -appeared in Germany at a time when Germany was very badly off and had -reached rock-bottom. I explained yesterday the total lack of unity that -existed in Germany—the number of parties, the continuous unrest caused -by elections. A complete distortion of the concepts of authority and -responsibility had arisen, and in the reverse direction. Authority lay -with the masses and responsibility was with the leader, instead of the -other way about. I am of the opinion that for Germany, particularly at -that moment of its lowest ebb, when it was necessary for all forces to -be welded together in a positive fashion, the Leadership Principle—that -is, authority from above downwards and responsibility from below -upwards—was the only possibility. Naturally I realize the fact that -here, too, a principle, while thoroughly sound in itself, can lead to -extremes. I should like to mention some parallels. The position of the -Catholic Church rests now, as before, on the clear leadership principle -of its hierarchy. And I think I can also say that Russia, too, without -the leadership principle, could not have survived the great burden which -was imposed on her by this war. - -DR. STAHMER: Concerning the measures for strengthening your power which -you described yesterday, did they take place in full agreement with -Reich President Von Hindenburg? - -GÖRING: As long as the Reich President was alive, and therefore active, -they naturally did take place in agreement with him. And as far as his -assent was constitutionally necessary, according to Paragraph 48, that -assent was also given. - -DR. STAHMER: Was the National Socialist Government recognized by foreign -powers? - -GÖRING: Our government was recognized from the first day of its -existence and remained recognized until the end, that is, except where -hostilities severed diplomatic connections with several states. - -DR. STAHMER: Did diplomatic representatives of foreign countries visit -your Party rallies in Nuremberg? - -GÖRING: The diplomatic representatives were invited to the Party -rallies, these being the greatest event and the greatest demonstration -of the movement; and they all attended, even if not the full number of -them every year. But one I remember very well. - -DR. STAHMER: Until what year? - -GÖRING: Until the last Party rally, 1938. - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent after the seizure of power was property of -political opponents confiscated? - -GÖRING: Laws were issued which decreed confiscation of the property of -people hostile to the State, that is, the property of parties we -declared to be hostile to the State. The party property of the Communist -Party and its associated units, and the property of the Social -Democratic Party was partly confiscated—but not, and I want to -emphasize that, the private property of the members or even of the -leaders of these parties. On the contrary, a number of leading Social -Democrats who had been ministers or civil servants were still paid their -full pension. In fact, later on it was increased. - -DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the actions against the trade unions? -How do you explain the actions against free workers’ associations? - -GÖRING: First of all, the trade unions: Trade unions in Germany were for -the most part, or the most important of them, very closely connected -with the Social Democratic Party, and also to an increasing extent, due -to the influence and the activity of the Communists, with the Communist -Party. They were in fact, if not formally so, organs, indeed very active -organs, of these parties, and here I am not talking about the masses of -the members of the trade unions, but about the leaders of the trade -unions. In addition there was also a smaller Christian trade union, an -organ of the Center Party. - -These trade unions, because of their leaders and the close connection of -these leaders with those parties which we regarded as our opponents, -agreed with our opponents to such an extent that they did not in any way -fit into our new State. Consequently the organization of trade unions -was dissolved, and for the workers the organization of the German Labor -Front was created. This did not result in the destruction of the liberty -of the German worker, in my opinion; on the contrary, I am convinced -that we were the ones to give the German workers real freedom, for it -consisted first of all in the fact that we made his right to have work -secure, and laid particular stress on his position in the State. - -We did, of course, do away with two things which perhaps must be -regarded as two characteristics of a freedom which I do not understand: -strikes on one side and lockouts on the other. These could not be made -consistent with the right to have work nor with the duties which every -citizen has towards the greatness of his nation. These two disquieting -elements, which also contributed to the great number of unemployed, we -removed and replaced with an enormous labor program. - -Creation of work was another essential point of our social program and -has also been adopted by others, though under a different name. - -I do not propose to elaborate on this social program. It was, however, -the first time that the worker had a right to a vacation, a paid -vacation, this I only add as an aside. Great recreation centers were -created for the workers. Enormous sums were invested in new housing -projects for workers. The whole standard of living for the worker was -raised. Up to that time the worker had been used and exploited. He -hardly had any property of his own because, during years of -unemployment, he had to sell everything or pawn it. Thus, without going -into detail, I should like to say in conclusion that we did not enslave -free workers, but rather we liberated the worker from the misery of -unemployment. - -DR. STAHMER: You talked about the Röhm revolt yesterday. Who was Röhm -and of what did the revolt consist? - -GÖRING: Röhm, from 1931, had been the Chief of Staff of the SA, that is -to say, he was responsible for the SA to the Führer, who was himself the -highest SA leader, and he led it in the Führer’s name. - -The main controversy between Röhm and us was that Röhm, like his -predecessor Pfeffer, wanted a stronger revolutionary way to be adopted, -whereas the Führer, as I said earlier, had ordered a legal development, -the final victory of which could be expected. - -After the seizure of power Röhm desired, under all circumstances, to get -hold of the Reich Defense Ministry. The Führer refused that point-blank, -as he did not wish the Armed Forces to be conducted politically in any -way, or to have any political influence brought to bear on the Armed -Forces. - -The contrast between the Armed Forces and the Röhm group—I am -intentionally not speaking of a contrast between the Armed Forces and -the SA, since there was none, but solely of this leadership group, which -called itself at that time the SA Leadership and it actually was—was -that Röhm wanted to remove the greater number of the generals and higher -officers who had been members of the Reichswehr all this time, since it -was his view that these officers did not offer a guarantee for the new -State, because, as he expressed it, their backbone had been broken in -the course of the years and they were no longer capable of being active -elements of the new National Socialist State. - -The Führer, and I also, had exactly the opposite point of view in this -connection. - -Secondly, the aims of the Röhm-minded people, as I should like to call -them, were directed in a different direction, towards a revolutionary -act; and they were opposed to what they called reaction. They definitely -desired to adopt a more Leftist attitude. They were also sharply opposed -to the Church and also very strongly opposed to the Jews. Altogether, -and I refer only to the clique consisting of certain persons, they -wished to carry out a revolutionary act. That Röhm placed all his people -in leading positions in the SA and removed the decent elements, and -misguided the decent SA people without their knowledge, is a well-known -fact. - -If encroachments did occur at that time, they always involved the same -persons, first of all the Berlin SA leader, Ernst, secondly the Breslau -leader, Heines, the Munich and Stettin leaders, _et cetera_. A few weeks -before the Röhm Putsch a low-ranking SA leader confided in me that he -had heard that an action against the Führer and his corps was being -planned to replace the Third Reich as expeditiously as possible by a -final Fourth Reich, an expression which these people used. - -I myself was urged and begged to place outside my house not only guards -from a police regiment but also to appoint an SA guard of honor. I had -agreed, and later on I heard from the commander of these troops that the -purpose of that guard of honor was to arrest me at a given moment. - -I knew Röhm very well. I had him brought to me. I put to him openly the -things which I had heard. I reminded him of our mutual fight and I asked -him to keep unconditional faith with the Führer. I brought forward the -same arguments which I have just mentioned, but he assured me that he -naturally was not thinking of undertaking anything against the Führer. -Shortly afterward I received further news to the effect that he had -close connections with those circles who also were strongly opposed to -us. There was, for instance, the group around the former Reich -Chancellor Schleicher. There was the group around Gregor Strasser, the -former member of the Reichstag and organizational leader of the Party, -who had been excluded from the Party. These were groups who had belonged -to the former trade unions and were rather inclined to the Left. I felt -it my duty to consult the Führer now on this subject. I was astonished -when he told me that he, too, already knew about these things and -considered them a great threat. He said that he wished, however, to -await further developments and observe them carefully. - -The next event occurred just about as the witness Körner described it -here, and therefore I can skip it. I was given the order to proceed -immediately against the implicated men of the Röhm group in northern -Germany. It was decided that some of them were to be arrested. In the -course of the day the Führer ordered the execution of the SA leader of -Pomerania, Ernst, and two or three others. He himself went to Bavaria -where the last meeting of a number of Röhm leaders was taking place and -personally arrested Röhm and these people in Wiessee. - -At that time this matter presented a real danger, as a few SA units, -through the use of false passwords, had been armed and called up. At one -spot only a very short fight ensued and two SA leaders were shot. I -deputized the police, which in Prussia was then already under Himmler -and Heydrich, to make the arrests. Only the headquarters of Röhm, who -himself was not present, I had occupied by a regiment of the uniformed -police subordinated to me. When the headquarters of the SA leader Ernst -in Berlin were searched, we found in the cellars of those headquarters -more submachine guns than the whole Prussian police had in its -possession. - -After the Führer, on the strength of the events which had been met with -at Wiessee, had ordered who should be shot in view of the state of -national emergency, the order for the execution of Ernst, Heydebreck, -and some of the other Röhm collaborators was issued. There was no order -to shoot the other people who had been arrested. In the course of the -arrest of the former Reich Chancellor Schleicher, it happened that both -he and his wife were killed. An investigation of this event took place -and it was found that when Schleicher was arrested, according to the -statements of the two witnesses, he reached for a pistol, possibly in -order to kill himself, whereupon the two men raised their pistols and -Frau Schleicher threw herself upon one of them, to hold him, causing his -revolver to go off. We deeply regretted that event. - -In the course of that evening I heard that other people had been shot as -well, even some people who had nothing at all to do with this Röhm -Putsch. The Führer came to Berlin that same evening. After I learned -this, later that evening or night, I went to him at noon the next day -and asked him to issue an order immediately, that any further execution -was under any circumstances forbidden by him, the Führer, although two -other people who were deeply involved and who had been ordered by the -Führer to be executed, were still alive. These people were consequently -left alive. I asked him to do that because I was worried lest the matter -should get out of hand—as, in fact, it had already done to some -extent—and I told the Führer that under no circumstances should there -be any further bloodshed. - -This order was then given by the Führer in my presence, and it was -communicated at once to all offices. The action was then announced in -the Reichstag, and it was approved by the Reichstag and the Reich -President as an action called for by the state of national emergency. It -was regretted that, as in all such incidents, there were a number of -blunders. - -The number of victims has been greatly exaggerated. As far as I can -remember exactly today, there were 72 or 76 people, the majority of whom -were executed in southern Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you know about the development of the attitude of the -Party and the State toward the Church, in the course of time? - -GÖRING: Certainly. But as a final remark on the Röhm Putsch I should -like to emphasize that I assume full responsibility for the actions -taken against those people—Ernst, Heydebreck, and several others—by -the order of the Führer, which I carried out or passed on; and that, -even today, I am of the opinion that I acted absolutely correctly and -with a sense of duty. That was confirmed by the Reich President, but no -such confirmation was necessary to convince me that here I had averted -what was a great danger to the State. - -As to the attitude towards the Church—the Führer’s attitude, was a -generous one, at the beginning absolutely generous. I should not like to -say that it was positive in the sense that he himself was a positive or -convinced adherent of any one confession, but it was generous and -positive in the sense that he recognized the necessity of the Church. -Although he himself was a Catholic, he wished the Protestant Church to -have a stronger position in Germany, since Germany was two-thirds -Protestant. - -The Protestant Church, however, was divided into provincial churches, -and there were various small differences which the dogmatists took very -seriously. For that reason they once in the past, as we know, fought -each other for 30 years; but these differences did not seem so important -to us. There were the Reformed, the United, and the pure Lutherans—I -myself am not an expert in this field. - -Constitutionally, as Prussian Prime Minister, I was, to be sure, in a -certain sense the highest dignitary of the Prussian Church, but I did -not concern myself with these matters very much. - -The Führer wanted to achieve the unification of the Protestant -Evangelical Churches by appointing a Reich Bishop, so that there would -be a high Protestant church dignitary as well as a high Catholic church -dignitary. To begin with, he left the choice to the Evangelical -churches, but they could not come to an agreement. Finally they brought -forward one name, exactly the one which was not acceptable to us. Then a -man was made Reich Bishop who had the Führer’s confidence to a higher -degree than any of the other provincial bishops. - -With the Catholic Church the Führer ordered a concordat to be concluded -by Herr Von Papen. Shortly before that agreement was concluded by Herr -Von Papen I visited the Pope myself. I had numerous connections with the -higher Catholic clergy because of my Catholic mother, and thus—I am -myself a Protestant—I had a view of both camps. - -One thing, of course, the Führer and all of us, I, too, stood for was to -remove politics from the Church as far as was possible. I did not -consider it right, I must frankly say, that on one day the priest in -church should humbly concern himself with the spiritual welfare of his -flock and then on the following day make a more or less belligerent -speech in parliament. - -A separation was planned by us, that is to say, the clergy were to -concentrate on their own sphere and refrain from becoming involved in -political matters. Owing to the fact that we had in Germany political -parties with strong church leanings, considerable confusion had arisen -here. That is the explanation of the fact that, because of this -political opposition that at first played its role in the political -field in parliament, and in election campaigns, there arose among -certain of our people an antagonistic attitude toward the Church. For -one must not forget that such election disputes and speeches often took -place before the electors between political representatives of our Party -and clergymen who represented those political parties which were more -closely bound to the Church. - -Because of this situation and a certain animosity, it is understandable -that a more rabid faction—if I may use that expression in this -connection—did not forget these contentions and now, on its side, -carried the struggle on again on a false level. But the Führer’s -attitude was that the churches should be given the chance to exist and -develop. In a movement and a party which gradually had absorbed more or -less the greater part of the German nation, and which now in its active -political aspect had also absorbed the politically active persons of -Germany, it is only natural that not all the members would be of the -same opinion in every respect, despite the Leadership Principle. The -tempo, the method, the attitude may be different; and in such large -movements, even if they are ever so authoritatively led, certain groups -form in response to certain problems. And if I were to name the group -which still saw in the Church, if not a political danger, at least an -undesirable institution, then I should mention above all two personages: -Himmler on one side and Bormann—particularly later on much more -radically than Himmler—on the other side. - -Himmler’s motives were less of a political and more of a confused -mystical nature. Bormann’s aims were much more clear-cut. It was clear, -too, that from the large group of Gauleiter, one or another might be -more keenly interested in this fight against the Church. Thus, there -were a number of Gaue where everything was in the best of order as far -as the Church was concerned, and there were a few others where there was -a keen fight against the Church. - -I did interfere personally on frequent occasions. First of all, in order -to demonstrate my attitude and to create order, I called into the -Prussian State Council, as men in whom I had special confidence, a high -Protestant and a high Catholic clergyman. - -I myself am not what you might call a churchgoer, but I have gone now -and then, and have always considered I belonged to the Church and have -always had those functions over which the Church presides—marriage, -christening, burial, _et cetera_—carried out in my house by the Church. - -My intention thereby was to show those weak-willed persons who, in the -midst of this fight of opinions did not know what they should do, that, -if the second man in the State goes to church, is married by the Church, -has his child christened and confirmed, _et cetera_, then they can -calmly do the same. From the number of letters which I received as the -result, I can see that I did the right thing. - -But as time went by, in other spheres as well as this, the situation -became more critical. During the early years of the war I spoke to the -Führer about it once more and told him that the main concern now was, -that every German should do his duty and that every soldier should go to -his death, if need be, bravely. If in that connection his religious -belief is a help and a support to him, whether he belongs to this or -that confession, it can be only an advantage, and any disturbance in -this connection could conceivably affect the soldier’s inward strength. -The Führer agreed absolutely. In the Air Force I deliberately had no -chaplains, because I was of the opinion that every member of the Air -Force should go to the clergyman in whom he had the most confidence. - -This was repeatedly told to the soldiers and officers at roll call. But -to the Church itself I said that it would be good if we had a clear -separation. Men should pray in church and not drill there; in the -barracks men should drill and not pray. In that manner, from the very -beginning, I kept the Air Force free from any religious disturbances and -I insured complete liberty of conscience for everyone. - -The situation became rapidly more critical—and I cannot really give the -reasons for this—especially in the last 2 or 3 years of the war. It may -have something to do with the fact that in some of the occupied -territories, particularly in the Polish territory and also in the Czech -territory, the clergy were strong representatives of national feeling -and this led again to clashes on a political level which were then -naturally carried over to religious fields. I do not know whether this -was one of the reasons, but I consider it probable. On the whole I -should like to say that the Führer himself was not opposed to the -Church. In fact, he told me on one occasion that there are certain -things in respect to which even as Führer one cannot entirely have one’s -way if they are still undecided and in need of reform, and that he -believed that at the time much was being thought and said about the -reorganization of the Church. He said that he did not consider himself -destined to be a reformer of the Church and that he did not wish that -any of his political leaders should win laurels in this field. - -DR. STAHMER: Now, in the course of years, a large number of clergy, both -from Germany and especially from the occupied territories—you yourself -mentioned Poland and Czechoslovakia—were taken to concentration camps. -Did you know anything about that? - -GÖRING: I knew that at first in Germany a number of clergymen were taken -to concentration camps. The case of Niemöller was common knowledge. I do -not want to go into it in detail, because it is well known. A number of -other clergymen were sent to concentration camps but not until the later -years when the fight became more critical, for they made political -speeches in the pulpit and criticized measures of the State or the -Party; then, according to the severity of this criticism, the police -intervened. - -I told Himmler on one occasion that I did not think it was wise to -arrest clergymen. As long as they talked in church they should say what -they wanted, but if they made political speeches outside their churches -then he could proceed against them, just as he would in connection with -any other people who made speeches hostile to the State. Several -clergymen who went very far in their criticism were not arrested. As far -as the arrest of clergy from occupied territories is concerned, I heard -about it; and I said earlier that this did not occur so much on the -religious level just because they were clergymen, but because they were -at the same time nationalists—I understand that from their point of -view—and consequently often involved in actions hostile to the -occupying forces. - -DR. STAHMER: The Party program included two points, I believe, dealing -with the question of the Jews. What was your basic attitude towards this -question? - -GÖRING: This question, which has been so strongly emphasized in the -Indictment, forces me under all circumstances to interpose certain -statements. - -After Germany’s collapse in 1918 Jewry became very powerful in Germany -in all spheres of life, especially in the political, general -intellectual and cultural, and, most particularly, the economic spheres. -The men came back from the front, had nothing to look forward to, and -found a large number of Jews who had come in during the war from Poland -and the East, holding positions, particularly economic positions. It is -known that, under the influence of the war and business concerned with -it—demobilization, which offered great possibilities for doing -business, inflation, deflation—enormous shifts and transfers took place -in the propertied classes. - -There were many Jews who did not show the necessary restraint and who -stood out more and more in public life, so that they actually invited -certain comparisons because of their numbers and the position they -controlled in contrast to the German people. In addition there was the -fact that particularly those parties which were avoided by nationally -minded people also had Jewish leadership out of proportion to the total -number of Jews. - -That did not apply only to Germany, but also to Austria, which we have -always considered a part of Germany. There the entire Social Democratic -leadership was almost exclusively in Jewish hands. They played a very -considerable part in politics, particularly in the left-wing parties, -and they also became very prominent in the press in all political -directions. - -At that time, there thus ensued a continuous uninterrupted attack on -everything national, national concepts and national ideals. I draw -attention to all the magazines and articles which dragged through the -mud things which were holy to us. I likewise call attention to the -distortion which was practiced in the field of art in this direction, to -plays which dragged the fighting at the front through the mud and -befouled the ideal of the brave soldier. In fact I could submit an -enormous pile of such articles, books, plays, and so forth; but this -would lead too far afield and I am actually not too well informed on the -subject. Because of all this, a defense movement arose which was by no -means created by National Socialism but which had existed before, which -was already strong during the war and which came even more strongly to -the fore after the war, when the influence of Jewry had such effects. - -Moreover, in the cultural and intellectual sphere also many things which -were not in accordance with German feeling came to be expressed. Here, -too, there was a great split. In addition there was the fact that in -economic matters, if one overlooks the western industry, there was an -almost exclusive domination on the part of Jewry, which, indeed, -consisted of elements which were most sharply opposed by the old, -established Jewish families. - -When the movement then drew up its program, which was done by a few -simple people—as far as I know, not even Adolf Hitler himself took part -in the drafting of the program, at least not yet as a leader—the -program included that point which played a prominent part as a defensive -point among large sections of the German people. Shortly before that -there had been the Räte-Republik in Munich and the murder of hostages, -and here, too the leaders were mostly Jews. It can be understood, -therefore, that a program drawn up in Munich by simple people quite -naturally took this up as a defense point. News also came of a -Räte-Republik in Hungary—again consisting mainly of Jews. All this had -made a very strong impression. When the program became known, the -Party—which was at that time extremely small—was at first not taken -seriously and was laughed at. But then, from the very beginning, a -concentrated and most bitter attack on the part of the entire Jewish -press, or the Jewish-influenced press, was started against the movement. -Everywhere Jewry was in the lead in the fight against National -Socialism, whether in the press, in politics, in cultural life by making -National Socialism contemptible and ridiculous, or in the economic -sphere. Whoever was a National Socialist could not get a position; the -National Socialist businessman could not get supplies or space for -advertisements, and so on. All this naturally resulted in a strong -defensive attitude on the part of the Party and led from the very -beginning to an intensification of the fight, such as had not originally -been the intention of the program. For the program aimed very definitely -at one thing above all—that Germany should be led by Germans. And it -was desired that the leadership, especially the political shaping of the -fate of the German people, should be in the hands of German persons who -could raise up the spirit of the German people again in a way that -people of a different kind could not. Therefore the main point was at -first merely to exclude Jewry from politics, from the leadership of the -State. Later on, the cultural field was also included because of the -very strong fight which had developed, particularly in this sphere, -between Jewry on the one side and National Socialism on the other. - -I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was said -by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should still be in -a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and speeches in -which the expressions and insults coming from the other side were far in -excess. All that obviously was bound to lead to an intensification. - -Shortly after the seizure of power countless exceptions were made. Jews -who had taken part in the World War and who had been decorated were -treated differently and shown consideration; they remained unaffected by -measures excluding Jews from civil services. - -As I have said, the chief aim was to exclude them from the political -sphere, then from the cultural sphere. - -The Nuremberg Laws were intended to bring about a clear separation of -races and, in particular, to do away with the notion of persons of mixed -blood in the future, as the term of half Jew or quarter Jew led to -continuous distinctions and confusion as far as their position was -concerned. Here I wish to emphasize that I personally had frequent -discussions with the Führer regarding persons of mixed blood and that I -pointed out to the Führer that, once German Jews were clearly separated, -it was impossible to have still another category between the two which -constituted an unclarified section of the German people, which did not -stand on the same level as the other Germans. I suggested to him that, -as a generous act, he should do away with the concept of the person of -mixed blood and place such people on the same footing as the other -Germans. The Führer took up this idea with great interest and was all -for adopting my point of view, in fact, he gave certain preparatory -orders. Then came more troubled times, as far as foreign policy was -concerned—the Sudeten crisis, Czechoslovakia, the occupation of the -Rhineland, and afterward the Polish crisis—and the question of persons -of mixed blood stepped into the background; but at the beginning of the -war the Führer told me that he was prepared to solve this matter in a -positive, generous fashion, but only after the war. - -The Nuremberg Laws were to exclude, for the future, that concept of -persons of mixed blood by means of a clear separation of races. -Consequently it was provided in the penal regulations of the Nuremberg -Laws, that never the woman but always the man should be punishable, no -matter whether he was German or Jewish. The German woman or the Jewess -should not be punished. Then quieter times came, and the Führer was -always of the opinion that for the time being Jews should remain in -economy, though not in leading and prominent positions, until a -controlled emigration, gradually setting in, then intensified, should -solve this problem. In spite of continuous disturbances and difficulties -in the economic field, the Jews on the whole remained unmolested in -their economic positions. - -The extraordinary intensification which set in later did not really -start in until after the events of 1938, and then to a still greater -extent in the war years. But here, again, there was naturally one more -radical group for whom the Jewish question was more significantly in the -foreground than it was for other groups of the Movement; just as, as I -should like to emphasize at this point, the idea of National Socialism -as a philosophy was understood in various ways—by one person more -philosophically, by another mystically, by a third in a practical and -political sense. This was also true of the different points of the -program. For one person certain points were more important, for another -person less so. One person would see in the point of the program which -was directed against Versailles and toward a free and strong Germany the -main point of the program; another person, perhaps, would consider the -Jewish question the main point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? Dr. -Stahmer, can you inform the Tribunal how much longer you think the -Defendant Göring’s examination will last? - -DR. STAHMER: I think that we shall finish in the course of tomorrow -morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is a very long time. - -DR. STAHMER: I shall do my best to shorten it. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you participate in the issuing of the -Nuremberg Laws of 1935? - -GÖRING: In my capacity as President of the Reichstag I announced those -laws and the law concerning the new Reich flag simultaneously here in -Nuremberg when the Reichstag was meeting at that time. - -DR. STAHMER: In the Indictment it says that the destruction of the -Jewish race was part of the planning of aggressive wars. - -GÖRING: That has nothing to do with the planning of aggressive wars; -also, the destruction of the Jewish race was not planned in advance. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you a party to the action against the Jews in the -night of 9-10 November 1938? - -GÖRING: I should like to discuss that briefly. I gathered yesterday, -from the cross-examination of the witness Körner, that a -misunderstanding had arisen in regard to this. On 9 November the march -to the Feldherrnhalle took place. This march was repeated every year and -for this occasion the prominent leaders of the movement gathered. Körner -referred to that when he said that everybody came to Munich. It was -customary, after the march was over, for practically everybody to meet -at the Munich City Hall for a dinner, at which the Führer was also -present. - -I never attended that dinner in any of the years in question, as I used -to utilize my stay in Munich by attending to various other matters in -the afternoon of that day. I did not take part in the dinner on this -occasion either, nor did Körner. He and I returned in my special train -to Berlin in the evening. As I heard later, when the investigation was -carried out, Goebbels announced at that dinner, after the Führer had -left, that the seriously wounded counsellor of the Embassy in Paris had -died of his wounds. There was a certain amount of excitement and then -Goebbels apparently spoke some words about retaliation and in his -way—he was probably the very strongest representative of -anti-Semitism—must have brought on this development of events; but that -was after the Führer had left. - -I myself, in fact, heard of the events upon my arrival in Berlin. First -of all the conductor in my car told me that he had seen fires in Halle. -Half an hour later I called my adjutant, who reported to me that riots -had taken place during the night, that Jewish stores had been broken -into and plundered and that synagogues had been set on fire. He did not -know any more about it himself. - -I proceeded to my apartment and at once had a call put through to the -Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night. That is the -report which has been referred to here and which was made to me by the -Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, concerning the events, as much as he -knew about them at that time; that was the evening of the following day, -I believe. The Führer, too, arrived in Berlin in the course of the -morning. Having in the meantime heard that Goebbels had at least played -an important part as instigator, I told the Führer that it was -impossible for me to have such events taking place at this particular -time. I was making every effort, in connection with the Four Year Plan, -to concentrate the entire economic field to the utmost. I had, in the -course of speeches to the nation, been asking for every old toothpaste -tube, every rusty nail, every bit of scrap material to be collected and -utilized. It could not be tolerated that a man who was not responsible -for these things should upset my difficult economic tasks by destroying -so many things of economic value on the one hand and by causing so much -disturbance in economic life on the other hand. - -The Führer made some apologies for Goebbels, but on the whole he agreed -that such events were not to take place and must not be allowed to take -place. I also pointed out to him, that such a short time after the -Munich agreement such matters would also have an unfavorable effect on -foreign policy. - -In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Führer. In the -meantime Goebbels had been to see him. The latter I had told over the -telephone in unmistakable terms, and in very sharp words, my view of the -matter. I told him then, with emphasis, that I was not inclined to -suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled utterances, as far as -economic matters were concerned. - -In the meantime the Führer, influenced by Goebbels, had somewhat changed -his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and to what extent he referred to -the excitement of the crowd, to urgently needed settlements, I do not -know. At any rate, the Führer’s views were not the same as they were on -the occasion of my first complaint. - -While we were talking, Goebbels, who was in the house, joined us and -began his usual talk: that such things could not be tolerated; that this -was the second or third murder of a National Socialist committed abroad -by a Jew. It was on that occasion that he first made the suggestion that -a fine should be imposed. Indeed, he wished that each Gau should collect -such a fine and he named an almost incredibly high sum. - -I contradicted him and told the Führer that, if there was to be a fine, -then the Reich alone should collect it, for, as I said, Herr Goebbels -had the most Jews right here in Berlin and would therefore not be a -suitable person for this, since he was the most interested party. Apart -from that, if such measures were to be taken, then only the sovereign -State had the right to take them. - -After a short discussion, this way and that, about the amount, -1,000,000,000 was agreed upon. I pointed out to the Führer that under -certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions on the tax -returns. The Führer then expressed the wish and ordered that the -economic solution also be carried through now. In order that there -should be no further occasion for such events, businesses obviously -Jewish and known to be Jewish were first of all to be Aryanized, in -particular the department stores. These were often a source of friction, -as the officials and employees from the ministries, who could shop only -between 6 and 7 in the evening, often went to these stores and had -difficulties. He ordered, in general terms, what should be done. - -Thereupon I called the meeting of 12 November with those departments -which had jurisdiction over these matters. Unfortunately, the Führer had -demanded that Goebbels should be represented on this -commission—actually a commission was to be appointed. He was, in fact, -present, although I maintained that he had nothing to do with economic -questions. The discussion was very lively. We were all irritated at this -meeting. Then I had the economic laws drafted and later I had them -published. - -I rejected other proposals which lay outside the economic sphere, such -as restriction of travel, restriction of residence, restriction in -regard to bathing resorts, _et cetera_, as I was not competent to deal -with these things and had not received any special orders. These were -issued later on by the police authorities, and not by me; but through my -intervention various mitigations and adjustments were made. - -I should like to point out that although I received oral and written -orders and commands from the Führer to issue and carry out these laws, I -assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws which bear my -signature; for I issued them and consequently am responsible, and do not -propose to hide in any way behind the Führer’s order. - -DR. STAHMER: Another matter. What were the reasons for the refusal to -take part in the Disarmament Conference and for the withdrawal from the -League of Nations? - -GÖRING: The chief reasons for that were, first of all, that the other -states who, after the complete disarming of Germany, were also bound to -disarm, did not do so. The second point was that we also found a lack of -willingness to meet in any way Germany’s justified proposals for -revisions; thirdly, there were repeated violations of the Treaty of -Versailles and of the Covenant of the League of Nations by other states, -Poland, Lithuania, _et cetera_, which were at first censured by the -League of Nations, but which were then not brought to an end, but were -rather accepted as accomplished facts; fourthly, all complaints by -Germany regarding questions of minorities were, indeed, discussed, and -well-meaning advice was given to the states against which the complaints -had been brought, but nothing was actually done to relieve the -situation. - -Those are the reasons for leaving the League of Nations and the -Disarmament Conference. - -DR. STAHMER: Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce compulsory -service? - -GÖRING: When Germany left the League of Nations and the Disarmament -Conference, she simultaneously announced to the leading powers concerned -her definite decision to aim at universal disarmament. The Führer then -made various proposals which, it can be assumed, are historically known: -restriction of active armed forces to a certain number of men; -restriction of weapons to be used; abolishing of certain weapons as, for -example, bombers; and various other points. Each one of these proposals -was rejected, however, and did not reach a general realization, nor were -even discussed. - -When we and the Führer recognized clearly that the other parties did not -think of disarming and that, on the contrary, that mighty power to the -east of us in particular, Russia, was carrying out an armament program -as never before, it became necessary for us, in order to safeguard the -most vital interests of the German people, their life and their -security, to free ourselves from all ties and to rearm to such an extent -as was now necessary for the interests and security of the Reich. That -was the first reason for the necessity of reintroducing compulsory -service. - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent did the Luftwaffe participate in this -rearmament? - -GÖRING: In 1933, when I founded the Air Ministry, we had not yet gone -into the question of rearmament. In spite of that I did arrange for -certain basic conditions. I immediately extended manufacture and -increased air traffic beyond the extent of necessary traffic, so as to -be able to train a larger number of pilots. At that time I took over a -number of young people, lieutenants, cadets, who then had to leave the -Wehrmacht in order to take up commercial flying and there to learn to -fly. - -I was aware from the beginning that protection in the air was necessary -as one of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation. -Originally it was my belief that a defensive air force, that is, a -fighter force, might suffice; but upon reflection I realized—and I want -to underline what witness Field Marshal Kesselring said on that -subject—that one would be lost with merely a fighter force for defense -purposes and that even a defensive force must contain bombers in order -that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on enemy -territory. - -Therefore I had bomber aircraft developed from commercial airplanes. In -the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be created -anew since nothing existed in the way of air armament. - -In 1935 I told the Führer that I now considered it proper, since we had -repeatedly received refusals in answer to our proposals, to declare to -the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had -already established a certain basis for that. This took place in the -form of an interview which I had with a British correspondent. - -Now I could proceed to rearm on a larger scale; but in spite of that we -confined ourselves at first to what we called a “Risk Air Force,” that -is a risk insofar as an enemy coming to attack Germany should know that -he could expect to meet with an air force. But it was by no means strong -enough to be of any real importance. - -In 1936 followed the famous report, which was presented to the witness -Bodenschatz, in which I said that we must from this moment on work on -the basis of mobilization, that money mattered nothing, and that, in -short, I should take the responsibility for overdrawing the budget. - -Since nothing had existed before, I should be able to catch up quickly -only if aircraft production on one hand were made to work with as many -shifts and as much speed as possible, that is with maximum effort and on -a mobilization basis, and if, on the other hand, extension of the ground -forces and similar matters was carried out at once with the greatest -possible speed. - -The situation in 1936 is defined by me, in that report to my co-workers, -as serious. Other states had, to be sure, not disarmed, but here and -there they had perhaps neglected their air force and they were catching -up on lost ground. Violent debates were taking place in England with -regard to modernizing and building up the air force; feverish activities -were taking place in Russia, concerning which we had reliable reports—I -shall refer to the question of Russian rearmament later. - -When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco sent a call for help to -Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. One should not -forget that Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa and that he -could not get the troops across, as the fleet was in the hands of the -Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the competent -Revolutionary Government in Spain. The decisive factor was, first of -all, to get his troops over to Spain. - -The Führer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support under -all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further spread of -communism in that theater and, secondly, to test my young Luftwaffe at -this opportunity in this or that technical respect. - -With the permission of the Führer, I sent a large part of my transport -fleet and a number of experimental fighter units, bombers, and -anti-aircraft guns; and in that way I had an opportunity to ascertain, -under combat conditions, whether the material was equal to the task. In -order that the personnel, too, might gather a certain amount of -experience, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow, that is, that -new people were constantly being sent and others recalled. - -The rearming of the Air Force required, as a basic condition, the -creation of a large number of new industries. It was no help to me to -build a strong Air Force and not to have any gasoline for it. Here, too, -therefore, I had to speed up the development of the refineries to the -utmost. There were other auxiliary industries, above all, aluminum. -Since I considered the Luftwaffe the most important part of the -Wehrmacht, as far as the security of the Reich was concerned, and, in -view of the modernization of technical science, it was my duty as -Commander-in-Chief to do everything to develop it to the highest peak; -and, too, as nothing was there to begin with, a supreme effort and a -maximum amount of work had to be achieved. That I did. - -Much has been said here in a cross-examination about four-engine -bombers, two-engine bombers, _et cetera_. The witnesses made statements -to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they were familiar only -with small sections and they gave their opinions from that point of -view. I alone was responsible and am responsible, for I was -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and Minister for Air. I was -responsible for the rearmament, the training and the morale of the -Luftwaffe. - -If at the beginning I did not build any four-engine bombers, it was not -because I had qualms that they might be construed as an aggressive -force. That would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason -was that the necessary technical and production conditions did not -exist. That kind of bomber simply had not yet been developed by my -industry, at any rate not so that I could use it. Secondly, I was still -short of aluminum, and anyone only half an expert knows how much -aluminum a four-engine bomber swallows up and how many fighters, that -is, two-engine bombers, one can build with the same amount. - -To start with, I had to ascertain who were likely to be Germany’s -opponents in a war. Were the technical conditions adequate for meeting -an attack against Germany by such an enemy? Of all possible opponents I -considered Russia the main opponent, but of course England, France, and -Italy also had to be considered. It was my duty to consider all -possibilities. - -As far as the European theater of war was concerned, I could, for the -time being, be satisfied with bombers which could operate against the -important centers of enemy armament industry. Thus, for the time being, -I did not need anything more than aircraft which would enable me to do -that, but it was important to have more of that kind. - -But in a speech to the aircraft industrialists I let it be clearly known -that I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded with the -necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. I asked them to work on -that diligently so that, if America should enter into war against -Germany, I could also reach the American armament industry. It was not a -question, therefore, of not wanting them. I even, as far as I remember, -inaugurated a prize competition for bombers capable of flying at great -heights and at great speeds over large distances. Even before the -beginning of the war we had begun to develop propellerless aircraft. - -Summing up, I should like to say that I did everything possible under -the technical and production conditions then prevalent, to rebuild and -rearm a strong Air Force. The technical knowledge of that time led us to -believe that, after 5 years of war, new technical and practical advances -would be made. That is a principle based on experience. I wanted to be -prepared to have an Air Force which, however the political situation -might develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and to deal -blows to Germany’s enemy. It is perfectly correct for Mr. Justice -Jackson to ask whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was -due to the fact that the German Air Force, acting according to modern -principles, contributed so much. It was the decisive factor. On the -other hand, though this does not concern me, the use of the American air -force was also a decisive factor for the Allied victory. - -DR. STAHMER: Has the fact that you were given control of raw materials -already in April 1936 anything to do with this rebuilding of the Air -Force? - -GÖRING: I need not repeat what the witness Körner elaborated yesterday, -or the day before yesterday, with regard to my gradual rise in economic -leadership. The starting point was the agricultural crisis in the year -of 1935. In the summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, Von Blomberg, -the Minister of Economy and President of the Reichsbank, Schacht, and -Minister Kerrl came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a -suggestion of theirs which they wanted to submit to the Führer, namely, -that I be appointed Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. -It was agreed that I should not function as an economics expert, which I -was not; but someone was needed to take care of the difficulties due to -shortage of foreign currency, which continuously arose because of our -heavy demands, and at the same time to make available and accumulate raw -materials—someone who was capable of taking measures which would -perhaps not be understood by many people, but would have the weight of -his authority. Secondly, it was decided that in this sphere, though not -as an expert, I should be the driving power and use my energy. - -Minister Schacht, who was the expert, had difficulties with the Party. -He was not a member of the Party. He was at that time on excellent terms -with the Führer and me, but not so much with the members of the Party. -The danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood -by the latter, and in this connection I would be the right man to make -these things known to the people and the Party. - -That is how that came about. But since I, as Minister of Air, was, as I -have explained, interested in raw materials, I played an ever -increasingly important role. Then the differences between agriculture -and economy in regard to foreign currency came more to the fore, so that -I had to make decisions, decisions which became more drastic. Thus I -entered the field of economic leadership. I devoted a great deal of time -and work to this task, particularly to procuring the raw materials -necessary for economy and for rearmament. Out of this the Four Year Plan -arose which gave me far-reaching plenary powers. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the aim of the Four Year Plan? - -GÖRING: The Four Year Plan had two aims: First, that German economy as -far as possible and particularly in the agricultural sector, should be -made secure against any crisis; secondly, in the event of war, Germany -should be able to withstand a blockade to the greatest extent possible. -Therefore it was necessary, first, to increase agriculture to the -utmost, to control and direct it, to control consumption, and to store -up supplies by means of negotiations with foreign countries; secondly, -to ascertain which raw materials, imported until then, could be found, -produced, and procured in Germany itself, and which raw materials that -were difficult to import could be replaced by others more easily -obtainable. Briefly, as far as the agricultural sphere was concerned: -utilization of every available space; regulation of cultivation -according to the crops needed; control of animal breeding; building up -of reserves for times of need or crop failures; as far as the industrial -sector was concerned, the creation of industries supplying raw -materials: First, coal—although there was sufficient coal, its -production would have to be increased considerably, since coal is the -basic raw material on which so many other things are dependent; -iron—our mining industry had made itself so dependent on foreign -countries that, in the event of a crisis, a most disastrous situation -might arise here. I can quite understand that from the purely financial -and business point of view that was all right but, nevertheless, we -should have to mine and make available the German iron ores which were -at our disposal, even though they were inferior to the Swedish ores; we -should have to compel industry to make alloys and manage with German -ores. - -I recklessly allowed industry a year’s time. As industry by then had -still not begun to exploit these ores, I founded the Reich works which -were given my name. They were primarily for opening up iron-ore reserves -in German soil and using them in the mining industry. It was necessary -to set up oil refineries, aluminum works and various other works, and -then to promote the development of the so-called synthetic material -industry in order to replace necessary raw materials which could be -obtained only from abroad and under difficult circumstances. In the -field of textiles this involved the conversion of the textile industry -and of I. G. Farben. - -That, roughly, was the task of the Four Year Plan. - -Naturally a third question is of importance in this connection: the -question of labor. Co-ordination was necessary here too. The most -important industries had to have workers; less important industries had -to dispense with them. The control of this allocation of labor, which -before the war functioned only within Germany, was another task of the -Four Year Plan and the Department for the Allocation of Labor. - -The Four Year Plan as such very quickly assumed too large proportions as -an official organization. Then, after Schacht had left, I took over the -Ministry of Economy for 2 months and fitted the Four Year Plan into it. -I retained only a very small staff of collaborators and carried out the -tasks with the assistance of the ministries competent to deal with these -things. - -DR. STAHMER: Was the purpose of carrying out these plans that of -preparing for aggressive war? - -GÖRING: No, the aim of the plans was, as I said, to make Germany secure -against economic crises, and to make her secure against a blockade in -the event of war, and, of course, within the Four Year Plan to provide -the necessary conditions for rearmament. That was one of its important -tasks. - -DR. STAHMER: How did the occupation of the Rhineland come about? - -GÖRING: The occupation of the Rhineland was not, as has been asserted -here, a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously did not -deal with the occupation of the Rhineland, but with the question of -mobilization measures in the Rhineland in case of an attack on Germany. - -The Rhineland occupation came about for two reasons. The balance which -was created through the Locarno Pact had been disturbed in western -Europe, because a new factor had arisen in France’s system of allies, -namely Russia, who even at that time had an extraordinarily large armed -force. In addition, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual -assistance pact. Thus, the conditions upon which the Locarno Pact had -been based no longer existed, according to our way of thinking. So, -there was now such a threat to Germany, or the possibility of such a -threat, that it would have been a neglect of duty and honor on the part -of the Government if it had not done everything to ensure, here also, -the security of the Reich. The Government therefore—as a sovereign -state—made use of its sovereign right and freed itself from the -dishonorable obligation not to place a part of the Reich under its -protection, and it did place this important part of the Reich under its -protection by building strong fortifications. - -The construction of such strong fortifications, such expensive -fortifications and such extensive fortifications, is justified only if -that frontier is regarded as final and definitive. If I had intended to -extend the frontier in the near future, it would never have been -possible to go through with an undertaking so expensive and such a -burden to the whole nation as was the construction of the West Wall. -This was done—and I want to emphasize this particularly—from the very -beginning only in the interest of defense and as a defensive measure. It -made the western border of the Reich secure against that threat which, -because of the recent shift of power, and the new combination of powers -such as the Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact, had become a threat -to Germany. The actual occupation, the decision to occupy the Rhineland, -was made at very short notice. The troops which marched into the -Rhineland were of such small numbers—and that is an historical -fact—that they provided merely a token occupation. The Luftwaffe itself -could not, for the time being, enter the Rhine territory on the left at -all, since there was no adequate ground organization. It entered the -so-called demilitarized territory on the right of the Rhine, Düsseldorf -and other cities. In other words, it was not as if the Rhineland were -suddenly occupied with a great wave of troops; but, as I said before, it -was merely that a few battalions and a few batteries marched in as a -symbol that the Rhineland was now again under the full sovereignty of -the sovereign German Reich and would in the future be protected -accordingly. - -DR. STAHMER: What were Hitler’s aims when he created the Reich Defense -Council and when he issued the Reich Defense Law? - -GÖRING: The Reich Defense Council, during the last months, played a very -important role here. I hope I shall not be misunderstood; I believe that -during these months more has been said about it than was ever said since -the moment of its creation. In the first place it is called Reich -Defense Council and not Reich Council for the Offensive. Its existence -is taken for granted. It exists in every other country in some form or -other, even if it has another name. First of all, there was a Reich -Defense Committee already, before our seizure of power. In this -committee there were official experts from all the ministries for the -purpose of carrying out mobilization preparations or, better said, -mobilization measures, which automatically come into consideration in -any kind of development—war, the possibility of war, the facts of war -involving bordering states and the subsequent need to guard one’s -neutrality. These are the usual measures to be taken—to ascertain how -many horses have to be levied in case of mobilization, what factories -have to be converted, whether bread ration cards and fat ration cards -have to be introduced, regulation of traffic, _et cetera_—all these -things need not be dealt with in detail, because they are so obvious. - -All such discussions took place in the Reich Defense -Committee—discussions by the official experts presided over by the then -chief of the ministerial office in the Reich Ministry of War, Keitel. -The Reich Defense Council was created, for the time being, as a -precautionary measure, when the armed forces were re-established, but it -existed only on paper. I was, I think, Deputy Chairman or Chairman—I do -not know which—I heard it mentioned here. I assure you under oath that -at no time and at no date did I participate in a meeting at which the -Reich Defense Council as such was called together. These discussions, -which were necessary for the defense of the Reich, were held in a -completely different connection, in a different form and depended on -immediate needs. Naturally, there were discussions about the defense of -the Reich, but not in connection with the Reich Defense Council. This -existed on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, that would -have been quite logical, since this concerns defense and not attack. The -Reich Defense Law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich -Defense, which is probably what you mean, was created only one day -before the outbreak of the war, since the Reich Defense Council actually -did not exist. This Ministerial Council for Reich Defense is not to be -considered the same as, for instance, the so-called War Cabinet that was -formed in England when the war broke out, and perhaps in other -countries. On the contrary, this Ministerial Council for the Reich -Defense was—by using abbreviated procedure—to issue only the -regulations necessary for wartime, laws dealing with daily issues, -explanations to the people, and it was to relieve the Führer to a -considerable extent, since he had reserved for himself the leadership in -military operations. The Ministerial Council therefore issued, first of -all, all those laws which, as I should like to mention, are to be -expected in any country at the beginning of a war. In the early period -it met three or four times, and after that not at all. I, too, had no -time after that. To abbreviate the procedure, these laws were circulated -and then issued. One, or one and a half years afterwards—I cannot -remember the exact time—the Führer took the direct issuance of laws -more into his own hands. I was the co-signer of many laws in my capacity -as Chairman of this Ministerial Council. But that, too, was practically -discontinued in the latter years. The Ministerial Council did not meet -again at all after 1940, I think. - -DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has presented a document, Number 2261-PS. -In this document a Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 is mentioned, which -for the time being was kept in abeyance by order of the Führer. I shall -have that document shown to you and I ask you to give your views on it? - -GÖRING: I am familiar with it. - -DR. STAHMER: Would you please state your views? - -GÖRING: After the Reich Defense Council had begun to exist, a Reich -Defense Law was provided in 1935 for the event of a mobilization. The -agreement or, better said, decision, was made by the Reich Cabinet and -this law was to be applied and became effective in the case of a -mobilization. Actually it was replaced when mobilization did come about, -by the law I have mentioned regarding the Ministerial Council for the -Reich Defense. In this law, before the time of the Four Year Plan, that -is 1935, a Plenipotentiary for Economy was created, at first for the -event of a mobilization, and a Plenipotentiary for Administration; so -that if war occurred, then all the departments of the entire -administration would be concentrated under one minister and all the -departments concerned with economy and armament were likewise to be -concentrated under one minister. The Plenipotentiary for Administration -did not function before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, -on the other hand—this title was not to be made known to the -public—was to begin his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary. -This is perhaps the clearest explanation of the fact that the creation -of the Four Year Plan necessarily led to clashes between the -Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, -since both of them were more or less working on the same or similar -tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was made Delegate for the Four Year -Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy practically -ceased. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questioning? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: A word has been repeatedly used here: Reich Research -Council (Reichsforschungsrat). What kind of institution was that? - -GÖRING: I believe it was in the year 1943 that I received the order to -concentrate the entire field of German research, particularly insofar as -it was of urgent importance to the conduct of war. Unfortunately, that -was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel research and -useless research, to concentrate all research on problems important for -the war. I myself became President of the Reich Research Council and -established directives for research according to the purpose mentioned. - -DR. STAHMER: Did this have any connection with the Research Office of -the Air Force? - -GÖRING: No, the Research Office of the Air Force was entirely different, -and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand or the Air -Force on the other hand. The expression was a sort of camouflage, for, -when we came to power, there was considerable confusion on the technical -side of control of important information. Therefore, I established for -the time being the Research Office, that was an office where all -technical devices for the control of radio, telegraph, telephone, and -all other technical communications could be provided. Since I was then -only Reich Minister for Air I could do this within only my own ministry -and therefore used this camouflaged designation. This machinery served -to exert control above all over foreign missions, and important persons, -who had telephone, telegraph, and radio connections with foreign -countries, as is customary everywhere in all countries, and then to -decipher the information thus extracted and put it at the disposal of -other departments. The office had no agents, no intelligence service, -but was a purely technical office intercepting wireless messages, -telephone conversations, and telegrams, wherever it was ordered, and -passing on the information to the offices concerned. In this connection -I may say that I have also read much about those communications made by -Mr. Messersmith, which figured here. He was at times the main source for -such information. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the purpose and importance of the Secret Cabinet -Council which was created a short time after the seizure of power? - -GÖRING: In February 1938 there came about the retirement of the War -Minister, Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Simultaneously, because of -particular circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel -General Von Fritsch, retired, that is to say, the Führer dismissed him. -The coincidence of these retirements or dismissals was, in the eyes of -the Führer, disadvantageous to the prestige of the Wehrmacht. He wanted -to divert attention from this change in the Wehrmacht by means of a -general reshuffling. He said he wanted above all to change the Foreign -Office because only such a change would make a strong impression abroad -and would be likely to divert attention from the military affairs. At -the time I opposed the Führer very strongly about this. In lengthy, -wearisome personal conversations I begged him to refrain from a change -in the Foreign Office. He thought, however, that he would have to insist -upon it. - -The question arose as to what should be done after Herr Von Neurath’s -retirement or after the change. The Führer intended to keep Herr Von -Neurath in the Cabinet by all means for he had the greatest personal -esteem for him. I myself have always expressed my respect for Herr Von -Neurath. In order to avoid a lowering of Herr Von Neurath’s prestige -abroad, I myself was the one to make a proposal to the Führer. I told -him that in order to make it appear abroad that Von Neurath had not been -entirely removed from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him -chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was, to be sure, no such -cabinet in existence, but the expression would sound quite nice, and -everyone would imagine that it meant something. The Führer said we could -not make him chairman if we had no council. Thereupon I said, “Then we -shall make one,” and offhand I marked down names of several persons. How -little importance I attached to this council can be seen in the fact -that I myself was, I think, one of the last on that list. - -Then, for the public at large the council was given out to be an -advisory council for foreign policy. When I returned I said to my -friends, “The affair has gone off all right, but if the Führer does not -ask the Foreign Minister for advice, he certainly will not ask a cabinet -council for advice on foreign policy; we will not have anything to do -with it!” I declare under oath that this Cabinet Council never met at -all, not even for a minute; there was not even an initial meeting for -laying down the rules by which it should function. Some members may not -even have been informed that they were members. - -DR. STAHMER: When was the Reich Cabinet in session last? - -GÖRING: As far as I remember, the last meeting of the Reich Cabinet was -in 1937, and, as far as I can remember, I presided over the last -meeting, the Führer having left shortly after the beginning. The Führer -did not think much of Cabinet meetings; it was too large a circle for -him, and perhaps there was too much discussion of his plans, and he -wanted that changed. - -From that time on there were only individual conferences—conferences -with single ministers or with groups of ministers from the ministries -concerned. But since the ministers found, very rightly, that this made -their work difficult, a solution was adopted whereby I, under the title -of the Four Year Plan, called the ministers together more frequently, in -order to discuss general matters with them. But at no time in the -Cabinet or the Ministerial Council was any political decision of -importance mentioned or discussed, as, for instance, those -decisions—the annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and -Czechoslovakia—which finally led to war. I know how much importance the -Führer attached to the fact that in all these matters only those -ministers should be informed who absolutely had to be informed, because -of the nature of their work, and that only at the very last minute. Here -too, I can say under oath that quite a number of ministers were not -informed about the beginning of the war or the march into -Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, or Austria until the next morning, when -they learned about it by radio or through the press, just as any other -German citizen. - -DR. STAHMER: What part did you have in making the Munich Pact of -September 1938? - -GÖRING: The incorporation of the Sudeten Germans or, better said, the -solution of the Sudeten German problem I had always emphasized as being -something that was necessary. I also told the Führer after the Anschluss -of Austria that I should regret it if his statements were misunderstood -to mean that with the Anschluss of Austria this question had been -settled. - -In November 1937, I stated to Lord Halifax that the Anschluss of -Austria, the solution of the Sudeten German question in the sense of a -return of the Sudeten Germans, and the solution of the problem of Danzig -and the Corridor were integral parts of German policy. Whether they were -tackled by Hitler one day, or by me or somebody else the next day, they -would still remain political aims which under all circumstances would -have to be attained sometime. However, both of us agreed that all -efforts should be made to achieve that without resorting to war. - -Furthermore, in my conversations with Mr. Bullitt I had always taken up -the very same position. And I told every other person, publicly and -personally, that these three points had to be settled and that the -settlement of the one would not make the others unimportant. - -I also want to stress that, if in connection with this, and also in -connection with other things, the Prosecution accuses us of not having -kept this or that particular promise that Germany had made in the past, -including the Germany that existed just before the seizure of power, I -should like to refer to the many speeches in which both the Führer—this -I no longer remember so well—and I, as I know very well, stated that we -warned foreign countries not to make any plans for the future on the -basis of any promises made by the present government, that we would not -recognize these promises when we acquired power. Thus there was absolute -clarity in respect to this. - -When the Sudeten question approached a crisis and a solution was -intended by the Führer, I, as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the -Luftwaffe, as was my duty, took the preparatory measures, ordered for -any eventuality. As a politician I was extremely happy at the attempts -which were made to find a peaceful solution. I acknowledge that at that -time I was very glad when I saw that the British Prime Minister was -making every possible effort. Nevertheless, the situation on the day -before the Munich agreement had again become very critical. - -It was about 6:30 or 7 o’clock in the morning when the Italian -Ambassador, Attolico, rang me up and said that he had to see me -immediately on orders from Mussolini, that it was about the solution of -the Sudeten problem. I told him he should go and see the Foreign -Minister. He said he had a special order from Mussolini to see me alone -first. I met him, as far as I remember, at 9 o’clock in the morning, and -there he suggested that Mussolini was prepared to mediate; that a -meeting should be called as soon as possible between Germany (Adolf -Hitler), England (Prime Minister Chamberlain), France (Premier -Daladier), and Italy (Mussolini), in order to settle the question -peacefully. He, Mussolini, saw a possibility of that and was prepared to -take all necessary steps and asked me personally to use all my influence -in that direction. I took the Ambassador, and also Herr Von Neurath -although he was not Foreign Minister at that time, at once to the Reich -Chancellery and reported everything to the Führer, tried to persuade -him, explained to him the advantages of such a step and said that this -could be the basis for a general easing of tension. Whether the other -current political and diplomatic endeavors would be successful one could -not yet say, but if four leading statesmen of the four large western -European powers were to meet, then much would be gained by that. - -Herr Von Neurath supported my argument, and the Führer agreed and said -we should call the Duce by telephone. Attolico, who waited outside, did -that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called the Führer officially and -matters were agreed and Munich decided upon as the place. - -Late in the afternoon I was informed by the Italian Embassy that both -the British Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister had agreed to -arrive at Munich the next day. - -I asked the Führer, or rather, I told him, that under all circumstances -I would go along. He agreed. Then I suggested that I could also take -Herr Von Neurath with me in my train. He agreed to that also. - -I took part in some of the discussions and, when necessary, contributed -to the settlement of many arguments and, above all, did my best to -create a friendly atmosphere on all sides. I had personal conversations -with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was sincerely happy -afterwards that everything had gone well. - -DR. STAHMER: Before that, the Anschluss of Austria with Germany had -taken place. What reasons did Hitler have for that decision, and to what -extent did you play a part in those measures? - -GÖRING: I told the Tribunal yesterday, when I gave a brief outline of my -life, that I personally felt a great affinity for Austria; that I had -spent the greater part of my youth in an Austrian castle; that my -father, even at the time of the old empire, often spoke of a close bond -between the future of the German motherland of Austria and the Reich, -for he was convinced that the Austrian Empire would not hold together -much longer. - -In 1918 while in Austria for 2 days, having come by plane, I saw the -revolution and the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire take place. Those -countries, with a predominantly German population, including Sudeten -Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the Parliament. They -declared themselves free of the dissolved Hapsburg State and declared, -including the representatives of Sudeten Germany, Austria to be a part -of the German Reich. This happened, as far as I know, under the Social -Democratic Chancellor, Renner. This statement by the representatives of -the Austrian-German people that they wanted to be a part of Germany in -the future was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited -by the dictate of the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any -other German was that of importance. - -The moment and the basic conditions had of course to be created for a -union of the two brother nations of purely German blood and origin to -take place. When we came to power, as I have said before, this was -naturally an integral part of German policy. - -The assurances which Hitler gave at that time regarding the sovereignty -of Austria were no deception; they were meant seriously. At first he -probably did not see any possibility. I myself was much more radical in -this direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite -commitments regarding the Austrian question. He believed, however, that -he had first of all to take Italy into consideration. - -It was evident, especially after the National Socialist Party in Germany -had come to power, that the National Socialist Party in Austria was also -growing more and more. This party, however, had existed in Austria even -before the seizure of power in Germany, just as the origin of the -National Socialist Workers Party goes back to Sudeten Germany. The Party -in Austria was therefore not a Fifth Column for the Anschluss, because -the Austrian people themselves originally wanted and always wanted the -Anschluss. If the idea of the Anschluss did not figure so clearly and -strongly in the Austrian Government of that time, it was not because it -did not want to be joined to Germany, but because the National Socialist -form of government was not compatible in any way with the form of -government in Austria at that time. - -Thus there resulted that tension, first in Austria itself, which has -repeatedly been mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. This -tension was bound to come because the National Socialists took the idea -of the Anschluss with Germany more seriously than the Government did. -This resulted in political strife between the two. That we were on the -side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned -is obvious, particularly as the Party in Austria was severely -persecuted. Many were put into camps, which were just like concentration -camps but had different names. - -At a certain time the leader of the Austrian Party was a man by the name -of Habicht from Wiesbaden. I did not know him before; I saw him only -once there. He falsely led the Führer to believe, before the so-called -Dollfuss case, that the Austrian armed forces were prepared to undertake -something independently in order to force the government to accept the -Anschluss, or else they would overthrow it. If this were the case, that -the Party in Austria was to support whatever the armed forces undertook -along those lines, then, so the Führer thought, it should have the -political support of the Party in Germany in this matter. But the whole -thing was actually a deception, as it was not the Austrian Army which -intended to proceed against the Austrian Government but rather a -so-called “Wehrmacht Standarte,” a unit which consisted of former -members, and released or discharged members, of the Austrian Army who -had gone over to the Party or joined it. - -With this deceptive maneuver Habicht then undertook this action in -Vienna. I was in Bayreuth with the Führer at the time. The Führer called -Habicht at once and reproached him most severely and said that he had -falsely informed him, tricked him and deceived him. - -He regretted the death of Dollfuss very much because politically that -meant a very serious situation as far as the National Socialists were -concerned, and particularly with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five -divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Führer -desired an appeasement which would be quick and as sweeping in its -effect as possible. That was the reason why he asked Herr Von Papen to -go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to work for an easing of -the atmosphere as quickly as possible. - -One must not forget the somewhat absurd situation which had developed in -the course of years, namely, that a purely German country such as -Austria was not most strongly influenced in governmental matters by the -German Reich but by the Italian Government. I remember that statement of -Mr. Churchill’s, that Austria was practically an affiliate of Italy. - -After the action against Dollfuss, Italy assumed a very stand-offish -attitude toward Germany and made it clear that Italy would be the -country which would do everything to prevent the Anschluss. Therefore, -besides the internal clearing up of Germany’s relations with Austria by -Herr Von Papen, the Führer also tried to bring about a change in -Mussolini’s attitude to this question. For this reason he went to Venice -shortly afterwards—maybe it was before—at any rate he tried to bring -about a different attitude. - -But I was of the opinion that in spite of everything we may have had in -common, let us say in a philosophic sense—fascism and National -Socialism—the Anschluss of our brother people was much more important -to me than this coming to an agreement. And if it were not possible to -do it with Mussolini, we should have to do it against him. - -Then came the Italian-Abyssinian war. With regard to the sanctions -against Italy, Germany was given to understand, not openly but quite -clearly, that it would be to her advantage, as far as the Austrian -question was concerned, to take part in these sanctions. - -That was a difficult decision for the Führer to make, to declare himself -out and out against Italy and to achieve the Anschluss by these means or -to bind himself by obligation to Italy by means of a pro-Italian or -correct attitude and thus to exclude Italy’s opposition to the -Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat -vague offer regarding Austria made by English-French circles, to try and -find out who was behind this offer and whether both governments were -willing to come to an agreement in regard to this point and to give -assurances to the effect that this would be considered an internal -German affair, and not some vague assurances of general co-operation, -_et cetera_. - -My suspicions proved right; we could not get any definite assurances. -Under those circumstances, it was more expedient for us to prevent Italy -being the main opponent to the Anschluss by not joining in any sanctions -against her. - -I was still of the opinion that the great national interest of the union -of these German peoples stood above all considerations regarding the -differences between the two present governments. For this to happen it -could not be expected that the government of the great German Reich -should resign and that Germany should perhaps be annexed to Austria; -rather the Anschluss would have to be carried through sooner or later. - -Then came the Berchtesgaden agreement. I was not present at this. I did -not even consent to this agreement, because I opposed any definite -statement which lengthened this period of indecision; for me the -complete union of all Germans was the only conceivable solution. - -Shortly after Berchtesgaden there was the plebiscite which the then -Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebiscite was of itself an -impossibility, a breach of the Berchtesgaden agreement. This I shall -pass over, but the way in which this plebiscite was supposed to take -place was unique in history. One could vote only by “yes,” every person -could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If -he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as “yes,” and so on. It -has no further interest. In this way it could be seen from the very -beginning that if only a few followers of the Schuschnigg system -utilized these opportunities sufficiently the result could be only a -positive majority for Herr Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce. - -We opposed that. First of all a member of the Austrian Government who -was at that moment in Germany, General Von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown -to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart—who, -since Berchtesgaden, was in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet—that Germany would -never tolerate this provocation. At the same time troops which were -stationed near the Austrian border were on the alert. That was on -Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day I was in the Reich Chancellery, -alone with the Führer in his room. I heard by telephone the news that -Glaise-Horstenau had arrived and made our demands known clearly and -unmistakably, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as -far as I remember, the answer came that the plebiscite had been called -off and that Schuschnigg had agreed to it. At this moment I had the -instinctive feeling that the situation was now mobile and that now, -finally, that possibility which we had long and ardently awaited was -there—the possibility of bringing about a complete solution. And from -this moment on I must take 100 percent responsibility for all further -happenings, because it was not the Führer so much as I myself who set -the pace and, even overruling the Führer’s misgivings, brought -everything to its final development. - -My telephone conversations have been read here. I demanded -spontaneously, without actually having first spoken to the Führer about -it, the immediate retirement of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was -granted, I put my next demand, that now everything was ripe for the -Anschluss. And that took place, as is known. - -The only thing—and I do not say this because it is important as far as -my responsibility is concerned—which I did not bring about personally, -since I did not know the persons involved, but which has been brought -forward by the Prosecution in the last few days, was the following: I -sent through a list of ministers, that is to say, I named those persons -who would be considered by us desirable as members of an Austrian -Government for the time being. I knew Seyss-Inquart, and it was clear to -me from the very beginning that he should get the Chancellorship. Then I -named Kaltenbrunner for Security. I did not know Kaltenbrunner, and that -is one of the two instances where the Führer took a hand by giving me a -few names. Also, by the way, I gave the name of Fischböck for the -Ministry of Economy without knowing him. The only one whom I personally -brought into this Cabinet was my brother-in-law, Dr. Hueber, as Minister -of Justice, but not because he was my brother-in-law, for he had already -been Austrian Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Prelate Seipel. He -was not a member of the Party at that time, but he came from the ranks -of the Heimwehr and it was important for me to have in the Cabinet also -a representative of that group, with whom we had at first made common -cause, but then opposed. I wanted to be sure of my influence on this -person, so that everything would now actually develop towards a total -Anschluss. For already plans had again appeared in which the Führer -only, as the head of the German Reich, should be simultaneously the head -of German Austria; there would otherwise be a separation. That I -considered intolerable. The hour had come and we should make the best -use of it. - -In the conversation which I had with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, -who was in London at that time, I pointed out that the ultimatum had not -been presented by us but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true _de -jure_; _de facto_, of course it was my wish. But this telephone -conversation was being listened to by the English, and I had to conduct -a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in -such cases say how matters are _de facto_; rather they always stress how -they are _de jure_. And why should I make a possible exception here? In -this telephone conversation I demanded of Herr Von Ribbentrop that he -ask the British Government to name British persons in whom they had the -fullest confidence. I would make all arrangements so that these persons -could travel around Austria everywhere in order to see for themselves -that the Austrian people in an overwhelming majority wanted this -Anschluss and greeted it with enthusiasm. Here, during the discussion of -the Austrian question no mention was made of the fact that already—this -conversation took place on a Friday—the Sunday before in Styria, one of -the most important parts of the hereditary countries, an internal -partial Anschluss had practically taken place, and that the population -there had already declared itself in favor of the Anschluss and had more -or less severed its ties with the Viennese Government. - -DR. STAHMER: I have handed to you a record of that conversation. It has -been put in by the Prosecution. One part of it has not been read into -the record yet, but you have given its contents. Would you please look -at it? - -GÖRING: Yes; I attach importance to having only those passages in this -document read in which I refer to the fact that I considered it -important that the English Government should send to Austria as soon as -possible people in whom they had confidence, in order that they might -see for themselves the actual state of affairs; and secondly, those -passages in which I refer to the fact that we were going to hold a -plebiscite according to the Charter of the Saar Plebiscite and that, -whatever the result might be, we should acknowledge it. I could promise -that all the more, as it was personally known to me and quite clear that -an overwhelming majority would vote in favor of the Anschluss. - -Now I come to the decisive part concerning the entry of the troops. That -was the second point where the Führer interfered and we were not of the -same opinion. The Führer wanted the reasons for the march into Austria -to be a request by the new Government of Seyss-Inquart, that is the -government desired by us—that they should ask for the troops in order -to maintain order in the country. I was against this, not against the -march into Austria—I was for the march under all circumstances—against -only the reasons to be given. Here there was a difference of opinion. -Certainly there might be disturbances at one place, namely Vienna and -Wiener-Neustadt, because some of the Austrian Marxists, who once before -had started an armed uprising, were actually armed. That, however, was -not of such decisive importance. It was rather of the greatest -importance that German troops should march into Austria immediately in -sufficient numbers to stave off any desire on the part of a neighboring -country to inherit even a single Austrian village on this occasion. - -I should like to emphasize that at that time Mussolini’s attitude to the -Austrian question had not yet crystallized, although I had worked on him -the year before to that end. The Italians were still looking with -longing eyes at eastern Tyrol. The five divisions along the Brenner Pass -I had not forgotten. The Hungarians talked too much about the -Burgenland. The Yugoslavs once mentioned something about Carinthia, but -I believe that I made it clear to them at the time that that was absurd. -So to prevent the fulfillment of these hopes once and for all, which -might easily happen in such circumstances, I very definitely wanted the -German troops to march into Austria proclaiming: “The Anschluss has -taken place; Austria is a part of Germany and therefore in its entirety -automatically and completely under the protection of the German Reich -and its Armed Forces.” - -The Führer did not want to have such a striking demonstration of foreign -policy, and finally asked me to inform Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram -to that effect. The fact that we were in agreement about the decisive -point, the march into Austria, helps explain the telephone conversation -in which I told Seyss-Inquart that he need not send a telegram, that he -could do it by telephone; that would be sufficient. That was the reason. -Mussolini’s consent did not come until 11:30 at night. It is well known -what a relief that was for the Führer. - -In the evening of the same day, after everything had become clear, and -the outcome could be seen in advance, I went to the Flieger Club, where -I had been invited several weeks before, to a ball. I mention this -because here that too has been described as a deceptive maneuver. But -that invitation had been sent out, I believe, even before the -Berchtesgaden conference took place. There I met almost all the -diplomats. I immediately took Sir Nevile Henderson, the British -Ambassador, aside. I spoke to him for 2 hours and gave him all the -reasons and explained everything, and also asked him to tell me—the -same question which I later asked Ribbentrop—what nation in the whole -world was damaged in any way by our union with Austria? From whom had we -taken anything, and whom had we harmed? I said that this was an absolute -restitution, that both parts had belonged together in the German Empire -for centuries and that they had been separated only because of political -developments, the later monarchy and Austria’s secession. - -When the Führer flew to Austria the next morning, I took over all the -business of the Reich in his absence, as is known. At that time I also -prohibited for the time being the return of the so-called Austrian -Legion—that was a group of people who had left Austria during the early -time of the fighting period—because I did not want to have any -disturbances. Secondly, however, I also made sure that north of the -Danube, that is between the Czechoslovak border and the Danube, only one -battalion should march through the villages, so that Czechoslovakia -would see very clearly that this was merely an Austro-German affair. -That battalion had to march through so that the towns north of the -Danube could also take part in the jubilation. - -In this connection I want to stress two points in concluding: If Mr. -Messersmith says in his long affidavit that before the Anschluss I had -made various visits to Yugoslavia and Hungary in order to win over both -these nations for the Anschluss, and that I had promised to Yugoslavia a -part of Carinthia, I can only say in answer to these statements that I -do not understand them at all. My visits in Yugoslavia and the other -Balkan countries were designed to improve relations, particularly trade -relations, which were very important to me with respect to the Four Year -Plan. If at any time Yugoslavia had demanded one single village in -Carinthia, I would have said that I would not even answer such a point, -because, if any country is German to the core, it was and is Carinthia. - -The second point: Here in the Indictment mention is made of an -aggressive war against Austria. Aggressive war is carried out by -shooting, throwing bombs, and so on; but there only one thing was -thrown—and that was flowers. But maybe the Prosecution meant something -else, and there I could agree. I personally have always stated that I -would do everything to make sure that the Anschluss should not disturb -the peace, but that in the long run, if this should be denied us -forever, I personally might resort to war in order to reach this goal; -that these Germans return to their fatherland—a war for Austria, not -against Austria. - -I believe, I have given in brief a picture of the Austrian events. And I -close with the statement that in this matter not so much the Führer as -I, personally, bear the full and entire responsibility for everything -that has happened. - -DR. STAHMER: On the evening before the march of the troops into Austria -you also had a conversation with Dr. Mastny, the Czechoslovak -Ambassador. On this occasion you are supposed to have given a -declaration on your word of honor. What about that conversation? - -GÖRING: I am especially grateful that I can at last make a clear -statement about this “word of honor,” which has been mentioned so often -during the last months and which has been so incriminating for me. - -I mentioned that on that evening almost all the diplomats were present -at that ball. After I had spoken to Sir Nevile Henderson and returned to -the ballroom, the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Dr. Mastny, came to me, very -excited and trembling, and asked me what was happening that night and -whether we intended to march into Czechoslovakia also. I gave him a -short explanation and said, “No, it is only a question of the Anschluss -of Austria; it has absolutely nothing to do with your country, -especially if you keep out of things altogether.” - -He thanked me and went, apparently, to the telephone. But after a short -time he came back even more excited, and I had the impression that in -his excitement he could hardly understand me. I said to him then in the -presence of others: “Your Excellency, listen carefully. I give you my -personal word of honor that this is a question of the Anschluss of -Austria only, and that not a single German soldier will come anywhere -near the Czechoslovak border. See to it that there is no mobilization on -the part of Czechoslovakia which might lead to difficulties.” He then -agreed. - -At no time did I say to him, “I give you my word of honor that we never -want to have anything to do with Czechoslovakia for all time.” All he -wanted was an explanation for this particular event, for this particular -time. I gave him this particular explanation, because I had already -clearly stated before that that the solution of the Sudeten German -problem would be necessary at some time and in some way. I would never -have given him a declaration on my word of honor in regard to a final -solution, and it would not have been possible for me, because before -that, I had already made a statement to a different effect. An -explanation was desired for the moment and in connection with the -Austrian events. I could conscientiously assure him on my word of honor -that Czechoslovakia would not be touched then, because at that time no -decisions had been made by us, as far as a definite time was concerned -with respect to Czechoslovakia or the solution of the Sudeten problem. - -DR. STAHMER: On the 15 March 1939 a conversation took place between -Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation? -And what was your part in it? - -GÖRING: That was the beginning of the establishment of the Protectorate -in Czechoslovakia. After Munich—that is, after the Munich Agreement and -the solution of the Sudeten German problem—a military decision had been -reached by the Führer and some of his collaborators to the effect that, -if there should be new difficulties after the Munich agreement, or -arising from the occupation of the zones, certain measures of precaution -would have to be taken by the military authorities, for, after the -occupation of the zones, the troops which had been in readiness for -“Case Green” (Schmundt File) had been demobilized. But a development -might easily take place which at any moment could become extremely -dangerous for Germany. One needs only to remember what an interpretation -was given at that time by the Russian press and the Russian radio to the -Munich agreement and to the occupation of the Sudetenland. One could -hardly use stronger language. There had been a liaison between Prague -and Moscow for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the Munich -agreement, could now strengthen its ties with Moscow. Signs of that were -seen particularly in the Czech officers’ corps and we were informed. And -in the event of this proving dangerous to Germany, instructions had been -issued to the various military offices to take preventive measures, as -was their duty. But that order has nothing to do with any intention of -occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia after a short time. - -I myself went to the Riviera at the end of January for my first long -vacation and during that time I dropped all business affairs. At the -beginning of March, much to my surprise, a courier came from the Führer -with a letter in which the Führer informed me that developments in -Czechoslovakia were such that he could not let things go on as they were -with impunity. They were becoming an increasing menace to Germany, and -he was determined to solve the question now by eliminating -Czechoslovakia as a source of danger right in the center of Germany, and -he therefore was thinking of an occupation. - -During that time I had met many Englishmen in San Remo. I had realized -that they had made the best of Munich and even found it satisfactory, -but that any other incidents, or demands on Czechoslovakia would cause -considerable excitement. - -I sent a letter back by courier. Maybe it is among the many tons of -documents in the possession of the Prosecution. I could also understand -if they do not submit it, for it would be a document of an extenuating -character as far as I am concerned. In this letter I communicated these -views to the Führer and wrote to him somewhat as follows: That if this -were to take place now, it would be a very serious loss of prestige for -the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and I hardly believed that he -would survive it. Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the -Führer knew Churchill’s attitude toward Germany. Secondly, it would not -be understood, since just a short time previously we had settled these -things to general satisfaction. Thirdly, I thought I could calm him by -telling him the following: I believed that what he wanted to eliminate -at the moment in the way of danger, by the occupation of Czechoslovakia, -could be achieved in a somewhat lengthier manner, at the same time -avoiding anything which might excite Czechoslovakia as well as other -countries. I was convinced that since the Sudetenland had been separated -and Austria was a part of Germany an economic penetration of -Czechoslovakia would be only a matter of time. That is to say, I hoped -by strong economic ties to reach a communications, customs, and currency -union, which would serve the economic interests of both countries. If -this took place, then a sovereign Czechoslovakia would be politically so -closely bound to Germany and German interests that I did not believe -that any danger could arise again. However, if Slovakia expressed her -desire for independence very definitely we should not have to counteract -that in any way. On the contrary, we could support it, as then economic -co-operation would naturally become even much closer than otherwise; -for, if Slovakia were to secede, both countries would have to look to -Germany in economic matters, and in such matters both countries could be -made interested in Germany and could be most closely bound to Germany. - -This letter—I have just given the gist of it—the courier took back. -Then I heard nothing for some days. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please? - -GÖRING: I was then called to Berlin on very short notice. I arrived in -Berlin in the morning and President Hacha arrived in the evening of the -same day. I presented orally to the Führer the views which I had already -expressed in my letter. The Führer pointed out to me certain evidence in -his possession to the effect that the situation in Czechoslovakia had -developed more seriously. This state had, for one thing, disintegrated -because of the detachment of Slovakia, but that was not the decisive -question. He showed me documents from the Intelligence Service which -indicated that Russian aviation commissions were present at the -airfields of Czechoslovakia, or certain of them, undertaking training, -and that such things were not in keeping with the Munich agreement. He -said that he feared that Czechoslovakia, especially if Slovakia were -detached, would be used as a Russian air base against Germany. - -He said he was determined to eliminate this danger. President Hacha had -requested an interview, so he told me at the time, and would arrive in -the evening; and he wished that I too should be present at the Reich -Chancellery. - -President Hacha arrived and talked first with the Reich Foreign -Minister. At night he came to see the Führer; we greeted him coldly. -First he conversed with the Führer alone; then we were called in. Then I -talked to him in the presence of his ambassador and urged him to meet as -quickly as possible the Führer’s demand that troops be kept back when -the Germans marched in, in order that there might be no bloodshed. I -told him that nothing could be done about it; the Führer had made his -decision and considered it necessary, and there would be only -unnecessary bloodshed as resistance for any length of time was quite -impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I should be -sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention of bombing Prague -did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in -the case of resistance that would not have been necessary—resistance -could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point -like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the -whole matter. - -I succeeded then in getting a telephone connection between him and his -Government in Prague, he gave the order, and the occupation and the -march, into Prague took place the next day. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you accompany the Führer to Prague? - -GÖRING: No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was rather annoyed. I -did not enter Czechoslovakia or Sudeten Germany at any time after that -incident, with the exception of 21 April 1945 when I passed through a -part of Czechoslovakia. - -DR. STAHMER: Why were you annoyed? - -GÖRING: Because the whole matter had been carried out more or less over -my head. - -DR. STAHMER: Did other powers take a part in the occupation of -Czechoslovakia? - -GÖRING: Yes. Poland took the Olsa territory at that time. - -DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution have presented a document from which the -conclusion is drawn that the murder of the German Ambassador was to take -place in connection with anti-German demonstrations in Prague. It has -been interpreted as if this assassination of the German Ambassador were -to be carried out in order to provide a motive for the annexation. - -GÖRING: That comes before the solution of the Sudeten German problem, -and I listened very carefully when that point came up. I also remember -what the facts really were. It was not discussed in that way and should -not be interpreted, that we wanted to murder our own Ambassadors, or had -even considered this possibility, in order to find a motive for settling -this problem. But we considered the possibilities which might lead to an -immediate clash. In view of the tension which existed between -Czechoslovakia and Germany in regard to Sudeten Germany, the possibility -was also considered that the German Ambassador in Prague might actually -be assassinated by the Czechs, and that this would necessitate immediate -action on Germany’s part under all circumstances, quite apart from any -other political actions. - -This possibility arose from the fact that outside the German Embassy in -Prague there had been a number of demonstrations, which cannot be -denied, for which reason Germany had sent arms to the Embassy for its -defense, so threatening was the situation. For these reasons we talked -of that possibility. That has been wrongly understood here. We did not -want to have the Ambassador assassinated as a provocation, or a possible -provocation, but we saw the possibility of such an assassination being -committed by the other side; and then the Führer would have acted -immediately. - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent were confiscations carried out in -Czechoslovakia? - -GÖRING: Before the war no confiscation took place in Czechoslovakia, -that is, no economic goods were taken away. On the contrary, -Czechoslovakia’s large and vigorous economic capacity was aligned in its -full extent with the economic capacity of Germany. That is to say, we -attached importance above all to the fact that, now that we had declared -the Protectorate and thus concluded an action, the Skoda Works and the -Brünn Armament Works, that is important armament works, would naturally -be included in the armament potential of Germany. That means that orders -were sent there for the time being to a considerable extent. Over and -above that we even created new industries there and gave our support in -respect to this. - -The accusation had been raised that among other things we dismantled new -rails there and replaced them with old rails from Germany. I believe -that to be a complete error, for the transportation system in -Czechoslovakia, the Protectorate, was one of the most important for -Germany. The entire southeastern transportation from the Balkans went -through the Protectorate, first, in the direction of Vienna, Prague, -Dresden, and Berlin; and secondly, the main line of -Vienna-Lundenburg-Oderberg-Breslau. And, since the canal had not been -completed, the entire transportation of all economic goods no longer -made a detour around the border, but took the shortest way. We would -have been mad if we had weakened this transportation system. I can think -of only one explanation, and that is that during the extension of the -existing transportation system perhaps, many rails from German stock -were also used which later appeared in the government report as “old.” -But that we dismantled new for old is absolute nonsense. - -Furthermore, it is obvious that as Sudetenland was included in the -Reich, the accusation that state property and forests were taken over -into German State possession has no bearing; for naturally if a country -is taken over, then its state property must also become the property of -the new state. - -Likewise the accusation, as far as Sudetenland is concerned, that the -banks there were affiliated with German banks is obviously not -justified, as German currency was introduced for the country, and -therefore the branch banks also had to be converted to that. - -As far as the later Protectorate is concerned, I have already emphasized -that even before the creation of that Protectorate a strong economic -penetration of Czechoslovakia had been prepared by me, on the one hand -by our acquiring shares from other owners which gave us a voice in Czech -and Slovak enterprises, and further I believe, by our replacing certain -loans originally made by Western powers. - -In this connection the Hermann Göring Werke came to the fore, as they -had acquired large number of shares in the Skoda Works, in order to use -the latter as a finishing industry for the products of their own rolling -mills and steel works, just as they used other industries in Germany. - -Moreover, after, the creation of the Protectorate, the total economic -capacity of the Protectorate was of course amalgamated with Germany’s -total economic capacity. - -DR. STAHMER: On 15 November 1937 a discussion with the Führer took place -at the Reich Chancellery, a record of which was prepared by a certain -Colonel Hossbach, and that has been referred to as Hitler’s last will. -It has repeatedly been the subject of the proceedings here. May I ask -you for a short explanation as to what significance this conference had. -I am going to have that document shown to you. It is Document Number -386-PS. - -GÖRING: This document has already been shown to me here, and I am fairly -familiar with the contents. This document played an important role in -the Indictment, since it appears under the heading “Testament of the -Führer.” This word “testament” is, in fact, used in one place by -Hossbach. - -As far as the technical aspect of this record is concerned, I want to -say the following: Hossbach was the adjutant of the Führer, the chief -adjutant. As such, he was present at the meeting and took notes. Five -days later, as I have ascertained, he prepared this record on the basis -of his notes. This is, therefore, a record which contains all the -mistakes which easily occur in a record, which is not taken down on the -spot by alternating stenographers, and which under certain circumstances -contains the subjective opinions of the recorder or his own -interpretations. - -It contains a number of points, as I said at the time, which correspond -exactly to what the Führer had repeatedly said; but there are other -points and expressions which I may say do not seem like the Führer’s -words. - -During the last months I have seen too many records and interrogations -which in part had nothing to do with it nor with the interpretation -which had been given to it; for that reason I must here too point out -the sources of mistakes. - -As far as the word “testament” is concerned, the use of this word -contradicts the Führer’s views completely. If anybody at all knows -anything about these views, it is I. - -The decision that I was to be the successor was not made first on 1 -September 1939, but as early as the late autumn of 1934. I have often -had the opportunity of discussing the question of a so-called political -testament with the Führer. He turned it down, giving as his reason the -fact that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political -testament, for developments and political events must allow him complete -freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly one could set down -political wishes or views, but never binding statements in the shape of -a will. That was his view then and as long as I stood in his confidence. - -Now, what did he aim at in this discussion? The Minister of War, the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and -the Luftwaffe and the then Reich Foreign Minister were called together. -Shortly before the Führer had informed me, as I was there earlier, that -he was going to call this meeting mainly in order, as he called it, to -put pressure on General Von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the -rearmament of the Army. He said it would not do any harm if Herr Von -Blomberg would also exercise a certain amount of pressure on Von -Fritsch. - -I asked why Von Neurath was to be present. He said he did not want the -thing to look too military, that as far as the commanders-in-chief were -concerned it was not so important, but that he wanted to make it very -clear to Commander-in-Chief Fritsch that the foreign political situation -required a forced speed in armament and that for that reason he had -asked the Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about the details, to come -along. - -The statements were then made in the way the Führer preferred on such -occasions. He went to great lengths to picture things within a large -political framework and he talked about the whole world situation from -all angles; and for anybody who knew him as well as I did the purpose -which he pursued was obvious. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that -he had great plans, that the political situation was such and such, and -the whole thing ended in the direction of a stronger armament program. I -should like to say that, if the Führer, a couple of hours later, had -talked to another group, for instance, diplomats of the Foreign Office, -or Party functionaries, then he probably would have represented matters -quite differently. - -Nevertheless, some of these statements naturally do reflect the basic -attitude of the Führer, but with the best intentions I cannot attach the -same measure of significance to the document as is being attached to it -here. - -DR. STAHMER: You said you had been considered as the Führer’s successor. -Were you in this capacity initiated in all political problems by Hitler? - -GÖRING: I am now talking of the period of my good relations, which -lasted until long into the war. Of course he informed me of all -important political and military problems. He initiated me into these -problems for the most part in many long discussions, which would take -place for many hours, day after day. Sometimes I was certainly surprised -concerning foreign political questions, but whenever possible I found -things out for myself, and on one occasion he said, in fact, that I had -a decided opinion of my own on foreign matters and that he did not -always find it easy to agree with me. But I want to emphasize that on -all important political questions I was, of course, always informed. - -DR. STAHMER: On 23 May 1939 a conference took place with the Führer, -which was briefly discussed in connection with the examination of the -witness Milch. - -A report of that was also made, Document Number L-79. According to the -wording of that report, you participated in this meeting, but the -witness Milch stated that you were not present. - -GÖRING: Actually I was not present. Milch was called in at the last -moment to represent me. But, of course, if the witness says that he had -not received any permission from the Führer to inform me, then you must -understand that the Führer did not want to have me informed of this -matter by way of my state secretary, but wanted rather to inform me -himself. But no, I was actually present at this meeting—I see that now -from another clue. But even if I had not been present, I think Milch -must have been thinking of another meeting. That would not be one of any -importance, for it is out of the question that the Führer would have had -a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before, or -afterwards if I myself were absent. It is, therefore, not at all -important. It is quite obvious that in such cases I was informed either -previously or, if I was not present, afterwards in great detail by the -Führer. But I see now that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he -is probably thinking of another meeting, for at the very end I asked -some questions with respect to the armament program which I now recall -very well. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the significance of this meeting? - -GÖRING: It was a conference held by the Führer at which he once more -stated his views with regard to the situation and the tasks demanded of -the Wehrmacht as a result of this situation. Once more the main point -was to inform the Armed Forces concerning armament and preparedness, -that he was considering all possible developments, political and -otherwise, and that he himself wanted to have complete freedom of -decision. - -Looking back, in regard to the events which have occurred up to this -moment—and I need not emphasize how easily matters viewed in -retrospect, in the light of their development, are seen and presented -differently to what they actually were when they occurred—but I can now -easily say that even at that time I wanted this or that, since I have in -the meantime achieved it. I can easily say also—this involuntarily -suggests itself—that this or that was always my intention, even though -one knows perfectly well that one was originally very dependent on other -factors, and that under certain circumstances one’s intentions at that -time might have been quite different. - -Generally speaking, this is another case where there are misconceptions -on the part of the adjutant; but, on the whole, it is typical of the -conferences which the Führer used to hold when he had some particular -purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve and wanted to give this aim -the necessary emphasis. - -DR. STAHMER: During the period from 1935 to 1938 you made many state -visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits? - -GÖRING: After German-Polish relations had been clarified in 1934, the -Führer wished a strengthening of that pact and the creation of a better -atmosphere. He requested me to take over this task because he believed -that I would find it easy to talk to these Polish gentlemen, which was -indeed the case. - -The President of the Polish State had invited me. That was in 1935, and -from then on—in 1935, 1936 and 1937—I spent about 1 or 2 weeks in -Poland each year. I had a long discussion with the then Marshal -Pilsudski, and afterwards always with the Foreign Minister, and Marshal -Rydz-Smygly. - -At that time the Führer had given me the serious task—not a task of -deception—while improving relations, to tell Poland that he was -interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an -excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The Führer had laid stress -on the solution of the Danzig question and the Corridor question in -speaking to me at that time, and had said that the opportunity for this -would come, but that, until then, there might be some sort of -opportunity to come to an agreement with Poland about that problem. The -Lithuanian problem played a part in this. But the decisive factor is -that he did not say, “Lull Poland to sleep. I am going to attack Poland -afterwards.” It was never the case, that from the very beginning, as has -often been represented here, we got together and, conspiring, laid down -every point of our plans for decades to come. Rather, everything arose -out of the play of political forces and interests, as has always been -everywhere the case, the whole world over, in matters of state policy. I -had this task, and I consciously considered it a serious task and -carried it out with an honest belief in it. Consequently, when the clash -with Poland came about it was not a very pleasant situation for me. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude toward the Memel, Danzig, and Polish -Corridor question? - -GÖRING: My attitude was always unequivocal. It was that Danzig and the -Free State, as purely German territory, should at some date in the near -future return to Germany. On the other hand, we certainly recognized -that Poland should have access to the sea, and also a port. -Consequently, our first thought was that the Free State and Danzig -should be returned to us and that through the Polish Corridor there -should be a German traffic lane. That was a very small and most modest -demand which for a long time was considered absolutely necessary, and -seemed to us quite possible. - -DR. STAHMER: Another conference with the Führer took place on 23 -November 1939. The record of that conference is Document Number 789-PS, -which was submitted to the Tribunal. I ask you to look at this document -and then to tell me briefly what your attitude is toward the subject of -this conference. - -GÖRING: About that I can be comparatively brief. This is an address -before the commanders-in-chief and commanders of the formations and -armies which were to be made ready for the attack in the West after -Poland’s defeat. This is quite understandable to me and indeed requires -no explanation if the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is -actually leading these forces, decides to undertake a strategic and -extensive tactical operation, as in this case, after the end of the -Polish Campaign. The Führer wanted under all circumstances, and was -perfectly correct, to transfer the troops in the late autumn and carry -out the blow against France, so that in the autumn and winter of 1939 -the end of that operation could be achieved. What prevented him was the -weather, since without using the Air Force he could not carry out this -operation, particularly the penetration of the Maginot Line at Sedan. He -needed good flying weather for at least 4 or 5 days at the beginning of -the attack. Merely because we could not assure him of such weather -conditions for weeks and weeks, the matter dragged on into the winter -and was eventually postponed, after Christmas and New Year, until the -beginning of the spring. - -But this was at a time when he still believed that he could carry it -through. Therefore he called the commanders-in-chief together and -informed them about the orders for attack. It was one of the speeches -customarily made in such cases. Naturally, since the Führer was not only -a military man but above all a politician, it always happened that these -military speeches, which a soldier would have confined exclusively to -the military-strategical field, were always to a large extent filled -with references to his political views and his political tendencies or -intentions. It must never be forgotten that he gave such speeches not -only as the Commander-in-Chief or the Supreme Commander of the Armed -Forces, but also as the head of the German State; and that is why so -frequently there was such a strong political tendency even to the -military speeches. - -But no general was asked on such occasions what his opinions were or -whether he approved of the principal tendencies of the policy or not. At -such speeches he was not even asked whether he approved of the military -plan or not; that happened at another time. If a matter was concluded -and purely strategical-tactical matters had been discussed with the -single commanders, then came a summary, also definitely political, in -which the last final concluding thoughts of the Führer were presented to -the generals. And if—this I emphasize since it has often played a role -here—if a general had been able to say, “My Führer, I consider your -statements wrong and not in keeping with the agreements we have made,” -or “This is not a policy of which we can approve,” it would have defied -understanding. Not because that particular general would have been shot; -but I would have doubted the sanity of that man, because how does one -imagine that a state can be led if, during a war, or before a war, which -the political leaders have decided upon, whether wrongly or rightly, the -individual general could vote whether he was going to fight or not, -whether his army corps was going to stay at home or not, or could say, -“I must first ask my division.” Perhaps one of them would go along, and -the other stay at home! That privilege in this case would have to be -afforded the ordinary soldier too. Perhaps this would be the way to -avoid wars in the future, if one were to ask every soldier whether he -wanted to go home! Possibly, but not in a Führer State. This I should -like to emphasize, that in every state of the world the military formula -is clearly defined. When there is a war, or when the state leadership -decides upon war, the military leaders receive their military tasks. -With respect to these they can voice an opinion, can make proposals as -to whether they want to press the attack on the left or the right or in -the center. But whether they thereby march through a neutral state or -not, is not the business of military leadership. That is entirely the -responsibility of the political leadership of the state. Therefore there -could be no possibility that a general discussion as to right or wrong -would ensue; rather the generals had already received their orders. The -Supreme Commander had decided and therefore there was nothing left for a -soldier to discuss; and that applies to a field marshal as well as to -the ordinary soldier. - -DR. STAHMER: A Führer Decree of 7 October 1939 bears your signature. In -this decree Himmler is given the task of germanizing. This decree is -presented as Document Number 686-PS. Please look at this and say what -the significance of this decree is? - -GÖRING: This decree of 7 October 1939 was issued after the Polish -campaign had ended. Poland at that time had been conquered and the -Polish State as such had ceased to exist. I draw your attention to the -note of the then People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Russia, -Molotov, who states his opinion about this, according to which that -injustice which Germany had felt, when in the Treaty of Versailles -German provinces were detached and given over to Poland, had been -compensated by the victory of arms. It was therefore a matter of course -for us that that part of Poland, which until 1918 had been German, -should again be given back, that is, returned to Germany. But in that -territory, in the course of years, more than one million Germans who had -formerly lived there, who had had property there, particularly farms, -estates, _et cetera_, had been thrown out, expelled and dispossessed. -That is quite clear from numerous complaints which during the years -after 1919 had been made to the League of Nations about this matter; and -a study of all these complaints and of all the events which had been -reported there, which must still be in the archives at Geneva, will -prove to what an enormous extent the Polonization of these German -territories was carried out. This decree aimed to put an end to that and -to make these territories German once more, that is, that those farms -and estates from which Germans had been driven, should once more come -into the hands of Germans. The fact that this task was given to Himmler -did not meet with my full agreement; but at the moment that was not of -decisive importance. He was given this task, not in his capacity as -Chief of the Police, but because, as is known, he was always -particularly and keenly interested in the question of the new -development of the German people, and therefore this office of “Folkdom” -or whatever it was called—just a moment, it does not make any -difference—anyhow Himmler was given this task. The Führer issued the -law. I naturally was also a signatory, since I was the Chairman of the -Ministerial Council at the time, and then it was also signed by the -Chief of the Chancellery, Lammers. These signatures are a matter of -course. I take a very positive attitude to this; it was quite in -accordance with my views, that where the Germans had been driven out -from what were German territories, they should return. But I want to -draw your attention to the fact that this, to be exact, is a question of -former German provinces. - -DR. STAHMER: You mean the occupied western Polish provinces? - -GÖRING: Yes. The Government, for instance, was not appointed for -purposes of Germanization. If Germans later were settled there—and I am -not certain of that—that was not done on the basis of this decree. You -asked about my attitude to the Memel question, I believe. Danzig and the -Polish Corridor, I have emphasized. Memel was a comparatively small -matter. In Memel, according to the Treaty of Versailles or the League of -Nations, there was to be a plebiscite. Shortly before, the Lithuanians -occupied Memel and the Memel territory. In order to prevent the -plebiscite Lithuania incorporated Memel and thereby produced a _fait -accompli_. Complaints of the German Government at that time naturally -were as futile as all previous complaints to the League of Nations. What -the Lithuanians had done was regretted, it was considered false and -wrong, but there could be no talk about returning it, or going through -with the prescribed plebiscite. After the Lithuanians, in violation of -all agreements, had occupied Memel, it was naturally our absolute -national right to rectify this encroachment and now to occupy Memel -ourselves. - -DR. STAHMER: On 19 October 1939 you published a decree which ordered the -removal of economic goods from Poland. This decree has been submitted in -Document Number EC-410. I should like to have your opinion on this -decree. - -GÖRING: This is a decree which represents general instructions as to -what economic procedure should be adopted in the whole of the Polish -territory occupied by us. It regulates the seizure and administration of -property of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German -troops, money and credit matters, the taking of economic measures, the -preparation for a settlement with foreign creditors which would become -necessary, _et cetera_. Confiscation was to be carried out only by the -Main Trustee Office East, _et cetera_. It is not so much a question of -the removal of economic goods. That was not the case. On the contrary, -even in the Government General, the economy in existence there, that -economy of course which could be used for purposes of war at that time, -was strengthened and extended. Such economy as was not absolutely -essential was cut down, just as in the rest of Germany and in all other -states in the event of war. As far as those raw materials are concerned -which were available and were important for the conduct of the war, such -as steel or copper or tin, it was my view, or better said my intention, -that these raw materials should be converted into manufactured products -there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture. If the -locality and its transportation facilities permitted it, they should -remain and be used for manufacture there. If it was not possible to use -them for manufacture on the spot, I would of course not let raw -materials of importance for the war lie there, but would have them -brought to wherever they could most quickly be used to serve the needs -of the war. That is in general, what this decree says. That was my basic -attitude and my basic instruction. The object was the quickest and most -purposeful use for manufacture wherever it was possible. - -DR. STAHMER: On 19 November 1945 a Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann made an -affidavit, which has been presented by the Prosecution under Document -Number 3042-PS. In this it says the following in three short sentences: - - “I was the Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland, - Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the - Government General from October 1939 to September 1943. This - task was given to me by Göring in his capacity as the Chairman - of the Committee for Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the - official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take in - custody all important works of art which belonged to Polish - public institutions, private collections and the church. I - confirm that the mentioned works of art were actually - confiscated and I am aware that, in the event of a German - victory, they would not have remained in Poland but would have - been used to complete German art collections.” - -GÖRING: Actually I had nothing directly to do with the safeguarding of -art treasures in Poland, absolutely nothing, in my capacity as Chairman -of the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense. However, Mühlmann, -whom I knew, did come to see me and told me that he was to take steps -for the safeguarding of art treasures there. It was my view too that -these art treasures should be safeguarded during the war, regardless of -what was to be done with them later, so that no destruction would be -possible through fire, bombing, _et cetera_. I want to emphasize now—I -shall refer to this matter again later in connection with France—that -nothing was taken from these art treasures for my so-called collection. -I mention that just incidentally. That these art treasures were actually -safeguarded is correct, and was also intended, partly for the reason -that the owners were not there. Wherever the owners were present, -however—I remember Count Potocki of Lincut, for instance—the art -collections were left where they were. The Führer had not yet finally -decided what was to be done with these art treasures. He had given an -order—and I communicated that by letter to Mühlmann and also, as far as -I remember, to Frank—that these art treasures were for the time being -to be brought to Königsberg. Four pictures were to be taken to the -safety “bunker” or the safety room of the German Museum in Berlin or to -the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin. The Dürer drawings in Lemberg -also figured here. In this connection I want to mention them now, since -the Prosecution has already concerned itself with them. The Dürer -drawings in Lemberg were not confiscated by us at that time, because -Lemberg had become Russian. Not until the march against Russia were -these Lemberg drawings—as far as I can remember from Mühlmann’s -story—rescued from the burning city in the battle by a Polish -professor, who had hidden from the Russians until that time, and he gave -them over to him. They were drawings and he came with them to visit me. -Although I am usually very interested in such things I unfortunately did -not have time to look at them properly, as I was on my way to the Führer -at the moment. I took them along with me and, as Mühlmann has confirmed, -delivered them there immediately. Where they went after that I do not -know. I believe I have now answered the question about the Polish art -treasures. Apart from that there is still the Veit Stoss altar, which -was originally made here in Nuremberg, a purely German work. The Führer -wished that this altar should come to the Germanisches Museum here in -Nuremberg—with that I personally had nothing to do. I merely know about -it. What was intended to be done with it finally had not yet been -stated. But it is certain that it also would have been mentioned in -negotiations for peace. - -DR. STAHMER: What connection did you have with Quisling? - -GÖRING: I met Quisling for the first time long after the occupation of -Norway, for the first and only time. He was in Berlin, visited me, and -we had a short, unimportant conversation. Before that, that is before -the outbreak of war, one of his men whom I did not know personally sent -a letter to me, which has been shown to me here but which I myself -cannot remember, as such letters, according to our practice, were hardly -ever submitted to me—that is immaterial. In that letter he expressed -himself in Quisling’s name to the effect that we should give financial -support to Quisling’s movement, and he described to what extent -political money contributions, on the one side from Russia—the -Communist Party there—and on the other from England, would flow into -the political office concerned. Then I—later on someone discussed with -me whether some sort of contribution could be given to Quisling by way -of coal deliveries. My point of view was that, because of the foreign -exchange situation and other factors—we were not so rich, we naturally -could not compete with the Russian or English money contributions—those -authorities should be consulted who could judge whether it was expedient -to give the Quisling movement financial support or not. If they answered -in the affirmative, then it would be perfectly clear to me that Quisling -should receive money. The amount concerned, which I also would have -given, was very much higher than the amount which was, I believe, paid -later on by the Führer by way of the Foreign Office. - -I never thought much of such small money contributions; if one was going -to give, then one should give properly, so that an end could really be -gained thereby. From the last World War I had experience enough in -connection with the money which went to the Romanian Parliament, but -which was unfortunately too little. On the basis of these experiences it -was my advice that if we were to contribute, then we should give the -proper amount. Apart from this, as I said, I did not become acquainted -with Quisling until much later, and had a very unimportant conversation -with him, which I do not remember. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude towards the Norway project? - -GÖRING: The Norwegian project surprised me rather, since strangely -enough for a rather long time I was not informed about it. The Führer -went very far in his basic decree, which I already mentioned at the -beginning, and did not call in the Air Force until very late. But since -the most important part of this undertaking fell to the Air Force, I -expressed my views in regard to this in an unmistakable and unfriendly -fashion. From a military point of view I was definitely against this -undertaking as such, since as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, quite -independent of political considerations, I had first of all to think -exclusively of strategic considerations. That it would considerably -improve my position as far as the Air Force was concerned if my -squadrons could operate against England from Norwegian bases was -obvious, and would be obvious to any prudent military expert. From the -strategic point of view I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, could -take only a very definite stand against this undertaking. My objection -was, firstly, that I had been informed too late and, secondly, that the -plans did not seem quite correct to me. - -DR. STAHMER: Was Hitler afraid of complications with Sweden, because of -this occupation? - -GÖRING: Yes, not because of occupation by German forces as such; but -when we, that is, the Führer, decided to occupy Norway, we already had -considerable and detailed information regarding the intended occupation -by the English and French, which was later also confirmed by the papers -of the English and French General Staff which we captured. In this -connection we also knew that the intention was not merely of occupying -Norway, but, above all, of cutting off the Swedish ore deliveries to -Germany by way of Narvik, and, over and above that, of intervening on -the side of Finland in the Russian-Finnish conflict, which was still -taking place at the time. The Führer feared that Sweden would yield -entirely to English pressure, that is, under the pretext of coming to -Finland’s aid, a march through would be allowed, thereby effecting the -complete cutting off of the Swedish iron ore basin and the ore -deliveries to us. I took a very heavy responsibility upon myself at that -time by assuring Hitler that I knew Sweden and her people and her King -so well that I knew that, whoever might want to exert pressure on -Sweden, regardless of which power—whether our power or another—Sweden -under all circumstances would defend her neutrality, with arms against -any power that tried to violate it, no matter what reasons there might -be for this violation. And I said that I personally and consciously -would take the responsibility for this, and that we could rest assured -in this respect. Therewith the question was settled. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-SECOND DAY - Friday, 15 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: What reasons were decisive for the invasion of Holland and -Belgium? - -GÖRING: This question had first been investigated from the purely -military and strategic point of view. To begin with it had been examined -whether the neutrality of the two States would be guaranteed absolutely. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is some difficulty with the equipment. The Tribunal -will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STAHMER: Would you please continue. - -GÖRING: I repeat. At first, we had to determine whether the neutrality -of Holland and Belgium would, under all circumstances, be assured in -case of a conflict and a war in the West. In the beginning it seemed as -if it would. Then information came that negotiations had taken place not -only between Belgium and France but also between Holland and England. -There was an incident at Venlo, where a Dutch officer of the general -staff had been caught on German territory, and I believe another one was -shot by the frontier post during this occurrence, which made it clear -that this neutrality could not be maintained under certain conditions -and under increased pressure from the enemy side. - -Now if neutrality was not assured under all circumstances, a tremendous -danger would exist in battle, in that the right flank was menaced and -exposed. The purely military authorities, who were concerned only with -the strategic point of view, when being asked for their opinion had to -give it from a purely military angle; that is, to point out that by -occupying both countries, the purely military and strategic situation -would of course be different from what it would be if this were not -done, and such an occupation were undertaken by the enemy. - -An additional element which gave rise to doubt as to the absolute -neutrality of these countries was the fact that nearly all flights from -Great Britain into Germany, which took place at that time, went over -Dutch or Belgian territory. Reliable information reached us that the -Belgian Army, which at the beginning of the war had been reinforced on -its southwestern frontier, was being regrouped and drawn up along the -German border with all its full fighting force. - -Further information indicated that an interchange of views between the -French and Belgian General Staffs had taken place, and that, under -pressure from the French General Staff, Belgium had promised to -intensify the work on the fortification line of the Maas against -Germany. - -Other information indicated that the chief of the French General Staff, -Gamelin, as well as Admiral Darlan and the chief of the Air Force, -Vuillemin, insisted on the occupation of Belgium under all -circumstances, for the security of France, and that considerable -negotiations were taking place on this subject between the French and -the British governments. The information at the time was highly -reliable. How correct and absolutely clear it was became evident later -when, after marching into France, we found the secret documents of the -French General Staff, and also minutes of conferences which had taken -place between the French and British Governments in the so-called -Supreme Military Council. - -It was the opinion of the Führer that the incapability of these -countries to maintain their neutrality in the face of increased French -and British pressure would in consequence expose to extreme danger the -Ruhr area, which was particularly vital to us. How justified this -opinion was can also be seen from reports in which the British chief of -government suggested, and had also fully explained by the experts in the -Military Council, how best the Ruhr Valley could be attacked by -low-flying British aircraft, which would approach over Belgium and then, -at the last moment, in a short flight from Belgium could attack the Ruhr -Valley and destroy the most important industries there. - -If that was not carried out at first, it was due to the concern of the -French Premier, for he, on his part, was worried about French industry -and wanted to leave it to the other side to make the first attacks -against industrial areas. England insisted, however, that she would be -able to carry out this attack on the Ruhr Valley via Belgium at any -time. - -If one takes into consideration how short the flying distance is from -the Belgian border to the most important industries of the Ruhr Valley, -only a few minutes, one can then fully realize the danger which would -arise if the neutrality of Belgium was not respected by our enemies. On -the other hand, if it were respected, an attack by the British Air Force -on the Ruhr Valley would have necessitated a relatively long flight over -the Helgoländer Bucht from the north, and at that time it would easily -have been possible for us to avoid and to repel such an attack. If, -however, they came via Belgium, it would have been almost impossible. - -In this hard struggle it was necessary in the first place, to think of -our own war interests and our own existence, and not to leave the -advantage to the enemy. At the very moment one was sincerely convinced -of the reality of the danger threatening our people, and above all our -Armed Forces; that danger had to be eliminated, in advance, and we had -to secure for ourselves those advantages which the adversary had -expected. - -DR. STAHMER: For what reason were officers interned in France again, -even after the war was over? - -GÖRING: First I would like to correct an expression in regard to this -question. In France the war as such was not terminated at all. An -armistice had been concluded. This armistice was a very generous one. -Even the preamble of this armistice showed a tendency to coming -conciliation, in contrast to that armistice which had been signed in -1918 on the same spot. - -When, at the time, Marshal Pétain asked for an armistice, the first -answer he received was that capitulation would have to be unconditional. -Later, however, we gave him to understand that quite a number of wishes -concerning the fleet, certain parts of the unoccupied territory, and the -respecting of the colonies would be considered. The situation was such -that Germany at that moment could have insisted on an absolutely -unconditional surrender, since no French forces of any consequence, or -any help that might come from England, were available to prevent a -complete military catastrophe in France. - -No line, no French formation, could have stopped the breakthrough of -German troops to the Mediterranean. No reserves were available in -England. All the available forces were in the expeditionary force which -had been routed in the Belgian and northern French area and finally at -Dunkirk. - -In this armistice those conditions were respected for which a wish had -been expressed. The Führer also, apart from that, had hinted at a -certain generous solution, especially in regard to the question of -captured officers. When, contrary to far-reaching satisfaction which we -had hoped for, and which we really got at the beginning, the resistance -movement within France began to develop gradually by means of propaganda -from across the Channel, and the establishment there of a new center of -resistance under General de Gaulle, it was perfectly understandable, -from my point of view, that French officers would offer their services -as patriots. But at the same time it was just as natural for Germany, -recognizing that danger and in trying to overcome it, again to take as -prisoners of war those elements who would be the leaders and experts in -such military resistance movements, that is to say all those officers -who were still moving freely in France. That was a necessary basic -condition in order to avoid the danger of a war in our back and of a -renewed flare-up in France. I believe that it is quite unique, that, -while war was still raging on all fronts, officers of a country with -whom one had only an armistice were permitted to move around freely when -war was at its height. As far as I know, that was the first time in the -history of warfare that such a thing had happened. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you give us specific facts to explain why the struggle -in France, which was apparently carried out in a mutually honorable -manner in 1940, later took on such a bitter character? - -GÖRING: One must consider the two phases of the war with France -completely separately. The first phase was the great military conflict, -that is to say, the attack of the German forces against the French Army. -This struggle was executed quickly. One cannot say that it was a -chivalrous fight throughout, because from that period we know of several -acts on the part of the French against our prisoners, which were -recorded in the White Books and later presented to the International Red -Cross in Geneva. But all in all, it kept within the usual bounds of a -military war with the excesses that always occur here and there in such -a struggle. - -After that had been terminated, appeasement and quiet set in for the -time being. Only later, when the struggle continued and expanded, -especially when the fight against Russia was added, and, as I said -before, when on the opposite side a new French center of leadership had -been created, then in the countries of the West, which had been quiet -until then and where no serious incidents had taken place, a definite -intensification of the resistance movement became evident. There were -attacks on German officers and soldiers; hand grenades and bombs were -thrown into restaurants where German officers or soldiers were present. -Bombs were even thrown in places where there were women, members of the -Women’s Auxiliary Signal Service and Red Cross nurses. Cars were -attacked, communications cut, trains blown up, and this on a growing -scale. - -A war behind the front during a period of land warfare represented -difficulty enough but when aerial warfare was added, entirely new -possibilities and methods were developed. Night after night a large -number of planes came and dropped a tremendous quantity of explosives -and arms, instructions, _et cetera_ for this resistance movement, in -order to strengthen and enlarge it. The German counterintelligence -succeeded, by means of aerial deception and code keys dropped by enemy -planes, in getting into their hands a large part of these materials; but -a sufficient amount was left which fell into the hands of the resistance -movement. The atrocities committed in this connection were also -widespread. As to this, documents can be submitted. Of course . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I am very reluctant to -interrupt this examination, but I should like to ask if the Tribunal -will avail itself of the Charter provision to require from Counsel a -statement as to how this is relevant to the charges which we are engaged -in trying. - -It raises a rather large and important question, and that question is -this, as I see it: It raises a question which involves a great deal of -time, if time is an important element in this proceeding. - -For the purposes of this statement, I may admit that there were actions -taken by partisan groups within occupied territories which were very -annoying and very objectionable and very injurious to the would-be -conqueror. If it is sought to introduce testimony as to what partisans -did toward the German occupying forces, on the theory of reprisal, then -I respectfully submit that Counsel is proceeding in reverse order, that -is to say, if the Defense says “Yes, we did commit certain atrocities; -we did violate international law,” then it may be that the motive—I -shall argue that it is not—is relevant under the Hague Convention, but -then at least we might have that question presented. - -But unless this evidence is offered on the theory that reprisals would -be justified, it has no place, I submit, in the case. If it is offered -on the basis of establishing a theory of reprisal, our first inquiry is, -what is it that reprisals were for? In other words, the doctrine of -reprisal can only be invoked when you first admit that you committed -certain definite acts in violation of international law. Then your -question is whether you were justified. I submit that it might shorten -and certainly would clarify this proceeding, if counsel will definitely -state as to what acts on the part of the German occupying force he is -directing this testimony, as I suppose, to excuse it; and that, unless -there is some theory of reprisal pointed out with sufficient -definiteness, so that we may identify the violations on Germany’s part -for which she is seeking excuse by way of reprisal, this testimony is -not helpful in deciding the ultimate question. - -The question here is not whether the occupying countries resisted. Of -course they resisted. The question is whether acts of the character we -have shown can be excused by way of reprisal; and, if so, there must be -an admission of those acts, and the doctrine of reprisal must be set -forth, it seems to me, much more specifically. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer. - -DR. STAHMER: I have not been able to get all of the statement, because -the translation did not quite keep up with it, but I believe that for -the following reasons what we have discussed up to now is relevant: - -The defendants are accused of the fact that hostages were taken in large -numbers and shot and it is maintained that this was not justified; at -any rate, the motives which led to the taking of hostages have not, up -to now, been discussed, at least not sufficiently. To clarify this -question, which is so important for the decisions in this Trial, it is -in my opinion absolutely necessary to make it clear that these decrees -concerning the arrest and the treatment of hostages were called for by -the attitude of the resistance movements. Therefore, in my opinion it -could be said with justification that the actions of the resistance -movement were the cause for the measures which had to be taken later by -the German military authorities, much to their regret. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I say one word in answer to Dr. Stahmer’s -offer, if it be an offer. - -The suggestion of Dr. Stahmer that the motives here are to be tried -seems to me to lead us very far afield. If he is invoking the -international law doctrine of reprisal, then he has to meet the -conditions of that doctrine. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of the -27th of July 1929 provides specifically that measures of reprisal -against prisoners of war are prohibited. He therefore must relate it to -someone other than prisoners of war. Under the doctrine of reprisal, as -we understand it, any act which is claimed to be justified as a reprisal -must be related to a specific and continuing violation of international -law on the other side. That is, it is not every casual and incidental -violation which justifies wholesale reprisals. If it were, then -international law could have no foundation, for a breach on one side, -however unimportant, would completely absolve the other from any rules -of warfare. - -Secondly, anything which is claimed to be justified as a reprisal must -follow within a reasonable time and it must be related reasonably to the -offense which it is sought to prevent. That is, you cannot by way of -reprisal engage in wholesale slaughter in order to vindicate a single -murder. Next it must be shown as to the reprisals that a protest was -made, as a basis for invoking reprisals. You cannot engage in reprisals -without notice. The reprisal must be noticed and there must be -notification by a responsible party of the government. - -And next, and most important, a deliberate course of violation of -international law cannot be shielded as a reprisal. Specific acts must -be reprisals for specific acts under the conditions I have pointed out. -You cannot vindicate a reign of terror under the doctrine of reprisals; -and so I respectfully submit that the offer of Dr. Stahmer to inquire -into the motives of Göring individually, or of all defendants -collectively, or of Germany, does not meet any legal test. It might be -pointed out to the Tribunal by way of mitigation of sentence after -conviction, but is not a proper consideration on the question of guilt -or innocence of the charges which we have brought to the bar. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I understood you to agree that this -sort of evidence might be relevant in mitigation of sentence? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think if Your Honors find the defendants guilty, -then it comes to the question of sentence, as is our practice. You might -find almost anything that a defendant saw fit to urge relevant to the -sentence, but I do not take it that Dr. Stahmer is now dealing with the -question of offers relevant to that subject. If it is, I should consent -that any plea for leniency be heard, of course. It is offered, as I -understand it, on the question of guilt. - -THE PRESIDENT: That may be so, but the Tribunal may consider it more -convenient to hear the evidence now. The Charter, as far as I see, has -not provided for any evidence to be given after conviction, if a -defendant is convicted. Therefore any evidence which would have to be -given in mitigation would be given now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The difficulty with that, I should think, would be -this: that a defendant may very well be found guilty on some counts but -not on others. That would require at this time the litigation of the -question of sentence, two-thirds of which might be irrelevant because he -might not be found guilty on more than one count. - -I may be biased in favor of the practice that I know, or at least may be -presumed to have some knowledge of. In our procedure the question of -guilt is tried first. The question of sentence is a separate subject, to -be determined after the verdict. I should think that would be the -logical way to proceed here. And I understand that this—and I think Dr. -Stahmer confirms my view—that this is not offered on the question of -sentence. I do not think he concedes he has reached that point yet. - -DR. STAHMER: May I briefly comment on the legal question? It is -maintained, or at least this side asserts, that violations of -international law were committed in France to a large extent by -organizing guerrilla warfare. The struggle against these actions, which -do not conform to international law, could be carried out by reprisals, -as has just been expounded by Mr. Justice Jackson. It is correct that -there were certain reasons for the application of reprisals, but in my -opinion it is questionable if such . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: May I ask whether you agree that the conditions which Mr. -Justice Jackson stated are accurately stated? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, but we have to deal here, in my opinion, with the fact -of an emergency, caused by conduct violating international law, that is -by unleashing guerrilla warfare. This fact justified the army commanders -to take general measures in order to remove these conditions brought -about illegally. Therefore, at any rate, these facts are of importance -for determining the verdict. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to hear an unlimited number -of the defendants’ counsel, but I observe that Dr. Exner is there, and -they are prepared to hear one other counsel—if counsel wish, Dr. -Exner—upon the subject. - -DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): May it please the -Tribunal. We are indeed, all interested in the question of reprisals, -and I would like to say a few words. - -For 10 years I have lectured on international law at the university and -I believe I understand a little about it. Reprisals are among the most -disputed terms of international law. One can say that only on one point -there is absolute certainty, namely that point, which Mr. Justice -Jackson mentioned first—“measures of reprisals against prisoners of war -are prohibited.” Everything else is matter of dispute and not at all -valid as international law. It is not correct that it is the general -practice in all states, and therefore valid international law, that a -protest is a prerequisite for taking reprisals. Neither is it correct -that there has to be a so-called reasonable connection. It was asserted -that there must be a relation as regards time, and above all a -proportionality between the impending and the actually committed -violation of international law. There are scholars of international law -who assert, and it is indeed so, that it would be desirable that there -be proportionality in every case. But in existing international law, in -the sense that some agreement has been made to that effect or that it -has become international legal usage, this is not the case. It will have -to be said therefore, on the basis of violations of international law by -the other side, that we under no circumstances make a war of reprisals -against prisoners of war, every other form of reprisals is, however, -admissible. - -I just wanted to state that in general terms; and perhaps I still might -say that it has been asserted that we may not speak about reasons for -mitigation now. I would like to remind the Tribunal that we are -permitted to make only one address, and if in this speech, which takes -place before the decision has been reached on the question of guilt, we -are not permitted to speak about mitigation, then we would not have any -opportunity to speak about it at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the evidence is admissible on the -question of reprisals, and the weight that should be given this or -similar evidence will be reserved for future consideration. - -DR. STAHMER: Will you please continue? - -GÖRING: I believe that the statement which I am about to make will -fulfill those conditions which Justice Jackson has requested; namely, I -do not in any way deny that things happened which may be hotly debatable -as far as international law is concerned. Also other things occurred -which under any circumstances must be considered as excesses. I wanted -only to explain how it happened, not from the point of view of -international law as regards reprisals, but considering it only from the -feeling of the threatened soldier, who was constantly hindered in the -execution of his task, not by regular troops in open combat, but by -partisans at his back. - -Out of all those things which I need not go into any further, this -animosity arose which led spontaneously—or in certain cases was ordered -as a necessity in a national emergency—to these partial excesses -committed here and there by the troops. One must go back to that period -of stormy battles. Today, after the lapse of years, in a quiet -discussion of the legal basis, these things sound very difficult and -even incomprehensible. Expressions made at the moment of embitterment, -today, without an understanding of that situation, sound quite -different. It was solely my intention to depict to the Tribunal for just -one moment that atmosphere in which and out of which such actions, even -if they could not always be excused, would appear understandable, and in -a like situation were also carried out by others. That was and is my -answer to the question why the conditions in France necessitated two -entirely different phases of war—the first, that of the regular -fighting, with which I have finished; the second, that of the fighting -which was not carried out by regular troops, but by those coming out of -hiding, from the underground, which always will and at all times has -entailed cruelties and excesses quite different to those of regular -military fighting. It often happens here that single actions occur, be -it by individuals or by troop units, which the Supreme Command cannot -always control or possibly keep in hand. - -DR. STAHMER: What measures were taken by the German occupational -authorities in France to help French agriculture during the occupation? - -GÖRING: I can reply very briefly, and I refer to the testimony of the -witness Körner, which I can only confirm. By that I mean that in France -agriculture was tremendously promoted and increased during the period of -occupation. A large number of tracts of fallow land or those which had -not been put to good agricultural use were turned to profitable -cultivation; other tracts, through intensified use of fertilizers or -other means of cultivation, were made considerably more productive. - -I am unable to give specific explanations as to just what was done and I -am not conversant with the figures showing the increase in agricultural -production in the course of the occupation years, which could be given -only by the responsible experts. - -DR. STAHMER: What were the reasons leading to the introduction of -Reichskreditkasse notes in the occupied countries? - -GÖRING: A measure which would probably be introduced by every occupying -power to regulate money circulation, to keep it in its proper limits, -and to keep the country’s currency at a certain level, similar to the -procedure which today takes place in all occupied zones of Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Document Number 141-PS is a decree of yours issued 15 -November 1940 in which you effected a regulation regarding art objects -brought to the Louvre. Are you familiar with this decree or shall I hand -it to you? - -GÖRING: I remember this document very distinctly as it has played an -important part here. These art objects were taken at first to the Louvre -and later to the exhibition hall called, I believe, “Salle du Jeu de -Paume.” This concerned art objects which were confiscated, being Jewish -property, that is ownerless property as their owners had left the -country. This order was not issued by me, I was not familiar with it; it -was a Führer decree. Then, when I was in Paris I heard of this, and -heard also that it was intended that most of these art objects would—as -far as they had museum value—be put into a Linz museum which the Führer -contemplated building. Personally, I admit this openly, I was interested -that not everything should go to southern Germany. I decided quite -sometime before, and informed the Finance Minister about it, that after -the war, or at some other time which seemed opportune to me, I would -found an art gallery containing the objects of art which I already had -in my possession before the war, either through purchase, through gifts, -or through inheritance, and give it to the German people. Indeed it was -my plan that this gallery should be arranged on quite different lines -from those usually followed in museums. The plans for the construction -of this gallery, which was to be erected as an annex to Karinhall in the -big forest of the Schorfheide, and in which the art objects were to be -exhibited according to their historical background and age in the proper -atmosphere, were ready, only not executed because of the outbreak of -war. Paintings, sculptures, tapestries, handicraft, were to be exhibited -according to period. Then, when I saw the things in the Salle du Jeu de -Paume and heard that the greater part were to go to Linz, that these -objects which were considered to be of museum value were to serve only a -minor purpose, then, I do admit, my collector’s passion got the better -of me; and I said that if these things were confiscated and were to -remain so, I would at least like to acquire a small part of them, so -that I might include them in this North German gallery to be erected by -me. - -The Führer agreed to this with one reservation, that he himself should -at least see the photographs of those objects which I intended to -acquire. In many cases, of course, it so happened that he wished to -earmark those particular objects for himself, that is, not for himself -but for his museum in Linz, and I had to give them back. From the -beginning, however, I wanted to have a clear distinction made, as I -meant to pay for those objects which I wanted to have for the gallery I -was going to build. Therefore I ordered an art expert, and not a German -but a Frenchman—it was some professor whose name I do not recall and to -whom I never talked—to value those things. I would then decide whether -the price was too high for me, whether I was no longer interested, or -whether I was willing to pay the price. One part, the first part, was -settled that way, but then the whole thing stopped because some of the -objects were sent back and forth; that is, they went back to the Führer -and they did not remain with me, and not until the matter was decided -could the payment be made. In this decree, which I called a “preliminary -decree” and which the Führer would have had to approve, I emphasized -that part of the things were to be paid for by me, and those things -which were not of museum value were to be sold by auction to French or -German dealers, or to whomever was present at the sale; that the -proceeds of this, as far as the things were not confiscated but were -paid for, was to go to the families of French war victims. I repeatedly -inquired where I was to send this money and said that in collaboration -with the French authorities a bank account would have to be opened. We -were always referring to the opening of such an account. The amount of -money was always available in my bank until the end. One day, when I -inquired again, I received a surprising answer. The answer was the Reich -Treasurer of the Party did not want to have this money paid. I at once -answered, and my secretary can verify this on oath, that I could not at -all understand what the Reich Treasurer of the Party had to do with this -matter and that I wanted to know to which French account I could have -this amount transferred. In this case, the Party, that is, the Reich -Treasurer, could have no authority to exempt me from paying or not, -because I myself had wished to make the payment. Even after France had -been occupied again, I once again requested to know the account to which -I could remit the amount reserved for it. - -In summarizing and concluding, I wish to state that according to a -decree I considered these things as confiscated for the Reich. Therefore -I believed myself to be justified in acquiring some of these objects, -especially as I never made a secret of the fact—either to the Reich -Minister for Finance or to anybody else—that these art objects of -museum value, as well as the ones I previously mentioned as already in -my possession, were being collected for the gallery which I described -before. - -As far as exchange was concerned, I would like to put this matter -straight also. Among the confiscated paintings there were some of the -most modern sort, paintings which I personally would not accept and -never did, which, however, as I was told, were in demand in the French -art trade. Thereupon I said that as far as I was concerned these -pictures could also be valued and acquired, in order that they might be -exchanged against old masters, in which I am interested. I never exerted -any pressure in that direction. I was concerned only as to whether the -price asked of me was too high; if so I would not enter into -negotiations, but as in every art deal if the offer was suitable I would -inquire into the authenticity of what was offered. This much about the -exchange; under no circumstances did I exert any pressure. - -Later, after I had acquired these objects, I naturally used some of them -as well as some of my own for general trading with museums. In other -words, if a certain museum was interested in one of those pictures and I -was interested, for my gallery, in a picture which was in the possession -of that museum, we would make an exchange. This exchange also took place -with art dealers from abroad. This did not concern exclusively pictures -and art objects of these acquisitions, but also those which I had -acquired in the open market, in Germany, Italy, or in other countries or -which were earlier in my possession. - -At this point, I would like to add that independent of these -acquisitions—and I am referring to the Salle du Jeu de Paume, where -these confiscated objects were located—I, of course, had acquired works -of art in the open market in France as in other countries before and -after the war, or rather during the war. I might add that usually if I -came to Rome, or Florence, Paris, or Holland, as if people had known in -advance that I was coming, I would always have in the shortest time a -pile of written offers, from all sorts of quarters, art dealers, and -private people. And even though most were not genuine, some of the -things offered were interesting and good, and I acquired a number of art -objects in the open market. Private persons especially made me very -frequent offers in the beginning. I should like to emphasize that, -especially in Paris, I was rather deceived. As soon as it was known that -it was for me the price was raised 50 to 100 percent. That is all I have -to say briefly and in conclusion in regard to this matter. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you make provisions for the protection of French art -galleries and monuments? - -GÖRING: I should like to refer at first to the state art treasures of -France, that is, those in the possession of the state museums. I did not -confiscate a single object, or in any way remove anything from the state -museums, with the exception of two contracts for an exchange with the -Louvre on an entirely voluntary basis. I traded a statue which is known -in the history of art as La Belle Allemande, a carved wood statue which -originally came from Germany, for another German wood statue which I had -had in my possession for many years before the war, and two pictures—an -exchange such as I used to make before the war with other museums here, -and as is customary among museums. Moreover I have always instructed all -authorities to do their utmost to protect art objects against -destruction by bombs or other war damage. I remember that when the -directors of the Louvre told me that most of the things had just been -put into the rooms of the so-called Loire castles, I said that I would -be willing at their request, and if it seemed necessary with the -increased bombing attacks, to help them put these objects into -safekeeping at places determined by them, as they complained of not -having transportation facilities. - -Now I wish to refer to art monuments, which I would call the buildings, -churches, and other monuments—anything of a stationary character. Here -I can say that perhaps sometimes I issued an order which stood in -contradiction to my strictly military duties, because I strongly -emphasized to my fliers that the magnificent Gothic cathedrals of the -French cities were, under all circumstances, to be protected and not to -be attacked, even if it were a question of troop concentrations in those -places; and that if attacks had to be made, precision bombing Stukas -were to be used primarily. Every Frenchman who was present at the time -will confirm this, that the peculiar situation arose, be it in Amiens, -Rouen, Chartres or in other cities, that the cathedrals—those art -monuments of such great importance and beauty—were saved and purposely -so, in contrast to what later happened in Germany. There was of course -some broken glass in the cathedrals, caused by bomb detonations, but the -most precious windows had been previously removed, thank God. As far as -I remember, the small cathedral in Beauvais had fallen victim to bombing -attacks on the neighboring houses, the large cathedral still is -standing. The French Government repeatedly acknowledged recognition of -this fact to me. I have no other comment on that point. - -DR. STAHMER: What reasons made you put Colonel Veltjens in charge of -centralizing the black market in France? - -GÖRING: Colonel Veltjens was a retired colonel. He was a flier in the -first World War. He then had entered business. Therefore, he was not -sent there in his capacity as colonel, but as an economist. He was not -only in charge of the black market in France, but also of that in -Holland and Belgium. It came about in the following manner: After a -certain period during the occupation, it was reported to me that various -items, in which I was particularly interested for reasons of war -economy, could be obtained only in the black market. It was then, for -the first time, that I became familiar with the black market, that is -that copper, tin, and other vital materials were still available, but -that some of them lay buried in the canals of Holland, and had also been -carefully hidden in other countries. However, if the necessary money -were paid, these articles would come out of hiding, while, on the basis -of the confiscation order, we would receive only very little of the raw -materials necessary for the conduct of the war. At that time, as during -the entire war, I was guided only by intentions and ideas leading toward -the ultimate war aim, the winning of victory. It was more important to -me to procure copper and tin, just to cite one example, to get them in -any case, no matter how high the price might be, than not to get them -merely because I did not consider such high prices justified. I -therefore told Veltjens in rather general terms, “You know in what -things German war economy is interested. Where and how you get these -things is immaterial to me. If you get them by means of confiscation, -that is all the better. If we have to pay a great deal of money to get -them, then we shall have to do that too.” The unpleasant thing was that -other departments, first without my knowing it—as the French -Prosecution has shown here quite correctly—also tried in the same way -to get the same things, in which they also were interested. The thought -of now having internal competition as well was too much for me. So then -I gave Veltjens the sole authority to be the one and only office in -control as far as the civilian dealers were concerned who insisted they -could procure these things only in that other way, and to be the only -purchasing office for these articles and, with my authority, to -eliminate other offices. - -The difficulty of combating the black market is the result of many -factors. Afterwards, at the special request of Premier Laval, I -absolutely prohibited the black market for Veltjens and his organization -as well. But in spite of this it was not thereby eliminated, and the -statement of the French Prosecution confirms my opinion that the black -market lasted even beyond the war. And as far as I know it is again -flourishing here in Germany today to the widest extent. These are -symptoms which always arise during and after a war when there is on the -one hand a tremendous scarcity and holding back and hiding of -merchandise and on the other hand the desire to procure these things. - -DR. STAHMER: Shall I stop now? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal understood from you that the -witness would probably—that the defendant would probably finish his -examination in chief at midday today. Can you now tell me how much -longer you think the defendant will be with his testimony? - -DR. STAHMER: I had counted on being able to finish this morning, but -there were several interruptions, and I hope to finish during the course -of the day. - -THE PRESIDENT: There was no interruption with the exception of that one -interruption with reference to Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection as to -reprisals. There was no other interruption that I remember. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, there was a technical disturbance earlier. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then the Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from 10 -to 1. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: What were the reasons that led to the attack on Yugoslavia? - -GÖRING: Germany, during all the years before the beginning of the war, -had the very best of relations with the Yugoslav people and the Yugoslav -Government. It was part of my foreign political task to cultivate these -relations especially. Since the Regent, Prince Paul, and Prime Minister -Stojadinovic were personal friends of mine, I often visited the country -and also spent a long vacation there. - -It was our intention to have not only the best economic relations by -each complementing the other, but also beyond that to come to a close -political understanding and friendship. This was successful to the -fullest extent and found its climax in the return visit which the -Regent, Prince Paul, made to Germany. - -Since at the same time I also had similar friendly relations with King -Boris of Bulgaria, I was able to exert a stabilizing influence here too, -and at times also in regard to Italy. My intervention in behalf of -Yugoslavia even caused there, for a time, a certain misapprehension -where I was concerned. - -After the outbreak of the war everything was likewise avoided which -could cause anything but friendly relations with Yugoslavia. -Unfortunately Prime Minister Stojadinovic resigned, but his successor -followed the same policy. - -The entering into the Three Power Pact had the purpose of maintaining -Yugoslavia’s neutrality under all circumstances and of not drawing her -into the war. Even at the time when the pact was signed one recognized -the necessity for sending troops to Romania as a precautionary measure, -and also to Greece because of the English landing there or the impending -English landing. In spite of that agreement it was expressly provided -that no troop transports should go through Yugoslavia, so that the -neutrality of that country after its entry into the Three Power Pact -would be confirmed in every way. - -When Premier Cvetkovic came to power, General Simovic’s revolt against -the government of the Prince Regent and the accession to the throne of -the King, who was still a minor, followed shortly after. We very quickly -learned, through our close relations with Yugoslavia, the background of -General Simovic’s revolt. Shortly afterwards it was confirmed that the -information from Yugoslavia was correct, namely, that a strong Russian -political influence existed, as well as extensive financial assistance -for the undertaking on the part of England, of which we later found -proof. It was clear that this venture was directed against the friendly -policy of the previous Yugoslav Government toward Germany. It must be -mentioned here that in later press statements it was pointed out by the -Russian side how strong their influence had been and for what purpose -this undertaking had been executed. - -The new Yugoslav Government, quite obviously and beyond doubt, stood -visibly in closest relationship with the enemies we had at that time, -that is to say, England and, in this connection, with our enemy to be, -Russia. - -The Simovic affair was definitely the final and decisive factor which -dispelled the very last scruples which the Führer had in regard to -Russia’s attitude, and caused him to take preventive measures in that -direction under all circumstances. Before this Simovic incident it is -probable that, although preparations had been undertaken, doubts as to -the inevitable necessity of an attack against Soviet Russia might have -been pushed into the background. These clear relations between Moscow -and Belgrade, however, dispelled the Führer’s very last doubts. At the -same time it was evident that Yugoslavia, under the new government, was -merely trying to gain time for massing her troops, for the very night -the revolt was undertaken secret and shortly afterwards official orders -for mobilization were issued to the Yugoslav Army. - -In spite of the assurances which Simovic gave Berlin, that he would feel -himself bound to the agreement or something like that, the maneuver -could easily be seen through. - -The situation was now the following: Italy, our ally, had at the time -attacked Greece, advancing from Albania in October or September 1940, if -I remember correctly. Germany had not been informed of this venture. The -Führer heard of this undertaking through me on the one hand, who had by -chance learned of it, and also through the Foreign Office, and he -immediately rerouted his train, which was on the way from France to -Berlin, in order to speak to the Duce in Florence. - -The Italian Government, or Mussolini himself, saw very clearly at this -moment why the Führer wanted to talk to him, and as far as I remember -the order to the Italian Army to march from Albania to Greece was -therefore released 24 or 48 hours before originally scheduled. The fact -is that the Führer, in his concern to prevent under all circumstances an -expansion of the conflict in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, -wanted to urge the Duce to forego such plans, which were not necessary, -but were undertaken only for reasons of prestige. - -When the meeting took place at 10 o’clock in the morning and the Führer -had mentioned his misgivings, Mussolini actually declared that since 6 -o’clock of that morning the Italian troops had already been advancing -through Greece and, in his opinion, would shortly be in Athens. The -Führer pointed out again that this would mean, that under certain -circumstances relations with Turkey would also be most seriously -endangered and another theater of war would be created, since he well -knew, although he did not mention it at that time, that an Italian -theater of war sooner or later would mean drawing on the German ally for -help. - -That actually was the situation at the outbreak of the attack on -Yugoslavia. Italy, stopped and thrown back, was left in a most -unfavorable position strategically and tactically while still facing the -Greek enemy. If only a part of the Yugoslav Army moved against the flank -and the rear of the Italian Skutari position, then not only would Italy -be eliminated there, but also an essential part of the Italian fighting -forces would be destroyed. It was clear that the position of these -Italian fighting forces would soon be hopeless, since because of the -landing of British auxiliary troops in Greece it was to be expected that -as soon as they came to the aid of the Greeks the Italian Army would not -only be thrown out of Greece, where they were standing merely at the -border, but also out of Albania; and the British troops would then be in -dangerous proximity to Italy and the Balkans, which were economically of -decisive importance for us. - -By means of the Simovic revolt and the mobilization of Yugoslavia the -elimination of the Italian Balkan armies would have been achieved. Only -the quickest action could prevent a twofold danger: first, a catastrophe -befalling our Italian ally; and second, a British foothold in the -Balkans, which would be detrimental to a future vantage point in the -conflict with Russia. - -The German troops which were on the march for “Operation Marita,” -Greece, which were to march against Greece in order to throw back into -the Mediterranean those British divisions which had landed, and to -relieve the rear of the Italian ally, were turned with the spearhead to -the right, and with accelerated, short-notice preparations for attack, -they were thrown into the flank of the massed Yugoslav troops. The Air -Force was called from its airfields in Germany within a very short time -and assembled at the airfields in the southeast area, which was easily -possible, and was also used to support the attack. Only by such quick -action, and due to the fact that the basic conditions had been provided -by Operation Marita, was Germany able to stave off an extraordinary -danger to her entire position in the Balkans and in the southeast area -at that moment. Politically and from a military point of view it would -have been a crime against the State as far as the vital German interests -were concerned, if in that case the Führer had not acted as he did. - -DR. STAHMER: What targets did the Air Force attack in Yugoslavia first? - -GÖRING: I have just explained the very particular situation of the -German Armed Forces at the outbreak of this war and the problems which -had to be solved with extraordinary speed and the likewise extraordinary -results which had to be attained in order to carry out their original -task, which was the piercing of—I do not remember the name now—the -Metaxas line in northern Greece before English troops, which had already -landed near Athens, could come to the support of the Greek garrisons -along the Metaxas line. - -Therefore there was first of all an order for a concentrated smaller -part of the German forces to penetrate that line, while the other part, -as planned, had to throw itself upon the Yugoslav Army and, here too -with insufficient forces in the shortest possible time, had to eliminate -this army. That was a necessary condition for the success of the whole -thing. Otherwise not only would the Italian Army surely be destroyed, -but the German Army, thus divided, with a part of its forces advancing -in Yugoslavia−the Bulgarian support came much later—another part -breaking through the strong Metaxas Line in time to prevent the English -deployment there, might get itself into a very difficult and critical, -and perhaps disastrous military position. Therefore the Air Force had, -in this case, to be employed with the greatest effect, in order that the -Yugoslav action of deployment against Germany and her ally should be -stopped as quickly as possible. - -Therefore there was first of all an order for a concentrated attack upon -the Yugoslav Ministry of War in Belgrade, and secondly, upon the -railroad station, which in Belgrade particularly, in view of the small -number of Yugoslavian railroad lines, was a special deployment junction. -Then there were several other rather important centers, the General -Staff building, _et cetera_, included in the order because, at that -time, the political and military headquarters were still located in -Belgrade. Everything was still concentrated there, and the bombing of -that nerve center at the very beginning would have an extraordinary -paralyzing effect on the further deployment of the resistance. - -A warning to Yugoslavia was not necessary for the following reasons. -Strictly speaking the objection might be raised that we did not send a -declaration of war or a warning. Actually, however, none of the leading -men in Yugoslavia had the least doubt but that Germany would attack. -That was recognized, for they had feverishly busied themselves with -deployment, and not only with mobilization. Moreover the attacks of the -German Army were made before the bombing of Belgrade. But even assuming -that the Air Force had made the first attack and only then the -Army—that is, without warning—Yugoslavia’s actions and the -extraordinary danger of the military situation would have demanded that. -We were already in the midst of the most severe battle. It was a -question of securing the Balkans on both sides and holding them firmly. -The targets—and I emphasize this once more—were, as I remember -exactly, the Ministry of War, the railroad station, the General Staff -building, and one or two other ministries. The city, of course, since -these buildings were spread about within the city, was also affected by -the bombardment. - -DR. STAHMER: During the last days we have heard here repeatedly about -the aerial attacks on Warsaw, Coventry, and Rotterdam. Were these -attacks carried out beyond military necessity? - -GÖRING: The witnesses, and especially Field Marshal Kesselring, have -reported about part of that. But these statements made me realize once -more, which is of course natural, how a commander of an army, an army -group or an air fleet really views only a certain sector. As -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, however, I am in a position to view -the whole picture, since I, after all, was the man responsible for -issuing orders, and according to my orders and my point of view the -chiefs of the fleets received their instructions and directives as to -what they had to do. - -Warsaw: First of all I should like to make clear the statement that on -the first morning of the attack on Poland, a number of Polish cities, I -believe the British prosecutor mentioned their names, were attacked. I -do not remember their names any more. In my instructions for the first -day of the attack on Poland it says specifically, first target: -destruction and annihilation of the enemy air force. Once that had been -achieved the other targets could be attacked without further delay. -Therefore I gave the order to attack the following airfields—I am -certain, without having the names at hand just now, that 80 percent of -the names mentioned were cities near which there were air bases. The -second main target, which was however to be attacked only to a slight -extent on the first day, or with the first main blow, were railroad -junctions of first importance for the marshaling of larger troop units. -I would point out that shortly before the last and decisive attack on -Warsaw, an air attack, about which I will speak in a minute, the French -military attaché in Poland sent a report to his government which we are -in a position to submit here, which we found later in Paris, from which -it can be seen that even this opponent declared that the German Air -Force, he had to admit, had attacked exclusively military targets in -Poland, “exclusively” particularly emphasized. - -At first Warsaw contained only one, two targets, long before—“long -before” is the wrong expression because it took place quickly—in other -words, before the encirclement of Warsaw. That was the Okecie airfield, -where the main enemy Polish air force was concentrated, and the Warsaw -railroad station, one of the main strategic railroad stations of Poland. -However, these attacks discussed were not the decisive ones; after -Warsaw was encircled, it was asked to surrender. That surrender was -refused. On the contrary I remember the appeals which urged the entire -civilian population of Poland as well as the inhabitants of Warsaw to -offer resistance, not only military but also resistance as civilians, -which is contrary to international law, as is known. Still we gave -another warning. We dropped leaflets at first, not bombs, in which we -urged the population not to fight. Secondly, when the commanding officer -persisted in his stand, we urged the evacuation of the civilian -population before the bombing. - -When a radio message was received that the commanding officer wanted to -send a truce emissary we agreed, but waited for him in vain. But then we -demanded that at least the diplomatic corps and all neutrals should -leave Warsaw on a road designated by us, which in fact was done. - -Then, after it was clearly stated in the last appeal that we would now -be forced to make a heavy attack on the city if no surrender took place, -we proceeded to attack first the forts, then the batteries erected -within the city and the troops. That was the attack on Warsaw. - -Rotterdam: In Rotterdam the situation was entirely different. In order -to terminate the campaign in the Netherlands as quickly as possible and -thereby avoid further bloodshed for a people with whom we had no basic -differences, but had to carry through this campaign only for the -previously mentioned reasons, I had suggested the use of the parachute -division in the rear of the entire Dutch forces deployed against -Germany, especially in order to capture the three most important -bridges, one near Moerdijk across the Rhine, the other near Dordrecht, -and the third near Rotterdam. Thereby from the beginning the way would -be paved in the rear of the entire troop deployment and, were we to -succeed, the Dutch Army with all its valor could only hold out for a few -days. This attack or landing of my parachute division on the three -bridges proved entirely successful. - -While at Moerdijk and Dordrecht resistance was overcome quickly, the -unit at Rotterdam got into difficulty. First it was surrounded by Dutch -troops. Everything hinged on the fact that the railroad bridge and the -road bridge, which were next to each other, should under all -circumstances fall into our hands without being destroyed, because then -only would the last backdoor to the Dutch stronghold be open. While the -main part of the division was in the southern section of Rotterdam, a -few daring spearheads of the parachutists had crossed both bridges and -stood just north of them, at one point in the railroad station, right -behind the railroad bridges north of the river, and the second point -within a block of houses which was on the immediate north side of the -road bridge, opposite the station and near the well-known butter or -margarine factory which later played an important role. This spearhead -held its position in spite of heavy and superior attacks. - -In the meantime a German panzer division approached Rotterdam from the -outside via the Moerdijk and Dordrecht bridges, and here I would like to -correct a misapprehension which arose in the cross-examination of Field -Marshal Kesselring by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe concerning persons -involved. Lieutenant General Schmidt belonged to this group which came -from the outside and led the panzer troops. General Student led the -parachute division which was in Rotterdam, that is, inside, and that -explains the fact that at one time there were negotiations for -capitulation with the German commander of the troops coming from the -outside, and at another time surrender negotiations with the general -commanding the parachute troops within the city. Both were later -co-ordinated. I do not want to go into details here as to whether clear -agreements were arrived at—examining this chronologically one can trace -it down to the very minute—and whether it could be seen at all that -capitulation would come about or not; this of course, for the time being -concerned Rotterdam alone. At that time the group north of the two -bridges was in a very precarious and difficult position. Bringing -reinforcements across the two bridges was extremely difficult because -they were under heavy machine gun fire. To this day I could still draw -an exact picture of the situation. There was also artillery fire, so -that only a few individual men, swinging from hand to hand under the -bridge, were able to work their way across, in order to get out of the -firing line—I still remember exactly the situation at that bridge later -on. - -It had been ordered that the batteries standing north of the station, -and also the Dutch forces on the road leading north between the station -and the butter factory, which presented a great handicap to our shock -troops, were to be bombed. For at that moment the parachute troops had -no artillery, and bombing was the only sort of artillery available for -the parachute troops, and I had assured my parachutists before the -venture that they would under all circumstances receive protection by -bombers against heavy fire. Three groups of a squadron were used. The -call for help came over the radio station of the paratroopers in -Rotterdam, which did not function as well as has been claimed here, and -also from the clearly exhibited and agreed upon ground signals which the -reconnaissance planes brought back. These were signs such as arrows, -indicators, and letters which intimated to the reconnaissance fliers: -“We are pressed by artillery from the north, east, south, _et cetera_.” - -Thereupon I ordered the air fleet to use one squadron. The squadron -started in 3 groups, about 25 to 30 or 36 planes. When the first group -arrived, as far as I know, the surrender negotiations were in progress, -but to no clearly defined end. In spite of that red flares were sent up. -The first group did not grasp the significance of these flares but threw -their bombs as agreed upon, exactly in that area, as had been ordered. -If I remember the figures correctly, there were at the most 36 -twin-motored planes which released mainly 50-kilo bombs. The second and -third groups which followed understood the red signals, turned around, -and did not drop their bombs. - -There was no radio connection between Rotterdam and the planes. The -radio connection went from Rotterdam by way of my headquarters, Air -Fleet 2, to the division, from division to squadron ground station, and -from there there was a radio connection to the planes. That was in May -1940, when in general the radio connection between ground station and -planes was, to be sure, tolerably good but in no way to be compared with -the excellent connections which were developed in the course of the war. -But the main point was that Rotterdam could not communicate directly -with the planes and therefore sent up the signals agreed upon, the red -flares, which were understood by Groups 2 and 3, but not by group 1. - -The great amount of destruction was not caused by bombs but, as has been -said, by fire. That can best be seen from the fact that all the -buildings which were built of stone and concrete are still standing in -the ruined part, while the older houses were destroyed. The spread of -this fire was caused by the combustion of large quantities of fats and -oils. Secondly—I want to emphasize this particularly—the spread of -this fire could surely have been prevented by energetic action on the -part of the Rotterdam fire department, in spite of the storm coming up. - -The final negotiations for capitulation, as far as I remember, took -place not until about 6 o’clock in the evening. I know that, because -during these surrender negotiations there was still some shooting going -on and the paratroopers’ general, Student, went to the window during the -surrender negotiations and was shot in the head, which resulted in a -brain injury. - -That is what I have to say about Rotterdam in explanation of the two -generals and their surrender negotiations, one from within and one from -without. - -Coventry: After the period from 6 or 7 September to November, after -repeating warnings to the English Government, and after the Führer had -reserved for himself the right to give the order for reprisal attacks on -London—and had long hesitated to give this order—and after German -cities which were not military objectives had been bombed again and -again, then London was declared a target for attack. From 6 and 7 -September—the first attack was on the 6 September in the afternoon—the -German Luftwaffe pounded London continuously. Although this seemed -expedient for reasons of retaliation and for reasons of political -pressure on the part of the political leadership, I did not consider it -of ultimate value. - -I do not wish to be misunderstood when I say that I knew from the first -World War that the people of London can take a great deal and that we -could not break their military resistance in this manner. It was -important to me, first of all, to prevent an increase in the defense -power of the British Air Force. As a soldier or, better said, as -Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe, the weakening and -elimination of the enemy air force was a matter of decisive importance -for me. - -Although the Führer wanted, now as before, to see London attacked, I, -acting on my own initiative, made exact preparations for the target of -Coventry because, according to my information, there was located in and -around Coventry an important part of the aircraft and aircraft -accessories industry. Birmingham and Coventry were targets of most -decisive importance for me. I decided on Coventry because there the most -targets could be hit within the smallest area. - -I prepared that attack myself with both air fleets, which regularly -checked the target information—and then with the first favorable -weather, that is, a moonlit night, I ordered the attack and gave -directions for it to be carried out as long and as repeatedly as was -necessary to achieve decisive effects on the British aircraft industry -there. Then to switch to the next targets in Birmingham and to a large -motor factory south of Weston, after the aircraft industry, partly near -Bristol and south of London, had been attacked. - -That was the attack on Coventry. That here the city itself was greatly -affected resulted likewise from the fact that the industry there was -widely spread over the city, with the exception of two new plants which -were outside the city, and again in this case the damage was increased -by the spreading of fire. If we look at German cities today, we know how -destructive the influence of fire is. That was the attack on Coventry. - -DR. STAHMER: In the year 1941, negotiations took place about -collaboration with Japan. Were you present at these negotiations? - -GÖRING: I myself did not take part in the negotiations. I can say very -little about negotiations with Japan because from a military point of -view I had very little to do with Japan and seldom met the Japanese. -During the entire war only once, and for a short time, I received a -delegation of Japanese officers and attachés. Therefore, I cannot say -anything about collaboration with Japan. We were instructed to exchange -experiences, war experiences, with the Japanese, but that went through -the various offices. Personally I had nothing to do with the Japanese. - -DR. STAHMER: When were you first informed that Hitler thought a war -against Russia necessary? - -GÖRING: It was not until the late fall of 1940, in Berchtesgaden, that I -was informed about the intentions of the Führer to enter into conflict -with Russia under certain circumstances. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you present at the conversation, which took place in -Berlin in November 1940 with the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov? - -GÖRING: I personally was not present at the conversation between Hitler -and Molotov. Mr. Molotov, however, also paid me a visit, and we -discussed the general situation. I know, of course, about the -conversation with Molotov, because the Führer informed me about it in -detail. It was just this conversation which very much increased the -Führer’s suspicion that Russia was getting ready for an attack upon -Germany, and this was brought out during this discussion by the remarks -and demands which Mr. Molotov made. - -These were, firstly, a guarantee to Bulgaria, and a pact of assistance -with Bulgaria, such as Russia had made with the three Baltic states. - -Secondly, it involved the complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, to -such an extent that Russia, who had signed a peace with Finland a short -time ago, thought herself justified in attacking Finland again in order -not to have to acquiesce in the results of the previous agreements, -Hangö, _et cetera_. - -Thirdly, it dealt with discussions about the Dardanelles and the -Bosporus; and the fourth point was the possibility of penetration into -Romania beyond Bessarabia. - -These were the points which were discussed with the Führer. There was -also a hint to the Foreign Minister about an occupation, or securing of -interests, at the exit of the Baltic. - -The Führer viewed these demands in a different light. Although Russia -might have been justified in making demands to Germany concerning -Finland, he believed, that in connection with other reports which he had -received about Russian preparations and deployment of troops, Russia -wanted to strengthen her position in Finland, in order to outflank -Germany in the north and to be in immediate proximity to the Swedish ore -mines, which were of vital or at least very decisive importance to -Germany in this war. Secondly, as to the advance, as demanded, into the -Romanian and Bulgarian area, the Führer was not at all sure that this -pressure would continue in the south, that is, the Dardanelles, or in a -near-easterly direction, but rather in a westerly direction; that is to -say, that here also Russia might push into the southern flank of Germany -and, by getting control of the Romanian oilfields, make Germany -absolutely dependent on Russia for deliveries of oil. In these demands -he saw the camouflaged attempts to deploy troops and obtain troop -positions against Germany. The suggestion of securing an outlet to the -Baltic did not even come up for discussion, as far as Germany was -concerned, at that time. Altogether that conversation caused the Führer -to feel that further relations were being menaced by Russia. - -Already in his discussion with me the Führer told me why he was thinking -about anticipating the Russian drive under certain circumstances. The -information about feverish work on deployment preparations in the area -newly acquired by Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and -Bessarabia, made him extremely suspicious. Until then we had sometimes -only 8, later 20 and 25 divisions along the entire eastern border. -Further reports came that Russia might be expected to attack us from the -rear as soon as Germany had gone to war in the West, either because of -an invasion by Britain or because Germany on her part had decided to -invade England. His arguments were strengthened even more by the fact -that shortly before, contrary to anything practiced in Russia before -this, engineers, and, I believe, also officers of ours, that is, -Germans, were suddenly shown the tremendous Russian armament works of -the aviation and tank industry. These reports about the surprisingly -high production capacity of these armament works further strengthened -the Führer’s conviction. He was so firmly convinced because, he -said—and this was his political reflection—if England still will not -consider coming to an agreement with us, although she now stands alone -against us, she must have something at the back of her mind. He had -information that Prime Minister Churchill had pointed out two things to -worried elements in England. - -First, that increased support by the United States could be expected, -first of all in the technical field, that is, with respect to armaments, -and then extending to other fields; and, secondly, which he considered -even more probable, that Churchill had already come to an understanding -with Russia in that direction, and he pointed out that here sooner or -later there would be a clash. His calculations were the following: -Before the United States could be ready with her armaments and the -mobilization of her army, he would have to smash the Russian troop -concentrations, and break down and weaken the Russian forces to such an -extent by strong concentrated attacks, that they would not represent a -danger in the rear if he had to enter into an English-American conflict -on the Continent. These were the explanations of the Führer. - -Then came the visit of Molotov, which I just mentioned and which -enhanced this point of view considerably. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude toward an attack on Russia at that -time? - -GÖRING: At first I was very much surprised at the time and asked the -Führer to give me a few hours to state my view. It came entirely as a -surprise to me. Then in the evening, after this conversation had taken -place in the afternoon, I told the Führer the following: - -I urged him most particularly not to start a war against Russia at that -moment, or even a short time after; not that I was moved by -considerations of international law or similar reasons; my point of view -was decided by political and military reasons only. First, at all times -since the seizure of power I, perhaps of all the leading men in Germany, -was the only one who always considered conflict with Russia as a -threatening menace to Germany. I knew—and many others with me—that for -over 10 years an exceedingly strong rearmament and training program had -been in effect in Russia, that the standard of living had been lowered -in all other fields in favor of one single tremendous rearmament. The -deliveries made by German industry and examination of the deliveries -made by the American, British, and other industries always showed -clearly that they consisted only of such machines as were directly or -immediately necessary for a gigantic industrial rearmament program. One -could thereby estimate the speed and the size of the Russian rearmament. -If Germany had now developed in the way of communism, then of course the -Russian rearmament, in my opinion, would have been directed against -other danger. But since we had come to power, the inner political and -ideological contrast naturally played, in my opinion, a menacing part. I -have come to understand that such contrasts do not necessarily have to -lead to conflicts between countries, because the political interests of -nation and state will always be stronger and greater than all -ideological contrasts or agreements. But here also I saw a menace, -because what did this tremendous Russian rearmament signify at a time -when Germany before the seizure of power, was impotent? I now told the -Führer that in spite of this basic attitude I always feared this danger -from Russia and had always recognized it, but that I was asking him -rather to leave this danger in abeyance and, if at all possible, to -direct Russia’s interests against England. - -And indeed I said to him: - - “We are at present fighting against one of the greatest world - powers, the British Empire. If you, my Führer, are not of - exactly the same opinion, then I have to contradict you, because - I am definitely of the opinion that sooner or later the second - great world power, the United States, will march against us. - This will not depend on the election of President Roosevelt; the - other candidate will also not be able to prevent this. Then we - shall be at war against two of the largest world powers. It was - your masterstroke at the beginning of the war to make possible a - one-front war; you have always pointed that out in your _Kampf_. - In the case of a clash with Russia at this time, the third great - world power would be thrown into the struggle against Germany. - We would again stand alone, against practically the entire - world; the other nations do not count. And again we would have - two fronts.” - -And he replied, - - “I fully appreciate your arguments. I appreciate the Russian - menace more than anybody else, but if we should succeed in - executing our plans as prepared in the fight against the British - Empire, and if these were only half-way successful, Russia would - not launch her attack. Only if we should become deeply involved - in a serious conflict in the West, would I be of your opinion, - that the Russian menace would increase enormously.” - -I was even of the opinion that the quick assent of the Russians to the -settlement of the Polish crisis was given in order that Germany, free -from that side, would be all the more likely to get into this conflict, -because the German-French-British conflict would come about thereby, and -it would be entirely understandable, as far as Russian interests were -concerned, to bring about this conflict and come out of it as well as -before. I furthermore told the Führer that, according to my reports and -evidence, Russian rearmament would reach its climax in the year 1942-43, -or perhaps even in 1944. Before then we should, however, succeed, if not -in achieving a peace by victory on our part, at least in coming to an -arrangement with England. This, however, would be possible only if -decisive successes were achieved against England. At that time the -German Air Force with all its weight was being employed in the attack on -England. If now a new front should be formed for an attack on Russia, a -considerable part of these air forces, more than half, two-thirds, would -have to be diverted to the East. For practical purposes an energetic air -attack on England would thereby cease. All the sacrifices up to that -time would be in vain; England would be given a chance to reorganize and -build up her shattered aircraft industry undisturbed. - -Much more decisive than these considerations was the fact that with a -deployment of that kind against Russia, my plan, which I had submitted -to the Führer, to attack England at Gibraltar and Suez, would have to be -dropped more or less finally. The attack on Gibraltar was so -methodically prepared by the Air Force that, according to all human -expectations, there could be no failure. The British air force stationed -there on the small airfield north of the Rock of Gibraltar was of no -importance. The attack of my paratroopers on the Rock would have been a -success. The simultaneous occupation of the other side, the African -side, and a subsequent march on Casablanca and Dakar would at least have -been a safeguard against America’s intervention—a campaign, such as -later took place in North Africa. To what extent beyond this, by -agreement, the Cape Verde Islands could still be used, was an open -question. It is obvious what it would have meant to be established with -aircraft and submarines at North African bases and to attack all the -convoys coming up from Capetown and South America from such favorable -positions. Even if the Mediterranean had been closed in the west, it -would not have been difficult, by pushing across Tripoli, to bring the -Suez project to a conclusion, the time and success of which could be -calculated in advance. - -The exclusion of the Mediterranean as a theater of war, the key point -Gibraltar—North Africa down to Dakar—Suez, and possibly extended -further south, would have required only a few forces, a number of -divisions on the one side and a number of divisions on the other, to -eliminate the entire insecurity of the long Italian coast line against -the possibility of attack. - -I urged him to put these decisive considerations in the foreground and -only after the conclusion of such an undertaking to examine further the -military and political situation with regard to Russia. For, if these -conditions were brought about, we would be in a favorable position in -the case of an intervention by the United States, a flanking position. I -explained to him all these reasons in great detail and pointed out to -him again and again that here we would be giving up something relatively -secure for something still insecure, and that, after securing such a -position, there would be much more of a prospect of coming, under -certain circumstances, to an arrangement with England at a time when the -two, both armed, would be standing opposite each other, the one on this, -the other on that side of the Channel. These were my reasons for -delaying the date, and I also told him that increased successes in this -direction might enable us to steer Russian preparations politically, -where possible, into other channels, against our enemies of the moment. -I emphasize, however, that the Führer, restrained by considerations of -caution, at first made only general preparations and was going to hold -in reserve, as he told me at the time, the actual attack; and the final -decision was not taken until after the Simovic revolt in Yugoslavia. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has submitted Document Number 376-PS, notes -of 29 October 1940, Paragraph 5 of which states the following: “The -Führer concerns himself with the question of a later war with America -and with an examination of the occupation of the Atlantic islands.” - -What can you say about this? - -GÖRING: I am very well acquainted with this document because it has been -submitted to me here. It concerns a letter which the representative of -the Luftwaffe in the OKW, the then Lieutenant Colonel Von Falkenstein, -wrote to the chief of the General Staff of my Air Force. It is a study -of, it refers to those points which I have just set forth, namely the -occupation of Gibraltar, North Africa, and perhaps also the Atlantic -Islands—first as a combat base against England, our enemy at that time, -and, secondly, in case America entered the war, to have a better -flanking position against her convoys. But this was just a General Staff -note. At that time I had already of my own accord, without having spoken -to the Führer beforehand, made my military investigation of the -possibility of carrying out such an undertaking. It is, therefore, of no -consequence. - -DR. STAHMER: In this connection I have a further question. An -organization plan for the year 1950 prepared by a Major Kammhuber has -been submitted here. - -GÖRING: This question also may be answered briefly. I am familiar with -this document, for on two or three occasions it has been mentioned by -the Prosecution. Consultation with an expert general staff officer of -any one of the powers represented would prove immediately that this -document is of secondary value. It is simply a General Staff study, by -the subordinate Organization Section, in order to work out the best -scheme for a leadership organization. It was a question of whether one -should concentrate on air fleets or land fortifications. It was a -question of whether mixed squadrons consisting of bombers and fighters, -or squadrons consisting only of bombers, or of fighters, should be used, -and other such questions which are always being dealt with by the -offices of a general staff, independent of war and peace. That such -studies must of course be based on certain assumptions which are in the -realm of strategic possibility, must be taken for granted. In this case -the Major took as a basis the situation around or until 1950, a -two-front war, which was not entirely beyond all probability, namely, a -war on the one side with England and France in the west, and on the -other side with Russia in the east. The basic assumption was that -Austria and Poland were in our own hands, and so on. This study never -reached me. I have just become acquainted with it here. But that is of -no significance because it was made in my ministry and in my general -staff and was therefore also made on my orders. For I placed such tasks -within the general framework of having organization, leadership, and -composition constantly tested by maneuvers and examples. This is -completely irrelevant to the political evaluation and completely out of -place in the framework of this Trial. - -DR. STAHMER: Several days ago reference was made to a speech which you -are said to have made to Air Force officers, in which you said that you -proposed to have such an air force that, once the hour had struck, it -would fall like an avenging host on the enemy. The opponent must have -the feeling of having lost before he ever started fighting with you. I -shall have this speech submitted to you and I would like you to tell us -whether this speech was known to you and what its purpose was? - -GÖRING: This quotation has been used by the Prosecution twice. Once in -the beginning and the second time, the other day, in the -cross-examination of Field Marshal Milch. This concerns a speech which -appeared in a book by me called _Speeches and Compositions_ which has -already been submitted to the Tribunal as evidence. The speech is called -“Comradeship, Fulfillment of Duty, and Willingness to Sacrifice,” an -address to 1,000 flight lieutenants on the day they took their oath in -Berlin on 20 May 1936. - -Here I was explaining at length to thousands of young flyers, the day -they became commissioned officers, the concepts of comradeship, -fulfillment of duty, and willingness to sacrifice. This quotation had -been completely removed from its context. I therefore take the liberty -of asking the Tribunal’s permission, to read a short preceding -paragraph, so that it will be seen in the right context, and I also -request to be allowed to portray the atmosphere. Before me stand 1,000 -young flight lieutenants full of hope, whom I now had to imbue with the -appropriate fighting spirit. That has nothing to do with an offensive -war, but the important thing was that my boys, should it come to war, -this way or that, should be brave fellows and men with a will to act. -The short quotation before this one is as follows: - - “I demand of you nothing impossible. I do not demand that you - should be model boys. I like to be generous. I understand that - youth must have its follies, otherwise it would not be youth. - You may have your pranks, and you will get your ears boxed for - it. But that is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is - rather that you should be honorable, decent fellows, that you - should be men. You can have your fun as much as you wish, but - once you get into the plane you must be men, determined to smash - all resistance. That is what I demand of you, brave, daring - fellows.” - -Then comes the paragraph which has just been read. “I have visions” -. . . “of possessing a weapon” . . . “which shall come like an avenging -host against the foe.” That has nothing to do with vengeance, for “an -avenging host” is a _terminus technicus_, a usual term, in Germany. I -might just as well have said that the opponent would use another word to -express the same thing. I shall not read any further here, for these -words, if I were to read them, would be readily understandable; one has -to realize to whom I was speaking. - -DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you assist in the economic and military -preparation of Case Barbarossa? - -GÖRING: As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I naturally took all the -measures which were necessary in the purely military field for the -preparation of such a campaign. Consent or refusal, as I have already -recently explained. . . . I took the obvious military preparations which -are always necessary in connection with a new strategic deployment, and -which every officer was in duty bound to carry out, and for which the -officers of the Air Corps received their command from me. I do not -believe that the Tribunal would be interested in the details as to how I -carried out the deployment of my air fleet. The decisive thing at the -time of the first attacks was, as before, to smash the enemy air arm as -the main objective. Independent of the purely military preparations, -which were a matter of duty, economic preparations seemed necessary -according to our experiences in the previous war with Poland, and in the -war in the West; and doubly necessary in the case of Russia, for here we -encountered a completely different form of economic life from that in -the other countries of the Continent. Here it was a matter of state -economy and state ownership; there was no private economy or private -ownership worth mentioning. That I was charged with this was again a -matter of course resulting from the fact that I, as Delegate for the -Four Year Plan, directed the whole economy and had to provide the -necessary instructions. I had therefore instructed the War Economy Staff -to formulate a general economic plan for the invasion, in consultation -with economic experts on Russia, especially as we had to expect that -with our advance, Russia, according to long-established procedure, would -destroy large parts of its economy. The result of these prepared -economic mobilization studies was the so-called “Green File.” I am of -the opinion that in every future war, as in past wars on other sides, -there must always be an economic mobilization besides a military and -political mobilization; otherwise one would get into very unpleasant -situations. - -The Green File has been cited repeatedly, and also here some of the -quotations have been torn from their context. In order to save time I do -not wish to read further passages from this Green File. That can perhaps -be done when documentary evidence is given. But if I were to read the -whole Green File from beginning to end, from A to Z, the Tribunal would -see that this is a very useful and suitable work for armed forces which -have to advance into a territory with a completely different economic -structure; the Court will also realize that it could be worked out only -that way. This Green File contains much positive material, and here and -there a sentence which, cited alone, as has been done, gives a false -picture. It provides for everything, among other things for -compensation. If an economy exists in a state, when one enters into war -with that state, and if one then gains possession of that economy, it is -to one’s interest to carry out this economy only insofar, of course, as -the interests of one’s own war needs are concerned—that goes without -saying. But in order to save time I shall dispense with the reading of -those pages which would exonerate me considerably for, I am stating, as -a whole as it is, that our making claims on the Russian state economy -for German purposes, after the conquest of those territories, was just -as natural and just as much a matter of duty for us as it was for Russia -when she occupied German territories, but with this difference, that we -did not dismantle and transport away the entire Russian economy down to -the last bolt and screw, as is being done here. These are measures which -result from the conduct of war. I naturally take complete responsibility -for them. - -DR. STAHMER: A document has been submitted as Document Number 2718-PS, -and this reads as follows: - - “Memorandum concerning the result of today’s conference with the - state secretaries in regard to Barbarossa. - - “1. The war can be continued further only if the entire Armed - Forces can be supplied with food by Russia in the third year of - war. - - “2. Millions of people will hereby doubtless starve if we take - from this country that which is needed by us.” - -Were you informed of the subject of this conference with the state -secretaries and of this document. - -GÖRING: I became familiar with this document only when it was submitted -to me here. This is a rather unreliable document. We can not tell -clearly just who was present, where this was discussed, and who was -responsible for the nonsense that is expressed in it. It is a matter of -course that, within the framework of all the conferences of official -experts, many things were discussed which proved to be absolute -nonsense. - -First of all the German Armed Forces would have been fed, even if there -had been no war with Russia. Therefore it was not the case, as one might -conclude from this, that, in order to feed the German Armed Forces, we -had to attack Russia. Before the attack on Russia the German Army was -fed, and it would have been fed thereafter. But if we had to march and -advance into Russia it was a matter of course that the army would always -and everywhere be fed from that territory. - -The feeding of several millions of people, that is, two or three, if I -figure the entire troop deployment in Russia with all its staff, cannot -possibly result in the starvation of many, many millions on the other -side. It is impossible for one soldier on the one side to eat so much -that on the other side there is not enough left for three times that -number. The fact is moreover that the population did not starve. -However, famine had become a possibility, not because the German Army -was to be fed from Russia, but because of the destruction or the sending -back by the Russians of all agricultural implements, and of the entire -seed stocks. It was first of all impossible to bring the harvest, which -had been partly destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, in from the -fields to an extent even approaching what was necessary, because of -inadequate implements; and, secondly, the spring and autumn crops were -greatly endangered owing to the lack of implements and seed. - -If this crisis was met, it was not because the Russian troops had not -destroyed or removed everything, but because Germany had to draw heavily -on her own stocks. Tractors, agricultural machines, scythes, and other -things had to be procured, even seed, so that for the time being the -troops were not fed by the country, but food had to be sent from -Germany—even straw and hay. Only through the greatest efforts of -organization and administration, and in co-operation with the local -population could a balance gradually be achieved in the agricultural -sector, and also a surplus for the German territories. - -As far as I know, famine occurred only in Leningrad, as has also been -mentioned here. - -But Leningrad was a fortress which was being besieged. In the history of -war I have until now found no evidence that the besieger generously -supplies the besieged with food in order that they can resist longer; -rather I know only of evidence in the history of wars that the besiegers -do everything to force the surrender of the fortress by cutting off the -food supply. Neither from the point of view of international law nor -from the point of view of the military conduct of war were we under any -obligation to provide besieged fortresses or cities with food. - -DR. STAHMER: And what part did the Air Force play in the attacks on -Leningrad? - -GÖRING: The air force at Leningrad was very weak. The most northern -sector of our position had the poorest air protection, so that the air -force there had to carry out very many tasks simultaneously. At no time -was there a concentrated attack by the Air Force on Leningrad, such as -we have made on other cities or as have been carried out on German -cities on the largest scale. The Führer not once but repeatedly, in the -presence of other gentlemen at briefing sessions, reproachfully said -that apparently the German Luftwaffe dared not venture into Leningrad. I -replied: - - “As long as my Air Force is ready to fly into the hell of London - it will be equally prepared to attack the much less defended - city of Leningrad. However I lack the necessary forces, and - besides you must not give me so many tasks for my Air Force - north of the front, such as preventing reinforcements from - coming over Lake Ladoga and other tasks.” - -Attacks were therefore made only on Kronstadt and on the fleet which was -left in the outer bay of Leningrad, and other targets such as heavy -batteries. - -I was interested to hear from the sworn testimony of the Russian -professor for museums, that he was under the impression that the German -Air Force was mainly out to destroy museums, and then from the -testimony—not sworn to—by I believe he called himself a metropolitan, -who had the impression that my Air Force had mainly chosen his -cathedrals as targets. I would like to call your attention to this -contradiction—perhaps understandable for people who are not experts. -St. Petersburg was in fact at the very front of the fighting, and it was -not necessary to attack by air, for medium and heavy artillery was -sufficient to reach the center of the city. - -DR. STAHMER: Was confiscation by the occupying power in Russia limited -to state property? - -GÖRING: In connection with the last question I forgot to mention -something briefly. - -There has been a great deal of talk here about the great destruction in -Russia. Pictures and films were shown, impressive in themselves, but not -so impressive to a German, for they showed only a modest proportion of -the destruction which we personally experienced in our own cities. But I -would like to point out that much of this destruction took place in the -course of battle, in other words, that destruction was not intended, by -the Air Force or by the artillery, but that cities, historical cities or -art monuments were very frequently destroyed by battle action. - -Also, in Germany men of the rank of the musician and composer -Tschaikovsky, and the poets Tolstoy and Pushkin are too highly revered -for deliberate destruction of the graves of these great and creative men -of culture to have been intended. - -Now to the question whether only state property was confiscated; as far -as I know, yes. Private property, as has been mentioned here from state -documents—I can easily imagine that in the cold winter of 1941-42 -German soldiers took fur shoes, felt boots, and sheep furs here and -there from the population—that is possible; but by and large there was -no private property, therefore it could not be confiscated. I personally -can speak only of a small section, namely of the surroundings of the -city of Vinnitza and the city of Vinnitza itself. When I stopped there -with my special train as headquarters, I repeatedly visited the peasant -huts, the villages, and the town of Vinnitza, because life there -interested me. - -I saw such abject poverty there that I cannot possibly imagine what one -could have taken. As an insignificant but informative example I would -like to mention that for empty marmalade jars, tin cans, or even empty -cigar boxes or cigarette boxes, the people would offer remarkable -quantities of eggs and butter because they considered these primitive -articles very desirable. - -In this connection I would also like to emphasize that no theaters or -the like were ever consciously destroyed either with my knowledge or -that of any other German person. I know only the theater in Vinnitza -that I visited. I saw the actors and actresses there and the ballet. The -first thing I did was to get material, dresses, and all sorts of things -for these people because they had nothing. - -As the second example, the destruction of churches. This is also a -personal experience of mine in Vinnitza. I was there when the dedication -took place of the largest church which for years had been a powder -magazine, and now, under the German administration, was reinstated as a -church. The clergy requested me to be present at this dedication. -Everything was decorated with flowers. I declined because I do not -belong to the Greek Orthodox Church. - -As far as the looting of stores was concerned, I could see only one -store in Vinnitza that was completely empty. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the significance for the Air Force of the work -camp Dora, which has been mentioned by the French Prosecution? - -GÖRING: Before I go on to that I must add that the accusation that we -destroyed industry everywhere is incorrect, but rather for our own -purposes we had to reconstruct a great part of industry. Thus I would -like to recall the famous dam of Dniepropetrovsk which was destroyed and -which was important for the electricity supply of the entire Ukraine, -and even for the Donetz area. - -As far as industry and agriculture are concerned, I have spoken of that -before and mentioned the scorched earth policy as it was described in -the Russian order and as it was carried out. This scorched earth policy, -the destruction of all stock, of everything, created a very difficult -situation which was hard to overcome. Therefore, from the economic point -of view, we also had much reconstruction to do. - -As far as destruction of cities is concerned, I would like to add that -over and beyond that which was shot to pieces in the course of battle, -during the advance or retreat, there were considerable parts and -important buildings of cities that had been mined and at the proper time -went up in the air, involving, of course, many German victims. I can -cite Odessa and Kiev as two main examples. - -Now I come to the question of Camp Dora. I also heard about Camp Dora -here for the first time. Of course, I knew of the subterranean works -which were near Nordhausen, though I never was there myself. But they -had been established at a rather early period. Nordhausen produced -mainly V-1’s and V-2’s. With the conditions in Camp Dora, as they have -been described, I am not familiar. I also believe that they are -exaggerated. Of course, I knew that subterranean factories were being -built. I was also interested in the construction of further plants for -the Luftwaffe. I cannot see why the construction of subterranean works -should be something particularly wicked or destructive. I had ordered -construction of an important subterranean work at Kahla in Thuringia for -airplane production in which, to a large extent, German workers and, for -the rest, Russian workers and prisoners of war were employed. I -personally went there to look over the work being done and on that day -found everyone in good spirits. On the occasion of my visit I brought -the people some additional rations of beverages, cigarettes, and other -things, for Germans and foreigners alike. - -The other subterranean works for which I requested concentration camp -internees were not built any more. That I requested inmates of -concentration camps for the aviation industry is correct, and it is in -my opinion quite natural because I was, at that time, not familiar with -the details of the concentration camps. I knew only that many Germans -also were in concentration camps—people who had refused to join the -Army, who were politically unreliable, or who had been punished for -other things, as also happens in other countries in time of war. At that -time everyone had to work in Germany. Women were taken into the ranks of -labor, including those who had never worked before. In my own home -parachute production was started, in which everyone had to participate. -I could not see why, if the entire people had to take part in work, the -inmates of prisons, concentration camps, or wherever they might be, -should not also be put to use for work essential to the war. - -Moreover I am of the opinion, from what I know today, that it certainly -was better for them to work and to be billeted in some plane factory -than in their concentration camps. The fact _per se_ that they worked, -is to be taken as a matter of course, and also that they worked for war -production. But that work meant destruction is a new idea. It is -possible that it was strenuous here or there. I for my part was -interested that these people should not be destroyed, but that they -should work and thereby produce. The work itself was the same as done by -German workers—that is, plane and motor production—no destruction was -intended thereby. - -DR. STAHMER: Under what conditions were prisoners of war used in -anti-aircraft operations? - -GÖRING: Prisoners of war were used for anti-aircraft operations mainly -for those stationary batteries at home which were for the protection of -factories and cities. And indeed these were auxiliary volunteers. They -were chiefly Russian prisoners of war, but not entirely as far as I -remember. One must not forget that in Russia there were various racial -groups who did not think alike and did not all have the same attitude to -the system there. Just as there were so-called East Battalions made up -of volunteers, so there were also a great number of volunteers who, -after the announcement in the camps, reported for service in the -anti-aircraft batteries. We also had an entire company of Russian -prisoners of war who volunteered to fight against their own country. I -did not think much of these people, but in time of war one takes what -one can get. The other side did the same thing. - -The volunteer auxiliaries liked to go to the anti-aircraft because they -had considerably less work there and their food was better as it was -soldiers’ rations; whatever other reasons they may have had I do not -know. However, if one did look at a local German anti-aircraft battery -in the year 1944 or 1945 it made, I admit, a rather strange impression. -There were German youths from 15 to 16 and old men from 55 to 60, some -women and some auxiliary volunteers of all nationalities, I always -called them my “gypsy batteries.” But they shot, and that was what -mattered. - -DR. STAHMER: What was Sauckel’s official relation to you? - -GÖRING: I mentioned that in the Four Year Plan in 1936 there was already -a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. In the year 1942, -after he had become ill and was being represented by somebody else, I -was taken aback by the direct appointment of a new Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor—an appointment made directly by the -Führer, and without my being consulted. - -But at that time the Führer had already begun to intervene much more -strongly and directly in such problems. If he did it here too, he did so -because the labor problem became more acute from day to day. It had been -suggested to him that he should appoint a new deputy for the time being, -perhaps a Gauleiter of a different name, the one from Silesia. But the -Führer decided on the Gauleiter from Thuringia, Sauckel, and made him -plenipotentiary. This order was countersigned by Lammers, not by me, but -that is of no significance; and it was formally included in the Four -Year Plan, for the Four Year Plan had general plenary authority for all -matters concerning economy. For this reason, up to the end even the -appointment of Goebbels as Plenipotentiary General for the total war, -which had nothing at all to do with me, was also included in the plenary -power of the Four Year Plan, since otherwise the entire legislative work -of the Four Year Plan, which I had gradually built up with its plenary -powers, would have collapsed and we should have had to create entirely -new conditions. - -If Sauckel from that time on received his orders mainly from the Führer, -it was because the Führer now intervened more effectively in all these -matters; but I welcomed the appointment of Sauckel, for I considered him -one of the calmest and most reliable Gauleiters and was also convinced -that he would fully dedicate himself to this new task. The connection -with the offices of the Four Year Plan was of course maintained, and in -the case of important legislative decrees Sauckel and my offices of the -Four Year Plan worked together, as far as I know. - -Sauckel himself spoke to me on several occasions after he had been with -the Führer, and sent me also a few of the reports which he sent to the -Führer. Even if not in full detail I was, on the whole, informed. - -DR. STAHMER: In March of 1944, 75 English Air Force officers escaped -from the prisoner-of-war camp Stalag Luft III. As you probably know from -the proceedings, 50 of these officers after their recapture were shot by -the SD. Did this order for shooting come from you, and did you know of -this intention? - -GÖRING: I came to know of the course of events, but unfortunately not -until a later period. When these 75 or 80 English Air Force officers -attempted to escape during the last 10 days of March, I was at the -moment on leave, as I can prove. I heard 1 or 2 days later about this -escape. As, however, prior to that, a few large escapes had already -taken place and each time a few days later most of the escaped prisoners -had been brought back to camp, I assumed that would happen in this case -also. - -On my return from my leave, the chief of my general staff told me that a -part, but he could not give me the figure at the time, of these escaped -officers had been shot. This had to a certain extent caused talk and -excitement in our Luftwaffe; one also feared reprisals. I asked from -whom he had his information and what had really happened. He said he -knew only that part of the escaped men had been recaptured by the camp -guards in the vicinity of the camp, and by the police authorities in the -immediate neighborhood, and had been brought back to camp. Nothing had -happened to these men. On the other hand, of the fate of those who had -been recaptured at a greater distance from the camp he knew only that -some of them had been shot. - -I then went to Himmler and asked him. He confirmed this without -mentioning a definite figure, and told me that he had received the order -from the Führer. I called his attention to the fact that such a thing -was utterly impossible, and that the English officers in particular were -bound to make at least one or two attempts to escape and that we knew -this. He said, I believe, that he had at least opposed the Führer in -this matter at first, but that the Führer had absolutely insisted on it, -since he maintained that escapes to such an extent represented an -extreme danger to security. - -I told him then that this would lead to the most severe agitation among -my forces, for no one would understand this action, and that if he were -to give such orders, he could at least inform me before carrying them -out so that I might have the opportunity of countermanding them if -possible. - -After giving these instructions I talked to the Führer personally about -the matter, and the Führer confirmed the fact that he had given the -order and told me why—the reasons just mentioned. I explained to him -why this order, according to our opinion, was completely impossible and -what repercussions it would cause with regard to my airmen employed -against the enemy in the West. - -The Führer—our relations were already extremely bad and -strained—answered rather violently that the airmen who were flying -against Russia have to reckon with the possibility of being immediately -beaten to death in case of an emergency landing, and that airmen going -to the West should not want to claim a special privilege in this -respect. I then told him that these two things really had no connection -with each other. - -Then I talked with the Chief of my General Staff and asked him—I -believe he was the Quartermaster General—to write to the OKW and say -that I was now requesting, that the Air Force was requesting, that these -camps be taken from our control. I did not want to have anything more to -do with prisoner-of-war camps in case such things should happen again. -This letter was closely connected with those events, a few weeks after -those events. That is what I know about this matter. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness Von Brauchitsch testified the other day that in May -of 1944 the Führer decreed the strictest measures against the so-called -terror-fliers. Did you, in compliance with this Führer decree, issue -instructions to shoot enemy terror-fliers or to have them handed over to -the SD? - -GÖRING: The definition of “terror-fliers” was very confused. A part of -the population, and also of the press, called everything which attacked -cities “terror-fliers,” more or less. Tremendous excitement had arisen -among the German population because of the very heavy and continued -attacks on German cities, in the course of which the population saw to a -certain extent that the really important industrial targets were less -frequently hit than houses and nonmilitary targets. Some German cities -had thus suffered most severely in their residential districts, while -the industries in these same cities remained on the whole untouched. - -Then with the further flights of enemy forces to Germany there came -so-called low-flying aircraft which attacked both military and -nonmilitary targets. Reports came repeatedly to the Führer, and I too -heard of these reports, that the civilian population was being attacked -with machine guns and cannons; that single vehicles, which could be -recognized as civilian vehicles, and also ambulances which were marked -with a red cross, had been attacked. One report came in—I remember it -distinctly because the Führer became especially excited about it—which -said that a group of children had been shot at. Men and women standing -in front of stores had also been shot at. And these activities were now -called those of terror-fliers. The Führer was extremely excited. - -The populace in its fury resorted at first to lynching, and we tried at -first to take measures to prevent this. I heard then that instructions -had been given through the police and Bormann not to take measures -against this. These reports multiplied, and the Führer then decreed, or -made a statement to the effect that these terror-fliers should be shot -on the spot. - -The belief that these fliers had been forbidden by their superiors to -make such attacks, and that really they were to attack with their -weapons only targets which could be recognized as military, I had -confirmed beforehand through an interrogation of the airmen. - -Now, as is often the case in matters of this kind, all offices which had -anything to do with this were called in and we were aware, as -Brauchitsch has already declared—not only those of us in the Air Force, -but also those in the OKW and other military offices—that it would be -very hard to formulate and to support an order in regard to this matter. -First of all the term “terror-flier” would have to be defined once and -for all. In this connection four points were set down, and these points -have already been read here. - -Debate on this matter went to and fro. In general I expressed the -opinion that these fliers, since they were prohibited by their own -superiors to do these things, could be legally prosecuted by a military -court every time. At any rate we arrived at no definite order after long -bickering; and no office of the Air Force was ever instructed to -undertake any steps in this direction. - -The document in which it is said on 6 June 1944 that a conference -between Himmler, Ribbentrop, and me took place in Klessheim and which is -signed by Warlimont, states that Warlimont said that Kaltenbrunner had -told him he had learned that such a conference had taken place. It does -not say it actually took place. Now this day, 6 June 1944, is a very -significant day, as Brauchitsch has already explained, for it is the day -of the invasion in France. I no longer know exactly who came to -Klessheim. Klessheim is a castle near Berchtesgaden and was used when -allied or foreign missions came to visit. - -For a long time already it had been customary that when such allied -visits took place I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was not -present for each of these visitors naturally wanted above all, on the -occasion of these conversations, to obtain help from the German Air -Force and always asked for German fighters and machines no matter -whether it was Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, or Italy or someone -else. I made a point of not being there on such occasions, so that the -Führer might have an opportunity to be evasive and to say, “I must first -consult with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces.” - -Therefore I had already left Berchtesgaden on the 4th or the 3rd, as far -as I remember, and was on my estate near Nuremberg. The General Staff -officer who accompanied me, the physician and various others will be -able to testify to this if necessary. In the morning hours I learned -here of the invasion. Brauchitsch is wrong in one point, that this had -already been reported as an invasion. On the contrary, in response to my -further inquiry it was said that one could not yet tell whether it was a -diversion maneuver or the actual invasion. Thereupon I returned to -Berchtesgaden in the late evening or in the afternoon—I remember -exactly. I left after lunch and it takes about 4-1/2 hours from here. I -therefore did not take part in the conference on this matter with -Ribbentrop or Himmler in Klessheim or anywhere else, and I want to -emphasize this especially. This conference was held by my adjutant, Von -Brauchitsch, that is, my General Staff officer, and he was the one who -told the OKW, without consulting me once more, that it was my opinion -that it was right to have court proceedings in such cases. The decisive -thing, however, is that no such order as a Führer order, or as an order -of mine, was issued to any office of the Luftwaffe or to the transit -camp or interrogation camp in Oberursel, or to any part of the troops. - -A document which has been read here concerns a report from Luftgau XI, -which mentions the shooting of American fliers. I believe they were -Americans, and this is mentioned in this connection because it says -Luftgau XI. I looked through the document—there are two very detailed -appendices. It is stated very definitely and clearly here that Luftgau -XI reported that a crew which had bailed out and been rescued from the -lake by some troops which did not belong to the Air Force, were shot by -the police while on the way to the airfield—the exact name of the -police office is given—that they therefore did not reach the airfield, -but had been shot beforehand by the police. Luftgau XI duly reports -these events as required. In the attached report each of the men is -mentioned by name and also what happened to him. Some were taken to -hospitals, others, as said before, were shot. And all these reports and -each individual report sheet can be explained by the fact that the -Luftgau offices, as the competent offices at home, were instructed -automatically to make reports on a printed form as to whether it was a -crash or a forced landing of our own or of enemy aircraft; at what time; -whether the crew bailed out; whether the crew was killed, or half of it -killed; whether they were brought to the camp or to the hospital. And in -this case it is correctly reported, “Shot by the police while trying to -escape; buried at such and such a place.” - -Records of this type ran into hundreds; I mean records of our own and of -hostile craft, which had been shot down with their crews, in the heavy -air fighting. The records were channeled from the Luftgau to the -competent offices. The Air Force itself had nothing to do with this; it -is very clear from the German original document that this was merely a -report. - -In this connection there were heated discussions. All of the gentlemen -who had to take part in the Führer’s daily briefing sessions will recall -exactly that the Führer repeatedly told me in a very unfriendly manner -that he definitely wished to know the names and the punishment of those -officers who again and again had protected fliers from the population. I -did not have these people searched for or arrested, nor did I have them -punished. I always pointed out to the Führer that it had already -happened that even our own fliers who had bailed out had been most -severely mishandled by our own people, who at first were completely -confused, and I therefore repeatedly emphasized on behalf of the Air -Force that such things must be stopped. - -There was one last sharp controversy, again in the presence of many -gentlemen, at a briefing session in which, when again I referred to -these things, the Führer cut me short with the words, “I well know that -both air forces have come to a mutual agreement of cowardice.” Whereupon -I told him, “We have not come to an agreement of cowardice, but somehow -we airmen have always remained comrades, no matter how much we fight -each other.” All the gentlemen present will remember this. - -DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude as the highest judicial authority of -the Luftwaffe with regard to punishable acts committed by the soldiers -under you in occupied territory? - -GÖRING: As highest judicial authority I had all the bad cases referred -to me and spent many hours examining them. That is why I attach -particular importance to the highest legal counsel of the Air Force by -being heard here on this point. In many cases I rescinded sentences -because they were too mild, especially if it was a matter of rape. In -these cases I always confirmed the death sentence which had been handed -down by the court, unless an appeal for mercy was made by the injured -party in exceptional cases. I thus confirmed the death sentence of a -number of members of the Air Force who took part in the murder of -inhabitants of the occupied territories in the East as well as in the -West. - -I do not wish to take up the time of the Tribunal by citing a number of -detailed cases which would prove this. Beyond this I was the judicial -authority with regard to such inhabitants of occupied territories as -were brought before an Air Force court. For instance, when in France, -Holland, or Russia or another country, the native civilian population -had helped enemy fliers to escape, or had been guilty of acts of -sabotage on airplanes, or had engaged in espionage in connection with -the Air Force, that is to say, all punishable acts which had taken place -in connection with the Air Force. The war situation demanded, of course, -that in general we should enforce strict measures here. - -I should like to say in this connection that death sentences were, of -course, also duly pronounced by the courts on women. In all these cases -involving women, during the entire war years, I did not once confirm -with my signature a single death sentence on a woman, not even in the -case of fatal attacks, or participation in such on members of my -Luftwaffe; even in the most severe cases I did not fail to give a -reprieve. - -DR. STAHMER: In your military and economic measures in the occupied -territories did you take into consideration whether these measures were -in keeping with the Hague Convention on land warfare? - -GÖRING: I scanned through the regulations for land warfare of the Hague -Convention for the first time just before the outbreak of the Polish -conflict. As I read them at that time I regretted that I had not studied -them much more thoroughly at an earlier date. If so I would have told -the Führer that, in view of these Hague Convention regulations for land -warfare, set down paragraph for paragraph, a modern war could not be -waged under any circumstances. One would perforce come into conflict -with conditions laid down in 1906 or 1907, because of the technological -expansion of modern war. Either they would have to be cancelled, or else -modern new viewpoints corresponding to technical developments would have -to be introduced. My reasoning is as follows: - -The regulations on land warfare of the Hague Convention, as they now -existed, I had in my opinion studied quite correctly and logically as -regulations for land warfare in 1907. But from 1939 to 1945 there was no -longer merely land warfare but also air warfare, which had not been -taken into consideration here and which in part created an entirely new -situation, and changed the regulations on land warfare of the Hague -Convention in many respects. But that is not so much the decisive point; -rather, modern and total war develops, as I see it, along three lines: -the war of weapons on land, at sea, and in the air; economic war, which -has become an integral part of every modern war; and, third, propaganda -war, which is also an essential part of this warfare. - -If one recognizes these principles on the basis of logic, certain -deviations will then result which, according to the letter, may be a -violation of logic, but not according to the spirit. If the regulations -on land warfare of the Hague Convention provide that weapons of the -opponent are to be regarded as booty, as a matter of course, then I must -say that today in a modern war the weapons of the opponent under certain -circumstances have value only as scrap, but that economic goods however, -raw materials, high grade steel, aluminum, copper, lead, and tin, seem -and are much more essential as war booty than obsolete weapons which I -might take from an opponent. But beyond that it is not only a matter of -raw materials, no matter whose property they are. The regulations on -land warfare of the Hague Convention provided at one point—I do not -remember it now—that those things which are necessary can be -confiscated, but against compensation, of course. That is also not the -decisive factor, as one can readily believe. Decisive is, however, the -fact that in this modern war, and in an economic war, which forms the -basis for any further conduct of war, supplies, first of all food, must -be regarded as absolutely necessary for war and must be made available -for use in war, and beyond that raw materials for industry. Moreover -production plants and machinery are also part of economic warfare. If -they have until now served the opponent—be they industries directly or -indirectly contributing to armaments and the conduct of war—they must -now also serve whoever has come into the possession of these means of -production through military decision, even if only temporarily, during -an armistice in occupied territories. In this connection the labor -question naturally also plays a far greater role in economic war than it -did in those former wars which served as examples in the regulations on -land warfare of the Hague Convention. In 1907 the most recent wars, the -Russo-Japanese War, and perhaps the English Boer War, which were, -however, conducted under entirely different circumstances—wars which -practically lay only one decade behind at that time—could serve as an -example of warfare. A war at that time between one army and another, in -which the population was more or less not involved, cannot be compared -with today’s total war, in which everyone, even the child, is drawn into -the experience of war through the introduction of air warfare. - -According to my opinion, manpower and thereby the workers and their use -at the moment, are also an integral part of economic war. By that it is -not meant that a worker should be so exploited that he suffers physical -injury, but only that his labor should be fully used. - -One of the witnesses mentioned recently what it means to be in an -occupied territory where fighting is still going on, and where one -remains for years, while one, two, three, four, or five new military age -groups are growing up, and if they have no work in their home country -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, is there any chance that the defendant will -finish by tonight? - -DR. STAHMER: This is the last question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Please continue. - -GÖRING: The question of the deportation of workers had therefore also to -be regarded from this point of view of security. We were obliged to -feed, as far as possible, the entire occupied territory. We also had to -dispose of manpower and, at the same time had to consider the removal -especially of those who had no work in their own country and represented -a danger in the growth of the underground resistance arising against us. - -If these age groups were drafted into Germany for work, it was because -of basic considerations of security, in order that they should not be -left idle in their own country—and thus be made available for the work -and the struggle against us—but should be used to our advantage in -economic war. - -Thirdly—I want to mention these things just very briefly—in -conclusion, the war of propaganda. At one point in the Indictment it is -also mentioned that we requisitioned radios, which is, to be sure, a -matter of course. For the great importance in propaganda warfare enemy -propaganda had, which extended by way of radio far into the hinterland, -no one has felt more strongly than Germany. All the great dangers of -underground movements, partisan war, the resistance movements and -sabotage, and everything connected with it, and finally also in this -war, this embitterment and this atmosphere, have been called forth to -the extreme by this mutual fight over the radio. - -Also whatever happened in the way of atrocities and similar acts, which -should not be tolerated, are in the last analysis, if one thinks about -it calmly, to be attributed primarily to the war of propaganda. - -Therefore the regulations on land warfare of the Hague Convention are in -my opinion not an instrument which can be used as a basis for a modern -war, because they do not take into consideration the essential -principles of this war; the war in the air, the economic war, and the -war of propaganda. - -And at this point I should like to say the same words which one of our -greatest, most important, and toughest opponents, the British Prime -Minister, Winston Churchill, used: “In the struggle for life and death -there is in the end no legality.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn. - -[_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-THIRD DAY - Saturday, 16 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have purposely deferred one single -question and not yet dealt with it, that is, Göring’s efforts to -maintain peace in the months of July and August 1939, before the -outbreak of the war. I have deferred the question for the following -reasons: Originally, I had intended to call Göring to the witness stand -only after the interrogation of the witness Dahlerus. But because -Dahlerus had not yet arrived, and I wanted to avoid an interruption of -the proceedings, I called Göring first. - -I now ask for a decision as to whether I may call Göring back to the -witness stand after the examination of the witness Dahlerus, who in the -meantime has arrived—I consider it expedient in the interest of saving -time, because in my opinion quite a number of questions would thereby -become unnecessary−or, whether I may question him again on this point -after the cross-examination. If that is not possible, I shall deal with -this matter immediately. It seems to me advisable, however, to put this -question after the examination of Dahlerus. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I can help on this point. If the -Tribunal could consider this application without its establishing a -precedent for other cases, I should have no objection, because in the -case of Dahlerus we are to understand that some one will have to go into -the matter in detail as to the events that happened within the last -fortnight. It might well mean a saving of time if that detail were gone -into only once, and it would be rather difficult for Dr. Stahmer to -examine the witness Dahlerus without going into the details. While I -feel strongly with the Tribunal that a defendant should not be recalled -except in the most exceptional circumstances, I think in this case it -might conceivably bring about a shortening of time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that if the witness Dahlerus were called, it -might obviate the necessity of calling the Defendant Göring in reference -to those events? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It might obviate that necessity, and it would in -any case mean, I should think, that the Defendant Göring would have to -answer only very few questions; but if it were opened up now, it would -be difficult to avoid both witnesses covering the same ground. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is only concerned with the saving of time, -and as the Tribunal is informed by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Stahmer, -that it may save time, the Tribunal is prepared to adopt that course, -and to allow the witness Dahlerus to be called before these questions -are put to the Defendant Göring; but it must not be taken as a precedent -for the recalling of any other witnesses. - -DR. STAHMER: Thank you, Sirs. Then I have no further questions to ask -the defendant at this time. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in their presentation, have frequently -mentioned the Defendant Keitel in connection with orders, directives, -and so forth. They were always quoted as Keitel orders, Keitel decrees, -and upon this, the Prosecution have based, among other things, their -indictment of the Defendant Keitel. I am anxious to clear up through -questioning you what the position of Field Marshal Keitel was, what -powers and what responsibility he had as Chief of the OKW or in other -official functions. Are you familiar with the decree of 4 February 1938 -by which the High Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW, was created and -Field Marshal Keitel appointed Chief of the OKW? - -GÖRING: Of course, I am familiar with that decree because I assisted in -the making of the decree in that the Führer discussed with me the entire -reshuffling of 8 February, and the resulting consequences and -organizational changes of his entire staff. - -DR. NELTE: Can you remember the diagram which was submitted by the -Prosecution concerning the organization of the German Armed Forces? - -GÖRING: Yes, I remember that it was here on the board. - -DR. NELTE: I shall have it shown to you. - -Do you think the OKW is placed correctly on this diagram? - -GÖRING: No, it is not correct. It says on top, “Commander-in-Chief of -the Armed Forces,” then there is a line, and below it says “Chief of the -High Command of the Armed Forces.” From there, indicating a -subordination, lines lead directly to the Commanders-in-Chief of the -Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. That is wrong. - -The High Command of the Armed Forces, and also the Chief of the High -Command of the Armed Forces, should not be placed in that manner, but -set separately to one side, that is to say, the three -Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces were -immediately subordinate to the Führer, as the Supreme Commander of the -Armed Forces, and in no subordination whatsoever to the High Command of -the Armed Forces, or to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed -Forces. - -The Führer at that time, in February, reorganized his entire staff, for -he had in his capacity as head of State the State Chancellery. He made -Meissner, who was then State Secretary, State Minister, and established -the State Chancellery as his administrative office. Thus he, in -collaboration with the records department of the Foreign Office, was in -charge of matters that concerned only the head of State. In his capacity -as Reich Chancellor and chief of the Government, he ruled that his -administrative organism should be the Reich Chancellery, and the State -Secretary of the Reich Chancellery became on the same day Reich Minister -and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. It was the function of this office -to maintain liaison with the ministries and the entire machinery of the -government of the Reich. The function of this minister as an organ of -the Führer, was not the issuing, but the execution of the Führer’s -orders and decrees. - -Thirdly, the Führer, as leader of the Party, had the Party Chancellery -of which the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, was in charge at that -time and occupied a high position within that organization. After his -leaving, Bormann did not become Deputy of the Führer but Chief of the -Party Chancellery. - -Fourthly, there was the Private Chancellery of the Führer, with a -Reichsleiter as Chief. - -For military matters, as his military cabinet or military staff—or as -it used to be known in former years, the “Maison Militaire”—the High -Command of the Armed Forces was formed. - -This reorganization was necessary, because after the retirement of -Blomberg as Minister of War, no new Minister of War had been appointed, -and the Führer, since as head of State he was in any case -Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, was now determined not only -formally to be this Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but to -execute that function in fact. In consequence, he now needed a staff -organization. This was to be the High Command of the Armed Forces, and -Keitel became Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. - -In Germany the word “chief” in the military sense has a different -meaning from “commander-in-chief.” The responsibility and right to issue -orders rest with the commander or the commander-in-chief. The assistant -in staff administration, in the working out, administering, and -transmitting of orders, and in maintaining liaison, is the actual chief -of the respective staff. Thus, the former Colonel General Keitel, or -General Keitel, was Chief of Staff of the military staff of the -Commander-in-Chief, called the High Command of the Armed Forces. On the -one hand, he had charge of the entire machinery of the staff of the -Commander-in-Chief, as far as military organizational and technical -matters, and military direction, that is to say, strategy, were -concerned, to the extent that the Führer wanted to have his strategic -orders administered from a central point. For this there was established -in the High Command as a purely general staff, strategic department, the -Supreme General Staff. - -DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, OKW is translated as High -Command of the Armed Forces, but this apparently has been used in -different ways, at one time as the Staff of the High Command of the -Armed Forces—as, for example, when Keitel was called the Chief of the -OKW—and at another time, as the OKW Office of the High Command of the -Armed Forces, in other words, Hitler. Is that right? - -GÖRING: That is correct as such, but not very clear. The High Command of -the Armed Forces is the staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed -Forces, in the same way that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force -had my General Staff on one hand, and my chief adjutant’s office on the -other—these formed the staff with which I worked. The High Command -constituted for the Führer, as Supreme Commander a similar organization. -The chief of my General Staff likewise could give no direct orders to -the commanders of the air fleets, commanding generals of air corps or -divisions. The orders could only be issued “By command of the -Commander-in-Chief,” signed “I.A.,” that is to say, “Im Auftrag (by -order).” - -The chief of a staff, therefore, even the Chief of the High Command of -the Armed Forces, had no command function except to the members of his -immediate office and the few administrative organizations connected with -that staff. An order, command, or directive from the High Command of the -Armed Forces, for instance, to me as Commander-in-Chief of the Air -Force, was only possible when the instruction began in the following -form: “The Führer has ordered . . .” or, “By command of the Führer, I -hereby inform you . . .” - -May I express myself quite emphatically: At one time I told Colonel -General Keitel, “I am bound only by orders of the Führer. Only orders in -the original and signed by Adolf Hitler are presented to me personally. -Instructions, directives or orders which start ‘By command of the -Führer,’ or ‘By order of the Führer’ go to my chief of staff who gives -me an oral report indicating the most important points. Whether then—to -put it bluntly—they are signed, ‘By command of the Führer: Keitel, -Colonel General,’ or ‘Meier, Stabsgefreiter’, makes no difference to me. -But if they constitute a direct command from you, an order, which you -want to give me, then save yourself time and paper because both are -meaningless to me. I am Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and -immediately and exclusively subordinate to the Führer.” - -DR. NELTE: Do you know whether Hitler, on the one hand, and the -commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, on the other, -observed these command functions described by you, or whether in other -branches of the Armed Forces the actual procedure was, perhaps, -different? - -GÖRING: Whether my two colleagues made it as clear to the Chief of the -High Command as I did, I cannot say; but that the two other -commanders-in-chief did not permit any interference with their rights -and prerogatives is obvious. - -DR. NELTE: Does the same apply to Himmler as Chief of the SS? - -GÖRING: The SS was never subordinate to the High Command of the Armed -Forces. Within the Armed Forces there was, from the beginning of the -war, the Waffen-SS, divided into divisions and corps. That was purely a -combat unit. Tactically and strategically it was subordinate to those -units of the Army to which it was assigned; in the matter of personnel -and development, it was subordinate to Himmler; and he had nothing to do -with the OKW. Here it might happen that the Chief of the High Command of -the Armed Forces, in questions of armament and organization of the -Waffen-SS, transmitted orders or decrees of the Führer. - -On this occasion I should like to correct an error which was made during -Justice Jackson’s examination of Field Marshal Kesselring. Field Marshal -Kesselring spoke of the Waffen-SS, as “Garde Truppe.” Then he was asked, -“Whom did it have to guard?” In applying the word “Garde” we do not -employ it as it has been translated, as “guard,” meaning sentries, but, -as Field Marshal Kesselring intended, a “picked troop”; just as in the -Russian military language there is a “Garde Korps,” and in the old -Imperial Army there was a “Garde Korps,” and also formerly in other -armies. The Waffen-SS during the first years of the war was not to be -regarded as a guard unit, but as a “picked unit” as far as personnel, -_et cetera_, was concerned. - -DR. NELTE: I would like to ask you to say something about the official -relationship between Adolf Hitler and Field Marshal Keitel; that is to -say, what official relations had Adolf Hitler in mind when he -established the office of the OKW? I mean, I should like to know what -Keitel was supposed to be and what, subsequently, his official functions -actually were after 1938? - -GÖRING: I think that is just what I have been explaining. - -DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask you, for instance, was he Hitler’s adviser? - -GÖRING: Adviser is a debatable expression. I can let somebody advise me -as to whether or not he thinks it will rain during the coming 3 hours, -when I am riding; but I can also have someone advise me in very -important and decisive questions. That depends on the temperament and -the attitude of the person who wants to be advised, and the one who -wishes to advise. - -With the dynamic personality of the Führer, unsolicited advice was not -in order, and one had to be on very good terms with him. That is to say, -one had to have great influence, as I had—and I ask you to understand -me correctly—as I had beyond doubt for many years, in order to come to -him unsolicited, not only with advice, but also with suggestions or even -persistent contradictions. On the other hand, if one were not on these -terms with the Führer, suggestions and advice were curtly brushed aside -whenever he had once made his decisions, or if he would not allow the -would-be adviser to attain that influence or that influential position. -Here I wish to say that the Chief of the High Command of the Armed -Forces, in important and decisive questions certainly was no adviser. In -current, everyday affairs, he was an adviser insofar as he may have -suggested to the Führer here and there that this or that should be said -to the commanders, or that in regard to the movement of troops this or -that should be pointed out. After all, advice from the chief of a -general staff is still more important than advice from the chief of an -organization or a state office. It was this way: In the sphere of -important strategic and tactical decisions the chief responsibility lay -with the adviser on the General Staff, the commanders-in-chief, the -Chief of Staff, and the Führer; in matters of pure strategy and tactics, -more with the chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; organizational -questions or current developments of the day, with the Chief of the High -Command. Because the Führer himself, as I said before, held several of -the highest offices, he had to limit his signatures. It often took weeks -until one could obtain the necessary signature from the Führer, -especially during the war when he had a tremendous amount of work, so -that the secretaries of the respective state offices were authorized to -sign “by order.” This explains why there was hardly any decree or order -issued by the Führer, that went out signed “By order of” or “By command -of the Führer,” which was not signed by Keitel, who was very -industrious. - -DR. NELTE: Wasn’t it a very thankless task that Field Marshal Keitel -had, I mean, thankless insofar as he frequently was in the position of -having to mediate between the various offices which were subordinated to -the Supreme Commander, namely Hitler; to submit their grievances to him, -and to exert himself on behalf of the two parties, helping here and -restraining there? - -GÖRING: That again depended very much on the personalities. It goes -without saying that if it came to a clash between the Führer and myself, -or other determined commanders-in-chief, the Chief of the High Command -of the Armed Forces was, I may say, trodden on by both sides. He came -between the millstones of stronger personalities; the one protested that -in speaking to the Führer he had not exerted enough pressure; the -Führer, when Keitel made presentations, turned a deaf ear and said he -would settle matters himself. - -The task was certainly a very thankless one and a difficult one. I -remember that once Field Marshal Keitel approached me and asked me -whether I could not arrange for him to be given a front-line command; -that he would be satisfied, though a Field Marshal, with one division if -he could only get away, because he was getting more kicks than ha’pence. -Whether the task was thankless or appreciated was all the same, I -answered him; he had to do his duty where the Führer ordered it. - -DR. NELTE: Are you aware that in this connection Field Marshal Keitel -was reproached with not being able to assert himself, as they say, with -the Führer? - -GÖRING: This reproach was made against him by quite a number of -commanders-in-chief of armies and army groups. It was easy for them to -make that reproach because they were out of range of Adolf Hitler, and -did not have to submit any proposals themselves. I know that, especially -after the collapse, quite a number of generals adopted the point of view -that Keitel had been a typical “yes-man.” I can only say I personally -should be interested if I could see those who today consider themselves -“no-men.” - -DR. NELTE: Was there ever, as far as Hitler was concerned, any -possibility of Field Marshal Keitel getting a release from his office? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal does not think—at least we -should like to ask you—what relevance does the gossip of the General -Staff or any reproaches which may have been raised against him by it -have to the charges against Keitel? What has that to do with the charges -against Keitel? - -DR. NELTE: If one wants to do justice to the Defendant Keitel, that is -to say, if one wants to try to establish what role he has played in this -terrible tragedy, then that is only possible if one establishes clearly -what his function was, and thereby what his legal responsibility was; -and then, if one takes the tactical conditions into consideration . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I know that perfectly well and we have spent -three-quarters of an hour in hearing the Defendant Göring describe what -his relationship was and what Keitel’s function was. What I asked you -was what this had to do with the case, the criticisms or gossip of the -General Staff about Keitel? I say we have spent three-quarters of an -hour in hearing what the Defendant Göring says his function was, and -what his relationships with the Führer were, and nothing else. - -DR. NELTE: I began with the organization of the OKW. I wanted to -determine the chain of command between the OKW and the Chief of the OKW, -on the one hand, and the branches of the Armed Forces, on the other; and -then I have tried to clarify the responsibilities which, as Chief of the -OKW, he was to have, according to Hitler’s wishes, and how he carried -these out. - -The gossip, Mr. President, was only, I believe, a subject for a few -minutes during the examination of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: My interruption was made because you asked the defendant -a question about somebody being reproached for something or other by the -members of the General Staff, and that seems to me to be totally -irrelevant. - -DR. NELTE: The last question which I put was whether there had been any -possibility of Field Marshal Keitel’s obtaining a release from his -position. May I assume, Mr. President, that this question is relevant? - -THE PRESIDENT: You may certainly ask that question as to whether he -asked to be relieved of his command. As a matter of fact, Dr. Nelte, -that question was asked before, the question at which I interrupted you; -and I have the answer written down, that Keitel asked for a command, -even if only of a division. - -DR. NELTE: That was the question which he put to Reich Marshal Göring. -He came to him, Göring, and put the question to him. Now I want to ask -whether there existed any possibility of Keitel’s obtaining a release -from his position from Hitler? - -GÖRING: The question whether a general could ask for and obtain his -release from the Führer has played an important role in these -proceedings generally. Actually, one has to make a distinction between -two phases, peace and war. - -In times of peace a general could ask for his release. Unless he was in -a prominent and definitely important position, and very well known to -the Führer, such a request for release was granted without question. If -he was in an especially important position and well known to the Führer, -then, using all his persuasive powers, with all the means at his -disposal the Führer appealed to him to remain at his post. If, however, -a general had asked the Führer for his release and had given as a reason -that in principle he was of a different political opinion, either -domestic or foreign, then without doubt he was retired, even if not on -that very day. But at the same time it would have given rise to an -extraordinary suspicion on the part of the Führer concerning the person. - -During the war, the matter was entirely different. The general, like -every soldier, was obliged to do his duty, to obey orders. The Führer -had issued the statement that he wanted no requests for release, neither -from generals nor any other important state personalities. He himself -would decide if a person were to resign or not. He himself could not -resign if things became unpleasant now, he considered that desertion. - -If, in spite of this, a general submitted a request for release in -wartime and this was refused, he certainly could not insist upon it. If -he resigned notwithstanding, he violated the law and from that moment -was guilty of desertion. - -Field Marshal Keitel might have asked the Führer, “Have me transferred -to a different office.” But the Führer disliked exceedingly to make any -changes in his immediate circle; and during the war—that I know from -his own words—he would not have agreed to a change, particularly with -regard to Field Marshal Keitel with whom he was used to working, unless -the Field Marshal had become ill and thereby really unable to continue -his duties. - -DR. NELTE: Were these considerations of which you have just spoken -likewise the determining factor in the retirement of Field Marshal Von -Brauchitsch? - -GÖRING: The case of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s retirement is very -well known to me, because the Führer had discussed it at length with me -beforehand; for at first he was not decided whether he or someone else -should take over the command of the Army. Thus we discussed who should -succeed, and so forth. At that moment the Führer was not satisfied with -the direction of the Army by the commander-in-chief of the Eastern -Front. The commander-in-chief was Brauchitsch; the chief of the Army -General Staff was Halder. I suggested to the Führer that he change the -chief of the Army General Staff, because I thought he was by far the -less capable. The Führer wanted to do that. Then the next morning he had -made up his mind and told me that he, the Führer, would himself assume -this command to bring about order on the Eastern Front, and that -therefore it was more important for him to retire the -Commander-in-Chief, although he agreed with me that the Chief of Staff -was the weaker one. Then I suggested that both be dismissed. - -The Führer called Brauchitsch, talked with him for 2 hours and requested -him in a clear way, that is in a way that could not be misunderstood, to -resign. - -Thus, in this case, a clear decision was made by the Führer to dismiss -the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in order to assume personally the -command of the Army. From that time on, the Führer was not only Supreme -Commander of the Armed Forces but also _de facto_ Commander-in-Chief of -the Army. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated and has produced evidence that -Field Marshal Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Council. You -spoke of this question yesterday. And I can now state that you said that -Field Marshal Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Council according -to the Reich Defense Law, but that this Reich Defense Council was never -constituted. You ought to know that because you were, according to that -law, chairman of that Reich Defense Council. Is that correct? - -GÖRING: I have stated clearly that I never attended a meeting, or called -a meeting. - -THE PRESIDENT: You know, do you not, that the Tribunal is directed to -hold an expeditious trial and for that reason they are not going to hear -cumulative evidence? The defendant has already given us an answer to the -question you have just put to him. The Tribunal do not wish to hear the -same answer again. - -DR. NELTE: I have not seen yesterday’s transcript yet, and it is of -great importance for the Defendant Keitel . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You were in court and you can take it from me that the -answer was given. - -DR. NELTE: The questions and the answers are not always as clear as they -may seem on reading the transcript. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Can you tell me whether Field Marshal Keitel -ever was a minister? - -GÖRING: He was not a minister. He had only the assimilated rank of a -minister. - -DR. NELTE: Was he entitled to participate in Cabinet meetings? - -GÖRING: Not by virtue of his positions; but, concerning questions of -interest to him which pertained to his work, he could be invited by the -Führer to attend Cabinet meetings. - -DR. NELTE: Keitel was a member of the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich. Did that make him a minister? - -GÖRING: No, he remained the same. He had only the rank of a minister. -Field Marshal Keitel could not attend Cabinet meetings of the Reich -Cabinet because he became Chief of the High Command only in 1938, and -from that time on no Cabinet meetings took place. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have also asserted that there was a -triumvirate, consisting of the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, the -Plenipotentiary General for Administration, and the Chief of the OKW. -Can you tell us something about that? - -GÖRING: I know nothing about that. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused Field Marshal Keitel of having -been a political general. Do you know anything about that? - -GÖRING: The generals in the Third Reich had no right whatsoever to -participate in any political activity. The only exception in this -respect was myself—and that was due to the peculiar nature of my -position, for I was at the same time a soldier, a general, and on the -other hand, in politics, a politician. The other generals, as the Führer -always very clearly pointed out, had nothing to do with politics. - -The general who always most interested himself in politics was the late -Field Marshal Von Reichenau. That was the reason the Führer, in spite of -his personal sympathies and the strongly positive attitude of Reichenau -toward the Nazi Party, refused to make him Commander-in-Chief of the -Army after the resignation of Fritsch; the Führer did not want any -political generals. - -DR. NELTE: But it cannot be denied that in the so-called decrees often -the political objective was made known, and that such decrees and orders -were signed by Keitel. - -GÖRING: Decrees were principally Führer decrees, because they contained -broad directives. The preamble of an important decree very commonly was -the political premise which explained why the Führer had decided on this -or that military measure. But that has nothing to do with a general -being political. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently mentioned that the Defendant -Keitel was present at state receptions, such as that accorded Hacha, and -at other ministerial receptions; from that they have tried to deduce -that he was a political general. - -GÖRING: When the Führer, as head of State, received foreign missions, -heads of states, or chiefs of governments, it was customary for the -chiefs of his most important offices to be present; the Chief of the -State Chancellery, frequently of the Reich Chancellery, depending on who -came; and the Chief of the High Command, since, in the conferences, -questions might come up for which the Führer would need military -information of some kind. And then, of course, there was also a certain -amount of ceremony involved. Whenever I had important visitors, my -military staff, or a representative of the staff, were also with me. - -DR. NELTE: May I say then that Field Marshal Keitel was present at, but -did not participate in, the conferences? - -GÖRING: If he participated, it was not at any rate of any consequence. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution stated that, on the occasion of the visit of -President Hacha, the Defendant Keitel exerted pressure on President -Hacha by threatening to bomb Prague. - -GÖRING: I said yesterday that I made that statement. - -DR. NELTE: I just wanted to establish it. - -Now I should like further to question you concerning the terror-fliers. -Do you remember that about the middle of June 1944, when negotiations on -this question took place among the various departments, you were waiting -at the Platterhof with Field Marshal Keitel for Hitler, and discussed -this question there? - -GÖRING: I cannot say whether that was at the Platterhof. At any rate, I -talked with the Field Marshal many times on the subject. - -DR. NELTE: It is important in this connection to establish whether the -Defendant Keitel approached you on this question and stated to you that -he was against the idea of lynch law, which was advocated by the Party. - -GÖRING: He said that several times. We were in agreement on this. - -DR. NELTE: Did the Defendant Keitel at that time also state to you that -he was in favor of an official warning or a note to the Allied -Governments—in respect to the well-known Dieppe case—rather than -separate court-martial proceedings without legal evidence? - -GÖRING: I think we had frequent discussions on this point. I advocated -that in the case of pure terror-fliers—that is to say, those who -violated the orders of their own superiors—there should be legal -proceedings. Keitel said it would be hard to differentiate, and to carry -this out. It would be more practical to send a note to the Allies to the -effect that if it were not stopped, measures would have to be taken. The -view that this course should be adopted was also advocated in other -quarters. - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, when submitting my applications for evidence, -I proposed, among other things, a characterization of Field Marshal -Keitel given to me by Göring. In the session of 25 February an agreement -was reached with the Prosecution that this characterization, which is in -the form of an affidavit, might be submitted in the presence of the -witness, that is, Göring. Am I now permitted to read you this -characterization, of which you have already received the original, or -may I refer to it as evidence and merely put it in? I ask this question -because a part of the description which is contained in the affidavit -has already been given by this witness in this interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the document that you are referring to? What is -the origin of it? Is it a document drawn up by the Defendant Göring? - -DR. NELTE: It is an affidavit signed by Göring, entitled, -“Characteristics of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.” It is referred to in -my applications as an affidavit. Much of what is contained in it has -already been said by Reich Marshal Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Göring is giving evidence under oath. -Therefore, nothing in the shape of an affidavit ought to be put in. If -you have any questions to ask him which he has not already answered, -about the Defendant Keitel, you may ask them now. It is inappropriate to -put in a written, sworn statement when you have a defendant giving -evidence under oath. - -DR. NELTE: In the session of 25 February 1946 this was approved, for the -reason that it would shorten the proceedings if an affidavit were to be -read and the witness were then to state: “That is correct.” I have a -copy here of the transcript of that session, should the Tribunal not -recall. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should not care to -object to this upon the ground that it is written, because I think there -are occasions when the writing out of the testimony of a witness might -be more expeditious than their examination. - -I object to it on the ground that it does not get us anywhere when you -include it. It starts off: “Keitel gives the impression of a military -man, an officer of the old school.” That is not testimony that gets us -anywhere. I admit that statement; he always impressed me that way. His -philosophy is dominated in the main by militaristic ideas and concepts. - -Let Keitel give us a description of himself, if we must have one. I -think an examination of this affidavit will show that it consists of -matter that has been covered, or of matter on which another witness -never ought to be interrogated. I object to it upon the ground that it -has no probative value. - -THE PRESIDENT: As you are aware, Dr. Nelte, any decision which the -Tribunal made about documents was expressly made provisionally and with -the condition that the decision about the relevancy of the document -should be made when the document was produced. If the document had been -produced before the Tribunal, they would have been able to look at it. -They have not seen the document. - -The document appears, as Mr. Justice Jackson says, to be not a document -which has any evidential value at all, and as the defendant is at -present giving evidence under oath, the Tribunal will not look at the -document. - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, as the Tribunal have examined this document -and found that it is irrelevant, I accept that decision. But it seems to -me that the Tribunal . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not preventing you from asking any questions of -the witness which may be relevant, but we do not desire to read another -document from the same person who is giving testimony. - -DR. NELTE: I shall omit this affidavit. - -DR. THOMA: Rosenberg was chief of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the -NSDAP until 1940. Did he in this capacity, or otherwise personally, have -an influence on Hitler’s decisions concerning foreign policy? - -GÖRING: I believe that the Party’s Central Department for Foreign Policy -after the seizure of power was never once consulted by the Führer on -questions of foreign policy. It was established earlier only so that -certain questions on foreign policy which arose within the Party could -be dealt with centrally. I am not informed in detail about the methods -of that office. As far as I know Rosenberg was certainly not consulted -on questions of foreign policy after the accession to power. - -DR. THOMA: Therefore, you do not know any details as to whether -Rosenberg had a certain influence on Hitler in the Norwegian question? - -GÖRING: That I do not know. I stated yesterday what I know concerning -the question of Quisling and also of Rosenberg. - -DR. THOMA: When you were Prime Minister did Rosenberg become conspicuous -to you as advocating the political or police persecution of the Church? - -GÖRING: He could not advocate the persecution of the Church by the -police, because he had nothing to do with the police, and I would not -have permitted any interference by him. - -DR. THOMA: Do you know whether Rosenberg urged you to evacuate the Jews -to Lublin, among other places? - -GÖRING: Rosenberg did not speak to me about that. - -DR. THOMA: Did Hitler express to you his satisfaction that Rosenberg had -not raised any objection to the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet -Union, concluded at that time? - -GÖRING: One cannot exactly say that Hitler expressed his satisfaction. -If Rosenberg had raised any objection, Hitler would probably have -expressed his dissatisfaction in a very unmistakable manner; but he did -state that Rosenberg, too, had apparently understood this political -step. - -DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg, as Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories, have any influence on the allocation of labor? Was he in a -specific position to prevent the employment of the eastern peoples? - -GÖRING: A certain co-operation with regard to the employment program -must have existed between the offices of Rosenberg and Sauckel, but -certainly not in the sense that Rosenberg could have prohibited the -recruiting of eastern workers in contradiction to the Führer’s order. - -DR. THOMA: It is known to you that Rosenberg repeatedly made -representations to the Führer on behalf of a cultural betterment of the -eastern European peoples, especially the Ukrainians? - -GÖRING: I was present once when Rosenberg spoke about the varying -treatment of the Occupied Eastern Territories, of the peoples living -there, and their cultural care. As far as I can recall—or better -said—I especially recall that the conversation dealt with the -establishment or the continuation of a university in Kiev. The Führer -agreed with him in his presence, I believe, but when he had gone, the -Führer said to me: “That man, too, has his particular worries. We have -more important things to take care of now than universities in Kiev.” -That I do remember. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter; one moment. I want to speak to Dr. Nelte -first. - -Dr. Nelte, in view of your application with reference to this document -which is called “Characteristics of General Field Marshal Wilhelm -Keitel,” the Tribunal have investigated that matter and have referred to -Page 4987 of the shorthand notes (Volume VIII, Page 233), which possibly -you may have had in mind; but you seem to have failed to notice that -this very document, “Characteristics of Keitel,” was denied in the order -of the Tribunal in Paragraph 2, which contains the decision of the -Tribunal after the argument in court, and which is set out on that page -of the shorthand notes to which I have referred. Therefore, in the -opinion of the Tribunal you have no right to offer that document which -the Tribunal have already denied. - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have not the entire notes of the session -before me. But I know that this affidavit was refused with the -explanation that, in case the witness can be called, an affidavit is not -to be submitted, and that is the case here. - -Thereupon, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in quoting this particular document -number of my document book, stated the following: “The Tribunal may -perhaps remember that in the case of the witness Dr. Blaha, my friend, -Mr. Dodd, adopted the practice of asking the witness. . . .” And this -affidavit belongs to this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I am quite aware of that and I have already -referred you to the exact page of the transcript which I have consulted. -But defendants’ counsel must be perfectly well aware that the Tribunal -have given no decision in open court upon these applications for -witnesses and documents, and the Tribunal made it perfectly clear that -they would afterwards consider the applications that had been made. In -each case a written order, which was perfectly clear, has been issued to -the defendants’ counsel, setting out the witnesses who are allowed, the -witnesses who are denied, interrogatories that are allowed, and the -interrogatories that are denied, the documents that were allowed and the -documents which had been denied. In Paragraph 2 of the order is “The -Characteristics of Keitel.” Therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal -that document should never have been offered. That is all. - -DR. NELTE: I tried to explain why I assumed that, in spite of the -refusal of the affidavit, the material of the affidavit could be used in -the interrogation of the witness. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Funk and Schirach): I request -permission to put the following questions, on behalf of the Defendant -Funk. - -[_Turning to the witness._] The Defendant Funk joined the Party in the -summer of 1931. At that time, as you know, he was the editor-in-chief of -the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_. Is it known to you that in this capacity -he enjoyed a particular prestige with the press and in German economic -circles? - -GÖRING: I know that at that time Funk and his economic articles in the -_Börsenzeitung_ were highly thought of and that he had many connections -in economic circles. - -DR. SAUTER: We have heard that the Defendant Funk is accused of having -promoted the coming to power of the Party through his activities, and I -would be interested in hearing from you whether Funk, before the coming -to power of the Party, played any role whatsoever in the Party; or is it -correct to say that after resigning as editor-in-chief of the _Berliner -Börsenzeitung_ he brought out a so-called economic-political information -service, not for the Party, but for all economic circles, including the -German People’s Party? - -GÖRING: May I request that the question be put perhaps more precisely; -this is a whole narration. But I can reply briefly. Before the seizure -of power I was acquainted only with Funk’s activity as editor of the -_Börsenzeitung_, which I have already mentioned. And as such I heard him -repeatedly mentioned in economic circles. Only after the seizure did I -hear at all of Funk’s having been in the Party and of his relationship -with it. Thus, his Party activity could not have been of such tremendous -significance or he would have come to my attention in some way. So far -as his information service is concerned, whether he favored the -Democrats or the People’s Party, I know nothing about that. - -DR. SAUTER: Then after the seizure of power, Funk became Press Chief of -the Reich Government. That is known to you? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then subsequently he became State Secretary in the Reich -Propaganda Ministry. That is also known to you? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now I would be interested to know what his work was as Press -Chief of the Reich Government. Had Funk in this work any influence on -the decisions of the Reich Cabinet? - -GÖRING: I am well acquainted with the circumstances of Funk’s -appointment as Reich Press Chief. After the Reich Cabinet had been sworn -in, the new Reich Press Chief was to be appointed. We were in a room of -the Kaiserhof Hotel, and the Führer did not want anyone from the press -organization who was a full Party member, but someone who had had some -previous press experience yet had not been so prominent in the Party or -bound to it. I do not know exactly who mentioned the name of Funk. But I -do know that he then said, “Good!” - -Funk was summoned, and I believe that it was a great surprise for him. I -had that impression. The Reich Press Chief had at the time, when -Hindenburg was still Reich President . . . - -[_There was a pause in the proceedings._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may go on now. - -DR. SAUTER: I would like to repeat the question because it was not -coming through. My question was to this effect: At the time that the -Defendant Funk was Press Chief in the Reich Government, that is, after -the seizure of power, had he any influence at all on the decisions of -the Reich Cabinet? - -GÖRING: The Reich Press Chief had no influence of any sort on the -decisions of the Reich Cabinet, for his task was of a different nature. - -DR. SAUTER: Then Funk became State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry. -Here I am interested to know from you whether he, while exercising this -office, was prominent in any way so far as propaganda or press policies -were concerned and what his tasks were at that time in the ministry, -according to your knowledge of the conditions? - -GÖRING: He became State Secretary because the Propaganda Ministry took -over as its main function the press and the handling of press matters. -Purely propaganda activities were carried on from the beginning by -Goebbels himself, who was at the same time Propaganda Chief of the -Party. Funk was appointed chiefly to organize the ministry as such, and -in particular to handle economic matters of the press, that is, the -acquisition of press organs, by purchase, subsidy, _et cetera_. His -specialized knowledge was mainly utilized in this field. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, when Dr. Schacht retired from his offices in November -1937, Funk became his successor as Reich Minister for Economics. The -appointment took place in November 1937, but he took over the Ministry -only in February 1938. Can you tell us why that was so, and who directed -the Ministry of Economics in the interim? - -GÖRING: In discussing the Four Year Plan I explained that after the -resignation of Schacht, I personally directed the Ministry from November -1937 to February 1938, as far as I remember, although Funk had already -been designated. I did this in order to integrate again into the -Ministry of Economics the economic agencies outside the Ministry which -were involved in the Four Year Plan. By freeing myself of this burden I -was able to administer my directives with the Ministry as such. - -DR. SAUTER: A similar situation seems to have existed for the -Plenipotentiary General for Economics, Dr. Schacht, if I may again point -this out, retired from this office at the same time as from the Ministry -of Economics, in November 1937. Funk was appointed his successor, as -Plenipotentiary for Economics, however, only in 1938. What is the reason -for that? - -GÖRING: He was appointed Plenipotentiary General only in 1938 due to the -fact that it was only in 1938 that he actually took over the Ministry of -Economics. According to an old regulation, the Plenipotentiary General -for Economics was identical with the Reich Minister of Economics. But at -this time, during the last part of Schacht’s term of office, that was -just a matter of form, as I have already said; for I explained that from -the minute when I actually took over the Four Year Plan, I personally -was _de facto_ the Plenipotentiary General for Economics. - -I suggested that this office be abolished, but, as is often the case, -some things remain purely for reasons of prestige, things which no -longer have any real significance. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan -was the sole Plenipotentiary General for the entire German economy. -Since there could not be two such men, the other existed only on paper. - -DR. SAUTER: The consequence was, if I may draw this conclusion—and I -ask you to reply to this—that Dr. Funk in his capacity of -Plenipotentiary General for Economics as well as President of the Reich -Bank was entirely subordinate to your directives as head of the Four -Year Plan. Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Naturally, according to the plenary powers that were given me, -he had to comply with my economic directives as far as the Ministry of -Economics and the Reich Bank were concerned. That was a reason for the -change, because I could not follow this procedure with Schacht, but from -the beginning, Funk adopted an irreproachable attitude toward me in this -respect. The directions or the economic policy which the Reich Minister -of Economics and Reich Bank President Funk carried out are fully and -entirely my exclusive responsibility. - -DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you remember a birthday letter which the Defendant -Funk wrote to Hitler about a week before the Polish campaign, I believe -on 25 August, in which he thanked the Führer for something or other. In -this letter Funk stated that he had prepared and executed certain -measures which, in the case of a war, would be necessary in the field of -civilian economy and finance. You will remember this letter, and it has -been read already. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you remember when you gave Funk these special duties? The -letter is dated, I believe 25 August 1939, if I may mention this again. -And when did you give this task and these directions to the Defendant -Funk? - -GÖRING: Just as military mobilization, or rather mobilization -preparations have to be kept up to date and have to keep pace with the -political situation—whether it be tense or relaxed, or when it -changes—economic matters also, as I mentioned in my concluding remarks -yesterday, have to keep pace in the same way. - -Thus, I ordered thorough preparations for mobilization in this field -also. In the matters of foreign exchange and finance it was the duty of -the president of the Reich Bank, as of the Reich Economics Ministry, in -economic matters to make all preparations which would put me in the -position, in the event of war, of having the utmost security for the -German people in the economic field as well. At what time exactly I -ordered this I cannot tell you, for it was a general basic directive -which was always in effect. - -DR. SAUTER: What powers did Funk have in the issuing of regulations, _et -cetera_, for the economic administration in the occupied territories? - -GÖRING: I can no longer remember in detail now. The general directive he -received from me. How far and to whom he, proceeding from this -directive, issued departmental instructions in his special field in the -occupied territory, I cannot say in detail; but they always resulted -from my personal responsibility. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that the Four Year Plan in the occupied -territories had special plenipotentiaries and departments, to the -exclusion of Funk, for carrying out your directives? - -GÖRING: In some areas of the occupied territory this was the case. In -other areas I made use of the departments existing there; and if I -considered it necessary I gave directives to the Economics Ministry also -to have this or that done with regard to the occupied territories. - -DR. SAUTER: Then during the war the Ministry of Armaments was created, I -believe in the spring of 1940. Is it correct that in the course of the -war to an ever increasing degree, the authority of the Reich Ministry of -Economics and, in the end, the entire civilian production also were -transferred to that ministry, so that finally the Ministry of Economics -remained as a commerce ministry only? - -GÖRING: At my suggestion, my urgent suggestion, the Führer created a -Ministry of Munitions under the then Minister Todt. This strictly -munitions ministry became, in the course of further developments, the -Armaments Ministry under Minister Speer, and gradually more and more -tasks were transferred to it. As armament was the focus of the whole -economy and everything else in economy had to be brought exclusively -into this focus, a number of tasks of the Ministry of Economics were -transferred to the Ministry of Armaments, in particular the whole of -production. It is correct that in the end the Ministry of Economics, by -and large, was left a hollow shell retaining only very subordinate -departments. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, I have a final question regarding the Defendant Funk. -It is a question in connection with the matter of the Central Planning -Board, that is, concerning the matter of foreign workers. I would be -interested to learn whether you know, Witness, that Funk was called to -attend the meetings of this Central Planning Board for the first time at -the end of November 1943, and never before that time? Is that known to -you? - -GÖRING: I know of the Central Planning Board. I never interfered in -their internal matters. I cannot state exactly when Funk was called to -this board. With the recruiting of foreign workers, however, he had -nothing to do. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if you will permit me, I have a few brief -questions on behalf of the Defendant Schirach. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know whether the so-called “Flying -HJ,” a subdivision of the Hitler Youth, ever received flying training? - -GÖRING: The Flying HJ pursued the sport of gliding exclusively. After -this training was completed, these men were taken into the National -Socialist Flier Corps, the former Reich Air Sports League, and there -continued their training in aircraft flying. - -DR. SAUTER: Then another question: Did any conferences take place -between you and the Defendant Schirach, especially while he was Reich -Youth Leader, which were concerned with the question of military -training, or pre-military training of youth in flying? Did such -conferences take place or not? - -GÖRING: Whether we discussed these matters occasionally I do not know. -There was no need for official conferences, because the situation was -entirely clear. The Flying Hitler Youth were interested in gliding, and -after they had received preliminary training they were taken into the -flying corps. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you recall the chart we were shown on the wall -representing the organization of the Reich Cabinet? In the lower part, -below the remark “other participants in Cabinet meetings,” this chart -showed the name of the Defendant Schirach along with Bohle, Popitz, -Dietrich, and Gerecke. For that reason I would like now to put the -following question to you: Was Schirach ever a member of the Reich -Cabinet, or what functions or rights did he have in this connection? - -GÖRING: The Reich Cabinet as such consisted solely of the Reich -Ministers. We differentiated between two kinds of sessions, Cabinet -sessions and Ministerial Council sessions. - -The Cabinet sessions were normally attended by the ministers and their -state secretaries. In some cases when special subjects were to be -discussed, ministerial directors, or higher officials of the ministries -concerned, could be called in for a short report. Then there were the -so-called highest Reich posts. The Reich Youth Leadership was also one -of these. If, therefore, legislation affecting the Reich Youth -Leadership was to be discussed by the Cabinet, and Schirach learned -about it, he could, by virtue of his position as Reich Youth Leader, -request to be called to this meeting. On the same basis the Chief of the -Reich Chancellery could order him to attend such a meeting. These -representatives never attended the other regular Cabinet sessions. I -believe I attended almost all sessions and, as far as I know, Schirach -was never present. - -In contrast to that were the Ministerial Council sessions to which only -Reich ministers were admitted and no one else. - -DR. SAUTER: I come now to the period after the fall of Mussolini, when -Badoglio took over the government in Italy. Do you recall, Witness, that -at that time the Defendant Von Schirach sent a wire with certain -suggestions to you? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What did he suggest and what did he want to accomplish? - -GÖRING: He suggested that I should tell the Führer to make a change in -the Foreign Office immediately and to replace Ribbentrop with Von Papen. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, a last question on behalf of the Defendant Schirach. -Do you recall another letter which the Defendant Schirach wrote, as far -as I know, in the spring of 1943? This was a letter occasioned by one -from Bormann and, so that you will know just which letter I mean, I -shall briefly explain the connection. Bormann at that time dispatched -letters, as a formality, to all Gauleiter, according to which the -Gauleiter were to report whether they had any ties with foreign -countries. Schirach was well aware at the time that this letter was -meant solely for him, for the other Gauleiter had no relatives in -foreign countries. Schirach wrote a letter which, as far as I know, you -read. And thereupon you are supposed to have intervened on behalf of -Schirach. Please tell us what kind of letter it was, what was the danger -threatening Schirach, and what you and others did to avert this danger? - -GÖRING: I must correct that, and I am fully acquainted with this -incident. This letter of Bormann’s was not directed to the Gauleiter to -establish whether they personally had connections abroad. Bormann sent, -by order of the Führer, a letter to all Gauleiter, and it was not a _pro -forma_ letter intended solely for Gauleiter Schirach, but was intended -for all. They were to check the political leaders within their -jurisdiction to establish whether any of their co-workers or any -political leader subordinate to them had family ties or connections -abroad, especially in enemy countries, whereby the individual affected -might, in some circumstances, have a conflict of conscience or might be -of questionable reliability. That was a general directive of the Führer, -which also applied to the Officer Corps and not solely to the case of -Schirach. I was at headquarters when Schirach’s letter arrived and -Bormann gave it to the Führer. Schirach replied that, before he could -take any steps in this matter with regard to his collaborators or -subordinates, he needed some clarification by the Führer as far as his -own person was concerned. He went on to describe in brief, in his -letter, his family ties in the United States of America, on his mother’s -side, and also mentioned in this letter that his connection with his -relatives abroad was a very cordial one and asked whether, under these -circumstances, it was still possible for the Führer to retain him in his -position as Gauleiter. At that time the Führer had not been kindly -disposed to Von Schirach for several months and had repeatedly -considered withdrawing him from office. He said on this occasion—and -that is how I came into possession of this letter, for he handed it to -me: “Schirach seems to plan for his future protection. I have a certain -suspicion.” Then, in the presence of Bormann, I told the Führer very -clearly and definitely that this was entirely unfounded; that I could -not understand his attitude toward Schirach, and that Schirach had done -the only possible and decent thing when, before dismissing any of his -collaborators or subordinates for such reasons, he demanded the -clarification of his own position, since his connections were known; and -that, in my opinion, this letter had no other purpose. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, however, in connection with this letter, a rather -strange suggestion seems to have been made by someone for further action -against Schirach? - -GÖRING: I know that Bormann and Himmler were opposed to Schirach. -Whether they wanted to give this letter an entirely different -interpretation in order to induce the Führer to recall Schirach and -eliminate him, and how far Himmler’s suggestion went, whether protective -custody was considered, I do not know. But I heard about these things -from other sources later on. - -DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, I have no further questions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Reich -Marshal, when did you become acquainted with Admiral Dönitz? - -GÖRING: I met Admiral Dönitz for the first time in his capacity as -Admiral and Commander of U-boats during the war, as far as I remember in -1940, at a conference in my special train, in France, I believe. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the conference concerned with military -or political questions? - -GÖRING: Purely military questions, namely, as to how far now and in the -future the Air Force could provide reconnaissance for U-boats in the -Atlantic. The then Admiral Dönitz complained that the reconnaissance was -too weak and urgently requested me to strengthen it and, as far as I -remember, to have it extended to as far as 30 degrees. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have further conferences with -Admiral Dönitz before his promotion to Commander-in-Chief in 1943? - -GÖRING: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you as Commander-in-Chief of the Air -Force use so-called emergency seaplanes for the rescue of fliers shot -down in the Channel? - -GÖRING: There were several squadrons of emergency seaplanes assigned to -the Channel for the rescue of fliers shot down, both German and enemy -fliers, as the order clearly proves. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did these planes look like? - -GÖRING: These planes were, as far as I remember, marked with the Red -Cross. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were they armed? - -GÖRING: Not at first. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And how were these emergency planes treated -by the British? - -GÖRING: There were some instances where they were not molested, but -there were a number of cases in which they were shot down while they -were engaged in rescue actions. Since these cases became predominant, I -said it would be more expedient not to use the Red Cross markings any -longer, to have these planes armed and thus try to rescue our comrades -from the sea. We had tremendous losses in these emergency sea squadrons. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have lifebuoys anchored in the -Channel for shot-down fliers? - -GÖRING: Quite a number of lifebuoys were anchored, to which ropes were -attached and to which fliers who had been shot down could cling. The -lifebuoys were also equipped with foodstuff, drinking water, life-saving -jackets, lifebelts, and the like. Besides these small lifebuoys there -were larger ones in the form of small rafts which the fliers could -board. There also food, drink, first-aid kits, blankets, and the like, -were to be found. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How were these lifebuoys treated by the -British? - -GÖRING: In different ways. Some remained, others were destroyed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions. - -DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that particularly in 1942 a severe -conflict arose between the Führer and Colonel General Jodl? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that at that time Jodl was even to be -relieved? - -GÖRING: The conflict arose from the Caucasus crisis. The Führer blamed -General Jodl for the fact that no concentrated forces had been used to -press forward in the direction of Tuapse; but that battalions of -mountain troops had been marched from the valleys over the mountain -chain of the Elbrus, which the Führer thought was senseless. At that -time, as far as I remember, Jodl pointed out to him that this matter had -been discussed with, and approved by him. The Führer severely criticized -the commander who was in charge of this sector. Jodl defended him on -those grounds, and this led to extremely strained relations. The Führer -mentioned to me that he wanted to relieve Jodl. The tension was so -strong that from this moment on, as far as I remember, the Führer -withdrew from the Officers Club jointly used by both his Operations -Staff and High Command, and even took his meals alone. For quite some -time, for several months, he refused to shake hands with this gentleman. -This illustration is just to show you how great the tension was at that -time. - -As successor to Jodl, Paulus was already selected; the Führer had -special confidence in him. Just why this change did not materialize, I -do not know exactly. I assume that here again, despite all tension, the -decisive factor for the Führer was that it was extremely hard for him to -get used to new faces, and that he did not like to make any changes in -his entourage. He preferred to continue working with men of his -entourage whom he did not like rather than change them. - -In the course of the years, however, his confidence in Jodl’s tactical -ability increased again considerably; he had complete confidence in his -tactical capacity. The personal relations of both gentlemen were never -very close. - -DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that, particularly in 1945, withdrawal -from the Geneva Convention was being considered? Do you know what -attitude Jodl took at that time? - -GÖRING: It may have been February 1945, when Minister Goebbels made this -proposal to the Führer. This proposal met with the utmost opposition by -all of us. In spite of that the Führer reverted to it again and again, -and for days was inclined to withdraw from this Convention. The reason -given was, oddly enough, that there were too many deserters in the west -and that the troops were inclined to surrender too easily. The Führer -was of the opinion that if the troops knew that in captivity they were -no longer protected by the Geneva Convention, they would fight harder -and would not react to the extensive enemy propaganda telling them how -well they would be treated if they stopped fighting. The united efforts, -in which, of course, Jodl participated, succeeded in dissuading the -Führer with the argument that this action would cause great disturbance -among the German people and anxiety for their relatives in captivity. - -DR. EXNER: One more question. Before the Norwegian campaign, Jodl -entered in his diary—it has been mentioned here before: “The Führer is -looking for a pretense.” But that is incorrect. The original reads: “for -a basis.” Now, to what extent did the Führer look for a basis at that -time? - -GÖRING: I remember this point also very well and therefore, I can state -under oath that the use of the word “basis” or “pretense” is entirely -out of place here. The case was as follows: - -The Führer knew exactly, and we knew as well, and had rather extensive -intelligence and reliable reports to the effect that Norway was to be -occupied by the Allies, England and France. I mentioned this the other -day. In order to prevent this, the Führer wanted to act first. He spoke -about the fact, that for us the basis of an Anglo-French attack was -clear, but that we had not sufficient proof for the outside world. -Hitler explained that he was still trying to get evidence. It would have -been better if Jodl had written, not that the Führer was still looking -for a basis, but—according to what the Führer meant—that the Führer -was still looking for conclusive evidence for the outside world. -Evidence as such we had. This was one thing. The second was that -generally, for such steps the Foreign Office had to execute the -necessary preparatory work including the drafting of notes. In the case -of Norway, however, the Führer advised the Foreign Office only, I -believe, 24 or 48 hours in advance. He did not want to inform it at all -at that time because he kept the entire plan extremely secret. I -remember that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was informed of -this plan at a very late date. This secrecy was the second reason why he -himself was concerned with finding a basis for the attack. These were -the two reasons. I would like to state again that it would have been -expressed much more clearly if he had said that the Führer was looking -for evidence, rather than for a basis. - -DR. EXNER: If I understand correctly, you mean evidence showing that the -British had the intention of occupying Norway? - -GÖRING: We had the report, but the final written evidence we received -only later. - -DR. EXNER: The Führer had no doubt about this? - -GÖRING: Not for a moment, none of us had any doubt about it. We received -the evidence later. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it correct that -Hitler authorized you to conduct all negotiations for the purpose of -forming a government under Hitler as it emerged on 30 January 1933, that -is, that you alone were commissioned to do this? - -GÖRING: That is correct. I stated this the other day. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that you talked about the formation of a -government with Von Papen for the first time in January 1933? - -GÖRING: I talked with Papen for the first time on a Sunday, 8 days prior -to the formation of the Government, in Ribbentrop’s home. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: If then, Papen had carried on negotiations concerning the -formation of a government between 4 January, the day of the meeting with -Hitler in the home of Baron Schröder, and 22 January, he would have had -to do this through you, and you would have known it. - -GÖRING: That is correct, because the Führer was in Munich at that time -and I was the sole authority in Berlin for the formation of this -government. Besides, it was not at all obvious at the beginning of -January that within a reasonable length of time we should have to form -such a government. Other negotiations were taking place which had -nothing to do with Herr Von Papen. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the formation of a new government in the middle of -January become inevitable for Hindenburg because Schleicher had no -parliamentary backing and his efforts to receive such backing, by -negotiations with Gregor Strasser to split the NSDAP were frustrated? - -GÖRING: I believe I have said already in a general way that Schleicher -did not receive a parliamentary majority and his attempt at splitting -the parties failed for the reason that the Führer immediately eliminated -Strasser, who actually had no following among the deputies. Since -Schleicher’s attempts to get a majority failed, he had to govern without -parliament, and that he could do only with extraordinary powers from -Hindenburg. Since he had told him previously that he would be able to -get a majority, the Reich President refused his demand for extraordinary -powers, such as held by the previous Cabinet of Papen, and then decided -to do what I stated here the other day. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that Von Papen gave up to you the prime -ministership of Prussia on 20 April 1933, because in the elections for -the Prussian Landtag of March 1933 the NSDAP had obtained a clear -majority in Prussia, and the Landtag therefore intended to elect you -prime minister? - -GÖRING: It is not entirely correct, for the Prussian Landtag did not -have to elect a prime minister at that time. But the fact that the NSDAP -had the absolute majority, induced Von Papen, in connection with my -conferences in Munich, to approach the Führer on his own initiative, -stating that he would agree to turn over to me the Prussian prime -ministership. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: One last question: You mentioned yesterday that you as -the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force granted many reprieves to people -in Belgium and France who were sentenced for their resistance. Is it -correct that Von Papen on various occasions conveyed to you wishes of -relatives of those who had been sentenced; and that he did this for the -reason that, in the interest of a later solidarity of the peoples, he -did not wish that in such sentences, even if they were militarily -justified, an impersonal attitude should develop, and that you complied -with the wishes of Von Papen? - -GÖRING: I merely remember that on occasions—I remember one case -especially, for a prominent name was involved—I received a request from -Herr Von Papen, as to whether the person concerned could not be granted -a reprieve. It concerned people sentenced because they had assisted -enemy airmen to escape. In this case I complied to a large extent with -the request of Herr Von Papen. I am no longer quite conversant with the -reasons. - -DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I ask the -Tribunal to permit me to put a few questions to the witness Göring. They -concern the well-known telephone conversations of 11 March 1938, between -Berlin and Vienna. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, when -he was appointed Austrian State Councillor in June of 1937, visited you -in Berlin accompanied by State Secretary Keppler? - -GÖRING: The date, I do not remember; the visit, yes. - -DR. BALLAS: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart, at that time, express the idea that -the Austrian National Socialists should be made entirely independent of -the Reich Party? - -GÖRING: Wishes of that nature were discussed by him because he wanted as -little friction as possible in his work in the cabinet. - -DR. BALLAS: At that time he further mentioned—and I would like you to -answer, whether it is correct—that the National Socialists were to be -given permission to be active in Austria, in order to establish as close -a relationship between Austria and Germany as possible within the -framework of an independent Austria. - -GÖRING: As far as Party matters are concerned, I do not remember exactly -what was discussed. The scheme of keeping Austria independent in its -collaboration with Germany was repeatedly advocated by Seyss-Inquart, -and I have recently outlined it. It seemed to me personally not -extensive enough. Just because I knew this attitude of Seyss-Inquart, I -must say frankly that I was a little distrustful of his attitude on the -11th and 12th of March, and therefore on the late afternoon that these -telephone conversations took place, I sent Keppler to Vienna, so that, -as regards the annexation, matters would take their proper course. I -would rather have sent someone else, because Herr Keppler was too weak -for me; but the Führer’s desire in this case was that, if anyone was to -be sent, it should be Keppler. - -DR. BALLAS: Is it correct that Dr. Seyss-Inquart explained his attitude -by pointing out the advantage of having German interests represented by -two States? - -GÖRING: It is absolutely correct that he said that. I answered that I -was of a completely different opinion; that I would prefer having German -interests represented by one state, which could act more energetically -than two, as the second might not synchronize. - -DR. BALLAS: Did you on 11 March 1938, or on the previous day, have -another telephonic or other communication with Seyss-Inquart? - -GÖRING: As far as I recall, but I cannot say with certainty, I believe I -did, on the previous Sunday. That is, these telephone conversations were -on the 11th, a Friday; on the Monday or Tuesday before I questioned him, -or one of his men, on the impression they had had in Graz and Styria. I -vaguely remember this but I cannot say so under oath. - -DR. BALLAS: Document Number 2949-PS submitted by the Prosecution -regarding the conversations between Berlin and Vienna in the critical -time of March 1938 shows that only at the time of the conversation -between Dr. Dietrich and State Secretary Keppler, who was in Vienna then -on your behalf, which took place at 2154 hours—that only on that day -was Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s agreement to the telegram, which you had -dictated in advance, conveyed by Keppler. Had the order to march into -Austria already been given at that time? - -GÖRING: I explained this recently. The order to march in had been given -and had nothing to do with the telegram as such. It was immaterial -whether or not he was in agreement. The responsibility for the marching -in rested with the Führer and me. - -DR. BALLAS: Then it is correct that the marching in would have occurred -even without the telegram? - -GÖRING: Yes. Of course. - -DR. BALLAS: What was the purpose then of this telegram? Had it perhaps -something to do with foreign policy? - -GÖRING: I have explained that here in greatest detail. - -DR. BALLAS: Do you remember, Witness, that in the night from 11 to 12 -March, State Secretary Keppler, in the name of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, -telephoned Berlin with the request not to carry out the entry into -Austria? - -GÖRING: I remember this very distinctly for I was extremely enraged that -such a senseless telegram—after everything was ready—should have -disturbed the Führer’s rest when he was worn out and was to go to -Austria the next day. I therefore severely reprimanded the Führer’s -adjutant and told him that such a telegram should have been given to me. -Because of this I remember the telegram distinctly, and its -pointlessness. - -DR. BALLAS: With the result then, that the Führer, if I have understood -you correctly, gave a flat refusal to this telegram? - -GÖRING: He no longer was able to give a refusal because the entire troop -movement was already underway. Such a movement cannot be halted in an -hour. Once a troop movement is underway it takes days to halt it. At -best we could have halted the movement at a certain point on the march. -That was not at all in our interest, as I stated. From this moment on, -not Seyss-Inquart, but the Führer and I held the fate of Austria in our -hands. - -DR. BALLAS: I have only two more questions regarding the Netherlands. Is -it correct that, in addition to the order of the Führer which was -promulgated on 18 May 1940 naming Dr. Seyss-Inquart Reich Commissioner -of the Netherlands, there was an order, not promulgated, which, made -Seyss-Inquart directly subordinate to you? - -GÖRING: Of this secret order, I know nothing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Put your questions more slowly. You can see that the -light is flashing. - -DR. BALLAS: Had the Four Year Plan its own independent office in the -Netherlands? - -GÖRING: I have not yet answered your first question, I understood that -you were to put this question once more, because it did not come -through. - -DR. BALLAS: I understood the Court to mean . . . - -GÖRING: I shall answer you now on this. Of this secret order, I know -nothing. It would have been senseless, for a Reich Commissioner in the -occupied territories could not have been subordinate to me separately. -But if it is a question of subordination in economic matter, then it is -clear that the Reich Commissioner was, of course, under my orders and -directions in this field as all other major Reich positions were. - -To your second question, I can say that I do not know today in detail -whether in the occupied territories, that is also in the Netherlands, -there was here and there a direct representative of the Four Year Plan, -or whether I used the military commander or the economic department of -the Reich Commissioner of the territory concerned. As far as I remember -now, without referring to documents, in the Netherlands the situation -was that the economic counsellor, or the representative of the Reich -Commissioner—Fischböck at that time—which was logical, executed the -economic directions of the Four Year Plan. The Reich Commissioner would -never have been in a position not to have carried out orders given by -me. He could have protested against them only to me or, in extreme -cases, to the Führer, but in itself this did not lead to any suspension. - -DR. BALLAS: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-FOURTH DAY - Monday, 18 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Had Dr. Kubuschok finished his cross-examination? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then would any other of the defendants’ -counsel wish to examine or cross-examine? - -PROFESSOR DOCTOR HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): -Professor Kraus for Dr. Lüdinghausen on behalf of the Defendant Von -Neurath. I ask your permission to put several questions to the witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, at the Munich conferences Hitler, -it is alleged, put the following question: “What is to happen if the -Czechs are not in agreement with our occupation of the Sudetenland?” -Thereupon Daladier answered, “Then we will force them.” Is that correct? - -GÖRING: This question was actually broached by the Führer during the -discussion. Premier Daladier said, in substance, whether with the same -words or not, something which corresponds to the sense of this -statement. As far as I can still remember fairly exactly, he emphasized -that now a decision in that direction had been reached by the great -powers for the purpose of maintaining peace, and this peace must not be -threatened anew by Czechoslovakia’s refusal, otherwise neither England -nor France would feel themselves in any way in duty bound to help, if -Czechoslovakia did not follow this advice. - -DR. KRAUS: Witness, how long have you known Herr Von Neurath? - -GÖRING: As far as I recall I saw Herr Von Neurath very briefly when he -was the German Ambassador to Denmark in 1919, but only for a short time. -Later I met him again just before the seizure of power and spoke to him -very briefly, I believe; my closer relationship and acquaintance begins -from the time after the seizure of power. - -DR. KRAUS: Did you have any closer knowledge of his activities as -Ambassador in London? - -GÖRING: That is correct. I did know about his work before, because even -in former times, that is in 1931 and 1932, before Herr Von Neurath -became Foreign Minister, in discussions about the possible formation of -a cabinet, we also considered the name of Herr Von Neurath as a -candidate, even though he did not belong to the Party. As a basic -consideration in this connection his very position as Ambassador to -England played the main role, since we, that is, Hitler as well as I, -were of the opinion that Herr Von Neurath’s relations as Ambassador to -the English Government were very good and that Herr Von Neurath could be -an important factor in this field—that of good relations with -England—which was a basic consideration in the Führer’s foreign policy. - -DR. KRAUS: Then I may assume that Herr Von Neurath had pursued a policy -of peace and understanding in London? - -GÖRING: Yes, you can assume that exactly. - -DR. KRAUS: Yes; and can you tell me if, beyond that, Herr Von Neurath -made efforts in his capacity as Foreign Minister as well, to continue -this policy of peace and understanding? - -GÖRING: When Reich President Von Hindenburg made it a condition, which I -have already mentioned, that Herr Von Neurath should become Foreign -Minister, the Führer was in full agreement with this condition, because -he saw that the task of establishing good relations with England and the -West was in good hands. Herr Von Neurath always made every effort in -this direction. - -DR. KRAUS: I should like to deal with another series of questions. - -Were you present at the meeting of the Reich Cabinet on 30 January 1937, -during which Hitler gave the Golden Party Emblem to those members of the -Cabinet who were not members of the Party, among them also Herr Von -Neurath? - -GÖRING: Yes, I was present. - -DR. KRAUS: And do you know that Hitler declared on this occasion that it -was purely a distinction such as the conferring of an order, and that -the gentlemen concerned did not thereby become Party members and had no -obligations toward the Party? - -GÖRING: I would not put it just that way. The Führer was speaking -spontaneously, since it was the anniversary of the seizure of power, and -he said it was his intention in this way to show his confidence in those -members of the Reich Cabinet who did not belong to the Party. I believe -he used the words, “I should like to ask them to accept this Party -Emblem.” He said at the time that in his opinion this was a decoration -and that he intended, as he actually did later, to develop additional -grades of this decoration. The first grade of this decoration was to be -the Golden Party Emblem. Then, on the spur of the moment, he stepped up -to the various ministers and handed them this emblem. In doing so he -neither emphasized that they were thereby to consider themselves members -of the Party, nor did he emphasize that they were not Party members. - -When he came to Herr Von Eltz-Rübenach, this gentleman asked whether he -was thereby obliged to stand for the partly anti-clerical tendency of -certain Party circles, or something to that effect. The Führer hesitated -for a minute and said, “Then you do not wish to accept it?” Whereupon -Herr Von Eltz said, “I do not wish to say that. I just wish to make a -certain reservation.” The Führer was taken aback; immediately he turned -around and left the cabinet room. - -In this connection it is not correct, as has been maintained, that Herr -Von Eltz resigned voluntarily because of this. I followed the Führer -immediately and felt, as did all the other gentlemen, that this incident -was an insult to the Führer, since membership in the Party had not been -mentioned at all. In addition, and this is very important, the Führer -was already considering a plan to divide the Ministry of Transport and -to re-establish the old Post Ministry and to put the railroad expert -Dorpmüller into the Ministry of Transport. The Führer had told me this -previously and, as he had left it to me to tell Von Eltz about it -gradually, in a diplomatic way, I took this opportunity and went to Herr -Von Eltz and said: “Your behavior was impossible, and I think the only -thing for you to do is to resign at once.” He said, “I did not mean it -like that,” and he was not willing to hand in his resignation right -away. I then asked him abruptly to do so by that evening. I also sent -State Secretary Meissner to him to say it would be advisable for him to -leave the Cabinet and hand in his resignation immediately, especially in -view of—and then I gave the explanations concerning the post and -railroads as I have just given them. - -That was what happened at that conference with regard to the Golden -Party Emblem. - -DR. KRAUS: Witness, were you present when Hitler, in the evening of 11 -March 1938, told Herr Von Neurath in the Reich Chancellery about the -entry of the troops into Austria, and informed him of the reasons for -this move, and asked him to inform the Foreign Office accordingly, -because he himself had to leave? - -GÖRING: I have already mentioned in my remarks about Austria that -Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was not present. Since the Führer had -delegated the representation of the Reich to me, I had asked him to ask -Herr Von Neurath to put his experience in foreign affairs at my disposal -during this time. Thereupon Herr Von Neurath was asked to come to the -Reich Chancellery that evening, I believe, and the Führer told him in -broad outlines what you have just said. It was to the effect that, if I -needed it and requested it, he was to advise me on matters of foreign -policy, since the Foreign Minister was not present and I had no -experience in answering diplomatic notes, and since it was to be -expected that some foreign political action, such as protests and notes, -at least, would be taken during the Führer’s absence. - -DR. KRAUS: Then one is to conclude that Herr Von Neurath was not the -deputy of the Foreign Minister but only in his absence was to serve as -sort of an adviser to you? - -GÖRING: He was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister; that would not at -all have been in keeping with his position and his rank. The deputy of -the Foreign Minister was the acting State Secretary. - -DR. KRAUS: Von Weizsäcker? - -GÖRING: I believe it was Herr Von Mackensen at that time; he also signed -the current correspondence in the absence of the Foreign Minister. Herr -Von Neurath was only my adviser in such matters of foreign policy as -were expected to come up in connection with the Austrian case. - -DR. KRAUS: Do you know of the protest which came from the British -Ambassador on 11 March 1938, which was addressed, strangely enough, to -Herr Von Neurath and in which the British Ambassador protested against -the marching in of German troops? - -GÖRING: That is not at all so strange, for on the evening of the -marching in of the troops I personally, as I have explained, spoke to -the British Ambassador for 2 hours and told him that the Führer was -going to Austria the next day; that I would administer the Reich and had -for this purpose requested Herr Von Neurath as my foreign political -adviser, as Sir Nevile Henderson had already hinted that this would not -be tolerated without protests. Thus the British Ambassador had already -received this information from me the evening before. This explains the -fact that he turned to Herr Von Neurath, because I had said to him, “If -you come around with your old notes of protest, I personally cannot do -very much about them.” - -DR. KRAUS: Did Herr Von Neurath, after the Foreign Minister had -formulated the answer to the protest, notify you by telephone of that -answer, and did he ask you whether you would sign it as Hitler’s deputy? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course; I was deputy head of State. He had to inform me -of the reply and it was also a matter of course that I should say to -him, “You sign,” for as deputy head of State I could not sign diplomatic -notes. - -DR. KRAUS: Thank you. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how far were the political leaders informed -beforehand of the Führer’s foreign political intentions? - -GÖRING: “Political leaders” is a very comprehensive term. It includes -everyone from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter or Zellenleiter. -Instruction of the entire body of political leaders with regard to -matters of foreign policy quite naturally and understandably never took -place, and could not take place unless the Führer publicly made known -his general foreign political intentions to the entire nation either in -the Reichstag or over the radio. The higher officers of the political -leaders, for instance, the Reichsleiter or the Gauleiter, were likewise -never called together as a group in order to be informed of political -intentions which the Führer did not want to announce publicly. - -He may personally have mentioned his intentions to one or other of the -political leaders, who at the same time held another state office, or -who was for some other reason in his confidence—I should first have to -think where that might have been the case. He certainly did not do it to -any unit or sub-unit. In his speeches to Gauleiter after the events had -taken place, he merely referred to these things each time in retrospect -and explained and unfolded his political intentions, which he had, -however, already realized by then. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, do you -know to what extent Von Ribbentrop was informed about military plans and -intentions in his capacity as Foreign Minister? - -GÖRING: I do not know the exact details. In general the same principle -applies here too, that only such authorities as were competent, as far -as these intentions were concerned, were kept informed, particularly so -in the case of military intentions. Just how much the Führer told Herr -Von Ribbentrop now and again in conversations about his military plans, -I did not know. - -DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler set down the guiding principles for -all policies, including foreign policy? - -GÖRING: That is a matter of course. Foreign policy above all was the -Führer’s very own realm. By that I mean to say that foreign policy on -the one hand and the leadership of the Armed Forces on the other hand -enlisted the Führer’s greatest interest and were his main activity. - -DR. HORN: Should I conclude from that that he was interested in the -details of foreign policy as well? - -GÖRING: He busied himself exceptionally with these details, as I have -just stated, and with particularly great interest in both of these -fields. - -DR. HORN: Did Hitler expressly instruct you to keep secret the -memorandum on Poland of 30 August 1939? - -GÖRING: He did not expressly instruct me. I do not know whether he knew -that I had it in my pocket. But in general he had given such -instructions since he had instructed the one who would have had to hand -it over, namely, Herr Von Ribbentrop, not to hand it over, so that I -actually handed over this memorandum against the express order of the -Führer, which constitutes a risk that probably only I—please do not -misunderstand me—indeed I alone could take and afford. - -DR. HORN: You mentioned a few days ago the diversified influence which -the various personages had on Hitler. Do you know any facts from which -we might conclude that Ribbentrop had not enough influence on Hitler to -induce him to change decisions once he had made them? - -GÖRING: As far as influence on Hitler, on the Führer, is concerned, that -is a problematical subject. I should like first to confine myself to the -question of Herr Von Ribbentrop’s influence. Herr Von Ribbentrop -definitely had no influence in the sense that he could have steered -Hitler in any one direction. To what extent arguments of an objective -nature may perhaps have definitely influenced the Führer sometimes to do -this or that in respect to foreign political affairs, or to refrain from -doing it, or to change it, would have depended entirely on the strength -of the arguments and the facts. To what extent that may sometimes have -played a role I cannot say, for I was not present at 99 percent of the -Führer’s conferences with Herr Von Ribbentrop. But Herr Von Ribbentrop -had at no time such influence that he could have said, “Do this” or “Do -not do it; I consider it a mistake,” when the Führer was convinced of -the correctness of any matter. - -DR. HORN: Do you know facts or observations which might point to the -existence of a conspiracy in the highest circles of the government? - -GÖRING: Conspiracy may be variously interpreted. Conspiracies naturally -never took place in the sense that men secretly came together and -discussed extensive plans in darkness and seclusion. As to conspiracy in -the sense that the Führer had comprehensive conferences and as a result -of these conferences decided upon joint undertakings, one can only talk -of conspiracy here to the extent—and I beg of you again not to -misunderstand me—that this took place between the Führer and me until, -say, 1941. There was no one who could even approach working as closely -with the Führer, who was as essentially familiar with his thoughts and -who had the same influence as I. Therefore at best only the Führer and I -could have conspired. There is definitely no question of the others. - -DR. HORN: American war propaganda consistently spoke of Germany’s -aggressive intentions toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know -about this? - -GÖRING: The Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America? - -DR. HORN: Yes. - -GÖRING: Even if Germany had completely dominated the nations of Europe, -between Germany and the American continent there are, as far as I still -recall from my geographic knowledge, about 6,000 kilometers of water, I -believe. In view of the smallness of the German fleet and the -regrettable lack of bombers to cover this distance, which I have already -mentioned, there was never any question of a threat against the American -continent; on the contrary, we were always afraid of that danger in -reverse, and we would have been very glad if it had not been necessary -to consider this at all. - -As far as South America is concerned, I know that we were always -accused, by propaganda at least, of economic penetration and attempted -domination there. If one considers the financial and commercial -possibilities which Germany had before and during the war, and if one -compares them with those of Great Britain or America, one can see the -untenability of such a statement. With the very little foreign exchange -and the tremendous export difficulties which we had, we could never -constitute a real danger or be in competition. If that had been the -case, the attitude of the South American countries would presumably have -been a different one. Not the mark, but only the dollar ruled there. - -DR. HORN: Thank you. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have submitted the diary of General Jodl -under Document Number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries from -the first half of 1940, in regard to which I should like to have your -opinion. These two entries concern Russia at a time when Germany and -Russia were on friendly terms. - -I should like to say in advance that the substance of the intentions -which are contained in these entries sounds rather fantastic, and that -is why I would like to have your opinion as Commander-in-Chief of the -Air Force. - -I quote the first entry dated 13 February 1940: - - “Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the Rewel Squadron is to - be employed in full force going from Bulgaria toward the - Caucasus. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea - originated.” - -The second entry of May 1940 reads as follows, and I quote verbatim: - - “Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening - post in the Caucasus.” - -I would like you to tell me what the thoughts were which guided you in -these plans as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and what facts were -the basis of those thoughts. - -GÖRING: If these entries were made on the basis of a report by Admiral -Canaris, who was the chief of foreign intelligence, and if they were -entered by Jodl in connection with the special long reconnaissance Rewel -Squadron, it is because of the former’s connection with this -squadron—to which he himself frequently assigned intelligence or -espionage tasks—that he had heard of my intention to use it—which was -something which I wanted to have kept especially secret. He apparently -informed the High Command of the Armed Forces, where this action, or the -intended action, met with complete misapprehension and could not be -understood. - -My intention in this connection—and I had personally ordered it—was -entirely clear. The statement that it was to do reconnaissance work in -or in the direction of the Caucasus is not quite correct. It would have -been more correct to say in the direction of the Caucasus, Syria, and -Turkey. But this mistake may have occurred in the report transmitted by -Canaris. - -I had received more and more intelligence reports to the effect that -from Asia Minor actions were to be undertaken against the Russian -oilfields of the Caucasus—Baku—and likewise actions for the purpose of -gravely disrupting the oil supply from Romania to Germany. - -As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I was the one chiefly interested -in obtaining Romanian oil as well as Caucasian oil, more precisely -petroleum and gasoline, on the basis of a trade agreement with Russia, -because at that time the refineries were not completed and not working -to capacity. A disturbance in either one of these supplying regions -would have affected my Air Force very badly. Therefore I had to watch -this closely. I anticipated disruption of the oil regions in the -Caucasus. - -I had the agents’ report checked by very reliable people and found that -in Syria an army was actually formed under General Weygand which had the -name of “Orient Army.” I was more interested, however, in the -concentration of squadrons of aircraft in the Syrian area, not only of -French but also English squadrons. As far as I remember I received these -reports about the intentions of the French-British air squadrons through -agents in Turkey, that is to say, from Turks, because there had been -negotiations with Turkey regarding permission to fly over her territory -in order to carry out the intention of the English-French air squadrons -of suddenly bombing the Baku area and thereby severely damaging the -Russian oil fields and eliminating deliveries to Germany. - -I therefore had to, or rather I was obliged to find out constantly, -through long-range reconnaissance flights, the extent to which the -airfields in Syria were becoming more active than before. There could be -no other reason for massing aircraft there exactly at this time, for it -was not a theater of war nor was any threat there on the part of Germany -at that moment. On the contrary, it would have been understandable if -all British and French aircraft had been needed in England and France -themselves. - -If, therefore, my long-range reconnaissance flights established the fact -that the airdromes in Syria were being used more than ever, and further -confirmed that possibly the airfields in the east of Turkey were being -increased, this would have been, and actually was, a confirmation of the -alleged intentions. In this case, as soon as I was fully convinced of -this, I should have to point out to the Führer that Germany should draw -Russia’s attention to the danger threatening her. - -The establishing of listening posts, not in the Caucasus but before the -Caucasus, naturally served the same purpose, namely that of setting up -secret radio stations along the general line of flight, Syria-Caucasus, -Syria-Baku, East Turkey-Baku, one, two or three, in order to find out -whether preparatory flights by the French and English Air Forces were -taking place; that is to say, reconnaissance on the oilfields, _et -cetera_, in order to get more information that way also. - -Since at the time I did not yet have conclusive and final proof in my -hands, I kept these things to myself and dealt with them only in the -offices responsible to my sector of the Air Force until I could obtain a -clear picture. Only later, after the termination of the French campaign, -absolute confirmation of these intentions was obtained by the discovery -of the secret reports of the French General Staff and of the meetings of -the combined Supreme Military Council of England and France, which -proved that my information was entirely correct and that a plan for a -surprise bombing attack on all the Russian oilfields had been prepared. -In the meantime the confirmation of the plan to eliminate the Romanian -oilfields, already known to us, was communicated to the Romanian -Government and this attack on neutral Romania was then prevented. - -DR. SIEMERS: I understood you correctly, did I not, that these plans -were made by both England and France? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And that the intelligence you received was to the effect -that the attacks on the oilfields were directly aimed at the then -neutral Russia and also indirectly at Germany by the cutting off of her -oil supply? - -GÖRING: Of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. - -HERR BOEHM: Witness, is it true, as the Prosecution maintains, that you -were Reichsführer of the SA? - -GÖRING: I was not Reichsführer of the SA, there never was such a title. -In 1923, on 9 November, I was a commander of the SA, which at that time -existed only in Bavaria and to a small extent in Württemberg. - -HERR BOEHM: According to that, how long were you commander of the SA? - -GÖRING: I have just told you, until November 1923. - -HERR BOEHM: From 1921 on? - -GÖRING: From the beginning of 1923. - -HERR BOEHM: What was your influence before and after 1923 respectively -in regard to the leadership of the SA, the indoctrination of the people, -and the giving of orders? - -GÖRING: Please repeat the question. - -HERR BOEHM: What was your influence before and after 1923 as far as the -leadership of the SA, the indoctrination of the SA men, and the issuing -of orders were concerned? - -GÖRING: From the beginning of 1923 until 9 November 1923 my influence -was complete and absolute, that is, I commanded the SA directly. After -1923 I was no longer entitled to have anything to do with the SA itself, -nor did I. - -HERR BOEHM: How was it before 1923, the relationship before 1923 as well -as after 1923? - -GÖRING: I beg your pardon? - -HERR BOEHM: Was your relationship to the SA the same before 1923 as -afterwards? - -GÖRING: I have explained this very precisely. Until November 1923 I was -commander of the SA with full power and authority to give orders. After -1923 I had nothing more to do with the SA as far as giving orders was -concerned, but I was only—I do not know what year it was, perhaps 1936 -or so—connected with the SA in an honorary capacity, but without -exercising any authority. Besides, I had no occasion to do so. - -HERR BOEHM: In the course of your testimony during the last week in -connection with the SA people, you said that they were always ready to -make great sacrifices. Now I would like you to tell me what kind of -sacrifices these were. - -GÖRING: The sacrifices of the SA men were these: they gave nearly all -their leisure time to the movement without being reimbursed; they did -without family life or recreation, so that in difficult times of our -struggle for power they were always at the disposal of the Party, for -election campaigns, continuous parades, protection of meetings, _et -cetera_. In my eyes this is a considerable sacrifice, if one considers -that most members of the SA were workers and minor employees who needed -the few hours of their leisure more for rest, but who were always ready -to be fully at the disposal of the Party and to work for their political -ideals according to their political beliefs. - -HERR BOEHM: Were these people promised material advantages? - -GÖRING: None at all. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that particularly after the seizure of power a -great number of communist agitators crept into the SA? - -GÖRING: Please repeat the question. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that especially after the seizure of power, a -great number of communist agitators were able to creep into the SA? - -GÖRING: That was a very noticeable and vital matter. As after the -seizure of power action was taken against the Communist Party, which was -something they had logically expected, a number of members of the Red -Front battle organization joined the SA, especially in large cities -where this was easier. This was all the easier because the then head of -the SA, Röhm, indiscriminately admitted SA men, or rather men into the -SA, who did not need to be members of the Party, as was formerly -required. Anyone could therefore become an SA man without belonging to -the Party. - -At the same time Hugenberg’s German National Party also started a -political battle organization which he called the “Green Shirts.” These -were also to be taken into the SA now, just as the Stahlhelm, as by -themselves they seemed purposeless. - -I personally remember one day when 400 to 500 of these people assembled -at the Wilhelmstrasse to be enrolled in the SA. I saw these people from -my window and definitely noticed that elements were involved which did -not belong there. I immediately summoned the police and had a check -made. Ninety-eight percent of these men had their communist Red Front -membership cards in their pockets. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, the Tribunal considers that this is all -cumulative to what the defendant has already said in his examination in -chief. He has given us a long account of the SA in his examination in -chief. He has added nothing in the course of what he is now saying. - -HERR BOEHM: According to the Prosecution, it is asserted that the SA was -composed of terror-gangsters. I feel in duty bound to correct or clarify -this statement in this respect by asking . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with what I said. It may be that -the Prosecution have said that. Probably they have. What I was pointing -out to you was that the Defendant Göring has been all over this ground -in the evidence he has already given. The Tribunal does not wish to hear -the same evidence twice. - -HERR BOEHM: Yes, that may apply to my first three questions in a way. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to ask further in what way you -influenced the SA in connection with the Versailles Treaty? Did you tell -the people that the Versailles Treaty should be annulled by diplomatic -means or by war? - -GÖRING: This question is extremely difficult to answer. If I made a -speech to my SA men in 1923 I could not very well say much about -diplomacy. They would not have understood that. Rather the question was -quite simply to be rid of Versailles. The ordinary SA man was not at all -concerned with the “how” or the “what.” That is the task of the -leadership. I did not say, “I promise that you will never have war”; or -that we were only a purely pacific organization and that we should try -by protests only to rid the world of Versailles. But neither did I say -to them, “In the next few years we will march out and make war.” In -reality I did not tell them anything. I said that they would have to be -obedient and have confidence in the leadership, and leave what was to be -done to the leadership—that that was proper, and a basic -attitude—every SA man knew that from our speeches and from the Party -program. Among all the people the wish was—of every decent German, I -hope—to be rid of Versailles. - -HERR BOEHM: According to your knowledge, and apart from the period of -1923, from 1921 to 1945, was the SA and also the organ of the SA, that -is, the leadership of the SA as well as the individual member, informed -that the NSDAP intended after the seizure of power to dominate other -states and to make war with that purpose in mind, even in disregard of -the rules of war and the laws of humanity if need be? - -GÖRING: I do not quite know just what one imagines the SA leadership and -the entire SA to be. It is quite impossible that anyone should stand up -and say, Listen, we wish: (1) to overthrow and subjugate and dominate -all other states; (2) to wage war continuously; (3) to destroy -everything and act as inhumanly as possible; and (4) to pay thereby no -attention to any law of war. - -I cannot imagine that anyone but an insane person would have made such -statements before the SA or anyone else. The SA was never instructed -politically in any way. It was told: “You will march tomorrow, and the -day after leaflets will be distributed and then . . .” as I have already -explained. - -HERR BOEHM: During the time of the seizure of power there were various -excesses on the part of the SA. Was this a matter of measures undertaken -by individual members, or were these measures in accordance with -instructions of the SA leadership? - -GÖRING: In no case, I believe, in accordance with instructions from the -middle or even the higher SA leadership offices. In an organization of a -million young people there will always be a certain percentage of -rowdies, especially in the large cities. As I have already mentioned, -there was a considerable number of agitators in the organization; that -thereby individual excesses on the part of individuals or groups of -like-minded persons will occur, is entirely inevitable. - -HERR BOEHM: Did the SA leadership in principle ever sanction individual -actions on the part of its members? - -GÖRING: I have already stated that I had very little to do with the -leadership of the SA, but I do not think so. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the police were forbidden to take steps -against excesses on the part of individual members of the SA? - -GÖRING: In the beginning that was not the case at all. By that I mean -that, on the contrary, the police had orders to take most decisive -action in such cases, and particularly the Police Commissioner of -Berlin, who was not of the Party, Admiral Von Levetzow, retired, acted -very vigorously here. That may even have been the reason for his being -removed by the Führer, 2 years later, I believe, owing to continued -complaints by the Berlin Gauleiter Goebbels. - -HERR BOEHM: How was it later on? If I understood you correctly, you said -that in the beginning that was not the case; later the police must have -been forbidden to intervene in the case of excesses by members of the -SA? - -GÖRING: No, it is not to be understood that way. At all times the police -intervened against excesses by individual SA men, as far as I remember. -A number of SA men were even convicted. - -HERR BOEHM: In the Prussian police system, and in the police system of -the other states, were only SA members used, or was it rather that all -Germans who at that time volunteered to enter the police service were -examined and according to the results of this examination were then used -or not used? - -GÖRING: There was a purging of the police according to our ideas, that -is, an investigation was made to see which elements were so strongly -bound to the party of the opponents, that is, to hostile parties, that -their use no longer seemed possible. These people were eliminated. But -that was a very small percentage in comparison with the actual total -number of police. They were replaced, and municipal police in -particular, who wore uniforms, were increased. Voluntary applications -for this came from all sides. Of course, members of our own -organizations were in part favored; but a number of people were also -taken who were not in these organizations, and those who came from the -organizations had to take tests of aptitude for the police services. -Many of them did not pass the test and were not taken. That is how -things were as long as I was concerned with the police. What happened -later I cannot tell you exactly. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the SA after 1934, besides training for -sports, was used mainly for emergencies, to line the route on the -occasion of marches, to shovel snow, to clean up bomb damage, and so -forth? - -GÖRING: After 1934 the importance of the SA declined tremendously. This -is understandable, for their chief task no longer existed after the -seizure of power. They were used to the fullest extent for the purposes -just mentioned by you. Then during the war they had pre-military duties; -and after the war they were to have formed a pool for the former -military clubs, so that they could be joined to the SA as veterans -associations. That was the intention, in order to give the SA a further -sphere of activities. - -HERR BOEHM: Do you know that the Stahlhelm, by virtue of an agreement -between the Führer and Seldte, were taken into the SA reserves in a -body? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that after 1933, like the Stahlhelm, the -riding clubs of that time were also taken into the SA through the -so-called conformity measures? - -GÖRING: I believe that is correct. - -HERR BOEHM: Was the SA leadership and its members before or after 1933 -at any time informed of the results of cabinet consultations, or of the -decisions taken by the Cabinet? - -GÖRING: I have already said in my general remarks just how the -leadership of the SA should be regarded. No, of course not. - -HERR BOEHM: The Indictment states in connection with the presentation of -the charge of aggressive war and the participation of the SA in such a -war, that the SA took part in its preparation in that before the war it -annually trained about 25,000 officers in special schools. You must -surely have known something about that? - -GÖRING: The training of officers of the Armed Forces was carried out -solely in the Armed Forces’ own military schools, and I could never -understand how the SA could be in a position from the purely technical -point of view, and as regards organization, to train officers for the -Armed Forces. In addition, it seems to me that the training of 25,000 -officers a year is far in excess of the number of officers needed for -the Armed Forces. It would have been very nice if we had had so many, -but this number, at all events for several years, is just as incorrect -as the statement that the SA had to train officers. The training of -officers was done by the Armed Forces entirely and exclusively. - -HERR BOEHM: But men do seem to have been trained. Do you know where -these men were trained and for what purpose? Do you know anything about -Führer Schools? - -GÖRING: Yes, there were Führer Schools for every organization. Every -organization had its schools where it taught and trained those who in -its own cadres were to have some sort of leading position. I can only -imagine that the Prosecution confused things perhaps, or perhaps wanted -to say that some of the SA leaders had received a certain preliminary -pre-military training, in the reading of maps or something similar. -That, however, is beyond the scope of my knowledge. - -HERR BOEHM: May I ask you to explain the relation of the Feldherrnhalle -to the SA or the Armed Forces? Was there a formation, or a regiment by -the name of Feldherrnhalle? What was particular about this? - -GÖRING: After the SS had been allowed several companies by the Führer as -armed units—and these actually represented military formations, as, for -instance, the Leibstandarte, Grossdeutschland and others−the SA -leadership requested that it be granted at least one unit which it might -arm with rifles and small arms, as a parade unit, I might say, and this -unit was called Feldherrnhalle. Lutze, the then SA leader, suggested to -the Führer that I should be made the head of this unit. It is a position -of honor to be the head of a regiment or a unit. When I saw this unit -for the first time—I believe in a body at a Party rally at -Nuremberg—it pleased me immensely because it was composed of only -outstanding, especially selected young men. - -Really I thanked the SA rather badly for this special honor, for after -seeing this excellent unit I dissolved it a few weeks later and took it -over in a body into the Air Force and made of it my first paratroop -regiment. So, after a brief existence, this unit became simply an Armed -Forces formation, a regiment of the Air Force. Because of this -procedure, which was unpleasant for the SA, it was quite some time, I -believe, before the SA leader Lutze decided to form a similar unit with -the name of Feldherrnhalle and he kept this unit very much smaller; it -did sentry duty for the supreme SA leadership, and he did not make me -the head of this unit a second time. - -HERR BOEHM: According to my information, as well as information I -personally received from SA-Gruppenführer and Obergruppenführer, and -other information which I obtained myself through reading, the -Feldherrnhalle was not armed until it passed into the Air Force. Is that -correct? - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct. I think, but I cannot say so under oath -with certainty, that they received rifles shortly before, but only -rifles. But as I said before, I do not know exactly. - -In this connection, as the Prosecution has referred to this point, I -should like to emphasize that this regiment was already provided for as -a paratroop regiment in Case Green. After Case Green had been peacefully -settled, that is, after the Sudetenland question had been solved -peacefully, and long after the occupation of the Sudetenland, I made -this regiment bail out and land there, as originally intended, but -purely for purposes of practice and maneuvers. This was the landing at -Freudenthal which the Prosecution has mentioned. By this time they were -already in blue uniforms when they landed and were therefore already a -regiment of the Air Force. Merely as a matter of courtesy I had invited -the SA leader Lutze to watch this demonstration. - -HERR BOEHM: In this war did the SA ever play a strategic or tactical -role in connection with the deployment of forces? - -GÖRING: No, the SA as such was never used in combat within the Armed -Forces as the SA or as an SA unit, either tactically or otherwise. It -may be that toward the end there were certain SA units in the -Volkssturm. - -HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the SA as a body co-operated with the -Armed Forces in the occupation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and the -Czech State? - -GÖRING: In the case of Austria, the Austrian SA, which was there on the -spot, did not take part in the occupation for it had been called up -there in a few places as auxiliary police. Actually the so-called -Austrian Legion, which was in the Reich, was at my express command and -at the express wish of Seyss-Inquart, held back for a long time and was -not allowed to go home until after the absolute consolidation of the -Austrian situation. It did come from Austria originally. How far units -of the SA marched into the Sudetenland after the zone was given over to -Germany, I do not know. I heard that there were also Sudeten Germans -involved here who had had to flee prior to that time and who were now -returning. In connection with the occupation of the rest of -Czechoslovakia, I cannot possibly imagine that SA formations played any -part in the entry of our troops. - -HERR BOEHM: Could the members of the SA have known that possibly, -according to the intention of the SA leadership, they would or could be -used for the carrying out of punishable acts? - -GÖRING: I did not quite get the substance of that question. - -HERR BOEHM: Could the members of the SA have known that according to the -intention of the SA leadership they might possibly be used to commit -crimes? - -GÖRING: Crimes, never. - -HERR BOEHM: Now, I have a last question, but I believe that in a certain -sense you have already answered it. Did the members of the SA know, or -could they know, or ought they to have known, the aims and purposes of -the SA at any time, so that they could recognize the intention of the SA -leadership, or of the staff leadership, to commit crimes against peace, -war crimes, and crimes against humanity as stated in the Indictment? - -GÖRING: I have already answered this. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I should like to ask you to permit me to put -one more basic question, namely, the question of honorary leadership. - -[_Turning to the witness._] There were honorary leaders in the SA, for -instance, the Obergruppenführer, Gruppenführer, Brigadeführer, -Standartenführer, and Sturmführer. Witness, I should like you to explain -to me what the significance of the honorary leader in the organization -of the SA was as far as the training of the SA and the issuing of orders -to the SA was concerned—what kind of influence he might have had. - -GÖRING: The honorary leaders of the SA were appointed for all sorts of -reasons and motives. They had an exclusively representative function, -that is to say, they took part in party ceremonies wearing the SA -uniform. They were by no means active members of the SA, and were not -informed of any internal activities of the SA, or of operations and -other tasks. Their function was purely decorative. - -DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): Witness, can one say that the -Gestapo in the year 1933, when it was created by you, was a National -Socialist combat unit, or was it rather a state organization such as, -for example, the criminal police or other state and Reich authorities? - -GÖRING: I have already emphasized that this was a purely state -organization built around the already existing political police force, -which was merely being reorganized and brought into line with the new -state principles. At this time it had not even the slightest connection -with the Party. The Party had no influence, or authority to give orders -or directives of any sort; it was exclusively a state institution. The -members who were in it already, or who came into it, were at this time -officials with all the rights and duties of such. - -DR. MERKEL: To your knowledge, did the position change in any way -between the time the State Police was taken over by Himmler and 1945? - -GÖRING: Until 1934 it was exactly as I described it. Then with the -further expansion, the SS element did certainly become stronger and -perhaps more people from this sector were brought in, but even these—at -that time they all had to pass an examination—became and remained -officials. I heard later that nothing changed as far as this official -character was concerned, but gradually in the course of years all -officials, whether they wanted to or not, had, I believe, to take on -some rank in the SS, so that a Gestapo official, who perhaps until the -year 1939 or 1940 had had nothing to do with the SS, and whose -employment dated from the old days—that is, he had been a police -official of the Weimar Republic—was automatically given some rank or -other in the SS. But he remained an official, that is, the Gestapo was -an apparatus for officials in the German police force. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know whether it is true that after the seizure of -power Himmler, in his capacity as Police Commissioner of Munich, was at -the same time the head of the political police and the criminal police -in Bavaria? - -GÖRING: As far as I know, and as I have already explained, Himmler was -first of all Police Commissioner of Munich. Very shortly afterwards, it -may perhaps have been one or two weeks, he called himself Police -Commander of Bavaria. Then in the course of one and one half months—it -all took place very quickly—he became—what he called himself I do not -know exactly—in fact the supreme police chief of all German provinces -and free cities, with the exception of Prussia. - -DR. MERKEL: You said before that the officials of the Gestapo were taken -into the SS. Did this happen voluntarily, or was there some coercion on -the part of the administrative authorities to make these officials part -of the SS? - -GÖRING: I believe—I heard this only from individual officials whom I -had known before—that they had to do this. They were not taken into the -SS, but they received an official rank in the SS. It was probably -Himmler’s idea that the SS and the police, both of which were under his -leadership, should be amalgamated. How he contemplated that and how it -worked out in detail I cannot say. Therefore, I may perhaps have stated -some things incorrectly here, but I did it to the best of my knowledge. - -DR. MERKEL: You said before that the 1933 officials of the political -police existing at that time were taken into the state police. Was this -done on the basis of a voluntary application by these officials, or were -they commanded or transferred in individual cases without their -concurrence? - -GÖRING: You are not correct when you say that the officials of the -former political police were simply incorporated into the Gestapo; on -the contrary, in this sector the weeding out was very drastic, because -it was a political police force, and up to then had contained -representatives of those parties which were hostile and opposed to us. -They had to be removed. Consequently new people came in, especially as -its strength was considerably increased. These new officials were taken -from the other police departments, from the criminal police and -elsewhere, and, as I have already stated, were in some cases brought in -from outside as new recruits, and our people were naturally given -special consideration. To what extent normal transfers took -place—whether Herr Müller was transferred from the criminal police to -the Secret State Police, and whether he was asked about this, I really -do not know. I believe not. I left that to the head of the Secret State -Police. After I had set up the general directives, I could not be -bothered with every single official in the criminal police. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know Obergruppenführer Müller, the Chief of Division -IV in the Reich Main Security Office? - -GÖRING: I knew him. - -DR. MERKEL: Did you know that he and his immediate associates came from -the Bavarian Political Police, as it existed before 1933? - -GÖRING: I did not know that; I knew only that he came from Bavaria. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know that the Secret State Police did not take part -in the disturbances on 9 November 1938? - -GÖRING: It has always been my conviction that they did not take part in -them. I saw a document here which instructed them not to intervene. I do -not believe that they took part. - -DR. MERKEL: If I understood you correctly, you said recently that on -this 9th of November, after your return to Berlin, you at once called up -the chief of the Gestapo. Did you make this call only because you wanted -more precise information, or did you make it because you thought the -Gestapo had taken an active part in these disturbances, had organized -them and carried them out? - -GÖRING: If I had been convinced that the Gestapo had instigated the -disturbances I would certainly not have asked them for information. I -gave the order to my collaborators through the police, and in this case -through the Gestapo, because they had the necessary connections, or to -the criminal police—it was all the same to me. I could address myself -only to the Chief of Police, who was Heydrich, and say that I wanted a -report quickly on what had happened; a report which merely stated the -facts. - -DR. MERKEL: It is correct that when you gave up your position as Chief -of the Police to Himmler you made the statement that it was unworthy of -a German official to ill-treat prisoners, and that you would not fail to -deal most severely with any officials who were guilty of such acts? - -GÖRING: The speech I made on this occasion is known and it contains such -passages. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know that there was an order from the Reich Security -Main Office—that is, issued after your resignation—which forbade any -official or employee of the state police, under threat of the most -severe punishment, to beat prisoners or ill-treat them? - -GÖRING: It is possible. I no longer know what orders were issued after -my resignation. - -DR. MERKEL: Putting this question in the negative, is it known to you -that there never was an order to manhandle prisoners or torture them, -either at the time when you were chief of the Secret State Police or -later? - -GÖRING: I can only say with absolute certainty that I did not issue or -permit any such order. I no longer know what was or was not issued in -this connection at a later date or in provinces other than Prussia. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything to the effect that, contrary to these -orders, such acts regularly took place in the Gestapo; or rather, if -such an act did take place, did it have to do only with individual cases -or individual excesses? - -GÖRING: At the time when I was still directly connected with the Gestapo -such excesses did, as I have openly stated, take place. In order to -punish them, one naturally had to find out about them. Punishments were -administered. The officials knew that if they did such things they ran -the risk of being punished. A large number of them were punished. I -cannot say what the practice was later. - -DR. MERKEL: I have no more questions. - -HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, did the same conditions -apply for the appointment of honorary leaders in the SS as in the SA? - -GÖRING: Yes, I believe so. - -HERR BABEL: Are you familiar with the directives or other regulations -regarding the appointment of honorary leaders? - -GÖRING: No. - -HERR BABEL: Was it possible to refuse the appointment? - -GÖRING: Yes, I believe so. - -HERR BABEL: Do you know what the reasons were for the expansion of the -Waffen-SS into the large permanent organization existing after 1939? - -GÖRING: The first divisions of the Waffen-SS, which consisted of the -best specially selected human material, fought with outstanding bravery -in combat. Consequently the Führer gladly agreed to Himmler’s suggestion -that still more divisions be set up. The Army and also the Air Force did -make some protest, and quite rightly, because this creaming off of the -best voluntary material meant that men of that type, who would have made -equally good officers, were partly lost to the Army and the Air Force, -and therefore they opposed this expansion. Also, in the beginning, the -Führer was not very keen to have armed formations of any appreciable -size outside the ranks of the Armed Forces, but he gave way more and -more. When replacement difficulties became even more acute as the war -went on, Himmler more or less deceived the Führer with the statement -that he was in a position to provide a large number of SS divisions, -that this would create a greater attraction for recruiting, and so on. -This, of course, was welcome news to the Führer since he needed troops -badly. But in point of fact already at that time Himmler was using -altogether different methods which had not much in common with purely -voluntary recruiting, and he created first of all on paper a number of -new SS divisions and cadres. At that time he had not the men for this. -He then told the Führer, “I have transferred my best Unterführer from -the other SS divisions to these new ones.” For this and other reasons -replacements in men did not flow in and the Army and the Air Force, -especially the Air Force, were those who bore the brunt of this. I now -had to help fill these SS divisions with men from the ground staffs and -from the anti-aircraft batteries. This aroused much dissatisfaction -among the men in the Air Force, because none of them wanted to volunteer -for these formations. But in the end the Führer ordered that men be -taken from the reserve units of the Army and, as far as I remember, from -naval reserves also. I can speak only for that contingent which was -taken from the Air Force by coercion and by command. I should estimate, -without reference to official records, that there were at least about -50,000 men and officers. Then, because this aroused such strong feeling, -I arranged that all men from the Air Force who were to be used for land -fighting in the future should no longer go to the SS, but to the new -parachute divisions which were to be formed. The Führer agreed, because -in the last phase of the war the parachute divisions proved to be the -most trusty and the most distinguished in the whole Armed Forces, and -superior to the SS in fighting spirit and power of resistance. From then -on no further contingents of the Air Force were incorporated into the -SS, and, as far as I know, no more SS divisions were created. - -HERR BABEL: I have no further questions. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER: Witness, what was the attitude of the General Staff -of the Army towards the possibility of being involved in a war with -other powers? - -GÖRING: Their attitude was, if I may say so, purely professional, that -is to say, the General Staff had to study theoretically and practically -all the possibilities and contingencies of a war. Its attitude toward -its own tasks and conceptions was—I must say this openly—a very -reticent and timid one for a general staff. This is probably to be -attributed to the fact that most of the General Staff officers had come -from the Reichswehr. The whole attitude of mind in this small Reichswehr -during the last decade and a half was such that they could hardly -imagine that a military clash might come, and consequently a much more -pacific attitude than is normally the case with soldiers was to be found -among the General Staff of the Army. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know generals or admirals who urged and incited -war? - -GÖRING: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are perhaps aware that you are the only living -man who can expound to us the true purposes of the Nazi Party and the -inner workings of its leadership? - -GÖRING: I am perfectly aware of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You, from the very beginning, together with those -who were associated with you, intended to overthrow, and later did -overthrow, the Weimar Republic? - -GÖRING: That was, as far as I am concerned, my firm intention. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, upon coming to power, you immediately -abolished parliamentary government in Germany? - -GÖRING: We found it to be no longer necessary. Also I should like to -emphasize the fact that we were moreover the strongest parliamentary -party, and had the majority. But you are correct, when you say that -parliamentary procedure was done away with, because the various parties -were disbanded and forbidden. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You established the Leadership Principle, which you -have described as a system under which authority existed only at the -top, and is passed downwards and is imposed on the people below; is that -correct? - -GÖRING: In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like once more -to explain the idea briefly, as I understand it. In German parliamentary -procedure in the past responsibility rested with the highest officials, -who were responsible for carrying out the anonymous wishes of the -majorities, and it was they who exercised the authority. In the -Leadership Principle we sought to reverse the direction, that is, the -authority existed at the top and passed downwards, while the -responsibility began at the bottom and passed upwards. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you did not believe in and did not -permit government, as we call it, by consent of the governed, in which -the people, through their representatives, were the source of power and -authority? - -GÖRING: That is not entirely correct. We repeatedly called on the people -to express unequivocally and clearly what they thought of our system, -only it was in a different way from that previously adopted and from the -system in practice in other countries. We chose the way of a so-called -plebiscite. We also took the point of view that even a government -founded on the Leadership Principle could maintain itself only if it was -based in some way on the confidence of the people. If it no longer had -such confidence, then it would have to rule with bayonets, and the -Führer was always of the opinion that that was impossible in the long -run—to rule against the will of the people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not permit the election of those who -should act with authority by the people, but they were designated from -the top downward continuously, were they not? - -GÖRING: Quite right. The people were merely to acknowledge the authority -of the Führer, or, let us say, to declare themselves in agreement with -the Führer. If they gave the Führer their confidence, then it was their -concern to exercise the other functions. Thus, not the individual -persons were to be selected according to the will of the people, but -solely the leadership itself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was this Leadership Principle supported and -adopted by you in Germany because you believed that no people are -capable of self-government, or because you believed that some may be, -not the German people; or that no matter whether some of us are capable -of using our own system, it should not be allowed in Germany? - -GÖRING: I beg your pardon, I did not quite understand the question, but -I could perhaps answer it as follows: - -I consider the Leadership Principle necessary because the system which -previously existed, and which we called parliamentary or democratic, had -brought Germany to the verge of ruin. I might perhaps in this connection -remind you that your own President Roosevelt, as far as I can recall—I -do not want to quote it word for word—declared, “Certain peoples in -Europe have forsaken democracy, not because they did not wish for -democracy as such, but because democracy had brought forth men who were -too weak to give their people work and bread, and to satisfy them. For -this reason the peoples have abandoned this system and the men belonging -to it.” There is much truth in that statement. This system had brought -ruin by mismanagement and according to my own opinion, only an -organization made up of a strong, clearly defined leadership hierarchy -could restore order again. But, let it be understood, not against the -will of the people, but only when the people, having in the course of -time, and by means of a series of elections, grown stronger and -stronger, had expressed their wish to entrust their destiny to the -National Socialist leadership. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The principles of the authoritarian government -which you set up required, as I understand you, that there be tolerated -no opposition by political parties which might defeat or obstruct the -policy of the Nazi Party? - -GÖRING: You have understood this quite correctly. By that time we had -lived long enough with opposition and we had had enough of it. Through -opposition we had been completely ruined. It was now time to have done -with it and to start building up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you came to power, you regarded it necessary, -in order to maintain power, to suppress all opposition parties? - -GÖRING: We found it necessary not to permit any more opposition, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also held it necessary that you should -suppress all individual opposition lest it should develop into a party -of opposition? - -GÖRING: Insofar as opposition seriously hampered our work of building -up, this opposition of individual persons was, of course, not tolerated. -Insofar as it was simply a matter of harmless talk, it was considered to -be of no consequence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in order to make sure that you suppressed the -parties, and individuals also, you found it necessary to have a secret -political police to detect opposition? - -GÖRING: I have already stated that I considered that necessary, just as -previously the political police had existed, but on a firmer basis and -larger scale. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And upon coming to power you also considered it -immediately necessary to establish concentration camps to take care of -your incorrigible opponents? - -GÖRING: I have already stated that the reason for the concentration -camps was not because it could be said, “Here are a number of people who -are opposed to us and they must be taken into protective custody.” -Rather they were set up as a lightning measure against the functionaries -of the Communist Party who were attacking us in the thousands, and who, -since they were taken into protective custody, were not put in prison. -But it was necessary, as I said, to erect a camp for them—one, two, or -three camps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you are explaining, as the high authority of -this system, to men who do not understand it very well, and I want to -know what was necessary to run the kind of system that you set up in -Germany. The concentration camp was one of the things you found -immediately necessary upon coming into power, was it not? And you set -them up as a matter of necessity, as you saw it? - -GÖRING: That was faultily translated—it went too fast. But I believe I -have understood the sense of your remarks. You asked me if I considered -it necessary to establish concentration camps immediately in order to -eliminate opposition. Is that correct? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your answer is “yes,” I take it? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it also necessary, in operating this system, -that you must not have persons entitled to public trials in independent -courts? And you immediately issued an order that your political police -would not be subject to court review or to court orders, did you not? - -GÖRING: You must differentiate between the two categories; those who had -committed some act of treason against the new state, or those who might -be proved to have committed such an act, were naturally turned over to -the courts. The others, however, of whom one might expect such acts, but -who had not yet committed them, were taken into protective custody, and -these were the people who were taken to concentration camps. I am now -speaking of what happened at the beginning. Later things changed a great -deal. Likewise, if for political reasons—to answer your -question—someone was taken into protective custody, that is, purely for -reasons of state, this could not be reviewed or stopped by any court. -Later, when some people were also taken into protective custody for -nonpolitical reasons, people who had opposed the system in some other -way, I once, as Prussian Prime Minister and Reich Minister of the -Interior, I remember . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let’s omit that. I have not asked for that. If you -will just answer my question, we shall save a great deal of time. Your -counsel will be permitted to bring out any explanations you want to -make. - -You did prohibit all court review and considered it necessary to -prohibit court review of the causes for taking people into what you -called protective custody? - -GÖRING: That I answered very clearly, but I should like to make an -explanation in connection with my answer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your counsel will see to that. Now, the -concentration camps and the protective custody . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks the witness -ought to be allowed to make what explanation he thinks right in answer -to this question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal thinks that you should be permitted to -explain your answer now, and it will listen to your answers. - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not mean that to apply generally to his answers. I -meant it to apply to this particular answer. - -GÖRING: In connection with your question that these cases could not be -reviewed by the court, I want to say that a decree was issued through me -and Frick jointly to the effect that those who were turned over to -concentration camps were to be informed after 24 hours of the reason for -their being turned over, and that after 48 hours, or some short period -of time, they should have the right to an attorney. But this by no means -rescinded my order that a review was not permitted by the courts of a -politically necessary measure of protective custody. These people were -simply to be given an opportunity of making a protest. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Protective custody meant that you were taking -people into custody who had not committed any crimes but who, you -thought, might possibly commit a crime? - -GÖRING: Yes. People were arrested and taken into protective custody who -had not yet committed any crime, but who could be expected to do so if -they remained free, just as extensive protective measures are being -taken in Germany today on a tremendous scale. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it is also a necessity, in the kind of state -that you had, that you have some kind of organization to carry -propaganda down to the people and to get their reaction and inform the -leadership of it, is it not? - -GÖRING: The last part of that question has not been intelligibly -translated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you had to have organizations to carry out -orders and to carry your propaganda in that kind of state, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: Of course, we carried on propaganda, and for this we had a -propaganda organization. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you carried that on through the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party, did you not? - -GÖRING: The Leadership Corps was there, of course, partly to spread our -ideas among the people. Secondly, its purpose was to lead and organize -the people who made up the Party. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Through your system of Gauleiter and Kreisleiter -down to Blockleiter, commands and information went down from the -authority, and information as to the people’s reactions came back to the -leadership, didn’t it? - -GÖRING: That is correct. The orders and commands that were to be given -for propaganda or other purposes were passed down the grades as far as -necessary. On the other hand, it was a matter of course that the -reactions of the broad masses of the people were again transmitted -upwards, through the various offices, in order to keep us informed of -the mood of the people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also had to have certain organizations to -carry out orders—executive organizations, organizations to fight for -you if necessary, did you not? - -GÖRING: Yes, administrative organizations were, of course, necessary. I -do not quite understand—organizations to fight what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if you wanted certain people killed you had -to have some organization that would kill them, didn’t you? Röhm and the -rest of them were not killed by Hitler’s own hands nor by yours, were -they? - -GÖRING: Röhm—the Röhm affair I explained here clearly—that was a -matter of State necessity . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you . . . - -GÖRING: . . . and was carried out by the police. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when it was State necessity to kill somebody, -you had to have somebody to do it, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: Yes, just as in other countries, whether it is called secret -service or something else, I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SA, the SS, and the SD, organizations of -that kind, were the organizations that carried out the orders and dealt -with people on a physical level, were they not? - -GÖRING: The SA never received an order to kill anybody, neither did the -SS, not in my time. Anyhow, I had no influence on it. I know that orders -were given for executions, namely in the Röhm Putsch, and these were -carried out by the police, that is, by a State organ. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What police? - -GÖRING: As far as I recall, through the Gestapo. At any rate, that was -the organization that received the order. You see, it was a fight -against enemies of the State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS was for the same purpose, was it not? - -GÖRING: Not in north Germany at that time; to what extent that was the -case in south Germany, where the Gestapo and the SS were still -separated, and who carried out the action in south Germany, I do not -know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the SS carried out arrests and carried out -the transportation of people to concentration camps, didn’t they? You -were arrested by the SS, weren’t you? - -GÖRING: Yes, I say, yes; but later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what time did the SS perform this function of -acting as the executor of the Nazi Party? - -GÖRING: After the seizure of power, when the police came to be more and -more in the hands of Himmler. It is difficult for me to explain to an -outsider where the SS or where the Gestapo was active. I have already -said that the two of them worked very closely together. It is known that -the SS guarded the camps and later carried out police functions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And carried out other functions in the camps? - -GÖRING: To what functions do you refer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They carried out all of the functions of the camps, -didn’t they? - -GÖRING: If an SS unit was guarding a camp and an SS leader happened to -be the camp commander, then this unit carried out all the functions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this system was not a secret system. This -entire system was openly avowed, its merits were publicly advocated by -yourself and others, and every person entering into the Nazi Party was -enabled to know the kind of system of government you were going to set -up, wasn’t he? - -GÖRING: Every person who entered the Party knew that we embraced the -Leadership Principle and knew the fundamental measures we wanted to -carry out, so far as they were stated in the program. But not everyone -who joined the Party knew down to the last detail what was going to -happen later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But this system was set up openly and was well -known, was it not, in every one of its details? As to organization, -everybody knew what the Gestapo was, did they not? - -GÖRING: Yes, everyone knew what the Gestapo was. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what its program was in general, not in detail? - -GÖRING: I explained that program clearly. At the very beginning I -described that publicly, and I also spoke publicly of the tasks of the -Gestapo, and I even wrote about it for foreign countries. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was nothing secret about the -establishment of a Gestapo as a political police, about the fact, that -people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that these -were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there? - -GÖRING: There was at first nothing secret about it at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, part of the effectiveness of a -secret police and part of the effectiveness of concentration camp -penalties is that the people do know that there are such agencies, isn’t -it? - -GÖRING: It is true that everyone knows that if he acts against the state -he will end up in a concentration camp or will be accused, of high -treason before a court, according to the degree of his crime. But the -original reason for creating the concentration camps was to keep there -such people whom we rightfully considered enemies of the State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is the type of government—the government -which we have just been describing—the only type of government which -you think is necessary to govern Germany? - -GÖRING: I should not like to say that the basic characteristic of this -government and its most essential feature was the immediate setting up -of the Gestapo and the concentration camps in order to take care of our -opponents, but that over and above that we had set down as our -government program a great many far more important things, and that -those other things were not the basic principles of our government. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But all of these things were necessary things, as I -understood you, for purposes of protection? - -GÖRING: Yes, these things were necessary because of the opponents that -existed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I assume that that is the only kind of -government that you think can function in Germany under present -conditions? - -GÖRING: Under the conditions existing at that time, it was, in my -opinion, the only possible form, and it also demonstrated that Germany -could be raised in a short time from the depths of misery, poverty, and -unemployment to relative prosperity. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, all of this authority of the State was -concentrated—perhaps I am taking up another subject. Is it the intent -to recess at this time? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: The witness Dahlerus has been in Nuremberg for several days -and is waiting to testify. He has informed me that he must be in -Stockholm again by Thursday without fail. For this reason he requests, -and I am asking the High Tribunal’s permission, that he be called as a -witness tomorrow morning, even if the cross-examination has not been -completed. The Prosecution have all agreed to my proposal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the Prosecution had agreed to your proposal? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, My Lord. I contacted the four gentlemen involved and -they have agreed to this. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you anticipate that the examination in chief -of the witness will take? You cannot answer for the cross-examination. - -DR. STAHMER: I believe that I will need half a day, that is, until -tomorrow noon. I cannot say definitely, but it is quite probable it will -last as long as that. - -THE PRESIDENT: His evidence is relevant only to the few days before the -1st of September 1939? - -DR. STAHMER: There are two additional questions, but these questions may -be answered very briefly. He seems to have made two further efforts -after September, but those are very brief questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: It appears to the Tribunal that half a day is a totally -unnecessary time for the examination in chief of a witness who is going -to speak about events during a few days before the war began. - -DR. STAHMER: I would not say that, Mr. President. It is not just a few -days. These negotiations started already at the end of June or the -beginning of July. I should like to add further that I shall naturally -limit myself to such questions as are necessary for the Trial, but these -questions should be asked. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal agrees, if the Prosecution is willing for -this evidence to be interposed. The Tribunal trusts that you will find -it possible to make your examination in chief much shorter than you have -indicated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, you have related to us the manner in which -you and others co-operated in concentrating all authority in the German -State in the hands of the Führer, is that right? - -GÖRING: I was speaking about myself and to what extent I had a part in -it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there any defendant in the box you know of who -did not co-operate toward that end as far as was possible? - -GÖRING: That none of the defendants here opposed or obstructed the -Führer in the beginning is clear, but I should like to call your -attention to the fact that we must always distinguish between different -periods of time. Some of the questions that are being put to me are very -general and, after all, we are concerned with a period extending over 24 -to 25 years, if a comprehensive survey is to be made. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to call your attention to the fruits of -this system. You, as I understand it, were informed in 1940 of an -impending attack by the German Army on Soviet Russia? - -GÖRING: I have explained just how far I was informed of these matters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You believed an attack not only to be unnecessary, -but also to be unwise from the point of view of Germany itself? - -GÖRING: At that particular time I was of the opinion that this attack -should be postponed in order to carry through other tasks which I -considered more important. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not see any military necessity for an -attack at that time, even from the point of view of Germany? - -GÖRING: Naturally, I was fully aware of Russia’s efforts in the -deployment of her forces, but I hoped first to put into effect the other -strategic measures, described by me, to improve Germany’s position. I -thought that the time required for these would ward off the critical -moment. I well knew, of course, that this critical moment for Germany -might come at any time after that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can only repeat my question, which I submit you -have not answered. - -Did you at that time see any military necessity for an attack by Germany -on Soviet Russia? - -GÖRING: I personally believed that at that time the danger had not yet -reached its climax, and therefore the attack might not yet be necessary. -But that was my personal view. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the Number 2 man at that time in all -Germany? - -GÖRING: It has nothing to do with my being second in importance. There -were two conflicting points of view as regards strategy. The Führer, the -Number 1 man, saw one danger, and I, as the Number 2 man, if you wish to -express it so, wanted to carry out another strategic measure. If I had -imposed my will every time, then I would probably have become the Number -1 man. But since the Number 1 man was of a different opinion, and I was -only the Number 2 man, his opinion naturally prevailed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony—and I think -you can answer this “yes” or “no,” and I would greatly appreciate it if -you would—I have understood from your testimony that you were opposed, -and told the Führer that you were opposed, to an attack upon Russia at -that time. Am I right or wrong? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were opposed to it because you thought -that it was a dangerous move for Germany to make; is that correct? - -GÖRING: Yes, I was of the opinion that the moment—and I repeat this -again—had not come for this undertaking, and that measures should be -taken which were more expedient as far as Germany was concerned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet, because of the Führer system, as I -understand you, you could give no warning to the German people; you -could bring no pressure of any kind to bear to prevent that step, and -you could not even resign to protect your own place in history. - -GÖRING: These are several questions at once. I should like to answer the -first one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Separate them, if you wish. - -GÖRING: The first question was, I believe, whether I took the -opportunity to tell the German people about this danger. I had no -occasion to do this. We were at war, and such differences of opinion, as -far as strategy was concerned, could not be brought before the public -forum during war. I believe that never has happened in world history. - -Secondly, as far as my resignation is concerned, I do not wish even to -discuss that, for during the war I was an officer, a soldier, and I was -not concerned with whether I shared an opinion or not. I had merely to -serve my country as a soldier. - -Thirdly, I was not the man to forsake someone, to whom I had given my -oath of loyalty, every time he was not of my way of thinking. If that -had been the case there would have been no need to bind myself to him -from the beginning. It never occurred to me to leave the Führer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Insofar as you know, the German people were led -into the war, attacking Soviet Russia under the belief that you favored -it? - -GÖRING: The German people did not know about the declaration of war -against Russia until after the war with Russia had started. The German -people, therefore, had nothing to do with this. The German people were -not asked; they were told of the fact and of the necessity for it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what time did you know that the war, as regards -achieving the objectives that you had in mind, was a lost war? - -GÖRING: It is extremely difficult to say. At any rate, according to my -conviction, relatively late—I mean, it was only towards the end that I -became convinced that the war was lost. Up till then I had always -thought and hoped that it would come to a stalemate. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in November 1941 the offensive in Russia -broke down? - -GÖRING: That is not at all correct. We had reverses because of weather -conditions, or rather, the goal which we had set was not reached. The -push of 1942 proved well enough that there was no question of a military -collapse. Some corps, which had pushed forward, were merely thrown back, -and some were withdrawn. The totally unexpected early frost that set in -was the cause of this. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said, “relatively late.” The expression that -you used does not tell me anything, because I do not know what you -regard as relatively late. Will you fix in terms, either of events or -time, when it was that the conviction came to you that the war was lost? - -GÖRING: When, after 12 January 1945, the Russian offensive pushed -forward to the Oder and at the same time the Ardennes offensive had not -penetrated, it was then that I was forced to realize that defeat would -probably set in slowly. Up to that time I had always hoped that, on the -one side, the position at the Vistula toward the East and, on the other -side, the position at the West Wall towards the West, could be held -until the flow of the new mass produced weapons should bring about a -slackening of the Anglo-American air war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you fix that by date; you told us when it -was by events. - -GÖRING: I just said January 1945; middle, or end of January 1945. After -that there was no more hope. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want it understood that, as a military man, -you did not realize until January of 1945 that Germany could not be -successful in the war? - -GÖRING: As I have already said, we must draw a sharp distinction between -two possibilities: First, the successful conclusion of a war, and -second, a war which ends by neither side being the victor. As regards a -successful outcome, the moment when it was realized that that was no -longer possible was much earlier, whereas the realization of the fact -that defeat would set in did not come until the time I have just -mentioned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For some period before that, you knew that a -successful termination of the war could only be accomplished if you -could come to some kind of terms with the enemy; was that not true? - -GÖRING: Of course, a successful termination of a war can only be -considered successful if I either conquer the enemy or, through -negotiations with the enemy, come to a conclusion which guarantees me -success. That is what I call a successful termination. I call it a draw, -when I come to terms with the enemy. This does not bring me the success -which victory would have brought but, on the other hand, it precludes a -defeat. This is a conclusion without victors or vanquished. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that it was Hitler’s policy never to -negotiate and you knew that as long as he was the head of the Government -the enemy would not negotiate with Germany, did you not? - -GÖRING: I knew that enemy propaganda emphasized that under no -circumstances would there be negotiations with Hitler. That Hitler did -not want to negotiate under any circumstances, I also knew, but not in -this connection. Hitler wanted to negotiate if there were some prospect -of results; but he was absolutely opposed to hopeless and futile -negotiations. Because of the declaration of the enemy in the West after -the landing in Africa, as far as I remember, that under no circumstances -would they negotiate with Germany but would force on her unconditional -surrender, Germany’s resistance was stiffened to the utmost and measures -had to be taken accordingly. If I have no chance of concluding a war -through negotiations, then it is useless to negotiate, and I must strain -every nerve to bring about a change by a call to arms. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By the time of January 1945 you also knew that you -were unable to defend the German cities against the air attacks of the -Allies, did you not? - -GÖRING: Concerning the defense of German cities against Allied air -attacks, I should like to describe the possibility of doing this as -follows: Of itself . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you answer my question? Time may not mean quite -as much to you as it does to the rest of us. Can you not answer “yes” or -“no”? Did you then know, at the same time that you knew that the war was -lost, that the German cities could not successfully be defended against -air attack by the enemy? Can you not tell us “yes” or “no”? - -GÖRING: I can say that I knew that, at that time, it was not possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after that time it was well known to you that -the air attacks which were continued against England could not turn the -tide of war, and were designed solely to effect a prolongation of what -you then knew was a hopeless conflict? - -GÖRING: I believe you are mistaken. After January 1945 there were no -more attacks on England, except perhaps a few single planes, because at -that time I needed all my petrol for the fighter planes for defense. If -I had had bombers and oil at my disposal, then, of course, I should have -continued such attacks up to the last minute as retaliation for the -attacks which were being carried out on German cities, whatever our -chances might have been. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about robot attacks? Were there any robot -attacks after January 1945? - -GÖRING: Thank God, we still had one weapon that we could use. I have -just said that, as long as the fight was on, we had to hit back; and as -a soldier I can only regret that we did not have enough of these V-1 and -V-2 bombs, for an easing of the attacks on German cities could be -brought about only if we could inflict equally heavy losses on the -enemy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was no way to prevent the war going on as -long as Hitler was the head of the German Government, was there? - -GÖRING: As long as Hitler was the Führer of the German people, he alone -decided whether the war was to go on. As long as my enemy threatens me -and demands absolutely unconditional surrender, I fight to my last -breath, because there is nothing left for me except perhaps a chance -that in some way fate may change, even though it seems hopeless. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the people of Germany who thought it was time -that the slaughter should stop had no means to stop it except revolution -or assassination of Hitler, had they? - -GÖRING: A revolution always changes a situation, if it succeeds. That is -a foregone conclusion. The murder of Hitler at this time, say January -1945, would have brought about my succession. If the enemy had given me -the same answer, that is, unconditional surrender, and had held out -those terrible conditions which had been intimated, I would have -continued fighting whatever the circumstances. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was an attack on Hitler’s life on 20 July -1944? - -GÖRING: Unfortunately, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time in 1945 when Hitler made a -will in Berlin whereby he turned over the presidency of the Reich to -your co-defendant, Admiral Dönitz. You know about that? - -GÖRING: That is correct. I read of this will here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in making his will and turning over the -Government of Germany to Admiral Dönitz, I call your attention to this -statement: - - “Göring and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my - person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole - nation by secret negotiations with the enemy which they - conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes, and by - illegally attempting to seize power in the State for - themselves.” - -And by that will he expelled you and Himmler from the Party and from all -offices of the State. - -GÖRING: I can only answer for myself. What Himmler did I do not know. - -I neither betrayed the Führer, nor did I at that time negotiate with a -single foreign soldier. This will, or this final act of the Führer’s, is -based on an extremely regrettable mistake, and one which grieves me -deeply—that the Führer could believe in his last hours that I could -ever be disloyal to him. It was all due to an error in the transmission -of a radio report and perhaps to a misrepresentation which Bormann gave -the Führer. I myself never thought for a minute of taking over power -illegally or of acting against the Führer in any way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In any event you were arrested and expected to be -shot? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in tracing the rise of power of the Party you -have omitted some such things as, for example, the Reichstag fire of 27 -February 1933. There was a great purge following that fire, was there -not, in which many people were arrested and many people were killed? - -GÖRING: I do not know of a single case where a man was killed because of -the Reichstag fire, except that of the incendiary, Van der Lubbe, who -was sentenced by the court. The other two defendants in this trial were -acquitted. Herr Thälmann was not, as you recently erroneously believed, -accused; it was the communist representative, Torgler. He was acquitted, -as was also the Bulgarian, Dimitroff. Relatively few arrests were made -in connection with the Reichstag fire. The arrests which you attribute -to the Reichstag fire are the arrests of communist functionaries. These -arrests, as I have repeatedly stated and wish to emphasize once more, -had nothing to do with this fire. The fire merely precipitated their -arrest and upset our carefully planned action, thus allowing several of -the functionaries to escape. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you had lists of Communists already -prepared at the time of the Reichstag fire, of persons who should be -arrested, did you not? - -GÖRING: We had always drawn up, beforehand, fairly complete lists of -communist functionaries who were to be arrested. That had nothing to do -with the fire in the German Reichstag. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were immediately put into execution—the -arrests, I mean—after the Reichstag fire? - -GÖRING: Contrary to my intention of postponing this action for a few -days and letting it take place according to plan, thereby perfecting the -arrangements, the Führer ordered that same night that the arrests should -follow immediately. This had the disadvantage, as I said, of -precipitating matters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You and the Führer met at the fire, did you not? - -GÖRING: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then and there you decided to arrest all the -Communists that you had listed? - -GÖRING: I repeat again that the decision for their arrests had been -reached some days before this; it simply meant that on that night they -were immediately arrested. I would rather have waited a few days -according to plan; then some of the important men would not have -escaped. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the next morning the decree was presented to -President Von Hindenburg, suspending the provisions of the constitution -which we have discussed here, was it not? - -GÖRING: I believe so, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Karl Ernst? - -GÖRING: Karl Ernst—whether his first name was Karl I do not know—was -the SA leader of Berlin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was Helldorf? - -GÖRING: Count Helldorf was the subsequent SA leader of Berlin. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heines? - -GÖRING: Heines was the SA leader of Silesia at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it is known to you, is it not, that Ernst made -a statement confessing that these three burned the Reichstag and that -you and Goebbels planned and furnished the incendiary materials of -liquid phosphorus and petroleum which were deposited by you in a -subterranean passage for them to get, which passage led from your house -to the Reichstag building? You knew of such a statement, did you not? - -GÖRING: I do not know of any statement by the SA leader Ernst. But I do -know of some fairytale published shortly after in the foreign press by -Röhm’s chauffeur. This was after 1934. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But there was such a passage from the Reichstag -building to your house, was there not? - -GÖRING: On one side of the street is the Reichstag building, and -opposite is the palace of the Reichstag president. The two are connected -by a passage along which the wagons run which carry the coke for the -central heating. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, in any event, shortly after this, Ernst was -killed without a trial and without a chance to tell his story, was he -not? - -GÖRING: That is not correct. The Reichstag fire was in February 1933. -Ernst was shot on 30 June 1934, because together with Röhm he had -planned to overthrow the Government and had plotted against the Führer. -He, therefore, had a year and a quarter in which he could have made -statements regarding the Reichstag fire, if he had wished to do so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he had begun to make statements, had he not, -and you were generally being accused of burning the Reichstag building? -You knew that, did you not? That was the . . . - -GÖRING: That accusation that I had set fire to the Reichstag came from a -certain foreign press. That could not bother me because it was not -consistent with the facts. I had no reason or motive for setting fire to -the Reichstag. From the artistic point of view I did not at all regret -that the assembly chamber was burned; I hoped to build a better one. But -I did regret very much that I was forced to find a new meeting place for -the Reichstag and, not being able to find one, I had to give up my Kroll -Opera House, that is, the second State Opera House, for that purpose. -The opera seemed to me much more important than the Reichstag. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you ever boasted of burning the Reichstag -building, even by way of joking? - -GÖRING: No. I made a joke, if that is the one you are referring to, when -I said that, after this, I should be competing with Nero and that -probably people would soon be saying that, dressed in a red toga and -holding a lyre in my hand, I looked on at the fire and played while the -Reichstag was burning. That was the joke. But the fact was that I almost -perished in the flames, which would have been very unfortunate for the -German people, but very fortunate for their enemies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never stated then that you burned the -Reichstag? - -GÖRING: No. I know that Herr Rauschning said in the book which he wrote, -and which has often been referred to here, that I had discussed this -with him. I saw Herr Rauschning only twice in my life and only for a -short time on each occasion. If I had set fire to the Reichstag, I would -presumably have let that be known only to my closest circle of -confidants, if at all. I would not have told it to a man whom I did not -know and whose appearance I could not describe at all today. That is an -absolute distortion of the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you remember the luncheon on Hitler’s birthday -in 1942 at the Kasino, the officers’ mess, at the headquarters of the -Führer in East Prussia? - -GÖRING: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not remember that? I will ask that you be -shown the affidavit of General Franz Halder, and I call your attention -to his statements which may refresh your recollection. I read it. - - “On the occasion of a luncheon on the Führer’s birthday in 1942, - the people around the Führer turned the conversation to the - Reichstag building and its artistic value. I heard with my own - ears how Göring broke into the conversation and shouted: ‘The - only one who really knows the Reichstag is I, for I set fire to - it.’ And saying this he slapped his thigh.” - -GÖRING: This conversation did not take place and I request that I be -confronted with Herr Halder. First of all I want to emphasize that what -is written here is utter nonsense. It says, “The only one who really -knows the Reichstag is I.” The Reichstag was known to every -representative in the Reichstag. The fire took place only in the general -assembly room, and many hundreds or thousands of people knew this room -as well as I did. A statement of this type is utter nonsense. How Herr -Halder came to make that statement I do not know. Apparently that bad -memory, which also let him down in military matters, is the only -explanation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know who Halder is? - -GÖRING: Only too well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us what position he held in the German -Army? - -GÖRING: He was Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and I repeatedly -pointed out to the Führer, after the war started, that he would at least -have to find a chief who knew something about such matters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Röhm purge you have left a little -indefinite. What was it that Röhm did that he was shot? What acts did he -commit? - -GÖRING: Röhm planned to overthrow the Government, and it was intended to -kill the Führer also. He wanted to follow it up by a revolution, -directed in the first place against the Army, the officers’ corps—those -groups which he considered to be reactionary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had evidence of that fact? - -GÖRING: We had sufficient evidence of that fact. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But he was never tried in any court where he would -have a chance to tell his story as you are telling yours, was he? - -GÖRING: That is correct. He wanted to bring about a Putsch and therefore -the Führer considered it right that this thing should be nipped in the -bud—not by a court procedure, but by smashing the revolt immediately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were the names of the people who were killed in -that purge, following the arrest of Röhm, ever published? - -GÖRING: Some of the names, yes; but not all of them, I believe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who actually killed Röhm? Do you know? - -GÖRING: I do not know who personally carried out this action. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To what organization was the order given? - -GÖRING: That I do not know either, because the shooting of Röhm was -decreed by the Führer and not by me, for I was competent in north -Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who took into custody those who were destined -for concentration camps, and how many were there? - -GÖRING: The police carried out the arrest of those who were, first of -all, to be interrogated, those who were not so seriously incriminated -and of whom it was not known whether they were incriminated or not. A -number of these people were released very soon, others not until -somewhat later. Just how many were arrested in this connection I cannot -tell you. The arrests were made by the police. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Gestapo, you mean? - -GÖRING: I assume so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Milch testified that he saw 700 or 800 in -Dachau in 1935, there must have been a very much larger number arrested, -since you say many were released. Do you know the number that were -arrested? - -GÖRING: I state again, I do not know exactly how many were arrested -because the necessary arrests, or the arrest of those who were -considered as having a part in this, did not go through me. My action -ended, so to speak, on the date when the revolt was smashed. I -understood Milch a little differently and I sent a note to my counsel in -order that it be made clear, through a question whether Milch meant by -these 700 people those concerned with the Röhm Putsch or whether he -meant to say that he saw altogether 700 arrested persons there. That is -the way I understood it. But to clarify this statement we should have to -question Milch again, for I believe this number of 500, 600, or 700, to -be far too high for the total number of people arrested in connection -with the Röhm Putsch. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among those who were killed were Von Schleicher and -his wife. He was one of your political opponents, was he not? - -GÖRING: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And also Erich Klausner, who had been Chief of the -Catholic Action of Germany? - -GÖRING: Klausner was likewise among those who were shot. Actually, it -was Klausner’s case which caused me, as I stated recently, to ask the -Führer to give immediate orders to cease any further action, since, in -my opinion, Klausner was quite wrongfully shot. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Strasser, who had been the former Number 2 man -to Hitler and had disagreed with him in December 1932—Strasser was -killed, was he not? - -GÖRING: Of Strasser it cannot be said that he was Number 2 man after -Hitler. He played an extremely important role within the Party before -the seizure of power, but he was banned from the Party already before -the seizure of power. Strasser participated in this revolt and he was -also shot. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when it got down to a point where there were -only two left on the list yet to be killed, you intervened and asked to -have it stopped; is that correct? - -GÖRING: No, that is not entirely correct. I made it fairly clear and -should like to repeat briefly that not when there were only two left on -the list did I intervene; I intervened when I saw that many were shot -who were not concerned with this matter. And when I did so, two persons -were left who had taken a very active part, and the Führer himself had -ordered that they be shot. The Führer was particularly furious with one -of them, the chief instigator of the action. What I wanted to make clear -was that I said to the Führer, “It is better for you to give up the idea -of having these two main perpetrators executed, and put an end to the -whole thing immediately.” That is what I meant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What date was that? Did you fix the time? - -GÖRING: Yes, I can give you a definite time. As far as I recall, the -decisive day was Saturday; on Saturday evening between 6 and 7 o’clock -the Führer arrived by plane from Munich. My request to stop the action -was made on Sunday, some time between 2 and 3 o’clock in the afternoon. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what happened to the two men who were left on -the list—were they ever brought to trial? - -GÖRING: No. One, as far as I remember, was taken to a concentration -camp, and the other was for the time being placed under a sort of house -arrest, if I remember correctly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, going back to the time when you met Hitler; -you said that he was a man who had a serious and definite aim, that he -was not content with the defeat of Germany and with the Versailles -Treaty; do you recall that? - -GÖRING: I am very sorry, the translation was rather defective and I -cannot understand it. Please repeat. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you met Hitler, as I understand your -testimony, you found a man with a serious and definite aim, as you said, -in that he was not content with the defeat of Germany in the previous -war and was not content with the Versailles Treaty. - -GÖRING: I think you did not quite understand me correctly here, for I -did not put it that way at all. I stated that it had struck me that -Hitler had very definite views of the impotency of protest; secondly, -that he was of the opinion that Germany must be freed from the dictate -of Versailles. It was not only Adolf Hitler; every German, every -patriotic German had the same feelings; and I, being an ardent patriot, -bitterly felt the shame of the dictate of Versailles, and I allied -myself with the man about whom I felt that he perceived most clearly the -consequences of this dictate, and that probably he was the man who would -find the ways and means to set it aside. All the other talk in the Party -about Versailles was, pardon the expression, mere twaddle. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, as I understand you, from the very beginning, -publicly and notoriously, it was the position of the Nazi Party that the -Versailles Treaty must be set aside and that protest was impotent for -that purpose? - -GÖRING: From the beginning it was the aim of Adolf Hitler and his -movement to free Germany from the oppressive fetters of Versailles, that -is, not from the whole Treaty of Versailles, but from those terms which -were strangling Germany’s future. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to do it by war, if necessary? - -GÖRING: We did not debate about that at all at the time. We debated only -about the foremost condition, that Germany should acquire a different -political structure, which alone would enable her to raise objections to -this dictate, this one-sided dictate—everybody always called it a -peace, whereas we Germans always called it a dictate—and not merely -objections, but such objections as would demand consideration. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the means—the means was the -reorganization of the German State, but your aim was to get rid of what -you call the dictate of Versailles. - -GÖRING: Liberation from these terms of the dictate of Versailles, which -in the long run would make German life impossible, was the aim and the -intention. But by that we did not go as far as to say, “We want to wage -war on our enemies and be victorious.” Rather, the aim was to suit the -methods to the political events. Those were the basic considerations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was for that end that you and all of the -other persons who became members of the Nazi Party gave to Hitler all -power to make decisions for them, and agreed, in their oath of office, -to give him obedience? - -GÖRING: Again here are several questions. Question One: The fight -against the dictate of Versailles was for me the most decisive factor in -joining the Party. For others, perhaps, other points of the program or -of the ideology, which seemed more important, may have been more -decisive. Giving the Führer absolute powers was not a basic condition -for getting rid of Versailles, but for putting into practice our -conception of the Leadership Principle. To give him our oath before he -became the head of the State was, under the conditions then existing, a -matter of course for those who considered themselves members of his -select leadership corps. I do not know and I cannot tell exactly, just -how the oath was given before the seizure of power; I can only tell you -what I myself did. After a certain period of time, when I had acquired -more insight into the Führer’s personality, I gave him my hand and said: -“I unite my fate with yours for better or for worse: I dedicate myself -to you in good times and in bad, even unto death.” I really meant -it—and still do. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you would answer three or four questions for me -“yes” or “no,” then I would be quite willing to let you give your entire -version of this thing. In the first place, you wanted a strong German -State to overcome the conditions of Versailles. - -GÖRING: We wanted a strong State anyhow, regardless of Versailles; but -in order to get rid of Versailles the State had, first of all, to be -strong, for a weak State never makes itself heard; that we know from -experience. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Führer principle you adopted because you -thought it would serve the ends of a strong State? - -GÖRING: Correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this aim, which was one of the aims of the Nazi -Party, to modify the conditions of Versailles, was a public and -notorious aim in which the people generally joined—it was one of your -best means of getting people to join with you, was it not? - -GÖRING: The dictate of Versailles was such that every German, in my -opinion, could not help being in favor of its modification, and there is -no doubt that this was a very strong inducement for joining the -movement. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, a number of the men who took part in this -movement are not here; and, for the record, there is no doubt in your -mind, is there, that Adolf Hitler is dead? - -GÖRING: I believe there can be no doubt about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the same is true of Goebbels? - -GÖRING: Goebbels, I have no doubt about that, for I heard from someone -whom I trust completely, that he saw Goebbels dead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have no doubt of the death of Himmler, have -you? - -GÖRING: I am not certain of that, but I think that you must be certain, -since you know much more about it than I, as he died a prisoner of -yours. I was not there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have no doubt of the death of Heydrich, have -you? - -GÖRING: I am absolutely certain about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And probably of Bormann? - -GÖRING: I am not absolutely certain of this. I have no proof. I do not -know, but I assume so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are the chief persons in your testimony, -who have been mentioned as being responsible—Hitler for everything, -Goebbels for inciting riots against the Jews, Himmler, who deceived -Hitler, and Bormann, who misled him about his will? - -GÖRING: The influence exerted on the Führer varied at different times. -The chief influence on the Führer, at least up till the end of 1941 or -the beginning of 1942, if one can speak of influence at all, was exerted -by me. From then until 1943 my influence gradually decreased, after -which it rapidly dwindled. All in all, I do not believe anyone had -anything like the influence on the Führer that I had. Next to me, or -apart from me, if one can speak of influence at all, Goebbels, with whom -the Führer was together quite a good deal, exerted an influence in a -certain direction from the very beginning. This influence wavered for a -time and was very slight, and then increased greatly in the last years -of the war, for it was easy to win influence by means of . . . - -Before the seizure of power and during the years immediately following -the seizure of power, Hess had a certain influence, but only in regard -to his special sphere. Then, in the course of the years, Himmler’s -influence increased. From the end of 1944 on this influence decreased -rapidly. The most decisive influence on the Führer during the war, and -especially from about 1942—after Hess went out in 1941 and a year had -elapsed—was exerted by Herr Bormann. The latter had, at the end, a -disastrously strong influence. That was possible only because the Führer -was filled with profound mistrust after 20 July, and because Bormann was -with him constantly and reported on and described to him all matters. -Broadly speaking these are the persons who had influence at one time or -another. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You took over a special intelligence organization -in 1933 which was devoted to monitoring the telephone conversations of -public officials and others inside and outside of Germany, did you not? - -GÖRING: I have explained that I had erected a technical apparatus which, -as you said, monitored the conversations of important foreigners to and -from foreign countries—telegrams and wireless communications which were -transmitted not only from Germany to foreign countries, but also from -one foreign country to the other through the ether, and which were -intercepted. It also monitored telephone conversations within Germany -of: (1) all important foreigners; (2) important firms, at times; and (3) -persons who for any reason of a political or police nature were to be -watched. - -In order to prevent any abuse on the part of the police, this department -had to obtain my personal permission when it was to listen to telephone -conversations. Despite this there could, of course, be uncontrolled -tapping of wires at the same time, just as that is technically possible -everywhere today. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You kept the results of those reports to yourself, -did you not? - -GÖRING: No; this was the procedure: These reports in which the Foreign -Office was interested were released to the Foreign Office. Those reports -which were important to the Führer went to the Führer. Those which were -important to the military authorities went to the Minister of War, or to -the Air Ministry, or to the Ministry of Economy. I or my deputy decided -whether a report was important for this or that office. There was a man -there whose job and responsibility it was to see that these secret -reports were submitted only to the chief. I could, of course, order at -any time that this or that report should be exclusively for my knowledge -and not be handed on. That was always possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had a good deal of difficulty with other police -authorities who wanted to get possession of that organization, did you -not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. The police did strive to get this instrument -into their hands. But they did not get it from me, and perhaps they kept -a watch of their own here and there. But the decisive control which had -to be directed through the Ministry of Posts could technically be -ordered only by me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have listened to the evidence of the -Prosecution against all of the defendants in this case, have you not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there any act of any of your co-defendants which -you claim was not one reasonably necessary to carry out the plans of the -Nazi Party? - -GÖRING: At present those are only assertions by the Prosecution; they -are not yet facts which have been proved. In these assertions there are -a number of actions which would not have been necessary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you specify which acts, of which defendants, -you claim, are beyond the scope of the plans of the Party? - -GÖRING: That is a very difficult question which I cannot answer straight -away and without the data. - -DR. STAHMER: I object to this question. I do not believe that this is a -question of fact, but rather of judgment, and that it is not possible to -give an answer to such a general question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks that the -question is somewhat too wide. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that the program of the Nazi Party -was to rectify certain injustices which you considered in the Treaty of -Versailles; and I ask you whether it is not a fact that your program -went considerably beyond any matter dealt with in that Treaty? - -GÖRING: Of course, the program contained a number of other points which -had nothing to do with the Treaty of Versailles. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to a statement in _Mein -Kampf_ as follows: - - “The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of - the German nation. They did not constitute a defense in the past - nor do they constitute a power in the future. They will not give - to the German people inner security or ensure their food supply, - nor do these boundaries appear to be favorable or satisfactory - from a military point of view.” - -That is all true, is it not? - -GÖRING: I should like to reread the original passage in _Mein Kampf_ in -order to determine if it is exactly as you have read it. I assume that -it is correct. If so, I can reply that this is the text of a public book -and not the Party program. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The first country to be absorbed by Germany was -Austria, and it was not a part of Germany before the first World War, -and had not been taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; is that -correct? - -GÖRING: For this very reason this point was distinctly separated from -Versailles in the program. Austria is directly connected with Versailles -only insofar as the right of self-determination, as proclaimed there, -was most gravely infringed; for Austria and the purely German population -were not allowed the Anschluss which they wanted to see accomplished as -early as 1918, after the revolution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The second territory taken by Germany was Bohemia, -then Moravia, and then Slovakia. These were not taken from Germany by -the Treaty of Versailles, nor were they part of Germany before the first -World War. - -GÖRING: As far as the Sudetenland is concerned the same applies as for -Austria. The German representatives of the German Sudetenland likewise -sat in the Austrian Parliament, and under their leader, Lottmann, cast -the same vote. It is different in the case of the last act, that is, the -declaration of the Protectorate. These parts of Czech territory, -especially Bohemia and Moravia, were not constituent parts of the -smaller German Reich before the Treaty of Versailles, but formerly they -had been united to the German Reich for centuries. That is an historical -fact. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You still have not answered my question, although -you answered everything else. They were not taken from you by the Treaty -of Versailles, were they? - -GÖRING: Of course Austria was taken away by the Versailles Treaty and -likewise the Sudetenland, for both territories, had it not been for the -Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain, would have become -German territories through the right of the people to -self-determination. To this extent they have to do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified, have you not, on interrogation, -that it was Hitler’s information that the United States would never go -to war, even if attacked, and that he counted on the isolationists of -that country to keep it out of war? - -GÖRING: This interrogation must have been recorded entirely incorrectly. -That is the very reason why I refused from the beginning to give my oath -to these interrogations before I had been able to look carefully at the -German transcript and determine whether it had been correctly understood -and translated. Only once, and that was on the part of the Russian -Delegation, was a completely correct transcript submitted to me. I -signed it page by page and thereby acknowledged it. Now, as far as this -statement is concerned, I should like to put it right. I said that, at -first, the Führer did not believe that America would intervene in the -war, and that he was confirmed in this belief by the attitude of the -isolationist press, while I, on the contrary, unfortunately feared from -the very beginning that America would in any case intervene in the war. -Such nonsense—I hope you will excuse me—as to say that America would -not come into the war even if she were attacked, you will understand -that I could never have uttered, because, if a country is attacked, it -defends itself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know Axel Wennergren? - -GÖRING: He is a Swede whom I have seen two or three times. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You talked with him about this subject, did you -not? - -GÖRING: About the subject of America’s entering the war I can very well -have talked with him; it is even probable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him that a democracy could not mobilize -and would not fight, did you not? - -GÖRING: I did not tell him any such nonsense, for we had one democracy -as our chief enemy, namely England, and how this democracy would fight -we knew from the last World War, and we experienced it again during this -war. When I talked with Wennergren, the war with England was in full -swing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified on interrogation, if I -understand you correctly, that there were at all times two basic ideas -in Hitler’s mind, either to ally himself with Russia and seek increase -in living space through the acquisition of colonies, or to ally himself -with Britain and seek acquisition of territories in the East. But in -view of his orientation, he would very much have preferred to ally -himself with Great Britain, is that true? - -GÖRING: That is correct. I need only to refer to the book _Mein Kampf_, -where these things were set down in thorough detail by Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as early as 1933 you began a real program to -rearm Germany regardless of any treaty limitations, did you not? - -GÖRING: That is not correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right; tell us when you started. - -GÖRING: After all the proposals of disarmament which the Führer made -were refused, that is, shortly after our withdrawal from the disarmament -conference he made several proposals for a limitation; but, since these -were not taken seriously or discussed, he ordered a complete rearmament. -At the end of 1933 already certain slight preparations were started by -me personally, to the extent that I had made some inconsiderable -preparations in regard to the air and had also undertaken a certain -militarization of the uniformed police. But that was done by me -personally; I bear the responsibility. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, the militarization of the police -auxiliary was not a state affair. It was your personal affair. What do -you mean by that? - -GÖRING: Not the auxiliary police, but the municipal police; that is, -there was one uniformed police force which had simply police duty on the -streets, and a second which was grouped in formations and was at our -disposal for larger operations—not created by us, let it be understood, -but existing at the time of the seizure of power. This municipal police, -which was grouped in units, uniformed, armed, and housed in barracks, I -formed very soon into a strong military instrument by taking these men -out of the police service and having them trained more along military -lines and giving them machine guns and such things, in addition to their -small arms. This I did on my own responsibility. These formations were -taken into the Armed Forces as regular Army units when the Armed Forces -Law was declared. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you some questions from your -interrogation of the 17th day of October, 1945. I will first read you -the questions and answers as they appear in the interrogations and I -shall then ask you whether you gave those answers, and then you can make -the explanations if you desire, and I assume you do. The interrogation -reads: - - “I wanted to ask you today about some of the economic history of - the period. When was the armament program first discussed, that - is, the rearmament program? What year? - - “Answer: Immediately; in 1933. - - “Question: In other words, Schacht had assumed the obligation at - that time already, to raise funds for the rearmament program? - - “Answer: Yes. But, of course, in co-operation with the Minister - of Finance. - - “Question: During the years 1933 to 1935, before general - conscription came in, naturally, the rearmament was a secret - rearmament, was it not? - - “Answer: Yes. - - “Question: So that money that was used outside of the budget - would have to be raised by some secret means not to be known to - foreign nations? - - “Answer: Yes, unless they could be raised from normal Army - funds. - - “Question: That is to say, you had a small budget for the - standing 100,000 man Army which was open, and the rest of the - rearmament had to be from secret sources? - - “Answer: Yes.” - -Were you asked those questions and did you give these answers, in -substance? - -GÖRING: More or less; generally speaking that is correct. I have these -remarks to make: Firstly, I was asked when rearmament had been -discussed, not when it had been started. It had, of course, been -discussed already in the year 1933, because it was clear at once that -our government had to do something about it, that is to say, to demand -that the others should disarm, and, if they did not disarm, that we -should rearm. These things required discussion. The conclusion of the -discussion and the formulation into a definite order followed after the -failure of our attempts to get other countries to disarm. As soon as we, -or rather the Führer, saw that his proposals would not be accepted under -any circumstances, a gradual rearmament, of course, began to take place. -There was no reason whatsoever why we should inform the world about what -we were doing in the way of rearmament. We were under no obligation to -do that, nor was it expedient. - -Herr Schacht, in the year 1933 at the very beginning, could not raise -any funds because at the start he held no office. He was able to do this -only at a later date. And here it was understandable that the funds had -to be raised through the Minister of Finance and the President of the -Reichsbank according to the wishes and the orders of the Führer, -especially as we had left no doubt that, if the other side did not -disarm, we would rearm. That had already been set down on our Party -program since 1921, and quite openly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that on the 21st of May 1935, by a -secret decree, Schacht was named Plenipotentiary for the War Economy? - -GÖRING: The date—if you will kindly submit the decree to me, then I can -tell you exactly. I have not the dates of decrees and laws in my head, -especially if they do not have anything to do with me personally; but -that can be seen from the decree. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At any event, shortly after he was named, he -suggested you as Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency, -did he not? - -GÖRING: If Herr Schacht made this suggestion shortly after his -appointment, then that appointment could not have taken place until -1936, because not until the summer of 1936 did Herr Schacht, together -with the Minister of War, Von Blomberg, make the proposal that I should -become Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I ask you if you did not give this answer to -the American interrogator on the 10th day of October 1945, referring to -Schacht: - - “He made the suggestion that I was to become the Commissioner - for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. He had the idea that, in - that position, I could give the Minister for Economics and the - President of the Reichsbank valuable support.” - -How did you give that answer, and is that information correct? - -GÖRING: Will you please repeat. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Referring to Schacht, the record shows that you -said: - - “He made the suggestion that I was to become the Commissioner - for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. He had the idea that, in - that position, I could give the Minister for Economics and the - President of the Reichsbank valuable support.” - -GÖRING: That is absolutely correct, with the exception of the word -“Reichstagspräsident;” that ought to be President of the Reichsbank. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. That is the way I have it. - -GÖRING: It sounded like “Reichstagspräsident” over the earphones. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Moreover, he was very outspoken in the - suggestion that he and Blomberg made, that I should be put in - charge of the Four Year Plan. However, Schacht’s idea was that I - did not know very much about economy, and that he could easily - hide behind my back.” - -GÖRING: That I said the other day quite clearly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from that time on you and Schacht collaborated -for some time in preparing a rearmament program, did you not? - -GÖRING: From that time on I worked together with Schacht in economic -matters and covered the whole field of German economy, including the -armament program, which of course was a sine qua non for the reassumed -German military sovereignty. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you and he had some jurisdictional differences -and executed an agreement settling your different spheres of authority, -did you not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was in 1937 on the 7th of July, right? - -GÖRING: On that day a certain proposal for a settlement was made, but -this did not lead to anything final being accomplished. That was because -of the nature of the two posts and our personalities. Both of us, I, as -Delegate for the Four Year Plan, and Herr Schacht, as Minister of -Economics and President of the Reichsbank, were able to exercise very -great influence on German economy. As Herr Schacht also had a very -strong personality and felt his position keenly, and I likewise was not -inclined to hide my light under a bushel, whether we were friends or not -we could not help getting in each other’s way because of this question -of authority, and one of us had finally to give in to the other. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time when he left the Ministry and -the Reichsbank? - -GÖRING: First he resigned from the Reich Ministry of Economy in November -1937, and, as far as I know, he resigned as President of the Reichsbank -at the end of 1938, but I cannot be certain about that date. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was no disagreement between you and him that -the program of rearmament should be carried through, was there? You -disagreed only in the methods of doing it. - -GÖRING: I assume that Herr Schacht also, as a good German, was, of -course, ready to put all his strength at the disposal of Germany’s -rearmament, in order that Germany should be strong; and therefore -differences could have occurred only in regard to methods, for neither -Herr Schacht nor I was arming for a war of aggression. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after he left the rearmament work he remained -as a Minister without Portfolio and sat in the Reichstag for some time, -did he? - -GÖRING: That is correct. The Führer wished it because, I believe, he -wanted in this way to express his recognition of Herr Schacht. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you recall the time when you considered the -calling up of 15-year-olds, the conscription of 15-year-olds? - -GÖRING: During the war you mean? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -GÖRING: It was a question of Air Force auxiliaries, that is correct. -They were 15- or 16-year-olds, I do not remember exactly which, and were -called in as Air Force auxiliaries. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number -3700-PS and ask you whether you received from Schacht the letter of -which that is a carbon copy. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -GÖRING: Yes, I certainly did receive that letter. The year is not given -here; that is missing in the copy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Could you fix, approximately, the date of its -receipt? - -GÖRING: It says here 3rd of November, but from the incidents described -on the other side, I assume it must be 1943. On this copy the year, -strangely enough, is not given, but I believe it was in the year 1943, I -received this letter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you reply to Document 3700-PS? Did you reply to -this letter? - -GÖRING: I cannot say that today with certainty—possibly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Four Year Plan had as its purpose to put -the entire economy in a state of readiness for war, had it not? - -GÖRING: I have explained that it had two tasks to fulfill—1) to -safeguard German economy against crises, that is to say, to make it -immune from export fluctuations, and, as regards food, from harvest -fluctuations, as far as possible; and 2) to make it capable of -withstanding a blockade, that is to say, in the light of experiences in -the first World War, to put it on such a basis that in a second World -War a blockade would not have such disastrous consequences. That the -Four Year Plan in this respect was a basic prerequisite for the entire -building-up and expansion of the armament industry goes without saying. -Without it the rearmament industry could not have been shaped in this -way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To get a specific answer, if possible, did you not -say in a letter to Schacht, dated the 18th day of December 1936, that -you saw it to be your task, using these words, “within 4 years to put -the entire economy in a state of readiness for war”? Did you say that or -did you not? - -GÖRING: Of course I said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you recall the report of Blomberg in 1937 -in which—and you may examine if you wish Document Number C-175—in -which he starts his report by saying: - - “The general political position justifies the supposition that - Germany need not expect an attack from any side.” - -GÖRING: That may have been quite possible at that moment. I took a most -reassuring view of the German situation in 1937. It was after the -Olympic games and at that time the general situation was extraordinarily -calm. But that had nothing to do with the fact that I felt obliged, -quite apart from passing fluctuations from a calmer to a more tense -atmosphere, to make German economy ready for war and proof against -crises or blockades, for exactly 1 year later incidents of a different -nature occurred. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, does not Blomberg continue: - - “Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war - in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the - deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states, - and of Russia in particular”? - -That was the situation in 1937, was it not? - -GÖRING: That is the way Herr Von Blomberg saw the situation. Concerning -the readiness for war in Russia, Herr Von Blomberg, in the same way as -all those representatives of our Reichswehr mentality, was always really -mistaken in contrast to the opinion expressed in other quarters with -regard to Russian armaments. This is merely the opinion of Herr Von -Blomberg—not the Führer’s, not mine, and not the opinion of other -leading people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That, however, was the report of the -Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the 24th of June 1937, was it -not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You organized, 1 month later, the Hermann Göring -Works? - -GÖRING: Right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Hermann Göring Works were concerned with -putting Germany in the condition of readiness for war, were they not? - -GÖRING: No, that is not right. The Hermann Göring Works were at first -concerned solely with the mining of German iron ore in the region of -Salzgitter and in a district in the Oberpfalz, and, after the -annexation, with the iron ore works in Austria. The Hermann Göring Works -first established exclusively mining and refining plants for this ore -and foundries. Only much later steel works and rolling mills were added, -that is to say, an industry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Hermann Göring Works were a part of the Four -Year Plan, were they not? - -GÖRING: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have already said that the Four Year Plan -had as its purpose to put the economy in a state of readiness for war; -and the Hermann Göring Works were organized to exploit ore mining and -iron smelting resources and to carry the process through to completed -guns and tanks, were they not? - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct; the Hermann Göring Works had at first -no armament works of their own, but merely produced, as I again repeat, -the basic product, steel, crude steel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at all events, you continued your efforts and -on the 8th of November 1943, you made a speech describing those efforts -to the Gauleiter in the Führer building at Munich, is that right? - -GÖRING: I do not know the exact date, but about that time I made a short -speech, one of a series of speeches, to the Gauleiter about the air -situation, as far as I remember, and also perhaps about the armament -situation. I do not remember the words of that speech, since I was never -asked about it until now; but the facts are correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let me remind you if you used these terms, -refreshing your recollection: - - “Germany, at the beginning of the war, was the only country in - the world possessing an operative, fighting air force. The other - countries had split their air fleets up into army and navy air - fleets and considered the air arm primarily as a necessary and - important auxiliary of the other branches of the forces. In - consequence, they lacked the instrument which is alone capable - of dealing concentrated and effective blows, namely, an - operative air force. In Germany we had gone ahead on those lines - from the very outset, and the main body of the Air Force was - disposed in such a way that it could thrust deeply into the - hostile areas with strategic effect, while a lesser portion of - the air force, consisting of Stukas and, of course, fighter - planes, went into action on the front line in the battlefields. - You all know what wonderful results were achieved by these - tactics and what superiority we attained at the very beginning - of the war through this modern kind of air force.” - -GÖRING: That is entirely correct; I certainly did say that, and what is -more, I acted accordingly. But in order that this be understood and -interpreted correctly, I must explain briefly: - -In these statements I dealt with two separate opinions on air strategy, -which are still being debated today and without a decision having been -reached. That is to say: Should the air force form an auxiliary arm of -the army and the navy and be split up to form a constituent part of the -army and the navy, or should it be a separate branch of the armed -forces? I explained that for nations with a very large navy it is -perhaps understandable that such a division should be made. From the -very beginning, thank God, we made the correct, consistent decision to -build up a strong—I emphasize the word “strong”—and independent Air -Force along with the Army and the Navy; and I described how we passed -from a tentative air force to an operative air force. - -As an expert I am today still of the opinion that only an operative air -force can have a decisive effect. I have also explained, in regard to -two- and four-engine bombers, that at first I was quite satisfied with -the two-engine bombers because, firstly, I did not have four-engine -bombers; and secondly, the operational radius of the two-engine bombers -was wide enough for the enemy with whom we had to deal at that time. I -further pointed out that the main reason for the swift ending of the -campaign in Poland and in the West was the effect of the Air Force. - -So that is quite correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I remind you of the testimony of the witness Milch, -sworn on your behalf, as to a subject on which I have not heard you -express yourself. He said: - - “I had the impression that already at the time of the occupation - of the Rhineland, he, Göring, was worried lest Hitler’s policy - should lead to war.” - -Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it true or false? True or mistaken, -perhaps, I should say. - -GÖRING: No, I did not want a war and I thought the best way to avoid a -war was to be strongly armed according to the well-known adage, “He who -has a strong sword has peace.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are still of that opinion? - -GÖRING: I am of that opinion today, now that I see the entanglements -more than ever. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is true, as Milch said, that you were -worried that Hitler’s policies would lead to war at the time of the -occupation of the Rhineland? - -GÖRING: Excuse me, I just understood you to ask whether it is also my -opinion today that only a nation that is strongly armed can maintain -peace. That is what I meant to answer with my last statement. - -If you are connecting this question to the statement of Milch, that I -was worried lest the policy of the Führer might lead to war, I should -like to say that I was worried lest war might come; and if possible I -wanted to avoid it, but not in the sense that the policy of the Führer -would lead to it, because the Führer also desired to carry out his -program by agreements and diplomatic action. - -In regard to the occupation of the Rhineland I was somewhat worried at -the time about the reactions; all the same, it was necessary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when nothing happened, the next step was -Austria? - -GÖRING: The one has nothing to do with the other. I never had any -misgivings about Austria leading to a war, as I had with the Rhineland -occupation, for in the case of the Rhineland occupation I could well -imagine that there might be repercussions. But how there could be any -repercussions from abroad over the union of two brother nations of -purely German blood was not clear to me, especially since Italy, who -always pretended that she had a vital interest in a separate Austria, -had somewhat changed her ideas. It could not have mattered in the least -to England and France, nor could they have had the slightest interest in -this union. Therefore I did not see the danger of its leading to a war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you just a few questions about Austria. You -said that you and Hitler had felt deep regret about the death of -Dollfuss, and I ask you if it is not a fact that Hitler put up a plaque -in Vienna in honor of the men who murdered Dollfuss, and went and put a -wreath on their graves when he was there. Is that a fact? Can you not -answer that question with “yes” or “no”? - -GÖRING: No, I cannot answer it with either “yes” or “no,” if I am to -speak the truth according to my oath. I cannot say, “Yes, he did it,” -because I do not know; I cannot say, “No, he did not do it,” because I -do not know that either. I want to say that I heard about this event -here for the first time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in June of 1937, Seyss-Inquart came to you and -State Secretary Keppler, and you had some negotiations. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was Seyss-Inquart’s desire to have an -independent Austria, was it not? - -GÖRING: As far as I remember, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Keppler was the man who was sent by Hitler to -Vienna at the time of the Anschluss and who telegraphed to Hitler not to -march in, do you recall? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the telegram that you characterized as -impudent and senseless from the man who was on the spot, and who had -negotiated earlier with Seyss-Inquart, do you recall that? - -GÖRING: I did not characterize the telegram with this word which has -just been translated to me in German, that is “impudent.” I said that -this telegram could no longer have any influence and was superfluous, -because the troops were already on the move and had their order; the -thing was already underway. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had demanded that Seyss-Inquart be made -Chancellor? Is that right? - -GÖRING: I did not desire that personally, but it arose out of the -circumstance that at that time he was the only man who could assume the -Chancellorship because he was already in the Government. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria -with the understanding that he was to surrender his country to Germany, -or did you lead him to believe that he would be independent, have an -independent country? - -GÖRING: I explained the other day that even at the time when he left by -plane the next morning, the Führer himself had still not made up his -mind as to whether the union with Austria should not be brought about by -means of a joint head of state. I also said that I personally did not -consider this solution far-reaching enough and that I was for an -absolute, direct, and total Anschluss. - -I did not know exactly what Seyss-Inquart’s attitude was at this time. -Nevertheless I feared that his attitude was rather in the direction of -continued separation with co-operation, and did not go as far as my -attitude in the direction of a total Anschluss. Therefore I was very -satisfied when this total Anschluss crystallized in the course of the -day. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I respectfully submit that the answers are not -responsive, and I repeat the question. - -Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with an understanding -that he would call in the German troops and surrender Austria to -Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he could continue an -independent Austria? - -GÖRING: Excuse me, but that is a number of questions which I cannot -answer simply with “yes” or “no.” - -If you ask me, “Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor according to -Hitler’s wishes and yours?”—yes. - -If you then ask me, “Did he become Chancellor with the understanding -that he should send a telegram for troops to march in?”—I say, “No,” -because at the time of the Chancellorship there was no question of his -sending us a telegram. - -If you ask me, thirdly, “Did he become Chancellor on the understanding -that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?”—then I have -to say again that the final turn of events was not clear in the Führer’s -mind on that evening. - -That is what I tried to explain. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not true that you suspected that he might -want to remain as independent as possible, and that that was one of the -reasons why the troops were marched in? - -GÖRING: No. Excuse me, there are two questions: I strongly suspected -that Seyss-Inquart wanted to be as independent as possible. The sending -of troops had nothing at all to do with that suspicion; not a single -soldier would have been needed for that. I gave my reasons for the -sending of the troops. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was never intimated to Seyss-Inquart that -Austria would not remain independent until after—as you put it—the -Führer and you were in control of Austria’s fate? Is that a fact? - -GÖRING: That was certainly not told him beforehand by the Führer. As far -as I was concerned, it was generally known that I desired it, and I -assume that he knew of my attitude. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have stated that you then, in conversation -with Ribbentrop in London, stressed that no ultimatum had been put to -Seyss-Inquart, and you have said that legally that was the fact. - -GÖRING: I did not say “legally,” I said “diplomatically.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that a convenient time to break off? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 19 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-FIFTH DAY - Tuesday, 19 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call as -witness the civil engineer, Birger Dahlerus of Stockholm. - -[_The witness Dahlerus took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name? - -BIRGER DAHLERUS (Witness): Birger Dahlerus. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that the evidence I shall -give shall be the truth—the whole truth—and nothing but the truth—so -help me God. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how you, as a -private person and a Swedish citizen, came to work for an understanding -between England and Germany? - -DAHLERUS: I knew England very well, since I had lived there for 12 -years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had been able to observe the -first World War from both sides, as I stayed both in Germany and in -England during that time. - -During a visit to England at the end of June 1939, I traveled around a -number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, and London, and I -found everywhere an absolute determination that the British would -tolerate no further aggressive acts on the part of Germany. - -On 2 July I met some friends in the Constitutional Club. We discussed -the current situation and they gave a pretty clear picture of public -opinion in Great Britain. - -As this summary of public opinion in Great Britain was the basis for my -discussions afterward with Göring, I think I should quote it. - - “Outline of conclusions reached by observation of conditions in - Great Britain and by conversations with people of the country: - - “A. Agreement that Berchtesgaden and Czechoslovakia have shaken - confidence, and that immediately after Berchtesgaden, before - Czechoslovakia could possibly be in a position to accomplish by - co-operation many things already decided upon by Germany. - - “B. Public opinion in Great Britain now extremely bitter. It is - resolved: so far and no farther. - - “C. Great Britain from now on has obligations which did not - exist at time of Berchtesgaden meeting. Poland and Danzig: An - attack on Danzig means war with Poland and Britain. Great - Britain will be involved automatically as a consequence of its - obligations. Hence, automatically, war with Great Britain. - - “D. Great Britain does not make her strength known; this is not - even known to the British public.” - -Then follows Statement Number 2, about Lord Halifax’s speech: - - “My personal observations indicate that England stands firmly - behind its declarations. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. I am afraid the Russian is coming through on -the French again. I am afraid the Tribunal must adjourn then. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Before the witness goes on with his evidence, the -Tribunal want me to say that the system by which the earphones are -connected with the interpreters was checked over after the Court rose -last night, was checked over again at 9:30 this morning, and again at -9:55 this morning. But everyone who comes into this court must realize -that it has not been possible to bury these cables so as to make them -altogether safe. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that -everybody who comes into this court should take real care to avoid, if -possible, treading upon these cables, which may become injured by being -kicked and broken, and in that way the faults in the system occur. - -Everything is being done to maintain the system as efficiently as -possible. It, therefore, rests with those who use this court to see that -they do their best to assist in keeping the system efficient. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, would you please continue. - -DAHLERUS: Point Number 2: Lord Halifax’s speech: - - “Personal observations indicate that England stands firmly - behind its declaration. Lord Halifax underestimates England’s - situation, which is customary with the British; that is, he - makes out the state of the strength of Great Britain to be - weaker than it actually is. Perhaps in Germany this is not fully - realized. - - “Point Number 3: England wants peace, but not peace at any - price. The German people are quite acceptable to the British, - and there seems to be no good reason for an armed conflict. As - before, Germany will certainly be defeated again, and will - accomplish far less by war then by peaceful negotiations. - England and her friends will likewise have to suffer much; - possibly it will mean the end of civilization.” - -Having observed that there was a disinclination in the Third Reich to -forward unfavorable reports, I felt both that it was my duty and that it -might be of great value if these clear expressions of British opinion -were to be transmitted to the highest quarters in Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, may I interrupt with a question? Were these -friends of yours members of the British Parliament? - -DAHLERUS: No, they were people from the business world, and if the -Tribunal desires, I can submit a list of the names. - -DR. STAHMER: What were their names? - -DAHLERUS: May I save time and submit the list of names to the Tribunal? - -THE PRESIDENT: Their names are not of any great importance, are they, if -they were people in the business world? - -DAHLERUS: After having agreed with my friends on the advisability of a -trip to Germany, I left for Germany and received an appointment with -Göring for 6 July at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, at Karinhall. - -I told him what I had observed in England and strongly emphasized the -necessity of doing everything to avoid the possibility of a war. Göring -expressed doubts as to whether these observations were not perhaps an -attempt by the English to bluff. He likewise pointed out that he was of -the opinion that England wanted to control developments on the -Continent. - -I told him that I did not want him to accept statements of mine, of a -neutral citizen, and I suggested to him that a meeting should be -arranged where he and some other members of the German Government might -have the opportunity of meeting British citizens who had absolute -knowledge of conditions. I suggested that such a meeting could well take -place in Sweden, possibly on the invitation of the King of Sweden, or -the Swedish Government. - -On 8 July I received from Göring a reply that Hitler had agreed to this -plan, and I left for Sweden to ascertain whether it would be possible to -make such an arrangement in Sweden. - -The Swedish Government, for certain reasons, considered it inadvisable -for the Swedish King or the Swedish Government, to extend such an -invitation, but they had no objections to private persons arranging such -a meeting. - -Count Trola Wachmeester willingly placed his castle, Trola Beelda, at -the disposal of such a meeting. I left then on 19 July for London to -begin the preparations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can you not take the witness on, in order to -save time, to the actual negotiations? All these preliminaries do not -seem to the Tribunal to be very important. Can you not take him on to -the actual negotiations? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, he will come directly to the meeting, to the -preliminary meeting that took place on 7 August at Soenke Nissen Koog. - -Witness, will you tell us of the meeting. You were about to state that -on 19 July you flew to London and there, on the 20th met Lord Halifax? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: I consider this statement very material. Would you tell the -Tribunal of the content of this meeting with Lord Halifax? - -DAHLERUS: I met Lord Halifax on 20 July. He said particularly that he -did not want any members of the British Government or Parliament to -participate. However, His Majesty’s Government would await the results -of the meeting with the greatest interest. The meeting took place at -Soenke Nissen Koog, in Schleswig-Holstein, near the Danish border. The -house belongs to my wife. Seven Englishmen, Göring, Bodenschatz, and Dr. -Schoettl were present. - -DR. STAHMER: On what day was this? - -DAHLERUS: It was on 7 August, and the meeting started at 10 o’clock. The -meeting started with Göring’s request to the Englishmen to put to him -any questions they desired. Then, a long discussion took place on -political developments, particularly with reference to relations between -Great Britain and Germany. Finally, both sides came to the question of -Munich and the events after Munich. The English representatives -emphasized that the policy of aggression in Europe would have to cease. -Then the question of the Corridor and Danzig was discussed. - -The Englishmen made it perfectly clear that if Germany were to try with -force to occupy any foreign territory, the British Empire, in accordance -with its obligations to Poland, would stand at the side of Poland. - -Göring indicated, on his word of honor as a statesman and a soldier, -that although he had the control and command of the strongest air force -in the world and might be tempted to lead this air force into battle, he -would do everything in his power to prevent a war. - -The result of the meeting was that all present agreed on the fact that -it would be of the greatest value if a meeting could be arranged as soon -as possible by representatives of England and Germany. The conference -ended late at night, but next morning the English delegates suggested -that such a conference should be extended to include four nations, Great -Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. I went to Sylt, where Göring was -staying, and he was prepared to consent, in the name of Germany, to this -modified proposal. - -DR. STAHMER: Did English Members of Parliament participate in this -meeting? - -DAHLERUS: No, English businessmen only. - -DR. STAHMER: Was a full report on this visit given to Lord Halifax? - -DAHLERUS: The English participants left Germany early on 9 August and -immediately on their return submitted a report to the Foreign Office. - -DR. STAHMER: Did this meeting that was planned then materialize, or how -did the matter further develop? - -DAHLERUS: I received a confirmation from Göring personally that Hitler -agreed to such a conference. The matter was then discussed in London, -and on 19 August, a request came to me to go to Paris, evidently to -receive a reply from the British side. Before I left, on 21 August, I -was informed that a commercial agreement had been concluded between -Russia and Germany. On the following day this was extended to an -agreement covering other political questions. On 23 August I was -requested by Göring, who telephoned me in the morning at 10:30 to come -to Berlin, if possible, at once. - -DR. STAHMER: Did he, during this conversation, point out the gravity of -the situation? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring stated that the situation had in the meantime -become very serious. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you meet Göring then? - -DAHLERUS: I arrived in Berlin on the 24th and saw Göring at 2 o’clock in -the afternoon. - -DR. STAHMER: What was the subject of your discussion? - -DAHLERUS: He told me that the situation had become very serious owing to -the fact that no agreement had been reached between Poland and Germany. -He asked me whether I could not go to London and explain the situation -there. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you to point out there in particular that Germany was -prepared to come to an understanding with England? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring stated that Germany wanted to come to an -understanding with England. - -DR. STAHMER: Then when did you leave for London? - -DAHLERUS: The following morning, on the 25th, a Friday. - -DR. STAHMER: Did this trip take place with Hitler’s agreement? - -DAHLERUS: That I cannot say. - -DR. STAHMER: With whom then did you have a discussion in London on the -evening of the 25th? - -DAHLERUS: The important meeting took place late in the afternoon at 6:30 -with Lord Halifax. - -DR. STAHMER: What did Halifax tell you on this occasion? - -DAHLERUS: He informed me that on the same day Henderson had spoken with -Hitler, and that Henderson was expected in London on Saturday, the 26th. -He expressed the hope then that now the official channels were open an -agreement might really become possible. He thanked me for my efforts, -and assured me that he did not think my services would be required any -longer. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you on the same evening have a telephone conversation -with Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: What was discussed? - -DAHLERUS: At 8 o’clock in the evening I tried to reach him on the -telephone, but only after I had obtained help from the Foreign Office -was I able to establish the connection. Göring revealed to me then that -the situation had become extremely serious and asked me to do everything -in my power to arrange a conference between representatives of England -and Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Lord Halifax of this conversation? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. Mr. Roberts of the Foreign Office received the exact -wording of our conversation, and before midnight Lord Halifax had the -report in his hands. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then on the next morning, that is on Saturday, 26 -August, have another conversation with Lord Halifax? What was the nature -of that conversation? - -DAHLERUS: I met Lord Halifax on Saturday, the 26th at 11 o’clock. I told -him that I had learned that the German Government was trying to bring -about a decision with all haste. And I stressed the importance of such -an attempt in order to make it clear to him that in such a serious -situation it was necessary to proceed with greatest sense of -responsibility and care. I asked him to emphasize to the German -Government that the British Government wanted an understanding. - -DR. STAHMER: Did anyone state that Göring was the only man on the German -side who could prevent war? - -DAHLERUS: Well, I personally had the impression that Göring was the -member of the German Government who was most probably working for peace. -I had this impression from the conversations that I had with him. - -DR. STAHMER: What suggestion did you make then to Lord Halifax? - -DAHLERUS: I suggested to Lord Halifax that he should write a letter to -Göring. I would go at once to Berlin and deliver it to him personally. - -DR. STAHMER: Was your suggestion taken? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, Lord Halifax conferred with Chamberlain, and afterwards -wrote an excellent letter in which he indicated in very clear and -distinct words the desire of his Majesty’s Government to bring about a -peaceful settlement. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then fly back to Berlin with this letter? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. I arrived in Berlin in the evening, and met Göring at -about 10 o’clock that evening. - -DR. STAHMER: Describe to the Tribunal the purport of this conversation -that you had as a consequence of your talk with Halifax. - -DAHLERUS: I met Göring in his train which was just on the way to -headquarters. I told him how matters looked in London and emphasized -that there was no doubt that, if the German Government proceeded against -Danzig, it would immediately be at war with England, but that I was -convinced that the German Government was prepared to do everything in -its power to avert the crisis. After I had said this to him, I handed -him the letter. He tore it open, and after having read it, he placed it -before me and asked me to translate it exactly, because it was of -greatest importance that the contents should be understood correctly. He -sent for his adjutant to come immediately, but the train stopped at the -next station, and he declared that in his opinion Hitler must be -informed immediately of the contents of this letter. I followed him in a -car to Berlin, and exactly at 12 o’clock, midnight, we arrived at the -Reich Chancellery. Göring went in immediately to talk with Hitler, and I -went to my hotel. - -DR. STAHMER: That was then on 27 August, in the night, was it not, or -early in the morning on 28 August? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then have a further conversation with Hitler? - -DAHLERUS: I was visited by two officers at a quarter past twelve, -midnight, who requested me to go with them immediately to Hitler. I was -received by him immediately upon my arrival. He was alone with Göring. - -DR. STAHMER: Will you describe this conversation somewhat more exactly -in detail. - -DAHLERUS: Hitler began, in his usual way to describe German policy to me -at length. That lasted about 20 minutes, and I thought that my visit -would not prove useful. When he inveighed against the English and -England, I interrupted him and stated that I had worked in Great -Britain, as a workman, as an engineer, and as a manager of industrial -enterprises, that I knew the English people well, and that I could not -agree with his statements. A long discussion resulted. He asked many -questions about England and the English people. Thereafter, he began to -explain to me how well equipped the German fighting forces were. Then he -seemed very excited, walked up and down the room, and in the end got -himself into a very agitated condition and told me that, if it came to a -war, he would build U-boats, U-boats, and more U-boats. He seemed really -to speak as though he were not aware that there was still anybody in the -room. After a while he shouted that he would build airplanes, airplanes, -and still more airplanes, and that he would win the war. Then he calmed -down again and talked again about England and said, “Herr Dahlerus, tell -me please, why I have not been able to arrive at an agreement with the -British Government. You seem really to know England so well. Perhaps you -can solve the riddle for me?” I hesitated at first, but then I told him -that, with my intimate knowledge of the English people, I was personally -of the opinion that their lack of confidence in him and his Government -was the reason. - -The conversation continued. He gave me a long report on his discussions -on Friday with Henderson, and finally he asked me to go to London at -once and explain his viewpoint. I refused, naturally, and told him that -I could not go there as an emissary of Germany. If, however, the British -Government expressed the wish that I should come, I would, of course, be -prepared to do this. The condition was such, however, that I must know -definitely what conditions and proposals he had to make. We spent an -hour and a half, during which he explained the various points in greater -detail than he had been able to do with Henderson. - -DR. STAHMER: What proposals were you specifically to make? - -DAHLERUS: In condensed form, they were as follows: - -(1) Germany wanted an agreement or an alliance with England. - -(2) England was to help Germany in the annexation of Danzig and the -Corridor. - -(3) Germany gave the assurance that it would guarantee Poland’s -boundaries. - -(4) An agreement should be reached on Germany’s colonies. - -(5) Adequate guarantees should be given for the treatment of German -minorities. - -(6) Germany gave its word to defend the British Empire with the German -Wehrmacht wherever it should be attacked. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, regarding Point 2, was not Poland assured of -a free harbor in Danzig? You may want to add something as to what -assurance Poland was to receive. That was Point 2? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. This was, of course, only an outline. These proposals -were naturally far more extensive. - -DR. STAHMER: Is it correct that Poland was to receive a free harbor in -Danzig, that it was to receive a corridor to Gdynia, according to the -proposals? - -DAHLERUS: That was what Hitler said. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, thank you. What was the further course of the -conversation? - -DAHLERUS: I left on a special plane the next morning, after I had got in -touch with London. I met Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace -Wilson, and Sir Alexander Cadogan. - -DR. STAHMER: This was on 27 August, was it not? - -DAHLERUS: On 27 August, yes. - -DR. STAHMER: Where? - -DAHLERUS: In Downing Street, Number 10. - -DR. STAHMER: What transpired in this conference with Lord Halifax and -Mr. Chamberlain? - -DAHLERUS: We discussed in full detail the proposals I had brought. On -certain points, as is seen from the British _Blue Book_, these proposals -were not the same as those made to Henderson. I therefore suggested to -the British Government that, if they had full confidence in me as an -intermediary, they should tell me how far they could accept the -proposals and how far not. I would go back to Berlin the same day and -discuss the English views with Hitler and Göring. They should keep -Henderson in London until Monday, so that the answer could be given -after they had been informed how Hitler regarded the English standpoint. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you also have a conference that day with Sir Alexander -Cadogan? - -DAHLERUS: After the meeting with the members of the Government that I -have mentioned, I had a long conversation with Cadogan. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you receive certain proposals from him? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: What were they? - -DAHLERUS: I must say that the English made the greatest effort to deal -in a fair and peaceable way with the various points. Naturally, Point 6, -the offer to defend the British Empire, was rejected. Similarly, they -did not want to have any discussion on the colonies as long as Germany -was not demobilized. With regard to the Polish boundaries, they wanted -these boundaries to be guaranteed by the five great powers: Russia, -Germany, England, France, and Italy. - -Concerning the Corridor, they proposed that negotiations with Poland be -undertaken immediately. - -With reference to the first point, England was willing in principle to -come to an agreement with Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then return to Germany with these proposals? - -DAHLERUS: Yes; after I had telephoned Berlin. As the English Government -had promised to send Henderson back the same day, I obtained -confirmation from Berlin that they were agreeable to Henderson’s -returning only on Monday. I left that same evening and shortly before -midnight was back in Berlin. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you have a conversation there with Göring? - -DAHLERUS: I met Göring about 11:10 on Sunday evening and told him the -results. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you describe that conversation somewhat more in detail? - -DAHLERUS: He did not consider the reply very favorable. I told him, -however, that in view of the events of the last year he could hardly -expect the English to be satisfied with the guarantees of Poland’s -boundaries by Germany only. With reference to the colonial question, I -made it clear to him that any British Government would be overthrown at -once that tried to force this point in Parliament as long as Germany’s -forces were mobilized. - -In reference to the sixth point, I tried to make it clear to him that -England, or the British Empire, preferred to look after their own -affairs themselves. Finally he said that it would probably be better if -he talked with Hitler alone. He went immediately to the Reich -Chancellery and I went to my hotel. At about 1 o’clock on Monday -morning, the 26th, I received a telephone call and heard that Hitler -would accept the English standpoint provided that the reply expected -from Henderson on the next day was, in general, what I had said. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then, that same night, go to the British Embassy? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. I went straight to the British Embassy and gave Sir -Ogilvie-Forbes a report of the results of my conversation with Göring, -and he cabled to London at once. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Göring of the substance of this conversation -that you had with Forbes? - -DAHLERUS: Of course. I acted quite openly, and therefore I told Göring -what I planned to do. The German Government knew, indeed, that I would -have this conversation with Forbes. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you see Göring again then? - -DAHLERUS: I saw him again on Monday, the 28th, in the morning, at his -headquarters. - -DR. STAHMER: It must have been Tuesday morning, was it not? - -DAHLERUS: No, Monday morning. It was Monday morning, the 28th. - -DR. STAHMER: What was said during this conversation with Göring? - -DAHLERUS: In general, we discussed the situation. He seemed to be -satisfied that Forbes had cabled London. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you visit Forbes again then? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, I saw Forbes later. But that was of no significance any -longer. - -DR. STAHMER: And you met Göring again on Tuesday, did you not, on -Tuesday morning? - -DAHLERUS: Well, the most important development was that on Tuesday -morning, or at 1:15, that is, shortly after midnight, on the 29th, I -received a telephone call from the Reich Chancellery, made at Göring’s -request by Lieutenant Colonel Konrad. He told me that Henderson had -submitted his reply in writing, that it was highly satisfactory, and -there was every hope that the threat of a war was past. - -I met Göring again then and he told me that he was highly pleased that -the matter had developed so well. - -DR. STAHMER: Did he not make a statement of this kind: “We shall have -peace; peace is assured?” - -DAHLERUS: Yes. He said something similar to that. - -DR. STAHMER: Then sometime on 29 August you were called up again by -Göring, were you not? What occasioned this? - -DAHLERUS: I was in my hotel, late in the evening, about 10:30. Forbes -called me up and said he had to see me at once. He came to my hotel and -said that Henderson and Hitler had had a meeting on Tuesday evening -which had taken a very unsatisfactory course. They had parted after a -big quarrel. He asked me what I could suggest under these circumstances. - -During our conversation I was called on the phone by Göring, and he -asked me to come to his house immediately. He told me the same story and -seemed very upset at the development. He showed me the German reply to -the British note and went through it point by point. He tried to explain -to me the reasons for the contents of this note. Finally he told me I -should go back to London again immediately and make every effort to -explain this unfortunate incident to the British Government. He -concluded then by saying that Hitler was busy, and that he was working -out a proposal for Poland which should probably be ready the next day. - -After a talk with Sir Kingsley Wood, the Air Minister, about another -visit to England, I left again by plane on Wednesday morning at 5 -o’clock. Immediately after my arrival in London I met the same members -of the British Government. - -DR. STAHMER: Who were they? - -DAHLERUS: The same personages, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace -Wilson, Sir Alexander Cadogan. - -DR. STAHMER: What was said in this discussion? - -DAHLERUS: It was obvious that by that time the British Government had -become highly mistrustful, and rather inclined to assume that whatever -efforts they might make, nothing would now prevent Hitler from declaring -war on Poland. The British Government had made the greatest effort. They -had expressed the wish through their ambassador in Warsaw that the -Polish Government should exert the greatest effort to avoid any border -incidents. They explained to me at the same time that it was hardly fair -to expect the Polish Government to send delegates to Berlin to -negotiate, when it was known what experience other countries had had in -the past years when they had been in Berlin on similar missions. - -I telephoned Berlin, and asked to be connected with Göring, in order to -persuade him to arrange a meeting of the delegates outside Germany. He -merely said, however, that this was impossible; that Hitler was in -Berlin, and the meeting would have to take place in Berlin. It was said, -too, that proposals had been made to Poland, and that the members of the -British Government viewed these proposals with the greatest suspicion. -The entire Polish Government was to meet in the afternoon, and would -cable the result of the session to Berlin. In the meantime I returned to -Berlin. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you meet Göring there? - -DAHLERUS: I met Göring . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you not make this a little bit shorter, Dr. Stahmer? - -DR. STAHMER: I believe this testimony is quite short, considering that -it deals with the essential circumstances leading to war. However, I -think that we shall not take too much more of the Tribunal’s time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dahlerus, the Tribunal wish you to come to the -crucial matter as soon as possible. - -DAHLERUS: I met Göring shortly after midnight on Wednesday, and he told -me the nature of the proposals made to Poland. He showed me the note. I -called up Forbes to give him this information. He then told me that -Ribbentrop had refused to give him the note, after he had read it -through very quickly. I went to Göring immediately and told him it was -impossible to treat the ambassador of an empire like Great Britain in -this way. I suggested to him that he should allow me to telephone Forbes -and give Forbes the contents of the note on the telephone. I did this at -about 1 o’clock on Thursday morning. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Göring not emphasize that he was taking a great -responsibility on himself in giving you this permission? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring emphasized that he was doing this on his own -responsibility. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then on the next morning go to the British Embassy -in order to convince yourself as to whether your telephonic -communication had been understood correctly? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, I saw Henderson on Thursday morning, the 31st, at 10 -o’clock, discussed the note with him, and he requested me then to go at -once to the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski, and give him a copy. - -DR. STAHMER: Was that done? - -DAHLERUS: He sent Forbes with me to Lipski, and I read the note to -Lipski, but he did not seem to grasp its purport. I, therefore, left the -room, dictated a note to the secretary, and handed it to him. In the -meantime, Lipski stated to Forbes that he would not be interested in -discussing this note with the German Government. - -DR. STAHMER: Would you reconstruct this conversation as far as you are -able? It seems to me particularly important. - -DAHLERUS: He said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German -Government. If it came to war between Poland and Germany, he knew—since -he had lived 5½ years in Germany—that a revolution would break out in -Germany, and that they would march on Berlin. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then inform London of your conversation by -telephone? - -DAHLERUS: I telephoned at once from the British Embassy and informed Sir -Horace Wilson of the conference that we had had. - -DR. STAHMER: Was there then another discussion in the afternoon with -Göring? - -DAHLERUS: I saw Göring at 1 o’clock in the afternoon. He received then a -copy of the cablegram from the Polish Government to Lipski, to the -effect that Lipski should not, without special instruction from Warsaw, -negotiate with the German Government. It was obvious that the Poles -under those circumstances were afraid to take any action. The German -Government was, however, much disturbed at this telegram. - -DR. STAHMER: On that afternoon did you again meet Göring, together with -the British Ambassador? - -DAHLERUS: The situation already seemed to have become impossible. Hitler -had quarreled with Henderson. Ribbentrop, too, had quarreled with him. -Therefore, I was of the opinion that the only possibility lay in Göring -coming to an understanding with Henderson. I suggested a meeting between -them. This took place at 4:50 in the afternoon, at Göring’s house. -Forbes was present, and I too. - -DR. STAHMER: What was said during this meeting? - -DAHLERUS: Even before the meeting, Henderson expressed his suspicion -that the German Government would try to arrange a settlement with -Britain and cause a break between England and Poland. Henderson was -therefore very cautious during the 2-hour session, and the result of the -conversation was only that both parties agreed that a meeting of -delegates from both countries would be necessary if war were possibly to -be avoided. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you on this occasion likewise suggest that Göring -should meet the British delegates immediately? - -DAHLERUS: I suggested that a meeting in Holland should be arranged at -once, at which Göring should represent Germany. - -DR. STAHMER: How did Henderson react to this proposal? - -DAHLERUS: Henderson promised to submit this proposal to his Government. -However, I had the impression that he already knew that German military -forces were on the march, and it did not seem to me that he had much -confidence in any fortunate outcome. - -DR. STAHMER: Are you acquainted with a statement of Göring to the effect -that if the Poles did not give in, Germany would kill them like lice; -and if Britain should decide to declare war, he would regret it very -much but it would be very unwise of Britain? - -DAHLERUS: I cannot recollect these words, but it is possible that during -the 2-hour conversation they were uttered. - -DR. STAHMER: How did this conference end then? - -DAHLERUS: At 7 o’clock in the evening it broke up and both parties were -agreed that they would endeavor to arrange for a meeting in Holland. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 1 September meet Göring again? - -DAHLERUS: On 1 September I met Göring at 8 o’clock at his headquarters. -After some hesitation he told me that the war had broken out because the -Poles had attacked the radio station of Gleiwitz and blown up a bridge -near Dirschau. Later he gave me more details from which I concluded that -the full force of the German Army was employed in the attack on Poland. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 3 September meet Göring again, and did you -on this occasion, make the suggestion that Göring should fly to London -immediately for a personal conference? - -DAHLERUS: Well, before I mention what happened then, I should like to -mention that I met Hitler on 1 September, immediately after his -Reichstag speech in the Kroll Opera House. He was at that time -exceedingly nervous and very agitated. He told me he had all along -suspected that England wanted the war. He told me further that he would -crush Poland and annex the whole country. Göring interrupted, and -pointed out that they would advance as far as certain given points. But -Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind. He began to shout he -would fight for 1 year, 2 years, and ended up in great agitation that he -would, in fact, fight 10 years. - -Then, on Sunday, 3 September, I was informed early in the morning by -Forbes that at 9 o’clock that morning an ultimatum would be given. The -conditions were that the hostilities must cease immediately and the -German forces must be withdrawn to the German border. I went immediately -to Göring’s headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler. -I appealed to him to try at least to arrange for a reasonable reply to -the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German -Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply were -given it would not be worded so as to avoid war with England. I -therefore suggested that Göring should declare himself prepared to go to -England, at once, before 11 o’clock, to negotiate there. - -DR. STAHMER: How did Göring react to this suggestion? - -DAHLERUS: He accepted this suggestion and telephoned Hitler, who -likewise concurred with it. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you then telephone London? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. I telephoned London and got in touch with the Foreign -Office. They gave the reply that they could not consider this proposal -before they had received a written reply to the ultimatum. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you forward this communication to Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, I told Göring this. - -DR. STAHMER: What impression did your communication make on Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Göring seemed to be sorry that the proposal was not accepted. - -DR. STAHMER: Then on 4 September did you speak once more with Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, I had a short conversation with Göring on 4 September, -but it was not of great importance. - -DR. STAHMER: On this occasion did Göring say to you that, come what -might, he would endeavor to carry on the war as humanely as possible? -That Germany would under no circumstances begin hostilities against -England first, but if England should attack Germany then the answer -would be forthcoming? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you publish a book entitled _Last Attempt_? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: Is the account given in this book in accordance with the -truth? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, it was written with greatest care. The contents are -absolutely accurate and correct. - -DR. STAHMER: Is this account based on notes that you took on these -events? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: When did you write these notes? - -DAHLERUS: I wrote them immediately after my return to Sweden on 5 -September 1939. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have three more brief questions—should I -stop now?—they pertain to the subsequent period. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you could ask them now. - -DR. STAHMER: [_Turning to the witness._] On 24 September 1939, did you -speak to Forbes in Stockholm? - -DAHLERUS: No, I met Forbes on 24 September in Oslo. That was after the -occupation of Poland. It was an endeavor to ascertain if there was still -a possibility of averting a world war. He gave me in writing the -viewpoint of the British Government. It was briefly as follows: “The -British and French Governments . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. What has this got to do with the Defendant -Göring? - -DR. STAHMER: This is evidence that he made efforts even later to bring -about peace. - -I have only one more question which concerns Göring directly. - -THE PRESIDENT: The fact that he met Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes in Oslo on -24 September does not at present appear to have anything to do with -Göring. - -DR. STAHMER: It appears significant in that it was the occasion for Mr. -Dahlerus to get in touch with Berlin and Göring again in order to try -once more, at this stage of events, to bring about peace. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on with your next question then. - -DAHLERUS: The conditions were: “To save Europe from continued German -aggressions and to enable the peoples of Europe . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has the letter that Sir George -Ogilvie-Forbes wrote got to do with Göring? - -DR. STAHMER: Dahlerus discussed this letter, the contents of this letter -on 26 September with Göring, and tried on this basis to reach an -agreement. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I enter a further objection? - -It has nothing to do with the Indictment. We have not charged that the -war against England was an aggressive war. The charge is that the war -against Poland was an aggressive war. All of this negotiation to keep -England out of the war while they took Poland is utterly irrelevant to -the Indictment. I respectfully submit that because it has nothing to do -with the Indictment, with the charge, it should be rejected. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if the witness had an interview with Göring -afterwards, you can come to that, but not to preliminary conferences -with Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes. - -DR. STAHMER: But that will not be comprehensible; he really must state -what Forbes told him. He saw Forbes, Forbes made certain suggestions to -him and with these suggestions Mr. Dahlerus went to Berlin and, of -course, informed Göring what Forbes said to him. Thus, it will not -otherwise be possible at all . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness give the account of his meeting with -Göring. - -DR. STAHMER: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Mr. Dahlerus, you then on 26 September -looked up Göring in Berlin, did you not? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, I met both Göring and Hitler on 26 September. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Göring of the proposals Forbes had made to -you? - -DAHLERUS: I discussed with Hitler on what conditions he would be -prepared to make good the harm he had done to Poland, and make peace. To -my great disappointment he then definitely declared that he was not -prepared at all to discuss the question of Poland. Poland was occupied -and that was no business any longer of Great Britain. I then realized -that his aim had been to split Poland and Britain and thus, with the -consent of Great Britain, to have the opportunity of occupying Poland -without running the risk of being involved in a war with Great Britain -and France. - -DR. STAHMER: In July 1940 did you again meet Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, Göring suggested in July, 1940 that His Majesty, the King -of Sweden, should endeavor to bring the various powers together for -peace negotiations. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:10 p.m. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions? - -DR. HORN: Witness, can you tell us the reason why the conference between -Hitler and Henderson on 29 August took an unfavorable course? - -DAHLERUS: No, I heard only the report that they disagreed and a quarrel -started. - -DR. HORN: Do you know on which of the six points the quarrel started? - -DAHLERUS: As far as I recollect, it was on the wording of the German -reply saying that they expected representatives from Poland during the -next 24 hours. - -DR. HORN: Did Hitler not explain to you then in the presence of Göring -why he made this demand and that was because the two armies, the Polish -and the German, were already facing each other in readiness, and at any -moment a serious conflict was to be expected. Therefore Hitler did not -want to present an ultimatum as to the sending of a negotiator from -Poland, and thereby wanted solely to avoid the outbreak of a conflict? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, explanations to that effect were given. - -DR. HORN: Is it correct, Witness, as you state in your book, that at the -Polish Embassy the Polish Ambassador Lipski told you that in case of war -the Polish Army would march to Berlin in triumph? - -DAHLERUS: No, he did not say that to me, but he made remarks to that -effect to Forbes. - -DR. HORN: And Forbes transmitted these remarks then to you. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. HORN: How did your meeting with Mr. Forbes in Oslo on 24 September -come about? - -DAHLERUS: I took the initiative and went to Oslo to see him. - -DR. HORN: Can you please tell us briefly the contents of the letter from -Forbes? - -DAHLERUS: I read that before. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already said that it does not want to -hear that. And I do not see what it has to do with Von Ribbentrop. - -DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, is under -indictment for the leadership of the entire German foreign policy. I -therefore consider it important that this letter, which will give -decisive information about the further course of foreign policy, as -Ribbentrop saw it—about his later attempt in the direction of peace, -for instance—be read to the Tribunal. - -DAHLERUS: To redeem Europe from the perpetually recurring fear of German -aggression . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Was this letter ever shown to Von Ribbentrop? - -DAHLERUS: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that it will not have the -letter read. - -DR. HORN: You had then on 26 September 1939 a discussion with Hitler. Is -it correct that Hitler told you at that time he could not negotiate with -England concerning Poland because the major part of Poland was occupied -by Russia, and Russia, to his knowledge, would certainly not give it up? - -DAHLERUS: He declared that he was not prepared to discuss the question -of Poland, and added afterwards that, apart from his decision, he did -not think Russia was prepared to discuss the territory occupied by -Russia. - -DR. HORN: Were you politically independent at the time you were -conducting your negotiation? - -DAHLERUS: Absolutely. - -DR. HORN: Thank you, I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have only one question for the witness: [_Turning to -the witness._] Witness, did high military leaders at any time -participate actively in the numerous negotiations which you had with -German authorities at that time? - -DAHLERUS: Never. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell me whether I -understood your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say “I -then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his”—that is -Göring’s—“aim had been to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy -Poland with the consent of Great Britain”? Is that right? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German -Government, including Göring. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait . . . the German Government. Thank you. -Now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal quite shortly why you did not -realize that aim earlier. - -DR. STAHMER: As far as I understood the witness’ answer before, he said -in answer to my question that that was Hitler’s opinion. The witness did -not speak of Göring at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will be able to re-examine him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you just to explain to the -Tribunal—and listen to the question I put to you—why did you not -understand that aim at the time? Your original object in seeing Göring -at the beginning of July was to inform him that British public opinion -had hardened and would not stand another act of aggression; that is -right, is it not? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The reason you went to Göring is shown on Page 8 -of your book, if you have got the English version. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I want you to be absolutely -sure that when I quote your book I do not take anything out of its -context. I shall try to make it as short as I can. Just before the break -on Page 8 you say this: - - “The essence of National Socialism was bellicose and aggressive - and completely devoid of all moral scruples in its dealings with - other nations. Hitler and his protégé Ribbentrop thirsted after - conquest. It was said that Göring had energetically striven for - a peaceful solution of the Munich crisis and this had lessened - his popularity within the German Government.” - -That was the reason you went to Göring? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And when you put your point of view to Göring -his first reaction was that the British Government was bluffing over -Danzig and Poland. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted and succeeded in arranging the -first meeting in order to convince Göring that, according to British -public opinion, the British Government was not bluffing, is that right? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to turn to Page 29 of your -book, at the very top of the page, which describes the end of your -conversation with the Defendant Göring in the train before the meeting -at the beginning of August. Do you remember? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Göring explained what his aim was. And if you -look at the second line: “This was a mutual agreement regarding the -holding of an Anglo-German conference . . .” and note the next words, -Mr. Dahlerus, “with plenipotentiary representatives from both -Governments.” One matter which Göring had always made clear was that he -would demand the return of Danzig and certain rights over the -Corridor—the Polish Corridor—is that not right? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And from the very start he wanted a -plenipotentiary conference at which territory could, if necessary, be -ceded to Germany, did he not? - -DAHLERUS: Evidently. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come straight on to 24 -August, when you saw Göring and he asked you to go to London. One of the -points that he wanted you to stress was that he and the German -Government thought that there had been a great improvement in their -military situation because of the German-Soviet treaty. - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the other—if you turn to the bottom of Page -35 in your book and then look at the top of Page 36: “The reason was his -disbelief that the German Foreign Office would be able or willing to -establish a sufficiently close contact with the British Foreign Office.” - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember that day you had the -conversation with him, and later on he rang you up at 11:30 before your -departure? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell the Tribunal one or two -of the things he did not tell you on that day. He did not tell you, did -he, that 2 days before, on the 22nd of August, at Obersalzberg, Hitler -had told him and other German leaders that he—Hitler—had decided in -the spring that a conflict with Poland was bound to come. He did not -tell you that, did he? - -DAHLERUS: I never had any indication or information on the political -intentions, either on the 11th of April, or the 23rd of May, or the 22nd -of August. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You never heard of—that is Document Number -798-PS, the one of the 22nd of August—you told us, you never heard of -the Fall Weiss that had been prepared in April, but I want to get it -quite clear about the other one, Document Number L-75 of the 23rd of -May. He never told you that Hitler had said to him on that day that -Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. “It is a question of -expanding our living space in the East.” And I think he also did not -tell you that Hitler had said on that day, “Our task is to isolate -Poland; the success of the isolation will be decisive.” He never spoke -to you about isolating Poland? - -DAHLERUS: He never indicated anything in that direction at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think he did tell you in the earlier -interview that he was going to see M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you, as I understand you, that -he was going to inform M. Lipski that the main obstacle to any -diminution of the tension between the two countries was Poland’s -alliance with Great Britain. He did not tell you that, did he? - -DAHLERUS: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Exhibit Number GB-39, Document Number -72-PS, Page 119. So that, while he was asking you to go to England to -deal with one side of the matter, he was dealing with M. Lipski on the -other. I just want to get a clear picture of the situation on the 24th. -Did he tell you that the decision had been made to attack Poland on the -morning of the 26th? - -DAHLERUS: No, in no way whatsoever. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were asked to go with these general -purposes, as I put it to you? You know now, Mr. Dahlerus, that on the -next day our _note verbale_ was given to Sir Nevile Henderson by -Hitler—on the 26th. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that note, as distinguished from what was -said to you later on, stated in general terms that the Polish question -must be solved, so that the effect of the plans, as they stood on the -evening of the 24th, when Göring rang you up, was that you were going -off in the morning with the expression of a general desire for a -peaceful solution. The _note verbale_ was to be given to Sir Nevile -Henderson on the afternoon of the 25th and at that time the plan was -that Poland would be attacked on the morning of the 26th, when you had -delivered your message, and Sir Nevile had sent on the _note verbale_? -That was the position? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did Göring ever tell you why the plan of -attack was changed from the 26th to the 31st? - -DAHLERUS: No, he never mentioned anything about the plan of attack; nor -that it was changed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you that—this is Document -Number TC-90, Exhibit Number GB-64—I quote Göring’s own words: - - “On the day when England gave her official guarantee to - Poland”—that was the 25th—“the Führer called me on the - telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion - of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or - for good. He said, ‘No, I will have to see whether we can - eliminate British intervention.’ So then I asked him, ‘Do you - think that it will be any different within 4 or 5 days?’” - -Göring never told you that, at the time you were being sent to London, -all that was wanted was to eliminate British intervention? - -DAHLERUS: Not at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to state again, quite -shortly; you went and came back with Lord Halifax’s letter. I want to -make this quite clear, Mr. Dahlerus: Throughout Lord Halifax made it -clear that Great Britain was going to stand by her obligations to -Poland, did he not? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then on the 27th of August, the night of the -26th to 27th, at 12:30 midnight, you had this interview with Hitler. -Now, to you, Mr. Dahlerus, Hitler for the first time made it clear that -his terms were, that Great Britain should help Germany in securing -Danzig and the Corridor. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not “rights in the Corridor,” but “the -Corridor.” Do you remember that when you told that to Mr. Chamberlain he -was surprised at the difference between your account and that given to -Sir Nevile Henderson? - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I am not going to go through it all again, -but I just want you to help me from your own book, which you say was -carefully and objectively written, as to the state of mind of the rulers -of Germany at that time. Now, would you first of all look, with regard -to Hitler, on Page 47? That is the passage you have already told the -Tribunal about, where he was shouting, “Dann werde ich U-Boote bauen.” - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let me put it to you—it is quite -short—how you described it at the time, and you tell me if it is right, -“If there should be a war,” he said, “Dann werde ich U-Boote bauen, -U-Boote, U-Boote!” and he raised his voice each time? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - - SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The voice became more indistinct and - finally one could not follow him at all. Then he pulled himself - together, raised his voice as though addressing a large audience - and shrieked—shrieked—‘Ich werde Flugzeuge bauen, Flugzeuge - bauen, Flugzeuge, Flugzeuge, und ich werde meine Feinde - vernichten.’” - -And you go on to say: - - “Just then he seemed more like a phantom from a story book than - a real person. I stared at him in amazement and turned to see - how Göring reacted, but he did not turn a hair.” - -Now, would you mind turning on to Page 53? No, just one sentence before -the bit I read on Page 47, I just want to get that clear. You say: “His -words became blurred and his behavior was that of a completely abnormal -person.” - -Now, you turn to Page 53. I want you to tell the Tribunal your -impression of the way he treated the Defendant Göring. The Tribunal has -heard a lot about the relations between them. At the bottom of the page -you say this: - - “From the very beginning of our conversation I had resented his - manner toward Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from - the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable, - but to require such obsequious humility, as Göring now - exhibited, from his closest collaborator seemed to me - excessively repellent and unprepossessing.” - -Would you just turn over to Page 54, the fifth line from the end? - - “I realized that I was dealing with a person who could not be - considered normal.” - -That was your considered view, was it not, Mr. Dahlerus? - -DAHLERUS: It was the opinion I formed the first time I met him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the Chancellor of Germany. Now I want -you, for a moment, to deal with the Foreign Minister of Germany, -according to the impressions that you formed. Generally, I think you got -the impression that Von Ribbentrop was doing everything he could to -interrupt and spoil your endeavors? - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Göring, he went further than -that. Will you look at Page 76? This is, you remember, when you were -just saying goodbye to Göring, on, I think, your last visit to London, -after he had drawn the map, which I will come to in a moment. Did you -say this: - - “Before we parted, he again went over the German standpoint, - saying finally that if we never met again he would like to take - the opportunity of thanking me for what I have done and for my - tireless energy in the cause of peace. I was somewhat surprised - by this farewell and could not help replying that in all - probability we should meet again soon. His expression changed - and he said solemnly: ‘Perhaps; but certain people are doing - what they can to prevent your getting out of this alive.’” - -That was said seriously and solemnly, Mr. Dahlerus? - -DAHLERUS: Exactly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you go on: - - “At a meeting in October of the same year Göring told me that - Ribbentrop had tried to arrange for my plane to crash. Hence - Göring’s solemn mien when he bid me farewell.” - -DAHLERUS: Well, he had mentioned Ribbentrop’s name just a minute before, -and when he spoke about the plane crashing, he used the word “he.” I -assumed he meant Ribbentrop. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the Foreign Minister, according to -Göring. - -I want you now to turn to Page 100, because I want to collect these -things. This is a description of the 1st of September, the afternoon of -the day on which Poland had been attacked, and you saw the Defendant -Göring, I think, in the Air Ministry or at one of his offices. Do you -see it? It is just before the second break. - - “To him”—that is, to Göring—“everything was lined up according - to a plan which nothing could upset. Finally he called in the - State Secretaries Körner and Gritzbach, gave them a long - harangue, and presented each of them with a sword of honor, - which he hoped they would carry gloriously through the war. It - was as if all these people were in some crazy state of - intoxication.” - -Are these your words? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that is the impression? Of course you mean -that they were mentally intoxicated with the idea of war? - -DAHLERUS: They had changed their frame of mind within a short time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, of the three principal people in -Germany, the Chancellor was abnormal; the Reich Marshal, or the Field -Marshal, as he was then, was in a crazy state of intoxication; and, -according to the Defendant Göring, the Foreign Minister was a would-be -murderer who wanted to sabotage your plane? - -[_The witness nodded assent._] - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us proceed, quite shortly, with what -happened after that. - -On the week end of 26 and 27 August you went to England. You have told -me that you did not know about the calling off of the attack on the -morning of the 26th, and you did not know that the intention of Hitler -was to eliminate English intervention. You did not know these points; so -you went back to England on the 27th with these fuller terms, and the -English answer was that, while they maintained their obligations, they -hoped and recommended that the German and Polish Governments might begin -negotiations between themselves with regard to the point? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was the answer that you brought back. - -Now, I just want you to think for a moment of the interview that you had -at breakfast time with Göring, I think in his train or in his -headquarters, on the 28th of August. You find it at Page 65 of the book, -if you want to refresh your memory. At that time, did Göring not try and -convince you that the return of Danzig and the Corridor would make no -difference to Poland’s military situation? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Because, illustrating it from his own war maps, -he thought that Germany was in a position to defeat the Poles anyhow, -whether they had the Corridor or whether they hadn’t? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And his Air Forces and the troops were all in -position to carry that out? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you now to come to the question of -the meeting at which the terms were given to Sir Nevile Henderson. That -was at 7:15 in the evening, on the 29th of August, and the meeting went -on for some time. Do you remember that meeting? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, as I think one of the counsel has -elicited from you, the difficulty arose over the demand for a -plenipotentiary to be back in 24 hours, as you have explained. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I think Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes told you -that that meeting had gone very badly, and then at 11:30 you saw Göring, -and Göring said much the same as Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes as to how the -meeting had gone. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he said, that what had upset the Chancellor -was that Sir Nevile Henderson had characterized or implied that this -demand that the plenipotentiary should come within 24 hours was -equivalent to an ultimatum. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember at that time that Göring -underlined certain of the terms? - -Will you turn to the preface of your book . . . - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the facsimile. Have you a copy? - -DAHLERUS: I have the original here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you will just look at it. Now, it is in -German. If you follow the German, I want just to read the bits which -Göring has underlined, and I will read it in English and you check to -see that I have got the right piece: - - “For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government - has never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital interests - or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The - German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances, agrees - to accept the British Government’s offer of its good offices in - securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full - powers. It counts on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, - 30 August 1939. The German Government will immediately draw up - proposals for a solution acceptable to itself and will, if - possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government - before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.” - -That is the bit which the Defendant Göring has underlined, just before -the bit about the sending of the plenipotentiary. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was no doubt that the Defendant -Göring was associating himself with the importance of that point. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember that at that time, during that -interview, that is, the night of the 29th, the Defendant Göring made a -great tirade against the Poles. - -DAHLERUS: That is right. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to go into that in detail; but -then he said to you that the Führer was preparing what I think in -English is a “magnanimous offer.” - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And to show you the nature of the “magnanimous -offer,” he hedged in a portion of the bits of Poland. That is also in -the preface to your book. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -Sir DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there are two points about what he hedged -in. In fact, it was much more than had been taken from Germany under the -Treaty of Versailles. - -Secondly, it was entirely different from what was cabled over by the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop to Sir Nevile Henderson the next night. - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I do not think I can put it -better than in your own words, if you will turn to Page 75. Is this how -you record it in your book, the second break: - - “This map, a reproduction of which is given in this book, is - extraordinarily interesting because it illustrates the rapidity - and recklessness with which the decisions in this question were - reached. I had the map with me when I left for London a few - hours later, but it turned out that the boundaries drawn up on - it differed very considerably from those given the well-known - ‘Project Ribbentrop,’ presented at top speed to Henderson on the - night between the 30th and 31st of August.” - -That is rather less than 24 hours later. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you go on to describe what it showed. -Well, it showed this quite clearly, that 24 hours before that was cabled -over to Sir Nevile Henderson the German Government had never seriously -considered what portion of the Corridor it was going to claim and what -portion it was not going to claim. Is that so? Göring was putting an -entirely different thing to you the night before, was he not? - -DAHLERUS: The first proposal I brought with me on Sunday morning, the -27th. Yes, there it was only the small Corridor, and they extended the -claims according to this last plan. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They extended the claim, so that the effect of -what was put to you, what you were sent to announce—that a “magnanimous -offer” was coming—was actually an extension of claims, and, equally -actually, quite different from what was suggested the next night by the -Defendant Ribbentrop. - -DAHLERUS: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to ask you one word about an -interview which took place on the 31st of August. You will find it at -Page 87. It is the interview at which Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes gave you -an account of what M. Lipski had said. I want you just to tell me this: -You did meet M. Lipski, did you not? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, of course—obviously, the same could be -said of everyone, I am sure of yourself also—M. Lipski was suffering -from considerable strain in that most critical time? - -DAHLERUS: He was very nervous. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very nervous. And did not Sir George Forbes tell -you that M. Lipski made his opinion quite clear that the German offer -was a breach of Polish sovereignty; and that, in his view, Poland and -France and England must stand firm and show a united front; and that -Poland, if left alone, would fight and die alone? That was M. Lipski’s -mood, was it not, at the time? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And with regard to the other matter, I am not -going into the details, but there is a considerable and significant -difference between the Polish version of the telegram of instructions to -M. Lipski and the version which the Defendant Göring showed to you? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the morning of the 1st of September I -think you saw Göring at 8 o’clock. Would it be a correct description of -the way in which he broke the fact that he had attacked Poland to say -that it was very gradual or slow, with Göring almost walking backwards, -when he broke the news to you that the attack had taken place? - -DAHLERUS: Well, so much so that I immediately phoned London and got in -contact with the Foreign Office and informed somebody that, according to -the information I had received, the Poles had been attacked, and they -naturally wondered what was happening to me when I gave that -information. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but he did eventually admit that they had -attacked Poland, and then you had a further interview with Hitler. There -is just one point I want you to clarify. I do not think you told the -Tribunal about the time when he said he would fight for 10 years. Look -at Page 98. - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see there, after saying: “‘Will ich zehn -Jahre kämpfen,’ he brandished his fist and bent down so that it nearly -touched the floor.” - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I take it, he was in the same state as at the -time of your previous interview. - -DAHLERUS: Well, if possible, more nervous. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is just one final matter, if you -would look at Page 102, and then I shall leave your book. - -You remember you saw the Defendant Göring on the morning of Saturday, 2d -September? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you say this: - - “To my surprise he was more inclined to listen to the viewpoints - which I maintained, for, as soon as we had sat down in his - private drawing-room car, he told me that there was talk of a - mediation sponsored by Mussolini. Mussolini was said to be - fervently trying to stop the war, and especially to prevent it - from spreading.” - -The next sentence is: - - “Göring said that he wanted to inaugurate a new Munich.” - -I do not want to put it unfairly, and therefore I ask you, Mr. Dahlerus, -does the “he” in that sentence refer to Göring or to Mussolini? - -DAHLERUS: I think it refers to Mussolini. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think it refers to Mussolini. That is what I -suspected, and therefore I will not trouble you further about it, except -to ask you this: - -I have taken you briefly—I hope you will agree, fairly—through the -points on this matter, and on these facts that I have put to you, and -with which you will agree, are they the basis of your opinion that the -aim of the German Government, including Göring, was to split Poland and -Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain? - -DAHLERUS: Well, if I had known the facts that I heard later . . . - -DR. STAHMER: I believe that this question goes too far. Therefore, I -have to object to this question. It refers in general to the government -and to a definite number of persons. Besides, it is an expression of -opinion and not a fact about which the witness is to testify. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was: Are these facts the basis of -your opinion? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is a perfectly proper question and -arises directly out of the examination in chief. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, you were answering. I had asked -you are these facts . . . - -DR. SAUTER: But then I should like to ask, Mr. President, that it be -clarified what is to be understood under the term “German Government,” -of which the prosecutor speaks constantly. The German Government -consists of quite a number of ministers, and if one speaks here -continuously of the German Government, without saying who is meant -individually, the impression is created, that each and every one of the -ministers was responsible and had participated in these negotiations, -although, in fact, he knew nothing about it. I am representing one of -these ministers who knew nothing about these negotiations, and therefore -it would be of interest to me if the prosecutor would be kind enough to -clarify who actually is meant by the term “German Government.” That is -to say, whether the Minister of Economics, Funk, for instance, is also -included, or whether it refers only to two or three other gentlemen. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not suppose . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not agree at all with what Dr. Sauter has said. We -have already heard the Defendant Göring at considerable length about -what the government consisted of, and it will be upon the defendants’ -counsel, when the time comes to argue the case, to argue that the -government did not include the members whom they represent. - -Defendants’ counsel do not seem to understand that, what they call -clarification is a matter which can be done in re-examination. Dr. -Stahmer will have the opportunity of re-examining, and then can ask any -questions that arise out of the cross-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put it, Mr. Dahlerus, in this way: Are -these facts which you have heard and agreed with this afternoon, are -they the basis of the view which you expressed in answer to Dr. -Stahmer’s question this morning? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. At the time I thought I could contribute something to -preventing a new war; I could definitely prove that nothing was left -undone by the British, by His Majesty’s Government to prevent war. But -had I known what I know today, I would have realized that my efforts -could not possibly succeed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is one other point. I ask Your -Lordship’s indulgence. Dr. Stahmer asked for the names of these English -industrialists. My Lord, I am very anxious, as representative of the -British Government, that there should be no concealment about this -matter at all, and I should, therefore, ask, with all humility, that -Your Lordship would allow me to ask Mr. Dahlerus to give the names, -simply for that reason. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if you wish to. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell us the names of the -gentlemen that you met on your wife’s estate in Schleswig-Holstein? - -DAHLERUS: Shall I read them or hand them in? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Read them if you will. - -DAHLERUS: The Honorable Charles McLarn, S. W. Rossen, A. Holden, Sir -Robert Renig, Bryon S. Mountain, C. F. Spencer, T. Menceford. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Prosecution wish to -cross-examine? - -Dr. Stahmer, do you not wish to re-examine? - -DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should like to put a question. May I ask, -without being misunderstood, why these names could not be read this -morning when Dr. Stahmer asked for them? - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you ask that question? What has it to do with the -case of Von Ribbentrop? - -DR. HORN: The witness Dahlerus was also approved for the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop, and I had reached an agreement with Dr. Stahmer as to -certain questions. I, too, was interested in these questions this -morning and also in the question about the people who had been there. - -THE PRESIDENT: The reason why the names were not given this morning was -because we wished to get on with this Trial, and we thought that the -names of these gentlemen were irrelevant. But as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe -asked that they might be introduced in order that there could be no -suggestion of concealment, the Tribunal has allowed them to be given. - -DR. HORN: Thank you. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, you said this morning that on 23 August you -were called up by Göring in Stockholm and that he told you that the -situation had become serious, and that, therefore, he was absolutely -obliged to talk to you. Did he tell you for what reasons he considered -the situation at that moment serious? - -DAHLERUS: No. - -DR. STAHMER: And you did not ask him about it? - -DAHLERUS: No. - -DR. STAHMER: You came then to Berlin on the 24th and conferred at once -with Göring. Did Göring tell you on this occasion what had made the -situation more serious in the meantime? - -DAHLERUS: Not clearly. - -DR. STAHMER: What did he tell you about the danger? In what did the -seriousness of the situation consist? - -DAHLERUS: He indicated that the fact that the Polish question was not -yet solved, and that there was no indication that it would be solved, -made the situation serious. He also said that it depended entirely on -the British attitude and initiative whether a solution could be found. - -DR. STAHMER: From this answer then you learned that Poland was the point -of danger? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: You did transmit proposals then on 27 August which had as -their main object the solution of the Polish question? - -DAHLERUS: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: In reply to my question with reference to the events of 26 -September, you said this morning, according to my notes, that you were -of the opinion at that time that Hitler’s plans were not quite clear. -Then this afternoon you spoke of Göring. How do you account for that -difference in your answer? - -DAHLERUS: At the time I had to assume that the leading members of the -German Government worked in close collaboration. - -DR. STAHMER: Then you concluded that from this fact? You also said -before, if you had known what you know today, you would not have -intervened. What has brought about your change of opinion? - -DAHLERUS: The facts disclosed, chiefly during the proceedings in this -court, and as published. - -DR. STAHMER: Which facts are these? - -DAHLERUS: The incidents I quoted, the declaration of 11 April, 23 May, -and 22 August. - -DR. STAHMER: You have no further facts, have you? - -DAHLERUS: Yes, but those are the main points. - -DR. STAHMER: What are the minor points? What are your other misgivings? - -DAHLERUS: One is the experience on 26 September 1939, the speech by -Hitler on 6 October 1939, and a number of declarations made since. - -DR. STAHMER: You mentioned before a plane crash, if I understood you -correctly, which was to have been brought about by Ribbentrop. Were you -really serious about that? - -DAHLERUS: Well, I corrected my statement to say that I assumed that it -was Ribbentrop, because his name had just been mentioned about a minute -before. - -DR. STAHMER: I have one more question for the witness. What about the -map of Poland which had just been shown and which allegedly was drawn by -Göring? - -DAHLERUS: I have the original of that map in my possession. - -DR. STAHMER: And what was the explanation given to you? - -DAHLERUS: That it was a territory that held a majority of Germans, and -not Poles. - -DR. STAHMER: How do you explain, then, the difference between the later -offer and that map? - -DAHLERUS: I can only assume that the question had not been thoroughly -discussed and various proposals had been made before the definite -proposal was submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire; and the Tribunal will adjourn. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, you will continue your -cross-examination, will you not? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have assumed, Your Honor, that, since Göring’s -testimony was suspended in order to hear Dahlerus, on the ground that it -might change some of his examination, Dr. Stahmer would complete any -direct examination he may have on this subject with the Witness Dahlerus -before I finish my cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, yes. Dr. Stahmer, will you ask any -questions of the Defendant Göring that you wish to ask, arising out of -the evidence of the Witness Dahlerus. - -DR. STAHMER: I can ask him these questions only after I have spoken with -him. I therefore consider it appropriate for Mr. Justice Jackson to -continue his cross-examination, and after the cross-examination I can -deal with these questions as well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal considers that you ought to be -prepared to go on now. It is you who asked for the evidence of Dahlerus -to be interposed, and Dahlerus was your witness, not the Prosecution’s -witness, and therefore presumably you knew what Dahlerus was going to -say. - -DR. STAHMER: Then I ask for the opportunity to discuss the matter with -the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court has just been adjourned for 10 minutes. - -DR. STAHMER: I was not able to finish the matter in that short period of -time. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that you must ask these -questions now and go on with the examination. If you wish to examine the -Defendant Göring on these matters you must do it now. - -DR. STAHMER: Very well. - -[_The Defendant Göring resumed the stand._] - -DR. STAHMER: [_Turning to the defendant._] A map was mentioned -previously which is supposed to have been drawn up by you and which is -contained in Mr. Dahlerus’ book, the authenticity of which he confirmed -this morning in answer to my question. I am having this map, which is to -be found on Page 53 of his book, shown to you and I ask for your -explanation of it. - -GÖRING: In the discussion that took place in the night of 29-30 August -between Dahlerus and me, I believe at the Führer’s, I tore a map from an -atlas on the spur of the moment and outlined with a red pencil, and I -believe a blue or green pencil, those regions—not the regions which we -would demand, as declared here before by the Prosecution—but those -regions of Poland in which Germans live. That the witness Dahlerus was -also of this opinion can be seen most clearly from the fact that he -repeated the same markings on another map and then wrote as follows, -next to the marked section: “German population according to Göring;” and -next to the dotted section: “Polish inhabitants according to Göring.” - -He then goes on writing and draws boundaries: “Göring’s first proposal -for the boundary” which agrees with the markings of the regions of -German and Polish populations. That was not a boundary proposal, but a -separation of the two populations. And then he writes: “Hitler’s -proposal;” that is the final, the correct, and the only proposal -transmitted to the Polish as well as to the British Government. If one -compares my map one sees that here quite spontaneously and in a great -hurry, with a two-color pencil, a quite superficial marking off of the -approximate zones of population is made, that is, one in which the -majority are Germans and one in which there are exclusively Poles. From -the beginning Mr. Dahlerus was given only the broad outlines of the -boundary proposal, which was later made more exact. That is the only one -in question, the same one which was published, which was read to -Ambassador Henderson, and which, as Henderson did not understand it, I -had telephoned to the Embassy by Dahlerus during the night, and checked -the next day. - -DR. STAHMER: Will you please repeat the last sentence? I believe it did -not come through. - -GÖRING: I said, the boundaries of the Corridor, as outlined here at -Hitler’s suggestion, were the official proposal which the Führer, as the -only person entitled to make final proposals, had worked out. It is the -same proposal that was read to Ambassador Henderson, and as he did not -understand it, I turned the note which was read to Henderson, over to -Dahlerus for him to dictate it so that I could be sure that the English -Ambassador was informed of it in its entirety. - -To do this was, as I have already said, actually an enormous risk, since -the Führer had forbidden this information being made public at the -moment, and, as I have stated already, only I could take that risk. But -for the rest, as far as my markings are concerned, they show clearly on -the map: “German population according to Göring; Polish population -according to Göring.” But that was only approximate and done in a great -hurry during the night, merely for his information, and on a map torn -from an atlas. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus said that you called him up on the 23rd of -August and asked him to come to Berlin immediately because in the -meantime the situation had become serious. What made you consider the -situation serious? - -GÖRING: Through the statements of the Führer at the Obersalzberg on that -22d of August it was clear to me that the tension had reached its peak. -The Führer had stated that he would have to bring about a solution of -the problem, if it were not possible to obtain one diplomatically. On -that occasion, since it was simply an address, without discussion, -before the higher officers of troop formations which would be used in -case of war, I, as senior officer present, confined myself to saying to -the Führer at the end: “The Wehrmacht will do its duty.” Of course it -has to do its duty, if it is called upon. At the same time, however, I -wanted to exert every effort in order to make as soon as possible—it -was now a matter of days; a definite date, the 25th or 26th, as decided -at first, had not yet been set on this day—to make one more attempt at -negotiations. I wanted to be able to say to the Führer, if such -negotiations were successfully underway, that there were still prospects -of and chances for a diplomatic solution. - -Hence, the concurrence of events on the afternoon of the 22d: the -Führer’s speech and my immediate reaction of sending for Dahlerus from -Stockholm. I, of course, did not tell him, and I could not, of course, -as a German, tell him, a foreigner—and especially not as an -officer—that my reason lay in these factors which I have explained. -Things are now being represented as if there could never have existed in -Germany such an idea as “secret military matter,” or “secret,” or “top -secret,” in German politics and in military life at all; as though we -were obligated to make known every military and political step to the -foreign press in advance. I therefore point out that we, of course, had -the same procedures as those adopted in every other country of the -world. - -DR. STAHMER: How was it that you handled the negotiations personally and -that the negotiations were not handled through the Foreign Office? - -GÖRING: I was bent on having this question settled peacefully as far as -it was at all possible. The work of the Foreign Office is official. Here -we were working at it anyhow, and according to the guiding principles -laid down by the Führer. I could make my influence felt only in a way -which was as direct as possible but not expressly official, because for -official action I did not hold the official position of Minister for -Foreign Affairs as far as foreign countries were concerned. And at this -time it was clear to me that it was not a question of formalities, but -rather a question of the most practical and the quickest way of -accomplishing something. If I wanted to influence the Führer, that was -possible only if I had something in my hand, that is, if I could say to -him: “On my own responsibility, but with your knowledge and without -committing you and your Reich policy, I am conducting negotiations in -order, circumstances permitting, to create an atmosphere which will -facilitate official negotiations in the direction of a peaceful -solution.” - -In addition, it would be faster. - -DR. STAHMER: This clear fact, that it was a personal step on your part -that was being taken alongside official diplomatic negotiations—was -that clear also to the British Government? - -GÖRING: It must have been clear from the entire action that this was a -nonofficial negotiation which only at one or two points touched the -official negotiations, or overlapped them. For instance, the phase where -Ambassador Henderson, instead of returning immediately to Berlin, -remained 1 or 2 days in London in order, first of all, through the -unofficial negotiator, Dahlerus, to explain to the British Government -the basis of these intentions, or for the negotiations, or to explain -the note, as I shall call it; and when that had been done, the -preparation for entering into these conferences was thereby considerably -improved. And that not I alone was of the honest conviction on that day -that a considerable step had been taken in the direction of a peaceful -solution at that time—I believe it was the 28th—is demonstrated by the -fact that the same view was held at the British Embassy at that moment, -as the Embassy Councillor, Sir Ogilvie-Forbes, has very clearly stated. -The situation did not become worse until the 29th. - -During all these negotiations it was not a question, as far as I was -concerned, of isolating Poland and keeping England out of the matter, -but rather it was a question, since the problem of the Corridor and -Danzig had come up, of solving it peaceably, as far as possible along -the lines of the Munich solution. That was my endeavor until the last -moment. If it had been only a question of eliminating England from the -matter, then, first of all, English diplomacy would surely have -recognized that immediately—it certainly has enough training for that. -However, it did enter into these negotiations. And, secondly, I probably -would have used entirely different tactics. - -It is not that I am reconstructing things in retrospect; I am speaking -of what actually happened in those days, of what I thought and wanted. -The descriptions given by the Witness Dahlerus today, and in his book -regarding his talks with the Führer, by no means represent the way these -talks took place. His descriptions are rather subjective, for the Führer -probably would not long have been party to such talks. - -There are also other subjective interpretations in the book, which -perhaps are purely unessential, but which have been brought forward by -the Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, that I, in a theatrical fashion, -had handed to two collaborators two swords so that they might accomplish -bold actions with them. One of those who allegedly received a sword from -me was my civilian State Secretary Körner, not a soldier. The most I -could have given him was a pen, since he had to draft decrees for the -Four Year Plan. The second person was the chief of my office staff, a -ministerial director, who also was no soldier and was not to earn any -war laurels, but whose main task during the war was exclusively that of -keeping my civilian, not my military, staff in order, and of insuring -the functioning and progress of that work. For both these matters these -gentlemen needed neither a sword nor any incitement, to behave in a -military way. - -DR. STAHMER: Is it correct that it was first intended to undertake -aggressive action against Poland on the 26th of August, and that this -date was later postponed? - -GÖRING: It was provided that if by this time—official negotiations were -being carried on before this, that must not be forgotten—if by then -these negotiations had not led to a solution of the problem, as a -consequence of the general mobilization of Poland and the deployment of -troops which had likewise taken place, and as a consequence of very -serious border incidents that had actually occurred—I remind you of the -bloody Sunday of Bromberg, of the more than 70,000 Germans who had fled, -and of the Germans slain—in other words, the atmosphere at this time -was such that the Führer would have wanted to bring about a solution by -means of war. Then this delay came about, precisely because one believed -that a diplomatic solution could still be found, and thus I took it as a -matter of course that I should intensify to the utmost the unofficial -course which I had already pursued in my previous efforts and see it -through. This explains Dahlerus’ frequent conferences in London and in -Berlin, the frequent changes in those conferences, and the frequent -flying to and fro. - -When the last attempt was suggested by me on the 3rd of September, the -situation was as follows, and it also has not been described quite -correctly. The British Government at first did not send any ultimatum -after the 1st of September, but it sent a note in which it demanded the -withdrawal . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreter please tell the Tribunal what the -last question asked by counsel was? Perhaps the interpreter would not -know it. Does the shorthand writer know what the last question was?—It -does not seem to me that any answer has been given; it related to the -26th of August. - -[_The interpreter repeated the question._] - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that was the question, and as far as I have heard -there has been no answer to it yet. - -DR. STAHMER: I did not understand that, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: The question that you asked was whether the date of the -26th of August was arranged for the action to take place against Poland, -and the Defendant Göring has been speaking for some considerable time -and has not answered that question yet as far as I have heard. - -GÖRING: The question—my answer to this question was that actually the -26th of August was at first planned by the Führer as the date for the -invasion, since he considered this date necessary, in view of the -situation that I have described. It was then possible, however, to -persuade him once more to postpone this date, in order to carry on -further negotiations. - -DR. STAHMER: How is it to be explained that Hitler’s proposal failed? - -GÖRING: Which proposal? - -DR. STAHMER: The last proposal of 27 August, that Dahlerus delivered to -London. - -GÖRING: This proposal was, of course, an unofficial one and was followed -by an official proposal that was read to the British Ambassador in the -form of a note; that is, the British Government was informed what -demands Germany would make on Poland. This proposal was not entirely -understood, and was then unofficially—but _de facto_—made known not -only to the British Government but also, to the Polish Ambassador, -exactly and precisely, in the unofficial way that Dahlerus has -described. It came to naught because the Polish Government did not agree -to discuss this proposal. First there was a prolongation for a -plenipotentiary to be appointed—I believe until the 30th or the 31st; -but nevertheless we waited even longer for a plenipotentiary. On the -intimation that the Polish Ambassador might be this plenipotentiary, -circumstances permitting, we waited for a conference with him; when he -declared that he was not authorized to accept any terms, the Führer -decided on invasion the next day. This telegram I also sent to the -British Ambassador via Dahlerus—the telegram of the Polish Government -to their Ambassador, in which they forbade him, in a postscript, to -conduct any negotiations regarding proposals, or to accept any proposal, -or any note on the subject. - -I immediately gave Dahlerus the decoded telegram, which I received from -the investigation office mentioned the day before yesterday, so that he -could hand it to Henderson, and I told him in addition, despite any -scruples I might have had, that, since it was a matter of extraordinary -importance, the British Government should find out as quickly as -possible how intransigent the Polish attitude was, so that it might, -circumstances permitting, influence the Polish Government in the -direction of a conference. I thus gave away the key, that is, I showed -that we had the Polish diplomatic code key and thus spoiled for Germany -a real and important source of information. This was a unique step, that -I could justify only by my absolute wish and determination to avert the -conflict at the last moment. I should, therefore, like to read the -appendix to the official dispatch; it is brief and runs: “From the -Polish Government to the Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin.” I skip the -first part and read only the following: - - “As a particular secret instruction for the Ambassador, he is in - addition informed that he should refrain from conducting - official negotiations under any circumstances. In the event of - oral or written proposals being made by the Reich Government, - please state that you have no plenipotentiary powers to respond - to or discuss them, and that you are empowered only to convey - the above message to that Government and that you must have - further instructions first.” - -It is clearly seen from this that the Ambassador was not, as we had been -told, authorized to do anything at all in the other direction, and this -telegram, which the Führer also read, probably indicated to him very -clearly the hopelessness of arriving at an understanding with Poland. - -DR. STAHMER: Were these negotiations begun and carried out by you with -the earnest intention of maintaining peace? - -GÖRING: If one reads these writings in their context, that can be seen -from this document; but I should not like to rely on the evidence of -this book but on what I have to say here under oath. It was my firm -determination to do everything to settle in a peaceful way this problem -that had arisen. I did not want war; consequently I did everything I -possibly could to avoid it. That has nothing to do with the preparations -which I carried out as a matter of duty in my capacity as a high-ranking -soldier. - -DR. STAHMER: A matter was brought up here concerning a flying accident -which might possibly have befallen Mr. Dahlerus. What about this remark? - -GÖRING: The witness Dahlerus said at the conclusion of his testimony -that he must correct himself, that he had not received this absurd -information from me, but that this was a conclusion of his because I had -mentioned Ribbentrop’s name shortly before in an entirely different -connection. I had only one concern and that I indicated: Dahlerus flew -in my own plane to London at that time; the tension was already very -acute, and in all states mobilization and a threatened state of war had -been proclaimed. Official air communications had been cut off long -before. So it was possible that under certain circumstances a German -plane flying to London with a courier or, vice versa, a British plane -flying to Berlin at that time might incur danger from our anti-aircraft -batteries or the like, and I wanted to obviate this danger as far as -possible by telephoning Dutch and English authorities, as far as I -remember. This was the only reason for my telling Dahlerus that I hoped -he would arrive and return safely, because in those times an accident -might easily have taken place. - -Herr Von Ribbentrop knew nothing whatsoever about the fact that Dahlerus -was being sent. During the whole time I never discussed the matter of -Dahlerus with Herr Von Ribbentrop. Thus he did not know at all that he -was flying, that he went back and forth between me and the British -Government. All that is an absolute concoction. - -DR. STAHMER: On 26 September 1939 were you present at the conference -between Dahlerus and Hitler? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: What did Hitler say then about Poland? - -GÖRING: It is correct that he made statements to the effect that a -restoration of Poland as she existed before the outbreak of war could no -longer be considered after the course taken by the battle, but that he -would now, of course, keep the old German provinces that had been taken -in 1918. But even at that time he indicated that the Government General -in Warsaw would not interest him and pointed out very emphatically to -Dahlerus that this was a question which was to be settled chiefly and -decisively by Germany and Russia, and that there could thus be no -question of a unilateral settlement with England because the greater -part of Poland was already occupied by Russia. And these were agreements -that he could no longer make unilaterally with England. That was the -gist of the Führer’s statements. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the testimony which you -gave yesterday and ask you if it is correct. - - “I think I was Deputy Chairman”—referring to the Reich Defense - Council—“I do not even know, I heard about that, but I assure - you under my oath, that at no time and at no date did I - participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense - of the Reich was called together as such.” - -Is that a correct transcription of your testimony? - -GÖRING: Yes, I said that in no single . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all. That is all I asked you. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have your attention called to Document -Number 3575-PS (Exhibit Number USA-781) which is the minutes of the -Reich Defense Council of 18 November 1938, with you presiding. - -I call your attention to the statement that the “meeting consisted -solely of a 3-hour lecture by the Field Marshal. No discussion took -place.” - -Is that correct? - -[_Document 3575-PS was submitted to the defendant._] - -GÖRING: I have to read it first, this is the first time I have seen the -document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not know when you testified yesterday that -we had this document, did you? Would you kindly answer that question? - -GÖRING: I have not seen this document before. I have to look at it -first. It says here: “Notes on the session of the Reich Defense Council -on 18 November 1938.” - -The Reich Defense Council, as it was described here, comprised few -people. Here there were present, however, all Reich ministers and state -secretaries, also the commanders-in-chief of the Army and the Navy, the -chiefs of the General Staff, of the three branches of the Armed Forces, -Reichsleiter Bormann for the Deputy of the Führer, General Daluege, SS -Gruppenführer Heydrich, the Reich Labor Führer, the Price Commissioner, -the President of the Reich Labor Office, and others. - -When I gave my testimony I was thinking only of the Reich Defense -Council as such. This is dealing with the Reich Defense Council within -the framework of a large assembly. Nevertheless, I was not thinking of -that; this concerns, over and beyond the Reich Defense Council, an -assembly that was much larger than that provided for under the Reich -Defense Council. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the fact that the “Field -Marshal stated it to be the task of the Reich Defense Council to -correlate all the forces of the nation for accelerated building up of -German armament.” - -Do you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have it now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The second paragraph? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Under II, “The Physical Task: The assignment is to -raise the level of armament from a current index of 100 to one of 300.” - -GÖRING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: I cannot quite see the reason why it repeatedly happens -that the Defense does not receive documents that are discussed in Court -and that are submitted to the Court. The document now discussed is also -not known to us, at least not to me. - -During the last few days I have noticed that several times documents -were suddenly presented by the Prosecution without any effort having -been made to inform us of their existence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is perfectly true, and I think every lawyer -knows that one of the great questions in this case is credibility, and -that if we have, in cross-examination, to submit every document before -we can refer to it in cross-examination, after we hear their testimony, -the possibilities of useful cross-examination are destroyed. - -Now, of course, he did not know; and we have had the experience of -calling document after document to their attention, always to be met -with some explanation, carefully arranged and read here from notes. No -defendant has ever had better opportunity to prepare his case than these -defendants, and I submit that cross-examination of them should not be -destroyed by any requirement that we submit documents in advance. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to say something? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I should like to make two points. First, I am entirely -agreed if Mr. Justice Jackson wants to make use of the element of -surprise. I should merely be thankful if the Defense then were also -permitted to use the element of surprise. Yet we have been told -heretofore that we must show every document we want to submit weeks -ahead of time, so that the Prosecution has several weeks to form an -opinion on it. - -Secondly, if the element of surprise is being used, I believe that at -least we, as Defense Counsel, should not be given this surprise at the -moment when the document is submitted to the Court and to the witness. I -have at this moment neither today’s documents nor the documents of the -previous days. - -THE PRESIDENT: What you have just said is entirely inaccurate. You have -never been compelled to disclose any documents which you wished to put -to a witness in cross-examination. This is cross-examination and -therefore it is perfectly open to Counsel for the Prosecution to put any -document without disclosing it beforehand; just as Defense Counsel could -have put any document to witnesses called on behalf of the Prosecution, -if they had wished to do so, in cross-examination. - -I am sure that if counsel for the defendants wish to re-examine upon any -such document as this, a copy of it will be supplied to them for that -purpose. - -The Tribunal now rules that this document may be put to the witness now. - -DR. SIEMERS: Does the Defense also have the opportunity, now that it is -known to the entire Court, of receiving the document? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should be thankful if I could have a copy now. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am frank to say I do not know whether we have -adequate copies to furnish them to all the Defense Counsel now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Maybe you have not, but you can let them have one or more -copies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But I do not think we should furnish copies until -the examination with reference to that document is completed, that is to -say . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: I should like to make one request that at least the technical -possibilities—that at least the counsel of these defendants who are -being cross-examined also be given the document that is submitted to the -defendant, so that they are in a position, just as the Tribunal is, to -follow the examination. - -If Justice Jackson says that it is his opinion that it would be right -for the defense counsel−in this case my colleague Stahmer—to receive -this document only after the examination—in this case of Göring—has -ended, I beg earnestly, in the interest of the dignity and prestige of -the Defense, to take objection to this suggestion of Justice Jackson’s. -I do not believe that he means by that to insinuate that the Defense -Counsel would be able—having these documents in its hands at the same -time as the Tribunal and at the same time as the witness—somehow -through signs or otherwise to influence the defendant and thereby -disturb the cross-examination by Mr. Justice Jackson, or by the -prosecutor. Mr. Justice Jackson certainly did not mean that, but one -might draw that conclusion. - -I therefore make this request: If in the cross-examination, for the -purpose of the cross-examination, in view of the altogether justified -element of surprise, a document is presented to a witness that at the -same time is presented to the Tribunal, that at least a copy of this -document be given at the same time to the defense counsel, the defense -counsel concerned, either the one who has called the witness or the one -whose defendant is in the witness box, so that he can have some idea of -what the witness is being confronted with, for Göring could read this -document, but Dr. Stahmer could not. In other words, he was not in a -position to follow the next part of Mr. Justice Jackson’s -cross-examination. That is certainly not intended, and would certainly -not be fair, and I should therefore like to ask Mr. Justice Jackson to -reply to my suggestion, and my application, in order to arrive at an -understanding and thereby to relieve the Tribunal of the decision on a -question that to me seems self-evident. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal is inclined to -think—the Tribunal certainly thinks—that you are perfectly right, that -there is no necessity at all, as I have already stated, to disclose the -document to the defendants before you use it in cross-examination. But, -at the time you use it in cross-examination, is there any objection to -handing a copy of it to the counsel for the defendant who is being -cross-examined? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In some instances it is physically impossible -because of our situation in reference to these documents. A good many of -these documents have come to us very lately. Our photostatic facilities -are limited. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not suggesting that you should hand it to all of -them, but only to Dr. Stahmer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If we have copies, I have no objection to doing -that, but if we do not have them in German—our difficulty has always -been to get German copies of these documents. - -DR. DIX: May I say something else. If it is not possible in German, then -it should at least be possible in English, for one English copy will -certainly be available. Furthermore, if it is a question of German -witnesses, such as Göring, the document will be shown him in German -anyhow; it will certainly be shown the witness in German. I believe that -will surely be possible. - -[_Dr. Siemers approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not really need to hear more than one counsel on -this sort of point. I have already ruled upon your objection, which was -that the document should be produced beforehand, but the Tribunal has -already ruled that objection should be denied. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am sorry. My motion was that the Defense -Counsel should receive these documents at the same time the Tribunal -does. I am not of the opinion expressed by Dr. Dix, that only one -defense counsel should receive it. If it is a report regarding the Reich -Defense Council, then it is a document important to several defendants. -One copy is therefore not sufficient, but each defense counsel must have -one. I believe that Mr. Justice Jackson . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: But not at this moment. There are, as we all know, the -very greatest difficulties in producing all these documents, and -extraordinary efforts have been made by the Prosecution and the -Translating Division to supply the defendants with documents, and with -documents in German, and it is not necessary that every member of the -Defense Counsel have these documents at the time the witness is being -cross-examined. I am sure the Prosecution will do everything it can to -let you have the documents in due course—any document that is being -used. - -In the opinion of the Tribunal it is perfectly sufficient if one copy of -the document is supplied to the counsel for the witness who is being -cross-examined. As I say, the Prosecution will doubtless let you have -copies of these documents in due course. - -You are appearing for the Defendant Raeder, and the Defendant Raeder, I -am afraid, at the present rate will not be in the witness box for some -time. - -DR. SIEMERS: The result of that is that the defense counsel, who is not -momentarily concerned, cannot understand the cross-examination. As to -the technical question, I ask the Court to consider that I cannot follow -Justice Jackson on this technical point. The document is mimeographed by -means of a stencil. In mimeographing it makes no difference at all -whether 20, 40, 80, or 150 copies are produced. It makes no difference -from the point of view of time, except perhaps 4 or 5 minutes. I -consider for this reason that one can hardly refer to technical -difficulties in this matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Prosecution will consider what you say, -but no rule has been made by the Tribunal that every document should be -supplied to every counsel during cross-examination. - -GÖRING: I should like to say again in regard to the document that this -is not . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I respectfully ask that the witness be -instructed to answer the question and reserve his explanations until his -counsel takes him on. Otherwise, this cross-examination cannot -successfully be conducted, in the sense of being reasonable in time. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already explained, on several occasions, that it -is the duty of defendants when they are in the witness box, and the duty -of witnesses, to answer questions directly, if they are capable of being -answered directly, in the affirmative or in the negative; and if they -have any explanation to make afterwards, they can make it after -answering the question directly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to Item 3, under II, -“Finances,” reading as follows: - - “Very critical situation of the Reich Exchequer. Relief - initially through the milliard imposed on the Jews and through - profits accruing to the Reich from the Aryanization of Jewish - enterprises.” - -You find that in the minutes, do you not? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you find the minutes signed by Woermann, do you -not? - -GÖRING: No, that is not true. I beg your pardon? Here on the photostat -Woermann has signed it, that is not Bormann. I know Bormann’s signature -well, it is quite different. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I said Woermann. - -GÖRING: Woermann, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, my poor pronunciation. Well, was it not -a fact that you set up a working committee under the Reich Defense -Council which did meet from time to time and did carry on certain work? - -GÖRING: I have already explained recently: That was the committee of -departmental chiefs. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I call your attention to Document Number -EC-405, minutes of a meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich -Defense Council, Meeting Number 10. - -GÖRING: I understood the President to say before that when I have -answered the question, I can add an explanation that seems necessary to -me. Now that I have clearly answered your question with regard to the -first document, I want to stress once again that this was not a meeting -of the close Reich Defense Council but a general calling together of all -ministers, state secretaries and numerous other persons. And that I -began my statements as follows: - - “I. Organization of the Reich Defense Council: The Reich Defense - Council was already, by decision of the Cabinet of 1933 and - 1934, called into being; but it has never met. Through the Reich - Defense Law of 4 September 1938 it was re-established. The - Chairman is the Führer, who has appointed General Field Marshal - Göring his permanent deputy.” - -Concerning the Reich Defense Council, about which we have been talking, -consisting of Schacht—or rather of the triumvirate—it is attested here -in writing once more, as I have correctly said, that this Council never -met. I ask to have the question about the second document repeated, as I -have forgotten it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that the movement into the Rhineland -had not been planned in advance. - -GÖRING: Only a short time in advance, I emphasized. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long? - -GÖRING: As far as I recall, at the most 2 to 3 weeks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to the minutes of the -10th meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, -Document Number EC-405 toward the end of that document, the discussion -on 6th month, 26th day of 1935, which reads as follows . . . - -GÖRING: May I ask what page? This document is very long and is new to -me. What page, please, otherwise I shall have to read the whole -document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Turn to the last paragraph and we will work -backwards. - - “Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes - is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary for - the smooth execution of the measures provided for the - demilitarized zone. Without exception such material must be kept - in safes.” - -Do you find that part? - -GÖRING: This document that has been handed to me contains alternating -statements of various individuals, that is, a dialogue. May I ask once -more . . . The last paragraph contains nothing of what you have stated, -apparently there must be a difference between the German and English -texts. The last paragraph here is altogether irrelevant. Where, please, -am I to read in the document? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you find the third paragraph from the end? If my -document is correct we have got the same document. - -GÖRING: You must tell me who was speaking, for different persons speak -here. - -[_The place in the document was indicated to the defendant._] - -Now it has been shown to me. Under the name Jodl; I have to read through -it first. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you find this: - - “The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his - speech of 21 May 1935 and in other statements, the Führer and - Reich Chancellor declared that the stipulations of the - Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact regarding the - demilitarized zone would be observed.” - -Do you find this? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you find the next paragraph, - - “Since at present international entanglements must be avoided - under all circumstances, all urgently needed preparations may be - made. The preparations as such, or their planning, must be kept - in strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest - of the Reich.” - -Do you find this? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also find, - - “These preparations include in particular”—a) and b) are not - important to my present question—“c) Preparation for the - liberation of the Rhine.” - -GÖRING: Oh, no, here you have made a great mistake. The original -phrase—and this alone is the point in question—is: “c) Preparation for -the clearing of the Rhine.” It is a purely technical preparation that -has nothing at all to do with the liberation of the Rhineland. Here it -says, first, mobilization measures for transportation and -communications, then “c) Preparation for the clearing of the Rhine,” -that is, in case of mobilization preparations the Rhine is not to be -overburdened with freighters, tugboats, _et cetera_, but the river has -to be clear for military measures. Then it continues: “d) Preparation -for local defense,” _et cetera_. Thus you see, it figures among small -quite general, ordinary and usual preparations for mobilization. The -phrase used by the Prosecution . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Mobilization, exactly. - -GÖRING: That, if you remember, I stressed clearly in my statement, that -in the demilitarized zone general preparations for mobilization were -made. I mentioned the purchase of horses, _et cetera_. I wanted only to -point out the mistake regarding “clearing of the Rhine,” which has -nothing to do with the Rhineland, but only with the river. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, those preparations were preparations for -armed occupation of the Rhineland, were they not? - -GÖRING: No, that is altogether wrong. If Germany had become involved in -a war, no matter from which side, let us assume from the East, then -mobilization measures would have had to be carried out for security -reasons throughout the Reich, in this event even in the demilitarized -Rhineland; but not for the purpose of occupation, of liberating the -Rhineland. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean the preparations were not military -preparations? - -GÖRING: Those were general preparations for mobilization, such as every -country makes, and not for the purpose of the occupation of the -Rhineland. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But were of a character which had to be kept -entirely secret from foreign powers? - -GÖRING: I do not think I can recall reading beforehand the publication -of the mobilization preparations of the United States. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I respectfully submit to the Tribunal that -this witness is not being responsive, and has not been in his -examination, and that it is . . . - -[_The defendant interposed a few words which were not recorded._] - -It is perfectly futile to spend our time if we cannot have responsive -answers to our questions. - -[_The defendant interposed a few words which were not recorded._] - -We can strike these things out. I do not want to spend time doing that, -but this witness, it seems to me, is adopting, and has adopted, in the -witness box and in the dock, an arrogant and contemptuous attitude -toward the Tribunal which is giving him the trial which he never gave a -living soul, nor dead ones either. - -I respectfully submit that the witness be instructed to make notes, if -he wishes, of his explanations, but that he be required to answer my -questions and reserve his explanations for his counsel to bring out. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already laid down the general rule, which is -binding upon this defendant as upon other witnesses. - -Perhaps we had better adjourn now at this state. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-SIXTH DAY - Wednesday, 20 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, the last question which I -asked last night referring to mobilization preparations in the -Rhineland, as shown in the official transcript, was this: “But of a -character which had to be kept entirely secret from foreign powers?” The -answer was: “I do not believe I can recall the publication of the -preparations of the United States for mobilization.” - -Now, representing the United States of America, I am confronted with -these choices—to ignore that remark and allow it to stand for people -who do not understand our system; or to develop, at considerable expense -of time, its falsity; or to answer it in rebuttal. The difficulty arises -from this, Your Honor, that if the witness is permitted to volunteer -statements in cross-examination there is no opportunity to make -objection until they are placed on the record. Of course, if such an -answer had been indicated by a question of counsel, as I respectfully -submit would be the orderly procedure, there would have been objection; -the Tribunal would have been in a position to discharge its duty under -the Charter and I would have been in a position to have shortened the -case by not having that remark placed. - -The Charter in Article 18 provides that the Tribunal shall rule out -irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever. We are squarely -confronted with that question; we cannot discharge those duties if the -defendant is to volunteer these statements without questions which bring -them up. I respectfully submit that, if the ruling of the Tribunal that -the defendant may volunteer questions of this kind is to prevail, the -control of these proceedings is put in the hands of this defendant, and -the United States has been substantially denied its right of -cross-examination under the Charter, because cross-examination cannot be -effective under this kind of procedure. Since we cannot anticipate, we -cannot meet . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I quite agree with you that any reference to the United -States’ secrecy with reference to mobilization is entirely irrelevant, -and that the answer ought not to have been made, but the only rule which -the Tribunal can lay down as a general rule is the rule—already laid -down—that the witness must answer if possible “yes” or “no,” and that -he may make such explanations as may be necessary after answering -questions directly in that way, and that such explanations must be brief -and not be speeches. As far as this particular answer goes, I think it -is entirely irrelevant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must, of course, bow to the ruling of the -Tribunal, but it is to the second part, I quite recall the admonition of -the Court that there shall be answers “yes” or “no.” This witness, of -course, pays not the slightest attention to that, and I must say I -cannot blame him; he is pursuing his interests. But we have no way of -anticipating, and here we are confronted with this statement in the -record, because when these statements are volunteered they are in the -record before the Tribunal can rule upon them and I have no opportunity -to make objections, and the Tribunal have no opportunity to rule. And it -puts, as I said before, the control of these proceedings in the hands of -the defendant, if he first makes the charges and then puts it up to us -to ignore them or answer them by long cross-examination in rebuttal; and -I think the specific charge made against the United States of America -from the witness stand presents that. - -Your Honor now advises the United States that it is an improper answer, -but it is in the record and we must deal with it. I respectfully submit -that unless we have . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What exactly is the motion you are making? Are you asking -the Tribunal to strike the answer out of the record? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, no; in a Trial of this kind, where propaganda -is one of the purposes of the defendant, striking out does no good after -the answer is made, and Göring knows that as well as I. The charge has -been made against the United States and it is in the record. I am now -moving that this witness be instructed that he must answer my questions -“yes” or “no” if they permit an answer, and that the explanation be -brought out by his counsel in a fashion that will permit us to make -objections, if they are irrelevant, and to obtain rulings of the -Tribunal, so that the Tribunal can discharge its functions of ruling out -irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever. We must not let -the Trial degenerate into a bickering contest between counsel and the -witness. That is not what the United States would expect me to -participate in. I respectfully suggest that if he can draw any kind of -challenge . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you submitting to the Tribunal that the witness has -to answer every question “yes” or “no” and wait until he is re-examined -for the purpose of making any explanations at all? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is the rule of cross-examination under -ordinary circumstances. The witness, if the question permits it, must -answer, and if there are relevant explanations they should be reserved -until later. - -Now let me come back to the specific problem I have right here this -morning. Here is an answer given which the Tribunal now rules is -irrelevant. But we have no opportunity to object to it. The Tribunal had -no opportunity to rule upon it. The witness asks, “Did you ever hear of -the United States publishing its plan of mobilization?” Of course, we -would have objected. The difficulty is that the Tribunal loses control -of these proceedings if the defendant, in a case of this kind where we -all know propaganda is one of the purposes of the defendant, is -permitted to put his propaganda in, and then we have to meet it -afterwards. I really feel that the United States is deprived of the -opportunity of the technique of cross-examination if this is the -procedure. - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is making too much of a sentence the witness -has said, whether the United States makes its orders for mobilization -public or not. Surely that is not a matter of very great importance. -Every country keeps certain things secret. Certainly it would be much -wiser to ignore a statement of that sort. But as to the general rule, -the Tribunal will now consider the matter. I have already laid down what -I believe to be the rule, and I think with the assent of the Tribunal, -but I will ascertain . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me say that I agree with Your Honor that as far -as the United States is concerned we are not worried by anything the -witness can say about it—and we expected plenty. The point is, do we -answer these things or leave them, apart from the control of the Trial? -And it does seem to me that this is the beginning of this Trial’s -getting out of hand, if I may say so, if we do not have control of this -situation. I trust the Tribunal will pardon my earnestness in presenting -this. I think it is a very vital thing. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have never heard it suggested that the Counsel for the -Prosecution have to answer every irrelevant observation made in -cross-examination. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That would be true in a private litigation, but I -trust the Court is not unaware that outside of this courtroom is a great -social question of the revival of Nazism and that one of the purposes of -the Defendant Göring—I think he would be the first to admit—is to -revive and perpetuate it by propaganda from this Trial now in process. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Doctor Stahmer? - -DR. STAHMER: I just wanted to explain the following: An accusation has -been made as if we intended to make propaganda here for Nazism, or in -some other direction. I do not think this accusation is justified. -Neither do I believe that the defendant intended to make an accusation -against the United States. I think we have to consider the question that -was put to him. That is, it was pointed out to him by the Prosecution -that this document which was submitted to him was marked “secret.” Then -he stated that he had never heard that a document of that kind would -have been made public in the United States. If instead of the U.S.A, he -had said any other nation, then the remark would have been considered -harmless. - -In my opinion the answer was quite justified. The witness should be -given the possibility not only to answer “yes” or “no,” but to give -reasons for his answer, as ruled by the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal considers that the rule -which it has laid down is the only possible rule and that the witness -must be confined strictly to answering the question directly where the -question admits of a direct answer, and that he must not make his -explanation before he gives a direct answer; but, after having given a -direct answer to any question which admits of a direct answer, he may -make a short explanation; and that he is not to be confined simply to -making direct answers “yes” or “no,” and leaving the explanation until -his counsel puts it to him in his re-examination. - -As to this particular observation of the defendant, the defendant ought -not to have referred to the United States, but it is a matter which I -think you might well ignore. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I shall bow to the ruling, of course. - -I wish to make a statement to the Tribunal about one of the documents. -At the conclusion of the session yesterday we were considering Document -Number EC-405. The Defendant Göring challenged the use of a word which -he said should have been translated “clearance” rather than -“liberation.” We have since had the translation checked and find that -the defendant is correct. This document was introduced under Exhibit -Number GB-160 on the 9th of January, at Page 2396 of the Tribunal’s -records (Volume V, Page 28), and since it has already been received in -evidence and it is before the Tribunal, we think it incumbent upon the -Prosecution to make that correction now for the record. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You stated yesterday that the minutes of the -Reich Defense Council with which you were presented were not minutes of -a meeting of the Reich Defense Council as such? - -GÖRING: Yes, I said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your testimony, notwithstanding that document, -still stands, I take it, that the Reich Defense Council never met? - -GÖRING: I said that also, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now ask to have you shown a document which has -just come into our possession, the minutes of the second session of the -Reich Defense Council. I should have said, just come to us for -translation. We have not had it translated; we just discovered it among -our great collection of documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could Doctor Stahmer have a copy in English or not? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have not even had a chance to get it into -English. I do not know what it says except that it is the minutes of -their meeting. We have a photostat. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Are those not the minutes of the second -meeting of the Reich Defense Council held on the 23rd of June 1939? - -GÖRING: I must read it first. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the fact that the chairman -is Minister President General Field Marshal Göring. You will find that -on Page 1. - -GÖRING: I have never disputed that. It was fixed by law. This deals with -the second Reich Defense Council, not the first one. Besides, I was not -present at this meeting; and I point out that on the left is a list of -the authorities who took part in the meeting, and in my case it says -“Minister President Field Marshal Göring,” and on the right, as -representative for him, “State Secretary Körner and State Secretary -Neumann.” But I shall have to look through the document first in order -to find out whether I took part personally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does it not say on Page 1, directly under the place -of meeting, “Chairman: Minister President Göring”? - -GÖRING: Yes. I have to read it first. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny the authenticity of those minutes? - -GÖRING: I have not looked them through yet. - -It seems to be an absolutely authentic copy of the minutes; I admit -that. But here again we are dealing with a meeting not, as I said when -answering my counsel, of the Reich Defense Council, but of a larger -meeting in which many other departments participated; and it is a matter -of the second Reich Defense Council, which was set up after 1938, not a -secret council such as was the case from 1933-38. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, in interpreting your testimony, we -must understand that, when you say there was no meeting of the Reich -Defense Council, you mean only that there were no meetings at which no -other people were present? - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct. There were two Reich defense laws -concerning the Reich Defense Council, which I tried to explain in my -statement: the Secret Council of 1933 to 1938, which was not made -public, and the Reich Defense Council which was created in 1938 and -converted into the Ministerial Council in 1939; the latter held meetings -which were in no way confined to its own members. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you say that this was not the Defense Council -that met under the ban of secrecy? - -GÖRING: The Prosecution want me to answer first with “yes” or “no.” It -is hard to answer this question with “yes” or “no.” I assert that the -Secret Defense Council, which was not made public and which arose out of -a meeting of ministers in 1933, never met. After 1938 a new Reich -defense law created a new council. At that time it was clear that our -military sovereignty had already been declared. This first council, -which the Prosecution called the secret one, never met, and the document -of yesterday proved that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you refer to Page 19 of this document, please, -and tell me whether one of the very things with which this meeting -concerned itself was not the lifting of the secrecy ban from the Reich -defense law? - -GÖRING: No, that is not the way it reads here. If I may translate it, -the last point on the agenda: Consequences resulting from the lifting of -the secrecy ban on the Reich defense law and measures to expedite -procedures have already been dealt with by a letter from the Reich -Defense Committee on 26 June: “Consequences resulting from the lifting -of the secrecy ban with a view to expediting written communications.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have stated that on the Jewish question, some -of the members of the government were more radical than you. Would you -state who these were? - -GÖRING: Broadly speaking, when we took over the government, we only -demanded their removal from political and other leading positions in the -State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is not what I asked you. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not a direct answer to the question. The question -was that you said some members of the government were more radical -toward Jews than you were. Would you tell us which of the members of the -government were more radical than you were? - -GÖRING: Excuse me, I did not understand the question to mean who were -more radical, but in what way they were more radical. If you ask who, -then I would say that those were primarily Minister Goebbels and -Himmler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you also include your co-defendant, Streicher, -as more radical than you? - -GÖRING: Yes, but he was not a member of the government. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was the Gauleiter, was he not, for this very -territory in which we are sitting. - -GÖRING: That is correct; but he had very little or no influence on -government measures. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about Heydrich? - -GÖRING: Heydrich was subordinate to Himmler. If I said Himmler, I, of -course, include Heydrich. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is then included in the list of the more -radical ones to whom you refer? - -GÖRING: That is right; yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about Bormann? - -GÖRING: It was only during the later years that I observed that Bormann -was becoming more radical. I do not know anything about his attitude in -the beginning. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to review with you briefly what the -Prosecution understands to be public acts taken by you in reference to -the Jewish question. From the very beginning you regarded the -elimination of the Jews from the economic life of Germany as one phase -of the Four Year Plan under your jurisdiction, did you not? - -GÖRING: The elimination, yes; that is partly correct. The elimination as -far as the large industries were concerned, because there were continual -disturbances due to the fact that there were large industries, also -armament industries, still partly under Jewish directors, or with Jewish -shareholders, and that gave rise to a certain anxiety among the lower -ranks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do I understand that you want the Tribunal to -believe that all you were concerned about was the big Jewish -enterprises? That is the way you want to be understood? - -GÖRING: I was not at first disturbed by the small stores. They did not -come into the Four Year Plan. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you become disturbed by the small stores? - -GÖRING: When trade had to be limited, it was pointed out that this could -be done first by closing the Jewish stores. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us go through the public acts which you -performed on the Jewish question. First, did you proclaim the Nuremberg -Laws? - -GÖRING: As President of the Reichstag, yes. I have already stated that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What date was that? - -GÖRING: 1935, I believe; here in Nuremberg, in September. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the beginning of the legal measures taken -against the Jews, was it not? - -GÖRING: That was a legal measure. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the first of the legal measures taken by -your government against the Jews, was it not? - -GÖRING: No, I believe the removal from office was before. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was that? - -GÖRING: I could not state the exact date, but I believe that happened in -1933. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then on the first day of December 1936, you -promulgated an act making it a death penalty for Germans to transfer -property abroad or leave it abroad; the property of a culprit to be -forfeited to the State, and the People’s Court given jurisdiction to -prosecute, did you not? - -GÖRING: That is correct; the “Decree Governing Restriction on Foreign -Currency.” That is to say, whoever had an account in a foreign country -without permission of the government. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, your third public act was on 22 April 1938 -when you published penalties for veiling the character of a Jewish -enterprise within the Reich, was it not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then on 28 July 1939, you, Hermann Göring, -published certain prescriptions on the competence of the courts to -handle those matters by the decree, did you not? - -GÖRING: Please, would you kindly read the law to me? I cannot recall it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will not take time reading it. Do you deny that -you published the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ law, 1939, found on Page 1370, -referring to the competence of the courts to handle penalties against -Jews? If you do not remember, say so. - -GÖRING: Yes, I say that I cannot remember the law. If it is in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ and bears my name, then, of course, it is so; but I -do not remember the contents. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, on 26 April 1938 you, under the Four Year -Plan, published a decree providing for the registration of Jewish -property and provided that Jews inside and outside Germany must register -their property, did you not? - -GÖRING: I assume so. I no longer remember it, but if you have the decree -there, and if it is signed by me, there cannot be any doubt. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: On 26 April 1938 you published a decree under the -Four Year Plan, did you not, that all acts of disposal of Jewish -enterprises required the permission of the authorities? - -GÖRING: That I remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you published on 12 November 1938 a decree, -also under the Four Year Plan, imposing a fine of a billion marks for -atonement on all Jews? - -GÖRING: I have already explained that all these decrees at that time -were signed by me, and I assume responsibility for them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am asking you if you did not sign that -particular decree? I am going to ask you some further questions about it -later. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then on the 12th of November 1938, you also signed -a decree that, under the Four Year Plan, all damage caused to Jewish -property by the riots of 1938 must be repaired immediately by the Jews, -and at their own expense; and their insurance claims were forfeited to -the Reich. Did you personally sign that law? - -GÖRING: I did sign a similar law. Whether it was exactly the same as you -have just read, I could not say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not disagree that that was the substance of -the law, do you? - -GÖRING: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the 12th of November 1938, did you not also -personally sign a decree, also under the Four Year Plan, that Jews may -not own retail stores, or engage independently in handicrafts or offer -goods, or services, for sale at markets, fairs, or exhibitions; or act -as leaders of enterprises or as members of co-operatives? Do you recall -all of that? - -GÖRING: Yes. Those are all parts of the decrees for the elimination of -Jewry from economic life. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, on the 21st of February 1939, you personally -signed a decree, did you not, that the Jews must surrender all objects -of precious metals and jewels purchased, to the public office within 2 -weeks? - -GÖRING: I do not remember that, but without doubt, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I refer to Volume I of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -1939, Page 282. You have no recollection of that? - -GÖRING: I have not the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ in front of me now, but if -there is a decree in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, or a law signed with my -name, then I signed that law and decreed it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not also, on the 3rd of March 1939, sign a -further decree concerning the period within which items of jewelry must -be surrendered by Jews—_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume I, 1939, Page 387? - -GÖRING: I assume that was the decree for the execution of the decree for -surrender previously mentioned. A law sometimes requires regulations and -decrees for execution consequent upon the law. Taken together, this is -one single measure. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not also sign personally a decree under the -Four Year Plan, of the 17th of September 1940, ordering the -sequestration of Jewish property in Poland? - -GÖRING: Yes, as I stated before, in that part of Poland which, I may -say, as an old German province, was to return to Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not also, on the 30th day of November 1940, -personally sign a decree which provided that the Jews should receive no -compensation for damages caused by enemy attacks or by German forces, -and did you not sign that in the capacity of President of the Reich -Defense Council? I refer to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume I, 1940, -Page 1547. - -GÖRING: If you have it there before you, then it must be correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have no recollection of that? - -GÖRING: Not of all the separate laws and decrees. That is impossible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, it was you, was it not, who signed, on the -31st day of July 1941, a decree asking Himmler, and the Chief of -Security Police and the SS Gruppenführer Heydrich to make the plans for -the complete solution of the Jewish question? - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct. I know that decree very well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown Document 710, Exhibit -Number USA-509. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that 710-PS? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 710-PS, Your Honor. - -[_Turning to the witness._] That document is signed by you, is it not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is addressed to the Chief of the Security -Police and the Security Service, and to SS Gruppenführer Heydrich, isn’t -it? - -GÖRING: That is also correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am not certain whether the entire thing has been -read into the record, but I think it should be; and, that we may have no -difficulty about the translation of this, you correct me if I am wrong: - - “Completing the task that was assigned to you on the 24th of - January 1939 . . .” - -GÖRING: Here is a mistake already. It says: “Complementing” not -“completing” the task which has been assigned to you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well, I will accept that. - - “. . . which dealt with arriving at a thorough furtherance of - emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as - advantageously as possible, I hereby charge you with making all - necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial - matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish - question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.” - -Am I correct so far? - -GÖRING: No, that is in no way correctly translated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Give us your translation of it? - -GÖRING: May I read it as it is written here? - - “Complementing the task which was conferred upon you already on - 24 January 1939, to solve the Jewish problem by means of - emigration and evacuation in the best possible way according to - present conditions, I charge you herewith to make all necessary - preparations as regards organizational, factual, and material - matters. . . .” - -Now comes the decisive word which has been mistranslated: “for a total -solution,” not “for a final solution.” - - “. . . for a total solution of the Jewish question within the - area of German influence in Europe. Should these come within the - competence of other governmental departments, then such - departments are to co-operate. - - “I charge you further to submit to me as soon as possible a - general plan showing the organizational and material measures - for reaching the desired total solution of the Jewish - question. . . . Complementing the task assigned to you on 24 - January 1939. . . .” - -That was at a time when there was no war or prospect of a war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now are you reporting the instrument or are you -making an explanation? - -GÖRING: I wanted to add an explanation to the quotation and just to -point out the date. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Well, I just did not want it to appear that it -was a part of the instrument. The last that is contained in the -instrument is: - - “I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an over-all - plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material - measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired - solution of the Jewish question.” - -Is that not a substantially accurate translation of your order to -Heydrich and Himmler? - -GÖRING: To Heydrich and the other government departments which had -anything to do with it. That can be seen from the first part of the -letter, the last sentence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us have no misunderstanding about this -translation now. This letter was directed to the Chief of the Security -Police and the Security Service, and SS Gruppenführer Heydrich. We are -right about that, are we not? - -GÖRING: That is correct, but I have to make an explanation in connection -with that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. - -GÖRING: The reason I sent this letter to him was that, by the decree of -24 January 1939, Heydrich, or it may have been Himmler, had been given -the task of dealing with the emigration of the Jews. Therefore, this was -the government department concerned, and it was to the department which -had been given the task that I had to apply concerning all material and -economic matters arising therefrom. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you ordered all other governmental -agencies to co-operate with the Security Police and the SS in the final -solution of the Jewish question, did you not? - -GÖRING: There is nothing about the SS here; only about the -Sicherheitspolizei, a governmental agency. The fact that Heydrich was SS -Gruppenführer had no direct bearing on it, because it was sent to the -Chief of the Security Police—mentioning his rank as SS Gruppenführer -Heydrich. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And mentioning his rank in the SS was just -superfluous and has nothing to do with the case? - -GÖRING: I have to explain that. For instance, if I write to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, then I write: “To the Commander-in-Chief -of the Army, Colonel General or Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.” And if I -write to the Chief of the Security Police, then I must address it: “To -the Chief of the Security Police, SS Gruppenführer Heydrich.” That was -his rank and his title. However, that does not mean that the SS had -anything to do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at the time that you issued this order you had -received complete reports as to the 1938 riots and Heydrich’s part in -them, hadn’t you? - -GÖRING: At that time I had no knowledge of Heydrich’s part in the -riots—only Heydrich’s report on the riots, for which I had asked. - -MR. JUSTICE, JACKSON: All right. Now we will show you Document Number -3058-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-508. - -[_Document 3058-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -That is the report written by Heydrich which you say you had received, -and it is dated 11 November 1938, is it not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it recited to you the looting of Jewish shops, -the arrest of 174 persons for looting, the destruction of 815 shops, 171 -dwellings set on fire or destroyed, and that this indicated only a -fraction of the actual damage caused; 191 synagogues were set on fire, -and another 76 completely destroyed; in addition, 11 parish halls, -cemetery chapels, and similar buildings were set on fire, and 3 more -completely destroyed; 20,000 Jews were arrested; also, 7 Aryans and 3 -foreigners—the latter were arrested for their own safety; 36 deaths -were reported, and the seriously injured were also numbered at 36. Those -killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed -include 1 Polish national, and those injured include 2 Poles. - -You had that report on or about the 11th day of November 1938, did you -not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. That is the report mentioned by me and which I -had asked the police to supply, because I wanted to know what had -happened up to then. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Exactly. And the note was made at the top of it, -“The General Field Marshal has been informed and no steps are to be -taken.” Was it not? - -GÖRING: That is not quite correct. It says here, “General Field Marshal -has taken note. No steps are to be taken by any other office,” because I -myself wanted to take them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you know that that is not true, do you not, -that steps were to be taken by some other office? I put it to you -squarely whether you are telling this Tribunal the truth when you say -that no steps were to be taken by anyone else. - -GÖRING: This is a note by my staff department, that nothing was to be -done by that quarter, because I said I was going to deal with it -personally. In fact I went straight to the Führer with this report. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Did you receive a report from the Chief -Party Judge of the Nazi Party, dated Munich, the 13th of February 1939, -concerning the proceedings taken by the Party in these matters? - -GÖRING: That is correct. I received that report much later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at the time you appointed—I withdraw the -question. It is obvious from the dates of the documents. You -acknowledged the receipt of that document, did you not, to Party member -Buch? - -GÖRING: That is also correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the only proceedings that were taken about -these riots were those taken by the Party Court, were they not? - -GÖRING: Not quite; some were brought before the law courts. That is in -the report also. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask that he be shown the report, which is -Document 3063-PS. It is not in evidence. Since the document apparently -has not been brought here, I will ask you from your recollection. - -GÖRING: I know it fairly well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought so. - -GÖRING: No, because it has been submitted to me before, here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, it has not been kept from you. Now, in the -first place, the Party Court reported that it was probably understood—I -quote—“by all of the Party leaders present, from oral instructions of -the Reich Propaganda Director, that the Party should not appear -outwardly as the originator of the demonstrations, but in reality should -organize and execute them.” Was that the report of the Party Court? - -GÖRING: The Party Court, as a result of its investigation, established -that the Propaganda Chief, Dr. Goebbels, had given these directives. May -I ask, if we are dealing with a report dated March or maybe April? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The 13th of February 1939, is the date. - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct; that is the result of investigations after -the incidents. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. Now, as a result of the riots, did -the Court, the Party Court, not also report this to you: that the -Supreme Party Court has reserved itself the right to investigate the -killings, also the severe mistreatment and moral crimes and will request -the Führer to drop proceedings against any person whom the Party Court -did not find guilty of excesses? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Party Court was made up of Gauleiter and -Group Leaders of the Party? - -GÖRING: The Party Court changed. I cannot say just now, without having -the document, who made up the Party Court at that time. I see that I am -being given the document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to Page 4, toward the bottom, -where the report says, “Gauleiter and Group Leaders of the branches -served as jurors at the trials and decisions.” - -GÖRING: Yes, it was a matter of course that the jurors of the Party -Court were always taken from these categories according to their -importance. I wanted only to say I did not know which persons were -taking part here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Party Court found five persons guilty of -offenses, did they not? Number 1, a Party member, was guilty of a moral -crime and race violation and he was expelled. Is that right? - -GÖRING: And turned over to the penal court. That is what it says in the -last sentence. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. Another Party member, Case Number 2, -was suspected of race violation and expelled from the Nazi Party. - -GÖRING: Expelled for suspected race violation and theft, and turned over -to the ordinary court. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; and Number 2, Gustav, was expelled from the -Party and SA for theft. Right? - -GÖRING: You are at Number 3? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have Number 2, Gustav, the first name mentioned. - -GÖRING: Gustav is the first name—Gerstner—yes, for theft, also turned -over to the ordinary court for suspected race violation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Number 3 dealt with two expulsions of Party -members on the grounds of moral crimes against a Jewess, and they are -now held in protective custody. Right? - -GÖRING: Expelled from the NSDAP and taken into protective custody; they -were also turned over to the civil court later. I know that very well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, we come to Cases 4 and 5, the first of which -was a man, a Party member and SA member, who was reprimanded and -declared unfit to hold office for 3 years because of a disciplinary -offense, namely, for killing the Jewish couple Selig, contrary to order. -Is that right? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in the last of these cases the offender was -reprimanded and declared unfit to hold office for 3 years for shooting a -16-year-old Jew, contrary to orders after completion of the drive. Is -that right? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We now come to the cases of the killing of Jews, -where proceedings were suspended or minor punishments pronounced. I will -not go through those in detail, but it is a fact that only minor -punishments were pronounced by the Supreme Court of the Party for the -killing of Jews, were they not? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now ask you to turn to Page 8. - -GÖRING: One moment please. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the language in regard to -Cases 3 to 16. - -GÖRING: Which page, please? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Nine, I believe it is. The Supreme Party Court asks -the Führer to quash the proceedings in the State criminal courts. - -GÖRING: To quash them, to beat them down, that does not mean suppress. A -penal proceeding can be “niedergeschlagen.” In Germany that is a -different thing from “suppress.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you give us your version of it and tell us -what it is. What does beating down a proceeding mean? Does it mean that -it has ended? - -GÖRING: That is what it means, but it can only be ordered by an office -which has authority to do it; that is to say, the Führer can at any time -“beat down” a proceeding by way of an amnesty. The Cabinet could at any -time pass a resolution to “beat down” a proceeding—suppressing it would -have been illegal. In Germany, “niedergeschlagen” is a legal term -meaning “to suspend.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And one further question. It was also reported to -you, was it not, in that report—I refer to Page 11: - - “The public down to the last man realize that political drives, - like those of 9 November, were organized and directed by the - Party, whether this is admitted or not. When all the synagogues - burned down in one night, it must have been organized in some - way and can only have been organized by the Party.” - -That also was in the report of the Supreme Party Court, was it not? - -GÖRING: I have not found it yet. It is not the same page as mine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us find it and not have any mistake about it. -Page 11. I should think it would be at the very bottom of Page 10, -perhaps, where it starts. - -GÖRING: Yes, I have just found it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did I give a reasonably correct translation of it? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? Before we -break off, will you offer in evidence these documents that you have been -putting to the witness? Those which are not already in evidence? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, they should be, Your Honor, I will do that. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think Document 3575-PS may have been offered yesterday, -but not strictly offered in evidence; and Document 3063-PS today; and -one other document the number of which I have not got. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I appreciate very much your calling my attention to -it. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. HORN: Mr. President: I ask you, Your Honor, to permit the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop to be absent from tomorrow’s session, as there are still -some fundamental questions I have to discuss with him in order to -prepare his counterevidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, your suggestion as I understand it, is that the -Defendant Ribbentrop should be absent from tomorrow morning’s sitting in -order that you may consult with him in reference to the preparation of -his defense. Is that right? - -DR. HORN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection to that course being taken -provided that you make arrangements with some other Defense Counsel to -look after Defendant Ribbentrop’s interests if any questions arise. The -Tribunal does not wish that you should come hereafter and say that you -and Defendant Ribbentrop were out of court and object to what may have -happened in your absence. You understand what I mean? - -DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, and I give you my assurance that I will -not use an objection of that nature, and shall ask one of my colleagues -to act on my behalf. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection to your taking that course -of action, but of course you realize that the Trial cannot be held up by -any delay which might be caused in the future by the fact that you were -not present. - -DR. HORN: Mr. President, the purpose of my request is such that it will -help me to avoid future delays. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I quite understand that. I was only saying that in -allowing you to do this, which is perfectly reasonable, the Tribunal is -merely indicating they will not allow any future delays. The Trial must -continue. - -DR. HORN: I understand that and I wish to thank you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Turning to the witness._] Now, the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ of the 12th of March 1933 quotes a speech of yours delivered -at Essen on the 11th of March 1933, including the following—and I -refresh your recollection by calling it to your attention: - - “I am told that I must employ the police. Certainly I shall - employ the police, and quite ruthlessly, whenever the German - people are hurt; but I refuse the notion that the police are - protective troops for Jewish stores. No, the police protect - whoever comes into Germany legitimately, but it does not exist - for the purpose of protecting Jewish usurers.” - -Did you say that? - -GÖRING: When did you say that was? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that on the 11th of March 1933 in a -speech at Essen, either that, or that in substance? - -GÖRING: That is correct, but the circumstances were different. Before I -answer, I would like to ask whether you have finished with the document -in the book that was submitted to me previously. I gave no explanation -and will ask my counsel to have me questioned later in regard to that -document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is satisfactory. - -After the riots of November 9th and 10th, you have testified that you -called a meeting on the 12th of November and ordered all officials -concerned to be present, and that the Führer had insisted on Goebbels -being present. - -GÖRING: Yes, all chiefs of the economic departments. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Could you tell us who was there in addition to -yourself and Goebbels? - -GÖRING: As far as I recall, the following were there for the purpose of -reporting: The Chief of the Secret State Police, concerning the events, -the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the -Interior . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you please state their names so that there -will not be any mistake about who was there at that time. - -GÖRING: I can quote only from memory. There were present to draw up a -report: The leader of the Secret State Police in Berlin, Heydrich; the -Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick; Dr. Goebbels you have mentioned -already; the then Minister of Economy, Funk, was there; the Finance -Minister, Count Schwerin von Krosigk; and Fischböck from Austria. - -Those are the only names I can recall at present, but there may have -been a few others there too. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Part of the time, Hilgard, representing the -insurance companies, was also present, was he not? - -GÖRING: He was summoned and waited there. His views were asked on -special questions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have been shown the stenographic minutes -of that meeting which are in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-261, being -Document Number 1816-PS, have you not, in your interrogation? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that they be shown to you, and now, so -that we may have no misunderstanding about the translations. - -You opened the meeting with this statement. I will read it: “Gentlemen -. . .” I think perhaps we had better be clear about which meeting it -was. This is the meeting held on the 12th day of November 1938 at the -office of the Reich Air Ministry. That is correct, is it not? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You opened the meeting: - - “Gentlemen, today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have - received a letter written on the Führer’s orders by the - Stabsleiter of the Führer’s Deputy, Bormann, requesting that the - Jewish question be now, once and for all, co-ordinated and - solved one way or another.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Further down, I find this: - - “Gentlemen, I have had enough of these demonstrations. They do - not harm the Jews, but finally devolve on me, the highest - authority for the German economy. If today a Jewish shop is - destroyed, if goods are thrown into the street, the insurance - company will pay the Jew for the damages so that he does not - suffer any damage at all. Furthermore, consumer goods, goods - belonging to the people, are destroyed. If, in the future, - demonstrations occur—and on occasion they may be - necessary—then I ask that they be so directed that we do not - cut our own throats.” - -Am I correct? - -GÖRING: Yes, quite correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Skipping two or three paragraphs, I come to this -. . . - -GÖRING: But the supplement has been omitted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you can supplement it any way you want to. - - GÖRING: “. . . then I ask that they be so directed that we do - not cut our own throats. For it is absurd to empty and set fire - to a Jewish store, when a German insurance company has to cover - the damage, and the goods which I sorely need are burned. I - might as well take and burn the raw materials when they come - in.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. You read any part of it that you -want to as we go along, in addition to what I read. - - “I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the German - insurance companies are the ones to suffer. To prevent this, I - will use my authority and issue a decree. In this, of course, I - ask for the support of the competent government agencies, so - that everything shall be settled properly and the insurance - companies will not be the ones who suffer. - - “But another problem immediately emerges: It may be that these - insurance companies have re-insurance in foreign countries. If - there are such re-insurances, I would not want to give them up, - because they bring in foreign exchange. The matter must be - looked into. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard from the - insurance company to attend, since he is best qualified to tell - us to what extent the insurance companies are covered by - re-insurance against such damage. I would not want to give this - up under any circumstances.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: That is absolutely correct. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “I do not want to leave any doubt, - gentlemen, as to the purpose of today’s meeting. We have not - come together merely to talk again, but to make decisions; and I - earnestly ask the competent departments to take trenchant - measures for the Aryanizing of German economy and to submit them - to me as far as is necessary.” - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I then skip a considerable portion, unless there is -more that you wish to put in, and come to this statement: - - “The State Trustee will estimate the value of the business and - decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount - is to be fixed as low as possible. The State Trustee will then - transfer the business to Aryan ownership. The aim is thus - accomplished, inasmuch as the business is transferred to the - right ownership and its goodwill and balance sheet remain - unimpaired. - - “Then the difficulties begin. It is easily understandable that - attempts will be made on a large scale to get Party members into - all these stores and thus give them some compensation. I have - witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of - Gauleiter have profited so much by these transactions that they - have raked in half a million. You gentlemen know it. Is that - correct?” - -And they assented. - -GÖRING: Yes, I said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you care to read anything further in -connection with that? - -GÖRING: Perhaps only the next sentence: - - “These are, of course, things which are not permissible, and I - shall not hesitate to deal ruthlessly with such underhand - dealings. If a prominent person is involved I shall go straight - to the Führer and report these dirty tricks quite impartially.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, if any individual was attempting to profit -by Jewish possessions—is that what you meant? - -GÖRING: By Aryanization. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will quote another portion: - - “In other words, it must be an ordinary business transaction. - One sells his business and another buys it. If there are Party - members among the would-be purchasers, they are to be given - preference if they fulfill the same conditions. First of all - should come those who have suffered damage. After that, - preference should be given on grounds of Party membership.” - -I will skip a line or two: - - “This Party member should have a chance to buy the business for - as cheap a price as possible. In such a case, the State will not - receive the full price, but only the amount the Jew received.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Just a moment, please, I believe you skipped something. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, we did. If you want to put it in, you may read -it. - -GÖRING: No, I want to put it quite briefly, so that it will not take too -long. I said what you have already said, that all things being equal, -the Party member is to be given preference, the first on the list being -the member who suffered prejudice by having his business license -cancelled because he was a Party member. Then follows the paragraph -which you read and which is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you then speak at considerable length of the -method by which you intended to Aryanize Jewish businesses, is that -right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then you take up the Aryanization of Jewish -factories. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You speak of the smaller factories first. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you found the place where you speak of the -factories? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I quote. - - “Now the factories. With regard to the smaller and medium-sized - ones, two things will have to be made clear: First, which are - the factories for which I have no use, and which can be shut - down? Could they not be put to another use? If not, then these - factories are to be pulled down. Second, if the factory should - be needed, it will be turned over to Aryans in the same manner - as the stores.” - -That is correct, isn’t it? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you care to say any more on that subject? - -GÖRING: No, those are the basic elements for the laws. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to the second paragraph, -starting, “Take now the larger factories.” Do you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dealing with the larger factories, do you not say -the solution is very simple, that the factory can be compensated in the -same manner as the stores, that is, at a rate which we shall determine, -and the Trustee shall take over the Jew’s interest, as well as his -shares, and in turn sell or transfer them to the State as he thinks fit. - -GÖRING: That means any one who has any interest in the factories will -receive compensation, according to the scale laid down by us. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reparation will be turned over to the State -Trustee, will it not? - -GÖRING: Yes, to the State Trustee. The matter was simply this: The Jew -relinquished his ownership and received bonds. That was to be settled by -the Trustee through 3 percent bonds. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will pass on to where you deal with the -foreign Jews, do you recall that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that point a representative of the Foreign -Office claimed the right to participate on behalf of the Foreign -Minister, is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, we will pass on to the point of the -conversation between yourself and Heydrich. - -GÖRING: Just a moment, please. Part of the minutes are missing. All -right. I have found the place where Heydrich is mentioned for the first -time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You inquired how many synagogues were actually -burned, and Heydrich replied, “Altogether there were 101 synagogues -destroyed by fire, 76 synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores destroyed -in the Reich.” Have I quoted that correctly? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then Dr. Goebbels interposed, “I am of the -opinion that this is our chance to dissolve the synagogues.” And then -you have a discussion about the dissolving of the synagogues, have you -not? - -GÖRING: By Dr. Goebbels, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, Dr. Goebbels raised the question of Jews -traveling in railway trains? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me know if I quote correctly the dialogue -between you and Dr. Goebbels on that subject. Dr. Goebbels said: - - “Furthermore, I advocate that Jews be banned from all public - places where they might cause provocation. It is still possible - for a Jew to share a sleeper with a German. Therefore, the Reich - Ministry of Transport must issue a decree ordering that there - shall be separate compartments for Jews. If this compartment is - full, then the Jews cannot claim a seat. They can only be given - separate compartments after all Germans have secured seats. They - must not mix with the Germans; if there is no more room, they - will have to stand in the corridor.” - -Is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Göring: I think it would be more sensible - to give them separate compartments. - - “Goebbels: Not if the train is overcrowded. - - “Göring: Just a moment. There will be only one Jewish coach. If - that is filled up the other Jews will have to stay at home. - - “Goebbels: But suppose there are not many Jews going, let us - say, on the long-distance express train to Munich. Suppose there - are two Jews on the train, and the other compartments are - overcrowded; these two Jews would then have a compartment to - themselves. Therefore, the decree must state, Jews may claim a - seat only after all Germans have secured a seat. - - “Göring: I would give the Jews one coach or one compartment, and - should a case such as you mention arise, and the train be - overcrowded, believe me, we will not need a law. He will be - kicked out all right, and will have to sit alone in the toilet - all the way.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Yes. I was getting irritated when Goebbels came with his small -details when important laws were being discussed. I refused to do -anything. I issued no decrees or laws in this connection. Of course, -today, it is very pleasant for the Prosecution to bring it up, but I -wish to state that it was a very lively meeting at which Goebbels made -demands which were quite outside the economic sphere, and I used these -expressions to give vent to my feelings. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Goebbels, who felt very strongly about these -things, said that Jews should stand in the corridor, and you said that -they would have to sit in the toilet. That is the way you said it? - -GÖRING: No, it is not. I said that they should have a special -compartment; and when Goebbels still was not satisfied, and harped on -it, I finally told him, “I do not need a law. He can either sit in the -toilet or leave the train.” These are utterances made in this connection -which, however, have nothing to do with the world-wide importance of the -great conflict. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us go down to where Goebbels brings up the -subject of the German forests. - -GÖRING: Just a moment. Yes. It starts where Goebbels asked for a decree -which would prevent Jews from going to German holiday resorts. To which -I replied “Give them their own.” And then he suggested that it would -have to be considered whether we should give them their own resorts, or -place some German bathing places at their disposal, but not the best -ones so that people might say: “You allow the Jews to get fit by using -our bathing resorts.” The question must also be considered whether it -was necessary to forbid the Jews to go into the German forests. Herds of -Jews are today running around in Grunewald; that is a constant -provocation—and so on. Then when he broke in again, I replied very -sharply, “It would be better to put a certain part of the forest at the -disposal of the Jews,” as he wanted them out of the whole of the -forests. Then I made the remark which seems to be of so much interest. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us have that remark. Is it not correct, you did -state: - - “We will give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and Alpers - will see to it that the various animals, which are damnably like - the Jews—the Elk too has a hooked nose—go into the Jewish - enclosure and settle down among them.” - -Is that what you said? - -GÖRING: Yes, I said it, but it should be linked up with the whole -atmosphere of the meeting. Goebbels comes back on it again in the next -sentence and says he considers my attitude provoking. I too can say I -was provoked by his insistence on unimportant things, when such -far-reaching and decisive matters were being discussed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you come to the point where you ask Mr. -Hilgard from the insurance company to come in. Can you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you made a statement to Mr. Hilgard when he -came in. - - “The position, is as follows: Because of the justified anger of - the people against the Jews, the Reich has suffered a certain - amount of damage. Windows have been broken, goods damaged, and - people hurt; synagogues have been burned, and so forth, I - suppose many of the Jews are also insured against damage - committed by public disorder? - - “Hilgard: Yes. - - “Göring: If that is so, the following situation arises. The - people in their justified anger meant to harm the Jews, but it - is the German insurance companies which have to compensate the - Jews for the damage. The thing is simple enough. I have only to - issue a decree to the effect that damage resulting from these - riots shall not have to be paid by the insurance companies.” - -Is that what you said? - -GÖRING: Yes, I said all that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Hilgard then outlined three kinds of insurance. He -pointed out that at least as far as plate glass insurance was concerned, -the majority of the sufferers were Aryans who owned buildings and that, -as a rule, the Jews only rented them. Is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes, those are the details of the discussion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hilgard said: - - “May I draw your attention to the following facts: Plate glass - is not manufactured by the Bohemian glass industry, but is - entirely in the hands of the Belgian glass industry. In my - estimation the damage amounts to 6 millions; that is to say, - under the insurance policies, we shall have to pay the owners, - who for the most part are Aryans, about 6 millions compensation - for the glass.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, before you pass from that page, in -the third paragraph, just for the sake of accuracy, it appears that the -name “Mr. Hilgard” is wrongly placed, does it not, because he seems both -to put the question and to answer it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think that is . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Probably the Defendant Göring put the question. It is the -third paragraph on my page. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I take the minutes to read that when Hilgard -appeared, Göring addressed him as “Mr. Hilgard.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it is correct, as Your Honor suggests. - -GÖRING: I wish to point out what was said before concerning the broken -glass. Goebbels said: “The Jews must pay for the damage,” and I said, -“It is no use, we have no raw material, it is all foreign glass. That -will require foreign currency. It is like asking for the moon.” Then -Hilgard comes with the discussions just mentioned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and Hilgard pointed out that: - - “Incidentally the amount of damage equals about half a year’s - production of the whole of the Belgian glass industry. We - believe that the manufacturers will take 6 months to deliver the - glass.” - -Do you recall that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, passing down, you come to a point at which -Hilgard tells you about a store on Unter den Linden which was attacked. -Can you find that? - -GÖRING: He said, “The biggest incident is the case of Margraf, Unter den -Linden.” Isn’t that so? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “The damage reported to us amounts to 1,700,000 -because the store was completely ransacked.” Is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Göring: Daluege and Heydrich, you must get me -these jewels by large-scale raids.” Is that the order you gave? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course, so that the stolen goods should be brought back. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Brought back to you, not to the Jews? - -GÖRING: Not to me personally, I beg your pardon, that is quite clear. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Brought back to the State—you did not intend to -return them to the Jews? - -GÖRING: It does not say that here. The main thing is, that they should -be brought back. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are trying to get the loot back,” as Heydrich -put it, is that right? And you added, “And the jewels?” - -GÖRING: If a large jewelry shop is plundered, something must be done -about it because with these valuables a great deal of trouble could be -caused. Therefore, I ordered raids to be carried out to have these -things, as well as other stolen goods, brought back. When a business was -Aryanized, its stock was also transferred to the new owner. The main -point, however, was that action should be taken against those who had -stolen and plundered, and in fact 150 had already been arrested. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heydrich went on to report on the method of -these raids after you reminded him to bring back, to get the jewels. - - “It is difficult to say. Some of the articles were thrown into - the street and picked up. The same happened with the furriers. - For example, in the Friedrichstrasse in the district of Police - Station C. There the crowd naturally rushed to pick up mink and - skunk furs, _et cetera_. It will be very difficult to recover - them. Even children filled their pockets just for the fun of the - thing. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth should not be - employed on such actions without the Party’s consent. Such - things are very easily destroyed.” - -GÖRING: Yes, so it says. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Daluege then suggests: - - “The Party should issue an order to the effect that the police - must immediately be notified if the neighbor’s wife—everybody - knows his neighbor very well—has a fur coat remodeled or - somebody is seen wearing a new ring or bracelet. We should like - the Party to assist in this matter.” - -Correct? - -GÖRING: This is absolutely correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Hilgard objected to your plan of releasing the -insurance companies from paying the claims, did he not? - -GÖRING: Yes, this is also correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he gave the reasons: - - “Hilgard: If I may give the reasons for my objection, the point - is that we do a large international business. Our business has a - sound international basis, and in the interests of the foreign - exchange position in Germany we cannot allow the confidence in - the German insurance business to be shaken. If we were now to - refuse to fulfill commitments entered into by legal contracts it - would be a blot on the escutcheon of the German insurance - business. - - “Göring: But it would not be if I were to issue a decree or a - law.” - -Am I quoting correct? - -GÖRING: Yes, and in Hilgard’s reply—and that is the reply I wanted to -come to—he pointed out that the insurance companies could not get out -of paying claims unless a law provided for it. If the sovereign state -passes a law to the effect that the insurance sums must be forfeited to -the state, then the insurance companies are no longer under any -obligation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suggest to you that that is not correct, but -that even though you proposed to issue a decree absolving the German -insurance companies, the companies insisted on meeting their -obligations; and then Heydrich interposed and said: “By all means, let -them pay the claims and when payment is made it will be confiscated. -Thus we will save our face.” - -Correct? - -GÖRING: Heydrich said that, but I issued a law. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not then say: - - “One moment. They will have to pay in any case because Germans - suffered damage. There will, however, be a law forbidding them - to make direct payments to Jews. They will also have to make - payment for damage suffered by Jews, not to the Jews, but to the - Minister of Finance. - - “Hilgard: Aha.” - -GÖRING: I have just said so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You accepted Heydrich’s suggestion, which was quite -contrary to the one you made? - -GÖRING: No, I did not accept Heydrich’s suggestion, but I issued a law -to the effect that insurance money due to Jews must be paid to the -Minister of Finance, as I did not agree with Heydrich that insurance -money should be paid out and then surreptitiously confiscated. I went -about it in a legal way and was not afraid to make the necessary law and -to take the responsibility for the claims to be paid to the State, that -is, to the Minister of Finance. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the Tribunal will judge for itself, we have -the evidence. - -Now, Hilgard, representing the insurance companies, then raised the -question that the amount of glass insurance premium was very important, -that glass insurance was the companies’ greatest asset, “but the amount -of the damage now caused is twice as high as in an ordinary year,” and -he pointed out that the whole of the profits of the German insurance -companies would be absorbed, did he not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And also the question of the number of the stores -destroyed—Heydrich reported 7,500, is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to the following -conversation. - -Daluege . . . - -Who, by the way, was he? - -GÖRING: Daluege was the leader of the Schutzpolizei. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “One question has still to be discussed. - Most of the goods in the stores were not the property of the - shopkeepers but were on consignment from other firms which had - supplied them. Now the unpaid invoices are being sent in by - these firms, which are certainly not all Jewish, but Aryan, in - respect to these goods on consignment. - - “Hilgard: We will have to pay for them too. - - “Göring: I wish you had killed 200 Jews instead of destroying - such valuables. - - “Heydrich: There were 35 killed.” - -Do I read that correctly? - -GÖRING: Yes, this was said in a moment of bad temper and excitement. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Spontaneously sincere, wasn’t it? - -GÖRING: As I said, it was not meant seriously. It was the expression of -spontaneous excitement caused by the events, and by the destruction of -valuables, and by the difficulties which arose. Of course, if you are -going to bring up every word I said in the course of 25 years in these -circles, I myself could give you instances of even stronger remarks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Funk interposed to discuss the foreign -exchange point, did he not? He contributed to the discussion, did he -not, for a while? I will not bother to go into it. - -GÖRING: Yes, but not everything is put down in the minutes, which are -not clear on this point. I regret the minutes are incomplete. That is -strange. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I join you in that. - -Hilgard returned again to the subject of the profit of the insurance -companies, did he not? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you made this statement, did you not? - - “The Jew must report the damage. He will get the insurance - money, but it will be confiscated. The final result will be that - the insurance companies will gain something, as not all damages - will have to be made good. Hilgard, you can consider yourself - damned lucky. - - “Hilgard: I have no reason for that. The fact that we shall not - have to pay for all the damage is called a profit. - - “Göring: Just a moment. If you are legally bound to pay 5 - millions and all of a sudden an angel, in my somewhat corpulent - shape, appears before you and tells you you may keep 1 million, - hang it, is this not a profit? I should like to go 50-50 with - you or whatever you call it. I only have to look at you, your - whole body exudes satisfaction. You are getting a big rake-off.” - -Am I quoting correctly? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course, I said all that. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Mr. President, the -Defendant Hess has expressed the wish to be excused from attending this -afternoon’s session, because he wants to prepare himself for his -examination as a witness, which will take place in the next few days. I -do not believe that this will cause a delay in the proceedings, and I -should like to ask the Tribunal to grant this request. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, on the same conditions as before, namely, that -you arrange with somebody to protect your interests while you are -absent. - -DR. SEIDL: I will not be absent myself, only Hess. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_To the witness._] I would like to call your -attention again to the Exhibit USA-261, Document 1816-PS. Would you turn -to Part 5, where you were speaking of Margraf’s jewels that disappeared? - -GÖRING: That is going back to something already dealt with. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, for a time, to Part 5. I call your attention -to your statement as follows: - - “Now we come to the damage sustained by the Jew, the - disappearance of the jewels at Margraf’s, _et cetera_. Well, - they are gone and he will not get them refunded. He is the one - who has to suffer the damage. Any of the jewels which may be - returned by the police will belong to the State.” - -Do you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct, but on the basis of the laws he was -compensated for that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was a representative of Austria present -at this meeting, was there not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you to turn to his statement in reference -to conditions in Austria, a page or so farther on. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you whether he did not report to your -meeting as follows: - - “Your Excellency, in this matter, we have already a very - complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish workshops and - 5,000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Even before the National - Socialist revolution we already had, concerning these 17,000 - shops, a definite plan for dealing with all tradesmen. Of the - 12,000 workshops about 10,000 were to be closed definitely - . . .” - -GÖRING: The interpreter did not follow . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you find it? - -GÖRING: I have found it, but the interpreter has not. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Regarding this total of 17,000 stores, of - the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be closed - definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. Four thousand of the - 5,000 retail stores were to be closed and 1,000 kept open, that - is, were to be Aryanized. According to this plan, 3,000 to 3,500 - of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others - closed. This was decided following investigations in every - single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with - all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon - as we shall receive the law which we requested in September. - This law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans - quite independently of the Jewish question. That would be quite - a short law. - - “Göring: I shall have this decree issued today.” - -GÖRING: Of course. This concerns a law for the curtailment of the heavy -retail trade which, even apart from the Jewish question, would have -reduced the number of retailers. That can be seen from the minutes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well, let us go on a little further. Do you -mean to inform the Tribunal that this did not apply to Jewish shops; -that it had no connection with the Jewish question? - -GÖRING: I have said that independently of the Jewish question, in view -of the overfilled retail trade, a limitation of the number of tradesmen -would have followed, and that it can be seen from the following -statement by Mr. Fischböck, which you have read, that I asked for a law -which would authorize us to withdraw licenses, without any connection -with the Jewish question. That would be a brief law. Whereupon I -answered, “I will issue the decree today.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, if you will . . . - -GÖRING: Naturally, above all, Jewish stores were to be eliminated, as I -said in the beginning. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Please go on down two paragraphs to where this was -reported: - - “But I do not believe that there will be 100 stores, probably - fewer; and thus, by the end of the year, we would have - liquidated all the recognized Jewish-owned businesses. - - “Göring: That would be excellent. - - “Fischböck: . . .” - -GÖRING: Yes, yes, that was the import of that meeting. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Fischböck: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or - 14,000 would be shut down and the remainder Aryanized or handed - over to the Trustee’s office, which belongs to the State. - - “Göring: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way the - whole affair in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals so to speak, - would be wound up by Christmas or by the end of the year. - - “Funk: We can do the same thing here. I have prepared a law - elaborating that. Effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be - prohibited from operating retail stores and wholesale - establishments, as well as independent workshops. They shall be - further prohibited from keeping employees, or offering any - ready-made products on the market; from advertising or receiving - orders. Whenever a Jewish shop is operated the police shall shut - it down. - - “From 1 January 1939 a Jew can no longer be head of an - enterprise, as stipulated in the law for the organization of - national labor of 20 January 1934. If a Jew has a leading - position in an establishment without being the head of the - enterprise, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by - the head of the enterprise. With the expiration of this period - all claims of the employee, including all claims to maintenance, - become invalid. That is always very disagreeable and a great - danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a corporation. Jewish - members of corporations will have to be retired by 31 December - 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent - ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the - provision necessary for execution of this law. - - “Göring: I believe we can agree with this law.” - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I ask you to pass a considerable dialogue -relating to the Vienna situation, and I call your attention to the point -at which Funk inquires of you: - - “Why should the Jew not be allowed to keep bonds? - - “Göring: Because in that way he would actually be given a - share.” - -GÖRING: Yes, that was the purpose, to get him out of the enterprise. If -he kept the bonds, on the basis of his rights as stockholder he still -had an interest in the enterprise, and on the basis of ownership of -stocks his will would still carry weight in the enterprise. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You turned Funk’s suggestion down that the Jews be -allowed to keep bonds? - -GÖRING: Yes. I replaced the bonds with securities. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will pass several more pages of debate, -unless there is something you want to call attention to; and I come to -the point where Heydrich is stating his position. I call your attention -to this dialogue: - - “Heydrich: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country - by legal measures. - - “Göring: . . .” - -GÖRING: One moment, please. I find it now. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave - the country by legal measures. - - “Göring: How was this possible?” - - And then Heydrich tells you that: “. . . through the Jewish - societies we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich - Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount and an - additional sum in foreign currency they made it possible for a - number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the - rich Jews leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: One moment. I do not find it here yet, but generally that is -correct, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Pass on a little further. Heydrich is making -suggestions and says: - - “As for the isolating, I would like to make a few proposals - regarding police measures, which are important also because of - their psychological effect on public opinion. - - “For example, anybody who is Jewish according to the Nuremberg - Laws will have to wear a certain badge. That is a possibility - which will facilitate many other things. I see no danger of - excesses, and it will make our relationship with the foreign - Jews easier. - - “Göring: A uniform? - - “Heydrich: A badge. In this way we could put an end to foreign - Jews being molested who do not look different from ours. - - “Göring: But my dear Heydrich, you will not be able to avoid the - creation of ghettos on a very large scale in all the cities. - They will have to be created.” - -Is that what you said? - -GÖRING: I said that. At that time the problem was also to get the Jews -together in certain parts of the cities and in certain streets, because -on the basis of the tenancy regulations there was no other possibility, -and if the wearing of badges was to be made obligatory, each individual -Jew could have been protected. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, passing further in the discussion, I call your -attention to this warning from Heydrich about, the measures which have -been discussed: - - “Göring: Once we have a ghetto, we could determine what stores - ought to be there and we would be able to say, ‘You, Jew so and - so, together with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of - goods,’ then a German wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver - the goods for this Jewish store. The store would then not be a - retail shop but a co-operative store, a co-operative society for - Jews. - - “Heydrich: All these measures will eventually lead to the - institution of a ghetto. I must say: nowadays one should not - want to set up a ghetto, but these measures, if carried through - as outlined here, will automatically drive the Jews into a - ghetto.” - -Did Heydrich give that warning? - -GÖRING: Here it says so, yes, but it can be seen from the following -discussion that I said: “Now comes that which Goebbels mentioned before, -compulsory renting. Now the Jewish tenants will come together.” It was a -question of the Jewish tenants drawing together in order to avoid the -disagreeable results which arose from reciprocal subletting. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have omitted that Funk also remarked at this -point that “Jews will have to stand together. What are 3 million? Every -one will have to stand up for the next fellow. Alone he will starve.” - -Do you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes. But in another part of these minutes it is stated very -clearly: “One cannot let the Jews starve, and therefore the necessary -measures must be taken.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Toward the close of that meeting you said the -following, didn’t you? - - “I demand that German Jewry as a whole shall, as a punishment - for the abominable crimes, _et cetera_, make a contribution of - 1,000,000,000 marks. That will work. The pigs will not commit a - second murder so quickly. Incidentally, I would like to say - again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.” - -GÖRING: That was correct, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you joking about that too? - -GÖRING: I have told you exactly what led to the fine of 1,000,000,000. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You pointed out that the chauffeurs of Gauleiter -must be prevented from enriching themselves through the Aryanization of -Jewish property, right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will now take up the subject of art. - -I call your attention to Document 141-PS, Exhibit Number USA-308. That -is the decree establishing priorities on the claim for Jewish art -property. Do you recall that? - -GÖRING: That has been mentioned several times, and I have recently -spoken about it in detail. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The order was issued as here stated, was it not? - -GÖRING: Yes, certainly; I emphasized that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Paragraph 5 reference is made to art objects -that are suitable to be given to French museums, and which were to be -sold by auction. The profit from this auction was to be given to the -French State for the benefit of war widows and children. You say that -this was never done? - -GÖRING: I did not say that this never happened. That was my intention in -that decree. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am asking you if it ever has been done. - -GÖRING: As far as Paragraph 5 is concerned, I cannot say. I can only -refer to the payments mentioned in Paragraph 2—the things that I -pointed out:—which I had had effected after an estimate, and I said the -other day that this amount was kept in readiness and that I repeatedly -asked into which account it should be paid. And among the objects -destined to go into the collection which I was to make, I had every -single item valued. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was this amount kept? - -GÖRING: In my bank, under the name “Art Funds.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In what bank? - -GÖRING: It was—I cannot say for sure, there were several banks—in -which bank exactly the art fund was deposited, I cannot say. I would -have to have the documents here for that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In the several interrogations you have never been -able to point out where that fund is, have you? - -GÖRING: I cannot say, but you would only have to question my secretary -who kept account of all the funds; she can tell you quite accurately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This order, 141-PS, was carried out by the -Rosenberg Special Staff (Einsatzstab), wasn’t it? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know who carried it out, who actually was -there? Did you know Turner? - -GÖRING: I did not understand the name. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know Mr. Turner? - -GÖRING: I know a certain Turner, who, however, had nothing to do with -the Einsatzstab, the Rosenberg Special Staff and who, as far as I know, -was in Yugoslavia. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Wasn’t State Counsellor Turner in Paris in -connection with the art collections? - -GÖRING: I repeat again so that no error is possible, you said Turner, -T-u-r-n-e-r, or Körner, K-ö-r-n-e-r? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Turner. - -GÖRING: Körner? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: T-u-r-n-e-r. - -GÖRING: Turner—I do not know whether he had anything to do with -Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew him, did you not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you know a Dr. Bunjes? - -GÖRING: Bunjes, B-u-n-j-e-s, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew him? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had to do with captured or confiscated Jewish -art treasures, did he not? - -GÖRING: I do not believe that Dr. Bunjes had anything to do with that. -He was competent in a different field of art; but the Einsatzstab -Rosenberg and certain departments of the military administration, had -something to do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown, so that you can -follow me, to refresh your memory, Document 2523-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-783, a letter from Dr. Bunjes, and ask you if this refreshes your -recollection of certain events. - - “On Tuesday, 4 February 1941, at 1830 hours I was ordered for - the first time to report to the Reich Marshal at the Quai - d’Orsay. Field Commander Von Behr of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg - was present. It is, of course, difficult to describe in words - the cordial atmosphere in which the conversation was held.” - -Do you recall such a meeting? - -GÖRING: No, it was not important enough for me to remember it, but I do -not deny it, in any case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We shall see if this refreshes your recollection: - - “The Reich Marshal dropped the subject for the time being and - asked for the report of the present state of the seizure of - Jewish art property in the occupied western territories. On this - occasion he gave Herr Von Behr the photographs of those objects - of art that the Führer wants to bring into his possession. In - addition, he gave Herr Von Behr the photographs of those objects - of art that the Reich Marshal wants to acquire for himself.” - -GÖRING: I cannot follow here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean you do not find these words, or you do not -recall the events? - -GÖRING: No, I have not found the passage yet, and I would like to have a -little time to see the context of this letter, which was neither written -by me nor addressed to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me call your attention to a further paragraph -of it and see if it does not refresh your recollection: - - “On Wednesday, 5 February 1941, I was ordered to the Jeu de - Paume by the Reich Marshal. At 1500 o’clock, the Reich Marshal, - accompanied by General Hanesse, Herr Angerer, and Herr Hofer, - visited the exhibition of Jewish art treasures newly set up - there.” - -GÖRING: Yes, I have already stated before that at Jeu de Paume I -selected the art treasures which were exhibited there. That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right; now we are getting there. - - “Then, with me as his guide, the Reich Marshal inspected the - exhibited art treasures and made a selection of those works of - art which were to go to the Führer, and those which were to be - placed in his own collection. - - “During this confidential conversation, I again called the Reich - Marshal’s attention to the fact that a note of protest had been - received from the French Government against the activity of the - Einsatzstab Rosenberg, with reference to the Hague Rules on Land - Warfare recognized by Germany at the Armistice of Compiegne and - I pointed out that General Von Stülpnagel’s interpretation of - the manner in which the confiscated Jewish art treasures are to - be treated, was apparently contrary to the Reich Marshal’s - interpretation. Thereupon, the Reich Marshal asked for a - detailed explanation and gave the following orders: - - “‘First, it is my orders that you have to follow. You will act - directly according to my orders. The art objects collected in - the Jeu de Paume are to be loaded on a special train immediately - and taken to Germany by order of the Reich Marshal. These art - objects which are to go into the Führer’s possession, and those - art objects which the Reich Marshal claims for himself, will be - loaded on two railroad cars which will be attached to the Reich - Marshal’s special train, and upon his departure for Germany, at - the beginning of next week, will be taken along to Berlin. - Feldführer Von Behr will accompany the Reich Marshal in his - special train on the journey to Berlin.’ - - “When I made the objection that the jurists would probably be of - a different opinion and that protests would most likely be made - by the military commander in France, the Reich Marshal answered, - saying verbatim as follows, ‘Dear Bunjes, let me worry about - that; I am the highest jurist in the State.’ - - “The Reich Marshal promised to send from his headquarters by - courier to the Chief of the Military Administrative District of - Paris on Thursday, 6 February, the written order for the - transfer to Germany of the confiscated Jewish art treasures.” - -Now, does that refresh your memory? - -GÖRING: Not in the least, but it is not at all in contradiction to what -I have said with respect to the art treasures, with the exception of one -sentence. It is pure nonsense that I should have said that I was the -highest jurist in the state because that, thank God, I was not. That is -something which Mr. Bunjes said, and I cannot be held responsible for -every statement which anyone may have made to somebody else without my -having any possibility of correcting it. As for the rest, it corresponds -to the statement I made recently. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the art objects then were loaded on cars and -shipped to Berlin, were they not? - -GÖRING: A part of them, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now call your attention to, and ask to have you -shown, Document 014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-784. Now, I ask you to -refresh your recollection by following this report to the Führer with -me, and tell me if this conforms with your testimony: - - “I report the arrival . . .” - -GÖRING: I would like to point out that this report did not come from me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand that. I am asking if it is right or -wrong. - - “I report the arrival of the principal shipment of ownerless - Jewish treasures of art at the salvage point Neuschwanstein by - special train on Saturday the 15th of this month. It was secured - by my Einsatzstab, in Paris. The special train, arranged for by - Reich Marshal Hermann Göring, comprised 25 express baggage cars - filled with the most valuable paintings, furniture, Gobelin - tapestries, works of artistic craftmanship, and ornaments. The - shipment consisted mainly of the most important parts of the - collections of Rothschild, Seligmann”—and half a dozen others. - -Have you found that and is it correct? - -GÖRING: I do not know whether this is correct, since the report did not -come from me. The only thing which I can remember is that I was asked by -the Einsatzstab to see to it that a sufficient number of special cars, -box cars was put at their disposal to ship the art treasures, since Jeu -de Paume was not a safe place in case of air attacks. Neuschwanstein -lies south of Munich. This concerns the objects destined for the Führer. - -I should like, however, to refer to the next sentence of this document, -which was not written by me. It goes as follows: - - “The confiscation actions of my Einsatzstab were begun in - October 1940 in Paris according to your order, my Führer.” - -That coincides with what I have said in my previous statements. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to read further? - -GÖRING: You mean where it says: - - “Besides this special train, the main art objects selected by - the Reich Marshal—mainly from the Rothschild collection—had - previously been shipped in two special cars to Munich and were - there put into the air raid shelter of the Führerhaus.” - -They are those most precious works of art which I had designated for the -Führer, and which were to be sent, at the wish of the Führer, to the air -raid shelter. This had nothing to do directly with my affairs, but I did -not dispute the fact, and I have explained it in detail. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you were examined by the American Foreign -Assets Commission, you estimated your art objects as having a value, at -the time you turned them over to the government, of 50 million -Reichsmark, as I recall it. Am I right? - -GÖRING: That is not quite correct. The Commission insisted on a -valuation, and the discussion continued a long time backwards and -forward. I expressly told the Commission that I could not assess the -value because I did not have the objects in hand nor a list of them, and -I could not quote them from memory; furthermore, that the estimates were -subject to fluctuation depending on the one hand upon the prices art -lovers might pay and, on the other, upon the actual market value. Since -I did not see a copy of the minutes, in spite of my pleas, and -especially as minutes of this nature often give rise to -misunderstandings, I can only acknowledge the records which I have -signed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, do you question this fact? “When I gave the -news to the Minister of Finance I estimated the value at that time at 50 -million marks.” Did you say that or did you not? - -GÖRING: I cannot estimate the value. I only told the Finance Minister -that the entire collection, including my own, would be turned over to -the State. And since I know my passion for collecting, I thought that it -was quite possible that something might suddenly happen to me, and that -as I had put my entire fortune into these works of art, the entire -collection might possibly become State, that is, public property, and my -family would thus be deprived of every means of subsistence. I therefore -asked him to provide for a pension or some compensation for my family. -That was the negotiation with the Finance Minister, to which he can -testify. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What proportion of your art collection was acquired -after 1933? - -GÖRING: I did not understand the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What proportion of your art collection was acquired -after 1933? - -GÖRING: That I could not say in detail—quite a number of pictures and -statues. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have claimed that some part of your art -collection you bought? - -GÖRING: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in connection with that some inquiry was made -into your financial transactions, was there not? - -GÖRING: I do not know who made the inquiries. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were asked, were you not, about your -receipt of 7,276,000 Reichsmark from the Reemtsma cigarette factory? - -GÖRING: No, I was never asked about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were never asked about it? - -GÖRING: No, neither about the amount nor about the cigarette factory, -nor anything else. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me refresh your recollection about that. Did -you not tell them and did you not tell Colonel Amen in interrogations -that this money was given to you by this cigarette factory and that -their back taxes were canceled? - -GÖRING: No, I even denied that their back taxes were ever canceled. I -remember now that the question was put to me in a different connection. -A sum of money was set aside for the so-called Adolf Hitler Fund, and -this amount the Führer put at my disposal for general cultural tasks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By the cigarette factory? - -GÖRING: Not by the cigarette factory; a number of business men -subscribed to the Adolf Hitler Fund, and Mr. Reemtsma gave me this sum -from the fund in the course of the years, after agreement with the -Führer. A part of it was allotted to the State theaters, another part -for building up art collections, and other cultural expenditure. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated on the 22d day of -December 1945 by the External Assets Branch of the United States -Investigation of Cartels and External Assets, were you not? - -GÖRING: May I first say explicitly that I had been asked whether I would -be ready to make any statements about it, and was told that these -statements would in no way be connected with this Trial. Therefore the -presence of my defense counsel would not be necessary. This was -expressly told me, and was repeated to me by the prison authorities, and -before the interrogation it was again confirmed to me that these -statements should in no way be brought in in connection with this Trial. -However, that is all the same to me. You may produce them as far as I am -concerned. But because of the method employed, I desire to have this -made known here. - -DR. STAHMER: I protest against the use of the statements for the reason -that has just been given by the witness. I myself sometime ago—I think -it was around Christmas—was asked by, I believe, members of the United -States Treasury whether they could interrogate the Defendant Göring on -questions of property, adding expressly that I did not have to be -present at the interrogation because this had nothing to do with the -Trial, and would not be used for it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am not able either to affirm or deny, and -therefore I will not pursue this subject further at this time. I do not -believe that any stipulation was made that these facts should not be -gone into. I was not informed of it, and if there has been, of course, -it would be absurd. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, you were asked about receiving some art -objects from Monte Cassino. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you if it is not the fact that an altar -statue taken from the Cassino Abbey was brought and delivered to you, -and that you expressed great appreciation for it. - -GÖRING: I am glad to be able to clarify this affair also. After the -monastery of Monte Cassino had been completely destroyed by shelling and -had been defended by a paratroop division, a delegation arrived one day -bringing along a statue of some saint, entirely worthless from an -artistic point of view, as a souvenir of this destroyed monastery. I -thanked the men and showed the statue to the curator of my art -collection, and he also considered the statue as of absolutely no value. -It then remained in the box and was put away somewhere. The other . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is coming through sufficiently loud -for the shorthand writers to hear. - -GÖRING: The rest of the art treasures from Monte Cassino, according to -my knowledge, were shipped in the following manner: A large part, -especially those objects which belonged to the old monastery itself, was -sent to the Vatican. I must assume this from the fact that the abbot of -the monastery sent me and my division a letter written in Latin in which -he expressed his extreme gratitude for this action. - -Secondly, as far as I remember, the art treasures from the museum in -Naples, which were at Monte Cassino, were for the greater part sent by -us to Venice and there turned over to the Italian Government. Some -pictures and statues were brought to Berlin, and there they were turned -over to me. On the very same day I gave the list to the Führer, and some -time later also the objects themselves which were in my air raid -shelter, so that he could negotiate about the matter with Mussolini. I -did not keep a single one of these objects for my own collection. If my -troops had not intervened, these priceless art treasures, which were -stored in Monte Cassino and belonged to the monastery there, would have -been entirely destroyed by enemy bombardment, that is to say, by the -British-American attackers. Thus they have been saved. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you say of no value—no substantial value? - -GÖRING: That is even now my conviction, and I depended, above all, on -the judgment of my experts. I never took this statue out of its packing -case. It did not interest me. On the other hand, I wanted to say a few -words of thanks to the men who brought it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The labor shortage in the Reich was becoming acute -by November of 1941, was it not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you yourself gave the directives for the -employment of Russian prisoners of war, did you not? - -GÖRING: Employment for what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For war industry—tanks, artillery pieces, airplane -parts. - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was at the conference of the 7th of November -1941, that you gave that order, was it not? - -GÖRING: At what conference that was I could not tell you; I issued these -directives only in a general way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the directive was that Russian prisoners of war -should be selected in collecting camps beyond the Reich border, and -should be transported as rapidly as possible and employed in the -following order of priority: mining, railroad maintenance, war -industry—tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts, agriculture, building -industry, _et cetera_. You gave that order, did you not? - -GÖRING: If I have signed it, the order is from me. I do not remember -details. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the number of that, Mr. Jackson? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown Document Number 1193-PS. - -GÖRING: I have not seen it yet. - -[_Document 1193-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -This document, which you have just mentioned . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get the answer. - -GÖRING: Excuse me. I have just received a document about the use of -Russian troops. Is that the document of which you speak? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. I call your attention to the fact -that it is referred to as an annex in the letter signed by Göring. - -GÖRING: I want to point out that this document is not signed by me, but -by Körner, which, however, does not diminish my responsibility. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not question that on the 7th day of -November 1941, you gave the order, as Körner reports it, do you, in the -document referred to as 1193-PS? - -GÖRING: I said only that it was not signed by me but by Körner, and here -even a still younger official, a Regierungsrat, and I wanted only to -explain that this was my field and that therefore I assume -responsibility. But I have not read it through yet. This deals with -directives and outlines which I gave in general and which were then -filled in and revised by the department concerned, whereby naturally not -every word or every sentence written here was said or dictated by -myself. But that does not alter the fact that I bear the responsibility -for it, even if I did not know it in detail, or would have perhaps -formulated it differently. But the general directives were given by me -and implemented accordingly by the lesser authorities. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also gave the order, did you not, that 100,000 -men were to be taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet -employed in armament industry? Gaps in manpower resulting therefrom will -be filled by Soviet prisoners of war. The transfer of the above-named -French prisoners of war is to be accomplished by October the 1st. You -gave the order, did you not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. Here we deal primarily with the fact that a -large part of French skilled workers who were prisoners of war were -turned into free workers on condition that they worked in the German -armament industry. The shortages which occurred at their previous places -of work at that time, where they had worked as prisoners of war, were to -be remedied by Russian prisoners of war, because I considered it -pointless that qualified skilled industrial workers should be employed -in agriculture, for instance, or in any other field not corresponding to -their abilities. Thus there was an incentive in the fact that these -people could become free workers instead of remaining prisoners of war, -if they would agree to these conditions. The directives were given by -me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you know that there was any forced labor -employed in Germany? - -GÖRING: Compulsory labor. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not testify under interrogation on the 3rd -of October 1945, that: - - “I would like to add something to the last question of the - interrogation. The Colonel asked me if the forced labor program - was effective, and I said ‘Yes’. There are two remarks I would - like to make to that. - - “All right. - - “I must say that in the results as such it was effective. - However, a great number of acts of sabotage did occur, and also - treason and espionage. - - “Question: But on the whole you would say it was a successful - program from the German point of view? - - “Answer: Yes. Without this manpower many things could never have - been achieved.” - -Did you say that? - -GÖRING: That is obvious, because without workers one cannot do any work. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you answered the question. The question -was if you said the forced labor had been a success. What do you have to -say to that? Did you say that? - -GÖRING: I have said what I did in answering the question whether the -manpower used was successful; yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were shown a document, 3700-PS, written by -Schacht to you, and you have said that you received it? - -GÖRING: Yes, I remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you and Schacht were somewhat rivals in the -economic field at one period, were you not? - -GÖRING: I explained that only recently, and to what extent. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You wanted his position abolished in the event of -war and he wanted your position abolished in event of war, did he -not—your economic position? - -GÖRING: Not quite. They were two similar authorities having similar -powers at the same time, two personalities, and that in the long run was -not possible. It simply had to be decided which one of the two should be -the sole authority. That would have been especially necessary in case of -a mobilization. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You, in testifying on the 17th day of October last, -as to your relations with Schacht, made this statement, did you not, in -reference to your disagreements with Schacht: “This I must underline: -Schacht always tried to maneuver for a new post, while all the other -ministers co-operated absolutely.” Did you say that? - -GÖRING: Not exactly as it is there, but I wanted to emphasize that, -contrary to the other ministers who obediently followed my directives -for the Four Year Plan, I had certain difficulties with Schacht, which I -have already explained, due to his original and strong personality. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The question was whether you made that statement in -substance or in those words? - -GÖRING: Not exactly in these words, but as I have just explained, in -substance. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you have in mind Schacht’s letter to you, -Document Number 3700-PS? - -GÖRING: Yes, I read it a short time ago. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in that letter Schacht said this to you, did he -not, referring to 3700-PS? “It may be militarily necessary . . .” Do you -want to follow it? - -[_Document 3700-PS was submitted to the witness._] - - “It may be militarily necessary to conscript the 15-year-olds, - but it will heavily tax the fighting morale of the German - people. The facts as the German people see them are as follows: - - “First, the original prospect of a short war has not been - realized. - - “Second, the prospective quick victory over England by the Air - Force did not materialize. - - “Third, the public statement that Germany would remain free of - enemy air raids has not been fulfilled. - - “Fourth, the repeated announcements that the Russian resistance - was definitely broken have been proved to be untrue. - - “Fifth, Allied supplies of arms to Russia, and the manpower - reserves of Russia have, on the contrary, been sufficient to - bring continuous heavy counterattacks against our Eastern Front. - - “Sixth, the original victorious advance into Egypt has been - halted after repeated attempts. - - “Seventh, the landing of the Allies in North and West Africa, - declared impossible, has nevertheless been accomplished. - - “Eighth, the extremely large amount of shipping space which was - required for this landing has shown that our U-boats, in spite - of their great successes, did not suffice to prevent this - transport. In addition, the reductions in civilian traffic, in - material for armaments, and in the availability of manpower are - obvious to all the people. - - “The conscription of the 15-year-olds will increase the doubts - concerning the termination of this war.” - -Can you fix any more definitely than you have done the date when you -received that letter? - -GÖRING: I can only say again that it is dated the 3rd of November, but -the year is missing. If I were to be given a copy where the year is -stated, I could give an exact answer. I have said recently that, -according to my knowledge of events, it is a question of either November -1944 or November 1943. But, unfortunately, that is not indicated here. I -can only see 3rd of November. The year is missing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know when Schacht was sent to the -concentration camp? Do you know the date of that? - -GÖRING: Not exactly, but now that you remind me of it, I can say that -this letter certainly was not written in 1944 because in November 1944, -I believe, Mr. Schacht was already in the concentration camp; -consequently, it must date back to November 1943. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was sent to the concentration camp shortly -after dispatching that letter to you, wasn’t he? - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How much longer was he at large? - -GÖRING: The letter is of 3 November 1943, as we have just found. I heard -about the arrest of Schacht only after the attempt on the life of the -Führer and after my return a few days later, after an illness of some -time, that is to say, in September 1944. There is not the least -connection between this letter and his arrest, because, when I asked -about his arrest, I was told definitely it was in connection with the -20th of July. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make an agreement, as Supreme Commander of -the Air Force, with the Reichsführer SS, the Youth Führer of the German -Reich, and the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, about -the recruiting of youthful Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, -Lithuanians, and Tartars between the ages of 15 and 20? Did you come to -some agreement with Himmler and Rosenberg about that? - -GÖRING: That I personally concluded such an agreement, I do not think -so. It is possible and even probable that my office did so, however. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have testified yesterday or the day -before—I think Friday—as follows; let me refresh your recollection -about the questions of confiscations. - - “Now, about the question of confiscation of State property and - it was only such property that was confiscated. As far as I - know, private property is mentioned in the official report as - far as the winter of 1941 and 1942 is concerned, that might have - been the case in the matter of furs or perhaps fur boots, and - some soldiers may have taken little odds and ends from the - people; but on the whole there was no private property and so - none could be confiscated.” - -And I think you also said that you never took anything, not even so much -as a screw or a bolt, when you were in occupation of foreign territory. -Do you recall that testimony? - -GÖRING: Very exactly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you still stand on it? - -GÖRING: Of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown a Document EC-317. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is a secret command matter, is it not, -dated the 7th of September 1943? Is that right? - -GÖRING: I have a letter here before me of 21 February 1944. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you have the wrong exhibit—EC-317, Page 3. - -GÖRING: Yes; Page 3. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This letter of transmittal we will not bother -about. Your secret command matter is dated 7 September 1943, is it not? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it reads as follows: - - “Concerning the removal of the harvested crops and the - destruction of the means of production in the agricultural and - food economy in parts of the Occupied Eastern Territories. - - “By direction of the Führer, I give the following orders: - - “First: In the territories east of the line fixed by the highest - military command, the following measures are to be taken - gradually, according to the military situation at the time. The - measures are to be determined by the commanders of the army - groups: - - “(1) All agricultural products, means of production, and - machinery of enterprises serving the agriculture and food - industry are to be removed. - - “(2) The factories serving the food economy, both in the field - of production and of processing, are to be destroyed. - - “(3) The basis of agricultural production, especially the - records and establishments, storage plants, _et cetera_, of the - organizations responsible for the food economy, are to be - destroyed. - - “(4) The population engaged in the agricultural and food economy - is to be transported into the territory west of the fixed line.” - -Right? - -GÖRING: Absolutely correct; but I want to make the following statement -in connection with it. We are dealing here with purely military measures -in a retreat, and may I comment on these four points: I emphasized the -other day that a great number of agricultural machines had been brought -to Russia by us. As the Russians, in their retreat, destroyed -everything, we had all the less military reason to allow the machinery -of industries which we had set up and brought there to fall into their -hands undestroyed. This concerns an urgently necessary military order -which had been issued during a retreat, and which was executed in the -same way as before in the reverse sense. It does not deal with any sort -of private property. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was signed by you? - -GÖRING: Yes, this order bears my signature. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am about to go into a different subject, may it -please Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that the witness be shown a document, -3786-PS, of which there are no extra copies available because it came to -us so late. I will ask you to examine that and tell me whether you -recall the meeting to which these minutes refer? - -GÖRING: We are apparently concerned here with a report dealing with a -meeting which took place daily with the Führer. As meetings occurred -once or twice daily, I naturally cannot, with any accuracy, without -first having read the report, recall the report of 27 January 1945, for -I was present at a great number of these meetings during the course of -the war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I shall call your attention to specific incidents -in it. The minutes indicate that the Führer, yourself, Keitel, and Jodl -were present, were they not? - -GÖRING: That is according to the notes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I will call your attention to Page 31 and ask -you to follow with me the notes and see if it refreshes your -recollection. Now this relates to 10,000 imprisoned air force officers. -I quote what is attributed to you. - - “Göring: Near Sagan, there are 10,000 imprisoned air force - officers. Their custody is the responsibility of the - Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army (B.d.E.). Personnel for - guarding or transporting them is said to be lacking. The - suggestion was made as to whether the prisoners should not be - left to their Soviet Russian allies. It would give them 10,000 - airmen. - - “The Führer: Why did you not remove them earlier? This is an - unequaled bungling. - - “Göring: That is the business of the commander of the B.d.E. We - have nothing to do with it. I can only report it. - - “The Führer: They must be removed, even if they have to go on - foot. The Volkssturm must be called in. Anyone who escapes will - be shot. Any means must be used. - - “Göring: That is from Sagan, there are 10,000 men. - - “Guderian: In the transfer process the 4th Armored Division has - been moved out completely, also the 227th Division; the - remainder of the 32d Division is now moving out. The next in - line is the Headquarters of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps which will - move tonight, and tomorrow night the Division Niederland, which - has already pulled out. Parts of the Division Nordland have also - been withdrawn from the front. - - “The Führer: Are they to get replacements? Are they already on - the move? - - “Guderian: Fegelein took care of that. He has already ordered - that they should be replenished immediately. - - “The Führer: It is absolutely clear that the Army Group Vistula - has nothing, for the time being, besides the Corps Nehring, the - one group, and what it has on the Vistula. This must be - organized. It will come from here and partly from Germany. It - must be done, notwithstanding. - - “Göring: How many cattle cars are needed for 10,000 men? - - “The Führer: If we transport them according to German standards, - then we need at least 20 transport trains for 10,000 men. If we - transport them according to Russian standards, we need 5 or 3. - - “Göring: Take their pants and boots off so that they cannot walk - in the snow.” - -Do you recall that incident? - -GÖRING: I remember this incident but vaguely. - -Now that I have given the answer I would like to give a short -explanation of the value of this document. - -I understood that this document has just now arrived, but I have already -been interrogated with respect to this document long before the -beginning of the proceedings. Already at that time I pointed out that at -the stenographic recording of a meeting two stenographers took notes at -the same time, since the meetings often lasted 4 or 5 hours, and -therefore these stenographic notes always had to be gone over -afterwards, especially as frequently, because of the presence of many -men, inaccuracies occurred in the recordings so that statements made by -one person were credited to another in the minutes. For that reason I -said at that time already that not only did I not remember this -statement, but that in my opinion I have never made this statement. We -were concerned solely with the preparation of motor vehicles for -transport. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I must say that you were interrogated with -reference to the incident, but not with reference to these notes which -were not transcribed. - -GÖRING: In respect to this transcript and this incident, it was -especially emphasized that we were concerned with the stenotype record -of the report of the meeting, and I already uttered a similar opinion at -that time. It was not submitted to me at that time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not stenotype, but stenographic. - -You are also reported on Page 35. I call your attention to this and ask -you, is it attributed to you mistakenly? - - “Göring: The 10,000 prisoners in Sagan should be transported - away by Obergruppenführer Jüttner.” Perhaps I do not pronounce - the word as you would. - - “The Führer: These prisoners must be removed by all available - means. Volkssturm must be employed with the most energetic men. - All who attempt to flee will be shot. - - “Fegelein: We have a man for that who guards the concentration - camps. That is Gruppenführer Glücks. He must do the job.” - -Did that occur? - -GÖRING: That I do not know. I have already testified before that the -B.d.E. had to take charge of the transportation, because we had nothing -to do with it. What ideas and opinions the other gentlemen expressed in -the discussions I cannot completely testify to, or state here. It was a -question of whether these 10,000 were to be surrendered or shipped away. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you a question or two about the Warsaw -bombing. Was it known to you that on the 3rd of September, the house of -the Ambassador of the United States, situated some 17 kilometers out of -Warsaw, was bombed by the German Air Force? - -GÖRING: No; that is unknown to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Air Force took a good many pictures of the -Polish villages and of Warsaw and used them for distributing among the -German people, didn’t they? - -GÖRING: That is possible, I was not concerned with that. In any event, -the Luftwaffe did not distribute pictures to the German people. It is -possible that pictures taken by the Luftwaffe might have got into the -German press by way of the Propaganda Ministry. But distribution, in the -sense of the Luftwaffe’s distributing photographs like leaflets, never -occurred. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Luftwaffe did take the pictures for the purpose -of determining the efficiency of its hits, did it not? - -GÖRING: The Luftwaffe took pictures before the target was bombed, and -again after the target had been bombed, to determine whether the target -had actually been hit. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown five photographs and ask -you if those are not photographs taken by the Luftwaffe, following the -attack on Poland. - -[_Photographs were shown to the witness._] - -GÖRING: To answer the first question, whether the pictures had actually -been taken by the German Air Force, I regret I cannot give a positive -answer for there is no indication that these were made by the German Air -Force. Four out of the five pictures were, if you observe them closely, -taken from an oblique angle, as though they had been taken from a church -steeple rather than from an airplane, from which generally only vertical -pictures are taken because of the built-in camera. - -The picture showing the destruction of parts of Warsaw can be regarded -technically as such an aerial photo. The date is lacking here. But none -of these pictures give any proof that they were taken by the Luftwaffe. - -However, let us assume that they were taken by the Luftwaffe, so that -further questions will be facilitated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say you will assume they were by the Luftwaffe? - -GÖRING: Yes, although I doubt it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not want you to give away anything here. If -you think they were not taken by the Luftwaffe, I do not want you to -admit it. - -GÖRING: I said there is no proof. I did not take the pictures, I do not -recognize them, they were not submitted to me as Luftwaffe pictures and -from a purely technical point of view they could only have been taken -from a plane with a private camera from a very oblique angle. They are -not true aerial pictures, that is vertical pictures as taken by the Air -Force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will pass them then and go to something -else. - -Let us take up Document 638-PS, Exhibit Number USA-788, about which you -have been interrogated and which, as I recall, you authenticated. - -[_Document 638-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -This is the document which was signed by Dr. Joel and I ask you to -follow me. - - “From the Reich Marshal’s plans of 24 September 1942. - - “First: The Reich Marshal is looking for daring fellows who will - be employed in the East as Sonderkommandos and who will be able - to carry out the task of creating confusion behind the lines. - They are to be formed into bands under leadership, and with - interpreters assigned to them. For this purpose the Reich - Marshal is considering convicts who are first offenders, who - have committed not particularly heinous offenses for which there - can be some human understanding. - - “The Reich Marshal first of all mentioned persons convicted of - poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsführer SS had - picked out the so-called poachers, and they were already in his - hands. He requests, however, that the question be re-examined. - The only suitable men are those with a passion for hunting, who - have poached for love of the trophy, not men who have laid - snares and traps. The Reich Marshal also mentioned fanatical - members of smuggling gangs, who take part in gun battles on the - frontiers and whose passion it is to outwit the customs at the - risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to bring - articles over the frontier in an express train or by similar - means. - - “The Reich Marshal leaves it to us to consider whether still - another category of convicts can be assigned to these bands or - pursuit commands. - - “In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands, - whose first task should be to destroy the communications of the - partisan groups, could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they - would once again come under strict supervision. - - “Signed: Dr. Joel, 24 September 1942.” - -Do you wish to make an explanation of that document to the Tribunal? - -GÖRING: Yes, with the same that I made once before. The first two -paragraphs clearly show that I wanted only those people who had -committed no offenses involving laws of honor, such as poachers, -distinguishing between those having a passion for hunting and those who -only want to steal. I made a distinction also with regard to smugglers, -between those who take personal risks showing a certain passion for -their activity, and those who do it in a dishonorable way. - -Both these main paragraphs plainly show that I did not wish to use -criminals of any type, and that is why I explicitly denied having said -what is stated in the last paragraphs. It is not a question of the -minutes but of the notes taken by an official with whom I discussed -these things. He should be able to testify where and if he heard these -words uttered by me. But they contradict my ideas so much, and I -particularly emphasize this, and in particular, as I have clearly said, -as regards rape, which I always punished with death even if committed -against citizens of enemy states, that I rejected that statement; and I -again pointed out that the main paragraphs are in utmost contradiction -to the last remark, because if it had been a matter of indifference to -me, I could have selected criminals. - -Thirdly, I expressly stated above, that their main task behind the lines -was to create confusion, to disrupt communications, to destroy railways, -and the like. Fourthly and lastly, the whole thing never took place. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You objected to the word “ravish” which had been -translated the first time “rape”, and that is the only objection you -made to this document when it was presented to you. Is that not correct? - -GÖRING: No, it is not correct that way. I say this because it is a most -significant concept which has always particularly contradicted my sense -of justice, for shortly after the seizure of power I instigated a -sharpening of this phase of German penal laws. And I wanted to show by -this word and this concept, that this entire latter part could not have -been uttered by me, and I deny having said it. I will absolutely and -gladly take responsibility for even the most serious things which I have -done, but I deny this statement, as being in complete contradiction to -my opinions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who is the signer of this document? - -GÖRING: Dr. Joel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes—you knew him? - -GÖRING: I knew him slightly. I saw him at this conference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was present at the conference? - -GÖRING: I instructed him to come to tell him that I wished that type of -people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you dealt in economic matters with the various -occupied countries through Reichskommissars? - -GÖRING: I testified the other day that all sorts of authorities, -including the Reichskommissars had to follow my economic directives and -orders. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And were to report to you on economic matters? - -GÖRING: Not about all of them, only insofar as they concerned my -directives. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Reichskommissar in Poland? - -GÖRING: There was no Reichskommissar in Poland. There was a Governor -General in Poland, that was Dr. Frank. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands? - -GÖRING: Dr. Seyss-Inquart was Reichskommissar for Holland. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Reichskommissar for Norway? - -GÖRING: In Norway the Gauleiter Terboven was Reichskommissar. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Terboven—he was also a Gauleiter you say? - -GÖRING: He was Gauleiter at Essen. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You appointed him to Norway or attained his -appointment? - -GÖRING: I neither appointed him for Norway—because that was beyond my -jurisdiction—nor did I have him appointed. I did not oppose his -appointment in any way as I considered he would make a very competent -Reichskommissar. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was there from 1940 until 1945? - -GÖRING: I believe that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I will ask to have you shown Document R-134, a -communication from Terboven to you. - -[_Document R-134 was submitted to the witness._] - -That is a communication of the 1st of May 1942, is it not? - -GÖRING: I note the date; yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that reports to you as follows, does it not—it -is addressed to you as Reich Marshal, “My esteemed Reich Marshal”, is -that right? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Omitting the first paragraph, unless you are to -give it. - - “Several days ago on an island west of Bergen we captured a - Norwegian sabotage unit, trained by the Secret Service, and - found extensive stores of sabotage instruments, some of them of - a new kind, including probably poison and bacteria. Those which - appeared unfamiliar were forwarded to the Reich Security Main - Office for closer examination. - - “Besides other tasks, this sabotage unit was to begin its - sabotage work, on Sola and Herdla using the explosive of which a - sample is enclosed herewith. This appears from written - directives found. Since it must be assumed that similar actions - are under way on airfields on the rest of the European coast, - and assuming that a means of sabotage actually unknown until now - is involved, I am communicating with you by the fastest possible - means, in order to give you an opportunity to issue an - appropriate warning. - - “Unfortunately, two especially reliable officers of the Security - Police were killed in the fight against the sabotage unit. We - buried them this morning at 1000 hours in the Heroes’ Cemetery - in Bergen. - - “On the same day and at the same hour 18 Norwegians were shot on - my order. These had been captured some time previously in the - attempt to go to England illegally. - - “On the same day, the entire village which had harbored the - sabotage unit was burned down and the population deported. All - the males were taken to a German concentration camp without any - notification being sent to their families. The women were sent - to a female forced labor camp in Norway, and those children who - were not capable of working went to a children’s camp. Heil - Hitler! Yours obediently, Terboven.” - -Is that correct? - -GÖRING: It says so in the letter, a copy of which is before me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Terboven remained after that report until 1945, -didn’t he? - -GÖRING: That’s correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, later in the same year, 1942, you adopted very -similar means to those reported by Terboven to you, did you not? - -GÖRING: I did not understand the question. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you adopted later in the same year the same -means as Terboven, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: I? Where? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will ask that you be shown Document -1742-PS. - -[_Document 1742-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -Now, this is a decree of 26 October 1942, by Göring. I ask you to follow -me: - - “Simultaneously with the intensified combating of guerrilla - activity ordered by the Führer, and the cleaning up of the land - behind the lines, in particular that behind the Army Group - Center, I request that the following points be taken into - consideration, and the conclusions drawn therefrom be put into - practice: - - “1. Simultaneously with the combating of the underground forces - and the combing out of the areas contaminated by them, all - available livestock must be driven off to safe areas. Similarly, - food supplies are to be removed and brought into safety, so that - they will no longer be available to the guerrillas. - - “2. All male and female labor suitable for any kind of - employment must be forcibly recruited and allocated to the - Plenipotentiary General for Labor, who will then employ them in - safe areas behind the lines or in the Reich. Separate camps must - be organized behind the lines for the children.” - -Is that right? - -GÖRING: Absolutely. It concerns areas overrun by guerrillas, and no one -could expect me to leave cattle and foodstuffs at their disposal. -Furthermore, people who were repeatedly being incited to guerrilla -activities and revolts against us had to be brought back to safe areas -and put to work. I would like to emphasize that this was absolutely -vital for the security of the troops. But I may emphasize again that you -said I gave the same orders which you read from Terboven’s letter. I did -not order villages to be burned, and did not order the shooting of -hostages. This was something basically different. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You simply seized all the men, women and children -and moved them out. That is what I referred to. - -By May of 1944 your problem in the loss of fighter aircraft and fighter -personnel was becoming serious? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: On the 19th of May, 1944, you had a conference in -your office, on the subject of fighter aircraft and the losses of -fighter personnel, did you not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have been shown the minutes of that meeting -and authenticated them in your interrogations? - -GÖRING: It is not the minutes of that conference. It is a short and -brief summary by an officer of a meeting which, as far as I know, lasted -2 days. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document L-166. It is -entitled, “Most Secret Document,” isn’t it? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is also entitled, “Minutes of conference on -fighter aircraft with the Reich Marshal on 15 and 16 May 1944.” That is -correct, too, is it not? - -GÖRING: No, it says, “Notices of a conference on fighter aircraft at the -Reich Marshal’s on 15 and 16 May 1944.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Notices,” you translate it “notices”? - -GÖRING: It says “memorandum” here and that is the original. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Notes of Conference on Fighter Aircraft.” - -GÖRING: Lasting 2 days. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And at first General Galland described in -detail the situation regarding fighter personnel. That took place, -didn’t it, and he reviewed the losses? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And reviewed the losses? - -GÖRING: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then he reviewed at some length under Item 2, -“Remedial Measures,” is that right? - -GÖRING: According to the memorandum, yes, but whether that actually took -place I cannot say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This conference took place, didn’t it? - -GÖRING: Absolutely, 2 days. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And under Item 3 General Galland made certain -proposals, did he not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then after considerable discussion General -Schmidt made certain proposals, Items 12 and 13, is that right? - -GÖRING: It must have been so. At any rate it says so according to the -memorandum. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You recommended a conference between the chief of -the General Staff and the chief of artillery, as soon as possible, did -you not? Item 13? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And General Schmidt’s recommendations and requests -appear in Items 14 and 15 and 16 and 17 and 18? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you decided: - - “The Reich Marshal has decided that only the III-groups of - fighter squadrons are to remain in the Reich, and that all the - fighters fit for operations are to be pressed into service.” - -That occurred, did it not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then: - - “The Reich Marshal desires that when low-level attack on - airfields are made, causing considerable loss in personnel and - material, the measures taken for defense and dispersal are to be - re-examined by the Luftwaffenführungsstab.” - -Number 19. That occurred, did it not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Item 20 reads: - - “The Reich Marshal wishes to propose to the Führer that American - and English crews who shoot indiscriminately over towns, at - moving civilian trains, or at soldiers hanging to parachutes - should be shot immediately on the spot.” - -Have I correctly read that? - -GÖRING: It says so here. And I objected at once at that time that this -was not correct. This passage has no connection at all with the context -of these notes, 19-21. Besides the expression “soldiers hanging to -parachutes” is entirely misleading and not commonly used. I thought for -a long time about how this could have got into the notes, which I never -saw and which were drawn up over a period of 2 days, and can only find -the explanation that I pointed out—as can be gathered from the other -evidence—that around that time the Führer gave a directive in that -connection, and that in any event there must be a mistake; that is, it -should not be that the Reich Marshal wants to propose, _et cetera_, to -the Führer, but that I might have suggested that the Führer had some -such intention. But about this the author of these notes would have to -be consulted. No other item in all these notes refers to this. Even the -next item is entirely different. Whereas everything else stands in -relationship, this one point is extraneous. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In all the notes of the 2 days, this is the one -thing that you say is mistaken. - -Now I ask to have you shown Document 731-PS. - -[_Document 731-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -Now, the conference, the notes of which I have just read you, was -followed within a week by the order, 731-PS, was it not, the memorandum, -731-PS, which reads: - - “The Führer has reached the following decision in regard to - measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special - instances: - - “Enemy airmen who have been brought down are to be shot without - court martial proceedings in the following instances . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, shouldn’t you refer to a passage -four lines above that, after “Report of the Reich Marshal”? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not, but perhaps for the record it ought to -be in full. - - “Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces, Chief WFSt. - Please direct drafting of order. W (Warlimont). K (Keitel), - Deputy Chief of Command Staff of the Armed Forces. Must go to - Reichsführer SS. According to the report of the Reich Marshal, - General Korten made the following statement: ‘Memorandum’”—I - think the next line is not in the original— - - “‘The Führer has given the following ruling in regard to - measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special - instances: - - “‘Enemy airmen whose machines have been shot down are to be shot - without trial by court martial in the following cases: - - “‘(1) In the event of the shooting of our own German air crews - while they are parachuting to earth. - - “‘(2) In the event of aerial attacks upon German planes which - have made emergency landings and whose crews are in the - immediate vicinity. - - “‘(3) In the event of attacks upon railway trains engaged in - public transport. - - “‘(4) In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon individual - civilians, farmers, workers, single vehicles, and so forth.’” - -Now, there is a note: “In the event of low-level aerial attacks on -individual civilians, single civilian vehicles, and so forth,” is there -not? - -GÖRING: On my copy, “In the event of low-level aerial attacks—on -single”—“single” is crossed out here and there are two words written -above which I cannot read. Before the expression, “single vehicles,” is -the word “civilian” and referring to Point 2, it says: - - “I consider it doubtful, because the destruction of a plane - which has made an emergency landing cannot be designated as - gangster methods but rather as a measure in keeping with the - strictest standards of civilized warfare.” - -We are concerned with the entire series of questions discussed in these -days and weeks and to which Von Brauchitsch also testified recently. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That note about that emergency landing is signed by -“J,” isn’t it, which, stands for “Jodl”? - -GÖRING: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is all I care to ask. - -There are a number of documents which should be introduced in this -connection, and I think it will be best perhaps if we tabulate them and -get them ready over the evening and present them in the morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Mr. Justice Jackson, you can put them all in -then. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you first some questions about the -matter of the British Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft -III. Do you remember that you said in giving your evidence that you knew -this incident very completely and very minutely? Do you remember saying -that? - -GÖRING: No—that I had received accurate knowledge; not that I had -accurate knowledge—but that I received it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me quote your own words, as they were taken -down, “I know this incident very completely, very minutely, but it came -to my attention, unfortunately, at a later period of time.” That is what -you said the other day, is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is what I meant; that I know about the incident -exactly, but only heard of it 2 days later. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told the Tribunal that you were on leave at -this time, in the last period of March 1944, is that right? - -GÖRING: Yes, as far as I remember I was on leave in March until a few -days before Easter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you said, “As I can prove.” I want you to -tell the Tribunal the dates of your leave. - -GÖRING: I say again, that this refers to the whole of March—I remember -it well—and for proof I would like to mention the people who were with -me on this leave. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know is, where you were on leave. - -GÖRING: Here, in the vicinity of Nuremberg. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you were within easy reach of the telephone -from the Air Ministry or, indeed, from Breslau, if you were wanted? - -GÖRING: I would have been easily accessible by phone if someone wanted -to communicate with me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to help me with regard to one or two -other dates of which you have spoken. You say: “I heard 1 or 2 days -later about this escape.” Do you understand, Witness, that it is about -the escape I am asking you, not about the shooting, for the moment; I -want to make it quite clear. - -GÖRING: It is clear to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you mean by that, that you heard about the -actual escape 1 or 2 days after it happened? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about it from the office of your -adjutant or from your director of operations? - -GÖRING: I always heard these things through my adjutant. Several other -escapes had preceded this one. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s right. There had been a number of -escapes from this camp. - -GÖRING: I cannot tell you exactly whether they were from this camp. -Shortly before several big escapes had taken place, which I always heard -of through the office of my adjutant. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to tell the Tribunal another date: -You say that on your return from leave your chief of staff made a -communication to you. Who was your chief of staff? - -GÖRING: General Korten was chief of staff at that time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you tell us the date at which he made this -communication to you? - -GÖRING: No, I cannot tell you that exactly. I believe I discussed this -incident with my chief of staff later, telling him what I had already -heard about it from other sources. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who was the first to tell you about it? Was it -your chief of staff who told you about the shootings? Do you mean that -some one else had told you about the shooting? - -GÖRING: I cannot say exactly now whether I heard about the shooting from -the chief of staff, or from other sources. But in any event I discussed -this with the chief of staff. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the date that you talked about it with -your chief of staff? - -GÖRING: I cannot tell you the date exactly from memory, but it must have -been around Easter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That would be just about the end of March, -wouldn’t it? - -GÖRING: No. It might have been at the beginning of April, the first half -of April. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you had an interview with Himmler, you -have told us? - -GÖRING: Yes, I talked with Himmler about this. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you fix that? - -GÖRING: Of course I cannot establish this date with certainty. I saw -Himmler, and, at the first opportunity after I had heard about this -incident, spoke to him about it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you can’t fix the date in relation to -your coming back from leave, or the interview with your chief of staff, -or any other date, or Easter? - -GÖRING: Without any documents it is, as I said, impossible for me today -to fix the date. I can only mention the approximate period of time; and -that I have done. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said the other day that you could prove when -you were on leave. Am I to take it that you haven’t taken the trouble to -look up what your leave dates were? - -GÖRING: I have already said that I was on leave during March. Whether I -returned on the 26th or the 28th or the 29th of March I cannot tell you. -For proof of that you would have to ask the people who accompanied me, -who perhaps can fix this date more definitely. I know only that I was -there in March. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will it be perfectly fair to you if I -take the latest of your dates, the 29th of March, to work on? - -GÖRING: It would be more expedient if you would tell me when Easter was -that year, because I do not recall it. Then it will be easier for me to -specify the dates, because I know that a few days before Easter I -returned to Berchtesgaden in order to pass these holidays with my -family. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few days before Easter you went back to -Berchtesgaden? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you had come back on leave some day before -that. Before you went to Berchtesgaden you had come back from your March -leave? - -GÖRING: Berchtesgaden was then at the same time the headquarters of the -Führer. I returned from my leave to Berchtesgaden, and with my return my -leave ended, because I returned to duty. The return to Berchtesgaden was -identical with the termination of my leave. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I can’t give you Easter offhand, but I -happen to remember Whitsuntide was the 28th of May, so that Easter would -be early, somewhere about the 5th of April. So that your leave would -finish somewhere about the end of March, maybe the 26th or the 29th; -that is right, isn’t it? - -Now, these shootings of these officers went on from the 25th of March to -the 13th of April; do you know that? - -GÖRING: I do not know that exactly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take that from me, because there is an -official report of the shooting, and I want to be quite fair with you. -Only 49 of these officers were shot on the 6th of April, as far as we -can be sure, and one was shot either on the 13th of April or later. But -the critical period is the end of March, and we may take it that you -were back from leave by about the 29th of March. - -I just want you to tell the Tribunal this was a matter of great -importance, wasn’t it? Considered a matter of great importance? - -GÖRING: It was a very important matter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Milch—I beg pardon—Field Marshal Milch -has said that it was a matter which would require the highest authority, -and I think you have said that you know it was Hitler’s decision that -these officers should be shot; is that so? - -GÖRING: The question did not come through clearly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was Hitler’s decision that these officers -should be shot? - -GÖRING: That is correct; and I was later notified that it was Hitler’s -decree. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you just to remember one other thing, -that immediately it was published, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. -Eden, at once said that Great Britain would demand justice of the -perpetrators of these murders; do you remember that? - -GÖRING: I cannot remember the speech to the House of Commons given by -Eden. I myself do not know the substance of this speech even today. I -just heard that he spoke in Parliament about this incident. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to tell the Tribunal just who the -persons in your ministry involved were. I will tell you; I think it -would be shorter in the end. If you disagree you can correct me. - -The commandant of Stalag Luft III was Oberst Von Lindeiner of your -service, was he not? - -GÖRING: That is quite possible. I did not know the names of all these -commandants. There was a court martial against him and that was because -the escape was possible. He was not connected with the shootings. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but he was commandant of the camp, and I -suppose you had to review and confirm the proceedings of the -Zentralluftwaffengericht which convicted him and sentenced him to a -year’s imprisonment for neglect of duty. That would come to you, -wouldn’t it? Wouldn’t that come to you for review? - -GÖRING: No, only if larger penalties were involved. One year -imprisonment would not come to my attention. But I know, and I would -like to certify, that court proceedings were taken against him for -neglect of duty at the time of the escape. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May of 1943, Inspectorate Number 17 had been -interposed between the Luftwaffe and the Prisoners of War Organization -of the OKW, the Kriegsgefangenenwesen; do you remember that? - -GÖRING: I do not know the details about inspection nor how closely it -concerned the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW, or how it was -otherwise. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of who your own officers -were. You understand, Witness, that your own officers are involved in -this matter. I want to remind you who they were. Was the head of -Inspectorate 17 Major General Grosch of the Luftwaffe? - -GÖRING: Major General Grosch is of the Luftwaffe. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told the Tribunal the other day—I am -quoting your own words—that you knew from information, you knew this -incident very completely and very minutely. You are now telling the -Tribunal you don’t know whether Major General Grosch was head of -Inspectorate Number 17 of the Luftwaffe. - -GÖRING: That is irrelevant. I told the High Tribunal that I heard an -accurate account of the incident of the shooting of these airmen, but -that has no connection with General Grosch and his inspectorate, for he -did not participate in the shooting. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will show you that connection in one minute if -you will just answer my questions. Was Grosch’s second in command Oberst -Welder; do you remember that? - -GÖRING: I do not know the particulars of the organization for inspection -of prisoner-of-war camps, nor the leaders, nor what positions they held. -At least not by heart. I would like to emphasize again, so that there -will be no confusion, that when I said I knew about this matter, I mean -that I knew how the order was issued and that the people were shot, that -I came to know all about this; but not as far as this was related to -inspections, possibilities of flight, _et cetera_. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did General Grosch, as head of Inspectorate -17, have to report to General Fōrster, your director of operations at -the Luftwaffe Ministerium? - -GÖRING: That I cannot tell you without having the diagram of the -subordinate posts before me. General Fōrster was, I believe at that -time, head of the Luftwehr, or a similar designation, in the ministry. I -concerned myself less with these matters, because they were not directly -of a tactical, strategic, or of an armament nature. But it is quite -possible and certain that he belonged to this department. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you quite shortly, and if you don’t -know I will leave it for the moment. Did you know Major General Von -Graevenitz was head of the Defendant Keitel’s department, the -Kriegsgefangenenwesen, that dealt with prisoners of war? - -GÖRING: I first heard about General Graevenitz here, for this department -did not directly concern me. I could not know all of these military -subordinate commanders in their hundreds and thousands of departments. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I take it that you did not know Colonel, now -General Westhoff, of the department under Von Graevenitz? - -GÖRING: Westhoff I never saw at all, and he did not belong to the -Luftwaffe. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not suggesting that Von Graevenitz and -Westhoff belonged to the Luftwaffe. I wanted to make it clear that I was -suggesting they belonged to General Keitel’s organization. - -GÖRING: I did not know either; and I did not know what posts they -occupied. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Up to that time you still had a considerable -influence in the Reich, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: At this time no longer. This no longer concerns 1944. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you were still head of the Luftwaffe and -head of the Air Ministry, weren’t you? - -GÖRING: Yes, I was. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had, as head of the Luftwaffe and head -of the Air Ministry, been responsible for six prisoner-of-war camps for -the whole of the war up to that time, hadn’t you? - -GÖRING: How many prisoner-of-war camps I do not know. But of course I -bear the responsibility for those which belonged to my ministry. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To the Air Force? - -GÖRING: Yes, those which were subordinate to the Air Force. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew about the general plan for treatment of -prisoners of war, which we have had in evidence as the “Aktion Kugel” -plan, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: No. I knew nothing of this action. I was not advised of it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were never advised of Aktion Kugel? - -GÖRING: I first heard of Aktion Kugel here; saw the document and heard -the expression for the first time. Moreover no officer of the Luftwaffe -ever informed me of such a thing; and I do not believe that a single -officer was ever taken away from the Luftwaffe camps. A report to this -effect was never presented to me, in any case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know what Aktion Kugel was: That escaped -officers and noncommissioned officers, other than British and American, -were to be handed over to the police and taken to Mauthausen, where they -were shot by the device of having a gun concealed in the measuring -equipment when they thought they were getting their prison clothes. You -know what Aktion Kugel is, don’t you? - -GÖRING: I heard of it here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not -know that escaped prisoners of war who were picked up by the police were -retained by the police and taken to Mauthausen? - -GÖRING: No, I did not know that. On the contrary, various prisoners who -escaped from my camps were caught again by the police; and they were all -brought back to the camps; this was the first case where this to some -extent did not take place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t you know that Colonel Welder, as -second in command of your ministry’s inspectorate, issued a written -order a month before this, in February 1944, that prisoners of war -picked up by the Luftwaffe should be delivered back to their camp, and -prisoners of war picked up by the police should be held by them and no -longer counted as being under the protection of the Luftwaffe; didn’t -you know that? - -GÖRING: No. Please summon this colonel to testify if he ever made a -report of that nature to me, or addressed such a letter to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, of course I cannot tell whether your -ministry was well run or not. But he certainly issued the order, because -he says so himself. - -GÖRING: Then he must say from whom he received this order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, he says that he issued this order, -and you know as well as I do that prisoners of war is a thing that you -have got to be careful about, because you have got a protecting power -that investigates any complaint; and you never denounced the Convention -and you had the protecting power in these matters all through the war, -had you not? That is right, isn’t it? - -GÖRING: That is correct, but I take the liberty to ask who gave him this -order, whether he received this order from me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, he would not get it direct from you. I do -not think you had ever met him, had you? He would get it from Lieutenant -General Grosch, wouldn’t he? - -GÖRING: Then Grosch should say whether he received such an order from -me. I never gave such an order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So you say that you had never heard—this -was 3½ years after the beginning of the war—and you had never heard -that any escaped prisoners of war were to be handed over to the police. -Is that what you ask the Tribunal to believe? - -GÖRING: To the extent that escaped prisoners of war committed any -offenses or crimes, they were of course turned over to the police, I -believe. But I wish to testify before the Court that I never gave any -order that they should be handed over to the police or sent to -concentration camps merely because they had attempted to break out or -escape, nor did I ever know that such measures were taken. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is my last question: I want to make it -quite clear, Witness, that I am referring to those who had escaped, who -had got away from the confines of the camp and were recaptured by the -police. Didn’t you know that they were handed over to the police? - -GÖRING: No. Only if they had committed crimes while fleeing, such as -murder and so on. Such things occurred. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-SEVENTH DAY - Thursday, 21 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you remember telling me last night -that the only prisoners of war handed over to the police were those -guilty of crimes or misdemeanors? - -GÖRING: I did not express myself that way. I said if the police -apprehended prisoners of war, those who had committed a crime during the -escape, as far as I know, were detained by the police and were not -returned to the camp. To what extent the police kept prisoners of war, -without returning them to a camp, I was able to gather from -interrogations and explanations here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Document D-569? Would you look -first at the top left-hand corner, which shows that it is a document -published by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht? - -GÖRING: The document which I have before me has the following heading at -the top left-hand corner: “The Reichsführer SS,” and the subheading: -“Inspector of Concentration Camps.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a document dated the 22d of November 1941. -Have you got it? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have it now. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at the left-hand bottom corner, as to -distribution. The second person to whom it is distributed is the Air -Ministry and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force on 22 November 1941. -That would be you. - -GÖRING: That’s correct. I would like to make the following statement in -connection with this . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just for a moment. I would like you to -appreciate the document and then make your statement upon it. I shall -not stop you. I want you to look at the third sentence in Paragraph 1. -This deals with Soviet prisoners of war, you understand. The third -sentence says: - - “If escaped Soviet prisoners of war are returned to the camp in - accordance with this order, they have to be handed over to the - nearest post of the Secret State Police, in any case.” - -And then Paragraph 2 deals with the special position—if they commit -crimes, owing to the fact that: - - “. . . at present these misdemeanors on the part of Soviet - prisoners of war are particularly frequent, due most likely to - living conditions still being somewhat unsettled, the following - temporary regulations come into force. They may be amended - later. If a Soviet prisoner of war commits any other punishable - offense then the commandant of the camp must hand the guilty man - over to the head of the Security Police.” - -Do I understand this document to say that a man who escapes will be -handed over to the Security Police? You understand this document says a -man who escapes will be handed over to the Secret Police, a man who -commits a crime, as you mentioned, will be handed over to the Security -Police. Wasn’t that the condition that obtained from 1941 up to the date -we are dealing with in March 1944? - -GÖRING: I would like to read the few preceding paragraphs so that no -sentences are separated from their context. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, while the witness is reading the -document, might I go over the technical matter of the arrangement of -exhibits? When I cross-examined Field Marshal Kesselring I put in three -documents, UK-66, which becomes Exhibit GB-274; D-39, which becomes -GB-275; TC-91, which becomes GB-276; so this document will become -GB-277. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Have you had an opportunity of reading it, -Witness? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I am right, am I not, that the Soviet -prisoners of war who escaped were to be, after their return to the camp, -handed over to the Secret State Police. If they committed a crime, they -were to be handed over to the Security Police, isn’t that right? - -GÖRING: Not exactly correct. I would like to point to the third sentence -in the first paragraph. There it says, “If a prisoner-of-war camp is in -the vicinity, then the man who is recaptured is to be transported -there.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But read the next sentence, “If a Soviet -prisoner of war is returned to the camp”—that is in accordance with -this order which you have just read—“he has to be handed to the nearest -service station of the Secret State Police.” Your own sentence. - -GÖRING: Yes, but the second paragraph which follows gives an explanation -of frequent criminal acts of Soviet prisoners of war, _et cetera_, -committed at that time. You read that yourself; that is also connected -with this Paragraph Number 1. But this order was given by itself and it -was distributed to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. And I would -like to give the explanation of its distribution. In this war there were -not only hundreds, but thousands of current orders which were issued by -superiors to subordinate officers and were transmitted to various -departments. That does not mean that each of these thousands of orders -was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief; only the most decisive and most -important were shown to him. The others went from department to -department. Thus it is that this order from the Chief of the High -Command was signed by a subordinate department, and not by the Chief of -the High Command himself. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This order would be dealt with by your -prisoner-of-war department in your ministry, wouldn’t it? - -GÖRING: This department, according to the procedure adopted for these -orders, received the order, but no other department received it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the answer to my question must be “yes.” -It would be dealt with by the prisoner-of-war department—your ministry. -Isn’t that so? - -GÖRING: I would say yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quicker, you see, if you say “yes” in the -beginning; do you understand? - -GÖRING: No; it depends upon whether I personally have read the order or -not, and I will then determine as to my responsibility. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the escape . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You were not asked about responsibility; you were asked -whether it would be dealt with by your prisoner-of-war department. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the escape about which I am asking you took -place on the night of the 24th to the 25th of March. I want you to have -that date in mind. The decision to murder these young officers must have -been taken very quickly, because the first murder which actually took -place was on the 26th of March. Do you agree with that? It must have -been taken quickly? - -GÖRING: I assume that this order, as I was informed later, was given -immediately, but it had no connection with this document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no; we are finished with that document; we -are going into the murder of these young men. The Grossfahndung—a -general hue and cry, I think, would be the British translation—was also -issued at once in order that these men should be arrested; isn’t that -so? - -GÖRING: That is correct. Whenever there was an escape, and such a large -number of prisoners escaped, automatically in the whole Reich, a hue and -cry was raised, that is, all authorities had to be on the lookout to -recapture the prisoners. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in order to give this order to murder -these men, and for the Grossfahndung, there must have been a meeting of -Hitler, at any rate with Himmler or Kaltenbrunner, in order that that -order would be put into effect; isn’t that so? - -GÖRING: That is correct. According to what I heard, Himmler was the -first to report this escape to the Führer. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff, who was in Defendant -Keitel’s Kriegsgefangenenwesen, in his prisoner-of-war set-up, says -this, that - - “On a date, which I think was the 26th, Keitel said to him, - ‘This morning Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler - for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It was unheard - of.’” - -Do you say that General Westhoff is wrong? - -GÖRING: Yes. This is not in accordance with the facts. General Westhoff -is referring to a statement of Field Marshal Keitel. This utterance in -itself is illogical, for I could not accuse Keitel because he would not -draw my attention to it, as the guarding was his responsibility and not -mine. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One of the Defendant Keitel’s officers dealing -with this matter was a general inspector, General Röttich. I do not know -if you know him. - -GÖRING: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, General Westhoff, as one could understand, -is very anxious to assure everyone that his senior officer had nothing -to do with it, and he goes on to say this about General Röttich: - - “He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these - matters were taken out of his hands. Apparently at that - conference with the Führer in the morning, that is to say, the - conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Göring, - which took place in the Führer’s presence, the Führer himself - always took a hand in these affairs when officers escaped.” - -You say that is wrong? You were at no such conference? - -GÖRING: I was not present at this conference, neither was General -Westhoff; he is giving a purely subjective view, not the facts of the -case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that we find that—you think that—Westhoff -is wrong? You see, Westhoff, he was a colonel at this time, I think, and -now he finishes as a major general, and he asks that the senior officers -be asked about it; he says this: “It should be possible to find out that -Himmler made the suggestion to the Führer—to find that out from Göring -who was present at the conference.” Again and again Westhoff, who after -all is a comparatively junior officer, is saying that the truth about -this matter can be discovered from his seniors. You say that it cannot. - -GÖRING: I would not say that. I would like just to say that General -Westhoff was never present for even a moment, therefore he cannot say, I -know or I saw that Reich Marshal Göring was present. He is assuming it -is so, or he may have heard it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What he says is, you know, that Keitel blamed -him, as I have read to you; that Keitel went on to say to him at General -Von Graevenitz’, “Gentlemen, the escapes must stop. We must set an -example. We shall take very severe measures. I am only telling you that, -that the men who have escaped will be shot; probably the majority of -them are dead already.” You never heard anything of that? - -GÖRING: I was neither present at the Keitel-Westhoff-Graevenitz -conversation nor at the Führer-Himmler conversation. As far as I know -General Westhoff will be testifying here. Moreover, Field Marshal Keitel -will be able to say whether I was there or not. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, I am bound to put this to you. I come -on to your own ministry. I suppose in general you take responsibility -for the actions of the officers of your ministry from the rank of field -officer and above—colonels and major generals and lieutenant generals? - -GÖRING: If they acted according to my directives and my instructions, -yes; if they acted against my directives and instructions, no. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see what happened in your -own ministry. You know that—do you know, that Colonel Walde made a -personal investigation of this matter at the camp? Did you know that? - -GÖRING: The particulars about this investigation, as I explained -yesterday, are unknown to me; I know only that investigations did take -place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 27th of March, that was a Monday, -did you know that there was a meeting in Berlin about this matter? Just -let me tell you who were there before you apply your mind to it, so you -will know. Your ministry was represented by Colonel Walde, because -Lieutenant General Grosch had another meeting, so he ordered his deputy -to attend; the Defendant Keitel’s organization was represented by -Colonel Von Reurmont; the Gestapo was represented by Gruppenführer -Müller; the Kripo was represented by Gruppenführer Nebe. Now, all these -officers were of course not on the policy level, but they were high -executive officers who had to deal with the actual facts that were -carried out, were they not? - -GÖRING: They were not executive officers, insofar as it has not been -definitely established that executive powers are within an officer’s -province. To the first question, whether I knew about this meeting, I -would say no. Colonel Walde I do not even know personally. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say, you are telling the Tribunal, -that you were never told about this meeting at any time? - -GÖRING: Yes, I am saying that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to look at—let him have Walde’s -statement—I want you to look at the statement of one of the officers of -your own ministry on this point. This is a statement made by Colonel -Ernst Walde, and—I am sorry I have not another German copy, but I will -get one in due course—and in my copy, Witness, it is at the foot of -Page 2, the beginning of the paragraph which I want you to look at, is: -“As recaptured prisoners were not to be taken back to their camp, -according to an order issued several weeks previously . . .”—can you -find it? - -GÖRING: Where is it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, in the English version it is at the middle -of the second page, and I want to ask you about the—the middle of that -paragraph; I do not know if you see a name—it stands out in my -copy—Major Dr. Hühnemörder; do you see that? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is the sentence after the name Major -Dr. Hühnemörder appears: “On this Monday”—have you got this? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. - - “On this Monday a conference took place at the Reich Security - Main Office at Berlin, Albrechtstrasse. As far as I remember - this conference had been called by the Chief of the - Prisoner-of-War Organization OKW, and I attended as - representative of Luftwaffe Inspektion 17, since General Grosch - was unable to attend in person, for reasons which I cannot - remember; the Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization, as far - as I know, was represented by Colonel Von Reurmont, while the - Security Office was represented by Gruppenführer Müller and - Gruppenführer Nebe, the Chief of the Criminal Police at that - time. I find it impossible to give a verbatim account of the - conversation or to state what was said by every single person. - But I remember this much: That we were informed about a - conference which had taken place on the previous day, that is - Sunday, at the Führer’s headquarters in connection with the mass - escape from Sagan, in the course of which heated discussions had - taken place between the participants. In this connection the - names of Himmler, Göring, and Keitel were mentioned. Whether - Ribbentrop’s name was also mentioned I do not remember. The - Führer was not mentioned. At this conference appropriate - measures were said to have been discussed, or taken, to check - any such mass escapes in the future. The nature of these - measures was not disclosed. Later, and more or less in - conclusion, Gruppenführer Müller declared that requisite orders - had already been given and put into effect the previous morning. - Regarding the search for escaped prisoners, he could or would - not make any statement; he merely declared that according to - reports so far received, shootings had taken place at some - points for attempted escapes. I think he said that the number - was 10 or 15. - - “After these remarks by Gruppenführer Müller, which unmistakably - caused a shattering effect, it became clear to me that a - decision had been made by the highest authority, and that - therefore any intervention by subordinate departments was - impossible and pointless.” - -Now, this was announced at a meeting of persons that I would call -executives, that the shooting had already begun. Are you telling this -Tribunal that this matter was made clear to these executives, including -one of your own officers, and was never told to you? Are you still -saying that? - -GÖRING: I am still saying that. Firstly, that I have never heard -anything about this conference. Secondly, that the officer in question -is only surmising when he mentions the names, he makes no assertion. And -thirdly, I would like to ask you also to mention the beginning of this -statement, which begins as follows: - - “In this matter of the mass escape of British Air Force officers - from Prisoner-of-War Camp Number III, at Sagan on 24 or 25 March - 1944, I make the following statement: - - “I have to point out that in view of the absence of any - documents, I am forced to reconstruct completely from memory - events which happened almost a year and 9 months ago; I - therefore ask that this fact and the possibility thus arising of - my making a mistake be taken into consideration, and that due - allowances be made.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is a perfectly fair point, and the answer -to it is that I will show you what this officer reported at the time to -his general. - -Give the witness General Grosch’s statement. - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] We are getting reasonably -high up. This officer, General Grosch, signs it as a Lieutenant General. -Now, would you like, if you can, to help me again—you were most helpful -last time—to try to find the place? This is a statement by Lieutenant -General Grosch. - -GÖRING: I request to have permission to read this document first, to see -whether similar modifications apply here also. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you read the first sentence? I do not want -to take up time to read an account of the general matter. It says: -“During my interrogation on 7 December 1945 I was told to write down all -I knew about the Sagan case.” And then he wrote it down. But I would -like you to look at Number 1, the first page. Do you see at the foot of -the page an account of the pyramid in your ministry of administration? -Do you see that at the foot of Page 1? - -[_There was no response._] - -SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you see at the foot of Page 1 the -pyramid? - -GÖRING: I see it but—I am now at the place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It comes in about the fourth paragraph. - -GÖRING: I can see it, but I should like to read the other first. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, if you will look about four small -paragraphs on, it begins: “A few days after the day of the escape—I -cannot remember the date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that OKW -had called a conference in Berlin.” - -Do you see that? - -I do not mind you running through it quickly, but you may take it that -the first two pages are what I said were there, the pyramid of your -ministry. - -GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. Which paragraph, please? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Part C, the fourth paragraph, the Sagan -case. “A few days after the escape. . . .” Do you find that? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have the place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. - - “A few days after the day of the escape—I cannot remember the - date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that the OKW had called - a conference in Berlin—I believe on the premises of a high SS - and police authority, and that the Inspectorate Number 17 was to - send representatives. I should have liked to have gone myself, - but had to attend another conference in Berlin, and asked - Colonel Walde to attend as representative. After his return - Colonel Walde informed me that the spokesman of the OKW had - informed them that there was a decision by the Führer to the - effect that, on recapture, the escaped British airmen were not - to be handed back to the Luftwaffe but were to be shot.” - -Then missing a paragraph and taking the last line of the next paragraph: - - “It is, however, certain that the danger of their being shot was - even then clearly recognizable. I asked Colonel Walde whether - such a far-reaching decision would be notified in writing to the - High Command of the Luftwaffe or the Reich Air Ministry or - whether he had been given anything in writing. Colonel Walde - gave me to understand that the assembly were told by the - spokesman of the OKW, that they would receive nothing in - writing, nor was there to be any correspondence on this subject. - The circle of those in the know was to be kept as small as - possible. I asked Colonel Walde whether the spokesman of the OKW - had said anything to the effect that the Reich Marshal or the - High Command of the Luftwaffe had been informed about the - matter. Colonel Walde assured me that the OKW spokesman had told - them that the Reich Marshal was informed.” - -I will not ask you about that for the moment. I want you to look at what -your general did. It says: - - “Up to the time of Colonel Walde’s report I had not received - even so much as a hint anywhere that escaped prisoners of war - should be treated in any other way than according to the - provisions of the Geneva Convention. - - “The same afternoon I rang up my superior officer, the Chief of - Air Defense, to ask time for an interview with General der - Flieger Förster. This was fixed for the next morning. - - “When I came there to report I found General Förster together - with his chief of staff. I asked General Förster for permission - to speak to him alone and put the facts before him. In - conclusion, I expressed the opinion that if the British airmen - were to be shot, (a) there would be a breach of the Geneva - Convention, (b) reprisal measures endangering the lives of - German airmen held by the British as prisoners of war would have - to be expected. I asked General Förster to bring the matter to - the notice of the Reich Marshal even at this very late stage, - and to stress those two points. - - “General Förster was immediately prepared to do this. When it - came to the choice of the way in which the matter could be - brought to the attention of the Reich Marshal, it was decided to - report to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch. - - “In my presence General Förster rang up the office of the state - secretary and obtained the interview at once. General Förster - left the room, and while doing so he instructed me to wait for - his return in his study. After some time General Förster came - back and told me that he had reported the matter to the state - secretary and that Field Marshal Milch had made the necessary - notes.” - -Look at the last paragraph: - - “I gave Colonel Walde the order, despite the ban by the OKW, to - incorporate a detailed written statement about the conference in - our records. So far as I know, this was done.” - -DR. STAHMER: Counsel Stahmer on behalf of the Defendant Göring. - -We have had submitted here a series of affidavits given by witnesses who -are in Nuremberg and who, in my opinion, could be brought as witnesses -in person. Because of the importance of this matter, not only for Göring -but for other defendants, I object to this procedure, on the assumption -that the same rules apply for cross-examination as examination in chief. -By that I mean that we should not be satisfied with an affidavit and -depend on an affidavit, if the Prosecution can, without difficulty, -summon the witness in order to have him testify before the Tribunal, so -that the Defense may be in position to cross-examine these witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you have said is entirely inaccurate. -The rules with reference to cross-examination are not the same as rules -with reference to examination in chief, and what is being done at the -present moment is that the Defendant Göring is being cross-examined as -to his credit. He has said that he knew nothing about this matter, and -he has been cross-examined to prove that he has lied when he said that. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, according to my opinion the procedure should -be that the witness be brought here in person. The fact remains that, in -our estimation, a reference to an affidavit is a less desirable means -than the personal testimony of a witness, which affords the Defense the -possibility of adducing evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I have already pointed out to you, you -are quite in error in thinking that the rules for cross-examination are -the same as for examination in chief. The witness at the present moment -is being cross-examined and is being cross-examined as to credit; that -is to say, to prove whether or not he is telling the truth. - -As to the calling of this witness—I think his name is Grosch—you can -apply to call him if you want to do so. That is an entirely different -matter. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. I quite understand, Mr. President; but I had to have -the possibility of calling the people who are mentioned in this -affidavit, in case I consider it necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can apply to do that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: [_Turning to the witness._] You understand, what -I am suggesting to you is that here was a matter which was not only -known in the OKW, not only known in the Gestapo and the Kripo, but was -known to your own director of operations, General Förster, who told -General Grosch that he had informed Field Marshal Milch. I am suggesting -to you, that it is absolutely impossible and untrue that in these -circumstances you knew nothing about it. - -GÖRING: I would like first to establish an entirely different point. In -the German interpretation regarding the first objection by Dr. Stahmer, -the following came through: - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal does not want you to discuss legal -objections. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer the question that is put to you? -You have already been told that you must answer a question directly and -make any explanation afterwards, and shorten it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still say, in view of that evidence, in -view of these statements from the officers of your own ministry, that -you knew nothing about this? - -GÖRING: Precisely these statements confirm this, and I would like to -make a short explanation. You determined a date. You said it was the -27th. But in this statement by Grosch this date is not determined. It -says: “A few days after the escape, I do not recall the date, Colonel -Walde informed me.” - -Secondly, it says here that General Förster, who was not chief of my -operational branch but chief of another branch of the ministry, -mentioned this matter to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch, without -referring to the date. General Field Marshal Milch was here as a -witness, but unfortunately, he was never questioned as to whether he -gave me this report, and at what time, and whether to me direct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, he was, and General Field Marshal Milch -took the same line as you, that he knew nothing about it, that Förster -had never spoken to him. It was asked by my friend, Mr. Roberts, “Didn’t -General Förster speak to you about it?”. - -What I am suggesting is that both you and Field Marshal Milch are saying -you knew nothing about it, when you did, and are leaving the -responsibility on the shoulders of your junior officers. That is what I -am suggesting and I want you to understand it. - -GÖRING: No, I do not wish to push responsibility on to the shoulders of -my subordinates, and I want to make it clear—that is the only thing -that is important to me—that Field Marshal Milch did not say that he -reported this matter to me. And, secondly, that the date when Förster -told Milch about this is not established. It could have been quite -possible that on the date when this actually happened, the Chief of the -General Staff of the Luftwaffe might already have conferred with me -about it. The important factor is—and I want to maintain it—that I was -not present at the time when the command was given by the Führer. When I -heard about it, I vehemently opposed it. But at the time I heard of it, -it was already too late. That a few were shot later, was not yet known -at the time, neither was the exact time of the event. Most of them had -been shot already. - -Thirdly, those who escaped, and were captured in the direct vicinity of -the camp by our guards were returned to the camp and were not handed -over. Those prisoners who were captured by the police and the -Grossfahndung, and returned to the camp before the Führer had issued the -decree, were likewise not handed over and shot. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that, according to Wielen, who is going -to give evidence, the selection of the officers to be shot—a list as -regards the selection of officers to be shot—a list had been prepared -by the camp authorities at the request of Department 5, that is of the -RSHA Kripo Department, in which those officers were regarded as -disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders, having been -specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant -or by one of these officers. Thereupon, the shooting of the officers -mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department 4 of the RSHA -and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei. - -Are you telling the Tribunal you did not know that your own officers -were selecting the men to be shot on the ground that they were plotters -and escape leaders? In any other service in the world, attempt to escape -is regarded as a duty of an officer, isn’t it, when he is a prisoner of -war? Isn’t that so? - -GÖRING: That is correct, and I have emphasized that. To your first -question, I would like to put on record very definitely that we are -dealing with the utterances of a man who will be testifying as a -witness. As to whether he actually asked for a list and saw a list, his -utterance is illogical. There was no selection made for shooting. Those -who were captured by the police were shot without exception, and those -who had not been returned to the camp. No officers were selected as -representing disturbing elements, but those who had returned to the camp -were not shot. Those who were recaptured by the police outside the camp -were shot without exception, on the orders of the Führer. Therefore, the -utterance is entirely illogical and not in accordance with the facts. - -I know nothing about such a list being asked for, nor about the carrying -out of such a wish. I personally pointed out to the Führer repeatedly -that it is the duty of these officers to escape, and that on their -return after the war, they would have to give an account of such -attempts, which as far as I can remember should be repeated three times, -according to English rules. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that the Government of Germany sent -an official note about this matter, saying that they had been shot while -resisting arrest while trying to escape? Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: I heard for the first time that there had been a note to this -effect when the reply to it was sent. I had no part in the drawing up of -the note. I know of its contents only through the reply, for I happened -to be there when the reply came in. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not at the moment on the point that -everyone now admits that the note was a complete and utter lie. I am on -the point of the seriousness of this matter. Do you know that General -Westhoff says in his statement: “Then, when we read this note to England -in the newspaper, we were all absolutely taken aback. We all clutched -our heads, mad.” According to Mr. Wielen, who will be here, it was a -contributory cause for General Nebe of the Kripo, for nights on end, not -going to bed but passing the night on his office settee. You will agree, -won’t you, Witness, that this was a serious and difficult matter? All -these officers that had to deal with it found it a serious and difficult -matter, isn’t that so? - -GÖRING: Not only these officers found this matter serious and difficult, -but I myself considered it the most serious incident of the whole war -and expressed myself unequivocally and clearly on this point, and later, -when I learned the contents of the note, I knew that this note was not -in accordance with the truth. I gave expression to my indignation, -inasmuch as I immediately told my Quartermaster General to direct a -letter to the OKW to the effect that we wished to give up the camps for -prisoners of war, because under these circumstances, we no longer wished -to have anything to do with them. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And according to your evidence in chief, what -you did was to turn to Himmler, asking him if he had received the order, -and then you said, - - “I told him what excitement would result in my branch, because - we could not understand such measures; and if he had received - such orders, he would please inform me before carrying them - through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such - orders from being carried out, if possible”—and then you said - that you—“talked to the Führer and that he confirmed that he - had given the order and told me why.” - -You, according to that evidence, still had enough influence in Germany, -in your opinion, to stop even Himmler issuing such orders or carrying—I -am sorry, I said “issuing”—carrying out such orders. - -GÖRING: You are giving my statement a completely wrong meaning. I told -Himmler plainly that it was his duty to telephone me before the -execution of this matter, to give me the possibility, even at this -period of my much diminished influence, to prevent the Führer from -carrying out this decree. I did not mean to say that I would have been -completely successful, but it was a matter of course that I, as Chief of -the Luftwaffe, should make it clear to Himmler that it was his duty to -telephone me first of all, because it was I who was most concerned with -this matter. I told the Führer in very clear terms just how I felt, and -I saw from his answers that, even if I had known of it before, I could -not have prevented this decree, and we must keep in mind that two -different methods of procedure are in question. The order was not given -to the Luftwaffe, that these people were to be shot by the Luftwaffe -personnel, but to the police. If the Führer had said to me, “I will -persist in this decree which I gave the police,” I would not have been -able to order the police not to carry through the Führer’s decree. Only -if this decree had had to be carried out by my men, would it have been -possible for me perhaps to circumvent the decree, and I would like to -emphasize this point strongly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that may be your view that you could not -have got anywhere with the Führer; but I suggested to you that when all -these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it, and -that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot, but -co-operated in this foul series of murders. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you passing from that now? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in evidence these two documents? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting them in. I put them to the witness. -D-731 will be GB-278, and D-730 will be GB-279. - -THE PRESIDENT: And should you not refer perhaps to the second paragraph -in 731? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: It shows that apparently, in the early hours of the 25th -of March the matter was communicated to the office of the adjutant of -the Reich Marshal—the second paragraph beginning with “the escape.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - - “The escape of about 30 to 40 prisoners, the exact number having - to be ascertained by roll call, was reported by telephone from - the Sagan Camp to the inspectorate in the early hours of the - 25th of March, Saturday morning, and duly passed on in the same - way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be - informed in case of mass escapes. These were: 1.) the Office of - the Adjutant of the Reich Marshal; 2.) the OKW, for directors of - these prisoners of war; 3.) the Inspector General of Prisoners - of War; and 4.) Director of Operations, Air Ministry.” - -I am much obliged. You must remember that the witness did not admit -yesterday afternoon that the news of the escape had been given to the -office of his adjutant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged to you. - -GÖRING: The escape was communicated to us every time relatively quickly. -I should now like to give my view of the statement made by you before -that—it concerns assertions made by you—but I still maintain that I -did not hear about this incident until after it had occurred. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have put my questions on the incident. I pass -to another point. I want to ask you two or three questions about the -evidence that you gave 2 days ago, dealing with the evidence of your own -witness, Herr Dahlerus, who made his first visit to London on the 25th -of August 1939, after an interview and a telephone conversation with you -on the 24th. I just want you to fix the date because it is sometimes -difficult to remember what these dates are. At that time, you were -anxious that he should persuade the British Government to arrange a -meeting of plenipotentiaries who would deal with the questions of Danzig -and the Corridor. Is that right? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that as -far as the Führer was concerned, Danzig and the Corridor was not the -real matter that was operating in his mind at all. Will you let me -remind you what he said on the 23rd of May: - - “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a - question of expanding our living space in the East, of securing - our food supplies, and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.” - -You knew that, didn’t you? - -GÖRING: I knew that he had said these things at that time, but I have -already pointed out repeatedly that such discussions can only be -assessed, if considered in conjunction with the whole political -situation. At the moment of these negotiations with England, we were -solely concerned with Danzig and the Corridor. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you say that despite what Hitler said on -the 23rd of May, that at that moment Hitler was only concerned with -Danzig and the Corridor? Do you say that seriously? - -GÖRING: I maintain in all seriousness that, in the situation as it was -at that time, this was really the case. Otherwise it would be impossible -to understand any of Hitler’s acts. You might just as well take his book -_Mein Kampf_ as a basis and explain all his acts by it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am interested in the last week of August at -the moment. I want you now just to remember two points on what you said, -with regard to Dahlerus, during the morning of the 25th. Do you -remember, you had a telephone conversation with him at 11:30 on the -24th? On the 25th, were you sufficiently in Hitler’s confidence to know -that he was going to proffer the _note verbale_ to Sir Nevile Henderson, -the British Ambassador, on the 25th? Did you know that? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At that time, when you were sending Dahlerus, -and the _note verbale_ was being given to the British Ambassador, the -arrangement and order was that you were going to attack Poland on the -morning of the 26th, wasn’t it? - -GÖRING: There seems to be a disturbance on the line. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think there is some mechanical difficulty. Perhaps it -would be a good thing to adjourn for a few minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me, Witness, that the arrangements to -attack Poland on the morning of the 26th were changed on the evening of -the 25th. Before I come to that, I will ask you one or two questions -about that. - -GÖRING: No, I did not say that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait a minute. I am sorry, but that is what I -understood you to say. - -GÖRING: No. I said explicitly that already on the 25th the attack for -the morning of the 26th was cancelled. It is a technical and military -impossibility to cancel a large-scale attack of a whole army the evening -before an attack. The shortest time required would be from 24 hours to -48 hours. - -I expressly mentioned that on the 25th the situation was clear. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the time, you had asked Dahlerus to go to -England on the 24th. It was still the plan that the attack would take -place on the 26th. Was not your object in sending Dahlerus to have the -British Government discussing their next move when the attack took -place, in order to make it more difficult for the British Government? - -GÖRING: No, I want to emphasize that—and perhaps I should have the -documents for the date—that when I sent Dahlerus at that time, and when -at that moment Sir Nevile had been handed a note on behalf of the -Führer, the attack for the 26th had been cancelled and postponed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of what you said yourself on -the 29th of August: - - “On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, - it was 5:30 on 25 August, the Führer called me on the telephone - and told me he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I - asked him then whether it was just temporary or for good. He - said, ‘No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British - intervention.’ I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be - definite within 4 or 5 days?’” - -Isn’t that right? - -GÖRING: That was what I said, but I did not say that this occurred on -the 25th, but when the Führer was clear about the guarantee that was -given. I emphasize that once more . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was quoting to you. When the -official guarantee was given, the treaty was signed at 5:30 on the -evening of the 25th of August. I am putting your own words to you. It -was after that that the Führer telephoned you and told you the invasion -was off. Do you wish to withdraw your statement that it was after the -official guarantee was given to Poland? - -GÖRING: I emphasized once more—after we knew that the guarantee would -be given. It must be clear to you too that if the signing took place at -5:30 p.m. on the 25th, the Führer could know about it only shortly -afterwards. Not till then would the Führer have called a conference, and -in that case an attack for the 26th could have been called off only -during the night of the 25th to 26th. Every military expert must know -that that is an absolute impossibility. I meant to say in my statement, -“. . . when it was clear to the Führer that a guarantee was given.” - -I emphasize once more that I have not seen this record nor sworn to it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I admit that I do not know anything about that. -I do not know whether you were still in Hitler’s confidence at the time -or not. But, wasn’t it a fact that Signor Attolico came on the 25th and -told Hitler that the Italian Army and Air Force were not ready for a -campaign? Were you told that? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course I was told that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was why the orders for the attack were -cancelled on the 26th, wasn’t it? - -GÖRING: No, that is absolutely wrong, because when the question of -Italian assistance came up, the fact was that its value was doubted in -many quarters. During the tension of the preceding days it became -evident that the demands made by the Italians which could not be -fulfilled by us were formulated in order to keep Italy out of the war. -The Führer was convinced that England had only given such a clear-cut -guarantee to Poland, because in the meantime the British Government had -learned that it was not the intention of Italy to come into the war as a -partner of the Axis. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put to you your own account of what the -Führer said. “I will have to see whether we can eliminate British -intervention.” Isn’t it correct that you tried, through Mr. Dahlerus, in -every way, to try and eliminate British intervention? - -GÖRING: I have never denied that. It was my whole endeavor to avoid war -with England. If it had been possible to avoid this war by coming to an -agreement with Poland, then that would have been accepted. If the war -with England could have been avoided in spite of a war with Poland, then -that was my task also. This is clear from the fact that, even after the -Polish campaign had started on 1 September 1939 I still made every -attempt to avoid a war with England and to keep the war from spreading. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In other words, what you were trying to do from -the 25th onwards was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich -in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn’t that right? - -GÖRING: That, of course, is quite clearly expressed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember the interview with Mr. -Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the -map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th -of August it will not mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that -I can ask you one or two questions about it. - -You remember, at that time, that you were upset at the interview which -had taken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply, and there -had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course I was upset, since that had suddenly completely -disturbed my whole position. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on Page -72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the -Poles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying: “Wir kennen die -Polen”? Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I -had heard about the excesses and I would not go and tell Dahlerus, a -neutral, that I considered Germany wholly guilty and the Poles -completely innocent. It is correct that I did say that, but it arose out -of a situation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still an admirer of Bismarck? - -GÖRING: I admire Bismarck absolutely, but I have never said that I am a -Bismarck. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you -might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember: “Haut -doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen”? (Let us strike the Poles -until they lose the courage to live.) Is that what was in your mind at -the time? - -GÖRING: No, I had no such thoughts, still less because for years I had -genuinely sought friendship with Poland. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have been quite frank about your general -intention, and I am not going to take time on it, but I just want to put -one or two subsidiary points. - -You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus’ book about the -airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him, -mentioning the Defendant Ribbentrop—you remember that passage? You have -given your explanation and I just want to . . . - -GÖRING: Yes, yes, I gave that explanation and I made it quite clear. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, your explanation was that Herr Dahlerus was -confusing your concern that his airplane should not be shot down in -making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn’t it? -You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was -your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn’t that -right? That is as I understood it. - -GÖRING: No, I think I have expressed it very clearly. Would you like me -to give it again? I will repeat it. - -Dahlerus, who stood in the witness box here, used the words, “I must -correct myself,” when he was asked about Ribbentrop. I am quoting -Dahlerus. He said, “I connected it with Ribbentrop, since shortly -beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection.” - -Thereupon I explained I was really anxious lest something might happen. -I explained that very clearly and I need not repeat it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question I put to you, Witness—I think we -are agreed on it—was that your anxiety was about his plane, and the -point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not -occur on this day when Dahlerus was preparing for his third visit, but -occurred when he was in England and rang you up during his second visit. -He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on Page 59 of -his book he says: - - “Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telephoned Göring to - confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He - seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he - was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British, or over - German territory. He asked me to hold the line, and a minute - later came back and gave me a concise description of the route - the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He - also assured me that the anti-aircraft stations along our course - would be informed that we were coming.” - -What I am suggesting to you is that your explanation is wrong, that you -have confused it with this earlier incident of which Mr. Dahlerus -speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about -the second incident which occurred 2 days later. - -GÖRING: That is not at all contradictory. In regard to the first flight -the position was that it was already dark, which means that the danger -was considerably greater; and I again point out that, in connection with -the second journey, preparedness for war in all countries had reached -such a degree that flying was hazardous. - -I emphasize once more that I had to correct Dahlerus when he was -questioned by my counsel, that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had -planned an attack against him. I emphasize for the last time that Von -Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dahlerus. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you really say that? Do you remember that on -the 29th of August—first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m., -when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the -difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering -direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, “We must summon Field -Marshal Göring to discuss it with him.” That is in our _Blue Book_, and -as far as I know it has never been denied. You were summoned to the -interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Nevile -Henderson. - -GÖRING: No, I must interrupt you. The Führer said, “We will have to -fetch him,” but I was not fetched and that is not said in the _Blue -Book_ either. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says: - - “During our conversation Göring described how he had been - summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson’s departure, how - Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that - had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of - them were with the result. In this connection Hitler had turned - to Ribbentrop and said mockingly, ‘Do you still believe that - Dahlerus is a British agent?’ Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied - that perhaps it was not the case.” - -You say that is not true, either? - -GÖRING: Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been -present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived -after Henderson had already left. The description is a little colorful. -Ribbentrop had no idea what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and -the Führer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely -knew that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was of course, opposed -to him, because he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels -being used. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly the point, you know, that I put -to you about 7 minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did know you were using -Dahlerus, with which you disagreed. You now agree that he knew you were -using Dahlerus, so I will leave it. - -GÖRING: No, I beg your pardon. I still say—please do not distort my -words—that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus -about, and that he had not even heard of it through the Führer. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said “distort my words.” I especially did -not say to you that he knew what you were negotiating about. I said to -you that he knew you were using Dahlerus, and that, you agree, is right. -I limited it to that, didn’t I? And that is right, isn’t it? - -GÖRING: He did not know either that I was carrying on negotiations with -England through Dahlerus at that time. He did not know about the flights -either. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to help me on one or -two other matters. - -You remember that in January of 1937, and in October of 1937, the German -Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviolability and -neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: I do not remember it in detail, but it has been mentioned here -in Court. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that on the 25th of August -1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and -Great Britain—oh no, that France would declare war during the case of -Fall Grün, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that? -It is Document Number 375-PS, Exhibit Number USA-84. I want you to have -it generally in mind because I am going to put a passage to you. - -GÖRING: May I ask whether the signature is Wolter? W-o-l-t-e-r? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall let you know. Yes, that is right. - -GÖRING: In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given -to me here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right. I only want to recall your -recollection to one sentence: - - “Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands represent an - extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war - against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it - is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to - the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be - carried out, and how long it would take.” - -Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you -remember it? - -GÖRING: That is absolutely correct. That was the principal work of a -captain of the General Staff, 5th Department, who, naturally, when -making his report, must propound the best arguments. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you -remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a -number of states, and this applied to Holland and Belgium? I think that -was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstag and mentioned a -number of small states as well as that; but he said it included Holland -and Belgium. - -GÖRING: Yes. It has, of course been mentioned repeatedly here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, do you remember that on the 23rd of -May, in the document that I have already put to you, at the meeting at -the Reich Chancellery, Hitler said this: “The Dutch and Belgian air -bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must -be ignored.” - -Do you remember his saying that? - -GÖRING: It says so in the document, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, on the 22d of August 1939, in the speech to -the commanders-in-chief, which is Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-29, he said: - - “Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and - Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well - as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available - means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of - these countries.” - -Do you remember his saying that? - -GÖRING: You can see for yourself from those words how often the Führer -changed his ideas, so that even the plan he had in May was not at all -final. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are perfectly consistent in my estimation. -He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality -must be ignored, and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and -France will not violate the neutrality, so it is perfectly easy for -Germany to do it. - -GÖRING: No, what he means to say is that we on our part would not find -it necessary to do so either. I merely want to point out that political -situations always turn out to be different, and that at these -interrogations and this Trial we must regard the political background of -the world as a whole. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was on the 22d. You have agreed as to what -was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, 4 days later, Hitler gave -another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave -another assurance? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the 6th of October, 1939, he gave a -further assurance, and on the 7th of October, the day after that last -assurance, the order, which is Document Number 2329-PS, Exhibit GB-105, -was issued. - - “Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special - orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if - the political situation so demands.” - -And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler: - - “Preparations should be made for offensive action on the - northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of - Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried - out as soon and as forcibly as possible.” - -Isn’t it quite clear from that, that all along you knew, as Hitler -stated on the 22d of August, that England and France would not violate -the neutrality of the low countries, and you were prepared to violate -them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn’t -that quite clear? - -GÖRING: Not entirely. Only if the political situation made it necessary. -And in the meantime the British air penetration of the neutrality of -Holland and Belgium had taken place, up to October. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say not entirely. That is as near agreement -with me as you are probably prepared to go. - -Now I want to ask you quite shortly again about Yugoslavia. You remember -that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the -war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with -the Yugoslav people, and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am -putting it quite shortly. - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was emphasized, if you will remember, -on the first of June 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince -Paul. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, 80 days after that, on the 12th of August -1939, the Defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler, and Ciano had a meeting, and -just let me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count -Ciano. - - “Generally speaking . . .” - -GÖRING: I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, it was my fault—Document Number -TC-77, Exhibit Number GB-48. It is the memorandum of a conversation -between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of -August. - -GÖRING: I merely wanted to know if this was from Ciano’s diary? That is -important for me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh no, not from Ciano’s diary, it is a -memorandum. This is the official report. - - “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for - uncertain neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This - process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion - one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing - with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as - a neutral of this kind.” - -That was rather inconsistent with your statement as to the good -intentions towards Yugoslavia, and the Führer’s statement to Prince -Paul, wasn’t it? - -GÖRING: I should like to read that through carefully once more and see -in what connection that statement was made. As it is presented now it -certainly would not fit in with that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know I do not want to stop you unnecessarily -in any way, but that document has been read at least twice during the -Trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will -agree, unless I have wrenched it out of its context—and I hope I have -not—that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not? - -GÖRING: As I said, it does not fit in with that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, it was 56 days after that, on the 6th of -October, Hitler gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said: - - “Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed - Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would - also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in - peace and friendship with her.” - -And then again in March 1941, on the entry of the Tripartite Pact, the -German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to -respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all -times. - -Now, after that of course, as I have always said when you dealt with -this, there was the Simovic Putsch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said -quite frankly in your evidence, that Hitler and yourself never took the -trouble, or thought of taking the trouble, of inquiring whether the -Simovic Government would preserve its neutrality or not. That is right, -is it not? - -GÖRING: I did not say that. We were convinced that they were using these -declarations to mislead. We knew that this Putsch was first of all -directed from Moscow, and, as we learned later, that it had been -financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we -recognized the hostile intentions as shown by the mobilization of the -Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear, and we did not want to -be deceived by the Simovic declarations. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like to say one word about the -mobilization in a moment. But on the 27th of March, that was 2 days -after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a -conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which -you were present, and do you remember the Führer saying: - - “The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty - declarations of the new government, to make all preparations to - destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No - diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. - Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted - anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will - start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready. - Politically it is especially important that the blow against - Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the - military destruction is effected in a lightning-like - undertaking. The plan is on the assumption that we speed up - schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that - the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest - possible time.” - -It was not a very friendly intention toward Yugoslavia to have no -diplomatic negotiations, not give them the chance of assurance or coming -to terms with you, and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it? - -GÖRING: I have just said that after the Simovic Putsch the situation was -completely clear to us, and declarations of neutrality on the part of -Yugoslavia could be regarded as only camouflage and deception in order -to gain time. After the Putsch, Yugoslavia definitely formed part of the -enemy front, and it was therefore for us also to carry out deceptive -moves and attack as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time -were relatively weak. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You realized, of course, that you said that -General Simovic was inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that -point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was 3 months -before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you? - -GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. It was precisely the Simovic Putsch which -removed the Führer’s last doubts that Russia’s attitude towards Germany -had become hostile. This Putsch was the very reason which caused him to -decide to take quickest possible counter measures against this danger. -Secondly . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in -the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was -postponed for 6 weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is -quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn’t it? - -GÖRING: No. If you will read again my statement on that point, you will -see I said that a number of moves on the part of Russia caused the -Führer to order preparations for invasion, but that he still withheld -the final decision on invasion, and that after the Simovic Putsch this -decision was made. From the strategic situation it follows that the -military execution of this political decision was delayed by the -Yugoslavian campaign. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you one other point about -Yugoslavia. - -You remember your evidence that the attack on Belgrade was due to the -fact that the war office and a number of other important military -organizations were located there. I am trying to summarize it, but that -was the effect of your evidence, was it not? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember how it was put in Hitler’s -order which I have just been reading to you: - - “The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible - with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground - installations . . .” - -Now, I ask you to note the next word “and”: - - “. . . and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by - waves. Besides the Air Force has to support the Army.” - -I put it to you that that order makes it clear that the attack on -Belgrade was just another of your exhibitions of terror attacks in order -to attempt to subdue a population that would have difficulty in -resisting them. - -GÖRING: No, that is not correct. The population of Belgrade did defend -itself. Belgrade was far more a center of military installations than -the capital of any other country; and I would like to draw your -attention to this. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am going to pass from that matter -to one or two points on which you gave evidence—I think at the instance -of counsel for the organizations. You remember you gave evidence in -answer to Dr. Babel about the Waffen-SS? Do you remember that—a few -days ago? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at a document -which has not got a number, but it is the Führer’s ideas about the -Waffen-SS, and to see if you agree. It is Document Number D-665, and it -will be Exhibit Number GB-280. It is a document from the High Command of -the Army, General Staff of the Army—statements of the Führer regarding -the future state military police—and the covering letter of the -document says, “After the Führer’s proposals for the Waffen-SS had been -passed on, doubts arose as to whether it was intended that they should -be given wider distribution.” If you will pass to the documents, perhaps -you will follow it while I read it. I do not think it has been -introduced before: - - “On 6 August 1940 when the order for the organization of the - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”—Adolf Hitler Bodyguard—“was - issued, the Führer stated the principles regarding the necessity - for the Waffen-SS as summed up below: - - “The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include - within its frontiers only those national groups which from the - very beginning will be well disposed towards the Reich. It is - therefore necessary to maintain outside the Reich proper a state - military police capable in any situation of representing and - imposing the authority of the Reich. - - “This task can be carried out only by a state police composed of - men of best German blood and wholeheartedly pledged to the - ideology on which the Greater German Reich is founded. Only such - a formation will resist subversive influences, even in critical - times. Such a formation, proud of its purity, will never - fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which - undermines the fundamental idea. In our future Greater German - Reich, a police corps will have the necessary authority over the - other members of the community only if it is trained along - military lines. Our people are so military-minded as a result of - glorious achievements in war and training by the National - Socialist Party that a ‘sock-knitting’ police, as in 1848, or a - bureaucratic police, as in 1918, would no longer have any - authority. - - “It is therefore necessary that this state police proves its - worth and sacrifices its blood at the front, in close - formations, in the same way as every unit of the armed forces. - Having returned home, after having proved themselves in the - field in the ranks of the Army, the units of the Waffen-SS will - possess the authority to execute their tasks as state police. - - “This employment of the Waffen-SS for internal purposes is just - as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never - again allow the conscripted German Wehrmacht to be used against - its fellow countrymen, weapon in hand, in critical situations at - home. Such action is the beginning of the end. A state which has - to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its - armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby gives - itself up. - - “There are deplorable examples of this in our history. In future - the Wehrmacht is to be used solely against the foreign enemies - of the Reich. - - “In order to ensure that the men in the units of the Waffen-SS - are always of high quality, the recruitment into the units must - be limited. The Führer’s idea of this limitation is that the - units of the Waffen-SS should generally not exceed 5 to 10 - percent of the peacetime strength of the Army.” - -Do you agree with that? Is that a correct description of the purpose of -the Waffen-SS? - -GÖRING: I am absolutely convinced that he did say that, but that does -not contradict my statement. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you, while we are on the SS, to -look at a note which is Document D-729 and will be Exhibit Number -GB-281. It is on the conversation between you and the Duce in the -Palazzo Venezia on 23 October 1942. At that time you were still in good -odor with the Führer and still retained your power; is that right? - -I will read it: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1. - - “The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting - the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were - taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans - all sources of supply.” - -GÖRING: Just a second please. Where is this? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1, but I will find it -for you if you have any difficulty. I think it is marked, and it begins -“The Reich Marshal . . .” Can you find it? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will start again if I may. - - “The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting - the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were - taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans - all sources of supply. Men and women were taken away to labor - camps, the children to children’s camps, and the villages burned - down. It was by the use of these methods that the railways in - the vast wooded areas of Bialowiza had been safeguarded. - Whenever attacks occurred, the entire male population of the - villages were lined up on one side and the women on the other. - The women were told that all the men would be shot, unless - they—the women—pointed out which men did not belong to the - village. In order to save their men, the women always pointed - out the nonresidents. Germany had found that, generally - speaking, it was not easy to get soldiers to carry out such - measures. Members of the Party discharged this task much more - harshly and efficiently. For the same reason armies trained - ideologically, such as the German—or the Russian—fought better - than others. The SS, the nucleus of the old Party fighters, who - have personal ties with the Führer and who form a special elite, - confirm this principle.” - -Now, is that a correct description? - -GÖRING: Yes, certainly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And this expresses correctly your views on how -war against partisans should be carried out? - -GÖRING: I have transmitted this. - -Just a second, please. May I ask what the number of this document is? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will give it again: Document Number -D-729, and it becomes Exhibit Number GB-281. - -Now, I just want you to help me on one other matter on these -organizations. You will remember that in answer, I think, to Dr. -Servatius, you made some remarks about the Leadership Corps. Do you -remember that? I just want you to have them in mind. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you look at the document which will be -presented to you, Document Number D-728, Exhibit Number GB-282. This is -a document from the Office of the Gau Leadership for Hessen-Nassau. I am -sorry; there is a reference to an order of the Party Chancellery dated -10 February 1945, its subject is, “Action by the Party to be taken for -keeping the German population in check until the end of the war.” It is -signed by Sprenger, Gauleiter and Commissioner for Reich Defense. - -GÖRING: The date is 15 March 1945, is that right? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am grateful to you. I knew it was just after -10 March. I have not got it in my copy, but if you say it, I will take -it. - -GÖRING: 1945. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -[_Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then read from the document excerpts which were -withdrawn and stricken from the record on 16 August 1946._] - -DR. STAHMER: I must object to the use of this document, since I cannot -recognize that it is genuine. I have not yet seen the original, and the -doubts as to its being genuine are due to the fact that expressions are -used which are most unusual in the German language. - -GÖRING: I was going to raise the same objection. It is not an original -as it says at the top, “copy,” and there is no original signature, but -only the typewritten words “Sprenger, Gauleiter” at the bottom. - -DR. STAHMER: For instance the expression “Gerichtlichkeiten” is used. -This is an expression completely unusual and unknown in the German -language, and I cannot imagine that an official document originating -from a Gauleiter could contain such a word. - -GÖRING: I can draw your attention to yet another point showing that this -is evidently not an original document. If there had been an increase in -meat or fat rations, I would have heard something about it. Not a single -word of these two documents is known to me. It does not bear a rubber -stamp either, the whole thing is typewritten, including the signatures. -Therefore, I cannot accept this document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a file copy which, to the best of my -knowledge, was captured at the office of the Gau Leader. It was sent to -us by the British Army of the Rhine. I shall make inquiries about it, -but it purports to be a file copy and I have put the original document -which we have, which is a file copy, to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have the original document in my hands -now, together with the certificate of an officer of the British Army -stating that the document was delivered to him in the above capacity, in -the ordinary course of official business, as the original of a document -found in German records of files captured by military forces under the -command of the Supreme Commander. Under these circumstances it is in -exactly the same position as all the other captured documents. The -defense, of course, can bring any evidence which it thinks right, to -criticize the authenticity of the document. The document stands on -exactly the same footing as the other captured documents, subject to any -criticism to support which you may be able to bring evidence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you to deal with the sentence in -paragraph 6. - -Now, this paragraph is certainly directed to all administrative levels -down to the Kreisleiter, county leaders of the Nazi Party, and it -assumes they knew all about the running of concentration camps. Are you -telling the Tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the -Reich, knew nothing about concentration camps? - -GÖRING: First of all, I want to say once more that I do not accept this -document, and that its whole wording is unknown to me, and that this -paragraph appears unusual to me. I did not know anything about what took -place and what methods were used in the concentration camps later, when -I was no longer in charge. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of the evidence that has been -given before this Court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned, -4,000,000 people were exterminated. Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: This I have heard as a statement here, but I consider it in no -way proved—that figure, I mean. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you do not consider it proved, let me remind -you of the affidavit of Hoettl, who was Deputy Group Leader of the -Foreign Section, of the Security Section of Amt IV of the RSHA. He says -that approximately 4,000,000 Jews have been killed in the concentration -camps, while an additional 2,000,000 met death in other ways. Assume -that these figures—one is a Russian figure, the other a German—assume -they are even 50 percent correct, assume it was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000, -are you telling this Tribunal that a Minister with your power in the -Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on? - -GÖRING: This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things -were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the -Führer knew the extent of what was going on. - -This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters -very secret. We were never given figures or any other details. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, haven’t you access to the foreign -press, the press department in your ministry, to foreign broadcasts? You -see, there is evidence that altogether, when you take the Jews and other -people, something like 10,000,000 people have been done to death in cold -blood, apart from those killed in battle. Something like 10,000,000 -people. Do you say that you never saw or heard from the foreign press, -in broadcasts, that this was going on? - -GÖRING: First of all, the figure 10,000,000 is not established in any -way. Secondly, throughout the war I did not read the foreign press, -because I considered it nothing but propaganda. Thirdly, though I had -the right to listen to foreign broadcasts, I never did so, simply -because I did not want to listen to propaganda. Neither did I listen to -home propaganda. - -Only during the last 4 days of the war did I—and this I could -prove—listen to a foreign broadcasting station for the first time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told Mr. Justice Jackson yesterday that -there were various representatives in Eastern territories, and you have -seen the films of the concentration camps, haven’t you, since this Trial -started? You knew that there were millions of garments, millions of -shoes, 20,952 kilograms of gold wedding rings, 35 wagons of furs—all -that stuff which these people who were exterminated at Maidanek or -Auschwitz left behind them. Did nobody ever tell you, under the -development of the Four Year Plan, or anyone else, that they were -getting all these amounts of human material? Do you remember we heard -from the Polish Jewish gentleman, who gave evidence, that all he got -back from his family, of his wife and mother and daughter, I think, were -their identity cards? His work was to gather up clothes. He told us that -so thorough were the henchmen of your friend Himmler that it took 5 -minutes extra to kill the women because they had to have their hair cut -off as it was to be used for making mattresses. Was nothing ever told -you about this accretion to German material, which came from the effects -of these people who were murdered? - -GÖRING: No, and how can you imagine this? I was laying down the broad -outlines for the German economy, and that certainly did not include the -manufacture of mattresses from women’s hair or the utilization of old -shoes and clothes. I leave the figure open. But, also I do want to -object to your reference to my “friend Himmler.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will say, “your enemy Himmler,” or -simply “Himmler” whichever you like. You know whom I mean, don’t you? - -GÖRING: Yes, indeed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to remind you of one other -point: Exhibit Number USA-228, Document Number 407(V)-PS, “. . . I have -the honor to report to you that it was possible to add 3,638,056 new -foreign workers to the German war economy between April 1st of last year -and March 31st of this year. . . . In addition to the foreign civilian -workers 1,622,929 prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” -Now, just listen to this, “out of the 5,000,000 foreign workers who have -arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” That is from the -minutes of the Central Planning Board on the 1st of March. Do you say -that you, in your position in the State and as the great architect of -German economy, did not know that you were getting for your economy -4,800,000 foreign workers who were forced to come? Do you tell the -Tribunal that? - -GÖRING: I never told the Tribunal that. I said that I knew quite well -that these workers were brought in and not always voluntarily, but -whether the figure of 200,000 is correct, that I do not know, and I do -not believe it either. The number of volunteers was greater, but this -does not alter the fact that workers were forced to come to the Reich. -That I have never denied, and have even admitted it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You admit—and I want to put it quite -fairly—that a large number of workers were forced to come to the Reich -and work there? - -GÖRING: Yes, certainly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, would you like to adjourn now? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, sir. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember what you said about the -relations between you and the Führer? May I repeat your words: - - “The chief influence on the Führer, if I may mention influence - on the Führer at all, was up to the end of 1941 or the beginning - of 1942, and that influence was I. Then my influence gradually - decreased until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily. - All in all, apart from myself I do not believe anyone else had - anywhere near the influence on the Führer that I had.” - -That is your view on that matter? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you told the Tribunal that right up to -the end your loyalty to the Führer was unshaken, is that right? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still seek to justify and glorify Hitler -after he had ordered the murder of these 50 young flying officers at -Stalag Luft Number III? - -GÖRING: I am here neither to justify the Führer Adolf Hitler nor to -glorify him. I am here only to emphasize that I remained faithful to -him, for I believe in keeping one’s oath not in good times only, but -also in bad times when it is much more difficult. - -As to your reference to the 50 airmen, I never opposed the Führer so -clearly and strongly as in this matter, and I gave him my views about -it. After that no conversation between the Führer and myself took place -for months. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer, at any rate, must have had full -knowledge of what was happening with regard to concentration camps, the -treatment of the Jews, and the treatment of the workers, must he not? - -GÖRING: I already mentioned it as my opinion that the Führer did not -know about details in concentration camps, about atrocities as described -here. As far as I know him, I do not believe he was informed. But -insofar as he . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking about details; I am asking about -the murder of four or five million people. Are you suggesting that -nobody in power in Germany, except Himmler and perhaps Kaltenbrunner, -knew about that? - -GÖRING: I am still of the opinion that the Führer did not know about -these figures. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember how Mr. Dahlerus described the -relations between you and Hitler on Page 53 of his book: - - “From the very beginning of our conversation, I resented his - manner towards Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from - the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable, - but to require such obsequious humility as Göring now exhibited, - from his closest collaborator, seemed to me abhorrent and - unprepossessing.” - -Is that how you had to behave with Hitler? - -GÖRING: I did not have to behave in that way, and I did not behave in -that way. Those are journalistic statements by Dahlerus, made after the -war. If Germany had won the war, this description would certainly have -been very different. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus was your witness, though. - -GÖRING: Mr. Dahlerus was not asked to give a journalistic account. He -was solely questioned about the matters with which he, as courier -between myself and the British Government, had to deal. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on Tuesday of last week, the defendant -called General Bodenschatz, who gave general evidence as to his -character and reputation. He, therefore, in my respectful submission, -makes me entitled to put one document to him which is an account by the -Defendant Raeder of his general character and reputation. In accordance -with the English practice, I make my submission and ask the Court’s -permission to put it in. - -DR. STAHMER: I object to the reading of this document. It would be -considerably easier to question Admiral Raeder, as witness, on his -statements, since he is here with us. Then we shall be able to determine -in cross-examination whether and to what extent he still maintains this -alleged statement. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have to put it in cross-examination to give -the defendant the chance of answering it. The Defendant Raeder can give -his explanations when he comes into the witness box. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document before it -is put in. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the English translation. I will show Dr. -Stahmer the German. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to point out, that the -document bears no date and we do not know when and where it was drawn -up. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by the Defendant Raeder. - -DR. STAHMER: When and where was it drawn up? The signature of Raeder is -unknown to me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The date is in Raeder’s handwriting as is the -signature; the 27th of July, I think it is 1945. Each page of the -document is signed by the Defendant Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you said the defendant has put his character -in issue through Bodenschatz? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship will remember he was asked by -Doctor Stahmer: “Will you now tell me about the defendant’s social -relations?” And then he proceeded to give an account of his character -and his kindness and other qualities at that time; and I notice that -Doctor Stahmer has just included as an exhibit still further evidence as -to character in the form of a statement by one Hermann Winter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it not have been appropriate, if the document was -to have been put in evidence, to have put it to Bodenschatz, who was -giving the evidence? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, My Lord, the rule is that if the defendant -puts his character in issue, he is entitled to be cross-examined on his -character and his general reputation, and of course it is permissible to -call a witness to speak as to his general reputation. - -DR. STAHMER: May I make the following remark? I did not call -Bodenschatz, neither did I question him as witness for Göring’s -character. I questioned him about certain facts and happenings from -which Bodenschatz subsequently drew certain conclusions. In my opinion, -all these questions should have been put to Bodenschatz when he was -here. These statements could then have been used to prove that it was -Bodenschatz who was not telling the truth, not that Göring had told an -untruth. To prove this the document should have been used during -Bodensehatz’s interrogation. Then we would have been able to question -Bodenschatz about it too. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He may prefer that Bodenschatz be brought back -and it be put to him, but I think I am entitled to put it to the -defendant who called for the evidence as to his character and -reputation. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that at the present stage, this -document cannot be used in cross-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Honor pleases, I understand that Your -Lordship leaves open the question for further argument, whether it can -be used for the Defendant Raeder in the witness box. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, Witness, you said before the Tribunal -adjourned, that Hitler, in your opinion, did not know about—broadly—or -was ignorant about, the question of concentration camps and the Jews. I -would like you to look at Document Number D-736. That is an account of a -discussion between the Führer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy on the -17th of April 1943, and if you would look at Page 4, you will see the -passage just after “Nuremberg and Fürth.” - -GÖRING: Just a moment. I should like to read through it very quickly to -determine its authenticity. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. - -GÖRING: Page 4. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 4—Exhibit Number GB-283. You see, after -the mention of Nuremberg and Fürth, Hitler goes on: - - “The Jews did not even possess organizational value. In spite of - the fears which he, the Führer, had heard repeatedly in Germany, - everything continued to go its normal way without the Jews. - Where the Jews were left to themselves, as for instance in - Poland, the most terrible misery and decay prevailed. They are - just pure parasites. In Poland, this state of affairs had been - fundamentally cleared up. If the Jews there did not want to - work, they were shot. If they could not work, they had to - perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli, with - which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel—if - one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as - hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by - them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be - more preserved? Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews - perish. One of the most famous examples is the downfall of that - people who were once so proud, the Persians, who now lead a - pitiful existence as Armenians.” - -And would you look at Exhibit USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170, which -is a conference which you had on the 6th of August 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document, is there not a -passage higher up that is important? It is about 10 lines down, I think, -in the middle of the line . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor is correct. - - “To Admiral Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he should do - with the Jews, now that they had been deprived of almost all - possibility of earning their livelihood—he could not kill them - off—the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the - Jews should be exterminated, or taken to concentration camps. - There was no other possibility.” - -GÖRING: I do not know this document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, this is a conference which you had with a -number of people, and on Page 143, if you will turn to it, you get on to -the question of butter. If you will look where it says: “Reich Marshal -Göring: How much butter do you deliver? 30,000 tons?” - -Do you see that? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then Lohse, who is in the conference, says, -“Yes,” and you say, “Do you also deliver to Wehrmacht units?” and then -Lohse says, “I can answer that too. There are only a few Jews left -alive. Tens of thousands have been disposed of, but I can tell you that -the civilian population gets, on your orders, 15 percent less than the -Germans.” I call your attention to the statement that “there are only a -few Jews left alive, tens of thousands have been disposed of.” Do you -still say, in the face of these two documents, that neither Hitler nor -yourself knew that the Jews were being exterminated? - -GÖRING: I beg that the remarks be rightly read. They are quite -incorrectly reproduced. May I read the original text? “Lohse:”—thus not -my remark, but the remark of Lohse—“I can also answer that. The Jews -are left only in small numbers. Thousands have gone.” It does not say -here that they were destroyed. From this remark you cannot conclude that -they were killed. It could also mean that they had gone away—they were -removed. There is nothing here . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: About the preceding remark, I suggest that you -make quite clear what you meant by “there are only a few Jews left -alive, whereas tens of thousands have been disposed of.” - -GÖRING: They were “still living there.” That is how you should -understand that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You heard what I read to you about Hitler, what -he said to Horthy and what Ribbentrop said, that the Jews must be -exterminated or taken to concentration camps. Hitler said the Jews must -either work or be shot. That was in April 1943. Do you still say that -neither Hitler nor you knew of this policy to exterminate the Jews? - -GÖRING: For the correctness of the document . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer my question. Do you still -say neither Hitler nor you knew of the policy to exterminate the Jews? - -GÖRING: As far as Hitler is concerned, I have said I do not think so. As -far as I am concerned, I have said that I did not know, even -approximately, to what extent these things were taking place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know to what degree, but you knew -there was a policy that aimed at the extermination of the Jews? - -GÖRING: No, a policy of emigration, not liquidation of the Jews. I knew -only that there had been isolated cases of such perpetrations. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. - -GEN. RUDENKO: If I understand you, Defendant Göring, you said that all -the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters -were taken by Hitler alone? Do I understand you rightly? - -GÖRING: Yes, certainly. After all, he was the Führer. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Am I to understand that Hitler took these decisions -without listening to the opinions of the experts who studied the -questions, and the intelligence reports on those matters? - -GÖRING: It depended upon the circumstances. In certain cases he would -ask for data to be submitted to him, without the experts knowing the -exact reason. In other cases, he would explain to his advisers what he -intended to do, and get from them the data and their opinion. Final -decisions he took himself as Supreme Commander. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, do I understand you correctly when you say -that when making important decisions, Hitler used the analysis and -material given to him by his close collaborators, who advised him -according to their speciality. Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Given to him partly by his collaborators, partly as in the case -of communication and intelligence, by other members of the departments -concerned? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Will you tell me then, who was the closest collaborator of -Hitler as far as the Air Force was concerned? - -GÖRING: I was, of course. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And on the questions of economics? - -GÖRING: In economic matters, it was also I. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And on political matters? - -GÖRING: It depended on what question came up for discussion, and on -whether the Führer had consulted anybody or asked his opinion. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me, who were these collaborators and -associates? - -GÖRING: The close collaborators of the Führer as I said before were -first I, myself. Another close associate—perhaps it is the wrong -word—with whom he perhaps spoke more than with others was Dr. Goebbels. -Then, of course, you must consider the different periods. It varied -during the 20 years; towards the end, it was Bormann first and foremost. -During the years 1933 and 1934, until shortly before the end, it was -Himmler also, when certain questions were dealt with. And if the Führer -was dealing with certain other specific questions, then he would, of -course, as is the custom in every government, consult the person who -knew most about the question and obtain the information from him. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Can you also name which of his collaborators were -associated with him in the field of foreign politics? - -GÖRING: As far as foreign policy was concerned, Hitler only consulted -his colleagues more on the, so to speak, purely technical side. The most -important and far-reaching political decisions were taken by himself, -and he then announced them to his collaborators and colleagues as -ready-made conceptions. Only very few people were allowed to discuss -them, myself for instance; and the technical execution of his decisions -in the field of foreign policy, when it came to framing the diplomatic -notes, was done by the Foreign Office and its minister. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The Defendant Ribbentrop? - -GÖRING: Yes, naturally, he was the foreign minister concerned, but he -did not make foreign policy. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And on questions of strategy, who advised Hitler? - -GÖRING: There were several people. On purely departmental matters of -strategic importance it was the three commanders-in-chief and their -chiefs of general staff, and to some extent, the Supreme General Staff -which was immediately attached to the Führer. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Which of the defendants can be placed in the category of -such consultants? - -GÖRING: If he was asked by the Führer, then the adviser on strategic -matters was the Chief of the Operations Staff, General Jodl; and as far -as military administrative questions were concerned, the -commanders-in-chief, that is myself, Admiral Raeder, and later Admiral -Dönitz for the Navy. The other representatives of the Army did not take -part. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The next question. If we approach the subject, not -theoretically but functionally, could we conclude that any -recommendations which Hitler’s leading associates might make, would have -had any considerable influence on Hitler’s final decisions? - -GÖRING: If I disregard the purely formal point of view and presumably -you are referring to the military sphere, then the position was . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: No, I mean all spheres. All aspects of questions such as -economic questions, home policy, foreign policy, military, and strategic -questions. I mean, if we approach the subject, not theoretically but -functionally, did their recommendations have any considerable influence -on Hitler’s final decisions? That is what I mean. - -GÖRING: To a certain extent, yes. Their rejection depended on whether or -not they appeared right to the Führer. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You said to a certain extent, did you not? - -GÖRING: Yes, of course, if a reasonable proposal was made, and he -considered it to be reasonable, then he certainly made use of it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to stress that all these consultants must -have been closely associated with Hitler. Therefore, they had a certain -influence on Hitler’s final decision. They did not stand quite aloof, -did they? - -GÖRING: They did not stand aloof. Their influence was only effective to -the extent that their convictions concurred with those of the Führer. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Let us now pass to the next set of -questions. - -When exactly did you start the working out of the plan of action for the -use of the German Luftwaffe against the Soviet Union in connection with -Case Barbarossa? - -GÖRING: The deployment of the Luftwaffe for Case Barbarossa was worked -out by my general staff, after the first directive of the Führer’s, that -is, after the November directive. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In 1940? - -GÖRING: In 1940. But I would add that I had already considered making -preparations not only in anticipation of a possible threat from Russia, -but from all those countries which were not already involved in the war, -but which might eventually be drawn in. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right. It was in November 1940, when Germany was -preparing to attack Russia? Plans were already being prepared for this -attack with your participation? - -GÖRING: The other day I explained exactly, that at the time a plan for -dealing with the political situation and the potential threat from -Russia had been worked out. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you to reply to this question briefly, “yes” or -“no.” I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly. - -Once more I say, in November 1940, more than half a year before the -attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your -participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this -briefly? - -GÖRING: Yes, but not in the sense in which you are presenting it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It seems to me that I have put the question quite clearly, -and there is no ambiguity here at all. How much time did it take to -prepare Case Barbarossa? - -GÖRING: In which sector, air, land, or sea? - -GEN. RUDENKO: If you are acquainted with all phases of the plan, that is -concerning the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, then I would like you -to answer for all phases of Case Barbarossa. - -GÖRING: Generally speaking, I can only answer for the air, where it took -a comparatively short time. - -GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, just how long did it take to prepare Case -Barbarossa? - -GÖRING: After so many years I cannot give you the exact time without -referring to the documents, but I answered your question when I told you -that as far as the Air Force was concerned, it took a comparatively -short time; as for the Army, it probably took longer. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Thus, you admit that the attack on the Soviet Union was -planned several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as -chief of German Air Force and Reich Marshal, participated directly in -the preparation of the attack. - -GÖRING: May I divide your numerous questions. Firstly, that was not -several months . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: There were not too many questions asked at once. It was -only one question. You have admitted that in November 1940 Case -Barbarossa was prepared and developed for the Air Force. I ask you in -your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe. - -GÖRING: That is right. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have answered already the first part of my question. -Now the following part: You admit that as chief of the German Air Force -and Reich Marshal you participated in preparations for the attack on the -Soviet Union? - -GÖRING: I once more repeat that I prepared for the possibility of an -attack, mainly because of Hitler’s assumption that Soviet Russia was -adopting a dangerous attitude. In the beginning the certainty of an -attack was not discussed, and that is stated clearly in the directive of -November 1940. - -Secondly, I want to emphasize that my position as Reich Marshal is of no -importance here. That is a title and a rank. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny—rather, you agree—that the plan was -already prepared in November 1940? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It appears to me that the question has already been -covered in such detail before the Tribunal that we need not talk too -much about Case Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the -next question: - -Do you admit that the objectives of the war against the Soviet Union -consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural -Mountains and joining it to the German Reich, including the Baltic -territories, the Crimea, the Caucasus; also the subjugation by Germany -of the Ukraine, of Bielorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet -Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan? - -GÖRING: That I certainly do not admit. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not admit that! Do you not remember that during the -conference at Hitler’s headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which -you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg, and others, -Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union -exactly as I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted -to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten -about that? - -GÖRING: I can remember the document exactly, and I have a fair -recollection of the discussion at the conference. I said the first time -that this document, as recorded by Bormann, appears to me extremely -exaggerated as far as the demands are concerned. At any rate, at the -beginning of the war, such demands were not discussed; nor had they been -discussed previously. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do admit that there are minutes of such a -conference? - -GÖRING: I admit it because I have seen them. It was a document prepared -by Bormann. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You also admit that according to the minutes of this -meeting, you participated in that conference. - -GÖRING: I was present at that conference, and for that reason I question -the record. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember that in those minutes the tasks were -formulated which were in connection with developing conditions? I shall -remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read -them in full. - -GÖRING: May I ask to be shown a copy of that record. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting? - -GÖRING: I ask to have it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. Would you like to read the document? - -GÖRING: No, only where you are going to quote it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Page 2, second paragraph, Point 2, about the Crimea: “We -emphasize”—can you find the place? Do you have it? - -GÖRING: Just a moment, I have not found it yet. Yes, I have it. - - GEN. RUDENKO: “We emphasize”—states this Point 2—“that we are - bringing freedom to the Crimea. The Crimea must be freed of all - foreigners and populated by the Germans. Also, Austrian Galicia - will become a province of the German Reich.” - -Have you found the place? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: “A province of the Reich,” it says. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to the end of the minutes. -It says here: “The Führer stresses the fact that the whole of the Baltic -States must become Reich territory.” - -Have you found the place, “The Führer stresses the fact”? - -GÖRING: You mean the very last bit? - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is right. - -GÖRING: “Finally, it is ordered . . .”? - -GEN. RUDENKO: A little higher up. - -GÖRING: “The Führer stresses . . .”? - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is right. - - “The Führer stresses the fact that the Baltic countries as well - must become Reich territory.” Then it goes on—“Reich territory - must also include the Crimea, with its adjoining regions. These - adjoining regions must be as big as possible.” - -The Führer then says something about the Ukrainians . . . - -Go on further; skip one paragraph. - - “The Führer, furthermore, stresses that the Volga region also - must become Reich territory, as well as the Baku Province, which - must become a military colony of the Reich. Eastern Karelia is - claimed by the Finns. - - “The peninsula Kola, however, because of the large supplies of - nickel, should become German territory. Great caution must be - exercised in the incorporation of Finland as a federal state. - The Finns want the surrounding region of Leningrad. The Führer - will level Leningrad to the ground and give it to the Finns - afterwards.” - -Have you not found the place where it mentions Leningrad and Finland? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: These are the minutes of the conference at which you were -present on the 16th of July 1941, 3 weeks after Germany attacked the -Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you? - -It is Document Number L-221. - -GÖRING: Just a moment, you are mistaken in the date. You said 3 days; -that is not correct. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks, not 3 days. - -GÖRING: Oh, 3 weeks; I see. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the -22d of June, and the conference took place at Hitler’s headquarters on -the 16th of July at 1500 hours, I think. - -Is it correct that such a conference took place? - -GÖRING: That is quite right. I have said so all along, but the record of -this is not right. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And who took the minutes of the meeting? - -GÖRING: Bormann. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What was the point of Bormann’s taking the minutes -incorrectly? - -GÖRING: In this record Bormann has exaggerated. The Volga territory was -not discussed. As far as the Crimea is concerned, it is correct, that -the Führer . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: Well, let us be a little more precise. Germany wanted the -Crimea to become a Reich territory, correct? - -GÖRING: The Führer wanted the Crimea, yes, but that was an aim fixed -before the war. The same applies to the three Baltic States, which had -previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go back to Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Pardon me. You say that the question of the Crimea arose -even before the war, that is, the question of acquiring the Crimea for -the Reich. How long before the war was that? - -GÖRING: No, before the war the Führer had not discussed territorial aims -with us, or, rather which territories he had in mind. At that time, if -you read the record, I myself considered the question premature, and I -confined myself to more practical matters during that conference. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to be still more precise. You state that with -regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea -Reich territory. - -GÖRING: Yes, that was discussed during that conference. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right, with regard to the Baltic provinces, there was -talk about those, too? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk -about annexing the Caucasus also? - -GÖRING: It was never a question of its becoming German. We merely spoke -about very strong German economic influence in that sphere. - -GEN. RUDENKO: So the Caucasus was to become a concession of the Reich? - -GÖRING: Just to what degree obviously could not be discussed until after -a victorious war. You can see from the record what a mad thing it is to -discuss a few days after a war has broken out the things recorded here -by Bormann, when nobody knows what the outcome of that war will be and -what the possibilities are. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore by exaggeration you mean that the Volga -territory for instance was not discussed. - -GÖRING: The exaggeration lies in the fact that at that time things were -discussed which could not be usefully discussed at all. At the most one -might have talked about territory which one occupied, and its -administration. - -GEN. RUDENKO: We are now trying to establish the facts, namely, that -those questions had been discussed, and these questions came up at the -conference. You do not deny that, do you? - -GÖRING: There had been some discussion, yes, but not as recorded in -these minutes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw just one conclusion. The facts bear -witness that even before this conference, aims to annex foreign -territories had been fixed in accordance with the plan prepared months -ago. That is correct, is it not? - -GÖRING: Yes that is correct, but I would like to emphasize that in these -minutes I steered away from these endless discussions, and here the -text, reads: - - “The Reich Marshal countered this, that is, the lengthy - discussion of all these things, by stressing the main points - which were of vital importance to us, such as, the securing of - food supplies to the extent necessary for economy, securing of - roads, _et cetera_.” - -I just wanted to reduce the whole thing to a practical basis. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Just so. You have contradicted yourself, inasmuch as in -your opinion, the most important thing was the food supply. All the -other things could follow later. It says so in the minutes. Your -contradiction does not lie in your objection to the plan itself but in -the sequence of its execution. First of all you wanted food and later -territory. Is that correct? - -GÖRING: No, it is exactly as I have read it out, and there is no -sequence of aims. There is no secret. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Please read it once more and tell me just where you -disagreed. - - GÖRING: “After the lengthy discussion about persons and matters - concerning annexation, _et cetera_, opposing this, the Reich - Marshal stressed the main points which might be the decisive - factors for us: Securing of food supplies to the extent - necessary for economy, securing of roads, _et - cetera_—communications.” - -At the time I mentioned railways, _et cetera_, that is, I wanted to -bring this extravagant talk—such as might take place in the first flush -of victory—back to the purely practical things which must be done. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable that the securing of food supplies -plays an important part. However, the objection you just gave does not -mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea or the annexation -of other regions, is that not correct? - -GÖRING: If you spoke German, then, from the sentence which says, -“opposing that, the Reich Marshal emphasized . . .” you would understand -everything that is implied. In other words, I did not say here, “I -protest against the annexation of the Crimea,” or, “I protest against -the annexation of the Baltic States.” I had no reason to do so. Had we -been victorious, then after the signing of peace we would in any case -have decided how far annexation would serve our purpose. At the moment -we had not finished the war, we had not won the war yet, and -consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. In that case, you considered the -annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself, -after the war was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed -them. In principle you have not protested. - -GÖRING: Not in principle. As an old hunter, I acted according to the -principle of not dividing the bear’s skin before the bear was shot. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. And the bear’s skin should be divided only -when the territories were seized completely, is that correct? - -GÖRING: Just what to do with the skin could be decided definitely only -after the bear was shot. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Luckily, this did not happen. - -GÖRING: Luckily for you. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And so, summing this up on the basis of the replies which -you gave to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will -agree, that the war aims were aggressive. - -GÖRING: The one and only decisive war aim was to eliminate the danger -which Russia represented to Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And to seize the Russian territories. - -GÖRING: I have tried repeatedly to make this point clear, namely, that -before the war started this was not discussed. The answer is that the -Führer saw in the attitude of Russia, and in the lining up of troops on -our frontier, a mortal threat to Germany, and he wanted to eliminate -that threat. He felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in -peace, after a victorious war, is quite another question, which at that -time was not discussed in any way. But to reply to your question, by -that I do not mean to say that after a victorious war in the East we -would have had no thoughts of annexation. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Court in returning -to the question of the so-called preventive war, but nevertheless, since -you touched on the subject, I should like to ask you the following: - -You remember the testimony of Field Marshal Milch, who stated that -neither Göring nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that -testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch? - -GÖRING: Yes, perfectly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do remember. In that case why did you not want war -with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat? - -GÖRING: Firstly, I have said already that it was the Führer who saw the -danger to be so great and so imminent. Secondly, in connection with the -question put by my counsel, I stated clearly and exactly the reasons why -I believed that the danger had not yet become so imminent, and that we -should take other preparatory measures first. That was my firm -conviction. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the testimony of your witness Milch? - -GÖRING: Milch held a somewhat different opinion from mine. He considered -it a serious danger to Germany because it would mean a war on two -fronts. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent -a danger, but he held that in spite of that danger one should take the -risk and not use attack as a preventive measure against that danger. I -too held the same opinion, but of course at a different time. - -GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your replies to questions during several -sessions, it appears there was no country on earth which you did not -regard as a threat. - -GÖRING: Most of the other countries did not represent a danger to -Germany, but I personally, from 1933 on, always saw in Russia the -greatest threat. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Well, of course, by “the other countries” you mean your -allies, is that right? - -GÖRING: No, I am thinking of most of the other countries. If you ask me -again I would say that the danger to Germany lay, in my opinion, in -Russia’s drive towards the West. Naturally, I also saw a certain danger -in the two western countries, England and France, and in this -connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a war, I regarded -the United States to be a threat as well. As far as the other countries -were concerned, I did not consider them to be a direct threat to -Germany. In the case of the small countries, they would only constitute -a direct threat, if they were used by the large countries, as bases in a -war against Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Naturally the small countries did not represent the same -threat because Germany already occupied them. That has often enough been -established by the Tribunal. - -GÖRING: No, a small country as such does not represent a threat, but if -another large country uses the small one against me, then the small -country too can become a danger. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to discuss the thing further as it does not -relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany’s intentions -with regard to the territory of the Soviet Union, and to that you have -already answered quite affirmatively and decisively. So I will not ask -you any more questions on this subject. I shall go on to the next -question. - -Do you admit that as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan you were in -full charge of the working out of the plans for the economic -exploitation of all the occupied territories, as well as the realization -of these plans? - -GÖRING: I have already admitted that I assumed responsibility for the -economic policy in the occupied territories, and the directions which I -had given for the exploitation of those territories. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me how many million tons of grain and other -products were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war? - -GÖRING: I cannot give you the figures. How could I know that from -memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here. - -GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your own documents I have the figures, but -we will pass on to that question later. - -I would like to return to the same conference which has already been -mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet -Prosecution, concerning the conference of the 6th of August 1942, -Exhibit Number USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170? On 6 August 1942, -there was a conference of commissioners of the occupied regions and of -the representatives of the military command. This conference took place -under your direction. You spoke at this conference—and I would like to -remind you of some of the things you said. - -GÖRING: May I have a look at these minutes? - -GEN. RUDENKO: You want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. It -is quite a long document. I do not intend to read the whole thing, but -only the relevant passages. I will ask you to look only at Page 111 of -this stenographic record—the place is marked with pencil—especially -the citations which I am going to quote here. On Page 111, it states: - - “Gentlemen: The Führer has given me general powers on a scale - such as he has never given hitherto under the Four Year Plan. He - has also empowered me . . .” - -GÖRING: Just one moment. Are you not omitting “under the Four Year -Plan”? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned -the Four Year Plan. - - “He has given me additional powers under the Four Year Plan - reaching into every branch of our economic structure, whether - within the State, the Party, or the Armed Forces.” - -Is it correct you were given such exclusive rights and prerogatives as -mentioned in the citation? - -GÖRING: When the Four Year Plan was formulated I received extraordinary -general powers. For the first time unlimited powers were given in the -economic sphere, I received authority to issue directives and -instructions to the highest Reich departments, to the higher offices of -the Armed Forces and the Party. During the war these powers were -extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In that case I have stated and interpreted, correctly, -what you stated at the conference. - -GÖRING: Absolutely, in spite of its being wrongly translated into -German. - -GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to your special prerogatives and rights, I am -going to cite the instructions which you gave, as well as the orders you -issued to some of the members who took part in a conference held on the -16th of August, and which were binding upon them. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, when you used such expressions as “squeeze -out,” “get everything possible out of the occupied territories,” such -sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates, -is that not correct? - -GÖRING: Naturally, they were then put into their proper form. These were -the words used in direct speech, and the language was not so polite. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. - -GÖRING: You are referring to the passage—may I repeat it: - - “You certainly are not sent there to work for the welfare of the - population . . .” - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. - -GÖRING: Do you mean that passage? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Page 112. It states here, I shall read it: - - “You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the - population, but for the purpose of extracting everything - possible out of these territories. That is what I expect from - you.” - -GÖRING: You have left out a sentence, “. . . so that the German nation -may live . . .” - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is right. - -GÖRING: One minute—“. . . extracting everything, so that the German -nation may live. That is what I expect from you.” - -Before that it states, however, and this is the sentence I would like to -read: - - “In each of the occupied territories I see the people stuffed - with food, while our own people starve.” - -The sentence follows then. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these are your own words: - - “You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the - population, but to extract everything possible . . .” - -GÖRING: You have to read that in connection with the preceding part. I -do not deny that I said that. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you deny your own words as stated here? - -GÖRING: No, I am telling you that I did say that. What I do object to is -the way you pick out certain things, whereas they should be taken with -their context. - -GEN. RUDENKO: These phrases in the document are very expressive. They -require no comment. - -I draw your attention to the following extract on Page 113, which is -also underlined. Here are some of your orders: - - “One thing I will do. I will get what I demand of you, and if - you cannot do it, I will set up agencies which will get it from - you, whether you like it or not.” - -Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the -conference? - -GÖRING: That quotation has not been translated by the interpreter as it -is written down here in the original. The interpreter who is translating -your words into German is using many strong expressions which are not -contained in this document. Squeeze out . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: Please read your original. - -GÖRING: It says here “to get from and obtain.” Between “to get from and -obtain,” and “to squeeze out,” there is a vast difference in German. - -GEN. RUDENKO: To “get out” and to “squeeze out” is about the same thing. -And what about the phrase, “I will set up agencies, which will squeeze -it out of you.” What have you got? - -GÖRING: “Get from” and not “squeeze out of.” - -GEN. RUDENKO: “Get from”? Did you have any cause not to trust the Reich -commissioners? You refer to them as “special agencies.” - -GÖRING: Not only were the Reich commissioners of the Eastern territories -present, but also the commissioners of all territories. It was a -question of the contribution in foodstuffs which the separate countries -had to make, to enable us to deal with the whole food question in all -those areas in Europe occupied by us. Before the conference I had been -told that it was to be expected, as is always the case in such a -situation, that everyone would hold back and get the other fellow to -deliver first. In other words, I did not want these fellows to let me -down. I knew they would offer me only half and I demanded 100 percent. -We could then meet somewhere half way. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you—these demands which you made to those present -at the conference, did they not mean a ruthless plundering of the -occupied territories? - -GÖRING: No, the main question at this conference was more food. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But I am talking about plunder. Plunder can mean -plundering of food from the occupied territories? - -GÖRING: I have just said I was responsible for the feeding of -practically the whole territory. Some of it was territory which had to -be provided with food, and some had a surplus, and it had to be -equalized. - -At this meeting the contribution to be made by each Reich commissioner -was for the most part fixed at 90 percent, and I in no way deny that in -making my demands at the meeting I was worked up and used strong words. -Later on the exact figures for the deliveries were laid down, and this -was the net result of the meeting. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to Page 118 Here it states -as follows, I quote your words, Page 118, please; have you found the -place? - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Here it says: - - “It seemed to me to be a relatively simple matter in former - days. It used to be called plundering. It was up to the party in - question to carry off what had been conquered. But today things - have become more humane. In spite of that, I intend to plunder - and to do it thoroughly.” - -Have you found the sentence? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have found it, and that was exactly what I said at that -conference. I emphasize that again. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I just wanted to ascertain that you really said that. - -GÖRING: I did say that, and now I should like to give you the reason. In -making that statement I meant that in former times war fed on war. Today -you call it something different, but in practice it remains the same. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I draw your attention to Page 119. There, -addressing those present at the meeting you state: - - “Whenever you come across anything that may be needed by the - German people, you must be after it like a bloodhound. It must - be taken out of store and brought to Germany.” - -Have you found that place? - -GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did you say that? - -GÖRING: I certainly assume that I did say it; yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You did say that. This sentence is the natural logical -conclusion of your directions “to plunder and do it thoroughly.” - -GÖRING: No, it is not. Just after that I said that I had issued a decree -authorizing the soldiers to buy up what they wanted, as much as they -wanted, and as much as they could carry. Just buy up everything. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You mention soldiers. I wanted to remind you of this too, -and as you have quoted it, I will refer to that sentence again. You -said, “Soldiers may purchase as much as they want, what they want, and -what they can carry away.” - -GÖRING: As much as they can carry away, yes, and that was necessary -because the custom authorities had issued a restrictive order whereby a -soldier could take only a small parcel. It seemed wrong to me, that a -soldier, who had fought should benefit the least from victory. - -GEN. RUDENKO: So that you do not deny that the extract which has just -been read is what you really said in your speech of 6 August 1942. - -GÖRING: I do not deny that at all. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us go to the next question. Do you admit -that as Delegate for the Four Year Plan you directed the deportation to -forced labor of millions of citizens from the occupied territories, and -that the Defendant Sauckel was your immediate subordinate in this -activity? Do you admit that? - -GÖRING: On paper he was my subordinate, but he was actually directly -subordinate to the Führer. I have already emphasized that to the extent -that I was informed, I will take my part of the responsibility; and of -course I knew about these statements. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to your other remarks at the -same conference. You will find that on Pages 141 and 142. - -GÖRING: That has already been read to the Tribunal. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to ask you now if you have found the place? - -GÖRING: I have found it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have found it. You said at this conference: - - “I do not want to praise Gauleiter Sauckel, he does not need it. - But what he has accomplished in such a short time and with such - speed for the recruitment of manpower from all over Europe and - setting them to work in our industries, is a unique - achievement.” - -Further, on Page 142, you say—you were speaking of Koch: - - “Koch, they are not only Ukrainians. Your ridiculous 500,000 - people! How many has he brought in? Nearly two million! Where - did he get the others?” - -Did you find the place? - -GÖRING: Yes; it does not read quite like that here. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It was not explicit. Make it more precise. - -GÖRING: Koch is trying to assert that he alone supplied all these people -for Sauckel. Whereupon, I replied that for the whole Sauckel program -2,000,000 workers had been supplied and that he, Koch, could lay claim -to have supplied only 500,000, at most. In other words, Koch was -claiming that he himself had supplied the total number. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did you think that 500,000 from the Ukraine was a small -number? - -GÖRING: No, that is not the point. I have just explained. Of these -2,000,000 which represent the total supplied by Sauckel in the past, -500,000 came from the whole of the Ukraine, so that Koch did not produce -the whole number as he was trying to assert. That is the meaning of the -quotation. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the underlying meaning that you were -speaking here of millions of people who were carried off forcibly to -Germany for slave labor. - -GÖRING: I do not deny that I was speaking of 2,000,000 workers who had -been called up, but whether they were all brought to Germany I cannot -say at the moment. At any rate, they were used for the German economy. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that this was forced labor, slavery? - -GÖRING: Slavery, that I deny. Forced labor did of course partly come -into it, and the reason for that I have already stated. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But they were forcibly taken out of their countries and -sent to Germany? - -GÖRING: To a certain extent deported forcibly, and I have already -explained why. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You heard, Defendant Göring, that a series of German -documents have been read which make it clear that these people from the -occupied territories were sent forcibly to Germany; that they were -rounded up, taken in the street, and from the cinemas, loaded into -trains and sent to Germany under military guard. If they refused to go -to Germany, or tried to evade mobilization, the peaceful inhabitants -were shot and submitted to tortures of various nature. You have heard of -these documents which describe these methods. - -GÖRING: Yes, but may I ask you to look at those documents again. These -show that recruitment was not ordered, but that registration even for -forced labor was regulated by decrees and other orders. If I had been -given an absolute guarantee, particularly in the East, that all these -people would be peaceful and peace-loving people, that they would never -take part in partisan activities or carry out sabotage, then I probably -would have put a larger number to work on the spot. But for security -reasons, both in the East and West—particularly in the West—where -young age groups were reaching the age of military service—we were -compelled to draft these men into labor and bring them to Germany. - -GEN. RUDENKO: They were taken to Germany only in the interest of -security and safety? - -GÖRING: There were two reasons. I have already explained them in detail. -Firstly, for security reasons. Secondly, because it was necessary to -find labor. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And for that reason—let us take the second, the necessity -of finding labor—people were forcibly taken from their country and sent -to slavery in Germany. Is that correct? - -GÖRING: Not to slavery; they were sent to Germany to work, but I must -repeat that not all of those who were taken away from the East and are -missing there today, were brought in to work. For instance, in the case -of Poland already 1,680,000 Poles and Ukrainians had been taken by the -Soviet Union from the territory which the Russians occupied at that -time, and transported to the East—the Far East. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I do not think you had better touch on the question of the -Soviet territories. Just answer the question which I am asking you, -which concerns the deportation to Germany of the peaceful population -from the occupied territories. I am asking you once more: You said in -answer to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s question that of the 5,000,000 -persons who were sent to Germany, approximately 200,000 were volunteers, -while the rest were taken to Germany forcibly. Is that not so? - -GÖRING: First of all, I must correct that. I did not say that to Sir -David at all, but he asked me. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And you admitted it? - -GÖRING: Just a moment. That is to say, he mentioned the figure 5,000,000 -of which he said not more than 200,000 were volunteers. He questioned me -on the strength of the minutes of the Central Planning Board, allegedly -a statement by Sauckel. I did not agree and answered that the figure of -volunteers was much higher, and that there must be a mistake in the -figures. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You affirm that the number of volunteers was -considerably larger, but you do not deny the fact that millions were -sent to Germany against their will. You do not deny that. - -GÖRING: Without wanting to tie myself down to a figure, the fact that -workers were forcibly put to work is something I have never denied, and -I answered accordingly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go to another question: Tell me, what procedure was -there for sending on the orders and directives of the OKW to various -other government agencies and organs. - -GÖRING: I did not understand the meaning of that question as it came -through in translation. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to describe the procedure which existed -for sending the directives of the OKW to the various units and -departments of the Air Force and other organs. How were they -distributed? - -GÖRING: If I have understood the question correctly, the procedure was -as follows: If an order came from the OKW, addressed to the Air Force, -it went through the following channels: If it was a direct order from -the Führer and signed by the Führer, the order had to be sent directly -to me, the Commander-in-Chief. If it was an order—not actually signed -by the Führer, but beginning with the words, “By order of the Führer,” -or “On the instructions of the Führer”—such an order, according to its -importance, would go to the Chief of the General Staff of my Air Force, -who, according to the purport and whether it was important, would report -it to me verbally. If, however, it dealt with current and departmental -matters the order would go immediately and directly to the lower -departments concerned without passing through the High Command. It would -have been impossible to work otherwise, owing to the very large number -of such orders. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. In connection with this I would like to ask -the following: In 1941 the OKW drew up a series of instructions and -orders with regard to the conduct of the troops in the East and how they -were to treat the Soviet population. These dealt specifically with -military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region—Document C-50, which has -already been submitted to the Tribunal. According to these instructions, -the German officers had the right to shoot any person suspected of a -hostile attitude towards the Germans, without bringing that person to -court. This directive also stated that the German soldiers could not be -punished for crimes which they committed against the local population. -Directives of this nature must have been submitted to you? - -GÖRING: I would have to see that from the distribution chart. May I see -the document please? - -GEN. RUDENKO: You would like to see the exhibit? - -GÖRING: I want to see whether that document went straight to me, or only -to my departments. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date, 13 May 1941. - -GÖRING: Actually it did not go straight to me. It says on the -distribution chart, “Ob. d. L., Air Force Operations Staff, Senior -General Staff officer.” Actually as far as my troops were concerned, I -issued very severe disciplinary orders. That is the reason why I have -asked for the senior Judge of the Air Force to be called as a witness, -and have now sent him an interrogatory which deals with these very -questions. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do know about this order, however? - -GÖRING: I have seen it here, and consequently asked for the witnesses, -since this order did not go directly to the Commander-in-Chief, but to -the department which I have just mentioned. Nevertheless, if this -department acted on this order, then I do of course formally share the -responsibility. But we are here concerned with an order from the Führer -and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which could not be questioned -by the troops. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that you must have known about this -document because of its importance? - -GÖRING: No, if so, it would have come directly to me, the -Commander-in-Chief, and not be sent to the Air Force Operations Staff, -and the General Staff officers’ department. It depended then on whether -this department considered the importance of the document to be such as -to require my personal orders and directives. But this was not the case -here, since the document did not affect us as much as it did the Army. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But the document was sent to your department and -circulated there. - -GÖRING: I have just said it was sent to two offices. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But this document should have been reported to you. - -GÖRING: No, it did not have to be reported to me. I explained a little -earlier that if every order and every instruction which came through in -the shape of an order, but which did not require my intervention, would -have had to be reported to me, I should have been drowned in a sea of -papers; and that is the reason why only the most important matters were -brought to me and reported to me. - -I cannot swear upon my oath that this document was not reported to me -verbally. It is possible. And I formally take responsibility also for my -departments. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to be more precise about it. You say that -the most important things were usually reported to you; correct? - -GÖRING: That is correct. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw your attention to the document before -you, to the third and fourth paragraphs of the order. The third -paragraph says: - - “Actions of hostile civilians against the German troops or - various troop units, as well as against service personnel, must - be suppressed on the spot by the most severe measures, even the - extermination of the attackers.” - -Paragraph 4: “Thus, no time should be lost . . .” - -GÖRING: Just a moment. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The fourth paragraph . . . - -GÖRING: You have sent me three documents, and I am trying to find out -which one; I am trying to sort them out. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right, sort them out. - -GÖRING: I shall repeat Paragraph 3 because it has been transmitted quite -erroneously in the German. - - “Also in the case of all other attacks by hostile civilians - against the Armed Forces, their members and service personnel, - extreme measures to suppress them must be taken by the troops on - the spot, even to the extent of annihilating the attackers.” - -GEN. RUDENKO: And Paragraph 4? - -GÖRING: Then we come to Number 4, and it is, if I understand you -correctly, the paragraph where it says: “Where measures of this kind -have been omitted or were not practicable at the moment, the suspected -elements will be taken at once to an officer who will decide whether -they are to be shot.” That is probably what you meant, is it not? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. That is what I had in mind. Could it be assumed that -this document, from your point of view, was important enough to have -been reported to you? - -GÖRING: Actually it was important, but it was not absolutely necessary -for it to be reported, because the order of the Führer had made it so -clear that a subordinate commander, and even a commander-in-chief of one -of the services could not alter a clear and strict order of that kind. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I draw your attention once more to the date in the -right-hand corner. It states there, Führer headquarters, 13 May 1941. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, it means that this was a month before the -German attack on the Soviet Union? Already, then, directives were -formulated about military jurisdiction within the regions covered by -Case Barbarossa, and you did not know about this document? - -GÖRING: When a plan for mobilization is laid, provision must be made for -certain eventualities. From his experience, the Führer believed that a -serious threat would immediately arise in the East, and in this document -measures are laid down for dealing with any action by the resistance, -and fighting behind the lines. It was therefore a precautionary order in -case of such happenings. Such measures have to be taken always and at -all times. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And the officers were given the right to shoot civilians -without bringing them to trial? - -GÖRING: An officer could hold a court martial on the spot, but, -according to this paragraph, he could also, if he thought fit and had -evidence that the opponent was making attacks from the rear, have him -shot on the spot. That has always been done. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You think that the officer can hold a court martial on the -spot? - -GÖRING: That is laid down in the articles of war. Every officer -commanding an independent unit can hold a court martial at any time. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that there is no question of any court -here? It states that he alone can decide what to do with the civilian. - -GÖRING: He could act alone or through a court martial, which was on the -spot. All he needed to do was to call just two more people, and he could -reach a decision, in 2 or 5 minutes if evidence of the attack was given. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In 5 minutes or 2 minutes, you say, and then he could -shoot the person? - -GÖRING: If I catch a man in the act of shooting at my troops from a -house in the rear, then the matter can be settled very swiftly by a -court martial. But where there is no evidence at all, you cannot do -that. Here, however, we are dealing with an immediate attack and with -the means of putting an end to it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Göring, let us leave this question. I would only -like to point out once more that this directive was issued by the High -Command of the Armed Forces on 13 May 1941, and that this order gives an -officer the right to shoot a man without a trial. I suppose you will not -deny this. Let us go on. - -GÖRING: Yes, but I deny that emphatically. There is nothing here which -says that an officer has the right to shoot a man right away. Let us get -this right. It says here—and I repeat it—“Attacks by hostile civilians -against the Armed Forces,” and then it says, “Where measures of this -kind are not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements -. . .”—and here is meant “suspected elements” only—are to be brought -before the highest officer of the formation there present and he will -decide the matter. In other words, it does not say that every officer -can decide the fate of any civilian. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But the resolution is to shoot. It is quite clear. The -second document which I would like to submit now and question you about -is that dated 16 September 1941. It has been submitted to the Court as -Exhibit Number R-98. - -GÖRING: Just a moment. What was the date you mentioned? - -GEN. RUDENKO: 16 September 1941 is the date of the document. Point B of -the document. I will not quote it. I am merely calling it to your mind. -It states that as a general rule the death of one German soldier must be -paid for by the lives of 50 to 100 Communists. That means that this rule -was to serve as a deterrent. I am not going to question you about the -main purport of the document. That is quite clear and needs no -clarification. What I am interested in is whether this document was -likewise unknown to you. - -GÖRING: It was not directed to me. Here again it merely went to some -office. The Air Force had very little to do with such matters. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And these offices did not report to you about such -documents? - -GÖRING: In a general way I knew about these reprisals, but not to this -extent. I learned only later—I mean during the war, not here—that the -order originally mentioned 5 to 10 and that the Führer personally made -it 50 to a 100. The question is whether you have any evidence that the -Air Force really made use of the order anywhere, and they did not. That -is all I can tell you. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do not put questions to me. I am asking you. Did your -administrative office ever report to you about this document? - -GÖRING: No, but later on I heard about this document. At a later date. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean by a “later date”? Please be more -precise. - -GÖRING: I cannot tell you at the moment. It was sometime during the war -that I heard that a figure which originally stood at from 5 to 10 had -been altered by the Führer personally to 50 to 100. That is what I -heard. - -GEN. RUDENKO: For one German? - -GÖRING: I have just explained to you. That is what I heard. The number -was originally 5 to 10 and the Führer personally added on a zero. It was -through that fact being once discussed that I learned about the whole -matter. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You mean the Führer added the zeros? - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, do you think it is really necessary to -go through these documents in such detail? The documents, after all, -speak for themselves, and they have already been presented to the -Tribunal. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing with this document, Mr. President. - -Do you know anything about the directives of the OKW with regard to the -treatment of Soviet prisoners of war? - -GÖRING: I shall have to see them. - -GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, Mr. President, the document has already -been submitted to the Tribunal, as 338-PS. - -Please look at Point A, Paragraph 3, which states that there is a broad -directive concerning the use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war. -The use of weapons must be considered permissible and in any incidents -involved the guards are not bound to report on the matter. - -This document also speaks for itself. I do not want . . . - -GÖRING: Just a moment, I must read it first; there is some ambiguity in -here. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to refresh your memory with still another -subject, that is, a short comment. It is taken from an order concerning -the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Here it is said that prisoners -of war who are trying to escape should be shot without warning. The same -subject is also mentioned in the memorandum concerning the treatment of -the Russian prisoners of war. - -GÖRING: The trouble here was the language difficulty; hence the guards -were instructed to use their arms immediately against persons attempting -escape. That is more or less the meaning of it, and that errors might -occur in this connection can be understood. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am not talking about the purport of the document which -speaks for itself. I want to know whether you knew about this document. - -GÖRING: This is a document dealing with the treatment of prisoners of -war, and it was passed directly to my department which was concerned -with prisoners of war. I did not know of this document, neither did I -know of the one which contains the opinion of the Foreign Intelligence -Department on the matter. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about this document? Very well. Now one -other, Number 884-PS, already submitted. It deals with the extermination -of political leaders and other political personalities. This is a -document . . . - -GÖRING: In explanation of this, I should like to point out that the Air -Force did not have any camps for Soviet prisoners of war. The Air Force -had only six camps in which the air force personnel of other powers were -confined; but it had no camps under it with Soviet prisoners of war. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have asked you these questions and shown you these -documents because as the second man in Germany, you could not possibly -have been unaware of these things. - -GÖRING: I apologize if I contradict you. The higher the office I held, -the less would I be concerned with orders dealing with prisoners of war. -From their very nature, these were departmental orders and not orders of -the highest political or military significance. If I had held a much -lower rank, then I might have had more knowledge of these orders. I am -now looking at the document which you submitted to me—Department of -Home Defense. It says on the left, “Reference: Treatment of Captured -Political and Military Russian Functionaries.” That is the document I am -looking at. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date of the document—12 May 1941, -Führer’s Headquarters. - -GÖRING: Yes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Look at Paragraph 3 of the document. - - “Political leaders among the troops are not to be considered - prisoners of war and must be exterminated at the latest in the - transit camps. They must never be transported to the rear.” - -Did you know about this directive? - -GÖRING: May I point out that this is in no way a directive, but that it -bears the heading, “Memorandum,” and is signed Warlimont. Also the -distribution chart does not show any other department than the Home -Defense Department, which I have mentioned. In other words, this is a -memorandum. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say then that you did not know about this -document? - -GÖRING: I say once more, this is a memorandum from the Operations Staff -of the OKW; and it is not an order or a directive, but a memorandum. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. You are telling us -what it was, not whether you knew of it. - -GÖRING: No; I did not. It had been put before me as an order, and I -wanted to point out that it is not an order. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on. The directives regarding the treatment of -Soviet prisoners of war must have been executed also by the units of the -Luftwaffe? - -GÖRING: If ordered by the Führer, yes; or if ordered by me, also. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember your own directives with regard to the -treatment of Soviet prisoners of war? - -GÖRING: No. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember them? - -GÖRING: The Air Force had no camps with Soviet prisoners of war. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Tell me, the majority of these criminal orders and -directives of the OKW, were they not issued even before the beginning of -the war against the Soviet Union and as part of the preparations for -that war? Does this not show that the German Government and the OKW -already had a prepared plan for exterminating the Soviet population? - -GÖRING: No. It does not prove it at all. It only shows that we -considered a struggle with the Soviet Union would be an extremely bitter -one, and that it would be conducted according to other rules as there -were no conventions. - -GEN. RUDENKO: These rules of warfare are well known to us. Please tell -me, do you know about Himmler’s directives given in 1941 about the -extermination of 30 million Slavs? You heard about it from the witness -Von dem Bach-Zelewski here in court. Do you remember that? - -GÖRING: Yes. First of all it was not an order but a speech. Secondly, it -was an assertion by Zelewski. And thirdly, in all speeches that Himmler -made to subordinate leaders, he insisted on the strictest secrecy. In -other words, this is a statement from a witness about what he had heard, -and not an order. Consequently, I have no knowledge of this nonsense. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about it. Very well. Tell me, in the -German totalitarian state was there not a governing center, which meant -Hitler and his immediate entourage, in which you acted as deputy? These -directives must have concerned Keitel and Himmler also. Could Himmler of -his own volition have issued directives for the extermination of 30 -million Slavs without being empowered by Hitler or by you? - -GÖRING: Himmler gave no order for the extermination of 30 million Slavs. -The witness said that he made a speech in which he said that 30 million -Slavs must be exterminated. Had Himmler issued such an order _de facto_, -if he kept to regulations, he would have had to ask the Führer—not me, -but the Führer—and the latter would probably have told him at once that -it was impossible. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I did not say it was an order; I said it was a directive -from Himmler. You therefore admit, or you state rather, that Himmler -could have issued instructions without discussing them with Hitler? - -GÖRING: I emphasize that such instructions could not have been given by -Himmler, and I know of no instructions; also no directive has been -mentioned here. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I shall repeat the question once more: Is it not true that -the directives and the orders of the OKW with regard to the treatment of -the civilian population and prisoners of war in the occupied Soviet -territories were part of the general directives for the extermination of -the Slavs? That is what I want to know. - -GÖRING: Not at all. At no time has there been a directive from the -Führer, or anybody I know of, concerning the extermination of the Slavs. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You must have known about the mass extermination of the -Soviet citizens from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union with -the help of the SD and the Security Police. Is it not true that the -Einsatz Kommandos and their activities were the result of the plan -prepared in advance for the extermination of Jews and other groups of -Soviet citizens? - -GÖRING: No. Einsatz Kommandos were an internal organ which was kept very -secret. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I shall have several other questions. Perhaps it is better -to adjourn now. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, General Rudenko? - -GEN. RUDENKO: I think not more than another hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: All these documents which you have been putting to the -witness, as I have pointed out to you, are documents which have already -been put in evidence and documents which seem to me to speak for -themselves. I hope, therefore, that you will make your cross-examination -as short as you can. The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-EIGHTH DAY - Friday, 22 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, yesterday I received the translation of -Document D-728. It is the document which was objected to yesterday as -being incorrect. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I request to have this retranslated, since this -translation is considerably different from the original wording and, in -particular, fails to make clear where the mistakes are which led to the -objection against the document. On the first page of that document there -are about 20 to 30 objections to be made. The translator, since he could -not realize the importance of the document, translated it quickly -without emphasizing the decisive points. A careful translation ought to -be made, which would enable us to get an idea of the original document. -I am fully aware of what the difficulties are. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, the translation shall be checked by a -different translator, or, if you like, by two different translators. - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I ask to have a new translation made for comparison, -since the version which we have here is also evidence of the fact that -the original already contains considerable mistakes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, it shall be checked and retranslated. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then, I request further that the opinion of an expert on -the German language be obtained. This opinion will ascertain that the -author of this document does not have full control of the German -language and that it must have been drawn up by someone who was a -foreigner. I do not want to give detailed reasons, but I would like to -make this motion in writing. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you must certainly make a written application -about that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I shall submit it in writing. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Göring, in your statement you said that the -attack on Poland was perpetrated after the bloody happenings in the town -of Bromberg. - -GÖRING: I said that the date for the attack was set due to the bloody -events which included, in addition to many other incidents, also the -Bloody Sunday at Bromberg. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that these events happened on 3 September -1939? - -GÖRING: I might have made a mistake regarding the date of Bromberg; I -would have to see the documents about that. I merely quoted that as one -example among a lot of others. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable. The attack was perpetrated on 1 -September, and the events in the town of Bromberg, which you just -mentioned to the Tribunal, happened on 3 September 1939. I submit to the -Tribunal the document evidence issued by the High Commission for the -Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, which is duly certified in -accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. From this testimony it is -clear that the events about which the Defendant Göring is testifying -here happened on 3 September 1939, that is to say, on the third day -after the attack by Germany on Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can put the document to the witness, if you want. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no German text. I have it in English and in -Russian. I just received this document. It is dated 19 March, and I will -submit it to the Tribunal as conclusive evidence to prove this fact. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is the appropriate time to put in -documents in that way. - -Very well, you can put in the document now if you like. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: It must be translated into German, of course. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no German translation of this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: It has to be translated into German in order that -defendant’s counsel may see it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: We will do that without fail. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I ask to have the document read now? It -is only a short memorandum; so we can hear immediately what it contains. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Will you read it into the record, General -Rudenko? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Sir. It is very short: - - “Certificate Based on the Investigation Performed by the Polish - Legal Authority. - - “The High Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in - Poland certifies that the so-called Bloody Sunday in the town of - Bromberg took place on 3 September 1939, that is to say, 3 days - after the time when Poland was subjected to the German attack. - - “On 3 September 1939, at 1015 in the morning, German Fifth - Columnists attacked Polish troop units retreating from Bromberg. - During the fighting 238 Polish soldiers and 223 German Fifth - Columnists were killed. As a consequence of the events after the - entrance of the German troops into the town of Bromberg, they - began mass executions, arrests, and deportations of Polish - citizens to concentration camps, which were performed by the - German authorities, the SS, and the Gestapo. There were 10,500 - murdered, and 13,000 exterminated in the camps. - - “This certificate is an official document of the Polish - Government and is submitted to the International Military - Tribunal in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter of 8 - August 1945. - - “Stefan Kurovsky, member of the High Commission for the - Investigation of German Crimes in Poland.” - -I should like to prove by this document that the events regarding which -the Defendant Göring gave testimony happened after the attack by Germany -on Poland. - -GÖRING: I am not sure whether we are both referring to the same event. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am speaking about the events in the town of Bromberg. -You spoke about them. - -GÖRING: Perhaps two different events took place in Bromberg. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It is quite possible. - -I pass on to the following question: It is known to you that there was -an order by the OKW regarding the branding of Soviet prisoners of war, -and what do you think about that? - -GÖRING: That order is not known to me, and no representative of the Air -Force was present at this preliminary discussion as I have ascertained -here from the records. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am interested as to whether you knew about this or not. -The orders are quite clear. - -GÖRING: No. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that the German High Command ordered that -Soviet war prisoners and Soviet citizens had to be used for clearing -mine fields and transporting bombs that had not exploded, _et cetera_? -Do you know about that? - -GÖRING: I know that Russian prisoners of war who were engineers had to -clear the mines which they had laid. To what extent the civilian -population was employed for that purpose I do not know, but it was -possible. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It is quite clear. - -Do you know about an order regarding the destruction of the towns of -Leningrad, Moscow, and other towns of the Soviet Union? - -GÖRING: In my presence the destruction of Leningrad was discussed only -in the document which was mentioned yesterday, in the sense that the -Finns, in case of the capture of Leningrad, would have no use for such a -big city. Of the destruction of Moscow I know nothing at all. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember the minutes of the meeting? This document -was presented to you yesterday—the minutes of the meeting of 16 July -1941. You were present at this meeting. They state that the Führer -declared . . . - -GÖRING: I have just mentioned and confirmed that. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did you speak about this same document? But, besides this -statement, there were also official orders. - -GÖRING: Would you be good enough to put them before me, then I would be -able to ascertain whether they are correct and whether they were known -to me. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no intention of submitting these documents to you. -They have already been submitted to the Tribunal. I am interested only -as to whether you were aware of these orders. - -GÖRING: I received no order to destroy Leningrad or Moscow in the sense -which you have indicated. - -GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You were told only about the important -happenings. But orders for the destruction of cities, and murder of -millions of men, _et cetera_, went through so-called service channels. - -GÖRING: If a town was to have been destroyed by bombing, then that order -would have been given by me directly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: On 8 March, here in the Tribunal, your witness Bodenschatz -stated that you told him in March 1945 that many Jews were killed and -that for that you will have to pay dearly. Do you remember this -testimony of your witness? - -GÖRING: This testimony, in the form in which it was translated now, I do -not recollect at all. The witness Bodenschatz never said it that way. I -ask that the record of the session be brought in. - -GEN. RUDENKO: How did Bodenschatz say that? Do you remember? - -GÖRING: That if we lost the war we would have to pay dearly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Why? For the murders which you had perpetrated? - -GÖRING: No, quite generally, and after all, we have experienced just -that. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Quite generally. I have a few concluding questions to put -to you. First of all, regarding the so-called theory of the master race. -I should like to put to you only one question in this connection and I -should like you to reply directly to it. Were you in accord with this -principle of the master race and education of the German people in the -spirit of it, or were you not in accord with it? - -GÖRING: No, and I have also stated that I have never used that -expression either in writing or orally. I definitely acknowledge the -differences between races. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But do I understand you correctly that you are not in -accord with this theory? - -GÖRING: I have never expressed my agreement with the theory that one -race should be considered as a master race, superior to the others, but -I have emphasized the difference between races. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer this question; it seems, you do not -consider it right? - -GÖRING: I personally do not consider it right. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The next question: You have stated here to the Tribunal -that you did not agree with Hitler regarding the question of the -annexation of Czechoslovakia, the Jewish question, the question of war -with the Soviet Union, the value of the theory of the master race, and -the question of the shooting of the British airmen who were prisoners of -war. How would you explain that, having such serious differences, you -still thought it possible to collaborate with Hitler and to carry out -his policy? - -GÖRING: That was not the way I worded my answers. Here, too, we must -consider separately various periods of time. As to the attack against -Russia, there were no basic differences but differences as to the date. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have told that already. Excuse me; I do not want you -to be lengthy on this theme. Will you reply directly? - -GÖRING: All right. I may have a different opinion from that of my -Supreme Commander, and I may also express my opinion clearly. If the -Supreme Commander insists on his opinion and I have sworn allegiance to -him, then the discussion comes to an end, just as it is the case -elsewhere. I do not think I need to elaborate on that. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You are not just a simple soldier, as you stated here; but -you have presented yourself also as a statesman? - -GÖRING: There you are right. I am not only a simple soldier, and just -because I am not a simple soldier but occupied such a prominent -position, I had to set an example for the ordinary soldier by my own -attitude as to how the oath of allegiance should be adhered to strictly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, you thought it possible, even with the -presence of these differences, to collaborate with Hitler? - -GÖRING: I have emphasized it and I maintain that it is true; My oath -does not hold good only in good times but also in bad times, although -the Führer never threatened me and never told me that he was afraid for -my health. - -GEN. RUDENKO: If you thought it possible to co-operate with Hitler, do -you recognize that, as the second man in Germany, you are responsible -for the organizing on a national, scale of murders of millions of -innocent people, independently of whether you knew about those facts or -not? Tell me briefly, “yes” or “no.” - -GÖRING: No, because I did not know anything about them and did not cause -them. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to underline again, “whether you were -informed of these facts or not.” - -GÖRING: If I actually do not know them, then I cannot be held -responsible for them. - -GEN. RUDENKO: It was your duty to know about these facts. - -GÖRING: I shall go into that. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am questioning you. Reply to this question: Was it your -duty to know about these facts? - -GÖRING: In what way my duty? Either I know the fact or I do not know it. -You can ask me only whether I was negligent in failing to obtain -knowledge. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You ought to know yourself better. Millions of Germans -knew about the crimes which were being perpetrated, and you did not know -about them? - -GÖRING: Neither did millions of Germans know about them. That is a -statement which has in no way been proved. - -GEN. RUDENKO: The last two questions: You stated to the Tribunal that -Hitler’s Government brought great prosperity to Germany. Are you still -sure that that is so? - -GÖRING: Definitely until the beginning of the war. The collapse was due -only to the war’s being lost. - -GEN. RUDENKO: As a consequence of which, you brought Germany, as a -result of your politics, to military and political destruction. I have -no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Chief Prosecutor for France wish to -cross-examine? - -M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for the French -Republic): I ask the Tribunal for permission to make one very short -statement to fulfill the desire expressed by the Tribunal and to -abbreviate as much as possible the discussions at this Trial. The French -Prosecution has come to an agreement with Mr. Justice Jackson and with -Sir David that the questions put to the Defendant Göring as a witness -should be only those which are considered pertinent. - -The questions have been asked and we have heard the answers of the -defendant, as far as it was possible to obtain from him anything except -propaganda speeches. - -I think the Defense will not be able to complain that its freedom has -been curtailed. It has been able to use its freedom abundantly in the -past 12 sessions without having been able in any way to weaken the -Prosecution’s overwhelming accusations, without having been noticeably -able to convince anyone that the second man in the German Reich was in -no way responsible for launching the war or that he knew nothing of the -atrocities committed by the men whom he was so proud to command. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will no doubt have the opportunity later to comment, -but the question that I ask you now is whether you wish to ask the -witness definite questions. - -M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: Mr. President, I have finished; I have said all -that I wanted to say, that is to say, after all these long discussions, -the French Prosecution feels that nothing has been changed in the -crushing accusation which we brought forth. Consequently, I have no -further questions to ask the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer? - -DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has stated that you issued direct -orders to the Hermann Göring Division during its employment in Italy -referring to the fight against the partisans. Is that statement correct? - -GÖRING: No. The Hermann Göring Division was a ground division and was -part of the operational task force of an army and army group. -Consequently, it could never have received orders for its tactical -employment from me, from Berlin or from my headquarters, which were not -on the scene. Therefore I could not have given it any orders as to -whether and how it was to be employed in the partisan war. Only such -orders are in question as referred exclusively to matters of personnel -and equipment or which concerned the internal administration of justice -with regard to officers; nor did the division submit to me daily reports -but only . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not catch that. I am sorry, My Lord, I -should have spoken earlier. I gather that these questions are directed -to the Hermann Göring Division. The defendant never dealt with that -point when he was being examined in chief; and, therefore, I never dealt -with it in cross-examination, because the point had not been raised. It -is therefore my submission that it is quite inadmissible for the matter -to be raised in re-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: You must remember, Sir David, that the practice in -foreign countries is not the same as the practice in the United States -and in England; and although it is perfectly true that Dr. Stahmer, -according to the rules of England at any rate, would not be able to -raise this point in re-examination, we are directed by the Charter not -to deal technically with any question of evidence. It may be you would -have to ask him some questions thereafter in cross-examination, although -I hope that will not be necessary, in view of the evidence of the -witness Kesselring. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I considered that point, but I wanted only to -make it clear that the Prosecution has not dealt with this point at all, -because it had not been raised previously. - -THE PRESIDENT: No; either in the examination or in the -cross-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Or in the cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I had already noticed the point that the -question had not been raised in the evidence of Hermann Göring. - -DR. STAHMER: May I, in explanation, assert that I received the document -only yesterday and consequently could not take any attitude earlier -toward this question, which has been dealt with already by the -Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: But, if my recollection is correct, the witness, Field -Marshal Kesselring, raised this very point himself, and therefore the -point was obvious and could have been raised in examination in chief, in -which case it would have been dealt with by the Defendant Göring. It -does not depend upon any particular document; it depends upon the -evidence of the Field Marshal Kesselring, who said that he was -bypassed—I think the word as it was translated was that he was bypassed -between the Hermann Göring Division and the Defendant Göring, although -the Hermann Göring Division was under his command. So it has nothing to -do with any document. - -DR. STAHMER: May the witness continue, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -GÖRING: The division was under my command only as far as personnel, -commissioning of officers, and equipment was concerned but not as to its -employment. I did not receive reports daily, but at intervals, regarding -events, losses, replacements. That, on the whole, was all the connection -I had with that division. I could not give any orders for its -employment, since it was under the command of parts of the Army. - -DR. STAHMER: Did you receive a report regarding the events at Civitella? - -GÖRING: No, I did not receive that report. I have learned of it for the -first time here from the affidavit of an Army general who was in command -of that division and who was also responsible for these matters, and who -apparently is trying now to shift that responsibility to the division -and, because of the name of the division, on to me. - -DR. STAHMER: Your relation to Hitler and your influence upon him has -again been touched upon during cross-examination. Will you please -summarize the facts briefly by particular periods, which are necessary -to form an opinion on that relation? - -GÖRING: Already during the cross-examination I have pointed out that a -very long period is involved here. In 1923, when I was an SA leader, my -relation was normal. Then there is a long interval—1931 . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. It seems to me in the -interests of time highly objectionable to allow the witness now to -summarize. He was given the advantage of answering any questions he -wanted as he went along. It seems to me that when he has covered a -subject at least once—and as a matter of fact he covered this one four -or five times in an address at nearly every question that would -permit—that that at least should bring us to the end of that subject. -It was exhausted. - -The matter of time here is a grave matter. By our calculation—a careful -calculation—of the witnesses which have been allowed, this Trial will -now project into August. It does not seem that we should allow him to -play this game both ways, to make his speeches during the -cross-examination and then to sum them up again afterwards. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal has allowed you to ask -questions which, strictly speaking, are not admissible in re-examination -and I want to make it clear to you what questions are admissible in -re-examination—only these which arise out of the cross-examination. As -to this particular question, the Defendant Göring was allowed to make -what were really speeches in his examination in chief without any -interruption whatever; and he went over the whole history of the Nazi -regime from its inception until the end of the war and the Tribunal does -not consider that he ought to be at liberty to go over the same ground -again in re-examination. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I had merely asked that question because up -to now it had not been dealt with comprehensively and I think it -necessary, in order to form an opinion of the defendant and his attitude -during that time, to have a comprehensive and coherent account of this -matter which in my opinion is so important for the decision to be made -in this Trial. If, however, the Tribunal objects to this question, I -must submit to that decision and withdraw the question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I have another question. During your -examination, you stated, regarding certain accusations, that you want to -assume responsibility for them. How is that to be understood? - -GÖRING: As to responsibility, one must discern between formal and actual -responsibility. Formally, I bear responsibility for that which was done -by those departments and offices which were under my command. Although I -could not possibly have seen or known beforehand everything that was -issued or discussed by them, I must nevertheless assume formal -responsibility, particularly where we are concerned with the carrying -out of general directives given by me. Actual responsibility I see in -those cases in which I personally issued orders or directives, including -in particular all acts and facts which I signed personally or issued -authentically, but I mean these facts only and not so much general words -and statements which were made during those 25 years here and there in -small circles. In particular, I want to say the following very clearly -about responsibility: The Führer, Adolf Hitler, is dead. I was regarded -as his successor in leading the German Reich. Consequently I must -declare, with reference to my responsibility, that it was my aim . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish that you should not make -speeches. The Tribunal is perfectly well able to understand the -difference between formal responsibility and actual responsibility for -orders given by you. - -GÖRING: I acknowledge my responsibility for having done everything to -carry out the preparations for the seizure of power, and to have made -the power firm in order to make Germany free and great. I did everything -to avoid this war. But after it had started, it was my duty to do -everything to win it. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard you say that more than once and we -do not wish to hear it again. - -GÖRING: On the question of labor: During the war, the inhabitants of the -occupied territories were brought in to work in Germany and their -countries were exploited economically. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you are supposed to be asking questions of -the witness. Now, what question is that in answer to? - -DR. STAHMER: I had asked him about his responsibility . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him questions, but you cannot ask him general -questions which invite speeches. If you have any particular questions to -ask him which arise out of the cross-examination, now is the time to ask -them. - -DR. STAHMER: I put this question: To what extent does he consider -himself responsible for the points mentioned here in the -cross-examination regarding the deportation of workers . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this question being put. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has already told us about that. He answered that -question more than once. - -DR. STAHMER: In that case, I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the defendant can retire. - -[_The defendant left the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer. - -DR. STAHMER: May I first of all give a short review of the present stage -of the Trial so that the Tribunal can see what the list of witnesses -still granted to me is like now. I was going to forego Dr. Lohse. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lohse, did you say? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, I abstain from calling Dr. Lohse, because the -defendant has in my opinion already made sufficient statements on that -subject. Furthermore, I had been granted Ambassador Dr. Paul Schmidt as -a witness. That witness, of whom I want to ask a few questions only, I -should like to hear later, subsequent to his examination by the -Defendant Ribbentrop, because he will have to answer a wide range of -questions during that examination, and it appears to me appropriate if I -ask him subsequent to that—which is also in accord with the wish of Dr. -Horn—if the Tribunal will agree to that procedure, the witness Koller -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -DR. STAHMER: The witness Koller, as it has now been ascertained, is in -Belgium, and not in Germany. His hearing was provided in case he was in -Germany. Consequently, I shall have to submit an interrogatory to that -witness. That has been done, but the interrogatory has not yet been -returned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: Furthermore, I have received permission to submit -interrogatories to the witnesses Ondarza, Freiherr Von Hammerstein, -Kammhuber, Student, and Bunjes. The interrogatories have been submitted -but have not been returned yet. The situation is that the addresses of -Ondarza and Kammhuber have since been ascertained; as to the other three -witnesses, inquiries are still being made, so that also here I cannot -yet submit anything. Then there are interrogatories of Uiberreither, -Lord Halifax, and Forbes; from Halifax and Forbes the interrogatories -have been received, and I am going to read them; from Uiberreither there -is a written statement as well. Then it concerns . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “a written statement as well”? You -said there are the interrogatories from Lord Halifax and Sir George -Ogilvie-Forbes. - -DR. STAHMER: Interrogatories have been received from Lord Halifax and -Forbes. There is a written affidavit from Uiberreither and I assume that -that may take the place of an interrogatory. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I understand. - -DR. STAHMER: Furthermore, there is the Katyn case, Mr. President. Five -witnesses are involved. I am still making inquiries regarding their -addresses. I am therefore not in a position to have these witnesses -called before the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer. Was that all that you wished to say at -this stage? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, upon the question of these witnesses; in addition I -must present what I have in the way of documents and then I shall have -completed my case for the time being. I have put down in writing what I -have to say about the documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal approves of the course -which you suggest. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I, in the interest of time, make a suggestion, -Your Honor, that these documents which Dr. Stahmer proposes to offer, I -understand, have been translated into all four languages, so that the -reason for reading them in open court does not sustain. I cannot speak -for my colleagues since I have not consulted them, but so far as the -United States is concerned, we will not raise a question of relevancy; -we spend no time arguing points of relevancy. I suggest that the reading -of a whole document book seems a waste of time of the Trial Court since -the documents are available in all four languages. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, before we consider that course which has -been suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, we should like to hear whether -any of the other Chief Prosecutors have anything to add to it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully submit that it is an excellent -suggestion and I want to make it clear to the Defense Counsel that I -feel that it will, on the one side, avoid arguments of relevancy on -comparatively small points and, on the other side, the Defense Counsel -will be able to use any of the excerpts in their final speeches with -more effect and probably with more help to the Tribunal than merely by -reading them at this stage. I respectfully support it and consider that -it will improve the general condition. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. We will hear you in a moment, Dr. -Stahmer, but I do not want you to go away; I want you to be able to -hear. I want to hear General Rudenko too. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I am fully in agreement with the suggestion of Mr. Justice -Jackson and that of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and I also consider that the -Tribunal accept these documents which have been translated in four -languages. This does not exclude the premise, namely that the Defense -has no right to submit documents that have nothing to do with the -present case. In particular I have a definite objection against -submitting as exhibits the extracts from documents of the so-called -_White Book_ which are being submitted by Dr. Stahmer in the document -book. These extracts have nothing to do with the present case and they -should not be submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Chief Prosecutor wish to add anything to -what has been said? - -M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: The French Prosecution has laid before the -Tribunal a note requesting rejection of Document Number Göring-26. It -concerns indeed an extract from a note from the German Government to the -French Government regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war in -France. This extract refers to a secret order from the headquarters of -the general commanding the 9th French Army. This extract says that the -general commanding the 9th French Army published an order; this order -was not given to us. We are dealing only with an assertion of the German -Government, which is the government of the defendant. The extract which -is offered to us has therefore no relevancy and we ask the Tribunal to -reject it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, at the moment, is not considering the -question of relevancy of particular documents. They are considering only -the general question of method as to whether all these documents have to -be read out to the Tribunal or whether they can be laid before the -Tribunal for the Tribunal’s consideration. If they have got to be read -out in full it will take a very considerable time, and therefore Mr. -Justice Jackson has suggested that instead of all these documents being -read out in full, which will take a very long time, as they have been -translated, the reason for that no longer exists as it did exist in the -case of the documents put in by the Prosecution which had not been -translated. But that does not mean that the question of relevancy of -individual documents or particular passages in the documents is decided -by the document books being presented for the consideration of the -Tribunal. Such questions as that may, in important cases, have to be -considered after argument, but as a general rule and for the purpose of -avoiding delay, the suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson appears to have a -very great deal to recommend it. - -M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: The matter which is before us today is to find -out whether all of the documents which have been submitted are relevant, -and that is why I asked that the Tribunal reject one of the documents as -irrelevant. If it is understood, that this question may be brought up -later when the document is produced then I see no objection to -postponing my explanation. I wish to state concerning Document Number -Göring-26 only that the quotation read by Dr. Stahmer is mutilated and I -shall ask the Tribunal to hear this document read in full. - -THE PRESIDENT: We would like to consider this matter, but before doing -so we would like to know whether you have any objection to the -suggestion that has been made. You understand what Mr. Justice Jackson’s -suggestion is? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I understand. It touches upon a -fundamental question of the defense, and I should like to discuss this -question briefly with the other Defense Counsel. I should like to -suggest that the Court take a short recess now so that there will be an -opportunity to discuss the matter. I would then make my statement -afterwards. I should like to point out now that at the time we were -willing to forego the reading of the Indictment, and its being read was -not due to our objections. The gentlemen probably were of the opinion -that it had to be read as a matter of principle. I shall clarify the -question and report immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about the reading of the Indictment? Are -you making a complaint because the Indictment had been read? - -DR. STAHMER: No, no, no. - -THE PRESIDENT; The matter stands upon a different footing. The Charter, -which is the document which governs the actions of the Tribunal, -provided that the Indictment must be read. It does not follow that what -is now being suggested is not provided for in the Charter. The only -reason why we ruled that every document which the Prosecution wished to -rely upon be read in open court was because the Prosecution, at that -time, had not found it possible to translate into four different -languages every document which it wished to put in evidence and for the -convenience and in fairness to the defendants and their counsel. We -ordered, as you remember at an earlier stage, that every sentence in a -document upon which the Prosecution relied and which we could consider -as evidence should be read into the microphone so that it could come to -you in German and would appear in the record, in the transcript. That -principle no longer applies to the documents which are now put in -because they have been translated into four different languages by the -Prosecution’s Translation Division. Therefore, in the interest of time, -which must be almost equally important to the Defense as well as to -everyone else concerned, it seems to the Tribunal that the suggestion -which Mr. Justice Jackson has made is a very sound one and you will, of -course, be able to comment in any way you think right during the course -of your final speeches upon the documents on which you rely, subject to -any question of relevancy which may be of real importance. There may be -certain documents which may be objected to by the Prosecution, but, as -Mr. Justice Jackson said, he will not now raise any question of -relevancy, and he is ready to have all these documents referred to in -your document book considered by the Tribunal. Remember also, when we -approved your documents, we expressly reserved any question of relevancy -of particular passages in these documents which you might want to use. - -Perhaps it will be appropriate for us to adjourn now and you can discuss -the question with your colleagues. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I was, of course, not in a position -to have a vote taken among my colleagues of the Defense on the proposal -of Mr. Justice Jackson, for the reason alone that not all Defense -Counsel are present here. But I have been able to convince myself that -the majority of the Defense Counsel agree with the reasons for what I am -going to say, and I have no doubt that all Defense Counsel support the -application which I am about to make to the effect that the suggestion -of Mr. Justice Jackson should be rejected. But to be correct and loyal I -feel obliged to emphasize that naturally every one of the gentlemen is -entitled to present his point of view on this question for himself and -within the scope of his own subject matter. - -And now to the matter itself. The suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson, -especially if it is followed in principle with regard to all the -documents which are to be submitted by the Defense, would aim at the -introduction of a tremendous volume of documents as subject matter in -the Trial without their being made known by oral presentation in open -session to the public and thus to the whole world, which is passionately -and wholeheartedly interested in this Trial. - -I abstain from quoting, with judicial dialectics, provisions, for -instance from the Charter set up for this Trial, which could be used to -conduct a polemic against Mr. Justice Jackson’s proposal. I will start -with the principle about the unconditional and absolute importance of -which there will certainly be no difference of opinion between the -Tribunal and us or between the Prosecution and us: namely, the principle -that this whole Trial must be subject to the absolute postulate of -justice and fairness. These are exactly the motives which prompted the -authors of the Charter to give Part IV of the Charter a very pronounced -heading. It says: “Fair Trial for Defendants.” - -But I cannot consider it just and I cannot consider it fair if the -Prosecution had the right, for months, not only once but sometimes -repeatedly and often, to bring their evidence to the knowledge of the -public and of the world by reading it into the microphone; and in this -regard it should be noted that when these documents were presented often -only parts of documents were read which, in the opinion of the -Prosecution, were incriminating to the defendants, while those parts -were omitted which, in our opinion, were exonerating for the defendants. -It must therefore be considered an injustice that a defendant should not -also have the opportunity to bring to the knowledge of the world through -his defense, those matters which, in his opinion and the opinion of his -counsel, speak in his favor, when the Prosecution had previously had the -right and the opportunity to apply that procedure to the incriminating -documents. - -May I draw attention to this fact—and I have pointed it out -repeatedly—that certain incriminating points have not only been brought -to the knowledge of the world public by reading the documentary -evidence, but were repeated in the form of representation to the -defendants when they were examined as witnesses, and thereby they have -been drilled into the ears of the listening world again and again. I am -asking you urgently and implore Your Honors in the interest of just -proceedings, which I am sure are desired by you as well as by the -authors of the Charter, to give the same opportunity to the defendants. - -In support of his suggestion Mr. Justice Jackson has furthermore even -emphasized formally the point of view that the Trial would be shortened. -The Defense does in no way deny the necessity of limiting this Trial to -the time necessary. But perhaps I may in this connection draw your -attention to a statement made by the president of the court at the -Belsen trial in reply to press criticism about the allegedly too lengthy -duration of the trial; the gist of which was that no duration however -long was to be regretted as long as it helped to reveal the truth in the -end. I ask you to put this principle before the necessity of saving time -in this Trial as well. - -And finally, may I—without assuming authority to criticize the measures -decided upon and carried out by the Prosecution in accordance with their -duties—may I point out that the duration of the Trial thus far, should -anyone consider it too long—I do not think it is too long—was at any -rate not brought about by the Defense. I think I can say with a clear -conscience that so far we have not done anything, said anything, or -caused anything which could be used in justly reproaching us for -delaying the Trial unnecessarily. - -If, furthermore, as your Lordship has pointed out, the reason no longer -exists which caused the Tribunal duly to order that those parts of -documents which were to become the subject matter of the Trial should be -presented orally, then I should like to point out that the vast majority -of the documents which were produced at the time and accordingly also -presented verbally in part were already at that time available in -fourfold translation. - -Furthermore, I should like to point out that this documentary evidence, -if it is to be comprehensible to the Tribunal and if it is to serve the -purpose of establishing the truth, without doubt in many cases calls for -explanatory comments by the Defense Counsel. The possibility of such -comment would be removed if we are instructed to submit these documents -to the Tribunal _in toto_. - -As far as I have been able to ascertain, without wanting to prejudice -anybody, my colleagues have by no means any intention of quoting the -entire contents of the document books. As far as I understand it, they -have in most cases rather the intention of presenting excerpts which -they are going to designate, and the relevancy of which may then be -discussed if occasion arises. Even such selection of those parts of the -documents which are considered to be really relevant would not be -possible if the Tribunal followed Mr. Justice Jackson’s suggestion. -Likewise, as I said before, it would not be possible to point out, in -documents already read by the Prosecution, those parts which have not -been read but which are exonerating for the defendant. - -If it has been said—and your Lordship has pointed it out—that the -Defense Counsel have an opportunity to quote these parts of the -documents during their address, then I believe I agree with the Judges -that the address should, if possible, be a coherent and terse summary, -evaluating the entire substance of the Trial. If we are now instructed -to refer to parts of documents during the address and quote explicitly -once more those to which we attach importance as evidence, but which we -would not mention at all or only incidentally or summarily in connection -with a comprehensive evaluation, then the danger arises that the -coherence or, let us say, the bold outline of our address would suffer -by a recital of the subject matter in detail. And the further danger -arises that the time which Mr. Justice Jackson wishes to save through -his suggestion will be lost again because the final address will take so -much longer, which need not be if it is strictly a summary, an over-all -evaluation, in accordance with its purpose. - -I consider it even possible that later on, if possibly in the confines -of our address a difference of opinion as to the relevancy of an -individual document might arise, there might be considerable delay and -disturbance in the proceedings, whereas, if one can submit the document -in its essential parts at this time, together with statements to explain -and connect them, one would have an immediate opportunity to state just -why one considers the part presented as relevant, so that the Tribunal -would have an opportunity to make a decision as to relevancy now. - -In my opinion there are many points which speak against Mr. Justice -Jackson’s suggestion. I summarize: As far as I am concerned, the most -important point of view is that of fairness and justice. The Defense -Counsel, as I have ascertained beyond any doubt by conversations during -the recess, must and would consider it a severe and intolerable -limitation of the Defense, if, contrary to the procedure exercised so -far by the Prosecution, it were deprived of the possibility of -presenting, in its turn, at least the relevant parts of its own -documentary evidence to the Tribunal verbally and with comments. I am of -the opinion, that it is a simple postulate of fairness in the forensic -engagement between Prosecution and Defense that now the Defense, too, -should be given the same opportunity. And this is not meant to be -criticism either but merely a statement of fact, of which the -Prosecution have availed themselves to a considerable and sometimes -cumulative extent. - -May I request, therefore, and I think my request is supported by the -entire Defense that the suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson be rejected. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. You began your address by saying that you -would not refer to the Charter. On what Article of the Charter do you -rely for your argument that all documents which are presented must now -be read? - -DR. DIX: I said that I would not refer to individual provisions of the -Charter as a basis for my application. As a basis for my application I -have merely mentioned the heading of Part IV of the Charter which says, -“Fair Trial for Defendants,” and I have explained and need not repeat -that I would not consider it a fair trial if Mr. Justice Jackson’s -suggestion were followed. However, I have deliberately—although my -attention was drawn to specific provisions of the Charter which, -directly or indirectly, might be used as a legal construction to support -my application—I have refrained deliberately from doing so, since these -individual rules in my opinion are not convincing. - -The principle of justice and fairness however is sufficiently strong in -my opinion, and so are the other arguments of practicability and -feasibility which I took the liberty to present to the Tribunal. I think -there must be a misunderstanding. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you will not have omitted to notice that Article 24 -deals expressly with the course of the Trial. Do you rely upon any part -of Article 24? - -DR. DIX: No, no. I have deliberately not referred to any part of Article -24, since that article gives considerable powers of discretion to the -Tribunal, regarding the general rules of procedure which, in my opinion, -have nothing to do with the question under discussion at present. This -is merely a question of justice and fairness, and, if I may add this, it -is a fundamental rule of oral trial. We now have an oral trial, we now -have a trial in open session. It is in existence here. I am not sure -whether or not the open session is prescribed by the Charter, but it -exists. Since it is in existence, we must proceed in accordance with -these principles and therefore, in my opinion, the defendant has also -the right to present to the public of the world what is in his favor -after the Prosecution have presented to the public of the world what is -not in his favor. - -THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you another question: Are you suggesting -that the Defense should be able to quote, to read documents, more than -once? - -DR. DIX: I am not suggesting that in any way. As far as I am concerned, -my documents of course will be read only in part and certainly not -twice. I have merely said that the Prosecution have done so, that is, -have read documents twice; sometimes even three times, I am told. But it -is not my task to criticize that conduct of the Prosecution; that is the -Prosecution’s business. I am not here to make criticism; that is up to -the Tribunal and the Prosecution. I have merely stated the fact. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal would like to put a -further question to Dr. Dix before they hear you, and also . . . - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would like to make a simple statement of fact -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Please do. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: . . . which I think will clarify this situation -some in justice to the United States of America. - -As to the fairness, I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that we -have printed, mimeographed, 250 copies of Dr. Stahmer’s entire document -book, and it is in the press room waiting for delivery to the press when -it is received by this Tribunal, so that we have done everything that we -could, everything that we did for ourselves, to make public his -documents. - -In the second place, we have gone so far as to print even things that -the Court ruled out, rather than to have controversy with them. - -In the third place, it is not the function of the Tribunal, under the -Charter, to spread propaganda. A large part of this is stuff that is 20 -years old and is in every good library and will not be used by -newspapers and constitutes a waste of our money. We have tried to do -everything in order to make this Trial completely fair to these people, -and now that I have discovered that we are printing documents that the -Court have already ruled out, I must say that I shall stop it. I think -we have been imposed upon, and this document book will show it. There -are documents after documents that the Tribunal have already ruled -irrelevant, and we have gone to the expense of printing them in order to -be more than fair. - -DR. DIX: May I answer to that very briefly? As far as the point of view -of propaganda is concerned, I regret that my suggestion has not been -followed, according to which the public and the world would hear only -those parts of our document books which have been recognized as relevant -by the Tribunal, and then presented by us. If the contents of the -document book do produce certain propaganda effects, which is unknown to -me and which would be entirely against our intentions, then it is merely -due to the fact that the contents of these document books have been -submitted to the press not through legal and normal channels or let us -say not by due procedure, that is, from the sessions’ records; instead -these document books of the Defense were placed at the disposal of the -press without our knowledge, and therefore also such things were -communicated to the press and the world public which, in the opinion of -the Tribunal, circumstances permitting, may be irrelevant or perhaps -biased. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not saying that they are; I -am merely talking in the abstract. But if you want to avoid just what -Mr. Justice Jackson wishes to avoid, namely, that political propaganda -is made by means of this Trial, then you must follow my suggestion; I -want only that to be presented and brought to the knowledge of the world -which has here been considered relevant by the Tribunal and admitted for -presentation. - -Due to the excitement in Court it is very difficult to understand every -word correctly through the earphones, but if Mr. Justice Jackson meant -that we are trying to obtain a propaganda effect here, that is not the -case. If he further mentions the point of fairness insofar as the -Prosecution had done everything to inform the world public by placing at -its disposal all the document books, then I have no criticism to offer -in that respect. Far be it from me to call that unfair. But here we are -in Court, having proper proceedings. We are not making press propaganda; -rather the press is to gather information and report to the world about -this Trial from this courtroom. The Defense are only grateful if their -efforts to carry through proper proceedings with full information to the -press are supported by the Tribunal. - -But this is not the crucial point. I have not accused anybody of being -unfair. I have merely emphasized that it is a requirement of fairness to -let the Defense do the same things which have continually and repeatedly -been done by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix, will you tell me this: What suggestion do -you have for shortening the Trial? You must recollect in the criticism -that you have been making of the Prosecution’s case with reference to -their documents, that their case has been based almost entirely upon -documents. They have called—I do not know how many witnesses, but very -few witnesses. You and the other defendants’ counsel are proposing to -call a very great number of witnesses, and what I would ask you is: How -do you propose that the Trial should be shortened so that it may not -last until the end of July or August? - -DR. DIX: If I make a suggestion, then I can of course do so only for -myself and for the case I have to defend. May I suggest, Your Lordship, -that we begin with producing the documentary evidence, and I would ask -you to realize that, if I am not mistaken, none of the Defense Counsel -intends to read his entire document book here before the Tribunal. -Whomever I have asked, at any rate the majority, certainly did not -intend to do that. Those with whom I have spoken want to quote excerpts -only, and in the choice of these excerpts and in the discussion of -whether their presentation would be relevant, a measure could be applied -which would, of course, take into consideration the necessity of the -matter as well as the question of time. I do not think that the -presentation of the documents will take a very long time. My colleague, -Dr. Stahmer, for instance, has told me that although he has an enormous -and important case to defend, he believes that he will probably complete -his case in about 2 hours or maybe in even less than 2 hours. I am not a -prophet, but I think the Tribunal is considering the matter as more -hazardous than it is in fact. Please give us a chance. You may certainly -assume that all of us are anxious not to delay the proceedings. Also we -are quite willing to take advice if the Court says, “We do not consider -this or that important,” or, “This or that we consider already -demonstrated,” or “We presume this or that,” _et cetera_. That way we -will make fast progress. May I, therefore, suggest not to lay down now -any obligatory abstract rule for the procedure to be followed but to go -to work with us now in a practical manner and to accept our assurances -that we want to assist in shortening the Trial and, to begin with, start -from the standpoint that we may present what we consider relevant. If it -should turn out that too much time is being taken up—which, as I have -said, I do not believe—then we could still discuss that matter once -more and after all, the Tribunal is at liberty to make its decisions. -All I ask is that it not be done now because I am afraid that the -Tribunal, on the strength of the experience with the documentary -evidence of the Prosecution, is overestimating the time required for the -presentation of our documentary evidence, in which connection I again -repeat that this is neither reproach nor criticism. I know that the -Prosecution have based their case mostly on documents, and therefore -naturally had to take more time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Dix. The Tribunal would like to hear—of -course, they cannot hear all the defendants’ counsel on this matter, but -they would like to hear one other representative of Counsel. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal back to the -legal aspect of the matter? - -The Tribunal quite rightly raised the question: What does the Charter -say regarding evidence? The difficulty is caused by the fact that -specific rules on this matter are not contained in the Charter. -Regarding the procedure, we have Article 24. This Article 24 refers to -the session—the session, which, according to the legal language used in -all kinds of criminal procedure, can mean nothing but the oral hearing -and the verbal debate. What is lacking in Article 24 is a paragraph -which concerns specifically the taking of documentary evidence. But may -I draw your attention to subparagraph (e). There the rebuttal of -evidence given by witnesses is discussed, the rebuttal, which of course, -is concerned not only with the presentation of witnesses but also with -the submission of documents. - -It is specifically provided there that the evidence should be taken. At -any rate, based on the German text and German usage of language, it -would not be permissible at all if this evidence taken in the -presentation were not produced now during Court sessions but if that -evidence, on the basis of the presented extensive written material, were -dealt with in the separate rooms of the Judges. - -It is a particularly important principle of a colleague-like Tribunal, -of a Tribunal which consists of several Judges, that the impression -which is to be conveyed to the Tribunal should be coherent and direct. -That can be achieved only if the material is presented and discussed in -oral proceedings. - -May I ask you to consider also that we have already acquired some -experience in that respect during this Trial. I am sure that everyone -who has presented a document has been very grateful to the President of -the Tribunal when he interfered during the quotation of the document by -limiting here or extending there, and, by doing so, let the Prosecution -or the Defense Counsel, who were quoting the document, know the opinion -of the Tribunal as to what is relevant. Our experience has been that -this guidance by the Tribunal had favorable results later on. - -As for the legal aspect, may I draw your attention to Article 21, which -contains a special provision, a special provision regarding those facts -which are of common knowledge and do not require any discussion. This -special provision of Article 21 clearly reveals the difference between -these facts and those which may be and need to be discussed. Everything -that may be and needs to be discussed must be presented in court in some -way so that the Tribunal has the possibility to intervene here also and -to make explanatory and guiding comments. That is what I have to say as -to the legal aspect of the matter. - -Apart from that, I believe that I understood Mr. Justice Jackson’s -suggestion somewhat differently. First of all, I think Mr. Justice -Jackson’s suggestion has been somewhat enlarged during the debate. I -think his suggestion was that we, as Defense Counsel, should impose -certain restrictions upon ourselves not to present the submitted -documentary material indiscriminately, but to confine ourselves to -choosing those parts which are really worth mentioning and which call -for presentation at the present stage of the Trial. - -To undergo such a restriction is certainly in line with the practical -duty of the Defense Counsel. Nothing is more fatal to the Defense or the -Prosecution than going into detail, that is, elaborating on irrelevant -facts. - -Particularly under firm and strict guidance of the procedure, every -Defense Counsel will soon notice whether he is on the wrong track, -whether he is presenting superfluous material and, by presenting -superfluous material is achieving an effect which he in no case wishes -to obtain. - -I therefore believe that, as my colleague, Dr. Dix, just said, the -self-control of the Defense Counsel and a well-concerned interest in his -case and in his client will automatically impose on him the necessary -limitation in his presentation. - -[_Dr. Seidl approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I said on behalf of the Tribunal that we wished to hear -two counsel. - -DR. SEIDL: I wanted to add only very briefly some remarks to what my two -colleagues have already said—very briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but then it may be possible that every one of the 20 -or more counsel who are present wish to add something. - -DR. SEIDL: I do not know, but I do not think so. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said two counsel, and I meant two counsel. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal would like to know -whether you have anything to add in reply to what has been said. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think nothing. I thought I was saving time. I -begin to doubt it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think the Tribunal would like to -know exactly how far your suggestion went. Were you really making any -further suggestion than this: That the defendants’ counsel should not -think it necessary to read every document in their document book in the -course of the presentation of their defense, or were you intending to -move the Tribunal to order that they should not be allowed to read any -document in their document book at this stage? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought their document book should be directed to -be filed as an exhibit at this stage of the case, without reading. I -would not be particular about it if they have passages they think are of -particular importance which they want to call to your attention, but -this document book consists of speeches made 15 years ago and published -in the press in every complete library in the country, largely, together -with a good deal that has been excluded. It would seem to me that they -should go in, so they are available to them, and that if there are -matters in them which particular countries wish to object to, they might -raise the question by motion to strike or raise it now if they desire. -As far as the United States is concerned, we have no objection to any of -it. I think some of it is highly objectionable on the ground of -relevancy, but it would take longer to argue it and it goes to certain -large questions of reprisals and things of that character that will have -to be settled in larger ways than questions of admission of evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you, on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors, have any -objection or think it inadvisable to adopt the suggestion which Dr. Dix -made that we should see how far the defendants’ counsel were prepared to -limit the amount of the documents which they read at this stage and see -how long it takes and see whether it is necessary to make any further -ruling in order to accelerate the Trial? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am quite willing to experiment, but I do -suggest that we are now handed a document book containing a number of -documents that the Court has passed upon, and, as I recall, Your Honor -called Dr. Stahmer’s attention to this at the opening of his case. I do -not have so much faith, perhaps, as I ought to have. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is very likely that documents have got into -Dr. Stahmer’s book by mistake, owing to the fact that he, being for the -first defendant, there were some difficulties in preparation for -instance, and I have already drawn attention to it. I think there is in -Dr. Stahmer’s book—I am not quite sure—a speech of Mr. Paul Boncour -which has been expressly denied by the Tribunal, and those are the sort -of documents to which you are referring, no doubt. And I had to draw -attention also in the case of one other counsel, I think, or one other -witness to a document being put to him which the Tribunal had expressly -denied. But of course, that is very wrong that any document should be -put into a document book which the Tribunal has expressly denied, but as -I say, I think that is very likely due to some mistake. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am quite ready, and I am sure my colleagues are, -to experiment with this and see how it goes. - -It is—and I think I should say this for all of us—it is a difficult -thing where we come from different systems and do not always understand -what the other man is driving at; it is a difficult thing to reconcile -these different procedures, and I am quite willing to be patient and -forbearing about it and see how it works. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -You must quite understand, Dr. Stahmer, that I am not making any ruling -on behalf of the Tribunal at this moment as to whether or not Dr. Dix’s -suggestion will be adopted, because the Tribunal will proceed now to -consider the matter, and then the ruling will be made. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I make just a personal explanation? The -inclusion in my document book of the documents which had been denied is -due to the following facts: At the request of the Translation Division -the document book had already been handed to that division before the -Tribunal had made its negative decision, and that accounts for the -inclusion. I was put under considerable pressure at the time to hand the -book over so that it might be submitted to the Court in translated form. -That is how it happened. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was probably that, Dr. Stahmer. - -The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2:30. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1430 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: In considering the matters which have been raised this -morning, the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and -at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has decided -that for the present it will proceed under rules heretofore announced; -that is to say: - -First, documents translated into the four languages may be introduced -without being read but in introducing them counsel may summarize them, -or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the Court, and may -read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed -important. - -Second; when a document is offered, the Tribunal will hear any -objections that may be offered to it and in this connection, I would -refer to the rule which the Tribunal made on the 8th of March 1946, -which reads as follows: - - “To avoid unnecessary translations, Defense Counsel shall - indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents - which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have - an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of - disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the - relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide - what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only - the cited passages need to be translated, unless the Prosecution - requires the translation of the entire document.” - -The Tribunal has allowed the Defendant Göring, who has given evidence -first of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible -as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any -interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi -regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany. - -The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the other defendants to go -over the same ground in their evidence except insofar as it is necessary -for their own defense. - -Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard -as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the -opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or -particular events. - -Now, as to tomorrow’s business, the Tribunal will sit in open session -for the purpose of hearing applications for witnesses and documents, -supplementary applications; and after sitting in that open session, the -Tribunal will adjourn into a closed session. - -Now, Dr. Stahmer, are you going to refer us to book Number 1? Which is -your book? Or are you referring us to your trial brief? - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall refer to the trial brief, Page 5. As -far as I am informed, the translations show the same numbers as the -original German text: Page 5, Paragraph II. Since this book is -translated into the three languages, and the document book, I am -informed, is also translated, I can limit myself to referring to them -briefly to present only what I consider essential. - -At the beginning of my presentation from this book I pointed out that -Germany had renounced the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact, and -that this renunciation as such was justified. After this renunciation -had taken place, Germany could proceed to rearm and also to reintroduce -general conscription. - -Moreover, rearmament and the reintroduction of military conscription -were ordered by Hitler only after he had previously and repeatedly -submitted, without success, offers of disarmament to the powers -concerned. Therefore the conclusion cannot be drawn from that fact alone -that at that time the intention existed to prepare or to plan German -wars of aggression. In this connection I draw your attention to the fact -that also in foreign countries rearmament took place to a considerable -degree from 1936 on, and as evidence for this fact I have submitted the -speeches and essays which are contained in Churchill’s book _Step by -Step_. The individual excerpts have been designated by me. I am -referring to the following in particular. On Page 5 of this book it says -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you must offer these things in evidence as a -matter of formality. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, of course. I have the book here with me. I shall -submit it immediately; I also have the individual excerpts here which -are included in the document book. It is Document Book 2, Page 44, the -first excerpt in Volume 2, Page 44. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to number your exhibit in some way? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have numbered it 40 I see, is that right? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. That is the number in this book. I have numbered these -books right through. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but whatever number you propose to use you must say -what the number is when you offer it in evidence, so that it will go -into the transcript. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President. - -The quotation is from Document Book Number 2 and it is Number 40 on Page -9: - - “On 18 June the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was signed, which - released Germany from the Versailles naval restrictions. That - meant in effect condonation of the breach of the military - clauses.” - -On Page 35: - - “The Air Force is in the process of being almost trebled. This - is a colossal expansion which is making the most prodigious - demands on our production potentialities. But quite apart from - these immediate needs, there is the far greater task of so - organizing England’s home industries that they will be ready to - direct the whole of their enormous and elastic capacity into the - channels of war production as soon as a serious necessity for - that should arise.” - -From the article “In the Waters of the Mediterranean” dated 13 November -1936, I quote, on Page 86, where it says literally: - - “But it is no longer thus. England has begun to rearm on a large - scale. Her wealth and her credit, the solidarity of her - organization, her vast resources and connections, all contribute - to this revival. The British fleet is still by far the mightiest - in Europe. Enormous yearly expenditure on it is under - consideration for the future.” - -Furthermore, I wish to produce evidence of the fact that the Defendant -Göring particularly, at various times, beginning after the seizure of -power, consistently emphasized his serious desire to maintain peace and -to avoid a war. He has also repeatedly stated clearly that the measures -taken by Germany were not to serve purposes of aggression. As evidence -of this I refer to several speeches made by the Defendant Göring, and to -begin with I cite a speech of 4 December 1934, which he made at the -Krupp works in Essen, and which is contained in the book _Hermann -Göring’s Speeches and Compositions_, Pages 174 to 176, and is reprinted -in Document Book Number 1, Page 18. - -From this excerpt I wish to quote only the following: - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the shorthand writer has yet heard what -the exhibit number is. - -DR. STAHMER: I beg your pardon. It is Exhibit Number 6. I quote—and it -is the last sentence of the first paragraph: - - “Today we want to secure this peace, and we want the world to - understand this always: That a respected Germany only is a - guarantor of world peace. Only a free German nation will keep - this peace and will know how to preserve this peace. - - “Therefore we demand for ourselves the same rights as others - possess.” - -And on the following page, I quote the last paragraph: - - “We do not want war, but we want our honor. We will not discuss - this honor with anybody in the world; that remains, for it is - the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire nation. Only - he who has a sharp sword at his side is unmolested and has - peace.” - -Sir Nevile Henderson emphasizes Göring’s love of peace in various -passages of his book _Failure of a Mission_. The passages are quoted -again in Document Book Number 1, Page 63, and I offer it as Document -Number 23, Exhibit Number Göring-2. I quote from Page 78 of the book. - - “I”—that is, Henderson—“was inclined to believe in the - sincerity of his”—that is, Göring’s—“personal desire for peace - and good relation with England.” - -On Page 83 of the book, it says: - - “I would like to express here my belief that the Field Marshal, - if it had depended on him, would not have gambled on war, as - Hitler did in 1939. As will be related in due course, he took a - decisive stand for peace in September 1938.” - -On Page 273, which is the next page, there is the following sentence -which I quote: - - “I saw the Polish Ambassador at 2 a.m. on 31 August 1939, gave - him an objective, and studiously moderate account of my - conversation with Ribbentrop, mentioned the cession of Danzig - and the plebiscite in the Corridor as the two main points in the - German proposals, stated that so far as I could gather they were - not on the whole too unreasonable, and suggested to him that we - recommend to his Government that they should propose at once a - meeting between the Field Marshals Smigly-Rydz and Göring.” - -On Page 276 of the book, you will find the following sentences which I -quote from the last paragraph: - - “Nevertheless, the Field Marshal seemed in earnest when after - having been called to the telephone, he returned to tell us that - M. Lipski was on his way to see Ribbentrop. He seemed relieved - and to hope that, provided contact could only be established, - war might, after all, be avoided.” - -In February of 1937, the Defendant Göring, on the occasion of an -international meeting of war veterans in Berlin, made the following -speech, which is contained in the book _Hermann Göring, the Man and His -Work_, on Page 265, and which is contained in Document Book 2, Page 42, -which is Exhibit Number 39, and from which I quote the following -sentences: - - “There are no better defenders of peace than the old war - veterans. I am convinced that they, above all others, have a - right to ask for peace and to shape it. I recognize that those - men who, weapon in hand, went through 4 hard years of the hell - of the World War, have the primary right to shape the life of - the nations, and I know that the war veterans more than anybody - else will take care to preserve the blessings of peace for their - countries.” - -I skip two sentences and then quote further: - - “But we know that it is a terrible thing, this final contest - between nations. It is my fervent and heartfelt wish that this - Congress may contribute towards the basis for a true peace with - honor and equality of rights for all sides. You, my comrades, - will have to pave the way for that.” - -The same desire is evident in the answers given by Lord Halifax to the -questions put him. I now read the following passages from this -interrogatory and I offer the original as Document Number Göring-22. It -is contained in Document Book I, Page 59. - -I think I can omit the first two questions. The third question is: - - “Did Göring say to you during this discussion, ‘Every German - Government would consider the following matters as an integral - part of its policy: (a) The incorporation of Austria and the - Sudetenland into Germany; (b) The return of Danzig to Germany - with a reasonable solution of the Corridor question’? - - “Answer: Yes. - - “Question 4: Did you answer thereupon: ‘But, I hope without - war’? - - “Answer: I said that His Majesty’s Government wanted all - questions affecting Germany and her neighbors settled by - peaceful methods. I did not otherwise discuss those questions. - - “Question 5: Did Göring answer thereupon: - - “‘That depends very much upon England. England would be able to - contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question. - Göring does not want war either for these reasons, but these - questions have to be settled under all circumstances.’ - - “Answer: Yes.” - -The next questions concern the conversation with Dahlerus . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that purport to be a verbatim account of what the -Defendant Göring said? Did he refer to himself in the third person, -“Göring does not want a war,” meaning, “I do not want a war”? - -DR. STAHMER: He did not want a war either. England would be able to -contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question. He does not -want war either for these reasons. He, that is, Göring does not want war -either, but these questions have to be settled under all circumstances. - -This is, of course, indirect speech. In direct speech it would be, “I, -Göring, do not want war, but the questions have to be settled under all -circumstances.” - -The next questions refer to Dahlerus. Question 15, which is the question -put to Halifax, is also of importance in my opinion: - - “Did you have the impression that Göring’s endeavors to avoid - war were sincere?” - -The answer of Halifax is: - - “I have no doubt that Göring would have preferred to enforce the - German demands on Poland without war, if he could have.” - -At the end of June or the beginning of July 1938, the Defendant Göring -made a speech to the Gauleiter at Karinhall which was distinctly a -speech for peace. I am referring to a statement from Dr. Uiberreither of -27 February 1946, the original of which is being presented as Document -Number 38, Exhibit Number Göring-4, and is given in Document Book Number -2 on Page 37. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in these originals, are you? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, indeed. - -In that statement from Dr. Uiberreither, dated 27 February 1946, at Page -38 in Document Book Number 2, Your Honor, it says: - - “On 25 May 1938”—says Dr. Uiberreither—“that is, after the - plebiscite concerning the reunion of Austria with Germany, which - had taken place on 10 April 1938, I was appointed Gauleiter of - Gau Steiermark. - - “A few weeks later—it may have been towards the end of June or - the beginning of July 1938—the former Field Marshal Hermann - Göring summoned all Gauleiter of the German Reich to Karinhall. - - “He there delivered quite a long address to the Gauleiter, - describing the political situation as it was at the time, and - discussing in detail the purpose and significance of the Four - Year Plan. - - “Field Marshal Göring first pointed out that other countries had - little understanding for the political developments in Germany, - and that consequently there existed the danger of Germany’s - being encircled. Directing German foreign policy was therefore a - difficult task. Consequently, we should endeavor to strengthen - Germany from the economic and military point of view, in order - to reduce the danger of Germany being attacked by a foreign - power. At the same time, this would result in Germany once more - exercising an increasingly important influence in European - politics after she had again become strong. - - “After that, Field Marshal Göring discussed the Four Year Plan. - In this connection he remarked: - - “By and large, Germany was cut off from the world’s sources of - raw materials and she therefore had to open up sources in her - own territory by dint of increased efficiency. This would be - done merely in order to make Germany independent of foreign - countries, and was not by any means to serve the purpose of - preparing for an aggressive war. - - “He then stressed, with great emphasis, that Germany’s foreign - policy would have to be conducted in such a way that war should - not ensue under any circumstances. The present generation was - still feeling the effects of a lost World War; the outbreak of - another war would be a shock to the German people. Furthermore, - it was his opinion that a new war might assume great - proportions, and even the outcome of a war against France alone - would be questionable. - - “In conclusion, he summarized his address by saying that we had - to do everything in our power to make the Four Year Plan a - success, and that all hardships caused thereby must be borne by - the people and were justified, because its success might prevent - war. - - “I point out that I remember all the details of this speech so - accurately because this was the first time that I was informed - by a leading personality of these conditions which were so - important for Germany, and because, as a result, until the war - actually started, I did not believe that it would come to a - war.” - -In the solution of the Austrian problem no aggressive action on the part -of Germany is to be seen. It took place in response to the desires of -the majority of the Austrian population for reunion with the Reich. The -defendant’s view of this problem can be seen from the telephone -conversation he had with the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop on 13 March -1938. The record of this conversation has already been produced under -Document Number 2949-PS, Exhibit Number USA-75. I shall quote from this -conversation some passages which have not yet been read. The -conversation is contained in Document Book Number 1, Pages 55-56. I am -going to quote only the following passages: - - “I want to say one thing: If it is said”—this is Göring - talking—“that we have used pressure on the Austrian people and - done outrage to their independence, it can be said that only one - thing was put under pressure, but not by us, and that was the - tiny little government. The Austrian people are free only now. I - would simply suggest to Halifax, or to a few really important - people whom he trusts, that he just send them over here so they - can look at the picture. They should travel through the country, - they can see everything.” - -And a few sentences later: - - “What state in the whole world is being harmed by our union? Are - we taking anything from any state?” - -Then it goes on, I skip two sentences: - - “All the people are German; all the people speak German. Thus - there is not a single other state involved.” - -The Defendant Göring—I am referring to Page 11 of the book next to the -last paragraph—did not only wish to maintain peace abroad; he also -supported the preservation of peace at home. In this respect he declared -in a speech he made on 9 April 1933 at the Berlin Sports Palace—it -appears in the book _Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions_, and is -reproduced in Document Book Number 1, Page 35, and I am offering it as -Document Number 13; I quote the first sentence: - - “Oh the other hand, however, my compatriots, we ought also to be - generous. We do not wish to practice petty revenge. After all, - we are the victors. . . . Therefore, let us be generous, let us - realize that we also thought differently at one time.” - -And then a little further down: - - “. . . the stronger and freer we feel ourselves to be, the more - generously, the more freely are we able to disregard what - happened in the past and to extend our hand with complete - sincerity in reconciliation.” - -I further quote from a speech of the defendant on 26 March 1938, -Document Book Number 1, Page 37, likewise a quotation from _Hermann -Göring’s Speeches and Compositions_, the exhibit number of which is 14. -I quote only one sentence from it: - - “. . . you were great in suffering and enduring; you were great - in standing firm; great in fighting. Now you must show that you - are also great in kindness, and especially so towards the many - who were misled.” - -His attitude towards the Church the defendant has . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can you not give the exhibit number? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, I think it was Number 13. I shall look again. It was -Number 14. - -His attitude towards the Church was expressed by the Defendant Göring in -several speeches. In this respect, on 26 October 1935, he made the -following statement. I am quoting from _Hermann Göring’s Speeches and -Compositions_, Document Book 1, Page 39, Document Number 15, the -following sentences: - - “It rests with the Church alone whether it wishes to have peace. - We, the Movement, and in particular the Government and the - State, have never attacked the Church; we have assured - protection to the Church, and the Church knows that it enjoys - this protection also today to the fullest extent. - - “Therefore, there is nothing to warrant blaming us for anything - in this respect.” - -And from another speech of 26 March 1938, which is also quoted from -_Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions_, Document Book Number 1, -Page 41, Document Number 16, I quote the first and the second sentences: - - “We do not wish to annihilate any Church, nor to destroy any - belief or religion. All we want is to bring about a clear - separation. The Church has its definite, very important and very - necessary tasks, and the State and the Movement have other, just - as important and just as decisive, tasks.” - -I refer further to a document submitted by a clergyman Werner Jentsch, -dated 30 October 1945, addressed to this Tribunal, Document Book Number -1, Pages 44 to 46, Exhibit Number 17. - -I quote only one sentence, Figure 8: - - “Hermann Göring himself, through his chief adjutant, had the - following answer given to a petition for the introduction of a - special chaplain’s office within the headquarters of the Air - Force; that he could not at the moment do anything because Adolf - Hitler had not yet made a final decision concerning the question - of religion. However, he wished full freedom of religion in the - Air Force, including the Christian denominations, and every - member of the Air Force could choose for himself whatever - chaplain or civilian pastor he desired.” - -The affidavit from Gauleiter Dr. Uiberreither, dated 27 February 1946, -deals with the question which I mentioned earlier and which is contained -in Document Book Number 1, Page 31. It, under Figure 2, deals with the -events of the night of 9 to 10 November 1938 and the knowledge thereof, -as follows: - - “A few weeks after the action against the Jews on the night of 9 - to 10 November 1938—towards the end of November or the - beginning of December 1938—Field Marshal Göring again called - all the Gauleiter to Berlin. During this meeting he criticized - the action in harsh words and stated that it had not been in - keeping with the dignity of the nation. Moreover, it had also - seriously lowered our prestige abroad. If the murder of Legation - Counsellor Von Rath was regarded as an attack by Jewry against - the Reich, then the German Reich had other means of countering - such an attack than appealing to the baser instincts. In an - orderly state no irregular mob action ought to take place under - any circumstances.” - -And in the last paragraph, under Number 2, it says: - - “In conclusion, he asked the Gauleiter to use their entire - influence to see to it that such incidents, which were - detrimental to Germany, would not recur in the future.” - -I can skip Page 16, Paragraph 5, as an explanation on that has already -been given. - -That the Defendant Göring took his duty as Supreme Administrator of -Justice very seriously becomes apparent from an affidavit of Judge -Advocate General Dr. Lehmann of 21 February 1946. I shall read from this -affidavit in Document Book Number I, Page 106, Document Number 27, -Exhibit Number Göring-6. I quote from Figure II onwards: - - “II. The opinion I have of him is the following: - - “The Reich Marshal originally took a negative attitude toward - lawyers. He was evidently influenced by the Führer. This - attitude underwent a change to the extent that he occupied - himself with legal matters of the Air Force. At the end of the - war the Reich Marshal was one of the high commanders who liked - to consult lawyers. He took special interest in the legal - department of the Air Force and attached great importance to it. - He assigned to this department difficult cases for investigation - concerning which he was sceptical of the reports of the other - offices.” - -From the following paragraph: - - “The Reich Marshal had himself thoroughly informed concerning - matters which I had to discuss with him. He devoted an unusual - amount of time to these matters. The conferences, even when - there were considerable differences of opinion, took a quiet and - objective course.” - -Then from Paragraph III: - - “III. Concerning the legal department of the Air Force, the - Reich Marshal reserved for himself the confirmation of sentences - in many cases, including all death sentences. - - “In passing judgment on individual cases he was inclined to show - occasional leniency—in spite of the harshness demanded of all - judges by the Führer. In cases of treason, and especially in - moral crimes, he showed merciless severity. I know from the - records that in severe cases of rape he would often reverse a - judgment because he considered the death sentence was necessary. - It did not matter whether the woman involved was from Germany or - from the occupied territories. I believe that I remember at - least one case from the records where he even changed the - regular manner of execution and ordered that the soldier be - hanged in the Russian village in which he had committed the - rape. - - “IV. When presiding at a trial the Reich Marshal was very - forceful but benevolent; also in his recommendations for mercy - to the Führer. - - “V. In his own decisions the Reich Marshal doubtless knowingly - often acted contrary to the ideas and demands of the Führer, - especially in political matters, which he judged much more - mildly, and in cases of excesses against inhabitants of the - occupied countries, which he judged much more harshly than the - Führer. - - “I have often discussed the personality of the Reich Marshal - with his legal adviser, a very experienced, quiet, and - conscientious lawyer, as well as with the Judge Advocate - General, who was distinguished by the same qualities, and was - often with him. We were of one opinion about the Reich Marshal.” - -In the course of this Trial, the Prosecution has repeatedly referred to -the so-called Green File, which was submitted under Document Number -1743-PS. This is not, as the Prosecution maintains, a regulation for the -spoliation and annihilation of the population. Its object was rather the -economic mobilization and the uninterrupted operation of industry, the -procurement and regular utilization of supplies, and of transport -facilities in the territories to be occupied by military operations, -with special consideration of the fact that Russia had no private -enterprise, but only a strict centrally regulated state economy. In -addition to that, vast destruction had to be anticipated in view of the -Russian attitude. Nowhere does it contain an order or directive to -exploit certain groups of the population beyond the necessities caused -by the war. - -From that Green File I have cited a whole series of passages which are -to prove my statements. I cannot refer to them in detail; I should like -to draw your attention only to one very characteristic passage which is -on Page 94 of this Green File, second paragraph: - - “Among the native population, that is, in this case, workmen and - clerical employees, the best possible relationship is to be - established.” - -Somewhat below, on the same page: - - “Endeavors must be made for good relations with the population, - in particular also with the workers in agriculture.” - -I am now coming to the next paragraph: - -The German Armed Forces entered the war fully respecting the -international conventions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is this part? - -DR. STAHMER: Page 23, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which volume? - -DR. STAHMER: In the trial brief. - -THE PRESIDENT: We seem to have only 22 pages in our trial brief. Are -there two volumes? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, I believe it is in the second trial brief. The -division was made to accelerate the translation. May I continue? - -The German Wehrmacht entered the war fully respecting the international -conventions. No large-scale excesses by German soldiers were noted. -Individual offenses were severely punished. However, immediately after -the beginning of hostilities there appeared reports and descriptions of -atrocities committed against German soldiers. These reports were -carefully investigated. The result was recorded by the German Foreign -Office in _White Papers_, which were sent to Geneva. In this way the -_White Book_ came into being which deals with the crimes against the -laws of war and humanity committed by the Russian soldiers. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors, Defense Counsel for Göring, Dr. Stahmer, -intends to submit to the Tribunal and to read into the record excerpts -from the so-called _White Book_ which was published by the Hitler -Government in 1941 in connection with some of the violations which -supposedly took place concerning German prisoners of war. I consider -that these excerpts cannot be submitted and read into the record here -because of the following reasons: - -There can be put in evidence only facts which refer to this case; there -can be submitted to the Tribunal only documents which refer to the -crimes which were perpetrated by the German major war criminals. - -The _White Book_ is a series of documents of invented data regarding -violations which were perpetrated not by the fascist Germans but by -other countries. Therefore the data contained in the _White Book_ cannot -serve as evidence in this case. This conclusion is all the more -justified in that the _White Book_ is a publication which served the -purpose of fascist propaganda, and which tried by inventions and forged -documents to justify or hide crimes which were perpetrated by the -fascists. Therefore I request the Tribunal to refuse the reading into -the record, or submitting to the Tribunal, excerpts from the so-called -_White Book_. - -THE PRESIDENT: On what theory do you justify the presentation of this -evidence, Dr. Stahmer? - -DR. STAHMER: The question whether it is possible and permissible to -refer to these _White Papers_ during this Trial as a means of evidence, -has been discussed repeatedly. In particular it was the subject of -debate when we were concerned with the question of whether I should be -allowed to refer to this _White Book_ as evidence. So far as I know, it -has been admitted as evidence for the time being. It was already pointed -out, during the debate which arose in regard to this subject, that, as -far as evidence is concerned, it is relevant for the evaluation of the -motives. - -At the time I already pointed out that the crimes committed against -German prisoners of war are of importance in order to understand the -measures taken on the part of Germany. One cannot evaluate the -underlying motives of the men who committed these offenses, or gave -orders to commit them, if one fails to consider the background against -which these deeds were enacted, or investigate the motives which caused -them to commit these acts. And because of the importance of the motive, -in order to know about the accusations raised by the Germans, it seems -to me that this reference to this document is absolutely necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are here to try major war criminals; we are not -here to try any of the signatory powers. Therefore you must justify the -introduction of evidence against the signatory powers in some legal way. - -DR. STAHMER: The presentation, if I may repeat, is made for the -following reasons: - -The defendants here are accused that under their leadership crimes and -offenses against members of foreign armed forces were committed which -are not in accordance with the Geneva Convention. On our part we plead -that if harsh treatment and excesses occurred on the German side, they -were caused by the fact that similar violations occurred also on the -other side, and that consequently these offenses must be judged -differently and not be considered as grave as would be the case if the -opposite side had conducted itself correctly. Anyway, these facts are -relevant for the evaluation of the motive. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you attempting to justify the introduction of this -evidence on the ground of reprisals? - -DR. STAHMER: Not only on the ground of reprisals, but from the point of -view of the motive for the deed. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are asking us to admit a document, a German -governmental document. Now, under the Charter we are bound to admit -documents, governmental documents, and reports of the United Nations, -but it is nowhere said that we are bound to admit or are at liberty to -admit documents issued by the German Government. We cannot tell whether -those documents contained facts truly stated or not. - -DR. STAHMER: We have here in the document books, court records of legal -inquiries. These must in my opinion have the same value as evidence as -official documents. They were records of court proceedings which are -quoted in the _White Book_. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like, Your Honors, to point out only one thing -here. Defense Counsel Stahmer tries to submit these documents in order, -as he says, to present his reasons which would explain the crimes of the -Germans. I should like to state here that these documents, which have -already been submitted to the Prosecution, and which were mentioned -yesterday here during the cross-examination of the Defendant Göring, -show quite clearly that the document regarding the crimes was drafted -before the beginning of the war. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what are the dates of these documents that -you are asking us to admit? - -DR. STAHMER: I have the individual ones here. Meanwhile I am having the -records looked for. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I suggest, Your Honor, that I support fully the -objection made by General Rudenko. I had supposed that the one thing -counsel on both sides were agreed upon, when this matter was under -discussion before, was that no reprisals against prisoners of war are -tolerated. Even my learned adversary, Dr. Exner, agreed that that is the -law. - -Secondly, certainly, we must know what crimes it is that are sought to -be excused. Are these the motives for what crimes? Counsel says they are -bare on their motives. Was it their motive in shooting American or -British fliers, that there were some violations on the part of the -Russians as they claim? The only way, it seems to me, that evidence of -this character is admissible would be to bring it under the doctrine of -reprisal very strictly by taking specific offenses and saying: “This -offense we admit, but we committed it in reprisal for certain other -specified offenses.” - -I submit that general allegations of this character and relating to -prisoners of war are admittedly inadmissible and carry us far afield in -the trial of this case. - -DR. STAHMER: May I point out one more fact: For instance, I have here a -telegram sent by the Foreign Office representative with the High Command -of the Army to the Foreign Office, dated 12 August 1941. In other words, -this is an official document, and until now the Prosecution has -submitted official documents in considerable numbers which have been -used as evidence against the defendants. If now an official document is -being produced here to exonerate the defendants, I think that this also -ought to be admitted and to the same extent, provided that this is -legally permissible. The formal side of the matter is that we have here -a telegram, as I said, from a representative of the Foreign Office with -the Army High Command, that is, from an official authority, addressed to -the Foreign Office, dated 12 August 1941. It says here, for instance: -“In the captured operational report Number 11, of the 13th of last -month, 10 o’clock, of the staff of the 26th Division, 1 kilometer west -of Slastjena in the forest north of Opuschka it says: ‘The enemy left -about 400 dead on the battlefield . . .’” - -THE PRESIDENT: You must not read it, as we are discussing its -admissibility. - -DR. STAHMER: I beg your pardon. I misunderstood you, Mr. President, you -asked me what document . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The date of the _White Book_. - -DR. STAHMER: The date of the _White Book_, I see, we misunderstood each -other; it is Berlin, 1941. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not a date, that is a year. - -DR. STAHMER: It says, “Bolshevist Crimes against the Laws of War and -Humanity. Documents compiled by the Foreign Office, First Volume, -Berlin, 1941.” That is the name of the document; the date of its -publication is not apparent from the book itself. The individual -documents and preliminary proceedings are contained in this book, -followed by a number of records which have individual dates. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then there is nothing to show when that document was -communicated, either to the Soviet Government or when it was -communicated—if it was—to Geneva or to the Protecting Power. - -DR. STAHMER: It was forwarded to Geneva. It was duly handed to the Red -Cross in Geneva. - -THE PRESIDENT: When? - -DR. STAHMER: In 1941. I had proposed to obtain these books from Geneva -and to bring in information from the Geneva Red Cross. - -Mr. President, may I once more point out that it is an official document -published by the Foreign Office. It is a series of reports compiled in -an official publication. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not the real point that the Tribunal is -considering. The question is, how can you justify in a trial of the -major war criminals of Germany, evidence against Great Britain, or -against the United States of America or against the U.S.S.R. or against -France? If you are going to try the actions of all those four signatory -powers, apart from other considerations, there would be no end to the -Trial at all, and their conduct has no relevance to the guilt of the -major war criminals of Germany, unless it can be justified by reference -to the doctrine of reprisal, and this cannot be justified in that way. -And therefore the Tribunal considers the document is irrelevant. - -DR. STAHMER: I now turn to the subject of aerial warfare, evidence on -Page 25 of my trial brief. Relevant to the question of guilt is the -question whether the German Air Force started to attack open cities only -after the British Air Force had carried out a great number of raids -against nonmilitary targets. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I object to this evidence. I was not -quite sure whether Dr. Stahmer had passed dealing with this evidence -with regard to the air war, or whether he was illustrating his argument. -I want to make it quite clear that I object to the first part of it as -being too remote, that is, the evidence about the various conferences -which took place with regard to the regulation of aerial warfare. - -With regard to the second part of the evidence, I object to the -documents which purport to show that Great Britain attacked nonmilitary -targets. Where I have been able to check the allegations, I find there -is a complete dispute as to whether the targets were military or -nonmilitary targets, and therefore I cannot accept the German official -reports as being evidence of any purported value on their part, and I -respectfully submit that, unless the Tribunal had authority from the -Charter, it ought to take the same line. - -I make these two additional points to the points raised by my learned -friends, General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, on the general -question. I do not want to take up more time with the argument by -developing that point. I will be pleased to help with any aspect of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me, Dr. Stahmer, that this matter stands upon -exactly the same footing as the matter upon which we have just ruled. - -DR. STAHMER: That is right. I believe that from this book on aerial -warfare one document is of importance in my opinion, which is quoted on -Page 27. It is merely a statement by the French General Armengaud -concerning the fact that the German Air Force operated in Poland in -accordance with the laws of warfare and attacked military targets -exclusively. I believe there will be no objection to reading at least -this quotation. It is Page 27. - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 27 of the trial brief? - -DR. STAHMER: Page 27 of the trial brief. There I give a quotation from -General Armengaud, the French Air Attaché in Warsaw, of 14 September -1939. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: There it says: After the outbreak of war the German Air -Force under its Commander-in-Chief, Göring, did not, by order of Hitler, -attack any open cities in Poland; this was confirmed by Buttler, the -British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 6 September 1939, and by -the French Air Attaché in Warsaw on 14 September 1939 (Documents 41 and -46 of the _White Book_). The latter, General Armengaud, says literally: - - “I must emphasize that the German Air Force acted according to - the laws of war; it attacked military targets only and, if - civilians were often killed or wounded this happened because - they were near the military targets. It is important that this - should be known in France and in England, so that no reprisals - will be taken where there is no cause for reprisals, and so that - total aerial warfare will not be let loose by us.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what is the origin of that? - -DR. STAHMER: May I have a look? It is contained in the document -concerning the bombing war, Number 46, “Report of the French Air Attaché -in Warsaw, General Armengaud.” It is dated 14 September 1939, and then -comes the report from which I have already quoted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: I have submitted it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: And now I proceed to Page 30 of the trial brief. And in -Paragraph 10, I refer to the creation of the Secret State Police by the -Defendant Göring. A passage is quoted there from the book, _Hermann -Göring, the Man and His Work_, Document Book 2, Page 53 and 54. I submit -it as Document Number 44, and I quote from it the following passage: - - “It can be seen from the big Stettin trial and also from others, - that Göring took ruthless measures against men who acted on - their own authority against his instructions. - - “The Prime Minister looked into hundreds of individual cases in - connection with the supervision of political prisoners. He did - not wait until he was asked; the offer was made on his own - initiative. - - “On the occasion of the Christmas amnesty of 1933, he ordered - the release of nearly 5,000 prisoners from the concentration - camps. ‘Even they must be given a chance.’ It would have been - only too understandable if those released had found doors and - gates closed to them whichever way they turned. That, however, - would not be in keeping with the spirit of this act of mercy. - Nobody was to consider himself shut out. Therefore, Göring in a - clearly worded decree ordered that no difficulties were to be - placed in the way of those released, by the authorities or by - the public. If this action were to have any point, every effort - must be made to take back these people, who had sinned against - the state, into the community again as full fellow Germans.” - -And from the last paragraph, I read the second sentence: - - “In September 1934 he ordered the release of an additional 2,000 - prisoners in a second big amnesty.” - -In this connection I beg to offer a telegram which I received a few days -ago, and I request that it be admitted as evidence. It is an unsolicited -telegram originating from a certain Hermann Winter, Berlin W 20, -Eisenach Street, 118. It has been included in the document book which I -submit. I believe it is the last document in my document book. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If we are to examine unsolicited correspondence or -telegrams, if it is to become evidence, I have a washbasket full of it -in my office that, if that kind of material could be used as evidence in -this case without any verification, I could bring here in rebuttal. It -does seem to me that we should know something more about this than that -just a wire has come in from some unknown person who may not even have -been the signer; maybe it is an assumed name. I think we are entitled to -a little better foundation than that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any other basis? - -DR. STAHMER: I have no other basis, and I beg to have your decision -whether this telegram is admissible as evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT; Well, I do not think we could admit it simply as a -telegram which has been received by you from an unknown person. - -DR. STAHMER: I request your decision. Is it being refused? I am coming -to the end, Page 34. - -THE PRESIDENT: Of the trial brief? - -DR. STAHMER: Page 34 of the trial brief, Figure 12. With respect to the -question of whether one could blame the defendants for having had -confidence in Hitler and following him, it is important to know -Churchill’s attitude, expressed in his book _Step by Step_, and I am -quoting two passages, Document Book Number 2, Page 46. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This is in 1937, before the events with which we -have mainly been dealing here. I do not think it is very important. Mr. -Churchill’s speeches are well known, but I do think that we waste time -going into Mr. Churchill’s opinions back in 1937, before the event, when -he is doubtless in the same position as Dahlerus, the witness, with -reference to his knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Inasmuch as we have already received this book and some -passages from it, you may state this. - -DR. STAHMER: I may state it? Thank you. On Page 187, in an article, -“Friendship with Germany,” of 17 September 1937, is written: - - “One can condemn Herr Hitler’s system and still marvel at its - patriotic achievement. Should our country be defeated, I could - only desire that we would find an equally indomitable champion - who would give us our courage again . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: I only said that you could read it because you had read -from this book of Mr. Churchill’s, but at the same time it seems to be -absolutely irrelevant. - -DR. STAHMER: I did not—Oh, I see. May I refer to the quotation on Page -323 which is also a description of Hitler’s personality. I consider it -of importance especially because I attach considerable weight in -particular to Churchill’s judgment. It says: “Our leadership must at -least . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Stahmer, do you not think we have heard -sufficient about Hitler’s personality? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, but not from that source. If the Tribunal . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Presumably the Defendant Göring knows more about Hitler -than Mr. Churchill. - -DR. STAHMER: If the Tribunal does not wish it to be read, then of -course, I will abide by that wish. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is cumulative. - -DR. STAHMER: Well, in that case I have finished. I may still of course -keep in reserve the evidence which I have not been able to submit up to -now, about which I spoke this morning. I said this morning, I had a -certain amount of evidence which I have not been able to submit because -I have not received it yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would this be a convenient time, if Your Honor -please, to make the record concerning the documents which I was to offer -formally for the record? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite follow? What documents are you referring -to? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The ones used in cross-examination . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: . . . which Your Honor spoke to me about. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand they have been handed to the Secretary -and they have been marked. - -The affidavit to Halder is USA-779. It is offered. - -Document Number 3700-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-780; Document Number -3775-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-781; Document Number 3787-PS is -offered as Exhibit USA-782; Document Number 2523-PS is offered as -Exhibit USA-783; Document Number 014-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-784; -Document Number 1193-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-785; Document Number -EC-317 is offered as Exhibit USA-786; Document Number 3786-PS is offered -as Exhibit USA-787; Document Number 638-PS is offered as Exhibit -USA-788; Document Number 1742-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-789. - -M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: Mr. President, Dr. Stahmer in his presentation -did not speak of Document Number Göring-26. It concerns a note from the -German Government to the French Government relating to the treatment of -German prisoners of war in France dated 30 May 1940. The reasons which -made us reject the _White Book_ from the discussion make it necessary to -reject this document too. I gather that Dr. Stahmer realized that and, -therefore, did not speak of it any more, but I would like him to be -assured that this document has been definitely rejected from the -discussion. - -DR. STAHMER: I have not mentioned the document. I withdraw it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I call on Counsel for the Defendant Hess. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Your Honors: Before commencing the -submission of evidence I have to make the following remarks at the -request of the Defendant Hess: - -The Defendant Hess contests the jurisdiction of the Tribunal where other -than war crimes proper are the subject of the Trial. However, he -specifically assumes full responsibility for all laws or decrees which -he has signed. Furthermore, he assumes responsibility for all orders and -directives which he issued in his capacity as Deputy of the Führer and -Minister of the Reich. For these reasons he does not desire to be -defended against any charges which refer to the internal affairs of -Germany as a sovereign state. That applies in particular to the -relations between Church and State, and similar questions. I shall, -therefore, submit evidence only with reference to questions in the -clarification of which other countries can have a justified interest. -This applies, for instance, to the tasks and activities of the foreign -organization of the NSDAP. Beyond that, evidence will be submitted to -the Tribunal only insofar as this is necessary to ascertain the -historical truth. This applies, among other things, to the motives which -caused Rudolf Hess to fly to England and to the purposes for which he -did it. - -The evidence which I have prepared is collected in three document books. -In view of the acceleration of the Trial desired by the Tribunal, I -shall forego quoting any documents whatsoever from the first book and -ask the Tribunal to take cognizance only of those parts of the document -book which have been marked in red. I shall read only the affidavit -which is at the end of the document book, and that is the affidavit of -the former secretary of the Defendant Rudolf Hess, Hildegard Fath, and I -shall read furthermore . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if your are passing from your opening remarks -and going to deal with the documents, I think it is right to point out -to you that there can be no challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court, -here. Article 3 provides that the Tribunal shall not be challenged by -the Prosecution or by the Defendants or their Counsel, and the Tribunal -cannot hear any argument upon that subject. Now you can go on with your -documents. - -DR. SEIDL: There will furthermore be read from the second volume the -record of a conversation between the Defendant Rudolf Hess and Lord -Simon, which took place on 10 June 1941 in England. So as to prevent -interruption in the reading of the documentary evidence, I shall today -read only the affidavit of the witness Hildegard Fath, Page 164 of the -document book. The affidavit reads as follows: - - “Having been advised of the consequences of a false affidavit, I - declare under oath the following, which is to be submitted to - the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg: - -Then come the “Personal Data;” and I am now quoting literally from -Figure 2: - - “I was employed as private secretary of the Führer’s Deputy, - Rudolf Hess, in Munich, from 17 October 1933 until his flight to - England on 10 May 1941. - - “Beginning in the summer of 1940—I cannot remember the exact - time—I had, by order of Hess, to obtain secret weather reports - about weather conditions over the British Isles and the North - Sea, and to forward them to Hess. I received the reports from a - Captain Busch. In part I also received reports from Miss Sperr, - the secretary of Hess with his liaison staff in Berlin. - - “Hess left a letter behind on his departure by air for England, - which was handed to the Führer at a time when Hess had already - landed in England. I read a copy of this letter. The letter - began with words more or less like this: - - “‘My Führer; when you receive this letter, I shall be in - England.’ I do not remember the exact wording of the letter. - Hess occupied himself in the letter mainly with the proposals - which he wanted to submit to England in order to achieve peace. - I can no longer remember the details of the proposed settlement. - I can however state definitely that no word was mentioned about - the Soviet Union or about the idea that a peace treaty should be - concluded with England in order to have the rear free on another - front. If this had been discussed in the letter, it certainly - would have been impressed upon my memory. From the content of - the letter the definite impression was to be gained that Hess - undertook this extraordinary flight in order to prevent further - bloodshed, and in order to create favorable conditions for the - conclusion of a peace. - - “In my capacity as secretary of long standing, I have come to - know Rudolf Hess quite well and his attitude towards certain - questions. If I am told now that, in a letter of the Reich - Minister of Justice to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich - Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, of 17 April 1941, it was mentioned - that the Führer’s Deputy had discussed the introduction of - corporal punishment against Poles in the annexed Polish - territories, I cannot believe that this attitude of the - department headed by Hess was due to any personal decision of - his. Such a proposal would be totally contradictory to the - behavior and attitude which the Führer’s Deputy displayed with - regard to similar questions on other occasions.” - -I shall refrain from reading the affidavit of the witness Ingeborg -Sperr, Page 166 of the document book. - -From the first two volumes of the document book I wish still, as I have -already said, to read only parts from a discussion between Hess and Lord -Simon. However, in order to prevent the report of this discussion from -being interrupted, I ask permission of the Tribunal to read this -document to the Tribunal next Monday? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You mean not to go on any more now? - -DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall stop now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you no other document you wish to produce? - -DR. SEIDL: I beg your pardon? Yes, there are some documents in Volume 3 -of the document book; but, however, I should prefer to submit these -documents coherently to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, if you wish it, we will adjourn -now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTY-NINTH DAY - Saturday, 23 March 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you consulted the Defense Counsel as to the order in -which they wish to take these supplementary applications? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have the order which the Tribunal has, -beginning with Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be the most convenient then. Is -Streicher’s counsel ready? Dr. Marx? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; Dr. Marx is here. - -DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Your Honors, Mr. -President, on behalf of the Defendant Streicher I have applied for the -calling of Fritz Herrwerth as a witness before the Tribunal. This -witness is a man who has been in the immediate vicinity of the Defendant -Streicher for years and who, because of that, is in a position to offer -information on all political events that can in many ways have a bearing -on the decision and judgment in the case of Streicher. In particular, I -have applied for this witness because he was present on that night of 9 -to 10 November when the Defendant Streicher had a conference with the SA -leader Von Obernitz, at which Von Obernitz informed Streicher that he, -Obernitz, had received the order to carry out demonstrations against the -Jewish population during that night. Streicher will establish that he -then told Herr Von Obernitz that he, Streicher, kept himself aloof in -this affair, that he considered these demonstrations a mistake, and -disapproved of them. Obernitz thereupon stated that he had received the -order from Berlin and had to carry it out. It can . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you object to this alteration of our -previous order? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have not seen any change in the -situation as the Tribunal decided it, but we do not want to press -against this witness being called orally, except that we must point out -that there is not any change. All these matters were gone into by the -Tribunal. If the Tribunal feels that it would be better that the witness -should be called orally, then the Prosecution will not take any -objection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have these interrogatories been drawn up? - -DR. MARX: No, they have not yet been completed. I beg your pardon, Mr. -President; is this question put with reference to the witness Herrwerth? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Yes, the questions to the witness have been completed; the -questions which the Defendant wishes . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, we will reconsider that. You have got something -else, haven’t you, Dr. Marx? You want some document; you have got a -document you are asking for, have you not, or don’t you ask for that? - -DR. MARX: May I speak, Mr. President? Actually, I should like to ask -that both the documents referred to be placed at my disposal. That is, -the matter of the suit against Karl Holz in the year 1931, and the files -of the disciplinary proceedings against Julius Streicher, concerning -which I am unfortunately not able to give the year. It might be 1931. - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Marx, did we not, with the agreement of the -Prosecution, strike out a passage from a document which was critical of -the Defendant Streicher? Does that not render this evidence entirely -irrelevant? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was about the witness Lothar Streicher, the -son, about an interview that took place in prison at which there were -certain allegations, and these were struck out by the consent of the -Prosecution. I confess I don’t know whether the disciplinary proceedings -in the matter of Streicher . . . - -DR. MARX: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. May I speak? The matter in -which Lothar Streicher figures is from the Göring report concerning the -visit or the conversation Streicher had with three youthful criminals, -during which Streicher was supposed to have taken an ugly or improper -attitude. Lothar Streicher was named as a witness by me to testify that -at that time no such thing happened. That is in connection with the -report of the Göring commission, whereas the other matter is concerned -with a disciplinary action. This proceeding was completed in 1931 before -the disciplinary court at Munich. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wasn’t it all in connection with the same alleged offense -by Streicher? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have the details now, if I might read -them. I think it makes them clear. The first application in relation to -the proceedings against Karl Holz reads: - - “The documents requested herein will be used to prove the - following facts: - - “During these proceedings Dr. Erich Bischof, an authority on the - _Talmud_, from Leipzig, gave evidence under oath that there was, - in the Jewish religious book _Sohar_ a law allowing ritual - murder.” - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Sir David, there are two different applications, -aren’t there? There is this application with reference to the Jewish -religious book, and then there is the other application with reference -to the trial of Karl Holz. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood it, My Lord, this application is -headed, “Files in the Trial in the Matter of Karl Holz,” and one of the -pieces of evidence in the trial of Karl Holz, according to Dr. Marx’s -application, was the evidence of Dr. Erich Bischof as to the _Talmud_; -and the application goes on to say that “these facts are relevant to my -defense for the following reasons: The accused wishes to prove with -these court records”—that is, the record from the trial of Holz—“that -_Der Stürmer_ did not deal with the question of ritual murder contrary -to his better knowledge.” That is, as I understand it, that _Der -Stürmer_ dealt with ritual murder according to the knowledge of Dr. -Bischof, as expressed at that trial. That, in my respectful submission, -would be quite irrelevant. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this religious book? It was written -in the Middle Ages, wasn’t it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord, and it was produced on 30 -October and 4 November 1931, by Dr. Bischof. - -Then, My Lord, the second one—just to get it clear, so Your Lordship -will have it in mind—it is the files of the disciplinary proceedings in -the matter of Streicher at the disciplinary court at Munich. - - “The documents requested herein will be used to prove the - following facts: - - “The accused wishes to prove, with the production of these - files, that he was not dismissed from his profession because of - indecent assault, but on political grounds, and with the - granting of part of his salary.” - -I myself don’t see the relevance of it, but perhaps Dr. Marx can inform -the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it charged against him in the Indictment? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, there is nothing about his criminal record -other than on anti-Jewish grounds. - -THE PRESIDENT: In that connection the Prosecution agreed to strike out -any reference to that incident, didn’t it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not sure that it is the same incident, but -the Prosecution did agree to strike out the only reference to it that -appeared in the record, to my knowledge—to any reference to a matter of -that kind. That was as to the treatment of certain boys in prison. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, may I, to clarify the matter, make a few -statements now. The defense counsel for the Defendant Streicher applied -to have the file on this disciplinary case produced for the following -reason: - -Streicher was asked by a Russian interrogator whether he had been -dismissed from his office because of moral delinquency and therefore it -is necessary to have the file on this disciplinary case produced. This -file shows that Streicher was not dismissed from his school post because -of indecent conduct, but because of his political attitude. That is one -point. And quite apart from that is the matter in which Lothar Streicher -is supposed to act as a witness. That was the matter mentioned in the -report of the Göring commission concerning the three young delinquents -who were visited by Streicher, and on which occasion he is supposed to -have been guilty of indecent manipulations or gestures. - -I come now to the question of Dr. Bischof, Mr. President. This matter -concerns the following: Streicher is accused, with reference to -quotations from the _Talmud_, or quotations referring to ritual murder, -either of having consulted an incorrect translation, or of not having -ascertained facts sufficiently, in a frivolous and grossly negligent -way. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you say, Dr. Marx, that he is being reproved with -that, there is no such charge in the Indictment. No such charge has been -made in the course of the case of the Prosecution. The charge against -him is that he provoked the German people to excesses against the Jews, -not by misquoting some Jewish book, but by referring to Jewish books of -the Middle Ages. - -DR. MARX: I take the liberty of drawing attention to the fact that, on -the contrary, the Prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, when he -presented the case against Streicher, referred to this point explicitly -and accused Streicher of having here, against better knowledge, quoted -passages from the _Talmud_. And consequently, it is important that this -file against Holz is consulted, because in it is established, by the -witness Dr. Bischof, how the quotations came about. This Dr. Bischof is -a recognized scholar. But, Mr. President, the whole matter could still -be shortened if the Prosecution would state today that this whole matter -regarding the ritual murder is not to be made a subject of the -Indictment. There would then be eliminated from the trial an element -which could only extend it in any case, and which can play no important -part against the defendant anyhow, and has nothing to do with the actual -Indictment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make that position perfectly clear. -The important point in the case for the Prosecution is the use of the -suggestion against the Jews that they committed ritual murder. If -someone takes something out of a book in the Middle Ages and reproduces -it so that it will be understood by the ordinary reader as being a -practice of Jews, or a reason for disliking Jews, then the Prosecution -says that that is an evil method of stirring up hatred against the Jews. -Whether anyone can find in the Jewish book of the Middle Ages some -remark about ritual murders is really immaterial. The gravamen of the -case for the Prosecution is using the ritual murder accusation as a -method for stirring up hatred against the Jews today. That is the case -which the defendant has to meet. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the application. - -DR. MARX: I beg your pardon! I consider it necessary, nevertheless, to -answer at least very briefly the statements of the preceding speaker, -Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. The fact is that the special number of _Der -Stürmer_ under discussion makes reference in particular to a trial which -took place in 1899 at Piseck, in Moravia or Bohemia, and during which -this question also figured. It is thus not true that the Defendant -Streicher had as his basis only medieval superstition, but on the -contrary, that he dealt with material taken from modern legal history, -using material, the genuineness of which I cannot establish, but which I -cannot simply dispose of as incorrect and which the Tribunal also would -probably have to investigate. That is why I said that this entire matter -ought not to be touched at all. For here it is a question merely of -whether Streicher was acting in good faith or not, and if he can say -that trials of that kind have taken place and the judges actually were -not unanimous, then one cannot say in fact that he acted against his -better knowledge. That is what is essential in this matter. Thus, I -personally would prefer to have this matter eliminated, if the -Prosecution would no longer consider this whole subject matter as part -of the Indictment. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the application. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next one on the list that I have, My Lord, -is an application by the Defendant Göring for a Major Buex; spelled -“B-u-e-x.” I asked Dr. Stahmer and he was good enough to tell me that -that was the same gentleman who was asked for as a witness by the -Defendant Jodl, under the spelling of “B-u-e-c-h-s.” I understand the -Tribunal has granted him as a witness to the Defendant Jodl, and Dr. -Stahmer will have the opportunity of asking him the questions then. - -DR. STAHMER: I agree. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next is an application by the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop. He requests Herr Hilger as a witness. The grounds of the -application are that Dr. Horn and the Defendant Ribbentrop found that -the witness Gaus, for whom he had asked, was not able to give as much -assistance as had been expected, and that they desired this witness -Hilger in addition. The view of the Prosecution is that the defendant -should have either Hilger or Gaus as a witness and an interrogatory to -the other one, and we have no objection to the witness Hilger being -brought to Nuremberg for consultation. - -DR. SIEMERS: I am deputizing at the moment for Dr. Horn, defense counsel -for the Defendant Ribbentrop. Actually, I had wanted to ask Sir David to -postpone this matter a little, as I have had Dr. Horn asked to come here -himself. We, the Defense Counsel, were not informed which applications -would be dealt with today. Hence Dr. Horn is not present at the moment. -But I think that, if the Tribunal agree, the matter can perhaps be dealt -with now, as far as I know, but I have to speak with Dr. Horn first, at -any rate. I am speaking without prejudice. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean about not being informed -about these applications. I made the statement yesterday that -supplementary applications for witnesses and documents would be taken -this morning. I do not understand your saying you did not know what -would be done. The Tribunal has no objection to it being taken later -when Dr. Horn is here, if he comes in time. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, and may I suggest that if Dr. Horn does not return in -time, I am ready to settle the matter for him; by then I will be in a -position to do so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. MARX: Pardon, Mr. President; may I make one more very brief -statement? Streicher just informs me that I should state that he will -forego the witness Lothar Streicher. If, therefore, the calling of this -witness was considered, then I state that the Defense will withdraw -application for him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t that been allowed—Lothar Streicher? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was the witness who was not to be allowed on -condition that the Prosecution applied to strike out this passage, and -we agreed to that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next is an application for the Defendant Von -Papen. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Sir David. Has that letter about withdrawing -the statement about the witness Lothar Streicher been read into the -record? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if it has been read into the -record. It has been sent to the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: It had better be put in as a document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. My Lord, the next is -the application for the Defendant Von Papen, who requests that the -witness Josten, who has been approved by the Tribunal as a witness, be -changed to an affidavit, which counsel already has, and Dr. Kubuschok -requests that Kroll be allowed as a witness. My Lord, the position with -regard to Kroll was that the Prosecution submitted that he was not -relevant, but the Tribunal allowed interrogatories for Kroll and, -therefore, the Prosecution accepts the decision of the Tribunal that he -is therefore relevant. On that basis, as Dr. Kubuschok is dropping one -witness, we feel that we cannot object to his being brought as an oral -witness, since the Tribunal has decided that his testimony is relevant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; and as to Josten, has the affidavit been submitted -to you? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, I have just received it with his signature. The -witness Josten has appeared today and has signed the affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: All I am thinking of is that the Prosecution may -hereafter want to have him called for cross-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have not seen the affidavit yet, My Lord; I -am sorry. I will look into that. - -THE PRESIDENT: The result of that would be that both witnesses would -have to be here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I appreciate that, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was taking it that Dr. Kubuschok meant an affidavit and -not an interrogatory. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, a sworn affidavit. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps, My Lord, the Tribunal would postpone a -decision on this point until I have had a chance to consider the -affidavit, and then I will communicate with Dr. Kubuschok and with the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I, Mr. President, mention yet another case. I had -been granted the witness Von Tschirschky, who is at present in England, -for oral interrogation. The witness has written to the Tribunal that it -is difficult for him to be absent from England at the moment, and -requests that his evidence be taken in writing. I am agreeable to this -and have drafted an interrogatory which is now being submitted to the -Tribunal. This, again, would mean another witness gone, Tschirschky, as -well as Josten, so that I request earnestly that the witness Kroll be -granted as an oral witness, since a considerable saving of time has now -been accomplished. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you have no objection to that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I have no objection to that. I may have to -consider certain cross-interrogatories for the witness, but that will -not affect the position of Dr. Tschirschky. - -Next is the application by the Defendant Rosenberg for a -document—Hitler’s letter to Rosenberg dated 1924. This document is in -regard to Rosenberg’s anti-Semitism. As far as I know, the Prosecution -has not any of these documents, but Dr. Thoma can explain what he wants. -I have no objection to having these documents if they can be found. - -DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I first draw your attention to the fact -that my application for a document—Rosenberg’s letter to Hitler, in -which Rosenberg asks not to be a candidate for the Reichstag—has since -been handed to me. This application has thus been settled. Secondly, I -have . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Thoma. You withdraw that application -because you have that letter, do you not? You said, “With that, the -application has been settled.” Do you mean that you withdraw that -application? - -DR. THOMA: No, Mr. President. The Tribunal has already permitted me to -offer this document as soon as it was found. It has since been found. - -Furthermore, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the -document in which Rosenberg writes to Hitler and asks to be relieved -from the position of editor-in-chief of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ has -been allowed me likewise. But I have not yet received it. - -Thirdly, may I ask that two further documents be granted me. Two -documents, which, during interrogation, have already been shown to -Rosenberg by the Prosecution. The first is a decree of Hitler sent to -Rosenberg in June 1943, in which Hitler instructs Rosenberg to limit -himself to the principal matters in Eastern questions . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you are now dealing with applications which -are not in writing; are you not? - -DR. THOMA: Yes, I have already submitted them in writing. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have only two applications here as far as I can see. - -One with reference to Hitler’s letter to Rosenberg dated 1924, and the -other with reference to three books about Jews. These are the only two -applications I have got. - -DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I already made these applications during open -session, and as far as I know, I had submitted them in writing even -before making them in open session. I have in fact received an answer as -regards two documents applied for. But for two applications the reply is -still outstanding. Hence I request the Tribunal’s permission to submit -these two applications in writing again. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will be allowed to if you will make them clear. -You ask for two further documents, and the first one, I understood you -to say, was a decree dated June 1943. Is that right? - -DR. THOMA: That is correct. And the next document is a letter from -Hitler to Rosenberg in which Hitler informs Rosenberg of the reasons for -his not wanting to work in the Reichstag and for not wanting to -participate in the elections. But I do recall that I submitted this -application in writing, and I beg to submit it again now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the application will be considered. Are you -referring to the document of 1924, the letter from Hitler to Rosenberg -dated 1924? - -DR. THOMA: Yes, 1923 or 1924. Then, Gentlemen, I have also this -fundamental application regarding the question of anti-Semitism. I have -asked here to be permitted only a few historic writings, these on the -question as to why the Jewish problem has existed in Germany, I believe -even from the 8th century, and why persecutions of the Jews recur -persistently in Germany. I want thereby to establish that in this -connection we are concerned with some tragic fact which we do not -rationally understand. By producing evidence both from Jewish and from -Christian theological literature, I want to prove that we are not -concerned with the fact that the German people were misled into -exterminating the Jews, and that the influence of the National Socialist -Party was such as to bring the German people to such hate for the Jews, -but that we are rather here facing irrational conditions and that this -is recognized both in Jewish and Christian literature. I wish also to -establish that an intellectual dispute between Jewry and the German race -has existed on a purely intellectual level, and in fact in a purely -intellectual way, because actually Moritz Goldstein said in 1911—I -mention only one example—that the Jews in Germany administer the -intellectual wealth of Germany. Thus here it is a matter of depicting -the problem in Germany, the role of Judaism in the cultural history of -Germany, and why such a drastic contrast between Judaism and the German -race exists here in Germany. I intend to quote only literature in this -connection, but I believe that my statements in the closing speech will -not be sufficiently credible to the Court if I have not also quoted -scientific—recognized scientific—writings. That is all with which I am -concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, your applications will be considered. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next application is on behalf of the -Defendant Speer, who requests a number of documents dealing with the -Central Planning Committee. I have not actually had the opportunity of -checking these with the exhibits, but if, as I believe, they are the -ones which were put by Mr. Justice Jackson to the Defendant Göring in -cross-examination, I think they are all either exhibits or the documents -which the Prosecution have, and they relate to the Defendant Speer. If -he does not have them, then we should do our best to give them copies. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you said they all had been put to the -Defendant Göring in cross-examination and were either exhibits or -documents; but if they have been put to the Defendant Göring, then they -should be exhibits . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Your Honor, they should be exhibits; I have -not had the opportunity of checking them, but if they have been -presented in Court they must be exhibits. - -The next one is an application on behalf of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart -for interrogatories to be submitted to Dr. Uiberreither. The Tribunal -will remember he was Gauleiter of one of the outstanding Austrian Gaue, -and a collaborator in the National Socialist Movement in Austria. I have -no objection to these interrogatories being submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: He gave another affidavit, did he not, a day or two ago? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir. That was for another defendant, -Göring. Dr. Uiberreither obviously has some knowledge of the Austrian -position. The only question is as to the requirements and the special -subject of the interrogatories. I don’t know. I have to reserve my -position as to actual wording of questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you seen the interrogatory? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: They have been deposited before us. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord; I had seen them. It is my -mistake. Dr. Uiberreither right here comes into the picture once or -twice. I had seen this application. And the only objection the -Prosecution felt was to the somewhat leading form of the questions that -were put, and perhaps my friends, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Baldwin, could -have a word on that point with Dr. Kubuschok, or whoever represents -Seyss-Inquart, before they are actually delivered. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next one is an application in regard to the -Defendant Sauckel. Dr. Kubuschok tells me there is another application -on behalf of Seyss-Inquart which was not on the form in front of me. -[_Turning to Dr. Kubuschok._] Perhaps you would develop that? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Defendant Seyss-Inquart is requesting permission for -an interrogatory to the witness Bohle. The examination of this witness -has been refused by the Tribunal on the grounds that it would be -cumulative evidence. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart requests again to have -these matters of evidence clarified, this time only by way of an -interrogatory. The witness is essential, particularly as the subject of -his evidence cannot be established by means of other direct witnesses. -The other witnesses who have been named in this connection can only -state what they have been told by Bohle. Regarding the actual events, -Bohle is the only man who can make statements based on his own -knowledge. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, if other witnesses who have been granted -are going to give what we call hearsay evidence, from what they heard -from Bohle, why wasn’t Bohle asked for instead of one of these other -witnesses? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: I do not know the intention of my colleague who is -defending Seyss-Inquart. All I know is that he has asked supplementarily -for indirect witnesses here, but I am told now that Bohle is considered -as a direct witness, and this because it must be expected that the other -witnesses, for whom this matter is not so important, may not remember -some points. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you want to say anything about it, Sir David? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal will remember that I informed the -Tribunal that all the questions to Bohle were the same as those to the -witness Von der Wense, except two, which I think dealt with the -requisitioning of lorries, and about which there could be little -dispute. It seemed to the Prosecution therefore that here was clear -proof that this witness was entirely cumulative. The interrogation is -the same, word for word, as the interrogation of the witness, Von der -Wense. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: It was certainly not expressed clearly in the original -applications that the other witnesses only know what they have heard -from Bohle. In fact, we are here concerned with evidence on instructions -given by Bohle personally, on which he is of course the best witness. If -necessary we would agree that the subject of that evidence be eliminated -as far as the other witnesses are concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Unless the matter can be agreed upon, the Tribunal can -scarcely decide on it without seeing the interrogatory to Bohle and the -interrogatories to these other witnesses. Would it meet the case if we -were to grant this interrogatory on the condition that, if it appeared -subsequently that other interrogatories when considered with this one -were cumulative, they might be disregarded? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as far as I am concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next is the Defendant Sauckel, and Dr. -Servatius and Mr. Roberts of my staff have been considering this -carefully together. Dr. Servatius is not here. Perhaps Mr. Roberts can -tell the Tribunal how far they got. - -MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius submitted a list of about 90 documents, a -formidable number; but most of them are short extracts from various -decrees and orders relating to the employment of labor, and it is -difficult to find any reason for objecting to them. Dr. Servatius at my -suggestion agreed to take from his list about 10 or 15 as cumulative. -There are about four documents relating to alleged ill-treatment of -workers at the hands of the enemies of Germany, to which I have objected -on the ground that they are not relevant, and as to those documents a -decision of the Tribunal will be necessary as a question of principle. - -My Lord, as Dr. Servatius could not, as I understand, be here today, -perhaps we could discuss the matter with the General Secretary on his -return at the beginning of next week, so that the matter then could be -put in a convenient and more or less agreed on form to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -Then you haven’t been able to come to any agreement about the witnesses, -have you? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I thought the position as to the witnesses was -this: That Sir David some weeks ago discussed it before the Tribunal and -Dr. Servatius discussed it, and Sir David conceded the calling of six -witnesses and affidavits from a number of others. That was considered by -Dr. Servatius, and he submitted his final and much-reduced list of 11 -witnesses, which I handed to an official of the Tribunal, and which I -understood has been before the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you the date there? Is it 4 March 1946? - -MR. ROBERTS: I have a document before me in German . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -MR. ROBERTS: And the Prosecution’s position was fully stated by Sir -David when these matters were being considered before, and it would be -now really for the Tribunal, I think, to decide on those two -contentions—one for 6 witnesses, and one for 11. What their decision -should be . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that takes us to the end of the listed ones. -There were some that were received later. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one from the Defendant Frank who -requests interrogatories to Ambassador Messersmith. That was granted by -the Tribunal, and in an executive session. It was not requested in -Counsels’ consolidated applications, but heard in open court. There is -obviously no objection to that in principle that the Prosecution are -aware of. - -Then the Defendant Von Ribbentrop requests the book, _America in the -Battle of the Continents_, by Sven Hedin . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Other defendants have administered interrogatories to Mr. -Messersmith, have they not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the answers been received yet? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They have not been received, I am told. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long is it since they were sent off? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will find out, My Lord. 21 February. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have seen these interrogatories, the ones now -suggested by the Defendant Frank? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not sure. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are five of them. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The position is that we got them yesterday and -they are still being discussed between my delegation and the American -delegation. They have not actually come to me yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: We had better consider this. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next is an application by the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop, who asks for the book, _America in the Battle of the -Continents_, by Sven Hedin. That must be subject to the general use of -books, and if there are passages that the defendant wants to use, if he -will submit them then we can deal with their relevance when the -individual passage comes up. - -THE PRESIDENT: That also will be considered. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. Then there is an -application on behalf of the Defendant Schacht for the book, _Warnings -and Prophecies_, by the late Lord Rothermere. The same, I submit, should -apply to that. Any passages desired to be used can be extracted and -shown to us, and then their relevance can be considered when use is -attempted to be made of them. Dr. Dix nods agreement to that. - -Now, I understand there is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von -Neurath. I understand that he wishes copies of the interrogations of Dr. -Gaus, who is the gentleman who is mentioned as a witness for the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The general ruling of the Tribunal has been, -as I understand it, that the defendants are only entitled to copies of -interrogations which are going to be used against them, that is, their -own interrogations, and it would be an extension of the rule which might -lead us into general difficulties if this were extended to copies of the -interrogations of other witnesses. Therefore the Prosecution object in -principle to that. - -But as I gather that Dr. Von Lüdinghausen wants it for the purpose of -preparing the case, if he would care to come and see me or my staff, -perhaps it could be conveyed to him; and if he indicates any matters on -which we can help him, we will be very pleased to discuss them with him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is Dr. Gaus? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Nuremberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can’t Dr. Lüdinghausen see him here? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would welcome that. I have not the least -objection to that at all. That will probably ease the situation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Both courses appear appropriate, that Dr. Lüdinghausen -could perhaps see you . . . - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: . . . with reference to interrogatories and see Dr. Gaus -in the prison here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I welcome both of these courses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, that concludes the matters. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As far as Ribbentrop is concerned . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Dr. Horn is not here, perhaps you could -deal with that application with reference to Hilger. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I am prepared to do that, but since I have not talked -to Dr. Horn I must ask that Dr. Horn not be bound by my statements. - -Hilger is a witness of very great importance, since he was an Embassy -Counsellor in Moscow, and that during the period when negotiations for a -pact were conducted between Germany and Russia, until the outbreak of -the war with Russia. He is therefore the person who participated in all -negotiations, is well acquainted with the attitude and the dealings of -Von Ribbentrop, and therefore the best informed and most reliable -witness. Hilger, until now has been in the background as a witness, -since Dr. Horn had asked for the ambassador, Dr. Gaus. But Dr. Horn -withdrew, or has withdrawn, his application for Dr. Gaus, as far as I -know, and wants only, in reference to some lesser points, to have -possibly an affidavit or an interrogatory. I assume that Sir David -agrees to this, if I submit it in that form. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has just very kindly expressed his agreement to -this course. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I agree, My Lord, as I suggested, that if this -witness Hilger is called as an oral witness, an interrogatory be -administered to the witness Gaus. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -That is all, isn’t it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider these matters. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, and Kraków etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in -the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Vol. 9_, by Various.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS--VOL 9 *** - -***** This file should be named 63467-0.txt or 63467-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/3/4/6/63467/ - -Produced by John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net. - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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